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HUDSON et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 96-976. Argued October 8, 1997 Decided December 10, 1997 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scaua, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, X, joined, post, p. 106. Stevens, X, post, p. 106, and Souter, X, post, p. 112, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Breyer, X, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, X, joined, post, p. 115. Bernard J. Rothbaum argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jack L. Neville, Jr., Lawrence S. Robbins, C. Merle Gile, James A. Rolfe, and Lynn Pringle. Deputy Solicitor the United States.- With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Paul R. Q. Wolfson. Briefs of amicus curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Arthur F. Mathews and Lisa Kemler; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Pepeo. A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for 48 States and Territories by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and David M. Gormley, Assistant Attorney General, Jan Graham, Attorney General of Utah, Carol Clawson, Solicitor General, and Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney General, John M. Bailey, Chief States Attorney of Connecticut, Jo Anne Robinson, Interim Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Toetagata A. Mialo of American Samoa, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A Modisett of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Michael G. Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Peter Vemiero of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Robert B. Dunlap II of the Northern Mariana Islands, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Jose Fuentes-Agosiini of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, John Knox Walkup of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Julio A Brady of the Virgin Islands, Richard Cullen of Virginia, Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington, and William U. Hill of Wyoming. CHIEF Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The Government administratively imposed monetary penalties and occupational debarment on petitioners for violation of federal banking statutes, and later criminally indicted them for essentially the same conduct. We hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a bar to the later criminal prosecution because the administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal. Our reasons for so holding in large part disavow the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989), and reaffirm the previously established rule exemplified in United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980). During the early and mid-1980’s, petitioner John Hudson was the chairman and controlling shareholder of the First National Bank of Tipton (Tipton) and the First National Bank of Hammon (Hammon). During the same period, petitioner Jack Rackley was president of Tipton and a member of the board of directors of Hammon, and petitioner Larry Baresel was a member of the board of directors of both Tipton and Hammon. An examination of Tipton and Hammon led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to conclude that petitioners had used their bank positions to arrange a series of loans to third parties in violation of various federal banking statutes and regulations. According to the OCC, those loans, while nominally made to third parties, were in reality made to Hudson in order to enable him to redeem bank stock that he had pledged as collateral on defaulted loans. On February 13,1989, OCC issued a “Notice of Assessment of Civil Money Penalty.” The notice alleged that petitioners had violated 12 U. S. C. §§ 84(a)(1) and 375b (1982 ed.) and 12 CFR §§ 31.2(b) and 215.4(b) (1986) by causing the banks with which they were associated to make loans to nominee borrowers in a maimer that unlawfully allowed Hudson to receive the benefit of the loans. App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a. The notice also alleged that the illegal loans resulted in losses to Tipton and Hammon of almost $900,000 and contributed to the failure of those banks. Id., at 97a. However, the notice contained no allegation of any harm to the Government as a result of petitioners’ conduct. “After taking into account the size of the financial resources and the good faith of [petitioners], the gravity of the violations, the history of previous violations and other matters as justice may require, as required by 12 U. S. C. §§ 93(b)(2) and 504(b),” OCC assessed penalties of $100,000 against Hudson and $50,000 each against Raekley and Baresel. Id., at 89a. On August 31, 1989, OCC also issued a “Notice of Intention to Prohibit Further Participation” against each petitioner. Id., at 99a. These notices, which were premised on the identical allegations that formed the basis for the previous notices, informed petitioners that OCC intended to bar them from further participation in the conduct of “any insured depository institution.” Id., at 100a. In October 1989, petitioners resolved the OCC proceedings against them by each entering into a “Stipulation and Consent Order.” These consent orders provided that Hudson, Baresel, and Raekley would pay assessments of $16,500, $15,000, and $12,500 respectively. Id., at 130a, 140a, 135a. In addition, each petitioner agreed not to “participate in any manner” in the affairs of any banking institution without the written authorization of the OCC and all other relevant regulatory agencies. Id., at 131a, 141a, 136a. In August 1992, petitioners were indicted in the Western District of Oklahoma in a 22-eount indictment on charges of conspiracy, 18 U. S. C. §371, misapplication of bank funds, §§656 and 2, and making false bank entries, §1005. The violations charged in the indictment rested on the same lending transactions that formed the basis for the prior administrative actions brought by OCC. Petitioners moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but the District Court denied the motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding on the nonparticipation sanction issue, but vacated and remanded to the District Court on the money sanction issue. 14 F. 3d 536 (CA10 1994). The District Court on remand granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss the indictments. This time the Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 92 F. 3d 1026 (1996). That court held, following HaVper, that the actual fines imposed by the Government were not so grossly disproportional to the proved damages to the Government as to render the sanctions “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes. We granted certiorari, 520 U. S. 1165 (1997), because of concerns about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper. We now affirm, but for different reasons. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” We have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, “‘in common parlance,’” be described as punishment. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 549 (1943) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852)). The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938); see also Hess, supra, at 548-549 (“Only” “criminal punishment” “subjeet[s] the defendant to ‘jeopardy within the constitutional meaning”); Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519, 528 (1975) (“In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution”), and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 Ú. S. 359, 366 (1983). Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. Helvering, supra, at 399. A court must first ask whether the legislature, “in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” Ward, 448 U. S., at 248. Even in those eases where the legislature “has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,” id., at 248-249, as to “transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 154 (1956). In making this latter determination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” It is important to note, however, that “these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face,” id., at 169, and “only the clearest proof” will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, Ward, supra, at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our opinion in United States v. Halper marked the first time we applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to a sanction without first determining that it was criminal in nature. In that case, Irwin Halper was convicted of, inter alia, violating the criminal false claims statute, 18 U. S. C. § 287, based on his submission of 65 inflated Medicare claims each of which overcharged the Government by $9. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and fined $5,000. The Government then brought an action against Halper under the civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982 ed., Supp. II). The remedial provisions of the False Claims Act provided that a violation of the Act rendered one “liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action.” Id., § 3729. Given Halper’s 65 separate violations of the Act, he appeared to be liable for a penalty of $130,000, despite the fact he actually defrauded the Government of less than $600. However, the District Court, concluded that a penalty of this magnitude would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause in light of Halper’s previous criminal conviction. While explicitly recognizing that the statutory damages provision of the Act “was not itself a criminal punishment,” the District Court nonetheless concluded that application of the full penalty to Halper would constitute a second “punishment” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 490 U. S., at 438-439. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. As the Halper Court saw it, the imposition of “punishment” of any kind was subject to double jeopardy constraints, and whether a sanction constituted “punishment” depended primarily on whether it served the traditional “goals of punishment,” namely, “retribution and deterrence.” Id., at 448. Any sanction that was so “overwhelmingly disproportionate” to the injury caused that it could not “fairly be said solely to serve [the] remedial purpose” of compensating the Government for its loss, was thought to be explainable only as “serving either retributive or deterrent purposes.” See id., at 448-449 (emphasis added). The analysis applied by the Halper Court deviated from our traditional double jeopardy doctrine in two key respects. First, the Halper Court bypassed the threshold question: whether the successive punishment at issue is a “criminal” punishment. Instead, it focused on whether the sanction, regardless of whether it was civil or criminal, was so grossly disproportionate to the harm caused as to constitute “punishment.” In so doing, the Court elevated a single Kennedy factor — whether the sanction appeared excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purposes — to dispositive status. But as we emphasized in Kennedy itself, no one factor should be considered controlling as they “may often point in differing directions.” 372 U. S., at 169. The second significant departure in Halper. was the Court’s decision to “asses[s] the character of the actual sanctions imposed,” 490 U. S., at 447, rather than, as Kennedy demanded, evaluating the “statute on its face” to determine whether it provided for what amounted to a criminal sanction, 372 U. S., at 169. We believe that Halper’s deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill considered. AlS subsequent eases have demonstrated, Hamper’s test for determining whether a particular sanction is “punitive,” and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable. We have since recognized that all civil penalties have some deterrent effect. See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 777, n. 14 (1994); United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267, 284-285, n. 2 (1996). If a sanction must be “solely” remedial (i. e., entirely nonde-terrent) to avoid implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, then no civil penalties are beyond the scope of the Clause. Under Halper’s method of analysis, a court must also look at the “sanction actually imposed” to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated. Thus, it will not be possible to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated until a defendant has proceeded through a trial to judgment. But in those eases where the civil proceeding follows the criminal proceeding, this approach flies in the face of the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the government from even “attempting a second time to punish criminally.” Helvering, 303 U. S., at 399 (emphasis added). Finally, it should be noted that some of the ills at which Halper was directed are addressed by other constitutional provisions. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses already protect individuals from sanctions which are downright irrational. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive civil fines, including forfeitures. Alexander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544 (1993); Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993). The additional protection afforded by extending double jeopardy protections to proceedings heretofore thought to be civil is more than offset by the confusion created by attempting to distinguish between “punitive” and “nonpunitive” penalties. Applying traditional double jeopardy principles to the facts of this ease, it is clear that the criminal prosecution of these petitioners would not. violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is evident that Congress intended the OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed for violations of 12 U. S. C. §§ 84 and 375b to be civil in nature. As for the money penalties, both §§ 93(b)(1) and 504(a), which authorize the imposition of monetary penalties for violations of §§ 84 and 375b respectively, expressly provide that such penalties are “civil.” While the provision authorizing debarment contains no language explicitly denominating the sanction as civil, we think it significant that the authority to issue debarment orders is conferred upon the “appropriate Federal banking agencies].” §§ 1818(e)(1)-(3). That such authority was conferred upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that Congress intended to provide for a civil sanction. See Helvering, supra, at 402; United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Administrative determinations of liability to deportation have been sustained as constitutional only by considering them to be-exclusively civil in nature, with no criminal consequences or connotations”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 235 (1896) (holding that quintessential criminal punishments may be imposed only “by a judicial trial”). Turning to the second stage of the Ward test, we find-that there is little evidence, much less the clearest proof that we require, suggesting that either OCC money penalties or debarment sanctions are “so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress’ intent to the contrary.” Ursery, supra, at 290. First, neither money penalties nor debarment has historically been viewed as punishment. We have long recognized that “revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted,” such as a debarment, “is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.” Helvering, 303 U. S., at 399, and n. 2. Similarly, “the payment of fixed or variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized as enforeible by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789.” Id., at 400. Second, the sanctions imposed not an tive disability or restraint,” as that term is normally understood. While petitioners have been prohibited from further participating in the banking industry, this is “certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 617 (1960). Third, neither sanction comes into play “only” on a finding of scienter. The provisions under which the money penalties were imposed, 12 U. S. C. §§ 93(b) and 504, allow for the assessment of a penalty against any person “who violates” any of the underlying banking statutes, without regard to the violator’s state of mind. “Good faith” is considered by OCC in determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed, § 93(b)(2), but a penalty ean be imposed even in the absence of bad faith. The fact that petitioners’ “good faith” was considered in determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed in this case is irrelevant, as we look only'to “the statute on its face” to determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature. Kennedy, 372 U. S., at 169. Similarly, while debarment may be imposed for a “willful” disregard “for the safety or soundness of [an] insured depository institution,” willfulness is not a prerequisite to debarment; it is sufficient that the disregard for the safety and soundness of the institution was “continuing." § 1818(e)(1)(C)(ii). Fourth, the conduct for which OCC sanctions are imposed may also be criminal (and in this ease formed the basis for petitioners’ indictments). This fact is insufficient to render the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally punitive, Ursery, 518 U. S., at 292, particularly in the double jeopardy context, see United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 704 (1993) (rejecting “same-conduct” test for double jeopardy purposes). Finally, we recognize that the imposition of both money penalties and debarment sanctions will deter others from emulating petitioners’ conduct, a traditional goal of criminal punishment. But the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence “may serve civil as well as criminal goals.” Ursery, supra, at 292; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 452 (1996) (“[Forfeiture . . . serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose”). For example, the sanctions at issue here, while intended to deter future wrongdoing, also serve to promote the stability of the banking industry. To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions “criminal” for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation of institutions sueh as banks. In sum, there simply is very little showing, to say nothing of the “clearest proof ” required by Ward, that OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions are criminal.. The Double Jeopardy Clause is therefore no obstacle to their trial on the pending indictments, and it may proceed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is accordingly Affirmed. Tipton and Hammon are two very small towns in western Oklahoma. The consent orders also contained language providing that they did not constitute "a waiver of any right, power, or authority of any other representatives of the United States, or agencies thereof, to bring other actions deemed appropriate.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 133a, 143a, 138a. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that this provision was not a waiver of petitioners’ double jeopardy claim. 14 F. 3d 536, 539 (CA10 1994). Only petitioner Raekley was indicted for making false bank entries in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1005. E. g., Zukas v. Hinson, 1997 WL 623648 (CA11, Oet. 21, 1997) (challenge to FAA revocation of a commercial pilot’s license as violative of double jeopardy); E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F. 3d 1077 (CA3 1997) (challenge to “Megan’s Law” as violative of double jeopardy); Jones v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 115 F. 3d 1173 (CA4 1997) (challenge to SEC debarment proceeding as violative of double jeopardy); United States v. Rice, 109 F. 3d 151 (CA3 1997) (challenge to criminal drug prosecution following general military discharge for same conduct as violative of double jeopardy); United States v. Hatfield, 108 F. 3d 67 (CA4 1997) (challenge to criminal fraud prosecution as foreclosed by previous debarment from Government contracting); Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F. 3d 1334 (CA3 1996) (challenge to eviction from federally subsidized housing based on guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia as violative of double jeopardy); United States v. Galan, 82 F. 3d 639 (CA5) (challenge to prosecution for prison escape following prison disciplinary proceeding as violative of double jeopardy), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 867 (1996). In his concurrence, Justice Stevens criticizes us for reexamining our Halper opinion rather than deciding the case on what he believes is the narrower Blockburger grounds. But the question upon which we granted certiorari in this ease is “whether imposition upon petitioners of monetary-fines as in personam civil penalties by the Department of the Treasury, together with other sanctions, is ‘punishment’ for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Pet. for Cert. i. It is this question, and not the Blockburger issue, upon which there is a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case did not even pass upon the Bloekbwrger question, finding it unnecessary to do so. 92 F. 3d, at 1028, n. 3. In Kurth Ranch, we held that the presence a purpose effect is not dispositive of the double jeopardy question. 511 U. S., at 781. Rather, we applied a Kennedy-like test, see 511 U. S., at 780-783, before concluding that Montana’s dangerous drug tax was “the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution,” id., at 784. Similarly, in Ursery, we rejected the notion that civil in rem forfeitures violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 518 U. S., at 270-271. We upheld such forfeitures, relying on the historical support for the notion that such forfeitures are civil and thus do not implicate double jeopardy. Id., at 292. “We... hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448-449 (1989).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

H. K. PORTER CO., INC., DISSTON DIVISION-DANVILLE WORKS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 230. Argued January 15, 1970 Decided March 2, 1970 Donald C. Winson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Paul R. Obert, Thomas P. Luscher, and William Alvah Stewart. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Joseph J. Connolly, Arnold Ordman, and Dominick L. Manoli. George H. Cohen argued the cause for respondent United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. With him on the brief were Elliot Bredhoff, Michael H. Gottesman, and Bernard Kleiman. Lawrence M. Cohen argued the cause for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the briefs was Milton A. Smith. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. After an election respondent United Steelworkers Union was, on October 5, 1961, certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining agent for certain employees at the Danville, Virginia, plant of the petitioner, H. K. Porter Co. Thereafter negotiations commenced for a collective-bargaining agreement. Since that time the controversy has seesawed between the Board, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and this Court. This delay of over eight years is not because the case is exceedingly complex, but appears to have occurred chiefly because of the skill of the company’s negotiators in taking advantage of every opportunity for delay in an act more noticeable for its generality than fqy its precise prescriptions. The entire lengthy dispute mainly revolves around the union’s desire to have the company agree to “check off” the dues owed to the union by its members, that is, to deduct those dues periodically from the company’s wage payments to the employees. The record shows, as the Board found, that the company’s objection to a checkoff was not due to any general principle or policy against making deductions from employees’ wages. The company does deduct charges for things like insurance, taxes, and contributions to charities, and at some other plants it has a checkoff arrangement for union dues. The evidence shows, and the court below found, that the company’s objection was not because of inconvenience, but solely on the ground that the company was “not going to aid and comfort the union.” Efforts by the union to obtain some kind of compromise on the checkoff request were all met with the same staccato response to the effect that the collection of union dues was the “union’s business” and the company was not going to provide any assistance. Based on this and other evidence the Board found, and the Court of Appeals approved the finding, that the refusal of the company to bargain about the checkoff was not made in good faith, but was done solely to frustrate the making of any collective-bargaining agreement. In May 1966, the Court of Appeals upheld the Board’s order requiring the company to cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith and directing it to engage in further collective bargaining, if requested by the union to do so, over the checkoff. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 124 U. S. App. D. C. 143, 363 F. 2d 272, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 851. In the course of that opinion, the Court of Appeals intimated that the Board conceivably might have required petitioner to agree to a checkoff provision as a remedy for the prior bad-faith bargaining, although the order enforced at that time did not contain any such provision. 124 U. S. App. D. C., at 146-147, and n. 16, 363 F. 2d, at 275-276, and n. 16. In the ensuing negotiations the company offered to discuss alternative arrangements for collecting the union’s dues, but the union insisted that the company was required to agree to the checkoff proposal without modification. Because of this disagreement over the proper interpretation of the court’s opinion, the union, in February 1967, filed a motion for clarification of the 1966 opinion. The motion was denied by the court on March 22, 1967, in an order suggesting that contempt proceedings by the Board would be the proper avenue for testing the employer’s compliance with the original order. A request for the institution of such proceedings was made by the union, and, in June 1967, the Regional Director of the Board declined to prosecute a contempt charge, finding that the employer had “satisfactorily complied with the affirmative requirements of the Order.” App. 111. The union then filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the earlier motion to clarify the 1966 opinion. The court granted that motion and issued a new opinion in which it held that in certain circumstances a “checkoff may be imposed as a remedy for bad faith bargaining.” United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 344, 347, 389 F. 2d 295, 298 (1967). The case was then remanded to the Board and on July 3, 1968, the Board issued a supplemental order requiring the petitioner to “[g]rant to the Union a contract clause providing for the checkoff of union dues.” 172 N. L. R. B. No. 72, 68 L. R. R. M. 1337. The Court of Appeals affirmed this order, H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 134 U. S. App. D. C. 227, 414 F. 2d 1123 (1969). We granted certiorari to consider whether the Board in these circumstances has the power to remedy the unfair labor practice by requiring the company to agree to check off the dues of the workers. 396 U. S. 817. For reasons to be stated we hold that while the Board does have power under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is without power to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. Since 1935 the story of labor relations in this country has largely been a history of governmental regulation of the process of collective bargaining. In that year Congress decided that disturbances in the area of labor relations led to undesirable burdens on and obstructions of interstate commerce, and passed the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449. That Act, building on the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), provided that employees had a federally protected right to join labor organizations and bargain collectively through their chosen representatives on issues affecting their employment. Congress also created the National Labor Relations Board to supervise the collective-bargaining process. The Board was empowered to investigate disputes as to which union, if any, represented the employees, and to certify the appropriate representative as the designated collective-bargaining agent. The employer was then required to bargain together with this representative and the Board was authorized to make sure that such bargaining did in fact occur. Without spelling out the details, the Act provided that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain. Thus a general process was established that would ensure that employees as a group could express their opinions and exert their combined influence over the terms and conditions of their employment. The Board would act to see that the process worked. The object of this Act was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their employees could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement. But it was recognized from the beginning that agreement might in some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that the Government would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement. This fundamental limitation was made abundantly clear in the legislative reports accompanying the 1935 Act. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor stated: “The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory." The discussions on the floor of Congress consistently reflected this same understanding. The Act was passed at a time in our Nation’s history when there was considerable legal debate over the constitutionality of any law that required employers to conform their business behavior to any governmentally imposed standards. It was seriously contended that Congress could not constitutionally compel an employer to recognize a union and allow his employees to participate in setting the terms and conditions of employment. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937), this Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that Congress was within the limits of its constitutional powers in passing the Act. In the course of that decision the Court said: “The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. . . . The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.” Id., at 45. In 1947 Congress reviewed the experience under the Act and concluded that certain amendments were in order. In the House committee report accompanying what eventually became the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, the committee referred to the above-quoted language in Jones & Laughlin and said: “Notwithstanding this language of the Court, the present Board has gone very far, in the guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not make. . . . “[Ujnless Congress writes into the law guides for the Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still further and seek to control more and more the terms of collective-bargaining agreements.” Accordingly Congress amended the provisions defining unfair labor practices and said in § 8 (d) that: “For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” In discussing the effect of that amendment, this Court said it is “clear that the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.” NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395, 404 (1952). Later this Court affirmed that view stating that “it remains clear that § 8 (d) was an attempt by Congress to prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of collective bargaining agreements.” NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 487 (1960). The parties to the instant case are agreed that this is the first time in the 35-year history of the Act that the Board has ordered either an employer or a union to agree to a substantive term of a collective-bargaining agreement. Recognizing the fundamental principle “that the National Labor Relations Act is grounded on the premise of freedom of contract,” 128 U. S. App. D. C., at 349, 389 F. 2d, at 300, the Court of Appeals in this case concluded that nevertheless in the circumstances presented here the Board could properly compel the employer to agree to a proposed checkoff clause. The Board had found that the refusal was based on a desire to frustrate agreement and not on any legitimate business reason. On the basis of that finding the Court of Appeals approved the further finding that the employer had not bargained in good faith, and the validity of that finding is not now before us. Where the record thus revealed repeated refusals by the employer to bargain in good faith on this issue, the Court of Appeals concluded that ordering agreement to the checkoff clause “may be the only means of assuring the Board, and the court, that [the employer] no longer harbors an illegal intent.” 128 U. S. App. D. C., at 348, 389 F. 2d, at 299. In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals held that § 8 (d) did not forbid the Board from compelling agreement. That court felt that “[s]eetion 8 (d) defines collective bargaining and relates to a determination of whether a . . . violation has occurred and not to the scope of the remedy which may be necessary to cure violations which have already occurred.” 128 U. S. App. D. C., at 348, 389 F. 2d, at 299. We may agree with the Court of Appeals that as a matter of strict, literal interpretation that section refers only to deciding when a violation has occurred, but we do not agree that that observation justifies the conclusion that the remedial powers of the Board are not also limited by the same considerations that led Congress to enact § 8 (d). It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that the Board acts to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of the parties. It would be anomalous indeed to hold that while § 8 (d) prohibits the Board from relying on a refusal to agree as the sole evidence of bad-faith bargaining, the Act permits the Board to compel agreement in that same dispute. The Board’s remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract. While the parties’ freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based — private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract. In reaching its decision the Court of Appeals relied extensively on the equally important policy of the Act that workers’ rights to collective bargaining are to be secured. In this case the court apparently felt that the employer was trying effectively to destroy the union by refusing to agree to what the union may have considered its most important demand. Perhaps the court, fearing that the parties might resort to economic combat, was also trying to maintain the industrial peace that the Act is designed to further. But the Act as presently drawn does not contemplate that unions will always be secure and able to achieve agreement even when their economic position is weak, or that strikes and lockouts will never result from a bargaining impasse. It cannot be said that the Act forbids an employer or a union to rely ultimately on its economic strength to try to secure what it cannot obtain through bargaining. It may well be true, as the Court of Appeals felt, that the present remedial powers of the Board are insufficiently broad to cope with important labor problems. But it is the job of Congress, not the Board or the courts, to decide when and if it is necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective-bargaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side’s demands. The present Act does not envision such a process. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further action consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1935). “Let me say that the bill requires no employer to sign any contract, to make any agreement, to reach any understanding with any employee or group of employees. . . . “Nothing in this bill allows the Federal Government or any agency to fix wages, to regulate rates of pay, to limit hours of work, or to effect or govern any working condition in any establishment or place of employment. “A crude illustration is this: The bill indicates the method and manner in which employees may organize, the method and manner of selecting their representatives or spokesmen, and leads them to the office door of their employer with the legal authority to negotiate for their fellow employees. The bill does not go beyond the office door. It leaves the discussion between the employer and the employee, and the agreements which they may or may not make, voluntary and with that sacredness and solemnity to a voluntary agreement with which both parties to an agreement should be enshrouded.” Remarks of Senator Walsh, 79 Cong. Rec. 7659; see also 79 Cong. Rec. 9682, 9711. H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1947). 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d) (emphasis added). “If . . . the Board shall be of the opinion that any person . . . has engaged in or is engaging in any . . . unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an. order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of [the Act].” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c). For example, the employer is not free to choose any employee representative he wants, and the representative designated by the majority of the employees represents the minority as well. The Act itself prohibits certain contractual terms relating to refusals to deal in the goods of others, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (e). Various practices in enforcing the Act may to some extent limit freedom to contract as the parties desire. See generally Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 467 (1964).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GILBERTVILLE TRUCKING CO., INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 40. Argued October 15, 1962. — Decided December 3, 1962. Loyd, M. Starrett, by special leave of Court, pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Henry E. Foley. Lionel Kestenbaum argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loevinger, Robert W. Ginnane and James Y. Piper. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns disapproval by the Interstate Commerce Commission of a proposed merger on the ground that “control and management in a common interest” over the two applicant-carriers had been unlawfully effectuated prior to the merger application in violation of § 5 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 54 Stat. 907, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (4). The applicant-carriers are L. Nelson & Sons Transportation Co. and Gilbertville Trucking Co., both of whom are certificated by the Commission as common carrier motor carriers. The principal stockholders of Nelson Co. are two half brothers, Charles Chilberg and Clifford Nelson; Gilbertville Co. is wholly owned by a third brother, Kenneth Nelson. The merger application was filed October 6,1955, by the two carriers and their stockholders pursuant to § 5 (2) of the. Act. Two and a half months later the Commission initiated an investigation into the possibility of a § 5 (4) violation pursuant to authority granted by § 5 (7) of the Act. The two proceedings were consolidated for hearing. The trial examiner determined that § 5 (4) was being violated, but recommended that the merger be approved on the ground that the violation was neither intentional nor flagrant. Division 4 affirmed the finding of a violation, but disapproved the merger, and ordered the violation terminated. 75 M. C. C. 45. On reconsideration, the full Commission affirmed the Division, but further ordered that Kenneth Nelson divest himself of Gilbertville Co. 80 M. C. C. 257. A suit before a three-judge United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to enjoin and set aside the Commission’s orders was dismissed on the ground that the orders were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. 196 F. Supp. 351. An appeal was taken to this Court contesting (1) the finding of a § 5 (4) violation, (2) the denial of the merger, and (3) the order of divestiture. We noted probable jurisdiction. 368 U. S. 983. The factual issue in this case turns upon the development of family, management, and operational relationships between Nelson, Gilbertville, and a third carrier, R. A. Byrnes, Inc., which is owned by the principal stockholders of Nelson. The Nelson transportation business was first organized in 1930 as'a partnership. In 1947 it was incorporated as L. Nelson & Sons Transportation Co. and stock issued to Mrs.. Nelson (formerly Mrs. Chilberg) and four of her seven children (including Kenneth Nelson, Clifford Nelson, and Charles Chilberg). Upon Mrs. Nelson’s death in 1950, equal numbers of shares of her stock in Nelson Co. were devised to her seven children. In 1951, Kenneth Nelson sold his original shares received in 1947 to Charles Chilberg and Clifford Nelson, and agreed to sell to them the remainder to which he was entitled on distribution of the estate. The distribution and transfer were made on January 23, 1953. Since that date, Charles and Clifford have been the principal stockholders in Nelson Co. Charles is now president and treasurer; Clifford is secretary and assistant treasurer. Upon the sale of his stock in 1951, Kenneth Nelson resigned as an officer and director of Nelson Co. However, he kept his office at Nelson Co. headquarters in Ellington, Connecticut, and was retained by the company as a “free-lance tariff consultant.” In such capacity he was paid approximately $15,000 in 1952 and $13,000 in 1953. While he claims to have been an independent contractor, his only client was Nelson Co. In the third week of January 1953, Kenneth Nelson wrote to Nelson Co.Js accountant, Mr. Sanol Solomon, requesting advice on thé acquisition of Gilbertville Trucking Co. Soon thereafter Kenneth began negotiations with Gilbertville’s owner, and on March 3, 1953, took over control. Since July 1953, all the stock in Gilbertville has been controlled by Kenneth. In April of 1954 Charles Chilberg and Clifford Nelson obtained temporary authority from the Commission to take over the operations of R. A. Byrnes, Inc.; their acquisition of Byrnes stock was approved in August 1956. The routes of these three carriers form a cohesive network along the eastern seaboard from Massachusetts to the District of Columbia. Gilbertville is presently certificated by the Commission as a common carrier for general commodities over regular and irregular routes between points in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York City. Byrnes is certificated as a common carrier for general commodities over irregular routes between New York City, Philadelphia, the District of Columbia, and points adjacent to these cities. It is also certificated as a contract carrier of canned goods in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Nelson is certificated as a common carrier for textile commodities over irregular routes between points in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and areas adjacent to New York and Philadelphia. It is also certificated for general commodities in intrastate traffic in Connecticut and Massachusetts. Thus, the Gilbertville and Byrnes general-commodity routes complement each other perfectly and overlap to a considerable degree the textile routes of Nelson. Soon after his acquisition of Gilbertville, Kenneth Nelson instituted a number of permanent changes in the carrier’s operations tending to integrate the terminal facilities of Nelson and Gilbertville; he received where necessary the cooperation of Nelson Co. Kenneth obtained permission from the Commission to move the business records and head offices of the acquired company from Gilbertville, Massachusetts, the place of incorporation, to Ellington, Connecticut, and took over the second floor of the Nelson Co. office 'building. Where possible Gilbert-ville used the Nelson terminals, subletting from Nelson in Ellington, Connecticut; New York City; Newton, Massachusetts ; and Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Its only other terminal was at Gilbertville, Massachusetts. In seven cities, Gilbertville and Nelson were listed under the same telephone number, and they shared interterminal telephone lines. Almost identical changes took place in 1954 upon Commission approval of Charles Chilberg and Clifford Nelson’s acquisition of Byrnes. Byrnes’ offices were moved from Mullica Hill, New Jersey, to the Nelson Co. headquarters in Ellington, Connecticut; Byrnes shared the Nelson terminal in New York; it listed under the Nelson telephone number; it shared interterminal telephone lines. Since the Byrnes changes were the direct result of control and management in a common interest of Byrnes and Nelson in the hands of Charles and Clifford, it might be inferred that the Gilbertville changes were similarly indicative of control and management in a common interest of Nelson and Gilbertville. Further substantiation of this terminal integration is provided by a fourth corporation, Bergson Company, a real estate corporation formed to receive the residual properties of Mrs. Linnea Nelson’s estate. Bergson owns the terminals leased to Nelson Co. at Philadelphia, Ellington, Woonsocket, and Newton, three of which are sublet to Gilbertville. Since Bergson is owned in equal shares by all seven children, all of whom are directors, it provides a direct corporate tie-in between Kenneth Nelson and his brothers. While it is not unusual for independent carriers to share terminal facilities, as indeed Gilbertville and Nelson do with unrelated carriers in New York and Woonsocket, the repetition of such practices throughout their respective systems makes their alleged independence suspect. When these practices are then supplemented by further day-today practices integrating business, equipment, and managerial policies, the Commission is justified in concluding the carriers are in fact being managed and controlled in a common interest. Such additional practices are readily found in the record of this case. Most significant is the equipment interdependence between Nelson and Gilbertville. When acquired for $35,000 in 1953, Gilbertville had a deficit about equal to the purchase price, assets of only $69,000, and a 1953 operating revenue of only $75,000. By 1956 Kenneth Nelson had increased the operating revenue to a seven-month figure of $444,777. This impressive growth was made in the face of a continuaLshort-term credit squeeze and lack of working capital and equipment. Nelson Co., however, was operating in a declining textile market in the Northeast with highly periodic demands for carriage. As a result, Nelson had a fluctuating overcapacity in equipment which was leased only to Gilbertville and occasionally Byrnes. Kenneth Nelson estimated that Gilbertville had from one to six tractor-trailer units on trip-lease from Nelson Co. every day and up to five other pieces of equipment on permanent lease, an amount equal at times to over one-half of Gilbertville’s own carriage capacity. Added to this equipment interdependence between Nelson and Gilbertville were certain interlining practices. Gilbertville interlined between 25% and 30% of its business. Over one-third of this interline business was with Nelson Co. and Byrnes, the majority being in truckload quantities. Owing to its equipment shortage, Gilbertville interlined with Nelson pursuant to a practice whereby a trip-lease was made out at the start of a run to take effect at the point of transfer to Gilbert-ville routes so that the Nelson tractor-trailer operated throughout the trip; moreover, the same driver might stay with the unit, changing employers at the point of transfer. Finally, the record includes evidence that on four occasions Commission employees discovered on highway spot checks that one of the carriers carried small shipments belonging to the other; that Nelson did about one-quarter of the Gilbertville repairs; and that Charles Chilberg and Kenneth Nelson each exercised managerial control over employees of both Nelson and Gilbertville This evidence is sufficient to show that Nelson and Gilbertville were in fact being controlled and managed in a common interest to a considerable degree. If § 5 (4) was intended by Congress to reach such de facto relationships, the Commission was warranted in concluding the section was being violated. I. Section 5 (4) is part of a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to place ownership, management, and operational control over common carriers within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Simply, § 5. (2) (a) gives the Commission power to authorize and approve the joint operation of properties belonging to two or more common carriers or the merger of such carriers; § 5 (4) then declares, “It shall be unlawful for any person, except as provided in paragraph (2), to enter into any transaction within the scope of subparagraph (a) thereof, or to accomplish or effectuate, or to participate in accomplishing or effectuating, the control or management in a common interest of any two or more carriers, however such result is attained, whether directly or indirectly, by use of common directors, officers, or stockholders, a holding or investment company or companies, a voting trust or trusts, or in any other manner whatsoever. ... As used in this paragraph . . . the words 'control or management’ shall be construed to include the power to exercise control or management.” The complementary character of these two sections was discussed at some length in United States v. Marshall Transport Co., 322 U. S. 31. As originally enacted in the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 217, § 5 (4) was applicable only to railroads; it was extended to cover motor carriers in the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 905, 907-908. As the appellants correctly state, Congress, in passing § 5 (4) and the supplementary § 5 (5) and (6), was primarily concerned with reaching the elaborate corporate devices used to centralize control over the railroads “without commission supervision and in defiance of the will of Congress.” Although Congress had intended the Transportation Act of 1920 to provide complete supervision, the Act proved inadequate to reach the holding company system. On the basis of this history, the appellants argue that § 5 (4) is limited to proscription of corporate devices and will not reach the informal relationships shown on this record. Such a narrow interpretation of the statute, however, confuses the particular manifestation of the problem with which Congress was faced in 1933 with the ultimate congressional intention of effectuating the Commission’s jurisdiction under § 5 (2). On its face, § 5 (4) proscribes not just corporate and legal devices, but control effectuated “in any other manner whatsoever.” Any doubt as to the scope of this phrase was removed when Congress added the definition of “control” to § 1 (3) (b) of the Act in the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899-900. This section states that for purposes of § 5 and other sections, “control” “shall be construed to include actual as well as legal control, whether maintained or exercised through or by reason of the method of or circumstances surrounding organization or operation . . . .” We have construed this language to encompass every type of control in fact and have left to the agency charged with enforcement the determination from the facts whether “control” exists, subject to normal standards of review. Marshall Transport Co., supra, p. 38; Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U. S. 151, 163-165; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145-146. In this manner, the Commission may adapt § 5 (4) to the actualities and current practices of the industry involved and apply it to the extent it feels necessary to protect its jurisdiction under § 5 (2) without having to return to Congress for additional authority every time industry practices change. A cursory glance at Commission experience shows the type of informal practices in the motor carrier industry which the Commission has decided are covered by § 5 (4) and must first be approved under § 5 (2). Typical of these practices have been attempts by active carriers to effectively lease the routes of a dormant carrier by interlining and trip-leasing their equipment continuously over the dormant carrier’s routes, e. g., Nigro Freight Lines, Inc.- — Purchase—Coady Trucking Co., 90 M. C. C. 113; attempts by carriers to acquire other carriers by supplying funds to allegedly independent third-party purchasers, e. g., Black — Investigation oj Control — Colony Motor Transportation, 75 M. C. C. 275; Coldway Food Express, Inc. — Control and Merger — Foodway Express, Inc., 87 M. C. C. 123; attempts by inactive owners to allow an employee of another carrier to manage and merge operations of the two carriers, e. g., Gate City Transport Co.— Control — Square Deal Cartage Co., 87 M. C. C. 591. In the present case, the trial examiner held that the facts in this record “require a finding” of control and management in a common interest in violation of § 5 (4). Division 4, after a similar review of the facts, concurred. On reconsideration, the full Commission affirmed the finding and conclusion of the examiner and Division 4. Judicial review of this conclusion is limited to consideration of whether it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, Inc., 327 U. S. 515; Mississippi Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282, 286-287. After our review of the facts and statutory sections involved, we detect no reason to disturb this finding. II. However, even admitting a § 5 (4) violation, the appellants protest as arbitrary the denial of their application for approval of the proposed merger of Nelson and Gilbertville. Section 5 (2) provides that a transaction within its scope is to be approved if found to be “consistent with the public interest.” The statute entrusts the Commission with the duty to decide what considerations other than those specifically mentioned in § 5 (2) (c) shall be given weight. Cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 6-7, 86-88; Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182, 193. As in the case of an original application for a certificate, the Commission has chosen to give weight to an applicant’s fitness. E. g., Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. — Control and Merger — The Cumberland Motor Express Corp., 75 M. C. C. 423, 428; cf. Interstate Commerce Act, § 207, 49 Stat. 551, 49 U. S. C. § 307. Integral to a determination of fitness is the applicant’s willingness and ability to fulfill its obligations to the Commission, considerations which may be demonstrated in part by past or continuing violations of Commission regulations. E. g., Powell — Purchase—Rampy, 57 M. C. C. 597. This has not been contested by the appellants, and its relevance to a finding of consistency with the public interest is self-evident. Nor do they dispute the principle recently stated by the Commission in Central of Georgia R. Co. Control, 307 I. C. C. 39, 43, that a § 5 (4) violation may alone bar approval of a merger unless, “upon consideration of all the facts, it clearly appears that the public interest will be served best by such approval.” Rather, they contend that in this case the Commission refused to consider all the facts presented and, in effect, made a § 5 (4) violation an automatic bar to approval of a subsequent merger. To support this allegation, the appellants point to the undisputed findings of the trial examiner that the violation in this case was neither willful, flagrant, nor the result of persistent disregard for regulation. They compare these findings with past Commission holdings that violations will be overlooked in the absence of willfulness, e. g., Gate City Transport Co. — Control—Square Deal Cartage Co., supra, and conclude that the rule applied in the present case must have been automatic. However, even an automatic rule is not necessarily arbitrary. As already noted, § 5 (4) is integral to the success of the regulatory scheme. To approve a merger in the face of a § 5 (4) violation may encourage others whose merger may or may not be consistent with the public interest to either present the Commission with a fait accompli or avoid its jurisdiction altogether. As the Commission pointed out in Central of Georgia, if such practices were encouraged, “our administration of the statute in the public interest would be seriously hindered, if not defeated.” 307 I. C. C., at 44. This additional interest in the proper administration of the statute places upon the applicant a heavier burden than may be the case for other regulatory violations, and mere lack of willfulness or alleged innocence need not suffice. In fact, the Commission’s rule is not automatic and will give way to a clear showing of public interest in approval. However, the appellants cannot attack the Commission’s order under even this less stringent rule since they made no clear showing of a public interest in approval such as a public need for’ the merged service or for larger consolidated carriers. The order denying the merger is therefore affirmed. III. The Commission’s final order requires Kenneth Nelson to divest himself of his stock in Gilbertville Co. in order to terminate the § 5 (4) violation. No other reference to divestiture can be found. In view of his recommendation that the merger be approved, the trial examiner made no findings or recommendations on a remedy for the violation. Division 4, upon denial of the merger, simply ordered that each of the applicants is hereby “required to terminate the violation.” On reconsideration, the full Commission reinstated Division 4’s order, but added, without explanation in its report, the order to divest. The District Court attempted to provide the rationale by suggesting that divestiture was so perfectly suited to the nature of the violation, an unlawful acquisition, that no explanation was necessary. There is little question that divestiture is within the scope of -the Commission’s power since, with respect to a § 5 (4) violation, it may order any party to “take such action as may be necessary, in the opinion of the Commission, to prevent continuance of such violation.” § 5 (7). Where the unlawful control is the result of an acquisition, divestiture may be the only effective remedy. However, as § 5 (7) itself implies, the Commission’s power is corrective, not punitive. The justification for the remedy is the removal of the violation. The use of equitable powers to expunge a statutory violation has been fully developed in the context of the antitrust laws and is, in many respects, applicable to § 5 (7). The “most drastic, but most effective” of these remedies is divestiture. And “[i]f the Court concludes that other measures will not be effective to redress a violation, and that complete divestiture is a necessary element of effective relief, the Government cannot be denied the latter remedy because economic hardship, however severe, may result.” United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U. S. 316, 326-327. Our duty is to give “complete and efficacious effect to the prohibitions of the statute” with as little injury as possible to the interests of private parties or the general public. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 185. As these cases indicate, the choice of remedy is as important a decision as the initial construction of the statute and finding of a violation. The court or agency charged with this choice has a heavy responsibility to tailor the remedy to the particular facts of each case so as to best effectuate the remedial objectives just described. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-331. As § 5 (7) expressly states, the Commission is charged with choosing the proper remedy in this case. Judicial review is accordingly limited. “It extends no further than to ascertain whether the Commission made an allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy.” Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 327 U. S. 608, 612. But prerequisite to such review is evidence that a judgment was in fact made, that the parties were heard on the issue, that the proper standards were applied. We find no such evidence in this record. Rather we are faced with evidence that the statutory violation occurred not just from Kenneth Nelson’s act of acquiring Gilbertville, but from the acquisition plus subsequent practices integrating the management and operations of Nelson and Gilbertville, practices that could conceivably be discontinued without divestiture. In addition the trial examiner found that the violation was not willful and that the parties’ experience in this proceeding would make them more responsive to regulation in the future. By referring to these mitigating considerations, we have no intention of prejudging the Commission or implying that divestiture would be unwarranted after proper treatment of the issue. These considerations merely indicate that a doubt can be raised and that a remand to the Commission is not purely academic for the sake of procedural regularity. When the Commission has exercised its judgment and issued its considered opinion, the propriety of the remedy chosen will be ripe for review. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, supra; Administrative Procedure Act, § 8 (b), 60 Stat. 242, 5 U. S. C. § 1007 (b). The judgment of the District Court is reversed in part and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., is hereinafter referred to as “the Act” or by the section number alone. “Interlining” is the practice whereby a carrier, whose certificated routes do not reach the shipment destination, transfers the shipment to another carrier for delivery. “Interchanging” is a form of interlining whereby the two interlining carriers switch trailers at the point of transfer. An interchange is most common where the shipment involves a truckload quantity, and the exchange of trailers obviates the necessity of unloading the shipment from the trailer of the transferor and loading it on the trailer of the transferee. The trailer taken in exchange for the shipment-trailer may be either empty or loaded with an interline shipment in the other direction. A further form of interlining involves the use of a trip-lease for the transferee’s leg of the journey. There the shipment-trailer is taken by the transferee, but no trailer is given in exchange; instead the transferor will lease the shipment-trailer to the transferee for the completion of the trip. Commission employee Edward D. Shea testified that Gilbert-ville’s terminal manager, John Kashady, had informed him that both these practices were regularly employed. Gilbertville records also indicate that Gilbertville lists the names of all Nelson drivers and keeps their doctor’s certificates on file. Other records indicate that Nelson drivers are often hired by Gilbertville during the same week and sometimes on the same day. The trip-lease arrangement is also supported by the fact that the majority of Nelson-Gilbertville interlining is at Monson, Connecticut, where Gilbertville Co. keeps only an open lot and, when possible, an empty, unguarded trailer for the receipt of less-than-truekload shipments. Kenneth Nelson’s testimony on these practices is ambiguous but, if anything, supports their occurrence. Edward D. Shea testified that he observed Charles Chilberg hire and dispatch a Gilbertville driver at Newton. He also testified that he observed Kenneth Nelson receive a teletype message in the Nelson Co. offices in Ellington, Connecticut, and direct Nelson Co. employees. The incident is disputed on the ground that Shea did not hear all the remarks made. On the other hand, it is to be noted that Kenneth Nelson refused to turn over upon request the teletype message he received on that occasion, an action in violation of Commission regulations. Section 5(4) is supplemented by §5(5) and (6) to cover specific instances where control over another carrier is accomplished with the aid of an intermediary. Section 5 (5) provides in part that control or management in a common interest is conclusively presumed whenever a person “affiliated” with a carrier joins with that carrier to acquire, or on his own acquires, control over another carrier. Section 5 (6) then provides that: “For the purposes of this section a person shall be held to be affiliated with a carrier if, by reason of the relationship of such person to such carrier ... , it is reasonable to believe that the affairs of any carrier of which control may be acquired by such person will be managed in the interest of such other carrier.” Parenthetically, § 5 (6) states that the relationship may be shown “by reason of the method of, or circumstances surrounding organization or operation . . . .” The Committee reports on these sections prior to their passage in the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933 stated their purpose as follows: “These paragraphs have been planned in the light of what has already been done through myriad devices without commission supervision and in defiance of the will of Congress. . . . The provisions of paragraph [(4)] ... would be of little effect unless the language contained therein were construed to include control or management effectuated or exercised indirectly through the use of legal devices such as holding companies, voting trusts, and combinations of affiliated interests. It is therefore intended by the provisions of paragraphs [(5)], [(6)] ... to make sure that paragraph [(4)] ... covers such types of control and management.” S. Rep. No. 87, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 9-10; H. R. Rep. No. 193, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 16-17. The House manager of the bill similarly observed, 77 Cong. Rec. 4857: “The important point is that unifications and groupings of railroads have been accomplished entirely without supervision by the Commission and without any opportunity to consider the question of public interest. ... It is to correct this .condition, and to prevent through the use of holding companies and other devices the defeat of the congressional will, that this bill has been drawn.” Concrete examples of the devices Congress intended to reach are found in the testimony of Committee counsel Mr. Walter Splawn and Interstate Commerce Commissioner Joseph Eastman during the Hearings on H. R. 9059 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-25, 34, 48-50, 61, 69-74 (1932). Hearings, op. cit., supra, note 6, pp. 16-19, 24 — 26; H. R. Rep. No. 650, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 63-64 (1920). In Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, supra, pp. 145-146, this Court gave the following test for reviewing a similar finding of “control” by the Federal Communications Commission as that word is used in the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 152 (b): “This is an issue of fact to be determined by the special circumstances of each case. So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body it must stand.” In view of the direct finding of a § 5 (4) violation by the Commission and our determination that such a finding was warranted by the statute and evidence, we find it unnecessary to consider the Commission’s alternative holding that Kenneth Nelson was “affiliated” with Nelson within the meaning of § 5 (6) and is therefore presumed to have effectuated control or management in a common interest pursuant to § 5 (5) when he acquired Gilbertville. The appellants attack the opinion of the District Court on the ground that there are variations between its statement of facts and the findings of the Commission. Such variations are insignificant in light of the fact that the court then quotes the findings of the Commission giving record citations for each statement. The appellants also contend that when the District Court found certain of the Commission’s findings to be “trivial” and “irrelevant,” it should have remanded for further findings. However, as the court itself pointed out, its disagreements with the Commission were minor and did not affect the substance of the Commission’s ultimate finding of a violation. Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 67.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION et al. v. DAYTON CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, INC., et al. No. 85-488. Argued March 26, 1986 Decided June 27, 1986 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 629. Kathleen McManus argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, and Helen M. Ninos, Assistant Attorney General. William Bentley Ball argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Philip J. Murren, Sandra E. Wise, and Bruce E. Pence Joan E. Bertin, George Kannar, Charles S. Sims, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, and Burt Neubome filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Committee et al. by Kimberlee Wood Colby, Samuel E. Ericsson, Michael J. Woodruff, Samuel Rabinove, and Richard T. Foltin; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Lee Boothby and Robert A. Yingst; for the Associated Christian Conciliation Services by John D. Robb; for the Catholic Conference of Ohio by David J. Young; for Concerned Women of America by Diane E. White, Joy R. Powell, and Jordan W. Lorence; for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Boothby and Rolland Truman; for the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Walter E. Carson and Warren L. Johns; for the Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation by Jerald L. Hill and Mark J. Bredemeier; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (“COLPA”) by Daniel D. Chazin, Nathan Lewin, and Dennis Rapps; for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, Guy 0. Farley, Jr., John W. Whitehead, D. Kevin Ikenberry, Thomas 0. Kotouc, Alfred Lindh, William B. Hollberg, and Wendell R. Bird; and for the United States Catholic Conference by Wilfred R. Caron and Mark E. Chopko. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stem and Ronald A. Krauss; and for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights et al. by Steven Frederick McDowell. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton), and various individuals brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin a pending state administrative proceeding brought against Dayton by appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission (Commission). Dayton asserted that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibited the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over it or from punishing it for engaging in employment discrimination. The District Court refused to issue the injunction on grounds that any conflict between the First Amendment and the administrative proceedings was not yet ripe, and that in any case the proposed action of the Commission violated neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the exercise of jurisdiction and the enforcement of the statute would impermissibly burden appellees’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause and would result in excessive entanglement under the Establishment Clause. We postponed the question of jurisdiction pending consideration of the merits. 474 U. S. 978 (1985). We now conclude that we have jurisdiction, and we reverse, holding that the District Court should have abstained under our cases beginning with Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). Dayton is a private nonprofit corporation that provides education at both the elementary and secondary school levels. It was formed by two local churches, the Patterson Park Brethren Church and the Christian Tabernacle, and it is regarded as a “nondenominational” extension of the Christian education ministries of these two churches. Dayton’s corporate charter establishes a board of directors (board) to lead the corporation in both spiritual and temporal matters. App. 11. The charter also includes a section entitled “Statement of Faith,” which serves to restrict membership on the board and the educational staff to persons who subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs. The Statement of Faith requires each board or staff member to be a born-again Christian and to reaffirm his or her belief annually in the Bible, the Trinity, the nature and mission of Jesus Christ, the doctrine of original sin, the role of the Holy Ghost, the resurrection and judgment of the dead, the need for Christian unity, and the divine creation of human beings. Id., at 5-6. The board has elaborated these requirements to include a belief in the internal resolution of disputes through the “Biblical chain of command.” The core of this doctrine, rooted in passages from the New Testament, is that one Christian should not take another Christian into courts of the State. Teachers are expected to present any grievance they may have to their immediate supervisor, and to acquiesce in the final authority of the board, rather than to pursue a remedy in civil court. The board has sought to ensure compliance with this internal dispute resolution doctrine by making it a contractual condition of employment. Linda Hoskinson was employed as a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She subscribed to the Statement of Faith and expressly agreed to resolve disputes internally through the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, she informed her principal, James Rakestraw, that she was pregnant. After consulting with his superiors, Rakestraw informed Hoskinson that her employment contract would not be renewed at the end of the school year because of Dayton’s religious doctrine that mothers should stay home with their preschool age children. Instead of appealing this decision internally, Hoskinson contacted an attorney who sent a letter to Dayton’s superintendent, Claude Schindler, threatening litigation based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if Dayton did not agree to rehire Hoskinson for the coming school year. Upon receipt of this letter, Schindler informed Hoskinson that she was suspended immediately for challenging the nonrenewal decision in a manner inconsistent with the internal dispute resolution doctrine. The board reviewed this decision and decided to terminate Hoskinson. It stated that the sole reason for her termination was her violation of the internal dispute resolution doctrine, and it rescinded the earlier nonrenewal decision because it said that she had not received adequate prior notice of the doctrine concerning a mother’s duty to stay home with her young children. Hoskinson filed a complaint with appellant Ohio Civil Rights Commission (Commission), alleging that Dayton’s nonrenewal decision constituted sex discrimination, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(A) (Supp. 1985), and that its termination decision penalized her for asserting her rights, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4112.02(1) (Supp. 1985). The Commission notified Dayton that it was conducting a preliminary investigation into the matter, and repeatedly urged Dayton to consider private settlement, warning that failure to do so could result in a formal adjudication of the matter. The Commission eventually determined that there was probable cause to believe that Dayton had discriminated against Hoskinson based on her sex and had retaliated against her for attempting to assert her rights in violation of §§ 4112(A) and (I). Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.05(B) (Supp. 1985), it sent Dayton a proposed Conciliation Agreement and Consent Order that would have required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay, and would have prohibited Dayton from taking retaliatory action against any employee for participating in the preliminary investigation. The Commission warned Dayton that failure to accede to this proposal or an acceptable counteroffer would result in formal administrative proceedings being initiated against it. When Dayton failed to respond, the Commission initiated administrative proceedings against it by filing a complaint. Dayton answered the complaint by asserting that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from exercising jurisdiction over it since its actions had been taken pursuant to sincerely held religious beliefs. App. 103. While these administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton filed this action against the Commission in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, seeking a permanent injunction against the state proceedings on the ground that any investigation of Dayton’s hiring process or any imposition of sanctions for Dayton’s nonrenewal or termination decisions would violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. App. 118— 120. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court should refrain from enjoining the administrative proceedings based on federal abstention doctrines. Record, Doc. No. 9, pp. 7-8. It also filed various documents defending its action on the merits. Without addressing the abstention argument, the District Court refused to issue the injunction. 578 F. Supp. 1004 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, as previously noted, holding that the exercise of such jurisdiction would violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 766 F. 2d 932 (1985). We hold that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. That statute authorizes an appeal to this Court “by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution.” This authority embraces cases holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 76, n. 6 (1970). Here there is no doubt that the decision by the Court of Appeals satisfies this test. The court expressly held that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4112.02 et seq. (Supp. 1985) is repugnant to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as applied to authorize the administrative body to investigate the charges against Dayton and to decide whether to impose sanctions. See 766 F. 2d, at 935, n. 5, 944, 955, 961. Having taken jurisdiction over the decision below, we now turn to whether the District Court should have exercised jurisdiction over the case itself. We conclude that the District Court should have abstained from adjudicating this case under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and later cases. The Commission urged such abstention in the District Court, and on oral argument here. Tr. of Oral Axg. 7-8. Dayton has filed a postargument brief urging that the Commission has waived any claim to abstention because it had stipulated in the District Court that that court had jurisdiction of the action. We think, however, that this argument misconceives the nature of Younger abstention. It does not arise from lack of jurisdiction in the District Court, but from strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction where particular kinds of state proceedings have already been commenced. A State may of course voluntarily submit to federal jurisdiction even though it might have had a tenable claim for abstention. See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 500, n. 9 (1984); Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471, 479-480 (1977); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396-397, n. 3 (1975). But in each of these cases the State expressly urged this Court or the District Court to proceed to an adjudication of the constitutional merits. We think there was no similar consent or waiver here, and we therefore address the issue of whether the District Court should have abstained from deciding the case. In Younger v. Harris, supra, we held that a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding except in the very unusual situation that an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury. We justified our decision both on equitable principles, id., at 43, and on the “more vital consideration” of the proper respect for the fundamental role of States in our federal system. Id., at 44. Because of our concerns for comity and federalism, we thought that it was “perfectly natural for our cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions.” Id., at 45 (emphasis added). We have since recognized that our concern for comity and federalism is equally applicable to certain other pending state proceedings. We have applied the Younger principle to civil proceedings in which important state interests are involved. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U. S. 415, 423 (1979). We have also applied it to state administrative proceedings in which important state interests are vindicated, so long as in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim. We stated in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 576-577 (1973), that “administrative proceedings looking toward the revocation of a license to practice medicine may in proper circumstances command the respect due court proceedings.” Similarly, we have held that federal courts should refrain from enjoining lawyer disciplinary proceedings initiated by state ethics committees if the proceedings are within the appellate jurisdiction of the appropriate State Supreme Court. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423 (1982). Because we found that the administrative proceedings in Middlesex were “judicial in nature” from the outset, id., at 432-434, it was not essential to the decision that they had progressed to state-court review by the time we heard the federal injunction case. We think the principles enunciated in these cases govern the present one. We have no doubt that the elimination of prohibited sex discrimination is a sufficiently important state interest to bring the present case within the ambit of the cited authorities. We also have no reason to doubt that Dayton will receive an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims. Dayton contends that the mere exercise of jurisdiction over it by the state administrative body violates its First Amendment rights. But we have repeatedly rejected the argument that a constitutional attack on state procedures themselves “automatically vitiates the adequacy of those procedures for purposes of the Younger-Huffman line of cases.” Moore, supra, at 427, n. 10. Even religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from some state regulation. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (1972). We therefore think that however Dayton’s constitutional claim should be decided on the merits, the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson’s discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge. Dayton also contends that the administrative proceedings do not afford the opportunity to level constitutional challenges against the potential sanctions for the alleged sex discrimination. In its reply brief in this Court, the Commission cites several rulings to demonstrate that religious justifications for otherwise illegal conduct are considered by it. See, e. g., In re St. Mary of the Falls, No. 948 (1975). Dayton in turn relies on a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 26, 309 N. E. 2d 900, 902 (1974), in which that court held that a local zoning commission could not consider constitutional claims. But even if Ohio law is such that the Commission may not consider the constitutionality of the statute under which it operates, it would seem an unusual doctrine, and one not supported by the cited case, to say that the Commission could not construe its own statutory mandate in the light of federal constitutional principles. Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979). In any event, it is sufficient under Middlesex, supra, at 436, that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding. Section 4112.06 of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (1980). provides that any “respondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission . . . may obtain judicial review thereof.” Dayton cites us to no Ohio authority indicating that this provision does not authorize judicial review of claims that agency action violates the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. We think that any ripeness challenge to appellees’ complaint is foreclosed by Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975). Steffel held that a reasonable threat of prosecution for conduct allegedly protected by the Constitution gives rise to a sufficiently ripe controversy. 415 U. S., at 458-460. If a reasonable threat of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in this case does not. It is true that the administrative body may rule completely or partially in appellees’ favor; but it was equally true that the plaintiffs in Steffel and Doran may have prevailed had they in fact been prosecuted. The lower courts have been virtually uniform in holding that the Younger principle applies to pending state administrative proceedings in which an important state interest is involved. See, e. g., Williams v. Red Bank Board of Education, 662 F. 2d 1008 (CA3 1981); Grandco Corp. v. Rochford, 536 F. 2d 197, 206 (CA7 1976); McCune v. Frank, 521 F. 2d 1152, 1158 (CA2 1975); McDonald v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Division of Metropolitan Transit Authority, 565 F. Supp. 37 (SDNY 1983) (Weinfeld, J.). Only the recent case of Martori Bros. Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F. 2d 1349, 1354 (CA9 1986), departs from this position, and it does so without analysis. Of course, if state law expressly indicates that the administrative proceedings are not even “judicial in nature,” abstention may not be appropriate. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 237-239 (1984). The application of the Younger principle to pending state administrative proceedings is fully consistent with Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496 (1982), which holds that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 suit in federal court. Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592, 607-611 (1975). Unlike Patsy, the administrative proceedings here are coercive rather than remedial, began before any substantial advancement in the federal action took place, and involve an important state interest.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MONROE et al. v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF JACKSON et al. No. 740. Argued April 3, 1968. Decided May 27, 1968. James M. Nabrit III and Jack Greenberg■ argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were Michael Meltsner, Avon N. Williams, Jr., and Z. Alexander Looby. Russell Rice, Sr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Poliak, Lawrence G. Wallace, and Brian K. Landsberg. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was argued with No. 695, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, ante, p. 430, and No. 805, Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School District, ante, p. 443. The question for decision is similar to the question decided in those cases. Here, however, the principal feature of a desegregation plan— which calls in question its adequacy to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory system in compliance with Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (Brown II) — is not “freedom of choice” but a variant commonly referred to as “free transfer.” The respondent Board of Commissioners is the School Board for the City of Jackson, located in midwestern Tennessee. The school district coincides with the city limits. Some one-third of the city’s population of 40,000 are Negroes, the great majority of whom live in the city’s central area. The school system has eight elementary schools, three junior high schools, and two senior high schools. There are 7,650 children enrolled in the system’s schools, about 40% of whom, over 3,200, are Negroes. In 1954 Tennessee by law required racial segregation in its public schools. Accordingly, five elementary schools, two junior high schools, and one senior high school were operated as “white” schools, and three elementary schools, one junior high school, and one senior high school were operated as “Negro” schools. Racial segregation extended to all aspects of school life including faculties and staffs. After Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 {Brown I), declared such state-imposed dual systems unconstitutional, Tennessee enacted a pupil placement law, Tenn. Code §49-1741 et seq. (1966). That law continued previously enrolled pupils in their assigned schools and vested local school boards with the exclusive authority to approve assignment and transfer requests. No white children enrolled in any “Negro” school under the statute and the respondent Board granted only seven applications of Negro children to enroll in “white” schools, three in 1961 and four in 1962. In March 1962 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the pupil placement law was inadequate “as a plan to convert a biracial system into a nonracial one.” Northcross v. Board of Education of City of Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818, 821. In January 1963 petitioners brought this action in the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that respondent was operating a compulsory racially segregated school system, injunctive relief against the continued maintenance of that system, an order directing the admission to named “white” schools of the plaintiff Negro school children, and an order requiring respondent Board to formulate a desegregation plan. The District Court ordered the Board to enroll the children in the schools in question and directed the Board to formulate and file a desegregation plan. A plan was duly filed and, after modifications directed by the court were incorporated, the plan was approved in August 1963 to be effective immediately in the elementary schools and to be gradually extended over a four-year period to the junior high schools and senior high schools. 221 F. Supp. 968. The modified plan provides for the automatic assignment of pupils living within attendance zones drawn by the Board or school officials along geographic or “natural” boundaries and “according to the capacity and facilities of the [school] buildings . . within the zones. Id., at 974. However, the plan also has the “free-transfer” provision which was ultimately to bring this case to this Court: Any child, after he has complied with the requirement that he register annually in his assigned school in his attendance zone, may freely transfer to another school of his choice if space is available, zone residents having priority in cases of overcrowding. Students must provide their own transportation; the school system does not operate school buses. By its terms the “free-transfer” plan was first applied in the elementary schools. After one year of operation petitioners, joined by 27 other Negro school children, moved in September 1964 for further relief in the District Court, alleging respondent had administered the plan in a racially discriminatory manner. At that time, the three Negro elementary schools remained all Negro; and 118 Negro pupils were scattered among four of the five formerly all-white elementary schools. After hearing evidence, the District Court found that in two respects the Board had indeed administered the plan in a discriminatory fashion. First, it had systematically denied Negro children — specifically the 27 intervenors — the right to transfer from their all-Negro zone schools to schools where white students were in the majority, although white students seeking transfers from Negro schools, to white schools had been allowed to transfer. The court held this to be a constitutional violation, see Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 683, as well as a violation of the terms of the plan itself. 244 F. Supp. 353, 359. Second, the court found that the Board, in drawing the lines of the geographic attendance zones, had gerrymandered three elementary school zones to exclude Negro residential areas from white school zones and to include those areas in zones of Negro schools located farther away. Id., at 361-362. In the same 1964 proceeding the Board filed with the court its proposed zones for the three junior high schools, Jackson and Tigrett, the “white” junior high schools, and Merry, the “Negro” junior high school. As of the 1964 school year the three schools retained their racial identities, although Jackson did have one Negro child among its otherwise all-white student body. The faculties and staffs of the respective schools were also segregated. Petitioners objected to the proposed zones on two grounds, arguing first that they were racially gerrymandered because so drawn as to assign Negro children to the “Negro” Merry school and white children to the “white” Jackson and Tigrett schools, and alternatively that the plan was in any event inadequate to reorganize the system on a nonracial basis. Petitioners, through expert witnesses, urged that the Board be required to adopt a “feeder system,” a commonly used method of assigning students whereby each junior high school would draw its students from specified elementary schools. The groupings could be made so as to assure racially integrated student bodies in all three junior high schools, with due regard for educational and administrative considerations such as building capacity and proximity of students to the schools. The District Court held that petitioners had not sustained their allegations that the proposed junior high school attendance zones were gerrymandered, saying “Tigrett [white] is located in the western section, Merry [Negro] is located in the central section and Jackson [white] is located in the eastern section. The zones proposed by the defendants would, generally, allocate the western section to Tigrett, the central section to Merry, and the eastern section to Jackson. The boundaries follow major streets or highways and railroads. According to the school population maps, there are a considerable number of Negro pupils in the southern part of the Tigrett zone, a considerable number of white pupils in the middle and northern parts of the Merry zone, and a considerable number of Negro pupils in the southern part of the Jackson zone. The location of the three schools in an approximate east-west line makes it inevitable that the three zones divide the city in three parts from north to south. While it appears that proximity of pupils and natural boundaries are not as important in zoning for junior highs as in' zoning for elementary schools, it does not appear that Negro pupils will be discriminated against.” 244 F. Supp., at 362. As for the recommended “feeder system,” the District Court concluded simply that “there is no constitutional requirement that this particular system be adopted.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed except on an issue of faculty desegregation, as to which the case was remanded for further proceedings. 380 F. 2d 955. We granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 1033, and set the case for oral argument immediately following Green v. County School Board, supra. Although the case presented by the petition for certiorari concerns only the junior high schools, the plan in its application to elementary and senior high schools is also necessarily implicated since the right of “free transfer” extends to pupils at all levels. The principles governing determination of the adequacy of the plan as compliance with the Board’s responsibility to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory system are those announced today in Green v. County School Board, supra. Tested by those principles the plan is clearly inadequate. Three school years have followed the District Court’s approval of the attendance zones for the junior high schools. Yet Merry Junior High School was still completely a “Negro” school in the 1967-1968 school year, enrolling some 640 Negro pupils, or over 80% of the system’s Negro junior high school students. Not one of the “considerable number of white pupils in the middle and northern parts of the Merry zone” assigned there under the attendance zone aspect of the plan chose to stay at Merry. Every one exercised his option to transfer out of the “Negro” school. The “white” Tigrett school seemingly had the same experience in reverse. Of the “considerable number of Negro pupils in the southern part of the Tigrett zone” mentioned by the District Court, only seven are enrolled in the student body of 819; apparently all other Negro children assigned to Tigrett chose to go elsewhere. Only the “white” Jackson school presents a different picture; there, 349 white children and 135 Negro children compose the student body. How many of the Negro children transferred in from the “white” Tigrett school does not appear. The experience in the junior high schools mirrors that of the elementary schools. Thus the three elementary schools that were operated as Negro schools in 1954 and continued as such until 1963 are still attended only by Negroes. The five “white” schools all have some Negro children enrolled, from as few as three (in a student body of 781) to as many as 160 (in a student body of 682). This experience with “free transfer” was accurately predicted by the District Court as early as 1963: “In terms of numbers . . . the ratio of Negro to white pupils is approximately 40-60. This figure is, however, somewhat misleading as a measure of the extent to which integration will actually occur under the proposed plan. Because the homes of Negro children are concentrated in certain areas of the city, a plan of unitary zoning, even if prepared without consideration of race, will result in a concentration of Negro children in the zones of heretofore ‘Negro’ schools and white children in the zones of heretofore ‘white’ schools. Moreover, this tendency of concentration in schools will be further accentuated by the exercise of choice of schools ... .” 221 F. Supp., at 971. (Emphasis supplied.) Plainly, the plan does not meet respondent’s “affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, supra, at 437-438. Only by dismantling the state-imposed dual system can that end be achieved. And manifestly, that end has not been achieved here nor does the plan approved by the lower courts for the junior high schools promise meaningful progress toward doing so. “Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the [“free transfer”] plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board.” Green v. County School Board, supra, at 441-442. That the Board has chosen to adopt a method achieving minimal disruption of the old pattern is evident from its long delay in making any effort whatsoever to desegregate, and the deliberately discriminatory manner in which the Board administered the plan until checked by the District Court. The District Court approved the junior high school attendance-zone lines in the view that as drawn they assigned students to the three schools in a way that was capable of producing meaningful desegregation of all three schools. But the “free-transfer” option has permitted the “considerable number” of white or Negro students in at least two of the zones to return, at the implicit invitation of the Board, to the comfortable security of the old, established discriminatory pattern. Like the transfer provisions held invalid in Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 683, 686, “[i]t is readily apparent that the transfer [provision] lends itself to perpetuation of segregation.” While we there indicated that “free-transfer” plans under some circumstances might be valid, we explicitly stated that “no official transfer plan or provision of which racial segregation is the inevitable consequence may stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 689. So it is here; no attempt has been made to justify the transfer provision as a device designed to meet “legitimate local problems,” ibid.; rather it patently operates as a device to allow resegregation of the races to the extent desegregation would be achieved by geographically drawn zones. Respondent’s argument in this Court reveals its purpose. We are frankly told in the Brief that without the transfer option it is apprehended that white students will flee the school system altogether. “But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.” Brown II, at 300. We do not hold that “free transfer” can have no place in a desegregation plan. But like “freedom of choice,” if it cannot be shown that such a plan will further rather than delay conversion to a unitary, nonracial, nondiscriminatory school system, it must be held unacceptable. See Green v. County School Board, supra, at 439-441. We conclude, therefore, that the Board “must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, . . . fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.” Id., at 442. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it affirmed the District Court’s approval of the plan in its application to the junior high schools, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with our opinion in Green v. County School Board, supra. It is so ordered. We imply no agreement with the District Court’s conclusion that under the proposed attendance zones for junior high schools “it does not appear that Negro pupils will be discriminated against.” We note also that on the record as it now stands, it appears that petitioners’ recommended “feeder system,” the feasibility of which respondent did not challenge in the District Court, is an effective alternative reasonably available to respondent to abolish the dual system in the junior high schools.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS et al. v. CAMENISCH No. 80-317. Argued March 31, 1981 Decided April 29, 1981 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 398. Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, and Richard E. Gray III, Executive Assistant Attorney General. Stephen J. Poliak, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ralph J. Moore, Jr., John Townsend Rich, Marc P. Charmats, Seymour DuBow, Paul R. Friedman, and Charles Smith. Peter Buscemi argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, and Jessica Dunsay Silver Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., and Susan Hirsch for the American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities et al.; by Therese M. Wandling for the Deaf Counseling, Advocacy and Referral Agency, Inc., et al.; by Margaret K. Brooks for the Legal Action Center of the City of New York, Inc.; and by Kent'Hull and Ronald M. Soskin for the Michigan Rehabilitation Association et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Marcia Robinson Lowry and Robert Levy for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by R. Claire Guthrie and Sheldon Elliot Steinbach for the American Council on Education et al. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. On March 1, 1978, Walter Camenisch, a deaf graduate student at the University of Texas, filed a complaint alleging that the University had violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which provides that “Mo otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” The complaint alleged that the University received federal funds and that the University had discriminatorily refused to pay for a sign-language interpreter for Camenisch. The complaint asked the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to grant declaratory relief and to “ [preliminarily and permanently order defendants to appoint an interpreter for the plaintiff while he is a student in good standing at the defendant University.” The District Court applied the “Fifth Circuit standard for temporary relief to see if the injunction sought is appropriate.” That standard, which was enunciated in Canal Authority of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F. 2d 567 (1974), requires that a federal district court consider four factors when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction: whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the injunction does not issue; whether the defendant will be harmed if the injunction does issue; whether the public interest will be served by the injunction; and whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits. Finding a possibility that Camenisch would be irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, and finding a substantial likelihood that Camenisch would prevail on the merits, the District Court granted a preliminarv injunction requiring that the University pay for Camenisch’s interpreter, but the court did so on the condition that Camenisch “post a security bond in the amount of $8,000.00 pending the outcome of this litigation pursuant to Rule 65 (c), F. R. C. P.” The District Court also ordered that the action be stayed “pending a final administrative determination on the merits, and that as a condition of preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff be required to initiate a complaint with HEW requesting the relief sought herein.” The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit likewise applied the Canal Authority test, and found that the balance of hardships weighed in favor of granting an injunction and that Camenisch’s claim would be successful on the merits. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. 616 F. 2d 127. The appellate court ruled, however, that Camenisch was not obligated to pursue any administrative remedy that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare might provide, and it therefore vacated that part of the District Court’s order staying the litigation pending administrative action. By the time the Court of Appeals had acted, the University had obeyed the injunction by paying for Camenisch’s interpreter, and Camenisch had been graduated. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected a suggestion that the case was therefore moot. The court said: “[A] justiciable issue remains: whose responsibility is it to pay for this interpreter?” Id., at 130-131. We granted certiorari, 449 U. S. 950, and Camenisch has now raised the mootness issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the case as a whole is not moot, since, as that court noted, it remains to be decided who should ultimately bear the cost of the interpreter. However, the issue before the Court of Appeals was not who should pay for the interpreter, but rather whether the District Court had abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction requiring the University to pay for him. Brown v. Chote, 411 U. S. 452, 457; Alabama v. United States, 279 U. S. 229. The two issues are significantly different, since whether the preliminary injunction should have issued depended on the balance of factors listed in Canal Authority, while whether the University should ultimately bear the cost of the interpreter depends on a final resolution of the merits of Camenisch’s case. This, then, is simply another instance in which one issue in a case has become moot, but the case as a whole remains alive because other issues have not become moot. See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486. In Ammond v. McGahn, 532 F. 2d 325 (CA3 1976), for instance, the issue of preliminary injunctive relief became moot, but an issue of damages remained. The court said: “Though the entire case is not moot, the question remains whether the issue of the appropriateness of injunctive relief is moot. If the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the determination whether the preliminary injunction was properly granted, the sole question before us on this appeal, then we must vacate the district court’s order and remand the case for consideration of the remaining issues.” Id., at 328. Because the only issue presently before us — the correctness of the decision to grant a preliminary injunction — is moot, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be vacated and the case must be remanded to the District Court for trial on the merits. See Brown v. Chote, supra. Since Camenisch’s likelihood of success on. the merits was one of the factors the District Court and the Court of Appeals considered in granting Camenisch a preliminary injunction, it might be suggested that their decisions were tantamount to decisions on the underlying merits and thus that the preliminary-injunction issue is not truly moot. It may be that this was the reasoning of the Court of Appeals when it described its conclusion that the case was not moot as “simply another way of stating the traditional rule that issues raised by an expired injunction are not moot if one party was required to post an injunction bond.” 616 F. 2d, at 131. This reasoning fails, however, because it improperly equates “likelihood of success” with “success,” and what is more important, because it ignores the significant procedural differences between preliminary and permanent injunctions. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits. A party thus is not required to prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing, Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222 (CA7 1961), and the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits, Industrial Bank of Washington v. Tobriner, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 51, 54, 405 F. 2d 1321, 1324 (1968); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F. 2d 738, 742 (CA2 1953). In light of these considerations, it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the merits. E. g., Brown v. Chote, supra; Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F. 2d 603 (CA4 1976); Santiago v. Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Vivienda de Puerto Rico, 453 F. 2d 794 (CA1 1972). Should an expedited decision on the merits be appropriate, Rule 65 (a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a means of securing one. That Rule permits a court to “order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application.” Before such an order may issue, however, the courts have commonly required that “the parties should -hbrmally receive clear and unambiguous notice [of the court’s intent to consolidate the trial and the hearing] either before the hearing commences or at a time which will still afford the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases.” Pughsley v. 8750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F. 2d 1055, 1057 (CA7 1972); Nationwide Amusements, Inc. v. Nattin, 452 F. 2d 651 (CA4 1971). This procedure was not followed here. In short, where a federal district court has granted a preliminary injunction, the parties generally will have had the benefit neither of a full opportunity to present their cases nor of a final judicial decision based on the actual merits of the controversy. Thus when the injunctive aspects of a case become moot on appeal of a preliminary injunction, any issue preserved by an injunction bond can generally not be resolved on appeal, but must be resolved in a trial on the merits. Where, by contrast, a federal district court has granted a permanent injunction, the parties will already have had their trial on the merits, and, even if the case would otherwise be moot, a determination can be had on appeal of the correctness of the trial court’s decision on the merits, since the case has been saved from mootness by the injunction bond. The principle underlying this basic distinction, although sometimes honored in the breach, is reflected in the relevant precedents. Tor instance, in this Court’s decision in Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, a decision often cited for the proposition that an injunction bond prevents a case from becoming moot, the injunction was permanent, not preliminary. The District Court there had thus reached a final decision on the merits. American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F. 2d 588 (CA3 1971), illuminates the distinction from a different angle. In that case, the plaintiffs had secured a preliminary injunction and had posted an injunction bond. When the issue of in-junctive relief became moot, the Court of Appeals held that the case as a whole was not moot, since the defendant would “in all likelihood institute suit against the sureties at some future time and, in any such action, the court [would] be faced with deciding the same issues that are in contention here.” Id., at 594. The appellate court ruled that liability on the injunction bond could not arise until there was a final judgment in favor of the defendant: “This rule is consistent with the policy considerations behind the injunction bond. The requirement of security is rooted in the belief that a defendant deserves protection against a court order granted without the full deliberation a trial offers.” Id., at 595, n. 12. The court therefore remanded the case to the trial court, where such “full deliberation” could take place. In Klein v. Califano, 586 F. 2d 250 (CA3 1978), the same United States Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, was confronted with a different situation involving a moot injunction which was survived by a possible claim for recoupment on a bond. The court “recognize [d] that part of the rationale of American Bible Society was the policy of the Rule 65 security bond to protect defendants from the consequences of temporary restraining orders granted without opportunity for full deliberation of the merits of a dispute.” Id., at 256. Because the District Court in Klein had “had such an opportunity to assess the merits of the complaint and [had] granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction,” ibid., the Court of Appeals reached the merits of the case. The present case is replete with circumstances indicating the necessity for a full trial on the merits in the nisi prius court, where a preliminary injunction has become moot and an injunction bond has been issued. The proceedings here bear the marks of the haste characteristic of a request for a preliminary injunction: the parties have relied on a short stipulation of facts, and even the legal theories on which the University has relied have seemed to change from one level of the proceeding to another. The District Court and the Court of Appeals both properly based their decisions not on the ultimate merits of Camenisch’s case but rather on the balance of the Canal Authority factors. While it is true that some of the Court of Appeals’ language suggests a conclusion that Camenisch would win on the merits, the court certainly did not hold that the standards for a summary judgment had been met. In sum, the question whether a preliminary injunction should have been issued here is moot, because the terms of the injunction, as modified by the Court of Appeals, have been fully and irrevocably carried out. The question whether the University must pay for the interpreter remains for trial on the merits. Until such a trial has taken place, it would be inappropriate for this Court to intimate any view on the merits of the lawsuit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. See, e. g., Bright v. Nunn, 448 F. 2d 245, 247, n. 1 (CA6 1971); but see 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2950, pp. 492-493 (1973). The Court of Appeals in the present case mistakenly believed that Kinnett Dairies v. Farrow, 580 F. 2d 1260 (CA5 1978), stands for a contrary principle. In that case, the question of mootness arose because the defendant’s solicitation of bids — which had been the subject of the District Court’s preliminary injunction — had run its course. The Court of Appeals said: “[T]he history of this controversy reveals the reasonable expectation — indeed, the near certainty — that the act complained of will be repeated. This case is a paradigm of the situation 'capable of repetition yet evading review.’ ” Id., at 1266 (footnote omitted). The court determined that the plaintiff could not win on the merits, and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction had, therefore, been erroneous. But the court did not say what it would have done had it not concluded that the case was capable of repetition yet avoiding review.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERCOUNTY CONSTRUCTION CORP. et al. v. WALTER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al. No. 74-362. Argued April 23, 1975 — Decided June 16, 1975 John C. Duncan III argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Frank H. Easterbrook argued the cause for respondent Walter pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solid- tor General Bork and Marshall H. Harris. Jefferson de R. Capps filed a brief for respondent Jones. Mr. Justice Reitnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 13 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1432, 33 U. S. C. § 913, provided: “The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury.” We must decide in this case whether § 22 of the same Act, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 922, bars consideration of a claim timely filed under § 13, which has not been the subject of an order by the deputy commissioner within one year after the cessation of voluntary compensation payments. Petitioners in the instant case are Intercounty Construction Corp., an employer, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., its insurance carrier. Respondents are Noah C. A. Walter, a deputy commissioner of the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation which was charged with administration of the Act, and Mary Jones, an intervenor below who is the personal representative of Charles Jones, an employee claimant under the Act. Claimant was injured in 1960 while working for the employer in the District of Columbia. Shortly thereafter, well within the one-year statute of limitations established by § 13 of the Act, he filed a claim for total permanent disability with the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation. The insurance carrier, admitting claimant’s injury in the course of employment while denying permanent disability to the extent stated in the claim, filed notice that it had begun payment of $54 per week, the amount payable for total disability, in advance of an award by the deputy commissioner. In 1965, the carrier filed notice that it was controverting the pending claim on the ground, inter alia, of extent of disability and that it was reducing claimant’s weekly compensation to $27 per week, the rate for 50% temporary disability. In 1966 a claims examiner from the Bureau held a hearing on the pending claim for total permanent disability benefits but the hearing was adjourned without action on the claim. On January 23, 1968, the carrier stopped payment of compensation to the claimant since its payments to claimant totaled $17,280, its maximum liability under the Act at the time for any condition other than permanent total disability or death. On February 11, 1970, two years after his last receipt of a voluntary payment of compensation from the carrier, claimant requested a hearing on his previously filed claim for total permanent disability. Although the claim had been pending since its timely filing in 1960, neither the carrier nor the claimant had requested action by the Bureau in the intervening 10 years to adjudicate its merits and no order or award had been entered during this period resolving it. Deputy Commissioner Walter, reversing his own initial determination that the claim was time barred under § 22 of the Act, concluded that § 22 was not applicable to this claim and entered an order awarding claimant compensation for permanent total disability. Petitioners then brought this suit under 33 U. S. C. § 921 (b) against respondent Walter to enjoin enforcement of the award. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the petitioners, holding that § 22 of the Act barred the claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that § 22 of the Act, applicable only to' the power of the deputy commissioner to modify prior orders, erected no barrier to consideration of claims which had not been the subject of a prior order by the deputy commissioner. Because of the conflict between the holding of the Court of Appeals in this case and that of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, 460 F. 2d 1108, cert. denied sub nom. Lewis v. Strachan Shipping Co., 409 U. S. 887 (1972), we granted certiorari. 419 U. S. 1119 (1975). Section 22 of the Act, as amended, provides: “Modification of awards “Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in section 919 of this title, and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.” Petitioners urge, and the Fifth Circuit in Strachan Shipping Co. held, that this provision superimposes on the express statute of limitations contained in § 13 of the Act, providing a time period for the filing of claims, an additional limitations period requiring action by the deputy commissioner on pending claims within one year after the date of the last voluntary payment of compensation where such payments have been made. In their view, since no action was taken on the pending claim in the instant case until more than one year after the claimant's last receipt of a voluntary compensation payment, the claim was time barred under § 22. In contrast, respondents argue, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, that § 22 is applicable only to the power of the deputy commissioner to modify prior orders and awards issued by him. In their view, it has no application to timely filed claims on which no prior action has been taken by the deputy commissioner. In this case they say that since the timely filed and still-pending 1960 claim had never been the subject of action by the Deputy Commissioner prior to the order here in issue, § 22 has no application to it. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that § 22 speaks ambiguously to the question before us. The statutory references to “new order,” “new compensation order,” and “the rejection of a claim,” and the limitation of the granted authority to “a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner” support an interpretation of the section's one-year time limit as applicable only to the power of the deputy commissioner to modify previously entered orders. Such an interpretation would make the section inapplicable to the authority of the deputy commissioner to enter an initial order with respect to a claim timely filed. On the other hand, the language “whether or not a compensation order has been issued” points to the applicability of the section's one-year time limit to all previously filed claims, even though not the subject of any prior order by the deputy commissioner. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, 460 F. 2d, at 1116. This phrase might also merely mean, when read in context, that the time limit established by this provision, applicable only to the modification of previously entered orders, runs from the date of the last voluntary payment even though the order sought to be modified is entered after receipt of the last voluntary payment. 163 U. S. App. D. C., at 150, 500 F. 2d, at 818; Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, supra, at 1117 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). These conflicting indicia are not completely reconcilable if the language in the statute is considered alone, and so we must resort to the legislative history of the provision. Section 22 was first enacted as part of the original Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in 1927. 44 Stat. 1424 — 1446. As petitioners concede, the provision as originally drafted applied only to the modification of orders previously entered by the deputy commissioner: “modification of awards “Sec. 22. Upon his own initiative, or upon application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions, the deputy commissioner may at any time during the term of an award and after the compensation order in respect of such award has become final, review such order in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in section 19, and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, increase, or decrease such compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation paid under authority of the prior order.” Id., at 1437. As originally adopted, § 22 provided power to the deputy commissioner to modify a prior order only “during the term of an award” and the provision was construed to constrict the power to modify a previous order to the period of payments pursuant to an award. Cf. F. Jarka Co. v. Monahan, 29 F. 2d 741, 742 (Mass. 1928). The United States Employees’ Compensation Commission (USECC), then charged with the administration of the Act, repeatedly recommended that § 22 be amended to allow continuing review of previously entered orders. 14th Ann. Rep. USECC 75 (1930); 15th Ann. Rep. USECC 77 (1931); 16th Ann. Rep. USECC 49 (1932); 17th Ann. Rep. USECC 18 (1933). See Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 390 U. S. 459, 463-465 (1968). In none of the annual reports of the USECC is there any indication that amendment of this provision was sought for any purpose other than broadening the length of time during which the deputy commissioner could exercise his power to modify previously entered orders. In 1934 Congress responded by amending this provision to read: “modification of compensation cases “Sec. 22. Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in section 19, and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner with the approval of the commission.” 48 Stat. 807. This amendment inserted the phrase “whether or not a compensation order has been issued,” the phrase upon which the petitioners’ statutory claim rests, and they naturally urge that it was intended to apply the one-year time limit of § 22, formerly applicable only to the modification of previously entered orders, to all pending claims. But the legislative history does not bear out petitioners’ contention. The committee reports of both Houses of Congress accompanying this change explain it in the following language: “[This bill] amends section 22 of the existing act so as to broaden the grounds on which a deputy commissioner can modify an award and also while strictly limiting the period, extends the time within which such modification may be made. . . . “The amendment is in line with the recommendation of the [USECC] except that it limits to 1 year after the date of the last payment of compensation the time during which such modification may be made.” S. Rep. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934). As we similarly stated in Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, supra, at 464: “The purpose of this amendment was to 'broaden the grounds on which a deputy commissioner can modify an award.’ ” See, e. g., O’Keeffe v. Aerojet General Shipyards, 404 U. S. 254, 255-256 (1971). There is no indication that Congress sought by this amendment to superimpose a new statute of limitations, in addition to the required period for filing provided by § 13, on all claims filed under the Act upon which payments are made. Taken in historical and statutory context, the phrase “whether or not a compensation order has been issued” is properly interpreted to mean merely that the one-year time limit imposed on the power of the deputy commissioner to modify existing orders runs from the date of final payment of compensation even if the order sought to be modified is actually entered only after such date. Section 22 was amended in 1938 to read as it presently does. 52 Stat. 1167. The chief change was permitting the deputy commissioner to review a case “at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim.” Such amendment would have been largely superfluous if Congress in 1934 had already extended this provision to cover claims whether or not previously disposed of by the deputy commissioner. And in fact the legislative history surrounding the 1938 amendment reveals a clear congressional understanding that § 22 applied only to modification of prior orders of the deputy commissioner. Thus, for example, the House Report accompanying the 1938 amendment stated that “[t]he purpose of this amendment is to extend to such cases the same provisions which now apply in connection with other cases finally acted upon by the deputy commissioner.” H. R. Rep. No. 1945, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 9 (1938). (Emphasis added.) See also H. R. Rep. No. 1807, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1935); S. Rep. No. 1199, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1936); S. Rep. No. 1988, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 8-9 (1938). Regulations issued under the Act by the USECC, contemporaneously with passage of the 1938 amendment, reflect an administrative understanding that § 22 governed “application [s] to the deputy commissioner for review of a compensation case for modification of an award.” 20 CFR § 31.15 (1938); 20 CFR § 31.16 (1949). The Fifth Circuit in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hollis, supra, indicated its belief that the absence of a procedure for orderly conclusion of compensation cases was incompatible with a scheme of cooperation and voluntary payments by employers and insurers envisaged by the Act. 460 F. 2d, at 1116. The court below disagreed, indicating its belief that the present procedures giving a carrier the right to compel the deputy commissioner to adjudicate claims eliminate any unfairness which might result from the absence of a fixed conclusion to such cases. 163 U. S. App. D. C., at 152, 500 F. 2d, at 820. Cf. 33 U. S. C. § 919 (c); 5 U. S. C. § 706 (1); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F. 2d 794 (CA5 1960). Whatever the merits of a fixed period for resolution of pending compensation claims not previously the subject of an order, Congress did not in § 22 establish such a period. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is therefore Affirmed. In 1972, this responsibility was transferred to the Office of Workmen’s Compensation Programs of the Department of Labor. See 20 CFR §§701.101-701.103 (1973). The District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act incorporates by reference the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. as amended. See D. C. Code Ann. § 36-501 (1973). Section 13 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §913, provided in part: “The right to compensation for disability under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed within one year after the injury . . . except that if payment of compensation has been made without an award on account of such injury ... a claim may be filed within one year after the date of the last payment. . . .” Section 12 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 912 (1970 ed. and Supp, III), requires the employee to give notice of injury unless the employer has actual notice of the injury. Since the Act requires the employer to begin making the payments called for by the Act within 14 days after receiving notice of injury without awaiting resolution of the compensation claim and permits withholding of payments only to the extent of any dispute, voluntary payment in advance of an actual order is common under the Act. See § 14 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 914 (1970 ed. and Supp. III). Either party may obtain resolution of a pending claim by request under § 19 (c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 919 (c), but in practice many pending claims are amicably settled through voluntary payments without the necessity of a formal order by the deputy commissioner. See n. 4, supra. The decision of the District Court is unreported. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported a.t 163 U. S. App. D. C. 147, 500 F. 2d 815 (1974).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILKIE ET AL. v. ROBBINS No. 06-219. Argued March 19, 2007 Decided June 25, 2007 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scaxia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Part III. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 568. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 568. Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, David B. Salmons, Barbara L. Herwig, and Edward Himmelfarb. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Karen Budd-Falen, Marc Stimpert, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, Pamela S. Karlan, and Thomas C. Goldstein. Amber H. Rovner and Larry D. Thompson, Jr., filed a brief for the National Wildlife Federation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Brooks Realty et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla and Roger J. Marzulla; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by Steven J. Lechner and William Perry Pendley; for the New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association et al. by Lee E. Peters; for the Oregon Cattlemen’s Association et al. by Paul A. Turcke; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by R. S. Radford; for the Paragon Foundation, Inc., by PomI M. Kienzle III; and for the Public Lands Council et al. by Mark B. Wiletsky. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Officials of the Bureau of Land Management stand accused of harassment and intimidation aimed at extracting an easement across private property. The questions here are whether the landowner has either a private action for damages of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), or a claim against the officials in their individual capacities under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). We hold that neither action is available. I A Plaintiff-respondent Frank Robbins owns and operates the High Island Ranch, a commercial guest resort in Hot Springs County, Wyoming, stretching across some 40 miles of territory. The ranch is a patchwork of mostly contiguous land parcels intermingled with tracts belonging to other private owners, the State of Wyoming, and the National Government. Its natural resources include wildlife and mineral deposits, and its mountainous western portion, called the upper Rock Creek area, is a place of great natural beauty. In response to persistent requests by environmentalists and outdoor enthusiasts, the Bureau tried to induce the ranch’s previous owner, George Nelson, to grant an easement for publie use over South Fork Owl Creek Road, which runs through the ranch and serves as a main route to the upper Rock Creek area. For a while, Nelson refused from fear that the public would disrupt his guests’ activities, but shortly after agreeing to sell the property to Robbins, in March 1994, Nelson signed a nonexclusive deed of easement giving the United States the right to use and maintain the road along a stretch of his property. In return, the Bureau agreed to rent Nelson a right-of-way to maintain a different section of the road as it runs across federal property and connects otherwise isolated parts of Robbins’s holdings. In May 1994, Nelson conveyed the ranch to Robbins, who continued to graze cattle and run guest cattle drives in reliance on grazing permits and a Special Recreation Use Permit (SRUP) issued by the Bureau. But Robbins knew nothing about Nelson’s grant of the easement across South Fork Owl Creek Road, which the Bureau had failed to record, and upon recording his warranty deed in Hot Springs County, Robbins took title to the ranch free of the easement, by operation of Wyoming law. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. -§34-1-120 (2005). When the Bureau’s employee Joseph Vessels discovered, in June 1994, that the Bureau’s inaction had cost it the easement, he telephoned Robbins and demanded an easement to replace Nelson’s. Robbins refused but indicated he would consider granting one in return for something. In a later meeting, Vessels allegedly told Robbins that “‘the Federal Government does not negotiate,’” and talks broke down. Brief for Respondent 5. Robbins says that over the next several years the defendant-petitioners (hereinafter defendants), who are current and former employees of the Bureau, carried on a campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at forcing him to regrant the lost easement. B Robbins concedes that any single one of the offensive and sometimes illegal actions by the Bureau’s officials might have been brushed aside as a small imposition, but says that in the aggregate the campaign against him amounted to coercion to extract the easement and should be redressed collectively. The substance of Robbins’s claim, and the degree to which existing remedies available to him were adequate, can be understood and assessed only by getting down to the details, which add up to a long recitation. In the summer of 1994, after the fruitless telephone conversation in June, Vessels wrote to Robbins for permission to survey his land in the area of the desired easement. Robbins said no, that it would be a waste of time for the Bureau to do a survey without first reaching agreement with him. Vessels went ahead with a survey anyway, trespassed on Robbins’s land, and later boasted about it to Robbins. Not surprisingly, given the lack of damage to his property, Robbins did not file a trespass complaint in response. Mutual animosity grew, however, and one Bureau employee, Edward Parodi, was told by his superiors to “look closer” and “investigate harder” for possible trespasses and other permit violations by Robbins. App. 128-129. Parodi also heard colleagues make certain disparaging remarks about Robbins, such as referring to him as “the rich SOB from Alabama [who] got [the Ranch].” Id., at 121. Parodi became convinced that the Bureau had mistreated Robbins and described its conduct as “the volcanic point” in his decision to retire. Id., at 133. Vessels and his supervisor, defendant Charles Wilkie, continued to demand the easement, under threat to cancel the reciprocal maintenance right-of-way that Nelson had negotiated. When Robbins would not budge, the Bureau canceled the right-of-way, citing Robbins’s refusal to grant the desired easement and failure even to pay the rental fee. Robbins did not appeal the cancellation to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) or seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 702. In August 1995, Robbins brought his cattle to a water source on property belonging to his neighbor, LaVonne Pennoyer. An altercation ensued, and Pennoyer struck Robbins with her truck while he was riding a horse. PlaintiffAppellee’s Supp. App. in No. 04-8016 (CA10), pp. 676-681 (hereinafter CA10 App.); 9 Record, PI. Exh. 2, pp. 164-166; 10 id., PI. Exh. 35a, at 102-108. Defendant Gene Leone fielded a call from Pennoyer regarding the incident, encouraged her to contact the sheriff, and himself placed calls to the sheriff suggesting that Robbins be charged with trespass. After the incident, Parodi claims that Leone told him: “ ‘I think I finally got a way to get [Robbins’s] permits and get him out of business.’” App. 125,126. In October 1995, the Bureau claimed various permit violations and changed the High Island Ranch’s 5-year SRUP to a SRUP subject to annual renewal. According to Robbins, losing the 5-year SRUP disrupted his guest ranching business, owing to the resulting uncertainty about permission to conduct cattle drives. Robbins declined to seek administrative review, however, in part because Bureau officials told him that the process would be lengthy and that his permit would be suspended until the IBLA reached a decision. Beginning in 1996, defendants brought administrative charges against Robbins for trespass and other land-use violations. Robbins claimed some charges were false, and others unfairly selective enforcement, and he took all of them to be an effort to retaliate for refusing the Bureau’s continuing demands for the easement. He contested a number of these charges, but not all of them, administratively. In the spring of 1997, the South Fork Owl Greek Road, the only way to reach the portions of the ranch in the Rock Creek area, became impassable. When the Bureau refused to repair the section of road across federal land, Robbins took matters into his own hands and fixed the public road himself, even though the Bureau had refused permission. The Bureau fined Robbins for trespass, but offered to settle the charge and entertain an application to renew the old maintenance right-of-way. Instead, Robbins appealed to the IBLA, which found that Robbins had admitted the unauthorized repairs when he sent the Bureau a bill for reimbursement. The Board upheld the fine, In re Robbins, 146 I. B. L. A. 213 (1998), and rejected Robbins’s claim that the Bureau was trying to “ ‘blackmail’ ” him into providing the easement; it said that “[t]he record effectively shows ... intransigence was the tactic of Robbins, not [the] BLM.” Id., at 219. Robbins did not seek judicial review of the IBLA’s decision. In July 1997, defendant Teryl Shryack and a colleague entered Robbins’s property, claiming the terms of a fence easement as authority. Robbins accused Shryack of unlawful entry, tore up the written instrument, and ordered her off his property. Later that month, after a meeting about trespass issues with Bureau officials, Michael Miller, a Bureau law enforcement officer, questioned Robbins without advance notice and without counsel about the incident with Shryack. The upshot was a charge with two counts of knowingly and forcibly impeding and interfering with a federal employee, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 111 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), a crime with a penalty of up to one year in prison. A jury acquitted Robbins in December, after deliberating less than 30 minutes. United States v. Robbins, 179 F. 3d 1268, 1269 (CA10 1999). According to a news story, the jurors “were appalled at the actions of the government” and one said that “Robbins could not have been railroaded any worse ... if he worked for the Union Pacific.” CA10 App. 852. Robbins then moved for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, § 617, 111 Stat. 2519, note following 18 U. S. C. §3006A, arguing that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. The trial judge denied the motion, and Robbins appealed too late. See 179 F. 3d, at 1269-1270. In 1998, Robbins brought the lawsuit now before us, though there was further vexation to come. In June 1999, the Bureau denied Robbins’s application to renew his annual SRUP, based on an accumulation of land-use penalties levied against him. Robbins appealed, the IBLA affirmed, In re Robbins, 154 I. B. L. A. 93 (2000), and Robbins did not seek judicial review. Then, in August, the Bureau revoked the grazing permit for High Island Ranch, claiming that Robbins had violated its terms when he kept Bureau officials from passing over his property to reach public lands. Robbins appealed to the IBLA, which stayed the revocation pending resolution of the appeal. Order in Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, IBLA 2000-12 (Nov. 10, 1999), CA10 App. 1020. The stay held for several years, despite periodic friction. Without a SRUP, Robbins was forced to redirect his guest cattle drives away from federal land and through a mountain pass with unmarked property boundaries. In August 2000, Vessels and defendants Darrell Barnes and Miller tried to catch Robbins trespassing in driving cattle over a corner of land administered by the Bureau. From a nearby hilltop, they videotaped ranch guests during the drive, even while the guests sought privacy to relieve themselves. That afternoon, Robbins alleges, Barnes and Miller broke into his guest lodge, left trash inside, and departed without closing the lodge gates. The next summer, defendant David Wallace spoke with Preston Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Indian Affairs who manages lands along the High Island Ranch’s southern border, and pressured him to impound Robbins’s cattle. Smith told Robbins, but did nothing more. Finally, in January 2003, tension actually cooled to the point that Robbins and the Bureau entered into a settlement agreement that, among other things, established a procedure for informal resolution of future grazing disputes and stayed 16 pending administrative appeals with a view to their ultimate dismissal, provided that Robbins did not violate certain Bureau regulations for a 2-year period. The settlement came apart, however, in January 2004, when the Bureau began formal trespass proceedings against Robbins and unilaterally voided the settlement agreement. Robbins tried to enforce the agreement in federal court, but a District Court denied relief in a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals in February 2006. Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, 438 F. 3d 1074 (CA10). C In this lawsuit (brought, as we said, in 1998), Robbins asks for compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Although he originally included the United States as a defendant, he voluntarily dismissed the Government, and pressed forward with a RICO claim charging defendants with repeatedly trying to extort an easement from him, as well as a similarly grounded Bivens claim that defendants violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity and failure to state a claim, which the District Court granted, holding that Robbins inadequately pleaded damages under RICO and that the APA and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. § 1846, were effective alternative remedies that precluded Bivens relief. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on both grounds, 300 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (2002), although it specified that Bivens relief was available only for those “constitutional violations committed by individual federal employees unrelated to final agency action,” 300 F. 3d, at 1212. On remand, defendants again moved to dismiss on qualified immunity. As to the RICO claim, the District Court denied the motion; as to Bivens, it dismissed what Robbins called the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution and those under the Fifth Amendment for due process violations, but it declined to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim of retaliation for the exercise of Robbins’s right to exclude the Government from his property and to refuse any grant of a property interest without compensation. After limited discovery, defendants again moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The District Court adhered to its earlier denial. This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed, after dealing with collateral order jurisdiction to consider an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, 433 F. 3d 755, 761 (2006) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530 (1985)). It held that Robbins had a clearly established right to be free from retaliation for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to exclude the Government from his private property, 433 F. 3d, at 765-767, and it explained that Robbins could go forward with the RICO claim because Government employees who “engag[e] in lawful actions with an intent to extort a right-of-way from [a landowner] rather than with an intent to merely carry out their regulatory duties” commit extortion under Wyoming law and within the meaning of the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1951, 433 F. 3d, at 768. The Court of Appeals rejected the defense based on a claim of the Government’s legal entitlement to demand the disputed easement: “if an official obtains property that he has lawful authority to obtain, but does so in a wrongful manner, his conduct constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act.” Id., at 769. Finally, the Court of Appeals said again that “Robbins’[s] allegations involving individual action unrelated to final agency action are permitted under Bivens.” Id., at 772. The appeals court declined defendants’ request “to determine which allegations remain and which are precluded,” however, because defendants had not asked the District Court to sort them out. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1075 (2006), and now reverse. II The first question is whether to devise a new Bivens damages action for retaliating against the exercise of ownership rights, in addition to the discrete administrative and judicial remedies available to a landowner like Robbins in dealing with the Government’s employees. Bivens, 403 U. S. 388, held that the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers had a claim for damages, and in the years following we have recognized two more nonstatutory damages remedies, the first for employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause, Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), and the second for an Eighth Amendment violation by prison officials, Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). But we have also held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest, and in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified. We have accordingly held against applying the Bivens model to claims of First Amendment violations by federal employers, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983), harm to military personnel through activity incident to service, United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296 (1983), and wrongful denials of Social Security disability benefits, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412 (1988). We have seen no case for extending Bivens to claims against federal agencies, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471 (1994), or against private prisons, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61 (2001). Whatever the ultimate conclusion, however, our consideration of a Bivens request follows a familiar sequence, and on the assumption that a constitutionally recognized interest is adversely affected by the actions of federal employees, the decision whether to recognize a Bivens remedy may require two steps. In the first place, there is the question whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages. Bush, supra, at 378. But even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: “the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” Bush, supra, at 378. A In this factually plentiful case, assessing the significance of any alternative remedies at step one has to begin by categorizing the difficulties Robbins experienced in dealing with the Bureau. We think they can be separated into four main groups: torts or tort-like injuries inflicted on him, charges brought against him, unfavorable agency actions, and offensive behavior by Bureau employees falling outside those three categories. Tortious harm inflicted on him includes Vessels’s unauthorized survey of the terrain of the desired easement and the illegal entry into the lodge, and in each instance, Robbins had a civil remedy in damages for trespass. Understandably, he brought no such action after learning about the survey, which was doubtless annoying but not physically damaging. For the incident at the lodge, he chose not to pursue a tort remedy, though there is no question that one was available to him if he could prove his allegations. Cf. Correctional Services Corp., supra, at 72-73 (considering availability of state tort remedies in refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy). The charges brought against Robbins include a series of administrative claims for trespass and other land-use violations, a fine for the unauthorized road repair in 1997, and the two criminal charges that same year. Robbins had the opportunity to contest all of the administrative charges; he did fight some (but not all) of the various land-use and trespass citations, and he challenged the road repair fine as far as the IBLA, though he did not take advantage of judicial review when he lost in that tribunal. **8 He exercised his right to jury trial on the criminal complaints, and although the rapid acquittal tended to support his charge of baseless action by the prosecution (egged on by Bureau employees), the federal judge who presided at the trial did not think the Government’s case thin enough to justify awarding attorney’s fees, and Robbins’s appeal from that decision was late. See Robbins, 179 F. 3d, at 1269-1270. The trial judge’s denial of fees may reflect facts that dissuaded Robbins from bringing a state-law action for malicious prosecution, though it is also possible that a remedy would have been unavailable against federal officials, see Blake v. Rupe, 651 P. 2d 1096, 1107 (Wyo. 1982) (“Malicious prosecution is not an action available against a law enforcement official”). ****6 For each charge, in any event, Robbins had some procedure to defend and make good on his position. He took advantage of some opportunities, and let others pass; although he had mixed success, he had the means to be heard. The more conventional agency action included the 1995 cancellation of the right-of-way in Robbins’s favor (originally given in return for the unrecorded easement for the Government’s benefit); the 1995 decision to reduce the SRUP from five years to one; the termination of the SRUP in 1999; and the revocation of the grazing permit that same year. Each time, the Bureau claimed that Robbins was at fault, and for each claim, administrative review was available, subject to ultimate judicial review under the APA. Robbins took no appeal from the 1995 decisions, stopped after losing an IBLA appeal of the SRUP denial, and obtained a stay from the IBLA of the Bureau’s revocation of the grazing permit. Three events elude classification. The 1995 incident in which Robbins’s horse was struck primarily involved Robbins and his neighbor, not the Bureau, and the sheriff never brought criminal charges. The videotaping of ranch guests during the 2000 drive, while no doubt thoroughly irritating and bad for business, may not have been unlawful, depending, among other things, upon the location on public or private land of the people photographed. C£ Restatement (Second) of Torts §652B (1976) (defining tort of intrusion upon seclusion). Even if a tort was committed, it is unclear whether Robbins, rather than his guests, would be the proper plaintiff, or whether the tort should be chargeable against the Government (as distinct from employees) under the FTCA, cf. Carlson, 446 U. S., at 19-20 (holding that FTCA and Bivens remedies were “parallel, complementary causes of action” and that the availability of the former did not preempt the latter). The significance of Wallace’s 2001 attempt to pressure Smith into impounding Robbins’s cattle is likewise up in the air. The legitimacy of any impoundment that might have occurred would presumably have depended on where particular cattle were on the patchwork of private and public lands, and in any event, Smith never impounded any. In sum, Robbins has an administrative, and ultimately a judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints. He suffered no charges of wrongdoing on his own part without an opportunity to defend himself (and, in the ease of the criminal charges, to recoup the consequent expense, though a judge found his claim wanting). And final agency action, as in canceling permits, for example, was open to administrative and judicial review, as the Court of Appeals realized, 433 F. 3d, at 772. This state of the law gives Robbins no intuitively meritorious case for recognizing a new constitutional cause of action, but neither does it plainly answer no to the question whether he should have it. Like the combination of public and private land ownership around the ranch, the forums of defense and redress open to Robbins are a patchwork, an assemblage of state and federal, administrative and judicial benches applying regulations, statutes, and common law rules. It would be hard to infer that Congress expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens hand, but equally hard to extract any clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new claim. Compare Bush, 462 U. S., at 388 (refusing to create a Bivens remedy when faced with “an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations”); and Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 426 (“Congress chose specific forms and levels of protection for the rights of persons affected”), with Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397 (finding “no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured [in this way] may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress”). B This, then, is a case for Bivens step two, for weighing reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action, the way common law judges have always done. See Bush, supra, at 378. Here, the competing arguments boil down to one on a side: from Robbins, the inadequacy of discrete, incident-by-incident remedies; and from the Government and its employees, the difficulty of defining limits to legitimate zeal on the public’s behalf in situations where hard bargaining is to be expected in the back-and-forth between public and private interests that the Government’s employees engage in every day. 1 As we said, when the incidents are examined one by one, Robbins’s situation does not call for creating a constitutional cause of action for want of other means of vindication, so he is unlike the plaintiffs in cases recognizing freestanding claims: Davis had no other remedy, Bivens himself was not thought to have an effective one, and in Carlson the plaintiff had none against Government officials. Davis, 442 U. S., at 245 (“For Davis, as for Bivens, ‘it is damages or nothing’ ” (quoting Bivens, supra, at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment))); Carlson, supra, at 23 (“[W]e cannot hold that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA remedy” against the Government). But Robbins’s argument for a remedy that looks at the course of dealing as a whole, not simply as so many individual incidents, has the force of the metaphor Robbins invokes, “death by a thousand cuts.” Brief for Respondent 40. It is one thing to be threatened with the loss of grazing rights, . or to be prosecuted, or to have one’s lodge broken into, but something else to be subjected to this in combination over a period of six years, by a series of public officials bent on making life difficult. Agency appeals, lawsuits, and criminal defense take money, and endless battling depletes the spirit along with the purse. The whole here is greater than the sum of its parts. 2 On the other side of the ledger there is a difficulty in defining a workable cause of action. Robbins describes the wrong here as retaliation for standing on his right as a property owner to keep the Government out (by refusing a free replacement for the right-of-way it had lost), and the mention of retaliation brings with it a tailwind of support from our longstanding recognition that the Government may not retaliate for exercising First Amendment speech rights, see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U. S. 378 (1987), or certain others of constitutional rank, see, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70 (1973) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury). But on closer look, the claim against the Bureau’s employees fails to fit the prior retaliation cases. Those cases turn on an allegation of impermissible purpose and motivation; an employee who spoke out on matters of public concern and then was fired, for example, would need to “prove that the conduct at issue was constitutionally protected, and that it was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination.” Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 675 (1996). In its defense, the Government may respond that the firing had nothing to do with the protected speech, or that “it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Ibid. In short, the outcome turns on “what for” questions: what was the Government’s purpose in firing him and would he have been fired anyway? Questions like these have definite answers, and we have established methods for identifying the presence of an illicit reason (in competition with others), not only in retaliation cases but on claims of discrimination based on race or other characteristics. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). But a Bivens case by Robbins could not be resolved merely by answering a “what for” question or two. All agree that the Bureau’s employees intended to convince Robbins to grant an easement. But unlike punishing someone for speaking out against the Government, trying to induce someone to grant an easement for public use is a perfectly legitimate purpose: as a landowner, the Government may have, and in this instance does have, a valid interest in getting access to neighboring lands. The “what for” question thus has a ready answer in terms of lawful conduct. Robbins’s challenge, therefore, is not to the object the Government seeks to achieve, and for the most part his argument is not that the means the Government used were necessarily illegitimate; rather, he says that defendants simply demanded too much and went too far. But as soon as Robbins’s claim is framed this way, the line-drawing difficulties it creates are immediately apparent. A “too much” kind of liability standard (if standard at all) can never be as reliable a guide to conduct and to any subsequent liability as a “what for” standard, and that reason counts against recognizing freestanding liability in a case like this. The impossibility of fitting Robbins’s claim into the simple “what for” framework is demonstrated, repeatedly, by recalling the various actions he complains about. Most of them, such as strictly enforcing rules against trespass or conditions on grazing permits, are legitimate tactics designed to improve the Government’s negotiating position. Just as a private landowner, when frustrated at a neighbor’s stubbornness in refusing an easement, may press charges of trespass every time a cow wanders across the property line or call the authorities to report every land-use violation, the Government too may stand firm on its rights and use its power to protect public property interests. Though Robbins protests that the Government was trying to extract the easement for free instead of negotiating, that line is slippery even in this case; the Government was not offering to buy the easement, but it did have valuable things to offer in exchange, like continued. permission for Robbins to use Government land on favorable terms (at least to the degree that the terms of a permit were subject to discretion). It is true that the Government is no ordinary landowner, with its immense economic power, its role as trustee for the public, its right to cater to particular segments of the public (like the recreational users who would take advantage of the right-of-way to get to remote tracts), and its wide discretion to bring enforcement actions. But in many ways, the Government deals with its neighbors as one owner among the rest (albeit a powerful one). Each may seek benefits from the others, and each may refuse to deal with the others by insisting on valuable consideration for anything in return. And as a potential contracting party, each neighbor is entitled to drive a hard bargain, as even Robbins acknowledges, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32. That, after all, is what Robbins did by flatly refusing to regrant the easement without further recompense, and that is what the defendant employees did on behalf of the Government. So long as they had authority to withhold or withdraw permission to use Government land and to enforce the trespass and land-use rules (as the IBLA confirmed that they did have at least most of the time), they were within their rights to make it plain that Robbins’s willingness to give the easement would determine how complaisant they would be about his trespasses on public land, when they had discretion to enforce the law to the letter. Robbins does make a few allegations, like the unauthorized survey and the unlawful entry into the lodge, that charge defendants with illegal action plainly going beyond hard bargaining. If those were the only coercive acts charged, Robbins could avoid the “too much” problem by fairly describing the Government behavior alleged as illegality in attempting to obtain a property interest for nothing, but that is not a fair summary of the body of allegations before us, according to which defendants’ improper exercise of the Government’s “regulatory powers” is essential to the claim. Brief for Respondent 21. (Of course, even in that simpler case, the tort or torts by Government employees would be so clearly actionable under the general law that it would furnish only the weakest argument for recognizing a generally available constitutional tort.) Rather, the bulk of Robbins’s charges go to actions that, on their own, fall within the Government’s enforcement power. It would not answer the concerns just expressed to change conceptual gears and consider the more abstract concept of liability for retaliatory or undue pressure on a property owner for standing firm on property rights; looking at the claim that way would not eliminate the problem of degree, and it would raise a further reason to balk at recognizing a Bivens claim. For at this high level of generality, a Bivens action to redress retaliation against those who resist Government impositions on their property rights would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property interests, from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations. Exercising any governmental authority affecting the value or enjoyment of property interests would fall within the Bivens regime, and across this enormous swath of potential litigation would hover the difficulty of devising a “too much” standard that could guide an employee’s conduct and a judicial factfinder’s conclusion. The point here is not to deny that Government employees sometimes overreach, for of course they do, and they may have done so here if all the allegations are true. The point is the reasonable fear that a general Bivens cure would be worse than the disease. C In sum, defendants were acting in the name of the Bureau, which had the authority to grant (and had given) Robbins some use of public lands under its control and wanted a right-of-way in return. Defendants bargained hard by capitalizing on their discretionary authority and Robbins’s violations of various permit terms, though truculence was apparent on both sides. One of the defendants, at least, clearly crossed the line into impermissible conduct in breaking into Robbins’s lodge, although it is not clear from the record that any other action by defendants was more serious than garden-variety trespass, and the Government has successfully defended every decision to eliminate Robbins’s permission to use public lands in the ways he had previously enjoyed. Robbins had ready at hand a wide variety of administrative and judicial remedies to redress his injuries. The proposal, nonetheless, to create a new Bivens remedy to redress such injuries collectively on a theory of retaliation for exercising his property right to exclude, or on a general theory of unjustifiably burdening his rights as a property owner, raises a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of action. A judicial standard to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work out, and a general provision for tortlike liability when Government employees are unduly zealous in pressing a governmental interest affecting property would invite an onslaught of Bivens actions. We think accordingly that any damages remedy for actions by Government employees who push too hard for the Government’s benefit may come better, if at all, through legislation. “Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation” against those who act on the public’s behalf. Bush, 462 U. S., at 389. And Congress can tailor any remedy to the problem perceived, thus lessening the risk of raising a tide of suits threatening legitimate initiative on the part of the Government’s employees. Ibid. (“[Congress] may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts”); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 814 (1982) (recognizing “the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). III Robbins’s other claim is under RICO, which gives civil remedies to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [18 U. S. C. § 1962].” 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c). Section 1962(e) makes it a crime for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” RICO defines “racketeering activity” to include “any act which is indictable under” the Hobbs Act as well as “any act or threat involving... extortion ..., which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” §§ 1961(1)(A)-(B) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The Hobbs Act, finally, criminalizes interference with interstate commerce by extortion, along with attempts or conspiracies, § 1951(a), extortion being defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right,” § 1951(b)(2). Robbins charges defendants with violating the Hobbs Act by wrongfully trying to get the easement under color of official right, to which defendants reply with a call to dismiss the RICO claim for two independent reasons: the Hobbs Act does not apply when the National Government is the intended beneficiary of the allegedly extortionate acts; and a valid claim of entitlement to the disputed property is a complete defense against extortion. Because we agree with the first contention, we do not reach the second. The Hobbs Act does not speak explicitly to efforts to obtain property for the Government rather than a private party, and that leaves defendants’ contention to turn on the common law conception of “extortion,” which we presume Congress meant to incorporate when it passed the Hobbs Act in 1946. See Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U. S. 393, 402 (2003) (construing the term “extortion” in the Hobbs Act by reference to its common law meaning); Evans v. United States, 504 U. S. 255, 259 (1992) (same); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken”). “At common law, extortion was a property offense committed by a public official who took any money or thing of value that was not due to him under the pretense that he was entitled to such property by virtue of his office.” Scheidler, supra, at 402 (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 141 (1769), and citing 3 R. Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure §1393, pp. 790-791 (1957); internal quotation marks omitted). In short, “[ejxtortion by the public official was the rough equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” Evans, supra, at 260. Thus, while Robbins is certainly correct that public officials were not immune from charges of extortion at common law, see Brief for Respondent 43, the crime of extortion focused on the harm of public corruption, by the sale of public favors for private gain, not on the harm caused by overzealous efforts to obtain property on behalf of the Government. The importance of the line between public and private beneficiaries for common law and Hobbs Act extortion is confirmed by our own case law, which is completely barren of an example of extortion under color of official right undertaken for the sole benefit of the Government. See, e. g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. 257, 273 (1991) (discussing circumstances in which public official’s receipt of campaign contributions constitutes extortion under color of official right); Evans, supra, at 257 (Hobbs Act prosecution for extortion under color of official right, where public official accepted cash in exchange for favorable votes on a rezoning application); United States v. Gillock, 445 U. S. 360, 362 (1980) (Hobbs Act prosecution for extortion under color of official right, where state senator accepted money in exchange for blocking a defendant’s extradition and agreeing to introduce legislation); cf. United States v. Deaver, 14 F. 595, 597 (WDNC 1882) (under the “technical meaning [of extortion] in the common law,... [t]he officer must unlawfully and corruptly receive such money or article of value for his own benefit or advantage”). More tellingly even, Robbins has cited no decision by any court, much less this one, from the entire 60-year period of the Hobbs Act that found extortion in efforts of Government employees to get property for the exclusive benefit of the Government. Of course, there is usually a case somewhere that provides comfort for just about any claim. Robbins musters two for his understanding of extortion under color of official right, neither of which, however, addressed the beneficiary question with any care: People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N. Y. 1827), and Willett v. Devoy, 170 App. Div. 203, 155 N. Y. S. 920 (1915). Whaley was about a charge of extortion against a justice of the peace who wrongfully ordered a litigant to pay compensation to the other party as well as a small administrative fee to the court. Because the case involved illegally obtaining property for the benefit of a private third party, it does not stand for the proposition that an act for the benefit of the Government alone can be extortion. The second case, Willett, again from New York, construed a provision of the State’s Public Officers Law. That statute addressed the problem of overcharging by public officers, see 4 Birdseye’s Consol. Laws of N. Y. Ann., Art. V, §67, p. 4640 (1909), and the court’s opinion on it said that common law extortion did not draw any distinction “on the ground that the official keeps the fee himself,” 170 App. Div., at 204,155 N. Y. S., at 921. But a single, two-page opinion from a state intermediate appellate court issued in 1915 is not much indication that the Hobbs Act was adopted in 1946 subject to the understanding that common law extortion was spacious enough to cover the case Robbins states. There is a reason he is plumbing obscurity. Robbins points to what we said in United States v. Green, 350 U. S. 415, 420 (1956), that “extortion as defined in the [Hobbs Act] in no way depends upon having a direct benefit conferred on the person who obtains the property.” He infers that Congress could not have meant to prohibit extortionate acts in the interest of private entities like unions, but ignore them when the intended beneficiary is the Government. See Brief for Respondent 47-48. But Congress could very well have meant just that; drawing a line between private and public beneficiaries prevents suits (not just recoveries) against public officers whose jobs are to obtain property owed to the Government. So, without some other indication from Congress, it is not reasonable to assume that the Hobbs Act (let alone RICO) was intended to expose all federal employees, whether in the Bureau of Land Management, the Internal Revenue Service, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or any other agency, to extortion charges whenever they stretch in trying to enforce Government property claims. See Sinclair v. Hawke, 314 F. 3d 934, 944 (CA8 2003) (OCC employees “do not become racketeers by acting like aggressive regulators”). As we just suggested, Robbins does not face up to the real problem when he says that requiring proof of a wrongful intent to extort would shield well-intentioned Government employees from liability. It is not just final judgments, but the fear of criminal charges or civil claims for treble damages that could well take the starch out of regulators who are supposed to bargain and press demands vigorously on behalf of the Government and the public. This is the reason we would want to see some text in the Hobbs Act before we could say that Congress meant to go beyond the common law preoccupation with official corruption, to embrace the expansive notion of extortion Robbins urges on us. He falls back to the argument that defendants violated Wyoming’s blackmail statute, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-402 (2005), which he says is a separate predicate offense for purposes of RICO liability. But even assuming that defendants’ conduct would be “chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,” 18 U. S. C. §1961(1)(A), it cannot qualify as a predicate offense for a RICO suit unless it is “capable of being generically classified as extortionate,” Scheidler, 537 U. S., at 409, 410; accord, United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286, 296 (1969). For the reasons just given, the conduct alleged does not fit the traditional definition of extortion, so Robbins’s RICO claim does not survive on a theory of state-law derivation. 4= * * Because neither Bivens nor RICO gives Robbins a cause of action, there is no reason to enquire further into the merits of his claim or the asserted defense of qualified immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Vessels was named as a defendant when the complaint was filed, but he has since died. Because this case arises on interlocutory appeal from denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to Robbins. According to Robbins, Bureau officials neglected to mention his right to seek a stay of the Bureau’s adverse action pending the IBLA’s resolution of his appeal. See 43 CFR §4.21 (2006). Such a stay, if granted, would have permitted Robbins to continue to operate under the 5-year SRUP. We recognized just last Term that the definition of an element of the asserted cause of action was “directly implicated by the defense of qualified immunity and properly before us on interlocutory appeal.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 257, n. 5 (2006). Because the same reasoning applies to the recognition of the entire cause of action, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over this issue, as do we. There was some uncertainty, if not inconsistency, about the willingness of the IBLA to entertain the sorts of claims Robbins advances here. Compare In re Robbins, 146 I. B. L. A. 213, 219 (1998) (rejecting a claim of “ ‘blackmail’ ” on the merits), with Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, 170 I. B. L. A. 219, 226 (2006) (holding that “the trespass decision must be upheld regardless of BLM’s motive in issuing the decision”). In any event, he could have advanced the claims in federal court whether or not the IBLA was willing to listen to them. Cf. In re Robbins, 167 I. B. L. A. 239, 241 (2005) (noting that Robbins “concede[d] that these assertions [of equal protection violations and harassment] are properly cognizable by a court and he raise[d] them only to preserve them as part of the record”). Robbins brought a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution in this litigation, but the District Court dismissed it, Robbins v. Bureau of Land Management, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1295-1298 (Wyo. 2003), and Robbins has pursued it no further. We are aware of no Wyoming case considering this tort. This is the “simple” question Robbins presents for review: “[C]an government officials avoid the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against taking property without just compensation by using their regulatory powers to harass, punish, and coerce a private citizen into giving the Government his property without payment?” Brief for Respondent 21. In light of Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on the extent and duration of the harm suffered by Robbins, we do not read her opinion to suggest that any single adverse action taken by the Government in response to a valid exercise of property rights would give rise to a retaliation claim. It thus appears that even if a “what for” question could be imported into this case, Robbins could not obtain relief without also satisfying an unspecified, and unworkable, “too much” standard. Justice Ginsburg says we mistakenly fail to see that Robbins’s retaliation claim presents only a “what for” question: did defendants take the various actions against Robbins in retaliation for refusing to grant the desired right-of-way gratis (or simply out of malice prompted by Robbins’s refusal and their own embarrassment after forgetting to record the Nelson grant)? But seeing the case as raising only a traditional “what for” question gives short shrift to the Government’s right to bargain hard in a continuing contest. In the standard retaliation case recognized in our precedent, the plaintiff has performed some discrete act in the past, typically saying something that irritates the defendant official; the question is whether the official’s later action against the plaintiff was taken for a legitimate purpose (firing to rid the work force of a substandard performer, for example) or for the purpose of punishing for the exercise of a constitutional right (that is, retaliation, probably motivated by spite). The plaintiff’s action is over and done with, and the only question is the defendant’s purpose, which may be maliciously motivated. In this case, however, the past act or acts (refusing the right-of-way without compensation) are simply particular steps in an ongoing refusal to grant requests for a right-of-way. The purpose of the continuing requests is lawful (the Government still could use the right-of-way), and there are actions the Government may lawfully take to induce or coerce Robbins to end his refusal (presumably like canceling the nonpermanent reciprocal right-of-way originally given to Nelson). The action claimed to be retaliatory may gratify malice in the heart of the official who takes it, but the official act remains an instance of hard bargaining intended to induce the plaintiff to come to legitimate terms. We do not understand Robbins to contend that malice alone, as distinguished from malice combined with the desire to acquire an easement, caused defendants to act the way they did. See Brief for Respondent 21 (accusing defendants of “using their regulatory powers to harass, punish, and coerce a private citizen into giving the Government his property without payment”); but cf. post, at 578-579, n. 3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (‘“Their cause, if they had one, is nothing to them now; They hate for hate’s sake’ ” (quoting There Will Be No Peace, reprinted in W. H. Auden: Collected Poems 615 (E. Mendelson ed. 2007))). Thus, we are not dealing •with one discrete act by a plaintiff and one discrete (possibly retaliatory) act by a defendant, the purpose of which is in question. Instead we are confronting a continuing process in which each side has a legitimate purpose in taking action contrary to the other’s interest. “Retaliation” cannot be classed as a basis of liability here, then, except on one or the other of two assumptions. The first is that the antagonistic acts by the officials extend beyond the scope of acceptable means for accomplishing the legitimate purpose; the acts go beyond hard bargaining on behalf of the Government (whatever spite may lurk in the defendant’s heart). They are “too much.” The second assumption is that the presence of malice or spite in an official’s heart renders any action unconstitutionally retaliatory, even if it would otherwise have been done in the name of legitimate hal’d bargaining. The motive-is-all test is not the law of our retaliation precedent. If a spiteful heart rendered any official efforts actionable as unconstitutional retaliation, our retaliation discharge cases would have asked not only whether the plaintiff was fired for cause (and would have been fired for cause anyway), but whether the official who discharged the plaintiff tainted any legitimate purpose with spitefulness in firing this particular, outspoken critic. But we have taken no such position; to the contrary, we have held that proof that the action was independently justified on grounds other than the improper one defeats the claim. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977). Any other approach would have frustrated an employer’s legitimate interest in securing a competent work force (comparable to the Government’s interest as a landowner here), and would have introduced the complication of proving motive even in cases in which the action taken was plainly legitimate. Since Justice Ginsburg disclaims the second alternative, post, at 580, n. 6, the acts of spite and ill will that she emphasizes will necessarily count in a “too much” calculation. Justice Ginsbueg points out that apprehension of many lawsuits is not a good reason to refrain from creating a Bivens action. Post, at 577, 582. But there is a world of difference between a popular Bivens remedy for a well-defined violation, on the one hand, and (on the other) litigation invited because the elements of a claim are so unclear that no one can tell in advance what claim might qualify or what might not. We ground our judgment on the elusiveness of a limiting principle for Robbins’s claim, not on the potential popularity of a claim that could be well defined. Although the legislative history of the Hobbs Act is generally “sparse and unilluminating with respect to the offense of extortion,” Evans, 504 U. S., at 264, we know that Congress patterned the Act after two sources of law: “the Penal Code of New York and the Field Code, a 19th-century model penal code,” Scheidler, 537 U. S., at 403. In borrowing from these sources, the Hobbs Act expanded the scope of common law extortion to include private perpetrators while retaining the core idea of extortion as a species of corruption, akin to bribery. But Robbins provides no basis for believing that Congress thought of broadening the definition of extortion under color of official right beyond its common law meaning. Section 6-2-402 provides: “(a) A person commits blackmail if, with the intent to obtain property of another or to compel action or inaction by any person against his will, the person: “(ii) Accuses or threatens to accuse a person of a crime or immoral conduct which would tend to degrade or disgrace the person or subject him to the ridicule or contempt of society.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. WJR, THE GOODWILL STATION, INC. et al. No. 495. Argued April 22, 1949. Decided June 6, 1949. . Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Stanley M. Silver-berg, Benedict P. Cottone, Max Goldman, Richard A. Solomon and Paul Dobin. - Louis G. Caldwell argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc.,,were Donald C. Beelar and Percy H. Russell, Jr. Frank U. Fletcher(/was also of counsel for the Coastal 'Plains.-Broadcasting Co., Inc., respondent. Mr. Justice Rutledge deliveréd the opinion of the Court. Most broadly stated, the important question presented by this case is the extent to which due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, Requires federal administrative tribunals to accord the right of oral argument to one claiming to be adversely affected by their action, more particularly upon questions of law. Lest this spacious form of statement bé taken as too sweeping and abstract to pose a justiciable issue, we think the specific context of fact and decisión out of which the question has arisen must be set forth. But before this is done we should say that, as we understand the Court of Appeals’, decision', it has ruled that Fifth Amendment procedural due process requires an opportunity for oral argument, to be given “on every question of law raised before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, including questions raised by demurrer or as if on demurrer, except such questions of law as may be involved in interlocutory orders such as orders for the stay of proceedings pendente lite, for temporary injunctions and the like,” 174 F. 2d 226, 233, and on this basis has remanded this cause to the Federal Communications Commission for oral argument. Involved in the controversy are two radio stations and the Commission, which is the petitioner here. One of the stations is the respondent WJR. It is licensed by the Commission as a “Class I-A Station,” to broadcast day and night from‘Detroit, Michigan, on a frequency of 760 kilocycles and with a strength of 50 kilowatts. The other station is the intervenor, Coastal Plains (formerly Tarboro) Broadcasting Company. Prior to August 22, 1946, Tarboro filed written application with the Commission for a permit to construct a “Class II Station” to broadcast from Tarboro, North Carolina. ' On ’that date the Commission granted the application. The permit specified that the new station was to broadcast during the day from Tarboro at a strength of one kilowatt on the frequency of 760 kilocycles, which previously had been used exclusively by WJR. The construction permit was granted without notice to WJR and without oral hearing or other participation by-it in the proceedings before the Commission. On'September 10 following, WJR filed with the Commission a written “Petition for reconsideration and hearing.” This'alleged that the proposed broadcasting range of the Coastal Plains station would cause “objectionable interference” with respondent’s broadcast signal. Interference was said to be anticipated principally in certain areas;, of Michigan where “the field intensity of WJR averagés 32 microvolts per meter or less during the daytime hours,” but where “WJR provides the best signal available”; limited interference “during the winter season” was also expected within “contours” of field intensity “much higher” than 32 microvolts; interference of unspecified extent was also thought likely in neighboring states, though as to such areas it was conceded that “a better signal is provided by other stations.” On the basis of these allegations WJR asked that the Commission hold a hearing on the Coastal Plains application to which WJR might be made a party or, in the. alternative, postpone final action on the Coastal Plains application until the conclusion of the then peh^ing.“Clear Channel” proceeding. In that proceeding, essentially legislative, in character, the Commission was considering the desirability of changing its rules so as to allow WJR and other stations to increase their broadcast strengths to 500 kilowatts. The basis for the alternative request was WJR’s fear that a grant of the Coastal Plains construction permit might prejudice a possible future WJR application for increased signal strength in the event the decision in the clear channel proceeding should so modify the Commission’s rules as to facilitate such an application. Coastal Plains filed an opposition to WJR’s petition for reconsideration, asserting among other grounds for denial' that WJR had not alleged that the proposed new opera*tion “would cause any interference within the normally protected service area of station. WJR” and had neither alleged nor proved “any interference within its normally protected contours.” The opposition was based on the theory that under the Commission’s regulations WJR’s license conferred no right, to protection against interference outside its normally protected contours as specified in the regulations, that the interference alleged was outside those contours, and hence WJR’s petition was legally insufficient on its face to state any basis for WJR to be made a party to or to be heard in the Coastal Plains proceeding. No response to the opposition was filed by WJR and some three months later, on December 17,1946, the Commission denied WJR’s application in a written opinion, rendered without prior oral argument. The opinion first disposed of the allegations of interference: “Station WJR is a Class I-A station. Under the Commission’s Rules and Standards, Class I-A stations are normally protected daytime to the 100 microvolt-per-meter contour. The area sought by petitioner to be protected is, according to the engineering affidavit accompanying the petition, served by Station WJR during the daytime with a signal intensity of 32 microvolts-per-meter or less, and is therefore outside the normally protected contour.” As the Court of Appeals later treated this ruling, it was the equivalent of holding as a matter of law, in judicial parlance essentially as though raised upon demurrer, that WJR’s petition did not state facts sufficient to raise any legal issue concerning (indirect) modification of lyJR’s license or fights under the license. The Commission also denied WJR’s alternate request to stay the Coastal Plains application, concluding that, postponement of the newly authorized service, out of deference to any possible “future assignment of facilities” to WJR “would not serve the public interest.” WJR then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The. court agreed that the Commission had not abused its discretion in refusing to stay the Coastal Plains permit until completion of the clear channel proceeding. It held, however, that WJR’s claim of objectionable interference with its broadcast signal presented a question of law and, by a closely divided vote, in the broad language quoted ■;above, that, concerning the merits of that question, the Fifth Amendment assured to WJR the right of oral argument before the Commission. Accordingly, it refused to consider whether the Commission was right in its legal conclusion that areas of signal intensity lower than 100 microvolts per meter were not within the “normally protected contour” of a Class I-A station, reversed the Commission’s denial of WJR’s petition, and remanded the case for oral argument before the Commission. 174 F. 2d 226. To consider the questions of importance to the administrative process thus determined, we issued our writ of certiorari./ 336 U. S. 917. At the outset we note our complete agreement with the Court of Appeals that the Commission was under no duty1" to WJR to postpone final action on the Coastal Plains permit until it had disposed of the clear channel proceeding. As the court pointed out, WJR had no vested right in the “supposititious eventualities” that the Commission at some indeterminate time might modify its rules governing clear channel stations. Furthermore, the judicial regulation of an administrative docket sought by WJR “would require [the Court of Appeals] to direct the order in which the Commission shall consider its cases.” And this, as the court said, it “cannot do.” 174 F. 2d at 231. “Only Congress could confer such a priority.” Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145. Obviously the most important question is the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Fifth Amendment due process required the Commission to afford respondent an opportunity for oral argument upon its petition for reconsideration of Coastal' Plains’ application; together with its grounding of that ruling in the even broader one that such an opportunity is an inherent element of procedural due process in all judicial or quasi-judicial, i. e., administrative, determinations ■ of questions of law, outside of such questions as may arise upon interlocutory matters involving stays pendente lite, temporary injunctions and the like. That the scope of its decision might not be .misunderstood, the court expressly stated: “A ruling upon a demurrer is obviously not interlocutory for if the demurrer is sustained the pleader’s cause (or defense) is dismissed upon the merits . ...” Moreover; except as to the indicated interlocutory matters, the right of oral argument on questions of law- (“as well as- . . . those of fact” when raised) was said to be “not conditional upon the ex parte view of the tribunal as to whether there is a substantial question as to the sufficiency of the allegations of a complainant.” 174 F. 2d at 240. Accordingly, although it was urged both by the Commission and by WJR to consider and determine thej “threshold” question of law upon. its merits, namely, whether the Commission’s decision in denying WJR’s petition was wrong, the court refused to consider or decide that question. In its view the question of the Commission’s duty to accord a hearing, “i. e., to hear argument before deciding whether the allegations of WJR’s petition were sufficient” in law, was “a procedural question quite separate from the question on the merits whether or not the allegations of the petition, assuming their truth, were sufficient.” 174 F. 2d at 240. The statutory scheme of the Communications Act, the court thought, “contemplates, before review in this court, proper éxercise of the Commission’s primary jurisdiction, i. e., valid first instance hearings' properly conducted from the procedural — due process — standpoint.” Ibid. Accordingly, the majority felt that the court, “must therefore remand the case with directions to the Commission to allow a hearing to WJR. Then if after hearing the Commission decides that the allegations were insufficient and dismisses the petition ... an appeal to this court will bring properly before us the question of the correctness of the Commission’s decision on the merits . . . .” Ibid. I. Taken at its literal and explicit import, the Court’s broad constitutional ruling cannot be sustained. So taken, it would require oral argument upon every question of law, apart from the excluded interlocutory matters, arising in administrative proceedings of every sort. This would be regardless of whether the legal question were substantial or insubstantial; of the substantive nature of the asserted right or interest involved; of whether Congress had provided a procedure, relating to the particular interest, requiring oral argument or allowing it to be dispensed with; and regardless of the fact that full opportunity for judicial review may be available. We do not stop to consider the .effects of such a ruling, if accepted, upon the work of the vast and varied administrative as well as judicial tribunals of the federal system and the equally numerous and diversified interests affected by their functioning; or indeed upon the many and different types of administrative and judicial procedures which Congress has provided for dealing adjudicatively with such interests. It is enough to say that due process of law, as conceived by the Fifth Amendment, has never been cast in so rigid and all-inclusive confinement. On the contrary, due process of law has never been a term of fixed and invariable content. This is as true with reference to oral argument as with respect to other elements of procedural due process. For this Court has held in some situations that such argument is essential to a fair hearing, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, in others that argument submitted in writing is sufficient. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481. See also Johnson & Wimsatt v. Hazen, 69 App. D. C. 151; Mitchell v. Reichelderfer, 61 App. D. C. 50. . The decisions cited are sufficient to show that, the broad generalization made by the Court of Appeals is not the law. Rather it is in conflict with this Court’s rulings, in effect, that the right of oral argument .as a matter of procedural due process varies from case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other procedural regulations. Certainly the Constitution does not require oral argument in all cases where only insubstantial or frivolous questions of law, or indeed even substantial ones, are raised. Equally certainly it has left wide discretion to Congress in creating the procedures to be followed in both administrative and judicial proceedings, as well as in their conjunction. Without in any sense discounting the value of oral argument wherever it may be appropriate or, by virtue of the particular circumstances, constitutionally required, we cannot accept the broad formula upon which the Court of Appeals rested its ruling. To do so would do violence not only to our own former decisions but also, we think, to the constitutional power of Congress to devise differing administrative and legal procedures appropriate for the disposition of issues affecting interests widely varying in kind. It follows also that we should not undertaké in this case to generalize more broadly than the particular circumstances require upon when and under what circumstances procedural due process may require oral argument. That is not a matter, under our decisions, for broadside generalization and indiscriminate application. It is rather one for case-to-case determination, through which alone account may be taken of differences in the particular interests affected, circumstances involved, and procedures prescribed by Congress for dealing with them. Only thus may the judgment of Congress, expressed pursuant to its power under the Constitution to devise both judicial and administrative procedures, be taken into account. Any other approach would be; in these respects, highly abstract, indeed largely in a vacuum. II. Descending to the concrete setting of this case in the provisions of the Communications Act, we are unable to conclude that the procedure Congress has provided for determination of the questions respondent raises affords any semblance of due process deficiency. The statute itself provides in terms for oral argument before the Commission in a single situation only, namely, in proceedings heard initially before an examiner under §409 (a). That provision however has no pertinence to this case, since it tvas not heard or assigned for hearing in the first instance before an examiner and respondent’s claimed right of participation arises under § 312 (b). 47 U. S. C. § 312 (b). That section authorizes the Commission to modify station licenses “if in the judgment of the Commission such action will, promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” but provides “That no such order of modification shall become final until the holder of such outstanding license . . . shall have been notified in writing of the proposed action and the grounds or reasons therefor and shall have been given reasonable opportunity to show cause why such an order of modification should not issue.” As bearing on the meaning of § 312 (b), account must be taken also of two other factors. One is § 4 (j) of the Act [47 U. S. C.. § 154 (j)], which provides: “The Commission may. conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends óf justice. . . . Any party may appear before the Commission and be heard in person or by attorney. . . .” The other factor consists in this Court’s decision in Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S. 239, the so-called KOA case. That case held that the granting of. a license to broadcast on a frequency and at a strength which would interfere with .the broadcast signal of a prior licensee within the protection of the latter’s license as afforded by the Commission’s existing rules constitutes an indirect modification of the prior outstanding license. From this it was held to follow that § 312 (b) gave the prior licensee the right to be made a party to the proceeding and hence to “have notice in writing of the proposed action and the grounds therefor and ... a reasonable opportunity to show cause why an order of modification should not issue.” 319 U. S. at 245-246. Then followed the Court’s conclusion that by virtue of KOA’s right to'be a party, it had also the right under § 402 (b) (2), as a “person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected,” to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Commission’s denial of its petition , to intervene and participate as a party in the proceedings before it. It is in this context of statutory provisions and judicial decision that, WJR’s claim of right to participate in the Commission’s proceedings, including the right óf oral argument, and. of denial of due process through the denial of its petition for reconsideration arises and must be considered. WJR’s petition presents the question whether upon its face it states facts sufficient to show (indirect) modification of its license by the granting of Coastal Plains’ application. This in turn depends on whether allegations not asserting interference within the 100 microvoltper-meter contour or, as the Commission held, allegations asserting interference only “outside the normally protected contour” of WJR’s license, set forth any legally sufficient basis for a claim of right to be made a party and participate in the proceedings. And, again, according to respondent, the answer to.that question turns on whether the Commission’s Standards of Good Engineering Practice Concerning Standard Broadcast Stations constitute a part of and a limitation upon WJR’s license. Respondent insists that those Standards, as a matter of law, do not limit its license or measure the protection it affords against “objectionable interference”; it necessarily argues in addition that the degree -of interference its petition alleges brings about an-(indirect) modification of its license (conversely stated, that^the license protected it against the alleged degree of interference) and hence, as in the KOA case, the proposed grant of a new license entitles it under § 312 (b) to be made a party to the Coastal Plains proceeding and to participate in it as § 312 (b) provides. This is the claim which the Court of Appeals purported expressly to refuse to consider or decide, prior to oral argument upon it before the Commission. But two things may be noted. One is that, contrary to the situation here, in the KOA case the Commission’s proposed grant of a new license to Station WHDH concededly created interference against which the existing rules of the Commission protected the prior license of KOA. In the second place, the majority’s disclaimer here of decision upon the merits seems hardly consistent with its opinion’s flat ruling, as we understand it, that WJR’s allegations qualified it as a party to the proceeding and not, as the dissenting judges thought, merely as a stranger seeking to come in as an intervenor. For that question here, viz., whether WJR’s allegations entitle it to standing as a party, is but another way of phrasing the issue whether its petition states a legally sufficient claim of (indirect) modification, since under § 312 (b) only a prior licensee who States such a claim is entitled to be made a party and to participate in the proceedings. To decide that one has the status of a party is therefore to decide the question of modification vel non. In view of the court’s mandate, however, we think we must accept its disclaimer. But we also think that, in the light of the disclaimer, its ruling, if it was such, that WJR is entitled to be made a party must be rejected and that question must be regarded as inherently involved in, indeed as identical with, the undetermined issue of modification vel non, if. any effect is to be given to the provisions of § 312 (b). We think the limitations of that section must be given effect. Indeed it is our view that the Act’s procedural scheme and its application in this case have not deprived the respondent of any procedural right guaranteed by the due-process requirement of the Fifth Amendment. That is true notwithstanding the Commission’s failure to afford respondent an opportunity for oral argument upon its allegations in this case. Congress, we think, has committed to the Commission’s discretion, by the terms of § 312 (b) and § 4 (j) of - the Communications Act, the questions whether and under what circumstances it will allow or require oral argument, except where the Act itself expressly requires it. As we have noted, Congress has required oral argument expressly in proceedings heard initially before an examiner under § 409 (a). But no such requirement was made by § 312 (b). While that section requires notice and statement of grounds for any proposed order of modification before such order “shall become final,” it does not specify that further proceedings shall include the right to oral argument; it requires only that the holder of the outstanding license to be modified “shall have been given reasonable opportunity to show cause why such an order of modification should not issue” before the order becomes final. In view of the contrast between this language and that of § 409 (a), it is hardly to be taken that Congress intended the “reasonable opportunity to show cause” always to. include opportunity for oral argument. Indeed, in the absence of any such explicit requirement as that of § 409 (a), the terms of § 312 (b) must be read in the light of the Act’s general procedural authorization in § 4 (j), which empowers the Commission to “conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” In this wording Congress was mindful not only of the ends of justice but also of the proper dispatch of the Commission’s business, a matter not unrelated to achieving the ends of justice, and left largely to its judgment the determination of the manner of conducting its business which would most fairly and reasonably accommodate those ends. Moreover it was dealing with substantive interests involving the use, pursuant To federal license, of channels of radio communication “but not the ownership thereof,” § 301, as to which moreover the Act expressly provides that “no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.” Ibid. In this connection it cannot be recalled too often that “ ‘public convenience, interest, or necessity’ was the touchstone for the exercise of the Commission’s authority” in matters relating to construction permits and licensing, and that this criterion “serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy.” Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137-188. “Necessarily, therefore, the subordinate questions of procedure in ascertaining the public interest, when the Commission’s licensing authority is. invoked — the scope of the inquiry, whether applications should be heard contemporaneously or successively, whether parties should be allowed to intervene in one another’s proceedings, and similar questions — were explicitly and by implication left to the Commission’s own devising, so long, of course, as it observes the basic requirements designed for the protection of private as well as public interest.” Id. at 138. We need not go again over the ground which was covered by this decision and others. Suffice it to say that the Commission has not seen fit to provide for oral argument in all such cases as this arising under § 312 (b); nor is there any basis in the section or the Act for believing-that Congress intended to require it to do- so. “Reasonable opportunity to show cause,” as used in § 3Í2 (b), comprehends, in the light of § 4 (j) and this Court’s prior decisions, that the Commission'shall have broad discretion in determining whether and when oral argument shall be required or permitted, as it does with respect to other procedural mátters. Respondent does not contend that it was denied any opportunity to present for the Commission’s consideration any matter of fact or law in connection with its application or that the Commission has not given all matters submitted by it due and full consideration. We cannot say, in view of the statute and of the subject matter involved, that the Commission abused its discretion in hearing respondent’s application on the written submission. Accordingly we think it was error for the court to decline to decide the merits of the question whether respondent’s application stated a legally sufficient case of (indirect) modification of its license within the terms of § 312 (b) as well as to decide, without determining that question, that respondent was entitled to be made a party to and participate as such in the Coastal Plains proceeding. As we have said, in the situation here presented, the two forms of statement pose the same question in substance, together with the further question, under the KOA decision, whether respondent has standing to appeal as a party aggrieved. The statutory sequence identifies- (1) a legally sufficient claim of modification with (2) right to'standing as a party and (3) right to appeal. This threefold issue presents a question of law respondent is entitled to have determined. The dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals considered the question insubstantial, because they thought, contrary to respondent’s position, that the Commission’s Standards of Good Engineering Practice applied as a limitation upon respondent’s license and therefore excluded it from protection against interference such as respondent alleged, i. e., outside the contours prescribed by the Standards. That question, being one of law, might now be decided here. But since the statute, if it affords respondent a right of appeal, provides that it shall be to the Court of Appeals, and since that court has not decided the basic issue on the merits, we think the cause should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for decision of that question, uncomplicated by questions of constitutionality relating to the Commission’s procedure. Accordingly the court’s decision is reversed apd the cause is remanded to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Murpht took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Federal Communications Commission Rules Governing Standard Broadcast Stations § 3.22 (a): “A 'Class I Station’ is a dominant station operating on a clear channel and designed to render primary and secondary service over, an extended area and at relatively long distances. Its primary service area is free from objectionable interference from other stations on the same and adjacent channels, and its secondary service area free from interference, except from stations on the adjacent channel, and from stations on the same channel, in accordance. With the channel designation in Sec. 3.25 or in accordance with,the ’‘Engineering Standards of Allocation’. The operating power shall" :be not less than 10 kw nor more than 50 kw (also see Sec. 3.25"(a) .for’further power limitation).” 4 Fed. Reg. 2715. Federal Communications Commission Rules Governing Standard Broadcast Stations-§ 3.22 (b): “A ‘Class II Station’ is a secondary statiijn which. operates on a clear channel (see Sec. 3.25) and is designed to render service over a primary service area which is limited by and. subject to such interference as may be received from Class -T .stations. A station of this class shall operate with power not dess than 0.25 kilowatts nor more than 50 kilowatts. Whenever necessary a Class II station shall use a directional antenna or other means to avoid interference with Class I stations and with other Class II stations, in accordance with the ‘Engineering Standards of Allocation.’ ’’ 4 Fed. Reg. 2715. For the meaning of the term “field intensity,” and for the relation óf a broadcast signal’s “field intensity” to the legal concept of a licensed radio station’s “normally protected contour,” see note 5. . Federal Communications Commission Rules Governing Standard Broadcast Stations § 3.21 (a): “A ‘clear channel’ is one-on which the, dominant station or stations render service over wide areas and which are cleared of objectionable interference, within their primary service areas and over all or a substantial portion of their secondary service areas.” 4 Fed. Reg. 2715. The dissenting opinion in the- Court of Appeals decision here under review offers a succinct exposition of these technical terms: "This concept of normal protection in the daytime is clear. The circumference of -the. protected area is a contour line, which is fixed by measurement of the strength of the radio waves from the par-. ticúlar station. That strength, or intensity, is measured in terms of microvolts (millionths of a volt) or millivolts (thousandths of a volt) per meter, abbreviated as uv/m and mv/m respectively. The wave which is measured is the groundwave, which follows the surface of the earth and extends greater or less distances depending upon the nature of the earth, its topography, and such obstacles as noise and steel structures. Generally speaking, the greater the distance from the station, the less the strength of the station signal. The ‘100 uv/m ground wave contour’ named in the Commission’s Standards, is the imaginary line which connects all points at which the ground wave of the station is of 100 microvolts per meter strength.” 174 F. 2d 226,244. The “Commission’s Standards” to which the opinion refers are the Standards of Good Engineering Practice Concerning Broadcast Stations. Under the subheading “Engineering Standards of Allocation,” paragraph (2) (a) provides as follows: “The Class I stations in Group 1 are those assigned to the channels allocated by Section 3.25, paragraph (a) [including, inter alia, the 760 kilocycle frequency assigned to WJR, 4 Fed. Reg. 2716], on which duplicate nighttime operation is not permitted, that is, no other station is .permitted to operate on a channel with a Class I station of this group within the limits of the United' States- (the Class II stations assigned the ■ channels operate limited time or daytime only) and during daytime the Class I station is protected to the 100 uv/m ground wave contour-.” 4 Fed. Reg. 2862-.- The case was first argued before three justices; Chief Justice Groner and Justices Clark and Prettyman. By direction of the court it was reargued before Justices Stephens, Edgerton, Clark, •Wilbur K. Miller and Prettyman. The decision was rendered pursiiant to an opinion of Justice Stephens, in which Justices Clark and Miller concurred.^ Justice Prettyman filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Edgerton joined. The statement, taken in its context and the. pervading sense of the opinion, related not merely to judicial rulings technically “raised by demurrer” but also to judicial and administrative rulings “as if on demurrer,” i. e., as expressly stated later in the opinion, to rulings “raised by demurrer or motion to dismiss or, in an administrative proceeding, by some less formally named instrument of'like purpose,, or by the tribunal’s sua sponte treatment of a petition as if under demurrer . . . .” 174 F. 2d at 236. Both from the wording of the immediate reference, quoted above, and from other language-in context, it is clear that the court’s reference to “the statutory scheme set up in the Communications Act” was not designed as a ruling that the statutory scheme itself, considered wholly as such and apart from any requirement of due process, affords the right of’ oral argument upon all questions of law, other than the interlocutory exceptions, before the Commission. Rather, the reference was intended to construe the Act as incorporating the court’s reiterated conception of due-process "requirements in this respect, in effect as a construction required by the Fifth Amendment. It is clear also that in this ruling the court identified “hearing” with “oral argument” insofar as determination of questions of law are concerned. We are thus confronted, so far as the court’s decision went, with no question purely of statutory construction but solely, at bottom, with one of constitutional import and effect. “The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights.” Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304 U. S. 333, 351. “The requirements imposed by that guaranty [Fifth Amendment due process] are not technical, nor is any particular form of procedure necessary.” Inland Empire Council v. Milis, 325 U. S. 697, 710. See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 519-521; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152-153; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 496-497; Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 342, 343; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 235; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597. For example, what may be appropriate or constitutionally required by way of procedure, including opportunity for oral argument, in protection of an alien’s claims of right to enter the country, cf. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U. S. 806, may be very different from what is required to determine an alleged citizen’s right of entry or reentry, cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 282; Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F. 2d 239, 243-244; a claimed right of naturalization, Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 576-578; a claim1 of just compensation for land condemned, cf. Roberts v. New York City, 295 U. S. 264, 277-278; or the right to defend against an indictment for crime. Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 1081, 47 U. S. C. § 301 ff. The section, reads in part: “In all cases heard by an examiner the Commission shall hear oral arguments . . . .” 47 U. S. C. §409 (a). The Standards, 4 Fed. Reg. 2862, expressly state that “during daytime the Class I station is protected to the 100 uv/m ground wave contour.” § 1 (2) (a). The Commission’s Standards of Good Engineering Practice Concerning Standard Broadcast Stations' were adopted in 1939 after formal and informal hearings. Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission (1940) 37. In other words, the interference alleged was within the conceded “normal contours” of KOA’s protection, not without them. There was therefore no question such as is presented here whether the existing station’s license protected it against the interference alleged. The KOA decision therefore cannot be taken as ruling that one asserting interference outside the scope' of its license protection, afforded by the Commission’s rules and regulations, is entitled to be made a party and to participate in proceedings involving the issuance of a new license creating only such interference. The court’s opinion stated: “WJR as an outstanding licensee is not a mere permissive intervener or, as the minority puts it, an ‘outsider’.” 174 F. 2d at 240. The statement of the minority to which this rejoinder was made was: “The ruling [of the majority] is that a petitioner for intervention in an administrative proceeding is entitled to an oral hearing as a matter of constitutional right, no matter what or how little he says in his petition. . . . [WJR’s petition] was basically a petition to intervene, as it asked that WJR be made a party to the Coastal Plains proceeding.” Id. at 243. The Court of Appeals was not simply construing the statute, but was influenced throughout its opinion by its broad constitutional generalization concerning oral argument. In that view necessarily the Act’s specific terms, including, those of §312 (b), sank into the generalization’s constitutional coloring. In that light, perhaps, the majority’s disclaimer and its ruling that WJR was entitled to come in as a party bore semblance of consistency. But without the coloration, § 312 (b) identifies showing of modification with standing as a party; and, unless this limitation is invalid for constitutional reasons, it must be given éffect. That is true even though § 4 (j) also provides that “Any party may appear before the Commission and be heard in person or by attorney.” That provision does not nullify the Comjnission’s discretion as to.the manner in which the “reasonable opportunity to show cause” afforded by §312 (b) shall be. given. It'only assures the right to participate “in person or by attorney” in the manner reasonably found by the Commission to be appropriate. Federal Rule 78, the terms of which were noted by the dissent in the Court of Appeals, 174 F. 2d 226, 247, provides in part, as to United States District Courts: “To expedite’ its business, the., court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 78. Similar notice may be taken of Rule 7 (2) of this Court which, governing not only motion practice in appellate cases but motions for leave to initiate original proceedings, provides in part: “Oral argument will not be heard on any motion unless the court specially assigns it therefor . . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RAYGOR et al. v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA et al. No. 00-1514. Argued November 26, 2001 Decided February 27, 2002 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 548. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 549. Howard L. Bolter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Eric Schnapper. Mark B. Rotenberg argued the cause for respondent. With’ him on the brief were Lorie S. Gildea and Tracy M. Smith. Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for intervenor United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Mc-Collum, Barbara McDowell, Mark B. Stern, and Alisa B. Klein. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Maryland et al. by J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Andrew Baida, Solicitor General, Robert H. Kono, Acting Attorney General of Guam, and Dan Schweitzer, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, John Cornyn of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Randolph Beales of Virginia; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In federal court, petitioners asserted state law claims under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (1994 ed.), against respondent university, an arm of the State of Minnesota. Those claims were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and petitioners refiled them in state court past the period of limitations. The supplemental jurisdiction statute purports to toll the period of limitations for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. § 1367(d). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that provision unconstitutional when applied to claims against noncon-senting state defendants, such as respondent university, and dismissed petitioners’ claims. We affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that the tolling provision does not apply to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting States. I In August 1995, petitioners Lance Raygor and James Goodchild filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charges alleged that their employer, the University of Minnesota, discriminated against them on the basis of age in December 1994 by attempting to compel them to accept early retirement at the age of 52. After petitioners refused to retire, the university allegedly reclassified petitioners’ jobs so as to reduce their salaries. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45; Brief for Petitioners 3. The EEOC cross-filed petitioners’ charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR) and later issued a right-to-sue letter on June 6,1996, advising that petitioners could file a lawsuit within 90 days under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Brief for United States 5. The MDHR likewise issued right-to-sue letters on July 17,1996, advising petitioners that they could file suit within 45 days under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat., ch. 363 (1991). 620 N. W. 2d 680, 681 (Minn. 2001); App. to Pet. for Cert. A-46 to A-47. On or about August 29, 1996, each petitioner filed a separate complaint against respondent Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota (hereinafter respondent), in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 620 N. W. 2d, at 681; App. to Pet. for Cert. A-41. Each complaint alleged a federal cause of action under the ADEA and a state cause of action under the MHRA. The suits were subsequently consolidated. 604 N. W. 2d 128, 130 (Minn. App. 2000). Respondent filed answers to these complaints in September 1996, setting forth eight affirmative defenses, including that the suits were “ ‘barred in whole or in part by Defendant’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.’” Brief for Petitioners 4. The District Court entered a scheduling plan that the parties agreed upon. According to the plan, discovery would finish by May 30,1997, and dispositive motions would be filed by July 15,1997. Ibid. The parties then engaged in discovery as well as mediation. Ibid. In early July 1997, respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners’ claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Brief for Petitioners 5, n. 5. The motion argued that the federal and state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Respondent Regents of the University of Minnesota 5. Petitioners’ response acknowledged respondent’s “ ‘potential Eleventh Amendment immunity from state discrimination claims in Federal Court,’” but urged the District Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims if the federal claims were upheld. Brief for Petitioners 5-6. On July 11, 1997, the District Court granted respondent’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismissed all of petitioners’ claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-39. Petitioners appealed, but the appeal was stayed pending this Court’s decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62 (2000). 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Kimel held that the “ADEA does not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.” 528 U. S., at 92. Given that result, petitioners moved to withdraw their appeal, and it was dismissed in January 2000. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682; Brief for Petitioners 6-7. In the meantime, approximately three weeks after the Federal District Court had dismissed their state law claims, petitioners refiled their state law claims in Hennepin County District Court. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent’s answer asserted that “ ‘plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.’” Brief for Petitioners 7. The state court initially stayed the lawsuit because of the pending federal appeal, but lifted the stay in December 1998 for the purpose of allowing respondent to move for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. 620 N. W. 2d, at 682. Respondent moved for summary judgment in February 1999, arguing that petitioners’ state claims were barred by the applicable 45 day statute of limitations. See Minn. Stat. §§363.06, subd. 3, 363.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2000). Respondent also argued that the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, did not apply to toll the limitations period on the state law claims while they were pending in federal court because the Federal District Court never had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners’ ADE A claims. Petitioners argued that the tolling provision of the supplemental jurisdiction statute applied because their state law claims had been dismissed without prejudice. App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3, B-4. The State District Court treated respondent’s motion for summary judgment as a motion to dismiss and granted it, holding that § 1367(d) did “not apply ... because the federal district court never had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the controversy” since “both the state and federal claims were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at B-5, B-6. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court first decided that the Federal District Court had original jurisdiction over the case before respondent’s Eleventh Amendment defense was “successfully asserted.” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132 (citing Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381 (1998)). The court then held that § 1367(d) applied to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims because that provision “allows tolling of any claim dismissed by a federal district court, whether dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds or at the discretion of the federal district court under [§1367](c).” 604 N. W. 2d, at 132-133. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The court noted that respondent was an arm of the State, and found that the federal tolling provision facially applied to petitioners’ state law claims. 620 N. W. 2d, at 684, 687. The court concluded, however, “that application of section 1367(d) to toll the statute of limitations applicable to state law claims against an unconsenting state defendant first filed in federal court but then dismissed and brought in state court is an impermissible denigration of [respondent’s] Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 687. The court thus concluded that § 1367(d) could not constitutionally apply to toll the statute of limitations for petitioners’ state law claims, and it dismissed those claims. We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 1065 (2001), on the question whether 28 U. S. C. § 1367(d) is unconstitutional as applied to a state defendant. H-I l — l In Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), this Court held that federal courts deciding claims within their federal-question subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, may decide state law claims not within their subject matter jurisdiction if the federal and state law claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and comprise “but one constitutional 'case.’ ” Mine Workers, supra, at 725. Jurisdiction over state law claims in such instances was known as “pendent jurisdiction.” This Court later made clear that, absent authorization from Congress, a district court could not exercise pendent jurisdiction over claims involving parties who were not already parties to a claim independently within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545 (1989). In the wake of Finley, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that “Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same ‘transaction or occurrence’ as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of additional parties.” Report of Federal Courts Study Committee 47 (Apr. 2, 1990). Soon thereafter, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1367, as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. Subsection (a) of § 1367 states that “[ejxcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.” Subsection (b) places limits on supplemental jurisdiction when the district court’s original jurisdiction is based only on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Subsection (c) allows district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in certain situations, such as when a “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.” § 1367(c)(1) (1994 ed.). Petitioners originally sought to have their state law claims heard in federal court as supplemental claims falling under § 1367(a). App. to Brief for Petitioners B-3. Prior to the enactment of § 1367, however, this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal court. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 120 (1984). In that context, the Eleventh Amendment was found to be an “explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction.” Id., at 118. Consequently, an express grant of jurisdiction over such claims would be an abrogation of the sovereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. Before Congress could attempt to do that, it must make its intention to abrogate “‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 228 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985)). The most that can be said about subsection (a), however, is that it is a general grant of jurisdiction, no more specific to claims against nonconsenting States than the one at issue in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775 (1991). There, we considered whether 28 U. S. C. § 1362 contained a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. That grant of jurisdiction provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (Emphasis added.) Such a. facially broad grant of jurisdiction over “all civil actions” could be read to include claims by Indian tribes against nonconsenting States, but we held that such language was insufficient to constitute a clear statement of an intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Blatchford, supra, at 786. Likewise, we cannot read § 1367(a) to authorize district courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims against nonconsenting States, even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims. Thus, consistent with Blatch- ford, we hold that § 1367(a)’s grant of jurisdiction does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants. Even so, there remains the question whether § 1367(d) tolls the statute of limitations for claims against nonconsenting States that are asserted under § 1367(a) but subsequently dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Subsection (d) of § 1367 provides that “[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” On its face, subsection (d) purports to apply to dismissals of “any claim asserted under subsection (a).” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus, it could be broadly read to apply to any claim technically “asserted” under subsection (a) as long as it was later dismissed, regardless of the reason for dismissal. But reading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the provision given principles of state sovereign immunity. If subsection (d) applied in such circumstances, it would toll the state statute of limitations for 30 days in addition to however long the claim had been pending in federal court. This would require a State to defend against a claim in state court that had never been filed in state court until some indeterminate time after the original limitations period had elapsed. When the sovereign at issue is the United States, we have recognized that a limitations period may be “a central condition” of the sovereign’s waiver of immunity. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, 843 (1986); see also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity”)- In suits against the United States, however, there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling under federal law applies to waivers of the United States’ immunity. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990). From this, the dissent argues that any broadening of a State’s waiver of immunity through tolling under § 1367(d) presumptively does not violate the State’s sovereign immunity. Post, at 552-553, and n. 11 (opinion of Stevens, J.). But this Court has never held that waivers of a State’s immunity presumptively include all federal tolling rules, nor is it obvious that such a presumption would be “a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, supra, at 95. Moreover, with respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued,” Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858), and that “[o]nly the sovereign’s own consent could qualify the absolute character of [its] immunity” from suit in its own courts, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414 (1979). Thus, although we have not directly addressed whether federal tolling of a state statute of limitations constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity with respect to claims against state defendants, we can say that the notion at least raises a serious constitutional doubt. Consequently, we have good reason to rely on a clear statement principle of statutory construction. When “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 242). This principle applies when Congress “intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States” or when it legislates in “ ‘traditionally sensitive areas’ ” that “ ‘affec[t] the federal balance.’ ” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)). In such cases, the clear statement principle reflects “an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461, 464 (1991). Here, allowing federal law to extend the time period in which a state sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal balance in an area that has been a historic power of the States, whether or not it constitutes an abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Thus, applying the clear statement principle helps “ ‘assur[e] that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.’” Will, supra, at 65 (quoting Bass, supra, at 349). This is obviously important when the underlying issue raises a serious constitutional doubt or problem. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 787 (2000) (relying in part on clear statement principle to decide the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§3729-3733 (1994 ed.), did not authorize “an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a State” and avoiding whether such a suit would violate the Eleventh Amendment, an issue raising a serious constitutional doubt); Gregory, supra, at 464 (relying on clear statement principle to determine that state judges were excluded from the ADEA in order to “avoid a potential constitutional problem” given the constraints on the Court’s “ability to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause”). The question then is whether § 1367(d) states a clear intent to toll the limitations period for claims against nonconsenting States that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Here the lack of clarity is apparent in two respects. With respect to the claims the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) to cover any claim “asserted” under subsection (a), but we have previously found similarly general language insufficient to satisfy clear statement requirements. For example, we have held that a statute providing civil remedies for violations committed by “ ‘any recipient of Federal assistance’” was “not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment” even when it was undisputed that a state defendant was a recipient of federal aid. Atascadero, 473 U. S., at 245-246 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982 ed.) (emphasis in original)). Instead, we held that “[w]hen Congress chooses to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.” 473 U. S., at 246. Likewise, § 1367(d) reflects no specific or unequivocal intent to toll the statute of limitations for claims asserted against nonconsenting States, especially considering that such claims do not fall within the proper scope of § 1367(a) as explained above. With respect to the dismissals the tolling provision covers, one could read § 1367(d) in isolation to authorize tolling regardless of the reason for dismissal, but § 1367(d) occurs in the context of a statute that specifically contemplates only a few grounds for dismissal. The requirements of § 1367(a) make clear that a claim will be subject to dismissal if it fails to “form part of the same case or controversy” as a claim within the district court’s original jurisdiction. Likewise, § 1367(b) entails that certain claims will be subject to dismissal if exercising jurisdiction over them would be “inconsistent” with 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). Finally, § 1367(c) (1994 ed.) lists four specific situations in which a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a particular claim. Given that particular context, it is unclear if the tolling provision was meant to apply to dismissals for reasons unmentioned by the statute, such as dismissals on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”). In sum, although § 1367(d) may not clearly exclude tolling for claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, we are looking for a clear statement of what the rule includes, not a clear statement of what it excludes. See Gregory, supra, at 467. Section 1367(d) fails this test. As such, we will not read § 1367(d) to apply to dismissals of claims against nonconsenting States dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. In anticipation of this result, petitioners argue that the tolling provision should be interpreted to apply to their claims because Congress enacted it to prevent due process violations caused by state claim preclusion and anti-claim-splitting laws. Brief for Petitioners 45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 5-12. In other words, petitioners contend that Congress enacted the tolling provision to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against perceived state violations. We have previously addressed the argument that if a statute were passed pursuant to Congress’ §5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism concerns “might carry less weight.” Gregory, 501 U. S., at 468. We concluded, however, that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism,” id., at 469, and held that insofar as statutory intent was ambiguous, we would “not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to... § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 470. That same rule applies here. As already demonstrated, it is far from clear whether Congress intended tolling to apply when claims against non-consenting States were dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Thus, it is not relevant whether Congress acted pursuant to § 5. Petitioners also argue that our construction of the statute does not resolve their case because respondent consented to suit in federal court. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2-4. We have stated that “[a] sovereign’s immunity may be waived” and have “held that a State may consent to suit against it in federal court.” Pennhurst, 465 U. S., at 99 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883)). Petitioners claim that respondent consented to suit by not moving to dismiss petitioners’ state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds until July 1997, some 10 months after the federal lawsuits were filed in August 1996. Yet respondent raised its Eleventh Amendment defense at the earliest possible opportunity by including that defense in its answers that were filed in September 1996. Given that, we cannot say that respondent “unequivocally expressed” a consent to be sued in federal court. Pennhurst, supra, at 99 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974)). The fact that respondent filed its motion in July 1997 is as consistent with adherence to the pretrial schedule as it is with anything else. Indeed, such circumstances are readily distinguishable from the limited situations where this Court has found a State consented to suit, such as when a State voluntarily invoked federal court jurisdiction or otherwise “ma[de] a ‘clear declaration’ that it intends to submit itself to our jurisdiction.” College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 676 (1999). And even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that consent could be inferred “from the failure to raise the objection at the outset of the proceedings,” Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S., at 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring) — a standard this Court has not adopted — consent would still not be found here since respondent raised the issue in its answer. Thus, we find no merit to petitioners’ argument that respondent was a consenting state defendant during the federal court proceedings. We express no view on the application or constitutionality of § 1367(d) when a State consents to suit or when a defendant is not a State. l — l t — 1 I — ( We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners’ state law claims and that § 1367(d) does not toll the period of limitations for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367(d) did not operate to toll the period of limitations for petitioners’ claims, and we affirm the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissing those claims. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. BYRUM, EXECUTRIX No. 71-308. Argued March 1, 1972 Decided June 26, 1972 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGer, C. J., and Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, and RehNQUist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN and BlacicmuN, JJ., joined, -post, p. 151. Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Loring W. Post, and Donald H. Olson. Larry H. Snyder argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Simon H. Rif kind, Adrian W. DeWind, James B. Lewis, and Maurice Austin filed a brief for Gilman et al., Executors, as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Decedent, Milliken C. Byrum, created in 1958 an irrevocable trust to which he transferred shares of stock in three closely held corporations. Prior to transfer, he owned at least 71% of the outstanding stock of each corporation. The beneficiaries were his children or, in the event of their death before the termination of the trust, their surviving children. The trust instrument specified that there be a corporate trustee. Byrum designated as sole trustee an independent corporation, Huntington National Bank. The trust agreement vested in the trustee broad and detailed powers with respect to the control and management of the trust property. These powers were exercisable in the trustee’s sole discretion, subject to certain rights reserved by Byrum: (i) to vote the shares of unlisted stock held in the trust estate; (ii) to disapprove the sale or transfer of any trust assets, including the shares transferred to the trust; (iii) to approve investments and reinvestments; and (iv) to remove the trustee and “designate another corporate Trustee to serve as successor.” Until the youngest living child reached age 21, the trustee was authorized in its “absolute and sole discretion” to pay the income and principal of the trust to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries, “with due regard to their individual needs for education, care, maintenance and support.” After the youngest child reached 21, the trust was to be divided into a separate trust for each child, to terminate when the beneficiaries reached 35. The trustee was authorized in its discretion to pay income and principal from these trusts to the beneficiaries for emergency or other “worthy need,” including education. When he died in 1964, Byrum owned less than 60% of the common stock in two of the corporations and 59% in the third. The trust had retained the shares transferred to it, with the result that Byrum had continued to have the right to vote not less than 71% of the common stock in each of the three corporations. There were minority stockholders, unrelated to Byrum, in each corporation. Following Byrum’s death, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the transferred stock was properly included within Byrum’s gross estate under § 2036 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §2036 (a). That section provides for the inclusion in a decedent’s gross estate of all property which the decedent has transferred by inter vivos transaction, if he has retained for his lifetime “(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property” transferred, or “(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.” The Commissioner determined that the stock transferred into the trust should be included in Byrum’s gross estate because of the rights reserved by him in the trust agreement. It was asserted that his right to vote the transferred shares and to veto any sale thereof by the trustee, together with the ownership of other shares, enabled Byrum to retain the “enjoyment of . . . the property,” and also allowed him to determine the flow of income to the trust and thereby “designate the persons who shall . . . enjoy . . . the income.” The executrix of Byrum’s estate paid an additional tax of $13,202.45, and thereafter brought this refund action in District Court. The facts not being in dispute, the court ruled for the executrix on cross motions for summary judgment. 311 F. Supp. 892 (SD Ohio 1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 440 F. 2d 949 (CA6 1971). We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari. 404 U. S. 937 (1971). I The Government relies primarily on its claim, made under §2036 (a)(2), that Byrum retained the right to designate the persons who shall enjoy the income from the transferred property. The argument is a complicated one. By retaining voting control over the corporations whose stock was transferred, Byrum was in a position to select the corporate directors. He could retain this position by not selling the shares he owned and by vetoing any sale by the trustee of the transferred shares. These rights, it is said, gave him control over corporate dividend policy. By increasing, decreasing, or stopping dividends completely, it is argued that Byrum could “regulate the flow of income to the trust” and thereby shift or defer the beneficial enjoyment of trust income between the present beneficiaries and the re-maindermen. The sum of this retained power is said to be tantamount to a grantor-trustee’s power to accumulate income in the trust, which this Court has recognized constitutes the power to designate the persons who shall enjoy the income from transferred property. At the outset we observe that this Court has never held that trust property must be included in a settlor’s gross estate solely because the settlor retained the power to manage trust assets. On the contrary, since our decision in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929), it has been recognized that a settlor’s retention of broad powers of management does not necessarily subject an inter vivos trust to the federal estate tax. Although there was no statutory analogue to § 2036 (a)(2) when Northern Trust was decided, several lower court decisions decided after the enactment of the predecessor of § 2036 (a)(2) have upheld the settlor’s right to exercise managerial powers without incurring estate-tax liability. In Estate of King v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 973 (1962), a settlor reserved the power to direct the trustee in the management and investment of trust assets. The Government argued that the settlor was thereby empowered to cause investments to be made in such a manner as to control significantly the flow of income into the trust. The Tax Court rejected this argument, and held for the taxpayer. Although the court recognized that the settlor had reserved “wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion as to the types of investments to be made,” id., at 980, it did not find this control over the flow of income to be equivalent to the power to designate who shall enjoy the income from the transferred property. Essentially the power retained by Byrum is the same managerial power retained by the settlors in Northern Trust and in King. Although neither case controls this one — Northern Trust, because it was not decided under §2036 (a)(2) or a predecessor; and King, because it is a lower court opinion — the existence of such precedents carries weight. The holding of Northern Trust, that the settlor of a trust may retain broad powers of management without adverse estate-tax consequences, may have been relied upon in the drafting of hundreds of inter vivos trusts. The modification of this principle now sought by the Government could have a seriously adverse impact, especially upon settlors (and their estates) who happen to have been “controlling” stockholders of a closely held corporation. Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from an interpretation of tax law which has been generally accepted when the departure could have potentially far-reaching consequences. When a principle of taxation requires reexamination, Congress is better equipped than a court to define precisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences. When courts readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may not rely with assurance on what appear to be established rules lest they be subsequently overturned. Legislative enactments, on the other hand, although not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the taxpayers advance warning. The Government argues, however, that our opinion in United States v. O’Malley, 383 U. S. 627 (1966), compels the inclusion in Byrum’s estate of the stock owned by the trust. In O’Malley, the settlor of an inter vivos trust named himself as one of the three trustees. The trust agreement authorized the trustees to pay income to the life beneficiary or to accumulate it as a part of the principal of the trust in their “sole discretion.” The agreement further provided that net income retained by the trustees, and not distributed in any calendar year, “ 'shall become a part of the principal of the Trust Estate.’ ” Id., at 629 n. 2. The Court characterized the effect of the trust as follows: “Here Fabrice [the settlor] was empowered, with the other trustees, to distribute the trust income to the income beneficiaries or to accumulate it and add it to the principal, thereby denying to the beneficiaries the privilege of immediate enjoyment and conditioning their eventual enjoyment upon surviving the termination of the trust.” Id., at 631. As the retention of this legal right by the settlor, acting as a trustee “in conjunction” with the other trustees, came squarely within the language and intent of the predecessor of § 2036 (a)(2), the taxpayer conceded that the original assets transferred into the trust were in-cludable in the decedent’s gross estate. Id., at 632. The issue before the Court was whether the accumulated income, which had been added to the principal pursuant to the reservation of right in that respect, was also in-cludable in decedent’s estate for tax purposes. The Court held that it was. In our view, and for the purposes of this case, O’Malley adds nothing to the statute itself. The facts in that case were clearly within the ambit of what is now § 2036 (a). That section requires that the settlor must have “retained for his life ... (2) the right... to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.” O’Malley was covered precisely by the statute for two reasons: (1) there the settlor had reserved a legal right, set forth in the trust instrument; and (2) this right expressly authorized the settlor, “in conjunction” with others, to accumulate income and thereby “to designate” the persons to enjoy it. It must be conceded that Byrum reserved no such “right” in the trust instrument or otherwise. The term “right,” certainly when used in a tax statute, must be given its normal and customary meaning. It connotes an ascertainable and legally enforceable power, such as that involved in O’Malley. Here, the right ascribed to Byrum was the power to use his majority position and influence over the corporate directors to “regulate the flow of dividends” to the trust. That “right” was neither ascertainable nor legally enforceable and hence was not a right in any normal sense of that term. Byrum did retain the legal right to vote shares held by the trust and to veto investments and reinvestments. But the corporate trustee alone, not Byrum, had the right to pay out or withhold income and thereby to designate who among the beneficiaries enjoyed such income. Whatever power Byrum may have possessed with respect to the flow of income into the trust was derived not from an enforceable legal right specified in the trust instrument, but from the fact that he could elect a majority of the directors of the three corporations. The power to elect the directors conferred no legal right to command them to pay or not to pay dividends. A majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty not to misuse his power by promoting his personal interests at the expense of corporate interests. Moreover, the directors also have a fiduciary duty to promote the interests of the corporation. However great Byrum’s influence may have been with the corporate directors, their responsibilities were to all stockholders and were enforceable according to legal standards entirely unrelated to the needs of the trust or to Byrum’s desires with respect thereto. The Government seeks to equate the de facto position of a controlling stockholder with the legally enforceable “right” specified by the statute. Retention of corporate control (through the right to vote the shares) is said to be “tantamount to the power to accumulate income” in the trust which resulted in estate-tax consequences in O’Malley. The Government goes on to assert that “[tjhrough exercise of that retained power, [Byrum] could increase or decrease corporate dividends . . . and thereby shift or defer the beneficial enjoyment of trust income.” This approach seems to us not only to depart from the specific statutory language, but also to misconceive the realities of corporate life. There is no reason to suppose that the three corporations controlled by Byrum were other than typical small businesses. The customary vicissitudes of such enterprises — bad years; product obsolescence; new competition; disastrous litigation; new, inhibiting Government regulations; even bankruptcy — prevent any certainty or predictability as to earnings or dividends. There is no assurance that a small corporation will have a flow of net earnings or that income earned will in fact be available for dividends. Thus, Byrum’s alleged de jacto “power to control the flow of dividends” to the trust was subject to business and economic variables over which he had little or no control. Even where there are corporate earnings, the legal power to declare dividends is vested solely in the corporate board. In making decisions with respect to dividends, the board must consider a number of factors. It must balance the expectation of stockholders to reasonable dividends when earned against corporate needs for retention of earnings. The first responsibility of the board is to safeguard corporate financial viability for the long term. This means, among other things, the retention of sufficient earnings to assure adequate working capital as well as resources for retirement of debt, for replacement and modernization of plant and equipment, and for growth and expansion. The nature of a corporation’s business, as well as the policies and long-range plans of management, are also relevant to dividend payment decisions. Directors of a closely held, small corporation must bear in mind the relatively limited access of such an enterprise to capital markets. This may require a more conservative policy with respect to dividends than would be expected of an established corporation with securities listed on national exchanges. Nor do small corporations have the flexibility or the opportunity available to national concerns in the utilization of retained earnings. When earnings are substantial, a decision not to pay dividends may result only in the accumulation of surplus rather than growth through internal or external expansion. The accumulated earnings may result in the imposition of a penalty tax. These various economic considerations are ignored at the directors’ peril. Although vested with broad discretion in determining whether, when, and what amount of dividends shall be paid, that discretion is subject to legal restraints. If, in obedience to the will of the majority stockholder, corporate directors disregard the interests of shareholders by accumulating earnings to an unreasonable extent, they are vulnerable to a derivative suit. They are similarly vulnerable if they make an unlawful payment of dividends in the absence of net earnings or available surplus, or if they fail to exercise the requisite degree of care in discharging their duty to act only in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Byrum was similarly inhibited by a fiduciary duty from abusing his position as majority shareholder for personal or family advantage to the detriment of the corporation or other stockholders. There were a substantial number of minority stockholders in these corporations who were unrelated to Byrum. Had Byrum and the directors violated their duties, the minority shareholders would have had a cause of action under Ohio law. The Huntington National Bank, as trustee, was one of the minority stockholders, and it had both the right and the duty to hold Byrum responsible for any wrongful or negligent action as a controlling stockholder or as a director of the corporations. Although Byrum had reserved the right to remove the trustee, he would have been imprudent to do this when confronted by the trustee’s complaint against his conduct. A successor trustee would succeed to the rights of the one removed. We conclude that Byrum did not have an unconstrained de facto power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much less the ‘‘right” to designate who was to enjoy the income from trust property. His ability to affect, but not control, trust income, was a qualitatively different power from that of the settlor in O’Malley, who had a specific and enforceable right to control the income paid to the beneficiaries. Even had Byrum managed to flood the trust with income, he had no way of compelling the trustee to pay it out rather than accumulate it. Nor could he prevent the trustee from making payments from other trust assets, although admittedly there were few of these at the time of Byrum’s death. We cannot assume, however, that no other assets would come into the trust from reinvestments or other gifts. We find no merit to the Government’s contention that Byrum’s de facto “control,” subject as it was to the economic and legal constraints set forth above, was tantamount to the right to designate the persons who shall enjoy trust income, specified by § 2036 (a)(2). II The Government asserts an alternative ground for including the shares transferred to the trust within Byrum’s gross estate. It argues that by retaining control, Byrum guaranteed himself continued employment and remuneration, as well as the right to determine whether and when the corporations would be liquidated or merged. Byrum is thus said to have retained “the . .. enjoyment of . . . the property” making it includable within his gross estate under §2036 (a)(1). The Government concedes that the retention of the voting rights of an “unimportant minority interest” would not require inclusion of the transferred shares under § 2036 (a)(1). It argues, however, “where the cumulative effect of the retained powers and the rights flowing from the shares not placed in trust leaves the grantor in control of a close corporation, and assures that control for his lifetime, he has retained the 'enjoyment’ of the transferred stock.” Brief for United States 23. It is well settled that the terms “enjoy” and “enjoyment,” as used in various estate tax statutes, “are not terms of art, but connote substantial present economic benefit rather than technical vesting of title or estates.” Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U. S. 480, 486 (1946). For example, in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929), in which the critical inquiry was whether the decedent had created a trust “intended ... ‘to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,’ ” id., at 348, the Court held that reserved powers of management of trust assets, similar to Byrum’s power over the three corporations, did not subject an inter vivos trust to the federal estate tax. In determining whether the settlor had retained the enjoyment of the transferred property, the Court said: “Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts save to decedent any control over the economic benefits or the enjoyment of the property. He would equally have reserved all these powers and others had he made himself the trustee, but the transfer would not for that reason have been incomplete. The shifting of the economic interest in the trust property which was the subject of the tax was thus complete as soon as the trust was made. His power .to recall the property and of control over it for his own benefit then ceased and as the trusts were not made in contemplation of death, the reserved powers do not serve to distinguish them from any other gift inter vivos not subject to the tax.” 278 U. S., at 346-347. The cases cited by the Government reveal that the terms “possession” and “enjoyment,” used in § 2036 (a) (1), were used to deal with situations in which the owner of property divested himself of title but retained an income interest or, in the case of real property, the lifetime use of the property. Mr. Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632 (1949), traces the history of the concept. In none of the cases cited by the Government has a court held that a person has retained possession or enjoyment of the property if he has transferred title irrevocably, made complete delivery of the property and relinquished the right to income where the property is income producing. The Government cites only one case, Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 564 (1943), in which a decedent had retained the right to vote transferred shares of stock and in which the stock was included within the decedent’s gross estate. In that case, it was not the mere power to vote the stock, giving the decedent control of the corporation, which caused the Tax Court to include the shares. The court held that “ 'on an inclusive view of the whole arrangement, this withholding of the income until decedent’s death, coupled with the retention of the certificates under the pledge and the reservation of the right to vote the stock and to designate the company officers’ ” subjects the stock to inclusion within the gross estate. Id., at 565. The settlor in Holland retained a considerably greater interest than Byrum retained, including an income interest. As the Government concedes, the mere retention of the right-to-vote shares does not constitute the type of “enjoyment” in the property itself contemplated by § 2036 (a)(1). In addition to being against the weight of precedent, the Government’s argument that Byrum retained “enjoyment” within the meaning of § 2036 (a)(1) is conceptually unsound. This argument implies, as it must under the express language of § 2036 (a), that Byrum “retained for his life ... (1) the possession or enjoyment” of the “property” transferred to the trust or the “income” therefrom. The only property he transferred was corporate stock. He did not transfer “control” (in the sense used by the Government) as the trust never owned as much as 50% of the stock of any corporation. Byrum never divested himself of control, as he was able to vote a majority of the shares by virtue of what he owned and the right to vote those placed in the trust. Indeed, at the time of his death he still owned a majority of the shares in the largest of the corporations and probably would have exercised control of the other two by virtue of being a large stockholder in each. The statutory language plainly contemplates retention of an attribute of the property transferred — such as a right to income, use of the property itself, or a power of appointment with respect either to income or principal. Even if Byrum had transferred a majority of the stock, but had retained voting control, he would not have retained “substantial present economic benefit,” 326 U. S., at 486. The Government points to the retention of two “benefits.” The first of these, the power to liquidate or merge, is not a present benefit; rather, it is a speculative and contingent benefit which may or may not be realized. Nor is the probability of continued employment and compensation the substantial “enjoyment of . . . [the transferred] property” within the meaning of the statute. The dominant stockholder in a closely held corporation, .if he is active and productive, is likely to hold a senior position and to enjoy the advantage of a significant voice in his own compensation. These are inevitable facts of the free-enterprise system, but the influence and capability of a controlling stockholder to favor himself are not without constraints. Where there are minority stockholders, as in this case, directors may be held accountable if their employment, compensation, and retention of officers violate their duty to act reasonably in the best interest of the corporation and all of its stockholders. Moreover, this duty is policed, albeit indirectly, by the Internal Revenue Service, which disallows the deduction of unreasonable compensation paid to a corporate executive as a business expense. We conclude that Byrum’s retention of voting control was not the retention of the enjoyment of the transferred property within the meaning of the statute. For the reasons set forth above, we hold that this case was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals and accordingly the judgment is Affirmed. The Trust Agreement in pertinent part provided: “Article IV. Irrevocable Trust. “This Trust shall be irrevocable and Grantor reserves no rights, powers, privileges or benefits either as to the Trust estate or the control or management of the trust property, except as set forth herein. “Article V. Powers Of The Trustee. “The Trustee shall have and possess and may exercise at all times not only the rights, powers and authorities incident to the office or required in the discharge of this trust, or impliedly conferred upon or vested in it, but there is hereby expressly conferred upon and vested in the Trustee all the rights, powers and authorities embodied in the following paragraphs in this Article, which are shown by way of illustration but not by way of limitation: “Sell. 5.02 To sell at public or private sale, to grant options to sell, to exchange, re-exchange or otherwise dispose of all or part of the property, real or personal, at any time belonging to the Trust Estate, upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration as said Trustee shall determine, and to execute and deliver all instruments of sale or conveyance necessary or desirable therefor. “Investments. 5.05 To invest any money in the Trust Estate in stocks, bonds, investment trusts, common trust funds and any other securities or property, real or personal, secured or unsecured, whether the obligations of individuals, corporations, trusts, associations, governments, expressly including shares and/or obligations of its own corporation, or otherwise, either within or outside of the State of Ohio, as the Trustee shall deem advisable, without any limitation whatsoever as to the character of investment under any statute or rule of law now or hereafter enacted or existing regarding trust funds or investments by fiduciaries or otherwise. “Voting. 5.06 To vote by proxy or in person any stock or security comprising a part of the Trust Estate, at any meeting, except that, during Grantor’s lifetime, all voting rights of any stocks which are not listed on a stock exchange, shall be exercised by Grantor, and after Grantor’s death, the voting rights of such stocks shall be exercised by Grantor’s wife during her lifetime. “Leases. 5.09 To make leases for any length of time, whether longer or shorter than the duration of this Trust, to commence at the present time or in the future; to extend any lease; to grant options to lease or to renew any lease; it being expressly understood that the Trustee may grant or enter into ninety-nine year leases, renewable forever. “Income Allocation. 5.13 To determine in its discretion how all receipts and disbursements, capital gains and losses, shall be charged, credited or apportioned between income and principal. “Limitation. 5.15 Notwithstanding the powers of the Trustee granted in paragraphs 5.02, 5.05, 5.09 and 5.11 above, the Trustee shall not exercise any of the powers granted in said paragraphs unless (a) during Grantor’s lifetime said Grantor shall approve of the action taken by the Trustee pursuant to said powers, (b) after the death of the Grantor and as long as his wife, Marian A. Byrum, shall live, said wife shall approve of the action taken by the Trustee pursuant to said powers. “Article VI. Distribution Prior To Age 21. “Until my youngest living child reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee shall exercise absolute and sole discretion in paying or applying income and/or principal of the Trust to or for the benefit of Grantor’s child or children and their issue, with due regard to their individual needs for education, care, maintenance and support and not necessarily in equal shares, per stirpes. The decision of the Trustee in the dispensing of Trust funds for such purposes shall be final and binding on all interested persons. “Article VI. Division At Age 21. “Principal Disbursements. 6.02 If prior to attaining the age of thirty-five (35), any one of the children of Grantor shall have an emergency such as an extended illness requiring unusual medical or hospital expenses, or any other worthy need including education of such child, the Trustee is hereby authorized and empowered to pay such child or use for his or her benefit such amounts of income and principal of the Trust as the Trustee in its sole judgment and discretion shall determine. “Article VIII. Removal of Trustee. “If the Trustee, The Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Columbus, Ohio, shall at any time change its name or combine with one or more corporations under one or more different names, or if its assets and business at any time shall be purchased and absorbed by another trust company or corporation authorized by law to accept these trusts, the new or successor corporation shall be considered as the said The Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio, and shall continue said Trusts and succeed to all the rights, privileges, duties and obligations herein conferred upon said The Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Columbus, Ohio, Trustee. “Grantor, prior to his death, and after the death of the Grantor, the Grantor’s wife, Marian A. Byrum, during her lifetime, may remove or cause the removal of The Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio, or any successor Trustee, as Trustee under the Trusts and may thereupon designate another corporate Trustee to serve as successor Trustee hereunder. “Article IX. Miscellaneous Provisions. “Discretion. 9.02 If in the opinion of the Trustee it shall appear that the total income of any beneficiary of any Trust fund created hereunder is insufficient for his or her proper or suitable support, care and comfort, and education and that of said beneficiary’s children, the Trustee is authorized to pay to or for such beneficiary or child such additional amounts from the principal of the Trust Estate as it shall deem advisable in order to provide suitably and properly for the support, care, comfort, and education of said beneficiary and of said beneficiary’s children, and the action of the Trustee in making such payments shall be binding on all persons.” The actual proportions were: Total Percentage Percentage Percentage Owned by Owned by Owned by Decedent Decedent Trust and Trust Byrum Lithographing Co., Inc. 59 12 71 Graphic Realty, Inc. 35 48 83 By chrome Co. 42 46 88 26 U. S. C. §2036 provides: “(a) General rule. “The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death— “(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or “(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.” United States v. O’Malley, 383 U. S. 627 (1966). It is irrelevant to this argument how many shares Byrum transferred to the trust. Had he retained in his own name more than 50% of the shares (as he did with one corporation), rather than retaining the right to vote the transferred shares, he would still have had the right to elect the board of directors and the same power to “control'’ the flow of dividends. Thus, the Government is arguing that a majority shareholder’s estate must be taxed for stock transferred to a trust if he owned at least 50% of the voting stock after the transfer or if he retained the right to vote the transferred stock and could thus vote more than 50% of the stock. It would follow also that if a settlor controlled 50% of the voting stock and similarly transferred some other class of stock for which the payment of dividends had to be authorized by the directors, his estate would also be taxed. Query: what would happen if he had the right to vote less than 50% of the voting stock but still “controlled” the corporation? See n. 10, infra. The Court has never overturned this ruling. See McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931); Helvering v. Duke, 290 U. S. 591 (1933) (affirmed by an equally divided Court). In Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632 (1949), and Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949), the Court invited, sua sponte, argument of this question, but did not reach the issue in either opinion. See, e. g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F. 2d 601 (CA1 1970); United States v. Powell, 307 F. 2d 821 (CA10 1962) ; Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 53 T. C. 114 (1969), aff’d, 450 F. 2d 878 (CA2 1971); Estate of Wilson v. Commissioner, 13 T. C. 869 (1949) (en banc), aff’d, 187 F. 2d 145 (CA3 1951); Estate of Budd v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 468 (1968); Estate of Pardee v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 140 (1967); Estate of King v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 973 (1962). The dissenting opinion attempts to distinguish the cases, holding that a settlor-trustee’s retained powers of management do not bring adverse estate-tax consequences, on the ground that management of trust assets is not the same as the power retained by Byrum because a settlor-trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to treat the life tenant beneficiaries and remaindermen as the trust instrument specifies. But the argument that in the reserved-power-of-management cases there was “a judicially enforceable strict standard capable of invocation by the trust beneficiaries by reference to the terms of the trust agreement,” post, at 166, ignores the fact that trust agreements may and often do provide for the widest investment discretion. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Justice White is correct in suggesting that in 1958, when this trust instrument was drawn, the estate-tax consequences of the settlor’s retained powers of management were less certain than they are now, this Court’s failure to overrule Northern Trust, plus the existence of recent cases such as King and the cases cited in n. 6, have undoubtedly been relied on by the draftsmen of more recent trusts with considerable justification. Our concern as to this point is not so much with whether Byrum properly relied on the precedents, but with the probability that others did rely thereon in good faith. Although Mr. Justice White’s dissent argues that the use of the word “power” in O’Malley implies that the Court’s concern was with practical reality rather than legal form, an examination of that opinion does not indicate that the term was used other than in the sense of legally empowered. At any rate, the “power” was a right reserved to the settlor in the trust instrument itself. The “control” rationale, urged by the Government and adopted by the dissenting opinion, would create a standard — not specified in the statute — so vague and amorphous as to be impossible of ascertainment in many instances. See n. 13, infra. Neither the Government nor the dissent sheds light on the absence of an ascertainable standard. The Government speaks vaguely of drawing the line between “an unimportant minority interest” (whatever that may be) and “voting control.” The dissenting opinion does not address this problem at all. See Comment, Sale of Control Stock and the Brokers’ Transaction Exemption — Before and After the Wheat Report, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 475, 479-481 (1971). Such a fiduciary relationship would exist in almost every, if not every, State. Ohio, from which this case arises, is no exception: “[I]f the majority undertakes, either directly or indirectly, through the directors, to conduct, manage, or direct the corporation’s affairs, they must do so in good faith, and with an eye single to the best interests of the corporation. It is clear that the interests of the majority are not always identical with the interests of all the shareholders. The obligation of the majority or of the dominant group of shareholders acting for, or through, the corporation is fiduciary in nature. A court of equity will grant appropriate relief where the majority or dominant group of shareholders act in their own interest or in the interest of others so as to oppress the minority or commit a fraud upon their rights.” 13 Ohio Jur. 2d, Corporations § 662, pp. 90-91 (footnotes omitted). See Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42 F. Supp. 586 (ED Pa. 1941), rev’d on other grounds, 146 F. 2d 889 (CA3 1944). “The directors of the corporation represent the corporation, not just one segment of it, but all of it. The fiduciary nature of the directors’ obligation requires that, in the management of the corporation’s affairs, they do not presume to play favorites among the shareholders or among classes of shareholders.” 12 Ohio Jur. 2d, Corporations § 497, p. 618. The Government uses the terms “control” and “controlling stockholder” as if they were words of art with a fixed and ascertainable meaning. In fact, the concept of “control” is a nebulous one. Although in this case Byrum possessed “voting control” of the three corporations (in view of his being able to vote more than 50% of the stock in each), the concept is too variable and imprecise to constitute the basis per se for imposing tax liability under § 2036 (a). Under most circumstances, a stockholder who has the right to vote more than 50% of the voting shares of a corporation “controls it” in the sense that he may elect the board of directors. But such a stockholder would not control, under the laws of most States, certain corporate transactions such as mergers and sales of assets. Moreover, control — in terms of effective power to elect the board under normal circumstances — may exist where there is a right to vote far less than 50% of the shares. This will vary with the size of the corporation, the number of shareholders, and the concentration (or lack of it) of ownership. See generally 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 770-783 (1961). Securities law practitioners recognize that possessing 10% or more of voting power is a factor on which the Securities and Exchange Commission relies as one of the indicia of control. SEC, Disclosure to Investors — The Wheat Report 245-247 (1969). In advocating this de jacto approach,, the Government relies on our opinion in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948). Sun-nen was a personal income tax case in which the Court found the taxpayer had made an assignment of income. The reasoning relied on the de facto power of a controlling shareholder to regulate corporate business for his personal objectives. This case is an estate tax case, not an income tax case. Moreover, unlike assignment-of-income cases, in which the issue is who has the power over income, this case concerns a statute written in terms of the “right” to designate the recipient of income. The use of the term “right” implies that restraints on the exercise of power are to be recognized and that such restraints deprive the person exercising the power of a “right” to do so. The spectrum of types of corporate businesses, and of permissible policies with respect to the retention of earnings, is broad indeed. It ranges from the public utility with relatively assured and stable income to the new and speculative corporation engaged in a cyclical business or organized to exploit a new patent or unproved technology. Some corporations pay no dividends at all, as they are organized merely to hold static assets for prolonged periods (e. g., land, mineral resources, and the like). Corporations which emphasize growth tend to low dividend payments, whereas mature corporations may pursue generous dividend policies. Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 55-56, 113 N. E. 669, 675 (1916): "[I]t is the duty of the directors, in determining the amount of net earnings available for the payment of dividends, to take into account the needs of the company in its business and sums necessary in the operation of its business until the income from further operations is available, the amount of its debts, the necessity or advisability of paying its debts or at least reducing them within the limits of the company’s credit, the preservation of its capital stock as represented in the assets of the company as a fund for the protection of its creditors and the character of its surplus assets, whether cash, credits or merchandise.” Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sube. G, pt. I, §§ 531-537, 26 U. S. C. §§ 531-537. Had Byrum caused the board to follow a dividend policy, designed to minimize or cut off income to the trust, which resulted in the imposition of the penalty for accumulated earnings not distributed to shareholders, there might have been substantial grounds for a derivative suit. A derivative suit also would have been a possibility had dividends been paid imprudently to increase the trust’s income at the expense of corporate liquidity. Minority shareholders in Ohio may bring derivative suits under Ohio Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1. In most States, the power to declare dividends is vested solely in the directors. 11 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, c. 58, § 5320. Ohio is no exception, and it limits the authority of directors to pay dividends depending on available corporate surplus. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.33. Although liability generally exists irrespective of a statute, nearly all States have statutes regulating the liability of directors who participate in the payment of improper dividends. 12 Eletcher, supra, c. 58, § 5432. Again, Ohio is no exception. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.95. App. 30-32. In Byrum Lithographing Co., Inc , none of the other 11 stockholders appears to be related by name to Byrum. In Bychrome Co. five of the eight stockholders appear to be unrelated to the Byrums; and in Graphic Realty Co. 11 of the 14 stockholders appear to be unrelated. See Wilberding v. Miller, 90 Ohio St. 28, 42, 106 N. E. 665, 669 (1914): “An arbitrary disregard of the rights of stockholders to dividends or other improper treatment of the assets of the company would be relieved against.” The trust instrument explicitly granted the trustee the power “[t]o enforce, abandon, defend against, or have adjudicated by legal proceedings, arbitration or by compromise, any claim or demand whatsoever arising out of or which may exist against the Trust Estate.” App. 10-11. The Government cites two other opinions of this Court, in addition to O’Malley, to support its argument. In both Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U. S. 480 (1946), and Lober v. United States, 346 U. S. 335 (1953), the grantor reserved to himself the power to distribute to the beneficiaries the entire principal and accumulated income of the trust at any time. This power to terminate the trust and thereby designate the beneficiaries at a time selected by the settlor, is not comparable to the powers reserved by Byrum in this case. While the trustee could not acquire or dispose of investments without Byrum’s approval, he was not subject to Byrum’s orders. Byrum could prevent the acquisition of an asset, but he could not require the trustee to acquire any investment. Nor could he compel a sale, although he could prevent one. Thus, if there were other income-producing assets in the trust, Byrum could not compel the trustee to dispose of them. In purporting to summarize the basis of our distinction of O’Malley, the dissenting opinion states: “Now the majority would have us accept the incompatible position that a settlor seeking tax exemption may keep the power of income allocation by rendering the trust dependent on an income flow he controls because the general fiduciary obligations of a director are sufficient to eliminate the power to designate within the meaning of §2036 (a)(2)Post, at 167. This statement, which assumes the critical and ultimate conclusion, incorrectly states the position of the Court. We do not hold that a settlor “may keep the power of income allocation” in the way MR. Justice White sets out; we hold, for the reasons stated in this opinion, that this settlor did not retain the power to allocate income within the meaning of the statute. The dissenting opinion’s view of the business world will come as a surprise to many. The dissent states: “Thus, by instructing the directors he elected in the controlled corporations that he thought dividends should or should not be declared Byrum was able to open or close the spigot through which the income flowed to the trust’s life tenants.” Post, at 152. This appears to assume that all corporations, including the small family type involved in this case, have a regular and dependable flow of earnings available for dividends, and that if there is a controlling stockholder he simply turns the “spigot” on or off as dividends may be desired. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, no such dream world exists in the life of many corporations. But whatever the situation may be generally, the fallacy in the dissenting opinion’s position here is that the record simply does not support it. This case was decided on a motion for summary judgment. The record does not disclose anything with respect to the earnings or financial conditions of these corporations. We simply do not know whether there were any earnings for the years in question, whether there was an earned surplus in any of the corporations, or whether — if some earnings be assumed — they were adequate in light of other corporate needs to justify dividend payments. Nor can we infer from the increase in dividend payments in the year following Byrum’s death that higher dividends could have been paid previously. The increase could be explained as easily by insurance held by the corporations on Byrum’s life. At one point Mr. Justice White seems to imply that Byrum also retained the enjoyment of the right to the income from the transferred shares: “When Byrum closed the spigot by deferring dividends of the controlled corporations, thereby perpetuating his own ‘enjoyment’ of these funds, he also in effect transferred income from the life tenants to the remaindermen.'''’ (Emphasis added.) Post, at 152. But, of course, even if dividends were deferred, the funds remained in the corporation; Byrum could not use them himself. See 26 CFR § 20.2036-1 (b) (2): “The ‘use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the transferred property’ is considered as having been retained by or reserved to the decedent to the extent that the use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment is to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation of the decedent, or otherwise for his pecuniary benefit.” Although Mr. Justice White questions the Court’s failure to interpret “possession or enjoyment” with “extreme literalness,” post, at 154 n. 3, apparently the Commissioner does not do so either. Reflection on the expansive nature of those words, particularly “enjoyment,” will demonstrate why interpreting them with “extreme literalness” is an impossibility. Northern Trust was decided under the Revenue Act of 1921, §402 (c), 42 Stat. 278. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940); Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632 (1949); Lober v. United States, 346 U. S. 335 (1953); United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U. S. 316 (1969); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F. 2d 667 (CA3), cert. denied, 361 U. S. 829 (1959); Guynn v. United States, 437 F. 2d 1148 (CA4 1971). In all of these cases, as in Church, the grantor retained either title or an income interest or the right to use real property for his lifetime. Despite Mr. Justice White’s suggestion, post, at 154, we have not “ignore[d] the plain language of the statute which proscribes ‘enjoyment’ as well as ‘possession or . . . the right to income.’ ” Bather, the cases we have cited clearly establish that the terms “possession” and “enjoyment” have never been used as the dissent argues. The cited opinion supplemented an earlier opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals in the same case, 47 B. T. A. 807 (1942). A more analogous case is Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U. S. T. C. ¶ 12,524 (ND Ill. 1968), in which a settlor-trustee, who transferred 60% of the shares of a wholly owned corporation to a trust, was found not to have retained the enjoyment of the property for her lifetime. The Government, for the reasons discussed in n. 4, supra, makes no distinction between retention of control by virtue of owning 50% or more of the voting shares and such retention by a combination of stock owned and that with respect to which the right to vote was retained. The interpretation given § 2036 (a) by the Government and by Mr. Justice White’s dissenting opinion would seriously disadvantage settlors in a control posture. If the settlor remained a controlling stockholder, any transfer of stock would be taxable to his estate. See n. 4, supra. The typical closely held corporation is small, has a checkered earning record, and has no market for its shares. Yet its shares often have substantial asset value. To prevent the crippling liquidity problem that would result from the imposition of estate taxes on such shares, the controlling shareholder’s estate planning often includes an irrevocable trust. The Government and the dissenting opinion would deny to controlling shareholders the privilege of using this generally acceptable method of estate planning without adverse tax consequences. Yet a settlor whose wealth consisted of listed securities of corporations he did not control would be permitted the tax advantage of the irrevocable trust even though his more marketable assets present a far less serious liquidity problem. The language of the statute does not support such a result and we cannot believe Congress intended it to have such discriminatory and far-reaching impact. Directors of Ohio corporations have been held liable for payment of excessive compensation. Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (ND Ohio 1958). 26 U. S. C. § 162 (a)(1) permits corporations to deduct “reasonable” compensation as business expenses. If the Internal Revenue Service determines that compensation exceeds the bounds of reason, it will not permit a deduction. See, e. g., Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 282 (1929). Moreover, there is nothing in the record of this case with respect to Byrum’s compensation. There is no showing that his control of these corporations gave him an “enjoyment” with respect to compensation that he would not have had upon rendering similar services without owning any stock. Transcript of Record 3, in No. 90, O. T. 1928, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILROAD CO. v. NEMITZ et al. No. 70-97. Argued October 21, 1971 Decided November 15, 1971 Martin M. Lucente argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Howard J. Trienens and John M. Curphey. Thomas J. Murray, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Solicitor General Griswold, Fritz R. Kahn, and Leonard S. Goodman filed a brief for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. In connection with a 1964 consolidation by which petitioner railway company absorbed New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.,Co. (Nickel Plate), the so-called Sandusky Line, running from Columbus, Ohio, to Sandusky, Ohio, was acquired from the Pennsylvania Railroad system. Respondents were at the time employees of the Pennsylvania on the Sandusky Line. Their work was seasonal because the winter freeze barred navigation on Lake Erie. During those periods j unior employees of Sandusky worked at other points on the Pennsylvania’s Toledo Division. In anticipation of the 1964 consolidation, petitioner entered into an agreement with 19 labor organizations for protection of the employees of the several railroads coming into the consolidation, including those on the San-dusky Line. Petitioner agreed to employ “all employees of the lines involved with the guarantee that they will not be adversely affected in their employment as a result of the proposed transactions or for any reason other than furloughs due to seasonal requirements or a decline in volume of traffic or revenue. 324 I. C. C. 1, 89 (emphasis added). Each employee was to receive a monthly supplement to his post-consolidation monthly earnings equal to the excess, if any, of his average monthly compensation for the 12 months prior to the consolidation in which he had performed services. Some 96 Sandusky Line employees elected to accept employment with petitioner on the terms and conditions stated. Twenty-five were junior men who had worked seasonally on the Toledo Division and they were the plaintiffs in this action. The consolidation took place and over a year elapsed during which these trainmen were not paid the compensation promised. Arbitration pursuant to the collective agreement was agreed upon. At that point in 1965 the union and petitioner entered into a new agreement which reduced substantially the benefits of the junior trainmen who had been Sandusky Line employees. The District Court (287 F. Supp. 221, 309 F. Supp. 575) held that this new agreement was not enforceable as a matter of law as it violated the Act under which the consolidation or merger took place. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 436 F. 2d 841, with a modification that the damages due respondent-employees should be determined by the District Court, not through arbitration. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 402 U. S. 994. Section 5 (2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended, 54 Stat. 906, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (f), provides that in mergers and consolidations “the Commission shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected” for a period of four years. The ICC in its approval of the consolidation or merger (324 I. C. C. 1, 106 (1964)) stated that the agreements respecting, inter alia, the rights of the Sandusky Line employees were “made pursuant to and in conformity with section 5 (2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act for the protection of covered employees.” It construed the agreements as requiring “that job eliminations as a result of the proposed acquisition of control be accomplished only through normal attrition.” Ibid. The mandate of § 5 (2)(f) seems clear enough: the Commission “shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected.” The Commission, as noted, said that the conditions protective of the employees were made pursuant to and in conformity with the provisions of § 5 (2) (f) and it gave its authorization “subject to such agreements.” 324 I. C. C., at 50. The Solicitor General and the ICC argue in their amicus curiae brief that the last sentence of § 5 (2) (f) — the “notwithstanding” provision — relieved the Commission of any duty to review the adequacy of the protective provisions contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, and that they were not accorded protection by the ICC order. We disagree with that view. We reviewed the history of § 5 (2) (f) in Railway Executives’ Assn. v. United States, 339 U. S. 142, and said that “one of its principal purposes was to provide mandatory protection for the interests of employees affected by railroad consolidations.” Id., at 148. That “mandatory protection” can be accorded by terms provided by the Commission, or, as is more likely, by provisions of a collective agreement which the Commission adopts or approves as adequate for a minimum of four years (as required by the second sentence) or longer (as allowed by the first sentence) if the Commission so provides. Id., at 154. The purpose of § 5 (2) (f) was not to freeze jobs but to provide compensatory conditions. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes v. United States, 366 U. S. 169, 175-176. In that case we noted that the Commission has consistently followed that practice “in over 80 cases, with the full support of the intervening brotherhoods.” Id., at 177. And the Commission over and over again has adopted the set of labor conditions contained in collective agreements in discharge of its duty under § 5 (2) (f). See Gulf, M. & O. R. Co. Purchase, 261 I. C. C. 405, 434; Erie R. Co. Trackage Rights, 295 I. C. C. 303, 305; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. Trackage Rights, 295 I. C. C. 743, 755-756. When there is a collective agreement and the Commission, as here, adopts or approves it, the “notwithstanding” sentence of § 5 (2) (f) is not, as suggested, read out of the Act. The collective agreement then becomes a “condition” of the Commission’s “approval” of the consolidation under the first sentence of § 5 (2) (f) and its provisions are deemed by the Commission to be “a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests” of the employees within the meaning of the first sentence. Thus, the significance of the “notwithstanding” proviso is that it provides the machinery for the terms of a pre-merger collective agreement and thus supplies the minimum measure of fairness required under the first sentence of § 5 (2)(f). In 1965 an implementing agreement, entered into after the consolidation, was made between the union and petitioner. It is petitioner’s claim that it limited these junior employees to their average monthly earnings on the Sandusky Line during the 12 months before the consolidation, regardless of how many months the employees had worked during that period on other sections of the Toledo Division. That is to say, each of them would receive under the 1965 implementing agreement an average monthly compensation based only on their seasonal Sandusky Line work. Thus, respondent Nemitz had an average monthly compensation of $583.34 representing pre-consolidation work on several sections of the Toledo Division. Under the § 5 (2) (f) agreement governing the consolidation, his earnings would be supplemented to the extent that his post-consolidation monthly earnings fell short of $583.34. Under the 1965 agreement his average monthly compensation, based solely on his work on the Sandusky Line, would be $194.40. Even this amount would not be paid if, as likely, he received that much in unemployment compensation. The 1965 agreement obviously placed these junior employees “in a worse position with respect to compensation,” as those words are used in the pre-consolidation agreement. For they no longer could work on any part of the former Toledo Division except the Sandusky Line and their prior compensation, reflecting in part work on other parts of the Toledo Division, was no longer a measure of the “compensation” to which they were entitled under the pre-consolidation agreement. For those whose historical average monthly earnings were so slight that they were now on unemployment insurance, the result would be much more drastic than “normal attrition,” which the Commission said was the only way under the protective conditions by which jobs would be eliminated. The Court of Appeals said: “An agreement made pursuant to the last sentence of Sec. 5 (2) (f) may vary the protections afforded by the I. C. C. order, but it may not substantially abrogate employees' rights grounded in an I. C. C. order.” 436 F. 2d, at 848. We agree with that view. We also agree that the 1965 implementing agreement abrogated the standard of “compensation” covered by the pre-consolidation agreement which had come under the protective order of the Commission. The judgment below is therefore Affirmed. It provides: “As a condition of its approval, under this paragraph, of any transaction involving a carrier or carriers by railroad subject to the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected. In its order of approval the Commission shall include terms and conditions providing that during the period of four years from the effective date of such order such transaction will not result in employees of the carrier or carriers by railroad affected by such order being in a worse position with respect to their employment, except that the protection afforded to any employee pursuant to this sentence shall not be required to continue for a longer period, following the effective date of such order, than the period during which such employee was in the employ of such carrier or carriers prior to the effective date of such order. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, an agreement pertaining to the protection of the interests of said employees may hereafter be entered into by any carrier or carriers by railroad and the duly authorized representative or representatives of its or their employees.” The Commission stated in its Report, 324 I. C. C. 1, 50: “As previously stated herein and in appendix A, various agreements have been reached between employee representatives and the Norfolk & Western for the protection of employees adversely affected by these transactions. Our authorizations herein will, by reference, be made subject to such agreements. . . . “We find that, as conditioned herein, the transactions under consideration meet the requirements prescribed by sections 5 (2) and 20a of the act and conform generally with the purposes and objectives of the national transportation policy declared by Congress. We are convinced that the transactions should be approved.” In the Appendix to its Report and Order, 324 I. C. C., at 89, the Commission continued: “Norfolk & Western has entered into an agreement with 19 of the principal labor organizations, members of the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, for the protection of employees of Norfolk & Western, Nickel Plate, and Wabash, as well as persons employed on the Sandusky Line of Pennsylvania, represented by these organizations. This agreement, which provides for the assumption by Norfolk & Western of all outstanding labor contracts, schedules and agreements of Nickel Plate and Wabash, as well as those having application on the Sandusky Line, basically requires that job eliminations as a result of the unification be accomplished only through normal attrition. Under its terms, Norfolk & Western agrees to take into its employment, upon consummation of the merger, lease, and purchase, all employees of the lines involved with the guarantee that they will not be adversely affected in their employment as a result of the proposed transactions or for any reason other than furloughs due to seasonal requirements or a decline in volume of traffic or revenue.” The result, of course, would be that there would be no basis for judicial review of the ICC order pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1336. A synopsis of the legislative history of § 5 (2) (f) is contained in an Appendix to our opinion in St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 347 U. S. 298, 315. The agreement authorized by the Commission when the merger was approved was described as follows by the Commisson, Appendix to Report and Order of Interstate Commerce Commission, 324 I. C. C., at 89: “The agreement also authorized Norfolk & Western to transfer the work of employees throughout the merged system and requires the labor organizations to enter into implementing agreements permitting employees either to follow their work or be assigned to other jobs within their craft or class within the same general locality as existing jobs, following a period of retraining, if necessary, at Norfolk & Western’s expense.” The union that negotiated the Implementing Agreement disagreed with that position as did the union’s National Board of Appeals. Both, however, proceeded on a mistaken view of the law.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MAINE et al. v. THIBOUTOT et vir. No. 79-838. Argued April 22, 1980 Decided June 25, 1980 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 11. James Eastman Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Maine, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Richard S. Cohen, Attorney General. Robert Edmond Mittel argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Susan Calkins and Hugh Calkins A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed by Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, and Robert E. Kelly and Allen C. Warshaw, Deputy Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, joined by officials for their respective States as follows: Francis X. Bettotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Garrick F. Cole, Assistant Attorney General; John J. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Andrea Silkowitz, Deputy Attorney General; Thomas D. Rath, Attorney General of New Hampshire; M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General of Vermont, and Benson Scotch, Assistant Attorney General; Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island, AUen P. Rubine, Deputy Attorney General, and John S. Foley and Eileen G. Cooney, Special Assistant Attorneys General; and Richard S. Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, and Regina M. Small, State Solicitor. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Bruce J. Ennis for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Carol Goodman for the Volunteer Lawyers Project of the Boston Bar Association et al. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The case presents two related questions arising under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Respondents brought this suit in the Maine Superior Court alleging that petitioners, the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Services, violated § 1983 by depriving respondents of welfare benefits to which they were entitled under the federal Social Security Act, specifically 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (7). The petitioners present two issues: (1) whether § 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law, and (2) if so, whether attorney’s fees under § 1988 may be awarded to the prevailing party in such an action. I Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel’s by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State’s interpretation of 42 U. S. C, §602 (a)(7), exhausted their state administrative remedies and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under § 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court’s judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members. The court, however, denied respondents’ motion for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A. 2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents had no entitlement to attorney’s fees under state law, but were eligible for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. We granted certiorari. 444 TJ. S. 1042 (1980). We affirm. II Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” (Emphasis added.) The question before us is whether the phrase “and laws,” as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents’ claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act. Even were the language ambiguous, however, any doubt as to its meaning has been resolved by our several cases suggesting, explicitly or implicitly, that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), for example, “held that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 675 (1974). Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 700-701 (1978), as support for its conclusion that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983, reasoned that “there can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.” Similarly, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 649 (1980), in holding that the common-law immunity for discretionary functions provided no basis for according municipalities a good-faith immunity under § 1983, noted that a court “looks only to whether the municipality has conformed to the requirements of the Federal Constitution and statutes.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 240, n. 30 (1972), and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 543, n. 7 (1972), noted that § 1983’s predecessor “was enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law.” Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 829-830 (1966), observed that under § 1983 state “officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well.” The availability of this alternative sanction helped support the holding that 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1) did not permit removal to federal court of a state prosecution in which the defense was that the state law conflicted with the defendants’ federal rights. As a final example, Mr. Justice Stone, writing in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 525-526 (1939), expressed the opinion that § 1983 was the product of an “extension] to include rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by the Constitution.” While some might dismiss as dictum the foregoing statements, numerous and specific as they are, our analysis in several § 1983 cases involving Social Security Act (SSA) claims has relied on the availability of a § 1983 cause of action for statutory claims. Constitutional claims were also raised in these cases, providing a jurisdictional base, but the statutory claims were allowed to go forward, and were decided on the merits, under the court’s pendent jurisdiction. In each of the following cases § 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory cause of action because, as the Court held in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673-674; id., at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the SSA affords no private right of action against a State. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125, 132, and n. 13 (1979) (state foster care program inconsistent with SSA); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725, 729, and n. 3 (1978) (state emergency assistance program consistent with SSA); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975) (state shelter allowance provisions inconsistent with SSA); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (state prohibition against AFDC aid for college students inconsistent with SSA); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 311 (1968) (state cohabitation prohibition inconsistent with SSA). Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 532-533, 543 (1974) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state recoupment provisions consistent with SSA) ; Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 670 (1972) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state absent-spouse rule consistent with SSA). In the face of the plain language of § 1983 and our consistent treatment of that provision, petitioners nevertheless persist in suggesting that the phrase “and laws” should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws. Petitioners suggest that when § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which accorded jurisdiction and a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution of the United States,” was divided by the 1874 statutory revision into a remedial section, Rev. Stat. § 1979, and jurisdictional sections, Rev. Stat. §§563 (12) and 629 (16), Congress intended that the same change made in § 629 (16) be made as to each of the new sections as well. Section 629 (16), the jurisdictional provision for the circuit courts and the model for the current jurisdictional provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), applied to deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights.” On the other hand, the remedial provision, the predecessor of § 1983, was expanded to apply to deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution and laws,” and § 563 (12), the provision granting jurisdiction to the district courts, to deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States.” We need not repeat at length the detailed debate over the meaning of the scanty legislative history concerning the addition of the phrase “and laws.” See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979); id., at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); id., at 646 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 672 (Stewart, J., dissenting). One conclusion which emerges clearly is that the legislative history does not permit a definitive answer. Id., at 610-611; id., at 674 (Stewart, J., dissenting). There is no express explanation offered for the insertion of the phrase “and laws.” On the one hand, a principal purpose of the added language was to “ensure that federal legislation providing specifically for equality of rights would be brought within the ambit of the civil action authorized by that statute.” Id., at 637 (Powell, J., concurring). On the other hand, there are no indications that that was the only purpose, and Congress’ attention was specifically directed to this new language. Representative Lawrence, in a speech to the House of Representatives that began by observing that the revisers had very often changed the meaning of existing statutes, 2 Cong. Rec. 825 (1874), referred to the civil rights statutes as “possibly [showing] verbal modifications bordering on legislation,” id., at 827. He went on to read to Congress the original and revised versions. In short, Congress was aware of what it was doing, and the legislative history does not demonstrate that the plain language was not intended. Petitioners’ arguments amount to the claim that had Congress been more careful, and had it fully thought out the relationship among the various sections, it might have acted differently. That argument, however, can best be addressed to Congress, which, it is important to note, has remained quiet in the face of our many pronouncements on the scope of § 1983. Cf. TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978). Ill Petitioners next argue that, even if this claim is within § 1983, Congress did not intend statutory claims to be covered by the Civil Eights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, which added the following sentence to 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (emphasis added): “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1988, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U. S. C. 1681 et seq.] or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Once again, given our holding in Part II, supra, the plain language provides an answer. The statute states that fees are available in any § 1983 action. Since we hold that this statutory action is properly brought under § 1983, and since § 1988 makes no exception for statutory § 1983 actions, § 1988 plainly applies to this suit. The legislative history is entirely consistent with the plain language. As was true with § 1983, a major purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of constitutional and civil rights. Principal sponsors of the measure in both the House and the Senate, however, explicitly stated during the floor debates that the statute would make fees available more broadly. Representative Drinan explained that the Act would apply to § 1983 and that § 1983 “authorizes suits against State and local officials based upon Federal statutory as well as constitutional rights. For example Blue against Craig, 505 F. 2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974).” 122 Cong. Rec. 35122 (1976). Senator Kennedy also included an SSA case as an example of the cases “enforcing] the rights promised by Congress or the Constitution” which the Act would embrace. Id., at 33314. In short, there can be no question that Congress passed the Fees Act anticipating that it would apply to statutory § 1983 claims. Several States, participating as amici curiae, argue that even if § 1988 applies to § 1983 claims alleging deprivations of statutory rights, it does not apply in state courts. There is no merit to this argument. As we have said above, Mar tinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), held that § 1983 actions may be brought in state courts. Representative Drinan described the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act as “authorizing] the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in actions brought in State or Federal courts.” 122 Cong. Rec. 35122 (1976). And Congress viewed the fees authorized by § 1988 as “an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain” compliance with § 1983. S. Rep. No, 94-1011, p. 5 (1976). It follows from this history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court. Affirmed. Petitioners also argue that jurisdiction to hear. § 1983 claims rests exclusively with the federal courts. Any doubt that state courts may also entertain such actions was dispelled by Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 283-284, n. 7 (1980). There, while reserving the question whether state courts are obligated to entertain § 1983 actions, we held that Congress has not barred them from doing so. The State did not appeal the judgment against it. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded to allow the Superior Court to exercise its discretion under § 1988 to determine the appropriate disposition of the fee request. Where the plain language, supported by consistent judicial interpretation, is as strong as it is here, ordinarily “it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 184, n. 29 (1978). In his concurring opinion in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979), Me. Justice Powell’s argument proceeds on the basis of the flawed premise that Congress did not intend to change the meaning of existing laws when it revised the statutes in 1874. He assumed that Congress had instructed the revisers not to make changes, and that the revisers had obeyed those instructions. In fact, the second section of the statute creating the Revision Commission, 14 Stat. 75, mandated that the commissioners “mak[e] such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile the contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend the imperfections of the original text.” Furthermore, it is clear that Congress understood this mandate to authorize the Commission to do more than merely “copy and arrange in proper order, and classify in heads the actual text of statutes in force.” 2 Cong. Rec. 825 (1874). We have already decided that the “customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reorganized without changing substance” cannot be taken at face value. United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 803 (1966) (holding that the revisers significantly broadened the forerunner of 18 U. S. C. §242). There is no inherent illogic in construing § 1983 more broadly than § 1343 (3) was construed in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, supra. It would only mean that there are statutory rights which Congress has decided cannot be enforced in the federal courts unless 28 U. S. C. §1331 (a)’s $10,000 jurisdictional amount is satisfied. The States appearing as amid suggest that Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), left open the issue whether Congress, exercising its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, could set aside the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in statutory as opposed to constitutional cases. Hutto, however, concluded alternatively that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar attorney’s fee awards in federal courts because the fee awards are part of costs, which “have traditionally been awarded without regard for the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 695. No Eleventh Amendment question is present, of course, where an action is brought in a state court since the Amendment, by its terms, restrains only “[t]he Judicial power of the United States.” In Blue v. Craig, the plaintiffs claimed that North Carolina’s Medicaid plan was inconsistent with the SSA. “In a case now pending, officials accepted Social Security Act funds for years for certain medical screening programs when in fact they had no such programs in most of the State. Bond v. Stanton, 528 F. 2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976).” 122 Cong. Rec. 33314 (1976). In the same list of examples, Senator Kennedy included La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F. R. D. 94 (ND Cal. 1972), in which plaintiffs demonstrated violations of “the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and various sections of 23 U. S. C. dealing with housing displacement and relocation.” Id., at 95. The Committee Reports are in accord. The Senate Report recognized that actions under § 1983 covered by the Act would include suits “redressing violations of the Federal Constitution or laws.” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976). The House Report, after suggesting that a party prevailing on a claim which could not support a fee award should be entitled to a determination on an attached claim covered by § 1988 in order to determine eligibility for fees, recognizes that a special problem is presented because “[i]n some instances . . . the claim with fees may involve a constitutional question. . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 7 (1976). The negative pregnant is that in other instances the claim with fees need not involve a constitutional question. The state courts which have addressed this issue have reached that same result. 405 A. 2d 230, 239 (Me. 1979) (case below); Ramirez v. County of Hudson, 169 N. J. Super. 455, 404 A. 2d 1271 (1979); Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P. 2d 873 (Alaska 1979); Young v. Toia, 66 App. Div. 2d 377, 413 N. Y. S. 2d 530 (1979); Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 416, 422, 601 P. 2d 963, 967 (1979); Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P. 2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978); Thorpe v. Durango School District, 41 Colo. App. 473, 591 P. 2d 1329 (1978), cert. granted by Colorado Supreme Court (1979). If fees were not available in state courts, federalism concerns would be raised because most plaintiffs would have no choice but to bring their complaints concerning state actions to federal courts. Moreover, given that there is a class of cases stating causes of action under § 1983 but not cognizable in federal court absent the $10,000 jurisdictional amount of §1331 (a), see n. 6, supra, some plaintiffs would be forced to go to state courts, but contrary to congressional intent, would still face financial disincentives to asserting their claimed deprivations of federal rights.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. GENERES et vir No. 70-28. Argued November 8, 1971 Decided February 23, 1972 BlackmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Marshall, JJ., joined and in which (as to Parts I, II, and III) BreNNAN and White, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion, -post, p. 107. White, J., filed a separate opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 112. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 113. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Walters, and Ernest J. Brown. Max Nathan, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. A debt a closely held corporation owed to an indemnifying shareholder-employee became worthless in 1962. The issue in this federal income tax refund suit is whether, for the shareholder-employee, that worthless obligation was a business or a nonbusiness bad debt within the meaning and reach of §§ 166 (a) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U. S. C. §§ 166 (a) and (d), and of the implementing Regulations § 1.166-5. The issue’s resolution is important for the taxpayer. If the obligation was a business debt, he may use it to offset ordinary income and for carryback purposes under § 172 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 172. On the other hand, if the obligation is a nonbusiness debt, it is to be treated as a short-term capital loss subject to the restrictions imposed on such losses by §166 (d)(1)(B) and §§ 1211 and 1212, and its use for carryback purposes is restricted by § 172 (d)(4). The debt is one or the other in its entirety, for the Code does not provide for its allocation in part to business and in part to nonbusiness. In determining whether a bad debt is a business or a nonbusiness obligation, the Regulations focus on the relation the loss bears to the taxpayer’s business. If, at the time of worthlessness, that relation is a “proximate” one, the debt qualifies as a business bad debt and the aforementioned desirable tax consequences then ensue. The present case turns on the proper measure of the required proximate relation. Does this necessitate a “dominant” business motivation on the part of the taxpayer or is a “significant” motivation sufficient? Tax in an amount somewhat in excess of $40,000 is involved. The taxpayer, Allen H. Generes, prevailed in a jury trial in the District Court. See 67-2 U. S. T. C. ¶9754 (ED La.). On the Government’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed by a divided vote. 427 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1970). Certiorari was granted, 401 U. S. 972 (1971), to resolve a conflict among the circuits. I The taxpayer as a young man in 1909 began work in the construction business. His son-in-law, William F. Kelly, later engaged independently in similar work. During World War II the two men formed a partnership in which their participation was equal. The enterprise proved successful. In 1954 Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc., was organized as the corporate successor to the partnership. It engaged in the heavy-construction business, primarily on public works projects. The taxpayer and Kelly each owned 44% of the corporation’s outstanding capital stock. The taxpayer’s original investment in his shares was $38,900. The remaining 12% of the stock was owned by a son of the taxpayer and by another son-in-law. Mr. Generes was president of the corporation and received from it an annual salary of $12,000. Mr. Kelly was executive vice-president and received an annual salary of $15,000. The taxpayer and Mr. Kelly performed different services for the corporation. Kelly worked full time in the field and was in charge of the day-to-day construction operations. Generes, on the other hand, devoted no more than six to eight hours a week to the enterprise. He reviewed bids and jobs, made cost estimates, sought and obtained bank financing, and assisted in securing the bid and performance bonds that are an essential part of the public-project construction business. Mr. Generes, in addition to being president of the corporation, held a full-time position as president of a savings and loan association he had founded in 1937. He received from the association an annual salary of $19,000. The taxpayer also had other sources of income. His gross income averaged about $40,000 a year during 1959-1962. Taxpayer Generes from time to time advanced personal funds to the corporation to enable it to complete construction jobs. He also guaranteed loans made to the corporation by banks for the purchase of construction machinery and other equipment. In addition, his presence with respect to the bid and performance bonds is of particular significance. Most of these were obtained from Maryland Casualty Co. That underwriter required the taxpayer and Kelly to sign an indemnity agreement for each bond it issued for the corporation. In 1958, however, in order to eliminate the need for individual indemnity contracts, taxpayer and Kelly signed a blanket agreement with Maryland whereby they agreed to indemnify it, up to a designated amount, for any loss it suffered as surety for the corporation. Maryland then increased its line of surety credit to $2,000,000. The corporation had over $14,000,000 gross business for the period 1954 through 1962. In 1962 the corporation seriously underbid two projects and defaulted in its performance of the project contracts. It proved necessary for Maryland to complete the work. Maryland then sought indemnity from Generes and Kelly. The taxpayer indemnified Maryland to the extent of $162,104.57. In the same year he also loaned $158,814.49 to the corporation to assist it in its financial difficulties. The corporation subsequently went into receivership and the taxpayer was unable to obtain reimbursement from it. In his federal income tax return for 1962 the taxpayer took his loss on his direct loans to the corporation as a nonbusiness bad debt. He claimed the indemnification loss as a business bad debt and deducted it against ordinary income. Later he filed claims for refund for 1959-1961, asserting net operating loss carrybacks under § 172 to those years for the portion, unused in 1962, of the claimed business bad debt deduction. In due course the claims were made the subject of the jury trial refund suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. At the trial Mr. Generes testified that his sole motive in signing the indemnity agreement was to protect his $12,000-a-year employment with the corporation. The jury, by special interrogatory, was asked to determine whether taxpayer’s signing of the indemnity agreement with Maryland “was proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee” of the corporation. The District Court charged the jury, over the Government’s objection, that significant motivation satisfies the Regulations’ requirement of proximate relationship. The court refused the Government’s request for an instruction that the applicable standard was that of dominant rather than significant motivation. After twice returning to the court for clarification of the instruction given, the jury found that the taxpayer’s signing of the indemnity agreement was proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee of the corporation. Judgment on this verdict was then entered for the taxpayer. The Fifth Circuit majority approved the significant-motivation standard so specified and agreed with a Second Circuit majority in Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F. 2d 849, 851 (1963), in finding comfort for so doing in the tort law’s concept of proximate cause. Judge Simpson dissented. 427 F. 2d, at 284. He agreed with the holding of the Seventh Circuit in Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F. 2d 1185 (1969), and with Chief Judge Lumbard, separately concurring in Weddle, 325 F. 2d, at 852, that dominant and primary motivation is the standard to be applied. II A. The fact responsible for the litigation is the taxpayer’s dual status relative to the corporation. Generes was both a shareholder and an employee. These interests are not the same, and their differences occasion different tax consequences. In tax jargon, Generes’ status as a shareholder was a nonbusiness interest. It was capital in nature and it was composed initially of tax-paid dollars. Its rewards were expectative and would flow, not from personal effort, but from investment earnings and appreciation. On the other hand, Generes’ status as an employee was a business interest. Its nature centered in personal effort and labor, and salary for that endeavor would be received. The salary would consist of pre-tax dollars. Thus, for tax purposes it becomes important and, indeed, necessary to determine the character of the debt that went bad and became uncollectible. Did the debt center on the taxpayer’s business interest in the corporation or on his nonbusiness interest? If it was the former, the taxpayer deserves to prevail here. Trent v. Commissioner, 291 F. 2d 669 (CA2 1961); Jaffe v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo ¶ 67,215; Estate of Saperstein v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo ¶ 70,209; Faucher v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo ¶ 70,217; Rosati v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo ¶ 70,343; Rev. Rul. 71-561, 1971-50 Int. Rev. Bull. 13. B. Although arising in somewhat different contexts, two tax cases decided by the Court in recent years merit initial mention. In each of these cases a major shareholder paid out money to or on behalf of his corporation and then was unable to obtain reimbursement from it. In each he claimed a deduction assertable against ordinary income. In each he was unsuccessful in this quest: 1. In Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U. S. 82 (1956), the taxpayer was a practicing lawyer who had guaranteed obligations of a labor newspaper corporation in which he owned stock. He claimed his loss as fully deductible in 1948 under § 23 (e) (2) of the 1939 Code. The standard prescribed by that statute was incurrence of the loss “in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business.” The Court rejected this approach and held that the loss was a nonbusiness bad debt subject to short-term capital loss treatment under §23(k)(4). The loss was deductible as a bad debt or not at all. See Rev. Rul. 60-48, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 112. 2. In Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U. S. 193 (1963), the taxpayer had provided organizational, promotional, and managerial services to a corporation in which he owned approximately an 80% stock interest. He claimed that this constituted a trade or business and, hence, that debts owing him by the corporation were business bad debts when they became worthless in 1953. The Court also rejected that contention and held that Whipple’s investing was not a trade or business, that is, that “[djevoting one’s time and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not of itself, and without more, a trade or business of the person so engaged.” 373 U. S., at 202. The rationale was that a contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with the principle that a corporation has a personality separate from its shareholders and that its business is not necessarily their business. The Court indicated its approval of the Regulations’ proximate-relation test: “Moreover, there is no proof (which might be difficult to furnish where the taxpayer is the sole or dominant stockholder) that the loan was necessary to keep his job or was otherwise proximately related to maintaining his trade or business as an employee. Compare Trent v. Commissioner, [291 F. 2d 669 (CA2 1961)].” 373 U. S., at 204. The Court also carefully noted the distinction between the business and the nonbusiness bad debt for one who is both an employee and a shareholder. These two eases approach, but do not govern, the present one. They indicate, however, a cautious and not a free-wheeling approach to the business bad debt. Obviously, taxpayer Generes endeavored to frame his case to bring it within the area indicated in the above quotation from Whipple v. Commissioner. Ill We conclude that in determining whether a bad debt has a “proximate” relation to the taxpayer’s trade or business, as the Regulations specify, and thus qualifies as a business bad debt, the proper measure is that of dominant motivation, and that only significant motivation is not sufficient. We reach this conclusion for a number of reasons: A. The Code itself carefully distinguishes between business and nonbusiness items. It does so, for example, in § 165 with respect to losses, in § 166 with respect to bad debts, and in § 162 with respect to expenses. It gives particular tax benefits to business losses, business bad debts, and business expenses, and gives lesser benefits, or none at all, to nonbusiness losses, nonbusiness bad debts, and nonbusiness expenses. It does this despite the fact that the latter are just as adverse in financial consequence to the taxpayer as are the former. But this distinction has been a policy of the income tax structure ever since the Revenue Act of 1916, § 5 (a), 39 Stat. 759, provided differently for trade or business losses than it did for losses sustained in another transaction entered into for profit. And it has been the specific policy with respect to bad debts since the Revenue Act of 1942 incorporated into § 23 (k) of the 1939 Code the distinction between business and non-business bad debts. 56 Stat. 820. The point, however, is that the tax statutes have made the distinction, that the Congress therefore intended it to be a meaningful one, and that the distinction is not to be obliterated or blunted by an interpretation that tends to equate the business bad debt with the nonbusiness bad debt. We think that emphasis upon the significant rather than upon the dominant would have a tendency to do just that. B. Application of the significant-motivation standard would also tend to undermine and circumscribe the Court’s holding in Whip-ple and the emphasis there that a shareholder’s mere activity in a corporation’s affairs is not a trade or business. As Chief Judge Lumbard pointed out in his separate and disagreeing concurrence in Weddle, supra, 325 F. 2d, at 852-853, both motives— that of protecting the investment and that of protecting the salary — are inevitably involved, and an inquiry whether employee status provides a significant motivation will always produce an affirmative answer and result in a judgment for the taxpayer. C. The dominant-motivation standard has the attribute of workability. It provides a guideline of certainty for the trier of fact. The trier then may compare the risk against the potential reward and give proper emphasis to the objective rather than to the subjective. As has just been noted, an employee-shareholder, in making or guaranteeing a loan to his corporation, usually acts with two motivations, the one to protect his investment and the other to protect his employment. By making the dominant motivation the measure, the logical tax consequence ensues and prevents the mere presence of a business motive, however small and however insignificant, from controlling the tax result at the taxpayer’s convenience. This is of particular importance in a tax system that is so largely dependent on voluntary compliance. D. The dominant-motivation test strengthens and is consistent with the mandate of § 262 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 262, that “no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses” except as otherwise provided. It prevents personal considerations from circumventing this provision. E. The dominant-motivation approach to § 166 (d) is consistent with that given the loss provisions in § 165 (c)(1), see, for example, Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361 F. 2d 640, 644 (CA3 1966), and in § 165 (c)(2), see Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F. 2d 583, 584 (CA2 1962). In these related areas, consistency is desirable. See also, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278, 286 (1960). F. We see no inconsistency, such as the taxpayer suggests, between the Government’s urging dominant motivation here and its having urged only significant motivation as the appropriate standard for the incurrence of liability for the accumulated-earnings tax under § 531 of the 1954 Code, 26 U. S. C. § 531, and for includability in the gross estate,-for federal estate tax purposes, of a transfer made in contemplation of death under § 2035, 26 U. S. C. § 2035. Sections 531 and 2035 are Congress’ answer to tax avoidance activity. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U. S. 297, 303 (1969), and Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F. 2d 794 (CA2 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 648 (1939). G. The Regulations’ use of the word “proximate” perhaps is not the most fortunate, for it naturally tempts one to think in tort terms. The temptation, however, is best rejected, and we reject it here. In tort law factors of duty, of foreseeability, of secondary cause, and of plural liability are under consideration, and the concept of proximate cause has been developed as an appropriate application and measure of these factors. It has little place in tax law where plural aspects are not usual, where an item either is or is not a deduction, or either is or is not a business bad debt, and where certainty is desirable. IV The conclusion we have reached means that the District Court's instructions, based on a standard of significant rather than dominant motivation, are erroneous and that, at least, a new trial is required. We have examined the record, however, and find nothing that would support a jury verdict in this taxpayer’s favor had the dominant-motivation standard been embodied in the instructions. Judgment n. o. v. for the United States, therefore, must be ordered. See Neely v. Eby Construction Co., 386 U. S. 317 (1967). As Judge Simpson pointed out in his dissent, 427 F. 2d, at 284-285, the only real evidence offered by the taxpayer bearing upon motivation was his own testimony that he signed the indemnity agreement “to protect my job,” that “I figured in three years’ time I would get my money out,” and that “I never once gave it [his investment in the corporation] a thought.” The statements obviously are self-serving. In addition, standing alone, they do not bear the light of analysis. What the taxpayer was purporting to say was that his $12,000 annual salary was his sole motivation, and that his $38,900 original investment, the actual value of which prior to the misfortunes of 1962 we do not know, plus his loans to the corporation, plus his personal interest in the integrity of the corporation as a source of living for his son-in-law and as an investment for his son and his other son-in-law, were of no consequence whatever in his thinking. The comparison is strained all the more by the fact that the salary is pre-tax and the investment is taxpaid. With his total annual income about $40,000, Mr. Generes may well have reached a federal income tax bracket of 40% or more for a joint return in 1958-1962. §§ 1 and 2 of the 1954 Code, 68A Stat. 5 and 8. The $12,000 salary thus would produce for him only about $7,000 net after federal tax and before any state income tax. This is the figure, and not $12,000, that has any possible significance for motivation purposes, and it is less than % of the original stock investment. We conclude on these facts that the taxpayer’s explanation falls of its own weight, and that reasonable minds could not ascribe, on this record, a dominant motivation directed to the preservation of the taxpayer’s salary as president of Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction that judgment be entered for the United States. It is so ordered. Me. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “§ 166. Bad debts. “(a) General rule.— “(1) Wholly worthless debts. — There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year. “(d) Nonbusiness debts.— “(1) General rule. — In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation— “(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and “(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months. “(2) Nonbusiness debt defined. — For purposes of paragraph (1), the term 'nonbusiness debt’ means a debt other than— “(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or “(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer’s trade or business.” Treas. Reg. on Income Tax: “26 CFR § 1.166-5 Nonbusiness debts. “(b) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes of section 166 and this section, a nonbusiness debt is any debt other than— “(2) A debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer’s trade or business. The question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in each particular case. . . . For purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the character of the debt is to be determined by the relation which the loss resulting from the debt’s becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes within the exception provided by that subparagraph. . . .” Edna Generes, wife of Allen H. Generes, is a named party because joint income tax returns were filed by Mr. and Mrs. Generes for some of the tax years in question. Compare the decision below and Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F. 2d 849 (CA2 1963), with Niblock v. Commissioner, 417 F. 2d 1185 (CA7 1969). In Smith v. Commissioner, 55 T. C. 260, 268-271 (1970), reviewed without dissent, the Tax Court felt constrained, under the policy expressed in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T. C. 742 (1970), aff’d, 445 E. 2d 985 (CA10 1971), to apply the Fifth Circuit test but stated that it agreed with the Seventh Circuit. Cases where the resolution of the issue was avoided include Stratmore v. United States, 420 F. 2d 461 (CA3 1970), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 951; Kelly v. Patterson, 331 F. 2d 753, 757 (CA5 1964); and Gillespie v. Commissioner, 54 T. C. 1025, 1032 (1970). See, also, Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F. 2d 420 (CA8 1968). For commentary on the present case, see 3 Sw. U. L. Rev. 135 (1971); 2 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 318 (1971); and 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 161 (1971). This difference in treatment between the loss on the direct loan and that on the indemnity is not explained. See, however, Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U. S. 193 (1963). “A debt is proximately related to the taxpayer’s trade or business when its creation was significantly motivated by the taxpayer’s trade or business, and it is not rendered a non-business debt merely because there was a non-qualifying motivation as well, even though the non-qualifying motivation was the primary one.” “You must, in short, determine whether Mr. Generes’ dominant motivation in signing the indemnity agreement was to protect his salary and status as an employee or was to protect his investment in the Kelly-Generes Construction Co. “Mr. Generes is entitled to prevail in this case only if he convinces you that the dominant motivating factor for his signing the indemnity agreement was to insure the receiving of his salary from the company. It is insufficient if the protection or insurance of his salary was only a significant secondary motivation for his signing the indemnity agreement. It must have been his dominant or most important reason for signing the indemnity agreement.” “Even if the taxpayer demonstrates an independent trade or business of his own, care must be taken to distinguish bad debt losses arising from his own business and those actually arising from activities peculiar to an investor concerned with, and participating in, the conduct of the corporate business.” 373 U. S., at 202. App. 67 and 59. Rather than Vk, as the taxpayer in his testimony suggested, App. 59, overlooking the pre-tax character of his salaried earnings.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC., et al. v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA et al. No. 85-732. Argued November 3, 1986 Decided February 24, 1987 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. White, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 135. Raymond J. Rasenberger argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Rachel B. Trinder and C. West-brook Murphy. Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was John Dewell, Assistant Attorney General. James E. Landry filed a brief for the Air Transport Association of America as amicus curiae urging reversal. James W. McBride and Gregory G. Fletcher filed a brief for the Railway Progress Institute et al. as amid curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we consider whether the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax, S. D. Codified Laws, ch. 10-29 (1982), violates the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(d). We conclude that because the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax is an “in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,” 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(d)(3), the tax does not violate § 1513(d). I The federal provision at issue is part of a series of congressional actions dedicated to improving the Nation’s air transportation system. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U. S. 7, 8-10 (1983). In 1970, following findings that “substantial expansion and improvement of the airport and airway system is [sic] required to meet the demands of interstate commerce, the postal service, and the national defense,” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1074, p. 29 (1970), Congress required the Secretary of Transportation to prepare a plan for the development of public airports, and authorized the Secretary to make grants to States and localities for airport development. Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219. Congress also established an Airport and Airway Trust Fund, maintained by federal aviation taxes, to finance airport development projects. §208, 84 Stat. 250. Soon afterward, Congress acted to limit state taxation of air transportation. Concluding that state passenger use taxes placed “an unnecessary burden on interstate commerce,” and had “a stifling effect on air transportation,” H. R. Rep. No. 93-157, p. 4 (1973), Congress prohibited such taxes in the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-44, §7(a), 87 Stat. 90. In the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 701, Congress added a §7(d) to the Airway Development Acceleration Act of 1973, prohibiting the imposition of discriminatory property taxes on air carriers. That prohibition, as codified at 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(d), reads: “(d) Acts which unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce; definitions “(1) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them: “(A) assess air carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the air carrier transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property of the same type in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property; “(B) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or “(C) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on air carrier transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. “(2) In this subsection— “(D) ‘commercial and industrial property’ means property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to commercial and industrial use and subject to a property tax levy; . . . “(3) This subsection shall not apply to any in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes.” The South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax, which appellants allege violates § 1513(d), was enacted in 1961. Flight property is defined as “all aircraft fully equipped ready for flight used in air commerce.” S. D. Codified Laws § 10-29-1(4) (1982). The portion of the value of flight property subject to the tax is based on flight tonnage, flight time, and revenue ton miles, § 10-29-10, and this value is taxed at the “average mill rate,” § 10-29-14. The statute also provides that “[t]he taxes imposed by this chapter shall be allocated by the secretary of revenue to the airports where such airlines companies make regularly scheduled landings and shall be used exclusively by such airports for airport purposes . . . .” §10-29-15. The South Dakota statute provides that “[fjlight property of airline companies operating in the state shall be assessed for the purpose of taxation by the department of revenue and not otherwise,” § 10-29-2. Airline flight property is 1 of 10 specific categories of property that are centrally assessed for purposes of taxation. (The other categories are certain property of railroads, private car-line companies, express companies, telephone companies, telegraph companies, electric, heating, water and gas companies, rural electric companies, rural water supply companies, and pipeline companies. See S. D. Codified Laws chs. 10-28 through 10-37.) Each of these categories was an exception from the general South Dakota scheme of local property tax assessment a1 the county level. S. D. Codified Laws § 10-3-16 (1982). In 1978, South Dakota exempted from ad valorem taxation all personal property that was locally rather than centrally assessed, §10-4-6.1. In May 1983, appellants, four airline companies operating in South Dakota, paid their flight property taxes for the first six months of 1983 under protest. Appellants then sued the appropriate county treasurers for a refund. Appellants alleged that, because airline flight property was subject to taxation while most other personal property was exempt, the South Dakota flight property tax violated §§ 1513(d)(1)(A) and (C). In each case the county answered that the state flight property tax was “utilized wholly for airport and aeronautical purposes and is in lieu of property taxes and is therefore permitted by 49 U. S. C. [App. §] 1513(d)(3).” App. 10-11. Following an unsuccessful request to seven county boards of commissioners to abate and refund flight property taxes paid after the effective date of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, appellants sued the county commissions for abatement and refund. App. 17. Finally, appellants appealed the property tax assessment to the South Dakota State Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization unanimously denied the appeal, holding that “the airline flight property tax is in lieu of personal property tax and is totally utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes, therefore, in conformity with Section [1513](d)(3), this tax is lawful and not a violation of Federal law.” Id., at 31. All the lawsuits described above were consolidated in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Hughes County, South Dakota. That court agreed with the counties and the Board of Equalization that the flight property tax was permitted under § 1513(d)(3). App. to Juris. Statement 19a-21a. On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota disagreed with the conclusion that the flight property tax was authorized under § 1513(d). 372 N. W. 2d 106 (1985). In order to be an “in lieu tax,” the court reasoned, the flight property tax must be a substitute for another tax on flight property. “In the case at bar, however, the tax is not a substitute for an ad valorem personal property tax. It is in fact the first imposition of personal property tax on the airline flight property.” Id., at 109. The State Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court, however, on an alternative ground. Under §§ 1513(d)(1)(A) and (C), the discriminatory nature of assessment ratios or tax rates applied to airline property is determined by comparison to the ratios and rates applied to other “commercial and industrial property.” “Commercial and industrial property” is defined as “property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to commercial and industrial use and subject to a property tax levy. ” § 1513(d)(2)(D) (emphasis supplied). Because locally assessed personal property was not subject to a property tax levy, the State Supreme Court concluded that such property “cannot be included as commercial or industrial property for comparison under either” §§ 1513(d)(1)(A) or (C). 372 N. W. 2d, at 110. Because appellants’ claims under § 1513(d) were based on a comparison between flight property and property no longer subject to a tax levy, the court concluded that the claims must be rejected. South Dakota Supreme Court Justice Henderson concurred in the court’s interpretation of the “in lieu tax” provision, but dissented from the court’s interpretation of “ ‘commercial and industrial property.’” The State Supreme Court holding, Justice Henderson observed, permitted “-‘greater discrimination when the [commercial and industrial] property is completely exempt than when it is taxed, but at a lower rate.’” Id., at 112, quoting Northwest Airlines v. State Board of Equalization, 358 N. W. 2d 515, 517 (1984). Such an interpretation of the federal antidiscrimination provisions was unreasonable, Justice Henderson concluded. “Since the level of assessment on commercial and industrial personal property is zero, the level of assessment of the airlines’ personal property must be reduced to zero.” 372 N. W. 2d, at 112. In their jurisdictional statement to this Court appellants challenged the Supreme Court of South Dakota’s interpretation of “commercial and industrial property” under § 1513(d). Appellees defended the judgment on the basis of the same reasoning used by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. We noted probable jurisdiction, 475 U. S. 1008 (1986). Following oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties, and called for the views of the United States, on the following questions: (1) Is the question whether a state tax is an “in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,” one of state or federal law, and “(2) If federal law governs the question whether a tax is an in lieu tax under § 1513(d)(3), is the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax ... an ‘in lieu tax’ under § 1513(d)(3)?” 479 U. S. 958 (1986). Because our conclusions on these two questions resolve this case, we do not reach the question of the interpretation of “commercial and industrial property” under § 1513(d). II The parties and the United States agree that the question whether a state tax is an “in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes,” under § 1513 (d)(3), is ultimately one of federal law. The general principle that, absent a clear indication to the contrary, the meaning of words in a federal statute is a question of federal law has especial force when the purpose of the federal statute is to eliminate discriminatory state treatment of interstate commerce. Indeed, in Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U. S., at 13-14, this Court held that a state legislature’s characterization of a tax could not shield the tax from application of another subsection of §1513. In the present case, as in Aloha Airlines, supra, we must examine the “purpose and effect” of the state tax in light of the policy embodied in the federal provision. Congress has given us little material with which to interpret the in lieu tax exception. The provision was added to the Act at conference, and there is no legislative history specifically discussing it. The language of § 1513(d)(3) itself, and the policies reflected in the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, however, lead us to the conclusion that the in lieu tax provision exempts the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax from the restrictions of § 1513(d). Section 1513(d)(3) uses two characteristics to identify a group of airline property taxes that are exempted from the restrictions of § 1513(d)(1). First, and perhaps most important, to fall under the protection of § 1513(d)(3) a tax must be “wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes.” Section 1513(d) is modeled on similar provisions in the 4-R Act and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 11503, 11503a. The legislative history of the antidiscrimi-nation provision in the 4-R Act demonstrates Congress’ awareness that interstate carriers “are easy prey for State and local tax assessors” in that they are “nonvoting, often nonresident, targets for local taxation,” who cannot easily remove themselves from the locality. S. Rep. No. 91-630, p. 3 (1969). The Department of Transportation had observed that “[s]tate and local governments derive substantial revenues from taxes on property owned by common carriers. ” Id., at 4. It is this temptation to excessively tax nonvoting, nonresident businesses in order to subsidize general welfare services for state residents that made federal legislation in this area necessary. The ability to use taxes levied on an interstate carrier to subsidize general welfare spending does not exist, of course, when the proceeds are allocated directly and entirely to the benefit of the carrier. Not only is the possibility of discriminatory benefits to state residents eliminated, but also the specter of discriminatory burdens on the carrier is avoided by the recycling of the tax revenues into the specific facilities used by the carrier. Second, the phrase “in lieu tax” restricts the protection of § 1513(d)(3) to property taxes applied to the exclusion of any other tax on the property, in other words, to taxes applied in lieu of any other possible property tax. This requirement reinforces the policy reflected in the “wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes” phrase. If the revenues collected pursuant to a property tax are specifically used for the benefit of those from whom the tax was collected, then, as explained above, the tax does not discriminatorily take from some in order to benefit others. If the same property is also subjected to tax used to subsidize general state expenditures, however, then the potential for abuse remains. Two individually nondiscriminatory taxes — a tax used for general welfare spending that meets the assessment ratio and rate restrictions of § 1513(d)(1), and a tax the proceeds of which are devoted entirely to the industry from which it is collected — obviously can become discriminatorily burdensome when combined. South Dakota levies a tax on airline flight property, the proceeds of which are wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes. See S. D. Codified Laws § 10-29-15 (1982), quoted supra, at 126. The South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax establishes a method of taxing a particular type of property to the exclusion of any other tax on that property. It therefore stands in lieu of the generally applicable ad valorem property tax that had been assessed on most other commercial and industrial property in the State at the time the airline flight property tax was established. The language and logic of § 1513(d)(3), therefore, lead to the conclusion that the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax falls under the in lieu tax exemption. Appellants argue, however, that these characteristics alone are not sufficient for a tax to be exempted by § 1513(d)(3). Appellants advocate the position taken by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, that in order to be exempted under this provision a tax must take the place of another tax that historically had been applied to the airline property. The fact that a property tax is applied to the exclusion of all other property taxes is immaterial, appellants assert, unless some past tax was actually replaced by the present tax. Because South Dakota’s taxation of airline flight property has always taken the form of the taxation scheme at issue in this case, appellants argue, the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax is not a true “in lieu tax.” Admittedly the phrase “in lieu tax” is open to this interpretation. The illogical results of applying such an interpretation, however, argue strongly against the conclusion that Congress intended these results when it drafted § 1513(d)(3). Under the interpretation appellants advocate, the question whether a tax would be exempted under the in lieu tax provision would, at best, turn on historical fortuity. The identical taxation scheme South Dakota utilizes would be exempted under § 1513(d)(3) if South Dakota had at one time applied some other taxation scheme to airline flight property. Thus, if at one time the proceeds of the airline flight property tax had gone to general state expenditures rather than directly to the benefit of airports and airlines, the present tax would be exempted. Because South Dakota has always chosen to devote its taxes on airline flight property solely to the benefit of those airlines, it is not exempted, according to appellants. Why a State that has consistently chosen to levy, to the exclusion of all other property taxes, a tax utilized wholly for aeronautical purposes should be penalized for its consistency is unexplained. At worst, appellants’ interpretation of § 1513(d)(3) would do no more than place a meaningless hurdle before state legislatures seeking to conform their tax scheme to the requirements of this provision. A closer examination of how this proposed replacement requirement would operate in practice illustrates the point. Appellants do not suggest— and have no basis upon which to suggest — that in order to be an “in lieu tax” under § 1513(d)(3) the airline flight property tax must have replaced some other tax by the effective date of the federal provision. If one tax must replace another, therefore, the replacement could take place at any time. Moreover, it could not be a condition of § 1513(d)(3) coverage that the “in lieu tax” replace a tax that had met the antidis-crimination restrictions of § 1513(d). If the tax described in § 1513(d)(3) could replace only a tax that met all the requirements of § 1513(d)(1), then § 1513(d)(3) would not be an exemption at all; it would simply add a restriction on how the taxes could be spent with no corresponding latitude on how they may be collected. Ultimately, therefore, South Dakota could satisfy appellants’ interpretation of § 1513(d)(3) by simply amending its tax code so that its airline flight property tax took some other form, then the following session substituting for that tax a tax utilized wholly for aeronautical purposes. This exercise of replacing one tax with another, while contributing somewhat to a state legislature’s workload, would contribute nothing to the policies of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act. In sum, the language of § 1513(d)(3), while at first glance ambiguous, should be interpreted in a manner that comports with the policies of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act. That interpretation is that § 1513(d)(3) exempts from the antidiscrimination provisions of § 1513(d)(1) a tax on airline flight property, applied to the exclusion of any other possible tax on that property, the proceeds of which are wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes. Because the South Dakota Airline Flight Property Tax fits this description, it does not violate the antidiscrimination provisions of § 1513(d). For this reason, the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Dakota is Affirmed. The United States and appellants have directed our attention to a 1975 Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10979, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act). As we note infra, at 131, the antidiscrimination provisions of 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(d) were modeled on a similar provision in the 4-R Act. This Report used the phrase “in lieu tax” to describe special taxes on common carriers that operate differently from the generally applicable property tax schemes. H. R. Rep. No. 94-725, pp. 77, 78 (1975). The House Report seems to have used the phrase “in lieu tax” to describe a broad range of taxes. This sliver of legislative history supports our interpretation of the phrase, see infra, at 131-132. Appellants submit an affidavit of John L. Zoraek, an attorney who “rep-resentes] clients in a variety of legislative matters before the United States Congress.” App. to Supplemental Brief for Appellants in No. 14560 (Sup. Ct. S. D.) B-l, B-2. Affiant Zoraek states that he was “involved” — in an unexplained capacity — in the passage of the legislation that ultimately became § 1513(d). According to affiant Zoraek, the “in lieu” provision “was intended to ensure that the Act would not invalidate state taxes which are a legitimate substitute for other taxes on air carrier transportation property and which are not imposed in an effort to tax such property at rates higher than those imposed on other comparable commercial and industrial property.” This would be an incongruous justification for the “in lieu” provision, however, since airline property taxes that are not imposed at rates higher than those imposed on other comparable commercial and industrial property are not threatened by the antidiscrimination provisions of § 1513(d). Mr. Zoraek adds that the in lieu provision “was inserted to take care of Minnesota’s objection to an earlier version.” “To my knowledge no other state made any representation at the time that it wished to be protected by the in lieu provision,” Mr. Zorack concludes. Id., at B-2, B-3. On the basis of this affidavit, appellants argue that to be covered by the in lieu provision a state tax must resemble the Minnesota airflight property tax, which was a substitute for other property taxes previously imposed on airlines. As we note, infra, at 133, the interpretation of an “in lieu tax” as a tax that actually replaced a tax previously imposed is admittedly a possible one. Appellants’ attempt at the creation of legislative history through the post hoc statements of interested onlookers is entitled to no weight, however.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COLORADO ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMISSION et al. v. CONTINENTAL AIR LINES, INC. No. 146. Argued March 28, 1963. Decided April 22, 1963. T. Raber Taylor and Floyd B. Engeman, Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. With Mr. Engeman on the brief for petitioners in No. 146 was Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General of Colorado. Patrick M. Westfeldt argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William Cant McClearn. By special leave of Court, Howard H. Jewel, Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for the State of California, as amicus curiae in No. 146, urging reversal. With him on a brief for the States of California and Missouri, as amici curiae, were Stanley Mosk, Attorney General of California, Thomas F. Eagleton, Attorney General of Missouri, Victor D. Sonenberg, Deputy Attorney General of California, James J. Murphy, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, and Charles E. Wilson. By special leave of Court, Shirley Adelson Siegel, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae in No. 146, urging reversal. With her on the brief were Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorneys General of New York, George N. Hayes, Attorney General of Alaska, William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General of Indiana, William M. Ferguson, Attorney General of Kansas, Edward J. McCormack, Jr., Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Walter F. Mondale, Attorney General of Minnesota, Thomas F. Eagleton, Attorney General of Missouri, Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, Mark McElroy, Attorney General of Ohio, Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, David Stahl, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General of Rhode Island, John J. O’Connell, Attorney General of Washington, and George Thompson, Attorney General of Wisconsin. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 146 and 492, were filed by Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Bruce J. Terris, Harold H. Greene and David Rubin for the United States; and by Gilbert Goldstein, Arnold Forster, Charles Rosenbaum, Edwin J. Lukas, Paul Hartman, Theodore Leskes and Sol Rabkin for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. Brief of amici curiae, urging reversal in No. 146, was filed by Joseph B. Robison, Melvin L. Wulf and Jack Green-berg for the American Jewish Congress et al. Brief of amicus curiae, urging reversal in No. 492, was filed by Quentin Oscar Ogren for the Catholic Council on Civil Liberties. Together with No. 492, Green v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Marlon D. Green, a Negro, applied for a job as a pilot with respondent Continental Air Lines, Inc., an interstate air carrier. His application was submitted at Continental’s headquarters in Denver, Colorado, and was later considered and rejected there. Green then made complaint to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission that Continental had refused to hire him because he was a Negro. The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957 provides that it is an unfair employment practice for an employer “to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation against, any person otherwise qualified, because of race, creed, color, national origin or ancestry.” After investigation and efforts at conciliation, the Commission held extensive hearings and found as a fact “that the only reason that the Complainant was not selected for the training school was because of his race.” The Commission ordered Continental to cease and desist from such discriminatory practices and to “give to the Complainant the first opportunity to enroll in its training school in its next course . . . .” On review the District Court in and for the City and County of Denver set aside the Commission’s findings and dismissed Green’s complaint. It held that the Anti-Discrimination Act could not “constitutionally be extended to cover the flight crew personnel of an interstate air carrier” because it would impose an undue burden upon commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress power “To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ,” and because the field of law concerning racial discrimination in the interstate operation of carriers is preempted by the Railway Labor Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and Federal Executive Orders. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of dismissal but discussed only the question of whether the Act as applied placed an undue burden on commerce, concluding that it did. 149 Colo. 259, 368 P. 2d 970 (1962). The obvious importance of even partial invalidation of a state law designed to prevent the discriminatory denial of job opportunities prompted us to grant certiorari. 371 U. S. 809 (1962). First. Continental argues that the State Supreme Court decision rested on an independent and adequate nonfederal ground. For that argument, it relies on the trial court's statement “that the Colorado legislature was not attempting to legislate concerning problems involving interstate commerce” and the statement of the Supreme Court of Colorado that: “The only question resolved was that of jurisdiction. The trial court determined that the Act was inapplicable to employees of those engaged in interstate commerce, and the judgment was based exclusively on that ground.” 149 Colo., at 265, 368 P. 2d, at 973. We reject this contention. The trial court itself did not rest on this ground. Instead, it clearly and unequivocally stated that the case presented a constitutional question of whether the Act could legally be applied to interstate operations. Nor did the Supreme Court of Colorado rely on this ground. It interpreted the trial court's opinion as having held that the Act was invalid insofar as it regulated interstate air carriers. The Court further stated that the question was whether the Act could be applied to interstate carriers, which it answered by concluding that under the Federal Constitution the State Legislature had no power to deal with such matters. We are satisfied that the courts below rested their judgments on their interpretation of the United States Constitution and the preemptive effect of federal statutes and Executive Orders. Second. In holding that the Colorado statute imposed an undue burden on commerce, the State Supreme Court relied on the principle, first stated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, that States have no power to act in those areas of interstate commerce which by their nature require uniformity of regulation, even though Congress has not legislated on the subject. The State Court read two prior decisions of this Court, Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878), and Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946), as having established that the field of racial discrimination by an interstate carrier must be free from diverse state regulation and governed uniformly, if at all, by Congress. We do not believe those cases stated so encompassing a rule. The line separating the powers of a State from the exclusive power of Congress is not always distinctly marked; courts must examine closely the facts of each case to determine whether the dangers and hardships of diverse regulation justify foreclosing a State from the exercise of its traditional powers. This was emphatically pointed out in Hall v. DeCuir, supra, the very case upon which Continental chiefly relies: “Judges not unfrequently differ in their reasons for a decision in which they concur. Under such circumstances it would be a useless task to undertake to fix an arbitrary rule by which the line must in all cases be located. It is far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to be settled in each case upon a view of the particular rights involved.” 95 U. S., at 488. The circumstances in Hall v. DeCuir were that a Louisiana law forbidding carriers to discriminate on account of race or color had been applied so as to hold a steamboat owner liable for damages for assigning a colored passenger to one cabin rather than another. This was held to violate the Commerce Clause, but only after a careful analysis of the effects of the law on that carrier and its passengers. Among other things, the Court pointed out that if each of the 10 States bordering the Mississippi River were free to regulate the carrier and to provide for its own passengers and freight, the resulting confusion would produce great inconvenience and unnecessary hardships. The Court concluded that: “Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a State line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business . . . .” 95 U. S., at 489. After the same kind of analysis, the Court in Morgan v. Virginia, supra, held that a Virginia law requiring segregation of motor carrier passengers, including those on interstate journeys, infringed the Commerce Clause because uniform regulation was essential. The Court emphasized the restriction on the passengers’ freedom to choose accommodations and the inconvenience of constantly requiring passengers to shift seats. As in Hall v. DeCuir, the Court explicitly recognized the absence of any one, sure test for deciding these burden-on-commerce cases. It concluded, however, that the circumstances before it showed that there would be a practical interference with carrier transportation if diverse state laws were permitted to stand. The importance of a particularized inquiry into the existence of a burden on commerce is again illustrated by Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28 (1948), where the Court had before it a state statute requiring common carriers to serve all people alike regardless of color. The Court upheld the law as applied to steamships transporting patrons between Michigan and Canada. Following the rule that each case must be adjudged on its particular facts, the Court concluded that neither Hall nor Morgan was “comparable in its facts, whether in the degree of localization of the commerce' involved; in the attenuating effects, if any, upon the commerce . . . ; or in any actual probability of conflicting regulations by different sovereignties.” 333 U. S., at 39. We are not convinced that commerce will be unduly burdened if Continental is required by Colorado to refrain from racial discrimination in its hiring of pilots in that State. Not only is the hiring within a State of an employee, even for an interstate job, a much more localized matter than the transporting of passengers from State to State but more significantly the threat of diverse and conflicting regulation of hiring practices is virtually nonexistent. In Hall and in Morgan the Court assumed the validity both of state laws requiring segregation and of state laws forbidding segregation. Were there a possibility that a pilot hired in Colorado could be barred solely because of his color from serving a carrier in another State, then this case might well be controlled by our prior holdings. But under our more recent decisions any state or federal law requiring applicants for any job to be turned away because of their color would be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The kind of burden that was thought possible in the Hall and Morgan cases, therefore, simply cannot exist here. It is, of course, possible that States could impose such onerous, harassing, and conflicting conditions on an interstate carrier’s hiring of employees that the burden would hamper the carrier’s satisfactory performance of its functions. But that is not this case. We hold that the Colorado statute as applied here to prevent discrimination in hiring on account of race does not impose a constitutionally prohibited burden upon interstate commerce. Third. Continental argues that federal law has so pervasively covered the field of protecting people in interstate commerce from racial discrimination that the States are barred from enacting legislation in this field. It is not contended, however, that the Colorado statute is in direct conflict with federal law, that it denies rights granted by Congress, or that it stands as an obstacle to the full effectiveness of a federal statute. Rather Continental argues that: “When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.” But this Court has also said that the mere “fact of identity does not mean the automatic invalidity of state measures.” To hold that a state statute identical in purpose with a federal statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause, we must be able to conclude that the purpose of the federal statute would to some extent be frustrated by the state statute. We can reach no such conclusion here. Continental relies first on the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, now the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and its broad general provisions forbidding air carriers to subject any particular person to “any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever” and requiring “The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices . . . .” This is a familiar type of regulation, aimed primarily at rate discrimination injurious to shippers, competitors, and localities. But we may assume, for present purposes, that these provisions prohibit racial discrimination against passengers and other customers and that they protect job applicants or employees from discrimination on account of race. The Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency have indeed broad authority over flight crews of air carriers, much of which has been exercised by regulations. Notwithstanding this broad authority, we are satisfied that Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and its successor had no express or implied intent to bar state legislation in this field and that the Colorado statute, at least so long as any power the Civil Aeronautics Board may have remains “dormant and unexercised,” will not frustrate any part of the purpose of the federal legislation. There is even less reason to say that Congress, in passing the Railway Labor Act and making certain of its provisions applicable to air carriers, intended to bar States from protecting employees against racial discrimination. No provision in the Act even mentions discrimination in hiring. It is true that in several cases we have held that the exclusive bargaining agents authorized by the Act must not use their powers to discriminate against minority groups whom they are supposed to represent. And we have held that employers too may be enjoined from carrying out provisions of a discriminatory bargaining agreement. But the duty the Act imposes is one of fair representation and it is imposed upon the union. The employer is merely prohibited from aiding the union in breaching its duty. Nothing in the Railway Labor Act or in our cases suggests that the Act places upon an air carrier a duty to engage only in fair nondiscriminatory hiring practices. The Act has never been used for that purpose, and we cannot hold it bars Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act. Finally, we reject the argument that Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act cannot constitutionally be enforced because of Executive Orders requiring government contracting agencies to include in their contracts clauses by which contractors agree not to discriminate against employees or applicants because of their race, religion, color, or national origin. The District Court purported to take judicial notice that “a certificated commercial carrier by air [such as respondent] is obligated to and in fact does transport United States mail under contract with the United States Government.” The Government answers that in fact it has no contract with Continental and that, while 49 U. S. C. § 1375 requires air lines to carry mail, it does not forbid discrimination on account of race or compel the execution of a contract subject to Executive Orders. We do not rest on this ground alone, however, nor do we reach the question of whether an Executive Order can foreclose state legislation. It is impossible for us to believe that the Executive intended for its orders to regulate air carrier discrimination among employees so pervasively as to preempt state legislation intended to accomplish the same purpose. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1960) § 80-24-6. The Commission also found that Continental was “guilty of a discriminatory and unfair employment practice in requiring on its application form, the racial identity of the applicant and the requirement of a photo to be attached to the application,” contrary to the Commission’s regulation. 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188. 52 Stat. 973, as amended, 49 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) §§401-722, now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1542. It is not claimed in this case that the Colorado Act discriminated against interstate commerce, see, e. g., Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940), or that it places a substantial economic burden on Continental, see, e. g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U. S. 520 (1959). See, e. g., California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 (1941); Erie B. Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914). E. g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962). See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913). See, e. g., United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62 (1956). See, e. g., Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538 (1945); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). Charleston & W. C. B. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597, 604 (1915). California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 730 (1949). 52 Stat. 973, as amended, 49 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) §§ 401-722. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was substantially reenacted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1542. Some of the powers and duties of the Civil Aeronautics Board were transferred to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency. 49 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 484 (b), now 49 U. S. C. § 1374 (b). 49 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 402 (c), now 49 U. S. C. § 1302 (c). Compare Interstate Commerce Act § 3 (1), 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1). See Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F. 2d 499 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M. D. Ala. 1962); cf. Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941). See 49 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) §§ 552, 559, now 49 U. S. C. §§ 1422, 1429. See, e. g., 14 CFR §§ 20.40, 20.42-20.45, 20.121, 21.1, 40.300. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rel. Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 775 (1947). See Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943); H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939). If the federal authorities seek to deal with discrimination in hiring practices and their power to do so is upheld, that would raise questions not presented here. Compare California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 (1941), with California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725 (1949). 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188. See, e. g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 (1957); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944). See, e. g., Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768, 775 (1952). Executive Order No. 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (Aug. 13, 1953), Executive Order No. 10557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Sept. 3, 1954), both revoked and superseded by Executive Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION et al. v. GERAGHTY No. 78-572. Argued October 2, 1979 Decided March 19, 1980 Blackmon, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 409. Kent L. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Heymann, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Jerome M. Feit, and Elliott Schulder. Kenneth N. Flaxman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Thomas R. Meites. Robert J. Hobbs filed a brief for the National Client Council, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mb. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises the question whether a trial court’s denial of a motion for certification of a class may be reviewed on appeal after the named plaintiff’s personal claim has become “moot.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a named plaintiff, respondent here, who brought a class action challenging the validity of the United States Parole Commission’s Parole Release Guidelines, could continue his appeal of a ruling denying class certification even though he had been released from prison while the appeal was pending. We granted certiorari, 440 U. S. 945 (1979), to consider this issue of substantial significance, under Art. Ill of the Constitution, to class-action litigation, and to resolve the conflict in approach among the Courts of Appeals. I In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted explicit Parole Release Guidelines for adult prisoners. These guidelines establish a "customary range” of confinement for various classes of offenders. The guidelines utilize a matrix, which combines a “parole prognosis” score (based on the prisoner’s age at first conviction, employment background, and other personal factors) and an “offense severity” rating, to yield the “customary” time to be served in prison. Subsequently, in 1976, Congress enacted the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (PCRA), Pub. L. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219, 18 U. S. C. §§ 4201-4218. This Act provided the first legislative authorization for paroie release guidelines. It required the newly created Parolé Commission to “promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the powefr] ... to grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner.” § 4203. Before releás-ing a prisoner on parole, the Commission must find, “upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the prisoner,” that release “would not depreciate the seriousness of his offense or promote disrespect for the law” and that it “would not jeopardize the public welfare.” § 4206 (a). Respondent John M. Geraghty was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois of conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1951, and of making false material declarations to a grand jury, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). On January 25, 1974, two months after initial promulgation of the release guidelines, respondent was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of four, years on the conspiracy count and one year on the false declarations count. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed respondent’s convictions. United States v. Braasch, 505 F. 2d 139 (1974), cert. denied sub nom. Geraghty v. United States, 421 U. S. 910 (1975). Geraghty later, pursuant to a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, obtained from the District Court a reduction of his sentence to 30 months. The court granted the motion because, in the court’s view, application of the guidelines would frustrate the sentencing judge’s intent with respect to the length of time Geraghty would serve in prison. United States v. Braasch, No. 72 CR 979 (ND Ill., Oct. 9, 1975), appeal dism’d and mandamus denied, 542 F. 2d 442 (CA7 1976). Geraghty then, applied for release on parole. His first application was denied in January 1976 with the following explanation: “Your offense behavior has been rated as very high severity. You have a salient factor score of 11. You have been in custody for a total of 4 months. Guidelines established by the Board for adult cases which consider the above factors indicate a range of 26-36 months to be served before release for cases with good institutional program performance and adjustment. After review of all relevant factors and information presented, it is found that a decision at this consideration outside the guidelines does not appear warranted.” App. 5. If the customary release date applicable to respondent under the guidelines were adhered to, he would not be paroled before serving his entire sentence minus good-time credits. Geraghty applied for parole again in June 1976; that application was denied for the same reasons. He then instituted this civil suit as a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the guidelines as inconsistent with the PCRA and the Constitution, and questioning the procedures by which the guidelines were applied to his case. Respondent sought certification of a class of “all federal prisoners who are or who will become eligible for release on parole.’’ Id., at 17. Without ruling on Geraghty’s motion, the court transferred the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where respondent was incarcerated. Geraghty continued to press his motion for class certification, but the court postponed ruling on the motion until it was prepared to render a decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court subsequently denied Geraghty’s request for class certification and granted summary judgment for petitioners on all the claims Geraghty asserted. 429 F. Supp. 737 (1977). The court regarded respondent’s action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, to which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applied only by analogy. It denied class certification as “neither necessary nor appropriate.” 429 F. Supp., at 740. A class action was “necessary” only to avoid mootness. The court found such a consideration not comprehended by Rule 23. It found class certification inappropriate because Geraghty raised certain individual issues and, inasmuch as some prisoners might be benefited by the guidelines, because his claims were not typical of the entire proposed class. 429 F. Supp., at 740-741. On the merits, the court ruled that the guidelines are consistent with the PCRA and do not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 429 F. Supp., at 741-744. Respondent, individually “and on behalf of a class,” appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. App. 29. Thereafter, another prisoner, Becher, who had been denied parole through application of the guidelines and who was represented by Geraghty’s counsel, moved to intervene. Becher sought intervention to ensure that the legal issue raised by Geraghty on behalf of the class “will not escape review in the appeal in this case.” Pet. to Intervene After Judgment 2. The District Court, concluding that the filing of Geraghty’s notice of appeal had divested it of jurisdiction, denied the petition to intervene. Becher then filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of intervention. The two appeals were consolidated. On June 30, 1977, before any brief had been filed in the Court of Appeals, Geraghty was mandatorily released from prison; he had served 22 months of his sentence, and had earned good-time credits for the rest. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the appeals as moot. The appellate court reserved decision of the motion to dismiss until consideration of the merits. The Court of Appeals, concluding that the litigation was not moot, reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 579 F. 2d 238 (CA3 1978). If a class had been certified by the District Court, mootness of respondent Geraghty’s personal claim would not have rendered the controversy moot. See, e. g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). The Court of Appeals reasoned that an erroneous denial of a class certification should not lead to the opposite result. 579 F. 2d, at 248-252. Rather, certification of a “certifiable” class, that erroneously had been denied, relates back to the original denial and thus preserves jurisdiction. Ibid. On the question whether certification erroneously had been denied, the Court of Appeals held that necessity is not a prerequisite under Rule 23. 579 F. 2d, at 252. The court expressed doubts about the District Court’s finding that class certification was “inappropriate.” While Geraghty raised some claims not applicable to the entire class of prisoners who are or will become eligible for parole, the District Court could have “certified] certain issues as subject to class adjudication, and . . . limite [d] overbroad classes by the use. of sub-classes.” Id., at 253. Failure “to consider these options constituted a failure properly to exercise discretion.” Ibid. “Indeed, this authority may be exercised sua sponte.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also held that refusal to certify because of a potential conflict of interest between Geraghty and other members of the putative class was error. The subclass mechanism would have remedied this problem as well. Id., at 252-253. Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of class certification and remanded the case to the District Court for an initial evaluation of the proper subclasses. Id., at 254. The court also remanded the motion for intervention. Id., at 245, n. 21. In order to avoid “improvidently dissipating] judicial effort,” id., at 254, the Court of Appeals went on to consider whether the trial court had decided the merits of respondent’s case properly. The District Court’s entry of summary judgment was found to be error because “if Geraghty’s recapitulation of the function and genesis of the guidelines is supported by the evidence,” the guidelines “may well be” unauthorized or unconstitutional. Id., at 259, 268. Thus, the dispute on the merits also was remanded for further factual development. II Article III of the Constitution limits federal “judicial Power,” that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to “Cases” and “Controversies.” This .case-or-controversy limitation serves "two complementary” purposes. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 (1968). It limits the business of federal courts to "questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process,” and it defines the “role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Ibid. Likewise, mootness has two aspects: “when the issues presented are no longer 'live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 (1969). It is clear that the controversy over the validity of the Parole Release Guidelines is still a “live” one between petitioners and at least some members of the class respondent seeks to represent. This is demonstrated by the fact that prisoners currently affected by the guidelines have moved to be substituted, or to intervene, as “named” respondents in this Court. See n. 1, supra. We therefore are concerned here with the second aspect of mootness, that is, the parties’ interest in the litigation. The Court has referred to this concept as the “personal stake” requirement. E. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 755 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The personal-stake requirement relates to the first purpose of the case-or-controversy doctrine — limiting judicial power to disputes capable of judicial resolution. The Court in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 100-101, stated: “The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government. . . . Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy/ Baker v. Carr, [369 U. S.], at 204, and whether the dispute touches upon ‘the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests/ Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, [300 U. S.], at 240-241.” See also Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 216-218 (1974). The “personal stake” aspect of mootness doctrine also serves primarily the purpose of assuring that federal courts are presented with disputes they are capable of resolving. One commentator has defined mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who. and When, 82 Yale L. J. 1363, 1384 (1973). III On several occasions the Court has considered the application of the “personal stake” requirement in the class-action context. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975), it held that mootness of the named plaintiff’s, individual claim after a class has been duly certified does not render the action moot. It reasoned that “even though appellees . . . might not again enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement against [the class representative], it is clear that they will enforce it against those persons in the class that appellant sought to represent and that the District Court certified.” Id., at 400. The Court stated specifically that an Art. Ill case or controversy “may exist . . . between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.” Id., at 402. Although one might argue that Sosna contains at least an implication that the critical factor for Art. Ill purposes is the timing of class certification, other cases, applying a “relation back” approach, clearly demonstrate that timing is not crucial. When the claim on the merits is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” the named plaintiff may litigate the class certification issue despite loss of his personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. E. g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110, n. 11 (1975). The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine, to be sure, was developed outside the class-action context. See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 514-515 (1911). But it has been applied where the' named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with respect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue notwithstanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal stake. See, e. g., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 123-125 (1973). Since the litigant faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the same controversy in the future, vigorous advocacy can be expected to continue. When, however, there is no chance that the named plaintiff’s expired claim will reoccur, mootness still can be avoided through certification of a class prior to expiration of the named plaintiff’s personal claim. E. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 752-757. See Kremens v. Bart- ley, 431 U. S. 119, 129-130 (1977). Some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires. The Court considered this possibility in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 110, n. 11. Gerstein was an action challenging pretrial detention conditions. The Court assumed that the named plaintiffs were no longer in custody awaiting trial at the time the trial court certified a class of pretrial detainees. There was no indication that the particular named plaintiffs might again be subject to pretrial detention. Nonetheless, the case was held not to be moot because: “The length of pretrial custody cannot be ascertained at the outset, and it may be ended at any time by release on recognizance, dismissal of the charges, or a guilty plea, as well as by acquittal or conviction after trial. It is by no means certain that any given individual, named as plaintiff, would be in pretrial custody long enough for a district judge to certify the class. Moreover, in this case the constant existence of a class of persons suffering the deprivation is certain. The attorney representing the named respondents is a public defender, and we can safely assume that he has other clients with a continuing live interest in the case.” Ibid. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 402, n. 11. In two different contexts the Court has stated that the proposed class representative who proceeds to a judgment on the merits may appeal denial of class certification. First, this assumption was “an important ingredient,” Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, at 338, in the rejection of interlocutory appeals, “as of right,” of class' certification denials. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 469, 470, n. 15 (1978). The Court reasoned that denial of class status will not necessarily be the “death knell” of a small-claimant action, since there still remains “the prospect of prevailing on the merits and reversing an order denying class certification.” Ibid. Second, in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-395 (1977), the Court held that a putative class member may intervene, for the purpose of appealing the denial of a class certification motion, after the named plaintiffs’ claims have been satisfied and judgment entered in their favor. Underlying that decision was the view that “refusal to certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs.” Id., at 393. See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S., at 469. And today, the Court holds that named plaintiffs whose claims are satisfied through entry of judgment over their objections may appeal the denial of a class certification ruling. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. 326. Gerstein, McDonald, and Roper are all examples of cases found not to be moot, despite the loss of a “personal stake” in the merits of the litigation by the proposed class representative. The interest of the named plaintiffs in Gerstein was precisely the same as that of Geraghty here. Similarly, after judgment had been entered in their favor, the named plaintiffs in McDonald had no continuing narrow personal stake in the outcome of the class claims. And in Roper the Court points out that an individual controversy is rendered moot, in the strict Art. Ill sense, by payment and satisfaction of a final judgment. Ante, at 333. These cases demonstrate the flexible character of the Art. III mootness doctrine. As has been noted in the past, Art. III justiciability is “not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 508 (1961) (plurality opinion). “[T]he justi-ciability doctrine [is] one of uncertain and shifting contours.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97. IV Perhaps somewhat anticipating today’s decision in Roper, petitioners argue that the situation presented is entirely different when mootness of the individual claim is caused by “expiration” of the claim, rather than by a judgment on the claim. They assert that a proposed class representative who individually prevails on the merits still has a “personal stake” in the outcome of the litigation, while the named plaintiff whose claim is truly moot does not. In the latter situation, where no class has been certified, there is no party before the court with a live claim, and it follows, it is said, that we have no jurisdiction to consider whether a class should have been certified. Brief for Petitioners 37-39. We do not find this distinction persuasive. As has been noted earlier, Geraghty’s “personal stake” in the outcome of the litigation is, in a practical sense, no different from that of the putative class representatives in Roper. Further, the opinion in Roper indicates that the approach to take in applying Art. III is issue by issue. “Nor does a confession of judgment by defendants on less than all the issues moot an entire case; other issues in the case may be appealable. We can assume that a district court’s final judgment fully satisfying named plaintiffs’ private substantive claims would preclude their appeal on that aspect of the final judgment; however, it does not follow that this circumstance would terminate the named plaintiffs’ right to take an appeal on the issue of class certification.” Ante, at 333. See also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 392; Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 497. Similarly, the fact that a named plaintiff’s substantive claims are mooted due to an occurrence other than a judgment on the merits does not mean that all the other issues in the case are mooted. A plaintiff who brings a class action presents two separate issues for judicial resolution. One is the claim on the merits; the other is the claim that he is entitled to represent a class. “The denial of class certification stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated,” Roper, ante, at 336. We think that in détermining whether the plaintiff may continue to press the class certification claim, after the claim on the merits “expires,” we must look to the nature of the “personal stake” in the class certification claim. Determining Art, Ill’s “uncertain and shifting contours,” see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97, with respect to nontraditional forms of litigation, such as the class action, requires reference to the purposes of the case-or-controversy requirement. Application of the personal-stake requirement to a procedural claim, such as the right to represent a class, is not automatic or readily resolved. A “legally cognizable interest,” as the Court described it in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 496, in the traditional sense rarely ever exists with respect to the class certification claim. The justifications that led to the development of the class action include the protection of the defendant from inconsistent .obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees, the provision of a convenient and economical means for. disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims. See, e. g., Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U. S. C. App., pp. 427-429; Note, Developments in the Law, Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1321-1323, 1329-1330 (1976). Although the named representative receives certain benefits from the class nature of the action, some of which are regarded as desirable and others as less so, these benefits generally are byproducts of the class-action device. In order to achieve the primary benefits of class suits, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the proposed class representative the right to have a class certified if the requirements of the Rules are met. This “right” is more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy the “personal stake” requirement. See Roper, ante, at 338. As noted above, the purpose of the “personal stake” requirement is to assure that the case is in a form capable , of judicial resolution. The imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial resolution are sharply presented issues in a concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating opposing positions. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S., at 753-756; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S., at 503 (plurality opinion). We conclude that these elements can exist with respect to the class certification issue notwithstanding the fact that the named plaintiff’s claim on the merits has expired. The question whether class certification is appropriate remains as a concrete, sharply presented issue. In Sosna v. Iowa it was recognized that a named plaintiff whose claim on the merits expires after class certification may still adequately represent the class. Implicit in that decision was the determination that vigorous advocacy can be assured through means other than the traditional requirement of a “personal stake in the outcome.” Respondent here continues vigorously to advocate his right to have a class certified. We therefore hold that an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied. The proposed representative retains a “personal stake” in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Art. III values are not undermined. If the appeal results in reversal of the class certification denial, and a class subsequently is properly certified, the merits of the class claim then may be adjudicated pursuant to the holding in Sosna. Our holding is- limited to the appeal of the denial of the class certification motion. A named plaintiff whose claim expires may not continue to press the appeal on the merits until a class has been properly certified. See Roper, ante, at 336-337. If, on appeal, it is determined that class certification properly was denied, the claim on the merits must be dismissed as moot. Our conclusion that the controversy here is not moot does not automatically establish that the named plaintiff is entitled to continue litigating the. interests of the class. “[I]t does shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative to ‘fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’ Rule 23 (a).” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 403. We hold only that a case or controversy still exists. The question of who is to represent the class is a separate issue. We need not decide here whether Geraghty is a proper representative for the purpose of representing the class on the merits.: No class as yet has been certified. Upon remand, the District Court can determine whether Geraghty may continue to press the class claims or whether another representative would be appropriate. We decide only that Geraghty was a proper representative for the purpose of appealing the ruling denying certification of the class that he initially defined. Thus, it was not improper for the Court of Appeals to consider whether the District Court should have granted class certification. y We turn now to the question whether the Court of Appeals’ decision on the District Court’s class certification ruling was proper. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the District Court to consider the possibility of certifying subclasses sua sponte. Petitioners strenuously contend that placing the burden of identifying and constructing subclasses on the trial court creates unmanageable difficulties. Brief for Petitioners 43-51. We feel that the Court of Appeals’ decision here does not impose undue burdens on the district courts. Respondent had no real opportunity to request certification of subclasses after the class he proposed was rejected. The District Court denied class certification at the same time it rendered its adverse decision on the merits. Requesting subclass certification at that time would have been a futile act. The District Court was not about to invest effort in deciding the subclass question after it had ruled that no relief on the merits was available. The remand merely gives respondent the opportunity to perform his function in the adversary system. On remand, however, it is not the District Court that is to bear the burden of constructing subclasses. That burden is upon the respondent and it is he who is required to submit proposals to the court. The court has no sua sponte obligation so to act. With this modification, the Court of Appeals’ remand of the case for consideration of subclasses was a proper disposition. It would be inappropriate for this Court to reach the merits of this controversy in the present posture of the case. Our holding that the case is not moot extends only to the appeal of the class certification denial. If the District Court again denies class certification, and that decision is affirmed, the controversy on the merits will be moot. Furthermore, although the Court of Appeals commented upon the merits for the sole purpose of avoiding waste of judicial resources, it did not reach a final conclusion on the validity of the guidelines. Rather, it held only that summary judgment was improper and remanded for further factual development. Given the interlocutory posture of the case before us, we must defer decision on the merits of respondent’s case until after it is determined affirmatively that a class properly can be certified. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The grant of certiorari also included the question of the validity of the Parole Release Guidelines, an issue left open in United States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178, 184 (1979). We have concluded, however, that it would be premature to reach the merits of that question at this time. See infra, at 408. While the petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, respondent Geraghty. filed a motion to substitute as respondents in this Court five prisoners, then incarcerated, who also were represented by Geraghty’s attorneys. In the alternative, the prisoners sought to intervene. We deferred our ruling on the motion to the hearing of the case on the merits. 440 U. S. 945 (1979). These prisoners, or most of them, now also have been released from incarceration. On September 25, 1979, a supplement to the motion to substitute or intervene was filed, proposing six new substitute respondents or intervenors; each of these is a presently incarcerated federal prisoner who, allegedly, has been adversely affected by the guidelines and who is represented by Geraghty’s counsel. Since we hold that respondent may continue to litigate the class certification issue, there is no need for us to. consider whether the motion should be granted in order to prevent the case from being moot. We conclude that the District Court initially should rule on the motion. See, e. g., Armour v. City of Anniston, 597 F. 2d 46, 48-19 (CA5 1979); Susman v. Lincoln American Cory., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978), cert. pending, No. 78-1169; Goodman v. Schlesinger, 584 F. 2d 1325, 1332-1333 (CA4 1978); Camper v. Calumet Petrochemicals, Inc., 584 F. 2d 70 (CA5 1978); Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F. 2d 1106 (CA5 1978), aff’d sub nom. Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, ante, p. 326; Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F. 2d 987 (CA5 1978) (en banc), cert. pending, No. 78-1008; Vun Cannon v. Breed, 565 F. 2d 1096 (CA9 1977); Winokur v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 560 F. 2d 271 (CA7 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978); Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F. 2d 1133 (CA2 1977); Kuahulu v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 557 F. 2d 1334 (CA9 1977); Boyd v. Justices of Special Term, 546 F. 2d 526 (CA2 1976); Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F. 2d 825 (CA10 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1049 (1977). 38 Fed. Reg. 31942-31945 (1973). The guidelines currently in force appear at 28 CFR § 2.20 (1979). The extortion count was based on respondent’s use of his position as a vice squad officer of the Chicago police force to “shake down” dispensers of alcoholic beverages; the false declarations concerned his involvement in this scheme. Apparently Becher, too, has.now been released from prison. The claim in Sosna also fit the traditional category of actions that are deemed not moot despite the litigant’s loss of personal stake, that is, those “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 753-755 (1976), however, the Court held that the class-action aspect of mootness doctrine does not depend on the class claim’s being so inherently transitory that it meets the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” standard. Three of the Court’s cases might be described as adopting a less flexible approach. In Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), and in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975), dismissal of putative class suits, as moot, was ordered after the named plaintiffs’ claims became moot. And in Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976), it was indicated that the action would have been moot, upon expiration of the named plaintiffs’ claims, had not the United States intervened as a party plaintiff. Each of these, however, was a case in which there was an attempt to appeal the merits without first having obtained proper certification of a class. In each case it was the defendant who petitioned this Court for review. As is observed subsequently in the text, appeal from denial of class classification is permitted in some circumstances where appeal on the merits is not. In the situation where the proposed class representative has lost a “personal stake,” the merits cannot be reached until a class properly is certified. Although the Court perhaps could have remanded Jacobs and Weinstein for reconsideration of the class certification issue, as the Court of Appeals did here, the parties in those cases did not suggest “relation back” of class certification. Thus we do not find this fine of cases dispositive of the question now before us. Were the class an indispensable party, the named plaintiff’s interests in certification would approach a “legally cognizable interest.” See, e. g., Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974); Simon, Class Actions — Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F. R. D. 375 (1972). We intimate no view as to whether a named plaintiff who settles the individual claim after denial of class certification may, consistent with Art. III, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 393-394, and n. 14 (1977). Mr. Justice Powell, in his dissent, advocates a rigidly formalistic approach to Art. III, post, at 412, and suggests that our decision today is the Court’s first departure from the formalistic view. Post, at 414-419. We agree that the issue at hand is one of first impression and thus, in that narrow sense, is “unprecedented,” post, at 419. We do not believe, however, that the decision constitutes a redefinition of Art. III principles or a “significant departure],” post, at 409, from “carefully considered” precedents, post, at 418. The erosion of the strict, formalistic perception of Art. III was begun well before today’s decision. For example, the protestations of the dissent are strikingly reminiscent of Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 116, in 1968. Mr. Justice Harlan hailed the taxpayer-standing rule pronounced in that case as a “new doctrine” resting “on premises that do not withstand analysis.” Id., at 117- He felt that the problems presented by taxpayer standing “involve nothing less than the proper functioning of the federal courts, and so run to the roots of our constitutional system.” Id., at 116. The taxpayers were thought to complain as “private attomeys-general,” and “[t]he interests they represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration.” Id., at 119. Such taxpayer actions “are and must be ... . ‘public actions’ brought to vindicate public rights.” Id., at 120. Notwithstanding the taxpayers’ lack of a formalistic “personal stake,” even Mr. Justice Harlan felt that the case should be held nonjusticiable on purely prudential grounds. His interpretation of the cases led him' to conclude that “it is . . . clear that [plaintiffs in a public action] as such are not constitutionally excluded from the federal courts.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). Is it not somewhat ironic that Mr. Justice Powell, who now seeks to explain United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, supra, as a straightforward application of settled doctrine, post, at 416-417, expressed in his dissent in McDonald, 432 U. S., at 396, the view that the holding rested on a fundamental misconception about the mootness of an uncertified class action after settlement of the named plaintiffs’ claims? He stated: “Pervading the Court’s opinion is the assumption that the class action somehow continued after the District Court denied class status. But that assumption is supported neither by the text nor by the history of Rule 23. To the contrary, . . . the denial of class status converts the litigation to an ordinary nonclass action.” Id., at 399. The dissent went on to say: “[Petitioner] argues with great force that, as a result of the settlement of their individual claims, the named plaintiffs ‘could no longer appeal the denial of class’ status that had occurred years earlier. . . . Although this question has not been decided by this Court, the answer on principle is clear. The settlement of an individual claim typically moots any issues associated with it. . . . This case is sharply distinguishable from cases such as Sosna v. Iowa . . . and Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,. . . where we allowed named plaintiffs whose individual claims were moot to continue to represent their classes. In those cases, the District Courts previously had certified the classes, thus giving them ‘a legal status separate from the-interest[s] asserted by [the named plaintiffs].’ Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 399. This case presents precisely the opposite situation: The prior denial of class status had extinguished any representative capacity.” Id., at 400 (footnote omitted). Thus, the assumption thought to be “[p]ervading the Court’s opinion” in McDonald, and so vigorously attacked by the dissent there, is now relegated to “gratuitous” “dictum,” post, at 416. Mr. Justice Powell, who finds the situation presented in the case at hand “fundamentally different” from that in Sosna and Franks', post, at 413, also found the facts of McDonald “sharply distinguishable” from those previous cases. 432 U. S., at 400. We do not recite these cases for the purpose of showing that our result is mandated by the precedents. We concede that the prior cases may be said to be somewhat confusing, and that some, perhaps, are irreconcilable with others. Our point is that the strict, formalistic view of Art. III jurisprudence, while perhaps the starting point of all inquiry, is riddled with exceptions. And, in creating each exception, the Court has looked to practicalities and prudential considerations. The resulting doctrine can be characterized, aptly, as “flexible”; it has been developed, not irresponsibly, but “with some care,” post, at 410, including the present case. The dissent is correct that once exceptions are made to the formalistic interpretation of Art. III, principled distinctions and bright lines become more difficult to draw. We do not attempt to predict how far down the road the Court eventually will go toward premising jurisdiction “upon the bare existence of a sharply presented issue in a concrete and vigorously argued case,” post, at 421. Each case must be decided on its own facts. We hasten to note, however, that this case does not even approach the extreme feared by the dissent. This respondent suffered actual, concrete injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct, and this injury would satisfy the formalistic personal-stake requirement if damages were sought. See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 495-500. His injury continued up to and beyond the time the District Court denied class certification. We merely hold that when a District Court erroneously denies a procedural motion, which, if correctly decided, would have prevented the action from becoming moot, an appeal lies from the denial and the corrected ruling “relates back” to the date of the original denial. The judicial process will not become a vehicle for “concerned bystanders,” post, at 413, even if one in respondent’s position can conceivably be characterized as a bystander, because the issue on the merits will not be addressed until a class with an interest in the outcome has been certified. The. “relation back” principle, a traditional equitable doctrine applied to class certification claims in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), serves logically to distinguish this case from the one brought a day after the prisoner is released. See post, at 420-421, n. 15. If the named plaintiff has no personal stake in the outcome at the time class certification is denied, relation back of appellate reversal of that denial still would not prevent mootness of the action. See, e. g., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part Two-Glass Actions, 54 Texas L. Rev. 1289, 1331-1332 (1976); Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 602-608.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MILLER v. ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE No. 96-1060. Argued November 4, 1997 Decided April 22, 1998 Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, G. J., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 445. Sc ALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 452. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 460. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 471. Donald Ross Patterson argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Edward C. DuMont, Michael Jay Singer, and John S. Koppel Walter A. Smith, Jr., St&ven B. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Martha Davis filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice joins. There are “two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.” United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 702 (1898). Within the former category, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that every person “born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.” 169 U. S., at 702. Persons not born in the United States acquire citizenship by birth only as provided by Acts of Congress. Id., at 703. The petitioner in this case challenges the constitutionality of the statutory provisions governing the acquisition of citizenship at birth by children born out of wedlock and outside of the United States. The specific challenge is to the distinction drawn by §309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 238, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1409, between the child of an alien father and a citizen mother, on the one hand, and the child of an alien mother and a citizen father, on the other. Subject to residence requirements for the citizen parent, the citizenship of the former is established at birth; the citizenship of the latter is not established unless and until either the father or his child takes certain affirmative steps to create or confirm their relationship. Petitioner contends that the statutory requirement that those steps be taken while the child is a minor violates the Fifth Amendment because the statute contains no limitation on the time within which the child of a citizen mother may prove that she became a citizen at birth. We find no merit in the challenge because the statute does not impose any limitation on the time within which the members of either class of children may prove that they qualify for citizenship. It does establish different qualifications for citizenship for the two classes of children, but we are persuaded that the qualifications for the members of each of those classes, so far as they are implicated by the facts of this case, are well supported by valid governmental interests. We therefore conclude that the statutory distinction is neither arbitrary nor invidious. I Petitioner was born on June 20,1970, in Angeles City, Republic of the Philippines. The records of the Local Civil Registrar disclose that her birth was registered 10 days later, that she was named Lorena Peñero, that her mother was Luz Peñero, a Filipino national, and that her birth was “illegitimate.” Spaces on the form referring to the name and the nationality of the father are blank. Petitioner grew up and received her high school and college education in the Philippines. At least until after her 21st birthday, she never lived in the United States. App. 19. There is no evidence that either she or her mother ever resided outside of the Philippines. Petitioner’s father, Charlie Miller, is an American citizen residing in Texas. He apparently served in the United States Air Force and was stationed in the Philippines at the time of petitioner’s conception. Id., at 21. He never married petitioner’s mother, and there is no evidence that he was in the Philippines at the time of petitioner’s birth or that he ever returned there after completing his tour of duty. In 1992, Miller filed a petition in a Texas court to establish his relationship with petitioner. The petition was unopposed and the court entered a “Voluntary Paternity Decree” finding him “to be the biological and legal father of Lorelyn Pe-ñero Miller.” The decree provided that “[t]he parent-child relationship is created between the father and the child as if the child were born to the father and mother during marriage.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38. In November 1991, petitioner filed an application for registration as a United States citizen with the State Department. The application was denied in March 1992, and petitioner reapplied after her father obtained the paternity decree in Texas in July 1992. The reapplication was also denied on the ground that the Texas decree did not satisfy “the requirements of Section 309(a)(4) INA, which requires that a child born out of wedlock be legitimated before age eighteen in order to acquire U. S. citizenship under Section 301(g) INA (formerly Section 301(a)(7) INA).” Id., at 33. In further explanation of its reliance on § 309(a)(4), the denial letter added: “Without such legitimation before age eighteen, there is no legally recognized relationship under the INA and the child acquires no rights of citizenship through an American citizen parent.” Ibid. II In 1993, petitioner and her father filed an amended complaint against the Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, seeking a judgment declaring that petitioner is a citizen of the United States and that she therefore has the right to possess an American passport. They alleged that the INA’s different treatment of citizen mothers and citizen fathers violated Mr. Miller’s “right to equal protection under the laws by utilizing the suspect classification of gender without justification.” App. 11. In response to a motion to dismiss filed by the Government, the District Court concluded that Mr. Miller did not have standing and dismissed him as a party. Because venue in Texas was therefore improper, see 28 U. S. C. § 1391(e), the court transferred the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia, the site of the Secretary’s residence. The Government renewed its motion in that forum, and that court concluded that even though petitioner had suffered an injury caused by the Secretary’s refusal to register her as a citizen, the injury was not “redressable” because federal courts do not have the power to “grant citizenship.” 870 F. Supp. 1, 3 (1994) (citing INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875, 884 (1988)). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. It first held that petitioner does have standing to challenge the constitutionality of 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a). If her challenge should succeed, the court could enter a judgment declaring that she was already a citizen pursuant to other provisions of the INA. 96 F. 3d 1467, 1470 (1996). .On the merits, however, the court concluded that the requirements imposed on the “illegitimate” child of an American citizen father, but not on the child of a citizen mother, were justified by the interest in fostering the child’s ties with this country. It explained: “[W]e conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit, that ‘a desire to promote early ties to this country and to those relatives who are citizens of this country is not a[n irrational basis for the requirements made by5 sections 1409(a)(3) and (4). Ablang [v. Reno], 52 F. 3d at 806. Furthermore, we find it entirely reasonable for Congress to require special evidence of such ties between an illegitimate child and its father. A mother is far less likely to ignore the child she has carried in her womb than is the natural father, who may not even be aware of its existence. As the Court has recognized, 'mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated.’ Parham v. Hughes, 441 U. S. 347, 355 (1979). 'The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of the child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother.’ Id. at 355 n. 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This sex-based distinction seems especially warranted where, as here, the applicant for citizenship was fathered by a U. S. serviceman while serving a tom' of duty overseas.” Id., at 1472. Judge Wald concurred in the judgment despite her opinion that there is “no rational basis for a law that requires a U. S. citizen fathei’, but not a U. S. citizen mother, to formally legitimate a child before she reaches majority as well as agree in writing to provide financial support until that date or forever forfeit the right to transmit citizenship.” Id., at 1473. While she agreed that “requiring some sort of minimal 'family ties’ between parent and child, as well as fostering an early connection between child and country, is rational government policy,” she did not agree that those goals justify “a set of procedural hurdles for men — and only men — who wish to confer citizenship on their children.” Id., at 1474. She nevertheless regretfully concurred in the judgment because she believed that our decision in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 (1977), required the court to uphold the constitutionality of. § 1409. 96 F. 3d, at 1473. We granted certiorari to address the following question: “Is the distinction in 8 U. S. C. § 1409 between ‘illegitimate’ children of United States citizen mothers and ‘illegitimate’ children of United States citizen fathers a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?” 520 U. S. 1208 (1997). III Before explaining our answer to the single question that we agreed to address, it is useful to put to one side certain issues that need not be resolved. First, we need not decide whether Fiallo v. Bell dictates the outcome of this case, because that case involved the claims of several aliens to a special immigration preference, whereas here petitioner claims that she is, and for years has been, an American citizen. Additionally, Fiallo involved challenges to the statutory distinctions between “illegitimate” and “legitimate” children, which are not encompassed in the question presented in this ease and which we therefore do not consider. The statutory provision at issue in this case, 8 U. S. C. § 1409, draws two types of distinctions between citizen fathers and citizen mothers of children born out of wedlock. The first relates to the class of unmarried persons who may transmit citizenship at birth to their offspring, and the second defines the affirmative steps that are required to transmit such citizenship. With respect to the eligible class of parents, an unmarried father may not transmit his citizenship to a child born abroad to an alien mother unless he satisfies the residency requirement in § 1401(g) that applies to a citizen parent who is married to an alien. Under that provision, the citizen parent must have resided in the United States for a total of at least five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of 14 years. If the citizen parent is an unmarried mother, however, § 1409(c) rather than § 1401(g) applies; under that subsection she need only have had one year of continuous residence in the United States in order to confer citizenship on her offspring. Since petitioner’s father satisfied the residency requirement in § 1401(g), the validity of the distinction between that requirement and the unusually generous provision in § 1409(c) is not at issue. As for affirmative steps, § 1409(a), as amended in 1986, imposes four requirements concerning unmarried citizen fathers that must be satisfied to confer citizenship “as of the date of birth” on a person born out of wedlock to an alien mother in another country. Citizenship for such persons is established if: “(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence, “(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person’s birth, “(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and “(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years— “(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or domicile, “(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or “(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.” 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a). Only the second of these four requirements is expressly included in § 1409(c), the provision applicable to unwed citizen mothers. See n. 7, supra. Petitioner, relying heavily on Judge Wald’s separate opinion below, argues that there is no rational basis for imposing the other three requirements on children of citizen fathers but not citizen mothers. The first requirement is not at issue here, however, because the Government does not question Mr. Miller’s blood relationship with petitioner. Moreover, even though the parties have disputed the validity of the third condition — and even though that condition is repeatedly targeted in Justice Breyer’s dissent — we need not resolve that debate because it is unclear whether the requirement even applies in petitioner’s case; it was added in 1986, after her birth, and she falls within a special interim provision that allows her to elect application of the preamendment § 1409(a), which required only legitimation before age 21. See n. 3, swpra. And even if the condition did apply to her claim of citizenship, the State Department’s refusal to register petitioner as a citizen was expressly based on § 1409(a)(4). Indeed, since that subsection is written in the disjunctive, it is only necessary to uphold the least onerous of the three alternative methods of compliance to sustain the Government’s position. Thus, the only issue presented by the facts of this ease is whether the requirement in § 1409(a)(4) — that children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but not citizen mothers, obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through legitimation, written acknowledgment by the father under oath, or adjudication by a competent court — violates the Fifth Amendment. It is of significance that the petitioner in this ease, unlike the petitioners in Fiallo, see 430 U. S., at 790, and n. 3, is not challenging the denial of an application for special status. She is contesting the Government’s refusal to register and treat her as a citizen. If she were to prevail, the judgment in her favor would confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than grant her rights that she does not now possess. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that she has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 96 F. 3d, at 1469-1470 (distinguishing INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U. S. 875 (1988)). Moreover, because her claim relies heavily on the proposition that her citizen father should have the same right to transmit citizenship as would a citizen mother, we shall evaluate the alleged discrimination against him as well as its impact on her. See, e. g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193-197 (1976). IV Under the terms of the INA, the joint conduct of a citizen and an alien that results in conception is not sufficient to produce an American citizen, regardless of whether the citizen parent is the male or the female partner. If the two parties engage in a second joint act — if they agree to marry one another — citizenship will follow. The provision at issue in this ease, however, deals only with cases in which no relevant joint conduct occurs after conception; it determines the ability of each of those parties, acting separately, to confer citizenship on a child born outside of the United States. If the citizen is the unmarried female, she must first choose to carry the pregnancy to term and reject the alternative of abortion — an alternative that is available by law to many, and in reality to most, women around the world. She must then actually give birth to the child. Section 1409(e) rewards that choice and that labor by conferring citizenship on her child. If the citizen is the unmarried male, he need not participate in the decision to give birth rather than to choose an abortion; he need not be present at the birth; and for at least 17 years thereafter he need not provide any parental support, either moral or financial, to either the mother or the child, in order to preserve his right to confer citizenship on the child pursuant to § 1409(a). In order retroactively to transmit his citizenship to the child as of the date of the child’s birth, all that § 1409(a)(4) requires is that he be willing and able to acknowledge his paternity in writing under oath while the child is still a minor. 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a)(4)(B). In fact, § 1409(a)(4) requires even less of the unmarried father— that provision is alternatively satisfied if, before the child turns 18, its paternity “is established by adjudication of a competent court.” § 1409(a)(4)(C). It would appear that the child could obtain such an adjudication absent any affirmative act by the father, and perhaps even over his express objection. There is thus a vast difference between the burdens imposed on the respective parents of potential citizens born out of wedlock in a foreign land. It seems obvious that the burdens imposed on the female citizen are more severe than those imposed on the male citizen by § 1409(a)(4), the only provision at issue in this case. It is nevertheless argued that the male citizen and his offspring are the victims of irrational discrimination because § 1409(a)(4) is the product of “ ‘overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women.’” Brief for Petitioner 8. We find the argument singularly unpersuasive. Insofar as the argument rests on the fact that the male citizen parent will "forever forfeit the right to transmit citizenship” if he does not come forward while the child is a minor, whereas there is no limit on the time within which the citizen mother may prove her blood relationship, the argument overlooks the difference between a substantive condition and a procedural limitation. The substantive conduct of the unmarried citizen mother that qualifies her child for citizenship is completed at the moment of birth; the relevant conduct of the unmarried citizen father or his child may occur at any time within 18 years thereafter. There is, however, no procedural hurdle that limits the time or the method by which either parent (or the child) may provide the State Department with evidence that the necessary steps were taken to transmit citizenship to the child. The substantive requirement embodied in § 1409(a)(4) serves, at least in part, to ensure that a person born out of wedlock who claims citizenship by birth actually shares a blood relationship with an American citizen. As originally enacted in 1952, § 1409(a) required simply that “the paternity of such child [born out of wedlock] is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation.” 66 Stat. 238. The section offered no other means of proving a biological relationship. In 1986, at the same time that it modified the INA provisions at issue in Fiallo in favor of unmarried fathers and their out-of-wedlock children, see n. 4, supra, Congress expanded § 1409(a) to allow the two other alternatives now found in subsections (4)(B) and (4)(C). Pub. L. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657. The purpose of the amendment was to “simplify and facilitate determinations of acquisition of citizenship by children born out of wedlock to an American citizen father, by eliminating the necessity of determining the father’s residence or domicile and establishing satisfaction of the legitimation provisions of the jurisdiction.” Hearings, at 150. The 1986 amendment also added § 1409(a)(1), which requires paternity to be established by clear and convincing evidence, in order to deter fraudulent claims; but that standard of proof was viewed as an ancillary measure, not a replacement for proof of paternity by legitimation or a formal alternative. See id., at 150, 155. There is no doubt that ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship between the potential citizen and its citizen parent is an important governmental objective. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 770-771 (1977); Fiallo, 430 U. S., at 799, n. 8. Nor can it be denied that the male and female parents are differently situated in this respect. The blood relationship to the birth mother is immediately obvious and is typically established by hospital records and birth certificates; the relationship to the unmarried father may often be undisclosed and unrecorded in any contemporary public record. Thus, the requirement that the father make a timely written acknowledgment under oath, or that the child obtain a court adjudication of paternity, produces the rough equivalent of the documentation that is already available to evidence the blood relationship between the mother and the child. If the statute had required the citizen parent, whether male or female, to obtain appropriate formal documentation within 30 days after birth, it would have been “gender-neutral” on its face, even though in practical operation it would disfavor unmarried males because in virtually every case such a requirement would be superfluous for the mother. Surely the fact that the statute allows 18 years in which to provide evidence that is comparable to what the mother provides immediately after birth cannot be viewed as discriminating against the father or his child. Nevertheless, petitioner reiterates the suggestion that it is irrational to require a formal act such as a written acknowledgment or a court adjudication because the advent of reliable genetic testing folly addresses the problem of proving paternity, and subsection (a)(1) already requires proof of paternity by clear and convincing evidence. See 96 P. 3d, at 1474. We respectfully disagree. Nothing in subsection (a)(1) requires the citizen father or his child to obtain a genetic paternity test. It is difficult, moreover, to understand why signing a paternity acknowledgment under oath prior to the child’s 18th birthday is more burdensome than obtaining a genetic test, which is relatively expensive, normally requires physical intrusion for both the putative father and child, and often is not available in foreign countries. Congress could fairly conclude that despite recent scientific advances, it still remains preferable to require some formal legal act to establish paternity, coupled with a clear-and-eonvincing evidence standard to deter fraud. The time limitation, in turn, provides assurance that the formal act is based upon reliable evidence, and also deters fraud. Congress is of course free to revise its collective judgment and permit genetic proof of paternity rather than requiring some formal legal act by the father or a court, but the Constitution does not now require any such change. Section 1409 also serves two other important purposes that are unrelated to the determination of paternity: the interest in encouraging the development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child while the child is a minor; and the related interest in fostering ties between the foreign-born child and the United States. When a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States, the citizen mother, unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of her child’s existence and typically will have custody of the child immediately after the birth. Such a child thus has the opportunity to develop ties with its citizen mother at an early age, and may even grow up in the United States if the mother returns. By contrast, due to the normal interval of nine months between conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even know that his child exists, and the child may not know the father’s identity. Section 1409(a)(4) requires a relatively easy, formal step by either the citizen father or his child that shows beyond doubt that at least one of the two knows of their blood relationship, thus assuring at least the opportunity for them to develop a personal relationship. The facts of this very ease provide a ready example of the concern. Mr. Miller and petitioner both failed to take any steps to establish a legal relationship with each other before petitioner’s 21st birthday, and there is no indication in the record that they had any contact whatsoever before she applied fór a United States passport. Given the size of the American military establishment that has been stationed in various parts of the world for the past half century, it is reasonable to assume that this case is not unusual. In 1970, when petitioner was born, about 683,000 service personnel were stationed in the Far East, 24,000 of whom were in the Philippines. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 381 (99th ed. 1978). Of all Americans in the military at that time, only one percent were female. These figures, coupled with the interval between conception and birth and the fact that military personnel regularly return to the United States when a tour of duty ends, suggest that Congress had legitimate concerns about a class of children born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or be known by, their children. It was surely reasonable when the INA was enacted in 1952, and remains equally reasonable today, for Congress to condition the award of citizenship to such children on an act that demonstrates, at a minimum, the possibility that those who become citizens will develop ties with this country — a requirement that performs a meaningful purpose for citizen fathers but normally would be superfluous for citizen mothers. It is of course possible that any child born in a foreign country may ultimately fail to establish ties with its citizen parent and with this country, even though the child’s citizen parent has engaged in the conduct that qualifies the child for citizenship. A citizen mother may abandon her child before returning to the States, and a citizen father, even after acknowledging paternity, may die or abscond before his child has an opportunity to bond with him or visit this country. The fact that the interest in fostering ties with this country may not be fully achieved for either class of children does not qualify the legitimacy or the importance of that interest. If, as Congress reasonably may have assumed, the formal requirements in § 1409(a)(4) tend to make it just as likely that fathers will have the opportunity to develop a meaningful relationship with their children as does the fact that the mother knows of her baby’s existence and often has custody at birth, the statute’s effect will reduce, rather than aggravate, the disparity between the two classes of children. We are convinced not only that strong governmental interests justify the additional requirement imposed on children of citizen fathers, but also that the particular means used in § 1409(a)(4) are well tailored to serve those interests. It is perfectly appropriate to require some formal act, not just any evidence that the father or his child know of the other’s existence. Such a formal act, whether legitimation, written acknowledgment by the father, or a court adjudication, lessens the risk of fraudulent claims made years after the relevant conduct was required. As for the requirement that the formal act take place while the child is a minor, Congress obviously has a powerful interest in fostering ties with the child’s citizen parent and the United States during his or her formative years. If there is no reliable, contemporaneous proof that the child and the citizen father had the opportunity to form familial bonds before the child turned 18, Congress reasonably may demand that the child show sufficient ties to this country on its own rather than through its citizen parent in order to be a citizen. Our conclusion that Congress may require an affirmative act by unmarried fathers and their children, but not mothers and their children, is directly supported by our decision in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 (1983). That case involved a New York law that automatically provided mothers of “illegitimate” children with prior notice of an adoption proceeding and the right to veto an adoption, but only extended those rights to unmarried fathers whose claim of paternity was supported by some formal public act, such as a court adjudication, the filing of a notice of intent to claim paternity, or written acknowledgment by the mother. Id., at 251-252, n. 5, 266. The petitioner in Lehr, an unmarried putative father, need only have mailed a postcard to the State’s “putative father registry” to enjoy the same rights as the child’s undisputed mother, id., at 264, yet he argued that this gender-based requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause. We rejected that argument, and we find the comparable claim in this case, if anything, even less persuasive. Whereas the putative father in Lehr was deprived of certain rights because he failed to take some affirmative step within about two years of the child’s birth (when the adoption proceeding took place), here the unfavorable gender-based treatment was attributable to Mr. Miller’s failure to take appropriate action within 21 years of petitioner’s birth and petitioner’s own failure to obtain a paternity adjudication by a “competent court” before she turned 18. Even though the rule applicable to each class of children born abroad is eminently reasonable and justified by important Government policies, petitioner and her amici argue that § 1409 is unconstitutional because it is a “gender-based classification.” We shall comment briefly on that argument. V The words “stereotype,” “stereotyping,” and “stereotypical” are used repeatedly in petitioner’s and her amici's briefs. They note that we have condemned statutory classifications that rest on the assumption that gender may serve as a proxy for relevant qualifications to serve as the administrator of an estate, Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), to engage in professional nursing, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718 (1982), or to train for military service, United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515 (1996), to name a few examples. Moreover, we have' expressly repudiated cases that rested on the assumption that only the members of one sex could suitably practice law or tend bar. See Hogan, 458 U. S., at 725, n. 10 (commenting on Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948)). Discrimination that “is merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females” is unacceptable. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The gender equality principle that was implicated in those cases is only indirectly involved in this case for two reasons. First, the conclusion that petitioner is not a citizen rests on several coinciding factors, not just the gender of her citizen parent. On the facts of this case, even if petitioner’s mother had been a citizen and her father had been the alien, petitioner would not qualify for citizenship because her mother has never been to the United States. Alternatively, if her citizen parent had been a female member of the Air Force and, like Mr. Miller, had returned to the States at the end of her tour of duty, § 1409 quite probably would have been irrelevant and petitioner would have become a citizen at birth by force of the Constitution itself. Second, it is not merely the sex of the citizen parent that determines whether the child is a citizen under the terms of the statute; rather, it is an event creating a legal relationship between parent and child — the birth itself for citizen mothers, but postbirth conduct for citizen fathers and their offspring. Nevertheless, we may assume that if the classification in § 1409 were merely the product of an outmoded stereotype, it would be invalid. The “gender stereotypes” on which §1409 is supposedly premised are (1) “that the American father is never anything more than the proverbial breadwinner who remains aloof from day-to-day child rearing duties,” and (2) “that a mother will be closer to her child born out of wedlock than a father will be to his.” Even disregarding the statute’s separate, nonstereotypieal purpose of ensuring reliable proof of a blood relationship, neither of those propositions fairly reflects the justifications for the classification actually at issue. Section 1409(a)(4) is not concerned with either the average father or even the average father of a child born out of wedlock. It is concerned with a father (a) whose child was born in a foreign country, and (b) who is unwilling or unable to acknowledge his paternity, and whose child is unable or unwilling to obtain a court paternity adjudication. A congressional assumption that such a father and his child are especially unlikely to develop a relationship, and thus to foster the child’s ties with this country, has a solid basis even if we assume that all fathers who have made some effort to become acquainted with their children are as good, if not better, parents than members of the opposite sex. Nor does the statute assume that all mothers of illegitimate children will necessarily have a closer relationship with their children than will fathers. It does assume that all of them will be present at the event that transmits their citizenship to the child, that hospital records and birth certificates will normally make a further acknowledgment and formal proof of parentage unnecessary, and that their initial custody will at least give them the opportunity to develop a caring relationship with the child. Section 1409(a)(4) — the only provision that we need consider — is therefore supported by the undisputed assumption that fathers are less likely than mothers to have the opportunity to develop relationships, not simply, as Justice Breyer contends, post, at 482-483, that they are less likely to take advantage of that opportunity when it exists. These assumptions are firmly grounded and adequately explain why Congress found it unnecessary to impose requirements on the mother that were entirely appropriate for the father. None of the premises on which the statutory classification is grounded can be fairly characterized as an accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about the members of either sex. The biological differences between single men and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born in foreign lands. Indeed, it is the suggestion that simply because Congress has authorized citizenship at birth for children born abroad to unmarried mothers, it cannot impose any postbirth conditions upon the granting of citizenship to the foreign-born children of citizen fathers, that might be characterized as merely a byproduct of the strong presumption that gender-based legal distinctions are suspect. An impartial analysis of the relevant differences between citizen mothers and citizen fathers plainly rebuts that presumption. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Her mother was bom in Leyte. Several years after petitioner's birth, her mother married a man named Prank Raspotnik and raised a family in Angeles aty. App. 22. Although there is no formal finding that his paternity has been established by dear and convincing evidence, it is undisputed. In a letter to petitioner’s attorney, the State Department acknowledged that it was “satisfied that Mr. Charlie R. Miller, the putative father, is a U. S. citizen, that he possesses suffident physical presence in the United States to transmit dtizenship, and that there is suffident evidence that he had access to the applicant's mother at the probable time of conception.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 32-33. The comment, of coarse, related only to cases in which the child horn out of wedlock claims citizenship through her father. Moreover, the reference to age 18 was inaccurate; petitioner was born prior to 1986, when § 309(a) was amended to change the relevant age from 21 to 18, see Pub. L. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657, and she falls within a narrow age bracket whose members may elect to have the preamendment law apply, see note following 8 U. S. C. § 1409 (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment) (quoting § 23(e), as added, Pub. L. 100-525, §8(r), 102 Stat. 2619). This oversight does not affect her case, however, because she was over 21 when the Texas decree was entered. The sections of the INA challenged in Fiallo defined the terms “child” and “parent,” which determine eligibility for the special preference immigration status accorded to the “children” and “parents” of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 788-789 (1977). “‘Child’” was defined to include “‘an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother.’” Id., at 788-789, n. 1 (quoting 8 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1976 ed.)). Thus, the statute did not permit an illegitimate child to seek preference by virtue of relationship with its citizen or resident father, nor could an alien father seek preference based on his illegitimate child’s citizenship or residence. 430 U. S., at 789. Following this Court’s decision in Fiallo upholding those provisions, in 1986 Congress amended the INA to recognize “child” and “parent” status where the preference is sought based on the relationship of a child bom out of wedlock to its natural father “if the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the person.” Pub. L. 99-603, §315(a), 100 Stat. 3439, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). See 8 U. S. O. § 1409(a) (directing that §§ 1401(e), (d), (e), (g) and 1408(2) “shall apply” if the specified conditions of § 1409(a) are met). Title 8 U. S. C. §1401 provides: “The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: “(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years ....” Prior to its amendment in 1986, the section had required residence of 10 total years, at least 5 of which were after attaining the age of 14. See §301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 236. Section 309(e) of the INA, codified in 8 U. S. C. § 1409(c), provides: “(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year.” The Government has offered two explanations for the special rule applicable to unmarried citizen mothers who give birth abroad: first, an assumption that the citizen mother would probably have custody, and second, that in most foreign countries the nationality of an illegitimate child is that of the mother unless paternity has been established. The Government submits that the special rule would minimize the risk that such a child might otherwise be stateless. See Brief for Respondent 32-34. The Government asserts that the purpose of § 1409(a)(3) is ‘“to facilitate the enforcement of a child support order and, thus, lessen the chance that the child could become a financial burden to the states.’” Brief for Respondent 25-26, n. 13 (quoting Hearings on H. R. 4823 et al. before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 150 (1986) (statement of Joan M. Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs) (hereinafter Hearings)). As a threshold matter, the Government now argues — though it never asserted this position below or in opposition to certiorari — that an alien outside the territory of the United States “has no substantive rights cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.” Brief for Respondent 11-12. Even if that is so, the question to be decided is whether petitioner is such an alien or whether, as she claims, she is a citizen. Thus, we must address the merits to determine whether the predicate for this argument is accurate. In the cases on which the Government relies, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950), and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990), it was perfectly clear that the complaining aliens were not citizens or nationals of the United States. Though petitioner claims to be a citizen from birth, rather than claiming an immigration preference, citizenship does not pass by descent. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U. S. 815, 830 (1971). Thus she must still meet the statutory requirements set by Congress for citizenship. Id., at 828-830; United States v. Ginsberg, 248 U. S. 472, 474 (1917). Deference to the political branches dictates “a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 82 (1976). Even if, as petitioner and her amici argue, the heightened scrutiny that normally governs gender discrimination claims applied in this context, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 532-534 (1996), we are persuaded that the requirement imposed by § 1409(a)(4) on children of unmarried male, but not female, citizens is substantially related to important governmental objectives. See 7 U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 1131.5-4(e) (1996) (hereinafter Foreign Affairs Manual). Commercially available testing in the United States presently appears to cost between about $450 to $600 per test. See Hotaling, Is He or Isn’t He?, Los Angeles Times Magazine, Sept. 7,1997, pp. 36, 54 (hereinafter Hotaling); Mirabella, Lab’s Tests Give Answers to Genetic Questions, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 25, 1997, pp. 1C, 8C, cols. 2, 4 (hereinafter Mirabella). Laboratories that conduct genetic paternity testing typically. use either blood samples or cells scraped from the inside of the cheek of the putative father, the child, and often the mother as well. See, e. g., 1 D. Faigman, D. Kaye, M. Saks, & J. Sanders, Modern Scientific Evidence §§19-2.2, 19-2.7.1, pp. 761, 763, 775 (1997); Hotaling 36, 54; Mirabella, at 8C, cols. 2,4. The State Department has observed that “the competence, integrity, and availability of blood testing physicians and facilities vary around the world.” 7 Foreign Affairs Manual § 1131.5-4(e). There are presently about 75 DNA testing laboratories in the United States, 51 of which are accredited by the American Association of Blood Banks. Hotaling 36. Once a child reaches the legal age of majority, a male citizen could make a fraudulent claim of paternity on the person’s behalf without any risk of liability for child support. In a different context Congress has already recognized the value of genetic paternity testing. See 96 F. 3d 1467, 1474-1475 (CADC 1996) (discussing Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984). Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Background Study, Use of Women in the Military 5 (2d ed. 1978). The proportion of military personnel who were female in 1970 had dropped from a high of 2.2 percent in 1945. Id., at 3. Since 1970, the proportion has steadily increased to its present level of about 13 percent. See Dept. of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 23 (1996). The same policy presently applies to foreign-born persons not eligible for citizenship at birth: A child may obtain special immigration preference and the immediate issuance of a visa based on a parent’s citizenship or lawful residence, but only until age 21. 8 U. S. G. §§ 1101(b)(1), 1158(d). Justice Breyer questions the relevance of Lehr because it was decided before advances in genetic testing, see post, at 487; there was, however, no question about the paternity of the father in that ease. As in this case, the father there failed to act promptly to establish a relationship with his child. Of course, the sex of the person claiming citizenship is irrelevant; if she were a male, petitioner’s case would be no stronger. Theoretically she might have been the child of an American soldier stationed in the Philippines during World War II. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F. 3d 801, 802 (CA9 1995), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1043 (1996). “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 1. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 8. 96 F. 3d, at 1473 (Wald, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Breyer does not dispute the fact that the unmarried father of a child born abroad is less likely than the unmarried mother to have the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child. He nevertheless would replace the gender-based distinction with either a “knowledge of birth” requirement or a distinction between “Caretaker and Noncaretaker Parents.” Post, at 487. Neither substitute seems a likely candidate for serious congressional consideration. The former in practice would be just as gender based as the present requirement, for surely every mother has knowledge of the birth when it occurs; nor would that option eliminate the need for formal steps and time limits to ensure that the parent truly had knowledge during the child's youth. The latter would be confusing at best, for Justice Breyer does not tell us how he would decide whether a father like Mr. Miller would qualify as a “caretaker” or a “non-caretaker”; and it would also be far less protective of families than the present statute, for it would deny citizenship to out-of-wedlock children who have relationships with their citizen parents but are not in the primary care or custody of those parents. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U. S. 464, 497-498, n. 4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argues that petitioner’s suit must be dismissed because the courts have “no power to provide the relief requested.” Post, at 453. Because we conclude that there is no constitutional violation to remedy, we express no opinion on this question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTH-CENTRAL TIMBER DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. WUNNICKE, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF ALASKA, et al. No. 82-1608. Argued February 29, 1984 Decided May 22, 1984 LeRoy E. DeVeaux argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard L. Crabtree, Donald I. Baker, Karen L. Grimm, and Erwin N. Griswold. Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, and Dirk D. Snel. Ronald W. Lorensen, Deputy Attorney General of Alaska, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General, and Michael J. Frank and Michele D. Brown, Assistant Attorneys General. James H. Clarke filed a brief for the Pacific Rim Trade Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. C. Dean Little filed a brief for Northwest Independent Forest Manufacturers et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice White announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and an opinion with respect to Parts III and IV, in which Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens joined. We granted certiorari in this case to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that held that Alaska’s requirement that timber taken from state lands be processed within the State prior to export was “implicitly authorized” by Congress and therefore does not violate the Commerce Clause. 464 U. S. 890 (1983). We hold that it was not authorized and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I In September 1980, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources published a notice that it would sell approximately 49 million board-feet of timber in the area of Icy Cape, Alaska, on October 23, 1980. The notice of sale, the prospectus, and the proposed contract for the sale all provided, pursuant to 11 Alaska Admin. Code §76.130 (1974), that “[pjrimary manufacture within the State of Alaska will be required as a special provision of the contract.” App. 35a. Under the primary-manufacture requirement, the successful bidder must partially process the timber prior to shipping it outside of the State. The requirement is imposed by contract and does not limit the export of unprocessed timber not owned by the State. The stated purpose of the requirement is to “protect existing industries, provide for the establishment of new industries, derive revenue from all timber resources, and manage the State’s forests on a sustained yield basis.” Governor’s Policy Statement, App. 28a. When it imposes the requirement, the State charges a significantly lower price for the timber than it otherwise would. Brief for Respondents 6-7. The major method of complying with the primary-manufacture requirement is to convert the logs into cants, which are logs slabbed on at least one side. In order to satisfy the Alaska requirement, cants must be either sawed to a maximum thickness of 12 inches or squared on four sides along their entire length. Petitioner, South-Central Timber Development, Inc., is an Alaska corporation engaged in the business of purchasing standing timber, logging the timber, and shipping the logs into foreign commerce, almost exclusively to Japan. It does not operate a mill in Alaska and customarily sells unprocessed logs. When it learned that the primary-manufacture requirement was to be imposed on the Icy Cape sale, it brought an action in Federal District Court seeking an injunction, arguing that the requirement violated the negative implications of the Commerce Clause. The District Court agreed and issued an injunction. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139 (Alaska 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding it unnecessary to reach the question whether, standing alone, the requirement would violate the Commerce Clause, because it found implicit congressional authorization in the federal policy of imposing a primary-manufacture requirement on timber taken from federal land in Alaska. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F. 2d 890 (1982). We must first decide whether the court was correct in concluding that Congress has authorized the challenged requirement. If Congress has not, we must respond to respondents’ submission that we should affirm the judgment on two grounds not reached by the Court of Appeals: (1) whether in the absence of congressional approval Alaska’s requirement is permissible because Alaska is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator; and (2), if not, whether the local-processing requirement is forbidden by the Commerce Clause. II Although the Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 326 (1979); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 534-538 (1949); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852). It is equally clear that Congress may “redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce” by “permitting] the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945). See also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 958-960 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331 (1982); Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 652-655 (1981); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946). The Court of Appeals held that Congress had done just that by consistently endorsing primary-manufacture requirements on timber taken from federal land. 693 F. 2d, at 893. Although the court recognized that cases of this Court have spoken in terms of express approval by Congress, it stated: “But such express authorization is not always necessary. There will be instances, like the case before us, where federal policy is so clearly delineated that a state may enact a parallel policy without explicit congressional approval, even if the purpose and effect of the state law is to favor local interests.” Ibid. We agree that federal policy with respect to federal land is “clearly delineated,” but the Court of Appeals was incorrect in concluding either that there is a clearly delineated federal policy approving Alaska’s local-processing requirement or that Alaska’s policy with respect to its timber lands is authorized by the existence of a “parallel” federal policy with respect to federal lands. Since 1928, the Secretary of Agriculture has restricted the export of unprocessed timber cut from National Forest lands in Alaska. The current regulation, upon which the State places heavy reliance, provides: “Unprocessed timber from National Forest System lands in Alaska may not be exported from the United States or shipped to other States without prior approval of the Regional Forester. This requirement is necessary to ensure the development and continued existence of adequate wood processing capacity in that State for the sustained utilization of timber from the National Forests which are geographically isolated from other processing facilities.” 36 CFR §223.10(c) (1983). From 1969 to 1973, Congress imposed a maximum export limitation of 350 million board-feet of unprocessed timber from federal lands lying west of the 100th meridian (a line running from central North Dakota through central Texas). 16 U. S. C. § 617(a). Beginning in 1973, Congress imposed, by way of a series of annual riders to appropriation Acts, a complete ban on foreign exports of unprocessed logs from western lands except those within Alaska. See, e. g., Pub. L. 96-126, Tit. Ill, §301, 93 Stat. 979. These riders limit only foreign exports and do not require in-state processing before the timber may be sold in domestic interstate commerce. The export limitation with respect to federal land in Alaska, rather than being imposed by statute, was imposed by the above-quoted regulation, and applies to exports to other States, as well as to foreign exports. Alaska argues that federal statutes and regulations demonstrate an affirmative expression of approval of its primary-manufacture requirement for three reasons: (1) federal timber export policy has, since 1928, treated federal timber land in Alaska differently from that in other States; (2) the Federal Government has specifically tailored its policies to ensure development of wood-processing capacity for utilization of timber from the National Forests; and (3) the regulation forbidding without prior approval the export from Alaska of unprocessed timber or its shipment to other States demonstrates that it is the Alaska wood-processing industry in particular, not the domestic wood-processing industry generally, that has been the object of federal concern. Acceptance of Alaska’s three factual propositions does not mandate acceptance of its conclusion. Neither South-Central nor the United States challenges the existence of a federal policy to restrict the out-of-state shipment of unprocessed Alaska timber from federal lands. They challenge only the derivation from that policy of an affirmative expression of federal approval of a parallel policy with respect to state timber. They argue that our cases dealing with congressional authorization of otherwise impermissible state interference with interstate commerce have required an “express” statement of such authorization, and that no such authorization may be implied. It is true that most of our cases have looked for an express statement of congressional policy prior to finding that state regulation is permissible. For example, in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, supra, the Court declined to find congressional authorization for state-imposed burdens on interstate commerce in ground water despite 37 federal statutes and a number of interstate compacts that demonstrated Congress’ deference to state water law. We noted that on those occasions in which consent has been found, congressional intent and policy to insulate state legislation from Commerce Clause attack have been “expressly stated.” 458 U. S., at 960. Similarly, in New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331 (1982), we rejected a claim by the State of New Hampshire that its restriction on the interstate flow of privately owned and produced electricity was authorized by § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act. That section provides that the Act “shall not. . . deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.” 16 U. S. C. § 824(b). We found nothing in the statute or legislative history “evinc[ing] a congressional intent ‘to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause.’” 455 U. S., at 341 (quoting United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, 345 U. S. 295, 304 (1953)). Alaska relies in large part on this Court’s recent opinion in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204 (1983), for its “implicit approval” theory. At issue in White was an executive order issued by the Mayor of Boston requiring all construction projects funded by the city or by funds that the city had authority to administer, to be performed by a work force consisting of at least 50% residents of the city. A number of the projects were funded in part with federal Urban Development Action Grants. The Court held that insofar as the city expended its own funds on the projects, it was a market participant unconstrained by the dormant Commerce Clause; insofar as the city expended federal funds, “the order was affirmatively sanctioned by the pertinent regulations of those programs.” Id., at 215. Alaska relies on the Court’s statements in White that the federal regulations “affirmatively permit” and “affirmatively sanctio[n]” the executive order and that the order “sounds a harmonious note” with the federal regulations, and it finds significance in the fact that the Court did not use the words “expressly stated.” Rather than supporting the position of the State, we believe that White undermines it. If approval of state burdens on commerce could be implied from parallel federal policy, the Court would have had no reason to rely upon the market-participant doctrine to uphold the executive order. Instead, the order could have been upheld as being in harmony with federal policy as expressed in regulations governing the expenditure of federal funds. There is no talismanic significance to the phrase “expressly stated,” however; it merely states one way of meeting the requirement that for a state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear. The requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated by the policies underlying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. It is not, as Alaska asserts, merely a wooden formalism. The Commerce Clause was designed “to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325 (1979). Unrepresented interests will often bear the brunt of regulations imposed by one State having a significant effect on persons or operations in other States. Thus, “when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.” South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U. S. 177, 185, n. 2 (1938); see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S., at 767-768, n. 2. On the other hand, when Congress acts, all segments of the country are represented, and there is significantly less danger that one State will be in a position to exploit others. Furthermore, if a State is in such a position, the decision to allow it is a collective one. A rule requiring a clear expression of approval by Congress ensures that there is, in fact, such a collective decision and reduces significantly the risk that unrepresented interests will be adversely affected by restraints on commerce. The fact that the state policy in this case appears to be consistent with federal policy — or even that state policy furthers the goals we might believe that Congress had in mind — is an insufficient indicium of congressional intent. Congress acted only with respect to federal lands; we cannot infer from that fact that it intended to authorize a similar policy with respect to state lands. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals. I — I HH We now turn to the issues left unresolved by the Court of Appeals. The first of these issues is whether Alaska’s restrictions on export of unprocessed timber from state-owned lands are exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny under the “market-participant doctrine.” Our cases make clear that if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U. S., at 206-208; Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429, 436-437 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 810 (1976). The precise contours of the market-participant doctrine have yet to be established, however, the doctrine having been applied in only three cases of this Court to date. The first of the cases, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra, involved a Maryland program designed to reduce the number of junked automobiles in the State. A “bounty” was established on Maryland-licensed junk cars, and the State imposed more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state scrap processors than on in-state ones. The Court rejected a Commerce Clause attack on the program, although it noted that under traditional Commerce Clause analysis the program might well be invalid because it had the effect of reducing the flow of goods in interstate commerce. Id., at 805. The Court concluded that Maryland’s action was not “the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned,” ibid., because “[njothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.” Id., at 810 (footnote omitted). In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, supra, the Court upheld a South Dakota policy of restricting the sale of cement from a state-owned plant to state residents, declaring that “[t]he basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law.” Id., at 436. The Court relied upon “‘the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’” Id., at 438-439 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307 (1919)). In essence, the Court recognized the principle that the Commerce Clause places no limitations on a State’s refusal to deal with particular parties when it is participating in the interstate market in goods. The most recent of this Court’s cases developing the market-participant doctrine is White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., supra, in which the Court sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge an executive order of the Mayor of Boston that required all construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds or city-administered funds to be performed by a work force of at least 50% city residents. The Court rejected the argument that the city was not entitled to the protection of the doctrine because the order had the effect of regulating employment contracts between public contractors and their employees. Id., at 211, n. 7. Recognizing that “there are some limits on a state or local government’s ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts business,” the Court found it unnecessary to define those limits because “[e]veryone affected by the order [was], in a substantial if informal sense, ‘working for the city.’” Ibid. The fact that the employees were “working for the city” was “crucial” to the market-participant analysis in White. United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U. S. 208, 219 (1984). The State of Alaska contends that its primary-manufacture requirement fits squarely within the market-participant doctrine, arguing that “Alaska’s entry into the market may be viewed as precisely the same type of subsidy to local interests that the Court found unobjectionable in Alexandria Scrap.” Brief for Respondents 24. However, when Maryland became involved in the scrap market it was as a purchaser of scrap; Alaska, on the other hand, participates in the timber market, but imposes conditions downstream in the timber-processing market. Alaska is not merely subsidizing local timber processing in an amount “roughly equal to the difference between the price the timber would fetch in the absence of such a requirement and the amount the state actually receives.” Ibid. If the State directly subsidized the timber-processing industry by such an amount, the purchaser would retain the option of taking advantage of the subsidy by processing timber in the State or forgoing the benefits of the subsidy and exporting unprocessed timber. Under the Alaska requirement, however, the choice is made for him: if he buys timber from the State he is not free to take the timber out of state prior to processing. The State also would have us find Reeves controlling. It states that “Reeves made it clear that the Commerce Clause imposes no limitation on Alaska’s power to choose the terms on which it will sell its timber.” Brief for Respondents 25. Such an unrestrained reading of Reeves is unwarranted. Although the Court in Reeves did strongly endorse the right of a State to deal with whomever it chooses when it participates in the market, it did not — and did not purport to — sanction the imposition of any terms that the State might desire. For example, the Court expressly noted in Reeves that “Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged,” 447 U. S., at 438, n. 9; that a natural resource “like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals,” was not involved, but instead the cement was “the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw materials,” id., at 443-444; and that South Dakota did not bar resale of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers, id., at 444, n. 17. In this case, all three of the elements that were not present in Reeves — foreign commerce, a natural resource, and restrictions on resale — are present. Finally, Alaska argues that since the Court in White upheld a requirement that reached beyond “the boundary of formal privity of contract,” 460 U. S., at 211, n. 7, then, a fortiori, the primary-manufacture requirement is permissible, because the State is not regulating contracts for resale of timber or regulating the buying and selling of timber, but is instead “a seller of timber, pure and simple.” Brief for Respondents 28. Yet it is clear that the State is more than merely a seller of timber. In the commercial context, the seller usually has no say over, and no interest in, how the product is to be used after sale; in this case, however, payment for the timber does not end the obligations of the purchaser, for, despite the fact that the purchaser has taken delivery of the timber and has paid for it, he cannot do with it as he pleases. Instead, he is obligated to deal with a stranger to the contract after completion of the sale. That privity of contract is not always the outer boundary of permissible state activity does not necessarily mean that the Commerce Clause has no application within the boundary of formal privity. The market-participant doctrine permits a State to influence “a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which [it] is a major participant.” White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Workers, Inc., 460 U. S., at 211, n. 7. Contrary to the State’s contention, the doctrine is not carte blanche to impose any conditions that the State has the economic power to dictate, and does not validate any requirement merely because the State imposes it upon someone with whom it is in contractual privity. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further. The State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market. Unless the “market” is relatively narrowly defined, the doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local industry. At the heart of the dispute in this case is disagreement over the definition of the market. Alaska contends that it is participating in the processed timber market, although it acknowledges that it participates in no way in the actual processing. Id., at 34. South-Central argues, on the other hand, that although the State may be a participant in the timber market, it is using its leverage in that market to exert a regulatory effect in the processing market, in which it is not a participant. We agree with the latter position. There are sound reasons for distinguishing between a State’s preferring its own residents in the initial disposition of goods when it is a market participant and a State’s attachment of restrictions on dispositions subsequent to the goods coming to rest in private hands. First, simply as a matter of intuition a state market participant has a greater interest as a “private trader” in the immediate transaction than it has in what its purchaser does with the goods after the State no longer has an interest in them. The common law recognized such a notion in the doctrine of restraints on alienation. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 404 (1911); but cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 53, n. 21 (1977). Similarly, the antitrust laws place limits on vertical restraints. It is no defense in an action charging vertical trade restraints that the same end could be achieved through vertical integration; if it were, there would be virtually no antitrust scrutiny of vertical arrangements. We reject the contention that a State’s action as a market regulator may be upheld against Commerce Clause challenge on the ground that the State could achieve the same end as a market participant. We therefore find it unimportant for present purposes that the State could support its processing industry by selling only to Alaska processors, by vertical integration, or by direct subsidy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34, 37, 45. Second, downstream restrictions have a greater regulatory effect than do limitations on the immediate transaction. Instead of merely choosing its own trading partners, the State is attempting to govern the private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners; that is, it restricts the post-purchase activity of the purchaser, rather than merely the purchasing activity. In contrast to the situation in White, this restriction on private economic activity takes place after the completion of the parties’ direct commercial obligations, rather than during the course of an ongoing commercial relationship in which the city retained a continuing proprietary interest in the subject of the contract. In sum, the State may not avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it is not a participant. > HH Finally, the State argues that even if we find that Congress did not authorize the processing restriction, and even if we conclude that its actions do not qualify for the market-participant exception, the restriction does not substantially burden interstate or foreign commerce under ordinary Commerce Clause principles. We need not labor long over that contention. Viewed as a naked restraint on export of unprocessed logs, there is little question that the processing requirement cannot survive scrutiny under the precedents of the Court. For example, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970), we invalidated a requirement of the State of Arizona that all Arizona cantaloupes be packed within the State. The Court noted that the State’s purpose was “to protect and enhance the reputation of growers within the State,” a purpose we described as “surely legitimate.” Id., at 143. We observed: “[T]he Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 16; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385.” Id., at 145. We held that if the Commerce Clause forbids a State to require work to be done within the State for the purpose of promoting employment, then, a fortiori, it forbids a State to impose such a requirement to enhance the reputation of its producers. Because of the protectionist nature of Alaska’s local-processing requirement and the burden on commerce resulting therefrom, we conclude that it falls within the rule of virtual per se invalidity of laws that “bloc[k] the flow of interstate commerce at a State’s borders.” City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 624 (1978). We are buttressed in our conclusion that the restriction is invalid by the fact that foreign commerce is burdened by the restriction. It is a well-accepted rule that state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny. It is crucial to the efficient execution of the Nation’s foreign policy that “the Federal Government . . . speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.” Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 285 (1976); see also Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979). In light of the substantial attention given by Congress to the subject of export restrictions on unprocessed timber, it would be peculiarly inappropriate to permit state regulation of the subject. See Prohibit Export of Unprocessed Timber: Hearing on H. R. 639 before the Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the House Committee on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. It is so ordered. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of this case. The proposed contract, which the successful bidder on the timber sale would have been required to sign, provided: “Section 68. Primary Manufacture. Timber cut under this contract shall not be transported for primary manufacture outside the State of Alaska without written approval of the State. “Primary Manufacture is defined under 11 AAC 76.130 and the Governor’s policy statement of May 1974.” 11 Alaska Admin. Code §76.130 (1974) (repealed 1982), which authorized the contractual provision in question, provided: “PRIMARY MANUFACTURE “(a) The director may require that primary manufacture of logs, cordwood, bolts or other similar products be accomplished within the State of Alaska. “(b) The term primary manufacture means manufacture which is first in order of time or development. When used in relation to sawmilling, it means “(1) the breakdown process wherein logs have been reduced in size by a headsaw or gang saw to the extent that the residual cants, slabs, or planks can be processed by resaw equipment of the type customarily used in log processing plants; or “(2) manufacture of a product for use without further processing, such as structural timbers (subject to a firm showing of an order or orders for this form of product). “(c) Primary manufacture, when used in reference to pulp ventures, means the breakdown process to a point where the wood fibers have been separated. Chips made from timber processing wastes shall be considered to have received primary manufacture. With respect to veneer or plywood production, it means the production of green veneer. Poles and piling, whether treated or untreated, when manufactured to American National Institute Standards specifications are considered to have received primary manufacture.” The local-processing requirement is now authorized by Alaska Admin. Code §§71.280, 71.910 (1982). Current regulations require that the cants be no thicker than 83A inches unless slabs are taken from all four sides. 11 Alaska Admin. Code § 71.910 (1982). Apparently, there is virtually no interstate market in Alaska timber because of the high shipping costs associated with shipment between American ports. Consequently, over 90% of Alaska timber is exported to Japan. Brief for Petitioner 14, n. 14. Although it would appear at first blush that it would be economically more efficient to have the primary processing take place within Alaska, that is apparently not the case. Material appearing in the record suggests that the slabs removed from the log in the process of making cants are often quite valuable, but apparently cannot be used and are burned. Record, Exh. 11, p. 63. It appears that because of the wasted wood, cants are actually worth less than the unprocessed logs. An affidavit of a vice president of South-Central states in part: “5. It is also my observation that within Alaska there is absolutely no market for domestic resawing of ‘cant’ or ‘square’ manufactured to State of Alaska specifications. In other words, a cant or square manufactured in Alaska would be virtually unsaleable within local Alaska sawmill markets. The reasons are: “A. Any sawmill would prefer round logs for its sawmill operations and the small volume of round logs required would be readily available locally. “B. Round logs are preferable because they can be stored in the water and moved in the water, whereas cants must be transported on land. “C. Once a log is placed on the sawmill carriage and the costs of getting it there have been incurred, it produces more lumber for the costs involved than does a cant. “D. Also the round log is much less subject to deterioration from weather and outside conditions. “6. South-Central had experience with attempting to make a sale of cants inside the State of Alaska. We had some cants at Jakalof Bay which were manufactured to State specifications, but which were not loaded aboard ships during that season. We attempted to market those cants to a sawmill in Anchorage, but found that just costs of transporting the cants from Jakalof Bay to Anchorage exceeded the highest possible sales price of the cants. Accordingly no sale was made. “7. Based on the above statements and my observations of the Alaska timber industry, it is my firm conclusion that a cant or a square manufactured to State of Alaska primary manufacture specifications is marketable only in foreign commerce and cannot be sold for use within Alaska. It is also my firm conclusion that no sawmill in Alaska will manufacture a cant or square for any domestic Alaska market.” App. 121a-122a. The United States appears as amicus curiae in support of the position of South-Central. The need for affirmative approval is heightened by the fact that Alaska’s policy has substantial ramifications beyond the Nation’s borders. The need for a consistent and coherent foreign policy, which is the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government, enhances the necessity that congressional authorization not be lightly implied. It is for that reason that we need not resolve the dispute between the parties about whether Congress’ purpose in applying the primary-manufacture requirement to federal lands was for the purpose of encouraging the Alaska wood-processing industry or whether it was merely to ensure adequate processing capacity to deal with federal timber. In either event, no congressional intent to permit a primary-manufacture requirement by the State appears. It is worthy of note, although we do not rely upon it, that Congress has been requested to authorize the imposition by States of in-state processing requirements but has declined to do so. Prohibit Export of Unprocessed Timber: Hearing on H. R. 639 before the Subcommittee on Forests, Family Farms, and Energy of the House Committee on Agriculture, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 18-19 (1981). The facts of the present case resemble closely the facts of Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928), in which the Court struck down a Louisiana law prohibiting export from the State of any shrimp from which the heads and hulls had not been removed. The Court rejected the claim that the fact that the shrimp were owned by the State authorized the State to impose such limitations. Although not directly controlling here, because of the Court’s recognition that “the State owns, or has power to control, the game and fish within its borders not absolutely or as proprietor or for its own use or benefit but in its sovereign capacity as representative of the people,” id., at 11, the Court’s reasoning is relevant. The Court noted that the State might have retained the shrimp for consumption and use within its borders, but “by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce, the State necessarily releases its hold and, as to the shrimp so taken, definitely terminates its control.” Id., at 13. The view of the market-participant doctrine expressed by Justice Rehnquist, post, at 102-103, would validate under the Commerce Clause any contractual condition that the State had the economic power to impose, without regard to the relationship of the subject matter of the contract and the condition imposed. If that were the law, it would have been irrelevant that the employees in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Workers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204 (1983), were in effect “working for the city.” Id., at 211, n. 7. If the only question were whether the condition is imposed by contract, a residency requirement could have been imposed with respect to the work force on all projects of any employer doing business with the city. This is not to say that the State could evade the reasoning of this opinion by merely including a provision in its contract that title does not pass until the processing is complete. It is the substance of the transaction, rather than the label attached to it, that governs Commerce Clause analysis.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CLARK, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE et al. No. 82-1998. Argued March 21, 1984 Decided June 29, 1984 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 300. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 301. Deputy Solicitor General Bator argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Alan I. Horowitz, Leonard Schaitman, and Katherine S. Gruenheck. Burt Neubome argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Charles S. Sims, Laura Macklin, Arthur B. Spitzer, and Elizabeth Symonds Ogden Northrop Lewis filed a brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether a National Park Service regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks violates the First Amendment when applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall in connection with a demonstration intended to call attention to the plight of the homeless. We hold that it does not and reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals. I The Interior Department, through the National Park Service, is charged with responsibility for the management and maintenance of the National Parks and is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the use of the parks in accordance with the purposes for which they were established. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1, la-1, 3. The network of National Parks includes the National Memorial-core parks, Lafayette Park and the Mall, which are set in the heart of Washington, D. C., and which are unique resources that the Federal Government holds in trust for the American people. Lafayette Park is a roughly 7-acre square located across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House. Although originally part of the White House grounds, President Jefferson set it aside as a park for the use of residents and visitors. It is a “garden park with a . . . formal landscaping of flowers and trees, with fountains, walks and benches.” National Park Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, White House and President’s Park, Resource Management Plan 4.3 (1981). The Mall is a stretch of land running westward from the Capitol to the Lincoln Memorial some two miles away. It includes the Washington Monument, a series of reflecting pools, trees, lawns, and other greenery. It is bordered by, inter alia, the Smithsonian Institution and the National Gallery of Art. Both the Park and the Mall were included in Major Pierre L’Enfant’s original plan for the Capital. Both are visited by vast numbers of visitors from around the country, as well as by large numbers of residents of the Washington metropolitan area. Under the regulations involved in this case, camping in National Parks is permitted only in campgrounds designated for that purpose. 36 CFR § 50.27(a) (1983). No such campgrounds have ever been designated in Lafayette Park or the Mall. Camping is defined as “the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or using any tents or . . . other structure ... for sleeping or doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities.” Ibid. These activities, the regulation provides, “constitute camping when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging.” Ibid. Demonstrations for the airing of views or grievances are permitted in the Memorial-core parks, but for the most part only by Park Service permits. 36 CFR §50.19 (1983). Temporary structures may be erected for demonstration purposes but may not be used for camping. 36 CFR §50.19(e)(8) (1983). In 1982, the Park Service issued a renewable permit to respondent Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) to conduct a wintertime demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall for the purpose of demonstrating the plight of the homeless. The permit authorized the erection of two symbolic tent cities: 20 tents in Lafayette Park that would accommodate 50 people and 40 tents in the Mall with a capacity of up to 100. The Park Service, however, relying on the above regulations, specifically denied CCNV’s request that demonstrators be permitted to sleep in the symbolic tents. CCNV and several individuals then filed an action to prevent the application of the no-camping regulations to the proposed demonstration, which, it was claimed, was not covered by the regulation. It was also submitted that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague, had been dis-criminatorily applied, and could not be applied to prevent sleeping in the tents without violating the First Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Park Service. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 227 U. S. App. D. C. 19, 703 F. 2d 586 (1983). The 11 judges produced 6 opinions. Six of the judges believed that application of the regulations so as to prevent sleeping in the tents would infringe the demonstrators’ First Amendment right of free expression. The other five judges disagreed and would have sustained the regulations as applied to CCNV’s proposed demonstration. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, 464 U. S. 1016 (1983), and now reverse. II We need not differ with the view of the Court of Appeals that overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment. We assume for present purposes, but do not decide, that such is the case, cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968), but this assumption only begins the inquiry. Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647-648 (1981); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 535 (1980). It is also true that a message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative. Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). Symbolic expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. United States v. O’Brien, supra. Petitioners submit, as they did in the Court of Appeals, that the regulation forbidding sleeping is defensible either as a time, place, or manner restriction or as a regulation of symbolic conduct. We agree with that assessment. The permit that was issued authorized the demonstration but required compliance with 36 CPR §50.19 (1983), which prohibits “camping” on park lands, that is, the use of park lands for living accommodations, such as sleeping, storing personal belongings, making fires, digging, or cooking. These provisions, including the ban on sleeping, are clearly limitations on the manner in which the demonstration could be carried out. That sleeping, like the symbolic tents themselves, may be expressive and part of the message delivered by the demonstration does not make the ban any less a limitation on the manner of demonstrating, for reasonable time, place, or manner regulations normally have the purpose and direct effect of limiting expression but are nevertheless valid. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, supra; Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). Neither does the fact that sleeping, arguendo, may be expressive conduct, rather than oral or written expression, render the sleeping prohibition any less a time, place, or manner regulation. To the contrary, the Park Service neither attempts to ban sleeping generally nor to ban it everywhere in the parks. It has established areas for camping and forbids it elsewhere, including Lafayette Park and the Mall. Considered as such, we have very little trouble concluding that the Park Service may prohibit overnight sleeping in the parks involved here. The requirement that the regulation be content-neutral is clearly satisfied. The courts below accepted that view, and it is not disputed here that the prohibition on camping, and on sleeping specifically, is content-neutral and is not being applied because of disagreement with the message presented. Neither was the regulation faulted, nor could it be, on the ground that without overnight sleeping the plight of the homeless could not be communicated in other ways. The regulation otherwise left the demonstration intact, with its symbolic city, signs, and the presence of those who were willing to take their turns in a day-and-night vigil. Respondents do not suggest that there was, or is, any barrier to delivering to the media, or to the public by other means, the intended message concerning the plight of the homeless. It is also apparent to us that the regulation narrowly focuses on the Government’s substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capital in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them by their presence. To permit camping — using these areas as living accommodations— would be totally inimical to these purposes, as would be readily understood by those who have frequented the National Parks across the country and observed the unfortunate consequences of the activities of those who refuse to confine their camping to designated areas. It is urged by respondents, and the Court of Appeals was of this view, that if the symbolic city of tents was to be permitted and if the demonstrators did not intend to cook, dig, or engage in aspects of camping other than sleeping, the incremental benefit to the parks could not justify the ban on sleeping, which was here an expressive activity said to enhance the message concerning the plight of the poor and homeless. We cannot agree. In the first place, we seriously doubt that the First Amendment requires the Park Service to permit a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall involving a 24-hour vigil and the erection of tents to accommodate 150 people. Furthermore, although we have assumed for present purposes that the sleeping banned in this case would have an expressive element, it is evident that its major value to this demonstration would be facilitative. Without a permit to sleep, it would be difficult to get the poor and homeless to participate or to be present at all. This much is apparent from the permit application filed by respondents: “Without the incentive of sleeping space or a hot meal, the homeless would not come to the site.” App. 14. The sleeping ban, if enforced, would thus effectively limit the nature, extent, and duration of the demonstration and to that extent ease the pressure on the parks. Beyond this, however, it is evident from our cases that the validity of this regulation need not be judged solely by reference to the demonstration at hand. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S., at 652-653. Absent the prohibition on sleeping, there would be other groups who would demand permission to deliver an asserted message by camping in Lafayette Park. Some of them would surely have as credible a claim in this regard as does CCNV, and the denial of permits to still others would present difficult problems for the Park Service. With the prohibition, however, as is evident in the case before us, at least some around-the-clock demonstrations lasting for days on end will not materialize, others will be limited in size and duration, and the purposes of the regulation will thus be materially served. Perhaps these purposes would be more effectively and not so clumsily achieved by preventing tents and 24-hour vigils entirely in the core areas. But the Park Service’s decision to permit nonsleeping demonstrations does not, in our view, impugn the camping prohibition as a valuable, but perhaps imperfect, protection to the parks. If the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the National Parks are adequately protected, which we think it has, and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out. As in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the regulation “responds precisely to the substantive problems which legitimately concern the [Government].” 466 U. S., at 810. We have difficulty, therefore, in understanding why the prohibition against camping, with its ban on sleeping oversight, is not a reasonable time, place, or manner regulation that withstands constitutional scrutiny. Surely the regulation is not unconstitutional on its face. None of its provisions appears unrelated to the ends that it was designed to serve. Nor is it any less valid when applied to prevent camping in Memorial-core parks by those who wish to demonstrate and deliver a message to the public and the central Government. Damage to the parks as well as their partial inaccessibility to other members of the public can as easily result from camping by demonstrators as by nondemonstra-tors. In neither case must the Government tolerate it. All those who would resort to the parks must abide by otherwise valid rules for their use, just as they must observe the traffic laws, sanitation regulations, and laws to preserve the public peace. This is no more than a reaffirmation that reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on expression are constitutionally acceptable. Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Park Service regulation is sustainable under the four-factor standard of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), for validating a regulation of expressive conduct, which, in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions. No one contends that aside from its impact on speech a rule against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks is beyond the constitutional power of the Government to enforce. And for the reasons we have discussed above, there is a substantial Government interest in conserving park property, an interest that is plainly served by, and requires for its implementation, measures such as the proscription of sleeping that are designed to limit the wear and tear on park properties. That interest is unrelated to suppression of expression. We are unmoved by the Court of Appeals’ view that the challenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid, because there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have satisfied the Government interest in preserving park lands. There is no gainsaying that preventing overnight sleeping will avoid a measure of actual or threatened damage to Lafayette Park and the Mall. The Court of Appeals’ suggestions that the Park Service minimize the possible injury by reducing the size, duration, or frequency of demonstrations would still curtail the total allowable expression in which demonstrators could engage, whether by sleeping or otherwise, and these suggestions represent no more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how much protection the core parks require or how an acceptable level of preservation is to be attained. We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O’Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The Secretary is admonished to promote and regulate the use of the parks by such means as conform to the fundamental purpose of the parks, which is “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein ... in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 39 Stat. 535, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1. Section 50.19(e)(8), as amended, prohibits the use of certain temporary structures: “In connection with permitted demonstrations or special events, temporary structures may be erected for the purpose of symbolizing a message or meeting logistical needs such as first aid facilities, lost children areas or the provision of shelter for electrical and other sensitive equipment or displays. Temporary structures may not be used outside designated camping areas for living accommodation activities such as sleeping, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities. The above-listed activities constitute camping when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging.” The per curiam opinion preceding the individual opinions described the lineup of the judges as follows: “Circuit Judge Mikva files an opinion, in which Circuit Judge Wald concurs, in support of a judgment reversing. Chief Judge Robinson and Circuit Judge Wright file a statement joining in the judgment and concurring in Circuit Judge Mikva’s opinion with a caveat. Circuit Judge Edwards files an opinion joining in the judgment and .concurring partially in Circuit Judge Mikva’s opinion. Circuit Judge Ginsburg files an opinion joining in the judgment. Circuit Judge Wilkey files a dissenting opinion, in which Circuit Judges Tamm, MacKinnon, Bork and Scalia concur. Circuit Judge Scalia files a dissenting opinion, in which Circuit Judges MacKinnon and Bork concur.” 227 U. S. App. D. C., at 19-20, 703 F. 2d, at 586-587. As a threshold matter, we must address respondents’ contention that their proposed activities do not fall within the definition of “camping” found in the regulations. None of the opinions below accepted this contention, and at least nine of the judges expressly rejected it. Id., at 24, 703 F. 2d, at 591 (opinion of Mikva, J.); id., at 42, 703 F. 2d, at 609 (opinion of Wilkey, J.). We likewise find the contention to be without merit. It cannot seriously be doubted that sleeping in tents for the purpose of expressing the plight of the homeless falls within the regulation’s definition of camping. We reject the suggestion of the plurality below, however, that the burden on the demonstrators is limited to “the advancement of a plausible contention” that their conduct is expressive. Id., at 26, n. 16, 703 F. 2d, at 593, n. 16. Although it is common to place the burden upon the Government to justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies. To hold otherwise would be to create a rule that all conduct is presumptively expressive. In the absence of a showing that such a rule is necessary to protect vital First Amendment interests, we decline to deviate from the general rule that one seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to it. Respondents request that we remand to the Court of Appeals for resolution of their claim that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment on the equal protection claim. Brief for Respondents 91, n. 50. They contend that there were disputed questions of fact concerning the uniformity of enforcement of the regulation, claiming that other groups have slept in the parks. The District Court specifically found that the regulations have been consistently applied and enforced in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner. App. to Pet. for Cert. 106a-108a. Only 5 of the 11 judges in the Court of Appeals addressed the equal protection claim. 227 U. S. App. D. C., at 43-44, 703 F. 2d, at 610-611 (opinion of Wilkey, J., joined by Tamm, MacKinnon, Bork, and Scalia, JJ.). Our review of the record leads us to agree with their conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the most that respondents have shown are isolated instances of undiscovered violations of the regulations. When the Government seeks to regulate conduct that is ordinarily nonexpressive it may do so regardless of the situs of the application of the regulation. Thus, even against people who choose to violate Park Service regulations for expressive purposes, the Park Service may enforce regulations relating to grazing animals, 36 CFR §50.13 (1983); flying model planes, §50.16; gambling, §50.17; hunting and fishing, §50.18; setting off fireworks, § 50.25(g); and urination, § 50.26(b). Reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions are valid even though they directly limit oral or written expression. It would be odd to insist on a higher standard for limitations aimed at regulable conduct and having only an incidental impact on speech. Thus, if the time, place, or manner restriction on expressive sleeping, if that is what is involved in this case, sufficiently and narrowly serves a substantial enough governmental interest to escape First Amendment condemnation, it is untenable to invalidate it under O’Brien on the ground that the governmental interest is insufficient to warrant the intrusion on First Amendment concerns or that there is an inadequate nexus between the regulation and the interest sought to be served. We note that only recently, in a case dealing with the regulation of signs, the Court framed the issue under O’Brien and then based a crucial part of its analysis on the time, place, or manner cases. City Coun cil of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 804-805, 808-810 (1984). We also agree with Judge Edwards’ observation that “[t]o insist upon a judicial resolution of this case, given the facts and record at hand, arguably suggests a lack of common sense.” 227 U. S. App. D. C., at 33, 703 F. 2d at 600. Nor is it any clearer to us than it was to him “what has been achieved by this rather exhausting expenditure of judicial resources.” Id., at 34. 703 F. 2d, at 601.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. JOBST No. 76-860. Argued October 4, 1977 Decided November 8, 1977 Stephen L. TJrbanczyk argued the cause pro hac vice for appellant. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, and William Kanter. J. D. Riff el argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion, of the Court. The question presented is whether Congress has the power to require that a dependent child's social security benefits terminate upon marriage even though his spouse is permanently disabled. Answering that question in the negative, the District Court held that 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (d) (1) (D) and 402 (d) (5) deprive appellee of property without due process of law. Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp. 909. We reverse. Mr. Jobst has been disabled by cerebral palsy since his birth in 1932. He qualified for child’s insurance benefits in 1957, several months after his father died. In 1970 he married another cerebral palsy victim. Since his wife was not entitled to benefits under the federal Act, the statute required the Secretary to terminate his benefits. Mr. Jobst brought this suit to review the Secretary’s action. The District Court held that the statute violated the equality principle applicable to the Federal Government by virtue of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, because all child’s insurance beneficiaries are not treated alike when they marry disabled persons. Beneficiaries who marry other social security beneficiaries continue to receive benefits whereas those who marry nonbeneficiaries lose their benefits permanently. The court held this distinction irrational. 368 F. Supp., at 913. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1262. Noting that Mr. Jobst and his wife had become entitled to benefits under a newly enacted statute authorizing supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled, this Court remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of that program. Weinberger v. Jobst, 419 U. S. 811. The District Court reviewed the new program, concluded that it had no relevance to the issues presented by this case, and reinstated its original judgment. The Secretary again appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U. S. 1089. Although the District Court focused on the statutory consequences of a marriage between two disabled persons, the Secretary argues that the relevant statutory classification is much broader. We therefore first describe the statutory scheme, then consider the validity of a general requirement that benefits payable to a wage earner’s dependent terminate upon marriage, and finally decide whether such a general requirement is invalidated by an exception limited to marriages between persons who are both receiving benefits. I As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act authorized a monthly benefit for qualified wage earners at least 65 years old and a death benefit payable to the estate of a wage earner who died at an earlier age. 49 Stat. 622-624. In 1939 Congress created secondary benefits for wives, children, widows, and parents of wage earners. See 53 Stat. 1362, 1364-1366. The benefits were intended to provide persons dependent on the wage earner with protection against the economic hardship occasioned by loss of the wage earner’s support. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185-186. Generally speaking, therefore, the categories of secondary beneficiaries were defined to include persons who were presumed to be dependent on the wage earner at the time of his death, disability, or retirement. Specifically, the child’s benefit as authorized in 1939 was available only to a child who was unmarried, under 18, and dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death or retirement. 53 Stat. 1364. Since Mr. Jobst was 23 at the time of his father’s death, he would not have been eligible for a child’s benefit under the 1939 Act. Under that statute, the child’s benefit, like the benefits for widows and parents, terminated upon marriage. 53 Stat. 1364-1366. In 1956, Congress enlarged the class of persons entitled to a child’s benefit to include those who, like Mr. Jobst, were under a disability which began before age 18. For such a person the benefit continued beyond the age of 18 but, as with other secondary benefits, it terminated upon marriage. In 1958, Congress adopted the amendment that created the basis for Mr. Jobst’s constitutional attack. The amendment provided that marriage would not terminate a child’s disability benefit if the child married a person who was also entitled to benefits under the Act. See 72 Stat. 1030-1031. A similar dispensation was granted to widows, widowers, divorced wives, and parents. In each case the secondary benefit survives a marriage to another beneficiary, but any other marriage — even to a disabled person unable to provide the beneficiary with support — is a terminating event unaffected by the 1958 amendment. It was the failure of Congress in 1958 to create a larger class of marriages that do not terminate the child's benefit for disabled persons that the District Court found irrational. II The provision challenged in this case is part of a complex statutory scheme designed to administer a trust fund financed, in large part, by taxes levied on the wage earners who are the primary beneficiaries of the fund. The entitlement of any secondary beneficiary is predicated on his or her relationship to a contributing wage earner. If the statutory requirements for eligibility are met, the amount of the benefit is unrelated to the actual need of the beneficiary. See, e. g., Mathews v. De Castro, supra, at 185-186. The statute is designed to provide the wage earner and the dependent members of his family with protection against the hardship occasioned by his loss of earnings; it is not simply a welfare program generally benefiting needy persons. Califano v. Coldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 213-214 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Nor has Congress made actual dependency on the wage earner either a sufficient or a necessary condition of eligibility in every case. Instead of requiring individualized proof on a case-by-case basis, Congress has elected to use simple criteria, such as age and marital status, to determine probable dependency. A child who is married or over 18 and neither disabled nor a student is denied benefits because Congress has assumed that such a child is not normally dependent on his parents. There is no question about the power of Congress to legislate on the basis of such factual assumptions. General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 776. Of course, a general rule may not define the benefited class by reference to a distinction which irrationally differentiates between identically situated persons. Differences in race, religion, or political affiliation could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for social security benefits, for such differences are totally irrelevant to the question whether one person is economically dependent on another. But a distinction between married persons and unmarried persons is of a different character. Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an important change in economic status. Traditionally, the event not only creates a new family with attendant new responsibilities, but also modifies the pre-existing relationships between the bride and groom and their respective families. Frequently, of course, financial independence and marriage do not go hand in hand. Nevertheless, there can be no question about the validity of the assumption that a married person is less likely to be dependent on his parents for support than one who is unmarried. Since it was rational for Congress to assume that marital status is a relevant test of probable dependency, the general rule which obtained before 1958, terminating all child’s benefits when the beneficiary married, satisfied the constitutional test normally applied in cases like this. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S., at 185; Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, and cases cited at 768-770. That general rule is not rendered invalid simply because some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were burdened thereby. For the marriage rule cannot be criticized as merely an unthinking response to stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged group, or as an attempt to interfere with the' individual’s freedom to make a decision as important as marriage. The general rule, terminating upon marriage the benefits payable to a secondary beneficiary, is unquestionably valid. Ill The question that remains is whether the 1958 amendment invalidates this general rule by carving out an exception for marriages between beneficiaries. The exception does create a statutory classification, but it is not as narrow as that described by the District Court. The District Court identified the relevant classification as one distinguishing between (1) the marriage of a disabled beneficiary to another disabled person who is receiving social security benefits and (2) the marriage of a disabled beneficiary to another disabled person who is not receiving benefits. It is true that persons in the former category are treated more favorably than those in the latter category. It is also true that persons in the latter category may have as great a need for benefits as those in the former category. But it is not correct to conclude, as the District Court did, that only disabled persons are affected by the exception, or that the legislative classification is wholly irrational. Both the class of persons favored by the 1958 amendment and the class which remains subject to the burdens of the general marriage rule include persons who are not disabled. The broad legislative classification must be judged by reference to characteristics typical of the affected classes rather than by focusing on selected, atypical examples. When so judged, both the exception and its limits are valid. The 1958 amendment reflects a legislative judgment that a marriage between two persons receiving benefits will not normally provide either spouse with protection against the economic hardship that would be occasioned by the termination of benefits. The Secretary submits, and we agree, that it was reasonable for Congress to ameliorate the severity of the earlier rule by protecting both spouses from the dual hardship which it effected. Mr. Jobst argues, however, that the reason for the amendment applies equally to his situation. He urges that his hardship is just as great as that which the amendment avoids when one beneficiary marries another, because his spouse is also disabled. He therefore attacks the exception as irrationally underinclusive. We are persuaded, however, that, even if the benign purpose of the 1958 amendment encompasses this case, legitimate reasons justify the limits that Congress placed on it. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78. The exception, like the general rule itself, is simple to administer. It requires no individualized inquiry into degrees of hardship or need. It avoids any necessity for periodic review of the beneficiaries’ continued entitlement. In the cases to which the exception does apply, it is a reliable indicator of probable hardship. Since the test is one that may be applied without introducing any new concepts into the administration of the trust fund, Congress could reasonably take one firm step toward the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by the general marriage rule without accomplishing its entire objective in the same piece of legislation. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489. Even if it might have been wiser to take a larger step, the step Congress did take was in the right direction and had no adverse impact on persons like the Jobsts. It is true, as Mr. Jobst urges, that the limited exception may have an impact on a secondary beneficiary’s desire to marry, and may make some suitors less welcome than others. But unless Congress should entirely repudiate marriage as a terminating event, that criticism will apply to any limited exception to the general rule. No one suggests that Congress was motivated by antagonism toward any class of marriages or marriage partners not encompassed by the exception. Congress’ purpose was simply to remedy the particular injustice that occurred when two dependent individuals married and simultaneously lost their benefits. We are satisfied that both the general rule and the 1958 exception are legitimate exercises of Congress’ power to decide who will share in the benefits of the trust fund. The favored treatment of marriages between secondary beneficiaries does not violate the principle of equality embodied in the Due' Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. Mrs. Jobst was receiving welfare assistance from the Division of Welfare of the State of Missouri, but was not receiving any social security benefits under 42 U. S. C. §§401-432 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Section 202 of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 623, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §402 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), provides in pertinent part: “(d)(1) Every child (as defined in section 416 (e) of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child— “ (A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits, “(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22, or (ii) is under a disability (as defined in section 423 (d) of this title) which began before he attained the age of 22, and “(C) was dependent upon such individual— “shall be entitled to a child’s insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding whichever of the following first occurs— “ (D) the month in which such child dies or marries, “(5) In the case of a child who has attained the age of eighteen and who marries— “(A) an individual entitled to benefits under subsection (a), (b), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section or under section 423 (a) of this title, or “(B) another individual who has attained the age of eighteen and is entitled to benefits under this subsection, “such child’s entitlement to benefits under this subsection shall, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection but subject to subsection (s) of this section, not be terminated by reason of such marriage .... “(s)(2) . . . [S]o much of subsectio[n] . . . (d) (5) ... of this section as precedes the semicolon, shall not apply in the case of any child unless such child, at the time of the marriage referred to therein, was under a disability . . . .” Mr. Jobst first exhausted his administrative remedies. A hearing examiner found in his favor, ruling that the denial of benefits was unconstitutional. The Appeals Council reversed; it held that an administrative agency has no power to rule on the constitutionality of the Act it administers. See Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). The 1956 amendment replaced the requirement that the child be under 18 at the time of application with a requirement that he be either under 18 or “under a disability . . . which began before he attained the age of eighteen . . . 70 Stat. 807. In 1972, Congress raised the age before which the child’s disability must begin from 18 to 22. 86 Stat. 1343-1345. 72 Stat. 1030-1032. The House Report explained the purpose of this change: “When a secondary beneficiary marries, such person’s benefit is terminated under present law. If he marries a person who is or who will become entitled to an old-age insurance benefit, he may qualify for a new benefit based on the earnings of the new spouse. But if the new spouse is also receiving a secondary benefit, the benefits of both are terminated and ordinarily neither beneficiary can become entitled to any new benefits. Your committee’s bill would eliminate the hardship in these cases by providing that marriage would not terminate a benefit where a person receiving mother’s, widow’s, widower’s, parent’s, or childhood disability benefits marries a person receiving any of these benefits or where a person receiving mother’s or childhood disability benefits marries a person entitled to old-age insurance benefits.” H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1958). No doubt there are many distant relatives and unrelated persons who do not qualify for benefits even though they are actually dependent on a wage earner. Similarly, some married children and some 19-year-old children remain dependent on their parents because they are unable to support themselves while their younger brothers and sisters may be self-sufficient. The idea that marriage changes dependency is expressed throughout the Social Security Act. Most secondary beneficiaries are eligible only if. they have not married or remarried. See 42 U. S. C. §402 (b)(1)(C) (divorced wives); § 402 (e) (1) (A) (widows); § 402 (f) (1) (A) (widowers); § 402 (g) (1) (A) (surviving or divorced mothers); § 402 (h) (1) (C) (parents). With some limited exceptions, §§ 402 (e) (4) and (f) (5), marriage or remarriage marks the end of secondary benefits. §§ 402 (b) (1) (H) (1970 ed., Supp. V), 402 (e)(1), 402 (f)(1), 402 (g)(1), and 402 (h)(1). In each case, however, Congress has excepted marriages to some social security beneficiaries. §§402 (b)(3), 402 (e)(3), 402(f)(4), 402 (g)(3), and 402 (h) (4). This proposition is not questioned by appellee. “As a general premise the Secretary undoubtedly correctly concludes it is reasonable to terminate social security payments to child beneficiaries in the event of marriage.” Brief for Appellee 21. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600, 603. Congress adopted this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life. This is not a case in which government seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling by banning, or criminally prosecuting, nonconforming marriages. See Loving v. Virginia, supra. Congress has simply recognized that marriage traditionally brings changed responsibilities. As we have seen, the burden of the general marriage rule is not limited to disabled beneficiaries; children, widowers, widows, divorced wives, and parents — all are affected by the rule. And although the District Court singled out for analysis marriages to disabled nonbeneficiaries, Congress did not; Mr. Jobst would also have lost his benefits if he had married’an able-bodied woman who was not receiving social security benefits. Finally, the protection extended by the 1958 amendment encompasses many more persons than those described by the District Court. Like the marriage rule itself, the amendment affects widows, widowers, parents, and divorced wives, as well as disabled children. See n. 8, supra. The fact that marriage characteristically signifies the end of a child’s dependency on parental support justifies a general rule terminating benefits when a child marries. The fact that a marriage between two spouses who are both receiving dependents’ benefits does not characteristically signify a similar change in economic status justifies the exception. In other words, since the justifying characteristic of the general class does not apply to the excepted class, the exception rests on a reasonable predicate. This is true even though some members of each class may possess the characteristic more commonly found in the other class. Even if we were to sustain his attack, and even though we recognize the unusual hardship that the general rule has inflicted upon him, it would not necessarily follow that Mr. Jobst is entitled to benefits. Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 17-18; Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U. S. 501. For the vice in the statute stems from the exception created by the 1958 amendment; that vice could be cured either by invalidating the entire exception or by enlarging it. Since the choice involves legislation having a nationwide impact, the equities of Mr. Jobst’s case would not control. See Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1136— 1137 (1969). If we were to enlarge the exception, it would be necessary to fashion some new test of need, dependency, or disability. Although the District Court only granted relief for persons marrying a “totally disabled” spouse, its rationale would equally apply to any marriage of a secondary beneficiary to a needy nonbeneficiary. We note, however, that Congress could have rationally concluded that beneficiaries who marry other beneficiaries present a more compelling case for legislative relief than beneficiaries who marry needy nonbeneficiaries. Secondary beneficiaries who marry each other lose two sets of benefits and thus may suffer a greater loss than does a couple that sacrifices only one set of benefits. In the very Act that created the exception for marriages between beneficiaries, Congress showed its reluctance to use individualized determinations in allocating social security benefits. The 1958 amendments abolished a requirement that disabled children over 18 prove their individual dependency on the wage earner to qualify for benefits. Pub. L. 85-840 § 306, 72 Stat. 1030. Congress concluded that these beneficiaries should be “deemed dependent” because “the older child who has been totally disabled since before age 18 is also likely to be dependent on his parent.” H. R. Rep. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1958). A logical application of Mr. Jobst’s position would permit the Secretary to end benefits only after an individual determination of disability or need. Congress, however, has sought to make social security payments independent of individual need, while establishing a separate program to serve those who are needy but ineligible for social security benefits. The Supplemental Security Income program is a federally funded welfare program administered through the Social Security Administration. Its purpose is plainly stated by H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 147 (1971): “[S]ome people who because of age, disability, or blindness are not able to support themselves through work may receive relatively small social security benefits. Contributory social insurance, therefore, must be complemented by an effective assistance program.” Mr. and Mrs. Jobst became eligible for the Supplemental Security Income program as soon as it was instituted. On remand the parties stipulated that, based on the couple’s need, they were receiving monthly payments only $20 less than the amount they would have been receiving if Mr. Jobst’s child’s benefits had been restored.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al. No. 73-1377. Argued November 12, 1974 Decided February 18, 1975 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNan, Stewart, Marshall, BlackmuN, Powell, and RehNQUIst, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., concurred in the result. Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Hills, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Edmund W. Kitch, William L. Patton, Robert E. Kopp, Eloise E. Davies, and David M. Cohen. John R. Thompson argued the cause for respondent city of New York. With him on the briefs were Adrian P. Burke, Gary Mailman, and Alexander Gigante, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, pro se, Robert H. O’Brien, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General, for the Attorney General of California; by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman and Charles Alpert, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Michigan; by Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, Byron E. Starns, Deputy Attorney General, Peter W. Sipkins, Solicitor General, and Eldon G. Kavl, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota; by William F. Hyland, Attorney General, pro se, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and John M. Van Dalen, Deputy Attorney General, for the Attorney General of New Jersey; by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard P. Fahey and David E. Northrop, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; by John L. Hill, Attorney General, Larry F. York, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip K. Maxwell, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, Robert W. Warren, Attorney General, and Theodore L. Priebe, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, John C. Danforth, Attorney General, and Robert M. Lindholm, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, Larry Derryberry, Attorney General, and Paul C. Duncan, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Vern Miller, Attorney General, and Curt T. Schneider, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, for the States of Texas, Wisconsin, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Kansas; by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, Gerald L. Balites, Deputy Attorney General, and James E. Ryan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia; by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Martin J. Durban and James B. McCabe, Special Assistant Attorneys General of Washington, and Israel Packet, Attorney General, and James R. Adams, Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, for the State of Washington and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., for the Center for Governmental Responsibility. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case poses certain questions concerning the proper construction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seg. (1970 ed., Supp III) (1972 Act), which provide a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution. Section 2 of the 1972 Act, 86 Stat. 833, in adding Title II, §§ 201-212, to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1281-1292 (1970 ed., Supp. Ill), makes available federal financial assistance in the amount of 75% of the cost of municipal sewers and sewage treatment works. Under § 207, there is “authorized to be appropriated” for these purposes “not to exceed” $5 billion for fiscal year 1973, “not to exceed” $6 billion for fiscal year 1974, and “not to exceed” $7 billion for fiscal year 1975. Section 205 (a) directs that “[s]ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to [§ 207]” for fiscal year 1973 be allotted “not later than 30 days after October 18, 1972.” The “[s]ums authorized” for the later fiscal years 1974 and 1975 “shall be allotted by the Administrator not later than the January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized . . . .” From these allotted sums, § 201 (g)(1) authorizes the Administrator “to make grants to any . . . municipality ... for the construction of publicly owned treatment works ...,” pursuant to plans and specifications as required by § 203 and meeting the other requirements of the Act, including those of § 204. Section 203 (a) specifies that the Administrator’s approval of plans for a project “shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the United States for the payment of its proportional contribution to such project.” The water pollution bill that became the 1972 Act was passed by Congress on October 4, 1972, but was vetoed by the President on October 17. Congress promptly overrode the veto. Thereupon the President, by letter dated November 22, 1972, directed the Administrator “not [to] allot among the States the maximum amounts provided by section 207” and, instead, to allot “[n]o more than $2 billion of the amount authorized for the fiscal year 1973, and no more than $3 billion of the amount authorized for the fiscal year 1974 . ...” On December 8, the Administrator announced by regulation that in accordance with the President's letter he was allotting for fiscal years 1973 and 1974 “sums not to exceed $2 billion and $3 billion, respectively.” This litigation, brought by the city of New York and similarly situated municipalities in the State of New York, followed immediately. The complaint sought judgment against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency declaring that he was obligated to allot to the States the full amounts authorized by § 207 for fiscal years 1973 and 1974, as well as an order directing him to make those allotments. In May 1973, the District Court denied the Administrator’s motion to dismiss and granted the cities’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “the Act requires the Administrator to allot the full sums authorized to be appropriated in § 207.” 161 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 131, 494 F. 2d 1033, 1050 (1974). Because of the differing views with respect to the proper construction of the Act between the federal courts in the District of Columbia in this case and those of the Fourth Circuit in Train v. Campaign Clean Water, post, p. 136, we granted certiorari in both cases, 416 U. S. 969 (1974), and heard them together. The sole issue before us is whether the 1972 Act permits the Administrator to allot to the States under § 205 (a) less than the entire amounts authorized to be appropriated by § 207. We hold that the Act does not permit such action and affirm the Court of Appeals. Section 205 (a) provides that the “[s]ums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to [§ 207] . . . shall be allotted by the Administrator.” Section 207 authorizes the appropriation of “not to exceed” specified amounts for each of three fiscal years. The dispute in this case turns principally on the meaning of the foregoing language from the indicated sections of the Act. The Administrator contends that § 205 (a) directs the allotment of only “sums” — not “all sums” — authorized by § 207 to be appropriated and that the sums that must be allotted are merely sums that do not exceed the amounts specified in § 207 for each of the three fiscal years. In other words, it is argued that there is a maximum, but no minimum, on the amounts that must be allotted under § 205 (a). This is necessarily the case, he insists, because the legislation, after initially passing the House and Senate in somewhat different form, was amended in Conference and the changes, which were adopted by both Houses, were intended to provide wide discretion in the Executive to control the rate of spending under the Act. The changes relied on by the Administrator, the so-called Harsha amendments, were two. First, § 205 of the House and Senate bills as they passed those Houses and went to Conference, directed that there be allotted “all sums” authorized to be appropriated by § 207. The word “all” was struck in Conference. Second, § 207 of the House bill authorized the appropriation of specific amounts for the three fiscal years. The Conference Committee inserted the qualifying words “not to exceed” before each of the sums so specified. The Administrator’s arguments based on the statutory language and its legislative history are unpersuasive. Section 207 authorized appropriation of “not to exceed” a specified sum for each of the three fiscal years. If the States failed to submit projects sufficient to require obligation, and hence the appropriation, of the entire amounts authorized, or if the Administrator, exercising whatever authority the Act might have given him to deny grants, refused to obligate these total amounts, § 207 would obviously permit appropriation of the lesser amounts. But if, for example, the full amount provided for 1973 was obligated by the Administrator in the course of approving plans and making grants for municipal contracts, § 207 plainly “authorized” the appropriation of the entire $5 billion. If a sum of money is “authorized” to be appropriated in the future by § 207, then § 205 (a) directs that an amount equal to that sum be allotted. Section 207 speaks of sums authorized to be appropriated, not of sums that are required to be appropriated; and as far as § 205 (a)’s requirement to allot is concerned, we see no difference between the $2 billion the President directed to be allotted for fiscal year 1973 and the $3 billion he ordered withheld. The latter sum is as much authorized to be appropriated by § 207 as is the former. Both’ must be allotted. It is insisted that this reading of the Act fails to give any effect to the Conference Committee’s changes in the bill. But, as already indicated, the “not to exceed” qualifying language of § 207 has meaning of its own, quite apart from §205 (a), and reflects the realistic possibility that approved applications for grants from funds already allotted would not total the maximum amount authorized to be appropriated. Surely there is nothing inconsistent between authorizing “not to exceed” $5 billion for 1973 and requiring the full allotment of the $5 billion among the States. Indeed, if the entire amount authorized is ever to be appropriated, there must be approved municipal projects in that amount, and grants for those projects may only be made from allotted funds. As for striking the word “all” from § 205, if Congress intended to confer any discretion on the Executive to withhold funds from this program at the allotment stage, it chose quite inadequate means to do so. It appears to us that the word “sums” has no different meaning and can be ascribed no different function in the context of § 205 than would the words “all sums.” It is said that the changes were made to give the Executive the discretionary control over the outlay of funds for Title II programs at either stage of the process. But legislative intention, without more, is not legislation. Without something in addition to what is now before us, we cannot accept the addition of the few words to § 207 and the deletion of the one word from § 205 (a) as altering the entire complexion and thrust of the Act. As conceived and passed in both Houses, the legislation was intended to provide a firm commitment of substantial sums within a relatively limited period of time in an effort to achieve an early solution of what was deemed an urgent problem. We cannot believe that Congress at the last minute scuttled the entire effort by providing the Executive with the seemingly limitless power to withhold funds from allotment and obligation. Yet such was the Government’s position in the lower courts — combined with the argument that the discretion conferred is unreviewable. The Administrator has now had second thoughts. He does not now claim that the Harsha amendments should be given such far-reaching effect. In this Court, he views §§ 205 (a) and 207 as merely conferring discretion on the Administrator as to the timing of expenditures, not as to the ultimate amounts to be allotted and obligated. He asserts that although he may limit initial allotments in the three specified years, “the power to allot continues” and must be exercised, “until the full $18 billion has been exhausted.” Brief for Petitioner 13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-17. It is true that this represents a major modification of the Administrator's legal posture, but our conclusion that § 205 (a) requires the allotment of sums equal to the total amounts authorized to be appropriated under § 207 is not affected. In the first place, under § 205 (a) the Administrator’s power to allot extends only to “sums” that are authorized to be appropriated under § 207. If he later has power to allot, and must allot, the balance of the $18 billion not initially allotted in the specified years, it is only because these additional amounts are “sums” authorized by § 207 to be appropriated. But if they are “sums” within the meaning of § 205 (a), then that section requires that they be allotted by November 17, 1972, in the case of 1973 funds, and for 1974 and 1975 “not later than the January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized.” The November 22 letter of the President and the Administrator’s consequent withholding of authorized funds cannot be squared with the statute. Second, even assuming an intention on the part of Congress, in the hope of forestalling a veto, to imply a power of some sort in the Executive to control outlays under the Act, there is nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicating that such discretion arguably granted was to be exercised at the allotment stage rather than or in addition to the obligation phase of the process. On the contrary, as we view the legislative history, the indications are that the power to control, such as it was, was to be exercised at the point where funds were obligated and not in connection with the threshold function of allotting funds to the States. The Court of Appeals carefully examined the legislative history in this respect and arrived at the same conclusion, as have most of the other courts that have dealt with the issue. We thus reject the suggestion that the conclusion we have arrived at is inconsistent with the legislative history of §§ 205 (a) and 207. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. So ordered. Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result. The provisions of Title II, as added by the 1972 Amendments chiefly involved in this case are, in pertinent part, as follows: Section 205 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1285 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. Ill): “Sums authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 1287 of this title for each fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, shall be allotted by the Administrator not later than the January 1st immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year for which authorized, except that the allotment for fiscal year 1973 shall be made not later than 30 days after October 18, 1972. . . .” Section 207, 33 U. S. C. § 1287 (1970 ed., Supp. Ill): “There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this sub-chapter ... for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, not to exceed $5,000,000,000, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, not to exceed $6,000,000,000, and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, not to exceed $7,000,000,000.” Section 203, 33 U. S. C. § 1283 (1970 ed., Supp. Ill): “(a) Each applicant for a grant shall submit to the Administrator for his approval, plans, specifications, and estimates for each proposed project for the construction of treatment works for which a grant is applied for [sic] under section 1281 (g)(1) of this title from funds allotted to the State under section 1285 of this title and which otherwise meets the requirements of this chapter. The Administrator shall act upon such plans, specifications, and estimates as soon as practicable after the same have been submitted, and his approval of any such plans, specifications, and estimates shall be deemed a contractual obligation of the United States for the payment of its proportional contribution to such project. “(b) The Administrator shall, from time to time as the work progresses, make payments to the recipient of a grant for costs of construction incurred on a project. These payments shall at no time exceed the Federal share of the cost of construction incurred to the date of the voucher covering such payment plus the Federal share of the value of the materials which have been stockpiled in the vicinity of such construction in conformity to plans and specifications for the project. “(c) After completion of a project and approval of the final voucher by the Administrator, he shall pay out of the appropriate sums the unpaid balance of the Federal share payable on account of such project.” The Act thus established a funding method differing in important respects from the normal system of program approval and authorization of appropriation followed by separate annual appropriation acts. Under that approach, it is not until the actual appropriation that the Government funds can be deemed firmly committed. Under the contract-authority scheme incorporated in the legislation before us now, there are authorizations for future appropriations but also initial and continuing authority in the Executive Branch contractually to commit funds of the United States up to the amount of the authorization. The expectation is that appropriations will be automatically forthcoming to meet these contractual commitments. This mechanism considerably reduces whatever discretion Congress might have exercised in the course of making annual appropriations. The issue in this case is the extent of the authority of the Executive to control expenditures for a program that Congress has funded in the manner and under the circumstances present here. Letter from President Nixon to William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Nov. 22, 1972, App. 15-16. Although the allotment for fiscal year 1975 is not directly at issue in this case, on January 15, 1974, the Administrator allotted $4 billion out of the $7 billion authorized for allotment for that fiscal year. Brief for Petitioner 6. 37 Fed. Reg. 26282 (1972). The District Court ordered the action to proceed as a class action under Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (b) (1) and (2) and also allowed the city of Detroit to intervene as a plaintiff. The petition for a writ of certiorari also presented the question whether a suit to compel the allotment of the sums in issue here is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but that issue was not briefed and apparently has been abandoned. The Administrator concedes that, if § 205 (a) requires allotment of the full amounts authorized by § 207, then “allotment is a ministerial act and the district courts have jurisdiction to order that it be done.” Brief for Petitioner 14. On July 12, 1974, while this case was pending in this Court the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 31 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IY), became effective. Title X of that Act imposes certain requirements on the President in postponing or withholding the use of authorized funds. If he determines that certain budget authority will not be required to carry out a particular program and is of the view that such authority should be rescinded, he must submit a special message to Congress explaining the basis therefor. For the rescission to be effective, Congress must approve it within 45 days. Should the President desire to withhold or delay the obligation or expenditure of budget authority, he must submit a similar special message to Congress. His recommendation may be rejected by either House adopting a resolution disapproving the proposed deferral. These provisions do not render this case moot or make its decision unnecessary, for § 1001, note following 31 U. S. C. § 1401 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), provides that: “Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made by this Act, shall be construed as— “(3) affecting in any way the claims or defenses of any party to litigation concerning any impoundment.” The Act would thus not appear to affect cases such as this one, pending on the date of enactment of the statute. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Administrator, has submitted a supplemental brief to this effect. The city of New York agrees that the case has not been mooted by the Impoundment Act and no contrary views have been filed. Although asserting on the foregoing ground and on other grounds that the Impoundment Act has no application here, the Executive Branch included among the deferrals of budget authority reported to Congress pursuant to the new Act: “Grants for waste treatment plant construction ($9 billion). Release of all these funds would be highly inflationary, particularly in view of the rapid rise in non-Federal spending for pollution control. Some of the funds now deferred will be allotted on or prior to February 1, 1975.” In connection with that submission, the President asserted that the Act “applies only to determinations to withhold budget authority which have been made since the law was approved,” but nevertheless thought it appropriate to include in the report actions which were concluded before the effective date of the Act. 120 Cong. Rec. S17195 (Sept. 23, 1974). Other than as they bear on the possible mootness in the litigation before us, no issues as to the reach or coverage of the Impoundment Act are before us. Section 205 as it appeared in the Senate bill directed the Administrator to “allocate” rather than to “allot.” The difference appears to be without significance. The Act declares that “it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985,” § 101 (a) (1), 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (1) (1970 ed., Supp. III). Congress intended also to apply to publicly owned sewage treatment works “the best practicable waste treatment technology over the life of the works consistent with the purposes of this subchapter.” §201 (g) (2) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1281 (g) (2) (A) (1970 ed, Supp. III). See §301 (b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C.§ 1311 (b)(1)(B) (1970 ed, Supp. III). The congressional determination to commit $18 billion during the fiscal years 1973-1975 is reflected in the following remarks of Senator Muskie, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee concerned with the legislation and the manager of the bill on the Senate floor: “[T]hose who say that raising the amounts of money called for in this legislation may require higher taxes, or that spending this much money may contribute to inflation simply do not understand the language of this crisis. “The conferees spent hours and days studying the problem of financing the cleanup effort required by this new legislation. The members agreed in the end that a total of $18 billion had to be committed by the Federal Government in 75-percent grants to municipalities during fiscal years 1973-75. That is a great deal of money; but that is how much it will cost to begin to achieve the requirements set forth in the legislation. “. . . [T]here were two strong imperatives which worked together to convince the members of the conference that this much money was needed: first, the conviction that only a national commitment of this magnitude would produce the necessary technology; and second, the knowledge that a Federal commitment of $18 billion in 75-per-cent grants to the municipalities was the minimum amount needed to finance the construction of waste treatment facilities which will meet the standards imposed by this legislation. “Mr. President, to achieve the deadlines we are talking about in this bill we are going to need the strongest kind of evidence of the Federal Government’s commitment to pick up its share of the load. We cannot back down, with any credibility, from the kind of investment in waste treatment facilities that is called for by this bill. And the conferees are convinced that the level of investment that is authorized is the minimum dose of medicine that will solve the problems we face.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33693-33694 (1972). Both Houses rejected authorization-appropriation funding in favor of the contract-authority system, which was deemed to involve a more binding and reliable commitment of funds. See 117 Cong. Rec. 38799, 38846-38853 (1971); 118 Cong. Rec. 10751-10761 (1972). Congressman Harsha, the House floor manager of the bill, explained the preference for the contract-authority approach and indicated that it was essential for orderly and continuous planning. Id., at 10757-10758. The Administrator goes on to argue that under his present view of the Act, there is little if any difference between discretion to withhold allotments and discretion to refuse to obligate, for under either approach the full amounts authorized will eventually be available for obligation. The city of New York contends otherwise. Our view of the Act makes it unnecessary to reach the question. The Administrator now indicates that the Act is presently being administered in accordance with his view of the Act asserted here. Brief for Petitioner 13. Under §205 (b), any funds allotted to a State that remain un-obligated at the end of a one-year period after the close of the fiscal year for which funds are authorized become available for reallotment by the Administrator in accordance with a formula to be determined by the Administrator. These provisions for reallotment, as well as the reallotment formula, plainly apply only to funds that have already been allotted. Senator Muskie, who was the senior majority conferee from the Senate, gave his view of the meaning of the Harsha amendments on the floor of the Senate: “Under the amendments proposed by Congressman William Harsha and others, the authorizations for obligational authority are ‘not to exceed’ $18 billion over the next 3 years. Also, ‘all’ sums authorized to be obligated need not be committed, though they must be allocated. These two provisions were suggested to give the Administration some flexibility concerning the obligation of construction grant funds.” 118 Cong’. Rec. 33694 (1972). He repeated his views in the course of Senate proceedings to override the President’s veto. Id., at 36871. Nothing was said in the Senate challenging the Senator’s view that executive discretion did not extend to allotments. In the House, the power to make allotments under § 205 was not mentioned in terms. The impact of the Harsha amendments was repeatedly explained by reference to discretion to obligate or to expend. Typical was • Representative Harsha’s remarks that the amendments were intended to “emphasize the President’s flexibility to control the rate of spending . . . ,” and that "the pacing item” in the expenditure of funds was the Administrator’s power to approve plans, specifications, and estimates. Id., at 33754. See also id., at 33693, 33704, 33715-33716, 33754^33755, 36873-36874, 37056-37060. 161 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 494 F. 2d 1033 (1974), aff’g 358 F. Supp. 669 (DC 1973). Other District Courts have reached this same result: Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Administrator, EPA Nos. C. 73-1061 & C. 74-104 (ND Ohio June 26, 1974); Maine v. Fri, Civ. No. 14-51 (Me. June 21, 1974); Florida v. Train, Civ. No. 73-156 (ND Fla. Feb. 25, 1974); Texas v. Ruckelshaus, No. A-73-CA-38 (WD Tex. Oct. 2, 1973); Martin-Trigona v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-C-3044 (ND Ill. June 29, 1973); Minnesota v. EPA, No. 4-73, Civ. 133 (Minn. June 25, 1974). The only District Court case in which the issue was actively litigated and which held to the contrary was Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (CD Cal. 1973).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SNAPP v. NEAL, STATE AUDITOR, et al. No. 16. Argued November 15-16, 1965. Decided January 18, 1966. Leon D. Hubert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Carl J. Felth. Martin R. McLendon, Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General. Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jones and I. Henry Kutz filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to California v. Buzará, ante, p. 386, decided today. The State of Mississippi levied an ad valorem tax against a house trailer of the petitioner, Sergeant Jesse E. Snapp. Sergeant Snapp was stationed under military orders at Crystal Springs Air Force Base, Mississippi. He bought the trailer in Mississippi and moved it on Mississippi highways to a private trailer park near the Air Force Base where he placed it on movable concrete blocks and used it as a home. He did not register or license the trailer, or pay any taxes on it in his home State of South Carolina. He challenged the Mississippi tax as a tax on his personal property prohibited by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1178, as amended in 1944, § 514, 50 U. S. C. App. § 574. The Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the levy on the ground that, as applied to motor vehicles, § 514 (2) (b) conditions the nonresident serviceman’s immunity from its ad valorem tax on the serviceman’s prior payment of the fees imposed by his home State. The court reasoned that since § 514 (2) (b) “stipulates] expressly that the taxation should not be limited to privilege and excise taxes, it necessarily follows that the prohibited tax must include the only other general branch of taxation, that is, ad valorem. It is emphasized that the federal statute is meant to include ad valorem taxes as being one of the taxes for which the serviceman is immune, -provided he complies with the laws of his home state concerning registration of the motor vehicle. If he fails to so comply, as was done in this case at bar, he is no longer entitled to protection of the Act of Congress.” 250 Miss. 597, at 614-615, 164 So. 2d 752, at 760. We granted certiorari, 380 U. S. 931. We reverse on the authority of our holding today in Buzará that the failure to pay the motor vehicle “license, fee, or excise” of the home State entitles the host State only to exact motor vehicle taxes qualifying as “licenses, fees, or excises”; the ad valorem tax, as the Mississippi Supreme Court acknowledged, is not such an exaction. We thus have no occasion to decide whether the Mississippi Supreme Court was correct in holding that the house trailer was a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of §514(2)(b). Reversed. The relevant text of the statute is in California v. Buzard, ante, p. 388, n. 1.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

K MART CORP. v. CARTIER, INC., et al. No. 86-495. Argued October 6, 1987 — Reargued April 26, 1988 Decided May 31, 1988 Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II-A, in which Eehn-quist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined, an opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-C, in which Eehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B, in which White, J., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Marshall and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in Part IV of which White, J., joined, post, p. 295. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Eehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 318. Deputy Solicitor General Cohen reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 86-625. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Spears, Jeffrey P. Minear, David M. Cohen, Robert V. Zener, and Alfonso Robles. Nathan Lewin reargued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 86-495 and 86-624. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 86-624 was Jamie S. Gorelick. Robert W. Steele argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 86-495 and 86-624 on the original argument. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 86-495 were Robert E. Hebda and James C. Tuttle. William H. Allen reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Eugene A. Ludwig, Scott D. Gilbert, and Elizabeth V. Foote Together with No. 86-624, 47th Street Photo, Inc. v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks et al., and No. 86-625, United States et al. v. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Washington by Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and John G. Hennen, Senior Assistant Attorney General; for the American Free Trade Association by Stephen Kurzman, Robert Ullman, and Steven R. Trost; for the Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., by Alan Mark Silbergeld; for Darby Dental Supply Co. et al. by Robert V. Marrow; for the National Association of Catalog Showroom Merchandisers by Richard B. Kelly and Thomas P. Mohen; for the National Mass Retailing Institute by William D. Coston and Robert J. Verdisco; and for Progress Trading Co. by William F. Sondericker, Robert L. Hoegle, and Frank W. Gaines, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for American Cyanamid Co. et al. by David Ladd and Thomas W. Kirby; for the American Intellectual Property Law Association, Inc., by Neil A. Smith; for Duracell Inc. by James N. Bierman, Jay N. Varón, Sheila McDonald Gill, and Gregg A. Dwyer; for Lever Brothers Co. by Robert P. Devlin; for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., by William H. Crabtree; for the United States Trademark Association by Marie V. Driscoll; and for Yamaha International Corp. et al. by Robert E. Wagner and Robert E. Browne. Harold C. Wegner, Barry E. Bretschneider, Donald R. Dinan, Charles F. Schill, and Albert P. Halluin filed a brief for Cetus Corp. as amicus curiae. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-C, and an opinion with respect to Part II-B, in which White, J., joined. A gray-market good is a foreign-manufactured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the consent of the United States trademark holder. These cases present the issue whether the Secretary of the Treasury’s regulation permitting the importation of certain gray-market goods, 19 CFR § 133.21 (1987), is a reasonable agency interpretation of § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1930 Tariff Act), 46 Stat. 741, as amended, 19 U. S. C. § 1526. I A The gray market arises in any of three general contexts. The prototypical gray-market victim (case 1) is a domestic firm that purchases from an independent foreign firm the rights to register and use the latter’s trademark as a United States trademark and to sell its foreign-manufactured products here. Especially where the foreign firm has already registered the trademark in the United States or where the product has already earned a reputation for quality, the right to use that trademark can be very valuable. If the foreign manufacturer could import the trademarked goods and distribute them here, despite having sold the trademark to a domestic firm, the domestic firm would be forced into sharp intrabrand competition involving the very trademark it purchased. Similar intrabrand competition could arise if the foreign manufacturer markets its wares outside the United States, as is often the case, and a third party who purchases them abroad could legally import them. In either event, the parallel importation, if permitted to proceed, would create a gray market that could jeopardize the trademark holder’s investment. The second context (case 2) is a situation in which a domestic firm registers the United States trademark for goods that are manufactured abroad by an affiliated manufacturer. In its most common variation (case 2a), a foreign firm wishes to control distribution of its wares in this country by incorporating a subsidiary here. The subsidiary then registers under its own name (or the manufacturer assigns to the subsidiary’s name) a United States trademark that is identical to its parent’s foreign trademark. The parallel importation by a third party who buys the goods abroad (or conceivably even by the affiliated foreign manufacturer itself) creates a gray market. Two other variations on this theme occur when an American-based firm establishes abroad a manufacturing subsidiary corporation (case 2b) or its own unincorporated manufacturing division (case 2c) to produce its United States trademarked goods, and then imports them for domestic distribution. If the trademark holder or its foreign subsidiary sells the trademarked goods abroad, the parallel importation of the goods competes on the gray market with the holder’s domestic sales. In the third context (case 3), the domestic holder of a United States trademark authorizes an independent foreign manufacturer to use it. Usually the holder sells to the foreign manufacturer an exclusive right to use the trademark in a particular foreign location, but conditions the right on the foreign manufacturer’s promise not to import its trademarked goods into the United States. Once again, if the foreign manufacturer or a third party imports into the United States, the foreign-manufactured goods will compete on the gray market with the holder’s domestic goods. B Until 1922, the Federal Government did not regulate the importation of gray-market goods, not even to protect the investment of an independent purchaser of a foreign trademark, and not even in the extreme case where the independent foreign manufacturer breached its agreement to refrain from direct competition with the purchaser. That year, however, Congress was spurred to action by a Court of Appeals decision declining to enjoin the parallel importation of goods bearing a trademark that (as in case 1) a domestic company had purchased from an independent foreign manufacturer at a premium. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (CA2 1921), rev’d, 260 U. S. 689 (1923). In an immediate response to Katzel, Congress enacted § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 975. That provision, later reenacted in identical form as § 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act, 19 U. S. C. § 1526, prohibits importing “into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise . . . bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States . . . , unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the timé of making entry.” 19 U. S. C. § 1526(a). The regulations implementing §526 for the past 50 years have not applied the prohibition to all gray-market goods. The Customs Service regulation now in force provides generally that “[f ]oreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.” 19 CFR § 133.21(b) (1987). But the regulation furnishes a “common-control” exception from the ban, permitting the entry of gray-market goods manufactured abroad by the trademark owner or its affiliate: “(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions . . . do not apply to imported articles when: “(1) Both the foreign and the U. S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same person or business entity; [or] “(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control. . . The Customs Service regulation further provides an “authorized-use” exception, which permits importation of gray-market goods where “(3) [t]he articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under authorization of the U. S. owner . . . 19 CFR § 133.21(c) (1987). Respondents, an association of United States trademark holders and two of its members, brought suit in Federal District Court in February 1984, seeking both a declaration that the Customs Service regulation, 19 CFR §§ 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987), is invalid and an injunction against its enforcement. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (DC 1984). They asserted that the common-control and authorized-use exceptions are inconsistent with §526 of the 1930 Tariff Act. Petitioners K mart and 47th Street Photo intervened as defendants. The District Court upheld the Customs Service regulation, 598 F. Supp., at 853, but the Court of Appeals reversed, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 252 U. S. App. D. C. 342, 790 F. 2d 903 (1986) (hereinafter COPIAT), holding that the Customs Service regulation was an unreasonable administrative interpretation of § 526. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1005 (1986), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. Compare Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F. 2d 1552, 1557-1560 (CA Fed. 1985), aff’g 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 1055 (1986); and Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F. 2d 315, 317-319 (CA2 1986), aff’g 627 F. Supp. 911 (EDNY 1985), cert. pending, No. 86-757, with COPIAT, supra, at 346-355, 790 F. 2d, at 907-916. In an earlier opinion, we affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the District Court had jurisdiction, and set the cases for reargument on the merits. 485 U. S. 176 (1988). A majority of this Court now holds that the common-control exception of the Customs Service regulation, 19 CFR §§ 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1987), is consistent with § 526. See post, at 309-310 (opinion of Brennan, J.). A different majority, however, holds that the authorized-use exception,. 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(3) (1987), is inconsistent with § 526. See post, at 328-329 (opinion of Scalia, J.). We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part. hH A In determining whether a challenged regulation is valid, a reviewing court must first determine if the regulation is consistent with the language of the statute. “If the statute is clear and unambiguous ‘that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’. . . The traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress.” Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U. S. 361, 368 (1986), quoting Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). See also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U. S. 153, 164 (1985). In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole. Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen, 485 U. S. 399, 403-405 (1988); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 220-221 (1986). If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue addressed by the regulation, the question becomes whether the agency regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron, supra, at 843; Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 125 (1985). If the agency regulation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, a reviewing court must give deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241, 246, n. 4 (1985). B Following this analysis, I conclude that subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) of the Customs Service regulation, 19 CFR §§ 133.21 (c)(1) and (c)(2) (1987), are permissible constructions designed to resolve statutory ambiguities. All Members of the Court are in agreement that the agency may interpret the statute to bar importation of gray-market goods in what we have denoted case 1 and to permit the imports under case 2a. See post, at 296, 298-299 (opinion of Brennan, J.); post, at 318 (opinion of Scalia, J.). As these writings state, “owned by” is sufficiently ambiguous, in the context of the statute, that it applies to situations involving a foreign parent, which is case 2a. This ambiguity arises from the inability to discern, from the statutory language, which of the two entities involved in case 2a can be said to “own” the United States trademark if, as in some instances, the domestic subsidiary is wholly owned by its foreign parent. A further statutory ambiguity contained in the phrase “merchandise of foreign manufacture,” suffices to sustain the regulations as they apply to cases 2b and 2c. This ambiguity parallels that of “owned by,” which sustained case 2a, because it is possible to interpret “merchandise of foreign manufacture” to mean (1) goods manufactured in a foreign country, (2) goods manufactured by a foreign company, or (3) goods manufactured in a foreign country by a foreign company. Given the imprecision in the statute, the agency is entitled to choose any reasonable definition and to interpret the statute to say that goods manufactured by a foreign subsidiary or division of a domestic company are not goods “of foreign manufacture.” C (1) Subsection (c)(3), 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(3) (1987), of the regulation, however, cannot stand. The ambiguous statutory phrases that we have already discussed, “owned by” and “merchandise of foreign manufacture,” are irrelevant to the proscription contained in subsection (3) of the regulation. This subsection of the regulation denies a domestic trademark holder the power to prohibit the importation of goods made by an independent foreign manufacturer where the domestic trademark holder has authorized the foreign manufacturer to use the trademark. Under no reasonable construetion of the statutory language can goods made in a foreign country by an independent foreign manufacturer be removed from the purview of the statute. (2) The design of the regulation is such that the subsection of the regulation dealing with case 3, § 133.21(c)(3), is sever-able. Cf. Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U. S., at 368 (invalidating a Federal Reserve Board definition of “bank” in 12 CFR § 225.2(a)(1) (1985), but leaving intact the remaining parts of the regulation). The severance and invalidation of this subsection will not impair the function of the statute as a whole, and there is no indication that the regulation would not have been passed but for its inclusion. Accordingly, subsection (c)(3) of § 133.21 must be invalidated for its conflict with the unequivocal language of the statute. Ill We hold that the Customs Service regulation is consistent with §526 insofar as it exempts from the importation ban goods that are manufactured abroad by the “same person” who holds the United States trademark, 19 CFR § 133.21(c) (1) (1987), or by a person who is “subject to common . . . control” -with the United States trademark holder, § 133.21(c)(2). Because the authorized-use exception of the regulation, § 133.21(c)(3), is in conflict with the plain language of the statute, that provision cannot stand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed insofar as it invalidated §§ 133.21(c)(1) and (c)(2), but affirmed with respect to § 133.21(c)(3). It is so ordered. The full text of § 526(a), as codified, 19 U. S. C. § 1526(a), is as follows: “(a) Importation prohibited “Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section [an exception added in 1978 for the importation of articles for personal use], it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in section 106 of said title 15, unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry.” The Customs Service regulation provides: “§ 133.21. Restrictions on importations of articles bearing recorded trademarks and trade names. “(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign or domestic manufacture bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark or trade name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited importations. A ‘copying or simulating’ mark or name is an actual counterfeit of the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to be likely to cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark with the recorded mark or name. “(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles beaming a trademark identical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations. “(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when: “(1) Both the foreign and the U. S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same person or business entity; “(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are. otherwise subject to common ownership or control (see §§ 133.2(d) [defining “common ownership and common control”] and 133.12(d) [providing that application to record trademark must report identity of any affiliate that uses same trade name abroad]); “(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under authorization of the U. S. owner; “(4) The objectionable mark is removed or obliterated prior to importation in such a manner as to be illegible and incapable of being reconstituted, for example by: “(i) Grinding off imprinted trademarks wherever they appear; “(ii) Removing and disposing of plates bearing a trademark or trade name; “(5) The merchandise is imported by the recordant of the trademark or trade name or his designate; “(6) The recordant gives written consent to an importation of articles otherwise subject to the restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, and such consent is furnished to appropriate Customs officials; or “(7) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark and the personal exemption is claimed and allowed under § 148.55 of this chapter.” 19 CFR §§ 133.21(a), (b), (c) (1987). Respondents sued the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury-, and the Commissioner of Customs. They also asserted that the Customs Service regulation was inconsistent with § 42 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1124, which prohibits the importation of goods bearing marks that “copy or simulate” United States trademarks. That issue is not before us. I disagree with Justice Scalia’s reasons for declining to recognize this ambiguity. See post, at 319-323. First, the threshold question in ascertaining the correct interpretation of a statute is whether the language of the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous. The purported gloss any party gives to the statute, or any reference to legislative history, is in the first instance irrelevant. Further, I decline to assign any binding or authoritative effect to the particular verbiage Justice Scalia highlights. The quoted phrases are simply the Government’s explanation of the practical effect the current regulation has in applying the statute, and come from the statement-of-the-case portion of its petition for a writ of certiorari. Additionally, I believe that agency regulations may give a varying interpretation of the same phrase when that phrase appears in different statutes and different statutory contexts. There may well be variances in purpose or circumstance that have led the agency to adopt and apply dissimilar interpretations of the phrase “of foreign manufacture” in other regulations implementing different statutes. I also disagree that our disposition necessarily will engender either enforcement problems for the Customs Service or problems we are unaware of arising out of our commercial treaty commitments to foreign countries. Initially, it is reasonable to think that any such problems or objections would have arisen before now since it is the current interpretation of the regulations we are sustaining. Second. I believe that the regulation speaks to the hypothetical situation Justice Scalia poses, and that the firm with the United States trademark could keep out “gray-market imports manufactured abroad by the other American firms," post, at 320, because the regulation allows a company justifiably invoking the protection of the statute to bar the importation of goods of foreign or domestic manufacture. 19 CFR § 133.21(a) (1987). In this instance, the domestic firm with the United States trademark could invoke the protection of the statute (ease 1) and bar the importation of the other domestic firm’s product manufactured abroad even though our interpretation of the phrase “of foreign manufacture" would characterize these latter goods to be of domestic manufacture.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNIVERSAL INTERPRETIVE SHUTTLE CORP. v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION et al. No. 19. Argued October 21-22, 1968. Decided November 25, 1968. Jeffrey L. Nagin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Allen E. Susman and Ralph S. Cunningham, Jr. Russell W. Cunningham argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission. Manuel J. Davis argued the cause for respondent D. C. Transit System, Inc. With him on the brief was Samuel M. Langerman. Assistant Attorney General Martz argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., S. Billingsley Hill, and Thomas L. McKevitt. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for maintaining our national parks, and for providing facilities and services for their public enjoyment through concessionaires or otherwise. In meeting this responsibility, he has contracted for petitioner to conduct guided tours of the Mall, a grassy park located in the center of the City of Washington and studded with national monuments and museums. Visitors to the Mall may board petitioner’s open "minibuses” which travel among the various points of interest at speeds under 10 miles per hour. Guides on the buses and at certain stationary locations describe the sights. Visitors may debark to tour the museums, boarding a later bus to return to the point of departure. Suit was brought by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (hereafter WMATC) to enjoin petitioner from conducting tours of the Mall without a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. Carriers permitted by WMATC to provide mass transit and sightseeing services in the City of Washington intervened as plaintiffs, and the United States appeared as amicus curiae. The concessionaire and the United States contend that the Secretary’s authority over national park lands, and in particular his grant of “exclusive charge and control” over the Mall dating from 1898, permit him to contract for this service without interference. The carriers and WMATC argue that the interstate compact which created the WMATC implicitly limited the Secretary’s authority over the Mall, and gave rise to dual jurisdiction over these tours in the Secretary and the WMATC. One carrier, D. C. Transit System, Inc., also argues that its franchise limits the Secretary’s power. In a detailed opinion the District Court dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals reversed without opinion. We granted certiorari and, having heard the case and examined the web of statutes on which it turns, we reverse, finding the Secretary’s exclusive authority to contract for services on the Mall undiminished by the compact creating WMATC or by the charter granted a private bus company. I. That the Secretary has substantial power over the Mall is undisputed. The parties agree that he is free to enter into the contract in question. They also agree that he is free to exclude traffic from the Mall altogether, or selectively to exclude from the Mall any carrier licensed by the WMATC or following WMATC instructions. Moreover, the parties agree that the Secretary could operate the tour service himself without need to obtain permission from anyone. Yet the WMATC argues that before the Secretary’s power may be exercised through a concessionaire, the consent of the WMATC must be obtained. This interpretation of the statutes involved would result in a dual regulatory jurisdiction overlapping on the most fundamental matters. The Secretary is empowered by statute to "contract for services . . . provided in the national parks ... for the public ... as may be required in the administration of the National Park Service_” Act of May 26, 1930, c. 324, § 3, 46 Stat. 382, 16 U. S. C. § 17b. Moreover, he is “to encourage and enable private persons and corporations ... to provide and operate facilities and services which he deems desirable . . . .” Pub. L. 89-249, § 2, 79 Stat. 969, 16 U. S. C. § 20a (1964 ed., Supp. III). Congress was well aware that the services provided by these national park concessionaires include transportation. Hearings on H. R. 5796, 5872, 5873, 5886, and 5887 before the Subcommittee on National Parks of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 151-159 (1964). In this case the Secretary concluded that there was a public need for a motorized, guided tour of the grounds under his control, and that petitioner was most fit to provide it. The WMATC, however, also asserts the power to decide whether this tour serves “public convenience and necessity,” and the power to require the concessionaire to “conform to the . . . requirements of the Commission” and the “terms and conditions” which it may impose. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 4 (b), 74 Stat. 1037. The Secretary’s contract leaves the tour’s route under his control, but the WMATC would in its certificate specify the “service to be rendered and the routes over which” the concessionaire might run within the Mall. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, §4 (d)(1), 74 Stat. 1037. Moreover, the WMATC might require the provision of additional service on or off the Mall and forbid the discontinuance of any existing service. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, §§4(e) and (i), 74 Stat. 1038, 1039. The contract with the Secretary provides fare schedules, pursuant to statutory authority in the Secretary to regulate the concessionaire’s charges. Pub. L. 89-249, § 3,79 Stat. 969, 16 U. S. C. § 20b (1964 ed., Supp. III). The WMATC would have the power to “suspend any fare, regulation, or practice” depending on the WMATC’s views of the financial condition, efficiency, and effectiveness of the concessionaire and the reasonableness of the rate. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 6, 74 Stat. 1040. And under the same section the WMATC could set whatever fare it found reasonable, although a profit of 6%% or less could not be prohibited. The Secretary is given statutory authority to require the keeping of records by the concessionaire and to inspect those records, and the Comptroller General is required to examine the concessionaire’s books every five years. Pub. L. 89-249, §9, 79 Stat. 971, 16 U. S. C. § 20g (1964 ed., Supp. III). The WMATC would also have the power to require reports and to prescribe and have access to the records to be kept. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 10, 74 Stat. 1042. Finally, the Secretary is given by statute the general power to specify by contract the duties of a concessionaire, 16 U. S. C. §§ 17b, 20-20g (1964 ed. and Supp. Ill); the WMATC would claim this power by regulation and rule. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 15, 74 Stat. 1045. We cannot ascribe to Congress a purpose of subjecting the concessionaire to these two separate masters, who show at the outset their inability to agree by presence on the opposite sides of this lawsuit. There is no indication from statutory language or legislative history that Congress intended to divest the Secretary partly or wholly of his authority in establishing the WMATC. When the WMATC was formed there was in the statute books, as there is now, a provision that the “park system of the District of Columbia is placed under the exclusive charge and control of the Director of the National Park Service.” Act of July 1, 1898, c. 543, § 2, 30 Stat. 570, as amended, D. C. Code §8-108(1967). He was, and is, explicitly “authorized and empowered to make and enforce all regulations for the control of vehicles and traffic.” Act of June 5, 1920, c. 235, § 1, 41 Stat. 898, D. C. Code § 8-109 (1967). And this extends to sidewalks and streets which “lie between and separate the said public grounds.” Act of March 4, 1909, c. 299, § 1, 35 Stat. 994, D. C. Code § 8-144 (1967). The creation of the Public Utilities Commission — the predecessor of the WMATC — was not intended “to interfere with the exclusive charge and control . . . committed to” the predecessor of the National Park Service. Act of March 3, 1925, c. 443, § 16 (b), 43 Stat. 1126, as amended, D. C. Code §40-613 (1967). In this context the WMATC was established. After World War II, metropolitan Washington had expanded rapidly into Maryland and Virginia. The logistics of moving vast numbers of people on their daily round became increasingly complicated, and increasingly in need of coordinated supervision. Congress therefore gave its consent and approval through a joint resolution to an interstate compact which “centralizes to a great degree in a single agency . . . the regulatory powers of private transit now shared by four regulatory agencies.” S. Rep. No. 1906, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1960). These four agencies were “the public utility regulatory agencies of the States of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia and the Interstate Commerce Commission.” Pub. L. 86-794, 74 Stat. 1031. The Secretary was not included in this listing. Moreover, Congress specifically provided that nothing in the Act or compact “shall affect the normal and ordinary police powers . . . of the Director of the National Park Service with respect to the regulation of vehicles, control of traffic and use of streets, highways, and other vehicular facilities . ...” Finally, the House Report on the compact lists the federal legislation which was suspended to give effect to the compact, and the laws giving exclusive control of the Mall to the Secretary are not on the list. H. R. Rep. No. 1621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-30 (1960). There is thus no reason to ignore the principle that repeals by implication are not favored or to suspect that the Congress, in creating the WMATC, disturbed the exclusivity of the Secretary’s control over the Mall either by extinguishing entirely his power to contract for transportation services or by burdening the concessionaire with two separate agencies engaged in regulating precisely the same aspects of its conduct. Congress was endeavoring to simplify the regulation of transportation by creating the WMATC, not to thrust it further into a bureaucratic morass. It therefore established the WMATC to regulate the mass transit of commuters and workers. A system of minibuses, proceeding in a circular route around the Mall at less than 10 miles per hour, and stopping from time to time to describe the sights before disgorging most passengers where it picked them up, serves quite a different function. The Mall is, and was intended to be, an expansive, open sanctuary in the midst of a metropolis; a spot suitable for Americans to visit to examine the historical artifacts of their country and to reflect on monuments to the men and events of its history. The Secretary has long had exclusive control of the Mall and ample power to develop it for these purposes. We hold that the WMATC has not been empowered to impose its own regulatory requirements on the same subject matter. II. If the WMATC is without jurisdiction to issue a certificate of convenience and necessity in this case, as we have found, then the D. C. Transit System’s interpretation of its franchise as protecting it from any uncerti-fied sightseeing service on the Mall would give it an absolute monopoly of service there: the WMATC, lacking jurisdiction over the Mall, would have no authority to certify another carrier. The Secretary, if D. C. Transit is right, would have to take D. C. Transit or no one. Nothing in the statute confers so rigid a monopoly. Section 1 (a) of D. C. Transit’s franchise, Pub. L. 757, c. 669, Tit. I, pt. 1, 70 Stat. 598, confers the power to operate a “mass transportation system.” That this does not include sightseeing is clearly shown by the separate grant of power to operate “charter or sightseeing services” in § 6, 70 Stat. 599. The section giving D. C. Transit a measure of exclusivity is § 3, 70 Stat. 598, which protects it from any uncertified “competitive . . . bus line” for the “transportation of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule . . . .” In determining what is “competitive” one must refer back to the sections which grant the franchise. Even if §§ 1 and 3 together would protect “mass transportation” on the Mall from uncertified competition, and even if § 3 protects § 6 activity, it does not follow that D. C. Transit has a monopoly over sightseeing on the Mall. Section 6 explicitly saves the “laws ... of the District of Columbia,” including the “exclusive charge and control” of the Secretary over the Mall. D. C. Code §8-108 (1967). D. C. Transit admits the Secretary could exclude its sightseeing service from the Mall; if so, surely the franchise protection does not extend there. Moreover, § § 3 and 6 together cannot confer a monopoly of Mall sightseeing both because this would involve an impairment of the Secretary’s power under District law contrary to § 6, and because it would be unreasonable to construe the protection of § 3 against carriers uncerti-fied by the WMATC to apply where the WMATC has no powers of certification. And even were § 3 so construed, its protection against “transportation of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule” was evidently aimed at commuter service whose most important qualities are speed and predictability, not the service here whose most important qualities are interesting dialogue and leisurely exposure of the rider to new and perhaps unexpected experiences. The agenda of the tour will be varied by the Secretary according to the events of the day. The franchise does not protect D. C. Transit against competition in this sort of service on the Mall. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the District Court. If the Congress, which has the matter before it, wishes to clarify or alter the relationship of these statutes and agencies, it is entirely free to do so. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 16 U. S. C. §§ 1, 17b, 20 (1964 ed. and Supp. Ill). This responsibility is met principally through the National Park Service, which was created by the Act of August 25, 1916, c. 408, § 1, 39 Stat. 535, as an agency of the Department of the Interior. Since there is no conflict between them, we shall refer directly to the Secretary of the Interior rather than to the Director of the National Park Service. In the Act of July 1, 1898, c. 543, § 2, 30 Stat. 570, Congress placed the District of Columbia parks under the “exclusive charge and control” of the United States Army Chief of Engineers. This authority was transferred in the Act of February 26, 1925, c. 339, 43 Stat. 983, to the Director of Public Buildings and Public Parks of the National Capital. And in Executive Order No. 6166, June 10, 1933, H. R. Doc. No. 69, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, this authority finally devolved upon the agency now called the National Park Service. Act of March 2, 1934, c. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 389. D. C. Transit System, Inc., an intervening carrier, contends otherwise. But that position is not directly at issue in our view of the case. The Secretary’s power does not extend beyond these limits, however. In order to institute a transportation service from the Mall to a proposed Visitors’ Center in Union Station he sought specific authorization from Congress to add to and confirm his existing authority and provide a service embracing both the Mall and its surroundings. S. Rep. No. 959, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 8-10 (1968). Congress simply directed him to study the transportation needs of the entire area. Pub. L. 90-264, Tit. I, § 104, 82 Stat. 44 (1968); S. Rep. No. 959, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 810, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967). Pub. L. 86-794, § 3, 74 Stat. 1050. The term “police power” is a vague one which “embraces an almost infinite variety of subjects.” Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 145 (1877) (economic regulation of grain storage an aspect of police power). It is broad enough to embrace the full range of the Secretary's power over the Mall, which even prior to the compact was ordinarily directed to ends quite different from that of the surrounding municipalities in regulating their streets. The Secretary sought explicit recognition of these differences through use of more specific language in the compact, but his clarification was not adopted. H. R. Rep. No. 1621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 20, 48-49 (1960). E. g., Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842); FTC v. A. P. W. Paper Co., 328 U. S. 193, 202 (1946). This transportation is undertaken by contract with the Federal Government to serve a purpose of the Federal Government, and so might be thought to fall within the specific exemption from the compact for transportation by the Federal Government. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 1(a) (2), 74 Stat. 1036. Moreover, it is not primarily designed to transport people “between any points” but rather back to the same point of departure, and might therefore be excepted from the WMATC’s jurisdiction. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, §1 (a), 74 Stat. 1035. But we find it unnecessary to reach these arguments, which would involve much more severe limits on the power of the WMATC throughout the city. “There is hereby granted to D. C. Transit System, Inc. ... a franchise to operate a mass transportation system of passengers for hire within the District of Columbia . . . the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church, and the counties of Arlington and Fairfax in the Commonwealth of Virginia and the counties of Montgomery and Prince Georges in the State of Maryland . . . Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt the Corporation from any law or ordinance of the Commonwealth of Virginia or the State of Maryland or any political subdivision of such Commonwealth or State, or of any rule, regulation, or order issued under the authority of any such law or ordinance, or from applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.” “The Corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to engage in special charter or sightseeing services subject to compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations of the District of Columbia and of the municipalities or political subdivisions of the States in which such service is to be performed, and with applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.” “No competitive street railway or bus line, that is, bus or railway line for the transportation of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule, shall be established to operate in the District of Columbia without the prior issuance of a certificate by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia ... to the effect that the competitive line is necessary for the convenience of the public.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PACIFIC OPERATORS OFFSHORE, LLP, et al. v. VALLADOLID et al. No. 10-507. Argued October 11, 2011 Decided January 11, 2012 Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Erin E. Murphy, Peder K. Batalden, Peter Abrahams, and Michael W. Thomas. Joseph R. Palmore argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and M. Patricia Smith. David C. Frederick argued the cause for respondent Valla-dolid. With him on the brief were Gregory G. Rapawy, Beverly C. Moore, Michael F. Sturley, Lynn E. Blais, Erin Glenn Busby, Joshua T Gillelan II, Timothy K. Sprinkles, and Charles D. Naylor. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) extends the federal workers’ compensation scheme established in the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U. S. C. §901 et seq., to injuries “occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf” for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the shelf. 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the OCSLA extends coverage to an employee who can establish a substantial nexus between his injury and his employer’s extractive operations on the Outer Continental Shelf. We affirm. I Petitioner Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP (Pacific), operates two drilling platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf off the coast of California and an onshore oil and gas processing facility in Ventura County, California. Pacific employed Juan Valladolid as a general manual laborer — known in the trade as a roustabout — in its oil exploration and extraction business. Valladolid spent about 98 percent of his time on one of Pacific’s offshore drilling platforms performing maintenance duties, such as picking up litter, emptying trashcans, washing decks, painting, maintaining equipment, and helping to load and unload the platform crane. Valladolid spent the remainder of his time working at Pacific’s onshore processing facility, where he also performed maintenance duties, including painting, sandblasting, pulling weeds, cleaning drain culverts, and operating a forklift. While on duty at the onshore facility, Valladolid died in a forklift accident. His widow, a respondent here (hereinafter respondent), filed a claim for benefits under the LHWCA pursuant to the extension of that Act contained within the OCSLA. The OCSLA provides, in relevant part: “With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the [LHWCA].” 43U.S. C. § 1333(b). After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed respondent’s claim. The ALJ reasoned that Valla-dolid’s fatal injury was not covered under § 1333(b) because his accident occurred on land, rather than on the Outer Continental Shelf. On appeal, the United States Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed, concluding that Congress intended to limit the coverage provided by the OCSLA to injuries suffered by employees within the “geographical locale” of the Outer Continental Shelf. L. V. v. Pacific Operations Offshore, LLP, 42 BRBS 67, 71 (2008) (per curiam). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that § 1333(b) neither contains a “situs-of-injury” requirement, as the Fifth Circuit has held, nor imposes a “but for” causation requirement, as the Third Circuit has held. See 604 F. 3d 1126, 1130-1140 (2010) (rejecting the holdings of Mills v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 877 F. 2d 356 (CA5 1989) (en banc); Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc., 849 F. 2d 805 (CA3 1988)). Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the claimant must establish a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf” to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits under the OCSLA. 604 F. 3d, at 1139. We granted Pacific’s petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve this conflict. 562 U. S. 1215 (2011). II In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. § 1301 et seq., which extended the boundaries of Coastal States up to three geographic miles into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and up to three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. At the same time, Congress enacted the OCSLA, affirming the Federal Government’s authority and control over the “outer Continental Shelf,” defined as the submerged lands subject to the jurisdiction and control of the United States lying seaward and outside of the submerged lands within the extended state boundaries. 67 Stat. 462, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1331(a), 1332(1). As defined by the OCSLA, the Outer Continental Shelf includes the “submerged lands” beyond the extended state boundaries, § 1331(a), but not the waters above those submerged lands or artificial islands or installations attached to the seabed. For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the entire geographical zone as the “OCS.” Section 1333 extends various provisions of state and federal law to certain aspects of the OCS. For example, § 1333(a)(1) extends the Constitution and federal laws of civil and political jurisdiction “to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed,” for the purpose of extracting its natural resources. Section 1333(a)(2)(A) makes the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State applicable to “that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf.” Section 1333(b), the provision involved in this case, makes LHWCA workers’ compensation benefits available for the “disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf” for the purpose of extracting its natural resources. The question before us is the scope of coverage under § 1333(b). The parties agree that § 1333(b) covers employees, such as oil rig and drilling platform workers, who are injured while working directly on the OCS to extract its natural resources. They disagree, however, whether employees who are involved in extraction operations but who are injured beyond the OCS are also covered under the OCSLA. This dispute focuses on the meaning of the phrase “any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf” in § 1333(b). The Courts of Appeals have offered competing interpretations. In Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc., 849 F. 2d, at 811, the Third Circuit held that, because Congress intended LHWCA coverage to be expansive, § 1333(b) extends to all injuries that would not have occurred “but for” operations on the OCS. The Third Circuit thus concluded that an employee who worked on a semisubmersible drill rig, but who was killed in a car accident on the way to the helicopter that was to fly him to that rig, was eligible for § 1333(b) benefits. Id., at 806, 811. As the Third Circuit summarized, “ ‘But for’ [Curtis’] travelling to [his drill rig] for the purpose of conducting ‘operations’ within § 1333(b), employee Curtis would not have sustained injuries in the automobile accident.” Id., at 811. In Mills v. Director, supra, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted a narrower interpretation of § 1333(b). The court concluded that Congress intended to establish “a bright-line geographic boundary for § 1333(b) coverage,” and held that § 1333(b) extends coverage only to employees engaged in OCS extractive activities who “suffer injury or death on an OCS platform or the waters above the OCS.” Id., at 362. Applying its “situs-of-injury” test, the Fifth Circuit held that a welder who was injured on land during the construction of an offshore oil platform was not eligible for § 1333(b) benefits. Id., at 357, 362. In the case below, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s “situs-of-injury” requirement as unsupported by the text of § 1333(b), and the Third Circuit’s “but for” test as too broad to be consistent with Congress’ intent. 604 F. 3d, at 1137,1139. Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted a third interpretation of § 1333(b), holding that a “claimant must establish a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf” to be eligible for § 1333(b) benefits. Id., at 1139. “To meet the standard,” the Ninth Circuit explained, “the claimant must show that the work performed directly furthers outer continental shelf operations and is in the regular course of such operations.” Ibid. The Solicitor General suggests yet a fourth interpretation of § 1333(b). This interpretation would extend coverage to two categories of injuries: (1) all on-OCS injuries suffered by employees of companies engaged in resource extraction on the OCS; and (2) the off-OCS injuries of those employees who spend a substantial portion of their worktime on the OCS engaging in extractive operations. Brief for Federal Respondent 32-33. According to the Solicitor General, this test would provide § 1333(b) coverage for off-OCS injuries only to those employees whose duties contribute to operations on the OCS and who perform work on the OCS itself that is substantial in both duration and nature. Id., at 35. III Pacific argues that the Fifth Circuit s situs-of-mjury test presents the best interpretation of § 1333(b). The crux of Pacific’s argument is that off-OCS injuries cannot be “the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf” for purposes of § 1333(b). Pacific asserts that because Valladolid was injured on dry land, his death did not occur as the result of extraction operations conducted on the OCS, and therefore respondent is ineligible for LHWCA workers’ compensation benefits. We disagree. A The OCSLA extends the provisions of the LHWCA to the “disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury .occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf.” § 1333(b). Contrary to the view of Pacific and the Fifth Circuit, nothing in that language suggests that the injury to the employee must occur on the OCS. Section 1333(b) states only two requirements: The extractive operations must be “conducted on the outer Continental Shelf,” and the employee’s injury must occur “as the result of” those operations. Despite the lack of a textual “situs-of-injury” requirement in § 1333(b), Pacific argues that it is logically impossible for an off-OCS employee to be injured “as the result of” on-OCS operations. Pacific offers no basis for this assertion, and we find none. Indeed, given that many OCS platforms are physically connected to onshore processing facilities via oil and gas pipelines, it is not difficult to imagine an accident occurring on an OCS platform that could injure employees located off the OCS. Moreover, if, as Pacific suggests, the purpose of § 1333(b) was to geographically limit the extension of LHWCA coverage to injuries that occurred on the OCS, Congress could easily have achieved that goal by omitting the following six words in §1333(b)’s text: “as the result of operations conducted.” Had Congress done so, the statute would extend LHWCA coverage to the “disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring on the outer Continental Shelf.” But that is not the text of the statute Congress enacted. Pacific also argues that, because all of § 1333(b)’s neighboring subsections contain specific situs limitations, we should infer that Congress intended to include a situs-of-injury requirement in § 1333(b). See, e. g., § 1333(a)(2)(A) (adopting the civil and criminal laws of the adjacent State as federal law “for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf”)- But our usual practice is to make the opposite inference. Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Congress’ decision to specify, in scrupulous detail, exactly where the other subsections of § 1333 apply, but to include no similar restriction on injuries in § 1333(b), convinces us that Congress did not intend § 1333(b) to apply only to injuries suffered on the OCS. Rather, § 1333(b) extends LHWCA workers’ compensation coverage to any employee injury, regardless of where it happens, as long as it occurs “as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf.” Pacific argues that this conclusion is foreclosed by language in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U. S. 414 (1985), and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, All U. S. 207 (1986); but neither of those cases held that § 1333(b) extends only to injuries that occur on the OCS. In Herb’s Welding, this Court considered whether an oil platform welder, who worked both within the territorial waters of Louisiana and on the OCS, was covered under the LHWCA after suffering an injury in the waters of Louisiana. 470 U. S., at 416-417. The Court explicitly declined to address whether the employee was eligible for workers’ compensation benefits under § 1333(b) because that question was neither passed upon by the Court of Appeals nor fully briefed and argued before this Court. Id., at 426, n. 12. Although the Court acknowledged that an employee might walk in and out of workers’ compensation coverage during his employment due to the “explicit geographic limitation to the [OCSLA’s] incorporation of the LHWCA,” id., at 427, the exact meaning of that statement is unclear. We cannot ascertain whether the comment was a reference to § 1333(b)’s explicit situs-of-operations requirement, as respondents suggest, or the recognition of an implicit situs-of-injury requirement, as Pacific argues. In any event, the ambiguous comment was made without analysis in dicta and does not control this case. The same is true of the Court’s opinion in Offshore Logistics. In that case, the Court considered whether the widows of oil platform workers who were killed when their helicopter crashed into the high seas could file wrongful-death suits under Louisiana law. In the Court’s analysis of §1333, it stated, “Congress determined that the general scope of OCSLA’s coverage . . . would be determined principally by locale, not by the status of the individual injured or killed.” 477 U. S., at 219-220 (citing the situs requirement in § 1333(a)(2)(A)). In a footnote, the Court commented: “Only one provision of OCSLA superimposes a status requirement on the otherwise determinative OCSLA situs requirement; § 1333(b) makes compensation for the death or injury of an ‘employee’ resulting from certain operations on the Outer Continental Shelf payable under the [LHWCA].” Ibid., n. 2. These comments about the scope of the OCSLA’s coverage and its determinative “situs requirement” do not provide definitive evidence that § 1333(b) applies only to injuries that occur on the OCS. As in Herb’s Welding, it is unclear whether the statement in the Offshore Logistics footnote regarding § 1333(b) was referring to the explicit situs-of-operations requirement or to an implicit situs-of-injury requirement. Moreover, the entire footnote is dictum because, as the Court explicitly stated, § 1333(b) had no bearing on the case. 470 U. S., at 219-220. Finally, Pacific argues that including off-OCS injuries within the scope of the workers’ compensation coverage created by § 1333(b) runs counter to Congress’ intent in drafting the OCSLA. According to Pacific, Congress intended to create a uniform OCS compensation scheme that both filled the jurisdictional voids and eliminated jurisdictional overlaps between existing state and federal programs. Pacific points out that, without a situs-of-injury requirement to narrow the scope of § 1333(b), an off-OCS worker could be eligible for both state and federal workers’ compensation coverage. There is no indication in the text, however, that the OCSLA excludes OCS workers from LHWCA coverage when they are also eligible for state benefits. To the contrary, the LHWCA workers’ compensation scheme incorporated by the OCSLA explicitly anticipates that injured employees might be eligible for both state and federal benefits. An offsetting provision in the LHWCA provides that “any amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death for which benefits are claimed under [the LHWCA] pursuant to any other workers’ compensation law or [the Jones Act] shall be credited against any liability imposed by [the LHWCA].” 33 U. S. C. § 903(e). This provision, in addition to the lack of any textual support for Pacific’s argument, convinces us that Congress did not limit the scope of 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b)’s coverage to only those geographic areas where state workers’ compensation schemes do not apply. B Pacific also offers an alternative argument derived from the interaction of § 1333(b) and a provision of the LHWCA. Specifically, Pacific argues that because the LHWCA contains an explicit situs-of-injury requirement, see 33 U. S. C. § 903(a) (providing benefits only for injuries occurring “upon the navigable waters” of the United States), and because 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b) extends the LHWCA workers’ compensation scheme to the OCS, § 1333(b) incorporates the strict LHWCA situs-of-injury requirement from § 903(a). According to Pacific, the words “occurring as the result of operations” in § 1333(b) impose a status requirement in addition to the imported LHWCA situs-of-injury requirement, with the result that employees who are injured on the OCS, but whose jobs are not related to extractive operations, are excluded from the workers’ compensation coverage created by § 1333(b). Thus, an accountant who is injured on a field trip to the drilling platform would be ineligible under § 1333(b) despite being an employee who is injured on the OCS. Although this alternative argument has the advantage of assigning some meaning to the words “occurring as the result of operations” in § 1333(b), we still find it unpersuasive. First, it is unlikely that Congress intended to impose a situs-of-injury requirement in § 1333(b) through such a nonintu-itive and convoluted combination of two separate legislative Acts. As we have already noted, creating an express situs-of-injury requirement in the text of § 1333(b) would have been simple. Second, combining the § 1333(b) definition of “United States” with the LHWCA situs-of-injury requirement in 33 U. S. C. § 903(a) would result in an OCS workers’ compensation scheme that applies only to the seabed of the OCS and to any artificial islands and fixed structures thereon. See 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b)(3) (stating that “the term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes the outer Continental Shelf and artificial islands and fixed structures thereon”). Pacific concedes that this scheme would exclude the navigable waters above the shelf, including the waters immediately adjacent to any drilling platforms. Consequently, under Pacific’s view, even employees on a crew ship immediately adjacent to an OCS platform who are injured during a platform explosion would be excluded from § 1333(b) coverage. That view cannot be squared with the text of the statute, which applies to “any injury occurring as the result of operations conducted” on the OCS. C Pacific also makes several policy arguments in favor of a situs-of-injury requirement, but policy concerns cannot justify an interpretation of § 1333(b) that is inconsistent with the text of the OCSLA. “[I]f Congress’ coverage decisions are mistaken as a matter of policy, it is for Congress to change them. We should not legislate for them.” Herb’s Welding, 470 U. S., at 427. The language of § 1333(b) simply does not support a categorical exclusion of injuries that occur beyond the OCS. IV The Solicitor General urges us to adopt a status-based inquiry that applies one test to on-OCS injuries and a different test to off-OCS injuries. Specifically, the Government proposes that when a worker is injured on the OCS, he is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits if he is employed by a company engaged in extractive operations on the OCS. But if the employee is injured off the OCS, the employee will be covered only if his “duties contribute to operations” on the OCS and if he performs “work on the [OCS] itself that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.” Brief for Federal Respondent 35. This approach is derived from our decision in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U. S. 347 (1995) (establishing criteria by which an employee qualifies as a “seaman” under the Jones Act), and might well have merit as legislation. But it has no basis in the text of the OCSLA as presently enacted. The “occurring as the result of operations” language in § 1333(b) plainly suggests causation. Although the Government asserts that a status-based test would be preferable to a causation-based test, we cannot ignore the language enacted by Congress. The Third Circuit’s “but for” test is nominally based on causation, but it is also incompatible with § 1333(b). Taken to its logical conclusion, the “but for” test would extend workers’ compensation coverage to all employees of a business engaged in the extraction of natural resources from the OCS, no matter where those employees work or what they are doing when they are injured. This test could reasonably be interpreted to cover land-based office employees whose jobs have virtually nothing to do with extractive operations on the OCS. Because Congress extended LHWCA coverage only to injuries “occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf,” we think that § 1333(b) should be interpreted in a manner that focuses on injuries that result from those “operations.” This view is consistent with our past treatment of similar language in other contexts. In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258 (1992), we considered a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act that provided a cause of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added). We rejected a “but for” interpretation, stating that such a construction was “hardly compelled” and that it was highly unlikely that Congress intended to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover. 503 U. S., at 265-266. Instead, we adopted a proximate-cause standard consistent with our prior interpretation of the same language in the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Id., at 267-268. Similarly, 43 U. S. C. § 1333(b)’s language hardly compels the Third Circuit’s expansive “but for” interpretation. Accordingly, we conclude that the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial-nexus” test is more faithful to the text of § 1333(b). We understand the Ninth Circuit’s test to require the injured employee to establish a significant causal link between the injury that he suffered and his employer’s on-OCS operations conducted for the purpose of extracting natural resources from the OCS. Although the Ninth Circuit’s test may not be the easiest to administer, it best reflects the text of § 1333(b), which establishes neither a situs-of-injury nor a “but for” test. We are confident that ALJs and courts will be able to determine whether an injured employee has established a significant causal link between the injury he suffered and his employer’s on-OCS extractive operations. Although we expect that employees injured while performing tasks on the OCS will regularly satisfy the test, whether an employee injured while performing an off-OCS task qualifies — like Valladolid, who died while tasked with onshore scrap metal consolidation — is a question that will depend on the individual circumstances of each case. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the Benefits Review Board to apply the “substantial-nexus” test in the first instance, and we agree with that disposition. The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, is a respondent in this case because the Director administers the OCSLA workers’ compensation scheme established by § 1333(b). See also 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(1) (extending the Constitution and federal laws of civil and political jurisdiction “to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State”); § 1333(c) (making the National Labor Relations Act applicable to any unfair labor act “occurring upon any artificial island, installation, or other device referred to in subsection (a) of this section”); § 1333(d)(1) (granting the Coast Guard enforcement authority “on the artificial islands, installations, and other devices referred to in subsection (a) of this section or on the waters adjacent thereto”); § 1333(d)(2) (granting the Coast Guard authority to mark “any artificial island, installation, or other device referred to in subsection (a) of this section” for the protection of navigation); § 1333(e) (granting the Army authority to prevent the obstruction of access “to the artificial islands, installations, and other devices referred to in subsection (a) of this section”); § 1333(f) (saving clause applying “to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and the artificial islands, installations, and other devices referred to in subsection (a) of this section”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

E. I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO. et al. v. COLLINS et al. No. 75-1870. Argued March 2, 1977 Decided June 16, 1977 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 57. Rehnquist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Daniel M. Gribbon argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-1870. With him on the briefs were Matthew J. Broderick and Richard S. Seltzer. David Ferber argued the cause for petitioner in No. 75-1872. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Bork, Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Jacob H. Stillman, and James R. Miller. Richard J. Collins, Jr., respondent, argued the cause pro se and filed a brief in both cases. Lewis C. Murtaugh, respondent, argued the cause pro se in both cases. With him on the brief was Timothy J. Murtaugh III. Together with No. 75-1872, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Collins et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in these cases to determine whether the Securities and Exchange Commission, in approving the merger of a closed-end investment company into an affiliate company, reasonably exercised its discretion under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-l et seq. The Commission valued the investment company essentially on the basis of the market value of the securities which constituted substantially all of its assets rather than on the lower basis of its own outstanding stock.. The statutory scheme here is relatively straightforward. Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940,15 U. S. C. § 80a-17, forbids an “affiliated person,” as defined in the Act, to purchase any securities or other property from a registered investment company unless the Commission finds, inter alia, that the “evidence establishes that . . . the terms of the proposed transaction, including the consideration to be paid or received, are reasonable and fair and do not involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned . A (1) The merger in this litigation involves Christiana Securities Co., a closed-end, nondiversified management investment company, and E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., a large industrial operating company engaged principally in the manufacture of chemical products. Christiana was formed in 1915 in order to preserve family control of Du Pont & Co. At the time the present merger negotiations were announced in April 1972, 98% of Christiana's assets consisted of Du Pont common stock. This block of Du Pont stock in turn comprised approximately 28.3% of the outstanding common stock of Du Pont. For purposes of this litigation, Christiana has been presumed to have at least the potential to control Du Pont, although it submits that “this potential lies dormant and unexercised and that there is no actual control relationship.” SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8615 (1974), 5 S. E. C. Docket 745, 747 (1974). Christiana itself has 11,710,103 shares of common stock outstanding and has about 8,000 shareholders. Unlike Du Pont stock, which is traded actively on the New York and other national stock exchanges, Christiana shares are traded in the over-the-counter market. Since virtually all of its assets are Du Pont common stock, the market price of Christiana shares reflects the market price of Du Pont stock. However, as is often the case with closed-end investment companies, Christiana’s own stock has historically sold at a discount from the market value of its Du Pont holdings. Apparently, this discount is primarily tax related since Christiana pays a federal intercorporate tax on dividends. Its stockholders are also subject to potential capital-gains tax on the unrealized appreciation of Christiana’s Du Pont stock which has a very low tax base. Additionally, the relatively limited market for Christiana stock likely influences the discount. In 1972, Christiana’s management concluded that, because of the tax disadvantages and the discount at which its shares sold, Christiana should be liquidated and its stockholders become direct owners of Du Pont stock. Christiana’s board of directors proposed liquidation of Christiana by means of a tax-free merger into Du Pont. Du Pont would purchase Christiana’s assets by issuing to Christiana shareholders new certificates of Du Pont stock. In more concrete terms, Du Pont would acquire Christiana’s $2.2 billion assets and assume its liabilities of approximately $300,000. In so doing, Du Pont would acquire from Christiana 13,417,120 shares of its own common stock. Du Pont would then issue 13,228,620 of its shares directly to Christiana holders. This would be 188,500 shares less than Du Pont would receive from Christi-ana. As a result of the merger, each share of Christiana common stock would be converted into 1.123 shares of Du Pont common stock. That ratio was ascertained by taking the market price of Christiana’s Du Pont stock and its other assets, subtracting Christiana’s relatively nominal liabilities, and making certain other minor adjustments. Direct ownership of Du Pont shares would increase the market value of the Christiana shareholders’ holdings and Du Pont would have acquired Christiana’s assets at a 2.5% discount from their net value. The Internal Revenue Service ruled the merger would be tax free. (2) Du Pont and Christiana filed a joint application with the Commission for exemption under § 17 of the Investment Company Act. Administrative proceedings followed. The Commission’s Division of Investment Management Regulation supported the application. A relatively small number of Du Pont shareholders, including the respondents in this case, opposed the transaction. Their basic argument was that, since Christiana was valued on the basis of its assets, Du Pont stock, rather than the much lower market price of its own outstanding stock, the proposed merger would be unfair to the shareholders of Du Pont since it provides relatively greater benefits to Christiana shareholders than to shareholders of Du Pont. The objecting stockholders argued that Du Pont & Co. should receive a substantial share of the benefit realized by Christiana shareholders from the elimination of the 23% discount from net asset value at which Christiana stock was selling. They also argued that the merger would depress the market price of Du Pont stock because it would place more than 13 million marketable Du Pont shares directly in the hands of Christiana shareholders. After the hearing, the parties waived the initial administrative recommendations and the record was submitted directly to the Commission. The Commission unanimously granted the application. Basically, it viewed the proposed transaction as an exchange of equivalents — Christiana’s Du Pont stock to be acquired by Du Pont in exchange for Du Pont stock issued directly to Christiana shareholders. It held that, for purposes of § 17 (b), the proper guide for evaluating Christiana was the market price of Christiana’s holdings of Du Pont stock: “Here justice requires no ventures into the unknown and unknowable. An investment company, whose assets consist entirely or almost entirely of securities the prices of which are determined in active and continuous markets, can normally be presumed to be worth its net asset value. . . . The simple, readily usable tool of net asset value does the job much better than an accurate gauge of market impact (were there one) could.” 5 S. E. C. Docket, at 751. The fact that Du Pont might have obtained more favorable terms because of its strategic bargaining position or by use of alternative methods of liquidating Christiana was considered not relevant by the Commission. In its view, the purpose of § 17 was to prevent persons in a strategic position from getting more than fair value. The Commission found no detriment in the transaction to Du Pont or to the value of its outstanding shares. Any depressing effects on the price of Du Pont would be brief in duration and the intrinsic value of an investment in Du Pont would not be altered by the merger. Moreover, in the Commission’s view, any valuation involving a significant departure from net asset value would “run afoul of Section 17 (b) (1) of the Act”; it would strip long-term investors in companies like Christiana of the intrinsic worth of the securities which underlie their holdings. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit divided in setting aside the Commission’s determination. Collins v. SEC, 532 F. 2d 584 (1976). The majority held that the Securities and Exchange Commission had erred, as a matter of law, in determining that Christiana should be presumptively valued on the basis of the market value of its principal asset, common stock of Du Pont. “[I]n judging transactions between dominant and subservient parties, the test is 'whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.’ Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 306-307 . . . (1939).” Id., at 592. Employing this standard, the Court of Appeals majority concluded that the record did not support the Commission’s finding that the terms of the merger were “reasonable and fair” since the “economic benefits to Christiana shareholders from the merger are immediate and substantial,” id., at 601, while “benefits to present Du Pont shareholders are minimal.” Id., at 602. The court concluded that, from Du Pont’s viewpoint, “the degree of [control] dispersion attained . . . does not justify the substantial premium paid for the Christiana stock.” Id., at 603. The panel also held that the Commission had erred in failing to give weight to the “occasional detriment to Du Pont shareholders,” id., at 605, caused by the increase of available Du Pont stock in the market. B In determining whether the Court of Appeals correctly set aside the order of the Commission, we begin by examining the nature of the regulatory process leading to the decision that court was required to review. In United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694 (1975), we noted that the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-1 et seq., “vests in the SEC broad regulatory authority over the business practices of the investment companies.” 422 U. S., at 704-705. The Act was the product of congressional concern that existing legislation in the securities field did not afford adequate protection to the purchasers of investment company securities. Prior to the enactment of the legislation, Congress mandated an intensive study of the investment company industry. One of the problems specifically identified was the numerous transactions between investment companies and persons affiliated with them which resulted in a distinct advantage to the “insiders” over the public investors. Section 17 was the specific congressional response to this problem. Congress therefore charged the Commission, in scrutinizing a merger such as this, to take into account the peculiar characteristics of such a. transaction in the investment company industry. Recognizing that an “arm’s length bargain,” cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 307 (1939), is rarely a realistic possibility in transactions between an affiliate and an investment company, Congress substituted, in effect, the informed judgment of the Commission to determine, inter alia, whether the transaction was “reasonable and fair and [did] not involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned.” Given the wide variety of possible transactions between an investment company and its affiliates, Congress, quite understandably, made no attempt to define this standard with any greater precision. Instead, it followed the practice frequently employed in other administrative schemes. The language of the statute was cast in broad terms and designed to encompass all situations falling within the scope of the statute; an agency with great experience in the industry was given the task of applying those criteria to particular business situations in a manner consistent with the legislative intent. C In this case, a judgment as to whether the terms of the merger were “reasonable and fair” turned upon the value assigned to Christiana. In making such an evaluation, the Commission concluded that “[t]he single, readily usable tool of net asset value does the job much better than an accurate gauge of market impact. ...” 5 S. E. C. Docket, at 751. Investment companies, it reasoned, are essentially a portfolio of securities whose individual prices are determined by the forces of the securities marketplace. In determining value in merger situations, “asset value” is thus much more applicable to investment companies than to other corporate entities. The value of the securities surrendered is, basically, the real value received by the transferee. In reviewing a decision of the Commission, a court must consider both the facts found and the application of the relevant statute by the agency. Congress has mandated that, in review of § 17 proceedings, “[t]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 15 U. S. C. § 80a-42. A reviewing court is also to be guided by the “venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong . . . .” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). “[Contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight. . . even though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than in litigation.” FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U. S. 385, 391 (1959). Here, however, the Court of Appeals held, as a matter of law, that the Commission erred in the method applied in passing on the merger, thus all but ignoring the congressional limitations on judicial review of agency action. The Commission has long recognized that the key factor in the valuation of the assets of a closed-end investment company should be the market price of the underlying securities. This method of setting the value of investment companies is, as Congress contemplated, the product of the agency’s long and intimate familiarity with the investment company industry. For instance, in issuing an advisory report to the United States District Court pursuant to § 173 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the Commission advised that “it is natural that net asset value based upon market prices should be the fundamental valuation criterion used by and large in the investment company field.” Central States Electric Corp., 30 S. E. C. 680, 700 (1949), approved sub nom. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F. 2d 879, 884 (CA4 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 917 (1951). Similarly, in mergers like the one presented in this litigation, the Commission has used “net asset value” as a touchstone in its analysis. See, e. g., Delaware Realty & Investment Co., 40 S. E. C. 469, 473 (1961); Harbor Plywood Corp., 40 S. E. C. 1002 (1962); Eastern States Corp., SEC Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 5693 and 5711 (1969). Moreover, despite the characterization of the Court of Appeals to the contrary, the Commission did not employ a mechanical application of a rule or “presumption.” It considered carefully the contentions of the respondents that a departure from the use of net asset value was warranted in this case. Upon analysis, it concluded that the central and controlling aspect of the merger remained the fact that it consisted of an exchange of Du Pont common stock for Du Pont common stock; it was not Christiana stock but Du Pont stock which Du Pont was receiving in the merger. As to the claim that Du Pont stock would be adversely affected over an extended period of time by volume selling, the Commission concluded there was no indication of a long-term adverse market impact. It noted that Christiana stock was held principally by long-term investors. There' was no evidence that Christiana stockholders, who for years had been indirect investors in Du Pont, would now change the essential nature of their investment. The Commission’s reliance on “net asset value” in this particular case and its consequent determination that the proposed merger met the statutory standards thus rested “squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 209 (1947). In rejecting the conclusion of the Commission, the Court of Appeals substituted its own judgment for that of the agency charged by Congress with that responsibility. We note that after receiving briefs and hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeals — over the objection of the Commission, Christiana, and Du Pont — undertook the unique appellate procedure of employing a university professor to assist the court in understanding the record and to prepare reports and memoranda for the court. Thus, the reports relied upon by that court included a variety of data and economic observations which had not been examined and tested by the traditional methods of the adversary process. We are not cited to any statute, rule, or decision authorizing the procedure employed by the Court of Appeals. Cf. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 16. In our view, the Court of Appeals clearly departed from its statutory appellate function and applied an erroneous standard in its review of the decision of the Commission. The record made by the parties before the Commission was in accord with traditional procedures and that record clearly reveals substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commission. Moreover, the agency conclusions of law were based on a construction of the statute consistent with the legislative intent. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is ^ D , Reversed. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 429 U. S. 815 (1976). Title 16 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (a) (3) defines an “affiliated person” as follows: “(3) ‘Affiliated person’ of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.” Section 17 (b) also requires that the proposed transaction be (1) consistent with the policy of each registered investment company concerned, and (2) consistent with “the general purposes of this title.” 54 Stat. 815, 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-17 (b)(2), (3). These criteria are not contested here. Christiana owns 13,417,120 shares of Du Pont. It also holds a relatively small amount of Du Pont preferred stock. Its other assets consist of two daily newspapers in Wilmington, Del., and 3.5% of the stock of the Wilmington Trust Co., which, in turn, holds more than one-half of Christiana’s common stock as trustee. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8615 (1974). According to the applicants’ Notice of Filing of Application, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7402 (1972), Du Pont has 47,566,694 shares of common stock outstanding held by approximately 224,964 shareholders. Ninety-five and one-fialf percent of these shares are held by 338 people. SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 8615, supra. In the two years preceding the date of the announcement of the merger negotiations, this discount was generally in the range of 20 %- 25%. Ibid. A petition for rehearing en bane was denied by an equally divided court. Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 837, 15 U. S. C. § 79z-4, mandated that the SEC undertake such a study. See United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 704 (1975). See generally Report on Investment Trust and Investment Companies, H. R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 1017-1561 (1940). While the House and Senate Reports indicate that the Congress’ chief concern was protection of the public investors of the investment company, S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 11-12 (1940); H. R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 9 (1940), the statute has been construed to afford protection to the stockholders of the affiliate as well. See Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 43 S. E. C. 635, 639 (1967). 15 U. S. C. §80a-17 (b)(1). This situation is quite different from that which confronted the Court earlier this Term in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977). There, the Court held that “the narrow legal issue” of implying a private right of action under the securities laws was “one peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution” and that the experience of the Commission on such a question was of “limited value.” Id., at 41 n. 27. By contrast, this case involves an assessment as to whether a given business arrangement is compatible with the regulatory scheme which the agency is charged by Congress to administer. This method of valuation of closed-end investment companies was similarly employed in ELT, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 8675 and 8714 (1975); Chemical Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 8773 and 8795 (1975); Citizens &. Southern Capital Corp., SEC Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 7755 and 7802 (1973) ; Detroit & Cleveland Nav. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 3082 and 3099 (1960); Cheapside Dollar Fund, Ltd., SEC Investment Company Act Releases Nos. 9038 and 9085 (1975). The Commission has, of course, required that such valuations be adjusted to reflect such factors as expenses of the merger and tax considerations. Talley Industries, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No: 5953 (1970) ; and Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5215 (1967), cited by the Court of Appeals, did not rely on net asset value since the companies held substantial assets other than securities. While Christiana also had some assets other than Du Pont stock, they amounted to only 2% of its assets.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC. v. CASEY, GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. No. 89-994. Argued October 9, 1990 Decided March 19, 1991 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 102. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 103. Robert T. Adams argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Jack M. Stover. Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General, Jerome T. Foerster, Deputy Attorney General, and John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General. David S. Tatel, Norman Redlich, Robert B. McDuff, Steven R. Shapiro, Harvey Grossman, Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Antonia Hernandez, and E. Richard Larson filed a brief for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Garen E. Dodge filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether fees for services rendered by experts in civil rights litigation may be shifted to the losing party pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which permits the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” I Petitioner West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. (WVUH), operates a hospital in Morgantown, W. Va., near the Pennsylvania border. The hospital is often used by Medicaid recipients living in southwestern Pennsylvania. In January 1986, Pennsylvania’s Department of Public Welfare notified WVUH of new Medicaid reimbursement schedules for services provided to Pennsylvania residents by the Mor-gantown hospital. In administrative proceedings, WVUH unsuccessfully objected to the new reimbursement rates on. both federal statutory and federal constitutional grounds. After exhausting administrative remedies, WVUH filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Named as defendants (respondents here) were Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey and various other Pennsylvania officials. Counsel for WVUH employed Coopers & Lybrand, a national accounting firm, and three doctors specializing in hospital finance to assist in the preparation of the lawsuit and to testify at trial. WVUH prevailed at trial in May 1988. The District Court subsequently awarded fees pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, including over $100,000 in fees attributable to expert services. The District Court found these services to have been “essential” to presentation of the case — a finding not disputed by respondents. Respondents appealed both the judgment on the merits and the fee award. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed as to the former, but reversed as to the expert fees, disallowing them except to the extent that they fell within the $30-per-day fees for witnesses prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 1821(b). 885 F. 2d 11 (1989). WVUH petitioned this Court for review of that disallowance; we granted certio-rari, 494 U. S. 1003 (1990). II Title 28 U. S. C. § 1920 provides: “A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: “(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; “(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the ease; “(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; “(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; “(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; “(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.” Title 28 U. S. C. § 1821(b) limits the witness fees authorized by § 1920(3) as follows: “A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30 per day for each day’s attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance. . . .” In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437 (1987), we held that these provisions define the full extent of a federal court’s power to shift litigation costs absent express statutory authority to go further. “[W]hen,” we said, “a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limits of § 1821(b), absent contract or explicit statutory authority to the contrary.” Id., at 439. “We will not lightly infer that Congress has repealed §§ 1920 and 1821, either through [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 54(d) or any other provision not referring explicitly to witness fees.” Id., at 445. As to the testimonial services of the hospital’s experts, therefore, Crawford Fitting plainly requires, as a prerequisite to reimbursement, the identification of “explicit statutory authority.” WVUH argues, however, that some of the expert fees it incurred in this case were unrelated to expert testimony, and that as to those fees the § 1821(b) limits, which apply only to witnesses in attendance at trial, are of no consequence. We agree with that, but there remains applicable the limitation of § 1920. Crawford Fitting said that we would not lightly find an implied repeal of § 1821 or of § 1920, which it held to be an express limitation upon the types of costs which, absent other authority, may be shifted by federal courts. 482 U. S., at 441. None of the categories of expenses listed in § 1920 can reasonably be read to include fees for services rendered by an expert employed by a party in a nontestimonial advisory capacity. The question before us, then, is — with regard to both testimonial and nontestimo-nial expert fees — whether the term “attorney’s fee” in § 1988 provides the “explicit statutory authority” required by Crawford Fitting. HH HH HH The record of statutory usage demonstrates convincingly that attorney’s fees and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of litigation cost. While some fee-shifting provisions, like §1988, refer only to “attorney’s fees,” see, e. g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k), many others explicitly shift expert witness fees as well as attorney’s fees. In 1976, just over a week prior to the enactment of § 1988, Congress passed those provisions of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2), which provide that a prevailing party may recover “the costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses.” (Emphasis added.) Also in 1976, Congress amended the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 2060(c), 2072(a), 2073, which as originally enacted in 1972 shifted to the losing party “cost[s] of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee,” see 86 Stat. 1226. In the 1976 amendment, Congress altered the fee-shifting provisions to their present form by adding a phrase shifting expert witness fees in addition to attorney’s fees. See Pub. L. 94-284, § 10, 90 Stat. 506, 507. Two other significant Acts passed in 1976 contain similar phrasing: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 6972(e) (“costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)”), and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1686(e) (“costs of suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expert witnesses fees”). Congress enacted similarly phrased fee-shifting provisions in numerous statutes both before 1976, see, e. g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(4) (“costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)”), and afterwards, see, e. g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U. S. C. § 2632(a)(1) (“reasonable attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and other reasonable costs incurred in preparation and advocacy of [the litigant’s] position”). These statutes encompass diverse categories of legislation, including tax, administrative procedure, environmental protection, consumer protection, admiralty and navigation, utilities regulation, and, significantly, civil rights: The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), the counterpart to § 1988 for violation of federal rights by federal employees, states that “‘fees and other expenses’ [as shifted by § 2412(d)(1)(A)] includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses . . . and reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). At least 34 statutes in 10 different titles of the United States Code explicitly shift attorney’s fees and expert witness fees. The laws that refer to fees for nontestimonial expert services are less common, but they establish a similar usage both before and after 1976: Such fees are referred to in addition to attorney’s fees when a shift is intended. A provision of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(e), directs the court to reimburse appointed counsel for expert fees necessary to the defense of indigent criminal defendants — even though the immediately preceding provision, § 3006A(d), already directs that appointed defense counsel be paid a designated hourly rate plus “expenses reasonably incurred.” WVUH’s position must be that expert fees billed to a client through an attorney are “attorney’s fees” because they are to be treated as part of the expenses of the attorney; but if this were normal usage, they would have been reimbursable under the Criminal Justice Act as “expenses reasonably incurred” — and subsection 3006A(e) would add nothing to the recoverable amount. The very heading of that subsection, “Services other than counsel” (emphasis added), acknowledges a distinction between services provided by the attorney himself and those provided to the attorney (or the client) by a nonlegal expert. To the same effect is the 1980 EAJA, which provides: “‘fees and other expenses’ [as shifted by §2412(d)(1)(A)] includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party’s case, and reasonable attorney fees.” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). If the reasonable cost of a “study” or “analysis” — which is but another way of describing nontestimonial expert services — is by common usage already included in the “attorney fees,” again a significant and highly detailed part of the statute becomes redundant. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (added 1980), and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 26 U. S. C. § 7430(c)(1), contain similar language. Also reflecting the same usage are two railroad regulation statutes, the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U. S. C. §§ 726(f)(9) (“costs and expenses (including reasonable fees of accountants, experts, and attorneys) actually incurred”), and 741(i) (“costs and expenses (including fees of accountants, experts, and attorneys), actually and reasonably incurred”), and the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 U. S. C. § 854(g) (“costs and expenses (including fees of accountants, experts, and attorneys) actually and reasonably incurred”). We think this statutory usage shows beyond question that attorney’s fees and expert fees are distinct items of expense. If, as WVUH argues, the one includes the other, dozens of statutes referring to the two separately become an inexplicable exercise in redundancy. > I — I WVUH argues that at least in pre-1976 judicial usage the phrase “attorney’s fees” included the fees of experts. To support this proposition, it relies upon two historical assertions: first, that pre-1976 courts, when exercising traditional equitable discretion in shifting attorney’s fees, taxed as an element of such fees the expenses related to expert services; and second, that pre-1976 courts shifting attorney’s fees pursuant to statutes identical in phrasing to § 1988 allowed the recovery of expert fees. We disagree with these assertions. The judicial background against which Congress enacted § 1988 mirrored the statutory background: Expert fees were regarded not as a subset of attorney’s fees, but as a distinct category of litigation expense. Certainly it is true that prior to 1976 some federal courts shifted expert fees to losing parties pursuant to various equitable doctrines — sometimes in conjunction with attorney’s fees. But they did not shift them as an element of attorney’s fees. Typical of the courts’ mode of analysis (though not necessarily of their results) is Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F. 2d 1036, 1065-1056 (CA7 1974), a case brought under the federal securities laws. Plaintiff won and was awarded various expenses: “Included in the . . . costs awarded by the [district] court were the sum of $1,700 for plaintiff’s expert witness, expenses of an accountant in the amount of $142, and of an illustrator-diagrammer for $50 . . . and attorneys’ fees of $15,660.” The court treated these items separately: The services of the accountant and illustrator (who did not testify at trial) were “costs” which could be fully shifted in the discretion of the District Court; the expert witness fees also could be shifted, but only as limited by § 1821; the attorney’s fees were not costs and could not be shifted at all because the case did not fit any of the traditional equitable doctrines for awarding such fees. Id., at 1056. See also In re Electric Power & Light Corp., 210 F. 2d 585, 587, 591 (CA2 1954) (“[Appellant] applied for an allowance for counsel fees of $35,975 and expenses . . . , and also for a fee of $2,734.28 for an expert accountant”; court permitted part of the attorney’s fee but disallowed the expert witness fee), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. SEC v. Drexel & Co., 348 U. S. 341 (1955); Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F. 2d 1163, 1170-1171 (CA7 1968) (itemizing attorney’s fee and expert witness fee separately, allowing part of the former and all of the latter permitted by § 1821); Burgess v. Williamson, 506 F. 2d 870, 877-880 (CA5 1975) (applying Alabama law to shift attorney’s fee but not expert witness fee); Henning v. Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District, 387 F. 2d 264, 267-268 (CA5 1968), on appeal after remand, 409 F. 2d 932, 937 (CA5 1969) (applying Louisiana law to shift expert fees but not attorney’s fee); Coughenour v. Campbell Barge Line, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 501, 506 (WD Pa. 1974) (“Plaintiffs’ claim for counsel fees is denied [because defendant acted in good faith and thus equitable shifting is unavailable]. Plaintiff’s claim for costs of medical expert witnesses is deemed proper insofar as they were necessary in establishing the claim . . .”) (citations omitted). Even where the courts’ holdings treated attorney’s fees and expert fees the same (i. e., granted both or denied both), their analysis discussed them as separate categories of expense. See, e. g., Wolf v. Frank, 477 F. 2d 467, 480 (CA5 1973) (“The reimbursing of plaintiffs’ costs for attorney’s fees and expert witness fees is supported ... by well established equitable principles”) (emphasis added); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 441 F. 2d 631, 636-637 (CA5 1971) (“[Appellant] argues that the district court erred in awarding costs, including attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees to Humble”); Bebchick v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 216, 233, 318 F. 2d 187, 204 (1963) (“It is also our view that reasonable attorneys’ fees for appellants, . . . reasonable expert witness fees, and appropriate litigation expenses, should be paid by [appellee]”); Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782, 798-801 (ND Tex. 1975) (in separate analyses, finding both attorney’s fees and expert witness fees barred). We have found no support for the proposition that, at common law, courts shifted expert fees as an element of attorney’s fees. Of arguably greater significance than the courts’ treatment of attorney’s fees versus expert fees at common law is their treatment of those expenses under statutes containing fee-shifting provisions similar to § 1988. WVUH contends that in some cases courts shifted expert fees as well as the statutorily authorized attorney’s fees — and thus must have thought that the latter included the former. We find, however, that the practice, at least in the overwhelming majority of cases, was otherwise. Prior to 1976, the leading fee-shifting statute was the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 15 (shifting “the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”). As of 1976, four Circuits (six Circuits, if one includes summary affirmances of district court judgments) had held that this provision did not permit a shift of expert witness fees. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F. 2d 561, 586-587 (CA10 1961) (accountant’s fees); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F. 2d 190, 223-224 (CA9 1964) (accounting fees); Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143, 164 (Md. 1968) (accountant’s fees), aff’d, 415 F. 2d 55 (CA4 1969); Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 924, 930 (Me.) (expert witness fees), aff’d, 421 F. 2d 61 (CA1 1969); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F. 2d 51, 81 (CA2 1971) (expert fees), rev’d on other grounds, 409 U. S. 363 (1973); Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F. 2d 1143, 1149 (CA6 1975) (expert witness fees); see also Brookside Theater Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 11 F. R. D. 259, 267 (WD Mo. 1951) (expert witness fees). No court had held otherwise. Also instructive is pre-1976 practice under the federal patent laws, which provided, 35 U. S. C. §285, that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” Again, every court to consider the matter as of 1976 thought that this provision conveyed no authority to shift expert fees. Specialty Equipment & Machinery Corp. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 193 F. 2d 515, 521 (CA4 1952) (“Congress having dealt with the subject of costs in patent cases and having authorized the taxation of reasonable attorneys fees without making any provision with respect to . . . fees of expert witnesses must presumably have intended that they be not taxed”); accord, Chromalloy American Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co., 353 F. Supp. 429, 431, n. 1, 433 (Del. 1973); ESCO Corp. v. Tru-Rol Co., 178 USPQ 332, 333 (Md. 1973); Scaramucci v. Universal Mfg. Co., 234 F. Supp. 290, 291-292 (WD La. 1964); Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 24 F. R. D. 305, 313 (Del. 1959). WVUH contends that its position is supported by Tasby v. Estes, 416 F. Supp. 644, 648 (ND Tex. 1976), and Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 FEP Cases 244, 246 (CD Cal. 1974). Even if these cases constituted solid support for the proposition advanced by the hospital, they would hardly be sufficient to overcome the weight of authority cited above. But, in any case, we find neither opinion to be a clear example of contrary usage. Without entering into a detailed discussion, it suffices to say, as to Davis (where the expert fee award was in any event uncontested), that the opinion does not cite the statute, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5, as the basis for its belief that the expert fee could be shifted, and considers expert fees in a section separate from that dealing with attorney’s fees. Given what was then the state of the law in the Ninth Circuit, and the District Court’s citation, 8 FEP Cases, at 246, of at least one case that is avowedly an equitable discretion case, see NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (MD Ala. 1972), it is likely that the District Court thought the shifting of the fee was authorized under its general equitable powers, or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). As for Tasby, that case unquestionably authorized a shift of expert witness fees pursuant to an attorney’s-fee-shifting statute, 20 U. S. C. § 1617 (1976 ed.). The basis of that decision, however, was not the court’s own understanding of the statutory term “attorney’s fees,” but rather its belief (quite erroneous) that our earlier opinion in Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U. S. 696 (1974), had adopted that interpretation. Thus, WVUH has cited not a single case, and we have found none, in which it is clear (or in our view even likely) that a court understood the statutory term “attorney’s fees” to include expert fees. In sum, we conclude that at the time this provision was enacted neither statutory nor judicial usage regarded the phrase “attorney’s fees” as embracing fees for experts’ services. V WVUH suggests that a distinctive meaning of “attorney’s fees” should be adopted with respect to § 1988 because this statute was meant to overrule our decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 (1975). As mentioned above, prior to 1975 many courts awarded expert fees and attorney’s fees in certain circumstances pursuant to their equitable discretion. In Alyeska, we held that this discretion did not extend beyond a few exceptional circumstances long recognized by common law. Specifically, we rejected the so-called “private attorney general” doctrine recently created by some lower federal courts, see, e. g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F. R. D. 94, 98-102 (ND Cal. 1972), which allowed equitable fee shifting to plaintiffs in certain types of civil rights litigation. 421 U. S., at 269. WVUH argues that § 1988 was intended to restore the prq-Alyeska regime — and that, since expert fees were shifted then, they should be shifted now. Both chronology and the remarks of sponsors of the bill that became § 1988 suggest that at least some members of Congress viewed it as a response to Alyeska. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 94-1011, pp. 4, 6 (1976). It is a considerable step, however, from this proposition to the conclusion the hospital would have us draw, namely, that § 1988 should be read as a reversal of Alyeska in all respects. By its plain language and as unanimously construed in the courts, § 1988 is both broader and narrower than the pre-Alyeska regime. Before Alyeska, civil rights plaintiffs could recover fees pursuant to the private attorney general doctrine only if private enforcement was necessary to defend important rights benefiting large numbers of people, and cost barriers might otherwise preclude private suits. La Raza Unida, supra, at 98-101. Section 1988 contains no similar limitation — so that in the present suit there is no question as to the propriety of shifting WVUH’s attorney’s fees, even though it is highly doubtful they could have been awarded under pr e-Alyeska equitable theories. In other respects, however, § 1988 is not as broad as the former regime. It is limited, for example, to violations of specified civil rights statutes — which means that it would not have reversed the outcome of Alyeska itself, which involved not a civil rights statute but the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. § 4821 et seq. Since it is clear that, in many respects, § 1988 was not meant to return us precisely to the pre-Alyeska regime, the objective of achieving such a return is no reason to depart from the normal import of the text. WVUH further argues that the congressional purpose in enacting § 1988 must prevail over the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms. It quotes, for example, the House Committee Report to the effect that “the judicial remedy [must be] full and complete,” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976), and the Senate Committee Report to the effect that “[c]itizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate [civil] rights in court,” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, supra, at 2. As we have observed before, however, the purpose of a statute includes not only what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave alone. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 525-526 (1987). The best evidence of that purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President. Where that contains a phrase that is unambiguous — that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial practice — we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms’”), quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917). Congress could easily have shifted “attorney’s fees and expert witness fees,” or “reasonable litigation expenses,” as it did in contemporaneous statutes; it chose instead to enact more restrictive language, and we áre bound by that restriction. WVUH asserts that we have previously been guided by the “broad remedial purposes” of § 1988, rather than its text, in a context resolving an “analogous issue”: In Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U. S. 274, 285 (1989), we concluded that § 1988 permitted separately billed paralegal and law clerk time to be charged to the losing party. The trouble with this argument is that Jenkins did not involve an “analogous issue,” insofar as the relevant considerations are concerned. The issue there was not, as WVUH contends, whether we would permit our perception of the “policy” of the statute to overcome its “plain language.” It was not remotely plain in Jenkins that the phrase “attorney’s fee” did not include charges for law clerk and paralegal services. Such services, like the services of “secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product,” id., at 285, had traditionally been included in calculation of the lawyers’ hourly rates. Only recently had there arisen “the ‘increasingly widespread custom of separately billing for [such] services,”’ id., at 286 (quoting from Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F. 2d 546, 558 (CA10 1983)). By contrast, there has never been, to our knowledge, a practice of including the cost of expert services within attorneys’ hourly rates. There was also no record in Jenkins — as there is a lengthy record here — of statutory usage that recognizes a distinction between the charges at issue and attorney’s fees. We do not know of a single statute that shifts clerk or paralegal fees separately; and even those, such as the EAJA, which comprehensively define the assessable “litigation costs” make no separate mention of clerks or paralegals. In other words, Jenkins involved a respect in which the term “attorney’s fees” (giving the losing argument the benefit of the doubt) was genuinely ambiguous; and we resolved that ambiguity not by invoking some policy that supersedes the text of the statute, but by concluding that charges of this sort had traditionally been included in attorney’s fees and that separate billing should make no difference. The term’s application to expert fees is not ambiguous; and if it were the means of analysis employed in Jenkins would lead to the conclusion that since such fees have not traditionally been included within the attorney’s hourly rate they are not attorney’s fees. WVUH’s last contention is that, even if Congress plainly did not include expert fees in the fee-shifting provisions of § 1988, it would have done so had it thought about it. Most of the pre-§ 1988 statutes that explicitly shifted expert fees dealt with environmental litigation, where the necessity of expert advice was readily apparent; and when Congress later enacted the EAJA, the federal counterpart of § 1988, it explicitly included expert fees. Thus, the argument runs, the 94th Congress simply forgot; it is our duty to ask how they would have decided had they actually considered the question. See Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F. 2d 511, 514 (CA7 1989) (awarding expert fees under §1988 because a court should “complete . . . the statute by reading it to bring about the end that the legislators would have specified had they thought about it more clearly”). This argument profoundly mistakes our role. Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law. See 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5201 (3d F. Horack ed. 1943). We do so not because that precise accommodative meaning is what the lawmakers must have had in mind (how could an earlier Congress know what a later Congress would enact?), but because it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris. But where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents such accommodation, it is not our function to eliminate clearly expressed inconsistency of policy and to treat alike subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently. The facile attribution of congressional “forgetfulness” cannot justify such a usurpation. Where what is at issue is not a contradictory disposition within the same enactment, but merely a difference between the more parsimonious policy of an earlier enactment and the more generous policy of a later one, there is no more basis for saying that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the earlier Congress felt differently. In such circumstances, the attribution of forgetfulness rests in reality upon the judge’s assessment that the later statute contains the better disposition. But that is not for judges to prescribe. We thus reject this last argument for the same reason that Justice Bran-déis, writing for the Court, once rejected a similar (though less explicit) argument by the United States: “[The statute’s] language is plain and unambiguous. What the Government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the judicial function.” Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 250-251 (1926). * * * For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 1988 conveys no authority to shift expert fees. When experts appear at trial, they are of course eligible for the fee provided by § 1920 and §1821 — which was allowed in the present case by the Court of Appeals. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 provides in relevant part: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 ... , or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Section 1821(b) has since been amended to increase the allowable per diem from $30 to $40. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 314. Justice Stevens suggests that the expert fees requested here might be part of the “costs” allowed by § 1988 even if they are not part of the “attorney’s fee.” We are aware of no authority to support the counter-intuitive assertion that “[t]he term ‘costs’ has a different and broader meaning in fee-shifting statutes than it has in the cost statutes that apply to ordinary litigation,” post, at 104. In Crmvford Fitting we held that the word “costs” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) is to be read in harmony with the word “costs” in 28 U. S. C. § 1920, see 482 U. S., at 441, 445, and we think the same is true of the word “costs” in § 1988. We likewise see nothing to support Justice Stevens’ speculation that the court below or the parties viewed certain disbursements by the hospital’s attorneys as “costs” within the meaning of the statute. Rather, it is likely that these disbursements (billed directly to the client) were thought subsumed within the phrase “attorney's fee.” See, e. g., Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis Schools, 611 F. 2d 624, 639 (CA6 1979) (“reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incui-red by the attorney” included in § 1988 “attorney’s fee” award). In addition to the provisions discussed in the text, see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (added 1980) (“reasonable expenses of expert witnesses . . . and reasonable attorney or agent fees”); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 57a(h)(l) (added 1975) (“reasonable attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees and other costs of participating in a rulemaking proceeding”); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 2805(d)(1)(C), 2805(d)(3) (“reasonable attorney and expert witness fees”); National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, 16 U. S. C. § 470w-4 (“attorneys’ fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of participating in such action”); Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 825q-1(b)(2) (added 1978) (“reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees and other costs of intervening or participating in any proceeding [before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]”); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 26 U. S. C. § 7430(c)(1) (“reasonable expenses of expert witnesses . . . and reasonable fees paid ... for the services of attorneys”); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1270(d) (“costs of litigation (including attorney and expert witness fees)”); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1427(c) (enacted 1980) (“costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees”); Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 30 U. S. C. § 1734(a)(4) (“costs of litigation including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees”); Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U. S. C. § 928(d) (“In cases where an attorney’s fee is awarded . . . there may be further assessed . . . as costs, fees and mileage for necessary witnesses”); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and 1987 amendment, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1365(d), 1369(b)(3) (“costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)”); Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U. S. C. § 2706(g) (1988 ed., Supp. II) (same); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U. S. C. § 1415(g)(4) (same); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U. S. C. § 1515(d) (same); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U. S. C. § 1910(d) (enacted 1980) (same); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. § 300j-8(d) (enacted 1974) (same); National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U. S. C. §300aa-31(c) (same); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U. S. C. § 4911(d) (same); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. § 5851(e)(2) (same); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6305(d) (enacted 1975) (same); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U. S. C. §§ 7413b, 7604(d), 7607(f) (same), and of 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 7622(b)(2)(B) (“all costs and expenses (including attorneys’ and expert witness fees) reasonably incurred”); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U. S. C. § 8435(d) (“costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)”); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 42 U. S. C. § 9124(d) (same); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U. S. C. § 9659(f) (added 1986) (same); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U. S. C. § 11046(f) (same); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U. S. C. § 1349(a)(5) (“costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees”); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, 49 U. S. C. App. § 2014(e) (“costs of suit, including reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expert witnesses fees”). WVUH cites a House Conference Committee Report from a statute passed in 1986, stating: “The conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the . . . case.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, p. 5 (1986) (discussing the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(4)(B)). In our view this undercuts rather than supports WVUH’s position: The specification would have been quite unnecessary if the ordinary meaning of the term included those elements. The statement is an apparent effort to depart from ordinary meaning and to define a term of art. The hospital also cites Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F. 2d 598 (CA5 1974), and Norris v. Green, 317 F. Supp. 100, 102 (ND Ala. 1965). But in Fairley the court, remanding for reconsideration of the fee award, was explicitly equivocal as to whether “court costs” other than the ones normally assessable under § 1920 were awardable under the statute in question (the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whose fee-shifting provision parallels § 1988), or rather “should have to meet the harder discretionary standards” applicable to the award of fees pursuant to equitable discretion. 493 F. 2d, at 606, n. 11. In any event, Fairley did not consider expert witnesses explicitly, and there is no indication that the court necessarily included expert fees within its (undefined) category of “court costs." As for Norris, that case awarded fees pursuant to 29 U. S. C. § 501(b), which is not parallel to § 1988, since it authorizes the shifting of “fees of counsel. . . and . . . expenses necessarily paid or incurred. ” (Emphasis added.) There is no indication in the opinion that the court thought the expert fees were part of the former rather than-the latter — and the court discussed them separately from attorney’s fees. WVUH at least asks us to guess the preferences of the enacting Congress. Justice Stevens apparently believes our role is to guess the desires of the present Congress, or of Congresses yet to be. “Only time will tell,” he says, “whether the Court, with its literal reading of § 1988, has correctly interpreted the will of Congress,” post, at 116. The implication is that today’s holding will be proved wrong if Congress amends the law to conform with his dissent. We think not. The “will of Congress” we look to is not a will evolving from Session to Session, but a will expressed and fixed in a particular enactment. Otherwise, we would speak not of “interpreting” the law but of “intuiting” or “predicting” it. Our role is to say what the law, as hitherto enacted, is; not to forecast what the law, as amended, ivill be.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ZUNI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al. No. 05-1508. Argued January 10, 2007 Decided April 17, 2007 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Auto, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 104. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Auto, J., joined, post, p. 107. Scaua, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined, and in which Souter, J., joined as to Part I, post, p. 108. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 123. Ronald J. VanAmberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were C. Bryant Rogers and George W. Kozeliski. Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Peter R. Maier, Kent D. Talbert, and Stephen H. Freid. Leigh M. Manasevit, Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause for the state respondent. With him on the brief was Willie R. Brown Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of Alaska by Craig J. Tillery, Acting Attorney General, and Kathleen Strasbaugh, Assistant Attorney General; and for New Mexico Public School Districts by Thomas C Bird. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. A federal statute sets forth a method that the Secretary of Education is to use when determining whether a State’s public school funding program “equalizes expenditures” throughout the State. The statute instructs the Secretary to calculate the disparity in per-pupil expenditures among local school districts in the State. But, when doing so, the Secretary is to “disregard” school districts “with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the. 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures. ..in the State.” 20 U. S. C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). The question before us is whether the emphasized statutory language permits the Secretary to identify the school districts that should be “disregardfed]” by looking to the number of the district’s pupils as well as to the size of the district’s expenditures per pupil. We conclude that it does. I A The federal Impact Aid Act, 108 Stat. 3749, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 7701 et seq., provides financial assistance to local school districts whose ability to finance public school education is adversely affected by a federal presence. Federal aid is available to districts, for example, where a significant amount of federal land is exempt from local property taxes, or where the federal presence is responsible for an increase in school-age children (say, of armed forces personnel) whom local schools must educate. See § 7701 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). The statute typically prohibits a State from offsetting this federal aid by reducing its own state aid to the local district. If applied without exceptions, however, this prohibition might unreasonably interfere with a state program that seeks to equalize per-pupil expenditures throughout the State, for instance, by preventing the state program from taking account of a significant source of federal funding that some local school districts receive. The statute consequently contains an exception that permits a State to compensate for federal impact aid where “the Secretary [of Education] determine^] and certifies . . . that the State has in effect a program of State aid that equalizes expenditures for free public education among local [school districts] in the State.” § 7709(b)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). The statute sets out a formula that the Secretary of Education must use to determine whether a state aid program satisfies the federal “equalization]” requirement. The formula instructs the Secretary to compare the local school district with the greatest per-pupil expenditures to the school district with the smallest per-pupil expenditures to see whether the former exceeds the latter by more than 25 percent. So long as it does not, the state aid program qualifies as a program that “equalizes expenditures.” More specifically the statute provides that “a program of state aid” qualifies, i. e., it “equalizes expenditures” among local school districts if, “in the second fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which the determination is made, the amount of per-pupil expenditures made by [the local school district] with the highest such per-pupil expenditures . . . did not exceed the amount of such per-pupil expenditures made by [the local school district] with the lowest such expenditures ... by more than 25 percent.” § 7709(b)(2)(A) (2000 ed.). The statutory provision goes on to set forth what we shall call the “disregard” instruction. It states that, when “making” this “determination,” the “Secretary shall... disregard [school districts] with per-pupil expenditures ... above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures.” § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). It adds that the Secretary shall further “take into account the extent to which [the state program reflects the special additional costs that some school districts must bear when they are] geographically isolated [or when they provide education for] particular types of students, such as children with disabilities.” § 7709(b)(2)(B)(ii). B This case requires us to decide whether the Secretary’s present calculation method is consistent with the federal statute’s “disregard” instruction. The method at issue is contained in a set of regulations that the Secretary first promulgated 30 years ago. Those regulations essentially state the following: When determining whether a state aid program “equalizes expenditures” (thereby permitting the State to reduce its own local funding on account of federal impact aid), the Secretary will first create a list of school districts ranked in order of per-pupil expenditure. The Secretary will then identify the relevant percentile cutoff point on that list on the basis of a specific (95th or 5th) percentile of student population — essentially identifying those districts whose students account for the 5 percent of the State’s total student population that lies at both the high and low ends of the spending distribution. Finally the Secretary will compare the highest spending and lowest spending school districts of those that remain to see whether they satisfy the statute’s requirement that the disparity between them not exceed 25 percent. The regulations set forth this calculation method as follows: “ [D]eterminations of disparity in current expenditures ... per-pupil are made by— “(i) Ranking all [of the State’s school districts] on the basis of current expenditures .. . per pupil [in the relevant statutorily determined year]; “(ii) Identifying those [school districts] that fall at the 95th and 5th percentiles of the total number of pupils in attendance [at all the State’s school districts taken together]; and “(iii) Subtracting the lower current expenditure . . . per pupil figure from the higher for those [school districts] identified in paragraph (ii) and dividing the difference by the lower figure.” 34 CFR pt. 222, subpt. K, App., ¶ 1 (2006). The regulations also provide an illustration of how to perform the calculation: “In State X, after ranking all [school districts] in order of the expenditures per pupil for the [statutorily determined] fiscal year in question, it is ascertained by counting the number of pupils in attendance in those [school districts] in ascending order of expenditure that the 5th percentile of student population is reached at [school district A] with a per pupil expenditure of $820, and that the 95th percentile of student population is reached at [school district B] with a per pupil expenditure of $1,000. The percentage disparity between the 95th percentile and the 5th percentile [school districts] is 22 percent ($1000 - $820 = $180/$820).” Ibid. Because 22 percent is less than the statutory “25 percent” requirement, the state program in the example qualifies as a program that “equalizes expenditures.” c This case concerns the Department of Education’s application of the Secretary’s regulations to New Mexico’s local district aid program in respect to fiscal year 2000. As the regulations require, Department officials listed each of New Mexico’s 89 local school districts in order of per-pupil spending for fiscal year 1998. (The calculation in New Mexico’s case was performed, as the statute allows, on the basis of per-pupil revenues, rather than per-pupil expenditures. See 20 U. S. C. § 7709(b)(2)(A). See also Appendix B, infra. For ease of reference we nevertheless refer, in respect to New Mexico’s figures and throughout the opinion, only to “per-pupil expenditures.”) After ranking the districts, Department officials excluded 17 school districts at the top of the list because those districts contained (cumulatively) less than 5 percent of the student population; for the same reason, they excluded an additional 6 school districts at the bottom of the list. The remaining 66 districts accounted for approximately 90 percent of the State’s student population. Of those, the highest ranked district spent $3,259 per student; the lowest ranked district spent $2,848 per student. The difference, $411, was less than 25 percent of the lowest per-pupil figure, namely, $2,848. Hence, the officials found that New Mexico’s local aid program qualifies as a program that “equalizes expenditures.” New Mexico was therefore free to offset federal impact aid to individual districts by reducing state aid to those districts. Two of New Mexico’s public school districts, Zuni Public School District and Gallup-McKinley County Public School District (whom we shall collectively call Zuni), sought further agency review of these findings. Zuni conceded that the Department’s calculations were correct in terms of the Department’s own regulations. Zuni argued, however, that the regulations themselves are inconsistent with the authorizing statute. That statute, in its view, requires the Department to calculate the 95th and 5th percentile cutoffs solely on the basis of the number of school districts (ranked by their per-pupil expenditures), without any consideration of the number of pupils in those districts. If calculated as Zuni urges, only 10 districts (accounting for less than 2 percent of all students) would have been identified as the outliers that the statute instructs the Secretary to disregard. The difference, as a result, between the highest and lowest per-pupil expenditures of the remaining districts (26.9 percent) would exceed 25 percent. Consequently, the statute would forbid New Mexico to take account of federal impaet aid as it decides how to equalize school funding across the State. See N. M. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-1 et seq. (2006). A Department of Education Administrative Law Judge rejected Zuni’s challenge to the regulations. The Secretary of Education did the same. Zuni sought review of the Secretary’s decision in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 393 F. 3d 1158 (2004). Initially, a Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the Secretary’s determination by a split vote (2 to 1). Subsequently, the full Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s decision and heard the matter en banc. The 12-member en banc court affirmed the Secretary but by an evenly divided court (6 to 6). 437 F. 3d 1289 (2006) (per curiam). Zuni sought certiorari. We agreed to decide the matter. II A Zuni’s strongest argument rests upon the literal language of the statute. Zuni concedes, as it must, that if the language of the statute is open or ambiguous — that is, if Congress left a “gap” for the agency to fill — then we must uphold the Secretary’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable. See Chevron U. S. A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). See also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 589, n. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). For purposes of exposition, we depart from a normal order of discussion, namely, an order that first considers Zuni’s statutory language argument. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002). Instead, because of the technical nature of the language in question, we shall first examine the provision’s background and basic purposes. That discussion will illuminate our subsequent analysis in Part II-B, infra. It will also reveal why Zuni concentrates its argument upon language alone. Considerations other than language provide us with unusually strong indications that Congress intended to leave the Secretary free to use the calculation method before us and that the Secretary’s chosen method is a reasonable one. For one thing, the matter at issue — i. e., the calculation method for determining whether a state aid program “equalizes expenditures” — is the kind of highly technical, specialized interstitial matter that Congress often does not decide itself, but delegates to specialized agencies to decide. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 234 (2001); cf. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994); Christensen, supra, at 589, n. (opinion of Scalia, J.). For another thing, the history of the statute strongly supports the Secretary. Congress first enacted an impact aid “equalization” exception in 1974. The exception originally provided that the “ter[m]... ‘equalizing] expenditures’ . . . shall be defined by the [Secretary].” 20 U. S. C. § 240(d)(2)(B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Soon thereafter, in 1976, the Secretary promulgated the regulation here at issue defining the term “equalizing expenditures” in the manner now before us. See Part I-B, supra. As far as we can tell, no Member of Congress has ever criticized the method the 1976 regulation sets forth nor suggested at any time that it be revised or reconsidered. The present statutory language originated in draft legislation that the Secretary himself sent to Congress in 1994. With one minor change (irrelevant to the present calculation controversy), Congress adopted that language without comment or clarification. No one at the time — no Member of Congress, no Department of Education official, no school district or State — expressed the view that this statutory language (which, after all, was supplied by the Secretary) was intended to require, or did require, the Secretary to change the Department’s system of calculation, a system that the Department and school districts across the Nation had followed for nearly 20 years, without (as far as we are told) any adverse effect. Finally, viewed in terms of the purpose of the statute’s disregard instruction, the Secretary’s calculation method is reasonable, while the reasonableness of a method based upon the number of districts alone (Zuni’s proposed method) is more doubtful. When the Secretary (then Commissioner) of Education considered the matter in 1976, he explained why that is so. Initially the Secretary pointed out that the “exclusion of the upper and bottom 5 percentile school districts is based upon the accepted principle of statistical evaluation that such percentiles usually represent unique or noneharacteristic situations.” 41 Fed. Reg. 26320 (1976) (emphasis added). That purpose, a purpose to exclude statistical outliers, is evident in the language of the present statute. The provision uses the technical term “percentile”; it refers to cutoff numbers (“95th” and “5th”) often associated with scientific calculations; and it directly precedes another statutory provision that tells the Secretary to account for those districts, from among the middle 5th to 95th percentile districts, that remain “noncharacteristic” in respect to geography or the presence of special students (such as disabled students). See 20 U. S. C. §§7709(b)(2)(B)(iMii) (2000 ed.). The Secretary added that under the regulation’s calculation system the “percentiles” would be “determined on the basis of numbers of pupils and not on the basis of numbers of districts.” 41 Fed. Reg. 26324. He said that to base “an exclusion on numbers of districts” alone “would act to apply the disparity standard in an unfair and inconsistent manner among States.” Ibid. He then elaborated upon his concerns: “The purpose of the exclusion is to eliminate those anomalous characteristics of a distribution of expenditures. In States with a small number of large districts, an exclusion based on percentage of school districts might exclude from the measure of disparity a substantial percentage of the pupil population in those States. Conversely, in States with large numbers of small districts, such an approach might exclude only an insignificant fraction of the pupil population and would not exclude anomalous characteristics.” Ibid. To understand the Secretary’s first problem, consider an exaggerated example, say, a State with 80 school districts of unequal size. Suppose 8 of the districts include urban areas and together account for 70 percent of the State’s students, while the remaining 72 districts include primarily rural areas and together account for 30 percent of the State’s students. If the State’s greatest funding disparities are among the 8 urban districts, Zuni’s calculation method (which looks only at the number of districts and ignores their size) would require the Secretary to disregard the system’s 8 largest districts (i. e., 10 percent of the number 80) even though those 8 districts (because they together contain 70 percent of the State’s pupils) are typical of, indeed characterize, the State’s public school system. It would require the Secretary instead to measure the system’s expenditure equality by looking only to noncharacteristic districts that are not representative of the system as a whole, indeed districts accounting for only 30 percent of the State’s pupils. Thus, according to Zuni’s method, the Secretary would have to certify a state aid program as one that “equalizes expenditures” even if there were gross disparities in per-pupil expenditures among urban districts accounting for 70 percent of the State’s students. By way of contrast, the Secretary’s method, by taking into account a district’s size as well as its expenditures, would avoid a calculation that would produce results so contrary to the statute’s objective. To understand the Secretary’s second problem consider this very case. New Mexico’s 89 school districts vary significantly in respect to the number of pupils each contains. Zuni’s calculation system nonetheless forbids the Secretary to discount more than 10 districts — 10 percent of the total number of districts (rounded up). But these districts taken together account for only 1.8 percent of the State’s pupils. To eliminate only those districts, instead of eliminating districts that together account for 10 percent of the State’s pupils, risks resting the “disregard” calculation upon a few particularly extreme noncharacteristic districts, yet again contrary to the statute’s intent. Thus, the history and purpose of the disregard instruction indicate that the Secretary’s calculation formula is a reasonable method that carries out Congress’ likely intent in enacting the statutory provision before us. B But what of the provision’s literal language? The matter is important, for normally neither the legislative history nor the reasonableness of the Secretary’s method would be determinative if the plain language of the statute unambiguously indicated that Congress sought to foreclose the Secretary’s interpretation. And Zuni argues that the Secretary’s formula could not possibly effectuate Congress’ intent since the statute’s language literally forbids the Secretary to use such a method. Under this Court’s precedents, if the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguously expressed by the statutory language at issue, that would be the end of our analysis. See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842-843. A customs statute that imposes a tariff on “clothing” does not impose a tariff on automobiles, no matter how strong the policy arguments for treating the two kinds of goods alike. But we disagree with Zuni’s conclusion, for we believe that the Secretary’s method falls within the scope of the statute’s plain language. That language says that, when the Secretary compares (for a specified fiscal year) “the amount of per-pupil expenditures made by” (1) the highest-per-pupil-expenditure district and (2) the lowest-per-pupil-expenditure district, “the Secretary shall... disregard” local school districts “with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures in the State.” 20 U. S. C. §§ 7709(b)(2)(A), (B)(i). The word “such” refers to “per-pupil expenditures” (or more precisely to “per-pupil expenditures” in the test year specified by the statute). The question then is whether the phrase “above the 95th percentile ... of.. . [per pupil] expenditures” permits the Secretary to calculate percentiles by (1) ranking local districts, (2) noting the student population of each district, and (3) determining the cutoff point on the basis of districts containing 95 percent (or 5 percent) of the State’s students. Our answer is that this phrase, taken with absolute literalness, limits the Secretary to calculation methods that involve “per-pupil expenditures.” But it does not tell the Secretary which of several different possible methods the Department must use. Nor does it rule out the present formula, which distributes districts in accordance with per-pupil expenditures, while essentially weighting each district to reflect the number of pupils it contains. Because the statute uses technical language (e. g., “percentile”) and seeks a technical purpose (eliminating uncharacteristic, or outlier, districts), we have examined dictionary definitions of the term “percentile.” See 41 Fed. Reg. 26320 (Congress intended measurements based upon an “accepted principle of statistical evaluation” (emphasis added)). Those definitions make clear that “percentile” refers to a division of a distribution of some population into 100 parts. Thus, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1675 (1961) (Webster’s Third) defines “percentile” as “the value of the statistical variable that marks the boundary between any two consecutive intervals in a distribution of 100 intervals each containing one percent of the total population.” A standard economics dictionary gives a similar definition for “percentiles”: “The values separating hundredth parts of a distribution, arranged in order of size. The 99th percentile of the income distribution, for example, is the income level such that only one per cent of the population have larger incomes.” J. Black, A Dictionary of Economics 348-349 (2d ed. 2002). A dictionary of mathematics states: “The n-th percentile is the value Xniiw such that n per cent of the population is less than or equal to XnJioo” It adds that “[t]he terms can be modified, though not always very satisfactorily, to be applicable to a discrete random variable or to a large sample ranked in ascending order.” C. Clapham & J. Nicholson, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Mathematics 378-379 (3d ed. 2005) (emphasis deleted). The American Heritage Science Dictionary 468 (2005) explains that a percentile is “[a]ny of the 100 equal parts into which the range of the values of a set of data can be divided in order to show the distribution of those values.” And Merriam-Webster’s Medical Desk Dictionary 612 (2002) describes percentile as “a value on a scale of one hundred that indicates the percent of a distribution that is equal to or below it.” These definitions, mainstream and technical, all indicate that, in order to identify the relevant percentile cutoffs, the Secretary must construct a distribution of values. That distribution will consist of a “population” ranked according to a characteristic. That characteristic takes on a “value” for each member of the relevant population. The statute’s instruction to identify the 95th and 5th “percentile of such expenditures” makes clear that the relevant characteristic for ranking purposes is per-pupil expenditure during a particular year. But the statute does not specify precisely what population is to be “distributed” (i. e., ranked according to the population’s corresponding values for the relevant characteristic). Nor does it set forth various details as to how precisely the distribution is to be constructed (as long as it is ranked according to the specified characteristic). But why is Congress’ silence in respect to these matters significant? Are there several different populations, relevant here, that one might rank according to “per-pupil expenditures” (and thereby determine in several different ways a cutoff point such that “n percent of [that] population” falls, say, below the percentile cutoff)? We are not experts in statistics, but a statistician is not needed to see what the dictionary does not say. No dictionary definition we have found suggests that there is any single logical, mathematical, or statistical link between, on the one hand, the characterizing data (used for ranking purposes) and, on the other hand, the nature of the relevant population or how that population might be weighted for purposes of determining a percentile cutoff. Here, the Secretary has distributed districts, ranked them according to per-pupil expenditure, but compared only those that account for 90 percent of the State’s pupils. Thus, the Secretary has used — as her predecessors had done for a quarter century before her — the State’s students as the relevant population for calculating the specified percentiles. Another Secretary might have distributed districts, ranked them by per-pupil expenditure, and made no reference to the number of pupils (a method that satisfies the statute’s language but threatens the problems the Secretary long ago identified, see 41 Fed. Reg. 26324; supra, at 91-93). A third Secretary might have distributed districts, ranked them by per-pupil expenditure, but compared only those that account for 90 percent of total pupil expenditures in the State. A fourth Secretary might have distributed districts, ranked them by per-pupil expenditure, but calculated the 95th and 5th percentile cutoffs using the per-pupil expenditures of all the individual schools in the State. See 41 Fed. Reg. 26324 (considering this system of calculation). A fifth Secretary might have distributed districts, ranked them by per-pupil expenditure, but accounted in his disparity calculation for the sometimes significant differences in per-pupil spending at different grade levels. See 34 CFR § 222.162(b)(1) (2006) (authorizing such a system); id., pt. 222, subpt. K, App. See also Appendix B, infra. Each of these methods amounts to a different way of determining which districts fall between the 5th and 95th “percentile of per-pupil expenditures.” For purposes of that calculation, they each adopt different populations — students, districts, schools, and grade levels. Yet, linguistically speaking, one may attribute the characteristic of per-pupil expenditure to each member of any such population (though the values of that characteristic may be more or less readily available depending on the chosen population, see 41 Fed. Reg. 26324). Hence, the statute’s literal language covers any or all of these methods. That language alone does not tell us (or the Secretary of Education), however, which method to use. Justice Scalia’s claim that this interpretation “defies any semblance of normal English” depends upon its own definition of the word “per.” That word, according to the dissent, “connotes ... a single average figure assigned to a unit the composite members of which are individual pupils.” Post, at 113 (emphasis deleted). In fact, the word “per” simply means “[f]or each” or “for every.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1171 (8th ed. 1999); see Webster’s Third 1674. Thus, nothing in the English language prohibits the Secretary from considering expenditures for each individual pupil in a district when instructed to look at a district’s “per-pupil expenditures.” The remainder of the dissent’s argument, colorful language to the side, rests upon a reading of the statutory language that ignores its basic purpose and history. We find additional evidence for our understanding of the language in the fact that Congress, in other statutes, has clarified the matter here at issue thereby avoiding comparable ambiguity. For example, in a different education-related statute, Congress refers to “the school at the 20th percentile in the State, based on enrollment, among all schools ranked by the percentage of students at the proficient level.” 20 U.S.C. §6311(b)(2)(E)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). In another statute fixing charges for physicians services, Congress specified that the maximum charge “shall be the 50th percentile of the customary charges for the service (weighted by the frequency of the service) performed by nonparticipating physicians in the locality during the [prior] 12-month period.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(j)(l)(C)(v) (2000 ed.) (emphasis added). In these statutes Congress indicated with greater specificity how a percentile should be determined by stating precisely not only which data values are of interest, but also (in the first) the population that is to be distributed and (in the second) the weightings needed to make the calculation meaningful and to avoid counterproductive results. In the statute at issue here, however, Congress used more general language (drafted by the Secretary himself), which leaves the Secretary with the authority to resolve such subsidiary matters at the administrative level. We also find support for our view of the language in the more general circumstance that statutory “[a]mbiguity is a creature not [just] of definitional possibilities but [also] of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). See also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132-133 (2000) (“[mjeaning — or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context” (emphasis added)). That may be so even if statutory language is highly technical. After all, the scope of what seems a precise technical chess instruction, such as “you must place the queen next to the king,” varies with context, depending, for example, upon whether the instructor is telling a beginner how to set up the board or telling an advanced player how to checkmate an opponent. The dietionary acknowledges that, when interpreting technical statistical language, the purpose of the exercise matters, for it says that “quantile,” “percentile,” “quartile,” and “decile” are “terms [that] can be modified, though not always very satisfactorily, to be applicable to ... a large sample ranked in ascending order.” Oxford Dictionary of Mathematics, at 378-379. Thus, an instruction to “identify schools with average scholastic aptitude test scores below the 5th percentile of such scores” may vary as to the population to be distributed, depending upon whether the context is one of providing additional counseling and support to students at low-performing schools (in which ease the relevant population would likely consist of students), or one of identifying unsuccessful learning protocols at low-performing schools (in which case the appropriate population may well be the schools themselves). Context here tells us that the instruction to identify school districts with “per-pupil expenditures” above the 95th percentile “of such expenditures” is similarly ambiguous, because both students and school districts are of concern to the statute. Accordingly, the disregard instruction can include within its scope the distribution of a ranked population that consists of pupils (or of school districts weighted by pupils) and not just a ranked distribution of unweighted school districts alone. Finally, we draw reassurance from the fact that no group of statisticians, nor any individual statistician, has told us directly in briefs, or indirectly through citation, that the language before us cannot be read as we have read it. This circumstance is significant, for the statutory language is technical, and we are not statisticians. And the views of experts (or their absence) might help us understand (though not control our determination of) what Congress had in mind. The upshot is that the language of the statute is broad enough to permit the Secretary’s reading. That fact requires us to look beyond the language to determine whether the Secretary’s interpretation is a reasonable, hence permissible, implementation of the statute. See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842-843. For the reasons set forth in Part II-A, supra, we conclude that the Secretary’s reading is a reasonable reading. We consequently find the Secretary’s method of calculation lawful. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. APPENDIXES TO OPINION OF THE COURT A We set out the relevant statutory provisions and accompanying regulations in full. The reader will note that in the text of our opinion, for purposes of exposition, we use the term “local school districts” where the statute refers to “local educational agencies.” We also disregard the statute’s frequent references to local “revenues” because those references do not raise any additional considerations germane to this case. Impact Aid Program, 20 U. S. C. § 7709 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV) (state consideration of payments in providing state aid): “(a) General prohibition “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a State may not— “(1) consider payments under this subchapter in determining for any fiscal year— “(A) the eligibility of a local educational agency for State aid for free public education; or “(B) the amount of such aid; or “(2) make such aid available to local educational agencies in a manner that results in less State aid to any local educational agency that is eligible for such payment than such agency would receive if such agency were not so eligible. “(b) State equalization plans “(1) In general “A State may reduce State aid to a local educational agency that receives a payment under section 7702 or 7703(b) of this title (except the amount calculated in excess of 1.0 under section 7703(a)(2)(B) of this title and, with respect to a local educational agency that receives a payment under section 7703(b)(2) of this title, the amount in excess of the amount that the agency would receive if the agency were deemed to be an agency eligible to receive a payment under section 7703(b)(1) of this title and not section 7703(b)(2) of this title) for any fiscal year if the Secretary determines, and certifies under subsection (c)(3)(A) of this section, that the State has in effect a program of State aid that equalizes expenditures for free public education among local educational agencies in the State. “(2) Computation “(A) In general “For purposes of paragraph (1), a program of State aid equalizes expenditures among local educational agencies if, in the second fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which the determination is made, the amount of per-pupil expenditures made by, or per-pupil revenues available to, the local educational agency in the State with the highest such per-pupil expenditures or revenues did not exceed the amount of such per-pupil expenditures made by, or per-pupil revenues available to, the local educational agency in the State with the lowest such expenditures or revenues by more than 25 percent. “(B) Other factors “In making a determination under this subsection, the Secretary shall— “(i) disregard local educational agencies with per-pupil expenditures or revenues above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures or revenues in the State; and “(ii) take into account the extent to which a program of State aid reflects the additional cost of providing free public education in particular types of local educational agencies, such as those that are geographically isolated, or to particular types of students, such as children with disabilities.” B 34 CFR §222.162 (2006) (What disparity standard must a State meet in order to be certified, and how are disparities in current expenditures or revenues per pupil measured?): “(a) Percentage disparity limitation. The Secretary considers that a State aid program equalizes expenditures if the disparity in the amount of current expenditures or revenues per pupil for free public education among LEAs in the State is no more than 25 percent. In determining the disparity percentage, the Secretary disregards LEAs with per pupil expenditures or revenues above the 95th or below the 5th percentile of those expenditures or revenues in the State. The method for calculating the percentage of disparity in a State is in the appendix to this subpart. “(b)(1) Weighted average disparity for different grade level groups. If a State requests it, the Secretary will make separate disparity computations for different groups of LEAs in the State that have similar grade levels of instruction. “(2) In those cases, the weighted average disparity for all groups, based on the proportionate number of pupils in each group, may not be more than the percentage provided in paragraph (a) of this section. The method for calculating the weighted average disparity percentage is set out in the appendix to this subpart. “(c) Per pupil figure computations. In calculating the current expenditures or revenue disparities under this section, computations of per pupil figures are made on one of the following bases: “(1) The per pupil amount of current expenditures or revenue for an LEA is computed on the basis of the total number of pupils receiving free public education in the schools of the agency. The total number of pupils is determined in accordance with whatever standard measurement of pupil count is used in the State.” 34 CFR pt. 222, subpt. K, App. (2006) (Methods of Calculations for Treatment of Impact Aid Payments Under State Equalization Programs): “The following paragraphs describe the methods for making certain calculations in conjunction with determinations made under the regulations in this subpart. Except as otherwise provided in the regulations, these methods are the only methods that may be used in making these calculations. “1. jDeterminations of disparity standard compliance under §222.162(b)(1). “(a) The determinations of disparity in current expenditures or revenue per pupil are made by— “(i) Ranking all LEAs having similar grade levels within the State on the basis of current expenditures or revenue per pupil for the second preceding fiscal year before the year of determination; “(ii) Identifying those LEAs in each ranking that fall at the 95th and 5th percentiles of the total number of pupils in attendance in the schools of those LEAs; and “(iii) Subtracting the lower current expenditure or revenue per pupil figure from the higher for those agencies identified in paragraph (ii) and dividing the difference by the lower figure. “(b) In cases under § 222.162(b), where separate computations are made for different groups of LEAs, the disparity percentage for each group is obtained in the manner described in paragraph (a) above. Then the weighted average disparity percentage for the State as a whole is determined by— “(i) Multiplying the disparity percentage for each group by the total number of pupils receiving free public education in the schools in that group; “(ii) Summing the figures obtained in paragraph (b)(i); and “(iii) Dividing the sum obtained in paragraph (b)(ii) by the total number of pupils for all the groups. EXAMPLE Group 1 (grades 1-6), 80,000 pupils x 18% = 14,400 Group 2 (grades 7-12), 100,000 pupils x 22% = 22,000 Group 3 (grades 1-12), 20,000 pupilsX35% = 7,000 Total 200,000 pupils.................................................... 43,400 43,400/200,000=21.70% Disparity „

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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NORTHEAST BANCORP, INC., et al. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM et al. No. 84-363. Argued April 15, 1985 Decided June 10, 1985 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Powell, J., who took no part in the decision of the case. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 178. Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief for petitioner Citicorp were Ira M. Millstein, Robert L. Stem, James W. Quinn, and Jay N. Fastow. George D. Reycraft, John Boyer, Jeffrey Q. Smith, Gregory Scott Mertz, and Joseph Polizzotto filed a brief for petitioners Northeast Bancorp, Inc., et al. The named attorneys filed a joint reply brief and supplemental memorandum for all petitioners. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Michael Kimmel. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents Bank of New England Corp. et al. With him on the briefs were Bertram M. Kantor, Michael H. Byowitz, Mark A. Weiss, Stuart C. Stock, Wilmot T. Pope, and Douglas M. Kraus. Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Jamie W. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for respondent Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General, Elliot F. Gerson, Deputy Attorney General, and John G. Haines and Jane D. Comerford, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for respondents State of Connecticut et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Robert Hermann, Solicitor General, R. Scott Greathead, First Assistant Attorney General, and Judith T. Kramer and Howard L. Zwickel, Assistant Attorneys General; for Chase Manhattan Corp. by Joseph A. Calif ano, Jr., and Kent T. Stauffer; for the David F. Bolger Revocable Trust by William A. Harvey and Edward S. Ellers; for the New York State Bankers Association by John Leferovich, Jr.; for Senator Alphonse D’Amato et al. by J. Robert Lunney; and for Frank L. Morsani by Dewey R. Villareal, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Georgia by Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, James P. Googe, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, First Assistant Attorney General, Verley J. Spivey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Grace E. Evans, Assistant Attorney General; for Bank of New York Co., Inc., by John L. Warden; for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors by Erwin N. Griswold, James F. Bell, and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Joyce Holmes Benjamin and Vicki C. Jackson; for Fleet Financial Group, Inc., by Allan B. Taylor, J. Bruce Boisture, Robert M. Taylor III, and Edward W. Dence, Jr.; and for Bob Graham, Governor of Florida, et al. by J. Thomas Cardwell, Sydney H. McKenzie III, S. Craig Kiser, and Carl B. Morstadt. Robert F. Mullen filed a brief for the New York Clearing House Association as amicus curiae. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents Bank of New England Corporation (BNE), Hartford National Corporation (HNC), and Bank of Boston Corporation (BBC) are bank holding companies which applied to the Federal Reserve Board to obtain approval for the acquisition of banks or bank holding companies in New England States other than the ones in which they are principally located. Petitioners Northeast Bancorp, Inc., Union Trust Company, and Citicorp opposed these proposed acquisitions in proceedings before the Board. The Board approved the acquisitions, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Board. Petitioners sought certio-rari, contending that the acquisitions were not authorized by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U. S. C. §1841 et seq., and that, if they were authorized by that Act, the state statutes which permitted the acquisitions in each case violated the Commerce Clause and the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution. We granted certiorari because of the importance of these issues, 469 U. S. 810, and we now affirm. The Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) regulates the acquisition of state and national banks by bank holding companies. The Act generally defines a bank as any institution organized under state or federal law which “(1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making commercial loans.” 12 U. S. C. § 1841(c). The Act defines a bank holding company as any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or similar organization that owns or has control over a bank or another bank holding company. §§ 1841(a)(1), (b); see § 1841(a)(5). Before a company may become a bank holding company, or a bank holding company may acquire a bank or substantially all of the assets of a bank, the Act requires it to obtain the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. § 1842. The Board will evaluate the proposed transaction for anti-competitive effects, financial and managerial resources, community needs, and the like. § 1842(c). In addition, § 3(d) of the Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1842(d), known as “the Douglas Amendment,” prohibits the Board from approving an application of a bank holding company or bank located in one State to acquire a bank located in another State, or substantially all of its assets, unless the acquisition “is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication.” Pursuant to the Douglas Amendment, a number of States recently have enacted statutes which selectively authorize interstate bank acquisitions on a regional basis. This case requires us to consider the validity of these statutes. From 1956 to 1972, the Douglas Amendment had the effect of completely barring interstate bank acquisitions because no State had enacted the requisite authorizing statute. Beginning in 1972, several States passed statutes permitting such acquisitions in limited circumstances or for specialized purposes. For example, Iowa passed a grandfathéring statute which-had the effect of permitting the only out-of-state bank holding company owning an Iowa bank to maintain and expand its in-state banking activities, Iowa Code § 524.1805 (1983); see Iowa Independent Bankers v. Board of Gover nors, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 286, 511 F. 2d 1288, cert. denied, 423 U. S. 875 (1975); Washington authorized out-of-state purchasers to acquire failing local banks, Wash. Rev. Code §30.04.230(4)(a) (Supp. 1985); and Delaware allowed out-of-state bank holding companies to set up special purpose banks, such as credit card operations, in Delaware so long as they do not compete in other respects with locally controlled full-service banks, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 5, §801 et seq. (Supp. 1984). Beginning with Massachusetts in December 1982, several States have enacted statutes lifting the Douglas Amendment ban on interstate acquisitions on a reciprocal basis within their geographic regions. The Massachusetts Act specifically provides that an out-of-state bank holding company with its principal place of business in one of the other New England States (Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont), which is not directly or indirectly controlled by another corporation with its principal place of business located outside of New England, may establish or acquire a Massachusetts-based bank or bank holding company, provided that the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges to Massachusetts banking organizations. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 167A, §2 (West 1984). In June 1983, Connecticut followed suit by adopting a substantially similar statute. 1983 Conn. Pub. Acts 83-411. The other New England States have taken different courses or have not acted. Rhode Island, in May 1983, authorized acquisition of local banks by out-of-state bank holding companies on a reciprocal basis similarly limited to the New England region, but this geographic limitation will expire on June 30, 1986, after which the authorization will extend nationwide subject only to the reciprocity requirement. R. I. Gen. Laws § 19-30-1 et seq. (Supp. 1984). Since February 1984, Maine has permitted banking organizations from all other States to acquire local banks without any reciprocity requirement. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 9-B, §1013 (Supp. 1984-1985). At the other extreme, New Hampshire and Vermont have not enacted any statute releasing the Douglas Amendment’s ban on interstate bank acquisitions. One predictable effect of the regionally restrictive statutes will apparently be to allow the growth of regional multistate bank holding companies which can compete with the established banking giants in New York, California, Illinois, and Texas. See 740 F. 2d 203, 209, and n. 16 (1984). The Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes have prompted at least 15 other States to consider legislation which, according to the Federal Reserve Board, would establish interstate banking regions in all parts of the country. 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 375-376 (1984). At least seven of these States have already enacted the necessary statutes. Two months after Connecticut passed its statute, BNE applied to the Board for approval of its merger with respondent CBT Corporation (CBT), a Connecticut bank holding company, and thereby to acquire indirectly the Connecticut Bank and Trust Company, N. A., of Hartford, Connecticut. Soon thereafter HNC applied to the Board for approval of the acquisition of Arltru Bank Corporation (Arltru), a Massachusetts bank holding company which owns the Arlington Trust Company, a bank located in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Finally BBC applied to the Board for approval of the acquisition of the successor by merger to Colonial Bancorp, Inc., a Connecticut bank holding company, by which it would acquire Colonial Bank of Waterbury, Connecticut. Citicorp offers financial services to consumers and businesses nationally through its bank and nonbank subsidiaries. In response to the Board’s invitation for comments from interested persons on these three proposed acquisitions, Citicorp submitted comments opposing all three of them. Northeast owns petitioner Union Trust Company, a Connecticut bank that competes directly with banks owned by CBT, HNC, and Colonial. In addition, Bank of New York Corporation has agreed to acquire Northeast if Connecticut or the United States enacts the necessary enabling legislation. Northeast and Union Trust submitted comments opposing BNE’s application to acquire CBT. The petitioners challenged the applications in part on the ground that the Douglas Amendment did not authorize them, and in part on the grounds that the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes, by discriminating against non-New England bank holding companies, violated the Commerce, Compact, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution. They claimed, therefore, that the proposed interstate acquisitions were not authorized by valid state statutes as required by the Douglas Amendment. The Board rejected these arguments. It first determined that the BNE-CBT and BBC-Colonial acquisitions were specifically authorized by the Connecticut statute and the HNC-Arltru acquisition was specifically authorized by the Massachusetts statute, and therefore that the Douglas Amendment would not prevent the Board from approving any of the three proposed transactions. The Board then rejected the constitutional challenge to the two state statutes. In doing so, it noted that it would hold a state statute unconstitutional only if there was “clear and unequivocal evidence” of its unconstitutionality. 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353, 354 (1984); id., at 376; 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524, 525-526 (1984). While stating that “the issue is not free from doubt,” it concluded that this standard had not been met. 70 Fed. Res. Bull, at 376-377. Interpreting the statutory language and the legislative history of the Douglas Amendment, it determined that “the Douglas Amendment should be read as a renunciation of federal interest in regulating the interstate acquisition of banks by bank holding companies.” Id., at 380. This renunciation of federal interest eliminated any objection to the statutes under the Compact Clause or dormant Commerce Clause. The Board also found nothing in the history of the Amendment to suggest that “the states were to be permitted only to choose between not allowing out-of-state bank holding companies to enter, and allowing completely free entry.” Id., at 386. The Board disposed of the equal protection challenge by reasoning that the regional restriction in the two statutes was “rationally related to an attempt to maintain a banking system responsive to local needs in New England.” Id., at 381. The Board then analyzed the proposed transactions in light of the relevant statutory considerations set out in 12 U. S. C. §§ 1842(c) and 1843(c)(8) and approved the applications. Pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1848, which provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Board” may seek review in a federal court of appeals, and § 1850, which permits prospective competitors to be aggrieved parties under §1848, Citibank, Northeast, and Union Trust petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review the Board’s order approving the BNE-CBT acquisition. Citibank also petitioned for review of the HNC-Arltru acquisition, and Northeast and Union Trust were permitted to intervene. These petitions were consolidated and the acquisitions stayed pending expedited review. Meanwhile, the Board stayed its order approving the BBC-Colonial acquisition, and the Court of Appeals consolidated a petition filed by Citicorp for review of that transaction with the two other pending review petitions. The court also permitted BBC, BNE, CBT, HNC, the State of Connecticut, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to intervene. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s orders approving the three applications in all respects. 740 F. 2d 203 (1984). It agreed with the Board’s determination that the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes satisfied the terms of the Douglas Amendment, and it then rejected challenges to the Board’s orders under the Commerce Clause, the Compact Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate and ordered that the status quo be maintained pending disposition by this Court. The Douglas Amendment The Douglas Amendment to the BHCA prohibits the Board from approving the application of a bank holding company or a bank located in one State to acquire a bank located in another State, or substantially all of its assets, unless the acquisition “is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication.” § 1842(d). Clearly the proposed acquisitions with which we deal in this case must be consistent with the Douglas Amendment, or they are invalid as a matter of federal statutory law. If the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes allowing regional acquisitions are not the type of state statutes contemplated by the Douglas Amendment, they would not lift the ban imposed by the general prohibition of the Douglas Amendment. While petitioners blend together arguments about the meaning of the Douglas Amendment with arguments about the effect of the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, we think the contentions are best treated separately. The Board resolved the statutory issue in favor of the state statutes, concluding that they were the sort of laws contemplated by the Douglas Amendment. While the Board apparently does not consider itself expert on any constitutional issues raised, it is nonetheless an authoritative voice on the meaning of a federal banking statute. Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 468 U. S. 207 (1984). The Board may have applied a higher standard than was necessary when it analyzed the Douglas Amendment to see whether there was a “clear authorization” for selective lifting of the ban, such as the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes undertake to do. Whether or not so stringent a standard was applicable, we think the Board was correct in concluding that it was in fact met in this case. The language of the Douglas Amendment plainly permits States to lift the federal ban entirely, as has been done by Maine. It does not specifically indicate that a State may partially lift the ban, for example in limited circumstances, for special types of acquisitions, or for purchasers from a certain geographic region. On the other hand, it also does not specifically indicate that a State is allowed only two alternatives: leave the federal ban in place or lift it completely. The Board concluded that the language “does not appear on its face to authorize discrimination” by region or “to meet the stringent test of explicitness laid down by” this Court in the dormant Commerce Clause cases. 70 Fed. Res. Bull., at 384. We need not resolve this issue because we agree with the Board that the legislative history of the Amendment supplies a sufficient indication of Congress’ intent. At the time of the BHCA, interstate branch banking was already prohibited by the McFadden Act. 12 U. S. C. § 36(c). The bank holding company device, however, had been created to get around this restriction. A holding company would purchase banks in different localities both within and without a State, and thereby provide the equivalent of branch banking. One of the major purposes of the BHCA was to eliminate this loophole. H. R. Rep. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-6 (1955); 101 Cong. Rec. 4407 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Wier); id., at 8028-8029 (remarks of Rep. Patman); 102 Cong. Rec. 6858-6859 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Douglas). As enacted by the House in 1955, the BHCA contained a flat ban on interstate bank acquisitions. The legislative history from the House makes it clear that the policies of community control and local responsiveness of banks inspired this flat ban. See 101 Cong. Rec. A2454 (1955) (remarks of Rep. Wier); id., at 8030-8031 (remarks of Rep. Rains); H. R. Rep. No. 609, supra, at 2-6. The Douglas Amendment was added on the floor of the Senate. Its entire legislative history is confined to the Senate debate. In such circumstances, the comments of individual legislators carry substantial weight, especially when they reflect a consensus as to the meaning and objectives of the proposed legislation though not necessarily the wisdom of that legislation. The instant case is not a situation where the comments of an individual legislator, even a sponsor, is at odds with the language of the statute or other traditionally mo're authoritative indicators of legislative intent such as the conference or committee reports. The bill reported out by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency permitted interstate bank acquisitions conditioned only on approval by the Federal Reserve Board. This approach apparently was favored by many of the large bank holding companies which sought further expansion, see, e. g., Control of Bank Holding Companies, 1955: Hearings on S. 880 et al. before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 132, 136 (1955) (testimony of Ellwood Jenkins, First Bank Stock Corp.), 298-299 (Baldwin Maull, Marine Midland Corp.), 320 (Cameron Thomson, Northwest Bancorporation), cf. 375, 385 (Frank N. Belgrano, Jr., Transamerica Corp.), and by some who thought the total ban in the House bill offensive to States’ rights, see 102 Cong. Rec. 6752 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Robertson, floor manager of Committee bill, quoting Sen. Maybank). The Douglas Amendment was a compromise between the two extremes that also accommodated the States’ rights concern: “Our amendment would prohibit bank holding companies from purchasing banks in other States unless such purchases by out-of-State holding companies were specifically permitted by law in such States.” Id., at 6860 (remarks of Sen. Douglas). Accord, ibid, (remarks of Sen. Bennett in opposition to the Amendment). Of central concern to this litigation, the Douglas compromise did not simply leave to each State a choice one way or the other — either to permit or bar interstate acquisitions of local banks — but to allow each State flexibility in its approach. Senator Douglas explained that under his amendment bank holding companies would be permitted to acquire banks in other States “only to the degree that State laws expressly permit them.” Id., at 6858. Petitioners contend that by the phrase “to the degree” Senator Douglas intended merely a quantitative reference to the number of States which might lift the ban, and did not mean that a State could partially lift the ban. Petitioners’ contention, however, is refuted by the close analogy drawn by Senator Douglas between his amendment and the McFadden Act, 12 U. S. C. § 36(c): “The organization of branch banks proceeded very rapidly in the 1920’s, and to check their growth various States passed laws limiting, and in some cases preventing it, as in the case of Illinois. National banks had previously been implicitly prohibited from opening branches, and there was a strong movement to remove this prohibition and completely open up the field for the national banks. This, however, was not done. Instead, by the McFadden Act and other measures, national banks have been permitted to open branches only to the degree permitted by State laws and State authorities. “I may say that what our amendment aims to do is to carry over into the field of holding companies the same provisions which already apply for branch banking under the McFadden Act — namely, our amendment will permit out-of-State holding companies to acquire banks in other States only to the degree that State laws expressly permit them; and that is the provision of the McFadden Act.” Ibid. See id., at 6860. In enacting the McFadden Act in 1927, Congress relaxed federal restrictions on branch banking by national banks, but at the same time subjected them to the same branching restrictions imposed by the States on state banks. First National Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U. S. 252, 258 (1966). Congress intended “to leave the question of the desirability of branch banking up to the States,” ibid., and to permit branch banking by national banks “‘in only those States the laws of which permit branch banking, and only to the extent that the State laws permit branch banking.’ ” Id., at 259 (quoting Sen. Glass, 76 Cong. Rec. 2511 (1933)). The McFadden Act did not offer the States an all-or-nothing choice with respect to branch banking. As Senator Douglas observed, some States had limited intrastate branching by state banks, and others like Illinois had prohibited it altogether. This variative approach to intrastate branching was nicely illustrated at the time by the structure in New York, which Senator Douglas described as follows: “In New York the State is divided into 10 zones. Branch banking is permitted within each of the zones, but a bank cannot have branches in another zone.” 102 Cong. Rec. 6858 (1956). At the same time, Pennsylvania permitted branching in contiguous counties. Upper Darby National Bank v. Myers, 386 Pa. 12, 124 A. 2d 116 (1956). In view of this analogy to the McFadden Act and Senator Douglas’ explanation of that Act, there can be no other conclusion but that Congress contemplated that some States might partially lift the ban on interstate banking without opening themselves up to interstate banking from everywhere in the Nation. Not only are the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes consistent with the Douglas Amendment’s anticipation of differing approaches to interstate banking, but they are also consistent with the broader purposes underlying the BHCA as a whole and the Douglas Amendment in particular to retain local, community-based control over banking. Faced with growing competition from nonbank financial services that are not confined within state lines, these States sought an alternative that allowed expansion and growth of local banks without opening their borders to unimpeded interstate banking. The Connecticut General Assembly established a Commission in 1979 to study the problem. It concluded: “Both at the national and state levels the philosophy underlying our structure of bank regulation has been to promote a pluralistic banking system — a system comprised of many units, rather than a highly concentrated system made up of a few large banks. The promotion of local ownership and control of banks has as one of its objectives the preservation of a close relationship between those in our communities who need credit and those who provide credit. To allow the control of credit that is essential for the health of our state economy to pass to hands that are not immediately responsive to the interests of Connecticut citizens and businesses would not, we believe, serve our state well. Similarly, to expose our smaller banks to the rigors of unlimited competition from large out-of-state banking organizations — particularly at a time when deregulation of banking products at the federal level is already putting strains on the resources of smaller banks — would not be wise.” Report to the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut (Jan. 5, 1983), 4 App. in No. 84-4047 (CA2), pp. 1230, 1240-1241. Rather, the Commission proposed “an experiment in regional banking” as a first step toward full interstate banking which “would afford the legislature an opportunity to make its own calculus of the benefits and detriments that might result from a broader program of interstate banking.” Id., at 1241-1242. The Connecticut General Assembly adopted the Commission’s recommendations, and we believe that Connecticut’s approach is precisely what was contemplated by Congress when it adopted the Douglas Amendment. We hold that the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes are of the kind contemplated by the Douglas Amendment to lift its bar against interstate acquisitions. Commerce Clause Petitioners contend that the regional limitation in the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes burdens commerce from without the region while permitting a free flow of commerce among the States within the region. They provide numerous citations to prove that one of the principal purposes of the Framers of the Constitution was to break up and forestall precisely this type of economic “Balkanization” into confederations of States to the detriment of the welfare of the Únion as a whole. See, e. g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 533 (1949); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325-326 (1979); The Federalist Nos. 7 and 22, pp. 62-63, 143-145 (Rossiter ed. 1961). There can be little dispute that the dormant Commerce Clause would prohibit a group of States from establishing a system of regional banking by excluding bank holding companies from outside the region if Congress had remained completely silent on the subject. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 39-44 (1980). Nor can there be serious question that an individual State acting entirely on its own authority would run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause if it sought to comprehensively regulate acquisitions of local banks by out-of-state holding companies. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941 (1982). But that is not our case. Here the commerce power of Congress is not dormant, but has been exercised by that body when it enacted the Bank Holding Company Act and the Douglas amendment to the Act. Congress has authorized by the latter amendment the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes which petitioners challenge as violative of the Commerce Clause. When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 653-654 (1981); White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204 (1983); cf. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U. S. 82 (1984). Petitioners’ Commerce Clause attack on the challenged acquisitions therefore fails. Compact Clause Petitioners maintain that the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes constitute a compact to exclude non-New England banking organizations which violates the Compact Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §10, cl. 3, because Congress has not specifically approved it. We have some doubt as to whether there is an agreement amounting to a compact. The two statutes are similar in that they both require reciprocity and impose a regional limitation, both legislatures favor the establishment of regional banking in New England, and there is evidence of cooperation among legislators, officials, bankers, and others in the two States in studying the idea and lobbying for the statutes. But several of the classic indicia of a compact are missing. No joint organization or body has been established to regulate regional banking or for any other purpose. Neither statute is conditioned on action by the other State, and each State is free to modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most importantly, neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional limitation. Bank holding companies based in Maine, which has no regional limitation, and Rhode Island, which will drop the regional limitation in 1986, are permitted by the two statutes to acquire Massachusetts and Connecticut banks. These two States are included in the ostensible compact under petitioners’ theory, yet one does not impose the exclusion to which petitioners so strenuously object and the other plans to drop it after two years. But even if we were to assume that these state actions constitute an agreement or compact, not every such agreement violates the Compact Clause. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503 (1893). “The application of the Compact Clause is limited to agreements that are ‘directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.’ ” New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U. S. 363, 369 (1976), quoting Virginia v. Tennessee, supra, at 519. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U. S. 452, 471 (1978). In view of the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA, the challenged state statutes which comply with that Act cannot possibly infringe federal supremacy. To the extent that the state statutes might conflict in a particular situation with other federal statutes, such as the provision under which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will arrange for the acquisition of failing banks by out-of-state bank holding companies, 12 U. S. C. § 1823(f), they would be pre-empted by those statutes, and therefore any Compact Clause argument would be academic. Petitioners also assert that the alleged regional compact impermissibly offends the sovereignty of sister States outside of New England. We do not see how the statutes in question either enhance the political power of the New England States at the expense of other States or have an “impact on our federal structure.” United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, supra, at 471, 473. Equal Protection Clause Petitioners argued before the Board and the Court of Appeals that the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause, U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, §2, by excluding bank holding companies from some States while admitting those from others. This claim was abandoned in their petition for certiorari and their briefs on the merits, but after our decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (1985), petitioners filed a supplemental brief urging us to consider the equal protection issue. Because the issue was fully reviewed by the Board and the Court of Appeals and because it would undoubtedly cloud other pending applications for acquisitions by bank holding companies, we elect to decide it. In Metropolitan Life we held that encouraging the formation of new domestic insurance companies within a State and encouraging capital investment in the State’s assets and governmental securities were not, standing alone, legitimate state purposes which could permissibly be furthered by discriminating against out-of-state corporations in favor of local corporations. There we said: “This case does not involve or question, as the dissent suggests, post, at 900-901, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own economy. We hold only that such regulation may not be accomplished by imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely because they are nonresidents.” Id., at 882, n. 10. Here the States in question — Massachusetts and Connecticut — are not favoring local corporations at the expense of out-of-state corporations. They are favoring out-of-state corporations domiciled within the New England region over out-of-state corporations from other parts of the country, and to this extent their laws may be said to “discriminate” against the latter. But with respect to the business of banking, we do not write on a clean slate; recently in Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S., at 38, we said that “banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern.” This statement is a recognition of the historical fact that our country traditionally has favored widely dispersed control of banking. While many other western nations are dominated by a handful of centralized banks, we have some 15,000 commercial banks attached to a greater or lesser degree to the communities in which they are located. The Connecticut legislative Commission that recommended adoption of the Connecticut statute in question considered interstate banking on a regional basis to combine the beneficial effect of increasing the number of banking competitors with the need to preserve a close relationship between those in the community who need credit and those who provide credit. 4 App. in No. 84-4047 (CA2), pp. 1289-1241. The debates in the Connecticut Legislature preceding the enactment of the Connecticut law evince concern that immediate acquisition of Connecticut banks by holding companies headquartered outside the New England region would threaten the independence of local banking institutions. See, e. g., App. to Pet. for Cert. A157-A160. No doubt similar concerns motivated the Massachusetts Legislature. We think that the concerns which spurred Massachusetts and Connecticut to enact the statutes here challenged, different as they are from those which motivated the enactment of the Alabama statute in Metropolitan, meet the traditional rational basis for judging equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 67 (1979); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979). We hold that the state statutes here in question comply with the Douglas Amendment and that they do not violate the Commerce Clause, the Compact Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION et al. v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA No. 79-900. Argued October 15, 1980 Decided December 15, 1980 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRger, C. J., and BrenNan, White, Marshall, BlackmuN, and Rehnqtjist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 247. Stewart, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Elliot Schulder, Michael N. Sohn, Howard E. Shapiro, Joanne L. Levine, and Mark W. Haase. George A. Sears argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Richard W. Odgers and C. Douglas Floyd. Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the issuance of a complaint by the Federal Trade Commission is “final agency action” subject to judicial review before administrative adjudication concludes. I On July 18, 1973, the Federal Trade Commission issued and served upon eight major oil companies, including Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), a complaint averring that the Commission had “reason to believe” that the companies were violating § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45, and stating the Commission’s charges in that respect. The Commission issued the complaint under authority of § 5 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b), which provides: “Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any . . . person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and containing a notice of a hearing . . . An adjudication of the complaint’s charges began soon thereafter before an Administrative Law Judge, and is still pending. On May 1, 1975, Socal filed a complaint against the Commission in the District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that the Commission had issued its complaint without having “reason to believe” that Socal was violating the Act. Socal sought an order declaring that the issuance of the complaint was unlawful and requiring that the complaint be withdrawn. Socal had sought this relief from the Commission and been denied. In support of its allegation and request, Socal recited a series of events that preceded the issuance of the complaint and several events that followed. In Socal’s estimation, the only inference to be drawn from these events was that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence when it issued the complaint to warrant a belief that Socal was violating the Act. The gist of Socal’s recitation of events preceding the issuance of the complaint is that political pressure for a public explanation of the gasoline shortages of 1973 forced the Commission to issue a complaint against the major oil companies despite insufficient investigation. The series of events began on May 31, 1973. As of that day, the Commission had not examined any employees, documents, or books of Socal’s, although the Commission had announced in December 1971, that it intended to investigate possible violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act in the petroleum industry. On May 31, Senator Henry M. Jackson, then Chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and of the Permanent Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of Government Operations, requested the Commission “to prepare a report within thirty days regarding the relationship between the structure of the petroleum industry and related industries and the current and prospective shortages of petroleum products.” Immediately the Commission subpoenaed three Soeal officers to testify before it, and they did so in late June. This examination was the Commission’s only inquiry as to Socal’s books and records, and the only interview of a Socal officer, prior to the issuance of the complaint. On July 6, the Commission sent to Senator Jackson a “Preliminary Federal Trade Commission Staff Report on Its Investigation of the Petroleum Industry,” requesting that the report not be made public because it had not yet “been evaluated or approved by the Commission.” On July 9, Senator Jackson informed the Commission by letter that he intended to publish the report as a congressional committee reprint unless the Commission explained by July 13 why public release of the report would be improper. The Commission responded on July 11 that public release of the report, which the Commission characterized as “an internal staff memorandum,” would be “inconsistent with [the Commission’s] duty to proceed judiciously and responsibly in determining what, if any, action should be taken on the basis of the staff investigation.” On July 13, Senator Jackson released the report for publication by the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. On July 18, the Commission issued its complaint. The subsequent events recited by Socal in its complaint were intended to confirm that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence before issuing its complaint to determine that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. One subsequent event was the issuance on August 27 of a report by the Office of Energy Advisor of the Department of the Treasury, concluding that the Commission’s staff report was wrong in implying that the major oil companies had contrived the gasoline shortages. The report recommended that the complaint be withdrawn. A second event was Senator Jackson’s statement in January 1974, at the conclusion of congressional hearings about the shortages, that he had found no “hard evidence” that the oil companies had created shortages. In addition to these expressions of doubt about the allegations of the Commission’s complaint, Socal recounted the several failures of the Commission’s complaint counsel in the adjudication to comply with orders of the Administrative Law Judge to identify the witnesses and documents on which the Commission intended to rely. The complaint counsel admitted that most of the evidence and witnesses the Commission hoped to introduce were yet to be secured through discovery, and he moved to relax the Commission’s procedural rules for adjudication in order to allow such extensive discovery. In certifying this motion to the Commission, the Administrative Law Judge recommended “withdrawal of this case from adjudication — that is, dismissal without prejudice— so that it may be more fully investigated.” The Commission denied the complaint counsel’s motion and declined to follow the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendations. The District Court dismissed Socal’s complaint on the ground that “a review of preliminary decisions made by administrative agencies, except under most unusual circumstances, would be productive of nothing more than chaos.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 596 F. 2d 1381 (1979). It held the Commission’s determination whether evidence before it provided the requisite reason to believe is “committed to agency discretion” and therefore is unreviewable according to § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a)(2). The Court of Appeals held, however, that the District Court could inquire whether the Commission in fact had made the determination that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. If the District Court were to find upon remand that the Commission had issued the complaint “solely because of outside pressure or with complete absence of a ‘reason to believe’ determination,” 596 F. 2d, at 1386, then it was to order the Commission to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals further held that the issuance of the complaint was “final agency action” under § 10 (c) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704. We granted the Commission’s petition for a writ of cer-tiorari because of the importance of the questions raised by Socal’s request for judicial review of the complaint before the conclusion of the adjudication. 445 U. S. 903 (1980). We now reverse. II The Commission averred in its complaint that it had reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act. That averment is subject to judicial review before the conclusion of administrative adjudication only if the issuance of the complaint was “final agency action” or otherwise was “directly reviewable” under § 10 (c) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704. We conclude that the issuance of the complaint was neither. A The Commission’s issuance of its complaint was not “final agency action.” The Court observed in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967), that “[t]he cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the 'finality’ element in a pragmatic way.” In Abbott Laboratories, for example, the publication of certain regulations by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs was held to be final agency action subject to judicial review in an action for declaratory judgment brought prior to any Government action for enforcement. The regulations required manufacturers of prescription drugs to print certain information on drug labels and advertisements. The regulations were “definitive” statements of the Commission’s position, id., at 151, and had a “direct and immediate . . . effect on the day-to-day business” of the complaining parties. Id., at 152. They had “the status of law” and “immediate compliance with their terms was expected.” Ibid. In addition, the question presented by the challenge to the regulations was a “legal issue ... fit for judicial resolution.” Id., at 153. Finally, because the parties seeking the declaratory judgment represented almost all the parties affected by the regulations, “a pre-enforcement challenge . . . [was] calculated to speed enforcement” of the relevant Act. Id., at 154. Taking “a similarly flexible view of finality,” id., at 150, and in view of similar pragmatic considerations, the Court had held the issuance of administrative regulations to be “final agency action” in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 (1942), Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U. S. 40 (1956), and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192 (1956). The issuance of the complaint in this case, however, is materially different. By its terms, the Commission’s averment of “reason to believe” that Socal was violating the Act is not a definitive statement of position. It represents a threshold determination that further inquiry is warranted and that a complaint should initiate proceedings. To be sure, the issuance of the complaint is definitive on the question whether the Commission avers reason to believe that the respondent to the complaint is violating the Act. But the extent to which the respondent may challenge the complaint and its charges proves that the averment of reason to believe is not “definitive” in a comparable manner to the regulations in Abbott Laboratories and the cases it discussed. Section 5 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b), in conjunction with Commission regulations, 16 CFR §§ 3.41-3.46 (1980), and § 5 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 554 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), requires that the complaint contain a notice of hearing at which the respondent may present evidence and testimony before an administrative law judge to refute the Commission’s charges. Either party to the adjudication may appeal an adverse decision of the administrative law judge to the full Commission, 5 U. S. C. §577; 16 CFR §3.52 (1980); see 15 U. S. C. §45 (c), which then may dismiss the complaint. See 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c). If instead the Commission enters an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the challenged practice, the respondent still is not bound by the Commission’s decision until judicial review is complete or the opportunity to seek review has lapsed. 15 U. S. C. §45 (g). Thus, the averment of reason to believe is a prerequisite to a definitive agency position on the question whether Socal violated the Act, but itself is a determination only that adjudicatory proceedings will commence. Cf. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 (1950); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1948). Serving only to initiate the proceedings, the issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe has no legal force comparable to that of the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, nor any comparable effect upon Socal’s daily business. The regulations in Abbott Laboratories forced manufacturers to “risk serious criminal and civil penalties” for noncompliance, 387 U. S., at 153, or “change all their labels, advertisements, and promotional materials; . . . destroy stocks of printed matter; and . . . invest heavily in new printing type and new supplies.” Id., at 152. Socal does not contend that the issuance of the complaint had any such legal or practical effect, except to impose upon Socal the burden of responding to the charges made against it. Although this burden certainly is substantial, it is different in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered to be final agency action. In contrast to the complaint’s lack of legal or practical effect upon Socal, the effect of the judicial review sought by Socal is likely to be interference with the proper functioning of the agency and a burden for the courts. Judicial intervention into the agency process denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to apply its expertise. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 765 (1975). Intervention also leads to piecemeal review which at the least is inefficient and upon completion of the agency process might prove to have been unnecessary. McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 195 (1969). Furthermore, unlike the review in Abbott Laboratories, judicial review to determine whether the Commission decided that it had the requisite reason to believe would delay resolution of the ultimate question whether the Act was violated. Finally, every respondent to a Commission complaint could make the claim that Socal had made. Judicial review of the averments in the Commission’s complaints should not be a means of turning prosecutor into defendant before adjudication concludes. In sum, the Commission’s issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe that Socal was violating the Act is not a definitive ruling or regulation. It had no legal force or practical effect upon Socal’s daily business other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation. And immediate judicial review would serve neither efficiency nor enforcement of the Act. These pragmatic considerations counsel against the conclusion that the issuance of the complaint was “final agency action.” B Socal relies, however, upon different considerations than these in contending that the issuance of the complaint is “final agency action.” Socal first contends that it exhausted its administrative remedies by moving in the adjudicatory proceedings for dismissal of the complaint. By thus affording the Commission an opportunity to decide upon the matter, Socal contends that it has satisfied the interests underlying the doctrine of administrative exhaustion. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 765. The Court of Appeals agreed. 596 F. 2d, at 1387. We think, however, that Socal and the Court of Appeals have mistaken exhaustion for finality. By requesting the Commission to withdraw its complaint and by awaiting the Commission’s refusal to do so, Socal may well have exhausted its administrative remedy as to the averment of reason to believe. But the Commission’s refusal to reconsider its issuance of the complaint does not render the complaint a “definitive” action. The Commission’s refusal does not augment the complaint’s legal force or practical effect upon Socal. Nor does the refusal diminish the concerns for efficiency and enforcement of the Act. Socal also contends that it will be irreparably harmed unless the issuance of the complaint is judicially reviewed immediately. Socal argues that the expense and disruption of defending itself in protracted adjudicatory proceedings constitutes irreparable harm. As indicated above, we do not doubt that the burden of defending this proceeding will be substantial. But “the expense and annoyance of litigation is 'part of the social burden of living under government.’ ” Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n, 304 U. S. 209, 222 (1938). As we recently reiterated: “Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1, 24 (1974). Socal further contends that its challenge to the Commission’s averment of reason to believe can never be reviewed unless it is reviewed before the Commission’s adjudication concludes. As stated by the Court of Appeals, the alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of the complaint “is likely to become insulated from any review” if deferred until appellate review of a cease-and-desist order. 596 F. 2d, at 1387. Socal also suggests that the unlawfulness will be “insulated” because the reviewing court will lack an adequate record and it will address only the question whether substantial evidence supported the cease-and-desist order. We are not persuaded by this speculation. The Act expressly authorizes a court of appeals to order that the Commission take additional evidence. 15 U. S. C. § 45(c). Thus, a record which would be inadequate for review of alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of a complaint can be made adequate. We also note that the APA specifically provides that a “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action,” 5 U. S. C. § 704, and that the APA also empowers a court of appeals to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 706. Thus, assuming that the issuance of the complaint is not “committed to agency discretion by law,” a court of appeals reviewing a cease-and-desist order has the power to review alleged unlawfulness in the issuance of a complaint. We need not decide what action a court of appeals should take if it finds a cease-and-desist order to be supported by substantial evidence but the complaint to have been issued without the requisite reason to believe. It suffices to hold that the possibility does not affect the application of the finality rule. Cf. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Cory., 327 U. S. 540, 545 (1946). c There remains only Socal’s contention that the claim of illegality in the issuance of the complaint is a “collateral” order subject to review under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). It argues that the Commission’s issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe “fall[s] in that small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in th'e action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Id., at 546. In that diversity case, a District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring shareholders bringing a derivative suit to post a security bond for the defendant’s litigation expenses. This Court held that the District Court’s order was subject to immediate appellate review under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Giving that section a “practical rather than a technical construction,” the Court concluded that this order “did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment.” 337 U. S., at 546. Cohen does not avail Socal. What we have said above makes clear that the issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe is a step toward, and will merge in, the Commission’s decision on the merits. Therefore, review of this preliminary step should abide review of the final order. Ill Because the Commission’s issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe that Socal has violated the Act is not “final agency action” under § 10 (c) of the APA, it is not judicially reviewable before administrative adjudication concludes. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the dismissal of the complaint. c r, . , ,7 It is so ordered. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The other seven respondents to the complaint were Exxon Corp., Texaco, Inc., Gulf Oil Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), Shell Oil Corp., and Atlantic Richfield Co. In re Exxon Corporation, et al., Docket No. 8934. Section 5 of the Act, as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 45, provides in pertinent part: “(a) ... (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” The Commission charged that the eight companies had “maintained and reinforced a noncopipetitive market structure in the refining of crude oil into petroleum products,” had “exercised monopoly power in the refining of petroleum products,” and had followed “common courses of action in accommodating the needs and goals of each other throughout the petroleum industry.” Socal invoked federal-court jurisdiction under 5 U. S. C. § 704 and 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1346, 1361, and 2201. The Commission had denied Socal’s motion to dismiss the complaint on February 12, 1974. The Commission also had denied Socal’s motion for reconsideration, stating: “[I]t has long been settled that the adequacy of the Commission’s 'reason to believe’ a violation of law has occurred and its belief that a proceeding to stop it would be in the 'public interest’ are matters that go to the mental processes of the Commissioners and will not be reviewed by the courts. Once the Commission has resolved these questions and issued a complaint, the issue to be litigated is not the adequacy of the Commission’s pre-complaint information or the diligence of its study of the material in question but whether the alleged violation has in fact occurred. That is the posture of the instant matter.” In re Exxon Corp., 83 F. T. C. 1759, 1760 (1974). On July 6, 1973, the Commission subpoenaed certain of SocaPs books and records, but the complaint was issued before those records were produced. The subpoena was quashed on July 27, 1973, by the commencement of adjudication. In addition to contending that the issuance of the complaint is not “final” agency action, the Commission argues that' the issuance is not “agency action” under § 2 (g) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 551 (13), and that, if agency action, it is “committed to agency discretion by law” under § 10. 5 U. S. C. §701 (a)(2). We agree with Socal and with the Court of Appeals that the issuance of the complaint is “agency action.” The language of the APA and its legislative history support this conclusion. According to § 10 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 701 (b) (2), “agency action” has the meaning given to it by §2, 5 U. S. C. § 551. That section provides that “ 'agency action’ includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,” 5 U. S. C. § 551 (13), and also that “ 'order’ means the whole or a part of a final disposition . . . of an agency in a matter other than rule making . . . .” 5 U. S. C. § 551 (6). According to the legislative history of the APA: “The term 'agency action’ brings together previously defined terms in order to simplify the language of the judicial-review provisions of section 10 and to assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, proceeding, action, or inaction. In that respect the term includes the supporting procedures, findings, conclusions, or statements or reasons or basis for the action or inaction.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 255 (1946). We conclude that the issuance of the complaint by the Commission is “a part of a final disposition” and therefore is “agency action.” In view of our conclusion that the issuance of the complaint was not “final agency action,” we do not address the question whether the issuance of a complaint is “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. §701 (a) (2). In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, the Court held reviewable a regulation of the Federal Communications Commission proscribing certain contractual arrangements between chain broadcasters and local stations. The Commission did not have authority to regulate such contracts; its regulation asserted only that the Commission would not license stations which maintained such contracts. In a challenge to the regulation before any enforcement action had been brought, the Court noted that the regulations had “the force of law before their sanctions are invoked as well as after/’ that they were “promulgated by order of the Commission,” and that “the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of equity.” 316 U. S., at 418-419. In Frozen Food Express v. United States, the Court held reviewable an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission specifying commodities that were deemed not to be “agricultural . . . commodities.” The carriage of such commodities exempted vehicles from ICC supervision. The order was held to be “final agency action” in a challenge brought by a carrier transporting commodities that the ICC’s order had not included in its terms. In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Court also held reviewable as “final agency action” a Federal Communications Commission regulation announcing a policy not to issue television licenses to applicants already owning five such licenses. The rulemaking was complete and “operate [d] to control the business affairs of Storer.” 351 U. S., at 199. The Commission held as much in its order denying Socal’s motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss. See n. 5, supra. Possible judicial review also includes review in this Court upon a writ of certiorari. 15 U. S. C. § 45 (g). The Court of Appeals additionally suggested that the complaint would be “insulated” from review because the alleged unlawfulness would be moot if Socal prevailed in the adjudication. These concerns do not support a conclusion that the issuance of a complaint averring reason to believe is “final agency action.” To the contrary, one of the principal reasons to await the termination of agency proceedings is “to obviate all occasion for judicial review.” Supra, at 242; McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 195 (1969). Thus, the possibility that Socal’s challenge may be mooted in adjudication warrants the requirement that Socal pursue adjudication, not shortcut it. Section 5 (c), as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c), provides in pertinent part: “If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the proceeding before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may see proper.” Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, we do not hold that the issuance of the complaint is reviewable agency action. We leave open the question whether the issuance of the complaint is unreviewable because it is “committed to agency discretion by law.” See n. 7, supra. By this holding, we do not encourage the issuance of complaints by the Commission without a conscientious compliance with the “reason to believe” obligation in 15 U. S. C. § 45 (b). The adjudicatory proceedings which follow the issuance of a complaint may last for months or years. They result in substantial expense to the respondent and may divert management personnel from their administrative and productive duties to the corporation. Without a well-grounded reason to believe that unlawful conduct has occurred, the Commission does not serve the public interest by subjecting business enterprises to these burdens.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED GAS PIPE LINE CO. v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al. No. 49. Argued October 19-20, 1966. Decided November 14, 1966. Vernon W. Woods argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Peter H. Schiff argued the cause for respondent-Federal Power Commission. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Richard A. Posner, Richard A. Solomon and Howard E. Wahrenbrock. Bruce R. Merrill argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Continental Oil Co. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. United Gas Pipe Line Company and Continental Oil Company executed a contract effective January 31, 1953, providing for the sale by Continental and the purchase by United of gas produced from the Johnson Bayou Field in the State of Louisiana, at prices stated in the contract. The contract was to run for 10 years and from year to year thereafter unless terminated by either party on 90 days’ notice. To effectuate delivery to United’s nearby Mud Lake transmission line for transportation of the gas into the Beaumont, Texas, area, Continental constructed several thousand feet of pipeline, separators and storage tanks. United, for its part, constructed a short length of pipeline, a separator, a meter station and valves. United sought, was granted and accepted a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the continued transportation of gas from the Johnson Bayou Field and the construction and operation of the facilities necessary therefor. 14 F. P. C. 582. Likewise, Continental was issued a certificate authorizing the sale of gas to United under the terms of the contract. 15 F. P. C. 1650. In October 1962 Continental elected to terminate the contract at the end of the primary term. Negotiations for a new contract were fruitless. Continental, after refusing United’s offer to continue purchasing on a day-today basis at the old contract rate, filed a rate increase with the Commission asking for an effective date of January 31, 1963. The Commission accepted the filing over United’s protest. United, after advance notice to Continental, then ceased purchasing gas from the Johnson Bayou Field on January 31, 1963, and has since refused to purchase gas from that source. Following a petition by Continental, an order to show cause issued by the Commission to United and a full hearing, the Commission found that United, by ceasing to take gas from the Johnson Bayou Field, had abandoned its facilities used for this purpose as well as the service rendered by these facilities, contrary to the provisions of § 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act which forbid such abandonment without the consent of the Commission being first obtained. Accordingly, the Commission ordered United to “renew operation of its Johnson Bayou Field facilities used to purchase gas from Continental” and directed that the purchases by United were to be at Continental’s new rate and in volumes consistent with the terms of the contract previously in force. 31 F. P. C. 1079, 1086. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s order, 350 F. 2d 689, and we granted certiorari, 383 U. S. 924, because the case involved an important question concerning the Commission’s jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. We affirm. We agree with the Commission and the Court of Appeals that United’s refusal to continue receiving gas from the Johnson Bayou Field constituted an abandonment of “facilities” and a “service” to which § 7 (b) applies. That section places conditions on the abandonment of facilities or of any service rendered thereby. The facilities covered by the section are those “subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,” the further identification of which requires resort to other sections of the Act. Section 1 (b) declares that the provisions of the Act are to apply to: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, (2) the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption and (3) natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale. Under § 7 (c) no natural gas company is permitted to engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, or to undertake the construction or extension of facilities therefor without a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing such acts or operations. Thus the “facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission” which are reached by the abandonment provisions of § 7 (b) are those facilities required for the interstate transportation of natural gas and for the interstate sale of gas for resale to the ultimate consumer. Conversely, it would seem beyond argument that the proscription of abandoning “any service” rendered by those facilities would include both transportation and sale, the twin functions which subject the facilities to the provisions of the Act. We are convinced that United's Johnson Bayou Field facilities were subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. They were constructed solely for the purpose of the taking and interstate transportation of Johnson Bayou gas. They could not, therefore, be abandoned without the consent of the Commission and we do not understand United's position in this Court to be otherwise. United, however, insists that there has not in fact been a § 7 (b) “abandonment.” It is true that the Johnson Bayou Field facilities were neither removed nor disconnected. Their use could have been resumed at any time had United so desired. But the physical alteration of facilities is not a sine qua non restricting the Commission’s jurisdiction under § 7 (b). Here United ceased taking and transporting gas from the Johnson Bayou Field on January 31, 1963, has not taken that gas or used its facilities constructed for that purpose since that time and has no intention of doing so as long as Continental’s present rates continue in effect. United, the Commission found, had by its own action rendered its facilities “operationally dormant for a period of indefinite duration.” 31 F. P. C. 1079, 1083. In addition, the Commission found that its interest went beyond the physical alteration of facilities. “We have a regulatory responsibility to assure that gas once dedicated to the interstate market will continue to be available to that market so long as the public interest demands . . . .” 31 F. P. C. 1079, 1082. As the instant proceeding unmistakably revealed, the responsibility of the Commission could not adequately be met if it were powerless to assure that facilities “certificated to transport this gas,” ibid., continued to operate. To hold United’s conduct an abandonment within the meaning of § 7 (b) is a reasonable interpretation of the Act and we shall not disturb it. The corollary conclusion, inescapably presented on the face of the Act itself, is that the consent of the Commission is necessary before United can cease taking and transporting Johnson Bayou gas, since this is a service United rendered through the facilities it constructed for that very purpose. United, however, contends that the words “any service” in § 7 (b) include only the sale of natural gas, not the taking and transportation of gas from any particular field. In its view it is free at any time to abandon the interstate transportation of gas from the Johnson Bayou Field, and to decide for itself wholly apart from the Commission what gas it will continue to transport interstate. But nothing in the Act, its legislative history or in our cases has been called to our attention which persuasively supports this narrow view or which would justify recognizing the sale of gas as a service but not the preceding transportation without which there would be no sale at all. The Act gives the Commission jurisdiction over interstate transportation of natural gas as a separate and distinct matter, whether the transportation is for hire or for sale and whether the sale is for consumption or resale. FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464; FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U. S. 1; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 359 F. 2d 675. Here, of course, the transportation is not for hire but for sale, some for consumption and some for resale. What is more, in Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U. S. 137, 149-150, the Court clearly recognized that the term “service” is not confined to sales but extends to the “movement of gas in interstate' commerce” and that one who engages in either the sale or the transportation of gas is performing a service within the meaning of both §§ 7 (e) and 7 (b). It could not be more clear that United here abandoned a “service,” the taking of Johnson Bayou Field gas and its transportation in interstate commerce. The statutory necessity of prior Commission approval, with its underlying findings, cannot be escaped. Even so, United argues that the Act gives the Commission no authority over the purchase of natural gas, and that the Commission therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering United to continue purchasing gas from Continental in amounts specified in an expired contract and at prices set unilaterally by Continental. It is true that the Act does not in so many words grant the same express authority over purchases to the Commission that it does over sales. Neither is there a blanket exemption of Commission jurisdiction over the purchase of gas, and there is express authority over transportation as well as sale. Under § 16, the Commission has the power “to perform any and all acts, and to . . . issue . . . such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.” 52 Stat. 830, 15 U. S. C. § 717o. Where it is necessary to regulate the purchase of gas in some respects to carry out its expressly granted authority over transportation and sale, the Commission must have the power to do so. In the case before us, there has been a § 7 (b) abandonment of facilities or services without Commission consent. It is therefore quite proper for the Commission to order the facilities reactivated and the abandoned service restored, even though the resumption by United of the transportation of gas from the Johnson Bayou Field will entail the purchase of gas from Continental at the legally established price. Undoubtedly, the continued purchase of gas has been ordered but only as an incident to regulating transportation or sale. This is no more than the Act authorizes and no more than United undertook to do when it sought and received certification for the service it sought to perform. After United had begun to purchase gas from the Johnson Bayou Field in 1953 and to transport it to markets in the State of Texas, United sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction and use of the facilities it had built and the continued transportation of the Johnson Bayou gas. United then asserted that the public convenience and necessity required the issuance of such a certificate. Both the construction and operation of the facilities and the transportation of gas by means thereof were found by the Commission to be required by the public convenience and necessity. United was found “able and willing ... to perform the service . . .” for which it had volunteered. A certificate was accordingly issued and formally accepted by United. United now wishes to abandon the express service it agreed to perform — the continued transportation of Johnson Bayou gas — without a § 7 (b) finding by the Commission “that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit[s] such abandonment.” This is precisely what the Act forbids. United claims that it does not need the Johnson Bayou gas to serve its customers and that the forced purchase of gas at prices set by Continental and approved by the Commission without regard to the prices at which United under contract or competition is bound to sell the gas deprives it of property without due process of law. In our view, these claims are premature. We do not hold that it would be inappropriate for the Commission to permit abandonment in this case if it is asked to do so and the necessary findings are made. We hold only that United has abandoned facilities and service without the consent of the Commission and that it must reactivate those facilities and restore the service until and unless the statutory consent is obtained. If United now resorts to the Commission, it will have every opportunity to present its economic and constitutional grounds for abandonment. For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. United unsuccessfully petitioned for rehearing of the Commission's order approving the rate increase, 29 F. P. C. 525, but did not seek judicial review of the order. Section 7 (b) of the Act provides that “No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present 'or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.” 52 Stat. 824, 15 U. S. C. §717f (b). The text of the section provides: “The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. §717 (b). The text of the section, in relevant part, provides that “No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . . .” Added by the Act of February 7, 1942, 56 Stat. S3, 15 TJ. S. C. § 7,17f (c). What we have said, of course, does not imply that the Commission has the. power to compel initial purchases of gas. We reach only the question of the Commission’s power under § 7 (b) to order reactivation of abandoned facilities and service. United’s application for the certificate, docketed September 20, 1954, appears in FPC Docket No. G-2818, United Gas Pipe Line Company. The Commission’s complete order appears in Docket G-2818, supra, n. 6; an abbreviated version appears in 14 F. P. C. 582. (Emphasis added.)

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

O’LEARY, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, FOURTEENTH COMPENSATION DISTRICT, v. BROWN-PACIFIC-MAXON, INC. et al. No. 267. Argued December 7, 1950. Decided February 26, 1951. Morton Hollander argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Clapp and Morton Liftin. Edward S. Franklin argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we are called upon to review an award of compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. The award was made on a claim arising from the accidental death of an employee of Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., a government contractor operating on the island of Guam. Brown-Pacific maintained for its employees a recreation center near the shoreline, along which ran a channel so dangerous for swimmers that its use was forbidden and signs to that effect erected. John Yalak, the employee, spent the afternoon at the center, and was waiting for his employer’s bus to take him from the area when he saw or heard two men, standing on the reefs beyond the channel, signaling for help. Followed by nearly twenty others, he plunged in to effect a rescue. In attempting to swim the channel to reach the two men he was drowned. A claim was filed by his dependent mother, based on the Longshoremen’s Act and on an Act of August 16, 1941, extending the compensation provisions to certain employment in overseas possessions. 55 Stat. 622, 56 Stat. 1035, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1651. In due course of the statutory procedure, the Deputy Commissioner found as a “fact” that “at the time of his drowning and death the deceased was using the recreational facilities sponsored and made available by the employer for the use of its employees and such participation by the deceased was an incident of his employment, and that his drowning and death arose out of and in the course of said employment . . . .” Accordingly, he awarded a death benefit of $9.38 per week. Brown-Pacific and its insurance carrier thereupon petitioned the District Court under § 21 of the Act to set aside the award. That court denied the petition on the ground that “there is substantial evidence ... to sustain the compensation order.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It concluded that “The lethal currents were not a part of the recreational facilities supplied by the employer and the swimming in them for the rescue of the unknown man was not recreation. It was an act entirely disconnected from any use for which the recreational camp was provided and not in the course of Valak’s employment.” 182 F. 2d 772, 773. We granted certiorari, 340 U. S. 849, because the case brought into question judicial review of awards under the Longshoremen’s Act in light of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act authorizes payment of compensation for “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.” § 2 (2), 44 Stat. 1425, 33 U. S. C. § 902 (2). As we read its opinion the Court of Appeals entertained the view that this standard precluded an award for injuries incurred in an attempt to rescue persons not known to be in the employer’s service, undertaken in forbidden waters outside the employer’s premises. We think this is too restricted an interpretation of the Act. Workmen’s compensation is not confined by common-law conceptions of scope of employment. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469, 481; Matter of Waters v. Taylor Co., 218 N. Y. 248, 251, 112 N. E. 727, 728. The test of recovery is not a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and the accident. Thom v. Sinclair, [1917] A. C. 127, 142. Nor is it necessary that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the “obligations or conditions” of employment create the “zone of special danger” out of which the injury arose. Ibid. A reasonable rescue attempt, like pursuit in aid of an officer making an arrest, may be “one of the risks of the employment, an incident of the service, foreseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by the statute.” Matter of Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N. Y. 14, 17, 164 N. E. 726, 727; Puttkammer v. Industrial Comm’n, 371 Ill. 497, 21 N. E. 2d 575. This is not to say that there are not cases “where an employee, even with the laudable purpose of helping another, might go so far from his employment and become so thoroughly disconnected from the service of his employer that it would be entirely unreasonable to say that injuries suffered by him arose out of and in the course of his employment.” Matter of Waters v. Taylor Co., 218 N. Y. at 252, 112 N. E. at 728. We hold only that rescue attempts such as that before us are not necessarily excluded from the coverage of the Act as the kind of conduct that employees engage in as frolics of their own. The Deputy Commissioner treated the question whether the particular rescue attempt described by the evidence was one of the class covered by the Act as a question of “fact.” Doing so only serves to illustrate once more the variety of ascertainments covered by the blanket term “fact.” Here of course it does not connote a simple, external, physical event as to which there is conflicting testimony. The conclusion concerns a combination of happenings and the inferences drawn from them. In part at least, the inferences presuppose applicable standards for assessing the simple, external facts. Yet the standards are not so severable from the experience of industry nor of such a nature as to be peculiarly appropriate for independent judicial ascertainment as “questions of law.” Both sides conceded that the scope of judicial review of such findings of fact is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. The standard, therefore, is that discussed in Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, ante, p. 474. It is sufficiently described by saying that the findings are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. The District Court recognized this standard. When this Court determines that a Court of Appeals has applied an incorrect principle of law, wise judicial administration normally counsels remand of the cause to the Court of Appeals with instructions to reconsider the record. Compare Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, supra. In this instance, however, we have a slim record and the relevant standard is not difficult to apply; and we think the litigation had better terminate now. Accordingly we have ourselves examined the record to assess the sufficiency of the evidence. We are satisfied that the record supports the Deputy Commissioner’s finding. The pertinent evidence was presented by the written statements of four persons and the testimony of one witness. It is, on the whole, consistent and credible. From it the Deputy Commissioner could rationally infer that Valak acted reasonably in attempting the rescue, and that his death may fairly be attributable to the risks of the employment. We do not mean that the evidence compelled this inference; we do not suggest that had the Deputy Commissioner decided against the claimant, a court would have been justified in disturbing his conclusion. We hold only that on this record the decision of the District Court that the award should not be set aside should be sustained. Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IRWIN v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS et al. No. 89-5867. Argued October 1, 1990 Decided December 3, 1990 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Black-mun, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 97. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 101. SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Jon R. Ker, by appointment of the Court, 494 U. S. 1025, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Brian Serr. Deputy Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, and Harriet S. Shapiro. Gregory O’Duden, Elaine Kaplan, and Kerry L. Adams filed a brief for the National Treasury Employees Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In April 1986, petitioner, Shirley Irwin, was fired from his job by the Veterans’ Administration (VA), which was subsequently redesignated as respondent Department of Veterans Affairs. Irwin contacted an equal employment opportunity counselor and filed a complaint with the VA, alleging that the VA had unlawfully discharged him on the basis of his race and physical disability. The VA dismissed Irwin’s complaint, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed that decision by a letter dated March 19, 1987. The letter, which was sent to both Irwin and his attorney, expressly informed them that Irwin had the right to file a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., within 30 days of receipt of the EEOC notice. According to Irwin, he did not receive the EEOC’s letter until April 7, 1987, and the letter to his attorney arrived at the attorney’s office on March 23, 1987, while the attorney was out of the country. The attorney did not learn of the EEOC’s action until his return on April 10, 1987. Irwin filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on May 6, 1987, 44 days after the EEOC notice was received at his attorney’s office, but 29 days after the date on which he claimed he received the letter. The complaint alleged that the VA discriminated against him because of his race, age, and handicap, in violation of 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq.; 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq.; 87 Stat. 390, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §791 et seq.; and the First and Fifth Amendments. Respondent VA moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because the complaint was not filed within 30 days of the EEOC’s decision as specified in 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c). The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 874 F. 2d 1092 (1989). The court held that the 30-day period begins to run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the offices of formally designated counsel or to the claimant, even if counsel himself did not actually receive notice until later. Id., at 1094. The Court of Appeals further determined that the 30-day span allotted under § 2000e-16(c) operates as an absolute jurisdictional limit. Id., at 1096. Accordingly, it reasoned that the District Court could not excuse Irwin’s late filing because federal courts lacked jurisdiction over his untimely claim. Ibid. That holding is in direct conflict with the decisions of four other Courts of Appeals. We granted certiorari to determine when the 30-day period under §2000e-16(c) begins to run and to resolve the Circuit conflict over whether late-filed claims are jurisdictionally barred. 493 U. S. 1069 (1990). Section 2000e-16(c) provides that an employment discrimination complaint against the Federal Government under Title VTI must be filed “[wjithin thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken” by the EEOC. The Court of Appeals determined that a notice of final action is “received” when the EEOC delivers its notice to a claimant or the claimant’s attorney, whichever comes first. Id., at 1094. Petitioner argues that the clock does not begin until the claimant himself has notice of his right to sue. We conclude that Irwin’s complaint filed in the District Court was untimely. As the Court of Appeals observed, § 2000e-16(c) requires only that the EEOC notification letter be “received”; it does not specify receipt by the claimant rather than by the claimant’s designated representative. There is no question but that petitioner appeared by his attorney in the EEOC proceeding. Under our system of representative litigation, “each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320, 326 (1880)). Congress has endorsed this sensible practice in the analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that “[wjhenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(b). To read the term “receipt” to mean only “actual receipt by the claimant” would render the practice of notification through counsel a meaningless exercise. If Congress intends to depart from the common and established practice of providing notification through counsel, it must do so expressly. See Decker v. Anheuser-Busch, 632 F. 2d 1221, 1224 (CA5 1980). We also reject Irwin’s contention that there is a material difference between receipt by an attorney and receipt by that attorney’s office for purposes of §2000e-16(c). The lower federal courts have consistently held that notice to an attorney’s office which is acknowledged by a representative of that office qualifies as notice to the client. See Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp., 796 F. 2d 769 (CA5 1986); Josiah-Faeduwor v. Communications Satellite Corp., 251 U. S. App. D. C. 346, 785 F. 2d 344 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) also permits notice to a litigant to be made by delivery of papers to the litigant’s attorney’s office. The practical effect of a contrary rule would be to encourage factual disputes about when actual notice was received, and thereby create uncertainty in an area of the law where certainty is much to be desired. The fact that petitioner did not strictly comply with § 2000e-16(c)’s filing deadline does not, however, end our inquiry. Petitioner contends that even if he failed to timely file, his error may be excused under equitable tolling principles. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument on the ground that the filing period contained in § 2000e-16(c) is jurisdictional, and therefore the District Court lacked authority to consider his equitable claims. The court reasoned that §2000e-16(c) applies to suits against the Federal Government and thus is a condition of Congress’ waiver of sovereign immunity. Since waivers of sovereign immunity are traditionally construed narrowly, the court determined that strict compliance with §2000e-16(c) is a necessary predicate to a Title VII suit. Respondents correctly observe that § 2000e-16(c) is a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed. See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310 (1986). But our previous cases dealing with the effect of time limits in suits against the Government have not been entirely consistent, even though the cases may be distinguished on their facts. In United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 94, n. 10 (1985), we stated that we were leaving open the general question whether principles of equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel apply against the Government when it involves a statutory filing deadline. But, as Justice White points out in his concurrence, post, at 99, nearly 30 years earlier in Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957), we held the petitioner’s claim to be jurisdictionally barred, saying that “Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed meant just that period and no more.” Id., at 276. More recently, in Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467, 479 (1986), we explained that “we must be careful not to ‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended,’ or construe the waiver ‘unduly restrictively’ ” (citation omitted). Title 42 U. S. C. §2000e~16(c) provides in relevant part: “Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title . . . .” The phraseology of this particular statutory time limit is probably very similar to some other statutory limitations on suits against the Government, but probably not to all of them. In the present statute, Congress said that “[w]ithin thirty days ... an employee . . . may file a civil action . . . .” In Soriano, supra, at 271, n. 1, Congress provided that “[e]very claim . . . shall be barred unless the petition ... is filed . . . within six years . . . .” An argument can undoubtedly be made that the latter language is more stringent than the former, but we are not persuaded that the difference between them is enough to manifest a different congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling. Thus a continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress. We think that this case affords us an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government. Time requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to “equitable tolling,” Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 27 (1989). Indeed, we have held that the statutory time limits applicable to lawsuits against private employers under Title VII are subject to equitable tolling. A waiver of sovereign immunity “‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). Once Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so. But an examination of the cases in which we have applied the equitable tolling doctrine as between private litigants affords petitioner little help. Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly. We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. We have generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U. S. 147, 151 (1984). Because the time limits imposed by Congress in a suit against the Government involve a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is evident that no more favorable tolling doctrine may be employed against the Government than is employed in suits between private litigants. Petitioner urges that his failure to file in a timely manner should be excused because his lawyer was absent from his office at the time that the EEOC notice was received, and that he thereafter filed within 30 days of the day on which he personally received notice. But the principles of equitable tolling described above do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. See Martinez v. Orr, 738 F. 2d 1107 (CA10 1984); Milam v. United States Postal Service, 674 F. 2d 860 (CA11 1982); Saltz v. Lehman, 217 U. S. App. D. C. 354, 672 F. 2d 207 (1982); and Boddy v. Dean, 821 F. 2d 346, 350 (CA6 1987). See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U. S. 345, 349, n. 3 (1983). See Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424 (1965) (plaintiff timely filed complaint in wrong court); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U. S. 77 (1945) (same); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah., 414 U. S. 538 (1974) (plaintiff’s timely filing of a defective class action tolled the limitations period as to the individual claims of purported class members). See Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U. S. 231 (1959) (adversary’s misrepresentation caused plaintiff to let filing period lapse); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946) (same).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RICHARDSON, COUNTY CLERK AND REGISTRAR OF VOTERS OF MENDOCINO COUNTY v. RAMIREZ et al. No. 72-1589. Argued January 15, 1974 Decided June 24, 1974 Duncan M. James argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Martin R. Glick argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Gene Livingston and Burton D. Fretz. Daniel Hays Lowenstein filed a brief for respondent Brown, Secretary of State of California. Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Iver E. Skjeie, Assistant Attorney General, and George J. Roth, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Chesterfield Smith and Daniel L. Skoler for the American Bar Assn., and by Philip L. Goar, A. L. Wirin, and Fred Okrand for the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California. Mr. Justice RehNquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The three individual respondents in this case were convicted of felonies and have completed the service of their respective sentences and paroles. They filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California to compel California county election officials to register them as voters. They claimed, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, that application to them of the provisions of the California Constitution and implementing statutes which disenfranchised persons convicted of an “infamous crime” denied them the right to equal protection of the laws under the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of California held that “as applied to all ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole have expired, the provisions of article II and article XX, section 11, of the California Constitution denying the right of suffrage to persons convicted of crime, together with the several sections of the Elections Code implementing that disqualification . . . , violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 216-217, 507 P. 2d 1345, 1357 (1973). We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 816 (1973). Article XX, § 11, of the California Constitution has provided since its adoption in 1879 that “[l]aws shall be made” to exclude from voting persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, “or other high crimes.” At the time respondents were refused registration, former Art. II, § 1, of the California Constitution provided in part that “no alien ineligible to citizenship, no idiot, no insane person, no person convicted of any infamous crime, no person hereafter convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and no person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in the English language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges of an elector in this State.” Sections 310 and 321 of the California Elections Code provide that an affidavit of registration shall show whether the affiant has been convicted of “a felony which disqualifies [him] from voting.” Sections 383, 389, and 390 direct the county clerk to cancel the registration of all voters who have been convicted of "any infamous crime or of the embezzlement or misappropriation of any public money.” Sections 14240 and 14246 permit a voter’s qualifications to be challenged on the ground that he has been convicted of “a felony” or of “the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money.” California provides by statute for restoration of the right to vote to persons convicted of crime either by court order after the completion of probation, or, if a prison term was served, by executive pardon after completion of rehabilitation proceedings. California also provides a procedure by which a person refused registration may obtain judicial review of his disqualification. Each of the individual respondents was convicted of one or more felonies, and served some time in jail or prison followed by a successfully terminated parole. Respondent Ramirez was convicted in Texas; respondents Lee and Gill were convicted in California. When Ramirez applied to register to vote in San Luis Obispo County, the County Clerk refused to allow him to register. The Monterey County Clerk refused registration to respondent Lee, and the Stanislaus County Registrar of Voters (hereafter also included in references to clerks) refused registration to respondent Gill. All three respondents were refused registration because of their felony-convictions. In May 1972 respondents filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California, invoking its original jurisdiction. They named as defendants below the three election officials of San Luis Obispo, Monterey, and Stanislaus Counties who had refused to allow them to register, "individually and as representatives of the class of all other County Clerks and Registrars of Voters who have the duty of determining for their respective counties whether any ex-felon will be denied the right to vote.” The petition for a writ of mandate challenged the constitutionality of respondents’ exclusion from the voting rolls on two grounds. First, it was contended that California’s denial of the franchise to the class of ex-felons could no longer withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on the Court’s recent voting-rights cases, respondents argued that a compelling state interest must be found to justify exclusion of a class from the franchise, and that California could assert no such interest with respect to ex-felons. Second, respondents contended that application of the challenged California constitutional and statutory provisions by election officials of the State’s 58 counties was so lacking in uniformity as to deny them due process and “geographical .. . equal protection.” They appended a report by respondent California Secretary of State, and the questionnaires returned by county election officials on which it was based. The report concluded that there was wide variation in the county election officials’ interpretation of the challenged voting exclusions. The Supreme Court of California upheld the first contention and therefore did not reach the second one. I Before reaching respondents’ constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of California considered whether a decision reached by the three county clerks not to contest the action, together with their representation to the court that they would henceforth permit all ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired to register and vote, rendered this case moot. That court decided that it did not. The acquiescence of the three officials was in no way binding on election officials of the other 55 California counties in which respondents might choose to reside, and it was undisputed that there were many ex-felons among the residents of those counties who had been or would be refused registration on the ground challenged. Because the case posed a question of broad public interest, which was likely to recur and which should receive a statewide resolution, the court exercised its “inherent discretion to resolve the issue, 'even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.’ . . . This rule is particularly applicable to challenges to the validity of election laws.” 9 Cal. 3d, at 203, 507 P. 2d, at 1347. In addition to California cases, the court cited Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973). As a practical matter, there can be no doubt that there is a spirited dispute between the parties in this Court as to the constitutionality of the California provisions disenfranchising ex-felons. Even though the Supreme Court of California did not in fact issue a permanent writ of mandate, and therefore its judgment is in effect a declaratory judgment, an action for such relief may stem from a controversy that is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). By reason of the special relationship of the public officials in a State to the court of last resort of that State, the decision of the Supreme Court of California, if left standing, leaves them permanently bound by its conclusion on a matter of federal constitutional law. Cf. North Dakota Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder’s Stores, 414 U. S. 156 (1973). This case in some respects presents stronger arguments for concluding that a live case or controversy remains than in other election cases in which we have addressed the question of mootness. Unlike Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), in which the particular candidacy was not apt to be revived in a future election, or Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45 (1969), in which the voters who had been disenfranchised because of a residence requirement would not have suffered the same fate under the amended statute, respondents here are indefinitely disenfranchised by the provisions of California law which they challenge. While the situation in Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, was described as “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review/ ” 394 U. S., at 816, that involved here can best be described, in view of the Supreme Court of California's decision against the state officials and their obligation to follow the law as laid down by that court, as “incapable of repetition,” and therefore evading review. There are thus the strongest sorts of practical arguments, as well as the language of Moore v. Ogilvie, supra, which militate against a conclusion of mootness in this case. But purely practical considerations have never been thought to be controlling by themselves on the issue of mootness in this Court. While the Supreme Court of California may choose to adjudicate a controversy simply because of its public importance, and the desirability of a statewide decision, we are limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. Ill to adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties. The mootness problem here arises because, as it noted, the Supreme Court of California was assured by the three county clerks who were named as defendants that the three named plaintiffs would be allowed to register and vote. The three named plaintiffs resided respectively in the California counties of San Luis Obispo, Monterey, and Stanislaus, and the county clerks of those counties who were named as defendants neither defended the action in the Supreme Court of California nor sought review here. Petitioner here is the County Clerk of Mendocino County, who though of course bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court of California, since she was made a party to that action, has no concrete dispute with voters who reside in other counties. Thus if the case were limited to the named parties alone, it could be persuasively argued that there was no present dispute on the issue of the right to register between the three named individual respondents in this Court and the one named petitioner here. We think, however, that the unusual procedural history of the case in the Supreme Court of California leads to the conclusion that the litigation before us is not moot. The individual named plaintiffs brought their action in the Supreme Court of California on behalf of themselves and all other ex-felons similarly situated, and not simply those ex-felons residing in the counties in which the named plaintiffs resided. While only the county clerks of Stanislaus, Monterey, and San Luis Obispo were named parties defendant, they were designated in the original complaint filed in the Supreme Court of California “as representatives of the class of all other County Clerks.” The California Secretary of State was likewise named a party defendant. On the basis of this complaint, the Supreme Court of California issued an alternative writ of mandate directed to the three named county clerks “individually and as representatives of the class of all other County Clerks and Registrars of Voters,” directing them to register to vote not simply the three named plaintiffs, but “all ex-felons whose term of incarceration and parole have expired and who upon application demonstrate that they are otherwise fully qualified to vote,” or in the alternative to show cause why they had not done so upon the return date of the writ. Thus, while the Supreme Court of California did not in so many words say that it was permitting respondents to proceed by way of a “class action,” the fact that the court's process recited that the named clerks were subject to it “individually and as representatives of the class of all other County Clerks and Registrars of Voters,” and the fact that the beneficiaries of that process were not merely the named plaintiffs but “all ex-felons whose term of incarceration and parole [had] expired . . .” indicates that the court treated the action as one brought for the benefit of the class described in the petition for the writ of mandate. Petitioner Viola Richardson, the County Clerk of Mendocino County, filed a complaint in intervention in the action in the Supreme Court of California, alleging that the suit as framed by the named plaintiffs was gollusive, in that neither the three named county clerks nor the Secretary of State could be expected to contest the claims of plaintiffs. Petitioner Viola Richardson further alleged in her complaint of intervention that she was a party to a lawsuit brought against her by an ex-felon (also named Richardson) who had sought to register in Mendocino County, had been denied the right, and whose suit seeking to establish the right was then pending in the State Court of Appeal. The county clerks actually named as defendants in the mandate action each obeyed the alternative writ issued by the Supreme Court of California, and did not contest the named plaintiffs’ legal claim that they had a right to vote secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which overrode the contrary provisions of the California Constitution. The Secretary of State appeared in the action and generally denied the named plaintiffs’ essential claims. The Supreme Court of California, prior to the return date of the writ, issued an order denying petitioner Richardson’s motion to intervene, but instead ordered her added to the named defendants in the action along with the three other named county clerks and the Secretary of State. This action in the Supreme Court of California, coming as it did after the acquiescence of the named clerks in the counties in which the named plaintiffs resided, and yet at a time when the Secretary of State was still a party defendant who had answered the complaint, clearly indicates tó us that that court considered the action to be not only on behalf of the three named plaintiffs, but also on behalf of all ex-felons in California similarly situated. We are reinforced in this conclusion by the language quoted above from the alternative writ of mandate issued by the Supreme Court of California. Had the Supreme Court of California based its action on petitioner Richardson’s claim that the suit was collusive, and that it might become a binding precedent in her litigation then pending in the State Court of Appeal, it would seem to have been sufficient to grant the motion to intervene. But the court’s action adding petitioner Richardson as a named defendant would appear to have been based on its conclusion that at least some members of the class represented by the plaintiffs in fact resided in Mendocino County, and were there seeking to exercise their right to vote. In reaching such a conclusion, of course, the Supreme Court of California had before it petitioner Richardson’s allegation that at least her opponent in the litigation pending in the Court of Appeal was not merely seeking to register to vote in Mendocino County, but had brought a lawsuit to enforce his claim. At the time petitioner Richardson was added as a party defendant, the three named plaintiffs had obtained the relief which they sought, whereas the remaining members of the class, including petitioner Richardson’s opponent in the Court of Appeal litigation, had not. We have held that in the federal system one may not represent a class of which he is not a part, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33 (1962), and if this action had arisen in the federal courts there would be serious doubt as to whether it could have proceeded as a class action on behalf of the class of ex-felons denied the right to register after the three named plaintiffs had been granted that right. Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). But California is at liberty to prescribe its own rules for class actions, subject only to whether limits may be imposed by the United States Constitution, and we interpret its action in adding petitioner Richardson as a defendant to mean that it regarded her opponent in the Court of Appeal litigation, both as an unnamed member of the class of ex-felons referred to in the mandate complaint, and as one of a class actually seeking to register in Mendocino County, as a party to the action in the Supreme Court of California, albeit an unnamed one. In Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41 (1969), we emphasized in finding the case moot that appellant's “suit did not purport to be a class action, and he sought no declaratory relief.” Id., at 42. We said: “[I]n view of the limited nature of the relief sought, we think the case is moot because the congressional election is over. The appellant did not allege that he intended to run for office in any future election. He did not attempt to maintain a class action on behalf of himself and other putative independent candidates, present or future. He did not sue for himself and others similarly situated as independent voters, as he might have under Ohio law. . . . He did not séek a declaratory judgment, although that avenue too was open to him. . . .” Id., at 43. Here, unlike Brockington, there was a class action, and relief in the nature of declaratory relief was granted. The decision below is not only binding on petitioner Richardson, and thus dispositive of her other Court of Appeal litigation, but also decides the federal constitutional question presented for the unnamed members of the classes represented below by petitioner and respondents, whose continuing controversy led the Supreme Court of California to conclude that this case was not moot. The briefs of the parties before us indicate that the adverse alignment in the Supreme Court of California continues in this Court, and we therefore hold the case is not moot. II Unlike most claims under the Equal Protection Clause, for the decision of which we have only the language of the Clause itself as it is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, respondents’ claim implicates not merely the language of the Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the provisions of the less familiar § 2 of the Amendment: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.” (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner contends that the italicized language of § 2 expressly exempts from the sanction of that section disenfranchisement grounded on prior conviction of a felony. She goes on to argue that those who framed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended to prohibit outright in § 1 of that Amendment that which was expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representation imposed by § 2 of the Amendment. This argument seems to us a persuasive one unless it can be shown that the language of § 2, “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” was intended to have a different meaning than would appear from its face. The problem of interpreting the “intention” of a constitutional provision is, as countless cases of this Court recognize, a difficult one. Not only are there deliberations of congressional committees and floor debates in the House and Senate, but an amendment must thereafter be ratified by the necessary number of States. The legislative history bearing on the meaning of the relevant language of § 2 is scant indeed;. the framers of the Amendment were primarily concerned with the effect of reduced representation upon the States, rather than with the two forms of disenfranchisement which were exempted from that consequence by the language with which we are concerned here. Nonetheless, what legislative history there is indicates that this language was intended by Congress to mean what it says. A predecessor of § 2 was contained in an earlier draft of the proposed amendment, which passed the House of Representatives, but was defeated in the Senate early in 1866. The Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction then reconvened, and for a short period in April 1866, revised and redrafted what ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. The Journal of that Committee’s proceedings shows only what motions were made and how the various members of the Committee voted on the motions; it does not indicate the nature or content of any of the discussion in the Committee. While the Journal thus enables us to trace the evolution of the draft language in the Committee, it throws only indirect light on the intention or purpose of those who drafted § 2. See B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 104-120 (1914). We do know that the particular language of § 2 upon which petitioner relies was first proposed by Senator Williams of Oregon to a meeting of the Joint Committee on April 28, 1866. Senator Williams moved to strike out what had been § 3 of the earlier version of the draft, and to insert in place thereof the following: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states which may be' included within this Union according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens, not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.” Id., at 102. The Joint Committee approved this proposal by a lopsided margin, and the draft Amendment was reported to the House floor with no change in the language of §2. Throughout the floor debates in both the House and the Senate, in which numerous changes of language in § 2 were proposed, the language “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime” was never altered. The language of § 2 attracted a good deal of interest during the debates, but most of the discussion was devoted to its foreseeable consequences in both the Northern and Southern States, and to arguments as to its necessity or wisdom. What little comment there was on the phrase in question here supports a plain reading of it. Congressman Bingham of Ohio, who was one of the principal architects of the Fourteenth Amendment and an influential member of the Committee of Fifteen, commented with respect to § 2 as follows during the floor debates in the House: “The second section of the amendment simply provides for the equalization of representation among all the States of the Union, North, South, East, and West. It makes no discrimination. New York has a colored population of fifty thousand. By this section, if that great State discriminates against her colored population as to the elective franchise, (except in cases of crime,) she loses to that extent her representative power in Congress. So also will it be with every other State.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2543 (1866). Two other Representatives who spoke to the question made similar comments. Representative Eliot of Massachusetts commented in support of the enactment of § 2 as follows: “Manifestly no State should have its basis of national representation enlarged by reason of a portion of citizens within its borders to which the elective franchise is denied. If political power shall be lost because of such denial, not imposed because of participation in rebellion or other crime, it is to be hoped that political interests may work in the line of justice, and that the end will be the impartial enfranchisement of all citizens not disqualified by crime.” Id., at 2511. Representative Eckley of Ohio made this observation: “Under a congressional act persons convicted of a crime against the laws of the United States, the penalty for which is imprisonment in the penitentiary, are now and always have been disfranchised, and a pardon did not restore them unless the warrant of pardon so provided. "... But suppose the mass of the people of a State are pirates, counterfeiters, or other criminals, would gentlemen be willing to repeal the laws now in force in order to give them an opportunity to land their piratical crafts and come on shore to assist in the election of a President or members of Congress because they are numerous? And let it be borne in mind that these latter offenses are only crimes committed against property; that of treason is against the nation, against the whole people — the highest known to the law.” Id., at 2535. The debates in the Senate did not cover the subject as exhaustively as did the debates in the House, apparently because many of the critical decisions were made by the Republican Senators in an unreported series of caucuses off the floor. Senator Saulsbury of Delaware, a Democrat who was not included in the majority caucus, observed: “It is very well known that the majority of the members of this body who favor a proposition of this character have been in very serious deliberation for several days in reference to these amendments, and have held some four or five caucuses on the subject.” Id., at 2869. Nonetheless, the occasional comments of Senators on the language in question indicate an understanding similar to that of the House members. Senator Johnson of Maryland, one of the principal opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, made this argument: “Now it is proposed to deny the right to be represented of a part, simply because they are not permitted to exercise the right of voting. You do not put them upon the footing of aliens, upon the footing of rebels, upon the footing of minors, upon the footing of the females, upon the footing of those who may have committed crimes of the most heinous character. Murderers, robbers, houseburners, counterfeiters of the public securities of the United States, all who may have committed any crime, at any time, against the laws of the United States or the laws of a particular State, are to be included within the basis; but the poor black man, unless he is permitted to vote, is not to be represented, and is to have no interest in the Government.” Id., at 3029. Senator Henderson of Missouri, speaking in favor of the version of § 2 which had been reported by the Joint Committee in April, as opposed to the earlier provision of the proposal which had been defeated in the Senate, said this: “The States under the former proposition [the corresponding provision of the original Amendment reported by the Committee of Fifteen, which passed the House of Representatives but was defeated in the Senate] might have excluded the negroes under an educational test and yet retained their power in Congress. Under this they cannot. For all practical purposes,. under the former proposition loss of representation followed the disfranchisement of the negro only; under this it follows the disfranchisement of white and black, unless excluded on account of 'rebellion or other crime.' ” Id., at 3033. Further light is shed on the understanding of those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus on the meaning of § 2, by the fact that at the time of the adoption of the Amendment, 29 States had provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or authorized the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of felonies or infamous crimes. More impressive than the mere existence of the state constitutional provisions disenfranchising felons at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is the congressional treatment of States readmitted to the Union following the Civil War. For every State thus readmitted, affirmative congressional action in the form of an enabling act was taken, and as a part of the readmission process the State seeking readmission was required to submit for the approval of the Congress its proposed state constitution. In March 1867, before any State was readmitted, Congress passed “An act to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States,” the so-called Reconstruction Act. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 153, 14 Stat. 428. Section 5 of the Reconstruction Act established conditions on which the former Confederate States would be readmitted to representation in Congress. It provided: “That when the people of any one of said rebel States shall have formed a constitution of government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States in all respects, framed by a convention of delegates elected by the male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such election, except such as may he disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at common law, and when such constitution shall provide that the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as have the qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates, and when such constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the persons voting on the question of ratification who are qualified as electors for delegates, and when such constitution shall have been submitted to Congress for examination and approval, and Congress shall have approved the same, and when said State, by a vote of its legislature. elected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when said article shall have become a part of the Constitution of the United States, said State shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress, and senators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom on their taking the oath prescribed by law, and then and thereafter the preceding sections of this act shall be inoperative in said State . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Section 5 was introduced as a Senate amendment to the House bill, which was concerned only with the establishment of military government in the former Confederate States. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., 1360-1361 (1867). The legislative history of the Reconstruction Act was recounted by Senator Henderson of Missouri, who ultimately voted for it: “As the bill originally came from the House it was a bald and naked proposition to establish without limitation of power or the time of its duration a purely military government for the ten States now unrepresented. This, in my judgment, was a most dangerous experiment. . . . “The Senate, being unwilling to embark on the experiment of pure military rule, modified the House bill by adopting what is known as the Blaine or Sherman amendment. This amendment conceded military rule, as asked by the House, but put some sort of limit to its duration. It provided that when the rebel States should adopt universal suffrage, regardless of color or race, excluding none, white or black, except for treason or such crimes as were felony at the common law, the regulation of exclusion to be left to the States themselves, and should adopt the constitutional amendment proposed at the last session of Congress . . . and so soon as a sufficient number of said States should adopt it to make it a part of the Constitution of the United States, then military law should cease and the States should be admitted, provided that Congress even then should see fit to receive them.” Id., at 1641. A series of enabling acts in 1868 and 1870 admitted those States to representation in Congress. The Act admitting Arkansas, the first State to be so admitted, attached a condition to its admission. Act of June 22, 1868, c. 69, 15 Stat. 72. That Act provided: “WHEREAS the people of Arkansas, in pursuance of the provisions of an act entitled ‘An act for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and the act supplementary thereto, have framed and adopted a constitution of State government, which is republican, and the legislature of said State has duly ratified the amendment to the Constitution of the United States proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen: Therefore, “Be it enacted . . . That the State of Arkansas is entitled and admitted to representation in Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following fundamental condition: That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted, under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State: Provided, That any alteration of said constitution prospective in its effect may be made in regard to the time and place of residence of voters.” The phrase “under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State” was introduced as an amendment to the House bill by Senator Drake of Missouri. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 2600 (1868). Senator Drake's explanation of his reason for introducing his amendment is illuminating. He expressed concern that without that restriction, Arkansas might misuse the exception for felons to disenfranchise Negroes: “There is still another objection to the condition as expressed in the bill, and that is in the exception as to the punishment for crime. The bill authorizes men to be deprived of the right to vote ‘as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted.' There is one fundamental defect in that, and that is that there is no requirement that the laws under which men shall be duly convicted of these crimes shall be equally applicable to all the inhabitants of the State. It is a very easy thing in a State to make one set of laws applicable to white men, and another set of laws applicable to colored men.” Ibid. The same “fundamental condition” as was imposed by the act readmitting Arkansas was also, with only slight variations in language, imposed by the Act readmitting North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, enacted three days later. Act of June 25, Í868, c. 70, 15 Stat.. 73. That condition was again imposed by the Acts readmitting Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, and Georgia early in 1870. Act of Jan. 26, 1870, c. 10, 16 Stat. 62; Act of Feb. 1, 1870, c. 12, 16 Stat. 63; Act of Feb. 23, 1870, c. 19, 16 Stat. 67; Act of Mar. 30, 1870, c. 39, 16 Stat. 80; Act of July 15, 1870, c. 299, 16 Stat. 363. This convincing evidence of the historical understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is confirmed by the decisions of this Court which have discussed the constitutionality of provisions disenfranchising felons. Although the Court has never given plenary consideration to the precise question of whether a State may constitutionally exclude some or all convicted felons from the franchise, we have indicated approval of such exclusions on a number of occasions. In two cases decided toward the end of the last century, the Court approved exclusions of bigamists and polygamists from the franchise under territorial laws of Utah and Idaho. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15 (1885); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890). Much more recently we have strongly suggested in dicta that exclusion of convicted felons from the franchise violates no constitutional provision. In Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959), where we upheld North Carolina's imposition of a literacy requirement for voting, the Court said, id., at 51: “Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record (Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 345-347) are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters.” Still more recently, we have summarily affirmed two decisions of three-judge District Courts rejecting constitutional challenges to state laws disenfranchising convicted felons. Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (MDNC1972), aff’d, 411 U. S. 961 (1973); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (SD Fla.), aff’d, 396 U. S. 12 (1969). Both District Courts relied on Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F. 2d 445 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1048 (1968), where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a challenge to New York’s exclusion of convicted felons from the vote did not require the convening of a three-judge district court. Despite this settled historical and judicial understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s effect on state laws disenfranchising convicted felons, respondents argue that our recent decisions invalidating other state-imposed restrictions on the franchise as violative of the Equal Protection Clause require us to invalidate the disenfranchisement of felons as well. They rely on such cases as Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969), and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U. S. 701 (1969), to support the conclusions of the Supreme Court of California that a State must show a “compelling state interest” to justify exclusion of ex-felons from the franchise and that California has not done so here. As we have seen, however, the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in the case of the other restrictions on the franchise which were invalidated in the cases on which respondents rely. We hold that the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause by this Court. We do not think that the Court’s refusal to accept Mr. Justice Harlan’s position in his dissents in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 589 (1964), and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 97 (1965), that § 2 is the only part of the Amendment dealing with voting rights, dictates an opposite result. We need not go nearly so far as Mr. Justice Harlan would to reach our conclusion, for we may rest on the demonstrably sound proposition that § 1, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement. Nor can we accept respondents' argument that because § 2 was made part of the Amendment “ ‘largely through the accident of political exigency rather than through the relation which it bore to the other sections of the Amendment,''' we must not look to it for guidance in interpreting § 1. It is as much a part of the Amendment as any of the other sections, and how it became a part of the Amendment is less important than what it says and what it means. Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curiae, are contentions that these notions are outmoded, and that the more modern view is that it is essential to the process of rehabilitating the ex-felon that he be returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has completed the serving of his term. We would by no means discount these arguments if addressed to the legislative forum which may properly weigh and balance them against those advanced in support of California’s present constitutional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one set of values over the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advocate is indeed the more enlightened and sensible one, presumably the people of the State of California will ultimately come around to that view. And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of California erred in concluding that California may no longer, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exclude from the franchise convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles. The California court did not reach respondents’ alternative contention that there was such a total lack of uniformity in county election officials’ enforcement of the challenged state laws as to work a separate denial of equal protection, and we believe that it should have an opportunity to consider the claim before we address ourselves to it. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The petition for a writ of mandate in the Supreme Court of California also named the California Secretary of State as a respondent in his capacity of chief elections officer of the State of California. He did not join the petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court, and has filed a brief as a party respondent. Respondents here (petitioners below) also include, in addition to the three individual respondents, the League of Women Voters and three nonprofit organizations which support the interests of ex-convicts — Los Pintos, 7th Step Foundations, Inc. (California Affiliates), and Prisoners’ Union. Proposition 7, passed at the November 7, 1972, general election, repealed former Art. II, § 1, of the California Constitution and added new Art. II, § 3: “The Legislature shall prohibit improper practices that affect elections and shall provide that no severely mentally deficient person, insane person, person convicted of an infamous crime, nor person convicted of embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, shall exercise the privileges of an elector in this state.” The Supreme Court of California concluded that the new constitutional provision was no different in substance from the former one, and that it did not implicitly repeal the implementing sections of the California Elections Code challenged here. Section 310 of the California Elections Code provides in relevant part that “[t]he affidavit of registration shall show: “ (h) That the affiant is not disqualified to vote by reason of a felony conviction.” Section 321 sets the form of the registration affidavit, which includes the following: “10. I am not disqualified to vote by reason of a felony conviction.” Section 383 of the California Elections Code provides: “The county clerk shall cancel the registration in the following cases: “(c) Upon the production of a certified copy of a subsisting judgment of the conviction of the person registered of any infamous crime or of the embezzlement or misappropriation of any public money. . . .” Section 389 provides: “The county clerk shall, in the first week of September in each year, examine the records of the courts having jurisdiction in case of infamous crimes and the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and shall cancel the affidavits of registration of all voters who have been finally convicted of an infamous crime or of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money. . . .” Section 390 provides: “The county clerk, on the basis of the records of courts in the county having jurisdiction of such offenses, shall furnish to the registrar of voters in a county where there is a registrar of voters, before the first day of September of each year, a statement showing the names of all persons convicted of infamous crimes or of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money during the year prior to that first day of September, whose convictions have become final. The registrar of voters shall, during the first week of September in each year, cancel the affidavits of registration of such persons. The county clerk shall certify the statement under the seal of his office. . . .” Section 14240 of the California Elections Code (Supp. 1974) provides: ' "A person offering to vote may be orally challenged within the polling place only by a member of the precinct board upon any or all of the following grounds: “ (g) That he has been convicted of a felony. “On the day of the election no person, other than a member of a precinct board or other official responsible for the conduct of the election, shall challenge any voter or question him concerning his qualifications to vote. . ..” Section 14246 (Supp. 1974) provides: “If the challenge is on the ground that the person challenged has been convicted of a felony or that he has been convicted of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, he shall not be questioned, but the fact may be proved by the production of an authenticated copy of the record or by the sworn oral testimony of two witnesses.” Section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code (Supp. 1974) provides: “(a) In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any other case in which a court, in its discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time after the termination of the period of probation, if he is not then serving a sentence for any offense, on probation for any offense, or charged with the commission of any offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and, in either case, the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and he shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he has been convicted. The probationer shall be informed of this right and privilege in his probation papers. . . .” Section 4852.01 of the California Penal Code (1970) provides that a person convicted of a felony who was incarcerated may file, any time after his release from custody, a notice of intention to apply for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. It further provides, however: “This chapter shall not apply to persons convicted of misdemeanors; to persons who have served time in county jails only; to persons serving a mandatory life parole; to persons committed under death sentences; or to persons in the military service.” Section 4852.13 of the California Penal Code (1970) provides: “If, after hearing, the court finds that the petitioner has demonstrated by his course of conduct his rehabilitation and his fitness to exercise all of the civil and political rights of citizenship, the court shall make an order declaring that the petitioner has been rehabilitated, and recommending that the Governor grant a full pardon to the petitioner. Such order shall be filed with the clerk of the court, and shall be known as a certificate of rehabilitation. The certificate shall show the date on which the original notice of intention to apply for a certificate was filed.” Section 4852.16 provides: “The certified copy of a certificate of rehabilitation transmitted to the Governor shall constitute an application for a full pardon upon receipt of which the Governor may, without any further investigation, issue a pardon to the person named therein, except that, pursuant to Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution, the Governor shall not grant a pardon to any person twice convicted of felony, except upon the written recommendation of a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court.” Section 4852.17 (Supp. 1974) provides: “Whenever a person is granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor, based upon a certificate of rehabilitation, the pardon shall entitle the person to exercise thereafter all civil and political rights of citizenship, including but not limited to: (1) the right to vote .. ..” Section 350 of the California Elections Code (1961) provides: “If the county clerk refuses to register any qualified elector in the county, the elector may proceed by action in the superior court to compel his registration. In an action under this section, as many persons may join as plaintiffs as have causes of action.” Respondents contended that pardon was not an effective device for obtaining the franchise, noting that during 1968-1971, 34,262 persons were released from state prisons but only 282 pardons were granted. Respondent Ramirez was convicted in Texas of the felony of “robbery by assault” in 1952. He served three months in jail and successfully terminated his parole in 1962. In February 1972 the San Luis Obispo County Clerk refused to allow Ramirez to register to vote on the ground that he had been convicted of a felony and spent time in incarceration. Respondent Lee was convicted of the felony of heroin possession in California in 1955, served two years in prison, and successfully terminated his parole in 1959. In March 1972 the Monterey County Clerk refused to allow Lee to register to vote on the sole ground that he had been convicted of a felony and had not been pardoned by the Governor. Respondent Gill was convicted in 1952 and 1967 of second-degree burglary in California, and in 1957 of forgery. He served some time in prison on each conviction, followed by a successful parole. In April 1972 the Stanislaus County Registrar of Voters refused to allow Gill to register to vote on the sole ground of his prior felony convictions. Paragraph VI of respondents’ petition for mandamus states that the named “Petitioners bring this action individually and on behalf of all other persons who are ineligible to register to vote in California solely by reason of a conviction of a felony other than an election code felony.” The remainder of the petition makes it clear that the class was further restricted to ex-felons, and the Supreme Court of California so treated it. We refer to the named “defendants” in the action in the Supreme Court of California, even though in that court they were actually denominated respondents according to California practice, and we refer to named “plaintiffs” in that court, even though they were actually there denominated as petitioners. We do this for convenience of reference, in order to avoid as much as possible confusion between reference to the position of the parties in the Supreme Court of California and their position here. The parties agree that the lack of uniformity is the result of differing interpretations of the 1966 Supreme Court of California decision in Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P. 2d 412, which defined “infamous crime” as used in the California constitutional provisions. The California Secretary of State’s report noted that “[m]ost” of the 49 responding counties “have attempted to develop consistent criteria for determining which ex-felons shall be entitled to register. In some counties these policies have been formalized in writing, but in most instances a case-by-case method has been used.” The report concluded: “2. Although the policy within most counties may be consistent, the fact that some counties have adopted different policies has created a situation in which there is a lack of uniformity across the state. It appears from the survey that a person convicted of almost any given felony would find that he is eligible to vote in some California counties and ineligible to vote in others. “3. In order to remedy this lack of uniformity, authoritative guidelines from either the legislature or the courts are urgently needed.” Our Brother Marshall argues in dissent that since the Supreme Court of California did not issue the peremptory writ of mandate,, its opinion in this case is an advisory one which does not come within the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. Ill of the Constitution. He also contends that that court's refusal to issue the peremptory writ must rest on some unarticulated state ground, which he concludes should bar review of the federal constitutional question by this Court. The Supreme Court of California has only recently noted its policy of avoiding advisory opinions on abstract questions of law, In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P. 2d 737 (1970), while in the same opinion adverting to its “declaratory use- of habeas corpus in a number of cases” such as In re Gonsalves, 48 Cal. 2d 638, 311 P. 2d 483 (1957). In support of its determination in the case before us that exercise of its original jurisdiction would be appropriate, the Supreme Court of California cited Young v. Gnoss, 7 Cal. 3d 18, 496 P. 2d 445 (1972). There it had exercised its original mandamus jurisdiction to conclude that the, durational residence requirements for voting imposed by California law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Saying that its “function at this time is simply to declare the minimum that must be done to implement Dunn v. Blumstein[, 405 U. S. 330 (1972)],” 7 Cal. 3d, at 27, 496 P. 2d, at 451, the court refused to issue a peremptory writ of mandate in that case, just as it did here, saying that “[s]ince there is no reason to believe that any of the parties to this proceeding will not accede to our holdings herein, no purpose would be served by issuing a writ of mandate to compel such compliance with respect to the November 1972 general election. . . .” Id., at 29, 496 P. 2d, at 453. United States courts of appeals, which are barred by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. Ill from issuing advisory opinions, have nonetheless declined to issue peremptory writs against district judges on the assumption that the latter would abide by the opinion of the court of appeals without the compulsion of such a writ. In re United States, 257 F. 2d 844 (CA5 1958); In re United States, 207 F. 2d 567 (CA5 1953). We think that the reliance of the Supreme Court of California on its earlier decision recognizing and approving the use of its original jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief, as well as its reliance on precedent in an original mandamus proceeding in which it- reached the merits but declined to issue the peremptory writ where there was no question of mootness, supports our conclusion that that court’s judgment in this case is for all practical purposes at least a declaratory judgment. And it is well settled that, where there is “an actual and acute controversy,” an appeal from a declaratory judgment of a state court presents a “case or controversy” within this Court’s jurisdiction. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933). Indeed, any other conclusion would unnecessarily permit a state court of last resort, quite contrary to the intention of Congress in enacting 28 U. S. C. § 1257, to invalidate state legislation on federal constitutional grounds without any possibility of state officials who were adversely affected by the decision seeking review in this Court. We are equally unable to accept the view of the dissenters that the California court’s failure here to issue the peremptory writ must rest on that court’s resolution of some unspecified state law question against petitioner. The mere failure of a state court to award peremptory relief in a proceeding which it treats as one for a declaratory judgment is not an “adequate state ground” which precludes our review of its federal constitutional holding. Ala. Const., Art. 6, § 5 (1819); Cal. Const., Art. 2, § 5 (1849); Conn. Const., Art. 6, § 3 (1818); Del. Const., Art. 4, § 1 (1831) ; Fla. Const., Art. 6, § 4 (1838); Ga. Const., Art. 2, § 6 (1868); 111. Const., Art. 2, §30 (1818); Ind. Const., Art. 6, § 4 (1816); Iowa Const., Art. 2, § 6 (1846); Kan. Const., Art. 5, § 2 (1859); Ky. Const., Art. 6, § 4 (1799); La. Const., Art. 6, § 4 (1812); Md. Const., Art. 1, § 5 (1851); Minn. Const., Art. 7, §2 (1857); Miss. Const., Art. 6, § 5 (1817); Mo. Const., Art. 3, § 14 (1820); Nev. Const., Art. 2, § 1 (1864); N. J. Const., Art. 2, § 1 (1844); N. Y. Const., Art. 2, § 2 (1821); N. C. Const., Art. 6, § 5 (1868); Ohio Const., Art. 4, §4 (1802); Ore. Const., Art. 2, § 3 (1857); R. I. Const., Art. 2, § 4 (1842); S. C. Const., Art. 4 (1865); Tenn. Const., Art. 4, § 2 (1834); Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 4 (1845); Va. Const., Art. 3, § 14 (1830); W. Va. Const., Art. 3, § 1 (1863); Wis. Const., Art. 3, § 2 (1848).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY et al. No. 72-847. Argued November 6, 1973 — • Decided February 26, 1974 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, White, and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., concurred in the result. Douglas, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 270. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 277. Mary M. Schroeder argued the cause for appellants. With her on the brief was John P. Frank. William J. Carter III argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. Sandor O. Shuch and John J. Relihan filed a brief for the Legal Aid Society of Maricopa County as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents an appeal from a decision of the Arizona Supreme Court upholding an Arizona statute requiring a year's residence in a county as a condition to receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at the county's expense. The constitutional question presented is whether this durational residence requirement is repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause as applied by this Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). I Appellant Henry Evaro is an indigent suffering from a chronic asthmatic and bronchial illness. In early June 1971, Mr. Evaro moved from New Mexico to Phoenix in Maricopa County, Arizona. On July 8, 1971, Evaro had a severe respiratory attack and was sent by his attending physician to appellant Memorial Hospital, a nonprofit private community hospital. Pursuant to the Arizona statute governing medical care for indigents, Memorial notified the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors that it had in its charge an indigent who might qualify for county care and requested that Evaro be transferred to the County’s public hospital facility. In accordance with the approved procedures, Memorial also claimed reimbursement from the County in the amount of $1,202.60, for the care and services it had provided Evaro. Under Arizona law, the individual county governments are charged with the mandatory duty of providing.necessary hospital and medical care for their indigent sick. But the statute requires an indigent to have been a resident of the County for the preceding 12 months in order to be eligible for free nonemergency medical care. Maricopa County refused to admit Evaro to its public hospital or to reimburse Memorial solely because Evaro had not been a resident of the County for the preceding year. Appellees do not dispute that Evaro is an indigent or that he is a bona fide resident of Maricopa County. This action was instituted to determine whether appellee Maricopa County was obligated to provide medical care for Evaro or was liable to Memorial for the costs it incurred because of the County’s refusal to do so. This controversy necessarily requires an adjudication of the constitutionality of the Arizona dura-tional residence requirement for providing free medical care to indigents. The trial court held the residence requirement unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In a prior three-judge federal court suit against Pinal County, Arizona, the District Court had also declared the residence requirement unconstitutional and had enjoined its future application in Pinal County. Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (Ariz. 1971). Nonetheless, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the challenged requirement. To resolve this conflict between a federal court and the highest court of the State, we noted probable jurisdiction, 410 U. S. 981 (1973), and we reverse the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. II In determining whether the challenged durational residence provision violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must first determine what burden of justification the classification created thereby must meet, by looking to the nature of the classification and the individual interests affected. The Court considered similar durational residence requirements for welfare assistance in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). The Court observed that those requirements created two classes of needy residents “indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference the first class [was] granted and second class [was] denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability .. . to obtain the very means to subsist — food, shelter, and other necessities of life.” Id., at 627. The Court found that because this classification impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed right of interstate travel, it was to be judged by the standard of whether it promoted a compelling state interest. Finding such an interest wanting, the Court held the challenged residence requirements unconstitutional. Appellees argue that the residence requirement before us is distinguishable from those in Shapiro, while appellants urge that Shapiro is controlling. We agree with appellants that Arizona’s durational residence requirement for free medical care must be justified by a compelling state interest and that, such interests being lacking, the requirement is unconstitutional. Ill The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom. Whatever its ultimate scope, however, the right to travel was involved in only a limited sense in Shapiro. The Court was there concerned only with the right to migrate, “with intent to settle and abide” or, as the Court put it, “to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life.” Id., at 629. Even a bona fide residence requirement would burden the right to travel, if travel meant merely movement. But, in Shapiro, the Court explained that “[t]he residence requirement and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites” for assistance and only the latter was held to be unconstitutional. Id., at 636. Later, in invalidating a durational residence requirement for voter registration on the basis of Shapiro, we cautioned that our decision was not intended to “cast doubt on the validity of appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residence requirements.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 342 n. 13 (1972). IV The appellees argue that the instant county residence requirement is distinguishable from the state residence requirements in Shapiro, in that the former penalizes, not interstate, but rather intrastate, travel. Even were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel, a question we do not now consider, such a distinction would not support the judgment of the Arizona court in the case before us. Appellant Evaro has been effectively penalized for his interstate migration, although this was accomplished under the guise of a county residence requirement. What would be unconstitutional if done directly by the State can no more readily be accomplished by a county at the State’s direction. The Arizona Supreme Court could have construed the waiting-period requirements to apply to intrastate but not interstate migrants; but it did not do so, and “it is not our function to construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State.” O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U. S. 524, 531 (1974). V Although any durational residence requirement impinges to some extent on the right to travel, the Court in Shapiro did not declare such a requirement to be per se unconstitutional. The Court’s holding was conditioned, 394 U. S., at 638 n. 21, by the caveat that some “waiting-period or residence requirements... may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.” The amount of impact required to give rise to the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear. The Court spoke of the requisite impact in two ways. First, we considered whether the waiting period would deter migration: “An indigent who desires to migrate . . . will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during his first year of residence, when his need may be most acute.” Id., at 629. Second, the Court considered the extent to which the residence requirement served to penalize the exercise of the right to travel. The appellees here argue that the denial of non-emergency medical care, unlike the denial of welfare, is not apt to deter migration; but it is far from clear that the challenged statute is unlikely to have any deterrent effect. A person afflicted with a serious respiratory ailment, particularly an indigent whose efforts to provide a living for his family have been inhibited by his incapacitating illness, might well think of migrating to the clean dry air of Arizona, where relief from his disease could also bring relief from unemployment and poverty. But he may hesitate if he knows that he must make the move without the possibility of falling back on the State for medical care should his condition still plague him or grow more severe during his first year of residence. It is true, as appellees argue, that there is no evidence in the record before us that anyone was actually deterred from traveling by the challenged restriction. But neither did the majority in Shapiro find any reason “to dispute the 'evidence that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred [from moving] by residence requirements.’ Indeed, none of the litigants had themselves been deterred.” Dunn, 405 U. S., at 340 (citations omitted). An attempt to distinguish Shapiro by urging that a durational residence requirement for voter registration did not deter travel, was found to be a “fundamental misunderstanding of the law” in Dunn, supra, at 339-340: “Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other 'right to travel’ cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling-state-interest test would be triggered by 'any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] ....’” (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Thus, Shapiro and Dunn stand for the proposition that a classification which “operates to penalize those persons . . . who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration,” must be justified by a compelling state interest. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 238 (1970) (separate opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.) (emphasis added). Although any durational residence requirement imposes a potential cost on migration, the Court in Shapiro cautioned that some “waiting-period.[s] . . . may not be penalties.” 394 U. S., at 638 n. 21. In Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, the Court found that the denial of the franchise, “a fundamental political right,” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964), was a penalty requiring application of the compelling-state-interest test. In Shapiro, the Court found denial of the basic “necessities of life” to be a penalty. Nonetheless, the Court has declined to strike down state statutes requiring one year of residence as a condition to lower tuition at state institutions of higher education. Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at least clear that medical care is as much “a basic necessity of life” to an indigent as welfare assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements. See, e. g., Shapiro, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 340-342 (1969). It would be odd, indeed, to find that the State of Arizona was required to afford Evaro welfare assistance to keep him from the discomfort of inadequate housing or the pangs of hunger but could deny him the medical care necessary to relieve him from the wheezing and gasping for breath that attend his illness. Nor does the fact that the durational residence requirement is inapplicable to the provision of emergency medical care save the challenged provision from constitutional doubt. As the Arizona Supreme Court observed, appellant “Evaro was an indigent person who required continued medical care for the preservation of his health and well being . . . ,” even if he did not require immediate emergency care. The State could not deny Evaro care just because, although gasping for breath, he was not in immediate danger of stopping breathing altogether. To allow a serious illness to go untreated until it requires emergency hospitalization is to subject the sufferer to the danger of a substantial and irrevocable deterioriation in his health. Cancer, heart disease, or respiratory illness, if untreated for a year, may become all but irreversible paths to pain, disability, and even loss of life. The denial of medical care is all the more cruel in this context, falling as it does on indigents who are often without the means to obtain alternative treatment. Finally, appellees seek to distinguish Shapiro as involving a partially federally funded program. Maricopa County has received federal funding for its public hospital but, more importantly, this Court has held that whether or not a welfare program is federally funded is irrelevant to the applicability of the Shapiro analysis. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U. S. 70 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Not unlike the admonition of the Bible that, “Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country,” Leviticus 24:22 (King James Version), the right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents. The State of Arizona's durational residence requirement for free medical care penalizes indigents for exercising their right to migrate to and settle in that State. Accordingly, the classification created by the residence requirement, “unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.” Shapiro, 394 U. S., at 634. (Emphasis in original.) VI We turn now to the question of whether the State has shown that its durational residence requirement is “legitimately defensible,” in that it furthers a compelling state interest. A number of purposes are asserted to be served by the requirement and we must determine whether these satisfy the appellees’ heavy burden of justification, and insure that the State, in pursuing its asserted objectives, has chosen means that do not unnecessarily burden constitutionally protected interests. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). A The Arizona Supreme Court observed: “Absent a residence requirement, any indigent sick person . . . could seek admission to [Maricopa County’s] hospital, the facilities being the newest and most modern in the state, and the resultant volume would cause long waiting periods or severe hardship on [the] county if it tried to tax its property owners to support [these] indigent sick . . . .” 108 Ariz. 373, 376, 498 P. 2d 461, 464. The County thus attempts to sustain the requirement as a necessary means to insure the fiscal integrity of its free medical care program by discouraging an influx of indigents, particularly those entering the County for the sole purpose of obtaining the benefits of its hospital facilities. First, a State may not protect the public fisc by drawing an invidious distinction between classes of its citizens, Shapiro, supra, at 633, so appellees must do more than show that denying free medical care to new residents saves money. The conservation of the taxpayers’ purse is simply not a sufficient state interest to sustain a durational residence requirement which, in effect, severely penalizes exercise of the right to freely migrate and settle in another State. See Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp. 554 (Conn. 1971), aff’d, 404 U. S. 1054 (1972). Second, to the extent the purpose of the requirement is to inhibit the immigration of indigents generally, that goal is constitutionally impermissible. And, to the extent the purpose is to deter only those indigents who take up residence in the County solely to utilize its new and modern public medical facilities, the requirement at issue is clearly overinclusive. The challenged durational residence requirement treats every indigent, in his first year of residence, as if he came to the jurisdiction solely to obtain free medical care. Such a classification is no more defensible than the waiting period in Shapiro, supra, of which the Court said: “[T]he class of barred newcomers is all-inclusive, lumping the great majority who come to the State for other purposes with those who come for the sole purpose of collecting higher benefits.” 394 U. S., at 631. Moreover, “a State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek [better public medical facilities] than it may try to fence out indigents generally.” Ibid. An indigent who considers the quality of public hospital facilities in entering the State is no less deserving than one who moves into the State in order to take advantage of its better educational facilities. Id., at 631-632. It is also useful to look at the other side of the coin — at who will bear the cost of indigents’ illnesses if the County does not provide needed treatment. For those newly arrived residents who do receive at least hospital care, the cost is often borne by private nonprofit hospitals, like appellant Memorial — many of which are already in precarious financial straits. When absorbed by private hospitals, the costs of caring for indigents must be passed on to paying patients and “at a rather inconvenient time” — adding to the already astronomical costs of hospitalization which bear so heavily on the resources of most Americans. The financial pressures under which private nonprofit hospitals operate have already led many of them to turn away patients who cannot pay or to severely limit the number of indigents they will admit. And, for those indigents who receive no care, the cost is, of course, measured by their own suffering. In addition, the County’s claimed fiscal savings may well be illusory. The lack of timely medical care could cause a patient’s condition to deteriorate to a point where more expensive emergency hospitalization (for which no durational residence requirement applies) is needed. And, the disability that may result from letting an untreated condition deteriorate may well result in the patient and his family becoming a burden on the State’s welfare rolls for the duration of his emergency care, or permanently, if his capacity to work is impaired. The appellees also argue that eliminating the dura-tional residence requirement would dilute the quality of services provided to longtime residents by fostering an influx of newcomers and thus requiring the County’s limited public health resources to serve an expanded pool of recipients. Appellees assert that the County should be able to protect its longtime residents because of their contributions to the community, particularly through the past payment of taxes. We rejected this “contributory” rationale both in Shapiro and in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 450 n. 6 (1973), by observing: “[Such] reasoning would logically permit the State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive them of police and fire protection. Indeed it would permit the State to apportion all benefits and services according to the past tax contributions of its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits such an apportionment of state services.” Shapiro, 394 U. S., at 632-633 (footnote omitted). Appellees express a concern that the threat of an influx of indigents would discourage “the development of modern and effective [public medical] facilities.” It is suggested that whether or not the durational residence requirement actually deters migration, the voters think that it protects them from low income families’ being attracted by the county hospital; hence, the requirement is necessary for public support of that medical facility. A State may not employ an invidious discrimination to sustain the political viability of its programs. As we observed in Shapiro, supra, at 641, “[p]erhaps Congress could induce wider state participation in school construction if it authorized the use of joint funds for the building of segregated schools,” but that purpose would not sustain such a scheme. See also Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F. 2d 807, 812-813 (CA1 1970). B The appellees also argue that the challenged statute serves some administrative objectives. They claim that the one-year waiting period is a convenient rule of thumb to determine bona fide residence. Besides not being factually defensible, this test is certainly overbroad to accomplish its avowed purpose. A mere residence requirement would accomplish the objective of limiting the use of public medical facilities to bona fide residents of the County without sweeping within its prohibitions those bona fide residents who had moved into the State within the qualifying period. Less drastic means, which do not impinge on the right of interstate travel, are available and employed to ascertain an individual’s true intentions, without exacting a protracted waiting period which may have dire economic and health consequences for certain citizens. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). The Arizona State welfare agency applies criteria other than the duration of residency to determine whether an applicant is a bona fide resident. The Arizona Medical Assistance to the Aged law provides public medical care for certain senior citizens, conditioned only on residence. Pinal County, Arizona, has operated its public hospital without benefit of the durational residence requirement since the application of the challenged statute in that County was enjoined by a federal court in Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (Ariz. 1971). The appellees allege that the waiting period is a useful tool for preventing fraud. Certainly, a State has a valid interest in preventing fraud by any applicant for medical care, whether a newcomer or oldtime resident, Shapiro, 394 U. S., at 637, but the challenged provision is ill-suited to that purpose. An indigent applicant, intent on committing fraud, could as easily swear to having been a resident of the county for the preceding year as to being one currently. And, there is no need for the State to rely on the durational requirement as a safeguard against fraud when other mechanisms to serve that purpose are available which would have a less drastic impact on constitutionally protected interests. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438. For example, state law makes it a crime to file an “untrue statement . . . for the purpose of obtaining hospitalization, medical care or outpatient relief” at county expense. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-297C (Supp. 1973-1974). See Dunn, 405 U. S., at 353-354; U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973). Finally, appellees assert that the waiting period is necessary for budget predictability, but what was said in Shapiro is equally applicable to the case before us: “The records . . . are utterly devoid of evidence that [the County] uses the one-year requirement as a means to predict the number of people who will require assistance in the budget year. [The appellees do not take] a census of new residents .... Nor are new residents required to give advance notice of their need for . . . assistance. Thus, the . . . authorities cannot know how many new residents come into the jurisdiction in any year, much less how many of them will require public assistance.” 394 U. S., at 634-635 (footnote omitted). Whatever the difficulties in projecting how many newcomers to a jurisdiction will require welfare assistance, it could only be an even more difficult and speculative task to estimate how many of those indigent newcomers will require medical care during their first year in the jurisdiction. The irrelevance of the one-year residence requirement to budgetary planning is further underscored by the fact that emergency medical care for all newcomers and more complete medical care for the aged are currently being provided at public expense regardless of whether the patient has been a resident of the County for the preceding year. See Shapiro, supra, at 635. VII The Arizona durational residence requirement for eligibility for nonemergency free medical care creates an “invidious classification” that impinges on the right of interstate travel by denying newcomers “basic necessities of life.” Such a classification can only be sustained on a showing of a compelling state interest. Appellees have not met their heavy burden of justification, or demonstrated that the State, in pursuing legitimate objectives, has chosen means which do not unnecessarily impinge on constitutionally protected interests. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the case remanded for further action not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concur in the result. Mr. Justice Douglas. The legal and economic aspects of medical care are enormous; and I doubt if decisions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are equal to the task of dealing with these matters. So far as interstate travel per se is considered, I share the doubts of my Brother Rehnquist. The present case, however, turns for me on a different axis. The problem has many aspects. The therapy of Arizona’s atmosphere brings many there who suffer from asthma, bronchitis, arthritis, and tuberculosis. Many coming are indigent or become indigent after arrival. Arizona does not deny medical help to “emergency” cases “when immediate hospitalization or medical care is necessary for the preservation of life or limb,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-297A (Supp. 1973-1974). For others, it requires a 12-month durational residence. The Act is not aimed at interstate travelers; it applies even to a long-term resident who moves from one county to another. As stated by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the present case: “The requirement applies to all citizens within the state including long term residents of one county who move to another county. Thus, the classification does not single out non-residents nor attempt to penalize interstate travel. The requirement is uniformly applied.” 108 Ariz. 373, 375, 498 P. 2d 461, 463. What Arizona has done, therefore, is to fence the poor out of the metropolitan counties, such as Maricopa County (Phoenix) and Pima County (Tucson) by use of a durational residence requirement. We are told that eight Arizona counties have no county hospitals and that most indigent care in those areas exists only on a contract basis. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, we had a case where Texas created a scheme by which school districts with a low property tax base, from which they could raise only meager funds, offered a lower quality of education to their students than the wealthier districts. That system was upheld against the charge that the state system violated the Equal Protection Clause. It was a closely divided Court and I was in dissent. I suppose that if a State can fence in the poor in educational programs, it can do so in medical programs. But to allow Arizona freedom to carry forward its medical program we must go one step beyond the San Antonio case. In the latter there was no legal barrier to movement into a better district. Here a one-year barrier to medical care, save for “emergency” care, is erected around the areas that have medical facilities for the poor. Congress has struggled with the problem. In the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 987, 42 U. S. C. § 302 (b)(2), it added provisions to the Social Security Act requiring the Secretary'of Health, Education, and Welfare to disapprove any state plan for medical assistance to the aged (Medicaid) that excludes “any individual who resides in the state,” thus eliminating durational residence requirements. Maricopa County has received over $2 million in federal funds for hospital construction under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U. S. C. § 291 et seq. Section 291c (e) authorizes the issuance of regulations governing the operation of Hill-Burton facilities. The regulations contain conditions that the facility to be constructed or modernized with the funds “will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial area of the applicant” and-that the applicant will render “a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor.” The conditions of free services for indigents, however, may be waived if “not feasible from a financial viewpoint.” Prior to the application the state agency must obtain from the applicant an assurance “that there will be made available in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay therefor. The requirement of an assurance from an applicant shall be waived if the applicant demonstrates to the satisfaction of the State agency, subject to subsequent approval by the Secretary, that such a requirement is not feasible from a financial viewpoint.” 42 CFR § 53.111 (c)(1). So far as I can ascertain, the durational residence requirement imposed by Maricopa County has not been federally approved as a condition to the receipt of Hill-Burton funds. Maricopa County does argue that it is not financially feasible to provide free nonemergency medical care to new residents. Even so, the federal regulatory framework does not leave the County uncontrolled in determining which indigents will receive the benefit of the resources which are available. It is clear, for example, that the County could hot limit such service to whites out of a professed inability to service indigents of all races because 42 CFR § 53.112 (c) prohibits such discrimination in the operation of Hill-Burton facilities. It does not allow racial discrimination even against transients. Moreover, Hill-Burton Act donees are guided by 42 CFR § 53.111 (g), which sets out m some detail the criteria which must be used in identifying persons unable to pay for such services. The criteria include the patient’s health and medical insurance coverage, personal and family income, financial obligations and resources, and “similar factors.” Maricopa County, pursuant to the state law here challenged, employs length of county residence as an additional criterion in identifying indigent recipients of uncompensated nonemergency medical care. The federal regulations, however, do not seem to recognize that as an acceptable criterion. And, as we held in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268; Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 U. S. 356, these federal conditions attached to federal grants are valid when “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.” 393 U. S., at 280-281. It is difficult to impute to Congress approval of the durational residence requirement, for the implications of such a decision would involve weighty equal protection considerations by which the Federal Government, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, as well as the States, are bound. The political processes rather than equal protection litigation are the ultimate solution of the present problem. But in the setting of this case the invidious discrimination against the poor, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, not the right to travel interstate, is in my view the critical issue. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J. Gourmand and Food — A Fable The people of Gourmand loved good food. They ate in good restaurants, donated money for cooking research, and instructed their government to safeguard all matters having to do with- food. Long ago, the food industry had been in total chaos. There were many restaurants, some very small. Anyone could call himself a chef or open a restaurant. In choosing a restaurant, one could never be sure that the meal would be good. A commission of distinguished chefs studied the situation and recommended that no one be allowed to touch food except for qualified chefs. “Food is too important to be left to amateurs,” they said. Qualified chefs were licensed by the state with severe penalties for anyone else who engaged in cooking. Certain exceptions were made for food preparation in the home, but a person could serve only his own family. Furthermore, to become a qualified chef, a man had to complete at least twenty-one years of training (including four years of college, four years of cooking school, and one year of apprenticeship). All cooking schools had to be first class. These reforms did succeed in raising the quality of cooking. But a restaurant meal became substantially more expensive. A second commission observed that not everyone could afford to eat out. “No one,” they said, “should be denied a good meal because of his income.” Furthermore, th&y argued that chefs should work toward the goal of giving everyone “complete physical and psychological satisfaction.” For those people who could not afford to eat out, the government declared that they should be allowed to do so as often as they liked and the government would pay. For others, it was recommended that they organize themselves in groups and pay part of their income into a pool that would undertake to pay the costs incurred by members in dining out. To insure the greatest satisfaction, the groups were set up so that a member could eat out anywhere and as often as he liked, could have as elaborate a meal as he desired, and would have to pay nothing or only a small percentage of the cost. The cost of joining such prepaid dining clubs rose sharply. Long ago, most restaurants would have one chef to prepare the food. A few restaurants were more elaborate, with chefs specializing in roasting, fish, salads, sauces, and many other things. People rarely went to these elaborate restaurants since they were so expensive. With the establishment of prepaid dining clubs, everyone wanted to eat at these fancy restaurants. At the same time, young chefs in school disdained going to cook in a small restaurant where they would have to cook everything. The pay was higher and it was much more prestigious to specialize and cook at a really fancy restaurant. Soon there were not enough chefs to keep the small restaurants open. With prepaid clubs and free meals for the poor, many people started eating their three-course meals at the elaborate restaurants. Then they began to increase the number of courses, directing the chef to “serve the best with no thought for the bill.” (Recently a 817-course meal was served.) The costs of eating out rose faster and faster. A new government commission reported as follows: (1) Noting that licensed chefs were being used to peel potatoes and wash lettuce, the commission recommended that these tasks be handed over to licensed dishwashers (whose three years of dishwashing training included cooking courses) or to some new category of personnel. (8) Concluding that many licensed chefs were overworked, the commission recommended that cooking schools be expanded, that the length of training be shortened, and that applicants with lesser qualifications be admitted. (3) The commission also observed that chefs were unhappy because people seemed to be more concerned about the decor and service than about the food. (In a recent taste test, not only could one patron not tell the difference between a 1930 and a 1970 vintage but he also could not distinguish between white and red wines. He explained that he always ordered the 1980 vintage because he knew that only a really good restaurant would stock such an expensive wine.) The commission agreed that weighty problems faced the nation. They recommended that a national prepayment group be established which everyone must join. They recommended that chefs continue to be paid on the basis of the number of dishes they prepared. They recommended that every Gourmandese be given the right to eat anywhere he chose and as elaborately as he chose and pay nothing. These recommendations were adopted. Large numbers of people spent all of their time ordering incredibly elaborate meals. Kitchens became marvels of new, expensive equipment. All those who were not consuming restaurant food were in the kitchen preparing it. Since no one in Gourmand did anything except prepare or eat meals, the country collapsed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11-291 (Supp. 1973-1974). Section 11-297A (Supp. 1973-1974) provides in relevant part that: “Except in emergency cases when immediate hospitalization or medical care is necessary for the preservation of life or limb no person shall be provided hospitalization, medical care or outpatient relief under the provisions of this article without first filing with a member of the board of supervisors of the county in which he resides a statement in writing, subscribed and sworn to under oath, that he is an indigent as shall be defined by rules and regulations of the state department of economic security, an unemployable totally dependent upon the state or county 'government for financial support, or an employable of sworn low income without sufficient funds to provide himself necessary hospitalization and medical care, and that he has been a resident of the county for the preceding twelve months.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the question of the rights oí transients to medical care is not presented by this case. Arizona’s intermediate appellate court had also declared the durational residence requirement unconstitutional in Board of Supervisors, Pima County v. Robinson, 10 Ariz. App. 238, 457 P. 2d 951 (1969), but its decision was vacated as moot by the Arizona Supreme Court. 105 Ariz. 280, 463 P. 2d 536 (1970). An Arizona one-year durational residence requirement for care at state mental health facilities was declared unconstitutional in Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (Ariz.), aff’d, 400 U. S. 884 (1970). See n. 11, infra. A Florida one-year durational residence requirement for medical care at public expense was found unconstitutional in Arnold v. Halifax Hospital Dist., 314 F. Supp. 277 (MD Fla. 1970), and Crapps v. Duval County Hospital Auth., 314 F. Supp. 181 (MD Fla. 1970). E. g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 173 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 335 (1972). 394 U. S., at 634. See also id., at 642-644 (Stewart, J., concurring). Dunn v. Blumstein, supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); see Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U. S. 1055 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 237 (1970) (separate opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), 285-286 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting, with whom Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U. S. 49 (1970); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-759 (1966); cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 105-106 (1971); Demiragh v. DeVos, 476 F. 2d 403 (CA2 1973). See generally Z. Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, pp. 171-181, 187 et seq. (1956). See King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 442 F. 2d 646, 648 n. 5 (CA2 1971); Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F. 2d 807, 811 (CA1 1970); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143, 147 (Del. 1972); cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 39 (1915); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 989, 1012 (1969). Appellees argue that the County should be able to apply a durational residence requirement to preserve the quality of services provided its longtime residents because of their ties to the community and the previous contributions they have made, particularly through past payment of taxes. It would seem inconsistent to argue that the residence requirement should be construed to bar longtime Arizona residents, even if unconstitutional as applied to persons migrating into Maricopa County from outside the State. Surely, longtime residents of neighboring counties have more ties with Maricopa County and equity in its public programs, as through past payment of state taxes, than do migrants from distant States. This “contributory” rationale is discussed, infra, at 266. Por a discussion of the problems posed by this ambiguity, see Judge Coffin’s perceptive opinion in Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F. 2d 807 (CA1 1970). In Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (Ariz.), aff’d, 400 U. S. 884 (1970), a federal court struck down an Arizona law permitting the director of a state mental hospital to return to the State of his prior residence, any indigent patient who had not been a resident of Arizona for the year preceding his civil commitment. It is doubtful that the challenged law could have had any deterrent effect on migration, since few people consider being committed to a mental hospital when they decide to take up residence in a new State. See also Affeldt v. Whitcomb, 319 F. Supp. 69 (ND Ind. 1970), aff’d, 405 U. S. 1034 (1972). See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441, 452-453, n. 9 (1973). For example, the Shapiro Court cautioned that it meant to “imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility [inter dial to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth.” 394 U. S., at 638 n. 21. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Report on Medical Resources Available to Meet the Needs of Public Assistance Recipients, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 74 (Comm. Print 1961). Similarly, President Nixon has observed : “ ‘It is health which is real wealth,’ said Ghandi, 'and not pieces of gold and silver.’ ” Health, Message from the President, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. Doc. No. 92-49, p. 18 (1971). See also materials cited at n. 4, supra. Reference to the tuition cases is instructive. The lower courts have .contrasted in-state tuition with “necessities of life” in a way that would clearly include medical care in the latter category. The District Court in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (Minn. 1970), aff’d, 401 U. S. 985 (1971), quoted with approval from Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-267 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U. S. 554 (1970) (emphasis added): “ ‘While we fully recognize the value of higher education, we cannot equate its attainment with food, clothing and shelter. Shapiro involved the immediate and pressing need for preservation of life and health of persons unable to live without public assistance, and their dependent children. Thus, the residence requirement in Shapiro could cause great suffering and even loss of life. The durational residence requirement for attendance at publicly financed institutions of higher learning [does] not involve similar risks. Nor was petitioner... precluded from the benefit of obtaining higher education. Charging higher tuition fees to non-resident students cannot be equated with granting of basic subsistence to one class of needy residents while denying it to an equally needy class of residents.' ” See also Note, The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 1139, 1149-1158 (1971). Moreover, in Vlandis, supra, the Court observed that “special problems [are] involved in determining the bona fide residence of college students who come from out of State to attend [a] public university . .. ,” since those students are characteristically transient, 412 U. S., at 452. There is no such ambiguity about whether appellant Evaro is a bona fide resident of Maricopa County. 108 Ariz. 373, 374, 498 P. 2d 461, 462 (emphasis added). See Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600, 603 (Ariz. 1971). See generally HEW Report on Medical Resources, supra, n. 14, at 73-74; Dept. of HEW, Human Investment Programs: Delivery of Health Services for the Poor (1967). See HEW, Hill-Burton Project Register, July 1, 1947-June 30, 1967. HEW Publication No. (HSM) 72-4011, p. 37. Maricopa County has received over $2 million in Hill-Burton (42 U. S. C. § 291 et seq.) funds since 1947. Medicaid, the primary federal program for providing medical care to indigents at public expense, does not permit participating States to apply a durational residence requirement as a condition to eligibility, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (b)(3), and “this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance.” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 687-688 (1973). The State of Arizona does not participate in the Medicaid program. Cf. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1223-1224 (1970); Note, Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1076-1077 (1969). The Arizona Supreme Court observed that because this case involves a governmental benefit akin to welfare, the “reasonable basis” test of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), should apply. In upholding a state regulation placing an absolute limit on the amount of welfare assistance to be paid a dependent family regardless of size or actual need, the Court in Dandridge found it “enough that the State’s action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.” Id., at 487. The Court later distinguished Dandridge in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 376 (1971), where Mr. Justice Blacicmun, writing for the Court, observed that “[appellants’ attempted rebanee on Dandridge ... is also misplaced, since the classification involved in that case [did not impinge] upon a fundamental constitutional right . . . .” Strict scrutiny is required here because the challenged classification impinges on the right of interstate travel. Compare Dandridge, supra, at 484 n. 16, with Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 629. See Cantor, The Law and Poor People’s Access to Health Care, 35 Law & Contemp. Prob. 901, 909-914 (1970); cf. Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 and 1268 (EDNY 1969), vacated and remanded, 397 U. S. 820, aff’d on remand, 430 F. 2d 1297, appeal dismissed, 400 U. S. 931 (1970). HEW Report on Medical Resources, supra, n. 14, at 74. See generally Health, Message from the President, supra, n. 14; E. Kennedy, In Critical Condition: The Crises in America’s Health Care (1973); Hearings on The Health Care Crisis in America before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Cantor, supra, n. 23; See E. Kennedy, supra, n. 24, at 78-94; Note, Working Rules for Assuring Nondiscrimination in Hospital Administration, 74 Yale L. J. 151, 156 n. 32 (1964); cf., e. g., Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S. W. 2d 558 (Mo. 1969) (hospital refused treatment to frostbite victim who was unable to pay $25 deposit). See generally HEW Report on Medical Resources, supra, n. 14, at 74; Hearings on The Health Care Crisis in America, supra, n. 24. “[L]ack of timely hospitalization and medical care for those unable to pay has been considered an economic liability to the patient, the hospital, and to the community in which these citizens might otherwise be self-supporting . . . .” HEW Report on Medical Resources, supra, n. 14, at 73; Comment, Indigents, Hospital Admissions and Equal Protection, 5 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 502, 515-516 (1972); cf. Battistella & Southby, Crisis,in American Medicine, The Lancet 581, 582 (Mar. 16, 1968). See Green v. Dept. of Public Welfare of Delaware, 270 F. Supp. 173, 177-178 (Del. 1967). Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-292 (1) (Supp. 1973-1974). § 46-261.02 (3) (Supp. 1973-1974). In addition, Pima County, Arizona, did not apply the dura-tional residence requirement between August 1969, when the requirement was found unconstitutional by the Arizona Court of Appeals, Board of Supervisors, Pima County v. Robinson, 10 Ariz. App. 238, 457 P. 2d 951, and September 1970, when that judgment was vacated as moot by the Arizona Supreme Court, 105 Ariz. 280, 463 P. 2d 536. See appendix to this opinion, post, p. 274. Title 42 CFR § 53.111 (b) (8) defines that term to mean “a level of uncompensated services which meets a need for such services in the area served by an applicant and which is within the financial ability of such applicant to provide.” The waiver of such a requirement requires notice and. opportunity for public hearing. 42 CFR § 53.111 (c) (2). For the impact of “free” indigent care on private hospitals and their paying patients see Dept, of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Report on Medical Resources Available to Meet the Needs of Public Assistance Recipients, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1961). Foreword to an article on Medical Care and its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal by Judith R. Lave and Lester B. Lave in 35 Law & Contemp. Prob. 252 (1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CLAY, aka ALI v. UNITED STATES No. 783. Argued April 19, 1971 Decided June 28, 1971 Chauncey Eskridge argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrib III, Jonathan Shapiro, and Elizabeth B. DuBois. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson and Beatrice Rosenberg. Per Curiam. The petitioner was convicted for willful refusal to submit to induction'into the Armed Forces. 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V). The judgment .of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit We granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 990, to consider whether the induction notice was invalid because grounded upon-an erroneous denial of the petitioner’s claim to be classified as a conscientious objector. I . The petitioner’s application for classification as a conscientious objector was turned down by his local draft board, ana he took, an administrative appeal. The State Appeal Board tentatively classified him I-A (eligible for unrestricted military service) and referred his filé" to the Department of Justice for an advisory recommenda-. tion, in accordance with then-applicable procedures. 50 U. S. C. App. § 456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. V). The FBI then conducted an “inquiry” as required by the statute, interviewing some 35 persons, including members of the petitioner’s family and many of his friends, neighbors, and business and religious associates. There followed a hearing on “the character and good faith of the [petitioner’s]" objections” before a hearing officer appointed by the Department. The hearing officer, a retired judge of many years’ experience, heard testimony from the petitioner’s mother and father, from one of his attorneys, from a minister of his religion, and from the petitioner himself. He also had the benefit of a full report from the FBI. On the basis of this record the hearing officer concluded that the registrant was sincere in his objection on religious grounds to participation in war in any form, and he recommended that the conscientious objector claim be sustained. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the Department of Justice wrote a letter to the Appeal Board, advising it that the petitioner’s conscientious objector claim should be denied. Upon receipt of this letter of advice, the Board denied the petitioner’s claim without a statement of reasons. After various further proceedings which it is not necessary to recount here, the petitioner was ordered to report for induction; He refused, to take the traditional step forward, and this prosecution and conviction followed. II In order to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector, a registrant.must satisfy three basic tests. He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form. Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions. United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163; Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333. And he must show that this objection is sincere. Witmer v. United States, 348 U. S. 375. In applying these tests, the Selective Service .System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. United States v. Seeger, supra; Gillette v. United States, supra; Williams v. United States, 216 F. 2d 350, 352. In asking us to affirm the judgment of conviction, the Government argues that there was a “basis in fact,” cf. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, for holding that the petitioner is not opposed to “war in any form,” but is only selectively opposed to certain wars. See Gillette v. United States, supra. Counsel for the petitioner, needless to say, takes the opposite position. The issue is one that need not be resolved in this case. For we have concluded that even if the Government’s position on this question is correct, the conviction before us must still be set aside for another quite independent reason. Ill 'f'he petitioner’s criminal conviction stemmed from the Selective Service System’s denial of his appeal seeking conscientious objector status. That denial, for which no reasons were ever given, was, as we have said, based on a recommendation of the Department of Justice, overruling its hearing officer and advising the Appeal Board that it “finds that the registrant’s conscientious-objector claim is not sustained and recommends to your Board that he be not [so] classified.” This finding was contained in a long letter of explanation, from which it is evident that Selective Service officials were led to believe that the Department had found that the petitioner had failed to satisfy each of the three basic tests for qualification as a conscientious objector. As to the requirement that a registrant must be opposed to war in any form, the Department letter said that the petitioner’s expressed beliefs “do not appear to preclude military service in any form, but rather are limited to military service in the Armed Forces of the United States. . . . These Constitute only objections to certain types of war in certain circumstances, rather than a general scruple against participation in war in any form. However, only a general scruple against participation in war in any form can support an exemption as a conscientious objector under the Act. United States v. Kauten, 133 F. 2d 703.” As to the requirement that a registrant’s opposition must be based upon religious training and belief, the Department letter said: “It seems clear that the teachings of the Nation of Islam preclude fighting for the United States not because of objections to participation in war in any form' but rather because of political and racial objections to policies of the United States as interpreted by Elijah Muhammad. ... It is therefore our conclusion that registrant’s claimed objections to participation in war insofar as they are based upon the teachings of the Nation of Islam, rest on grounds which primarily are political and racial.” As to the requirement that a registrant’s opposition to war must be sincere, that part of the letter began by stating that “the registrant has not consistently manifested his conscientious-objector claim. Such a course of overt manifestations is requisite to establishing a subjective state of mind and belief.” There followed several paragraphs reciting the timing and circumstances of the petitioner’s conscientious objector claim, and a concluding paragraph seeming to state a rule of law — that “a registrant has not shown overt manifestations sufficient to establish his subjective belief where, as here, his conscientious-objector claim was not asserted jmtil military service became imminent. Campbell v. United States, 221 F. 2d 454. " United States v. Corliss, 280 F. 2d 808, cert. denied, 364 U. S. 884.” In this Court the Government has now fully conceded that the petitioner’s beliefs are based upon “religious training and belief,” as defined in United States v. Seeger, supra: “There is no dispute that petitioner’s professed beliefs were founded on basic tenets of the Muslim religion, as he understood them, and derived in substantial part from his devotion to Allah as the Supreme Being. Thus, under this Court’s decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163, his claim unquestionably was within the 'religious training and belief’ clause of the exemption provision.” This concession is clearly correct. For the record shows that the petitioner’s beliefs are founded on tenets of the Muslim- religion as he understands them. They are surely no less religiously based- than those of the three registrants before this Court in Seeger. See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333. The Government in this Court has also made clear that it no longer questions the sincerity of the petitioner’s beliefs. This concession, is also correct. The Department hearing officer — the only person at the administrative appeal level who carefully examined the petitioner and other witnesses in person and who had the benefit of the full FBI filé — found “that the registrant is sincere in his objection.” The Department of Justice was wrong in advising the Board in terms of a purported rule of law that it should disregard this finding simply because of the circumstances and timing of the petitioner’s- claim. See Ehlert v. United States, 402 U. S. 99, 103-104; United States ex rel. Lehman v. Laird, 430 F. 2d 96, 99; United States v. Abbott, 425 F. 2d 910, 915; United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 413 F. 2d 936, 939-940; Cohen v. Laird, 315 F. Supp. 1265, 1277-1278. Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for its denial of the petitioner’s claim, there is absolutely no way of knowing upon which of the three grounds offered in the Department’s letter it relied. Yet the Government now acknowledges that two of those grounds were not valid. And, the Government’s concession aside, it is indisputably clear, for the reasons stated, that the Department was simply wrong as a matter of law in advising that the petitioner’s beliefs were not religiously based ¿nd were not sincerely held. This case, therefore, falls squarely within the four corners of this Court’s decision in Sicurella v. United States, 348 U. S. 385. There as here the Court was asked to hold that an error in an advice letter prepared by the Department of Justice did not require reversal of a criminal conviction because there was a ground on which the Appeal Board might properly have denied a conscientious objector classification. This Court refused to consider the proffered alternative ground: “[W]e feel that this error of law by the Department, to which the Appeal Board might naturally look for guidance on such questions, must vitiate the entire proceedings at least where it is not clear that' the Board relied on some legitimate ground. Here, where it is impossible to determine on exactly which grounds the Appeal Board decided, the integrity of the Selective Service System demands, at least, that the Government not recommend illegal grounds. There is an impressive body of lower court cases taking this position and we believe that they state the correct rule.” Id., at 392. The doctrine thus articulated 16 years ago in Sicurella was hardly new. It was long ago established as essential to the administration of criminal justice. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359. In Stromberg the Court reversed a conviction for violation of a California statute containing three separate clauses, finding one of the three clauses constitutionally invalid. As Chief Justice Hughes put the matter, “[I]t is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained.” Thus, “if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.” Id., at 368. The application of this doctrine in the area of Selective Service law goes back at least to 1945, and Judge Learned Hand’s opinion for the Second Circuit in United States v. Cain, 149 F. 2d 338. It is a doctrine that has been • consistently and repeatedly followed by the federal courts in dealing with the criminal sanctions of the selective service laws. See, e. g., United States v. Lemmens, 430 F. 2d 619, 623-624 (CA7 1970); United States v. Broyles, 423 F. 2d 1299, 1303-1304 (CA4 1970); United States v. Haughton, 413 F. 2d 736 (CA9 1969); United States v. Jakobson, 325 F. 2d 409, 416-417 (CA2 1963), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163; Kretchet v. United States, 284 F. 2d 561, 565-566 (CA9 1960); Ypparila v. United States, 219 F. 2d 465, 469 (CA10 1954); United States v. Englander, 271 F. Supp. 182 (SDNY 1967); United States v. Erikson, 149 F. Supp. 576, 578-579 (SDNY 1957). In every one of the above cases the defendant was acquitted or the conviction set aside under the Sicurella application of the Stromberg doctrine. The long established rule of law embodied in these settled precedents thus clearly requires that the judgment before us be reversed. . It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The original judgment of affirmance, 397 F. 2d 901, was set aside by this Court on a ground wholly unrelated to the issues now before us, sub norm. Giordano v. United States, 394 U. S. 310. Upon remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the conviction. 430 F. 2d 165. The hearing officer was Judge Lawrence Grauman, who had served on a Kentucky circuit court for some 25 years. Applicable regulations, 32 CFR § 1626.25 (1967 ed.), did not require that the hearing officer’s report be transmitted to the Appeal Board, and the Government declined to disclose it to the petitioner. The statements in text are taken from the description of that report in the letter of advice from the Department of Justice, recommending denial of the petitioner’s claim. Brief for the United States 12. “We do not here seek to support the denial of petitioner’s claim on the ground of insincerity .-. . .” Id., at 33.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITIES SERVICE GAS CO. v. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION OF KANSAS et al. No. 85. Argued January 13-14, 1958. Decided January 20, 1958. Joe Rolston argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Conrad C. Mount, O. R. Stites and Mark H. Adams. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Paul A. Sweeney, Robert S. Green, Willard W. Gatchell and Howard E. Wahrenbrock. Dale M. Stucky and Frank G. Theis argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief was Clyde Milligan. A joint brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the States of Arkansas, by Bruce Bennett, Attorney General; Colorado, by Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General; Kansas, by John Anderson, Attorney General; Louisiana, by Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General, and Bailey Walsh, Special Assistant Attorney General; Mississippi, by Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General; Nebraska, by C. S. Beck, Attorney General; New Mexico, by Fred M. Standley, Attorney General; North Dakota, by Leslie R. Bur gum, Attorney General; Oklahoma, by Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General; Texas, by Will Wilson, Attorney General, and James N. Ludlum, First Assistant Attorney General; Utah, by E. R. Callister, Attorney General; and Wyoming, by Thomas 0. Miller, Attorney General. Latham Castle, Attorney General of Illinois, and William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General, filed a statement adopting the brief filed by the various State Attorneys General as amici curiae. Per Curiam. The judgment is reversed. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corporation, 349 U. S. 44.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Greg McQUIGGIN, Warden, Petitioner v. Floyd PERKINS. No. 12-126. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 25, 2013. Decided May 28, 2013. John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, for Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Columbus, OH, for Respondent. Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Michigan Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lansing, MI, B. Eric Restuccia, Deputy Solicitor General, John S. Pallas, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, for Petitioner. Jason Burnette, Jones Day, Atlanta, GA, Chad A. Readler, Counsel of Record, Eric E. Murphy, Allison E. Haedt, Jones Day, Columbus, OH, for Respondent. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the "actual innocence" gateway to federal habeas review applied in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), and further explained in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). In those cases, a convincing showing of actual innocence enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims. Here, the question arises in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Specifically, if the petitioner does not file her federal habeas petition, at the latest, within one year of "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence," § 2244(d)(1)(D), can the time bar be overcome by a convincing showing that she committed no crime? We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: "[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851; see House, 547 U.S., at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (emphasizing that the Schlup standard is "demanding" and seldom met). And in making an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, "the timing of the [petition]" is a factor bearing on the "reliability of th[e] evidence" purporting to show actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S., at 332, 115 S.Ct. 851. In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that habeas petitioner Perkins (respondent here) had filed his petition after the statute of limitations ran out, and had "failed to diligently pursue his rights." Order in No. 09-1875, (CA6, Feb. 24, 2010), p. 2 (Certificate of Appealability). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court denying Perkins' petition, and held that Perkins' actual-innocence claim allowed him to pursue his habeas petition as if it had been filed on time. 670 F.3d 665, 670 (2012). The appeals court apparently considered a petitioner's delay irrelevant to appraisal of an actual-innocence claim. See ibid. We vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the case. Our opinion clarifies that a federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway claim, should count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner's part, not as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining whether actual innocence has been reliably shown. See Brief for Respondent 45 (habeas court "could ... hold the unjustified delay against the petitioner when making credibility findings as to whether the [actual-innocence] exception has been met"). I A On March 4, 1993, respondent Floyd Perkins attended a party in Flint, Michigan, in the company of his friend, Rodney Henderson, and an acquaintance, Damarr Jones. The three men left the party together. Henderson was later discovered on a wooded trail, murdered by stab wounds to his head. Perkins was charged with the murder of Henderson. At trial, Jones was the key witness for the prosecution. He testified that Perkins alone committed the murder while Jones looked on. App. 55. Chauncey Vaughn, a friend of Perkins and Henderson, testified that, prior to the murder, Perkins had told him he would kill Henderson, id., at 39, and that Perkins later called Vaughn, confessing to his commission of the crime. Id., at 36-38. A third witness, Torriano Player, also a friend of both Perkins and Henderson, testified that Perkins told him, had he known how Player felt about Henderson, he would not have killed Henderson. Id., at 74. Perkins, testifying in his own defense, offered a different account of the episode. He testified that he left Henderson and Jones to purchase cigarettes at a convenience store. When he exited the store, Perkins related, Jones and Henderson were gone. Id., at 84. Perkins said that he then visited his girlfriend. Id., at 87. About an hour later, Perkins recalled, he saw Jones standing under a streetlight with blood on his pants, shoes, and plaid coat. Id., at 90. The jury convicted Perkins of first-degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole on October 27, 1993. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Perkins' conviction and sentence, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Perkins leave to appeal on January 31, 1997. Perkins' conviction became final on May 5, 1997. B Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a state prisoner ordinarily has one year to file a federal petition for habeas corpus, starting from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If the petition alleges newly discovered evidence, however, the filing deadline is one year from "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." § 2244(d)(1)(D). Perkins filed his federal habeas corpus petition on June 13, 2008, more than 11 years after his conviction became final. He alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance on the part of his trial attorney, depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel. To overcome AEDPA's time limitations, Perkins asserted newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. He relied on three affidavits, each pointing to Jones, not Perkins, as Henderson's murderer. The first affidavit, dated January 30, 1997, was submitted by Perkins' sister, Ronda Hudson. Hudson stated that she had heard from a third party, Louis Ford, that Jones bragged about stabbing Henderson and had taken his clothes to the cleaners after the murder. App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a-55a. The second affidavit, dated March 16, 1999, was subscribed to by Demond Louis, Chauncey Vaughn's younger brother. Louis stated that, on the night of the murder, Jones confessed to him that he had just killed Henderson. Louis also described the clothes Jones wore that night, bloodstained orange shoes and orange pants, and a colorful shirt. Id., at 50a-53a. The next day, Louis added, he accompanied Jones, first to a dumpster where Jones disposed of the bloodstained shoes, and then to the cleaners. Finally, Perkins presented the July 16, 2002 affidavit of Linda Fleming, an employee at Pro-Clean Cleaners in 1993. She stated that, on or about March 4, 1993, a man matching Jones's description entered the shop and asked her whether bloodstains could be removed from the pants and a shirt he brought in. The pants were orange, she recalled, and heavily stained with blood, as was the multicolored shirt left for cleaning along with the pants. Id., at 48a-49a. The District Court found the affidavits insufficient to entitle Perkins to habeas relief. Characterizing the affidavits as newly discovered evidence was "dubious," the District Court observed, in light of what Perkins knew about the underlying facts at the time of trial. Id., at 29a. But even assuming qualification of the affidavits as evidence newly discovered, the District Court next explained, "[Perkins'] petition [was] untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(D)." Ibid. "[If] the statute of limitations began to run as of the date of the latest of th[e] affidavits, July 16, 2002," the District Court noted, then "absent tolling, [Perkins] had until July 16, 2003 in which to file his habeas petition." Ibid. Perkins, however, did not file until nearly five years later, on June 13, 2008. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the District Court stated, "a habeas petitioner who demonstrates a credible claim of actual innocence based on new evidence may, in exceptional circumstances, be entitled to equitable tolling of habeas limitations." Id., at 30a. But Perkins had not established exceptional circumstances, the District Court determined. In any event, the District Court observed, equitable tolling requires diligence and Perkins "ha[d] failed utterly to demonstrate the necessary diligence in exercising his rights." Id., at 31a. Alternatively, the District Court found that Perkins had failed to meet the strict standard by which pleas of actual innocence are measured: He had not shown that, taking account of all the evidence, "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him," or even that the evidence was new. Id., at 30a-31a. Perkins appealed the District Court's judgment. Although recognizing that AEDPA's statute of limitations had expired and that Perkins had not diligently pursued his rights, the Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to a single question: Is reasonable diligence a precondition to relying on actual innocence as a gateway to adjudication of a federal habeas petition on the merits? Certificate of Appealability 2-3. On consideration of the certified question, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment. Adhering to Circuit precedent, Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 597-602 (2005), the Sixth Circuit held that Perkins' gateway actual-innocence allegations allowed him to present his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as if it were filed on time. On remand, the Court of Appeals instructed, "the [D]istrict [C]ourt [should] fully consider whether Perkins assert[ed] a credible claim of actual innocence." 670 F.3d, at 676. We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on whether AEDPA's statute of limitations can be overcome by a showing of actual innocence. 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 527, 184 L.Ed.2d 338 (2012). Compare, e.g., San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267-1268 (C.A.11 2011) ("A court ... may consider an untimely § 2254 petition if, by refusing to consider the petition for untimeliness, the court thereby would endorse a 'fundamental miscarriage of justice' because it would require that an individual who is actually innocent remain imprisoned."), with, e.g., Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 871-872 (C.A.7 2005) ("Prisoners claiming to be innocent, like those contending that other events spoil the conviction, must meet the statutory requirement of timely action."). See also Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 548 (C.A.2 2012) (collecting cases). II A In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010), this Court addressed the circumstances in which a federal habeas petitioner could invoke the doctrine of "equitable tolling." Holland held that "a [habeas] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2562 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the courts below comprehended, Perkins does not qualify for equitable tolling. In possession of all three affidavits by July 2002, he waited nearly six years to seek federal postconviction relief. "Such a delay falls far short of demonstrating the ... diligence" required to entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (District Court opinion). See also Certificate of Appealability 2. Perkins, however, asserts not an excuse for filing after the statute of limitations has run. Instead, he maintains that a plea of actual innocence can overcome AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. He thus seeks an equitable exception to § 2244(d)(1), not an extension of the time statutorily prescribed. See Rivas, 687 F.3d, at 547, n. 42 (distinguishing from "equitable tolling" a plea to override the statute of limitations when actual innocence is shown). Decisions of this Court support Perkins' view of the significance of a convincing actual-innocence claim. We have not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-405, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). We have recognized, however, that a prisoner "otherwise subject to defenses of abusive or successive use of the writ [of habeas corpus] may have his federal constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper showing of actual innocence." Id., at 404, 113 S.Ct. 853 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992) ). See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) ("[W]e think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default."). In other words, a credible showing of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims (here, ineffective assistance of counsel) on the merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief. "This rule, or fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, is grounded in the 'equitable discretion' of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons." Herrera, 506 U.S., at 404, 113 S.Ct. 853. We have applied the miscarriage of justice exception to overcome various procedural defaults. These include "successive " petitions asserting previously rejected claims, see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (plurality opinion), "abusive" petitions asserting in a second petition claims that could have been raised in a first petition, see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-495, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991), failure to develop facts in state court, see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), and failure to observe state procedural rules, including filing deadlines, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ; Carrier, 477 U.S., at 495-496, 106 S.Ct. 2639. The miscarriage of justice exception, our decisions bear out, survived AEDPA's passage. In Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998), we applied the exception to hold that a federal court may, consistent with AEDPA, recall its mandate in order to revisit the merits of a decision. Id., at 558, 118 S.Ct. 1489 ("The miscarriage of justice standard is altogether consistent ... with AEDPA's central concern that the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong showing of actual innocence."). In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998), we held, in the context of § 2255, that actual innocence may overcome a prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional objection on direct review. Most recently, in House, we reiterated that a prisoner's proof of actual innocence may provide a gateway for federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim of constitutional error. 547 U.S., at 537-538, 126 S.Ct. 2064. These decisions "see[k] to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent individual should not abate when the impediment is AEDPA's statute of limitations. As just noted, see supra, at 1931 - 1932, we have held that the miscarriage of justice exception applies to state procedural rules, including filing deadlines. Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. A federal court may invoke the miscarriage of justice exception to justify consideration of claims defaulted in state court under state timeliness rules. See ibid. The State's reading of AEDPA's time prescription would thus accord greater force to a federal deadline than to a similarly designed state deadline. It would be passing strange to interpret a statute seeking to promote federalism and comity as requiring stricter enforcement of federal procedural rules than procedural rules established and enforced by the States . B The State ties to § 2244(d)'s text its insistence that AEDPA's statute of limitations precludes courts from considering late-filed actual-innocence gateway claims. " Section 2244(d)(1)(D)," the State contends, "forecloses any argument that a habeas petitioner has unlimited time to present new evidence in support of a constitutional claim." Brief for Petitioner 17. That is so, the State maintains, because AEDPA prescribes a comprehensive system for determining when its one-year limitations period begins to run. "Included within that system," the State observes, "is a specific trigger for the precise circumstance presented here: a constitutional claim based on new evidence." Ibid. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) runs the clock from "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim ... could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." In light of that provision, the State urges, "there is no need for the courts to act in equity to provide additional time for persons who allege actual innocence as a gateway to their claims of constitutional error." Ibid. Perkins' request for an equitable exception to the statute of limitations, the State charges, would "rende[r] superfluous this carefully scripted scheme." Id., at 18. The State's argument in this regard bears blinders. AEDPA's time limitations apply to the typical case in which no allegation of actual innocence is made. The miscarriage of justice exception, we underscore, applies to a severely confined category: cases in which new evidence shows "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner]." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 2244(d)(1)(D) is both modestly more stringent (because it requires diligence) and dramatically less stringent (because it requires no showing of innocence). Many petitions that could not pass through the actual-innocence gateway will be timely or not measured by § 2244(d)(1)(D)'s triggering provision. That provision, in short, will hardly be rendered superfluous by recognition of the miscarriage of justice exception. The State further relies on provisions of AEDPA other than § 2244(d)(1)(D), namely, §§ 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2), to urge that Congress knew how to incorporate the miscarriage of justice exception when it was so minded. Section 2244(b)(2)(B), the State observes, provides that a petitioner whose first federal habeas petition has already been adjudicated when new evidence comes to light may file a second-or-successive petition when, and only when, the facts underlying the new claim would "establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). And § 2254(e)(2), which generally bars evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings initiated by state prisoners, includes an exception for prisoners who present new evidence of their innocence. See §§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), (B) (permitting evidentiary hearings in federal court if "the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense"). But Congress did not simply incorporate the miscarriage of justice exception into §§ 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2). Rather, Congress constrained the application of the exception. Prior to AEDPA's enactment, a court could grant relief on a second-or-successive petition, then known as an "abusive" petition, if the petitioner could show that "a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim." McCleskey, 499 U.S., at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1454. Section 2244(b)(2)(B) limits the exception to cases in which "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence," and the petitioner can establish that no reasonable factfinder "would have found [her] guilty of the underlying offense" by "clear and convincing evidence." Congress thus required second-or-successive habeas petitioners attempting to benefit from the miscarriage of justice exception to meet a higher level of proof ("clear and convincing evidence") and to satisfy a diligence requirement that did not exist prior to AEDPA's passage. Likewise, petitioners asserting actual innocence pre-AEDPA could obtain evidentiary hearings in federal court even if they failed to develop facts in state court. See Keeney, 504 U.S., at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715 ("A habeas petitioner's failure to develop a claim in state-court proceedings will be excused and a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing."). Under AEDPA, a petitioner seeking an evidentiary hearing must show diligence and, in addition, establish her actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. §§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), (B). Sections 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2) thus reflect Congress' will to modify the miscarriage of justice exception with respect to second-or-successive petitions and the holding of evidentiary hearings in federal court. These provisions do not demonstrate Congress' intent to preclude courts from applying the exception, unmodified, to "the type of petition at issue here"-an untimely first federal habeas petition alleging a gateway actual-innocence claim. House, 547 U.S., at 539, 126 S.Ct. 2064. The more rational inference to draw from Congress' incorporation of a modified version of the miscarriage of justice exception in §§ 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2) is simply this: In a case not governed by those provisions, i.e., a first petition for federal habeas relief, the miscarriage of justice exception survived AEDPA's passage intact and unrestricted. Our reading of the statute is supported by the Court's opinion in Holland ."[E]quitable principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas corpus," Holland reminded, and affirmed that "we will not construe a statute to displace courts' traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command." 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2562 (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of § 2244(d)(1) contains no clear command countering the courts' equitable authority to invoke the miscarriage of justice exception to overcome expiration of the statute of limitations governing a first federal habeas petition. As we observed in Holland, "AEDPA seeks to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process. But AEDPA seeks to do so without undermining basic habeas corpus principles and while seeking to harmonize the new statute with prior law.... When Congress codified new rules governing this previously judicially managed area of law, it did so without losing sight of the fact that the writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights." Id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2562 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). III Having rejected the State's argument that § 2244(d)(1)(D) precludes a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence, we turn to the State's further objection to the Sixth Circuit's opinion. Even if a habeas petitioner asserting a credible claim of actual innocence may overcome AEDPA's statute of limitations, the State argues, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no threshold diligence requirement at all applies to Perkins' petition. While formally distinct from its argument that § 2244(d)(1)(D)'s text forecloses a late-filed claim alleging actual innocence, the State's contention makes scant sense. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) requires a habeas petitioner to file a claim within one year of the time in which new evidence "could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." It would be bizarre to hold that a habeas petitioner who asserts a convincing claim of actual innocence may overcome the statutory time bar § 2244(d)(1)(D) erects, yet simultaneously encounter a court-fashioned diligence barrier to pursuit of her petition. See 670 F.3d, at 673 ("Requiring reasonable diligence effectively makes the concept of the actual innocence gateway redundant, since petitioners ... seek [an equitable exception only] when they were not reasonably diligent in complying with § 2244(d)(1)(D)."). While we reject the State's argument that habeas petitioners who assert convincing actual-innocence claims must prove diligence to cross a federal court's threshold, we hold that the Sixth Circuit erred to the extent that it eliminated timing as a factor relevant in evaluating the reliability of a petitioner's proof of innocence. To invoke the miscarriage of justice exception to AEDPA's statute of limitations, we repeat, a petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence." Schlup, 513 U.S., at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. Unexplained delay in presenting new evidence bears on the determination whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing. Perkins so acknowledges. See Brief for Respondent 52 (unjustified delay may figure in determining "whether a petitioner has made a sufficient showing of innocence"). As we stated in Schlup, "[a] court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of [a petitioner's] affiants bear on the probable reliability of ... evidence [of actual innocence]." 513 U.S., at 332, 115 S.Ct. 851. See also House, 547 U.S., at 537, 126 S.Ct. 2064. Considering a petitioner's diligence, not discretely, but as part of the assessment whether actual innocence has been convincingly shown, attends to the State's concern that it will be prejudiced by a prisoner's untoward delay in proffering new evidence. The State fears that a prisoner might "lie in wait and use stale evidence to collaterally attack his conviction ... when an elderly witness has died and cannot appear at a hearing to rebut new evidence." Brief for Petitioner 25. The timing of such a petition, however, should seriously undermine the credibility of the actual-innocence claim. Moreover, the deceased witness' prior testimony, which would have been subject to cross-examination, could be introduced in the event of a new trial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (recognizing exception to the Confrontation Clause where witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination). And frivolous petitions should occasion instant dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4. Focusing on the merits of a petitioner's actual-innocence claim and taking account of delay in that context, rather than treating timeliness as a threshold inquiry, is tuned to the rationale underlying the miscarriage of justice exception-i.e., ensuring "that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons." Herrera, 506 U.S., at 404, 113 S.Ct. 853. IV We now return to the case at hand. The District Court proceeded properly in first determining that Perkins' claim was filed well beyond AEDPA's limitations period and that equitable tolling was unavailable to Perkins because he could demonstrate neither exceptional circumstances nor diligence. See supra, at 1930. The District Court then found that Perkins' alleged newly discovered evidence, i.e., the information contained in the three affidavits, was "substantially available to [Perkins] at trial." App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. Moreover, the proffered evidence, even if "new," was hardly adequate to show that, had it been presented at trial, no reasonable juror would have convicted Perkins. Id., at 30a-31a. The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the question whether reasonable diligence is a precondition to reliance on actual innocence as a gateway to adjudication of a federal habeas petition on the merits. We have explained that untimeliness, although not an unyielding ground for dismissal of a petition, does bear on the credibility of evidence proffered to show actual innocence. On remand, the District Court's appraisal of Perkins' petition as insufficient to meet Schlup 's actual-innocence standard should be dispositive, absent cause, which we do not currently see, for the Sixth Circuit to upset that evaluation. We stress once again that the Schlup standard is demanding. The gateway should open only when a petition presents "evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error." 513 U.S., at 316, 115 S.Ct. 851. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Sixth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join, and with whom Justice ALITO joins as to Parts I, II, and III, dissenting. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that a "1-year period of limitation shall apply" to a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The gaping hole in today's opinion for the Court is its failure to answer the crucial question upon which all else depends: What is the source of the Court's power to fashion what it concedes is an "exception" to this clear statutory command? That question is unanswered because there is no answer. This Court has no such power, and not one of the cases cited by the opinion says otherwise. The Constitution vests legislative power only in Congress, which never enacted the exception the Court creates today. That inconvenient truth resolves this case. I A "Actual innocence" has, until today, been an exception only to judge-made, prudential barriers to habeas relief, or as a means of channeling judges' statutorily conferred discretion not to apply a procedural bar. Never before have we applied the exception to circumvent a categorical statutory bar to relief. We have not done so because we have no power to do so. Where Congress has erected a constitutionally valid barrier to habeas relief, a court cannot decline to give it effect. Before AEDPA, the Supreme Court had developed an array of doctrines, see, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (procedural default); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (abuse of the writ), to limit the habeas practice that it had radically expanded in the early or mid-20th century to include review of the merits of conviction and not merely jurisdiction of the convicting court, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475-478, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915) ); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533-534, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L.Rev. 441, 483-499 (1963). For example, the doctrine of procedural default holds that a state prisoner's default of his federal claims "in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule" bars federal habeas review of those claims. Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). That doctrine is not a statutory or jurisdictional command; rather, it is a "prudential" rule "grounded in 'considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice.' " Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-393, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004) (quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-539, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976) ). And what courts have created, courts can modify. One judge-made exception to procedural default allows a petitioner to proceed where he can demonstrate "cause" for the default and "prejudice." See Coleman, supra, at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546 As relevant here, we have also expressed a willingness to excuse a petitioner's default, even absent a showing of cause, "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) ; see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) ; House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-537, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). There is nothing inherently inappropriate (as opposed to merely unwise) about judge-created exceptions to judge-made barriers to relief. Procedural default, for example, raises "no question of a federal district court's power to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus." Francis,supra, at 538, 96 S.Ct. 1708. Where a petitioner would, but for a judge-made doctrine like procedural default, have a good habeas claim, it offends no command of Congress's for a federal court to consider the petition. But that free-and-easy approach has no place where a statutory bar to habeas relief is at issue. "[T]he power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written law," Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 94, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.), and "judgments about the proper scope of the writ are 'normally for Congress to make,' " Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996) ). One would have thought it too obvious to mention that this Court is duty bound to enforce AEDPA, not amend it. B Because we have no "equitable" power to discard statutory barriers to habeas relief, we cannot simply extend judge-made exceptions to judge-made barriers into the statutory realm. The Court's insupportable leap from judge-made procedural bars to all procedural bars, including statutory bars, does all the work in its opinion-and there is not a whit of precedential support for it. McCleskey v. Zant applied a "miscarriage of justice" exception to the judge-made abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. 499 U.S., at 487-489, 495, 111 S.Ct. 1454.Coleman v. Thompson and Murray v. Carrier applied it to the judge-made procedural-default doctrine. 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 477 U.S., at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), applied it to a variant of procedural default: a state prisoner's failure adequately to develop material facts in state court. Id., at 8, 112 S.Ct. 1715. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), a plurality opinion, applied it to a statute that merely said lower federal courts "need not" entertain successive petitions, thus leaving them with "discretion to entertain successive petitions under some circumstances." Id., at 449, 451, 106 S.Ct. 2616 (emphasis added). Not one of the cases on which the Court relies today supports the extraordinary premise that courts can create out of whole cloth an exception to a statutory bar to relief. The opinion for the Court also trots out post-AEDPA cases to prove the irrelevant point that "[t]he miscarriage of justice exception ... survived AEDPA's passage." Ante, at 1930 - 1931. What it ignores, yet again, is that after AEDPA's passage, as before, the exception applied only to nonstatutory obstacles to relief. Bousley v. United States and House v. Bell were applications of the judge-made doctrine of procedural default. See Bousley, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) ; id., at 625, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree with the Court's central holding ... that none of its judge-made rules foreclose petitioner's collateral attack ..." (emphasis added)); id., at 630, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (SCALIA, J., dissenting); House, 547 U.S., at 522, 126 S.Ct. 2064. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998), a non-AEDPA case, involved the courts of appeals' "inherent power to recall their mandates, subject to review for an abuse of discretion," id., at 549, 118 S.Ct. 1489; it stands only for the proposition that the miscarriage-of-justice exception is an appropriate " 'means of channeling' " that discretion, id., at 559, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (quoting McCleskey, supra, at 496, 111 S.Ct. 1454). The Court's opinion, in its way, acknowledges the dearth of precedential support for its holding. "Prior to AEDPA," it concedes, "this Court had not ruled that a credible claim of actual innocence could supersede a federal statute of limitations." Ante, at 1934, n. 2. Its explanation for this lack of precedent is that before AEDPA, "petitions for federal habeas relief were not governed by any statute of limitations." Ibid. That is true but utterly unprobative. There are many statutory bars to relief other than statutes of limitations, and we had never (and before today, have never) created an actual-innocence exception to any of them. The reason why is obvious: Judicially amending a validly enacted statute in this way is a flagrant breach of the separation of powers. II The Court has no qualms about transgressing such a basic principle. It does not even attempt to cloak its act of judicial legislation in the pretense that it is merely construing the statute; indeed, it freely admits that its opinion recognizes an "exception" that the statute does not contain. Ante, at 1931. And it dismisses, with a series of transparent non sequiturs, Michigan's overwhelming textual argument that the statute provides no such exception and envisions none. The key textual point is that two provisions of § 2244, working in tandem, provide a comprehensive path to relief for an innocent prisoner who has newly discovered evidence that supports his constitutional claim. Section 2244(d)(1)(D) gives him a fresh year in which to file, starting on "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence," while § 2244(b)(2)(B) lifts the bar on second or successive petitions. Congress clearly anticipated the scenario of a habeas petitioner with a credible innocence claim and addressed it by crafting an exception (and an exception, by the way, more restrictive than the one that pleases the Court today). One cannot assume that Congress left room for other, judge-made applications of the actual-innocence exception, any more than one would add another gear to a Swiss watch on the theory that the watchmaker surely would have included it if he had thought of it. In both cases, the intricate craftsmanship tells us that the designer arranged things just as he wanted them. The Court's feeble rejoinder is that its (judicially invented) version of the "actual innocence" exception applies only to a "severely confined category" of cases. Ante, at 1932 - 1933. Since cases qualifying for the actual-innocence exception will be rare, it explains, the statutory path for innocent petitioners will not "be rendered superfluous." Ibid . That is no answer at all. That the Court's exception would not entirely frustrate Congress's design does not weaken the force of the State's argument that Congress addressed the issue comprehensively and chose to exclude dilatory prisoners like respondent. By the Court's logic, a statute banning littering could simply be deemed to contain an exception for cigarette butts; after all, the statute as thus amended would still cover something . That is not how a court respectful of the separation of powers should interpret statutes. Even more bizarre is the Court's concern that applying AEDPA's statute of limitations without recognizing an atextual actual-innocence exception would "accord greater force to a federal deadline than to a similarly designed state deadline." Ante, at 1932; see also ante, at 1934, n. 2. The Court terms that outcome "passing strange," ante, at 1932, but it is not strange at all. Only federal statutes of limitations bind federal habeas courts with the force of law; a state statute of limitations is given effect on federal habeas review only by virtue of the judge-made doctrine of procedural default. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 730-731, 111 S.Ct. 2546. With its eye firmly fixed on something it likes-a shiny new exception to a statute unloved in the best circles-the Court overlooks this basic distinction, which would not trouble a second-year law student armed with a copy of Hart & Wechsler. The Court simply ignores basic legal principles where they pose an obstacle to its policy-driven, free-form improvisation. The Court's statutory-construction blooper reel does not end there. Congress's express inclusion of innocence-based exceptions in two neighboring provisions of the Act confirms, one would think, that there is no actual-innocence exception to § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(b)(2)(B), as already noted, lifts the bar on claims presented in second or successive petitions where "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through ... due diligence" and "the facts underlying the claim ... would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found" the petitioner guilty. Section 2254(e)(2) permits a district court to hold an evidentiary hearing where a diligent state prisoner's claim relies on new facts that "would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found" him guilty. Ordinarily, we would draw from the express enumeration of these two actual-innocence exceptions the inference that no others were intended. The Court's twisting path to the contrary conclusion is not easy to follow, but I will try. In the Court's view, the key fact here is that these two provisions of AEDPA codified what had previously been judge-made barriers to relief and applied to them a stricter actual-innocence standard than the courts had been applying. See ante, at 1933 - 1934. From this, the Court reasons that Congress made a conscious choice not also to apply the more restrictive actual-innocence standard to the statute of limitations. Ergo, the Court concludes, we are free to apply the more lenient version of the actual-innocence exception. Ante, at 1933 - 1934. That clever account ignores the background against which Congress legislated. Of course Congress did not "constrain" application of the actual-innocence exception to the statute of limitations. It felt no need to do so, because it had no reason whatsoever to suspect that any version of the exception would apply to the statute of limitations. The collective efforts of respondent and the majority have turned up not a single instance where this Court has applied the actual-innocence exception to any statutory barrier to habeas relief, much less to a statute of limitations. See Part I-B, supra . What has been said of equitable tolling applies in spades to non-tolling judicial inventions: "Congress cannot intend to incorporate, by silence, various forms of equitable tolling that were not generally recognized in the common law at the time of enactment." Bain & Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 Creighton L.Rev. 493, 503 (2004). The only conceivable relevance of §§ 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2) is (1) as we have said, that no other actual-innocence exception was intended, and (2) that if Congress had anticipated that this Court would amend § 2244(d)(1) to add an actual-innocence exception (which it surely did not), it would have desired the more stringent formulation and not the expansive formulation applied today, which it specifically rejected for those other provisions. III Three years ago, in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010), we held that AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. That holding offers no support for importing a novel actual-innocence exception. Equitable tolling-extending the deadline for a filing because of an event or circumstance that deprives the filer, through no fault of his own, of the full period accorded by the statute-seeks to vindicate what might be considered the genuine intent of the statute. By contrast, suspending the statute because of a separate policy that the court believes should trump it ("actual innocence") is a blatant overruling. Moreover, the doctrine of equitable tolling is centuries old, and dates from a time when the separation of the legislative and judicial powers was incomplete. See, e.g., Bree v. Holbech, 2 Doug. 655, 656 (1781) (Mansfield, J.); South-Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 24 E.R. 1004, 3 P. Wms. 143, 144 (1732); Booth v. Warrington, 2 E.R. 111, 112-113, 4 Bro. P.C. 163, 165-166 (1714); see also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) ; Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 446-447, 38 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed. 1200 (1918) ; Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1875) ; Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1304-1305 (No. 12,782) (C.C.D.N.H.1828) (Story, J.); Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates 109 (Pa.1804). As Professor Manning has explained, until the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Crown retained " pretensions to independent legislative authority, and English judges continued to serve as the Crown's agents, in theory and practice a component of the executive. Given these conditions, which distinguish the old English from the American constitutional context, it is not surprising to find a similarly indistinct line between appropriate legislative and judicial functions in matters of interpretation." Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L.Rev. 1, 36-37 (2001) (footnote omitted). Thus, the doctrine of the equity of the statute, of which equitable tolling was an example, was reflected in Blackstone's Commentaries "two-thirds of the way through the eighteenth century." Manning, supra, at 52. American courts' later adoption of the English equitable-tolling practice need not be regarded as a violation of the separation of powers, but can be seen as a reasonable assumption of genuine legislative intent. Colonial legislatures would have assumed that equitable tolling would attend any statute of limitations they adopted. In any case, equitable tolling surely represents such a reasonable assumption today. "It is hornbook law that limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling, unless tolling would be inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute. Congress must be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background principle." Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49-50, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists? 106 Colum. L.Rev. 70, 81-82, and n. 42 (2006). Congress, being well aware of the longstanding background presumption of equitable tolling, "may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so." Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). The majority and dissenting opinions in Holland disputed whether that presumption had been overcome, but all agreed that the presumption existed and was a legitimate tool for construing statutes of limitations. See Holland, 560 U.S., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2560-2561 ; id., at ----, 130 S.Ct., at 2554 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Here, by contrast, the Court has ambushed Congress with an utterly unprecedented (and thus unforeseeable) maneuver. Congressional silence, "while permitting an inference that Congress intended to apply ordinary background" principles, "cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of those rules." Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003). Because there is no plausible basis for inferring that Congress intended or could have anticipated this exception, its adoption here amounts to a pure judicial override of the statute Congress enacted. "It is wrong for us to reshape" AEDPA "on the very lathe of judge-made habeas jurisprudence it was designed to repair." Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 647, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). "It would be marvellously inspiring to be able to boast that we have a criminal-justice system in which a claim of 'actual innocence' will always be heard, no matter how late it is brought forward, and no matter how much the failure to bring it forward at the proper time is the defendant's own fault." Bousley, 523 U.S., at 635, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). I suspect it is this vision of perfect justice through abundant procedure that impels the Court today. Of course, "we do not have such a system, and no society unwilling to devote unlimited resources to repetitive criminal litigation ever could." Ibid. Until today, a district court could dismiss an untimely petition without delving into the underlying facts. From now on, each time an untimely petitioner claims innocence-and how many prisoners asking to be let out of jail do not?-the district court will be obligated to expend limited judicial resources wading into the murky merits of the petitioner's innocence claim. The Court notes "that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare." Ante, at 1928. That discouraging reality, intended as reassurance, is in truth "the condemnation of the procedure which has encouraged frivolous cases." Brown, 344 U.S., at 537, 73 S.Ct. 397 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). It has now been 60 years since Brown v. Allen, in which we struck the Faustian bargain that traded the simple elegance of the common-law writ of habeas corpus for federal-court power to probe the substantive merits of state-court convictions. Even after AEDPA's pass through the Augean stables, no one in a position to observe the functioning of our byzantine federal-habeas system can believe it an efficient device for separating the truly deserving from the multitude of prisoners pressing false claims. " [F]loods of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own.... It must prejudice the occasional meritorious applicant to be buried in a flood of worthless ones." Id., at 536-537, 73 S.Ct. 397. The "inundation" that Justice Jackson lamented in 1953 "consisted of 541" federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L.Rev. 142, 143 (1970). By 1969, that number had grown to 7,359. Ibid. In the year ending on September 30, 2012, 15,929 such petitions were filed. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts 3 (Sept. 30, 2012) (Table C-2). Today's decision piles yet more dead weight onto a postconviction habeas system already creaking at its rusted joints. I respectfully dissent. In House, we rejected the analogous argument that AEDPA replaced the standard for actual-innocence gateway claims prescribed in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence"), with a "clear and convincing" evidence requirement. 547 U.S., at 539, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (internal quotation marks omitted). As here, the State relied on §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and 2254(e)(2) to support its argument. But "[n]either provision address[ed] the type of petition at issue ... [,] a first federal habeas petition seeking consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence." Ibid. Consequently, we held inapplicable to first petitions the stricter standard AEDPA prescribed for second-or-successive petitions. Ibid. Prior to AEDPA, it is true, this Court had not ruled that a credible claim of actual innocence could supersede a federal statute of limitations. The reason why that is so is evident: Pre-AEDPA, petitions for federal habeas relief were not governed by any statute of limitations. Notably, we said in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), that a petitioner who failed to comply with a timeliness requirement in state court could nevertheless plead her claims on the merits in federal court if she could show that "failure to consider the claims [would] result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. For eight pages, the dissent stridently insists that federal (although not state) statutes of limitations allow no exceptions not contained in the text. Well, not quite so, the dissent ultimately acknowledges. Post, at 1940 - 1941. Even AEDPA's statute of limitations, the dissent admits, is subject to equitable tolling. But that is because equitable tolling "can be seen as a reasonable assumption of genuine legislative intent." Post, at 1941. Why is it not an equally reasonable assumption that Congress would want a limitations period to yield when what is at stake is a State's incarceration of an individual for a crime, it has become clear, no reasonable person would find he committed? For all its bluster, the dissent agrees with the Court on a crucial point: Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law. Post, at 1941 - 1942. At the time of AEDPA's enactment, multiple decisions of this Court applied the miscarriage of justice exception to overcome various threshold barriers to relief. See supra, at 1931 - 1932. It is hardly "unprecedented," therefore, to conclude that "Congress intended or could have anticipated [a miscarriage of justice] exception" when it enacted AEDPA. Post, at 1941 - 1942. We note one caveat: A showing that delay was part of a deliberate attempt to manipulate the case, say by waiting until a key prosecution witness died or was deported, might raise a different ground for withholding equitable relief. No such contention was presented here, however, so we do not discuss the point. If the Court is really troubled by this disparity, there is a way to resolve it that is consistent with the separation of powers: Revise our judge-made procedural-default doctrine to give absolute preclusive effect to state statutes of limitations. The Court concedes that "Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law," but protests that "[a]t the time of AEDPA's enactment, multiple decisions of this Court applied the miscarriage of justice exception to overcome various threshold barriers to relief." Ante, at 1935, n. 3. That is right, of course, but only at an uninformative level of generality; the relevant inquiry is, to which barriers had we applied the exception? Whistling past the graveyard, the Court refuses to engage with this question. * * *

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILL v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE et al. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN No. 87-1207. Argued December 5, 1988 Decided June 15, 1989 William Burnham argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Clark Cunningham, Paul D. Rein-gold, John A. Powell, Helen Hershkoff, and Steven R. Shapiro. George H. Weller, Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Thomas L. Casey, Assistant Solicitor General. William A. Bradford, Jr., Conrad K. Harper, Stuart J. Land, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, and Antonia Hernandez filed a brief for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Tennessee et al. by W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael W. Catalano, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, John Van de Kamp of California, Duane Woodard of Colorado, Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly of Delaware, Robert Buttenvorth of Florida, Warren Pries III of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, Frederic J. Cowan of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Mike Gt'eely of Montana, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Stephen E. Merrill of New Hampshire, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Nicholas Spaeth of North Dakota, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Robert Henry of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Hector Rivera-Cruz of Puerto Rico, Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Jeffrey Amestoy of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, Charlie Brown of West Virginia, Don J. Hanaway of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; and for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Kenneth S. Geller, and Andreiv J. Pincus. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a State, or an official of the State while acting in his or her official capacity, is a “person” within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Petitioner Ray Will filed suit in Michigan Circuit Court alleging various violations of the United States and Michigan Constitutions as grounds for a claim under §1983. He alleged that he had been denied a promotion to a data systems analyst position with the Department of State Police for an improper reason, that is, because his brother had been a student activist and the subject of a “red squad” file maintained by respondent. Named as defendants were the Department of State Police and the Director of State Police in his official capacity, also a respondent here. The Circuit Court remanded the case to the Michigan Civil Service Commission for a grievance hearing. While the grievance was pending, petitioner filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims raising an essentially identical § 1983 claim. The Civil Service Commission ultimately found in petitioner’s favor, ruling that respondents had refused to promote petitioner because of “partisan considerations.” App. 46. On the basis of that finding, the state-court judge, acting in both the Circuit Court and the Court of Claims cases, concluded that petitioner had established a violation of the United States Constitution. The judge held that the Circuit Court action was barred under state law but that the Claims Court action could go forward. The judge also ruled that respondents were persons for purposes of § 1983. The Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the judgment against the Department of State Police, holding that a State is not a person under § 1983, but remanded the case for determination of the possible immunity of the Director of State Police from liability for damages. The Michigan Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N. W. 2d 749 (1987). The Supreme Court agreed that the State itself is not a person under § 1983, but held that a state official acting in his or her official capacity also is not such a person. The Michigan Supreme Court’s holding that a State is not a person under § 1983 conflicts with a number of state- and federal-court decisions to the contrary. We granted certio-rari to resolve the conflict. 485 U. S. 1005 (1988). Prior to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 668 (1978), the question whether a State is a person within the meaning of § 1983 had been answered by this Court in the negative. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), the Court had held that a municipality was not a person under § 1983. “[T]hat being the case,” we reasoned, § 1983 “could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 446, 452 (1976). But in Monell, the Court overruled Monroe, holding that a municipality was a person under § 1983. 436 U. S., at 690. Since then, various members of the Court have debated whether a State is a person within the meaning of § 1983, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 700-704 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 708, n. 6 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but this Court has never expressly dealt with that issue. Some courts, including the Michigan Supreme Court here, have construed our decision in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), as holding by implication that a State is not a person under § 1983. See Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, supra, at 581, 410 N. W. 2d, at 767. See also, e. g., State v. Green, 633 P. 2d 1381, 1382 (Alaska 1981); Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 44-45, n. 7, 423 N. E. 2d 782, 786, n. 7 (1981); Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 221, 595 P. 2d 534, 537 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1077 (1980). Quern held that §1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, a holding that the concurrence suggested was “patently dicta” to the effect that a State is not a person, 440 U. S., at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Petitioner filed the present § 1983 actions in Michigan state court, which places the question whether a State is a person under § 1983 squarely before us since the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 9, n. 7 (1980). For the reasons that follow, we reaffirm today what we had concluded prior to Monell and what some have considered implicit in Quern: that a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. We observe initially that if a State is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, the section is to be read as saying that “every person, including a State, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects . . . .” That would be a decidedly awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability. At the very least, reading the statute in this way is not so clearly indicated that it provides reason to depart from the often-expressed understanding that “fin common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’” Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941)). See also United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947). This approach is particularly applicable where it is claimed that Congress has subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before. In Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, supra, we followed this rule in construing the phrase “white person” contained in 25 U. S. C. § 194, enacted as Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, as not including the “sovereign States of the Union.” 442 U. S., at 667. This common usage of the term “person” provides a strong indication that “person” as used in § 1983 likewise does not include a State. The language of § 1983 also falls far short of satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the “usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,” it must make its intention to do so “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 99 (1984). Atascadero was an Eleventh Amendment case, but a similar approach is applied in other contexts. Congress should make its intention “clear and manifest” if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), or if it intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 16 (1981); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207 (1987). “In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971). Our conclusion that a State is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 is reinforced by Congress’ purpose in enacting the statute. Congress enacted § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the precursor .to § 1983, shortly after the end of the Civil War “in response to the widespread deprivations of civil rights in the Southern States and the inability or unwillingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights or punish wrongdoers.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 147 (1988). Although Congress did not establish federal courts as the exclusive forum to remedy these deprivations, ibid., it is plain that “Congress assigned to the federal courts a paramount role” in this endeavor, Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 503 (1982). Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U. S. 468, 472-473 (1987) (plurality opinion), or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. That Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the federal-state balance in that respect was made clear in our decision in Quern. Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did not provide such a federal forum for civil rights claims against States, we cannot accept petitioner’s argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create a cause of action against States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through § 1983. This does not mean, as petitioner suggests, that we think that the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are not separate issues. Certainly they are. But in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading of § 1983 that disregards it. Our conclusion is further supported by our holdings that in enacting §1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law. “One important assumption underlying the Court’s decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.” Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258 (1981). Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, 356 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967); and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951), are also to this effect. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at common law. “The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 339 (1880). It is an “established principle of jurisprudence” that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858). We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its consent. The legislative history of § 1983 does not suggest a different conclusion. Petitioner contends that the congressional debates on § 1 of the 1871 Act indicate that § 1983 was intended to extend to the full reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby to provide a remedy “ ‘against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.”’ Brief for Petitioner 16 (quoting Monell, 436 U. S., at 700-701). He refers us to various parts of the vigorous debates accompanying the passage of § 1983 and revealing that it was the failure of the States to take appropriate action that was undoubtedly the motivating force behind § 1983. The inference must be drawn, it is urged, that Congress must have intended to subject the States themselves to liability. But the intent of Congress to provide a remedy for unconstitutional state action does not without more include the sovereign States among those persons against whom § 1983 actions would lie. Construing § 1983 as a remedy for “official violation of federally protected rights” does no more than confirm that the section is directed against state action — action “under color of” state law. It does not suggest that the State itself was a person that Congress intended to be subject to liability. Although there were sharp and heated debates, the discussion of § 1 of the bill, which contained the present § 1983, was not extended. And although in other respects the impact on state sovereignty was much talked about, no one suggested that § 1 would subject the States themselves to a damages suit under federal law. Quern, 440 U. S., at 343. There was complaint that § 1 would subject state officers to damages liability, but no suggestion that it would also expose the States themselves. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 366, 385 (1871). We find nothing substantial in the legislative history that leads us to believe that Congress intended that the word “person” in § 1983 included the States of the Union. And surely nothing in the debates rises to the clearly expressed legislative intent necessary to permit that construction. Likewise, the Act of Feb. 25, 1871, §2, 16 Stat. 431 (the “Dictionary Act”), on which we relied in Monell, supra, at 688-689, does not counsel a contrary conclusion here. As we noted in Quern, that Act, while adopted prior to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was adopted after §2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1 of the 1871 Act was derived. 440 U. S., at 341, n. 11. Moreover, we disagree with Justice Brennan that at the time the Dictionary Act was passed “the phrase ‘bodies politic and corporate’ was understood to include the States.” Post, at 78. Rather, an examination of authorities of the era suggests that the phrase was used to mean corporations, both private and public (municipal), and not to include the States. In our view, the Dictionary Act, like § 1983 itself and its legislative history, fails to evidence a clear congressional intent that States be held liable. Finally, Monell itself is not to the contrary. True, prior to Monell the Court had reasoned that -if municipalities were not persons then surely States also were not. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S., at 452. And Monell overruled Monroe, undercutting that logic. But it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States. States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not, Monell, 436 U. S., at 690, n. 54, and we consequently limited our holding in Monell “to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” ibid. Conversely, our holding here does not cast any doubt on Monell, and applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977). Petitioner asserts, alternatively, that state officials should be considered “persons” under § 1983 even though acting in their official capacities. In this case, petitioner named as defendant not only the Michigan Department of State Police but also the Director of State Police in his official capacity. Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464, 471 (1985). As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. See, e. g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165-166 (1985); Monell, supra, at 690, n. 55. We see no reason to adopt a different rule in the present context, particularly when such a rule would allow petitioner to circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading device. We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. The judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Section 1983 provides as follows: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.” 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Also named as defendants were the Michigan Department of Civil Service and the State Personnel Director, but those parties were subsequently dismissed by the state courts. The courts in the following cases have taken the position that a State is a person under § 1983. See Della Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F. 2d 343, 349 (CA1 1986); Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University, 612 F. 2d 160, 163-164 (CA5), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1034 (1980); Uberoi v. University of Colorado, 713 P. 2d 894, 900-901 (Colo. 1986); Stanton v. Godfrey, 415 N. E. 2d 103, 107 (Ind. App. 1981); Gumbhir v. Kansas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 231 Kan. 507, 512-513, 646 P. 2d 1078, 1084 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1103 (1983); Rahmah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 104 N. M. 302, 310, 720 P. 2d 1243, 1251 (App.), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 940 (1986). A larger number of courts have agreed with the Michigan Supreme Court that a State is not a person under § 1983. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F. 2d 1115, 1137 (CA5), modified on other grounds, 688 F. 2d 266 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1042 (1983); Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. Ilinois, 744 F. 2d 1296, 1298-1299, and n. 1 (CA7 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1051 (1985); Harris v. Missouri Court of Appeals, 787 F. 2d 427, 429 (CA8), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 851 (1986); Aubuchon v. Missouri, 631 F. 2d 581, 582 (CA8 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 915 (1981); State v. Green, 633 P. 2d 1381, 1382 (Alaska 1981); St. Mary’s Hospital and Health Center v. State, 150 Ariz. 8, 11, 721 P. 2d 666, 669 (App. 1986); Mezey v. State, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1065, 208 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (1984); Hill v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 513 So. 2d 129, 132 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1064 (1988); Merritt ex rel. Merritt v. State, 108 Idaho 20, 26, 696 P. 2d 871, 877 (1985); Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 44-45, n. 7, 423 N. E. 2d 782, 786, n. 7 (1981); Bird v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 375 N. W. 2d 36, 43 (Minn. App. 1985); Shaw v. St. Louis, 664 S. W. 2d 572, 576 (Mo. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 849 (1984); Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N. J. 319, 323-324, 537 A. 2d 652, 654, cert. denied, 488 U. S. 826 (1988); Burkey v. Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 38 Ohio App. 3d 170, 170-171, 528 N. E. 2d 607, 608 (1988); Gay v. State, 730 S. W. 2d 154, 157-158 (Tex. App. 1987); Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 221, 595 P. 2d 534, 537 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1077 (1980); Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 584, 305 N. W. 2d 133, 143-144, cert. denied, 454 U. S. 973 (1981). Petitioner cites a number of cases from this Court that he asserts have “assumed” that a State is a person. Those cases include ones in which a State has been sued by name under § 1983, see, e. g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), various eases awarding attorney’s fees against a State or a state agency, Maine v. Thiboutot, supra; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), and various cases discussing the waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by States, see, e. g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 167, n. 14 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). But the Court did not address the meaning of person in any of those cases, and in none of the eases was resolution of that issue necessary to the decision. Petitioner’s argument evidently rests on the proposition that whether a State is a person under § 1983 is “jurisdictional” and “thus could have been raised by the Court on its own motion” in those cases. Brief for Petitioner 25, n. 15. Even assuming that petitioner’s premise and characterization of the cases is correct, “this Court has never considered itself bound [by prior sub silentio holdings] when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 535, n. 5 (1974). Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U. S. 160 (1983), on which petitioner relies, is fully reconcilable with our holding in the present case. In Jefferson County, the Court held that States were persons that could be sued under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 13(a) and 13(f). 460 U. S., at 155-157. But the plaintiff there was seeking only injunctive relief and not damages against the State defendant, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama; the District Court had dismissed the plaintiff’s damages claim as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 153, n. 5. Had the present § 1983 action been brought in federal court, a similar disposition would have resulted. Of course, the Court would never be faced with a case such as Jefferson County that had been brought in a state court because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims under the federal antitrust laws. 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26. Moreover, the Court in Jefferson County was careful to limit its holding to “state purchases for the purpose of competing against private enterprise ... in the retail market.” 460 U. S., at 154. It assumed without deciding “that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to state purchases for consumption in traditional governmental functions,” ibid., which presents a more difficult question because it may well “affec[t] the federal balance.” See United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971). . Petitioner argues that Congress would not have considered the Eleventh Amendment in enacting § 1983 because in 1871 this Court had not yet held that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal-question cases against States in federal court. This argument is no more than an attempt to have this Court reconsider Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), which we decline to do. Our recognition in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), that a municipality is a person under § 1983, is fully consistent with this reasoning. In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980), we noted that by the time of the enactment of § 1983, municipalities no longer retained the sovereign immunity they had previously shared with the States. “[B]y the end of the 19th century, courts regularly held that in imposing a specific duty on the municipality either in its charter or by statute, the State had impliedly withdrawn the city’s immunity from liability for the nonperformance or misperformance of its obligation,” id., at 646, and, as a result, municipalities had been held liable for damages “in a multitude of cases” involving previously immune activities, id., at 646-647. . The Dictionary Act provided that “in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense.” Act of Feb. 25, 1871, §2, 16 Stat. 431. See United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 321 (1877); 1 B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 155 (1879) (“most exact expression” for “public corporation”); W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 127 (1893) (“most exact expression for a public corporation or corporation having powers of government”); Black’s Law Dictionary 143 (1891) (“body politic” is “term applied to a corporation, which is usually designated as a ‘body corporate and politic’ ” and “is particularly appropriate to a public corporation invested with powers and duties of government”); 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 212 (2d ed. 1871) (“body politic” is “term applied to a corporation, which is usually designated as a body corporate and politic”). A public corporation, in ordinary usage, was another term for a municipal corporation, and included towns, cities, and counties, but not States. See 2 Abbott, supra, at 347; Anderson, supra, at 264-265; Black, supra, at 278; 2 Burrill, supra, at 352. Justice BRENNAN appears to confuse this precise definition of the phrase with its use “in a rather loose way,” see Black, supra, at 143, to refer to the state (as opposed to a State). This confusion is revealed most clearly in Justice Brennan’s reliance on the 1979 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “body politic or corporate” as “[a] social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” Post, at 79. To the extent Justice Brennan’s citation of other authorities does not suffer from the same confusion, those authorities at best suggest that the phrase is ambiguous, which still renders the Dictionary Act incapable of supplying the necessary clear intent. Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because “official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S., at 167, n. 14; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159-160 (1908). This distinction is “commonplace in sovereign immunity doctrine,” L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-27, p. 190, n. 3 (2d ed. 1988), and would not have been foreign to the 19th-century Congress that enacted § 1983, see, e. g., In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 506-507 (1887); United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 219-222 (1882); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541 (1876); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824). City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U. S. 507, 513 (1973), on which Justice Stevens relies, see post, at 93, n. 8, is not to the contrary. That case involved municipal liability under § 1983, and the fact that nothing in § 1983 suggests its “bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them,” 412 U. S., at 513, is not surprising, since by the time of the enactment of § 1983 municipalities were no longer protected by sovereign immunity. Supra, at 67-68, n. 7.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ASSOCIATION OF DATA PROCESSING SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, INC., et al. v. CAMP, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, et al. No. 85. Argued November 18, 1969 Decided March 3, 1970 Bert M. Gross argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Milton R. Wessel and Felix M. Phillips. Alan S. Rosenthal argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Camp were Solid- tor General Grisioold, Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus, and Peter L. Strauss. Fallon Kelly filed a brief for respondent American National Bank & Trust Co. Matthew P. Mitchell and Leland R. Selna, Jr., filed a brief for the Sierra Club as amicus curiae urging reversal. Matthew Hale filed a brief for the American Bankers Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners sell data processing services to businesses generally. In this suit they seek to challenge a ruling by respondent Comptroller of the Currency that, as an incident to their banking services, national banks, including respondent American National Bank & Trust Company, may make data processing services available to other banks and to bank customers. The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing of petitioners to bring the suit. 279 F. Supp. 675. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 406 F. 2d 837. The case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted. 395 U. S. 976. Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such. One generalization is, however, necessary and that is that the question of standing, in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework of Article III which restricts judicial power to “cases” and “controversies.” As we recently stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101, “[I]n terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution/' Flast was a taxpayer’s suit. The present is a competitor’s suit. And while the two have the same Article III starting point, they do not necessarily track one another. The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. There can be no doubt but that petitioners have satisfied this test. The petitioners not only allege that competition by national banks in the business of providing data processing services might entail some future loss of profits for the petitioners, they also allege that respondent American National Bank & Trust Company was performing or preparing to perform such services for two customers for whom petitioner Data Systems, Inc., had previously agreed or negotiated to perform such services. The petitioners' suit was brought not only against the American National Bank & Trust Company, but also against the Comptroller of the Currency. The Comptroller was alleged to have caused petitioners injury in fact by his 1966 ruling which stated: “Incidental to its banking services, a national bank may make available its data processing equipment or perform data processing services on such equipment for other banks and bank customers.” Comptroller's Manual for National Banks ¶ 3500 (October 15, 1966). The Court of Appeals viewed the matter differently, stating: “[A] plaintiff may challenge alleged illegal competition when as complainant it pursues (1) a legal interest by reason of public charter or contract, . . . (2) a legal interest by reason of statutory protection, ... or (3) a ‘public interest’ in which Congress has recognized the need for review of administrative action and plaintiff is significantly involved to have standing to represent the public . . . .” 406 F. 2d, at 842-843. Those tests were based on prior decisions of this Court, such as Tennessee Power Co. v. TV A, 306 U. S. 118, where private power companies sought to enjoin TVA from operating, claiming that the statutory plan under which it was created was unconstitutional. The Court denied the competitors’ standing, holding that they did not have that status “unless the right invaded is a legal right,— one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.” Id., at 137-138. The “legal interest” test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the “case” or “controversy” test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Thus the Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person “aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5 U. S. C. § 702 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). That interest, at times, may reflect “aesthetic, conservational, and recreational” as well as economic values. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F. 2d 608, 616; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 328, 334-340, 359 F. 2d 994, 1000-1006. A person or a family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203. We mention these noneconomic values to emphasize that standing may stem from them as well as from the economic injury on which petitioners rely here. Certainly he who is “likely to be financially” injured, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477, may be a reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest in the present case. Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of standing, as resolved by this Court for its own governance, have involved a “rule of self-restraint.” Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255. Congress can, of course, resolve the question one way or another, save as the requirements of Article III dictate otherwise. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved “persons” is symptomatic of that trend. In a closely analogous case we held that an existing entrepreneur had standing to challenge the legality of the entrance of a newcomer into the business, because the established business was allegedly protected by a valid city ordinance that protected it from unlawful competition. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 83-84. In that tradition was Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, which involved a section of the TVA Act designed primarily to protect, through area limitations, private utilities against TVA competition. We held that no explicit statutory provision was necessary to confer standing, since the private utility bringing suit was within the class of persons that the statutory provision was designed to protect. It is argued that the Chicago case and the Hardin case are relevant here because of § 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1864, which provides: “No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks.” The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F. 2d 1147, 1153, that by reason of § 4 a data processing company has standing to contest the legality of a national bank performing data processing services for other banks and bank customers: “Section 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the service corporations. It was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such a prohibition, the bill would have enabled ‘banks to engage in a nonbanking activity/ S. Rep. No. 2105, [87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-12] (Supplemental views of Senators Proxmire, Douglas, and Neuberger), and thus constitute ‘a serious exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.’ (Supplemental views of Senators Muskie and Clark). We think Congress has provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing even though the competition may not be the precise kind Congress legislated against.” We do not put the issue in those words, for they implicate the merits. We do think, however, that § 4 arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it. That leaves the remaining question, whether judicial review of the Comptroller’s action has been precluded. We do not think it has been. There is great contrariety among administrative agencies created by Congress as respects “the extent to which, and the procedures by which, different measures of control afford judicial review of administrative action.” Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 312 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The answer, of course, depends on the particular enactment under which review is sought. It turns on “the existence of courts and the intent of Congress as deduced from the statutes and precedents.” Id., at 308. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that the provisions of the Act authorizing judicial review apply “except to the extent that — (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). In Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48, 51, we referred to “the generous review provisions” of that Act; and in that case as well as in others (see Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 379-380) we have construed that Act not grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial purpose. We read § 701 (a) as sympathetic to the issue presented in this case. As stated in the House Report: “The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they relate to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41. There is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism (see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140), unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme. Cf. Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297. We find no evidence that Congress in either the Bank Service Corporation Act or the National Bank Act sought to preclude judicial review of administrative rulings by the Comptroller as to the legitimate scope of activities available to national banks under those statutes. Both Acts are clearly “relevant” statutes within the meaning of § 702. The Acts do not in terms protect a specified group. But their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable. It is clear that petitioners, as competitors of national banks which are engaging in data processing services, are within that class of “aggrieved” persons who, under § 702, are entitled to judicial review of “agency action.” Whether anything in the Bank Service Corporation Act or the National Bank Act gives petitioners a “legal interest” that protects them against violations of those Acts, and whether the actions of respondents did in fact violate either of those Acts, are questions which go to the merits and remain to be decided below. We hold that petitioners have standing to sue and that the case should be remanded for a hearing on the merits. Reversed and remanded. [For opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see post, p. 167.] The first two tests applied by the Court of Appeals required a showing of a “legal interest.” But the existence or non-existence of a “legal interest” is a matter quite distinct from the problem of standing. Barlow v. Collins, post, p. 159. The third test mentioned by the Court of Appeals, which rests on an explicit provision in a regulatory statute conferring standing and is commonly referred to in terms of allowing suits by “private attorneys general,” is inapplicable to the present case. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470; Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, vacated on suggestion of mootness, 320 U. S. 707. Petitioners allege that the Comptroller’s ruling violates the National Bank Act, Rev. Stat. § 5136, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh, which provides that national banks have power to exercise “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.” We intimate no view, under the decisions rendered today here and in Barlow v. Collins, supra, on the issue of standing involved in No. 835, National Association of Securities Dealers v. SEC, and No. 843, Investment Company Institute v. Camp, now pending on petitions for writs of certiorari.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. WITKOVICH. No. 295. Argued February 28, 1957. Decided April 29, 1957. John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and J. F. Bishop. Pearl M. Hart argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Cyril D. Robinson. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellee was indicted under § 242 (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 208, originally part of § 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1010, on the charge that, as an alien against whom a final order of deportation had been outstanding for more than six months, he had wilfully failed to give information to the Immigration and Naturalization Service as required by that section. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds, inter alia, that it failed to state an offense within the statute and in the alternative, if it did so, that the statute was unconstitutional. The District Court held that the statute as construed by it was not unconstitutional. 140 F. Supp. 815. Thereupon the United States filed a motion for clarification of the court’s opinion, and appellee filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the statute as construed by the district judge did not authorize the Government to elicit the demanded information. The District Court, in a second opinion, dismissed the indictment for failure to state an offense. 140 F. Supp., at 820. The case was brought here, 352 U. S. 817, under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3731. The Section, as amended, 68 Stat. 1232, 8 U. S. C. (Supp. II) § 1252 (d), is as follows: “(d) Any alien, against whom a final order of deportation as defined in subsection (c) heretofore or hereafter issued has been outstanding for more than six months, shall, pending eventual deportation, be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Such regulations shall include provisions which will require any alien subject to supervision (1) to appear from time to time before an immigration officer for identification; (2) to submit, if necessary, to medical and psychiatric examination at the expense of the United States; (3) to give information under oath as to his nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities, and such other information, whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper; and (4) to conform to such reasonable written restrictions on his conduct or activities as are prescribed by the Attorney General in his case. Any alien who shall willfully fail to comply with such regulations, or willfully fail to appear or to give information or submit to medical or psychiatric examination if required, or knowingly give false information in relation to the requirements of such regulations, or knowingly violate a reasonable restriction imposed upon his conduct or activity, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” The District Court construed § 242 (d) as conferring upon the Attorney General “power to supervise the alien to make sure he is available for deportation, and no further power.” Accordingly, it held that clause (3) of this subsection is to be restricted to require only “such information as is necessary to enable the Attorney General to be certain that the alien is holding himself in readiness to answer the call to be deported when it comes.” 140 F. Supp., at 819-820. The court found that the questions listed in the indictment, which are set forth in the margin, were not relevant to appellee’s availability for deportation. The interpretation that the District Court thus placed on § 242 (d) was derived from a consideration of its relation to the entire statutory scheme of deportation of which it is a part. The court below was further guided by the principle that requires courts, when construing statutes, to avoid constitutional doubts. “To hold that the statute intended to give an official the unlimited right to subject a man to criminal penalties for failure to answer absolutely any question the official may decide to ask would raise very serious constitutional questions.” Id., at 821. The Government does not support the questions put to the alien on the basis of the construction that the District Court placed upon § 242 (d). This construction authorizes all questions reasonably appropriate to keep the Attorney General advised regarding the continued availability for departure of a deportable alien. The Government contends that the District Court misconceived the scope of the statute. It points to what it characterizes as “the eloquent breadth” of clause (3), whereby the alien is to give “such other information, whether or not related to the foregoing, as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper.” This, says the Government, establishes a requirement “in the broadest possible statutory terms for the furnishing of information by the alien.” And this view, it maintains, fits into the statutory scheme. In the circumstances defined by § 242 (a), an alien may be detained pending determination of deportability; and § 242 (c) authorizes such detention for six months after the alien has been found deportable. So, the Government argues, § 242 (d), though it does not authorize detention after six months, is an attempt to accomplish in a modified form the ends that would justify detention in the earlier stages of the deportation process. Our decision in Carlson v. London, 342 U. S. 524, is heavily invoked. If, so the argument runs, detention of active alien Communists pending deportation hearings was sustainable under § 242 (a), the national interest in avoiding recurrence of past Communist activity for which appellee is being deported should at least require him to answer questions regarding any present Communist relationships. For this view of the purpose of supervision, support is found in two other statutory provisions: § 242 (e), making an alien’s wilful failure to leave the country a felony but providing for suspension of sentence and release of the alien upon judicial consideration, inter alia, of the effect of release upon the national security and the likelihood of resumption of conduct that serves as a basis for deportation; and the recital in § 2 (13) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, that “numerous aliens who have been found to be deportable, many of whom are in the subversive, criminal, or immoral classes . . . are free to roam the country at will without supervision or control.” 64 Stat. 987. The language of § 242 (d)(3), if read in isolation and literally, appears to confer upon the Attorney General unbounded authority to require whatever information he deems desirable of aliens whose deportation has not been effected within six months after it has been commanded. The Government itself shrinks from standing on the breadth of these words. But once the tyranny of literalness is rejected, all relevant considerations for giving a rational content to the words become operative. A restrictive meaning for what appear to be plain words may be indicated by the Act as a whole, by the persuasive gloss of legislative history or by the rule of constitutional adjudication, relied on by the District Court, that such a restrictive meaning must be given if a broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts. The preoccupation of the entire subsection of which clause (3) is a part is certainly with availability for deportation. Clause (1) requires the alien’s periodic appearance for the purpose of identification, and clause (2) dealing with medical and psychiatric examination, when necessary, clearly is directed to the same end; and the “reasonable written restrictions on [the alien’s] conduct or activities” authorized by clause (4) have an implied scope to be gathered from the subject matter, i. e., the object of the statute as a whole. Moreover, this limitation of “reasonableness” imposed by clause (4) upon the Attorney General’s power to restrict suggests that, if we are to harmonize the various provisions of the section, the same limitation must also be read into the Attorney General’s seemingly limitless power to question under clause (3). For, assuredly, Congress did not authorize that official to elicit information that could not serve as a basis for confining an alien’s activities. Nowhere in § 242 (d) is there any suggestion of a power of broad supervision like unto that over a probationer. When Congress did want to deal with the far-flung interest of national security or the general undesirable conduct of aliens, it gave clear indication of this purpose, as in § 242 (e). In providing for the release of aliens convicted of wilful failure to depart, that subsection specifically requires courts to inquire into both the effect of the alien’s release upon national security and the likelihood of his continued undesirable conduct. The legislative history likewise counsels confinement of the mere words to the general purpose of the legislative scheme of which clause (d) is a part, namely, the actual deportation of certain undesirable classes of aliens. Section 242 (d), as it was reported by the House Judiciary Committee and passed by the House in 1949, was in its present state in all but one significant respect. It provided for indefinite detention of any alien who wilfully failed to comply with the regulations, to appear, to give information or to submit to medical examination, or who knowingly gave false information or violated a reasonable restriction upon his activity. H. R. Rep. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-3. The report of the House Committee, although in several places focusing only upon availability for deportation, does indicate concern over the threat to the national interest represented by undesirable but undeportable aliens. The Senate Judiciary Committee, while sharing the desire of the House to control the activities of such aliens, substituted for the House bill's detention provision the imposition of criminal penalties for failure to comply with the conditions of supervision. The report of the Senate Committee significantly states the reason for the change: “This provision in the bill as it passed the House of Representatives appears to present a constitutional question.” S. Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8. This history, although suggesting a desire to exercise continuing control over the activities as well as the availability of aliens whose deportation had been ordered but not effected, shows a strong congressional unwillingness to enact legislation that may subject the Attorney General’s supervisory powers to constitutional challenge. Acceptance of the interpretation of § 242 (d) urged by the Government would raise doubts as to the statute’s validity. By construing the Act to confer power on the Attorney General and his agents to inquire into matters that go beyond assuring an alien’s availability for deportation we would, at the very least, open up the question of the extent to which an administrative officer may inhibit deportable aliens from renewing activities that subjected them to deportation. See 70 Harv. L. Rev. 718. This is not Carlson v. Landon, supra, where the question was whether an alien could be detained during the customarily brief period pending determination of deportability. Contrariwise, and as the Senate and House Committees recognized in passing on § 242 (d), supervision of the undeportable alien may be a lifetime problem. In these circumstances, issues touching liberties that the Constitution safeguards, even for an alien “person,” would fairly be raised on the Government’s view of the statute. The path of constitutional concern in this situation is clear. “When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62. See also cases cited in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 348, note 8. Section 242 (d) is part of a legislative scheme designed to govern and to expedite the deportation of undesirable aliens, and clause (3) must be placed in the context of that scheme. As the District Court held and as our own examination of the Act confirms, it is a permissible and therefore an appropriate construction to limit the statute to authorizing all questions reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney General advised regarding the continued availability for departure of aliens whose deportation is overdue. Accordingly, the judgment of the District °°urt is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “(a) Q. Do you subscribe to the Daily Worker? “ (b) Q. Mr. Witkovich, can you read in any other language other than Slovene and English? “(c) Q. Since the order of supervision was entered on March 4, 1954, have you at any time visited the office of the ‘Narodny Glasnik/ 1413 West 18th Street, Chicago, Illinois? “(d) Q. Since the order of supervision was entered on March 4, 1954, Mr. Witkovich, have you ever visited the offices of the Bohemian publication ‘Nova Dova’ or the Slovakian publication 'Ludovy Noviny/ 1510 West 18th Street, Chicago, Illinois? “(e) Q. Do you know the editor of the ‘Narodni Glasnik’? “(f) Q. Do you know Leo Fisher? “(g) Q. Do you know Anton Minerich? “(h) Q. Do you know Nick Rajkovich? “(i) Q. Do you know Arsenio Bartl? “(j) Q. Do you know John Zuskar? “(k) Q. Do you know Calvin Brook? “(1) Q. Since the order of deportation was entered in your case on June 25, 1953 have you attended any meeting of the Communist Party of the U. S. A.? “(m) Q. Since the order of supervision was entered on March 4, 1954 have you attended any meeting of any organization other than the singing club? “(n) Q. Have you addressed any lodges of the Slovene National Benefit Society requesting their aid in your ease, since the order of deportation was entered June 25, 1953? “(o) Q. Have you distributed petitions or leaflets published by the Slovene National Benefit Society seeking aid for you, in your behalf, in your deportation ease since the order of deportation was entered June 25, 1953? “(p) Q. Since the order of supervision have you attended any meetings or lectures at the Peoples Auditorium, 2457 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois? “(q) Q- Since the order of supervision was entered against you have you attended any meetings or socials at the Chopin Cultural Center, 1547 North Leavitt Street, Chicago? “(r) Q. Have you attended any movies since your order of supervision was entered at the Cinema Annex, 3210 West Madison Street, Chicago ? “(s) Q. Are you acquainted with an individual named Irving Franklin ? “(t) Q. Are you now a member of the Communist Party of U. S. A.? “(u) Q. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Slovene American National Council? “(v) Q. Are you now or have you ever been a member of the United Committee of South Slavic Americans?”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PEORIA TRIBE OF INDIANS OF OKLAHOMA et al. v. UNITED STATES. No. 219. Argued January 15, 1968.— Decided April 1, 1968. Jack Joseph argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Louis L. Rochmes. Robert 8. Rifkind argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Acting Assistant Attorney General Harrison and Roger P. Marquis. MR. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. On May 30, 1854, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, petitioner, and the United States, respondent, entered into a treaty under which the Tribe reserved a portion of its lands and ceded the remainder, amounting to some 208,585 acres, to be sold at public auction by the United States for the Tribe’s benefit. 10 Stat. 1082. This was provided for in Article 4 of the treaty: “[T]he President shall immediately cause the residue of the ceded lands to be offered for sale at public auction .... And in consideration of the cessions hereinbefore made,, the United States agree to pay to the said Indians, as hereinafter provided, all the moneys arising from the sales of said lands after deducting therefrom the actual cost of surveying, managing, and selling the same.” Article 7 of the treaty further provided: “And as the amount of the annual receipts from the sales of their lands, cannot now be ascertained,' it is agreed that the President may, from time to time, and upon consultation with said Indians, determine how much of the net proceeds of said sales shall be paid them, and how much shall be invested in safe and profitable stocks, the interest to be annually paid to them, or expended for their benefit and improvement.” In this case the Indian Claims Commission found that the United States violated the treaty in 1857 by selling most of the ceded lands, some 207,759 acres, not by public auction, but by private sales at appraised prices lower than would have prevailed at public auction. The Commission found that the United States thus received for the lands $172,726 less than it would have received if the sales had been made as required by the treaty. 15 Ind. Cl. Comm. 123. Neither party questions these findings. The petitioner, however, sought review in the Court of Claims upon the issue of the measure of its damages for the treaty’s violation — contending that by virtue of Article 7 of the treaty, the United States is liable not only for the $172,726, but in addition for the amount that that sum would have produced if “invested in safe and profitable stocks, the interest to be annually paid . ...” The Court of Claims, two judges dissenting, rejected this contention, 177 Ct. Cl. 762, 369 F. 2d 1001, and we granted certiorari to consider it. 389 U. S. 814. In supporting the judgment of the Court of Claims, the respondent relies heavily upon the general rule that the United States is not liable for interest on claims against it. This general rule, as the respondent points out, has been held to be fully applicable to the claims of Indian tribes. But this is not a case where the Court is asked to exercise “the power to award interest against the United States,” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S. 654, 663. The issue, rather, concerns the measure of damages for the treaty’s violation in the light of the Government’s obligations under that treaty. Under Article 7 of the treaty, the United States could at any time pay to the Tribe all or any part of the proceeds received from the sales of the lands at public auction. But until the proceeds were paid over, the United States was obligated to invest them and pay the annual income to the Tribe. The United States was not free merely to hold the proceeds without investing them. The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the obligation of the United States to invest unpaid proceeds applies to proceeds which, by virtue of the United States’ violation of the treaty, were never in fact received. Our decision is largely controlled by United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U. S. 180. There an 1831 treaty obligated the United States to sell certain Indian lands at public auction and to place all proceeds in excess of a stated amount in a fund for the benefit of the Indians. The fund could be dissolved and paid over to the Indians “during the pleasure of Congress,” but until its dissolution, the United States was obligated to pay the Indians an “annuity” upon the retained fund. The lands were sold and the proceeds were paid to the Indians in 1852. In 1893 the Court of Claims held that the United States had violated the treaty by selling some of the lands at private sales rather than at public auction, resulting in the realization of lower prices. This Court held that the obligation to pay the “annuity” applied to the differential that would have been received if the lands had been sold at public auction in accord with the treaty, and that this obligation extended beyond the dissolution of the fund by Congress in 1852: “While the treaty bound the government to pay a five per cent annuity until the dissolution of the fund, which dissolution took place September 28, 1852, when the sum of $37,180.58, the amount of the fund resulting from actual sales, was paid over to the chiefs of the tribe, this dissolution terminated the stipulation for the annuity only pro tanto. If the government had originally accounted, for the whole amount for which the court below held it to be liable, it would have paid five per cent upon this amount until the whole fund was paid over. The fund as to this amount being not yet distributed, the obligation to pay the five per cent annuity continues until the money is paid over. . . .” 155 U. S., at 193. Similarly in the case before us, we hold that the obligation to invest the $172,726 and to pay its annual income to the Tribe “continues until the money is paid over.” Cf. United States v. Mille Lac Chippewas, 229 U. S. 498. As the dissenters in the Court of Claims rightly pointed out, “Indian treaties ‘are not to be interpreted narrowly, as sometimes may be writings expressed in words of art employed by conveyancers, but are to be construed in the sense in which naturally the Indians would understand them.’ United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 116 (1938). ‘[T]hey are to be construed, so far as possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them, and “in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people.” Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 684-85. . . .’ ” 177 Ct. Cl., at 771, 369 F. 2d, at 1006-1007. Since the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims erroneously held that the United States is not liable for its failure to invest the proceeds that would have been received had the United States not violated the treaty, they had no occasion to determine the measure of damages resulting from this liability. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Court of Claims for further remand to the Indian Claims Commission in order to determine that question. The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The singular form is used throughout for the petitioners, who were previously known as the Confederated Tribe of the Peoria, Kaskaskia, Wea and Piankeshaw Indians. The parties are agreed that “the terms 'stocks’ and ‘interest’ should be understood to include bonds or other securities and dividends or other income, respectively.” Respondent’s Brief 11, n. 4. The term “stocks” was used in other treaties of the period to refer to what would today be called bonds. See, e. g., Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476, 492. See also Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 26, 1853, H. Doc. No. 1, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., 243, 263. The investments actually made pursuant to the treaty in the present case were purchases of state bonds. See, e. g., United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U. S. 585; United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S. 654; United States v. Goltra, 312 U. S. 203. See, e. g., United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U. S. 48; United States v. Omaha Tribe of Indians, 253 U. S. 275, 283; Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 175 Ct. Cl. 451. Blackfeather v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 447. The respondent did not brief or argue the question of how to measure these damages. The petitioner suggested that these damages might be measured by looking to the rate of interest which the United States has paid on Indian funds over the same period, arguing for this approach by analogy to private trust law. The petitioner also points out that Congress at one time considered the United States’ treaty obligations to “invest in safe and profitable stocks” satisfied by an annual appropriation for the Indians of an amount equivalent to an interest payment. See Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 30, 1852, S. Doc. No. 1, 32d Cong., 2d Sess., 293, 300-301; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 26, 1853, supra, n. 2. Because the United States is not liable for interest on judgments in the absence of an express consent thereto, it cannot be hable for interest on the annual income payments not made. Therefore, if an interest rate measure is adopted by the Commission, it must be simple and not compound interest.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. ILLINOIS et al. No. 12. Argued November 12, 1957. Decided January 13, 1958. R. K. Merrill argued the cause for appellant in No. 12. With him on the brief were W. J. Quinn and Edwin R. Eckersall. Solicitor General Rankin submitted on brief for the United States, appellant in No. 27. Charlie H. Johns, Jr. argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellant in No. 28. With him on the brief was Robert W. Ginnane. Harry R. Begley, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Illinois and the Illinois Commerce Commission, appellees. With him on the brief were Latham Castle, Attorney General, and Elmer M. Walsh, Jr., Assistant Attorney General. S. Ashley Guthrie argued the cause for the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association, appellee. With him on the brief were Henry F. Tenney and Francis D. Fisher. Together with No. 27, United States v. Illinois et al., and No. 28, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois et al., also on appeals from the same Court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association, aggrieved by an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing intrastate passenger fares for the Milwaukee Road’s Chicago suburban commuter service higher than the fares authorized by the State Commission, brought this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, seeking relief under 28 U. S. C. § 1336. The ICC order, 297 I. C. C. 353, was made under 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4), which authorizes the ICC to prescribe intrastate fares if it finds that “. . . any such . . . [existing intrastate] fare . . . causes . . . any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate . . . commerce.” The three-judge District Court set aside the order, enjoined its enforcement, and remanded the case to the ICC for further proceedings. 146 F. Supp. 195. The District Court held, inter alia, that the ICC failed to make findings appropriate to show that the existing fares caused undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce. The judgment was appealed under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction, 352 U. S. 939. The ICC found that the Milwaukee Road’s 1954 passenger revenues from the Chicago suburban commuter service fell short by $306,038 of meeting the out-of-pocket cost of the service. This was the basis of the conclusion that the existing intrastate fares caused undue discrimination against interstate commerce. To remove this discrimination the ICC prescribed fares to produce $383,000 additional annual revenue, enough to eliminate the determined out-of-pocket loss and to allow $77,000 annually as a contribution to indirect costs and taxes. The question for our decision is whether the District Court properly set aside the ICC order as void for lack of findings necessary to support an order under § 13 (4). The Chicago suburban commuter service, except for a relatively insignificant exception mentioned below, is entirely an intrastate service. It is provided in two directions from Chicago’s Union Station. One direction, wholly within Illinois, is west from Chicago some 37 route miles to Elgin, Illinois. The other direction is north from Chicago to Walworth, Wisconsin; however, 62 of the 74 route miles in that direction, and 24 of the 26 station stops, are located within Illinois. Total 1954 passenger revenues from this service were $1,796,231 from 4,869,064 passengers. Commuters traveling on commutation and multiple-ride tickets numbered 3,910,526 of this total and accounted for $1,374,261 of the revenue. Commuter fares of most of the railroads providing commuter service in the Chicago area have been determined, at least since 1950, in joint hearings conducted by the ICC and the State Commission under 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3). 297 I. C. C. 353, 354. On July 24, 1952, however, the Milwaukee Road, instead of filing petitions or schedules with both Commissions, filed a petition with the State Commission only requesting “authority to discontinue all off-peak Chicago suburban passenger trains and'consolidate certain peak-hour trains and also to increase one-way, round-trip and commutation fares to such extent as will after taking into consideration the economy effected by such discontinuances and consolidation of trains, give respondent sufficient revenues to permit operation of the Chicago 'suburban service without an out-of-pocket loss.” 297 I. C. C., at 355. The State Commission did not act on the application until 1954. Meanwhile the Milwaukee Road changed the suburban service from a steam to a diesel operation. The State Commission found that the cost savings effected by this change eliminated the out-of-pocket loss and, on November 10, 1954, denied the application. The Milwaukee Road thereupon, in February 1955, petitioned the ICC for relief under § 13 (4). This case presents once again the problem of adjusting state and federal interests in the regulation of intrastate rates. These intrastate rates are primarily the State’s concern and federal power is dominant “only so far as necessary to alter rates which injuriously affect interstate transportation.” North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511. Thus, whenever this federal power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification for its exercise must “clearly appear.” Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 212. The statute provides a practical method of minimizing the inevitable irritations inherent in the conflict by requiring the ICC to notify the State whenever there is brought before it any fare imposed by state authority. In addition, the ICC may confer with the state regulatory authority, or may hold joint hearings with the state agency, when the State’s rate-making authority may be affected by the action taken by the ICC. 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3). The occasion for the exercise of the federal power asserted by § 13 (4) is the necessity for effecting the required contribution by intrastate traffic of its proportionate share of the revenues necessary to pay a carrier’s operating cost and to yield a fair return. When intrastate revenues fall short of producing their fair proportionate share of required total revenues, they work an undue discrimination against interstate commerce, and the ICC may remove the discrimination by fixing intrastate rates high enough reasonably to protect interstate commerce. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 479; Wisconsin R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 586; United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 75. In determining whether an undue revenue discrimination against interstate commerce is caused by intrastate rates, the ICC may consider “among other things, the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient railway transportation service and the need of revenues sufficient to sustain such service,” a standard written into 49 U. S. C. § 15a (2). King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254, 264. No formal requirements are prescribed for the findings to be made by the ICC under § 13 (4). United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 80. Reasonable determinations suffice. Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 9. But the justification for the exercise of this exceptional federal power to interfere with intrastate rates must be made definitely and clearly apparent. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 212. In the instant case the ICC interfered with suburban commuter rates — intrastate rates peculiarly localized in impact upon the Chicago suburban community. In substance, the ICC found that because this single segment of the Milwaukee Road’s intrastate operations in Illinois did not meet out-of-pocket costs, there was an undue discrimination against the road’s interstate operations, without regard to the contribution of other Illinois intrastate revenues, freight or passenger, concerning which both the record and the findings are entirely silent. We think this is a case where the ICC cannot be sustained in altering intrastate rates merely because the Chicago suburban commuter traffic — of the Milwaukee Road’s total intrastate Illinois traffic, freight and passenger — is not remunerative or reasonably compensatory. Cf. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194; North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507. The limited and exceptional federal power asserted by § 13 (4) over intrastate rates must be exercised with “scrupulous regard for maintaining the [primary] power of the state in this field.” North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511. It is of course desirable that each particular intrastate service should as nearly as may be pay its own way and return a profit — but the State Commission, not the ICC, has the responsibility in the first instance to achieve that desired end. Passenger deficits have become chronic in the railroad industry and it has become necessary to make up these deficits from more remunerative services. The ICC has recognized this practical reality of today’s railroading and has changed its rate-fixing policy so that if interstate passenger service inevitably and inescapably cannot bear its direct costs and its share of joint or indirect costs, the ICC feels compelled in a general rate case to take the passenger deficit into account in the adjustment of interstate freight rates and charges. King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254, 261. An equally broad power must be conceded to a state commission in the exercise of its primary authority to prescribe and adjust intrastate rates. In view of that policy, we do not think that the deficit from this single commuter operation can fairly be adjudged to work an undue discrimination against the Milwaukee Road’s interstate operations without findings which take the deficit into account in the light of the carrier’s other intrastate revenues from Illinois traffic, freight and passenger. The basic objective of § 13 (4), applied in the light of § 15a (2) to this case, is to prevent a discrimination against the carrier’s interstate traffic which would result from saddling that traffic with an undue burden of providing intrastate services. A fair picture of the intrastate operation, and whether the intrastate traffic unduly discriminates against interstate traffic, is not shown, in this case, by limiting consideration to the particular commuter service in disregard of the revenue contributed by the other intrastate services. A requirement for findings which reflect the commuter service deficit in the totality of intrastate revenues is not a departure from previous holdings of this Court. The precise situation presented by this case has not heretofore been considered by the Court. The previous cases involving Commission orders increasing intrastate rates in the interest of the carrier’s revenue (as distinguished from cases of discrimination against particular persons and localities, see Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342) involved statewide orders raising intrastate rates. In passenger fare cases, ICC orders were sustained on a showing that following general increases in interstate passenger rates, state commissions refused to increase intrastate passenger rates to the same level for what were essentially identical services. Wiscon sin R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563; New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591. It was held that the state passenger rates in that circumstance were not producing their fair proportionate share. In North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, also a passenger fare case, the ICC order was not sustained because the findings were held to be insufficient. Nonpassenger fare cases in which ICC orders raising intrastate rates were sustained were United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1; and King v. United States, 344 U. S. 254. The order was not sustained, however, in an earlier Florida case, Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194. The only case ostensibly based upon a revenue discrimination caused by a local operation was not a passenger fare case. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. United States, 292 U. S. 474. Basically the discrimination there complained of, however, was a persons-and-locality discrimination against interstate shippers. It should also be noted that in King v. United States, supra, the Court adverted to those very factors among the ICC’s findings whose absence in the present case we find to be a fatal defect. The Court there emphasized the ICC finding that the entire intrastate traffic, freight and passenger, constituted a revenue drain upon the carrier’s revenues from interstate traffic. Since the Commission has not in this case found whether or not the commuter rates, viewed in the light of the Illinois intrastate operation as a whole, constitute an undue revenue discrimination against the Milwaukee Road’s interstate operations, the judgment of the District Court in remanding the case to the Commission for further consideration must be affirmed. The District Court also held that the ICC erred in considering evidence which was not presented by the Milwaukee Road to the State Commission. The evidence in question concerned certain depreciation and maintenance-of-way expenses totaling $258,172, which the ICC took into account in computing out-of-pocket costs. The District Court said: “If different evidence is to be offered or a different basis of fares is to be urged before the interstate commission, the state commission should have been given a chance to fix fares on the same evidence and the same basis. “Where a railroad seeks the fixing of higher intrastate rates by the interstate commission after failing in such endeavor before a state commission, § 13 (4) does not contemplate that the state commission is to be considered only a way station in a journey to the interstate commission.” 146 F. Supp. 195, 201, 202. This holding in effect restricts the ICC in decisions under § 13 (4) to the identical evidence presented by the railroad to the State Commission. So to restrict the ICC’s consideration as to whether intrastate rates work an undue discrimination against interstate commerce might seriously interfere with the Commission’s duty to remove the discrimination to protect the exclusive federal domain of interstate commerce. It is contrary to this Court’s holding in Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194. There the State Commission had not affirmatively prescribed the existing rates which the ICC increased. It was urged that until the State Commission did so § 13 (4) granted no power to the ICC to prescribe higher rates. This Court rejected this contention, saying “To hold . . . that there can be no adjustment of intrastate rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission so far as may be needed to protect interstate commerce until the State itself has first 'sat in judgment on the issue of the lawfulness of those intrastate rates’ would be to impose a limitation not required by the terms of the statute and repugnant to the grant of authority.” Id., at 210. In this case the ICC might more wisely have arranged for joint hearings under § 13 (3) or have deferred action pending an opportunity for the State Commission to consider this evidence. However, nothing in the statute compels either course or denies the ICC the power to determine the question presented by the railroad’s petition, whatever may have been the evidence presented before the State Commission. See North Carolina v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 718, affirmed, 350 U. S. 805; Illinois v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 36, 47, affirmed, 342 U. S. 930. Finally, it is argued that the District Court erred in setting aside so much of the ICC order as authorized an increase in the interstate fares to the two Wisconsin points. We believe, however, that these rates are so interwoven with and so closely bound to the intrastate rates that a proper disposition of this case reasonably requires that the Commission reconsider them as part of its reconsideration of the entire Chicago suburban commuter service. The only reason why the ICC increased the interstate rates was to make them conform to the increased intrastate rates. Paragraph 3 of the District Court judgment dated June 14, 1956, is modified to provide that the remand to the ICC shall be for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 24 Stat. 383, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4): “Whenever in any such investigation the commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be observed while in effect by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding.” The injunction was stayed pending the hearing of the appeal to this Court. The excess fares are being impounded under a provision of the stay order providing for their refund to the persons who paid them in the event the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The Milwaukee Road is the appellant in No. 12. The United States is the appellant in No. 27. The ICC is the appellant in No. 28. Bach appeals from the particular provisions of the judgment by which it is aggrieved. The interstate fares to the two Wisconsin points were also raised in this proceeding by an ICC order entered November 21, 1955, and Order No. 26550, Passenger Fares and Surcharges, 214 I. C. C. 174, was modified so as to permit the rates to be made effective. No affirmative order raising the intrastate rates was made, however, until March 2, 1956. The ICC report allowed the Milwaukee Road and the Illinois Commerce Commission 60 days in which to adjust the intrastate rates on the bases prescribed in the report. Failing such adjustment the order of March 2, 1956, prescribing the intrastate rates was entered and Order No. 11703, Intrastate Rates Within Illinois, 59 I. C. C. 350, was modified to permit the Milwaukee Road to make the intrastate rates effective. 24 Stat. 383, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3): “Whenever in any investigation under the provisions of this chapter, or in any investigation instituted upon petition of the carrier concerned, which petition is authorized to be filed, there shall be brought in issue any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority of any State, the commission, before proceeding to hear and dispose of such issue, shall cause the State or States interested to be notified of the proceeding. The commission may confer with the authorities of any State having regulatory jurisdiction over the class of persons and corporations subject to this chapter or chapter 12 of this title with respect to the relationship between rate structures and practices of carriers subject to the jurisdiction of such State bodies and of the commission; and to that end is authorized and empowered, under rules to be prescribed by it, and which may be modified from time to time, to hold joint hearings with any such State regulating bodies on any matters wherein the commission is empowered to act and where the rate-making authority of a State is or may be affected by the action taken by the commission. The commission is also authorized to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of such State authorities in the enforcement of any provision of this chapter or chapter 12 of this title.” Wisconsin R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 586. “The effective operation of the [Interstate Commerce] act will reasonably and justly require that intrastate traffic should pay a fair proportionate share of the cost of maintaining an adequate railway system.” This would seem to be particularly required here in light of the Commission’s recognition “that the deficit from the [Milwaukee Road’s] total passenger operations is relatively greater than from its suburban operations.” 297 I. C. C. 353, 359. The Commission found that the Milwaukee Road earned in 1954 from its freight operations $37,293,050, and suffered a deficit from all passenger operations of $22,824,532, resulting in a net railway operating income of $14,568,518. This represented a return of approximately 2%. We agree with the District Court that that portion of the prescribed increases designed to produce $77,000 annually as a contribution to indirect costs and taxes is not based upon adequate findings. There is no finding of the total of indirect costs and taxes to which contribution is to be made, nor any finding from which we may infer how the ICC derived its conclusion that a $77,000 contribution was fair. It is axiomatic that to know whether something is a fair proportionate part of something else, we must be told what the something else is. On the other hand we cannot agree with the District Court that there was not support in the evidence for the ICC’s finding that the prescribed rates would be just and reasonable for the future. The ICC did not rely solely upon the comparison with the similar fares of the Northwestern, for there was ample other evidence in the record to sustain their findings. But the factors which determine the reasonableness of a rate are so different from the factors which determine what is a fair proportionate share of a carrier’s total income that a finding of the reasonableness of the rates prescribed does not embrace all the findings necessary to support the exercise of the § 13 (4) power.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIEDRICH et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 80-2204. Argued February 24, 1982 Decided June 15, 1982 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 200. Norman E. Beal argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Gilbert S. Rothenberg. William Waller filed a brief for Ralph Owen et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Joseph C. Niebler filed a brief for Laird C. Cleaver et ux. as amici curiae. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict as to whether a donor who makes a gift of property on condition that the donee pay the resulting gift tax receives taxable income to the extent that the gift tax paid by the donee exceeds the donor’s adjusted basis in the property transferred. 454 U. S. 813 (1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the donor realized income. 643 F. 2d 499 (1981). We affirm. I A Diedrich v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue In 1972 petitioners Victor and Frances Diedrich made gifts of approximately 85,000 shares of stock to their three children, using both a direct transfer and a trust arrangement. The gifts were subject to a condition that the donees pay the resulting federal and state gift taxes. There is no dispute concerning the amount of the gift tax paid by the donees. The donors’ basis in the transferred stock was $51,073; the gift tax paid in 1972 by the donees was $62,992. Petitioners did not include as income on their 1972 federal income tax returns any portion of the gift tax paid by the donees. After an audit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that petitioners had realized income to the extent that the gift tax owed by petitioners but paid by the donees exceeded the donors’ basis in the property. Accordingly, petitioners’ taxable income for 1972 was increased by $5,959. Petitioners filed a petition in the United States Tax Court for re-determination of the deficiencies. The Tax Court held for the taxpayers, concluding that no income had been realized. 39 TCM 433 (1979). B United Missouri Bank of Kansas City v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue In 1970 and 1971 Mrs. Frances Grant gave 90,000 voting trust certificates to her son on condition that he pay the resulting gift tax. Mrs. Grant’s basis in the stock was $8,742.60; the gift tax paid by the donee was $232,620.09 As in Diedrich, there is no dispute concerning the amount of the gift tax or the fact of its payment by the donee pursuant to the condition. Like the Diedrichs, Mrs. Grant did not include as income on her 1970 or 1971 federal income tax returns any portion of the amount of the gift tax owed by her but paid by the donee. After auditing her returns, the Commissioner determined that the gift of stock to her son was part gift and part sale, with the result that Mrs. Grant realized income to the extent that the amount of the gift tax exceeded the adjusted basis in the property. Accordingly, Mrs. Grant’s taxable income was increased by approximately $112,000. Mrs. Grant filed a petition in the United States Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiencies. The Tax Court held for the taxpayer, concluding that no income had been realized. Grant v. Commissioner, 39 TCM 1088 (1980). C The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit consolidated the two appeals and reversed, concluding that “to the extent the gift taxes paid by donees” exceeded the donors’ adjusted bases in the property transferred, “the donors realized taxable income.” 643 F. 2d, at 504. The Court of Appeals rejected the Tax Court’s conclusion that the taxpayers merely had made a “net gift” of the difference between the fair market value of the transferred property and the gift taxes paid by the donees. The court reasoned that a donor receives a benefit when a donee discharges a donor’s legal obligation to pay gift taxes. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commissioner in rejecting the holding in Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 356 (1968), aff’d per curiam, 410 F. 2d 752 (CA6 1969), and its progeny, and adopted the approach of Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T. C. 791 (1973), aff’d, 495 F. 2d 1079 (CA6), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1040 (1974), and Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 72 T. C. 780 (1979), aff’d, 634 F. 2d 12 (CA2 1980). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, and we affirm. II A Pursuant to its constitutional authority, Congress has defined "gross income” as income “from whatever source derived,” including “[ijncome from discharge of indebtedness.” 26 U. S. C. § 61 (12). This Court has recognized that “income” may be realized by a variety of indirect means. In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929), the Court held that payment of an employee’s income taxes by an employer constituted income to the employee. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Taft concluded that “[t]he payment of the tax by the employe[r] was in consideration of the services rendered by the employee and was a gain derived by the employee from his labor.” Id., at 729. The Court made clear that the substance, not the form, of the agreed transaction controls. “The discharge by a third person of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.” Ibid. The employee, in other words, was placed in a better position as a result of the employer’s discharge of the employee’s legal obligation to pay the income taxes; the employee thus received a gain subject to income tax. The holding in Old Colony was reaffirmed in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1 (1947). In Crane the Court concluded that relief from the obligation of a nonrecourse mortgage in which the value of the property exceeded the value of the mortgage constituted income to the taxpayer. The taxpayer in Crane acquired depreciable property, an apartment building, subject to an unassumed mortgage. The taxpayer later sold the apartment building, which was still subject to the nonrecourse mortgage, for cash plus the buyer’s assumption of the mortgage. This Court held that the amount of the mortgage was properly included in the amount realized on the sale, noting that if the taxpayer transfers subject to the mortgage, “the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.” Id., at 14. Again, it was the “reality,” not the form, of the transaction that governed. Ibid. The Court found it immaterial whether the seller received money prior to the sale in order to discharge the mortgage, or whether the seller merely transferred the property subject to the mortgage. In either case the taxpayer realized an economic benefit. B The principles of Old Colony and Crane control. A common method of structuring gift transactions is for the donor to make the gift subject to the condition that the donee pay the resulting gift tax, as was done in each of the cases now before us. When a gift is made, the gift tax liability falls on the donor under 26 U. S. C. § 2502(d). When a donor makes a gift to a donee, a “debt” to the United States for the amount of the gift tax is incurred by the donor. Those taxes are as much the legal obligation of the donor as the donor’s income taxes; for these purposes they are the same kind of debt obligation as the income taxes of the employee in Old Colony, supra. Similarly, when a donee agrees to discharge an indebtedness in consideration of the gift, the person relieved of the tax liability realizes an economic benefit. In short, the donor realizes an immediate economic benefit by the donee’s assumption of the donor’s legal obligation to pay the gift tax. An examination of the donor’s intent does not change the character of this benefit. Although intent is relevant in determining whether a gift has been made, subjective intent has not characteristically been a factor in determining whether an individual has realized income. Even if intent were a factor, the donor’s intent with respect to the condition shifting the gift tax obligation from the donor to the donee was plainly to relieve the donor of a debt owed to the United States; the choice was made because the donor would receive a benefit in relief from the obligation to pay the gift tax. Finally, the benefit realized by the taxpayer is not diminished by the fact that the liability attaches during the course of a donative transfer. It cannot be doubted that the donors were aware that the gift tax obligation would arise immediately upon the transfer of the property; the economic benefit to the donors in the discharge of the gift tax liability is indistinguishable from the benefit arising from discharge of a preexisting obligation. Nor is there any doubt that had the donors sold a portion of the stock immediately before the gift transfer in order to raise funds to pay the expected gift tax, a taxable gain would have been realized. 26 U. S. C. § 1001. The fact that the gift tax obligation was discharged by way of a conditional gift rather than from funds derived from a pregift sale does not alter the underlying benefit to the donors. C Consistent with the economic reality, the Commissioner has treated these conditional gifts as a discharge of indebtedness through a part gift and part sale of the gift property transferred. The transfer is treated as if the donor sells the property to the donee for less than the fair market value. The “sale” price is the amount necessary to discharge the gift tax indebtedness; the balance of the value of the transferred property is treated as a gift. The gain thus derived by the donor is the amount of the gift tax liability less the donor’s adjusted basis in the entire property. Accordingly, income is realized to the extent that the gift tax exceeds the donor’s adjusted basis in the property. This treatment is consistent with § 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that the gain from the disposition of property is the excess of the amount realized over the transferor’s adjusted basis in the property. Ill We recognize that Congress has structured gift transactions to encourage transfer of property by limiting the tax consequences of a transfer. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. §102 (gifts excluded from donee’s gross income). Congress may obviously provide a similar exclusion for the conditional gift. Should Congress wish to encourage “net gifts,” changes in the income tax consequences of such gifts lie within the legislative responsibility. Until such time, we are bound by Congress’ mandate that gross income includes income “from whatever source derived.” We therefore hold that a donor who makes a gift of property on condition that the donee pay the resulting gift taxes realizes taxable income to the extent that the gift taxes paid by the donee exceed the donor’s adjusted basis in the property. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is Affirmed. Subtracting the stock basis of $51,073 from the gift tax paid by the do-nees of $62,992, the Commissioner found that petitioners had realized a long-term capital gain of $11,919. After a 50% reduction in long-term capital gain, 26 U. S. C. § 1202, the Diedrichs’ taxable income increased by $5,959. The gift taxes were $232,630.09. Subtracting the adjusted basis of $8,742.60, the Commissioner found that Mrs. Grant realized a long-term capital gain of $223,887.49. After a 50% reduction for long-term capital gain, 26 U. S. C. § 1202, Mrs. Grant’s taxable income increased by $111,943.75. During pendency of this lawsuit, Mrs. Grant died and the United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, the decedent’s executor, was substituted as petitioner. The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income “from whatever source derived.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Arndt. 16. In Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U. S. 461, 469 (1940), the Court noted: “While it is true that economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is settled that the realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset. Gain may occur as a result of exchange of property, payment of the taxpayer’s indebtedness, relief from a liability, or other profit realized from the completion of a transaction.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Crane the taxpayer received favorable tax treatment for the loan and was allowed depreciation on the property. The Court concluded that the taxpayer could not then later escape taxation after having received these benefits when the loan obligation was assumed by another. Whether income would have been realized in Crane if the value of the property at the time of transfer had been less than the amount of the mortgage need not be considered here. See Crane, 331 U. S., at 14, n. 37. Although the Commissioner has argued consistently that payment of gift taxes by the donee results in income to the donor, several courts have rejected this interpretation. See, e. g., Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 356 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 410 F. 2d 752 (CA6 1969); Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F. 2d 427 (CA4 1978) (en banc). Cf. Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F. 2d 1079 (CA6), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1040 (1974). It should be noted that the gift tax consequences of a conditional gift will be unaffected by the holding in this case. When a conditional “net” gift is given, the gift tax attributable to the transfer is to be deducted from the value of the property in determining the value of the gift at the time of transfer. See Rev. Rul. 75-72,1975-1 Cum. Bull. 310 (general formula for computation of gift tax on conditional gift); Rev. Rul. 71-232,1971-1 Cum. Bull. 275. “The tax imposed by section 2501 shall be paid by the donor.” Section 6321 imposes a lien on the personal property of the donor when a tax is not paid when due. The donee is secondarily responsible for payment of the gift tax should the donor fail to pay the tax. 26 U. S. C. § 6324(b). The donee’s liability, however, is limited to the value of the gift. Ibid. This responsibility of the donee is analogous to a lien or security. Ibid. See also S. Rep. No. 665,. 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1932); H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 30 (1932). Several courts have found it highly significant that the donor intended to make a gift. Turner v. Commissioner, supra; Hirst v. Commissioner, supra. It is not enough, however, to state that the donor intended simply to make a gift of the amount which will remain after the donee pays the gift tax. As noted above, subjective intent has not characteristically been a factor in determining whether an individual has realized income. In Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U. S. 278, 286 (1960), the Court noted that “the donor’s characterization of his action is not determinative.” See also Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U. S. 609, 613 (1938) (“A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a devious path”). The existence of the “condition” that the gift will be made only if the donee assumes the gift tax consequences precludes any characterization that the payment of the taxes was simply a gift from the donee back to the donor. A conditional gift not only relieves the donor of the gift tax liability, but also may enable the donor to transfer a larger sum of money to the donee than would otherwise be possible due to such factors as differing income tax brackets of the donor and donee. Section 1001 provides: “(a) Computation of gain or loss. — The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized. “(b) Amount realized. — The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received. . . .” “By treating conditional gifts as a part gift and part sale, income is realized only when highly appreciated property is transferred, for only highly appreciated property will result in a gift tax greater than the adjusted basis.” Petitioners argue that even if this Court holds that a donor realizes income on a conditional gift to the extent that the gift tax exceeds the adjusted basis, that holding should be applied prospectively and should not apply to the taxpayers in this case. In this case, however, there was no dispositive Eighth Circuit holding prior to the decision on review. In addition, this Court frequently has applied decisions which have altered the tax law and applied the clarified law to the facts of the case before it. See, e. g., United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S. 286, 294-295 (1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 74. Argued May 19, 1960. Decided June 27, 1960. Peter T. Beardsley argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Larry A. Esckilsen. Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Acting Assistant Attorney General Bicks. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause and filed a brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellee. Robert L. Pierce argued the cause for Pacific Motor Trucking Co. et alv appellees. With him on the brief were Edward M. Reidy, Thormund A. Miller, Wm. Mein-hold, Henry M. Hogan, Walter R. Frizzell and Beverley S. Simms. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question presented on this appeal is whether the appellee Interstate Commerce Commission properly declined to impose certain restrictions upon motor carrier permits it issued to a trucking company which is a subsidiary of a railroad. The permits in question are designed to allow appellee Pacific Motor Trucking Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Southern Pacific Company, to perform a particular type of transportation service for appellee General Motors Corporation. Prior to issuance of these permits, Pacific Motor already had been authorized to conduct certain trucking activities in a number of States into which Southern Pacific’s extensive railway system penetrates. Without adverting to immaterial details, that authority may be described as follows: Pacific Motor held common carrier certificates from the Commission for the transportation of commodities, by way of service auxiliary to and supplemental of Southern Pacific rail service, over routes paralleling Southern Pacific lines in Oregon, California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. It also held contract carrier authority from the State of California for intrastate transportation of trucks and automobiles. Finally, it had been granted contract carrier permits by the Commission for the transportation of automobiles, trucks, and buses from certain points in California to three nonrail points in Nevada, to two points on the Mexican border, to certain points in Los Angeles Harbor, and to points in Nevada located on the Southern Pacific line. These latter contract carrier permits did not contain restrictions designed to make the service auxiliary to and supplemental of Southern Pacific rail service. Pacific Motor’s only contract carrier shipper has been General Motors. By the four applications which gave rise to the present controversy, Pacific Motor sought to extend the scope of its contract carrier service for General Motors.. It requested authorization from the Commission for the transportation of new automotive equipment from plants of General Motors at Oakland, Raymer, and South Gate, California, to various interstate destinations not included within its prior permits. Generally speaking, the first application, designated Sub 84, covered contract carrier service from the Oakland plants to points on the Southern Pacific line in Oregon; the second, Sub 35, covered similar service to three Nevada nonrail points; the third, Sub 36, covered transportation from the Raymer plant to points in Arizona which are stations on the Southern Pacific line; and the last — and broadest — application, Sub 87, covered transportation from the Oakland, Raymer, and South Gate plants to points in seven States, whether or not on the Southern Pacific line. The Commission proceedings resulted in the grant of some, but not all, of the requested authority. On May 8, 1957, the Commission acted favorably on the Sub 84 application. 71 M. C. C. 561. However, the Commission thereafter consolidated the four applications and heard oral argument. On September 9, 1958, the Commission issued its final report, 77 M. C. C. 605, which may be described specifically enough for our purposes as authorizing transportation by Pacific Motor to the three additional Nevada nonrail points and to points on the Southern Pacific line in Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Oregon, and New Mexico. Otherwise, the applications were denied. There were certain other conditions imposed by the Commission, which we will detail later, but the major restriction was the limitation of points of destination to points on the Southern Pacific line. Appellants — American Trucking Associations, Inc., its Contract Carrier Conference, the National Automobile Transporters Association, and six motor carriers — brought suit in Federal District Court to set aside the Commission’s order. See 28 U. S. C. § 1336. Appellees Pacific Motor and General Motors intervened in support of the order. The United States was named a party defendant, together with the Interstate Commerce Commission, but did not either participate in or oppose the defense. See 28 U. S. C. § 2323. A three-judge court, which was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2325 and 2284, denied relief. 170 F. Supp. 38. Our appellate jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 361 U. S. 806. In this Court, the Commission opposes and the United States supports the appellants. There is a preliminary challenge by Pacific Motor and General Motors to appellants’ standing, a challenge which was sustained by two members of the lower court. We disagree with this holding. Since the basis for our view on the problem of standing will be more readily appreciated after the merits of the case have been fully treated, we postpone our discussion of this matter. The critical issue raised by appellants is whether the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by granting the permits in question to a railroad subsidiary without imposing more stringent limitations than it did. On this question, the lower court unanimously ruled against appellants. This judgment must be evaluated in the light of this Court’s previous decisions, set against the background of Commission practice. Both the Commission and this Court have recognized that Congress has expressed a strong general policy against railroad invasion of the motor carrier field. This policy is evinced in a general way in the preamble to the 1940 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act — the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 — which articulates the congressional purpose that the Act be “so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages” of “all modes of transportation.” More particularly, Congress’ attitude is reflected by a proviso to § 5 (2) (b) of the Act, which enjoins the Commission to withhold approval of an acquisition by a railroad of a motor carrier “unless it finds that the transaction proposed will be consistent with the public interest and will enable such carrier to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations and will not unduly restrain competition.” The Commission long ago concluded that the policy of the transportation legislation requires that the standards of § 5 (2) (b) — then § 213 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 555 — be followed as a general rule in other situations, notably in applications for common carrier certificates of convenience and necessity under § 207. Kansas City Southern Transport Co., Common Carrier Application, 10 M. C. C. 221 (1938). And this Court has confirmed the correctness of the Commission’s conception of its responsibilities under both § 5 (2) (b) and § 207. See United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 340 U. S. 419; United States v. Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co., 340 U. S. 450; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60. The Court has also taken cognizance of the congressional confirmation of the Commission’s policy by the 1940 re-enactment in § 5 (2) (b) of the provisions of § 213 (a), after some of the pertinent Commission decisions had been specifically called to Congress’ attention. See United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., supra, at 432. And although the instant proceeding involves contract carrier applications and hence falls under § 209, the Commission in its opinion recognized that, for purposes of the relevance of the § 5 (2) (b) standards, there is no distinction between this type of case and proceedings arising under § 207. 77 M. C. C. 621-622. Nor can we discern any grounds for differentiation. Thus it is evident that the policy of opposition to railroad incursions into the field of motor carrier service has become firmly entrenched as a part of our transportation law. Moreover, this general policy fortunately has not been implemented merely by way of a more or less unguided suspicion of railroad subsidiaries, but rather has evolved through a series of Commission decisions from embryonic form into a set of reasonably firm, concrete standards. The Commission’s opinion in the case at bar describes these standards as follows: “The restrictions usually imposed in common-carrier certificates issued to rail carriers or their affiliates in order to insure that the service rendered thereunder shall be no more than that which is auxiliary to or supplemental of train service are: (1) the service by motor vehicle to be performed by rail carrier or by a rail-controlled motor subsidiary should be limited to service which is auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service, (2) applicant shall not serve any point not a station on the railroad, (3) a key-point requirement or a requirement that shipments transported by motor shall be limited to those which it receives from or delivers to the railroad under a through bill of lading at rail rates covering, in addition to the movement by applicant, a prior or subsequent movement by rail, (4) all contracts between the rail carrier and the motor carrier shall be reported to the Commission and shall be subject to revision if and as the Commission finds it to be necessary in order that such arrangements shall be fair and equitable to the parties, and (5) such further specific conditions as the Commission, in the future, may-find it necessary to impose in order to insure that the service shall be auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service. . . The key phrase in this summary is obviously “auxiliary to or supplemental of train service.” If a trucking service can fairly be so characterized, it is clear enough that there is compliance with the mandate of § 5 (2) (b) that the carrier should be able “to use service by motor vehicle to public advantage in its operations.” But if, on the other hand, the motor transportation is essentially unrelated to rail service, the railroad parent is invading the field of trucking, and, under normal circumstances, the National Transportation Policy is thereby offended. It is this “auxiliary to or supplemental of” verbalization of the policy of § 5 (2) (b), as applied to § 207, that has found favor in this Court. See American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 355 U. S. 141; United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., supra; United States v. Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co., supra; Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Parker, supra. Moreover, while the Court has not specified the more particularized restrictions which it might regard as essential constituents of the “auxiliary to or supplemental of” concept, it is significant that the Court in Rock Island apparently accepted the Commission’s view that the phrase implies a limitation of function, i. e., type of trucking service, and not merely a geographical limitation, i. e., place where the service is performed. 340 U. S., at 436-444. But while the judicial and administrative current has run strongly in favor of auxiliary and supplemental restrictions on motor carrier subsidiaries of railroads, the Commission has determined, and this Court has agreed, that the public interest may sometimes be promoted by not imposing such limitations. A prime example is American Trucking Assns. v. United States, supra, where the trucking service was not being performed adequately by independent motor concerns. We there observed that the mandatory provisions of § 5 (2) (b) do not appear in § 207, and approved the Commission’s policy of not attaching auxiliary and supplemental restrictions where “special circumstances” prevail. We concluded: “We repeat . . . that the underlying policy of § 5 (2) (b) must not be divorced from proceedings for new certificates under § 207. Indeed, the Commission must take ‘cognizance’ of the National Transportation Policy and apply the Act ‘as a whole.’ But ... we do not believe that the Commission acts beyond its statutory authority when in the public interest it occasionally departs from the auxiliary and supplementary limitations in a § 207 proceeding.” 355 U. S., at 151-152. These, then, are the guiding principles which have been established by what has gone before and which mark the range of our inquiry in this case. Since, as we have indicated, the Commission believes, and we agree, that there is no relevant difference between a § 207 proceeding and a § 209 proceeding so far as the problem here involved is concerned, the decisive questions are: (1) Did the Commission impose conditions upon the permits issued to Pacific Motor under which the service to be rendered would be truly auxiliary to and supplemental of Southern Pacific’s rail service? (2) If not, was the Commission’s waiver of such restrictions justified by “special circumstances”? The first question need not detain us long. The principal permits were qualified only by the following conditions: (1) the service was to be restricted to points which are stations on the Southern Pacific line; (2) “there may from time to time in the future be attached to the permits . . . such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations as the public interest and national transportation policy may require”; and (3) Pacific Motor was to request the imposition of restrictions upon its outstanding certificates with respect to the transportation of automobiles and trucks. The last restriction was designed to obviate any dual operation problem under § 210, and is not pertinent to the auxiliary and supplemental standard. See 77 M. C. C., at 624. The second condition obviously is no restriction at all on present operations, and hence can hardly be said to limit the trucking to an auxiliary or supplemental service. We so recognized in American Trucking Associations, where the certificates contained a similar restriction. 355 U. S., at 154. And the first limitation, upon which appellees principally rely, is but a geographical, not a functional, restriction. As we have noted, Rock Island gives strong support to the view there expressed by the Commission that the essence of auxiliary and supplemental limitation is functional control. While it may be true, as appellees argue, that such a geographical limitation is a necessary ingredient of an auxiliary and supplemental restriction, it does not by any means follow that this ingredient makes the whole. Moreover, we have the strongest evidence that the Commission did not believe that it did, since the Commission specifically refrained from imposing the most general, but obviously the most significant, restriction — that “the service by motor vehicle . . . should be limited to service which is auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service.” 77 M. C. C., at 622-623. The conclusion seems inescapable that the conditions imposed upon the permits to Pacific Motor, though undoubtedly “restrictions” in a general sense, were not limitations sufficient to hold Pacific Motor to a truly auxiliary and supplemental service. Appellees urge that nonetheless there were “special circumstances” within the meaning of American Trucking Associations. Appellees point to various findings of fact by the Commission, such as the need of General Motors for a service of the type here involved, Pacific Motor’s experience and qualifications, and the unlikelihood that a significant amount of traffic would be diverted from rail to motor transportation even if the permits were granted. The difficulty with appellees’ argument is that the Commission did not find that considerations of this nature constituted “special circumstances” under the American Trucking Associations rule, but rather viewed them simply as supporting the basic determinations which it was required to make under § 209 (b) in order to issue a contract carrier permit to any applicant. And naturally we should not substitute our judgment for the Commission’s on a matter like this, for “[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.” Securities & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87. The Commission assigned but a single reason for not imposing the normal restrictions upon the Pacific Motor permits: to do so would compel Pacific Motor to conduct a common carrier service. Appellees support this decision upon the ground that the Commission is without authority under § 209 (b) to impose such character-destroying conditions upon a contract carrier permit. We need not determine whether the Commission possesses the power to attach such limitations, or, in the alternative, to award a common carrier certificate, since we believe that, in any event, the Commission’s reason is insufficient justification for its action. Assuming that the restrictions which would limit Pacific Motor’s operations to an auxiliary and supplemental service would also be incompatible with a contract carrier operation, and that the Commission was consequently powerless to impose those restrictions, this alone does not, in our view, meet the “special circumstances” test. There is, for example, no finding that independent contract carriers were unable or unwilling to perform the same type of service as Pacific Motor. In such a situation we do not believe that the policy of the Act allows the Commission to authorize service by Pacific Motor, limited only to points on the Southern Pacific line, simply because General Motors wants a contract carrier operation. If that desire of General Motors, in combination with the policy of the Act, disables a railroad subsidiary from obtaining the business, that is simply the result of the National Transportation Policy. This consequence, we believe, does not meet the compelling public interest standard established by American Trucking Associations. A contrary conclusion would open the door to approval of over-the-road contract trucking by railroad subsidiaries to most, if not virtually all, major destinations, and hence would greatly attenuate the safeguards which have been painstakingly erected to prevent railroad domination of trucking. Appellees say that these safeguards are no longer needed, because independent trucking is no longer an “infant industry.” This is an immaterial argument in this forum. We do not condemn the wisdom of the Commission's action. We simply say that the transportation legislation does, and that the pardoning power in this case belongs to Congress. Thus the decision of the District Court must be reversed, because we conclude that the Commission fell into error of law. The question then arises whether there should be a remand which permits further proceedings. Appellants argue that there should not be, .because the Commission, according to appellants, found that there were no special circumstances aside from the alleged impossibility of imposing the usual restrictions upon a contract carrier. It is true that the Commission based the rail-point restriction upon “the absence of any showing of unusual conditions.” 77 M. C. C., at 623. But we cannot be certain that the Commission thereby intended to say that there were no special circumstances within the meaning of the American Trucking Associations principle. As we have pointed out, the rail-point restriction, standing alone, is different in kind from limitations which impose an auxiliary and supplemental service. Consequently, we cannot be sure that the Commission believes the same sort of circumstances determine the applicability of both types of restrictions. Moreover, the Commission’s discussion of this point is open to the interpretation that it was repeating some of its conclusions with respect to the § 209 (b) standards, e. g., “the effect which granting the permit would have upon the services of the protesting carriers.” See note 9, supra. Under these circumstances, we would be warranted in precluding further proceedings only if, by an independent search of the record, we were able to conclude that, as a matter of law, there are no factors present which the Commission could have regarded as special circumstances. Although the findings of the Commission which are reflected in its opinion do not seem to us to comply with the American Trucking Associations standard, as the silence of the Commission seems to imply, we are unwilling in a complicated proceeding of this nature to deal with this problem ab initio or to say that the Commission could not have made additional findings on the basis of the evidence had it been aware that the ground its decision rested upon was insuffi-eient. Consequently, under the particular circumstances of this case, we believe that it should be remanded to the Commission so that it can apply what we hold to be the applicable principles in such further proceedings as it may find to be consistent with this opinion. The reversal and remand, however, will not include one aspect of the Commission’s action — the grant of authority to provide a service to three nonrail points in Nevada— which is not governed by the rationale of our opinion. This small segment of the controversy has been submerged in the dispute over the much broader permit covering transportation to rail points in various States. It is obvious, of course, that “special circumstances” would have to be present to justify this Nevada award. Ap-pellees maintain that there was such justification, and appellants have not established that it was lacking. Nor do we perceive any other reason to upset this award. Consequently, we affirm with respect to this particular permit. There remains only the question of standing. Although the three-judge court concluded that the Commission had not exceeded its authority in this case, two members of the court also believed that “there was no showing of actual or anticipated direct injury such as would entitle [the appellants] to institute this action.” 170 F. Supp., at 48. In support of this conclusion, appellees rely principally upon Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76, aff’d per curiam, 350 U. S. 892. That decision held that certain railroads had no standing to challenge a Commission order authorizing acquisition by one motor carrier of others. Since the lower court in Atchison stressed the fact that the Commission there had not created any additional motor carrier service, the decision clearly is not in point. In the instant case, not only has the Commission created new operating rights, but they are rights in which appellants have a stake. And surely the statement by General Motors that it would not in any event give the business to any appellant cannot deprive appellants of standing. The interests of these independents cannot be placed in the hands of a shipper to do with as it sees fit through predictions as to whom its business will or will not go. The decision we believe to be controlling is not Atchison, but rather Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, where the Court confirmed the standing of a railroad to contest the award of a certificate to a competing trucker. We conclude, then, that appellants had standing to maintain their action to set aside the Commission’s order under the “party in interest” criterion of § 205 (g) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 550, 49 U. S. C. § 305 (g), and under the “person suffering legal wrong ... or adversely affected or .aggrieved” criterion of § 10 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (a). Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised by appellants. We have no desire to hamper the Commission in the discharge of its heavy responsibilities, and we have always recognized that the Commission has been given a wide discretion by Congress. But that discretion has limits; our decision in favor of the Commission in American Trucking Associations established the limits relevant to this case; and we conclude that those limits have been transgressed. Of course, in remanding the case we do not intend to circumscribe the Commission in determining whether appropriate “special circumstances” do exist in this instance which would take the case out of the otherwise conventional standards. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with directions to remand to the Commission for such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropriate. It is so ordered. With respect to the transportation from Oakland and Raymer, the States were Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico. The proposed transportation from South Gate was to be to the same States, excluding New Mexico but adding Montana. One Commissioner who concurred said that he would give broader authority; three Commissioners dissented from the grant; and of the three Commissioners who did not participate, one said that he would have joined the dissenters. 54 Stat. 906, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2) (b). 49 Stat. 551, 49 U. S. C. §307. 49 Stat. 552, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 309. The first major Commission decision was rendered the year after enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Pennsylvania Truck Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Barker Motor Freight, Inc., 1 M. C. C. 101. In refusing approval of an acquisition unless certain conditions were met, a division of the Commission stated: “. . . [W] e are not convinced that the way to maintain for the future healthful competition between rail and truck service is to give the railroads free opportunity to go into the kind of truck service which is strictly competitive with, rather than auxiliary to, their rail operations. The language of section 213 ... is evidence that Congress was not convinced that this should be done. Truck service would not, in our judgment, have developed to the extraordinary extent to which it has developed if it had been under railroad control. Improvement in the particular service now furnished by the partnership might flow from control by the railroad, but the question involved is broader than that and concerns the future of truck service generally. The financial and soliciting resources of the railroads could easily be so used in this field that the development of independent service would be greatly hampered and restricted, and with ultimate disadvantage to the public.” Id., at 111-112. The development of Commission policy is traced in detail in Rock Island Motor Transit Co. — Purchase—White Line Motor Freight Co., 40 M. C. C. 457. See also the similar and lengthy discussion in United States v. Rock Island Co., supra, passim. “The Commission asserts that the meaning of ‘auxiliary and supplemental’ . . . was not geographical. . . . “What was in the Commission’s mind as to the meaning of auxiliary and supplemental at the time it issued its certificate, we cannot be sure. At present a motor service is auxiliary and supplemental to rail service, in the Commission’s view, when the railroad-affiliated motor carrier in a subordinate capacity aids the railroad in its rail operations by enabling the railroad to give better service or operate more cheaply rather than independently competing with other motor carriers. . . . The Commission has continually evidenced ... its intention to have rail-owned motor carriers serve in auxiliary and supplemental capacity to the railroads. “The Commission has expressed its policy ... by the phrase, perhaps too summary, auxiliary and supplemental. Though the phrase is difficult to define precisely, its general content is set out in Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co. Application, 41 M. C. C. 721, 726 [establishing generally the same conditions set forth in the text, supra, pp. 7-9] .... While the practice of the Commission has varied in the conditions imposed, the purpose to have rail-connected motor carriers act in coordination with train service has not. . . .” 340 U. S., at 439, 442-443. See the detailed discussion in Rock Island Motor Transit Co. — Purchase — White Line Motor Freight Co., 40 M. C. C. 457. (“[T]here ... appears to have developed a tendency in rail-motor acquisition proceedings to treat the Barker case restrictions as geographical or territorial only in their intent rather than as substantive limitations upon the character of the service which might be rendered by a railroad or its affiliate under any acquired right.” Id., at 470.) See also Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co. Common Carrier Application, supra, at 726. (“Since petitioner’s certificates limit the service to be performed to that which is auxiliary to or supplemental of the rail service of the railway, it is without authority to engage in operations unconnected with the rail service .... To the extent petitioner is performing or participating in all-motor movements on the bills of lading of a motor carrier and at all-motor rates, it is performing a motor service in competition with the rail service and the service of existing motor carriers; and, to the extent it is substituting rail service for motor-vehicle service, the rail service is auxiliary to or supplemental of the motor-vehicle service rather than the motor-vehicle service being auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service.”) 49 Stat. 554, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 310. Section 209 (b) provides in pertinent part: “Subject to section 310 of this title, a permit shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor authorizing in whole or in part the operations covered by the application, if it appears from the applications or from any hearing held thereon, that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service of a contract carrier by motor vehicle, and to conform to the provisions of this- chapter and the lawful requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed operation, to the extent authorized by the permit, will be consistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy declared in the Interstate Commerce Act; otherwise such application shall be denied. In determining whether issuance of a permit will be consistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy declared in the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission shall consider the number of shippers to be served by the applicant, the nature of the service proposed, the effect which granting the permit would have upon the services of the protesting carriers and the effect which denying the permit would have upon the applicant and/or its shipper and the changing character of that shipper’s requirements. . . (Emphasis added.) The italicized portion was added by an amendment of August 22, 1957, 71 Stat. 411, well before the Commission’s decision of September 9, 1958. Consequently, the Commission was required to apply the new standards. Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U. S. 73, 78. Section 209 (b) provides in part that the Commission “shall attach to [the permit] . . . such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations, consistent with the character of the holder as a contract carrier ... as may be necessary to assure that the business is that of a contract carrier and within the scope of the permit, and to carry out . . . the requirements established by the Commission under section 304 (a) (2) and (6) of this title . . . .” “Such restrictions hamper railroad companies in the use of their physical facilities — stations, terminals, warehouses — their personnel and their capital in the development of their transportation enterprises to encompass all or as much of motor transportation as the roads may desire. The announced transportation policy of Congress did not permit such development.” United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., supra, at 443-444. The rail-point limitation appears to have been designed primarily to prevent encroachment upon the business of competing rail carriers. Various railroads opposed the grant of authority before the Commission, but did not join in the federal court action.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DETROIT EDISON CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 77-968. Argued November 6, 1978 Decided March 5, 1979 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-A of which SteveNS, J., joined. StbveNS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and-dissenting in part, post, p. 320. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, and in Part I of which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 320. John A. McGuinn argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Leon S. Cohan. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Louis F. Claiborne, John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, and David S. Fishback. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Bruce L. Montgomery for the American Psychological Assn.; by Thaddeus Holt, William J. Kilberg, and Lawrence Z. Lorber for the American Society for Personnel Administration et ah; and by William J. Rodgers and Stephen A. Bokat for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Burt Pines, Cecil W. Marr, and John W. Witt filed a brief for the city of Los Angeles et al. as amici curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The duty to bargain collectively, imposed upon an employer by § 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by a labor union for the proper performance of its duties as the employees’ bargaining representative. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149; NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432. In this case an employer was brought before the National Labor Relations Board to answer a complaint that it had violated this statutory duty when it refused to disclose certain information about employee aptitude tests requested by a union in order to prepare for arbitration of a grievance. The employer supplied the union with much of the information requested, but refused to disclose three items: the actual test questions, the actual employee answer sheets, and the scores linked with the names of the employees who received them. The Board, concluding that all the items requested were relevant to the grievance and would be useful to the union in processing it, ordered the employer to turn over all of the materials directly to the union, subject to certain restrictions on the union's use of the information. 218 N. L. R. B. 1024 (1975). A divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered enforcement of the Board's order without modification. 560 F. 2d 722 (1977). We granted certiorari to consider an important question of federal labor law. 435 U. S. 941. This is apparently the first case in which the Board has held that an employer’s duty to provide relevant information to the employees’ bargaining representative includes the duty to disclose tests and test scores achieved by named employees in a statistically validated psychological aptitude testing program administered by the employer. Psychological aptitude testing is a widely used employee selection and promotion device in both private industry and government. Test secrecy is concededly critical to the validity of any such program, and confidentiality of scores is undeniably important to the examinees. The underlying question is whether the Board’s order, enforced without modification by the Court of Appeals, adequately accommodated these concerns. I The petitioner, Detroit Edison Co. (hereinafter Company), is a public utility engaged in the generation and distribution of electric power in Michigan. Since about 1943, the Utility Workers Union of America, Local 223, AFL-CIO (Union) has represented certain of the Company’s employees. At the time of the hearing in this case, one of the units represented by the Union was a unit of operating and maintenance employees at the Company’s plant in Monroe, Mich. The Union was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for employees in that unit in 1971, and it was agreed that these employees would be covered by a pre-existing collective-bargaining agreement, one of the provisions of which specified that promotions within a given unit were to be based on seniority “whenever reasonable qualifications and abilities of the employees being considered are not significantly different.” Management decisions to bypass employees with greater seniority were subject to the collective agreement’s grievance machinery, including ultimate arbitration, whenever a claim was made that the bypass had been arbitrary or discriminatory. The aptitude tests at issue were used by the Company to screen applicants for the job classification of “Instrument Man B.” An Instrument Man is responsible for installing, maintaining, repairing, calibrating, testing, and adjusting the powerplant instrumentation. The position of Instrument Man B, although at the lowest starting grade under the contract and usually requiring on-the-job training, was regarded by the Company as a critical job because it involved activities vital to the operation of the plant. The Company has used aptitude tests as a means of predicting job performance since the late 1920’s or early 1930’s. In the late 1950’s, the Company first began to use a set of standardized tests (test battery) as a predictor of performance on the Instrument Man B job. The battery, which had been “validated” for this job classification, consisted of the Wonderlic Personnel Test, the Minnesota Paper Form Board (MPFB), and portions of the Engineering and Physical Science Aptitude Test (EPSAT). All employees who applied for acceptance into the Instrument Man classification were required to take this battery. Three adjective scores were possible: “not recommended,” “acceptable,” and “recommended.” In the late 1960’s, the technical engineers responsible for the Company’s instrumentation department complained that the test battery was not an accurate screening device. The Company’s industrial psychologists, accordingly, performed a revalidation study of the tests. As a result, the Personnel Test was dropped, and the scoring system was changed. Instead of the former three-tier system, two scores were possible under the revised battery: “not recommended” and “acceptable.” The gross test score required for an “acceptable” rating was raised to 10.3, a figure somewhat lower than the former score required for a “recommended” but higher than the “acceptable” score used previously. The Company administered the tests to applicants with the express commitment that each applicant’s test score would remain confidential. Tests and test scores were kept in the offices of the Company’s industrial psychologists who, as members of the American Psychological Association, deemed themselves ethically bound not to disclose test information to unauthorized persons. Under this policy, the Company’s psychologists did not reveal the tests or report actual test numerical scores to management or to employee representatives. The psychologists would, however, if an individual examinee so requested, review the test questions and answers with that individual. The present dispute had its beginnings in 1971 when the Company invited bids from employees to fill six Instrument Man B openings at the Monroe plant. Ten Monroe unit employees applied. None received a score designated as “acceptable,” and all were on that basis rejected. The jobs were eventually filled by applicants from outside the Monroe plant bargaining unit. The Union filed a grievance on behalf of the Monroe applicants, claiming that the new testing procedure was unfair and that the Company had bypassed senior employees in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The grievance was rejected by the Company at all levels, and the Union took it to arbitration. In preparation for the arbitration, the Union requested the Company to turn over various materials related to the Instrument Man B testing program. The Company furnished the Union with copies of test-validation studies performed by its industrial psychologists and with a report by an outside consultant on the Company’s entire testing program. It refused, however, to release the actual test battery, the applicants’ test papers, and their scores, maintaining that complete confidentiality of these materials was necessary in order to insure the future integrity of the tests and to protect the privacy interests of the examinees. The Union then filed with the Board the unfair labor practice charge involved in this case. The charge alleged that the information withheld by the Company was relevant and necessary to the arbitration of the grievance, “including the ascertainment of promotion criteria, the veracity of the scoring and grading of the examination and the testing procedures, and the job relatedness of the test(s) to the Instrument Man B classification.” After filing the unfair labor practice charge, the Union asked the arbitrator to order the Company to furnish the materials at issue. He declined on the ground that he was without authority to do so. In view of the pendency of the charges before the Board, the parties proceeded with the arbitration on the express understanding that the Union could reopen the case should it ultimately prevail in its claims. During the course of the arbitration, however, the Company did disclose the raw scores of those who had taken the test, with the names of the examinees deleted. In addition, it provided the Union with sample questions indicative of the types of questions appearing on the test battery and with detailed information about its scoring procedures. It also offered to turn over the scores of any employee who would sign a waiver releasing the Company psychologist from his pledge of confidentiality. The Union declined to seek such releases. The arbitrator’s decision found that the Company was free under the collective agreement to establish minimum reasonable qualifications for the job of Instrument Man and to use aptitude tests as a measure of those qualifications; that the Instrument Man B test battery was a reliable and fair test in the sense that its administration and scoring had been standardized; and that the test had a “high degree of validity” as a predictor of performance in the job classification for which it was developed. He concluded that the 10.3 score created a “presumption of significant difference under the contract.” He also expressed the view that the Union's position in the arbitration had not been impaired because of lack of access to the actual test battery. Several months later the Board issued a complaint based on the Union’s unfair labor practice charge. At the outset of the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, the Company offered to turn over the test battery and answer sheets to an industrial psychologist selected by the Union for an independent evaluation, stating that disclosure to an intermediary obligated to preserve test secrecy would satisfy its concern that direct disclosure to the Union would inevitably result in dissemination of the questions. The Union rejected this compromise. The Administrative Law Judge found that notwithstanding the conceded statistical validity of the test battery, the tests and scores would be of probable relevant help to the Union in the performance of its duties as collective-bargaining agent. He reasoned that the Union, having had no access to the tests, had been “deprived of any occasion to check the tests for built-in bias, or discriminatory tendency, or any opportunity to argue that the tests or the test questions are not well suited to protect the employees’ rights, or to check the accuracy of the scoring.” The Company’s claim that employees’ privacy might be abused by disclosure to the Union of the scores he rejected as insubstantial. Accordingly, he recommended that the Company be ordered to turn over the test scores directly to the Union. He did, however, accept the Company’s suggestion that the test battery and answer sheets be disclosed to an expert intermediary. Disclosure of these materials to lay Union representatives, he reasoned, would not be likely to produce constructive results, since the tests could be properly analyzed only by professionals. The Union was to be given “the right to see and study the tests,” and to use the information therein “to the extent necessary to process and arbitrate the grievances,” but not to disclose the information to third parties other than the arbitrator. The Company specifically requested the Board “to adopt that part of the order which requires that tests be turned over to a qualified psychologist,” but excepted to the requirement that the employee-linked scores be given to the Union. It contended that the only reason asserted by the Union in support of its request for the scores — to check their arithmetical accuracy — was not sufficient to overcome the principle of confidentiality that underlay its psychological testing program. The Union filed a cross exception to the requirement that it select a psychologist, arguing that it should not be forced to “employ an outsider for what is normal grievance and Labor-Management work.” The Board, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in its decision enforcing the Board’s order, ordered the Company to turn over all the material directly to the Union. They concluded that the Union should be able to determine for itself whether it needed a psychologist to interpret the test battery and answer sheets. Both recognized the Company’s interest in maintaining the security of the tests, but both reasoned that appropriate restrictions on the Union’s use of the materials would protect this interest. Neither was receptive to the Company’s claim that employee privacy and the professional obligations of the Company’s industrial psychologists should outweigh the Union request for the employee-linked scores. II Because of the procedural posture of this case, the questions that have been preserved for our review are relatively narrow. The Company has presented a lengthy argument designed to demonstrate that the Board and the Court of Appeals misunderstood the premises of its aptitude testing program and thus erred in concluding that the information requested by the Union would be of any actual or potential relevance to the performance of its duties. This basic challenge, insofar as it concerns the test battery and answer sheets, is foreclosed, however, by § 10 (e) of the Act because of the Company’s failure to raise it before the Board. Two issues, then, are presented on this record. The first concerns the Board’s choice of a remedy for the Company’s failure to disclose copies of the test battery and answer sheets. The second, and related, question concerns the propriety of the Board’s conclusion that the Company committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to disclose, without a written consent from the individual employees, the test scores linked with the employee names. A We turn first to the question whether the Board abused its remedial discretion when it ordered the Company to deliver directly to the Union the copies of the test battery and answer sheets. The Company’s position, stripped of the argument that it had no duty at all to disclose these materials, is as follows: It urges that disclosure directly to the Union would carry with it a substantial risk that the test questions would be disseminated. Since it spent considerable time and money validating the Instrument Man B tests and since its tests depend for reliability upon the examinee’s lack of advance preparation, it contends that the harm of dissemination would not be trivial. The future validity of the tests is tied to secrecy, and disclosure to employees would not only threaten the Company’s investment but would also leave the Company with no valid means of measuring employee aptitude. The Company also maintains that its interest in preserving the security of its tests is consistent with the federal policy favoring the use of validated, standardized, and nondiscriminatory employee selection procedures reflected in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In his brief on behalf of the Board, the Solicitor General has acknowledged the existence of a strong public policy against disclosure of employment aptitude tests and, at least in the context of civil service testing, has conceded that “[g]overnmental recruitment would be seriously disputed and public confidence eroded if the integrity of . . . tests were compromised.” Indeed, he has also acknowledged that the United States Civil Service Commission “has been zealous to guard against undue disclosure and has successfully contended for protective orders which limit exposure of the tests to attorneys and professional psychologists with restrictions on copying or disseminating test materials.” He urges, however, that the Board’s order can be justified on the grounds that the Union’s institutional interests militate against improper disclosure, and that the specific protective provisions in the Board’s order will safeguard the integrity of the tests. He emphasizes the deference generally accorded to “the considered judgment of the Board, charged by Congress with special responsibility for effectuating labor policy.” We do not find these justifications persuasive. A union’s bare assertion that it needs information to process a grievance does not automatically oblige the employer to supply all the information in the manner • requested. The duty to supply information under § 8 (a) (5) turns upon “the circumstances of the particular case,” NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S., at 153, and much the same may be said for the type of disclosure that will satisfy that duty. See, e. g., American Cyanamid Co., 129 N. L. R. B. 683, 684 (1960). Throughout this proceeding, the reasonableness of the Company’s concern for test secrecy has been essentially conceded. The finding by the Board that this concern did not outweigh the Union’s interest in exploring the fairness of the Company’s criteria for promotion did not carry with it any suggestion that the concern itself was not legitimate and substantial. Indeed, on this record — which has established the Company’s freedom under the collective contract to use aptitude tests as a criterion for promotion, the empirical validity of the tests, and the relationship between secrecy and test validity — the strength of the Company’s concern has been abundantly demonstrated. The Board has cited no principle of national labor policy to warrant a remedy that would unnecessarily disserve this interest, and we are unable to identify one. It is obvious that the remedy selected by the Board does not adequately protect the security of the tests. The restrictions barring the Union from taking any action that might cause the tests to fall into the hands of employees who have taken or are likely to take them are only as effective as the sanctions available to enforce them. In this instance, there is substantial doubt whether the Union would be subject to a contempt citation were it to ignore the restrictions. It was not a party to the enforcement proceeding in the Court of Appeals, and the scope of an enforcement order under § 10 (e) is limited by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 66 (d) making an injunction binding only “upon the parties to the action . . . and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them . . . See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 9, 14. The Union, of course, did participate actively in the Board proceedings, but it is debatable whether that would be enough to satisfy the requirement of the Rule. Further, the Board’s regulations contemplate a contempt sanction only against a respondent, 29 CFR §§ 101.9, 101.14-101.15 (1978), and the initiation of contempt proceedings is entirely within the discretion of the Board’s General Counsel. Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261, 269. Effective sanctions at the Board level are similarly problematic. To be sure, the Board’s General Counsel could theoretically bring a separate unfair labor practice charge against the Union, but he could also in his unreviewable discretion refuse to issue such a complaint. See 29 U. S. C.. § 153 (d); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 182. Moreover, the Union clearly would not be accountable in either contempt or unfair labor practice proceedings for the most realistic vice inherent in the Board’s remedy — the danger of inadvertent leaks. We are mindful that the Board is granted broad discretion in devising remedies to undo the effects of violations of the Act, NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 346; Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 216, and of the principle that in the area of federal labor law “the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194. Nonetheless, the rule of deference to the Board’s choice of remedy does not constitute a blank check for arbitrary action. The role that Congress in § 10 (e) has entrusted to the courts in reviewing the Board’s petitions for enforcement of its orders is not that of passive conduit. See Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 216. The Board in this case having identified no justification for a remedy granting such scant protection to the Company’s undisputed and important interests in test secrecy, we hold that the Board abused its discretion in ordering the Company to turn over the test battery and answer sheets directly to the Union. B The dispute over Union access to the actual scores received by named employees is in a somewhat different procedural posture, since the Company did on this issue preserve its objections to the basic finding that it had violated its duty under § 8 (a)(5) when it refused disclosure. The Company argues that even if the scores were relevant to the Union’s grievance (which it vigorously disputes), the Union’s need for the information was not sufficiently weighty to require breach of the promise of confidentiality to the examinees, breach of its industrial psychologists’ code of professional ethics, and potential embarrassment and harassment of at least some of the examinees. The Board responds that this information does satisfy the appropriate standard of “relevance,” see NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432, and that the Company, having “unilaterally” chosen to make a promise of confidentiality to the examinees, cannot rely on that promise to defend against a request for relevant information. The professional obligations of the Company’s psychologists, it argues, must give way to paramount federal law. Finally, it dismisses as speculative the contention that employees with low scores might be embarrassed or harassed. We may accept for the sake of this discussion the finding that the employee scores were of potential relevance to the Union’s grievance, as well as the position of the Board that the federal statutory duty to disclose relevant information cannot be defeated by the ethical standards of a private group. Cf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235, 239. Nevertheless we agree with the Company that its willingness to disclose these scores only upon receipt of consents from the examinees satisfied its statutory obligations under §8 (a)(5). The Board’s position appears to rest on the proposition that union interests in arguably relevant information must always predominate over all other interests, however legitimate. But such an absolute rule has never been established, and we decline to adopt such a rule here. There are situations in which an employer’s conditional offer to disclose may be warranted. This we believe is one. The sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence is sufficiently well known to be an appropriate subject of judicial notice. There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Company promised the examinees that their scores would remain confidential in order to further parochial concerns or to frustrate subsequent Union attempts to process employee grievances. And it has not been suggested at any point in this proceeding that the Company’s unilateral promise of confidentiality was in itself violative of the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Indeed, the Company presented evidence that disclosure of individual scores had in the past resulted in the harassment of some lower scoring examinees who had, as a result, left the Company. Under these circumstances, any possible impairment of the function of the Union in processing the grievances of employees is more than justified by the interests served in conditioning the disclosure of the test scores upon the consent of the very employees whose grievance is being processed. The burden on the Union in this instance is minimal. The Company’s interest in preserving employee confidence in the testing program is well founded. In light of the sensitive nature of testing information, the minimal burden that compliance with the Company’s offer would have placed on the Union, and the total absence of evidence that the Company had fabricated concern for employee confidentiality only to frustrate the Union in the discharge of its responsibilities, we are unable to sustain the Board in its conclusion that the Company, in resisting an unconsented-to disclosure of individual test results, violated the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149. Accordingly, we hold that the order requiring the Company unconditionally to disclose the employee scores to the Union was erroneous. The judgment is vacated, and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 29 U. S. C. §§151-158. The arbitration was subsequently held without the benefit of this information, subject to the stipulation that the union could reopen the award if a court ordered disclosure of these materials. See infra, at 308. Aptitude tests are not designed to measure current knowledge and skills relevant to a job, but, instead, to measure the examinee’s ability to acquire such knowledge and skills. The Company used the empirical method of establishing validity; that is, it analyzed the requirements of the Instrument Man B job and developed objective measures by which supervisors were to rate the performance of employees in this job classification. Incumbents were given the preselected tests, and their scores were then compared with the supervisory ratings. A statistically significant correlation between the scores and the ratings was demonstrated. Both the Company and the Union were named defendants in a lawsuit in which various Company employment practices, including aptitude tests used for other job classifications, were found to violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. See Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 118-119 (ED Mich. 1973), rev’d as to remedy, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F. 2d 301 (CA6 1975), vacated and remanded, Detroit Edison v. EEOC, 431 U. S. 951 (1977), superseding order entered, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 17 E. P. D. ¶ 8583 (ED Mich. 1978), notice of appeal filed, Aug. 24, 1978. The issues in the present unfair labor practice litigation are distinct, and nothing in this opinion, particularly use of such words as “valid” or “validate,” is to be understood as bearing in any way on possible Title VII questions. Cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 425-436. During the decade or so that this test battery was in use, only one grievance involving it was filed. In that instance, a senior employee who had received an “acceptable" score was bypassed for acceptance in favor of a junior employee who had received a higher “recommended” score. The grievance was upheld. See American Psychological Assn., Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests (1974). Standard J-2 prohibits disclosure of aptitude tests and test scores to unauthorized individuals. See also Ethical Standards of Psychologists (1977 rev.). Principle 5 of the Ethical Standards imposes an obligation on the psychologist to safeguard “information about an individual that has been obtained ... in the course of . . . teaching, practice, or investigation.” Subsection (b) of the Principle permits the psychologist to discuss evaluative data concerning employees but only if the “data [is] germane to the purposes of the evaluation” and “every effort” has been made to “avoid undue invasion of privacy.” The arbitrator did conclude, however, that the 10.3 cutoff score was too high because it eliminated some applicants who would probably succeed in the Instrument Man job. Based on the Company’s validation statistics, he concluded that seniority would be undermined unless those applicants who had received scores of between 9.3 and 10.3 were given an opportunity to demonstrate that they had other qualifications that might offset their somewhat lower scores. Three applicants were in this group. As a result of the evaluation ordered by the arbitrator, one was promoted. The Company had consistently maintained that disclosure to the Union would serve no purpose. It contended that the validity of the tests depended upon a statistical determination that they were accurate predictors of future job performance. Lay examination of the questions, it asserted, could only determine whether the questions were on their face related to the job. The Board, although it ordered the Company to supply the tests and answer sheets directly to the Union, incorporated by reference the Administrative Law Judge’s restrictions on the Union’s use of the materials. Under those restrictions, the Union was given the right “to use the tests and the information contained therein to the extent necessary to process and arbitrate the grievances, but not to copy the tests, or otherwise use them for the purpose of disclosing the tests or the questions to employees who have in the past, or who may in the future take these tests, or to anyone (other than the arbitrator) who may advise the employees of the contents of the tests.” After the conclusion of the arbitration, the Union was required to return “all copies of the battery of tests” to the Company. The Court of Appeals, in enforcing the Board’s order, stated that the “restrictions on use of the materials and obligation to return them to Detroit Edison are part of the decision and order which we enforce.” 560 F. 2d 722, 726. 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). Section 10 (e) precludes a reviewing court from considering an objection that has not been urged before the Board, “unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” The Board enforces a similar procedural limitation through a rule providing that any exception to a finding of the Administrative Law Judge not specifically urged before the Board “shall be deemed to have been waived.” 29 CFR § 102.46 (b) (1978). The rule serves a sound purpose, and unless a party’s neglect to press an exception before the Board is excused by the statutory “extraordinary circumstances” exception or unless the Board determination at issue is patently in excess of its authority, we are bound by it. See, e. g., NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U. S. 318, 322. The Company has justified its failure to object on the ground that it had “no practical reason” to challenge the portion of the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation adopting its suggestion that the tests and answer sheets be disclosed to an intermediary. If this ground were accepted as an “extraordinary circumstance,” however, little would be left of the statutory exception. In any case, the Company’s “practical” reason disappeared when it again failed to challenge the finding of relevance after the Union had filed a cross exception urging that direct disclosure be ordered. Moreover, much of the Company’s challenge to relevancy is based upon the arbitrator’s findings and conclusion that examination of these materials would prove little. We do not question the arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective agreement. Nonetheless, the parties agreed not to be bound by the arbitrator’s determination of relevance, the arbitrator accepted this condition, and the Board concluded that the Union could properly invoke its jurisdiction on these terms. This is not to say that the arbitral award itself is irrelevant to this controversy. The arbitration record and award were before the Administrative Law Judge, and we do not understand the Board to have disturbed the arbitrator’s resolution of the contract issues peculiarly within his competence. Cf. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U. S. 432, 436-437. 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. The Company places particular emphasis on § 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(h), and the agency guidelines promulgated thereunder. Indeed, it has argued that the guidelines are violated by the Board’s order directing disclosure to the employee representative. With this we cannot agree. Section 703 (h) permits an employer to “give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” Pursuant to §703 (h), specific guidelines on employee testing programs have been issued. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.1 et seq. (1977). The guidelines state that “properly validated and standardized employee selection procedures can significantly contribute to the implementation of non-discriminatory personnel policies.” § 1607.1 (a). In another section of the guidelines, it is stated that evidence of test validity must be based on “studies employing generally accepted procedures for determining criterion-related validity, such as those described in the ‘Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals’ published by the American Psychological Association.” § 1607.5. The guidelines further provide that “[t]ests must be administered and scored under controlled and standardized conditions, with proper safeguards to protect the security of tests scores.” § 1607.5 (b)(2). Contrary to the Company’s assertion, these provisions, although they do recognize the relationship between test security and test validity, do not insulate testing materials from the employer’s duty under the Act to disclose relevant information. At most, they provide evidence of the employer’s interest in maintaining the security of properly validated tests. See n. 9, supra. The Board limited discussion of its reasons for eliminating the intermediary requirement to the statement that “it is reasonable to assume that, having requested the papers, the Union intends effectively to utilize them.” Consequently, it said, it “would not condition the Union’s access to the information on the retention of a psychologist but rather would have [the Company] submit the information directly to the Union and let the Union decide whether the assistance or expertise of a psychologist is required.” See Emeryville Research Center, Shell Development Co. v. NLRB, 441 F. 2d 880 (CA9 1971) (refusal to supply relevant salary information in precise form demanded did not constitute violation of § 8 (a) (5) when company’s proposed alternatives were responsive to union’s need); Shell Oil Co. v. NLRB, 457 F. 2d 615 (CA9 1975) (refusal to supply employee names without employee consent not unlawful when company had well-founded fear that nonstriking employees would be harassed); cf. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 399 F. 2d 455 (CA6 1968) (no disclosure of operating ratio data when, under circumstances, interests of employer predominated); United Aircraft Corp., 192 N. L. R. B. 382, 390 (1971) (employer acted reasonably in refusing to honor generalized request for employee medical records without employee’s permission), modified on other grounds, Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F. 2d 422 (CA2 1975). NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, relied upon by the Solicitor General, is not to the contrary. The interests at stake and the legal issues involved in that case, in which the Board ordered the company to disclose the names and addresses of employees to a union in the process of an organizing campaign, were far different from those involved here. A person’s interest in preserving the confidentiality of sensitive information contained in his personnel files has been given forceful recognition in both federal and state legislation governing the recordkeeping activities of public employers and agencies. See, e. g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S. C. § 552a (written consent required before information in individual records may be disclosed, unless the request falls within an explicit statutory exception); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-204 (3) (a) (1973) (regulating disclosure of medical, psychological, and scholastic achievement data in public records); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 68A.7 (10)-(11) (West 1973) (regulating disclosure of personal information in public employee records); N. Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 89 (2) (b) (i)-(c) (ii) (McKinney Supp. 1978) (disapproving unconsented-to release of employment and medical information in public records). See also IT. S. Privacy Protection Study Comm’n, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977) (recommending that all employers should be under a duty to safeguard the confidentiality of employee records). Cf. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U. S. C. § 1232g (explicitly recognizing, in the context of education, the interest of the individual in maintaining the confidentiality of test scores). Indeed, the federal Privacy Act ban on unconsented-to disclosure of employee records without written consent has been construed to provide a valid defense to a union request for certain employee personnel data made pursuant to the terms of a public employee collective-bargaining agreement. See American Federation of Oovt. Employees v. Defense General Supply Center, 423 F. Supp. 481 (ED Va. 1976), aff’d per curiam, 573 F. 2d 184 (CA4 1978).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ESTATE OF ROMANI et al. No. 96-1613. Argued January 12, 1998 Decided April 29, 1998 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsbtjrg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 535. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wax-man, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, William S. Estabrook, and Joan 1. Oppenheimer. Patrick F. McCartan argued the cause for respondent Romani Industries, Inc. With him on the brief were Gregory G. Katsas and Lawrence L. Davis. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The federal priority statute, 31 U. S. C. § 3713(a), provides that a claim of the United States Government “shall be paid first” when a decedent’s estate cannot pay all of its debts. The question presented is whether that statute requires that a federal tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor’s perfected lien on real property even though such a preference is not authorized by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U. S. C. § 6321 et seq. I On January 25,1985, the Court of Common Pleas of Cam-bria County, Pennsylvania, entered a judgment for $400,000 in favor of Romani Industries, Inc., and against Francis J. Romani. The judgment was recorded in the clerk’s office and therefore, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, it became a lien on all of the defendant’s real property in Cambria County. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service filed a series of notices of tax liens on Mr. Romani’s property. The claims for unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties described in those notices amounted to approximately $490,000. When Mr. Romani died on January 13,1992, his entire estate consisted of real estate worth only $53,001. Because the property was encumbered by both the judgment lien and the federal tax liens, the estate’s administrator sought permission from the Court of Common Pleas to transfer the property to the judgment creditor, Romani Industries, in lieu of execution. The Federal Government acknowledged that its tax liens were not valid as against the earlier judgment lien; but, giving new meaning to Franklin’s aphorism that "in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes,” it opposed the transfer on the ground that the priority statute (§3713) gave it the right to “be paid first.” The Court of Common Pleas overruled the Government’s objection and authorized the conveyance. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the State also affirmed. 547 Pa. 41, 688 A. 2d 703 (1997). That court first determined that there was a “plain inconsistency” between § 3713, which appears to give the United States “absolute priority” over all competing claims, and the Tax Lien Act of 1966, which provides that the federal tax lien “shall not be valid” against judgment lien creditors until a prescribed notice has been given. Id., at 45, 688 A. 2d, at 705. Then, relying on the reasoning in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715 (1979), which had noted that the Tax Lien Act of 1966 modified the Federal Government’s preferred position in the tax area and recognized the priority of many state claims over federal tax liens, id., at 738, the court concluded that the 1966 Act had the effect of limiting the operation of § 3713 as to tax debts. The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conflicts with two Federal Court of Appeals decisions, Kentucky ex rel. Luckett v. United States, 383 F. 2d 13 (CA6 1967), and Nesbitt v. United States, 622 F. 2d 433 (CA9 1980). Moreover, in its petition for certiorari, the Government submitted that the decision is inconsistent with our holding in Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396 (1817), and with the admonition that “ ‘[o]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of [31 U. S. C. § 3713],'” United States v. Key, 397 U. S. 322, 324-325 (1970) (quoting United States v. Emory, 314 U. S. 423, 433 (1941)). We granted certiorari, 521 U. S. 1117 (1997), to resolve the conflict and to consider whether Thelusson, Key, or any of our other cases construing the pí’iority statute requires a different result. II There is no dispute about the meaning of two of the three statutes that control the disposition of this case. It is therefore appropriate to comment on the Pennsylvania lien statute and the Federal Tax Lien Act before considering the applicability of the priority statute to property encumbered by an antecedent judgment creditor’s hen. The Pennsylvania statute expressly provides that a judgment shall create a lien against real property when it is recorded in the county where the property is located. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4303(a) (1995). After the judgment has been recorded, the judgment creditor has the same right to notice of a tax sale as a mortgagee. The recording in one county does not, of course, create a lien on property located elsewhere. In this case, however, it is undisputed that the judgment creditor acquired a valid hen on the real property in Cambria County before the judgment debtor’s death and before the Government served notice of its tax liens. Romani Industries’ lien was “perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a ehoate lien — when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established.” United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 84 (1954); see also Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 375 (1946). The Federal Government’s right to a lien on a delinquent taxpayer’s property has been a part of our law at least since 1865. Originally the lien applied, without exception, to all property of the taxpayer immediately upon the neglect or failure to pay the tax upon demand. An unrecorded tax lien against a delinquent taxpayer’s property was valid even against a bona fide purchaser who had no notice of the lien. United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210, 213-215 (1893). In 1913, Congress amended the statute to provide that the federal tax lien “shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor5’ until notice has been filed with the clerk of the federal district court or with the appropriate local authorities in the district or county in which the property subject to the lien is located. Act of Mar. 4,1913, 37 Stat. 1016. In 1939, Congress broadened the protection against unfiled tax liens to include pledgees and the holders of certain securities. Act of June 29, 1939, §401, 53 Stat. 882-883. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 again broadened that protection to encompass a variety of additional secured transactions, and also included detailed provisions protecting certain secured interests even when a notice of the federal lien previously has been filed. 80 Stat. 1125-1132, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 6323. In sum, each time Congress revisited the federal tax lien, it ameliorated its original harsh impact on other secured creditors of the delinquent taxpayer. In this ease, it is agreed that by the terms of § 6323(a), the Federal Government’s liens are not valid as against the lien created by the earlier recording of Romani Industries’ judgment. III The text of the priority statute on which the Government places its entire reliance is virtually unchanged since its enactment in 1797. As we pointed out in United States v. Moore, 423 U. S. 77 (1975), not only were there earlier versions of the statute, but “its roots reach back even further into the English common law,” id., at 80. The sovereign prerogative that was exercised by the English Crown and by many of the States as “an inherent incident of sovereignty,” ibid., applied only to unsecured claims. As Justice Brandéis noted in Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380, 384 (1920), the common-law priority “[did] not obtain over a specific lien created by the debtor before the sovereign undertakes to enforce its right.” Moreover, the statute itself does not create a lien in favor of the United States. Given this background, respondent argues that the statute should be read as giving the United States a preference over other unsecured creditors but not over secured creditors. There are dicta in our earlier cases that support this contention as well as dicta that tend to refute it. Perhaps the strongest support is found in Justice Story’s statement: “What then is the nature of the priority, thus limited and established in favour of the United States? Is it a right, which supersedes and overrules the assignment of the debtor, as to any property which the United States may afterwards elect to take in execution, so as to prevent such property from passing by virtue of such assignment to the assignees? Or, is it a mere right of prior payment, out of the general funds of the debtor, in the hands of the assignees? We are of opinion that it clearly falls, within the latter description. The language employed is that which naturally would be employed to express such an intent; and it must be strained from its ordinary import, to speak any other.” Concord v. Atlantic Ins. Co. of N. Y., 1 Pet. 386, 439 (1828). Justice Story’s opinion that the language employed in the statute “must be strained” to give it any other meaning is entitled to special respect because he was more familiar with 18th-century usage than judges who view the statute from a 20th-century perspective. We cannot, however, ignore the Court’s earlier judgment in Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat., at 426, or the more recent dicta in United States v. Key, 397 U. S., at 324-325. In Thelusson, the Court held that the priority statute gave the United States a preference over the claim of a judgment creditor who had a general lien on the debtor’s real property. The Court’s brief opinion is subject to the interpretation that the statutory priority always accords the Government a preference over judgment creditors. For two reasons, we do not accept that reading of the opinion. First, as a factual matter, in 1817 when the ease was decided, there was no procedure for recording a judgment and thereby creating a ehoate lien on a specific parcel of real estate. See generally 2 L. Dembitz, A Treatise on Land Titles in the United States § 127, pp. 948-952 (1895). Notwithstanding the judgment, a bona fide purchaser could have acquired the debtor’s property free from any claims of the judgment creditor. See Semple v. Burd, 7 Serg. & Rawle 286, 291 (Pa. 1821) (“The prevailing object of the Legislature, has uniformly been, to support the security of a judgment creditor, by confirming his lien, except when it interferes with the circulation of property by embarrassing a fair purchaser”). That is not the ease with respect to Romani Industries’ choate lien on the property in Cambria Comity. Second, and of greater importance, in his opinion for the Court in the Conard case, which was joined by Justice Washington, the author of Thelusson, Justice Story explained why that holding was fully consistent with his interpretation of the text of the priority statute: “The real ground of the decision, was, that the judgment creditor had never perfected his title, by any execution and levy on the Sedgely estate; that he had acquired no title to the proceeds as his property, and that if the proceeds were to be deemed general funds of the debtor, the priority of the United States to payment had attached against all other creditors; and that a mere potential lien on land, did not carry a legal title to the proceeds of a sale, made under an adverse execution. This is the manner in which this case has been understood, by the Judges who concurred in the decision; and it is obvious, that it established no such proposition, as that a specific and perfected lien, can be displaced by the mere priority of the United States; since that priority is not of itself equivalent to a lien.” Conard, 1 Pet., at 444. The Government also relies upon dicta from our opinion in United States v. Key, 397 U. S., at 324-325, which quoted from our earlier opinion in United States v. Emory, 314 U. S., at 433: “Only the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command as that of [§ 3713].” Because both Key and Emory were eases in which the competing claims were unsecured, the statutory command was perfectly clear even under Justice Story’s construction of the statute. The statements made in that context, of course, shed no light on the clarity of the command when the United States relies on the statute as a basis for claiming a preference over a secured creditor. Indeed, the Key opinion itself made this specific point: “This ease does not raise the question, never decided by this Court, whether § 3466 grants the Government priority over the prior specific liens of secured creditors. See United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361, 365-366 (1953).” 397 U. S., at 332, n. 11. The Key opinion is only one of many in which the Court has noted that despite the age of the statute, and despite the fact that it has been the subject of a great deal of litigation, the question whether it has any application to antecedent perfected liens has never been answered definitively. See United States v. Vermont, 377 U. S. 351, 358, n. 8 (1964) (citing cases). In his dissent in United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U. S. 361 (1953), Justice Frankfurter referred to the Court’s reluctance to decide the issue “not only today but for almost a century and a half.” 345 U. S., at 367. The Government’s priority as against specific, perfected security interests is, if possible, even less settled with regard to real property. The Court has sometimes concluded that a competing creditor who has not “divested” the debtor of “either title or possession” has only a “general, unperfeeted lien” that is defeated by the Government’s priority. E. g., id., at 366. Assuming the validity of this “title or possession” test for deciding whether a lien on personal property is sufficiently ehoate for purposes of the priority statute (a question of federal law, see Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U. S., at 371), we are not aware of any decisions since Thelusson applying that theory to claims for real property, or of any reason to require a lienor or mortgagee to acquire possession in order to perfect an interest in real estate. Given the fact that this basic question of interpretation i’emains unresolved, it does not seem appropriate to view the issue in this case as whether the Tax Lien Act of 1966 has implicitly amended or repealed the priority statute. Instead, we think the proper inquiry is how best to harmonize the impact of the two statutes on the Government’s power to collect delinquent taxes. IV In his dissent from a particularly harsh application of the priority statute, Justice Jackson emphasized the importance of considering other relevant federal policies. Joined by three other Justices, he wrote: “This decision announces an unnecessarily ruthless interpretation of a statute that at its best is an arbitrary one. The statute by which the Federal Government gives its own claims against an insolvent priority over claims in favor of a state government must be applied by courts, not because federal claims are more meritorious or equitable, but only because that Government has more power. But the priority statute is an assertion of federal supremacy as against any contrary state policy. It is not a limitation on the Federal Government itself, not an assertion that the priority policy shall prevail over all other federal policies. Its generalities should not lightly be construed to frustrate a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute.” Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, 635 (1948). On several prior occasions the Court had followed this approach and concluded that a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control our construction of the priority statute, even though it had not been expressly amended. Thus, in Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, 107 U. S. 445, 448-451 (1883), the Court concluded that the priority statute did not apply to federal claims against national banks because the National Bank Act comprehensively regulated banks’ obligations and the distribution of insolvent banks’ assets. And in United States v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 280 U. S. 478, 485 (1930), we determined that the Transportation Act of 1920 had effectively superseded the priority statute with respect to federal claims against the railroads arising under that Act. The bankruptcy law provides an additional context in which another federal statute was given effect despite the priority statute’s literal, unconditional text. The early federal bankruptcy statutes had accorded to “ ‘all debts due to the United States, and all taxes and assessments under the laws thereof’” a preference that was “coextensive” with that established by the priority statute. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152, 158 (1912) (quoting the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Rev. Stat. § 5101). As such, the priority Act and the bankruptcy laws “were to be regarded as in pari materia, and both were unqualified;... as neither contained any qualification, none could be interpolated.” 224 U. S., at 158. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, however, subordinated the priority of the Federal Government’s claims (except for taxes due) to certain other kinds of debts. This Court resolved the tension between the new bankruptcy provisions and the priority statute by applying the former and thus treating the Government like any other general creditor. Id., at 158-160; Davis v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 315, 317-319 (1925). There are sound reasons for treating the Tax Lien Act of 1966 as the governing statute when the Government is claiming a preference in the insolvent estate of a delinquent taxpayer. As was the case with the National Bank Act, the Transportation Act of 1920, and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Tax Lien Act is the later statute, the more specific statute, and its provisions are comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt to accommodate the strong policy objections to the enforcement of secret liens. It represents Congress5 detailed judgment as to when the Government’s claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many different sorts of interests (including, for instance, judgment liens, mechanic’s liens, and attorney’s liens) in many different types of property (including, for example, real property, securities, and motor vehicles). See 26 U. S. C. §6323. Indeed, given our unambiguous determination that the federal interest in the collection of taxes is paramount to its interest in enforcing other claims, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S., at 733-735, it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended the priority statute to impose greater burdens on the citizen than those specifically crafted for tax collection purposes. Even before the 1966 amendments to the Tax Lien Act, this Court assumed that the more recent and specific provisions of that Act would apply were they to conflict with the older priority statute. In the Gilbert Associates ease, which concerned the relative priority of the Federal Government and a New Hampshire town to funds of an insolvent taxpayer, the Court first considered whether the town could qualify as a “judgment creditor” entitled to preference under the Tax Lien Act. 345 U. S., at 363-364. Only after deciding that question in the negative did the Court conclude that the United States obtained preference by operation of the priority statute. Id., at 365-366. The Government would now portray Gilbert Associates as a deviation from two other relatively recent opinions in which the Court held that the priority statute was not trumped by provisions of other statutes: United States v. Emory, 314 U. S., at 429-433 (the National Housing Act), and United States v. Key, 397 U. S., at 324-333 (Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act). In each of those cases, however, there was no “plain inconsistency” between the commands of the priority statute and the other federal Act, nor was there reason to believe that application of the priority statute would frustrate Congress’ intent. Id., at 329. The same cannot be saidin the present suit. The Government emphasizes that when Congress amended the Tax Lien Act in 1966, it declined to enact the American Bar Association’s proposal to modify the federal priority statute, and Congress again failed to enact a similar proposal in 1970. Both proposals would have expressly provided that the Government’s priority in insolvency does not displace valid liens and security interests, and therefore would have harmonized the priority statute with the Tax Lien Act. See Hearings on H. R. 11256 and 11290 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 197 (1966) (hereinafter Hearings); S. 2197, 92d Cong., 1st Se1ss. (1971). But both proposals also would have significantly changed the priority statute in many other respects to follow the priority scheme created by the bankruptcy laws. See Hearings, at 85, 198; Plumb 10, n. 53, 33-37. The earlier proposal may have failed because its wide-ranging subject matter was beyond the House Ways and Means Committee’s jurisdiction. Id., at 8. The failure of the 1970 proposal in the Senate Judiciary Committee— explained by no reports or hearings — might merely reflect disagreement with the broad changes to the priority statute, or an assumption that the proposal was not needed because, as Justice Story had believed, the priority statute does not apply to prior perfected security interests, or any number of other views. Thus, the Committees’ failures to report the proposals to the entire Congress do not necessarily indicate that any legislator thought that the priority statute should supersede the Tax Lien Act in the adjudication of federal tax claims. They provide no support for the hypothesis that both Houses of Congress silently endorsed that position. The actual measures taken by Congress provide a superior insight regarding its intent. As we have noted, the 1966 amendments to the Tax Lien Act bespeak a strong condemnation of secret liens, which unfairly defeat the expectations of innocent creditors and frustrate “the needs of our citizens for certainty and convenience in the legal rules governing their commercial dealings.” 112 Cong. Rec. 22227 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); cf. United States v. Speers, 382 U. S. 266, 275 (1965) (referring to the “general policy against secret liens”). These policy concerns shed light on how Congress would want the conflicting statutory provisions to be harmonized: “Liens may be a dry-as-dust part of the law, but they are not without significance in an industrial and commercial community where construction and credit are thought to have importance. One does not readily impute to Congress the intention that many common commercial liens should be congenitally unstable.” E. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term — Foreword: Process of Law, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 87 (1958) (footnote omitted). In sum, nothing in the text or the long history of interpreting the federal priority statute justifies the conclusion that it authorizes the equivalent of a secret lien as a substitute for the expressly authorized tax lien that Congress has said “shall not be valid” in a case of this kind. The judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. “§3713. Priority of Government claims “(a)(1) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when— “(A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and— “(i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts makes a voluntary assignment of property; “(ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or “(iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or “(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administrator, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor. “(2) This subsection does not apply to a case under title 11.” 81 U. S. G. §3713. The present statute is the direct deseendent of §3466 of the Revised Statutes, which had been codified in 31U. S. G. §191. Letter of Nov. 13, 1789, to Jean Baptiste Le Roy, in 10 Writings of Benjamin Franklin 69 (A. Smyth ed. 1907). As is often the case, the original meaning of the aphorism is clarified somewhat by its context: “Our new Constitution is now established, and has an appearance that promises permanency; but in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” Ibid. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 26 U. S. C. §6321 et seq., provides in pertinent part: “§6321. Lien for taxes “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” “§ 6323. Validity and priority against certain persons “(a) Purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic’s lienors, and judgment lien creditors “The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary.” Section 6323(f)(l)(A)(i) provides that the required notice “shall be filed[,] . . . [i]n the case of real property, in one office within the State (or the county, or other governmental subdivision), as designated by the laws of such State, in which the property subject to the lien is situated.” If the State has not designated such an office, notice is to be filed with the clerk of the federal district court “for the judicial district in which the property subject to the lien is situated.” § 6323(f)(1)(B). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has elaborated: “We must now decide whether judgment creditors are also entitled to personal or general notice by the [County Tax Claim] Bureau as a matter of due process of law. “Judgment liens are a product of centimes of statutes which authorize a judgment creditor to seize and sell the land of debtors at a judicial sale to satisfy their debts out of the proceeds of the sale. The judgment represents a binding judicial determination of the rights and duties between the parties, and establishes their debtor-creditor relationship for all the world to notice when the judgment is recorded in a Prothonotary’s Office. When entered of record, the judgment also operates as a lien upon all real property of the debtor in that county.” In re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks County, 505 Pa. 327, 334, 479 A. 2d 940, 943 (1984). The post-avü War Reconstruction Congress imposed a tax of three cents per pound on “the producer, owner, or holder” of cotton and a lien on the cotton until the tax was paid. Act of July 13, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 98. The same statute also imposed a general lien on all of a delinquent taxpayer’s property, see § 9,14 Stat. 107, which was nearly identical to a provision in the revenue Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 470-471, quoted in n. 6, infra. The 1865 revenue Act contained the following sentence: “And if any person, bank, association, company, or corporation, liable to pay any duty, shall neglect or refuse to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States from the time it was due until paid, with the interests, penalties, and costs that may accrue in addition thereto, upon all property and rights to property; and the collector, after demand, may levy or by warrant may authorize a deputy collector to levy upon all property and rights to property belonging to such person, bank, association, company, or corporation, or on which the said lien exists, for the payment of the sum due as aforesaid, with interest and penalty for nonpayment, and also of such further sum as shall be sufficient for the fees, costs, and expenses of such levy.” 13 Stat. 470-471. This provision, as amended, became §3186 of the Revised Statutes. For a more thorough description of the early history and of Congress’ reactions to this Court’s tax lien decisions, see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L. J. 905, 919-922 (1954) (hereinafter Kennedy). The Act of Mar. 3, 1797, § 5, 1 Stat. 515, provided: “And be it further enacted, That where any revenue officer, or other person hereafter becoming indebted to the United States, by bond or otherwise, shall become insolvent, or where the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of executors or administrators, shall be insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debt due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall be deemed to extend, as well to eases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, shall make a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor, shall be attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of legal bankruptcy shall be committed.” Compare § 3466 of the Revised Statutes with the present statute quoted in n. 1, supra. It has long been settled that the federal priority covers the Government’s claims for unpaid taxes. Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 499-502 (1926); Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U. S. 611, 625-626, and n. 24 (1948). “The earliest priority statute was enacted in the Act of July 31,1789, 1 Stat. 29, which dealt with bonds posted by importers in lieu of payment of duties for release of imported goods. It provided that the ‘debt due to the United States’ for such duties shall be discharged first ‘in all cases of insolvency, or where any estate in the hands of executors or administrators shall be insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased....’ § 21, 1 Stat. 42. A 1792 enactment broadened the Act’s coverage by providing that the language ‘eases of insolvency’ should be taken to include eases in which a debtor makes a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, and the other situations that § 3466, 31 U. S. C. § 191, now covers. 1 Stat. 263.” United States v. Moore, 423 U. S., at 81. “In construing the statutes on this subject, it has been stated by the court, on great deliberation, that the priority to which the United States are entitled, does not partake of the character of a lien on the property of public debtors. This distinction is always to be recollected.” United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 73, 90 (1805). Although this argument was not presented to the state courts, respondent may defend the judgment on a ground not previously raised. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 468-469, n. 12 (1983). We will rarely consider such an argument, however. Ibid.; see also Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367, 379, n. 5 (1996). The relevant portion of the opinion reads, in fell, as follows: “These [statutory] expressions are as general as any whieh could have been used, and exclude all debts due to individuals, whatever may be their dignity.... The law makes no exception in favour of prior judgment creditors; and no reason has been, or we think can be, shown to warrant this court in making one. “... The United States are to be first satisfied; but then it must be out of the debtor’s estate. If, therefore, before the right of preference has accrued to the United States, the debtor has made a bona fide conveyance of his estate to a third person, or has mortgaged the same to secure a debt; or if his property has been seized under a fi. fa., the property is devested out of the debtor, and cannot be made liable to the United States. A judgment gives to the judgment creditor a lien on the debtor’s lands, and a preference over all subsequent judgment creditors. But the act of congress defeats this preference in favour of the United States, in the cases specified in the 65th section of the act of 1799.” Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396, 425-426 (1817). In the later Canard case, Justice Story apologized for Thelusson: “The reasons for that opinion are not, owing to accidental circumstances, as fully given as they are usually given in this Court.” Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co. of N. Y., 1 Pet. 386, 442 (1828). Justice Washington’s opinion for this Court in Thelusson affirmed, and was essentially the same as, his own opinion delivered in the Circuit Court as a Circuit Justice. 2 Wheat., at 426, n. h. Relying on this and several other cases, in 1857 the Attorney General of the United States issued an opinion concluding that Thelusson “has been distinctly overruled” and that the priority of the United States under this statute “will not reach back over any lien, whether it be general or specific.” 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 28, 29. See also Kennedy 908-911 (advancing this same interpretation of the early priority Act decisions). Congress amended the priority statute in 1978 to make it expressly inapplicable to Title 11 bankruptcy cases. Pub. L. 95-598, § 322(b), 92 Stat. 2679, codified in 31 U. S. C. § 3713(a)(2). The differences between the bankruptcy laws and the priority statute have been the subject of criticism: “[A]s a result of the continuing discrepancies between the bankruptcy and insolvency rules, some creditors have had a distinct incentive to throw into bankruptcy a debtor whose ease might have been handled, with less expense and less burden on the federal courts, in another form of proceeding.” Plumb, The Federal Priority in Insolvency: Proposals for Reform, 70 Mch. L. Rev. 3, 8-9 (1971) (hereinafter Plumb).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MISTRETTA v. UNITED STATES No. 87-7028. Argued October 5, 1988 Decided January 18, 1989 Alan B. Morrison argued the cause for petitioner in No. 87-7028 and respondent in No. 87-1904. With him on the briefs were Patti A. Goldman, Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., and Christopher C. Harlan. Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Douglas Letter, Gregory C. Sisk, and John F. De Pue. Paul M. Bator argued the cause for the United States Sentencing Commission as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, and John R. Steer. Together with No. 87-1904, United States v. Mistretta, also on certiorari before judgment to the same court. David O. Bickart filed a brief for Joseph E. DiGenova et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States Senate by Michael Davidson, Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., and Morgan J. Frankel; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Benson B. Weintraub, Benedict P. Kuehne, and Dennis N. Balske. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In this litigation, we granted certiorari before judgment in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in order to consider the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission. The Commission is a body created under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Act), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3551 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV), and 28 U. S. C. §§ 991-998 (1982 ed., Supp. IV). The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled that the Guidelines were constitutional. United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033 (1988). I A Background For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing. Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine. This indeterminate-sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by which an offender was returned to society under the “guidance and control” of a parole officer. See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U. S. 359, 363 (1938). Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were based on concepts of the offender’s possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to society. It obviously required the judge and the parole officer to make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation. As a result, the court and the officer were in positions to exercise, and usually did exercise, very broad discretion. See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert —Counsel in the PenoCorrectional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 812-813 (1961).. This led almost inevitably to the conclusion on the part of a reviewing court that the sentencing judge “sees more and senses more” than the appellate court; thus, the judge enjoyed the “superiority of his nether position,” for that court’s determination as to what sentence was appropriate met with virtually unconditional deference on appeal. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 663 (1971). See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 431 (1974). The decision whether to parole was also “predictive and discretionary.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972). The correction official possessed almost absolute discretion over the parole decision. See, e. g., Brest v. Ciccone, 371 F. 2d 981, 982-983 (CA8 1967); Rifai v. United States Parole Comm’n, 586 F. 2d 695 (CA9 1978). Historically, federal sentencing — the function of determining the scope and extent of punishment — never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of Government. Congress, of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime, United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820), and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control. Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27 (1916). Congress early abandoned fixed-sentence rigidity, however, and put in place a system of ranges within which the sentencer could choose the precise punishment. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1978). Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so selected. This broad discretion was further enhanced by the power later granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an elaborate probation system. Also, with the advent of parole, Congress moved toward a “three-way sharing” of sentencing responsibility by granting corrections personnel in the Executive Branch the discretion to release a prisoner before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge. Thus, under the indeterminate-sentence system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the Executive Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment. See Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248 (1949). See also Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm’n, 719 F. 2d 1199, 1211 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1103 (1984); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S. 178, 190 (1979); United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 443 (1965) (“[I]f a given policy can be implemented only by a combination of legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation, no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked will”). Serious disparities in sentences, however, were common. Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most cases. See N. Morris, The Future of Imprisonment 24-43 (1974); F. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal (1981). In 1958, Congress authorized the creation of judicial sentencing institutes and joint councils, see 28 U. S. C. § 334, to formulate standards and criteria for sentencing. In 1973, the United States Parole Board adopted guidelines that established a “customary range” of confinement. See United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 391 (1980). Congress in 1976 endorsed this initiative through the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U. S. C. §§4201-4218, an attempt to envision for the Parole Commission a role, at least in part, “to moderate the disparities in the sentencing practices of individual judges.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S., at 189. That Act, however, did not disturb the division of sentencing responsibility among the three Branches. The judge continued to exercise discretion and to set the sentence within the statutory range fixed by Congress, while the prisoner’s actual release date generally was set by the Parole Commission. This proved to be no more than a way station. Fundamental and widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties and the disparities continued to be expressed. Congress had wrestled with the problem for more than a decade when, in 1984, it enacted the sweeping reforms that are at issue here. Helpful in our consideration and analysis of the statute is the Senate Report on the 1984 legislation, S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983) (Report). The Report referred to the “outmoded rehabilitation model” for federal criminal sentencing, and recognized that the efforts of the criminal justice system to achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed. Id., at 38. It observed that the indeterminate-sentencing system had two “unjustified]” and “shameful” consequences. Id., at 38, 65. The first was the great variation among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders. The second was the uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in prison. Each was a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal justice system. The Report went on to note that parole was an inadequate device for overcoming these undesirable consequences. This was due to the division of authority between the sentencing judge and the parole officer who often worked at cross purposes; to the fact that the Parole Commission’s own guidelines did not take into account factors Congress regarded as important in sentencing, such as the sophistication of the offender and the role the offender played in an offense committed with others, id., at 48; and to the fact that the Parole Commission had only limited power to adjust a sentence imposed by the court. Id., at 47. Before settling on a mandatory-guideline system, Congress considered other competing proposals for sentencing reform. It rejected strict determinate sentencing because it concluded that a guideline system would be successful in reducing sentence disparities while retaining the flexibility needed to adjust for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case. Id., at 78-79, 62. The Judiciary Committee rejected a proposal that would have made the sentencing guidelines only advisory. Id., at 79. B The Act The Act, as adopted, revises the old sentencing process in several ways: 1. It rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation, 28 U. S. C. §994(k), and it states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals, 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2). 2. It consolidates the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission to decide what punishment an offender should suffer. This is done by creating the United States Sentencing Commission, directing that Commission to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing, and prospectively abolishing the Parole Commission. 28 U. S. C. §§991, 994, and 995(a)(1). 3. It makes all sentences basically determinate. A prisoner is to be released at the completion of his sentence reduced only by any credit earned by good behavior while in custody. 18 U. S. C. §§ 3624(a) and (b). 4. It makes the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines binding on the courts, although it preserves for the judge the discretion to depart from the guideline applicable to a particular case if the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor present that the Commission did not adequately consider when formulating guidelines. §§ 3553(a) and (b). The Act also requires the court to state its reasons for the sentence imposed and to give “the specific reason” for imposing a sentence different from that described in the guideline. § 3553(c). 5. It authorizes limited appellate review of the sentence. It permits a defendant to appeal a sentence that is above the defined range, and it permits the Government to appeal a sentence that is below that range. It also permits either side to appeal an incorrect application of the guideline. §§ 3742(a) and (b). Thus, guidelines were meant to establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors, “among others.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(b), (c), and (d). The maximum of the range ordinarily may not exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25% or six months, and each sentence is to be within the limit provided by existing law. §§ 994(a) and (b)(2). C The Sentencing Commission The Commission is established “as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States.” §991(a). It has seven voting members (one of whom is the Chairman) appointed by the President “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” “At least three of the members shall be Federal judges selected after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” Ibid. No more than four members of the Commission shall be members of the same political party. The Attorney General, or his designee, is an ex officio nonvoting member. The Chairman and other members of the Commission are subject to removal by the President “only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown.” Ibid. Except for initial staggering of terms, a voting member serves for six years and may not serve more than two full terms. §§ 992(a) and (b). D The Responsibilities of the Commission In addition to the duty the Commission has to promulgate determinative-sentence guidelines, it is under an obligation periodically to “review and revise” the guidelines. § 994(o). It is to “consult with authorities on, and individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system.” Ibid. It must report to Congress “any amendments of the guidelines.” §994(p). It is to make recommendations to Congress whether the grades or maximum penalties should be modified. § 994(r). It must submit to Congress at least annually an analysis of the operation of the guidelines. § 994(w). It is to issue “general policy statements” regarding their application. § 994(a)(2). And it has the power to “establish general policies ... as are necessary to carry out the purposes” of the legislation, § 995(a)(1); to “monitor the performance of probation officers” with respect to the guidelines, § 995(a)(9); to “devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel” and others, § 995(a)(18); and to “perform such other functions as are required to permit Federal courts to meet their responsibilities” as to sentencing, § 995(a)(22). We note, in passing, that the monitoring function is not without its burden. Every year, with respect to each of more than 40,000 sentences, the federal courts must forward, and the Commission must review, the presentence report, the guideline worksheets, the tribunal’s sentencing statement, and any written plea agreement. II This Litigation On December 10, 1987, John M. Mistretta (petitioner) and another were indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on three counts centering in a cocaine sale. See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1904, p. 16a. Mistretta moved to have the promulgated Guidelines ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that the Sentencing Commission was constituted in violation of the established doctrine of separation of powers, and that Congress delegated excessive authority to the Commission to structure the Guidelines. As has been noted, the District Court was not persuaded by these contentions. The District Court rejected petitioner’s delegation argument on the ground that, despite the language of the statute, the Sentencing Commission “should be judicially characterized as having Executive Branch status,” 682 F. Supp., at 1035, and that the Guidelines are similar to substantive rules promulgated by other agencies. Id., at 1034-1035. The court also rejected petitioner’s claim that the Act is unconstitutional because it requires Article III federal judges to serve on the Commission. Id.; at 1035. The court stated, however, that its opinion “does not imply that I have no serious doubts about some parts of the Sentencing Guidelines and the legality of their anticipated operation.” Ibid. Petitioner had pleaded guilty to the first count of his indictment (conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§846 and 841(b)(1)(B)). The Government thereupon moved to dismiss the remaining counts. That motion was granted. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 87-1904, p. 33a. Petitioner was sentenced under the Guidelines to 18 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Id., at 30a, 35a, 37a. The court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $50 special assessment. Id., at 31a, 40a. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit, but both petitioner and the United States, pursuant to this Court’s Rule 18, petitioned for certiorari before judgment. Because of the “imperative public importance” of the issue, as prescribed by the Rule, and because of the disarray among the Federal District Courts, we granted those petitions. 486 U. S. 1054 (1988). Ill Delegation of Power Petitioner argues that in delegating the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense to an independent Sentencing Commission, Congress has granted the Commission excessive legislative discretion in violation of the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine. We do not agree. The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government. The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §1, and we long have insisted that “the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution” mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692 (1892). We also have recognized, however, that the separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches. In a passage now enshrined in our jurisprudence, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, explained our approach to such cooperative ventures: “In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination.” J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). So long as Congress “shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Id., at 409. Applying this “intelligible principle” test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, Wage and Hour Div. of Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 145 (1941) (“In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative policy”); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 274 (1967) (opinion concurring in result). “The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function.” Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 421 (1935). Accordingly, this Court has deemed it “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.” American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105 (1946). Until 1935, this Court never struck down a challenged statute on delegation grounds. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (DC) (three-judge court), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986). After invalidating in 1935 two statutes as excessive delegations, see A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra, we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad standards. See, e. g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (upholding delegation of authority to determine excessive profits); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S., at 105 (upholding delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding delegation to Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and equitable, and would effectuate purposes of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine just and reasonable rates); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing “as public interest, convenience, or necessity” require). In light of our approval of these broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that Congress’ delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements. Congress charged the Commission with three goals: to “assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth” in the Act; to “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records . . . while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences,” where appropriate; and to “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.” 28 U. S. C. §991(b)(1). Congress further specified four “purposes” of sentencing that the Commission must pursue in carrying out its mandate: “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and “to provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional treatment.” 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2). In addition, Congress prescribed the specific tool — the guidelines system — for the Commission to use in regulating sentencing. More particularly, Congress directed the Commission to develop a system of “sentencing ranges” applicable “for each category of offense involving each category of defendant.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(b). Congress instructed the Commission that these sentencing ranges must be consistent with pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code and could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima. Congress also required that for sentences of imprisonment, “the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.” § 994(b)(2). Moreover, Congress directed the Commission to use current average sentences “as a starting point” for its structuring of the sentencing ranges. § 994(m). To guide the Commission in its formulation of offense categories, Congress directed it to consider seven factors: the grade of the offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime; the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime; the community view of the gravity of the offense; the public concern generated by the crime; the deterrent effect that a particular sentence may have on others; and the current incidence of the offense. §§ 994(c)(1)— (7). Congress set forth 11 factors for the Commission to consider in establishing categories of defendants. These include the offender’s age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon crime for a livelihood. § 994(d)(1) — (11). Congress also prohibited the Commission from considering the “race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders,” § 994(d), and instructed that the guidelines should reflect the “general inappropriateness” of considering certain other factors, such as current unemployment, that might serve as proxies for forbidden factors, § 994(e). In addition to these overarching constraints, Congress provided even more detailed guidance to the Commission about categories of offenses and offender characteristics. Congress directed that guidelines require a term of confinement at or near the statutory maximum for certain crimes of violence and for drug offenses, particularly when committed by recidivists. § 994(h). Congress further directed that the Commission assure a substantial term of imprisonment for an offense constituting a third felony conviction, for a career felon, for one convicted of a managerial role in a racketeering enterprise, for a crime of violence by an offender on release from a prior felony conviction, and for an offense involving a substantial quantity of narcotics. §994(i). Congress also instructed “that the guidelines reflect. . . the general appropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment” for a crime of violence that resulted in serious bodily injury. On the other hand, Congress directed that guidelines reflect the general inappropriateness of imposing a sentence of imprisonment “in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense.” §994(j). Congress also enumerated various aggravating and mitigating circumstances, such as, respectively, multiple offenses or substantial assistance to the Government, to be reflected in the guidelines. §§ 994(l) and (n). In other words, although Congress granted the Commission substantial discretion in formulating guidelines, in actuality it legislated a full hierarchy of punishment — from near maximum imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some imprisonment, to alternatives — and stipulated the most important offense and offender characteristics to place defendants within these categories. We cannot dispute petitioner’s contention that the Commission enjoys significant discretion in formulating guidelines. The Commission does have discretionary authority to determine the relative severity of federal crimes and to assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics that Congress listed for the Commission to consider. See §§ 994(c) and (d) (Commission instructed to consider enumerated factors as it deems them to be relevant). The Commission also has significant discretion to determine which crimes have been punished too leniently, and which too severely. § 994(m). Congress has called upon the Commission to exercise its judgment about which types of crimes and which types of criminals are to be considered similar for the purposes of sentencing. But our cases do not at all suggest that delegations of this type may not carry with them the need to exercise judgment on matters of policy. In Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944), the Court upheld a delegation to the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that “in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act” to stabilize prices and avert speculation. See id., at 420. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943), we upheld a delegation to the Federal Communications Commission granting it the authority to promulgate regulations in accordance with its view of the “public interest.” In Yakus, the Court laid down the applicable principle: “It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the ex-ereise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework. . . . “. . . Only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose . . . .” 321 U. S., at 425-426. Congress has met that standard here. The Act sets forth more than merely an “intelligible principle” or minimal standards. One court has aptly put it: “The statute outlines the policies which prompted establishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should do and how it should do it, and sets out specific directives to govern particular situations.” United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (ED La. 1988). Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate. Although Congress has delegated significant discretion to the Commission to draw judgments from its analysis of existing sentencing practice and alternative sentencing models, “Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S., at 425-426. We have no doubt that in the hands of the Commission “the criteria which Congress has supplied are wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose” of the Act. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 398 (1940). IV Separation of Powers Having determined that Congress has set forth sufficient standards for the exercise of the Commission’s delegated authority, we turn to Mistretta’s claim that the Act violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty. See, e. g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 685-696 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S., at 725. Madison, in writing about the principle of separated powers, said: “No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.” The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In applying the principle of separated powers in our jurisprudence, we have sought to give life to Madison’s view of the appropriate relationship among the three coequal Branches. Accordingly, we have recognized, as Madison admonished at the founding, that while our Constitution mandates that “each of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others,” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 629 (1935), the Framers did not require — and indeed rejected — the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct. See, e. g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 443 (1977) (rejecting as archaic complete division of authority among the three Branches); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974) (affirming Madison’s flexible approach to separation of powers). Madison, defending the Constitution against charges that it established insufficiently separate Branches, addressed the point directly. Separation of powers, he wrote, “d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,” but rather “that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.” The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 442, n. 5. Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degrée of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which “would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976). In a passage now commonplace in our cases, Justice Jackson summarized the pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power to which we are heir: “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion). In adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers, we simply have recognized Madison’s teaching that the greatest security against tyranny — the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch — lies not in a hermetic division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch. “[T]he greatest security,” wrote Madison, “against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.” The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Accordingly, as we have noted many times, the Framers “built into the tripartite Federal Government ... a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 122. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 951 (1983). It is this concern of encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated our separation-of-powers jurisprudence and aroused our vigilance against the “hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power.” Ibid. - Accordingly, we have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch. For example, just as the Framers recognized the- particular danger of the Legislative Branch’s accreting to itself judicial or executive power, so too have we invalidated attempts by Congress to exercise the responsibilities of other Branches or to reassign powers vested by the Constitution in either the Judicial Branch or the Executive Branch. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986) (Congress may not exercise removal power over officer performing executive functions); INS v. Chadha, supra (Congress may not control execution of laws except through Art. I procedures); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982) (Congress may not confer Art. Ill power on Art. I judge). By the same token, we have upheld statutory provisions that to some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988) (upholding judicial appointment of independent counsel); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833 (1986) (upholding agency’s assumption of jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims). In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra, upholding, against a separation-of-powers challenge, legislation providing for the General Services Administration to control Presidential papers after resignation, we described our separation-of-powers inquiry as focusing “on the extent to which [a provision of law] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.” 433 U. S., at 443 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 711-712. In cases specifically involving the Judicial Branch, we have expressed our vigilance against two dangers: first, that the Judicial Branch neither be assigned nor allowed “tasks that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches,” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S., at 680-681, and, second, that no provision of law “impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S., at 851. Mistretta argues that the Act suffers from each of these constitutional infirmities. He argues that Congress, in constituting the Commission as it did, effected an unconstitutional accumulation of power within the Judicial Branch while at the same time undermining the Judiciary’s independence and integrity. Specifically, petitioner claims that in delegating to an independent agency within the Judicial Branch the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines, Congress unconstitutionally has required the Branch, and individual Article III judges, to exercise not only their judicial authority, but legislative authority — the making of sentencing policy — as well. Such rulemaking authority, petitioner contends, may be exercised by Congress, or delegated by Congress to the Executive, but may not be delegated to or exercised by the Judiciary. Brief for Petitioner 21. At the same time, petitioner asserts, Congress unconstitutionally eroded the integrity and independence of the Judiciary by requiring Article III judges to sit on the Commission, by requiring that those judges share their rulemaking authority with nonjudges, and by subjecting the Commission’s members to appointment and removal by the President. According to petitioner, Congress, consistent with the separation of powers, may not upset the balance among the'Branches by co-opting federal judges into the quintessentially political work of establishing sentencing guidelines, by subjecting those judges to the political whims of the Chief Executive, and by forcing judges to share their power with nonjudges. Id., at 15-35. “When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S., at 736 (opinion concurring in judgment). Although the unique composition and responsibilities of the Sentencing Commission give rise to serious concerns about a disruption of the appropriate balance of governmental power among the coordinate Branches, we conclude, upon close inspection, that petitioner’s fears for the fundamental structural protections of the Constitution prove, at least in this case, to be “more smoke than fire,” and do not compel us to invalidate Congress’ considered scheme for re-, solving the seemingly intractable dilemma of excessive disparity in criminal sentencing. A Location of the Commission The Sentencing Commission unquestionably is a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government. Although placed by the Act in the Judicial Branch, it is not a court and does not exercise judicial power. Rather, the Commission is an “independent” body comprised of seven voting members including at least three federal judges, entrusted by Congress with the primary task of promulgating sentencing guidelines. 28 U. S. C. § 991(a). Our constituí tional principles of separated powers are not violated, however, by mere anomaly or innovation. Setting to one side, for the moment, the question whether the composition of the Sentencing Commission violates the separation of powers, we observe that Congress’ decision to create an independent rulemaking body to promulgate sentencing guidelines and to locate that body within the Judicial Branch is not unconstitutional unless Congress has vested in the Commission powers that are more appropriately performed by the other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary. According to express provision of Article III, the judicial power of the United States is limited to “Cases” and “Controversies.” See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 356 (1911). In implementing this limited grant of power, we have refused to issue advisory opinions or to resolve disputes that are not justiciable. See, e. g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1852). These doctrines help to ensure the independence of the Judicial Branch by precluding debilitating entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political Branches, and prevent the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the other Branches by extending judicial power to matters beyond those disputes “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97; see also United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S., at 396. As a general principle, we stated as recently as last Term that “ ‘executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.’” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S., at 677, quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 123, citing in turn United States v. Ferreira, supra, and Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). Nonetheless, we have recognized significant exceptions to this general rule and have approved the assumption of some nonadjudicatory activities by the Judicial Branch. In keeping with Justice Jackson’s Youngstown admonition that the separation of powers contemplates the integration of dispersed powers into a workable Government, we have recognized the constitutionality of a “twilight area” in which the activities of the separate Branches merge. In his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), Justice Brandéis explained that the separation of powers “left to each [Branch] power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial.” Id., at 291. That judicial rulemaking, at least with respect to some subjects, falls within this twilight area is no longer an issue for dispute. None of our cases indicate that rulemaking per se is a function that may not be performed by an entity within the Judicial Branch, either because rulemaking is inherently nonjudicial or because it is a function exclusively committed to the Executive Branch. On the contrary, we specifically have held that Congress, in some circumstances, may confer rulemaking authority on the Judicial Branch. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1 (1941), we upheld a challenge to certain rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which conferred upon the Judiciary the power to promulgate federal rules of civil procedure. See 28 U. S. C. §2072. We observed: “Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States.” 312 U. S., at 9-10 (footnote omitted). This passage in Sibbach simply echoed what had been our view since Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825), decided more than a century earlier, where Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch may be “conferred on the judicial department.” Discussing this delegation of rulemaking power, the Court found Congress authorized “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction in certain specified cases, in all which it has power to render judgment. “That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly conferred by this clause, seems to be one of those plain propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer.” Id., at 22. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S. 460 (1965). Pursuant to this power to delegate rulemaking authority to the Judicial Branch, Congress expressly has authorized this Court to establish rules for the conduct of its own business and to prescribe rules of procedure for lower federal courts in bankruptcy cases, in other civil cases, and in criminal cases, and to revise the Federal Rules of Evidence. See generally J. Weinstein, Reform of Court Rule-Making Procedures (1977). Our approach to other nonadjudicatory activities that Congress has vested either in federal courts or in auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch has been identical to our approach to judicial rulemaking: consistent with the separation of powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch non-adjudicatory functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary. Following this approach, we specifically have upheld not only Congress’ power to confer on the Judicial Branch the rulemaking authority contemplated in the various enabling Acts, but also to vest in judicial councils authority to “make ‘all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.’” Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U. S. 74, 86, n. 7 (1970), quoting 28 U. S. C. § 332 (1970 ed.). Though not the subject of constitutional challenge, by established practice we have recognized Congress’ power to. create the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Rules Advisory Committees that it oversees, and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts whose myriad responsibilities include the administration of the entire probation service. These entities, some of which are comprised of judges, others of judges and nonjudges, still others of nonjudges only, do not exercise judicial power in the constitutional sense of deciding cases and controversies, but they share the common purpose of providing for the fair and efficient fulfillment of responsibilities that are properly the province of the Judiciary. Thus, although the judicial power of the United States is limited by express provision of Article III to “Cases” and “Controversies,” we have never held, and have clearly disavowed in practice, that the Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, are “necessary and proper ... for carrying into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce.” Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat., at 22. Because of their close relation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudicial activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are not more appropriate for another Branch. In light of this precedent and practice, we can discern no separation-of-powers impediment to the placement of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch. As we described at the outset, the sentencing function long has been a peculiarly shared responsibility among the Branches of Government and has never been thought of as the exclusive constitutional province of any one Branch. See, e. g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U. S., at 188-189. For more than a century, federal judges have enjoyed wide discretion to determine the appropriate sentence in individual cases and have exercised special authority to determine the sentencing factors to be applied in any given case. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act makes clear that Congress’ decision to place the Commission within the Judicial Branch reflected Congress’ “strong feeling” that sentencing has been and should remain “primarily a judicial function.” Report, at 159. That Congress should vest such rulemaking in the Judicial Branch, far from being “incongruous” or vesting within the Judiciary responsibilities that more appropriately belong to another Branch, simply acknowledges the role that the Judiciary always has played, and continues to play, in sentencing. Given the consistent responsibility of federal judges to pronounce sentence , within the statutory range established by Congress, we find that the role of the Commission in promulgating guidelines for the exercise of that judicial function bears considerable similarity to the role of this Court in establishing rules of procedure under the various enabling Acts. Such guidelines, like the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, are court rules — rules, to paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall’s language in Wayman, for carrying into execution judgments that the Judiciary has the power to pronounce. Just as the rules of procedure bind judges and courts in the proper management of the cases before them, so the Guidelines bind judges and courts in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases. In other words, the Commission’s functions, like this Court’s function in promulgating procedural rules, are clearly attendant to a central element of the historically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch. Petitioner nonetheless objects that the analogy between the Guidelines and the rules of procedure is flawed: Although the Judicial Branch may participate in rulemaking and administrative work that is “procedural” in nature, it may not assume, it is said, the “substantive” authority over sentencing policy that Congress has delegated to the Commission. Such substantive decisionmaking, petitioner contends, entangles the Judicial Branch in essentially political work of the other Branches and unites both judicial and legislative power in the Judicial Branch. We agree with petitioner that the nature of the Commission’s rulemaking power is not strictly analogous to this Court’s rulemaking power under the enabling Acts. Although we are loath to enter the logical morass of distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules, see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U. S. 717 (1988) (distinction between substance and procedure depends on context), and although we have recognized that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regulate matters “falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, [and] are rationally capable of classification as either,” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U. S., at 472, we recognize that the task of promulgating rules regulating practice and pleading before federal courts does not involve the degree of political judgment integral to the Commission’s formulation of sentencing guidelines. To be sure, all rulemaking is nonjudicial in the sense that rules impose standards of general application divorced from the individual fact situation which ordinarily forms the predicate for judicial action. Also, this Court’s rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants. Nonetheless, the degree of political judgment about crime and criminality exercised by the Commission and the scope of the substantive effects of its work does to some extent set its rulemaking powers apart from prior judicial rulemaking. Cf. Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423 (1987) (state sentencing guidelines not procedural). We do not believe, however, that the significantly political nature of the Commission's work renders unconstitutional its placement within the Judicial Branch. Our separation-of-powers analysis-does, not turn on the labeling of an activity as “substantive”'ass opposed to “procedural,” or “political” as opposed to “judicial.” See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S., at 749 (“[GJovernmental power cannot always be readily characterized with only one . . . labe[l]”) (opinion concurring in judgment). Rather, our inquiry is focused on the “unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article III.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S., at 857. In this case, the “practical consequences” of locating the Commission within the Judicial Branch pose no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts. First, although the Commission is located in the Judicial Branch, its powers are not united with the powers of the Judiciary in a way that has meaning for separation-of-powers analysis. Whatever constitutional problems might arise if the powers of the Commission were vested in a court, the Commission is not a court, does not exercise judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch. The Commission, on which members of the Judiciary may be a minority, is an independent agency in every relevant sense. In contrast to a court’s exercising judicial power, the Commission is fully accountable to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of the Guidelines as it sees fit either within the 180-day waiting period, see § 235(a)(l)(B)(ii)(III) of the Act, 98 Stat. 2032, or at any time. In contrast to a court, the Commission’s members are subject to the President’s limited powers of removal. In contrast to a court, its rulemaking is subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U. S. C. § 994(x). While we recognize the continuing vitality of Montesquieu’s admonition: “ ‘Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul,’ ” The Federalist No. 47, p. 326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), quoting Montesquieu, because Congress vested the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines in an independent agency, not a court, there can be no serious argument that Congress combined legislative and judicial power within the Judicial Branch. Second, although the Commission wields rulemaking power and not the adjudicatory power exercised by individual judges when passing sentence, the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the Judicial Branch has not increased the Branch’s authority. Prior to the passage of the Act, the Judicial Branch, as an aggregate, decided precisely the questions assigned to the Commission: what sentence is appropriate to what criminal conduct under what circumstances. It was the everyday business of judges, taken collectively, to evaluate and weigh the various aims of sentencing and to apply those aims to the individual cases that came before them. The Sentencing Commission does no more than this, albeit basically through the methodology of sentencing guidelines, rather than entirely individualized sentencing determinations. Accordingly, in placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch, Congress cannot be said to have aggrandized the authority of that Branch or to have deprived the Executive Branch of a power it once possessed. Indeed, because the Guidelines have the effect of promoting sentencing within a narrower range than was previously applied, the power of the Judicial Branch is, if anything, somewhat diminished by the Act. And, since Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its own authority, the Act does not unconstitutionally diminish Congress’ authority. Thus, although Congress has authorized the Commission to exercise a greater degree of political judgment than has been exercised in the past by any one entity within the Judicial Branch, in the unique context of sentencing, this authorization does nothing to upset the balance of power among the Branches. What Mistretta’s argument comes down to, then, is not that the substantive responsibilities of the Commission aggrandize the Judicial Branch, but that that Branch is inevitably weakened by its participation in policymaking. We do not believe, however, that the placement within the Judicial Branch of an independent agency charged with the promulgation of sentencing guidelines can possibly be construed as preventing the Judicial Branch “from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.” Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 443. Despite the substantive nature of its work, the Commission is not incongruous or inappropriate to the Branch. As already noted, sentencing is a field in which the Judicial Branch long has exercised substantive or political judgment. What we said in Morrison when upholding, the power of the Special Division to appoint independent counsel applies with even greater force here: “This is not a case in which judges are given power ... in an area in which they have no special knowledge or expertise.” 487 U. S., at 676, n. 13. On the contrary, Congress placed the Commission in the Judicial Branch precisely because of the Judiciary’s special knowledge and expertise. Nor do the Guidelines, though substantive, involve a degree of political authority inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch. Although the Guidelines are intended to have substantive effects on public behavior (as do the rules of procedure), they do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public or vest in the Judicial Branch the legislative responsibility for establishing minimum and maximum penalties for every crime. They do no more than fetter the discretion of sentencing judges to do what they have done for generations —impose’ sentences within the broad limits established by Congress. Given their limited reach, the special role of the Judicial Branch in the field of sentencing, and the fact that the Guidelines are promulgated by an independent agency and not a court, it follows that as a matter of “practical consequences” the location of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch simply leaves with the Judiciary what long has belonged to it. In sum, since substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been and remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology of rulemaking has been and remains appropriate to that Branch, Congress’ considered decision to combine these functions in an independent Sentencing Commission and to locate that Commission within the Judicial Branch does not violate the principle of separation of powers. B Composition of the Commission We now turn to petitioner’s claim that Congress’ decision to require at least three federal judges to serve on the Commission and to require those judges to share their authority with nonjudges undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch. The Act provides in part: “At least three of [the Commission’s] members shall be Federal judges selected [by the President] after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 991(a). Petitioner urges us to strike down the Act on the ground that its requirement of judicial participation on the Commission unconstitutionally conscripts individual federal judges for political service and thereby undermines the essential impartiality of the Judicial Branch. We find Congress’ requirement of judicial service somewhat troublesome, but we do not believe that the Act impermissibly interferes with the functioning of the Judiciary. The text of the Constitution contains no prohibition against the service of active federal judges on independent commissions such as that established by the Act. The Constitution does include an Incompatibility Clause applicable to national legislators: “No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §6, cl. 2. No comparable restriction applies to judges, and we find it at least inferentially meaningful that at the Constitutional Convention two prohibitions against plural officeholding by members of the Judiciary were proposed, but did not reach the floor of the Convention for a vote. Our inferential reading that the Constitution does not prohibit Article III judges from undertaking extrajudicial duties finds support in the historical practice of the Founders after ratification. Our early history indicates that the Framers themselves did not read the Constitution as forbidding extrajudicial service by federal judges. The first Chief Justice, John Jay, served simultaneously as Chief Justice and as Ambassador to England, where he negotiated the treaty that bears his name. Oliver Ellsworth served simultaneously as Chief Justice and as Minister to France. While he was Chief Justice, John Marshall served briefly as Secretary of State and was a member of the Sinking Fund Commission with responsibility for refunding the Revolutionary War debt. All these appointments were made by the President with the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate. Thus, at a minimum, both the Executive and Legislative Branches acquiesced in the assumption of extrajudicial duties by judges. In addition, although the records of Congress contain no reference to the confirmation debate, Charles Warren, in his history of this Court, reports that the Senate specifically rejected by a vote of 18 to 8 a resolution proposed during the debate over Jay’s nomination to the effect that such extrajudicial service was “contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.” 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 119 (rev. ed. 1937). This contemporaneous practice by the Founders themselves is significant evidence that the constitutional principle of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit extrajudicial service. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S., at 723-724 (actions by Members of the First Congress provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence about the meaning of the Constitution). Subsequent history, moreover, reveals a frequent and continuing, albeit controversial, practice of extrajudicial service. In 1877, five Justices served on the Election Commission that resolved the hotly contested Presidential election of 1876, where Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes were the contenders. Justices Nelson, Fuller, Brewer, Hughes, Day, Roberts, and Van Devanter served on various arbitral commissions. Justice Roberts was a member of the commission organized to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor. Justice Jackson was one of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials; and Chief Justice Warren presided over the commission investigating the assassination of President Kennedy. Such service has been no less a practice among lower court federal judges. While these extrajudicial activities spawned spirited discussion and frequent criticism, and although some of the judges who undertook these duties sometimes did so with reservation and may have looked back on their service with regret, “traditional ways of conducting government. . . give meaning” to the Constitution. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S., at 610 (concurring opinion). Our 200-year tradition of extrajudicial service is additional evidence that the doctrine of separated powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity. Furthermore, although we have not specifically addressed the constitutionality of extrajudicial service, two of our precedents reflect at -least an early understanding by this Court that the Constitution does not preclude judges from assuming extrajudicial duties in their individual capacities. In Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), the Court considered a request for a writ of mandamus ordering a Circuit Court to execute a statute empowering federal and state courts to set pensions for disabled Revolutionary War veterans. The statute authorized the courts to determine monthly disability payments, but it made those determinations re viewable by the Secretary of War. Because Congress by an amendment of the statute rendered the case moot, the Court did not pass on the constitutional issue. Mr. Dallas, in reporting the case, included in the margin three Circuit Court rulings on the statute. All three concluded that the powers conferred could not be performed by an Article III court. The “judicial Power” of the United States did not extend to duties more properly performed by the Executive. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S., at 677-678, n. 15 (characterizing Hayburn’s Case). As this Court later observed in United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1852), however, the New York Circuit, in 1791, with a bench consisting of Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge Duane, believed that individual judges acting not in their judicial capacities but as individual commissioners could exercise the duties conferred upon them by the statute. Neither of the other two courts expressed a definitive view whether judges acting as commissioners could make disability determinations reviewable by the Secretary of War. In Ferreira, however, this Court concluded that although the Circuit Courts were not fully in agreement as to whether the statute could be construed as conferring the duties on the judges as commissioners, if the statute was subject to that construction “there seems to have been no doubt, at that time, but that they might constitutionally exercise it, and the Secretary constitutionally revise their decisions.” Id., at 50. Ferreira itself concerned a statute authorizing a Federal District Court in Florida to adjudicate claims for losses for which the United States was responsible under the 1819 treaty by which Spain ceded Florida to the United States. As in Hayburn’s Case, the court’s determination was to be reported to an executive officer, the Secretary of the Treasury, who would exercise final judgment as to whether the claims should be paid. 13 How., at 45-47. This Court recognized that the powers conferred on the District Court were “judicial in their nature,” in the sense that they called for “judgment and discretion.” Id., at 48. Nonetheless, we concluded that those powers were not “judicial ... in the sense ini which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.” Ibid. Because the District Court’s decision was not an exercise of judicial power, this' Court found itself without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id!.,, at. 51-52;. We did1 not conclude in; Ferreira,, however, that Congress could not confer on a federal1 judge the function of resolving administrative claims. On the contrary, we expressed general agreement with the view of some of the judges in Hayburn’s Case that while such administrative duties could not be assigned to a court, or to judges acting as part of a court, such duties could be assigned to judges acting individually as commissioners. Although we did not decide the question, we expressed reservation about whether the District Judge in Florida could act legitimately as a commissioner since he was not appointed as such by the President pursuant to his Article II power to appoint officers of the United States. 13 How., at 51. In sum, Ferreira, like Hayburn’s Case, suggests that Congress may authorize a federal judge, in an individual capacity, to perform an executive function without violating the separation of powers. Accord, United States v. Yale Todd (1794) (unreported decision discussed in the margin of the opinion in Ferreira, 13 How., at 52-53). - In light of the foregoing history and precedent, we conclude that the principle of separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit Article III judges from serving on commissions such as that created by the Act. The judges serve on the Sentencing Commission not pursuant to their status and authority as Article III judges, but solely because of their appointment by the President as the Act directs. Such power as these judges wield as Commissioners is not judicial power; it is administrative power derived from the enabling legislation. Just as the nonjudicial members of the Commission act as administrators, bringing their experience and wisdom to bear on the problems of sentencing disparity, so too the judges, uniquely qualified on the subject of sentencing, assume a wholly administrative role upon entering into the deliberations of the Commission. In other words, the Constitution, at least as a per se matter, does not forbid judges to wear two hats; it merely forbids them to wear both hats at the same time. This is not to suggest, of course, that every kind of extrajudicial service under every circumstance necessarily accords with the Constitution. That the Constitution does not absolutely prohibit a federal judge from assuming extrajudicial duties does not mean that every extrajudicial service would be compatible with, or appropriate to, continuing service on the bench; nor does it mean that Congress may require a federal judge to assume extrajudicial duties as long as the judge is assigned those duties in an individual, not judicial, capacity. The ultimate inquiry remains whether a particular extrajudicial assignment undermines the integrity of the Judicial Branch. With respect to the Sentencing Commission, we understand petitioner to argue that the service required of at least three judges presents two distinct threats to the integrity of the Judicial Branch. Regardless of constitutionality, this mandatory service, it is said, diminishes the independence of the Judiciary. See Brief for Petitioner 28. It is further claimed that the participation of judges on the Commission improperly lends judicial prestige and an aura of judicial impartiality to the Commission’s political work. The involvement of Article III judges in the process of policy-making, petitioner asserts, “ ‘[wjeakens confidence in the disinterestedness of the judicatory functions.’” Ibid., quoting F. Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, in 1 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 475, 478 (1930). In our view, petitioner significantly overstates the mandatory nature of Congress’ directive that at least three members of the Commission shall be federal judges, as well as the effect of this service on the practical operation of the Judicial Branch. Service on the Commission by any particular judge is voluntary. The Act does not conscript judges for the Commission. No Commission member to date has been appointed without his consent and we have no reason to believe that the Act confers upon the President any authority to force a judge to serve on the Commission against his will. Accordingly, we simply do not face the question whether Congress may require a particular judge to undertake the extrajudicial duty of serving on the Commission. In Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U. S. 74 (1970), we found “no constitutional obstacle preventing Congress from vesting in the Circuit Judicial Councils, as administrative bodies,” authority to administer “‘the business of the courts within [each] circuit.’” Id., at 86, n. 7, quoting 28 U. S. C. §332 (1970 ed.). Indeed, Congress has created numerous nonadjudicatory bodies, such as the Judicial Conference, that are composed entirely, or in part, of federal judges. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 331, 332; see generally Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1031 (1979). Accordingly, absent a more specific threat to judicial independence, the fact that Congress has included federal judges on the Commission does not itself threaten the integrity of the Judicial Branch. Moreover, we cannot see how the service of federal judges on the Commission will have a constitutionally significant practical effect on the operation of the Judicial Branch. We see no reason why service on the Commission should result in widespread judicial recusals. That federal judges participate in the promulgation of guidelines does not affect their or other judges’ ability impartially to adjudicate sentencing issues. Cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438 (1946) (that this Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not foreclose its consideration of challenges to their validity). While in the abstract a proliferation of commissions with congressionally mandated judiciary participation might threaten judicial independence by exhausting the resources of the Judicial Branch, that danger is far too remote for consideration here. We are somewhat more troubled by petitioner’s argument that the Judiciary’s entanglement in the political work of the Commission undermines public confidence in the disinterestedness of the Judicial Branch. While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through recusal, no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement in the making of policy. The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action. Although it is a judgment that is not without difficulty, we conclude that the participation of federal judges on the Sentencing Commission does not threaten, either in fact or in appearance, the impartiality of the Judicial Branch. We are drawn to this conclusion by one paramount consideration: that the Sentencing Commission is devoted exclusively to the development of rules to rationalize a process that has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by the Judicial Branch. In our view, this is an essentially neutral endeavor and one in which judicial participation is peculiarly appropriate. Judicial contribution to the enterprise of creating rules to limit the discretion of sentencing judges does not enlist the resources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in either the legislative business of determining what conduct should be criminalized or the executive business of enforcing the law. Rather, judicial participation on the Commission ensures that judicial experience and expertise will inform the promulgation of rules for the exercise of the Judicial Branch’s own business — that of passing sentence on every criminal defendant. To this end, Congress has provided, not inappropriately, for a significant judicial voice on the Commission. Justice Jackson underscored in Youngstown that the Constitution anticipates “reciprocity” among the Branches. 343 U. S., at 635. As part of that reciprocity and as part of the integration of dispersed powers into a workable government, Congress may enlist the assistance of judges in the creation of rules to govern the Judicial Branch. Our principle of separation of powers anticipates that the coordinate Branches will converse with each other on matters of vital common interest. While we have some reservation that Congress required such a dialogue in this case, the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from enlisting federal judges to present a uniquely judicial view on the uniquely judicial subject of sentencing. In this case, at least, where the subject lies so close to the heart of the judicial function and where purposes of the Commission are not inherently partisan, such enlistment is not coercion or co-optation, but merely assurance of judicial participation. Finally, we reject petitioner’s argument that the mixed nature of the Commission violates the Constitution by requiring Article III judges to share judicial power with nonjudges. As noted earlier, the Commission is not a court and exercises no judicial power. Thus, the Act does not vest Article III power in nonjudges or require Article III judges to share their power with nonjudges. C Presidential Control The Act empowers the President to appoint all seven members of the Commission with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Act further provides that the President shall make his choice of judicial appointees to the Commission after considering a list of six judges recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Act also grants the President authority to remove members of the Commission, although “only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown.” 28 U. S. C. § 991(a). Mistretta argues that this power of Presidential appointment and removal prevents the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned functions. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 443. Although we agree with petitioner that the independence of the Judicial Branch must be “jealously guarded” against outside interference, see Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S., at 60, and that, as Madison admonished at the founding, “neither of [the Branches] ought to possess directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers,” The Federalist No. 48, p. 332 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), we do not believe that the President’s appointment and removal powers over the Commission afford him influence over the functions of the Judicial Branch or undue sway over its members. The notion that the President’s power to appoint federal judges to the Commission somehow gives him influence over the Judicial Branch or prevents, even potentially, the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned functions is fanciful. We have never considered it incompatible with the functioning of the Judicial Branch that the President has the power to elevate federal judges from one level to another or to tempt judges away from the bench with Executive Branch positions. The mere fact that the President within his appointment portfolio has positions that may be attractive to federal judges does not, of itself, corrupt the integrity of the Judiciary. Were the impartiality of the Judicial Branch so easily subverted, our constitutional system of tripartite Government would have failed long ago. We simply cannot imagine that federal judges will comport their actions to the wishes of the President for the purpose of receiving an appointment to the Sentencing Commission. The President’s removal power over Commission members poses a similarly negligible threat to judicial independence. The Act does not, and could not under the Constitution, authorize the President to remove, or in any way diminish the status of Article III judges, as judges. Even if removed from the Commission, a federal judge appointed to the Commission would continue, absent impeachment, to enjoy tenure “during good Behaviour” and a full judicial salary. U. S. Const., Art. Ill, §1. Also, the President’s removal power under the Act is limited. In order to safeguard the independence of the Commission from executive control, Congress specified in the Act that the President may remove the Commission members only for good cause. Such congressional limitation on the President’s removal power, like the removal provisions upheld in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988), and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), is specifically crafted to prevent the President from exercising “coercive influence” over independent Agencies. See Morrison, 487 U. S., at 688; Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S., at 630. In other words, since the President has no power to affect the tenure or compensation of Article III judges, even if the Act authorized him to remove judges from the Commission at will, he would have no power to coerce the judges in the exercise of their judicial duties. In any case, Congress did not grant the President unfettered authority to remove Commission members. Instead, precisely to ensure that they would not be subject to coercion even in the exercise of their nonjudicial duties, Congress insulated the members from Presidential removal except for good cause. Under these circumstances, we see no risk that the President’s limited removal power will compromise the impartiality of Article III judges serving on the Commission and, consequently, no risk that the Act’s removal provision will prevent the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned function of fairly adjudicating cases and controversies. V We conclude that in creating the Sentencing Commission— an unusual hybrid in structure and authority — Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches. The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory direction as is present here. Nor does our system of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges. Accordingly, we hold that the Act is constitutional. The judgment of United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri is affirmed. It is so ordered. Hereinafter, for simplicity in citation, each reference to the Act is directed to Supplement IV to the 1982 edition of the United States Code. The District Court’s memorandum, written by Judge Howard F. Sachs, states that his conclusion that “the Guidelines are not subject to valid challenge” by claims based on the Commission’s lack of constitutional status or on a theory of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, 682 F. Supp., at 1033-1034, is shared by District Judges Elmo B. Hunter, D. Brook Bartlett, and Dean Whipple of the Western District. IcL, at 1033, n. 1. Chief District Judge Scott O. Wright wrote in dissent. Id., at 1035. The corresponding Report in the House of Representatives was filed a year later. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-1017 (1984). The House bill (H. R. 6012, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)) eventually was set aside in favor of the Senate bill. The House Report, however, reveals that the Senate’s rationale underlying sentencing reform was shared in the House. Until the Parole Commission ceases to exist in 1992, as provided by §§ 218(a)(5) and 235(a)(1) of the Act, 98 Stat. 2027 and 2031, the Chairman of that Commission serves as an ex officio nonvoting member of the Sentencing Commission. § 235(b)(5), 98 Stat. 2033. Petitioner’s claims were identical to those raised by defendants in other cases in the Western District of Missouri. Argument on petitioner’s motion was presented to a panel of sentencing judges. The result is described in n. 2, supra. The disarray is revealed by the District Court decisions cited in the petition for certiorari in No. 87-1904, pp. 9-10, nn. 10 and 11. Since certiorari was granted, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a divided vote, has invalidated the Guidelines on separation-of-powers grounds, Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F. 2d 1245 (1988), cert. pending sub nom. United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, No. 88-550, and a panel of the Third Circuit (one judge, in dissent, did not reach the constitutional issue) has upheld them, United States v. Frank, 864 F. 2d 992 (1988). In Schechter and Panama Refining the Court concluded that Congress had failed to articulate any policy or standard that would serve to confine the discretion of the authorities to whom Congress had delegated power. No delegation of the kind at issue in those eases is present here. The Act does not make crimes of acts never before criminalized, see Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 249 (1947) (analyzing Panama Refining), or delegate regulatory power to private individuals, see Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 424 (1944) (analyzing Schechter). In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional. See, e. g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 646 (1980); National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U. S. 336, 342 (1974). Congress mandated that the guidelines include: “(A) a determination whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment; “(B) a determination as to the appropriate amount of a fine or the appropriate length of a term of probation or a term of imprisonment; “(C) a determination whether a sentence to a term of imprisonment should include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment, and, if so, the appropriate length of such a term; and “(D) a determination whether multiple sentences to terms of imprisonment should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(a)(1). The Senate Report on the legislation elaborated on the purpose to be served by each factor. The Report noted, for example, that the reference to the community view of the gravity of an offense was “not intended to mean that a sentence might be enhanced because of public outcry about a single offense,” but “to suggest that changed community norms concerning certain particular criminal behavior might be justification for increasing or decreasing the recommended penalties for the offense.” Report, at 170. The Report, moreover, gave speeific examples of areas in which prevailing sentences might be too lenient, including the treatment of major white-collar criminals. Id,., at 177. Again, the legislative history provides additional guidance for the Commission’s consideration of the statutory factors. For example, the history indicates Congress’ intent that the “criminal history . . . factor includes not only the number of prior criminal acts —whether or not they resulted in convictions — the defendant has engaged in, but their seriousness, their recentness or remoteness, and their indication whether the defendant is a ‘career criminal’ or a manager of a criminal enterprise." Id., at 174. This legislative history, together with Congress’ directive that the Commission begin its consideration of the sentencing ranges by ascertaining the average sentence imposed in each category in the past, and Congress’ explicit requirement that the Commission consult with authorities in the field of criminal sentencing provide a factual background and statutory context that give content to the mandate of the Commission. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 104-105 (1946). Petitioner argues that the excessive breadth of Congress’ delegation to the Commission is particularly apparent in the Commission’s considering whether to “reinstate” the death penalty for some or all of those crimes for which capital punishment is still authorized in the Federal Criminal Code. See Brief for Petitioner 51-52. Whether, in fact, the Act confers upon the Commission the power to develop guidelines and procedures to bring current death penalty provisions into line with decisions of this Court is a matter of intense debate between the Executive Branch and some members of Congress, including the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F. 2d, at 1256. We assume, without deciding, that the Commission was assigned the power to effectuate the death penalty provisions of the Criminal Code. That the Commission may have this authority (but has not exercised it) does not affect our analysis. Congress did not authorize the Commission to enact a federal death penalty for any offense. As for every other offense within the Commission’s jurisdiction, the Commission could include the death penalty within the guidelines only if that punishment was authorized in the first instance by Congress and only if such inclusion comported with the substantial guidance Congress gave the Commission in fulfilling its assignments. Justice Brennan does not join this footnote. Madison admonished: “In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.” The Federalist No. 51, p. 350 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). If the potential for disruption is present, we then determine “whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.” Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 443. Our recent cases cast no doubt on the continuing vitality of the view that rulemaking is not a function exclusively committed to the Executive Branch. Although in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), we characterized rulemaking as “Executive action” not governed by the Presentment Clauses, we did so as part of our effort to distinguish the rulemaking of administrative agencies from “lawmaking” by Congress which is subject to the presentment requirements of Article I. Id., at 953, n. 16. Plainly, this reference to rulemaking as an executive function was not intended to undermine our recognition in previous eases and in over 150 years of practice that rulemaking pursuant to a legislative delegation is not the exclusive prerogative of the Executive. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (1976) (distinguishing between Federal Election Commission’s exclusively executive enforcement power and its other powers, including rule-making); see also Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 617 (1935). On the contrary, rulemaking power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch. More generally, it hardly can be argued in this case that Congress has impaired the functioning of the Executive Branch. In the field of sentencing, the Executive Branch never has exercised the kind of authority that Congress has vested in the Commission. Moreover, since Congress has empowered the President to appoint and remove Commission members, the President’s relationship to the Commission is functionally no different from what it would have been had Congress not located the Commission in the Judicial Branch. Indeed, since the Act grants ex officio membership on the Commission to the Attorney General or his designee, 28 U. S. C. § 991(a), the Executive Branch’s involvement in the Commission is greater than in other independent agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, not located in the Judicial Branch. The Judicial Conference of the United States is charged with “promoting] uniformity of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of court business,” in part by “a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure,” and recommending changes “to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.” 28 U. S. C. §331 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Similarly, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts handles the administrative and personnel matters of the courts, matters essential to the effective and efficient operation of the judicial system. § 604 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Congress also has established the Federal Judicial Center which studies improvements in judicial administration. §§ 620-628 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). We also have upheld Congress’ power under the Appointments Clause to vest appointment power in the Judicial Branch, concluding that the power of appointment, though not judicial, was not “inconsistent as a functional matter with the courts’ exercise of their Article III powers.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 679, n. 16 (1988). See also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880) (appointment power not incongruous to Judiciary). In Morrison, we noted that Article III courts perform a variety of functions not necessarily or directly connected to adversarial proceedings in a trial or appellate court. Federal courts supervise grand juries and compel the testimony of witnesses before those juries, see Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 49 (1959), participate in the issuance of search warrants, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41, and review wiretap applications, see 18 U. S. C. §§2516, 2518 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). In the interest of effectuating their judgments, federal courts also possess inherent authority to initiate a contempt proceeding and to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987). See also In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F. 2d 1488, 1505 (CA11) (upholding statute authorizing judicial council to investigate improper conduct by federal judge), cert. denied sub nom. Hastings v. Godbold, 477 U. S. 904 (1986). Indeed, had Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we might face the constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had assigned judicial responsibilities to the Executive or unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute and the power to sentence within one Branch. Ronald L. Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, testified before the Senate to this very effect: “If guidelines were to be promulgated by an agency outside the judicial branch, it might be viewed as an encroachment on a judicial function . . . .” Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearing on S. 1437 et al. before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 13, p. 9005 (1977). Under its mandate, the Commission must make judgments about the relative importance of such considerations as the “circumstances under which the offense was committed,” the “community view of the gravity of the offense,” and the “deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission of the offense by others.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(c)(2), (4), (6). Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, has inspired a controversy over the philosophical, social, and economic merits and demerits of class actions. See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 (1979). We express no opinion about whether, under the principles of separation of powers, Congress may confer on a court rulemaking authority such as that exercised by the Sentencing Commission. Our precedents and customs draw no clear distinction between nonadjudicatory activity that may be undertaken by auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch, but not by courts. We note, however, that the constitutional calculus is different for considering nonadjudicatory activities performed by bodies that exercise judicial power and enjoy the constitutionally mandated autonomy of courts from what it is for considering the nonadjudicatory activities of independent nonadjudieatory agencies that Congress merely has located within the Judicial Branch pursuant to its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. We make no attempt here to define the nonadjudicatory duties that are appropriate for auxiliary bodies within the Judicial Branch, but not for courts. Nonetheless, it is clear to us that an independent agency located within the Judicial Branch may undertake without constitutional consequences policy judgments pursuant to a legitimate congressional delegation of authority that, if undertaken by a court, might be incongruous to or destructive of the central adjudicatory mission of the Branch. See United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1852). In this sense, the issue we face here is different from the issue we faced in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988), where we considered the constitutionality of the non-adjudicatory functions assigned to the “Special Division” court created by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U. S. C. §§49, 591 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), or the issue we faced in Haybum’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792), and in Ferreira, in which Article III courts were asked to render judgments that were reviewable by an executive officer. One such prohibition appeared in the New Jersey Plan’s judiciary provision, see 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 244 (1911); the other, proposed by Charles Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, was not reported out of the Committee on Detail to which he submitted it, see 2 id., at 341-342. See also Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 S. Ct. Rev. 123. Coneededly, it is also true that the delegates at the Convention rejected two proposals that would have institutionalized extrajudicial service. Despite support from Madison, the Framers rejected a proposed “Council of Revision,” comprised of, among others, a “convenient number of the National Judiciary,” 1 Farrand, supra, at 21, that would have exercised veto power over proposed legislation. Similarly, the Framers rejected a proposed “Council of State,” of which the Chief Justice was to be a member, that would have acted as adviser to the President in a fashion similar to the modem cabinet. See Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S. Ct. Rev. 127,174-177. At least one commentator has observed that a number of the opponents of the Council of Revision and the Council of State believed that judges individually could assume extrajudicial service. Wheeler, supra, at 127-130. We do not pretend to discern a clear intent on the part of the Framers with respect to this issue, but glean from the Constitution and the events at the Convention simply an inference that the Framers did not intend to forbid judges to hold extrajudicial positions. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705-706, n. 16 (1974). It would be naive history, however, to suggest that the Framers, including the Justices who accepted extrajudicial service, were of one mind on the issue or believed that such service was in all cases appropriate and constitutional. Chief Justice Jay, in draft correspondence to President Washington, explained that he was “far from thinking it illegal or unconstitutional,” for the Executive to use individual judges for extrajudicial service so long as the extrajudicial service was “consistent and compatible” with “the judicial function.” Draft of a letter by Jay, intended for President Washington, enclosed with a letter dated September 15, 1790, from Jay to Justice Iredell, reproduced in 2 G. McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Iredell 293, 294 (1949). Chief Justice Marshall stepped down from his post as Secretary of State when appointed to the bench, agreeing to stay on only until a replacement could be found. Chief Justice Ells-worth accepted his posting to France with reluctance and his appointment was unsuccessfully opposed on constitutional grounds by Jefferson, Madison, and Pinckney. But that some judges have turned down extrajudicial service or have expressed reservations about the practice, see Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1953), does not detract from the fact that judges have continued to assume extrajudicial duties, and efforts to curb the practice as contrary to the letter or spirit of the Constitution have not succeeded. But see Note, The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 Yale L. J. 1363, 1381-1385 (1987). Compendia of extrajudicial activities may be found in several sources. See Mason, supra; McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 Law & Contemp. Prob. 9 (1970); Slonim, Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of the Separation of Powers, 49 Conn. B. J. 391 (1975). See also In re President’s Comm’n on Organized Crime, 783 F. 2d 370 (CA3 1986). Article III judges, and the Chief Justice in particular, also have served and continue to serve on numerous cultural commissions. The Chief Justice by statute is a member of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, Rev. Stat. §5580, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §42, and a trustee of the National Gallery of Art, 50 Stat. 52, 20 U. S. C. § 72(a). Four Justices, pursuant to 44 U. S. C. § 2501, have served successively as the judiciary member of the National Historical Publications and Records Commission. And Chief Justice Burger began his service as Chairman of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution before he assumed retirement status. See Pub. L. 98-101, 97 Stat. 719. For example, Judges A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., James B. Parsons, Luther W. Youngdahl, George C. Edwards, Jr., James M. Carter, and Thomas J. MacBride, and others, have served on various Presidential and national commissions. See Brief for United States 48, n. 40. Extrajudicial activity has been the subject of extensive testimony in Congress from federal judges, academics, legislators, and members of the legal community. See Nonjudieial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and other Federal Judges, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Although many participants were critical of extrajudicial service, the testimony shed little light on what types of service were not merely unwise, but unconstitutional. Perhaps the most interesting lament on the subject comes from Chief Justice Warren reflecting on his initial refusal to participate in the commission looking into President Kennedy’s death: “First, it is not in the spirit of constitutional separation of powers to have a member of the Supreme Court serve on a presidential commission; second, it would distract a Justice from the work of the Court, which had a heavy docket; and, third, it was impossible to foresee what litigation such a commission might spawn, with resulting disqualification of the Justice from sitting in such' cases. I then told them that, historically, the acceptance of diplomatic posts by Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth had not contributed to the welfare of the Court, that the service of five Justices on the HayesTilden Commission had demeaned it, that the appointment of Justice Roberts as chairman to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster had served no good purpose, and that the action of Justice Robert Jackson in leaving Court for a year to become chief prosecutor at Nürnberg after World War II had resulted in divisiveness and internal bitterness on the Court.” E. Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 356 (1977). Despite his initial reservations, the Chief Justice served as Chairman of the commission and endured criticism for so doing. The effect of extrajudicial service on the functioning of the Judicial Branch is not solely a constitutional concern. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States, is intended to ensure that a judge does not accept extrajudicial service incompatible with the performance of judicial duties or that might compromise the integrity of the Branch as a whole. Canon 5(G) provides: “A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, unless appointment of a judge is required by Act of Congress. A judge should not, in any event, accept such an appointment if the judge’s governmental duties would interfere with the performance of judicial duties or tend to undermine the public confidence in the integrity, impartiality, or independence of the judiciary . . . .” Administrative Office of U. S. Courts, Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges (1987). Certainly nothing in the Act creates any coercive power over members of the Judicial Branch and we construe the statute as affording none. “[I]t is the duty of federal courts to construe a statute in order to save it from constitutional infirmities, see, e. g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U. S. 833, 841 (1986).” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S., at 682. Notably, the statutory provision creating the Judicial Councils of the Circuits that we found constitutionally unobjectionable in Chandler requires the Chief Judge of each Court of Appeals to preside over his Circuit’s Judicial Council. 28 U. S. C. § 332. The statutory provision creating the Judicial Conference of the United States also requires the service of the Chief Judge of each Court of Appeals. 28 U. S. C. § 331 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Thus, we have given at least tacit approval to this degree of congressionally mandated judicial service on nonadjudicatory bodies. Petitioner does not raise the issue central to our most recent opinions discussing removal power, namely, whether Congress unconstitutionally has limited the President’s authority to remove officials engaged in executive functions or has reserved for itself excessive removal power over such officials. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986). Moreover, as has been noted, the Act limits the President’s power to use his appointments to the Commission for political purposes by explicitly requiring that he consider a list of six judges submitted by the Judicial Conference before making his selections. Senator Hart explained that this provision provided “greater assurance that a broad range of interests will be represented.” 124 Cong. Rec. 378 (1978). The textual requirements of Article III that judges shall enjoy tenure and be paid an irreducible compensation “were incorporated into the Constitution to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from control of the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.” Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 59 (1982). These inviolable guarantees are untrammeled by the Act. Concededly, since Commission members receive a salary equal to that of a court of appeals judge, 28 U. S. C. § 992(c), district court judges appointed to the Commission receive an increase in salary. We do not address the hypothetical constitutional question whether, under the Compensation Clause of Article III, a district judge removed from the Commission must continue to be paid the higher salary. This removal provision is precisely the kind that was at issue in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States where we wrote: “The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which [commissioners] shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime.” 295 U. S., at 629. Although removal from the Sentencing Commission conceivably could involve some embarrassment or even damage to reputation, each judge made potentially subject to these injuries will have undertaken the risk voluntarily by accepting the President’s appointment to serve. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986), is not to the contrary. In Bowsher, we held that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.” Id., at 726. To permit Congress to remove an officer performing executive functions whenever Congress might find the performance of his duties unsatisfactory would, in essence, give Congress veto power over executive action. In light of the special danger recognized by the Founders of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions, “[t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws ... is constitutionally impermissible.” Id., at 726-727. Nothing in Bowsher, however, suggests that one Branch may never exercise removal power, however limited, over members of another Branch. Indeed, we already have recognized that the President may remove a judge who serves on an Article I court. McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174, 185 (1891). In any event, we hold here no more than that Congress may vest in the President the power to remove for good cause an Article III judge from a nonadjudicatory independent agency placed within the Judicial Branch. Because an Article III judge serving on a nonadjudicatory commission is not exercising judicial power, and because such limited removal power gives the President no control over judicatory functions, interbranch removal authority under these limited circumstances poses no threat to the balance of power among the Branches. Our paramount concern in Bowsher that Congress was accreting to itself the power to control the functions of another Branch is not implicated by a removal provision, like the one at issue here, which provides no control in one Branch over the constitutionally assigned mission of another Branch.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. No. 82-524. Argued April 19, 1983 Decided June 6, 1983 O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. David A. Strauss argued the cause for petitioners in all cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 82-545 were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, John H. Garvey, Jacques B. Gelin, and E. Leo Slaggie. Henry V. Nickel, F. William Brownell, and George C. Freeman, Jr., filed briefs for petitioners in No. 82-524. James P. McGranery, Jr., and Michael I. Miller filed briefs for petitioners in No. 82-551. Raymond M. Momboisse, Sam Kazman, Ronald A. Zumbrun, and Robert K. Best filed a brief for respondent Pacific Legal Foundation in support of petitioners. Timothy B. Atkeson argued the cause for respondents in all cases and filed a brief for respondent Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Ezra I. Bialik, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter H. Schiff filed a brief for respondent State of New York. Together with No. 82-545, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.; and No. 82-551, Commonwealth Edison Co. et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amicus curiae urging reversal were filed by Harold F. Reis and Linda L. Hodge for the Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.; and by Wayne T. Elliott for Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Minnesota by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, and Jocelyn Furtwangler Olson, Special Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Wisconsin et al. by Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Carl A. Sinderbrand, Assistant Attorney General; Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, and Robert Vinson Eye, Assistant Attorney General; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana; Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut; John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, and Merideth Wright, Assistant Attorney General; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, and Robert Lindholm, Assistant Attorney General; William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General of Tennessee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota; Paul G. Bardacke, Attorney General of New Mexico; Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, and Leonard Knee, Deputy Attorney General; A. G. McClintock, Attorney General of Wyoming; Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, and David Richards, Executive Assistant Attorney General; Janice E. Kerr and J. Calvin Simpson; for Kansans for Sensible Energy by John M. Simpson; and for Limerick Ecology Action, Inc., et al. by Charles W. Elliott. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C) (NEPA), requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of any major federal action. As part of its generic rule-making proceedings to evaluate the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear powerplants, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) decided that licensing boards should assume, for purposes of NEPA, that the permanent storage of certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact and thus should not affect the decision whether to license a particular nuclear power-plant. We conclude that the Commission complied with NEPA and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §706. The environmental impact of operating a light-water nuclear powerplant includes the effects of offsite activities necessary to provide fuel for the plant (“front end” activities), and of offsite activities necessary to dispose of the highly toxic and long-lived nuclear wastes generated by the plant (“back end” activities). The dispute in these cases concerns the Commission’s adoption of a series of generic rules to evaluate the environmental effects of a nuclear power-plant’s fuel cycle. At the heart of each rule is Table S-3, a numerical compilation of the estimated resources used and effluents released by fuel cycle activities supporting a year’s operation of a typical light-water reactor. The three versions of Table S-3 contained similar numerical values, although the supporting documentation has been amplified during the course of the proceedings. The Commission first adopted Table S-3 in 1974, after extensive informal rulemaking proceedings. 39 Fed. Reg. 14188 et seq. (1974). This “original” rule, as it later came to be described, declared that in environmental reports and impact statements for individual licensing proceedings the environmental costs of the fuel cycle “shall be as set forth” in Table S-3 and that “[n]o further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required.” Id., at 14191. The original Table S-3 contained no numerical entry for the long-term environmental effects of storing solidified transuranic and high-level wastes, because the Commission staff believed that technology would be developed to isolate the wastes from the environment. The Commission and the parties have later termed this assumption of complete repository integrity as the “zero-release” assumption: the reasonableness of this assumption is at the core of the present controversy. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a respondent in the present cases, challenged the original rule and a license issued under the rule to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Table S-3’s treatment of the “front end” of the fuel cycle, but vacated and remanded the portion of the rule relating to the “back end” because of perceived inadequacies in the rulemaking procedures. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 178 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 547 F. 2d 633 (1976). Judge Tamm disagreed that the procedures were inadequate, but concurred on the ground that the record on waste storage was inadequate to support the zero-release assumption. Id., at 361, 547 F. 2d, at 658. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), this Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision that the Commission had used inadequate procedures, finding that the Commission had done all that was required by NEPA and the APA and determining that courts generally lack the authority to impose “hybrid” procedures greater than those contemplated by the governing statutes. We remanded for review of whether the original rule was adequately supported by the administrative record, specifically stating that the court was free to agree or disagree with Judge Tamm’s conclusion that the rule pertaining to the “back end” of the fuel cycle was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of § 10(e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 706. Id., at 536, n. 14. While Vermont Yankee was pending in this Court, the Commission proposed a new “interim” rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to adopt a revised Table S-3. The proposal explicitly acknowledged that the risks from long-term repository failure were uncertain, but suggested that research should resolve most of those uncertainties in the near future. 41 Fed. Reg. 45850-45851 (1976). After further proceedings, the Commission promulgated the interim rule in March 1977. Table S-3 now explicitly stated that solidified high-level and transuranic wastes would remain buried in a federal repository and therefore would have no effect on the environment. 42 Fed. Reg. 13807 (1977). Like its predecessor, the interim rule stated that “[n]o further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required.” Id., at 13806. The NRDC petitioned for review of the interim rule, challenging the zero-release assumption and faulting the Table S-3 rule for failing to consider the health, cumulative, and socioeconomic effects of the fuel cycle activities. The Court of Appeals stayed proceedings while awaiting this Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee. In April 1978, the Commission amended the interim rule to clarify that health effects were not covered by Table S-3 and could be litigated in individual licensing proceedings. 43 Fed. Reg. 15613 et seq. (1978). In 1979, following further hearings, the Commission adopted the “final” Table S-3 rule. 44 Fed. Reg. 45362 et seq. (1979). Like the amended interim rule, the final rule expressly stated that Table S-3 should be supplemented in individual proceedings by evidence about the health, socioeconomic, and cumulative aspects of fuel cycle activities. The Commission also continued to adhere to the zero-release assumption that the solidified waste would not escape and harm the environment once the repository was sealed. It acknowledged that this assumption was uncertain because of the remote possibility that water might enter the repository, dissolve the radioactive materials, and transport them to the biosphere. Nevertheless, the Commission predicted that a bedded-salt repository would maintain its integrity, and found the evidence “tentative but favorable” that an appropriate site would be found. Id., at 45368. The Commission ultimately determined that any undue optimism in the assumption of appropriate selection and perfect performance of the repository is offset by the cautious assumption, reflected in other parts of the Table, that all radioactive gases in the spent fuel would escape during the initial 6- to 20-year period that the repository remained open, ibid., and thus did not significantly reduce the overall conservatism of Table S-3. Id., at 45369. The Commission rejected the option of expressing the uncertainties in Table S-3 or permitting licensing boards, in performing the NEPA analysis for individual nuclear plants, to consider those uncertainties. It saw no advantage in reassessing the significance of the uncertainties in individual licensing proceedings: “In view of the uncertainties noted regarding waste disposal, the question then arises whether these uncertainties can or should be reflected explicitly in the fuel cycle rule. The Commission has concluded that the rule should not be so modified. On the individual reactor licensing level, where the proceedings deal with fuel cycle issues only peripherally, the Commission sees no advantage in having licensing boards repeatedly weigh for themselves the effect of uncertainties on the selection of fuel cycle impacts for use in cost-benefit balancing. This is a generic question properly dealt with in the rule-making as part of choosing what impact values should go into the fuel cycle rule. The Commission concludes, having noted that uncertainties exist, that for the limited purpose of the fuel cycle rule it is reasonable to base impacts on the assumption which the Commission believes the probabilities favor, i. e., that bedded-salt repository sites can be found which will provide effective isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere. ” Id., at 45369. The NRDC and respondent State of New York petitioned for review of the final rule. The Court of Appeals consolidated these petitions for all purposes with the pending challenges to the initial and interim rules. By a divided panel, the court concluded that the Table S-3 rules were arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with NEPA because the Commission had not factored the consideration of uncertainties surrounding the zero-release assumption into the licensing process in such a manner that the uncertainties could potentially affect the outcome of any decision to license a particular plant. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 9, 685 F. 2d 459 (1982). The court first reasoned that NEPA requires an agency to consider all significant environmental risks from its proposed action. If the zero-release assumption is taken as a, finding that long-term storage poses no significant environmental risk, which the court acknowledged may not have been the Commission’s intent, it found that the assumption represents a self-evident error in judgment and is thus arbitrary and capricious. As the evidence in the record reveals and the Commission itself acknowledged, the zero-release assumption is surrounded with uncertainty. Alternatively, reasoned the Court of Appeals, the zero-release assumption could be characterized as a decision-making device whereby the Commission, rather than individual licensing boards, would have sole responsibility for considering the risk that long-lived wastes will not be disposed of with complete success. The court recognized that the Commission could use generic rulemaking to evaluate environmental costs common to all licensing decisions. Indeed, the Commission could use generic rulemaking to balance generic costs and benefits to produce a generic “net value.” These generic evaluations could then be considered together with case-specific costs and benefits in individual proceedings. The key requirement of NEPA, however, is that the agency consider and disclose the actual environmental effects in a manner that will ensure that the overall process, including both the generic rulemaking and the individual proceedings, brings those effects to bear on decisions to take particular actions that significantly affect the environment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the zero-release assumption was not in accordance with this NEPA requirement because the assumption prevented the uncertainties — which were not found to be insignificant or outweighed by other generic benefits — from affecting any individual licensing decision. Alternatively, by requiring that the licensing decision ignore factors that are relevant under NEPA, the zero-release assumption is a clear error in judgment and thus arbitrary and capricious. We granted certiorari. 459 U. S. 1034 (1982). We reverse. h-4 I — I We are acutely aware that the extent to which this Nation should rely on nuclear power as a source of energy is an important and sensitive issue. Much of the debate focuses on whether development of nuclear generation facilities should proceed in the face of uncertainties about their long-term effects on the environment. Resolution of these fundamental policy questions lies, however, with Congress and the agencies to which Congress has delegated authority, as well as with state legislatures and, ultimately, the populace as a whole. Congress has assigned the courts only the limited, albeit important, task of reviewing agency action to determine whether the agency conformed with controlling statutes. As we emphasized in our earlier encounter with these very proceedings, “[administrative decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute . . . , not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.” Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 558. The controlling statute at issue here is NEPA. NEPA has twin aims. First, it “places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action.” Vermont Yankee, supra, at 553. Second, it ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U. S. 139, 143 (1981). Congress in enacting NEPA, however, did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations. See Stryckers’ Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U. S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam). Rather, it required only that the agency take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences before taking a major action. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976). The role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415-417 (1971). In its Table S-3 rule here, the Commission has determined that the probabilities favor the zero-release assumption, because the Nation is likely to develop methods to store the wastes with no leakage to the environment. The NRDC did not challenge and the Court of Appeals did not decide the reasonableness of this determination, 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 28, n. 96, 685 F. 2d, at 478, n. 96, and no party seriously challenges it here. The Commission recognized, however, that the geological, chemical, physical, and other data it relied on in making this prediction were based, in part, on assumptions which involve substantial uncertainties. Again, no one suggests that the uncertainties are trivial or the potential effects insignificant if time proves the zero-release assumption to have been seriously wrong. After confronting the issue, though, the Commission has determined that the uncertainties concerning the development of nuclear waste storage facilities are not sufficient to affect the outcome of any individual licensing decision. It is clear that the Commission, in making this determination, has made the careful consideration and disclosure required by NEPA. The sheer volume of proceedings before the Commission is impressive. Of far greater importance, the Commission’s Statement of Consideration announcing the final Table S-3 rule shows that it has digested this mass of material and disclosed all substantial risks. 44 Fed. Reg. 45367-45369 (1979). The Statement summarizes the major uncertainty of long-term storage in bedded-salt repositories, which is that water could infiltrate the repository as a result of such diverse factors as geologic faulting, a meteor strike, or accidental or deliberate intrusion by man. The Commission noted that the probability of intrusion was small, and that the plasticity of salt would tend to heal some types of intrusions. The Commission also found the evidence “tentative but favorable” that an appropriate site could be found. Table S-3 refers interested persons to staff studies that discuss the uncertainties in greater detail. Given this record and the Commission’s statement, it simply cannot be said that the Commission ignored or failed to disclose the uncertainties surrounding its zero-release assumption. Congress did not enact NEPA, of course, so that an agency would contemplate the environmental impact of an action as an abstract exercise. Rather, Congress intended that the “hard look” be incorporated as part of the agency’s process of deciding whether to pursue a particular federal action. It was on this ground that the Court of Appeals faulted the Commission’s action, for failing to allow the uncertainties potentially to “tip the balance” in a particular licensing decision. As a general proposition, we can agree with the Court of Appeals’ determination that an agency must allow all significant environmental risks to be factored into the decision whether to undertake a proposed action. We think, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Commission had not complied with this standard. As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not require agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking structure. Here, the agency has chosen to evaluate generically the environmental impact of the fuel cycle and inform individual licensing boards, through the Table S-3 rule, of its evaluation. The generic method chosen by the agency is clearly an appropriate method of conducting the “hard look” required by NEPA. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 535, n. 13. The environmental effects of much of the fuel cycle are not plant specific, for any plant, regardless of its particular attributes, will create additional wastes that must be stored in a common long-term repository. Administrative efficiency and consistency of decision are both furthered by a generic determination of these effects without needless repetition of the litigation in individual proceedings, which are subject to review by the Commission in any event. See generally Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F. 2d 998, 1002, n. 5 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J.) (quoting Administrative Conference Proposed Recommendation 73-6). The Court of Appeals recognized that the Commission has discretion to evaluate generically the environmental effects of the fuel cycle and require that these values be “plugged into” individual licensing decisions. The court concluded that the Commission nevertheless violated NEPA by failing to factor the uncertainty surrounding long-term storage into Table S-3 and precluding individual licensing decisionmakers from considering it. The Commission’s decision to affix a zero value to the environmental impact of long-term storage would violate NEPA, however, only if the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding generically that the uncertainty was insufficient to affect any individual licensing decision. In assessing whether the Commission’s decision is arbitrary and capricious, it is crucial to place the zero-release assumption in context. Three factors are particularly important. First is the Commission’s repeated emphasis that the zero-release assumption — and, indeed, all of the Table S-3 rule — was made for a limited purpose. The Commission expressly noted its intention to supplement the rule with an explanatory narrative. It also emphasized that the purpose of the rule was not to evaluate or select the most effective long-term waste disposal technology or develop site selection criteria. A separate and comprehensive series of programs has been undertaken to serve these broader purposes. In the proceedings before us, the Commission’s staff did not attempt to evaluate the environmental effects of all possible methods of disposing of waste. Rather, it chose to analyze intensively the most probable long-term waste disposal method — burial in a bedded-salt repository several hundred meters below ground — and then “estimate its impacts conservatively, based on the best available information and analysis.” 44 Fed. Reg. 45863 (1979). The zero-release assumption cannot be evaluated in isolation. Rather, it must be assessed in relation to the limited purpose for which the Commission made the assumption. Second, the Commission emphasized that the zero-release assumption is but a single figure in an entire Table, which the Commission expressly designed as a risk-averse estimate of the environmental impact of the fuel cycle. It noted that Table S-3 assumed that the fuel storage canisters and the fuel rod cladding would be corroded before a repository is closed and that all volatile materials in the fuel would escape to the environment. Given that assumption, and the improbability that materials would escape after sealing, the Commission determined that the overall Table represented a conservative (i. e., inflated) statement of environmental impacts. It is not unreasonable for the Commission to counteract the uncertainties in postsealing releases by balancing them with an overestimate of presealing releases. A reviewing court should not magnify a single line item beyond its significance as only part of a larger Table. Third, a reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential. See, e. g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); id., at 705-706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). With these three guides in mind, we find the Commission’s zero-release assumption to be within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking required by the APA. We have already noted that the Commission’s Statement of Consideration detailed several areas of uncertainty and discussed why they were insubstantial for purposes of an individual licensing decision. The Table S-3 rule also refers to the staff reports, public documents that contain a more expanded discussion of the uncertainties involved in concluding that long-term storage will have no environmental effects. These staff reports recognize that rigorous verification of long-term risks for waste repositories is not possible, but suggest that data and extrapolation of past experience allow the Commission to identify events that could produce repository failure, estimate the probability of those events, and calculate the resulting consequences. NUREG-0116, at 4-86. The Commission staff also modeled the consequences of repository failure by tracing the flow of contaminated water, and found them to be insignificant. Id., at 4-89 through 4-94. Ultimately, the staff concluded that “[t]he radiotoxic hazard index analyses and the modeling studies that have been done indicate that consequences of all but the most improbable events will be small. Risks (probabilities times consequences) inherent in the long term for geological disposal will therefore also be small.” Id., at 2-11. We also find significant the separate views of Commissioners Bradford and Gilinsky. These Commissioners expressed dissatisfaction with the zero-release assumption and yet emphasized the limited purpose of the assumption and the overall conservatism of Table S-3. Commissioner Bradford characterized the bedded-salt repository as a responsible working assumption for NEPA purposes and concurred in the zero-release figure because it does not appear to affect Table S-3’s overall conservatism. 44 Fed. Reg. 45372 (1979). Commissioner Gilinsky was more critical of the entire Table, stating that the Commission should confront directly whether it should license any nuclear reactors in light of the problems of waste disposal, rather than hide an affirmative conclusion to this issue behind a table of numbers. He emphasized that the “waste confidence proceeding,” see n. 14, supra, should provide the Commission an appropriate vehicle for a thorough evaluation of the problems involved in the Government’s commitment to a waste disposal solution. For the limited purpose of individual licensing proceedings, however, Commissioner Gilinsky found it “virtually inconceivable” that the Table should affect the decision whether to license, and characterized as “naive” the notion that the fuel cycle effluents could tip the balance in some cases and not in others. 44 Fed. Reg. 45374 (1979). In sum, we think that the zero-release assumption — a policy judgment concerning one line in a conservative Table designed for the limited purpose of individual licensing decisions — is within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking. It is not our task to determine what decision we, as Commissioners, would have reached. Our only task is to determine whether the Commission has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 285-286 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971). Under this standard, we think the Commission's zero-release assumption, within the context of Table S-3 as a whole, was not arbitrary and capricious. r-4 1 — 4 HH As we have noted, n. 5, supra, Table S-3 describes effluents and other impacts in technical terms. The Table does not convert that description into tangible effects on human health or other environmental variables. The original and interim rules declared that “the contribution of the environmental effects of. . . fuel cycle activities . . . shall be as set forth in the following Table S-3 [and] [n]o further discussion of such environmental effects shall be required.” 39 Fed. Reg. 14191 (1974); 42 Fed. Reg. 13806 (1977). Since the Table does not specifically mention health effects, socioeconomic impacts, or cumulative impacts, this declaration does not clearly require or preclude their discussion. The Commission later amended the interim rule to clarify that health effects were not covered by Table S-3 and could be litigated in individual licensing proceedings. In the final rule, the Commission expressly required licensing boards to consider the socioeconomic and cumulative effects in addition to the health effects of the releases projected in the Table. 44 Fed. Reg. 45371 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that the original and interim rules violated NEPA by precluding licensing boards from considering the health, socioeconomic, and cumulative effects of the environmental impacts stated in technical terms. As does the Commission, we agree with the Court of Appeals that NEPA requires an EIS to disclose the significant health, socioeconomic, and cumulative consequences of the environmental impact of a proposed action. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U. S. 766 (1983); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S., at 410; 40 CFR §§ 1508.7, 1508.8 (1982). We find no basis, however, for the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Commission ever precluded a licensing board from considering these effects. It is true, as the Commission pointed out in explaining why it modified the language in the earlier rules, that the original Table S-3 rule “at least initially was apparently interpreted as cutting off” discussion of the effects of effluent releases. 44 Fed. Reg. 45364 (1979). But even the notice accompanying the earlier versions stated that the Table was “to be used as a basis for evaluating the environmental effects in a cost-benefit analysis for a reactor,” 39 Fed. Reg. 14190 (1974) (emphasis added), suggesting that individual licensing boards were to assess the consequences of effluent releases. And when, operating under the initial rule, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board suggested the desirability of discussing health effects for comparing nuclear with coal plants, In re Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant Units), 5 N. R. C. 92, 103, n. 52 (1977), the Commission staff was allowed to introduce evidence of public health consequences. Cf. In re Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station), 7 N. R. C. 179, 187 (1978). Respondents have pointed to no case where evidence concerning health or other consequences of the data in Table S-3 was excluded from licensing proceedings. We think our admonition in Vermont Yankee applies with equal force here: “[WJhile it is true that NEPA places upon an agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed action, it is still incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the intervenors’ position and contentions.” 435 U. S., at 553. In short, we find it totally inappropriate to cast doubt on licensing proceedings simply because of a minor ambiguity in the language of the earlier rule under which the environmental impact statement was made, when there is no evidence that this ambiguity prevented any party from making as full a presentation as desired, or ever affected the decision to license the plant. IV For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is Reversed. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. APPENDIX TO THE OPINION OF THE COURT Section 102(2)(C) provides: “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible ... (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— “(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, [and] “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” The original Table S-3 rule was promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Congress abolished the AEC in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,42 U. S. C. § 5801 et seq., and transferred its licensing and regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The interim and final rules were promulgated by the NRC. This opinion will use the term “Commission” to refer to both the NRC and the predecessor AEC. Title 5 U. S. C. § 706 states in part: “The reviewing court shall— “(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” A light-water nuclear powerplant is one that uses ordinary water (H20), as opposed to heavy water (D20), to remove the heat generated in the nuclear core. See Van Nostrand’s Scientific Encyclopedia 1998, 2008 (D. Considine & G. Considine eds., 6th ed. 1983). The bulk of the reactors in the United States are light-water nuclear reactors. NRC Ann. Rep., Appendix 6 (1980). For example, the tabulated impacts include the acres of land committed to fuel cycle activities, the amount of water discharged by such activities, fossil fuel consumption, and chemical and radiological effluents (measured in curies), all normalized to the annual fuel requirement for a model 1,000 megawatt light-water reactor. See Table S-3, reprinted in the Appendix, infra. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq., a utility seeking to construct and operate a nuclear powerplant must obtain a separate permit or license at both the construction and the operation stage of the project. After the Commission’s staff has examined the application for a construction license, which includes a review of possible environmental effects as required by NEPA, a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board conducts a public adjudicatory hearing and reaches a decision which can be appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board and, in the Commission’s discretion, to the Commission itself. The final agency decision may be appealed to the courts of appeals. A similar procedure occurs when the utility applies for an operating license, except that a hearing need be held only in contested cases. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 526-527 (1978). High-level wastes, which are highly radioactive, are produced in liquid form when spent fuel is reprocessed. Transuranic wastes, which are also highly toxic, are nuclides heavier than uranium that are produced in the reactor fuel. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 222 U. S. App. D. C. 9, 16, n. 11, 685 F. 2d, 459, 466, n. 11 (1982). In Vermont Yankee, we indicated that the Court of Appeals could consider any additions made to the record by the Commission, and could consolidate review of the initial review with review of later rules. 435 U. S., at 537, n. 14. Consistent with this direction, the parties stipulated that all three versions of the rule could be reviewed on the basis of the whole record. See 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 21, n. 39, 685 F. 2d, at 471, n. 39. Judge Bazelon wrote the opinion for the court. Judge Wilkey joined the section of the opinion that rejected New York’s argument that the waste-disposal technology assumed for calculation of certain effluent release values was economically infeasible. That issue is not before us. Judge Wilkey filed a dissenting opinion on the issues that are under review here. Judge Edwards of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation, joined these sections of Judge Bazelon’s opinion, and also filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting on the economic infeasibility issue. As the Court of Appeals recognized, 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 31, n. 118, 685 F. 2d, at 481, n. 118, the Commission became increasingly candid in acknowledging the uncertainties underlying permanent waste disposal. Because all three versions of Table S-3 use the same zero-release assumption, and the parties stipulated that the entire record be used in reviewing all three versions, see n. 8, supra, we need review only the propriety of the final Table S-3 rule. We leave for another day any general concern with an agency whose initial Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is insufficient but who later adequately supplements its consideration and disclosure of the environmental impact of its action. The record includes more than 1,100 pages of prepared direct testimony, two rounds of questions by participants and several hundred pages of responses, 1,200 pages of oral hearings, participants’ rebuttal testimony, concluding statements, the 137-page report of the hearing board, further written statements from participants, and oral argument before the Commission. The Commission staff has prepared three studies of the environmental effects of the fuel cycle: Environmental Survey of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, WASH-1248 (Apr. 1974); Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle, NUREG-0116 (Supp. 1 to WASH-1248) (Oct. 1976) (hereinafter cited as NUREG-0116); and Public Comments and Task Force Responses Regarding the Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle, NUREG-0216 (Supp. 2 to WASH-1248) (Mar. 1977). We are reviewing here only the Table S-3 rulemaking proceedings, and do not have before us an individual EIS that incorporates Table S-3. It is clear that the Statement of Consideration supporting the Table S-3 rule adequately discloses the environmental uncertainties considered by the Commission. However, Table S-3 itself refers to other documents but gives only brief descriptions of the environmental effects it encapsulates. There is some concern with an EIS that relies too heavily on separate documents rather than addressing the concerns directly. Although we do not decide whether they have binding effect on an independent agency such as the Commission, it is worth noting that the guidelines from the Council on Environmental Quality in effect during these proceedings required that “care should be taken to ensure that the statement remains an essentially self-contained instrument, capable of being understood by the reader without the need for undue cross reference.” 38 Fed. Reg. 20554 (1973), 40 CFR § 1500.8(b) (1974). The present regulations state that incorporation by reference is permissible if it will not “imped[e] agency and public review of the action. The incorporated material shall be cited in the statement and its content briefly described.” 40 CFR § 1502.21 (1982). The Court of Appeals noted that NEPA “requires an agency to do more than to scatter its evaluation of environmental damage among various public documents,” 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 34, 685 F. 2d, at 484, but declined to find that the incorporation of other documents by reference would invalidate an EIS that used Table S-3 to describe the environmental impact of the fuel cycle. The parties here do not treat this insufficient disclosure argument as a separate argument and, like the Court of Appeals, we decline to strike down the rule on this ground. We do not deny the value of an EIS that can be understood without extensive cross-reference. The staff documents referred to in Table S-3 are public documents, however, and we note that the Commission has proposed an explanatory narrative to accompany Table S-3, which would be included in an individual EIS, that may alleviate some of the concerns of incorporation. See n. 13, infra. In March 1981, the Commission submitted a version of the explanatory narrative for public comment as a proposed amendment to the final fuel cycle rule. 46 Fed. Reg. 15154 (1981). The Commission has not yet adopted a final narrative. In response to Minnesota v. NRC, 195 U. S. App. D. C. 234, 602 F. 2d 412 (1979), the Commission has initiated a "waste confidence” proceeding to consider the most recent evidence regarding the likelihood that nuclear waste can be safely disposed of and when that, or some other offsite storage solution, can be accomplished. 44 Fed. Reg. 61372 et seq. (1979). See id., at 45363. The recently enacted Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201, 42 U. S. C. § 10101 et seq. (1982 ed.), has set up a schedule for identifying site locations and a funding mechanism for development of permanent waste repositories. The Environmental Protection Agency has also proposed standards for future waste repositories, 47 Fed. Reg. 58196 et seq. (1982). For example, Table S-3 assumes that plutonium will not be recycled. The Commission noted that, in response to a Presidential directive, it had terminated separate proceedings concerning the possibility of recyling plutonium in mixed oxide fuel. 44 Fed. Reg. 45369, n. 28 (1979). See In re Mixed Oxide Fuel, 6 N. R. C. 861 (1977); In re Mixed Oxide Fuel, 7 N. R. C. 711 (1978). The Commission also increased the overall conservatism of the Table by overestimating the amount of fuel consumed by a reactor, underestimating the amount of electricity produced, and then underestimating the efficiency of filters and other protective devices. See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Hearing Board Regarding the Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, Docket No. Rm 50-3, App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 82-524, pp. 282a-293a. Additionally, Table S-3, which analyzes both a uranium-recycle and no-recycle system, conservatively lists, for each effluent, the highest of the two releases that would be expected under each cycle. 41 Fed. Reg. 45849, 45850 (1976). The Court of Appeals recognized that the Commission could weigh certain generic costs and benefits of reactors against each other to produce a generic “net value” to be used in individual licensing proceedings. 222 U. S. App. D. C., at 32, 685 F. 2d, at 482. We see no reason why the Commission does not have equal discretion to evaluate certain environmental costs together to produce a generic net cost. For example, using this approach the staff estimated that a meteor the size necessary to damage a repository would hit a given square kilometer of the earth’s surface only once every 50 trillion years, and that geologic faulting through the Delaware Basin in southeast New Mexico (assuming that were the site of the repository) would occur once in 25 billion years. NUREG-0116, at 4-87. The staff determined that a surface burst of a 50 megaton nuclear weapon, far larger than any currently deployed, would not breach the repository. Ibid. The staff also recognized the possibility that heat generated by the waste would damage the repository, but suggested this problem could be alleviated by decreasing the density of the stored waste. In recognition that this suggestion would increase the size of the repository, the Commission amended Table S-3 to reflect the greater acreage required under these assumptions. See 44 Fed. Reg. 45369 (1979). Of course, just as the Commission has discretion to evaluate generically aspects of the environmental impact of the fuel cycle, it has discretion to have other aspects of the issue decided in individual licensing decisions.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al. No. 12. Argued October 11, 1956. Decided December 17, 1956. Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for the appellant. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen and Daniel M. Friedman. Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the Interstate Commerce Commission. With him on the brief was B. Franklin Taylor, Jr. Windsor F. Cousins argued the cause for the railroad appellees. On the brief were Charles P. Reynolds and James B. McDonough, Jr., for the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., Richard B. Gwathmey for the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., A. J. Dixon and William B. Jones for the Southern Railway Co., John P. Fishwick for the Norfolk & Western Railway Co., Martin A. Meyer, Jr., for the Virginian Railway Co., and Hugh B. Cox and Mr. Cousins for the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. MR. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal requires a determination of whether railroads serving the port of Norfolk, Virginia, must grant the United States an allowance for the Government’s performance of certain wharfage and handling services on its own export freight. For shippers who conform to the requirements of the tariff, the railroads assume these charges as a part of the rate. The United States, however, found it impractical to conform to the tariff requirements. The present litigation was instituted pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2325 in a three-judge District Court of the District of Columbia by the United States, through its Department of the Army, against the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States, to set aside the Commission’s order in United States v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 289 I. C. C. 49. That order dismissed a complaint filed by the United States on November 20, 1951, against several named railroads charging them with violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. The District Court, one judge dissenting, dismissed the complaint. 132 F. Supp. 34. We noted probable jurisdiction. 350 U. S. 930. Since May 1, 1951, the railroads have refused to pay an allowance to the Army for the wharfage and handling services the Army performs on military export traffic passing through Army base piers in Norfolk, Virginia. The railroads have assumed in their tariffs the obligation to furnish these accessorial services for all shippers that comply with their tariffs. And, in accordance with these tariffs, the railroads have furnished the services for commercial shippers at public sections of the same piers without additional charge. These services were performed for the Army and the railroads by the same private company — for the Army under contract to carry out its orders for terminal and storage services; for the railroads by contract to act as the carriers’ agent in accordance with their tariffs. The Army sought a determination that the railroads’ refusal to make an allowance to it to the same extent that the railroads paid the private company, Stevenson & Young, for handling of private shipments subjected the Government to unjust discrimination and constituted an unreasonable practice in violation of §§ 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Army also requested an order that the railroads cease and desist from such refusal in the future. The transfer of export freight from rail carriers to outbound water carriers is made on piers or wharves that allow the unloading of freight from railroad cars to within reach of ships’ tackle. Railroads are under no statutory-obligation to furnish such piers or to unload carlot freight, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kittanning Co., 253 U. S. 319, 323. In general the railroads have taken on the duty of wharfage and handling for freight consigned for overseas shipment. In some instances railroads have charged for the use of the piers (“wharfage”) and the necessary “handling” separately from their charge for line-haul transportation. In other cases there has been only a single factor export rate (one inclusive charge) providing for limited shipside delivery with the railroad furnishing these accessorial services pursuant to their tariffs at no extra charge to the shipper. The latter practice has been generally followed by railroads serving North Atlantic ports. Where railroads do not have their own piers, they have provided these services by contracting with commercial terminal operators. 1 — 1 The Norfolk piers, involved m this matter, were managed by such operators. They were built by the United States after World War I and have been leased in part or in whole to a series of commercial operators since then. The leases were cancelled during World War II but they were leased to Stevenson & Young, a private terminal operator, at the end of that war. The railroads here involved, using the single factor shipside rate described above, contracted with Stevenson & Young, as their agent, to perform the wharfage and handling for 25$ per ton for wharfage and 75«¡ per ton for handling, on both commercial and military freight. But with the advent of the Korean hostilities, the Government again cancelled the leases and the Army took entire control of the piers. Apparently the military shipments require special handling and storage. To assure its complete satisfaction, the Army hired Stevenson & Young to perform those services under a general pier-operating contract for the Army. The unused portions of the piers were later released by the Government, by a contract dated December 28, 1951, for the commercial operations of Stevenson & Young. By that contract Stevenson & Young leased the unused parts for 1952 from the United States, for a public commercial maritime terminal. It was over these leased portions of the piers that the lessee carried on its public warehousing activities in accordance with the railroad tariffs. A typical tariff arrangement appears in the note below. It is the basic exhibit in this case. It was bottomed on a contract of April 5, 1947, between the Pennsylvania Railroad and Stevenson & Young. By that contract Stevenson & Young, as a public wharfinger, agreed to act “as directed by the Railroad” and as its agent for wharfage and handling of “export, import, coastwise and intercoastal freight” in accordance with the tariff upon the facilities it acquired on the Army base. The agent assumed responsibility for freight charges and care of freight in its charge. It agreed, paragraph 4, that: “The Terminal [Stevenson & Young] shall provide adequate facilities for the handling and storage of the freight subject to this agreement, shall provide access to the Railroad or its agent, the Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad, for the delivery of cars to and from shipside without interference or interruption, and shall load and unload cars promptly without delay of freight or railroad equipment.” Paragraph 13 said: “This agreement shall terminate absolutely and immediately whenever the Terminal ceases to operate the said facilities as a public wharfinger for the handling of freight, and in any event shall be terminable by either party on thirty days notice in writing.” A large amount of private commercial traific continued over the released portions of the piers, and the railroads continued to absorb the cost of that wharfage and handling by paying Stevenson & Young $1.00 per ton of freight. The result of the Army’s insistence on operating its own pier facilities is that the Army pays the same export rates without receiving wharfage and handling services as commercial shippers do for whom the railroads provide those services at no additional charge. Because the Army provides these services itself, it claims a right to the $1.00 per ton payment paid by the railroads on behalf of the commercial shippers. In terms of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Government bases its argument on two grounds: “The railroads’ refusal to absorb wharfage and handling charges on Army freight to the same extent that they absorb such charges on civilian freight moving over the same piers under identical rates is unjustly discriminatory in violation of Section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act.” and “The railroads’ refusal to- pay for wharfage and handling on Army freight was’‘an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of Section 1 (6) of the Act.” It should be noted that the United States is not attacking the form of the tariff, which provides for both line-haul service and the accessorial services in the single factor export rate. Consequently, this case involves only charged discrimination and injustice. Cf. United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 337 U. S. 426, 437-438. In short, the United States seeks to be excepted from the tariff requirement that calls for the shipper to use a public wharfinger under contract to the railroads for performance of the wharfage and handling. This controversy is similar to one that arose out of the Army's cancellation of the Norfolk pier leases during World War II, United States v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 269 I. C. C. 141. Interpreting railroad practices much like those now before this Court, the I. C. C. determined that the Army was not being discriminated against. However, on review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the case to the I. C. C. for further exposition and clarification. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 178, 198 F. 2d 958. On remand the I. C. C. reaffirmed its earlier determination and no appeal has been taken from that order. 294 I. C. C. 203. Because the question of whether the Army was discriminated against following the Government’s World War II lease cancellation has never been finally passed upon, the District of Columbia ruling is not inconsistent with the Commission’s conclusion in this litigation. II. The Government asserts that it is charged more on its export shipments through the Norfolk Army Base than commercial shippers under substantially similar circumstances. Such an exaction would be, of course, an unjust and unreasonable practice of discrimination. But it seems apparent that the circumstances of Army shipments are markedly different from those of private shippers that receive wharfage and handling services. Moreover, it seems equally clear that the Army is treated identically with those shippers who for business reasons do not care to comply with the tariff requirements. The Army routed its export shipments direct to itself at the Army base as consignee. As is shown by the contracts summarized above, the entire Army base property was under military control except for the commercial operations of Stevenson & Young. The base included piers, bulkheads, railways and storage warehouses, and railroad switches, tracks and yards. The Commission found that the Army had determined “that ports of embarkation must be operated by personnel of the military service and civilian employees of the Government.” 289 I. C. C., at 53. Although the Army hired the Stevenson company to operate the Army portion of the base, the Army’s control was “absolute.” “[An Army yardmaster] is on duty at all times to give instructions for disposition of cars of Army freight delivered at the base. When either the Belt Line or the Virginian has cars for delivery, the yard clerk at the base is notified by telephone. If placement at a pier or warehouse is ready for any of those cars, the carrier is told where to make delivery. These instructions are confirmed in writing and handed to the conductor when he arrives at the base. Cars for which placement orders are not ready are left in the pier No. 1 yard by the Belt Line and in the uptown yard by the Virginian, in accordance with a general understanding as to the disposition of such cars.” 289 I. C. C., at 54-55. Such direction was necessary. As the Commanding Officer said, in regard to switching and placing by the carriers: “The Witness: If you would let them switch themselves, they have to know what they are doing, we have to give them the switch list and know what to do with it. “Q. Will you permit them to do it at their own convenience, in an orderly manner? “A. I don’t know how any business can be run, if you run it at the convenience of someone else. They couldn’t possibly do it at their own convenience, unless their convenience coincided with our requirement. “Q. And yet you couldn’t permit the terminal operator to operate in a normal way. “A. No, because that involves a management problem. You would have to have a management team in here to settle the accounts of the terminal operator. They don’t work for' nothing, as you quite well know. Somebody has to monitor all that, manage the whole thing, and direct the bringing in of the cargo. That is all in over-lay staff of ours, which is large enough.” This Army control over the movement of freight on those portions of the piers that were not leased to Stevenson & Young left the railroads serving the base without authority in those areas to direct the switching, spotting and removal of the cars according to their own convenience. 289 I. C. C., at 64. The fact that the Army controls its areas of the base, and the fact that the railroads handle their own wharfage and switching on their portions as they choose, are not mere formal differences. They are factors in traffic movement. “It is the right of every shipper including the Government as here concerned, to prohibit a carrier from performing switching upon private tracks, even though the carrier might be willing and able to perform the service. When so prohibited by the shipper, as was here done by the Army, the carrier’s obligation to perform the service is discharged, and the payment of allowances to the shipper for its performance of the service, in whole or in part, would be unlawful, except as a voluntary concession of the carriers to the Government under section 22.” 289 I. C. C., at 65. The problems of the assumption by the carriers of the costs of wharfage and handling at ports have a long history. The Norfolk area has not been an exception, as has been heretofore indicated. See p. 168, supra. When the Government again in 1951 found it desirable to cancel the leases, it was familiar with the various facets of the controversy over wharfage and handling. III. It is obvious that the method of handling government freight does not comply with the tariff requirements. It does not move over wharf properties owned, leased and operated by the Stevenson company “as a public terminal facility of the rail carriers.” Rule 47 (b), n. 7, supra. “At all times during that period, military traffic was stored on and handled over wharf and other properties on the Army Base which were under the exclusive control of the Army.” 289 I. C. C., at 60. Any deviation from tariffs by carriers violates § 6 (7) of the Act, 49 U. S. C., unless they grant a concession under § 22. IV. The Government actually is being treated just as any shipper who decides not to take advantage of the services offered in the tariff. It seeks a preference over these other shippers who take deliveries of export rate traffic at piers under their own control, so-called private piers. The general practice at North Atlantic ports is to refuse to absorb handling charges at private piers, even though they are absorbed where the carriers have control of the facilities. The record shows 84 private piers along the Atlantic Coast where the railroads make no allowance or compensation for handling or wharfage. It was testified: “One of the principal limitations on the port practices which I shall mention is the restriction of the loading practice to railroad or other public piers, as distinguished from private piers operated by shippers.” There was no evidence to the contrary and the Commission accepted that situation as a fact. 289 I. C. C., at 58, 61, 63. The difference between a public and a private pier under the tariffs is whether the railroads have control of the areas directly or through their agents, or whether the shipper or consignee has control. There is no objection to such a practice generally, whether the line-haul rates and the handling rates are stated in a single factor rate or separately. To require the carriers to furnish such accessorial services at every private pier would disperse the traffic, cause the maintenance of more crews or watchmen, and thus add to the cost of transportation. The Government contends that it is not in the same position as other shippers who control private piers, because it took control of the Norfolk piers to meet a national emergency. But we think that the emergency cannot convert the Government’s operation of its private piers into a category different from that of private shippers. And, the fact that the operations of the Government and the railroads are in the same pier area seems to us immaterial. If the railroads gave an allowance here, excepting one given under § 22 of the Act, they would have to give it at all private piers where the shipper wanted to handle wharfage at its own discretion. Cf. Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 501; Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 229 I. C. C. 463. The Government has the right to have its shipments accorded the same privileges given others. Moreover, in emergencies its traffic may have “preference or priority in transportation,” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (15) (d), and it may be granted and may accept preferences in rates. But the Government cannot otherwise require extra services or allowances. In the situation here presented, it could have used the same facilities as commercial shippers and obtained the benefits of the tariff. The evidence to this effect is uncontradicted. The Commission accepted it as a fact. 289 I. C. C., at 58, 60-61, 63. y. The Commission drew from the above circumstances a conclusion that the tariffs and conduct of the railroads are not shown to have been unlawful. The United States argues that carriers cannot perform accessorial services in such a way that “some shippers would pay an identical line-haul rate for less service than that required by other industrial plants.” United States v. United States Smelting Co., 339 U. S. 186, 197. To do so would indeed violate § 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act. But the Smelting case is not apposite. We affirmed a Commission order enjoining intra-plant car switching and spotting services after termination of the line haul. It terminated at a “convenient point” on a siding at consignee’s plant. Our decision there turned on and upheld the Commission’s power to determine the end point of the line haul. Because the line-haul tariffs included only car movement to and from that convenient point, some shippers received more service than others for the line-haul rate. P. 197. Thus our determination was based on the unlawful preference allowed some shippers by the tariffs since those discriminated against could not get the same service as other shippers. Furthermore, whether the circumstances and conditions are sufficiently dissimilar to justify differences in rates or charges is a question of fact for the Commission’s determination. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the record before the Commission, and we affirm. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “Wharfage refers to the provision of space on the docks for storage of freight pending transfer between freight cars and cargo vessels; handling refers to the unloading of goods from freight cars and placing them on the docks within reach of ship’s tackle . . . .” United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 178, at 182, 198 F. 2d 958, at 962. See Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 157 I. C. C. 663, 672. “It is made the duty of all common carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable classifications of property for transportation, with reference to which rates, tariffs, regulations, or practices are or may be made or prescribed, and just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting classifications, rates, or tariffs . . . which may be necessary or proper to secure the safe and prompt receipt, handling, transportation, and delivery of property subject to the provisions of this chapter upon just and reasonable terms, and every unjust and unreasonable classification, regulation, and practice is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (6). “If any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this chapter, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.” 49 U. S. C. § 2. “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject 1 . . any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . . . ." 49 U. S. C. § 3(1). As §§ 1 (6), 2 and 3 (1) of the Act only are material on this appeal, they alone are quoted in pertinent part. No reparations were requested in this proceeding. However, as the Government indicates, if the railroads’ refusal to pay for wharf-age and handling is held to be a violation of the Act, the Government may deduct the prior “overpayments” from future sums due the railroads. See 49 U. S. C. § 66. See 289 I. C. C., at 61. They can assume such and similar accessorial services by tariffs approved by the Commission as fair. See Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. 507, 524. It is discrimination or unfairness in the tariffs that calls for correction. United States v. United States Smelting Co., 339 U. S. 186, 194-197. Such determinations are on a case-by-case basis. See, e. g., United States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403. It called for performance of “all terminal and pier warehouse intransit storage services excluding physical plant facilities (piers, warehouses, etc.); all checking and clerking services in connection therewith; all policing (sweeping and cleaning) services; and such other terminal services (excluding vessel checking and stevedoring; watchmen and guard service; utilities and maintenance of premises service) as may be designated herein, and, in connection therewith, . . . [the performance of] all the duties of a terminal operator in such areas of the Norfolk Army Base or at any pier in or about the Hampton Roads harbor area as may be designated by the Contracting Officer . . . ." “Statement of Excerpts from Penna. R.R. Tariff ICC 3007, Setting Forth the Regulations and the Compensation Which the Penna. R.R. Will Pay to the Norfolk Terminals Division of Stevenson & Young, Inc., for Wharfage Facilities Furnished and Handling Services Performed at Norfolk, Va. “Rule 47 “. . . wharfage and handling charges published in Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company Tariff No. 6-J, I.C.C. 105, will be included in the freight rate to or from Norfolk, Va., on Export, Import, Intercoastal and Coastwise freight traffic, any quantity, . . . subject to the following conditions: “ (b) When receipt from or delivery to vessel is in rail service over wharf properties owned or leased by Norfolk Terminals Division of Stevenson & Young, Inc., and operated by Norfolk Terminals Division of Stevenson & Young, Inc., as a public terminal facility of the rail carriers. [On January 1, 1952, the above rule (b) was changed. As the change strengthened the tariff in favor of the railroads, it is not quoted. See 289 I. C. C., at 59.] “Compensation “The Pennsylvania Railroad Company will pay to Norfolk Terminals Division of Stevenson & Young, Inc., as its agent, for wharfage facilities furnished and handling services performed on traffic described and conforming to the conditions specified above, compensation in the following amounts in cents per 100 pounds, except as otherwise provided. Wharfage Handling “[Generally] 1)4 3% or 75 cents per ton [There were exceptions.] “(1) (a) Handling Charges will not be absorbed on freight in open cars, except on lumber, .... “(b) When stowing in open cars is required, handling charge of % cent per 100 pounds or 10 cents per 2000 pounds will be absorbed on lumber, all kinds .... “(2) (a) Wharfage and/or handling charges will not be absorbed on freight accorded literage, or on Grain or any other inbound or outbound traffic milled, mixed, malted or stored in transit at the wharf properties operated by Norfolk Terminals Division of Stevenson & Young, Inc., [or numerous other warehouses and terminals]. “(b) In all other respects on Export, Import, Intercoastal and Coastwise traffic, the wharfage, handling, storage and/or other charges applicable at the wharf properties operated by Norfolk Terminals Division of Stevenson & Young, Inc., [or numerous other warehouses and terminals] will be in addition to the rate to and from Norfolk, Va. or Portsmouth, Va., as the case may be, published in tariffs lawfully on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.” See United States v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 289 I. C. C., at 61. It seems clear that such an attack could be made if present conditions justified a re-examination. The War Department attacked the practice in 1921 but its objection was overruled by the I. C. C. in 1929 after a thorough investigation in a 6-5 vote. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 157 I. C. C. 663, 678-686. Separation was sought largely to force the railroads to increase terminal charges so that competitive municipal and other nonrailroad wharfingers might expand to develop better port facilities. The Commission reached the conclusion that such separation was inadvisable, as there was no evidence of injury from such practice. “The carriers afford port facilities in competition with each other at the ports and a competitive condition exists which can not be eliminated by the mere segregation of uniform port charges. If the port charges were uniform at all ports the carriers still could meet competition by shrinking their line-haul rates. If the port charges were different at each port the carriers having the larger charge could shrink their line-haul rates sufficiently to offset the larger port charge, and the real substance of the present ship-side rates, where they exist, would be reestablished.” Id., at 684. It was the sensitivity of the foreign importers and domestic ports to rates so stated that led to this conclusion. In the highly competitive railway network, export traffic is an important factor to the carriers and the ports. Costs of port handling vary widely, 157 I. C. C., at 673. Such variations are now absorbed in the practice of quoting shipside delivery in tariffs. Such an exception is beyond the requirements of § 6 (8) of the Act that provides for preference and precedence for United States shipments in emergencies. This conclusion was amply supported by testimony of a Government witness, the Commanding Officer, Hampton Roads, Port of Embarkation: “Only such personnel has the requisite training in the intricate nomenclature pertaining to the items and to the documentation required in connection with the proper loading and dispatching of vessels. “A vast amount of pre-stowage planning of vessels in a port of embarkation must precede the labor of actual loading. Precise knowledge of overseas requirements must be available. Therefore, controls required to be exercised of all shipments must be absolute. These, begin when freight is ordered shipped from points of origin and continue until the various commodities reach their final destination overseas.” The Government’s request for export rates on its war shipments was granted by the railroads so that commercial and government export freight had the same rates. Cf. War Materials Reparation Cases, 294 I. C. C. 5. This was a substantial concession by the railroads, contrary to their tariffs, and done only because of § 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C., allowing concessions to the United States. 289 I. C. C., at 63. The railroads have also spotted cars for the Army after delivery in the storage yards without extra charge. Other shippers would be charged for such service. 289 I. C. C., at 55. See United States v. American Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402. Such relaxation of possible additional charges-by the railroads does not decide the Army’s claim for allowances for handling. The Commission did take the concessions into consideration, however, as to the fairness of the refusal to grant the claimed allowances. 289 I. C. C., at 64. Although the Government seeks only an allowance of the published charge absorbed by the carriers of $1.00 per ton, the kind of service it requires in its area is illustrated by the fact that it pays $2.87 for handling. 289 I. C. C., at 61 et seq. The Army’s reliance on Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 232 U. S. 199, is misplaced. There this Court sustained the Commission in granting a shipper of fruit the right to precool the car and contents, although the carriers were in a position to refrigerate, though not in the better way. As the carriers were not in a position to perform the service properly, they could not by a tariff deny the consignor such right. “Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the . . . handling of property free or at reduced rates for the United States ...” 49 U. S. C. § 22. “If it were not for the fact that the Government has reasons for handling its water-borne traffic differently from commercial shippers, there would be no reason why the Government should not use public piers like other shippers. There is no question but that a private shipper operating his own pier and handling his own traffic in a manner similar to the operation of the Norfolk Army Base today would not be entitled to the port rates.” 289 I. C. C., at 63: “Evidence presented by the defendants supports their position that it is not unreasonable to refuse to extend wharfage and handling services to traffic handled over private piers when the shipper does not wish to use adequate facilities of the defendants. The defendants serving the Norfolk port area have had available port facilities more than ample to handle all the military traffic moving over the Army Base at Norfolk, at least on and since May 1,1951.” 49 U. S. C. § 2, n. 2, supra. A typical tariff reads: “Delivery of a line-haul carload shipment destined to smelter at Leadville, Colo., will include movement within smelter plant over track scales, to and from thaw-house, to and from a smelter sampler or to and from a combination sampler and concentrator to a designated unloading point indicated by the sampling company.” 339 U. S., at 196. See also United States Smelting & Refining Co., 266 I. C. C. 476, 478. L. T. Barringer & Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 1, 6-7: “Whether those circumstances and conditions are sufficiently dissimilar to justify a difference in rates, or whether, on the other hand, the difference in rates constitutes an unjust discrimination because based primarily on considerations relating to the identity or competitive position of the particular shipper rather than to circumstances attending the transportation service, is a question of fact for the Commission’s determination. Hence its conclusion that in view of all the relevant facts and circumstances a rate or practice either is or is not unjustly discriminatory within the meaning of § 2 of the Act will not be disturbed here unless we can say that its finding is unsupported by evidence or without rational basis, or rests on an erroneous construction of the statute.” For the same reasons, in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. 507, 526, dealing with storage of goods in transit, and United States v. American Tin Plate Co., 301 U. S. 402, 407-408, dealing with post-line-haul switching practices, this Court has upheld the Commission’s determination of unfairness vis-á-vis other shippers and its prohibitory orders. See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 57; Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 501; United States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403, 410.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. CHENERY CORPORATION et al. NO. 81. Argued December 13, 16, 1946. Decided June 23, 1947. Roger S. Foster argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath and Theodore L. Thau. Spencer Gordon argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in No. 81. Allen S. Hubbard argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 82. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is here for the second time. In S. E. C. v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, we held that an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission could not be sustained on the grounds upon which that agency acted. We therefore directed that the case be remanded to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be appropriate. On remand, the Commission reexamined the problem, recast its rationale and reached the same result. The issue now is whether the Commission’s action is proper in light of the principles established in our prior decision. When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency. We also emphasized in our prior decision an important corollary of the foregoing rule. If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action; nor can a court be expected' to chisel that which must be precise from what the agency has left vague and indecisive. In other words, “We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.” United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511. Applying this rule and its corollary, the Court was unable to sustain the Commission’s original action. The Commission had been dealing with the reorganization of the Federal Water Service Corporation (Federal), a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803. During the period when successive reorganization plans proposed by the management were before the Commission, the officers, directors and controlling stockholders of Federal purchased a substantial amount of Federal’s preferred stock on the over-the-counter market. Under the fourth reorganization plan, this preferred stock was to be converted into common stock of a new corporation; on the basis of the purchases of preferred stock, the management would have received more than 10% of this new common stock. It was frankly admitted that the management’s purpose in buying the preferred stock was to protect its interest in the new company. It was also plain that there was no fraud or lack of disclosure in making these purchases. But the Commission would not approve the fourth plan so long as the preferred stock purchased by the management was to be treated on a parity with the other preferred stock. It felt that the officers and directors of a holding company in process of reorganization under the Act were fiduciaries and were under a duty not to trade in the securities of that company during the reorganization period. 8 S. E. C. 893, 915-921. And so the plan was amended to provide that the preferred stock acquired by the management, unlike that held by others, was not to be converted into the new common stock; instead, it was to be surrendered at cost plus dividends accumulated since the purchase dates. As amended, the plan was approved by the Commission over the management’s objections. 10 S. E. C. 200. The Court interpreted the Commission’s order approving this amended plan as grounded solely upon judicial authority. The Commission appeared to have treated the preferred stock acquired by the management in accordance with what it thought were standards theretofore recognized by courts. If it intended to create new standards growing out of its experience in effectuating the legislative policy, it failed to express itself with sufficient clarity and precision to be so understood. Hence the order was judged by the only standards clearly invoked by the Commission. On that basis, the order could not stand. The opinion pointed out that courts do not impose upon officers and directors of a corporation any fiduciary duty to its stockholders which precludes them, merely because they are officers and directors, from buying and selling the corporation’s stock. Nor was it felt that the cases upon which the Commission relied established any principles of law or equity which in themselves would be sufficient to justify this order. The opinion further noted that neither Congress nor the Commission had promulgated any general rule proscribing such action as the purchase of preferred stock by Federal’s management. And the only judge-made rule of equity which might have justified the Commission’s order related to fraud or mismanagement of the reorganization by the officers and directors, matters which were admittedly absent in this situation. After the case was remanded to the Commission, Federal Water and Gas Corp. (Federal Water), the surviving corporation under the reorganization plan, made an application for approval of an amendment to the plan to provide for the issuance of new common stock of the reorganized company. This stock was to be distributed to the members of Federal’s management on the basis of the shares of the old preferred stock which they had acquired during the period of reorganization, thereby placing them in the same position as the public holders of the old preferred stock. The intervening members of Federal’s management joined in this request. The Commission denied the application in an order issued on February 8,1945. Holding Company Act Release No. 5584. That order was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 365, 154 F. 2d 6, which felt that our prior decision precluded such action by the Commission. The latest order of the Commission definitely avoids the fatal error of relying on judicial precedents which do not sustain it. This time, after a thorough reexamination of the problem in light of the purposes and standards of the Holding Company Act, the Commission has concluded that the proposed transaction is inconsistent with the standards of §§ 7 and 11 of the Act. It has drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing with utility reorganizations. And it has expressed its reasons with a clarity and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of its order. The argument is pressed upon us, however, that the Commission was foreclosed from taking such a step following our prior decision. It is said that, in the absence of findings of conscious wrongdoing on the part of Federal’s management, the Commission could not determine by an order in this particular case that it was inconsistent with the statutory standards to permit Federal’s management to realize a profit through the reorganization purchases. All that it could do was to enter an order allowing an amendment to the plan so that the proposed transaction could be consummated. Under this view, the Commission would be free only to promulgate a general rule outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a rule would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect upon the instant situation. We reject this contention, for it grows out of a misapprehension of our prior decision and of the Commission’s statutory duties. We held no more and no less than that the Commission’s first order was unsupportable for the reasons supplied by that agency. But when the case left this Court, the problem whether Federal’s management should be treated equally with other preferred stockholders still lacked a final and complete answer. It was clear that the Commission could not give a negative answer by resort to prior judicial declarations. And it was also clear that the Commission was not bound by settled judicial precedents in a situation of this nature. 318 U. S. at 89. Still unsettled, however, was the answer the Commission might give were it to bring to bear on the facts the proper administrative and statutory considerations, a function which belongs exclusively to the Commission in the first instance. The administrative process had taken an erroneous rather than a final turn. Hence we carefully refrained from expressing any views as to the propriety of an order rooted in the proper and relevant considerations. See Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608, 613-614. When the case was directed to be remanded to the Commission for such further proceedings as might be appropriate, it was with the thought that the Commission would give full effect to its duties in harmony with the views we had expressed. Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364, 374; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 278. This obviously meant something more than the entry of a perfunctory order giving parity treatment to the management holdings of preferred stock. The fact that the Commission had committed a legal error in its first disposition of the case certainly gave Federal’s management no vested right to receive the benefits of such an order. See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145. After the remand was made, therefore, the Commission was bound to deal with the problem afresh, performing the function delegated to it by Congress. It was again charged with the duty of measuring the proposed treatment of the management’s preferred stock holdings by relevant and proper standards. Only in that way could the legislative policies embodied in the Act be effectuated. Cf. Labor Board v. Donnelly Co., 330 U. S. 219, 227-228. The absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading during reorganization did not affect the Commission’s duties in relation to the particular proposal before it. The Commission was asked to grant or deny effectiveness to a proposed amendment to Federal’s reorganization plan whereby the management would be accorded parity treatment on its holdings. It could do that only in the form of an order, entered after a due consideration of the particular facts in light of the relevant and proper standards. That was true regardless of whether those standards previously had been spelled out in a general rule or regulation. Indeed, if the Commission rightly felt that the proposed amendment was inconsistent with those standards, an order giving effect to the amendment merely because there was no general rule or regulation covering the matter would be unjustified. It is true that our prior decision explicitly recognized the possibility that the Commission might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this problem under its statutory rule-making powers, in which case the issue for our consideration would have been entirely different from that which did confront us. 318 U. S. 92-93. But we did not mean to imply thereby that the failure of the Commission to anticipate this problem and to promulgate a general rule withdrew all power from that agency to perform its statutory duty in this case. To hold that the Commission had no alternative in this proceeding but to approve the proposed transaction, while formulating any general rules it might desire for use in future cases of this nature, would be to stultify the administrative process. That we refuse to do. Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the Holding Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise. See Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. In other words, problems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 421. Hence we refuse to say that the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the problem of management trading during reorganization, was forbidden from utilizing this particular proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304. That such action might have a retroactive effect was not necessarily fatal to its validity. Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency. But such retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable" principles. If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law. See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607, 620. And so in this case, the fact that the Commission’s order might retroactively prevent Federal’s management from securing the profits and control which were the objects of the preferred stock purchases may well be outweighed by the dangers inherent in such purchases from the statutory standpoint. If that is true, the argument of retroactivity becomes nothing more than a claim that the Commission lacks power to enforce the standards of the Act in this proceeding. Such a claim deserves rejection. The problem in this case thus resolves itself into a determination of whether the Commission’s action in denying effectiveness to the proposed amendment to the Federal reorganization plan can be justified on the basis upon which it clearly rests. As we have noted, the Commission avoided placing its sole reliance on inapplicable judicial precedents. Rather it has derived its conclusions from the particular facts in the case, its general experience in reorganization matters and its informed view of statutory requirements. It is those matters which are the guide for our review. The Commission concluded that it could not find that the reorganization plan, if amended as proposed, would be “fair and equitable to the persons affected thereby” within the meaning of § 11 (e) of the Act, under which the reorganization was taking place. Its view was that the amended plan would involve the issuance of securities on terms “detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors” contrary to §§ 7 (d) (6) and 7 (e), and would result in an “unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power” among the Federal security holders within the meaning of § 7 (e). It was led to this result “not by proof that the interveners [Federal’s management] committed acts of conscious wrongdoing but by the character of the conflicting interests created by the interveners’ program of stock purchases carried out while plans for reorganization were under consideration.” The Commission noted that Federal’s management controlled a large multi-state utility system and that its influence permeated down to the lowest tier of operating companies. The financial, operational and accounting policies of the parent and its subsidiaries were therefore under the management’s strict control. The broad range of business judgments vested in Federal’s management multiplied opportunities for affecting the market price of Federal’s outstanding securities and made the exercise of judgment on any matter a subject of greatest significance to investors. Added to these normal managerial powers, the Commission pointed out that a holding company management obtains special powers in the course of a voluntary reorganization under § 11 (e) of the Holding Company Act. The management represents the stockholders in such a reorganization, initiates the proceeding, draws up and files the plan, and can file amendments thereto at any time. These additional powers may introduce conflicts between the management’s normal interests and its responsibilities to the various classes of stockholders which it represents in the reorganization. Moreover, because of its representative status, the management has special opportunities to obtain advance information of the attitude of the Commission. Drawing upon its experience,-the Commission indicated that all these normal and special powers of the holding company management during the course of a § 11 (e) reorganization placed in the management’s command “a formidable battery of devices that would enable it, if it should choose to use them selfishly, to affect in material degree the ultimate allocation of new securities among the various existing classes, to influence the market for its own gain, and to manipulate or obstruct the reorganization required by the mandate of the statute.” In that setting, the Commission felt that a management program of stock purchase would give rise to the temptation and the opportunity to shape the reorganization proceeding so as to encourage public selling on the market at low prices. No management could engage in such a program without raising serious questions as to whether its personal interests had not opposed its duties “to exercise disinterested judgment in matters pertaining to subsidiaries’ accounting, budgetary and dividend policies, to present publicly an unprejudiced financial picture of the enterprise, and to effectuate a fair and feasible plan expeditiously.” The Commission further felt that its answer should be the same even where proof of intentional wrongdoing on the management’s part is lacking. Assuming a conflict of interests, the Commission thought that the absence of actual misconduct is immaterial; injury to the public investors and to the corporation may result just as readily. “Questionable transactions may be explained away, and an abuse of investors and the administrative process may be perpetrated without evil intent, yet the injury will remain.” Moreover, the Commission was of the view that the delays and the difficulties involved in probing the mental processes and personal integrity of corporate officials do not warrant any distinction on the basis of evil intent, the plain fact being “that an absence of unfairness or detriment in cases of this sort would be practically impossible to establish by proof.” Turning to the facts in this case, the Commission noted the salient fact that the primary object of Federal’s management in buying the preferred stock was admittedly to obtain the voting power that was accruing to that stock through the reorganization and to profit from the investment therein. That stock had been purchased in the market at prices that were depressed in relation to what the management anticipated would be, and what in fact was, the earning and asset value of its reorganization equivalent. The Commission admitted that the good faith and personal integrity of this management were not in question; but as to the management’s justification of its motives, the Commission concluded that it was merely trying to “deny that they made selfish use of their powers during the period when their conflict of interest, vis-a-vis public investors, was in existence owing to their purchase program.” Federal’s management had thus placed itself in a position where it was “peculiarly susceptible to temptation to conduct the reorganization for personal gain rather than the public good” and where its desire to make advantageous purchases of stock could have an important influence, even though subconsciously, upon many of the decisions to be made in the course of the reorganization. Accordingly, the Commission felt that all of its general considerations of the problem were applicable to this case. The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary administrative action. The wisdom of the principle adopted is none of our concern. See Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U. S. 534, 548. Our duty is at an end when it becomes evident that the Commission’s action is based upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority granted by Congress. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 224. We are unable to say in this case that the Commission erred in reaching the result it did. The facts being undisputed, we are free to disturb the Commission’s conclusion only if it lacks any rational and statutory foundation. In that connection, the Commission has made a thorough examination of the problem, utilizing statutory standards and its own accumulated experience with reorganization matters. In essence, it has made what we indicated in our prior opinion would be an informed, expert judgment on the problem. It has taken into account “those more subtle factors in the marketing of utility company securities that gave rise to the very grave evils which the Public Utility Holding [Company] Act of 1935 was designed to correct” and has relied upon the fact that “Abuse of corporate position, influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively only by pfóhibitions not concerned with the fairness of a particular transaction.” 318 U. S. at 92. Such factors may properly be considered by the Commission in determining whether to approve a plan of reorganization of a utility holding company, or an amendment to such a plan. The “fair and equitable” rule of § 11 (e) and the standard of what is “detrimental to the public interest or the interest of investors or consumers” under § 7 (d) (6) and § 7 (e) were inserted by the framers of the Act in order that the Commission might have broad powers to protect the various interests at stake. 318 U. S. at 90-91. The application of those criteria, whether in the form of a particular order or a general regulation, necessarily requires the use of informed discretion by the Commission. The very breadth of the statutory language precludes a reversal of the Commission’s judgment save where it has plainly abused its discretion in these matters. See United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225; I. C. C. v. Railway Labor Assn., 315 U. S. 373. Such an abuse is not present in this case. The purchase by a holding company management of that company’s securities during the course of a reorganization may well be thought to be so fraught with danger as to warrant a denial of the benefits and profits accruing to the management. The possibility that such a stock purchase program will result in detriment to the public investors is not a fanciful one. The influence that program may have upon the important decisions to be made by the management during reorganization is not inconsequential. Since the officers and directors occupy fiduciary positions during this period, their actions are to be held to a higher standard than that imposed upon the general investing public. There is thus a reasonable basis for a judgment that the benefits and profits accruing to the management from the stock purchases should be prohibited, regardless of the good faith involved. And it is a judgment that can justifiably be reached in terms of fairness and equitableness, to the end that the interests of the public, the investors and the consumers might be protected. But it is a judgment based upon public policy, a judgment which Congress has indicated is of the type for the Commission to make. The Commission’s conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies the use of the administrative process. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 800. Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb. Reversed. Mr. Justice Burton concurs in the result. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson dissent, but there is not now opportunity for a response adequate to the issues raised by the Court’s opinion. These concern the rule of law in its application to the administrative process and the function of this Court in reviewing administrative action. Accordingly, the detailed grounds for dissent will be filed in due course.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. RAMSEY et al. No. 76-167. Argued March 30, 1977 Decided June 6, 1977 Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Thornburgh, and Jerome M. Feit. Allan M. Palmer argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Ramsey. Irving R. M. Panzer, by appointment of the Court, 429 U. S. 916, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Kelly. Mélvin L. Wulf, Joel M. Gora, and Jack D. Novik filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Me. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Customs officials, acting with “reasonable cause to suspect” a violation of customs laws, opened for inspection incoming international letter-class mail without first obtaining a search warrant. A divided Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, contrary to every other Court of Appeals which has considered the matter, that the Fourth Amendment forbade the opening of such mail without probable cause and a search warrant. 176 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 538 F. 2d 415. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to resolve this Circuit conflict. 429 U. S. 815. We now reverse. I Charles W. Ramsey and James W. Kelly jointly commenced a heroin-by-mail enterprise in the Washington, D. C., area. The process involved their procuring of heroin, which was mailed in letters from Bangkok, Thailand, and sent to various locations in the District of Columbia area for collection. Two of their suppliers, Sylvia Bailey and William Ward, who were located in West Germany, were engaged in international narcotics trafficking during the latter part of 1973 and the early part of 1974. West German agents, pursuant to court-authorized electronic surveillance, intercepted several transAtlantic conversations between Bailey and Ramsey during which their narcotics operation was discussed. By late January 1974, Bailey and Ward had gone to Thailand. Thai officials, alerted to their presence by West German authorities, placed them under surveillance. Ward was observed mailing letter-sized envelopes in six different mail boxes; five of these envelopes were recovered; and one of the addresses in Washington, D. C., was later linked to respondents. Bailey and Ward were arrested by Thai officials on February 2, 1974; among the items seized were eleven heroin-filled envelopes addressed to the Washington, D. C., area, and later connected with respondents. Two days after this arrest of Bailey and Ward, Inspector George Kallnischkies, a United States customs officer in New York City, without any knowledge of the foregoing events, inspecting a sack of incoming international mail from Thailand, spotted eight envelopes that were bulky and which he believed might’contain merchandise. The envelopes, all of which appeared to him to have been typed on the same typewriter, were addressed to four different locations in the Washington, D. C., area. Inspector Kallnischkies, based on the fact that the letters were from Thailand, a known source of narcotics, and were “rather bulky,” suspected that the envelopes might contain merchandise or contraband rather than correspondence. He took the letters to an examining area in the post office, and felt one of the letters: It “felt like there was something in there, in the envelope. It was not just plain paper that the envelope is supposed to contain.” He weighed one of the envelopes, and found it weighed 42 grams, some three to six times the normal weight of an airmail letter. Inspector Kallnischkies then opened that envelope: “In there I saw some cardboard and between the cardboard, if I recall, there was a plastic bag containing a white powdered substance, which, based on experience, I knew from Thailand would be heroin. “I went ahead and removed a sample. Gave it a field test, a Marquis Reagent field test, and I had a positive reaction for heroin.” App. 32. He proceeded to open the other seven envelopes which “in a lot of ways were identical”; examination revealed that at least the contents were in fact identical: each contained heroin. The envelopes were then sent to Washington in a locked pouch where agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, after obtaining a search warrant, opened the envelopes again and removed most of the heroin. The envelopes were then resealed, and six of them were delivered under surveillance. After Kelly collected the envelopes from the three different addressees, rendezvoused with Ramsey, and gave Ramsey a brown paper bag, federal agents arrested both of them. The bag contained the six envelopes with heroin, $1,100 in cash, and “cutting” material for the heroin. The next day, in executing a search upon warrant of Ramsey’s residence, agents recovered, inter alia, two pistols. Ramsey and Kelly were indicted, along with Bailey and Ward, in a 17-count indictment. Respondents moved to suppress the heroin and the two pistols. The District Court denied the motions, and after a bench trial on the stipulated record, respondents were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for what is in effect a term of 10 to 30 years. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed the convictions, holding that the “border search exception to the warrant requirement” applicable to persons, baggage, and mailed packages did not apply to the routine opening of international letter mail, and held that the Constitution requires that “before international letter mail is opened, a showing of probable cause be made to and a warrant secured from a neutral magistrate.” 176 U. S. App. D. C., at 73, 538 F. 2d, at 421. II Congress and the applicable postal regulations authorized the actions undertaken in this case. Title 19 U. S. C. § 482, a recodification of Rev. Stat. § 3061, and derived from § 3 of the Act of July 18, 1866, 14 Stat. 178, explicitly deals with the search of an “envelope”: “Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may . . . search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law . . . .” This provision authorizes customs officials to inspect, under the circumstances therein stated, incoming international mail. The “reasonable cause to suspect” test adopted by the statute is, we think, a practical test which imposes a less stringent requirement than, that of “probable cause” imposed by the Fourth Amendment as a requirement for the issuance of warrants. See United States v. King, 517 F. 2d 350, 352 (CA5 1975); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 8, 21-22, 27 (1968). Inspector Kallnischkies, at the time he opened the letters, knew that they were from Thailand, were bulky, were many times the weight of a normal airmail letter, and “felt like there was something in there.” Under these circumstances, we have no doubt that he had reasonable “cause to suspect” that there was merchandise or contraband in the envelopes. The search, therefore, was plainly authorized by the statute. Since the search in this case. was authorized by statute, we are left simply with the question of whether the search, nevertheless violated the Constitution. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 877 (1975). Specifically, we need not decide whether Congress conceived the statute as a necessary precondition to the validity of the search or whether it was viewed, instead, as a limitation on otherwise existing authority of the Executive. Having acted pursuant to, and within the scope of, a congressional Act, Inspector Kallnischkies’ searches were permissible unless they violated the Constitution. Ill A That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. The Congress which proposed the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, to the state legislatures on September 25, 1789, 1 Stat. 97, had, some two months prior to that proposal, enacted the first customs statute, Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29. Section 24 of this statute granted customs officials “full power and authority” to enter and search “any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed . . . .” This acknowledgment of plenary customs power wras differentiated from the more limited power to enter and search “any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place . . .” where a warrant upon “cause to suspect” was required. The historical importance of the enactment of this customs statute by the same Congress which proposed the Fourth Amendment is, we think, manifest. This Court so concluded almost a century ago. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 623 (1886), this Court observed: “The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43, contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as ‘unreasonable,’ and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.” (Emphasis supplied.) This interpretation, that border searches were not subject to the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment and were “reasonable” within the meaning of that Amendment, has been faithfully adhered to by this Court. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), after noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable,” id., at 147, recognized the distinction between searches within this country, requiring probable cause, and border searches, id., at 153-154: “It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country . . . have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.” (Emphasis supplied.) More recently, we noted this longstanding history in United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 376 (1971): “But a port of entry is not a traveler’s home. His right to be let alone neither prevents the search of his luggage nor the seizure of unprotected, but illegal, materials when his possession of them is discovered during such a search. Customs officials characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned in this case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country.” In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123, 125 (1973), we observed: “Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Historically such broad powers have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.” Finally, citing Carroll and Boyd, this Court stated in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 272 (1973), that it was “without doubt” that the power to exclude aliens “can be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our borders.” See also id., at 288 (White, J., dissenting). Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless “reasonable” has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself. We reaffirm it now. B Respondents urge upon us, however, the position that mailed letters are somehow different, and, whatever may be the normal rule with respect to border searches, different considerations, requiring the full panoply of Fourth Amendment protections, apply to international mail. The Court of Appeals agreed, and felt that whatever the rule may be with respect to travelers, their baggage, and even mailed packages, it would not “extend” the border-search exception to include mailed letter-size envelopes. 176 U. S. App. D. C., at 73, 538 F. 2d, at 421. We do not agree that this inclusion of letters within the border-search exception represents any “extension” of that exception. The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter the country. It is clear that there is nothing in the rationale behind the border-search exception which suggests that the mode of entry will be critical. It was conceded at oral argument that customs officials could search, without probable cause and without a warrant, envelopes carried by an entering traveler, whether in his luggage or on his person. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43-44. Surely no different constitutional standard should apply simply because the envelopes were mailed, not carried. The critical fact is that the envelopes cross the border and enter this country, not that they are brought in by one mode of transportation rather than another. It is their entry into this country from without it that makes a resulting search “reasonable.” Almost a century ago this Court rejected such a distinction in construing a protocol to the Treaty of Berne, 19 Stat. 604, which prohibited the importation of letters which might contain dutiable items. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215 (1883). Condemning the unsoundness of any distinction between entry by mail and entry by other means, Mr. Justice Miller, on behalf of a unanimous Court, wrote, id., at 218: “Of what avail would it be that every passenger, citizen and foreigner, without distinction of country or sex, is compelled to sign a declaration before landing, either that his trunks and satchels in hand contain nothing liable to duty, or if they do, to state what it is, and even the person may be subjected to a rigid examination, if the mail is to be left unwatched, and all its sealed contents, even after delivery to the person to whom addressed, are to be exempt from seizure, though laces, jewels, and other dutiable matter of great value may thus be introduced from foreign countries.” The historically recognized scope of the border-search doctrine, suggests no distinction in constitutional doctrine stemming from the mode of transportation across our borders. The contrary view of the Court of Appeals and respondents stems, we think, from an erroneous reading of Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S., at 153, under which the Court of Appeals reasoned that “the rationale of the border search exception ... is based upon . . . the difficulty of obtaining a warrant when the subject of the search is mobile, as a car or person . . . .” 176 U. S. App. D. C., at 70, 538 F. 2d, at 418. The fundamental difficulty with this position is that the “border search” exception is not based on the doctrine of “exigent circumstances” at all. It is a longstanding, historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendent’s general principle that a warrant be obtained, and in this respect is like the similar “search incident to lawful arrest” exception treated in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224 (1973). We think that the language in Carroll v. United States, supra, makes this point abundantly clear. The Carroll Court quoted verbatim the above-quoted language from Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), including the reference to customs searches and seizures of the kind authorized by 1 Stat. 29, 43, as being neither “unreasonable” nor “embraced within the prohibition of the [Fourth] [A]mendment.” Later in the opinion, the Court commented that having “established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances such search may be made.” 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis supplied). It then, in the passage quoted supra, at 618, distinguished, among these types of searches which required no warrant, those which required probable cause from those which did not: border searches did not; vehicular searches inside the country did. Carroll thus recognized that there was no “probable cause” requirement at the border. This determination simply has nothing to do with “exigent circumstances.” The Court of Appeals also relied upon what it described as this Court’s refusal in recent years twice “to take an expansive view of the border search exception or the authority of the Border Patrol. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 . . . (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 . . . (1973).” 176 U. S. App. D. C., at 72, 538 F. 2d, at 420. But, as the language from each of these opinions suggests, 422 U. S., at 876, 884; 413 U. S., at 272-273, plenary border-search authority was not implibated by our refusal to uphold searches and stops made at places in the interior of the country; the express premise for each holding was that the checkpoint or stop in question was not the border or its “functional equivalent.” In view of the wealth of authority establishing the border search as “reasonable” within the Fourth Amendment even though there be neither probable cause nor a warrant, we reject the distinctions made by the Court of Appeals in its opinion. Nor do we agree that, under the circumstances presented by this case, First Amendment considerations dictate a full panoply of Fourth Amendment rights prior to the border search of mailed letters. There is, again, no reason to distinguish between letters mailed into the country, and letters carried on the traveler’s person. More fundamentally, however, the existing system of border searches has not been shown to invade protected First Amendment rights, and hence there is no reason to think that the potential presence of correspondence makes the otherwise constitutionally reasonable search “unreasonable.” The statute in question requires that there be “reasonable cause to believe” the customs laws are being violated prior to the opening of envelopes. Applicable postal regulations flatly prohibit, under all circumstances, the reading of correspondence absent a search warrant, 19 CFR § 145.3 (1976): “No customs officer or employee shall read or authorize or allow any other person to read any correspondence contained in sealed letter mail of foreign origin unless a search warrant has been obtained in advance from an appropriate judge or U. S. magistrate which authorizes such action.” Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 1702. We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening of international mail in search of customs violations, under the above guidelines, impermissibly chills the exercise of free speech. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to consider the constitutional reach of the First Amendment in this area in the absence of the existing statutory and regulatory protection. Here envelopes are opened at the border only when the customs officers have reason to believe they contain other than correspondence, while the reading of any correspondence inside the envelopes is forbidden. Any “chill” that might exist under these circumstances may fairly be considered not only “minimal,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560, 562 (1976); cf. United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311, 316-317 (1972), but also wholly subjective. We therefore conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not interdict the actions taken by Inspector Kallnischkies in opening and searching the eight envelopes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, Reversed. Several Courts of Appeals have held that international letter-class mail may be opened, pursuant to a border search, without probable cause and without a warrant. United States v. Milroy, 538 F. 2d 1033 (CA4), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 924 (1976); United States v. King, 517 F. 2d 350 (CA5 1975); United States v. Barclift, 514 F. 2d 1073 (CA9), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 842 (1975); United States v. Bolin, 514 F. 2d 554 (CA7 1975); United States v. Odland, 502 F. 2d 148 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1088 (1974). Several other Courts of Appeals, in approving the warrantless opening of mailed packages crossing the borders, have indicated that-the opening of international letter-class mail should be governed by the same standards. United States v. Doe, 472 F. 2d 982 (CA2), cert. denied, sub nom. Rodriguez v. United States, 411 U. S. 969 (1973); United States v. Beckley, 335 F. 2d 86 (CA6 1964), cert. denied, sub nom. Stone v. United States, 380 U. S. 922 (1965). The First Circuit has reserved the question of letters. United States v. Emery, 541 F. 2d 887, 888-889 (1976). The mail was inspected at the General Post Office in New York City, where incoming international air mail landing at Kennedy Airport is taken for routing and customs inspections. There is no dispute that this is the “border” for purposes of border searches, see n. 11, infra. Inspector Kallnischkies also testified that his “normal procedure,” when examining envelopes from certain countries which were of a certain weight and bulkiness, was to “shake it a little,” and “if it moves, I know there is something in there that is not correspondence. It is merchandise and I have to open it to cheek it out.” App. 48-49. He was unable to specifically recall, however, whether or not he had followed the “normal procedure” in this case. The Government does not seek to justify the original discovery of the heroin on the basis of this warrant: “[A] post-opening warrant obviously does not justify the original opening.” Brief for United States 4 n. 2. We accordingly accord no significance to the obtaining of this subsequent warrant. Bailey and Ward, although indicted, were not tried, as they have remained outside the United States. The Government acknowledges that “[t]he weapons were found as a result of respondents’ arrests and so are ‘fruit’ of the discovery of the heroin. The convictions consequently must stand or fall with the heroin offenses.” Id., at 5 n. 4. Neither court below considered whether Ramsey or Kelly had standing to object to the opening of the envelopes in light of the fact that none of the envelopes were addressed to them. The Government, however, did not raise the issue below, and consequently we do not reach it. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 41 n. 2 (1976). Postal regulations have implemented this authority. See 19 CFR § 145.2 (1976); 39 CFR § 61.1 (1975). The regulations were promulgated in 1971; prior to that time existing regulations did not implement the statutory authority. The fact that postal authorities did not open incoming international letter-class mail upon “reasonable cause to suspect” prior to 1971 does not change our analysis. Title 39 U. S. C. §3623 (d), which prohibits the opening of first-class mail of “domestic origin,” “except under authority of a search warrant authorized by law . . . ,” has, by its own terms, no application to international mail of any class. A proposed amendment, which would have imposed similar statutory requirements on the opening of international mail, was defeated on the floor of the House, 116 Cong. Rec. 20482-20483 (1970). Our dissenting Brethren find no fewer than five separate reasons for refusing to follow the unambiguous language of the statutory section. The first is the longstanding respect Congress has shown for “the individual’s interest in private communication.” Post, at 626. But as we examine it, infra, at 616-619, no such support may be garnered from the history of the Fourth Amendment insofar as border searches are concerned. Insofar as they rely on the First Amendment, they ignore the limitations imposed on the search by the statute, infra, at 623-624, as well as by the regulations. Postulating a sensitive concern for First Amendment values as of 1866 is a difficult historical exercise on the basis of available materials from that time. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1878) (Fourth Amendment analysis only). Most puzzling of all, however, is the dissent’s reliance on the defeated amendment, offered in 1970, when there is no dearth of available materials, which would have imposed a specific warrant requirement on the opening of international letter-class mail. Contrary to the tenor of the dissent, the amendment was defeated, not passed. The one bit of legislative history the dissent quotes, a statement of Congressman Derwinski, reflects only the concern that with the amendment “ ‘the problem of stopping the flow of narcotics and pornography would be greatly compounded.’ ” Post, at 626 n. 2. We do not see how any solace whatever for the dissenting position may be derived from this sort of legislative history. The dissent also relies on a brief colloquy on the floor. of the Senate during the debate on the 1866 Act. The colloquy is notable both for its brevity and for its ambiguity. It does not distinguish between mailed packages and mailed letters; it refers generally to the “‘examination of... the United States mails.’ ” Post, at 627. Yet, by that time, the “mail” encompassed both. See 12 Stat. 704. (To the extent the colloquy was meant to encompass any intrusion on the “mails,” the statute has long since been interpreted otherwise. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 219 (1883).) Perhaps because of its brevity, the colloquy does not distinguish between domestic and international mail, nor does it distinguish between the searching of envelopes for contraband and the possible reading of enclosed communications. It explicitly manifests a concern with §2 as well as with §3 of the bill. But §2 allowed customs inspectors “to go on board of any vessel . . . and to inspect, search, and examine the same, and any person, trunk, or envelope on board . . . .” Section 3, however, contains a “reasonable cause to suspect” requirement that is not found in § 2, and the colloquy may have simply referred to a concern about the wholesale opening, and reading, of letters. Cf. Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 3440-3441 (1866). The colloquy by no means indicates to us that Congress was concerned only with detecting smuggling that would be carried in “trunk”-sized packages. It is at best insufficient to overcome the precise and clear statutory language Congress actually enacted. The dissent additionally relies on the language of the statute in its entirety as demonstrating a concern only with “packages of the kind normally used to import dutiable merchandise.” Post, at 628. But this assertion — assuming we as judges know what size packages dutiable merchandise usuqlly comes in — is wholly contrary to the thrust of the purpose, and the language, of the Act. The purpose of the Act is “to Prevent Smuggling.” Nowhere does this purpose, however and wherever articulated, reflect a concern with the physical size of the container employed in smuggling, nor do we possess any reliable indication that only large items were smuggled into this country in 1866. As for the word “envelope,” it is difficult to see how our dissenting Brethren derive comfort from its use in the statute. The contemporary dictionary source they cite states that the most common use of the word “envelope” is in the sense of “ ‘the cover or wrapper of a document, as of a letter.’ ” Post, at 630 n. 5. We are quite unable to see how this, the most common usage of the word, reinforces the view that Congress intended only a narrow definition when it used the word without restriction. The dissent also relies on a “consistent construction” over 105 years by the Executive. Post, at 631. To the extent it relies on a construction that things entering by mail are not covered by the statute, this reliance founders on the opinion of a former Acting Attorney General. See 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 457 (1886). To the extent it is referring only to letter-sized mail, the dissent nowhere demonstrates any actual interpretation by anyone that the congressional authority was perceived as an affirmative limitation on the power of the Executive to open letters at the border when there existed “reasonable cause” to suspect a violation of customs laws. The evidence marshaled by our dissenting Brethren on this point could be called “consistent” only by the most generous appraiser of such material. The dissent’s final reliance is on the assertion that asking the addressee for consent to open a letter had not been proved unworkable. Presumably the conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Executive’s reason for a change in its policy is weak. But this is beside the point; it reflects not at all on Congress’ words or intent in 1866 or at any other time. That the Executive Branch may have relied on a less-than-cogent reason in its 1971 regulatory change has nothing to do with the interpretation of an Act of Congress. Underlying all of these reasons, apparently, is the fear that “[i]f the Government is allowed to exercise the power it claims, the door will be open to the wholesale, secret examination of all incoming international letter mail.” Post, at 632. That specter is simply not presented by this case. As we observe, infra, at 623-624, the opening of mail is limited by a “reasonable cause” requirement, while the reading of letters is totally interdicted by regulation. It is this unwarranted speculation, and not the policy followed by the Executive, that poses the “serious constitutional question” to be avoided. The Court of Appeals, it should be noted, evidently believed that Inspector Kallnischkies possessed sufficient information at the time the envelopes were opened to meet the stricter “probable cause” requirement; it believed "that the facts in this case are such that, had they been presented to a magistrate, issuance of a search warrant permitting opening of the envelopes would have been appropriate.” 176 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 73 n. 8, 538 F. 2d 415, 421 n. 8. Because of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that question. In light of our conclusion that there existed “reasonable cause to suspect” a violation of the customs laws, we need not, and do not, decide whether the search would have nonetheless been authorized by other statutory grants of authority urged alternatively upon us by the Government. Title 19 U. S. C. §482 also authorizes customs officials to “stop, search, and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom . . . they shall suspect there is merchandise which is subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle or beast, or otherwise . . . .” Title 19 U. S. C. § 1582 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations for the search of persons and baggage . . . ; and all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under such regulations.” Although the statutory authority authorizes searches of envelopes “wherever found,” 19 U. S. C. § 482, the envelopes were searched at the New York City Post Office as the mail was entering the United States. We, therefore, do not have before us the question, recently addressed in other contexts, of the geographical limits to border searches. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973). Nor do we need to decide whether the broad statutory authority subjects such mail to customs inspection at a place other than the point of entry into this country. See United States v. King, 517 F. 2d, at 354 (“[T]he envelopes had passed an initial stage in the customs process when they were routed to Alabama, but they were still in the process of being delivered, and still subject to customs inspection”). Section 23 of this customs statute provided, in pertinent part: “[I]t shall be lawful for the collector, or other officer of the customs, after entry made of any goods, wares or merchandise, on suspicion of fraud, to open and examine, in the presence of two or more reputable merchants, any package or packages thereof . . . .” Section 24 of this customs statute provided, in pertinent part: “[E]very collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial . . . .” We do not decide whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed “unreasonable” because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out. Cf. Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 356-358 (1931) The opinion in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925), itself reminds us that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.” This explanation does not, and cannot, fully explain the border-search “exception” even if it were grounded in the “exigent circumstances” doctrine. For a letter may as easily be held by customs officials when it crosses with a traveler as it can when it crosses in the mail. Too, this explanation cannot explain the different treatment which the Court of Appeals apparently would have accorded mailed packages, which presumably may be detained as easily as letter-size envelopes. There is no reason to infer that mailed letters somehow carry with them a greater expectation of privacy than do letters carried on one’s person. Cf. 39 U. S. C. § 3623 (d). There are limited justifiable expectations of privacy for incoming material crossing United States borders. Not only is there the longstanding, constitutionally authorized right of customs officials to search incoming persons and goods, but there is no statutorily created expectation of privacy. See 39 U. S. C. § 3623 (d). See also United States v. King, 517 F. 2d, at 354; United States v. Odland, 502 F. 2d 148 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1088 (1974); United States v. Doe, 472 F. 2d, at 985. We, accordingly, have no occasion to decide whether, in the absence of the regulatory restrictions, speech would be “chilled,” or, if it were, whether the appropriate response would be to apply the full panoply of Fourth Amendment requirements. Cf. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 502-506 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 485 (1965). In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539 (1974), this Court, in the context of the opening of mail from an attorney to a prisoner-client, noted that “freedom from censorship is not equivalent to freedom from inspection or perusal,” id., at 576. This Court held: “As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship; since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’ opening the letters.” Id., at 577. We deal here, of course, with borders, not prisons. Yet the power of customs officials to take plenary action to stop the entry of contraband is no less in the border-search area than in prisons. The safeguards in the border-search area, we think, are comparable to those found constitutionally valid in Wolff.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MORRIS v. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE No. 71-6698. Argued January 17, 1973 Decided February 22, 1973 E. R. McClelland argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Walter H. Fleischer argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Mark L. Evans, Kathryn H. Baldwin, and Michael Kimmel. Per Curiam. Twenty days after this Court granted a writ of certiorari, 409 U. S. 841, Congress amended the relevant statutory provisions, § 202 (d)(8) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §402 (d)(8). See § 111 (a), Social Security Amendments of 1972 (Oct. 30, 1972), Pub. L. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329. The writ of certiorari heretofore granted is dismissed as improvidently granted.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BANKS v. CHICAGO GRAIN TRIMMERS ASSN., INC., et al. No. 59. Argued January 17, 1968. Decided April 1, 1968. Harold A. Liebenson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Edward G. Baszus. Mark A. Braun argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Thomas P. Smith. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. On January 30, 1961, shortly after returning home from work, the petitioner’s husband suffered a fall that resulted in his death on February 12. On February 20, 1961, the petitioner on behalf of herself and her three minor children filed a claim against her husband’s employer, the respondent, for compensation death benefits under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950. The petitioner alleged that her husband’s fall on January 30 had resulted from a work-connected injury suffered on January 26. A hearing was held before a Department of Labor Deputy Commissioner; and on June 8,1961, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the petitioner’s claim for failure to establish that her husband’s death had resulted from a work-connected injury. The petitioner did not bring an action in District Court to set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s ruling. 33 U. S. C. § 921. Some time after the Deputy Commissioner’s decision, the petitioner discovered an eyewitness to a work-connected injury suffered by her husband on January 30, the same day as his fall at home. On August 22, 1961, the petitioner filed a second compensation action against the respondent — this time alleging that the fall resulted from an injury suffered on January 30. On September 8,1961, the petitioner began a wrongful-death action in the Northern District of Illinois against' a third party, the Norris Grain Company, alleging that her husband’s fall resulted from the same January 30 injury. On May 3, 1963, a jury rendered a verdict of $30,000 for the petitioner in that lawsuit. The grain company moved for a new trial, and the trial judge ruled that the motion would be granted unless the petitioner consented to a remittitur of $11,000. On May 16, 1963, without consulting the respondent, the petitioner accepted the remittitur. Judgment was entered for $19,000. On August 29, 1963, a hearing on the petitioner’s second compensation action commenced. On January 27, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner entered findings of fact and an award for the petitioner. The respondent brought an action in District Court to set the award aside. The District Court affirmed, but the Court of Appeals reversed. 369 F. 2d 344. We granted certiorari to consider questions concerning the administration of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 389 U. S. 813. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner’s second compensation action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The petitioner contends that that doctrine is displaced in this case by the operation of § 22 of the Act, which provides: “Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed [for original claims], and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation.” 33 U. S. C. § 922. (Emphasis added.) The petitioner asserts that her second compensation action came under § 22 because it challenged a “determination of fact by the deputy commissioner” in her original compensation action — namely, the finding that her husband’s fall did not result from a work-connected injury. The respondent argues that “a mistake in a determination of fact” in § 22 refers only to clerical errors and matters concerning an employee’s disability, not to matters concerning an employer’s liability. Conceding that nothing in the statutory language supports this reading, the respondent contends that the legislative history reveals Congress’ limited purpose. Section 22 was first enacted as part of the original Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in 1927. 44 Stat. 1437. At that time the section provided for review by the Deputy Commissioner only on the ground of a “change in conditions.” The Deputy Commissioner was authorized by the section to “terminate, continue, increase, or decrease” the original compensation award; review was permitted only “during the term of an award.” From 1930 to 1933, the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, which was charged with administering the Act, recommended in its annual reports that § 22 be amended to permit review by the Deputy Commissioner at any time. 14th Ann. Rep. of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission (hereafter USECC) 75 (1930); 15th Ann. Rep. USECC 77 (1931); 16th Ann. Rep. USECC 49 (1932); 17th Ann. Rep. USECC 18 (1933). In 1934 Congress, while not adopting the recommendation entirely, responded by amending § 22 to permit review “any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation.” 48 Stat. 807. At the same time Congress added a second ground for review by the Deputy Commissioner: “a mistake in a determination of fact.” The purpose of this amendment was to “broaden the grounds on which a deputy commissioner can modify an award” by allowing modification where “a mistake in a determination of fact makes such modification desirable in order to render justice under the act.” S. Rep. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934). In its annual reports for 1934-1936, the Compensation Commission recommended that § 22 be further amended to apply in cases where the original compensation claim is rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. 18th Ann. Rep. USECC 38 (1934); 19th Ann. Rep. USECC 49 (1935); 20th Ann. Rep. USECC 52 (1936). Congress responded in 1938 by amending § 22 to permit review by the Deputy Commissioner “at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim” and to allow the Deputy Commissioner after such review to “award compensation.” 52 Stat. 1167. The purpose of this amendment was to extend “the enlarged authority therein [1934 amendment] provided to cases in which the action of the deputy commissioner has been a rejection of the claim.” S. Rep. No. 1988, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 8 (1938); H. R. Rep. No. 1945, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 8 (1938). We find nothing in this legislative history to support the respondent’s argument that a “determination of fact” means only some determinations of fact and not others. The respondent points out that the recommendations of the Compensation Commission prior to the 1934 amendment referred to analogous state laws; but those recommendations dealt with the time period in which review was to be available, not with the grounds for review. The respondent has referred us to no decision, state or federal, holding that a statute permitting review of determinations of fact is limited to issues relating to disability. In the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary, we attribute to the words of a statute their ordinary meaning, and we hold that the petitioner’s second compensation action, filed a few months after the rejection of her original claim, came within the scope of § 22. The respondent raised two other issues in the Court of Appeals, which that court found unnecessary to reach. These issues have been fully briefed and argued in this Court; and in order to bring this litigation to a close, we dispose of them here. Section 33 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act permits an individual entitled to compensation to sue a third party for damages. 33 U. S. C. § 933 (a). If no such suit is brought and compensation is accepted from the employer under an award, the rights of the employee against third parties are assigned to the employer. 33 U. S. C. § 933 (b) and (c). If, as in this case, a suit is brought against a third party, the employer is liable in compensation only to the extent that allowable compensation benefits exceed the recovery from the third party. 33 it. S. C. § 933 (f). Section 33 (g) of the Act further provides: “If compromise with such third person is made by the person entitled to compensation ... of an amount less than the compensation to which such person or representative would be entitled to under this chapter, the employer shall be liable for compensation . . . only if such compromise is made with his written approval.” 33 U. S. C. § 933 (g). The respondent contends that the petitioner’s acceptance of the judicially ordered remittitur of $11,000 in her third-party lawsuit was a “compromise” within the meaning of § 33 (g). We disagree. The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was modeled on the New York employees’ compensation statute. Lawson v. Suwannee S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198, 205; H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1926). Under the analogous provision of that act, the New York Court of Appeals has held that a' remittitur is not a compromise. “Plaintiff’s stipulation consenting to take that portion of the verdict judicially determined as being not excessive, does not fall within any recognized meaning of the word ‘compromise.’ ” Gallagher v. Carol Construction Co., 272 N. Y. 127, 129, 5 N. E. 2d 63, 64. An order of remittitur is a judicial determination of recoverable damages; it is not an agreement among the parties involving mutual concessions. Section 33 (g) protects the employer against his employee’s accepting too little for his cause of action against a third party. That danger is not present when damages are determined, not by negotiations between the employee and the third party, but rather by the independent evaluation of a trial judge. Cf. Bell v. O’Hearne, 284 F. 2d 777. Finally, the respondent attacks the Deputy Commissioner’s finding of fact that there was a causal connection between the work-connected injury suffered by the petitioner’s husband on January 30 and his fall at home some two hours later. The Deputy Commissioner’s finding must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504. The District Court held that the Deputy Commissioner’s finding was supported by substantial evidence, and we agree. While some of the testimony of the petitioner’s medical expert was arguably inconsistent with other parts of his testimony, it was within the province of the Deputy Commissioner to credit part of the witness’ testimony without accepting it all. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The petitioner’s husband had worked for the Chicago Grain Trimmers Association, Inc. (hereafter respondent) as a grain trimmer since 1934. Grain trimmers load and unload grain-carrying barges and vessels. It is not entirely clear from the Deputy Commissioner’s decision whether it rested on insufficient proof of a causal nexus between the January 26 injury and the January 30 fall or on insufficient proof that the alleged January 26 injury in fact occurred at all. The petitioner also contends that (1) the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to administrative compensation cases generally, and (2) if res judicata does apply, her second action did not arise out of the same cause of action as did her first. We do not reach these contentions. The respondent does not rely on either of the reasons given by the Court of Appeals for holding §22 inapplicable: (1) that the Deputy Commissioner was not aware of Banks’ January 30 injury until more than one year after the petitioner’s original claim was rejected, and (2) that the petitioner’s second compensation action did not dispute the original findings of fact of the Deputy Commissioner. The petitioner filed her second compensation action within a few months after the original claim was rejected; it is irrelevant that the hearing occurred more than a year later. Candado Stevedoring Corp. v. Willard, 185 F. 2d 232. The question of the causation of the petitioner’s husband’s fall is obviously one of fact, cf. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504; the case cited by the Court of Appeals, Flamm v. Hughes, 329 F. 2d 378, is utterly inapposite since it dealt with the possibility of litigating a question of constitutional law in a § 22 proceeding. In 1928 the Commission recommended that “an amendment be adopted which will give deputy commissioners the continuing authority to reopen cases that is usually conferred upon compensation boards” because “situations are continually arising in which the action taken by a deputy commissioner in correcting an error in an order may give rise to controversy and result in a failure to do justice to either the employer or the employee.” 12th Ann. Rep. USECC 40 (1928). It is not at all clear just what the Commission thus meant to recommend. In any event this recommendation was not repeated in later annual reports, and there is no evidence that Congress at any time sought to adopt it. (Compare the committee reports to the 1934 amendment to § 22, which contain specific references to the 17th Ann. Rep. USECC (1933). S. Rep. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934).) Congress also added authority for the Deputy Commissioner to “reinstate” compensation as well as to terminate, continue, increase, or decrease it. It is true that the statute as enacted in 1927, permitting review only “on the ground of a change in conditions,” might have supported a distinction between issues of disability and liability. But after the 1934 and 1938 amendments, permitting review of “a determination of fact” and authorizing the Deputy Commissioner to “award compensation” even where the original claim is rejected, the asserted distinction can draw no support from the statutory language. It is irrelevant for purposes of § 22 that the petitioner labeled her second action a claim for compensation rather than an application for review so long as the action in fact comes within the scope of the section. Candado Stevedoring Corp. v. Willard, 185 F. 2d 232.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTHCROSS et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, CITY SCHOOLS et al. No. 1136. Decided March 9, 1970 Jack Greenberg and James M. Nabrit III for petitioners. Jack Petree for respondents. Per Curiam. In 1966 the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee approved a plan of respondent Board of Education for the desegregation of the Memphis school system. In July 1968 petitioners made a motion that the court order the Board to adopt a new plan prepared with the assistance of the Title IV Center of the University of Tennessee. The Center is funded by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The 1966 plan permitted unrestricted free transfers, and petitioners desired a plan without such a provision, and one that would also provide among other things for complete faculty desegregation. The District Court denied the motion as filed but on May 15, 1969, in an unreported opinion, directed respondent Board to file a revised plan which would incorporate the existing plan (as respondent proposed during the hearing to supplement it), and which also would contain a modified transfer provision, a provision for the appointment of a Director of Desegregation charged with responsibility to devise ways and means “of assisting the Board in its affirmative duty to convert to a unitary sj^stem in which racial discrimination will be eliminated root and branch,” and provision for faculty desegregation. The court also directed that, prior to January 1, 1970, the Board file a map of proposed revised zone boundary lines and enrollment figures by race within the revised zones to enable the court then to “reconsider the adequacy of the transfer plan.” The District Court expressly found that such further steps were necessary because, although the respondent Board “has acted in good faith,” “the existing and proposed [supplemental] plans do not have real prospects for dismantling the state-imposed dual system at the ‘earliest practicable date.' ” Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In June 1969 they filed a Motion for Summary Reversal and on November 3, 1969, after this Court’s decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969), a motion to require adoption of a unitary system now. Both motions were denied on December 19, 1969, and the case was remanded to the District Court; the Court of Appeals stated that action on its part would be premature “until the United States District Court has had submitted to it the ordered plan, and has had opportunity to consider and act upon it.” Petitioners thereupon filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for injunction pending certiorari which, in reliance upon Alexander v. Holmes County Board, sought an injunction requiring respondent Board “to prepare and file on or before January 5, 1970, in addition to the adjusted zone lines it is presently required to file, a plan for the operation of the City of Memphis public schools as a unitary system during the current 1969-70 school year.” The motion was denied on January 12, 1970, on the ground that Alexander v. Holmes County Board was inapplicable to the case because “[the Court of Appeals is] satisfied that the respondent Board of Education of Memphis is not now operating a ‘dual school system’ and has, subject to complying with the present commands of the District Judge, converted its pre-Brown dual system into a unitary system ‘within which no person is to be effectively excluded because of race or color.’ ” Petitioners, on January 30, 1970, filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and a motion for injunction pending certiorari “requiring the preparation, with the assistance of H. E. W. or the H. E. W.-funded University of Tennessee Title IV Center, of a plan of complete pupil and faculty integration affecting all phases of the operations of the Memphis public school system, for implementation during the 1969-70 school year in conformity with . . . Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. . . .” The petition for certiorari is granted. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in the following respects: 1. Since the findings of the District Court — that the state-imposed dual system had not been dismantled under the 1966 plan and that that plan and the Board’s proposed supplemental plan did “not have real prospects for dismantling [it] ... at the ‘earliest practicable date’ ” — are supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its own finding that respondent Board “is not now operating a ‘dual school system’. . . .” 2. Since it appears that neither the revised plan of desegregation filed on June 9, 1969, nor the revised school zones and updated enrollment figures which were ordered to be filed on or before January 1, 1970, were properly before the Court of Appeals for review, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to rule that the Board “has, subject to complying with the present commands of the District Judge, converted its pre-Brown dual system into a unitary system ‘within which no person is to be effectively excluded because of race or color.’ ” 3. In holding that Alexander v. Holmes County Board is inapplicable to this case. The Court of Appeals’ order of remand of December 19, 1969, is affirmed, but with direction that the District Court proceed promptly to consider the issues before it and to decide the case consistently with Alexander v. Holmes County Board. The order of the Court of Appeals of January 12, 1970, denying injunctive relief is affirmed. The motion for injunction pending cer-tiorari filed in this Court is denied. The judgment herein shall issue forthwith. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL CARBIDE CORP. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. NO. 151. Argued January 6, 1949. Decided March 28, 1949. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Boykin C. Wright, Edgar J. Goodrich and John A. Wilson. Hilbert P. Zarky argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Stanley M. Silver-berg, Ellis N. Slack and Lee A. Jackson. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners are three wholly owned subsidiaries of Air Reduction Corporation (Aireo). They seek a determination of the question whether deficiencies in income and declared value excess profits taxes for the year 1938 found by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are properly chargeable to them. Their contention is that they are corporate agents of Aireo, that the income from their operations is income of Aireo, and that income and excess profits taxes must be determined on that basis. By a series of combinations and dissolutions of previously acquired subsidiary companies, Aireo had, prior to 1938, reduced the number of its subsidiaries to four. All operated strictly in accordance with contracts with Aireo. The subsidiaries were utilized by Aireo as operating companies in the four major fields of operation in which it was engaged. Air Reduction Sales Company carried on the manufacture and sale of the gaseous constituents of air; National Carbide Corporation, the manufacture and sale of calcium carbide; Pure Carbonic, Inc., the manufacture and sale of carbon dioxide; and Wilson Welder & Metals Co., the manufacture and sale of welding machines, equipment and supplies. The contracts between Aireo and its subsidiaries provided, in substance, that the latter were employed as agents to manage and operate plants designed for the production of the products assigned to each, and as agents to sell the output of the plants. Aireo was to furnish working capital, executive management and office facilities for its subsidiaries. They in turn agreed to pay Aireo all profits in excess of six percent on their outstanding capital stock, which in each case was nominal in amount. Title to the assets utilized by the subsidiaries was held by them, and amounts advanced by Aireo for the purchase of assets and working capital were shown on the books of the subsidiaries as accounts payable to Aireo. The value of the assets of each company thus approximated the amount owed to Aireo. No interest ran on .these accounts. Aireo and its subsidiaries were organized horizontally into six overriding divisions: corporate, operations, sales, financial, distribution, and research. Officers heading each division were, in turn, officers of the subsidiaries. Top officials of Aireo held similar positions in the subsidiary companies. Directors of the subsidiaries met only to ratify the actions of the directors and officers of Aireo. Aireo considered the profits turned over to it by the subsidiaries pursuant to the contracts as its own income and reported it as such. Petitioners reported as income only the six per cent return on capital that each was entitled to retain. Similarly, in declaring the value of their capital stock for declared value excess profits tax purposes, the subsidiaries reported only the nominal amounts at which the stock was carried on the books of each. The Commissioner notified petitioners of substantial income and excess profits tax deficiencies in their 1938 returns, having taken the position that they are taxable on the income turned over to Aireo as well as the nominal amounts retained. The Tax Court held, however, that the income from petitioners’ operations in excess of six per cent of their capital stock was income and property of Aireo. Three judges dissented. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 167 F. 2d 304. We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari, 335 U. S. 810, because of this conflict of opinion and the disagreement between courts as to the continuing vitality of Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330 (1918). Petitioners’ contention is, in substance, that our decision in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 436 (1943), which held that the tax laws require taxation of the corporate entity if it engages in “business activity,” expressly excepted the situation in which the corporation is the agent of its owner; that Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, supra, defines the content of “agency” for tax purposes; and that, as the Tax Court found, this Court’s characterization of the relationship between the corporations in the Southern Pacific case is “aptly descriptive” of the relationship between Aireo and petitioners. It must follow, according to petitioners, that income received by them and transmitted to Aireo is taxable only to Aireo. Respondent does not quarrel with the first and third propositions. The collision occurs at the second. The issue as presented by petitioners is, therefore, whether the principal-agent relationship described in the Southern Pacific case — and the similar arrangement between Aireo and petitioners — contains the “usual incidents of an agency relationship,” as that phrase was used in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra. Petitioners’ contention that the Southern Pacific case established a concept of agency that has survived our later decisions may be dealt with rather summarily. That case treated income earned by a wholly owned subsidiary before March 1, 1913, the effective date of the Income Tax Act of 1913, as having accrued to its parent prior to that date despite the fact that the actual transfer of funds by declaration of dividends occurred subsequent thereto. The theory of the case was that the two corporations could be treated as identical, for the purposes of the 1913 Act, because of the complete domination and control exercised by the parent over its subsidiary. By this decision, this Court is said to have “looked beyond the corporate form,” and ignored “the separate entity of a corporation.” Whatever the dialectics employed, courts and commentators have agreed that parent and subsidiary were treated as one corporation for the purposes of the taxes there-in question; transfer of earnings to the parent was merely “a paper transaction.” The Southern Pacific case did not, and did not purport to, rest on any principle of agency. The only reference to the subsidiary (Central Pacific) as an agent is made in this context: . . the Central Pacific and the Southern Pacific were in substance identical because of the complete ownership and control which the latter possessed over the former, as stockholder and in other capacities. While the two companies were separate legal entities, yet in fact, and for all practical purposes they were merged, the former being but a part of the latter, acting merely as its agent and subject in all things to its proper direction and control.” 247 U. S. at 337. It is thus clear beyond doubt that the subsidiary was not referred to as an agent of the parent in the usual or technical sense. “Agency” and “practical identity,” as those words are used in the Southern Pacific case, are unquestionably opposite sides of the same coin. The close relationship between corporations because of compíete ownership and control of one by the other was the basis for the result reached, whatever its articulation. That basis has been repudiated by subsequent decisions of this Court. Whatever the vitality of Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe on its special facts, we have held that a corporation formed or operated for business purposes must share the tax burden despite substantial identity, in practical operation, with its owner. Complete ownership of the corporation, and the control primarily dependent upon such ownership — the important ingredients of the Southern Pacific case — are no longer of significance in determining taxability. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U. S. 415 (1932). In both of the cases last cited, the agency argument now urged upon us was made and rejected. In both cases, Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, supra, was relied upon by the taxpayers. In both, we found that the contention that the corporation was the agent of its owner was simply the argument that the subsidiary had no corporate identity distinct from its stockholders in a different form. It is true that petitioners here do not ask that they be ignored completely for tax purposes. They are willing to pay taxes on the nominal amounts they retain as Airco’s “agents.” But this fact serves to emphasize the inapplicability of the Southern Pacific case, upon which they rely. There, as in Commonwealth Improvement Co. and Moline Properties cases, the decision turned upon the question whether the corporate entity was or was not to be completely ignored for tax purposes. If the Central Pacific had been accorded any tax status in the Southern Pacific case, it unquestionably would have been taxed on the entire income it received. In fact, it was so taxed upon all income received after March 1, 1913; only income received prior thereto was considered income of the parent directly. We think, therefore, that petitioners’ argument is without merit because based on an erroneous interpretation of Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, supra. The agency argument, to quote the opinion in Moline Properties, “is basically the same argument of identity in a different form. . . . the question of agency or not depends upon the same legal issues as does the question of identity previously discussed.” Ownership of a corporation and the control incident thereto can have no different tax consequences when clothed in the garb of agency than when worn as a removable corporate veil. But it is necessary to go farther. The Tax Court did not, as petitioners seem to think, consider the argument that they were agents- of Aireo as different from or having any greater validity than the argument of identity of Aireo and its subsidiaries. The court, in characterizing petitioners as Airco’s agents, used that term exactly as it had been used in the Southern Pacific, Commonwealth Improvement Co., and Moline Properties cases. According to the Tax Court’s opinion: “The issue which [was decided] in this proceeding is whether, as the respondent has determined, the income from the operations of the three petitioners belonged not to Aireo, the parent, but to the petitioners, and was taxable to them; or whether, as the three petitioners contend, the income from the operations of the petitioners in 1938, exclusive of the small amounts paid to petitioners under the contracts, belonged and was taxable to Aireo, the parent company, both because the petitioners were in fact incorporated departments, divisions, or branches of Airco’s business and because the petitioners operated pursuant to express contract with Aireo.” The theory upon which the Tax Court expunged the deficiencies apparently was that since the Southern Pacific Co. case was not expressly overruled by Moline Properties, the “business purpose” rule laid down in the latter is not absolute, but that the corporate entity may be disregarded (or the corporation treated as an agent of its owner) for tax purposes when the facts of ownership and control of the corporation approximate those presented by the Southern Pacific case. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that under our decisions, when a corporation carries on business activity the fact that the owner retains direction of its affairs down to the minutest detail, provides all of its assets and takes all of its profits can make no difference tax-wise. The court concluded that “Even though Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, supra, set up a different test, we regard it as pro tanto no longer controlling.” The result reached by the Court of Appeals is clearly required by our later decisions. Our reluctance to erase Southern Pacific from the books has been due not to any belief that it lays down a correct rule for tax purposes generally, but to the fact that it concerns “very peculiar facts” which make it clearly distinguishable from later cases involving the tax status of a subsidiary or other wholly owned corporation. For that reason, we have, instead, held that it lays down no rule for tax purposes. Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., supra at p. 419; Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at p. 439. That the concept of identity of the corporation with its owner set out in the Southern Pacific case is incompatible with later decisions of this Court may be demonstrated by a consideration of the facts enumerated and relied upon by the Tax Court, which based such reliance on the emphasis placed upon similar facts in the Southern Pacific case. These facts relate to the ownership, control, and right to income reserved by the parent. So far as control is concerned, we can see no difference in principle between Airco’s control of petitioners and that exercised over Moline Properties, Inc., by its sole stockholder. Undoubtedly the great majority of corporations owned by sole stockholders are “dummies” in the sense that their policies and day-to-day activities are determined not as decisions of the corporation but by their owners acting individually. We can see no significance, therefore, in findings of fact such as, “The Aireo board held regular meetings and exercised complete domination and control over the business of Aireo and each of the petitioners,” and “The chairman, vice chairman, and president of Aireo were in charge of the administration and management of the activities of each petitioner and carried out the policies and directives with respect to each petitioner as promulgated by the Aireo board.” We reversed the Board of Tax Appeals in Moline Properties in the face of its finding that “Full beneficial ownership was in Thompson [the sole stockholder], who continued to manage and regard the property as his own individually.” Some stress was placed by the Tax Court, and by petitioners in argument here, upon the form of ownership of assets adopted by Aireo and its subsidiaries. Petitioners’ capital stock was, as has been stated, nominal in amount. Assets of considerable value, to which title was held by the subsidiaries, were balanced by accounts payable to Aireo on the books of each. The Tax Court thought it material that “All assets held by each petitioner were furnished to it by Aireo, which paid for them with its own cash or stock. Aireo supplied all the working capital of each petitioner.” If Aireo had supplied assets to its subsidiaries in return for stock valued at amounts equal to the value of the assets, no question could be raised as to the reality of ownership of the assets by the subsidiaries. Aireo would then have been in a position comparable, so far as ownership of the assets of petitioners is concerned, to that of the sole stockholder in Moline Properties. We think that it can make no difference that financing of the subsidiaries was carried out by means of book indebtednesses in lieu of increased book value of the subsidiaries’ stock. A corporation must derive its funds from three sources: capital contributions, loans, and profits from operations. The fact that Aireo, the sole stockholder, preferred to supply-funds to its subsidiaries primarily by the second method, rather than either of the other two, does not make the income earned by their utilization income to Aireo. We need not decide whether the funds supplied to petitioners by Aireo were capital contributions rather than loans. It is sufficient to say that the very factors which, as petitioners contend, show that Aireo “supplied” and “furnished” their assets also indicate that petitioners were the recipients of capital contributions rather than loans. Nor do the contracts between Aireo and petitioners by which the latter agreed to pay all profits above a nominal return to the former, on that account, become “agency” contracts within the meaning of our decisions. The Tax Court felt that the fact that Aireo was entitled to the profits by contract shows that the income “belonged to Aireo” and should not, for that reason, be taxed to petitioners. Our decisions requiring that income be taxed to those who earn it, despite anticipatory agreements designed to prevent vesting of the income in the earners, foreclose this result. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940); United States v. Joliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U. S. 44 (1942); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591 (1948). Of course one of the duties of a collection agent is to transmit the money he receives to his principal according to their agreement. But the fact that petitioners were required by contract to turn over the money received by them to Aireo, after deducting expenses and nominal profits, is no sure indication that they were mere collection agents. Such an agreement is entirely consistent with the corporation-sole stockholder relationship whether or not any agency exists, and with other relationships as well. What we have said does not foreclose a true corporate agent or trustee from handling the property and income of its owner-principal without being taxable therefor. Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account of the principal, binds the principal by its actions, transmits money received to the principal, and whether receipt of income is attributable to the services of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal are some of the relevant considerations in determining whether a true agency exists. If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such is the case. Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the normal duties of an agent. Absence of the factors mentioned above, and the essentiality of ownership of the corporation to the existence of any “agency” relationship in the Moline Properties, Commonwealth Improvement Co., and Southern Pacific cases, indicate the fallacy of the agency argument made in those cases. The same fallacy is apparent in the contention that petitioners are agents of Aireo. They claim that they should be taxable on net income aggregating only $1,350, despite the fact that during the tax year (1938) they owned assets worth nearly 20 million dollars, had net sales of approximately 22 million dollars, and earned nearly four and one-half million dollars net. Their employees number in the thousands. We have passed the question whether Airco’s interest in these assets is that of owner of the subsidiaries or lender, but whatever the answer, they do not belong to Aireo as principal. The entire earnings of petitioners, except for trifling amounts, are turned .over to Aireo not because the latter could command this income if petitioners were owned by third persons, but because it owns and thus completely dominates the subsidiaries. Aireo, for sufficient reasons of its own, wished to avoid the burdens of principalship. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Sheldon Building Corp. v. Commissioner, 118 P. 2d 835 (1941). Compare Forshay v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 537 (1930). It cannot now escape the tax consequences of that choice, no matter how bona fide its motives or longstanding its arrangements. When we referred to the “usual incidents of an agency relationship” in the Moline Properties case, we meant just that — not the identity of ownership and control disclosed by the facts of this case. We have considered the other arguments made by petitioners and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The substance of a typical subsidiary-parent contract is .as follows: “Aireo hereby employs Sales as its agent to manage and operate, during the term of this contract, all plants for the production of oxygen, acetylene arid other gases and for the manufacture of apparatus and containers for the utilization and transportation of such gases . . . ; and likewise employs Sales as its agent to market and sell, during the term of this contract, the output of all such plants. . . . Aireo agrees (1) to give Sales the use of all cylinders, containers, motor trucks, equipment, and shipping facilities, which it now owns or may hereafter acquire; (2) to supply such working capital as Sales may need; (3) to provide such executive management (but not accounting, bookkeeping and clerical service), and office accommodation and facilities, as may be necessary for the proper conduct of Sales business .... Sales agrees (1) to manage and operate ... all of said plants; (2) to maintain the same in first class condition, charging necessary repairs and replacements to operating expense and setting aside and charging to operating expense proper reserves for depreciation ... (3) to distribute, market and sell, the product manufactured in said plants as efficiently as possible ... (4) to pay all expenses of such operation, maintenance and selling, and to discharge all expenses or liabilities incurred therein or thereby and to collect all accounts receivable or other proceeds resulting therefrom; (5) to credit monthly on its books to Aireo all profits accruing to it from the operation of-its entire business over and above an amount equal to six per cent (6%) per annum on its outstanding capital stock, which said amount it is hereby authorized to deduct and retain, and it hereby agrees to accept as full compensation for its services hereunder; and (6) to pay over to Aireo upon demand any profits becoming due and credited to Aireo as aforesaid.” Wilson Welder had a net deficit during the year here involved and is not a petitioner in this action. Sales had outstanding 125 shares of stock of $100 par value; Carbide’s outstanding capital stock was 50 shares of $100 par value; Carbonic also had 50 shares of $100 par value. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (1948 ed.), Vol. 10A, p. 237. Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax, 44 Yale L. J. 436, 448. In Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 Cal L. Rev. 12, 18, the writer discusses this use of the agency concept as follows: “What is meant by such terms as ‘adjunct,’ ‘agency,’ ‘instrumentality,’ ‘creature’ or ‘mouthpiece’? What conditions must exist to warrant a court in treating the A corporation as the mere adjunct of the B corporation? The word ‘agency’ is often used as a synonym of ‘adjunct,’ whatever that may mean, and as descriptive of a relation variously defined in the cases as ‘alter ego,’ ‘alias,’ ‘device,’ ‘dummy,’ ‘branch,’ ‘tool,’ ‘corporate double,’ ‘business conduit,’ ‘instrumentality,’ etc., but all in the sense of ‘means’ through which a corporation’s own business is actively prosecuted.” The case other than Southern Pacific relied upon by the Tax Court was Munson Steamship Line v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 849. That case was explained in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, as depending upon a particular legislative purpose which justified disregarding the separate entity. Plaintiff’s Exhibit P, No. 452, October Term 1917, is an income tax statement of the subsidiary, Central Pacific Co., showing payment of income taxes on $3,333,846.18, its total net income for 1913 less one-sixth (i. e., making an allowance for the two months before the income tax law went into effect March 1). 319 U. S. at 440-441. 8 T. C. 594, 611. After enumerating the facts considered pertinent, the court concluded: “It is true, of course, that, taken separately, some of the foregoing facts would not be sufficient in themselves to make inoperative the general rule that corporations are separate juristic persons and are to be so treated for tax purposes. We think, however, that when all these facts are viewed together they bring petitioners within the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, supra.” Id. at 614. It should be added that the Court of Appeals, whose opinion was written by its Chief Judge, did not so much as mention the agency argument now made by petitioners. Its only references to agency were isolated quotations from the -Tax Court’s opinion and the contracts quoted in footnote 1. The court’s opinion phrases the question as “when a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent corporation shall be treated for purposes of income taxation as a separate taxable person, and when as merely a part of the corporate activities of the parent.” 167 F. 2d 304,305. Id. at 307. Two basic distinctions between the Southern Pacific case and subsequent cases (except Gulf Oil Co. v. Lewellyn, 248 U. S. 71 (1918), which followed Southern Pacific) are immediately apparent. First, the Southern Pacific case involved taxation of the parent-owner rather than the subsidiary corporation; second, the question was when the income had been earned, rather than who had earned it. The importance of these distinctions is indicated by the fact that the subsidiary paid income taxes upon income received subsequent to March 1, 1913 (see footnote 8, supra), and that the parent did not dispute its tax liability for dividends from post-1913 earnings of the subsidiary. The decision is based on an interpretation of the Income Tax Act of 1913. The Court felt that it was not the intent of the Act to tax earnings prior to the effective date of the Act, and that the Central Pacific’s pre-1913 income had actually accrued to the parent before the effective date of the Act. The opinion states that “The case turns upon its very peculiar facts, and is distinguishable from others in which the question of the identity of a controlling stockholder with his corporation has been raised.” 247 U. S. at 338-339. By its very terms, the decision is limited to its precise facts. Much of the testimony introduced by petitioners had to do with the intercorporate relationship between Aireo and its subsidiaries, the use of certain facilities by two or more of the subsidiaries, the duties of various officers who held positions with Aireo and its subsidiaries, and the services performed for all of the subsidiaries by certain departments of Aireo. So far as this testimony shows the integration of the corporate system and its direction by Aireo, it is, as we have indicated, immaterial. So far as it indicates that the subsidiaries received the use of equipment and services for which they were not charged, it is relevant as showing that their income was distorted to that extent, but it does not indicate that the income received “belonged” to Aireo at the time of its receipt. The Commissioner made allowance for this distortion by allocating over $400,000 of the expenses reported by Aireo to petitioners under the authority given him by § 45 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 26 U. S. C. § 45. 45 B.T.A. 647, 650. As a practical matter, a considerable part of the assets of petitioners was supplied out of profits from their operations. Even though assets were purchased directly out of the earnings of a subsidiary, however, the amount withdrawn was entered in the accounts payable by the subsidiary and in the accounts receivable of Aireo, since substantially all profits of the subsidiaries were, by contract, payable only to the parent. Since petitioners were required to pay all profits except very small amounts to Aireo each year, it was obviously impossible for them to pay the accounts payable to Aireo. See note 15. Mr. C. E. Adams, Chairman of Air Reduction Corporation, testified that the assets of the subsidiaries represented by the accounts payable could be realized by Aireo only upon dissolution of the subsidiaries. In other words, there was never any expectation that the accounts would be paid prior to dissolution. Since no interest ran on these accounts, the “loans” were identical, except in name, with contributions of capital. See American Cigar Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 425; Hoyt v. Commissioner, 145 F. 2d 634; Van Clief v. Helvering, 135 F. 2d 254; Reading Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 306. Levy and Simonds, Stockholder Advances to Corporations — Are They Loans or Capital Contributions? 25 Taxes 127, 128, state that “intention to lend and expectation of repayment are necessary to the existence of a valid debt.” The fact that no interest ran on these “loans” is, of course, further indication that they are capital contributions. Berry Motor Car Co., B. T. A. Memo. Op. Dkt. 99962, Jan. 25, 1941. Title to gas cylinders used by petitioners, amounting in value to about $13,000,000, was retained by Aireo, but the cylinders were used by the subsidiaries without charge. Whether these, too, were capital contributions we find it unnecessary to decide in this case. Free use of the cylinders by petitioners, if they were merely on loan, may have distorted the subsidiaries’ income beyond the allocations made by the Commissioner, but that problem is not before us. Restatement of Agency, § 427. In United States v. Joliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U. S. 44 (1942), a lessee railroad agreed to pay rental payments to the lessor’s stockholders directly. The lessor thereafter carried on no active business. It was nevertheless held taxable on the income received by its stockholders, since they received the payments only because they held its stock. Art. 22 (a)-l of Treasury Regulations 101, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1938, provides: “Art. 22(a)-l. What included, in gross income. — Gross income includes in general compensation for personal and professional services, business income, profits from sales of and dealings in property, interest, rent, dividends, and gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever, unless exempt from tax by law. (See sections 22(b) and 116.) In general, income is the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets. . . .” See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207 (1920); Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 519 (1921). In the case of a subsidiary who supplies the labor and the capital with which the income is earned, as is true of petitioners here, it can hardly be contended that it did not earn the income. Of course even a corporation which satisfies the usual tests of agency may be disregarded by the Commissioner if it is a sham or unreal. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 (1940); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935). Escaping taxation is not a “business” activity. See National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F. 2d 466. The two main purposes for the adoption by Aireo of the corporate subsidiary method of operation, as related by Mr. C. E. Adams, Chairman of Air Reduction Corp., were these: “Frankly, in 1918 and still, Air Reduction, Inc., was and is a New York corporation. Even at that early date it became evident, as I already said, we were going to have plants scattered all over the United States. We didn’t want to domicile the parent company in 48 states of the Union and have us subject to service in all those states, that is, have the parent company subject to service in all those states, and that was distinctly a reason for using this corporate setup in connection with operations to be run as divisions, just as the contract sets forth. “Now, in addition to that, as a practical matter, out in the field and on the firing line, to have a representative, an officer, we will say, of Pure Carbonic, when trouble arises with a customer, a vice president of Pure Carbonic, who is not an officer of Air Reduction, Inc., at all, who goes in and straightens that out with that customer, increases his cudos [sic], helps him with all his negotiating efforts, with their competitors on the outside.” It is thus apparent that Aireo was attempting to avoid the status of principal vis-á-vis its subsidiaries. As principal it would have been subject to service of process through its agents; as owner of the subsidiary it was not. See Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 391 (1907); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925). The purpose of having officers of subsidiaries who could deal directly with customers does not indicate an agency relationship. On the contrary, the very purpose of the organization adopted was to lead customers to believe that they were dealing with top men in the company actually manufacturing and selling the products they purchased.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ENGLISH v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. No. 89-152. Argued April 25, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. M. Travis Payne argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Arthur M. Schiller. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Allen H. Feldman, Steven J. Mandel, and Jeffrey A. Hennemuth. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Rex E. Lee, Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Philip A. Lacovara, and Barton A. Smith. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Attorney General of North Carolina et al. by Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, pro se, John C. Brooks, pro se, Donnell Van Noppen III, and Michael G. Okun; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon; and for the Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association by J. Michael McGuinness and Paul Tobias. Nicholas S. Reynolds and Richard K. Walker filed a brief for the Nuclear Management and Resources Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Government Accountability Project by Louis A. Clark; and for the National Whistleblower Center by Stephen M. Kohn and Michael D. Kohn. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. In the particular context of this case we must decide whether federal law pre-empts a state-law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The suit is brought by an employee of a nuclear-fuels production facility against her employer and arises out of actions by the employer allegedly taken in retaliation for the employee’s nuclear-safety complaints. I Petitioner Vera M. English was employed from 1972 to 1984 as a laboratory technician at the nuclear-fuels production facility operated by respondent General Electric Company (GE) in Wilmington, N. C. In February 1984, petitioner complained to GE’s management and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) about several perceived violations of nuclear-safety standards at the facility, including the failure of her co-workers to clean up radioactive material spills in the laboratory. Frustrated by the company’s failure to address her concerns, petitioner on one occasion deliberately failed to clean a work table contaminated with a uranium solution during a preceding shift. Instead, she outlined the contaminated areas with red tape so as to make them conspicuous. A few days later, petitioner called her supervisor’s attention to the marked-off areas, which still had not been cleaned. As a result, work was halted while the laboratory was inspected and cleaned. Shortly after this episode, GE charged petitioner with a knowing failure to clean up radioactive contamination and temporarily assigned her to other work. On April 30, 1984, GE’s management informed petitioner that she would be laid off unless, within 90 days, she successfully bid for a position in an area of the facility where she would not be exposed to nuclear materials. On May 15, petitioner was notified of the company’s final decision affirming the disciplinary action taken against her. Petitioner did not find another position by July 30, and her employment was terminated. In August, petitioner filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor charging GE with violating § 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as added, 92 Stat. 2951, 42 U. S. C. § 5851(a) (1982 ed.), which makes it unlawful for an employer in the nuclear industry to “discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee . . . “(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced a proceeding under, this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; “(2) testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or; “(3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding . . . or in any other action to carry out the purposes of this Act or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.” In her charge, petitioner alleged that GE’s actions constituted unlawful employment discrimination in retaliation for her nuclear-safety complaints to GE’s management and to the NRC. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to whom the matter was referred found that GE had violated § 210(a) when it transferred and then discharged petitioner. The Secretary, however, dismissed the complaint as untimely because it had not been filed, as required by § 210(b)(1), within 30 days after the May 15 notice of the company’s final decision. In March 1987, petitioner filed a diversity action against GE in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Petitioner in four counts raised two claims, one for wrongful discharge and one for intentional infliction of emotional distress. With respect to the latter, petitioner alleged that she was suffering from severe depression and emotional harm as a result of GE’s “extreme and outrageous conduct.” App. 20. Petitioner alleged that, in addition to transferring and ultimately firing her, GE (1) had removed her from the laboratory position under guard “as if she were a criminal,” id., at 14; (2) had assigned her to degrading “make work” in her substitute assignment, ibid.; (3) had derided her as paranoid; (4) had barred her from working in controlled areas; (5) had placed her under constant surveillance during working hours; (6) had isolated her from coworkers, even during lunch periods; and (7) had conspired to charge her fraudulently with violations of safety and criminal laws. Id., at 14-17. Petitioner sought punitive as well as compensatory damages. Although the District Court concluded that petitioner had stated a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law, it nonetheless granted GE’s motion to dismiss. 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1017-1018 (1988). The court did not accept GE’s argument that petitioner’s claim fell within the field of nuclear safety, a field that, according to GE, had been completely pre-empted by the Federal Government. The court held, however, that petitioner’s claim was pre-empted because it conflicted with three particular aspects of § 210: (1) a provision that bars recovery under the section to any employee who “deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of [the Energy Reorganization Act,] or of the Atomic Energy Act,” § 210(g); (2) the absence of any provision generally authorizing the Secretary to award exemplary or punitive damages; and (3) the provisions requiring that a whistle-blower invoking the statute file an administrative complaint within 30 days after the violation occurs, and that the Secretary resolve the complaint within 90 days after its filing. See §§ 210(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). In the court’s view, Congress enacted this scheme to foreclose all remedies to whistle-blowers who themselves violate nuclear-safety requirements, to limit exemplary damages awards against the nuclear industry, and to guarantee speedy resolution of allegations of nuclear-safety violations— goals the court found incompatible with the broader remedies petitioner sought under state tort law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s emotional distress claim on the basis of the District Court’s reasoning. 871 F. 2d 22, 23 (1989). That court concluded that Congress had intended to foreclose nuclear whistle-blowers from pursuing state tort remedies and stated its belief that the District Court “correctly identified and applied the relevant federal and state law.” Id., at 23. Because of an apparent conflict with a decision of the First Circuit, see Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 881 F. 2d 1144 (1989), we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 1055 (1990). II A The sole question for our resolution is whether the Federal Government has pre-empted petitioner’s state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Our cases have established that state law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, in three circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 95-98 (1983). Preemption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent, see Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, 299 (1988), and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one. Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or where an Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Although this Court has not hesitated to draw an inference of field pre-emption where it is supported by the federal statutory and regulatory schemes, it has emphasized: “Where . . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted” includes areas that have “been traditionally occupied by the States,” congressional intent to supersede state laws must be “‘clear and manifest.’” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S., at 230. Finally, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Thus, the Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements, see, e. g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 747 (1981). It is undisputed that Congress has not explicitly preempted petitioner’s state-law tort action by inserting specific pre-emptive language into any of its enactments governing the nuclear industry. The District Court and apparently the Court of Appeals did not rest their decisions on a field preemption rationale either, but rather on what they considered an actual tension between petitioner’s cause of action and the congressional goals reflected in § 210. In this Court, respondent seeks to defend the judgment both on the lower courts’ rationale and on the alternative ground that petitioner’s tort claim is located within a field reserved for federal regulation—the field of nuclear safety. Before turning to the specific aspects of § 210 on which the lower courts based their decisions, we address the field pre-emption question. B This is not the first case in which the Court has had occasion to consider the extent to which Congress has pre-empted the field of nuclear safety. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm’n, 461 U. S. 190 (1983), the Court carefully analyzed the congressional enactments relating to the nuclear industry in order to decide whether a California law that conditioned the construction of a nuclear powerplant on a state agency’s approval of the plant’s nuclear-waste storage and disposal facilities fell within a pre-empted field. Although we need not repeat all of that analysis here, we summarize briefly the Court’s discussion of the actions Congress has taken in the nuclear realm and the conclusions it drew from these actions. Until 1954, the use, control, and ownership of all nuclear technology remained a federal monopoly. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq. (1982 ed.), stemmed from Congress’ belief that the national interest would be served if the Government encouraged the private sector to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal regulation and licensing. The Act implemented this policy decision by opening the door to private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear-power reactors under the strict supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 63 (1978). The AEC was given exclusive authority to license the transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of all nuclear materials. As was observed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 550 (1978): “The [Federal Government’s] prime area of concern in the licensing context . . . [was] national security, public health, and safety.” With respect to these matters, no significant role was contemplated for the States. In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to “clarify the respective responsibilities . . . of the States and the [Federal Government] with respect to the regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials,” 42 U. S. C. § 2021(a)(1) (1982 ed.), and generally to increase the States’ role. The 1959 amendments authorized the AEC, by agreements with state governors, to discontinue the Federal Government’s regulatory authority over certain nuclear materials under specified conditions. State regulatory programs adopted under the amendment were required to be “coordinated and compatible” with those of the AEC. § 2021(g). In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U. S. C. § 5801 et seq. (1982 ed.), which abolished the AEC and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority to the NRC. § 5841(f). The 1974 Act also expanded the number and range of safety responsibilities under the NRC’s charge. As was observed in Pacific Gas, the NRC does not purport to exercise its authority based upon economic considerations, but rather is concerned primarily with public health and safety. See 461 U. S., at 207. Finally, in 1978, Congress amended both the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy Reorganization Act. Pub. L. 95-601, 92 Stat. 2947. Among these amendments is § 210, 42 U. S. C. § 5851 (1982 ed.), which, as discussed above, encourages employees to report safety violations and provides a mechanism for protecting them against retaliation for doing so. After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions and legislative history, the Court in Pacific Gas concluded that “the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States.” 461 U. S., at 212. Although we ultimately determined that the California statute at issue there did not fall within the pre-empted field, we made clear our view that Congress intended that only “the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant.” Id., at 205. In the present dispute, respondent and petitioner disagree as to whether petitioner’s tort action falls within the boundaries of the pre-empted field referred to in Pacific Gas. Respondent maintains that the pre-empted field of “nuclear safety” is a large one, and that §210 is an integral part of it. Specifically, respondent contends that because the Federal Government is better able to promote nuclear safety if whistle-blowers pursue the federal remedy, the whole area marked off by § 210 should be considered part of the pre-empted field identified in Pacific Gas. Accordingly, respondent argues that all state-law remedies for conduct that is covered by § 210 are pre-empted by Congress’ decision to have the Federal Government exclusively regulate the field of nuclear safety. Petitioner and the United States as amicus curiae, on their part, contend that petitioner’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not pre-empted because the Court made clear in Pacific Gas that state laws supported by nonsafety rationales do not lie within the pre-empted field. They argue that since the state tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is supported by a nonsafety rationale— namely, the State’s “substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the kind of abuse of which [petitioner] complain[s],” see Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290, 302 (1977)—petitioner’s cause of action must be allowed to go forward. We think both arguments are somewhat wide of the mark. With respect to respondent’s contention, we find no “clear and manifest” intent on the part of Congress, in enacting § 210, to pre-empt all state tort laws that traditionally have been available to those persons who, like petitioner, allege outrageous conduct at the hands of an employer. Indeed, acceptance of respondent’s argument would require us to conclude that Congress has displaced not only state tort law, which is at issue in this case, but also state criminal law, to the extent that such criminal law is applied to retaliatory conduct occurring at the site of a nuclear employer. For example, if an employer were to retaliate against a nuclear whistle-blower by hiring thugs to assault the employee on the job (conduct literally covered by § 210), respondent’s position would imply that the state criminal law prohibiting such conduct is within the pre-empted field. We simply cannot believe that Congress intended that result. Instead, we think the District Court was essentially correct in observing that while § 210 obviously bears some relation to the field of nuclear safety, its “paramount” purpose was the protection of employees. See 683 F. Supp., at 1013. Accordingly, we see no basis for respondent’s contention that all state-law claims arising from conduct covered by the section are necessarily included in the pre-empted field. Nor, however, can we accept petitioner’s position, or the reading of Pacific Gas on which it is based. It is true that the holding in that case was premised, in part, on the conclusion that the California ban on nuclear construction was not motivated by safety concerns. Indeed, the majority of the Court suggested that a “state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the prohibited field.” 461 U. S., at 213. In other words, the Court defined the pre-empted field, in part, by reference to the motivation behind the state law. This approach to defining the field had some support in the text of the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, which provided, among other things, that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.” 42 U. S. C. § 2021(k) (1982 ed.) (emphasis added). But the Court did not suggest that a finding of safety motivation was necessary to place a state law within the pre-empted field. On the contrary, it took great pains to make clear that state regulation of matters directly affecting the radiological safety of nuclear-plant construction and operation, “even if enacted out of nonsafety concerns, would nevertheless [infringe upon] the NRC’s exclusive authority.” 461 U. S., at 212. Thus, even as the Court suggested that part of the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law in question, it made clear that another part of the field is defined by the state law’s actual effect on nuclear safety. Because it is clear that the state tort law at issue here is not motivated by safety concerns, the former portion of the field argument is not relevant. The real issue, then, is whether petitioner’s tort claim is so related to the “radiological safety aspects involved in the . . . operation of a nuclear [facility],” see id., at 205, that it falls within the pre-empted field. In addressing this issue, we must bear in mind that not every state law that in some remote way may affect the nuclear safety decisions made by those who build and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within the pre-empted field. We have no doubt, for instance, that the application of state minimum wage and child labor laws to employees at nuclear facilities would not be pre-empted, even though these laws could be said to affect tangentially some of the resource allocation decisions that might have a bearing on radiological safety. Instead, for a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels. We recognize that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress at issue here may have some effect on these decisions, because liability for claims like petitioner’s will attach additional consequences to retaliatory conduct by employers. As employers find retaliation more costly, they will be forced to deal with complaints by whistle-blowers by other means, including altering radiological safety policies. Nevertheless, we believe that this effect is neither direct nor substantial enough to place petitioner’s claim in the pre-empted field. This result is strongly suggested by the decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 (1984). The Court there held that a claim for punitive damages in a state tort action arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear facility did not fall within the pre-empted field discussed in Pacific Gas. The Court reached this result notwithstanding the “tension between the conclusion that [radiological] safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a State may nevertheless award damages [including punitive damages] based on its own law of liability” governing unsafe working conditions. 464 U. S., at 256. Although the decision in Silkwood was based in substantial part on legislative history suggesting that Congress did not intend to include in the pre-empted field state tort remedies for radiation-based injuries, see id., at 251-256, we think it would be odd, if not irrational, to conclude that Congress intended to include tort actions stemming from retaliation against whistle-blowers in the pre-empted field but intended not to include tort actions stemming from radiation damage suffered as a result of actual safety violations. Potential liability for the kind of claim at issue in Silkwood will affect radiological safety decisions more directly than will potential liability under the kind of claim petitioner raises, because the tort claim in Silkwood attaches additional consequences to safety violations themselves, rather than to employer conduct that merely arises from allegations of safety violations. Moreover, and related, the prospect of compensatory and punitive damages for radiation-based injuries will undoubtedly affect nuclear employers’ primary decisions about radiological safety in the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities far more substantially than will liability under the kind of claim petitioner asserts. It is thus not surprising that we find no evidence of a “clear and manifest” intent on the part of Congress to pre-empt tort claims like petitioner’s. Cf. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 186 (1988) (increased workers’ compensation award for injury caused by a safety violation at a Government-owned nuclear facility is “incidental regulatory pressure” that Congress finds acceptable). Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner’s claim does not lie within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety. c We now turn to the question whether, as the lower courts concluded, petitioner’s claim conflicts with particular aspects of § 210. On its face, the section does no more than grant a federal administrative remedy to employees in one industry against one type of employer discrimination—retaliation for whistle-blowing. Ordinarily, the mere existence of a federal regulatory or enforcement scheme, even one as detailed as § 210, does not by itself imply pre-emption of state remedies. The Court has observed: “Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however, that every federal statute ousts all related state law. . . . Instead, we must look for special features warranting pre-emption.” Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 719 (1985). Here, the District Court identified three “special features” of § 210 that it believed were incompatible with petitioner’s claim. The District Court relied first on § 210(g), which provides that “Subsection (a) of this section [the prohibition on employer retaliation] shall not apply” where an employee “deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of this Act or of the Atomic Energy Act.” According to the District Court and respondent, this section reflects a congressional desire to preclude all relief, including state remedies, to a whistle-blower who deliberately commits a safety violation referred to in § 210(g). Permitting any state-law claim based on whistle-blowing retaliation, the court reasoned, would frustrate this congressional objective. We do not agree. As an initial matter, we note that the text of § 210(g) specifically limits its applicability to the remedy provided by § 210(a) and does not suggest that it bars state-law tort actions. Nor does the legislative history of § 210 reveal a clear congressional purpose to supplant state-law causes of action that might afford broader relief. Indeed, the only explanation for any of the statute’s remedial limitations is the Committee Report’s statement that employees who deliberately violate nuclear-safety requirements would be denied protection under § 210(g) “[i]n order to avoid abuse of the protection afforded under this section.” S. Rep. No. 95-848, p. 30 (1978) (emphasis added). In any event, even if the District Court and respondent are correct in concluding that Congress wanted those who deliberately commit nuclear-safety violations, as defined under § 210(g), to be denied all remedies against employer retalia tion, this federal interest would be served by pre-empting state law only to the extent that it afforded recovery to such violators. See Norris v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 881 F. 2d 1144, 1150 (CA1 1989). In the instant case, the ALJ found that petitioner had not deliberately committed a safety violation within the meaning of § 210(g), App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, and neither the Secretary nor the lower courts have suggested otherwise. Thus, barring petitioner’s tort action would not even serve the federal interest the lower courts and respondent have gleaned from their reading of this section. The District Court also relied on the absence in § 210 of general authorization for the Secretary to award exemplary damages against employers who engage in retaliatory conduct. The District Court concluded, and respondent now argues, that this absence implies a congressional intent to bar a state action, like petitioner’s, that permits such an award. As the District Court put it, § 210 reflects “an informed judgment [by Congress] that in no circumstances should a nuclear whistler blower receive punitive damages when fired or discriminated against because of his or her safety complaints.” 683 F. Supp., at 1014. We believe the District Court and respondent have read too much into Congress’ decision not to authorize exemplary damages for most § 210 violations. First, even with respect to actions brought under § 210, the District Court was incorrect in stating that “in no circumstances” will a nuclear whistle-blower receive punitive damages; § 210(d) authorizes a district court to award exemplary damages in enforcement proceedings brought by the Secretary. Moreover, and more importantly, we think the District Court failed to follow this Court’s teaching that “[o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law.” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 105 (1989). Absent some specific suggestion in the text or legislative history of § 210, which we are unable to find, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to pre-empt all state actions that permit the recovery of exemplary damages. Finally, we address the District Court’s holding that the expeditious timeframes provided by Congress for the processing of § 210 claims reflect a congressional decision that no whistle-blower should be able to recover under any other law after the time for filing under § 210 has expired. The District Court reasoned, and respondent agrees, that if a state-law remedy is available after the time for filing a § 210 complaint has run, a whistle-blower will have less incentive to bring a § 210 complaint. As a result, the argument runs, federal regulatory agencies will remain unaware of some safety violations and retaliatory behavior and will thus be unable to ensure radiological safety at nuclear facilities. We cannot deny that there is some force to this argument, but we do not believe that the problem is as great as respondent suggests. First, many, if not most, retaliatory incidents come about as a response to safety complaints that employees register with federal regulatory agencies. The Federal Government thus is already aware of these safety violations, whether or not the employee invokes the remedial provisions of § 210. Also, we are not so sure as respondent seems to be that employees will forgo their § 210 options and rely solely on state remedies for retaliation. Such a prospect is simply too speculative a basis on which to rest a finding of pre-emption. The Court has observed repeatedly that pre-emption is ordinarily not to be implied absent an “actual conflict.” See, e. g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 533 (1912). The “teaching of this Court’s decisions . . . enjoin[s] seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists.” Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 446 (1960). III We conclude that petitioner’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not fall within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases. Nor does it conflict with any particular aspect of § 210. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Although, technically, petitioner was placed on a layoff status on July 30, and retained certain benefits and recall rights at that point, as a practical matter she no longer was employed by GE after that date. If an employee believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of the statute, he may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days after the violation occurs. § 210(b)(1). The Secretary then must investigate the alleged violation, hold a public hearing, and, within 90 days of receiving the complaint, issue an order that either provides or denies relief. § 210(b)(2)(A). If a violation is found, the Secretary may order reinstatement with backpay, award compensatory damages, and require the violator to pay the employee’s costs and attorney’s fees. § 210(b)(2)(B). Any person adversely affected by an order of the Secretary may obtain judicial review in the appropriate United States court of appeals, and either the Secretary or the complainant may seek enforcement of the Secretary’s order in United States district court. §§ 210(c) through (e). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision but remanded the case for consideration of petitioner’s separate claim that she was subjected to a continuing course of retaliatory harassment after the May 15 disciplinary decision. English v. Whitfield, 858 F. 2d 957 (1988). Upon remand, the ALJ concluded that that claim, also, should be dismissed as time barred. The ALJ’s recommended decision on this issue is still pending before the Secretary. The District Court ruled that petitioner had not made out a claim under state law for wrongful discharge. Because petitioner has not appealed that ruling, the wrongful-discharge claim is not now before us. By referring to these three categories, we should not be taken to mean that they are rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation. Nevertheless, because we previously have adverted to the three-category framework, we invoke and apply it here. In this regard, we note that the enforcement and implementation of § 210 was entrusted by Congress not to the NRC—the body primarily responsible for nuclear safety regulation—but to the Department of Labor. Two Justices thought that since the California statute at issue in Pacific Gas was not motivated by safety concerns, there was no reason for the majority to discuss this portion of the field argument there either. See 461 U. S., at 223-224. Whether the suggestion of the majority in Pacific Gas that legislative purpose is relevant to the definition of the pre-empted field is part of the holding of that case is not an issue before us today because, as discussed above, even if safety motivation is relevant, petitioner’s broad suggestion that safety motivation is necessary to a finding that a particular state law falls within the occupied field lacks merit. Respondent relies, see Brief for Respondent 45-49, on decisions construing the pre-emptive effect of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., to argue that petitioner’s claim falls within the pre-empted field. We regard this reliance as misplaced. To begin with, the NLRA, unlike statutes governing the nuclear-employment field, comprehensively deals with labor-management relations from the inception of organizational activity through the negotiation of a collective-bargaining agreement. Moreover, special factors support the conclusion that pre-emption of state labor relations law is warranted—specifically, Congress’ perception that the NLRA was needed because state legislatures and courts were unable to provide an informed and coherent labor policy. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 286 (1971).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

YOUR HOME VISITING NURSE SERVICES, INC. v. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES No. 97-1489. Argued December 2,1998 Decided February 23, 1999 Diana L. Gustin argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, John P. Schnitker, Harriet S. Robb, Bruce R. Granger, and Henry R. Goldberg Denise Rios Rodrigmz and Amy Blumberg Hafey filed a brief for the American Hospital Association et al. as amici curiae. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Medicare Act, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 290, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. II), the Secretary of Health and Human Services reimburses the providers of covered health services to Medicare beneficiaries, see §§ 1395f(b)(l), 1395h, 1395x(v)(l)(A). A provider seeking such reimbursement submits a yearly cost report to a fiscal intermediary (generally a private insurance company) that acts as the Secretary’s agent. See 42 CFR § 405.1801(b) (1997). The intermediary analyzes the cost report and issues a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR) determining the amount of reimbursement to which the provider is entitled for the year. See §405.1803. As is relevant here, a dissatisfied provider has two ways to get this determination revised. First, a provision of the Medicare Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo, allows a provider to appeal, within 180 days, to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (Board) — an administrative review panel that has the power to conduct an evidentiary hearing and affirm, modify, or reverse the intermediary’s NPR determination. The Board’s decision is subject to judicial review in federal district court. § 1395oo(f). Second, one of the Secretary’s regulations, 42 CFR §405.1885 (1997), permits a provider to request the intermediary, within three years, to reopen the reimbursement determination. Petitioner Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc., owns and operates several entities that provide home health care services to Medicare beneficiaries. Petitioner submitted cost reports for the year 1989 to its fiscal intermediary, and did not seek administrative review of the resulting NPRs within 180 days. Within three years, however, it did ask the intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination on the ground that “new and material” evidence demonstrated entitlement to additional compensation. The intermediary denied the request. Petitioner sought to appeal that denial to the Board, but the Board dismissed the appeal on the ground that §405.1885 divested it of jurisdiction to review an intermediary’s refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. Petitioner then brought the instant action in Federal District Court, seeking review of the Board’s dismissal and of the intermediary’s refusal to reopen. In an unpublished opinion, the District Court agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the refusal to reopen, and rejected petitioner’s alternative contention that the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1381, or the mandamus statute, § 1361, gave the District Court jurisdiction to review the intermediary’s refusal directly. It accordingly dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 182 F. 3d 1135 (CA6 1997). We granted certiorari. 524 U. S. 925 (1998). I The primary issue in this case is whether the Board has jurisdiction to review a fiscal intermediary’s refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination. The regulation that authorizes reopening provides that “[j]urisdietion for reopening a determination . . . rests exclusively with that administrative body that rendered the last determination or decision.” 42 CFR § 405.1885(c) (1997). In this litigation, the Secretary defends the position set forth in the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual §2926, App. A, ¶ B.4 (Sept. 1993): “A refosal by the intermediary to grant a reopening requested by the provider is not appealable to the Board, pursuant to 42 CFR § 405.1885(c)_” The Secretary construes the' regulation to mean that where, as here, the intermediary is the body that rendered the last determination with respect to the cost reports at issue, review by the Board of the intermediary’s refusal to reopen would divest the intermediary of its “exclusiv[e]” “[jjurisdiction for reopening a determination.” Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that “jurisdiction” in § 405.1885(c) refers only to original jurisdiction over the reopening question, and not to appellate jurisdiction to review the intermediary’s refusal. Even if it should win on this point, however, petitioner would only establish that the Board’s otherwise extant appellate jurisdiction has not been excluded; it would still have to establish that the Board’s appellate jurisdiction is somewhere conferred. Another regulation, §405.1889, says that an intermediary’s affirmative decision to reopen and revise a reimbursement determination “shall be considered a separate and distinct determination” to which the regulations authorizing appeal to the Board are applicable; but it says nothing about appeal of a refusal to reopen. Petitioner must thus establish the Board’s appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the unelabo-rated text of the Medicare Act itself. Petitioner relies upon 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(l)(A)(i), which says that a provider may obtain a hearing before the Board with respect to a cost report if the provider “is dissatisfied with a final determination of. .. its fiscal intermediary .. . as to the amount of total program reimbursement due the provider ... for the period covered by such report. . . .” Petitioner maintains that the refusal to reopen a reimbursement determination constitutes a separate “final determination ... as to the amount of total program reimbursement due the provider.” The Secretary, on the other hand, maintains that this phrase does not include a refusal to reopen, which is not a “final determination ... as to the amount,” but rather the refusal to make a new determination. The Secretary’s reading of § 1395oo(a)(l)(A)(i) frankly seems to us the more natural — but it is in any event well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, and hence entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). The reasonableness of the Secretary’s construction of the statute is farther confirmed by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977), in which we held that § 205(g) of the Social Security Act does not authorize judicial review of the Secretary’s decision not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for benefits. In reaching this conclusion we relied, in part, upon two considerations: that the opportunity to reopen a benefit adjudication was afforded only by regulation and not by the Social Security Act itself; and that judicial -review of a reopening denial would frustrate the statutory purpose of imposing a 60-day limit on judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on an initial claim for benefits. Id., at 108. Similar considerations apply here. The right of a provider to seek reopening exists only by grace of the Secretary, and the statutory purpose of imposing a 180-day limit on the right to seek Board review of NPRs, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(a)(3), would be frustrated by permitting requests to reopen to be reviewed indefinitely. Finally, we do not think that the Secretary’s position is inconsistent with 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A)(ii), which provides that the Secretary’s cost-reimbursement regulations shall “provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments where, for a provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate reimbursement produced by the methods of determining costs proves to be either inadequate or excessive.” Petitioner asserts that the reopening regulations, as construed by the Secretary, do not create a “suitable” procedure for making “retroactive corrective adjustments” because an intermediary’s refusal to reopen a determination is not subject to administrative review. In support of this assertion, petitioner decries the “double standard” inherent in a procedure that allows the intermediary to reopen (during the 8-year period) for the purpose of recouping overpayments, but to deny reopening when alleged underpayments are at issue. This argument fails for two reasons. First, and most importantly, petitioner’s construction of § lS95x(v)(l)(A)(ii) is inconsistent with our decision in Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402 (1993), in which we held that the Secretary reasonably construed clause (ii) to refer to the year-end reconciliation of monthly payments to providers, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395g, with the total amount of program reimbursement determined by the intermediary. Although we did not specifically consider the procedure for reopening determinations after the year’s books are closed, we think our conclusion there — that clause (ii) refers to the year-end book balancing — forecloses petitioner’s contention that clause (ii) requires any particular procedure for reopening reimbursement determinations. And second, the procedures for obtaining reimbursement would not be “unsuitable” simply because an intermediary’s refusal to reopen is not administratively reviewable. Medicare providers already have the right under § 1395oo(a)(3) to appeal an intermediary’s reimbursement determination to the Board. Title 42 CFR §405.1885 (1997) generously gives them a second chance to get the decision changed — this time at the hands of the intermediary itself, but without the benefit of administrative review. That is a “suitable” procedure, especially in light of the traditional rule of administrative law that an agency’s refusal to reopen a closed case is generally “ ‘committed to agency discretion by law”’ and therefore exempt from judicial review. See ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 282 (1987). As for the alleged “double standard,” given the administrative realities we would not be shocked by a system in which underpayments could never 'be the basis for reopening. The few dozen fiscal intermediaries often need three years within which to discover overpay-ments in the tens of thousands of NPRs that they issue, while each of the tens of thousands of sophisticated Medicare-provider recipients of these NPRs is generally capable of identifying an underpayment in its own NPR within the 180-day time period specified in 42 U. S. C. § 1895oo(a)(3). Petitioner’s invocation of gross unfairness is also refuted by the Secretary’s representation that fiscal intermediaries grant between 30 and 40 percent of providers’ requests to reopen reimbursement determinations. Brief for Respondent 27, n. 11. II We also reject petitioner’s fallback argument that it is entitled to judicial review of the intermediary’s refusal to reopen. First, judicial review under the federal-question statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, is precluded by 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), applicable to the Medicare Act by operation of § 1S95Ü, which provides that “[n]o action against... the [Secretary] or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331... of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subehapter.” Petitioner’s claim “arises under” the Medicare Act within the meaning of this provision because “'both the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation’ ” of the claim are the Medicare Act. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 615 (1984). Second, the lower courts properly declined to issue mandamus to order petitioner’s fiscal intermediary to reopen its 1989 reimbursement determination. Even if mandamus were available for claims arising under the Social Security and Medicare Acts, petitioner would still not be entitled to mandamus relief because it has not shown the existence of a “clear nondiscretionary duty,” id., at 616, to reopen the reimbursement determination at issue. The reopening regulations do not require reopening, but merely permit it: “A determination of an intermediary ... may be reopened .. . by such intermediary ... on the motion of the provider affected by such determination,” 42 CFR § 405.1885(a) (1997) (emphasis added). To be sure, the Secretary’s Medicare Reimbursement Provider Manual §2931.2 (Feb. 1985) does provide that “[wjhether or not the intermediary will reopen a determination, otherwise final, will depend upon whether (1) new and material evidence has been submitted, or (2) a clear and obvious error was made, or (3) the determination is found to be inconsistent with the law, regulations and rulings, or general instructions.” But we hardly think that this disjunctive listing of factors was meant to convert a discretionary function into a mandatory one. As to factor (1), for example, it seems to us inconceivable that the existence of new and material evidence would alone require reopening, no matter how unpersuasive that evidence might be. The present case, we might note, involves evidence that was already before the intermediary at the time of its decision. The holding of ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, supra, that the decision whether to reopen, at least where no new evidence is at issue, is “‘committed to agency discretion by law5” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, and hence unreviewable, see id., at 282, is squarely applicable. The last point alone would suffice to defeat petitioner’s suggestion that we grant it the relief it requests under the judicial-review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706. In addition, however, we have long held that this provision is not an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99 (1977). * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. The clause immediately following the quoted portion of the Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual reads “except for providers which are located within the jurisdiction of the U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where such a refusal to reopen is appealable.” §2926, App. A, ÍB.4. This exception obviously reflects, not an inconsistency in the Secretary’s position, but an acknowledgment of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of that position. See Oregon v. Bowen, 854 F. 2d 346 (1988). The relevant portion of § 205(g), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (1970 ed.), provided that “[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days ...See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S., at 108. The Secretary urges us to hold that mandamus is altogether unavailable to review claims arising under the Medicare Act, in light of the second sentence of 42 U. S. C. § 405(h), which provides that "[n]o findings of fact or decision of the [Secretary] shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as” provided in the Medicare Act itself. We have avoided deciding this issue in the past, see, e. g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 616-617 (1984), and we again find it unnecessary to reach it today.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RALSTON PURINA CO. et al. v. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 75-1015. Decided June 14, 1976 Per Curiam. This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge District Court setting aside and annulling a decision and order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 607 (WD Ky. 1975). In 1973, the railroads in southern territory, which lies south of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi, proposed new tariffs changing the method of calculating the through rates on vegetable oil, cake or meal, and related articles, which were subject to transit privileges at various points where animal, fish, and poultry feed using these ingredients was made and transshipped. Certain large feed manufacturers protested. The Commission found that the net effect of the new tariffs would be to increase the through rates on the articles involved and that the railroads had “not presented probative evidence in justification” of the new tariffs. Based on the testimony and evidence presented by the protestante the Commission found “strong support on this record for concluding that these shippers will divert a considerable portion of their feed traffic, from railroad to trucks, with the establishment of the proposed rule.” The result, the Commission found, would be “a net loss of revenue to the [railroads] despite the assessment of the higher rates and charges and thus will be self-defeating.” The Commission concluded that the railroads had not met their burden of proof that the proposed tariffs were just and reasonable under § 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 384, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §15(7), and required that the railroads cancel the schedule. 346 I. C. C. 579, 587-588 (1973). The District Court set aside and annulled the Commission order for want of substantial evidence to support it. The District Court considered the shippers’ evidence mere conjecture and self-serving and could not accept the Commission’s conclusion that the railroads would lose revenue from the new tariffs. It also thought it “un-controverted” that “the railroads have incurred a loss of revenue from the transportation of meal,” and therefore “clearly established that if there should be a diversion of meal traffic as predicted by the shippers, the carriers would actually be in a better financial position than at present.” 397 F. Supp., at 610. We reverse the judgment of the District Court. Con-cededly, there was detailed evidence with respect to the anticipated traffic diversion which the Commission credited and thought strongly supported its conclusion. The District Court exceeded its function in reweighing the testimony, which is primarily the task of the Commission. Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 23-24 (1942); Illinois C. R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 385 U. S. 57, 69 (1966). On the record before it, the District Court also erred in differing with the Commission and agreeing with the railroads with respect to the impact of the new tariffs on railroad revenue. The court relied on evidence which showed only that under the old rates the railroads sustained a loss on feed outbound from the transit points and which, as a railroad witness testified, Comm’n Tr. 28-29, did not relate to the net gain or loss on inbound meal shipments or on the through movement when both legs were considered together. Reversed. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION CO. v. KALO BRICK & TILE CO. No. 79-1336. Argued December 9, 1980 Decided March 9, 1981 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Bruce E. Johnson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Louis T. DuerincJc, James P. Daley, Stuart F. Gassner, and Frank W. Davis, Jr. M. Gene Blackburn argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Ned Alan Stockdale. Henri F. Bush argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Edwin S. Kneedler, Richard A. Allen, and Charles A. Stark. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Through the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments, Congress has granted to the Interstate' Commerce Commission authority to regulate various activities of interstate rail carriers, including their decisions to cease service on their branch lines. Under Iowa state law, a shipper by rail who is injured as the result of a common carrier’s.failure to provide adequate rail service has available several causes of action for damages. In this case we are called upon to decide whether these state-law actions may be asserted against a regulated carrier when the Commission has approved its decision to abandon the line in question. I Petitioner, an interstate common carrier by rail, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. For some time prior to April 1973, petitioner operated a 5.6-mile railroad branch line between the towns of Kalo and Fort Dodge in Iowa. Respondent operated a brick manufacturing plant near Kalo, and used petitioner’s railroad cars and branch line to transport its products to Fort Dodge and outward in interstate commerce. During the 1960’s, the tracks on the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line were damaged by three mud slides. Petitioner made repairs after the first two slides, but following the last slide in 1967, when portions of the embankment wholly vanished under the waters of the Des Moines River, petitioner decided to stop using the branch line. Petitioner instead leased part of another railroad’s parallel branch line to connect Kalo with Fort Dodge. In April 1973, the leased line was also damaged by a mud slide. By that time, respondent was the only shipper using the Kalo-Fort Dodge line. After inspecting the damage to the leased line, petitioner decided not to repair it. Petitioner then notified respondent that it would no longer provide service on the Kalo-Fort Dodge line, although it would continue to make cars available at Fort Dodge if respondent would ship its goods there by truck. Respondent determined that shipment by truck was not economically feasible, and notified its customers that it would complete existing contracts and then go out of business. In November 1973, petitioner filed with the Commission an application for a certificate declaring that the public convenience and necessity permitted it to abandon the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. The United States Government intervened in support of petitioner’s application. Respondent was the sole party appearing in opposition to the request, but failed to perfect its filing before the Commission. In a decision issued in April 1976, the Commission found that petitioner had abandoned the line due to conditions beyond its control and granted the request for a certificate. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. Abandonment, AB1, Sub. No. 24 (Jan. 11, 1976), App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. Respondent made no attempt to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act regarding judicial review of the Commission’s decision. Instead, while the abandonment request was still pending before the Commission, respondent filed this damages action against petitioner in state court. The complaint alleged that petitioner had violated Iowa Code §§ 479.3, 479.122 (1971) and state common law by refusing to provide cars on the branch line, by negligently failing to maintain the roadbed, and by tortiously interfering with respondent’s contractual relations with its customers. The state trial court, holding that the Interstate Commerce Act wholly preempted state law as to the matters in contention, dismissed the action. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that state abandonment law was not pre-empted and that the state and federal schemes represented “complimentary [sic], alternative means of relief for injured parties.” 295 N. W. 2d 467, 469 (1979). After the Supreme Court of Iowa denied petitioner’s application for review, we granted certiorari, 446 U. S. 951 (1980). We reverse. II Pre-emption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored “in the absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.” Florida Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963). See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 356 (1976). The underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine, as stated more than a century and a half ago, is that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that “interfere with or are contrary to, the laws of congress . . . .” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824). The doctrine does not and could not in our federal system withdraw from the States either the “power to regulate where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern” of federal law, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 243 (1959), or the authority to legislate when Congress could have regulated “a distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly adapted to local regulation, . . . but did not,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 68, n. 22 (1941). But when Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to its constitutional powers, then a court must find local law pre-empted by federal regulation whenever the “challenged state statute 'stands! as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649 (1971), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67. Making this determination “is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict.” Perez v. Campbell, supra, at 644. And in deciding whether any conflict is present, a court’s concern is necessarily with “the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra, at 243. The Interstate Commerce Act is among the most pervasive and comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes and has consequently presented recurring pre-emption questions from the time of its enactment. Since the turn of the century, we have frequently invalidated attempts by the States to impose on common carriers obligations that are plainly inconsistent with the plenary authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission or with congressional policy as reflected in the Act. These state regulations have taken many forms. For example, as early as 1907, the Court struck down a State’s common-law cause of action to challenge as unreasonable a rail common carrier’s rates because rate regulation was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, and a state-court action “would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act.” Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446. Similarly, in Transit Comm’n v. United States, 289 U. S. 121, 129 (1933), we held that the Interstate Commerce Commission’s statutory authority to regulate extensions of service was exclusive and therefore stripped a similar state commission of all power to act in the same area. More recently, in Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77 (1958), we held that a city ordinance requiring a license from a municipal authority before a railroad could transfer passengers, an activity also subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act, was facially invalid as applied to an interstate carrier. “[I]t would be inconsistent with [federal] policy,” we observed, “if local authorities retained the power to decide” whether the carriers could do what the Act authorized them to do. Id., at 87. The common rationale of these cases is easily stated: “[T]here can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and . . . the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive.” Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925). Consequently, state efforts to regulate commerce must fall when they conflict with or interfere with federal authority over the same activity. Ill In deciding whether respondent’s state-law damages action is pre-empted, we must determine what Congress has said about a carrier’s ability to abandon a line, what Iowa state law provides on the same subject, and whether the two are inconsistent. To these tasks we now turn. A The Interstate Commerce Commission has been endowed by Congress with broad power to regulate a carrier’s permanent or temporary cessation of service over lines used for interstate commerce. Under §§ 1 (4) and 1 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, recodified at 49 U. S. C. §§ 11101 (a) and 11121 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. HI), the Commission is empowered both to pass on the reasonableness of a carrier’s temporary suspension of its service and, if necessary, to order it resumed. See ICC v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 533 F. 2d 1025, 1027, n. 2 (CA8 1976); ICC v. Maine Central R. Co., 505 F. 2d 590, 593-594 (CA2 1974). In addition, and most relevant here, the Act endows the Commission with broad authority over abandonments, or permanent cessations of service. The Commission’s power to regulate abandonments by rail carriers stems from the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 477-478, which added to the Interstate Commerce Act a new § 1 (18), recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 10903 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). That section stated in pertinent part: “[N]o carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.” This section, we have said, must be “construed to make federal authority effective to the full extent that it has been exerted and with a view of eliminating the evils that Congress intended to abate.” Transit Comm’n v. United States, supra, at 128. Among those evils is “[m]ultiple control in respect of matters affecting [interstate railroad] transportation,” because such control, in the judgment of Congress, has proved “detrimental to the public interest.” 289 U. S., at 127. See Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., supra, at 87. Consequently, we have in the past concluded that the authority of the Commission to regulate abandonments is exclusive. Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, 346, n. 7 (1951). See Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 164-166 (1926). The Commission’s authority over abandonments is also plenary. So broad is this power that it extends even to approval of abandonment of purely local lines operated by regulated carriers when, in the Commission’s judgment, “the over-riding interests of interstate commerce requirfe] it.” Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939). The broad scope of the Commission’s authority under § 1 (18) has been clear since the Court first interpreted that provision in Colorado v. United States, supra. There, the Court rejected a challenge by the State of Colorado to the power of the Commission to grant a certificate permitting an abandonment of a wholly intrastate branch line operated' by an interstate carrier. Justice Bran-déis wrote for the Court: “Congress has power to assume not only some control, but paramount control, insofar as interstate commerce is involved. It may determine to what extent and in what manner intrastate service must be subordinated in order that interstate service may be adequately rendered. The power to make the determination inheres in the United States as an incident of its power over interstate commerce. The making of this determination involves an exercise of judgment upon the facts of the particular case. The authority to find the facts and to exercise thereon the judgment whether abandonment is consistent with public convenience and necessity, Congress conferred upon the Commission.” 271 U. S., at 165-166. The exclusive and plenary nature of the Commission’s authority to rule on carriers’ decisions to abandon lines is critical to the congressional scheme, which contemplates comprehensive administrative regulation of interstate commerce. In deciding whether to permit an abandonment, the Commission must balance “the interests of those now served by the present line on the one hand, and the interests of the carrier and the transportation system on the other.” Purcell v. United States, 315 U. S. 381, 384 (1942). Once the Commission has struck that balance, its conclusion is entitled to considerable deference. “The weight to be given to cost of a relocated line as against the adverse effects upon those served by the abandoned line is a matter which the experience of the Commission qualifies it to decide. And, under the statute, it is not a matter for judicial redecision.” Id., at 385. The breadth of the Commission’s statutory discretion suggests a congressional intent to limit judicial interference with the agency’s work. The Act in fact spells out with considerable precision the remedies available to a shipper who is injured either by the Commission’s approval of an abandonment or by a carrier’s abandoning a line without securing Commission approval. A shipper objecting to an abandonment may ask the Commission to investigate the carrier’s action. § 13 (1), recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 11701 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. III). A shipper may also oppose any request for abandonment filed before the Commission. 49 CFR § 1121.36 (1980). If ultimately dissatisfied with the Commission’s action, a shipper may seek review of its action in the appropriate court of appeals, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2321 (a), 2342 (5). In addition, at the time that this action was filed in state court, § 1 (20) of the Act expressly provided that a shipper believing a carrier’s abandonment was unlawful could seek an injunction against it. There is no provision in the Act for a civil damages action against a carrier for an abandonment that has been approved by the Commission. The structure of the Act thus makes plain that Congress intended that an aggrieved shipper should seek relief in the first instance from the Commission. In sum, the construction of the applicable federal law is straightforward and unambiguous. Congress granted to the Commission plenary authority to regulate, in the interest of interstate commerce, rail carriers’ cessations of service on their lines. And at least as to abandonments, this authority is exclusive. Equally clear are the meanings of the state statutory and common-law obligations that petitioner seeks to challenge. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that Iowa Code §§ 479.3 and 479.122 (1971) “impos[e] on the railroads the unqualified and unconditional duty to furnish car service and transportation to all persons who apply,” and that this state-law duty was not pre-empted by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act imposing a similar duty. 295 N. W. 2d, at 469. According to respondent’s complaint in the state court, petitioner’s failure to carry out these “duties of a common carrier” injured it in the amount of $350,000. App. 78. The state court also held that respondent could maintain its causes of action for common-law negligence based on petitioner’s alleged failure to maintain the roadbed and for common-law tort for purported interference with contractual relations with respondent's customers. 295 N. W. 2d, at 471-472. The negligence count as outlined in respondent’s complaint claimed $150,000 in damages based on petitioner’s alleged failure “to maintain the track in a proper manner” and “to properly maintain the railroad right-of-way.” App. 79-80. The tort count alleged that “at all times material hereto, it was the avowed and publicized purpose of [petitioner] to close all unproductive lines under its control,” and that this plan interfered with respondent’s contracts and damaged it in the amount of $100,000. Id., at 81. These, then, are the claims that the Iowa Court of Appeals held properly cognizable in the state courts. B Armed with these authoritative constructions of both the federal regulatory scheme and the state law, we must next determine whether they conflict. The Iowa Court of Appeals held that the two remedies for abandonment merely complemented one another. We disagree. Both the letter and the spirit of the Interstate Commerce Act are inconsistent with Iowa law as construed by that court. The decision below amounts to a holding that a State can impose sanctions upon a regulated carrier for doing that which only the Commission, acting pursuant to the will of Congress, has the power to declare unlawful or unreasonable. Cf. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S., at 87. It is true that not one of the three counts of respondent’s state-court complaint mentions the word “abandonment,” but compliance with the intent of Congress cannot be avoided by mere artful pleading. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the instant litigation represents little more than an attempt by a disappointed shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was denied by the Commission. Respondent’s main cause of action alleges an improper failure to furnish cars on the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. In Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404 (1925), this Court confronted the precise question whether a state-court damages action would lie for a carrier’s failure to furnish cars to carry a shipper’s goods in interstate commerce. The Court held that because the lumber shipped by the carrier moved in interstate, rather than intrastate, commerce, “[t]he state law has no application . . . Id., at 408. In the instant case, the bricks that respondent here shipped in petitioner’s cars, like the lumber in Missouri Pacific, were moving in interstate commerce. Respondent in essence seeks to use state law to compel petitioner to furnish cars in spite of the congressional decision to leave regulation of car service to the Commission. But “[t]he duty to provide cars is not absolute,” and the law “ 'exacts only what is reasonable of the railroads under the existing circumstances.’ ” Milmine Grain Co. v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 352 I. C. C. 575, 585 (1976), citing Elgin Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 277 F. Supp. 247, 250 (ED Tenn. 1967). See Midland Valley R. Co. v. Barkley, 276 U. S. 482, 484 (1928). The judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness belongs exclusively to the Commission. Cf. Purcell v. United States, 315 U. S., at 384-385. It would vitiate the overarching congressional intent of creating “an efficient and nationally integrated railroad system,” ICC v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 315 U. S. 373, 376 (1942), to permit the State of Iowa to use the threat of damages to require a carrier to do exactly what the Commission is empowered to excuse. A system under which each State could, through its courts, impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service requirements could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act. The conclusion that a suit under state law conflicts with the purposes of the Act is merely bolstered when, as here, the Commission has actually approved the abandonment. In reaching its decision, the Commission expressly found that “the cessation of service occurred because of conditions over which [petitioner] had no control.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a. Because Congress granted the exclusive discretion to make such judgments to the Commission,, there is no further role that the state court could play. Even though the approval did not come until after respondent filed its civil suit, it would be contrary to the language of the statute to permit litigation challenging the lawfulness of the carrier’s actions to go forward when the Commission has expressly found them to be reasonable. See 49 U. S. C. § 1 (17)(a), recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 10501 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III). We therefore hold that Iowa’s statutory cause of action for failure to furnish cars cannot be asserted against an interstate rail carrier on the facts of this case. The same reasoning applies to respondent’s other asserted causes of action, because they, too, are essentially attempts to litigate the issues underlying petitioner’s abandonment of the Kalo-Fort Dodge line. The questions respondent seeks to raise in the state court — whether roadbed maintenance was negligent or reasonable and whether petitioner abandoned its line with some tortious motive — are precisely the sorts of concerns that Congress intended the Commission to address in weighing abandonment requests from the carriers subject to its regulation. See Purcell v. United States, supra, at 385; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 35, 42 (1931). That alone might be enough to prohibit respondent from raising them in a state court. Cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Bros. Coal Mining Co., 238 U. S. 456, 469 (1915) (no damages action may be brought for car distribution practices until Commission has ruled them unlawful). But we need not decide whether a state-court suit is barred when the Commission is empowered to rule on the underlying issues, because here the Commission has actually addressed the matters respondent wishes to raise in state court. The Commission’s order approving the abandonment application found that after the first two landslides, petitioner “made necessary repairs to enable continuation of service,” that further repairs after the 1967 slide would not have been “sufficient to insure continuous operations,” that the abandonment was not “willful,” that respondent has no right to “insist that a burdensome line be maintained solely for its own use,” and that “continued operation of the line would be an unnecessary burden on [petitioner] and on interstate commerce.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-36a. These findings by the Commission, made pursuant to the authority delegated by Congress, simply leave no room for further litigation over the matters respondent seeks to raise in state court. Consequently, we hold that on the facts of this case, the Interstate Commerce Act . also pre-empts Iowa’s common-law causes of action for damages stemming from a carrier’s negligence and tort when the judgments of fact and of reasonableness necessary to the decision have already been made by the Commission. Nothing in our decision in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U. S. 121 (1915), compels a contrary-result. But because both respondents and the Iowa Court of Appeals rely heavily on its language, we discuss the case in some detail. In Puritan, this Court was called upon for the first time to interpret what was then § 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act as it related to a carrier’s duty to furnish cars. That section, which survives without substantive change in the Act as recodified, provided that nothing in the Act “shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies.” Relying on this language, this Court held that a shipper could pursue its state common-law remedies for failure to provide cars when the carrier had previously agreed to provide them, as long as “there is no administrative question involved.” Id., at 131-132. Without this provision, the opinion explained, “it might have been claimed that, Congress having entered the field, the whole subject of liability of carrier to shippers in interstate commerce had been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the state courts,” so § 22 was added to make plain that the Act “was not intended to deprive the state courts of their general and concurrent jurisdiction.” Id., at 130. The Iowa Court of Appeals relied on this broad-sounding language in concluding that respondent’s causes of action survived the enactment of and the various amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. Respondent urges essentially the same point in this Court. This analysis fails to take into account the fact that the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over abandonments arises from the Transportation Act of 1920, and its authority over car service from the Esch Car Service Act, ch. 23, 40 Stat. 101. Our decision in Puritan preceded these amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, so it can hardly be viewed as an authoritative construction of the Act as amended. And even assuming for the sake of argument the continuing validity of that opinion’s reasoning, it does not control the disposition of the instant case. The Court in Puritan expressly noted that the matters presented to the state courts for decision involved no questions of law or questions calling for an administrative judgment, and, in particular, no issue as to the reasonableness of the carrier’s policies. 237 U. S., at 131-132. Instead, the state court was called upon to decide only the factual question whether the railroad had carried out the duties that it had agreed to undertake. The Court’s opinion in Puritan recognized the importance of this distinction: “[I]t must be borne in mind that there are two forms of discrimination, — one in the rule and the other in the manner of its enforcement; one in promulgating a discriminatory rule, the other in the unfair enforcement of a reasonable rule. In a suit where the rule of practice itself is attacked as unfair or discriminatory, a question is raised which calls for the exercise of the judgment and discretion of the administrative power which has been vested by Congress in the Commission. . . . Until that body has declared the practice to be discriminatory and unjust, no court has jurisdiction of a suit against an interstate carrier for damages occasioned by its enforcement. . . . “But if the carrier’s rule, fair on its face, has been unequally applied, and the suit is for damages, occasioned by its violation or discriminatory enforcement, there is no administrative question involved, the courts being called upon to decide a mere question of fact.” Ibid. Here, we face the reverse of the situation that gave rise to the Puritan case. The questions presented to the state court in the instant litigation all involve evaluations of the reasonableness of petitioner’s abandonment of the branch line. These issues call for the type of administrative evaluations and conclusions that Congress has entrusted to the informed discretion of the Commission. See Midland Valley R. Co., v. Barkley, 276 U. S., at 484-486; Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 291 (1922). Under the Puritan analysis, “no court has jurisdiction” of a suit such as respondent’s until the Commission “has declared the practice to be . . . unjust.” 237 U. S., at 131. And the Commission, in an exercise of its discretion, has done precisely the opposite; it has decided that the abandonment was proper. Respondent has chosen not to seek judicial review of the Commission’s judgment through the means provided by Congress. For all of these reasons, to the extent that the Puritan analysis has any application here, it supports petitioner’s and the Commission’s arguments that the Iowa courts lack jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s suit for damages arising from petitioner’s abandonment of the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. Our decision today does not leave a shipper in respondent’s position without a remedy if it is truly harmed. On the contrary, an aggrieved shipper is still free to pursue the avenues for relief set forth in the statute. Respondent could have gone to the Commission and challenged petitioner’s refusal to provide service before any abandonment application was filed, but it did not. After petitioner filed its request for a certificate, respondent had the opportunity to present evidence to the Commission in support of its allegation, but failed to do so. Having lost its battle there, respondent could have followed the congressionally prescribed path by seeking review in the appropriate United States court of appeals. This, too, respondent failed to do. The Act creates no other express remedies for a shipper who is damaged by a carrier’s abandonment of a line. In particular, nothing in the Act suggests that Congress contemplated permitting a shipper to bring a civil damages action in state court. And such a right to sue, with its implied threat of sanctions for failure to comply with what the courts of each State consider reasonable policies, is plainly contrary to the purposes of the Act. We are thus not free to assume that it has been preserved. IV We hold that the Interstate Commerce Act precludes a shipper from pressing a state-court action for damages against a regulated carrier when the Interstate Commerce Commission, in approving the carrier’s application for abandonment, reaches the merits of the matters the shipper seeks to raise in state court. We reserve for another day the question whether such a cause of action lies when no application is made to the Commission. The judgment of the Iowa Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Respondent used petitioner’s branch line only for the shipment of bricks that were traveling in interstate commerce. All of the bricks that respondent shipped intrastate traveled by truck. It is undisputed that at this time, petitioner had not made a decision whether to abandon the Kalo-Fort Dodge branch line. An abandonment “is characterized by an intention of the carrier to cease permanently or indefinitely all transportation service on the relevant line.” ICC v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 533 F. 2d 1025, 1028 (CA8 1976). See ICC v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 501 F. 2d 908, 911 (CA8 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 972 (1975). An embargo, by contrast, is a temporary emergency suspension of service initiated by filing of a notice with the Commission. ICC v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., supra, at 1027, n. 2. In particular, respondent “did not file a verified statement in opposition as required,” and was therefore “deemed to be in default and entitled to no further formal proceedings.” Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. Abandonment, AB1, Sub. No. 24 (Jan. 11, 1976), App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a-35a. .The reason for this default, according to respondent, was that it had gone out of business and therefore had no continuing interest in forcing petitioner to continue its service on the branch line. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2321 (a), 2342 (5), 2343, 2344. Iowa Code §479.3 (1971) provides in relevant part: “Every railway corporation shall upon reasonable notice, and within a reasonable time, furnish suitable cars to any and all persons who may apply therefor, for the transportation of any and all kinds of freight, and receive and transport such freight with all reasonable dispatch . . . .” Iowa Code §479.122 (1971) provides: “Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable for all damages sustained by any person, including employees of such corporation, in consequence of the neglect of the agents, or by any mismanagement of the engineers, or other employees thereof, and in consequence of the willful wrongs, whether of commission or omission, of such agents, engineers, or other employees, when such wrongs are in any manner connected with the use and operation of any railway on or about which they shall be employed, and no contract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding.” The conclusion that these statutes create a state-court damages action for failure to provide proper service is not a new one under Iowa law. See, e. g., Baird Bros. v. Minneapolis & St. L. B., 181 Iowa 1104, 165 N. W. 412 (1917). After respondent filed its state-court action, petitioner sought to remove the case to federal court, but the federal court, finding that diversity of citizenship was lacking, remanded the case to state court. The Iowa Court of Appeals correctly held that this federal-court ruling had no relevance to its inquiry into whether the pre-emption doctrine barred the state courts from exercising their jurisdiction. 295 N. W. 2d 467, 468-469 (1979). See Brancadora v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn., 344 F. 2d 933, 935 (CA9 1965); Alaska v. K & L Distributors, Inc., 318 F. 2d 498, (CA9 1963). The Iowa court also held the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, in the sense of initial deferral to the expertise of the Commission, had no application to this litigation. 295 N. W. 2d, at 471-472. Petitioner, as well as the United States and the Commission as amici curiae, argues that the primary-jurisdiction doctrine precludes respondent’s suit on the facts of this case, but we have no occasion to address that question. Although we agree with petitioner and amici that the Commission has special expertise in the matters respondent wishes to raise in state court, see infra, at 326-327, and n. 14, we do not rely on the primary-jurisdiction doctrine. As we have stated in interpreting another provision of the Interstate Commerce Act: “[T]he survival of a judicial remedy . . . cannot be determined on the presence or absence in the Commission of primary jurisdiction to decide the basic question on which relief depends. Survival depends on the effect of the exercise of the remedy upon the statutory scheme of regulation.” Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U. S. 84, 89 (1962). Even if the primary-jurisdiction doctrine were applicable here, it would at best require the state courts to postpone any action until the Commission had an opportunity to address the administrative questions raised in the civil damages action. But here, the Commission has actually ruled, and the state trial on liability and damages has not yet taken place. Consequently, the requirements of the doctrine have been complied with in spirit, even if not through any intent of respondent. We save for a later case a decision on the proper application of the primary-jurisdiction doctrine when the Commission has not yet ruled. Under Pub. L. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337, the Interstate Commerce Act and its various amendments have been completely recodified as Subtitle IV of Title 49 of the United States Code. In the main, this recodi-fication is without substantive change. In this opinion, we cite to the original Act for ease in referring to the decision below and to our precedents. Where appropriate, we also give parallel cites to the Act as recodified. A carrier who files an application for a certificate permitting abandonment must make reasonable efforts to give notice to all shippers who have used the line in the past 12 months. 49 U. S. C. § 10904 (a) (3) (D) (1976 ed., Supp. III). See In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 611 F. 2d 662, 668 (CA7 1979). Section 1 (20), which was, like § 1 (18), added by the Transportation Act of 1920, provided that “any court of competent jurisdiction” could enjoin a carrier’s abandonment of a line when application for approval has not been made to the Commission. The right of a private party to seek an injunction was repealed by the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 127-130. Under the Act as amended and recodified, only the United States, the government of a State, or the Commission itself may sue to enjoin most illegal abandon-ments. See 49 U. S. C. §§ 11505 (action by state), 11702 (action by the Commission), 11703 (action by the United States) (1976 ed., Supp. III). A private person may seek injunctive relief only to prevent illegal abandonment of a freight-forwarding service. See 49 U. S. C. § 11704 (1976 ed., Supp. III). The fact that shippers in the position of respondent no longer have available the remedy of injunction does not affect our decision, because numerous other remedies for improper cessations of service still exist. “[T]he absence of any judicial remedy [would] plac[e] the shipper entirely at the mercy of the carrier, contrary to the overriding purpose of the Act.” Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U. S., at 88 (emphasis added). Although §§ 8 and 9, recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 11705 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), provide a general right to seek damages when injured by a carrier’s violation of the Act, this Court stated in Powell v. United States, 300 U. S. 276, 287 (1937), that the injunctive remedy, see n. 9, supra, was “the only method for enforcing” what was then § 1 (18) of the Act. Because the carrier’s actions here have been approved by the Commission, there has been no violation of the Act, and this damages remedy could have no application to this case. We therefore need not decide whether the language of Powell means that a damages action can never be brought for an illegal abandonment, or if such an action can be brought, whether Congress might have intended that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. We thus reserve those questions for a proper case. The fact that respondent did not perfect its filing before the Commission, see n. 3, supra, does not affect either the validity or the finality of the Commission’s findings with respect to the reasonableness of petitioner’s actions. These findings remain valid if supported by substantial evidence, see Illinois Central R. Co. v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 385 U. S. 57, 66 (1966), and in any case are not ordinarily subject to revision via collateral attack in a civil action. The Commission’s authority over furnishing cars was reflected in §§ 1 (4) and 1 (11) of the Act, recodified at 49 U. S. C. §§ 11101 (a) and 11121 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). See n. 1, supra. Most of the Commission’s abandonment decisions turn in part on factors such as those respondent wishes the state court to decide. See, e. g., Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. Abandonment, 354 I. C. C. 121, 125-126 (1977); Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co. Abandonment, 348 I. C. C. 678, 700-703 (1976); Missouri Pacific R. Co. Abandonment, 342 I. C. C. 643, 644 (1972). See 49 U. S. C. § 10103 (1976 ed., Supp. III). The Transportation Act of 1920, moreover, also added to the Interstate Commerce Act a new § 1 (17)(a), recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 10501 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III), which expressly invalidates state remedies when they are “inconsistent with an order of the Commission” or prohibited under any provision of the Act. See supra, at 326. The Puritan Court obviously could not have considered this provision when deciding that a shipper could in some circumstances bring a state-court action for failure to furnish cars. The court below apparently recognized the distinction for jurisdictional purposes between state-court actions raising strictly factual claims and those calling for an exercise of administrative discretion. See 295 N. W. 2d, at 472. If it is assumed that Puritan remains good law, then the state court erred only in concluding that a suit such as respondent's raises only questions of fact that do not call for any expertise. Respondent itself concedes that even under its theory of the case, “the sole issue for determination is whether or not the service was terminated by compelling circumstances beyond the control of the carrier.” Brief for Respondent 6 (emphasis in original). That is exactly the kind of question Congress intended that the Commission decide, and in the case before us, the Commission has of course already decided it. Respondent’s reliance on ICC v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 533 F. 2d 1025 (CA8 1976), is also misplaced. That case held only that a federal-court suit seeking injunctive relief on behalf of the Commission, which is among the express remedies enumerated in the Act, could go forward without awaiting the Commission’s decision on a pending request for an abandonment. We express no opinion as to the merits of that case, but we do note that its facts bear little relation to those before us.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. TUSCARORA INDIAN NATION. No.'63. Argued December 7, 1959. Decided March 7, 1960 Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 63. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade, Lionel Kestenbaum, Willard W. Gatchell, John C. Mason, Leonard D. Eesley and Joseph B. Hobbs. Thomas F. Moore, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner in No. 66. With him on the brief were Samuel I. Rosen-man, Frederic P. Lee and John R. Davison. Arthur Lazarus, Jr. argued the causes for respondent. With him on the brief was Eugene Gressman. Together with No. 66, Power Authority of the State of New York v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, also on certiorari to the same Court. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. The ultimate question presented by these cases is whether certain lands, purchased and owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and lying adjacent to a natural power site on the Niagara River near the town of Lewiston, New York, may be taken for the storage reservoir of a hydroelectric power project, upon the payment of just compensation, by the Power Authority of the State of New York under a license issued to it by the Federal Power Commission as directed by Congress in Public Law 85-159, approved August 21, 1957, 71 Stat. 401. The Niagara River, an international boundary stream and a navigable waterway of the United States, flows from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario, a distance of 36 miles. Its mean flow is about 200,000 cubic feet per second. The river drops about 165 feet at Niagara Falls and an additional 140 feet in the rapids immediately above and below the falls. The “head” created by these great falls, combined with the large and steady flow of the river, makes the Lewiston power site, located below the rapids, an extremely favorable one for hydroelectric development. For the purpose of avoiding “continuing waste of a great natural resource and to make it possible for the United States of America and Canada to develop, for the benefit of their respective peoples, equal shares of the waters of the Niagara River available for power purposes/’ the United States and Canada entered into the Treaty of February 27, 1950, providing for a flow of 100,000 cubic feet per second over Niagara Falls during certain specified daytime and evening hours of the tourist season (April 1 to October 31) and of 50,000 cubic feet per second at other times, and authorizing the equal division by the United States and Canada of all excess waters for power purposes. In consenting to the 1950 Treaty, the Senate imposed the condition that “no project for redevelopment of the United States’ share of such waters shall be undertaken until it be specifically authorized by Act of Congress.” 1 U. S. T. 694, 699. To that end, a study was made and reported to Congress in 1951 by the United States Army Corps of Engineers respecting the most feasible plans for utilizing all of the waters available to the United States under the 1950 Treaty, and detailed plans embodying other studies were prepared and submitted to Congress prior to June 7, 1956, by the Bureau of Power of the Federal Power Commission, the Power Authority of New York, and the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation. To enable utilization of all of the United States’ share of the Niagara waters by avoiding waste of the nighttime and week-end flow that would not be needed at those times for the generation of power, all of the studies and plans provided for a pumping-generating plant to lift those waters at those times into a reservoir, and for a storage reservoir to contain them until released for use — through the pumping-generating plant, when its motors (operating in reverse) would serve as generators — during the daytime hours when the demand for power would be highest and the diversion of waters from the river would be most restricted by the treaty. Estimates of dependable capacity of the several recommended projects varied from 1,240,000 to 1,723,000 kilowatts, and estimates of the needed reservoir capacity varied from 22,000 acre-feet covering 850 acres to 41,000 acre-feet covering 1,700 acres. The variations in these estimates were largely due to differing assumptions as to the length of the daily period of peak demand. Although there was “no controversy as to the most desirable engineering plan of development,” there was serious disagreement in Congress over whether the project should be publicly or privately developed and over marketing preferences and other matters of policy. That disagreement continued through eight sessions of Committee Hearings, during which more than 30 proposed bills were considered, in the Eighty-first to Eighty-fifth Congresses and delayed congressional authorization of the project for seven years. On June 7, 1956, a rock slide destroyed the Schoellkopf plant. This created a critical shortage of electric power in the Niagara community. It also required expansion of the plans for the Niagara project if the 20,000 cubic feet per second of water that had been reserved for the Schoellkopf plant was to be utilized. Accordingly, the Power Authority of New York prepared and submitted to Congress a major revision of the project plans. Those revised plans, designed to utilize all of the Niagara waters available to the United States under the 1950 Treaty, provided for an installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts, of which 1,800,000 kilowatts would be dependable power for 17 hours per day, necessitating a storage reservoir of 60,000 acre-feet capacity covering about 2,800 acres. Confronted with the destruction of the Schoellkopf plant and the consequent critical need for electric power in the Niagara community, Congress speedily composed its differences in the manner and terms prescribed in Public Law 85-159, approved August 21, 1957. 71 Stat. 401. By § 1(a) of that Act, Congress “expressly authorized and directed” the Federal Power Commission “to issue a license to the Power Authority of the State of New York for the construction and operation of a power project with capacity to utilize all of the United States share of the water of the Niagara River permitted to be used by international agreement.” By § 1 (b) of the Act, the Federal Power Commission was directed to “include among the licensing conditions, in addition to those deemed necessary and required under the terms of the Federal Power Act,” seven conditions which are of only collateral importance here. The concluding section of the Act, § 2, provides: “The license issued under the terms of this Act shall be granted in conformance with Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Federal Power Commission, but in the event of any conflict, the provisions of this Act shall govern in respect of the project herein authorized.” Thereafter, the Power Authority of the State of New York, a municipal corporation created'under the laws of that State to develop the St. Lawrence and Niagara power projects, applied to the Federal Power Commission' for the project license which Congress had thus directed the Commission to issue to it. Its application embraced the project plans that it had submitted to the Eighty-fifth Congress shortly before its approval of Public Law 85-159. The project was scheduled to be completed in 1963 at an estimated cost of $720,000,000. Hearings were scheduled by the Commission, of which due notice was given to all interested parties, including the Tuscarora Indian Nation, inasmuch as the application contemplated the taking of some of its lands for the reservoir. The Tuscarora Indian Nation intervened and objected to the taking of any of its lands upon the ground "that the applicant lacks authority to acquire them.” At the hearings, it was shown that the Tuscarora lands needed for the reservoir — then thought to be about 1,000 acres— are part of a separate tract of 4,329 acres purchased in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation, with the assistance of Henry Dearborn, then Secretary of War, from the Holland Land Company on November 21, 1804, with the proceeds derived from the contemporaneous sale of their lands in North Carolina — from which they had removed in about the year 1775 to reside with the Oneidas in central New York. After concluding the hearings, the Commission, on January 30, 1958, issued its order granting the license. It found that a reservoir having a usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet “is required to properly utilize the water resources involved.” Although the Commission found that the Indian lands “are almost entirely undeveloped except for agricultural use,” it did not pass upon the Tuscaroras’ objection to the taking of their lands because it then assumed that “other lands are available for reservoir use if the Applicant is unable to acquire the Indian lands.” But the Commission did direct the licensee to revise its exhibit covering the reservoir, to more definitely show the area and acreage involved, and to resubmit it to the Commission for approval within a stated time. In its application for rehearing, the Tuscarora Indian Nation contended, among other things, that the portion of its lands sought to be taken for the reservoir was part of a “reservation,” as defined in § 3 (2), and as used in § 4 (e), of the Federal Power Act, and therefore could not lawfully be taken for reservoir purposes in the absence of a finding by the Commission “that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired.” By its order of March 21, 1958, denying that application for rehearing, the Commission found that “[t]he best location of the reservoir would require approximately 1,000 acres of land owned by Intervener,” and it held that the Indian lands involved “are not part of a 'reservation’ referred to in Section 4 (e) as defined in Section 3 (2) of the [Federal Power] Act and the finding suggested by Intervener is not required.” On May 5, 1958, the Commission issued its order approving the licensee’s revised exhibit which precisely delineated the location, area, and acreage to be embraced by the reservoir — which included 1,383 acres of the Tuscaroras’ lands. On May 16, 1958, the Tuscarora Indian Nation filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit challenging the license issued by the Commission on January 30, 1958, insofar as it would authorize the taking of Tuscarora lands. By its opinion and interim judgment of November 14, 1958, the Court of Appeals held that the Tuscarora lands sought to be taken for the reservoir constitute a part of a “reservation” within the meaning of §§ 3 (2) and 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, and that the Commission may not include those lands in the license in the absence of a § 4 (e) finding that their taking “will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired,” and the court remanded the case to the Commission that it might “explore the possibility of making that finding.” 105 U. S. App. D. C. 146, 265 F. 2d 338. Upon remand, the Commission held extensive hearings, exploring not only the matter of the making of the finding held necessary by the Court of Appeals but also the possibility of locating the reservoir on other lands. In its order of February 2, 1959, the Commission found that the use of other lands for the reservoir would result in great delay, severe community disruption, and unreasonable expense; that a reservoir with usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet is required to utilize all of the United States’ share of the water of the Niagara River, as required by Public Law 85-159; that removal of the reservoir from the Tuscarora lands by reducing the area of the reservoir would reduce the usable storage capacity from 60,000 acre-feet to 30,000 acre-feet and result in a loss of about 300,000 kilowatts of dependable capacity. But it concluded that, although other lands contiguous to their- reservation might be acquired by the Tuscaroras, the taking of the 1,383 acres of Tuscarora lands for the reservoir “would interfere and would be inconsistent with the purpose for which the reservation was created or acquired.” That order was transmitted to the Court of Appeals which, on March 24, 1959, after considering various motions of the parties, entered its final judgment approving the license except insofar as it would authorize the taking of Tuscarora lands for the reservoir, and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to amend the license “to exclude specifically the power of the said Power Authority to condemn the said lands of the Tuscarora Indians for reservoir purposes.” 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 152, 265 F. 2d, at 344. Because of conflict between the views of the court below and those of the Second Circuit, and of the general importance of the questions involved, we granted certio-rari. 360 U. S. 915. The parties have urged upon us a number of contentions, but we think these cases turn upon the answers to two questions, namely, (1) whether the Tuscarora lands covered by the Commission’s license are part of a “reservation” as defined and used in the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq., and, if not, (2) whether those lands may be condemned by the licensee, under the eminent domain powers conferred by § 21 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 814. We now turn to a consideration of those questions in the order stated. I. A Commission finding that “the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired" is required by § 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 797 (e), only if the lands involved are within a “reservation” in the sense of that term as defined and used in that Act. That by generally accepted standards and common understanding these Tuscarora lands may be part of a “reservation” is not at all decisive of whether they are such within the meaning of the Federal Power Act. Congress was free and competent artificially to define the term “reservations” for the purposes it prescribed in that Act. And we are bound to give effect to its definition of that term, for it would be idle for Congress to define the sense in which it used it “if we were free in despite of it to choose a meaning for ourselves.” Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 96. By § 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (2), Congress has provided: “Sec. 3. The words defined in this section shall have the following meanings for purposes of this Act, to wit: “(2) 'reservations’ means national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and interests in lands acquired and held for any public purpose; but shall not include national monuments or national parks.” (Emphasis added.) The plain words of this definition seem rather clearly to show that Congress intended the term “reservations,” wherever used in the Act, to embrace only “lands and interests in lands owned by the United States.” Turning to the definition’s legislative history, we find that it, too, strongly indicates that such was the congressional intention. In the original draft bill of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, as proposed by the Administration and passed by the House in the Sixty-fifth and Sixty-sixth Congresses, the term was defined as follows: “ 'Reservations' means lands and interest in lands owned by the United States and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld from private appropriation and disposal under the public-land laws, and lands and interest in lands acquired and held for any public purpose.” It is difficult to perceive how congressional intention could be more clearly and definitely expressed. However, after the bill reached the Senate it inserted the words "national monuments, national parks, national forests, tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other” (emphasis added) at the beginning of the definition. When the bill was returned to the House it was explained that the Senate’s “amendment recasts the House definition of 'reservations.' ” The bill as enacted contained the definition as thus recast. It remains in that form, except for the deletion of the words "national monuments, national parks,” which was occasioned by the Act of March 3, 1921 (41 Stat. 1353), negating Commission authority to license any project works within “national monuments or national parks,” and those words were finally deleted from the definition by amendment in 1935. 49 Stat. 838. It seems entirely clear that no change in substance was intended or effected by the Senate's amendment, and that its “recasting” only specified, as illustrative, some of the “reservations” on “lands and interests in lands owned by the United States.” Further evidence that Congress intended to limit “reservations,” for the “purposes of this Act” (§3), to those located on “lands owned by the United States” or in which it owns an interest is furnished by its use of the term in the context of § 4 (e) of the Act. By that section Congress, after authorizing the Commission to license projects in streams or other bodies of water over which it has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), authorized the Commission to license projects “upon any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States.” Congress must be deemed to have known, as this Court held in Federal Power Comm’n v. Oregon, 349 U. S. 435, 443, that the licensing power, “in relation to public lands and reservations of the United States springs from the Property Clause” of the Constitution — namely, the “. . . Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .” Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In thus acting under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress must have intended to deal only with “the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Ibid. Moreover, the Federal Power Act’s plan of compensating for lands taken or used for licensed projects is explicable only if the term “reservations” is confined, as Congress evidently intended, to those located on “lands owned by the United States” or in which it owns a proprietary interest. By § 21, 16 U. S. C. § 814, licensees are authorized to acquire “the lands or property of others necessary to the” licensed project “by the exercise of the right of eminent domain” in the federal or state courts, and, of course, upon the payment of just compensation. But, despite its general and all-inclusive terms, § 21 does not apply to nor authorize condemnation of lands or interests in lands owned by the United States, because § 10 (e) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (e), expressly provides that “the licensee shall pay to the United States reasonable annual charges ... for recompensating it for the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of its lands or other property” (emphasis added) devoted to the licensed project. It therefore appears to be unmistakably clear that by the language of the first proviso of that section saying, in pertinent part; “That when licenses are issued involving the use of Government dams or other structures owned by the United States or tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations (these italicized words being lifted straight from the § 3 (2) definition of ‘reservations’) the Commission shall ... fix a reasonable annual charge for the use thereof . . . ,” Congress intended to treat and treated only with structures, lands and interests in lands owned by the United States, for, as stated, the section expressly requires the “reasonable annual charges” to be paid to the United States for the use, occupancy, and enjoyment of “its lands or other property.” (Emphasis added.) This analysis of the plain words and legislative history of the Act’s definition of “reservations” and of the plan and provisions of the Act leaves us with no doubt that Congress, “for purposes of this Act” (§ 3 (2)), intended to and did confine “reservations,” including “tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations” (§ 3 (2)), to those located on lands “owned by the United States” (§3 (2)), or in which it owns a proprietary interest. The Court of Appeals did not find to the contrary. Indeed, it found that the Act’s definition of “reservations” includes only those located on lands in which the United States “has an interest.” But it thought that the national paternal relationship to the Indians and the Government’s concern to protect them against improper alienation of their lands gave the United States the requisite “interest” in the lands here involved, and that the result “must be the same as if the phrase ‘owned by the United States, [etc.]’ were not construed as a limitation upon the term ‘tribal lands [etc.].’” 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 150, 265 F. 2d, at 342. We do not agree. The national “interest” in Indian welfare and protection “is not to be expressed in terms of property . . . .” Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 437. The national “paternal interest” in the welfare and protection of Indians is not the “interests in lands owned by the United States” required, as an element of “reservations,” by § 3 (2) of the Federal Power Act. (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as the lands involved are owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation and no “interest” in them is “owned by the United States,” we hold that they are not within a “reservation” as that term is defined and used in the Federal Power Act, and that a Commission finding under § 4 (e) of that Act “that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired” is not necessary to the issuance of a license embracing the Tuscarora lands needed for the project. II. We pass now to the question whether the portion of the Tuscarora lands here involved may be condemned by the licensee under the provisions and eminent domain powers of § 21 of the Federal Power Act. Petitioners contend that § 21 is a broad general statute authorizing condemnation of “the lands or property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any” licensed project, and that lands owned by Indians in fee simple, not being excluded, may be taken by the licensee under the federal eminent domain powers delegated to it by that section. Parrying this contention, the Tuscarora Indian Nation argues that § 21, being only a general Act of Congress, does not apply to Indians or their lands. The Tuscarora Indian Nation heavily relies upon Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94. It is true that in that case the Court, dealing with the question whether a native-born American Indian was made a citizen of the United States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, said: “Under the Constitution of the United States, as originally established . . . General Acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them.” 112 U. S., at 99-100. However that may have been, it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests. In Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418, the funds of a restricted Creek Indian were held and invested for him by the Superintendent, and a question arose as to whether income from the investment was subject to federal income taxes. In an earlier case, Blackbird v. Commissioner, 38 F. 2d 976, the Tenth Circuit had held such income to be exempt from federal income taxation. But in this case the Board of Tax Appeals sustained the tax, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, and the Superintendent brought the case here. This Court observed that in the Blackbird case the Tenth Circuit had said that to hold a general act of Congress to be applicable to restricted Indians “would be contrary to the almost unbroken policy of Congress in dealing with its Indian wards and their affairs. Whenever they and their interests have been the subject affected by legislation they have been named and their interests specifically dealt with.” That is precisely the argument now made here by the Tuscarora Indian Nation. But this Court, in affirming the judgment, said: “This does not harmonize with what we said in Choteau v. Burnet (1931), 283 U. S. 691, 693, 696: “ 'The language of [the Internal Revenue Act of 1918] subjects the income of “every individual” to tax. Section 213 (a) includes income “from any source whatever.” The intent of Congress was to levy the tax with respect to all residents of the United States and upon all sorts of income. The Act does not expressly exempt the sort of income here involved, nor a person having petitioner’s status respecting such income, and we are not referred to any other statute which does. . . . The intent to exclude must be definitely expressed, where, as here, the language of the Act laying the tax is broad enough to include the subject matter.’ “The court below properly declined to follow its quoted pronouncement in Blackbird’s case. The terms of the 1928 Revenue Act are very broad, and nothing there indicates that Indians are to be excepted. See Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161; Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U. S. 232; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84; Pitman v. Commissioner, 64 F. (2d) 740. The purpose is sufficiently clear.” 295 U. S., at 419-420. In Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, this Court, in holding that the estate of a restricted Oklahoma Indian was subject to state inheritance and estate taxes under general state statutes, said: “The language of the statutes does not except either Indians or any other persons from their scope. [319 U. S., at 600.] If Congress intends to prevent the State of Oklahoma from levying a general nondiscriminatory estate tax applying alike to all its citizens, it should say so in plain words. Such a conclusion cannot rest on dubious inferences.” 319 U. S., at 607. See, e. g., Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corporation, 276 U. S. 575, 581-582; United States v. Ransom, 263 U. S. 691; Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U. S. 556, 563-564; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 673. The Federal Power Act constitutes a complete and comprehensive plan for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission and utilization of electric power in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its commerce powers, and upon the public lands and reservations of the United States under its property powers. See § 4 (e). It neither overlooks nor excludes Indians or lands owned or occupied by them. Instead, as has been shown, the Act specifically defines and treats with lands occupied by Indians — “tribal lands embraced within Indian reservations.” See §§ 3 (2) and 10 (e). The Act gives every indication that, within its comprehensive plan, Congress intended to include lands owned or occupied by any person or persons, including Indians. The Court of Appeals recognized that this is so. 105 U. S. App. D. C., at 151, 265 F. 2d, at 343. Section 21 of the Act, by broad general terms, authorizes the licensee to condemn “the lands or property of others necessary to the construction, maintenance, or operation of any” licensed project. That section does not exclude lands or property owned by Indians, and, upon the authority of the cases cited, we must hold that it applies to these lands owned in fee simple by the Tuscarora Indian Nation. The Tuscarora Indian Nation insists that even if its lands are embraced by the terms of § 21 of the Federal Power Act, they still may not be taken for public use “without the express consent of Congress referring specifically to those lands,” because of the provisions of 25 U. S. C. § 177. That section, in pertinent part, provides: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution. . . .” The obvious purpose of that statute is to prevent unfair, improvident or improper disposition by Indians of lands owned or possessed by them to other parties, except the United States, without the consent of Congress, and to enable the Government, acting as parens patriae for the Indians, to vacate any disposition of their lands made without its consent. See, e. g., United States v. Hellard, 322 U. S. 363; United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 441-442; Henkel v. United States, 237 U. S. 43, 51; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 46-48. But there is no such requirement with respect to conveyances to or condemnations by the United States or its licensees; “nor is it conceivable that it is necessary, for the Indians are subject only to the same rule of law as are others in the State . . . .” United States v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 318 U. S. 206, 211. As to the Tuscaroras’ contention that § 177 prohibits the taking of any of their lands for the reservoir “without the express and specific consent of Congress,” one thing is certain. It is certain that if § 177 is applicable to alienations effected by condemnation proceedings under § 21 of the Federal Power Act, the mere “expressed consent” of Congress would be vain and idle. For § 177 at the very least contemplates the assent of the Indian nation or tribe. And inasmuch as the Tuscarora Indian Nation withholds such consent and refuses to convey to the licensee any of its lands, it follows that the mere consent of Congress, however express and specific, would avail nothing. Therefore, if § 177 is applicable to alienations effected by condemnation under § 21 of the Federal Power Act, the result would be that the Tuscarora lands, however imperative for the project, could not be taken at all. But § 177 is not applicable to the sovereign United States nor, hence, to its licensees to whom Congress has delegated federal eminent domain powers under § 21 of the Federal Power Act. The law is now well settled that: “A general statute imposing restrictions does not impose them upon the Government itself without a clear expression or implication to that effect.” United States v. Wittek, 337 U. S. 346, 358-359. In United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273, the Court said: “There is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.” See, e. g., Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 220, 224-225; United States v. Wyoming, 331 U. S. 440, 449; United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. 190; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U. S. 548, 553-555; Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618, 622; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 263; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239. This Court has several times applied, in combination, the rules (1) that general Acts of Congress apply to Indians as well as to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary, and (2) that general statutes imposing restrictions do not apply to the Government itself without a clear expression to that effect. It did so in Henkel v. United States, 237 U. S. 43 (sustaining the right of the United States to take Indian lands for reservoir purposes under the general Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388), in Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S. 394 (sustaining the power of the Government to convey a strip of land through a tract owned by an Indian tribe to one Chandler for the use of the State of Michigan in constructing a canal, even though the conveyance was in derogation of a treaty with the Indian tribe), and in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641. There, this Court sustained the right of a licensee of the Government to take so much of the undescribed fee lands of an Indian tribe as was necessary for the licensed project, though in derogation of the terms of a treaty between the United States and the Indian tribe, saying: See also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565; Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U. S. 114, 117-118; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. “It would be very strange if the national government, in the execution of its rightful authority, could exercise the power of eminent domain in the several States, and could not exercise the same power in a Territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe, the members of which were wards of the United States, and directly subject to its political control. The lands in the Cherokee territory, like the lands held by private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States, are held subject to the authority of the general government to take them for such objects as are germane to the execution of the powers granted to it; provided only, that they are not taken without just compensation being made to the owner.” 135 U. S., at 656-657. In the light of these authorities we must hold that Congress, by the broad general terms of § 21 of the Federal Power Act, has authorized the Federal Power Commission’s licensees to take lands owned by Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed for a licensed project, upon the payment of just compensation; that the lands in question are not subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras (see notes 10 and 18); and that 25 U. S. C. § 177 does not apply to-the United States itself nor prohibit it, or its licensees under the Federal Power Act, from taking such lands in the manner provided by § 21, upon the payment of just compensation. All members of this Court — no one more than any other — adhere to the concept that agreements are made to be performed — no less by the Government than by others — but the federal eminent domain powers conferred by Congress upon the Commission’s licensee, by § 21 of the Federal Power Act, to take such of the lands of the Tuscaroras as are needed for the Niagara project do not breach the faith of the United States, or any treaty or other contractual agreement of the United States with the Tuscarora Indian Nation in respect to these lands for the conclusive reason that there is none. Reversed. Mr. Justice Brennan concurs in the result. 1 U. .S. T. 694. The excess flow of water available for power purposes under the 1950 Treaty was estimated to fluctuate between 44,000 and 210,000 cubic feet per second, depending on the flow, the time of year, and the time of day. S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. The 1950 Treaty superseded the Boundary Waters Treaty of January 11, 1909 (Treaty Series 548, 36 Stat. 2448) which limited diversions of water by Canada to 36,000, and by the United States to 20,000, cubic feet per second. Beginning in 1921, the waters available to the United States under that treaty were utilized by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation in its Schoellkopf hydroelectric plant, under a federal license expiring in 1971. The rated capacity of that plant was 360,000 kilowatts. S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-6. Ibid. Hearings were held before the Senate Committee on Public Works, or its Subcommittee, in the Eighty-second, Eighty-third and Eighty-fourth Congresses, and in the first session of the Eighty-fifth Congress; before the House Committee on Public Works in the first sessions of the Eighty-first and Eighty-second Congresses, and in the first and second sessions of the Eighty-fourth Congress. Joint hearings were held by the House Committee and a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee in the Eighty-third Congress, first session. Reports on these bills were S. Rep. No. 2501, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 713, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1408, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 2635, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. The Committee Reports on the bill which was finally enacted were S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 862, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. See note 2. The Report of the Senate Committee on Public Works of June 27, 1957, reporting out the bill that was finally adopted, contained the following statement: “The proposals by the Power Authority of the State of New York at present contemplate a project with a total installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts. Of this 1,800,000 will constitute firm power on a 17-hour-day basis. They anticipate that in order to achieve this amount of firm capacity pump-storage and pumping-generating facilities will be required.” S. Rep. No. 539, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. The Report of the House Committee on Public Works of July 23, 1957, contained the following statement: “As a result of the [Schoellkopf] disaster, the redevelopment project will be enlarged so as to develop the water formerly utilized in the destroyed plant. The proposal now contemplates a project with a total installed capacity of 2,190,000 kilowatts. Of this 1,800,000 will constitute firm power on a 17-hour-day basis. It is anticipated that in order to achieve this amount of firm capacity, pump-storage and pumping-generating facilities will be required.” H. E. Eep. No. 862, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7. Those seven conditions resolved the previously disputed issues which had so long delayed congressional authorization of the project. By those conditions, at least 50% of the project power must be made available to public bodies and nonprofit cooperatives “at the lowest rates reasonably possible,” and 20% of that amount must be made available for use in neighboring States. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation was given the right to purchase 445,000 kilowatts for a designated period to supply, and “restore low power costs to,” the customers of its Schoellkopf plant, in exchange for relinquishment of its federal license. The Power Authority of New York was authorized to construct independent transmission lines to reach its preference customers and to control the resale rates of distributors purchasing power from it. The project was required to bear the United States' share of the cost of remedial works in the river, and, within a designated maximum sum, the cost of a scenic drive and a park. The plans embraced by the application for the license consisted, in general, of (1) the main generating plant on the east bank of the river, (2) a pumping-generating plant, located a short distance east of the main generating plant, (3) a storage reservoir, adjacent to the pumping-generating plant, having a usable storage capacity of 60,000 acre-feet, and covering about 2,800 acres, (4) a water intake structure on the east bank of the river about three miles above the falls, and (5) a water conveyance system extending from the intake to a forebay at the pumping-generating plant, and from the latter to a forebay at the main generating plant. Because the proceeds of the sale of the Tuscaroras’ North Carolina lands ($15,000) were payable in three equal annual installments and were to be used, so far as necessary, for the payment of the purchase price of the New York lands ($13,752.80), which was also payable in three substantially equal annual installments, the latter lands were conveyed on November 21, 1804, by deed of the Holland Land Company (which acknowledged receipt of the first installment of the purchase price, and reserved a lien to secure the two unpaid installments of the purchase price) to Henry Dearborn “in Trust” for the “Tuscarora Nation of Indians and their Assigns forever . . . the said Henry Dearborn and his Heirs [to] grant and convey the same in Fee Simple or otherwise to such person or persons as the said Tuscarora Nation of Indians shall at any time hereafter direct and appoint.” After collection of the remaining installments of the purchase price of the Tuscaroras’ North Carolina lands and, in turn, remitting to the Holland Land Company so much thereof as was necessary to pay the balance of the purchase price for the New York lands, Henry Dearborn conveyed the New York lands to the “Tuscarora Nation of Indians and their Successors and Assigns for ever,” in fee simple free and clear of encumbrances, on January 2,1809. The Tuscarora Indian Nation has ever since continued to own those lands under that conveyance. In addition to the 4,329 acres purchased from the Holland Land Company in 1804, the Tuscaroras’ reservation embraces two other contiguous tracts containing 1,920 acres. The first, a tract of 640 acres, was ceded to the Tuscaroras by the Holland Land Company in June 1798. The second, a tract of 1,280 acres, was ceded to them by the Holland Land Company in 1799. Those tracts are not involved in this case. As amended, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§ 796 (2) and 797 (e). Meanwhile, on April 15, 1958, the Power Authority of New York commenced so-called “appropriation” proceedings under § 30 of the New York State Highway Law, McKinney’s Consol. Laws, c. 25, and also under Art. 5, Tit. 1, of the New York Public Authorities Law, McKinney’s Consol. Laws, c. 43-A, to condemn the 1,383 acres of Tuscarora lands for reservoir use. On April 18, 1958, the Tuscarora Indian Nation filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Power Authority and the Superintendent of Public Works of New York, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Power Authority had no right or power to take any of its lands without the express and specific consent of the United States, and (2) a permanent injunction against the appropriation or condemnation of any of its lands. The court issued a temporary restraining order. The action, being a “local" one, was then transferred to the District Court for the Western District of New York. After hearing, that court on June 24, 1958, denied the relief prayed, dissolved the restraining order, and dismissed the complaint on the merits. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 164 F. Supp. 107. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the Power Authority was authorized under Public Law 58-159 and the Federal Power Act and by the Commission’s license thereunder of January 30, 1958, to take the part of the Tuscarora lands needed for the reservoir, but that they could be taken only by a condemnation action in a state or federal court in the district where the property is located under and in the manner provided by § 21 of the Federal Power Act (16 U. S. C. § 814), and not by “appropriation” proceedings under the New York laws referred to. Tuscarora Nation of Indians v. Power Authority of the State of New York, 257 F. 2d 885. The Tuscarora Indian Nation’s petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari was denied on October 13, 1958. 358 U. S. 841. The Superintendent of Public Works of New York, a respondent in the Second Circuit proceedings, has appealed to this Court from so much of the judgment as denied a right to acquire the Tuscarora lands by appropriation proceedings under the New York laws, and that appeal is now pending here. (No. 4, Oct. Term, 1959.) In making the statement referred to in the text the Commission was doubtless alluding to the fact that in May 1958, the Power Authority offered the Tuscaroras $1,500,000 for the 1,383 acres, or in excess of $1,000 per acre, plus payment for, or removal to or replacing on other lands, the 37 houses located on these 1,383 acres and offered to construct for them a community center building, involving a total expenditure of about $2,400,000, which offer, the Commission says, has never been withdrawn. The Tuscarora Indian Nation tells us in its brief that: “What the Government unfortunately fails to point out is that the Power Authority’s ‘offer’ was and still is an empty gesture since, as the court below and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit both ruled, the Tuscarora Nation is prohibited by law from selling its lands without the consent of the United States expressed in an act of Congress. 25 U. S. C. §§ 177, 233.” See H. R. Rep. No. 715, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 22; S. Rep. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10. See S. Rep. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10; 59 Cong. Rec. 1103. See H. R. Rep. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7. The Tuscaroras also rely upon 25 U. S. C. § 233, which confers, subject to qualifications, jurisdiction upon the courts of New York over civil actions between Indians and also between them and other persons, and contains a pertinent proviso “That nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing the alienation from any Indian nation, tribe, or band of Indians of any lands within any Indian reservation in the State of New York.” The Tuscarora Indian Nation argues that its lands in question should be regarded as subject to and protected from condemnation by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of October 22, 1784 (7 Stat. 15), the unratified Treaty of Fort Harmar of January 9, 1789 (7 Stat. 33), and the Treaty of Canandaigua of November 11, 1794 (7 Stat. 44). But the record shows that the first two of these treaties related to other lands and, principally at least, to other Indian nations, and that the last treaty mentioned, though covering the lands in question, was with another Indian nation (the Senecas) which, pursuant to the Treaty of Big Tree of September 15, 1797 (7 Stat. 601) and with the approbation of the United States, sold its interest in these lands to Robert Morris and thus freed them from the effects of the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794. Robert Morris, in turn, conveyed these lands to the Holland Land Company and it, in turn, conveyed the part in question to the Tuscarora Indian Nation, and its title rests upon that conveyance, free of any treaty. It appears from the record that, as earlier stated (see note 10), the Tuscaroras, save for a few of them who remained on their lands “on the Roanoke” in North Carolina, moved from their North Carolina lands to reside with the Oneidas in central New York — at a point about 200 miles east of the lands now owned by the Tuscaroras in Niagara County, New York — -in 1775. The Tuscaroras had no proprietary interest in the Oneidas’ lands in central New York but were there as “guests” of the Oneidas or as “tenants at will or by suffer-anee.” Hough, Census of the State of New York, 1857, p. 510; New York Senate Document No. 24, 1846, p. 68. They came to be recognized, however, as members of the Five Nations which thereafter became known as the Six Nations (the others being the Oneidas, the Mohawks, the Onondagas, the Cayugas and the Senecas). The Senecas occupied a vast area in western New York, including the lands here in question. A few Tuscaroras fought with the Senecas on the side of the British and after their defeat at the battle of Elmira in 1779, they went to reside with the Senecas in the vicinity of Fort Niagara in about 1780. Other Tuscaroras then moved to that place. Just when they did so is not known with certainty and it appears that the most that can be said is that they were there prior to 1797. The Tuscaroras had the same kind of tenure, i. e., guests or tenants at will or by sufferance, with the Senecas as they had earlier had with the Oneidas in central New York. One of their chiefs described their situation as “squatters upon the territory of another distinct nation.” By the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784 (7 Stat. 15) and the unrati-fied Treaty of Fort Harmar of 1789 (7 Stat. 33) with the Six Nations, the United States promised to hold the Oneidas and the Tuscaroras secure in the lands upon which they then lived — which were the lands in central New York about 200 miles east of the lands in question. By the same treaties the United States promised to secure to the Six Nations a tract of land in western New York in the vicinity of the Niagara River. By the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794 (7 Stat. 44) between the United States and the Six Nations, which superseded the prior treaties (except, by Article VI, the United States remained bound to pay the Tuscaroras $4,500 per year for the purchase of clothing), it was recognized that the Senecas alone had possessory rights to the western New York area here involved and, as a result of that treaty, a large tract of western New York lands, including the lands now owned by the Tuscaroras, was secured to the Senecas. Under the 1786 Hartford Compact between New York and Massachusetts, New York was recognized to have sovereignty over those lands and Massachusetts to own the underlying fee to those lands and the right to purchase the Senecas’ interest in them. In 1794, Massachusetts sold the fee and the right to purchase the Senecas’ right to occupy these western New York lands, including the lands now owned by the Tuscaroras, to Robert Morris, who, in turn, sold those lands and rights to the Holland Land Company with the covenant that he would buy out the Senecas’ rights of occupancy for and on behalf of the Holland Land Company. And at the Treaty of Big Tree of 1797 (7 Stat. 601), Morris, with the approbation of the United States, purchased the Senecas’ rights of occupancy in the lands here in question for the Holland Land Company. Thus the lands in question were entirely freed from the effects of all then existing treaties with the Indians, and the Tuscaroras’ title to their present lands derives, as earlier stated, from the Holland Land Company (see note 10 for further details) and has never since been subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEWIS, COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA v. CONTINENTAL BANK CORP. et al. No. 87-1955. Argued November 28, 1989 Decided March 5, 1990 SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Eric J. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, Charles L. Stutts, R. Michael Underwood, Albert T. Gimbel, J. Thomas Cardwell, and Joe A. Walters. Andrew L. Gordon argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Bowman Broion and Lee D. Mack son. Benna Ruth Solomon and Charles Rothfeld filed a brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. John L. Warden and Michael M. Wiseman filed a brief for the New York Clearing House Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Andrew J. Pincus, Daniel R. Barney, Robert Digges, Jr., and William S. Busker filed a brief for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., as amicus curiae. Justice & alia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an Illinois bank holding company’s challenge to certain Florida banking statutes that are alleged to violate the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. 1, §8, cl. 3. We conclude that the case has been rendered moot by 1987 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act. I Under § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), 70 Stat. 134, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1842(d), a bank holding company with its principal banking operations in one State may not establish or acquire a bank in another State unless the latter State’s statutes specifically authorize it to do so. The BHCA thus effectively permits States to prevent out-of-state holding companies from owning in-state banks. That license for state discrimination applies, however, only if the proposed banking subsidiary is a “bank” as defined in §2(c) of the BHCA, 70 Stat. 133, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1841(c). Until 1987, a banking institution qualified as a “bank” for purposes of the BHCA only if it both accepted demand deposits and engaged in the business of commercial lending. As amended by the Competitive Equality Amendments of 1987, 101 Stat. 554, the BHCA definition was expanded to include all banks whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See 12 U. S. C. § 1841(c)(1)(A). On June 29, 1981, appellee Continental Bank Corporation, a bank holding company with its principal place of business in Illinois, filed an application with the Florida Department of Banking and Finance to establish and operate an “industrial savings bank” (ISB) in Florida. According to the application, “ ‘[a]ll deposit relationships’ ” would be insured “ ‘to the maximum extent allowed by the [FDIC].”’ Juris. Statement 1-2. Appellant Lewis, Comptroller of the State of Florida and head of the Department of Banking and Finance, refused to process the application on the ground that two Florida statutes, Fla. Stat. §658.29(1) (Supp. 1980) and Fla. Stat. §664.03 (14) (Supp. 1980), prohibited out-of-state bank holding companies from operating ISBs in Florida. Continental thereupon filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, claiming that the statutes violated the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, and praying for declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the Florida statutes unconstitutionally discriminated against nonresidents, and ordered Lewis to process Continental’s application. In June 1984, after the District Court had entered judgment, the State of Florida amended its statutes to prohibit the chartering of any new ISBs in the State, whether by resident or nonresident enterprises. Fla. Stat. §664.02(1) (Supp. 1984). Lewis then moved to amend or alter the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the new nondiscriminatory ban had rendered the validity of the challenged statutes moot. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that the new statute, even if constitutional, did not moot the case because the State’s unconstitutional behavior was “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” App. 66a. Meanwhile, Continental had moved for an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988, arguing that Lewis’ enforcement of the statutes had deprived it of its constitutional rights in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court denied that motion without explanation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the merits issue, though resting its determination that the case was not moot on the different ground that the supervening ban on new ISBs was unconstitutional, since it had the purpose and effect of denying nonresident holding companies access to Florida deposits. The Court of Appeals did not resolve Continental’s claim for attorney’s fees, but remanded the case to the District Court for an explanation of why that claim had been denied. Continental Illinois Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F. 2d 1517 (1987). In August 1987, shortly before the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, there was again a change in the law, this time at the federal level. As part of the Competitive Equality Amendments of 1987, 101 Stat. 554, Congress expanded the BHCA definition of “bank.” The new definition, codified at 12 U. S. C. § 1841(c)(1)(A), includes any “insured bank as defined by section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,” which in turn defines “insured bank” as “any bank . . . the deposits of which are insured” by the FDIC. 12 U. S. C. § 1813(h). After this amendment to the BHCA, Lewis filed a petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the new legislation mooted the controversy because the ISB that Continental proposed to establish would have FDIC-insured deposits and therefore would be a “bank” within the coverage of the BHCA. Such coverage, Lewis argued, would mean that Florida’s refusal to permit Continental to establish an ISB, even if discriminatory against interstate commerce, would be authorized by federal law and hence immune from challenge under the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing in a brief opinion, saying that it did “not agree that the amendments necessarily would make Continental’s operation of an ISB in Florida a ‘banking’ activity in every instance,” and that it could not “now guess what the parties will do or not do as a result of the enactment of the August 10, 1987 [BHCA] amendments.” 838 F. 2d 457, 458 (CA11 1988). In addition, the court awarded Continental attorney’s fees for the appeal, without explaining the basis for the award, and remanded to the District Court for a calculation of a proper award for the appeal as well as a determination whether an award was appropriate for work done in the District Court. Lewis appealed to this Court, invoking our jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1254(2) (1982 ed.), now repealed, 102 Stat. 662, 664. We noted probable jurisdiction. 490 U. S. 1097 (1989). II Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 199 (1988); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975). To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision, Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 750-751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 471-473 (1982). Article III denies federal courts the power “to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them,” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971), and confines them to resolving “‘real and substantial controversies] admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” Ibid. (quoting Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 241 (1937)). This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate. To sustain our jurisdiction in the present case, it is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained in the Court of Appeals. Deakins, supra, at 199; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974). The parties must continue to have a “ ‘personal stake in the outcome’ ” of the lawsuit, Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962)). On the record before us, the only evidence of Continental’s stake in the outcome was its application to establish and operate an ISB. That application, however, pertained to an FDIC-insured institution, specifying that “all deposit relationships” would be insured “to the maximum extent allowed” by the FDIC. Thus, the stake represented by that application was eliminated by the 1987 amendments to the BHCA, which make it clear that no matter how the Commerce Clause issues in this suit are resolved the application can constitutionally be denied. Continental concedes that, under the amended BHCA, an FDIC-insured ISB is a “bank” within the BHCA definition; that Florida is thus authorized by Congress to exclude insured ISBs owned by nonresident holding companies; and that such exclusion (by virtue of its congressional authorization) does not violate the Commerce Clause. Continental has argued in this Court that the quoted language of the application meant that the ISB would have insurance if insurance was available, and none if none wTas available. We think not. “Insured by the FDIC to the maximum extent allowed” is quite different from “insured by the FDIC if possible,” or “insured by the FDIC to the maximum extent allowed, if any.” It envisions FDIC insurance, but instead of specifying a fixed dollar amount of that insurance (the permissible level of which has varied over the years, see, e. g., 94 Stat. 147) specifies the maximum amount allowable from time to time. The application thus constitutes no evidence that Continental had an intent to establish an ««insured bank. Nor can it be said that the difference between an insured bank and an uninsured bank is inconsequential, so that an expressed intention to open the one displays as well an intention to open the other. Particularly at a time when prospective depositors have been reading news of widespread bank failures, FDIC insurance may well be seen as essential to viability. Continental contends that it still has a claim for relief because its complaint sought not only the specific relief of ordering Lewis to process the original application, but also a declaration that the Florida statutes were unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement in the future. The BHCA amendment, it argues, does not render that requested relief nugatory insofar as it applies to uninsured banks. That may well be so, but the Article III question is not whether the requested relief would be nugatory as to the world at large, but whether Continental has a stake in that relief. Even in order to pursue the declaratory and injunctive claims, in other words, Continental must establish that it has a “specific live grievance” against the application of the statutes to uninsured ISBs, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 110 (1969), and not just an “‘abstract disagreement]’” over the constitutionality of such application, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 580 (1985) (quoting Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148 (1967)). As we have discussed, nothing in the record establishes that. Continental informs us that under Florida law it remains free to amend its application so as to seek an uninsured rather than an insured ISB. Perhaps so. But it could also be said that every bank in the country is free to file an application seeking an uninsured Florida ISB. In the one case as in the other, the mere power to seek is not an indication of the intent to do so, and thus does not establish a particularized, concrete stake that would be affected by our judgment. Continental’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Florida statutes’ application to an uninsured bank that it has neither applied for nor expressed any intent to apply for amounts to a request for advice as to “what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts,” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S., at 241, or with respect to “‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’ ” Thomas, supra, at 580-581, quoting 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532 (1984). Continental sought to supplement the record in this Court, after argument, by filing the affidavit of an officer of one of its subsidiaries, averring Continental’s interest in opening an uninsured Florida ISB, and explaining its failure to file an updated application for such a bank. In the circumstances of the present case, we are not disposed to accept such an affidavit as dispositive, without providing petitioner the opportunity of rebuttal. At the time Continental’s challenge to denial of its application for an insured ISB was mooted by the amendments to the BHCA, this litigation had been in progress for almost seven years. An order vacating the judgment on grounds of mootness would deprive Continental of its claim for attorney’s fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (assuming, arguendo, it would have such a claim), because such fees are available only to a party that “prevails” by winning the relief it seeks, see Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1 (1988); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987). This interest in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim, see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 70-71 (1986). Where on the face of the record it appears that the only concrete interest in the controversy has terminated, reasonable caution is needed to be sure that mooted litigation is not pressed forward, and unnecessary judicial pronouncements on even constitutional issues obtained, solely in order to obtain reimbursement of sunk costs. Reasonable caution includes, we think, not accepting as conclusive the ex parte affidavit of the party seeking fees, without providing the other party the opportunity to adduce controverting facts that show the alleged dispute to be “abstract, feigned, or hypothetical.” Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 57 (1968). In any event, whenever possible (and it is possible where the decision under review is that of a federal court) the evaluation of such factual contentions bearing upon Article III jurisdiction should not be made by this Court in the first instance. We therefore decline to accept Continental’s supplementation of the record in this Court. Finally, Continental urges that its suit remains justiciable even if it has no concrete interest in application of the statutes to uninsured banks, because its dispute with Florida is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This contention is twice wrong. We have permitted suits for prospective relief to go forward despite abatement of the underlying injury only in the “exceptional situations,” Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S., at 109, where the following two circumstances were simultaneously present: “'(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.’” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U. S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975)). Neither of these requirements is satisfied here. Since Florida’s allegedly unconstitutional action is no longer unconstitutional with respect to insured ISBs, there is no “reasonable expectation” that Continental will suffer the same wrong again — unless, of course, it intends to establish an uninsured ISB, which does not appear on this record. Cf. California Coastal Common v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572, 578 (1987); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 478 U. S. 1, 6 (1986). Nor is the State’s refusal to issue a bank charter the sort of action which, by reason of the inherently short duration of the opportunity for remedy, is likely forever to “evad[e] review.” See, e. g., Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes, 481 U. S. 429, 436, n. 4 (1987) (injunction on secondary picketing in railroad labor dispute); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 546-547 (1976) (protective order on press coverage of criminal trial). If Continental applies for and is denied a charter for an uninsured bank in Florida, there will be ample time to obtain judicial review of the denial. Ill Our ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has become moot on appeal is to vacate the judgment with directions to dismiss. See, e. g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S., at 204; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 (1950). However, in instances where the mootness is attributable to a change in the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously, our practice is to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in which the parties may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop the record more fully. See Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Inc., 404 U. S. 412, 415 (1972). That is essentially the situation here. The need for Continental to set forth its interest in an uninsured ISB could not have been apparent to anyone until the BHCA amendments were passed. This did not occur until the case had already been argued and submitted in the Court of Appeals. Had Florida’s petition for rehearing on the basis of the amendments been granted, Continental could properly be criticized for not supplementing the record at that point. In fact, however, the petition was denied, and we do not think Continental was negligently sleeping on its rights not to take the extraordinary step of seeking to supplement the record at the appellate level merely because the motion was pending. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for the Court of Appeals to consider (or to remand for the District Court to consider) such material as may be submitted by both parties in supplementation of the record, bearing upon Continental’s concrete interest in the grant of an application for an uninsured Florida ISB. Since the judgment below is vacated on the basis of an event that mooted the controversy-before the Court of Appeals’ judgment issued, Continental was not, at that stage, a “prevailing party” as it must be to recover fees under § 1988, see Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S., at 3-4. Whether Continental can be deemed a “prevailing party” in the District Court, even though its judgment was mooted after being rendered but before the losing party could challenge its validity on appeal, is a question of some difficulty, see, e. g., Palmer v. Chicago, 806 F. 2d 1316, 1321 (CA7 1986), that has been addressed by neither court below. We decline to resolve that, as well as the related question whether §1988 fees are available in a Commerce Clause challenge. The judgment is vacated, and the cause is remanded for such proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al. v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. No. 146. Argued February 27-28, 1951. Decided May 21, 1951. By special leave of Court, Merton Roland Nachman, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, pro hac vice, and Richard T. Rives argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief was Si Garrett, Attorney General. A. A. Carmichael, then Attorney General, and Wallace L. Johnson, then Assistant Attorney General, were also on a brief with Mr. Rives. Charles Clark argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Marion Rushton, Earl E. Eisenhart, Jr., Sidney S. Alderman and Jos. F. Johnston. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was argued with No. 395, decided this day, ante, p. 341, and brings the same parties before the Court. This proceeding arises out of appellee’s efforts to discontinue operation of passenger trains Nos. 11 and 16 operated daily between Birmingham, Alabama, and Columbus, Mississippi, a distance of approximately 120 miles mainly within Alabama. Alleging that the trains are little used and produce revenues far below their direct operating expenses, appellee applied to the Alabama Public Service Commission on September 13, 1948, for the permission to discontinue required by Alabama law. Over a year later, and before any action on the application had been taken by the Alabama Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered a reduction in the interstate and intrastate operation of coal-burning passenger locomotives to prevent undue depletion of coal reserves during a national coal strike. In response to the I. C. C. order, appellee discontinued service on a number of its trains, including trains Nos. 11 and 16. When the I. C. C. order was rescinded, other trains were restored to operation but appellee refused to restore the financially costly operation of trains Nos. 11 and 16, at least until the Alabama Commission granted a hearing upon its application for permanent discontinuance. An impasse developed and the Alabama Commission entered an order in which it refused to hear evidence proffered by appellee, threatened to delay any hearing on the application until appellee restored the trains, found ap-pellee in contempt of the Commission and called appel-lee’s attention to a provision of the Alabama Code providing penalties for the violation of an order of the Commission. On December 6, 1949, the day after entry of this order, appellee filed its complaint in the District Court alleging that requiring continued operation of trains 11 and 16 would confiscate its property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It prayed for an injunction restraining appellants from enforcing those laws of Alabama, including penalty provisions, which prevented appellee from discontinuing those trains. A temporary restraining order was issued. In the court below and in this Court, appellants have argued that a federal court should not interfere with a state’s imposition of penalties to punish defiant disregard of its regulatory laws. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Corp., 312 U. S. 45, 51 (1941); Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 662 (1915). Compare Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 267 U. S. 493, 496 (1925). Appellee, on the other hand, emphasizes the Commission’s delay in passing upon its application to discontinue the financially burdensome service as being so long-continued and unreasonable as to permit the intervention of a federal court before a decision by the Commission. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587 (1926). Though these arguments were relevant when the temporary restraining order was issued, we are called upon to review only the final decree, cf. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 44 (1920), and do not find it necessary to pass upon such contentions in view of the additional developments occurring prior to the entry of the final judgment below. The Commission did hold a hearing on December 8, 1949, in Fayette, Alabama, one of the communities affected by the discontinuance of service, and, on January 9, 1950, entered an order denying permission to discontinue operation of trains Nos. 11 and 16 on the grounds that a public need exists for the service and that appellee had not made a sufficient effort to reduce losses through adoption of more economical operating methods. The pleadings in the court below were amended in light of the Commission’s order of January 9, 1950, and the final judgment entered by the three-judge District Court was based upon a finding that enforcement of that order would be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. 88 F. Supp. 441 (1950). Appellee challenges the validity of an order of the Alabama Public Service Commission, but did not invoke the adequate state remedy provided for review of such orders. Therefore, as this case comes to us, it is governed by our decision in No. 395, decided this day, ante, p. 341. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is Reversed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson concur in the result for the reasons set forth in their opinion in No. 395, Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., ante, p. 351.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ZITTMAN v. McGRATH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUCCESSOR TO THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN. NO. 299. Argued February 28, 1951. Decided May 28, 1951. Joseph M. Cohen argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 299. Henry I. Fillman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 315. With him on the brief was Otto C. Sommerich. Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baynton, James L. Morrisson and George B. Searls. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. These are companion cases to Nos. 298 and 314,- ante, p. 446. Here, the petitioners attached the accounts of the Deutsche Reichsbank with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The attachments were levied at the same time as those levied on the Chase Bank accounts, and were also followed by state court actions against the Reichsbank, culminating in default judgments that have not been satisfied because of the Federal Government’s freezing program. The Alien Property Custodian served on the Federal Reserve Bank Vesting Orders similar to those served on the Chase Bank in Nos. 298 and 314. But he also served on the Federal Reserve Bank a “turnover directive” describing the specific property which he required to be “turned over to the undersigned to be held, administered and accounted for as provided by law,” and calling attention to the protection which § 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act gives for compliance. No such directive was served on the Chase Bank in the companion cases. The Federal Reserve Bank refused to release to him the portion of the accounts that had been subjected to the attachment levies. The Custodian has been sustained by the courts below, as he was in Nos. 298 and 314, on the basis of Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472. All that we have said in subdivisions numbered I, II, and III in Nos. 298 and 314, respecting the nature of the rights acquired under New York law by an attaching creditor, and the position occupied by those rights consistent with the freezing program, is equally applicable to the attachments here involved. The important distinction between these cases and their companions is in the Vesting Orders issued by the Custodian and the nature of the judgment he has sought in each. The only order issued to the Chase Bank was a “right, title, and interest” Vesting Order, which, as we understand the Custodian to concede, put him in the place of the German banks and left open to judicial determination whether any valid interests as against anyone were created by the attachments. In the litigation involving the Chase Bank, the Custodian sought a declaratory judgment that the freezing program precluded attaching creditors from obtaining any interest in the blocked property good as against the debtors. In these cases the Custodian pursued a different course, not only in that he served on the Federal Reserve Bank a “turnover directive,” but also in that the relief asked in this case omits any request for a declaration that the attachments are invalid. He asks a decree only that the Custodian is “entitled to possession” of the accounts in their entirety. In other words', in the actions involving the Chase Bank the Custodian stepped into the shoes of the German banks and sought to free their titles of the state liens; here he seeks to step into the shoes of the Federal Reserve Bank as possessor of the credits and funds, leaving unadjudicated the effect of such substitution of custody upon the attaching creditors’ rights. While the statute under which the funds are to be “held, administered and accounted for” authorizes the vesting of such foreign-owned property in the Custodian and its administration “in the interest of and for the benefit of the United States,” it is not a confiscation measure, but a liquidation measure for the protection of American creditors. It provides for the filing and proving of claims and states that the funds “shall be equitably applied” for the payment of debts. If the Custodian disallows a claim, or if he disallows a claim of priority where claims exceed assets, the claimant may seek relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The transfer of possession of these funds does not purport to work any automatic deprivation of rights of any class of creditors, but takes over the estate for administration. In view of these facts, we decide, and decide only, that the Custodian has power to possess himself of these funds and to administer them. To hold otherwise would be incompatible with the federal program. The consequences, if any, that flow from the substitution of the Custodian in place of the Bank as holder of the funds, upon rights derived from valid state court judgments secured by attachment, are not ripe for determination. They may never come into controversy. All questions as to the petitioners’ claims, judgments, or priorities are reserved for decision in the proceedings prescribed by statute. The power of the United States to take and administer the fund is paramount. The judgment below must, therefore, be Affirmed. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 82 F. Supp. 740; 182 F. 2d 349. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 411, as amended, §5 (b) (1), 55 Stat. 839. §34 (a), 60 Stat. 925. Id. § 34 (e), (f).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 77-285. Argued March 28, 1978 Decided July 3, 1978 RehNquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Stewart, BlackmtjN, Powell, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 679. Roderick Walston, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Évelle J. Younger, Attorney General, R. H. Connett, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard C. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General. Deputy Solicitor General Barnett argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Sagalkin, Sara Sun Beale, Peter R. Steenland, and Carl Strass A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed by officials for their respective States as follows: Bruce E. Babbitt, Attorney General of Arizona, and Ralph E, Hunsaker; J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, and David W. Robbins, Deputy Attorney General; Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General of Idaho; Curt T. Schneider, Attorney General of Kansas; Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Steven C. Smith, Assistant Attorney General; Robert List, Attorney General of Nevada, and Harry W. Swain-ston, Deputy Attorney General; Toney Anaya, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Richard A. Simms, Special Assistant Attorney General; Allen I. Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota; Larry D. Derryberry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Larry D. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General; James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon, and Al J. Laue, Solicitor General; William J. Janklow, Attorney General of South Dakota, and Warren B. Neufeld, Assistant Attorney General; John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas; Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, and Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General; and V. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Jack D. Palma II, Special Assistant Attorney General. Thomas Graff and Frederic P. Sutherland filed a brief for the Environmental Defense Fund et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Kenneth A. Kuney, John P. Fraser, and T. V. A. Dillon filed a brief for the Friant Water Users Assn, et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Robert S. Pelcyger and Robert D. Stitser for the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians; and by Charles J. Meyers fro se. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States seeks to impound 2.4 million acre-feet of water from California’s Stanislaus River as part of its Central Valley Project. The California State Water Resources Control Board ruled that the water could not be allocated to the Government under state law unless it agreed to and complied with various conditions dealing with the water’s use. The Government then sought a declaratory judgment in the District Court for the Eastern District of California to the effect that the United States can impound whatever unappropriated water is necessary for a federal reclamation project without complying with state' law. The District Court held that, as a matter of comity, the United States must apply to the State for an appropriation permit, but that the State must issue the permit without condition if there is sufficient unappropriated water. 403 F. Supp. 874 (1975). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but held that § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, as codified, 43 U. S. C. §§ 372, 383, rather than comity, requires the United States to apply for the permit. 558 F. 2d 1347 (1977). We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it holds that California cannot condition its allocation of water to a federal reclamation project. 434 U. S. 984 (1977). We now reverse. I Principles of comity and federalism, which the District Court and the Court of Appeals referred to and which have received considerable attention in our decisions, are as a legal matter based on the Constitution of the United States, statutes enacted by Congress, and judge-made law. But the situations invoking the application of these principles have contributed importantly to their formation. Just as it has been truly said that the life of the law is not logic but experience, see 0. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881), so may it be said that the life of the law is not political philosophy but experience. The very vastness of our territory as a Nation, the different times at which it was acquired and settled, and the varying physiographic and climatic regimes which obtain in its different parts have all but necessitated the recognition of legal distinctions corresponding to these differences. Those who first set foot in North America from ships sailing the tidal estuaries of Virginia did not confront the same problems as those who sailed flat boats down the Ohio River in search of new sites to farm. Those who cleared the forests in the old Northwest Territory faced totally different physiographic problems from those who built sod huts on the Great Plains. The final expansion of our Nation in the 19th century into the arid lands beyond the hundredth meridian of longitude, which had been shown on early maps as the “Great American Desert,” brought the participants in that expansion face-to face with the necessity for irrigation in a way that no previous territorial expansion had. In order to correctly ascertain the meaning of the Reclamation Act of 1902, we must recognize the obvious truth that the history of irrigation and reclamation before that date was much fresher in the minds of those then in Congress than it is to us today. “[T]he afternoón of July 23, 1847, was the true date of the beginning of modern irrigation. It was on that afternoon that the first band of Mormon pioneers built a small dam across City Creek near the present site of the Mormon Temple and diverted sufficient water to saturate some 5 acres of exceedingly dry land. Before the day was over they had planted potatoes to preserve the seed.” During the subsequent half century, irrigation expanded throughout the arid States of the West, supported usually by private enterprise or the local community. By the turn of the century, however, most of the land which could be profitably irrigated by such small-scale projects had been put to use. Pressure mounted on the Federal Government to provide the funding for the massive projects that would be needed to complete the reclamation, culminating in the Reclamation Act of 1902. The arid lands were not all susceptible of the same sort of reclamation. The climate and topography of the lands that constituted the “Great American Desert” were quite different from the climate and topography of the Pacific Coast States. As noted in both United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950), and Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958), the latter States not only had a more pronounced seasonal variation and precipitation than the intermountain States, but the interior portions of California had climatic advantages which many of the intermountain States did not. “The prime value in our national economy of the lands of summer drought on the Pacific coast is as a source of plant products that require mild winters and long growing seasons. Citrus fruits, the less hardy deciduous fruits, fresh vegetables in winter — these are their most important contributions at present. Rainless summers make possible the inexpensive drying of fruits, which puts into the market prunes, raisins, dried peaches, and apricots. In its present relation to American economy in general, the primary technical problem of agriculture in the Pacific Coast States is to make increasingly more effective use of the mild winters and the long growing season in the face of the great obstacle presented by the rainless summers. To overcome that obstacle supplementary irrigation is necessary. Hence the key position of water in Pacific Coast agriculture.” If the term “cooperative federalism” had been in vogue in 1902, the Reclamation Act of that year would surely have qualified as a leading example of it. In that Act, Congress set forth on a massive program to construct and operate dams, reservoirs, and canals for the reclamation of the arid lands in 17 Western States. Reflective of the “cooperative federalism” which the Act embodied is § 8, whose exact meaning and scope are the critical inquiries in this case: “[N]othing in this Act shall he construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigar tion, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, that the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.” 32 Stat. 390 (emphasis added). Perhaps because of the cooperative nature of the legislation, and the fact that Congress in the Act merely authorized the expenditure of funds in States whose citizens were generally anxious to have them expended, there has not been a great deal of litigation involving the meaning of its language. Indeed, so far as we can tell, the first case to come to this Court involving the Act at all was Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937), and the first case to require construction of § 8 of the Act was United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., supra, decided nearly half & century after the enactment of the 1902 statute. The New Melones Dam, which this litigation concerns, is part of the California Central Valley Project, the largest reclamation project yet authorized under the 1902 Act. The Dam, which will impound 2.4 million acre-feet of water of California's Stanislaus River, has the multiple purposes of flood control, irrigation, municipal use, industrial use, power, recreation, water-quality control, and the protection of fish and wildlife. The waters of the Stanislaus River that will be impounded behind the New Melones Dam arise and flow solely in California. The United States Bureau of Reclamation, as it has with every other federal reclamation project, applied for a permit from the appropriate state agency, here the California State Water Resources Control Board, to appropriate the water that would be impounded by the Dam and later used for reclamation. After lengthy hearings, the State Board found that unappropriated water was available for the New Melones Dam during certain times of the year. Although it therefore approved the Bureau's applications, the State Board attached 25 conditions to the permit. California State Water Resources Control Board, Decision 1422 (Apr. 14, 1973). The most important conditions prohibit full impoundment until the Bureau is able to show firm commitments, or at least a specific plan, for the use of the water. The State Board concluded that without such a specific plan of beneficial use the Bureau had failed to meet the California statutory requirements for appropriation. “The limited unappropriated water resources of the State should not be committed to an applicant in the absence of a showing of his actual need for the water within a reasonable time in the future. When the evidence indicates, as it does here, that an applicant already has a right to sufficient water to meet his needs for beneficial use within the foreseeable future, rights to additional water should be withheld and that water should be reserved for other beneficial uses.” Id., at 16. II The history of the relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of the arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress. The rivers, streams, and lakes of California were acquired by the United States under the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with the Republic of Mexico, 9 Stat. 922. Within a year of that treaty, the California gold rush began, and the settlers in this new land quickly realized that the riparian doctrine of water rights that had served well in the humid regions of the East would not work in the arid lands of the West. Other settlers coming into the intermountain area, the vast basin and range country which lies between the Rocky Mountains on the east and the Sierra Nevada and Cascade Ranges on the west, were forced to the same conclusion. In its place, the doctrine of prior appropriation, linked to beneficial use of the water, arose through local customs, laws, and judicial decisions. Even in this early stage of the development of Western water law, before many of the Western States had been admitted to the Union, Congress deferred to the growing local law. Thus, in Broder v. Water Co., 101 U. S. 274 (1879), the Court observed that local appropriation rights were “rights which the government had, by its conduct, recognized and encouraged and was bound to protect.” Id., at 276. In 1850, California was admitted as a State to the Union “on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.” 9 Stat. 452. While § 3 of the Act admitting California to the Union specifically reserved to the United States all “public lands” within the limits of California, no provision was made for the unappropriated waters in California's streams and rivers. One school of legal commentators held the view that, under the equal-footing doctrine, the Western States, upon their admission to the Union, acquired exclusive sovereignty over the unappropriated waters in their streams. In 1903, for example, one leading expert on reclamation and water law observed that “[i]t has heretofore been assumed that the authority of each State in the disposal of the water-supply within its borders was unquestioned and supreme, and two of the States have constitutional provisions asserting absolute ownership of all water-supplies within their bounds.” E. Mead, Irrigation Institutions 372 (1903). Such commentators were not without some support from language in contemporaneous decisions of this Court. See S. Wiel, Water Nights in the Western States §§ 40-43, pp. 84t-95 (2d ed. 1908). Thus, in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907), the Court noted: “While arid lands are to be found mainly, if not only in the Western and newer States, yet the powers of the National Government within the limits of those States are the same (no greater and no less) than those within the limits of the original thirteen. “In the argument on the demurrer counsel for plaintiff endeavored to show that Congress had expressly imposed the common law on all this territory prior to its formation into States. . . . But when the States of Kansas and Colorado were admitted into the Union they were admitted with the full powers of local sovereignty which belonged to other States, Pollard v. Hagan, [3 How. 212]; Shively v. Bowlby, [152 U. S. 1]; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 519; and Colorado by its legislation has recognized the right of appropriating the flowing waters to the purposes of irrigation.” Id., at 92 and 95. And see United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U. S. 690, 702-703, and 709 (1899). As noted earlier, reclamation of the arid lands began almost immediately upon the arrival of pioneers to the Western States. Huge sums of private money were invested in systems to transport water vast distances for mining, agriculture, and ordinary consumption. Because a very high percentage of land in the West belonged to the Federal Government, the canals and ditches that carried this water frequently crossed federal land. In 1862, Congress opened the public domain to homesteading. Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392. And in 1866, Congress for the first time expressly opened the mineral lands of the public domain to exploration and occupation by miners. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251. Because of the fear that these Acts might in some way interfere with the water rights and systems that had grown up under state and local law, Congress explicitly recognized and acknowledged the local law: “[WJhenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same.” § 9, 14 Stat. 253. The Mining Act of 1866 was not itself a grant of water rights pursuant to federal law. Instead, as this Court observed, the Act was “ ‘a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of possession, constituting a valid claim to its continued use.’ ” United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., supra, at 705. Congress intended “to recognize as valid the customary law with respect to the use of water which had grown up among the occupants of the public land under the peculiar necessities of their condition.” Basey v. Gallagher, 20 Wall. 670, 684 (1875). See Broder v. Water Co., supra, at 276; Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 459-461 (1879). In 1877, Congress took its first step toward encouraging the reclamation and settlement of the public desert lands in the West and made it clear that such reclamation would generally follow state water law. In the Desert Land Act of 1877, Congress provided for the homesteading of arid public lands in larger tracts “by [the homesteader’s] conducting water upon the same, within the period of three years [after filing a declaration to do so], Provided however that the right to the use of water by the person so conducting the same . . . shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and necessarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation: and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufactuing purposes subject to existing rights.” Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (emphasis added). This Court has had an opportunity to construe the 1877 Desert Land Act before. In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142 (1935), Mr. Justice Sutherland explained that, through this language, Congress “effected a severance of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.” Id., at 158. The nonnavigable waters thereby severed were “reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories.” Id., at 162. Congress’ purpose was not to federalize the prior-appropriation doctrine already evolving under local law. Quite the opposite: “What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including those since created out of the territories named, with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain. For since ‘Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any state,’ Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 94, the full power of choice must remain with the state. The Desert Land Act does not bind or purport to bind the states to any policy. It simply recognizes and gives sanction, in so far as the United States and its future grantees are concerned, to the state and local doctrine of appropriation, and seeks to remove what otherwise might be an impediment to its full and successful operation. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419, 465.” Id., at 163-164. See also Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land & Irrig. Co., 188 U. S. 545, 552-553 (1903); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82, 95 (1937) ; Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 367 (1937). Congress next addressed the task of reclaiming the arid lands of the West 11 years later. The opening of the arid lands to homesteading raised the specter that settlers might claim lands more suitable for reservoir sites or other irrigation works, impeding future reclamation efforts. Congress addressed this problem in the Act of Oct. 2, 1888, 25 Stat. 527, which provided: “[A] 11 the lands which may hereafter be designated or selected by such United States surveys for sites for reservoirs, ditches or canals for irrigation purposes and all the lands made susceptible of irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches or canals are from this time henceforth hereby reserved from sale as the property of the United States, and shall not be subject after the passage of this act, to entry, settlement or occupation until further provided by law.” Unfortunately, this language, which had been hastily drafted and passed, had the practical effect of reserving all of the public lands in the West from settlement. As a result, “there came a perfect storm of indignation from the people of the West, which resulted in the prompt repeal of the extraordinary [1888] provision.” 29 Cong. Rec. 1955 (1897) (statement of Cong. McRae). In the Act of Aug. 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 391, Congress repealed the 1888 provision except insofar as it reserved reservoir sites. Then, in the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1101, as amended, 43 U. S. C. § 946, Congress provided for rights-of-way across the public lands to be used by “any canal or ditch company formed for the purpose of irrigation.” The apparent purpose of the 1890 and 1891 Acts was to reserve reservoir sites from settlement but to open them for use in reclamation projects. As before, Congress expressly indicated that the reclamation would be controlled by state water law: “[T]he right of way through the public lands and reservations of the United States is hereby granted ... for the purpose of irrigation ... , to the extent of the ground occupied by the water of the reservoir and of the canal and its laterals . . . ; Provided, That . . . the privilege herein granted shall not be construed to interfere with the control of water for irrigation and other purposes under authority of the respective States or Territories.” 26 Stat. 1101 (emphasis added). The Secretary of the Interior, unfortunately, interpreted the 1890 and 1891 Acts as reserving governmentally surveyed reservoir sites from use rather than for use. Congress rectified this interpretation in the Act of Feb. 26, 1897, ch. 335, 29 Stat. 599, which provided: “[A] 11 reservoir sites reserved or to be reserved shall be open to use and occupation under the right-of-way Act of March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-one. And any State is hereby authorized to improve and occupy such reservoir sites to the same extent as an individual or private corporation, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe: Provided, That the charges for water coming in whole or part from reservoir sites used or occupied under the provisions of this Act shall always be subject to the control and regulation of the respective States and Territories in which such reservoirs are in whole or part situate.” The final provision of the 1897 Act was proposed as a floor amendment by Representative, later Speaker, Cannon to expressly preserve States’ control over reclamation within their borders. It was clearly the opinion of a majority of the Congressmen who spoke on the bill, however, that such an amendment was unnecessary except out of an excess of caution. According to Congressman Lacey, Chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands and a principal sponsor of the 1897 Act, the water through which the reclamation would be accomplished “does not belong to the [Federal] Government. The reservoirs in which the water is stored belong to the Government, but the water belongs to the States and will be controlled by them. The amendment proposed by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cannon] relieves this measure from all possible doubt upon that subject. I think there could be no doubt anyhow, but this amendment takes away the possibility of any question being raised as to the right of the States and Territories to regulate and control the management and the price of the water.” 29 Cong. Rec. 1952 (1897). Congressman Lacey’s statement found reflection in contemporaneous decisions of this Court holding that, with limited exceptions not relevant to reclamation, authority over intrastate waterways lies with the States. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., for example, New Mexico’s authority to adopt a prior appropriation system of water rights for the Rio Grande River was challenged. The Court unhesitatingly held that “as to every stream within its dominion a State may change [the] common law rule and permit the appropriation of the flowing waters for such purposes as it deems wise.” 174 U. S., at 702-703. The Court noted that there are two limitations to the State’s exclusive control of its streams — reserved rights “so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property,” id., at 703, and the navigation servitude. The Court, however, was careful to emphasize with respect to these limitations on the States’ power that, except where the reserved rights or navigation servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total authority over its internal waters. “Unquestionably the State . . . has a right to appropriate its waters, and the United States may not question such appropriation, unless thereby the navigability of the '[river] be disturbed.” Id., at 709. Similarly, in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907), the United States claimed that it had a right in the Arkansas River superior to that of Kansas and Colorado stemming from its power “to control the whole system of the reclamation of arid lands.” The Court disagreed and held that state reclamation law must prevail. The United States, of course, could appropriate water and build projects to reclaim its own public lands. “As to those lands within the limits of the States, at least of the Western States, the National Government is the most considerable owner and has power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting its property.” Id., at 92. But federal legislation could not “override state laws in respect to the general subject of reclamation.” Ibid. “[E]ach State has full jurisdiction over the lands within its borders, including the beds of streams and other waters.” Id., at 93. With respect to the question that had been presented in Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., the Court reaffirmed that each State “may determine for itself whether the common law rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of waters for the purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any State.” 206 U. S., at 94. Ill It is against this background that Congress passed the Reclamation Act of 1902. With the help of the 1891 and 1897 Acts, private and state reclamation projects had gone far toward reclaiming the arid lands, but massive projects were now needed to complete the goal and these were beyond the means of private companies and the States. In 1900, therefore, all of the major political parties endorsed federal funding of reclamation projects. While the Democratic Party’s platform specified none of the attributes of a federal program other than to recommend that it be “intelligent,” K. Porter & D. Johnson, National Party Platforms 115 (2d ed. 1961), the Republicans specifically recommended that the reclamation program “reserv[e] control of the distribution of water for irrigation to the respective States and territories.” Id., at 123. In his first message to Congress after assuming the Presidency, Theodore Roosevelt continued the cry for national funding of reclamation and again recommended that state law control the distribution of water. As a result of the public demand for federal reclamation funding, a bill was introduced into- the 57th Congress to use the money from the sale of public lands in the Western States to build reclamation projects in those same States. The projects would be built on federal land and the actual construction and operation of the projects would be in the hands'of the Secretary of the Interior. But the Act clearly provided that state water law would control in the appropriation and later distribution of the water. As originally introduced, § 8 of the Reclamation Act provided: “[N]othing in this act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation; but State and Territorial laws shall govern and control in the appropriation, use, and distribution of the waters rendered available by the works constructed under the provisions of this act: Provided, That the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.” From the legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902, it is clear that state law was expected to control in two important respects. First, and of controlling importance to this case, the Secretary would have to appropriate, purchase, or condemn necessary water rights in strict conformity with state law. According to Representative Mondell, the principal sponsor of the reclamation bill in the House, once the Secretary determined that a reclamation project was feasible and that there was an adequate supply of water for the project, “the Secretary of the Interior would proceed to make the appropriation of the necessary water by giving the notice and complying with the forms of law of the State or Territory in which the works were located.” 35 Cong. Rec. 6678 (1902) (emphasis added). The Secretary of the Interior could not take any action in appropriating the waters of the state streams “which could not be undertaken by an individual or corporation if it were in the position of the Government as regards the ownership of its lands.” H. R. Rep. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1902). Thus, in response to the statement of an opponent to the bill that the Secretary would be allowed to condemn water even if in violation of state law, Representative Mondell briskly responded: “Whereabouts does the gentleman find any such provision as he is arguing? Whereabouts in the bill is there anything that attempts to give the Federal Government any right to condemn or to take any water right or do anything which an individual could not do? Will the gentleman point out any place or any provision for the Federal Government to do anything that I could not do if I owned the public land? “Mr. RAY of New York. Do you say there is nothing in this bill that provides for condemnation? “Mr. MONDELL. The bill provides explicitly that even an appropriation of water can not be made except under State law.” 35 Cong. Rec. 6687 (1902) (emphasis added). Second, once the waters were released from the Dam, their distribution to individual landowners would again be controlled by state law. As explained by Senator Clark of Wyoming, one of the principal supporters of the reclamation bill in the Senate, “the control of waters after leaving the reservoirs shall be vested in the States and Territories through which such waters flow.” Id., at 2222. As Senator Clark went on to explain: “[I]t is right and proper that the various States and Territories should control in the distribution. The conditions in each and every State and Territory are different. What would be applicable in one locality is totally and absolutely inapplicable in another. ... In each and every one of the States and Territories affected, after a long series of experiments, after a due consideration of conditions, there has arisen a set of men who are especially qualified to deal with local conditions. “Every one of these States and Territories has an accomplished and experienced corps of engineers who for years have devoted their energies and their learning to a solution of this problem of irrigation in their individual localities. To take from these experienced men, to take from the legislatures of the various States and Territories, the control of this question at the present time would be something little less than suicidal. They are the men qualified to deal with the question, the laws are written upon their statute books and read of all men, and in every one of these States and Territories the laws have been passed that most diligently regard the rights of the settler and of the farmer . . . .” Ibid. As Representative Sutherland, later to be a Justice of this Court, succinctly put it, “if the appropriation and use were not under the provisions of the State law the utmost confusion would prevail.” Id., at 6770. Different water rights in the same State would be governed by different laws and would frequently conflict. A principal motivating factor behind Congress’ decision to defer to state law was thus the legal confusion that would arise if federal water law and state water law reigned side by side in the same locality. Congress also intended to “folio [w] the well-established precedent in national legislation of recognizing local and State laws relative to the appropriation and distribution of water.” Id., at 6678 (Cong. Mondell). As Representative Mondell noted after reviewing the legislation discussed in Part II of this opinion: “Every act since that of April 26, 1866, has recognized local laws and customs appertaining to the appropriation and distribution of water used in irrigation, and it has been deemed wise to continue our policy in this regard.” Id., at 6679. Both sponsors and opponents of the Reclamation Act also expressed constitutional doubts as to Congress' power to override the States’ regulation of waters within their borders. Congress was fully aware that the Supreme Court had “in several decisions recognized the right of the State to regulate and control the use of water within its borders.” Ibid. (Cong. Mondell). According to the House Report, “Section 8 recognizes State control over waters of nonnavigable streams such as are used in irrigation.” H. R. Rep. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1902) (emphasis added). IV For almost half a century, this congressionaily mandated division between federal and state authority worked smoothly. No project was constructed without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, and the United States through this official preserved its authority to determine how federal- funds should be expended. But state laws relating to water rights were observed in accordance with the congressional directive contained in § 8 of the Act of 1902. In 1958, however, the first of two cases was decided by this Court in which private landowners or municipal corporations contended that state water law had the effect of overriding specific congressional directives to the Secretary of the Interior as to the operation of federal reclamation projects. In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275, the Supreme Court of California decided that California law forbade the 160-acre limitation on irrigation water deliveries expressly written into § 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, and that therefore, under § 8 of the Reclamation Act, the Secretary was required to deliver reclamation water without regard to the acreage limitation. Both the State of California and the United States appealed from this judgment, and this Court reversed it, saying: “Section 5 is a specific and mandatory prerequisite laid down by the Congress as binding in the operation of reclamation projects, providing that ‘[n]o right to the use of water . . . shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner . . . .’ Without passing generally on the coverage of § 8 in the delicate area of federal-state relations in the irrigation field, we do not believe that the Congress intended § 8 to override the repeatedly reaffirmed national policy of § 5.” 357 U. S., at 291-292. Five years later, in City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963), this Court affirmed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holding that § 8 did not require the Secretary of the Interior to ignore explicit congressional provisions preferring irrigation use over domestic and municipal use. Petitioners do not ask us to overrule these holdings, nor are we presently inclined to do so. Petitioners instead ask us to hold that a State may impose any condition on the “control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water” through a federal reclamation project that is not inconsistent with clear congressional directives respecting the project. Petitioners concede, and the Government relies upon, dicta in our cases that may point to a contrary conclusion. Thus, in Ivanhoe, the Court went beyond the actual facts of that case and stated: “As we read § 8, it merely requires the United States to comply with state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein. . . . We read nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions imposed by the State.” 357 U. S., at 291-292. Like dictum was repeated in City of Fresno, supra, at 630, and in this Court’s opinion in Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963), where the Court also said: “The argument that § 8 of the Reclamation Act requires the United States in the delivery of water to follow priorities laid down by state law has already been disposed of by this Court in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, . . . and reaffirmed in City of Fresno v. California .... Since § 8 of the Reclamation Act did not subject the Secretary to state law in disposing of water in [Ivanhoe], we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the Secretary must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the Project Act.” Id., at 586-587. While we are not convinced that the above language is diametrically inconsistent with the position of petitioners, or that it squarely supports the United States, it undoubtedly goes further than was necessary to decide the cases presented to the Court. Ivanhoe and City of Fresno involved conflicts between § 8, requiring the Secretary to follow state law as to water rights, and other provisions of Reclamation Acts that placed specific limitations on how the water was to be distributed. Here the United States contends that it may ignore state law even if no explicit congressional directive conflicts with the conditions imposed by the California State Water Control Board. In Arizona v. California, the States had asked the Court to rule that state law would control in the distribution of water from the Boulder Canyon Project, a massive multistate reclamation project on the Colorado River. After reviewing the legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U. S. C. § 617 et seq., the Court concluded that because of the unique size and multistate scope of the Project, Congress did not intend the States to interfere with the Secretary’s power to determine with whom and on what terms water contracts would be made. While the Court in rejecting the States’ claim repeated the language from Ivanhoe and City of Fresno as to the scope of § 8, there was no need for it to reaffirm such language except as it related to the singular legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project Act. But because there is at least tension between the above-quoted dictum and what we conceive to be the correct reading of § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, we disavow the dictum to the extent that it would prevent petitioners from imposing conditions on the permit granted to the United States which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions authorizing the project in question. Section 8 cannot be read to require the Secretary to comply with state law only when it becomes necessary to purchase or condemn vested water rights. That section does, of course, provide for the protection of vested water rights, but it also requires the Secretary to comply with state law in the “control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water.” Nor, as the United States contends, does § 8 merely require the Secretary of the Interior to file a notice with the State of his intent to appropriate but to thereafter ignore the substantive provisions of state law. The legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 makes it abundantly clear that Congress intended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state water law. The Government’s interpretation would trivialize the broad language and purpose of §8. Indeed, until recently, it has been the consistent position of the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation, who are together responsible for executing the provisions of the Reclamation Act of 1902, that in appropriating water for reclamation purposes the Bureau must comply with state law. The Bureau’s operating instructions, for example, provide: “State and Federal law and policy establish the framework for project formulation. Project 'plans must comply with State legal provisions or priorities for beneficial use of water .... In some cases, . . . State laws . . . have been modified to meet specific conditions in the authorization of particular projects.” U. S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Instructions § 116.3.1 (1959) (emphasis added). "The Reclamation Act recognizes the interests and rights of the States in the utilization and control of their water resources and requires the Bureau, in carrying out provisions of the Act, to proceed in conformity with State water laws. Since the construction of a reservoir and the subsequent storage and release of water for beneficial purposes normally entails stream regulation, it is necessary to reach an understanding with the States regarding reservoir operating limitations.” Id., § 231.5.1 (1957) (emphasis added). With respect to the Central Valley Project, the Bureau advised Congress that “ '[reclamation law . . . recognizes State water law and rights thereunder’ ” and that “Bureau filings on water are subject to State approval.” 95 Cong. Rec. A961 (1949). Indeed, until the unnecessarily broad language of the Court’s opinion in Ivanhoe, both the uniform practice of the Bureau of Reclamation and the opinions of the Court clearly supported petitioners’ argument that they may impose any condition not inconsistent with congressional directive. In holding that the United States was not an indispensable party in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U. S. 40 (1935), this Court observed: “[T]he Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the [1902] Act, applied to the state engineer of Wyoming and obtained from him permission ... to appropriate waters, and was awarded a priority date. . . . All of the acts of the Reclamation Bureau in operating the reservoirs so as to impound and release waters of the river are subject to the authority of Wyoming. “The bill alleges, and we know as matter of law [citing § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act], that the Secretary and his agents, acting by authority of the Reclamation Act and supplementary legislation, must obtain permits and priorities for the use of water from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as a private appropriator or an irrigation district formed under the state law.” Id., at 42-43. Ten years later, in its final decision in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945), the Court elaborated on its original observation: “All of these steps make plain that [the Reclamation] projects were designed, constructed and completed according to the pattern of state law as provided in the Reclamation Act. We can say here what was said in Ickes v. Fox, [300 U. S. 82 (1937)]: ‘Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water, the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or water-rights became vested in the United States is not well founded. Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the land owners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract already referred to, the water-rights became the property of the land owners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government in the irrigation works. . . . The government was and remained simply a carrier and distributor of the water . . . , with the right to receive the sums stipulated in the contracts as reimbursement for the cost of construction and annual charges for operation and maintenance of the works.’ “We have then a direction by Congress to the Secretary of the Interior to proceed in conformity with state laws in appropriating water for irrigation purposes. We have a compliance with that direction. . . .” Id., at 613-615. The United States suggests that, even if the Congress of 1902 intended the Secretary of the Interior to comply with state law, more recent legislative enactments have subjected reclamation projects “to a variety of federal policies that leave no room for state controls on the operation of a project or on the choice of uses it will serve.” Brief for United States 89. While later Congresses have indeed issued new directives to the Secretary, they have consistently reaffirmed that the Secretary should follow state law in all respects not directly inconsistent with these directives. The Flood Control Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 888, for example, which first authorized the New Melones Dam, provides that it is the “policy of the Congress to recognize the interests and rights of the States in determining the development of watersheds within their borders and likewise their interests and rights in water utilization and control.” Perhaps the most eloquent expression of the need to observe state water law is found in the Senate Report on the McCarran Amendment, 43 U. S. C. § 666 (a), which subjects the United States to state-court jurisdiction for general stream adjudications: “In the arid Western States, for more than 80 years, the law has been the water above and beneath the surface of the ground belongs to the public, and the right to the use thereof is to be acquired from the State in which it is found, which State is vested with the primary control thereof. “Since it is clear that the States have the control of water within their boundaries, it is essential that each and every owner along a given water course, including the United States, must be amenable to the law of the State, if there is to be a proper administration of the water law as it has developed over the years.” S. Rep. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 6 (1951). V Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals both held that California could not impose any conditions whatever on the United States’ appropriation permit, those courts did not reach the United States’ alternative contention that the conditions actually imposed are inconsistent with congressional directives as to the New Melones Dam. Nor did they reach California’s contention that the United States is barred by principles of collateral estoppel from challenging the consistency of the permit conditions. Assuming, arguendo, that the United States is still free to challenge the consistency of the conditions, resolution of their consistency may well require additional factfinding. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. A. Golzé, Reclamation in the United States 6 (2d ed. 1961). The author was at the time of publication the Chief Engineer of the California Department of Water Resources and had been formerly Assistant Commissioner of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Id., at 6-12. Id., at 12-13. Private development has continued to be a major contributor to the reclamation of the West. From 1902 to 1950, federal reclamation projects increased the amount of irrigated land by 5,700,000 acres. This still only accounted, however, for approximately one-fifth of the irrigated acreage in the 17 Western States covered by the Reclamation Act of 1902. During the same period from 1902 to 1950, private reclamation opened up over 10,000,000 acres for irrigation. Id., at 14, Table 1-1. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Climate and Man 204 (1941). For a general description of water conditions in California and the Californians’ answer to them, see E. Cooper, Aqueduct Empire (1968). Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act has been mentioned in only seven cases decided by this Court. See Ide v. United States, 263 U. S. 497 (1924); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 295 U. S. 40 (1935); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725 (1950); Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963); Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963). The New Melones Dam was authorized by the Flood Control Acts of 1944 and 1962, 58 Stat. 901, 76 Stat. 1191. As in the case of all other reclamation projects, Congress specifically directed that the Dam be constructed and operated “pursuant to the, Federal reclamation laws,” 76 Stat. 1191, the principal one of which is'the Reclamation Act of 1902. Under California law, any person who wishes to appropriate water must apply for a permit from the State Water Resources Control Board. Cal. Water Code Ann. §§ 1201 and 1225 (West 1971). The Board is to issue a permit only if it determines that unappropriated water is available and that the proposed use is both “reasonable” and “beneficial” and best serves “the public interest.” §§ 1240, 1255, and 1375; Cal. Const., Art. 10, § 2. In determining whether to issue a permit, the Board is to consider not only the planned use of the water but also alternative uses, including enhancement of water quality, recreation, and the preservation of fish and wildlife. Cal. Water Code Ann. §§ 1242.5, 1243, and 1257 (West 1971). The Board can also impose such conditions in the permit as are necessary to insure the “reasonable” and “beneficial” use of the water and to protect “the public interest.” §§ 1253 and 1391. Other conditions prohibit collection of water during periods of the year when unappropriated water is unavailable; require that a preference be given to water users in the water basin in which the New Melones Dam is located; require storage releases to be made so as to maintain maximum and minimum chemical concentrations in the San Joaquin River and protect fish and wildlife; require the United States to provide means for the release of excess waters and to clear vegetation and structures from the reservoir sites; require the filing of additional reports and studies; and provide for access to the project site by the State Board and the public. Still other conditions reserve jurisdiction to the Board to impose further conditions on the appropriations if necessary to protect the “beneficial use” of the water involved. The United States did not challenge any of the conditions under state law, but instead filed the federal declaratory action that is now before us. Dr. Elwood Mead was Chief of Irrigation Investigations for the Department of Agriculture at the time of his treatise’s publication. Dr. Mead was a principal witness before Congress during the hearings on the Reclamation Act of 1902 and later became Commissioner of Reclamation, serving in that position from 1924 until his death in 1936. Three Western States have adopted constitutional provisions asserting absolute ownership over the waters in their States. See Colo. Const., Art. 16, § 5; N. D. Const., Art. 17, § 210; Wyo. Const., Art. 8, § 1. Other States have asserted ownership by statute. See, e. g., Idaho Code § 42-101 (1977). The courts of these States have upheld these provisions on the ground that the States gained absolute dominion over their nonnavigable waters upon their admission to the Union. See, e. g., Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 27-29, 129 P. 220, 221-222 (1912); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900). Senator Stewart, the most vocal of the 1866 Act’s supporters, noted during debate that § 9 “confirms the rights to the use of water ... as established by local law and the decisions of the courts. In short, it proposes no new system, but sanctions, regulates, and confirms a system to which the people are devotedly attached.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 3227 (1866) (emphasis added). Four years later, in the Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218, Congress reaffirmed that occupants of federal public land would be bound by state water law, by providing that “all patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights.” The effect of the 1866 and 1870 Acts was not limited to rights previously acquired. “They reach [ed] into the future as well, and approve[d] and confirm[ed] the policy of appropriation for a beneficial use, as recognized by local rules and customs, and the legislation^and judicial decisions of the arid-land states, as the test and measure of private rights in and to the non-navigable waters on the public domain.” California, Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142, 155 (1935). Mr. Justice Sutherland had grown up in. Utah and was very familiar with the Westerners’ efforts to tame the desert. Elected to Congress in 1900, Sutherland was assigned to the Committee on Irrigation. According to his biographer, Sutherland’s “intimate knowledge of the water problem in the West enabled him to make a conspicuous contribution” in this assignment. J. Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State 43 (1951). Sutherland was one of the principal participants in the formulation of the Reclamation Act of 1902. Id., at 44. See 29 Cong. Rec. 1948 (1897) (discussion by Cong. Lacey); id., at 1955 (discussion by Cong. McRae). Ibid. And see Report to the Secretary of the Interior on the Blue Water Land & Irrigation Co. by the Acting Commissioner of the General Land Office, Nov. 23, 1895. Congress’ intent was reflected in contemporary administrative decisions. According to the Department of the Interior, the 1891 Act “relegate[d] the matter of appropriation and control of all natural sources of water supply in the state of California to the authority of that state. The act of March 3, 1891, deals only with the right of way over the public lands to be used for the purposes of irrigation, leaving the dispoátion of the water to the state.” If. H. Sinclair, 18 I. D. 573, 574 (1894). In a circular of the same period explaining the 1891 Act, the Interior Department noted that the “control of the flow and use of the water is ... a matter exclusively under State or Territorial control, the matter of administration within the jurisdiction of this Department being limited to the approval of maps carrying the right of way over the public lands.” 18 I. D. 168, 169-170 (1894). “A reservoir site without water is entirely useless. The water is the particular thing in question, and the waters are controlled by the States through which they flow, and not by the United States of America. These are surface waters, the waters of small streams not navigable, and the States control them. “[T]he United States does not control the water. It controls only the reservoir sites in which the water may be collected. The water is under the control of the States.” 29 Cong. Rec. 1948-1949 (1897) (Cong. Lacey). “It is the State alone that owns and controls the water, under the constitution of our States; and I suppose that is true under the laws of every State.” Id., at 1951 (Cong. Bell). “The amendment which has been proposed by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON], and adopted, really serves no purpose, because it merely reenacts the existing law. It would be the law even if the act of 1891 were not in existence. The waters belong to the States. The United States Government has always recognized that, and the States have enacted legislation directly controlling the use of the waters.” Id., at 1952 (Cong. Shafroth). Only Congressman Terry, who unsuccessfully opposed the bill, suggested the contrary. In his view, the Federal Government could use its control of the land to regulate the price of the water stored. See id., at 1949-1950. See A. Golzé, Reclamation in the United States 9-23 (1961). “The pioneer settlers on the arid public domain chose their homes along streams from which they could themselves divert the water to reclaim their holdings. Such opportunities are practically gone. There remain, however, vast areas of public land which can be made available for homestead settlement, but only by reservoirs and main-line canals impracticable for private enterprise. These irrigation works should be built by the National Government. The lands reclaimed by them should be reserved by the Government for actual settlers, and the cost of construction should so far as possible be repaid by the land reclaimed. The distribution of the water, the division of the streams among irrigators, should be left to the settlers themselves in conformity with State laws and without interference with those laws or with vested rights.” H. R. Doc. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., xxvm (1901) (emphasis added). In the House, § 8 was amended so as to provide, rather than that state law “shall govern and control,” that “the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with” state law “relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water.” According to- Representative Newlands, who- had introduced the original bill in the House, the original bill was "identical in its provisions, though differing somewhat in phraseology,” to the ultimate Act. 35 Cong. Rec. 6673 (1902). The bill may have been amended to make clear the congressional intent that state law could not override the specific directives of Congress that water rights would be appurtenant to the land and would not be sold to tracts of greater than 160 acres. See id., at 6674. See generally n. 21, infra. Earlier in the debates, Representative Mondell observed that under the Reclamation Act the Secretary of the Interior would only have the power to condemn water rights in compliance with state law. “In some of the arid States . . . water rights can be condemned for the purposes contemplated in this bill, and in such States the Secretary of the Interior would have as much authority to condemn as any other individual, and no more. Where the State laws do not recognize the right to condemn property for the purposes contemplated in the act, it will not be condemned, and there is the end of it ... . [W]here the State laws do not authorize condemnation, and projects can not be carried on without condemnation, those particular projects will not be undertaken, and others, where there is no such obstacle, will.” 35 Cong. Rec. 6680 (1902). In response to Representative Mondell’s statement, Representative Ray asked whether he had “forgotten . . . that they have in this bill a provision which purports to confer upon the Secretary of the Interior power to condemn water and water rights for the purpose of carrying out this scheme.” Representative Mondell responded that the power existed only “[w]herever the State law gives him authority to do so.” Id., at 6688. Representative Sutherland also noted that the “Secretary must proceed in the condemnation proceedings under the laws of the State.” Id., at 6769. Congress did not intend to relinquish total control of the actual distribution of the reclamation water to the States. Congress provided in § 8 itself that the water right must be appurtenant to the land irrigated and governed by beneficial use, and in § 5 Congress forbade the sale of reclamation water to tracts of land of more than. 160 acres. It is conceivable, of course, that Congress may not have intended to actually override state law when inconsistent with these other provisions but instead only intended to exercise a veto power over any reclamation project that, because of state law, could not be operated in compliance with these provisions. A project simply would not be built by the Federal Government if such a conflict existed. As the House Report explained the workings of the 160-acre limitation and the appurtenance requirement: “The character of the water rights contemplated being clearly defined, the Secretary of the Interior would not be authorized to begin construction of works for the irrigation of lands in any State or Territory until satisfied that the laws of said State or Territory fully recognized and protected water rights of the character contemplated. This feature of the bill will undoubtedly tend to uniformity and perfection of water laws throughout the region affected.” H. R. Rep. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1902). Some support for this interpretation of the congressional intent can also be found in contemporaneous administrative material of the Department of the Interior. See, e. g., Department of the Interior, Proceedings of First Conference of Engineers of the Reclamation Service 103 (1904) (“Before the filing of the first notice of appropriation of water in any State the matter of the advisability of making such filing should be submitted to the chief engineer, because some of the State laws may be such that it is impossible to comply with them hi conducting operations under the reclamation act”); Department of the Interior, Second Annual Report of the Reclamation Service 33 (1904) (“[Cjareful study must be made of the effect of State laws upon each project under consideration in that particular State. It appears probable that in some of the States radical changes in the laws must be made before important projects can be undertaken”). In previous cases interpreting § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, however, this Court has held that state water law does not control in the distribution of reclamation water if inconsistent with other congressional directives to the Secretary. See Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U. S. 275 (1958); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U. S. 627 (1963). We believe that this reading of the Act is also consistent with the legislative history and indeed is the preferable reading of the Act. See n. 25, infra. Whatever the intent of Congress with respect to state control over the distribution of water, however, Congress in the 1902 Act intended to follow state law as to appropriation of water and condemnation of water rights. Under the 1902 Act, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized in his discretion to “locate and construct” reclamation projects. As the legislative history of the 1902 Act convincingly demonstrates, however, if state law did not allow for the appropriation or condemnation of the necessary water, Congress did not intend the Secretary of the Interior to initiate the project. Subsequent legislation authorizing a specific project may by its terms signify congressional intent that the Secretary condemn or be permitted to appropriate the necessary water rights for the project in question, but no such legislation was considered by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in this case. That court will be free to consider arguments by the Government to this effect on remand. See Part V, infra. In addition to the legislation discussed in Part II of this, opinion, Congressman Mondell also cited to the National Forest Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 36, “provid [ing] for the use of waters on such reserves ‘under the laws of the State wherein such forest reservations are situated.’ ” 35 Cong. Rec. 6679 (1902). Opponents of the 1902 Reclamation Act also expressed doubt whether Congress could constitutionally override the States’ regulation of waters within their borders: “Again, to be clear, the United States as to its public lands in a State is only an owner with the rights of private ownership, the same as those of an individual. When territory is admitted into the Union as a State the sovereignty of the United States is surrendered to the new State and the sovereignty of the State attaches and becomes paramount as to every foot of soil, unless expressly reserved to the General Government, and subject to the right of that Government to condemn for a public use of the United States necessary to the performance of its governmental functions or to its preservation.” H. R. Rep. No. 794, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (Minority Views), 16-17 (1902). See also id., at 8; 35 Cong. Rec. 6687 (1902) (Cong. Ray). “Section 9 (c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 . . . provides: 'No contract relating to municipal water supply or miscellaneous purposes . . . shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary [of the Interior], it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes.’ ... It therefore appears clear that Fresno has no preferential rights to contract for project water, but may receive it only if, in the Secretary’s judgment, irrigation will not be adversely affected.” 372 U. S., at 630-631. The Court also concluded in a separate portion of its opinion: “§ 8 does not mean that state law may operate to prevent the United States from exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others. . . . Rather, the effect of § 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made.” Id,., at 630. Because no provision of California law was actually inconsistent with the exercise by the United States of its power of eminent domain, this statement was dictum. It also might have been apparent from examination of the congressional authorization of the Central Valley Project that Congress intended the Secretary to have the power to condemn any necessary water rights. We disavow this dictum, however, to the exent that it implies that state law does not control even where not inconsistent with such expressions of congressional intent. As discussed earlier in n. 21, it is at least arguable that Congress did not intend to override state water law when it was inconsistent with congressional objectives such as the 160-aere limitation, but intended instead to enforce those objectives simply by the Secretary’s refusal to approve a project which could not be built or operated in accordance with them. This intent, however, is not clear, and Congress may have specifically amended § S to provide that state law could not override congressional directives with respect to a reclamation project. See n. 19, supra. Ivanhoe and City of Fresno read the legislative history of the 1902 Act as evidencing Congress’ intent that specific congressional directives which were contrary to state law regulating distribution of water would override that law. Even were this aspect of Ivanhoe res nova, we believe it to be the preferable reading of the Act. Part of the Court’s opinion in Ivanhoe indeed would appear to directly support petitioners’ position. Thus, the Court concluded that under § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act the United States must “comply with state law when, in the construction and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests therein.” 357 U. S., at 291 (emphasis added). The State of California was an appellant in Ivanhoe and supported the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in City of Fresno. The Special Master agreed with the States that they had such power under § 14 of the Project Act, 43 U. S. C. § 617m, which incorporated the Reclamation Act of 1902, and § 18 of the Project Act, 43 U. S. C. § 617q, which provided that nothing in the Act should be construed “as interfering with such rights as the States had on December 21, 1928, either to the waters within their borders or to adopt such policies and enact such laws as they deem necessary with respect to the appropriation, control, and use of waters within their borders.” The Court disagreed, with three Justices dissenting. Even though concluding that the power of the States was so limited, the Court went on to note that the Project Act “plainly allows the States to do things not inconsistent with the Project Act or with federal control of the river.” 373 U. S., at 588. A remarkably similar history of administrative construction and advice to Congress was given weight in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S., at 735-736. Considerable weight must be accorded to these interpretations of the Reclamation Act by the agency charged with its operation. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). It is worth noting that the original Reclamation Act of 1902 was not devoid of such directives. That Act provided that the charges for water should “be determined with a view of returning to the reclamation fund the estimated cost of construction of the project, and ... be apportioned equitably” and that water rights should “be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use . . . the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right”; the Act also forbade sales to tracts of more than 160 acres. Despite these restraints on the Secretary, however, it is clear from the language and legislative history of the 1902 Act that Congress intended state law to control where it was not inconsistent with the above provisions.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BROWN-FORMAN DISTILLERS CORP. v. NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY No. 84-2030. Argued March 3, 1986 Decided June 3, 1986 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in all but n. 6 of which Blackmun, J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 586. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 586. Brennan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease. Macdonald Flinn argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. Lloyd Constantine, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Robert Hermann, Solicitor General, and August L. Fietkau, Richard G. Liskov, and Christopher Keith Hall, Assistant Attorneys General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, Inc., by David W. Ichel and Russell W. Shannon; for the Distillers Somerset Group Inc. by Bartlett H. McGuire and James D. Liss; for the United States Brewers Association, Inc., et al. by Jeffrey Ives Glekel, Timothy G. Reynolds, Lawrence J. Block, Jerome I. Chapman, and William H. Allen; and for the Wine Institute by Arnold M. Lerman, Daniel Marcus, and Roy T. Englert, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon; and for Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., by Michael Whiteman, Douglas W. Metz, and Abraham Tunick. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The State of New York requires every liquor distiller or producer that sells liquor to wholesalers within the State to sell at a price that is no higher than the lowest price the distiller charges wholesalers anywhere else in the United States. The issue in this case is whether that requirement violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. I New York extensively regulates the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within its borders. The State’s Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (ABC Law) prohibits the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages within the State without the appropriate licenses, ABC Law § 100(1) (McKinney 1970), and regulates the terms of all sales, §§101-a to 101-bbb (McKinney 1970 and Supp. 1986). Distillers and their agents may not sell to wholesalers in New York except in accordance with a price schedule filed with the State Liquor Authority. § 101-b(3)(a). The distiller or agent must file the price schedule before the 25th day of each month, and the prices therein become effective on the first day of the second following month. The schedule must contain a precise description of each item the distiller intends to sell, and a per-bottle and per-case price. All sales to any wholesaler in New York during the month for which the schedule is in effect must be at those prices. This litigation concerns § 101 — b(3)(d) of the ABC Law, which requires any distiller or agent that files a schedule of prices to include an affirmation that “the bottle and case price of liquor to wholesalers set forth in such schedule is no higher than the lowest price at which such item of liquor will be sold by such [distiller] to any wholesaler anywhere in any other state of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or to any state (or state agency) which owns and operates retail liquor stores” during the month covered by the schedule. Violation of the statute may lead to revocation of a distiller’s license and the forfeiture of bond posted by the distiller in connection with the license, § 101 — b(6). Twenty other States have similar affirmation laws. Appellant Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. (BrownForman) is a distiller that owns several brands of liquor that it sells in New York and in other States. Beginning in 1978, appellant has offered its wholesalers cash payments, or “promotional allowances,” which are credited against any amounts due appellant. Appellant intends for wholesalers to use these allowances for advertising; however, the amount of the allowance a wholesaler receives is not tied to the quantity either of the wholesaler’s advertising or of its purchases of appellant’s products. The amount of a particular wholesaler’s allowance does depend on its past purchases and projections of future purchases, but accepting the allowance does not constitute an agreement to purchase any particular quantity of Brown-Forman products. The allowances, therefore, are unconditional, lump-sum payments to all wholesalers, in every State except New York, that purchase Brown-Forman brands. Appellant offered the promotional allowance to its New York wholesalers, but the Liquor Authority determined that the ABC Law prohibited such payments. The Authority also determined, however, that the payment of promotional allowances to wholesalers in other States lowered the effective price of Brown-Forman brands to those wholesalers, and thus violated § 101 — b(3)(d) of the ABC Law. The Liquor Authority accordingly instituted license revocation proceedings against appellant. Appellant sought review of the Liquor Authority’s ruling in the state courts, asserting that it was both arbitrary and unconstitutional. Appellant contended that it could not possibly file a schedule of prices that reflected precisely the “effective price” charged to wholesalers in other States, because there was no one “effective price.” Each participating wholesaler could pay a different effective price in a given month depending on the amount of Brown-Forman product it had purchased during that month. Moreover, appellant argued, other States did not treat the promotional allowances as discounts. Were New York to force appellant to reduce its prices in that State, appellant would be charging a lower price to New York wholesalers than the price recognized by other States, thereby forcing appellant to violate the affirmation laws of those States. Appellant contended that the only way to avoid this dilemma was to stop offering promotional allowances, unless other States chose to alter their affirmation laws. By effectively forcing appellant to discontinue a promotional program in other States where that program was legal, appellant argued, New York’s regulation violated the Commerce Clause. Appellant also argued that the affirmation law on its face directly regulated interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court rejected these arguments, 100 App. Div. 2d 55, 473 N. Y. S. 2d 420 (1984), as did the New York Court of Appeals, 64 N. Y. 2d 479, 479 N. E. 2d 764 (1985). The Court of Appeals concluded, first, that the Liquor Authority’s decision to consider the promotional allowances as a discount was supported by substantial evidence. Second, the court held that the ABC Law as applied does not violate the Commerce Clause, rejecting as speculative appellant’s contention that it cannot comply simultaneously with the affirmation laws of New York and of other States. Finally, the court held that the affirmation law, on its face, does not violate the Commerce Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction limited to the question whether the ABC Law, on its face, violates the Commerce Clause, 474 U. S. 814 (1985). We now reverse. II This Court has adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause. When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 (1925); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 640-643 (1982) (plurality opinion). When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). We have also recognized that there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach. In either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity. See Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429, 440-441 (1978). A Appellant does not dispute that New York’s affirmation law regulates all distillers , of intoxicating liquors evenhandedly, or that the State’s asserted interest — to assure the lowest possible prices for its residents — is legitimate. Appellant contends that these factors are irrelevant, however, because the lowest-price affirmation provision of the ABC Law falls within that category of direct regulations of interstate commerce that the Commerce Clause wholly forbids. This is so, appellant contends, because the ABC Law effectively regulates the price at which liquor is sold in other States. By requiring distillers to affirm that they will make no sales anywhere in the United States at a price lower than the posted price in New York, appellant argues, New York makes it illegal for a distiller to reduce its price in other States during the period that the posted New York price is in effect. Appellant contends that this constitutes direct regulation of interstate commerce. The law also disadvantages consumers in other States, according to appellant, and is therefore the sort of “simple economic protectionism” that this Court has routinely forbidden. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 624. If appellant has correctly characterized the effect of the New York lowest-price affirmation law, that law violates the Commerce Clause. While a State may seek lower prices for its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers in other States surrender whatever competitive advantages they may possess. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 528 (1935); Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets v. Louisiana Milk Comm’n, 365 F. Supp. 1144 (MD La. 1973), aff’d, 416 U. S. 922 (1974). Economic protectionism is not limited to attempts to convey advantages on local merchants; it may include attempts to give local consumers an advantage over consumers in other States. See, e. g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331, 338 (1982) (State may not require “that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders”). In Seelig, supra, this Court struck down New York’s Milk Control Act. The Act set minimum prices for milk purchased from producers in New York and in other States, and banned the resale within New York of milk that had been purchased for a lower price. Justice Cardozo’s opinion for the Court recognized that a State may not “establish a wage scale or a scale of prices for use in other states, and . . . bar the sale of the products . . . unless the scale has been observed.” Id., at 528. The mere fact that the effects of New York’s ABC Law are triggered only by sales of liquor within the State of New York therefore does not validate the law if it regulates the out-of-state transactions of distillers who sell in-state. Our inquiry, then, must center on whether New York’s affirmation law regulates commerce in other States. B This Court has once before examined the extraterritorial effects of a New York affirmation statute. In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966), the Court considered the constitutionality, under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, of the predecessor to New York’s current affirmation law. That law differed from the present version in that it required the distiller to affirm that its prices during a given month in New York would be no higher than the lowest price at which the item had been sold elsewhere during the previous month. The Court recognized in that case, as we have here, that the most important issue was whether the statute regulated out-of-state transactions. Id., at 42-43. It concluded, however, that “[t]he mere fact that [the statute] is geared to appellants’ pricing policies in other States is not sufficient to invalidate the statute.” The Court distinguished Seelig, supra, by concluding that any effects of New York’s ABC Law on a distiller’s pricing policies in other States were “largely matters of conjecture,” 384 U. S., at 42-43. Appellant relies on United States Brewers Assn. v. Healy, 692 F. 2d 275 (CA2 1982), summarily aff’d, 464 U. S. 909 (1983), in seeking to distinguish the present case from Seagram. In Healy, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a Connecticut price-affirmation statute for beer sales that is not materially different from the current New York ABC Law. The Connecticut statute, like the ABC Law, required sellers to post prices at the beginning of a month, and proscribed deviation from the posted prices during that month. The statute also required brewers to affirm that their prices in Connecticut were as low as the price at which they would sell beer in any bordering State during the effective month of the posted prices. The Court of Appeals distinguished Seagram based on the “prospective” nature of this affirmation requirement. It concluded that the Connecticut statute made it impossible for a brewer to lower its price in a bordering State in response to market conditions so long as it had a higher posted price in effect in Connecticut. By so doing, the statute “regulate[d] conduct occurring wholly outside the state,” 692 F. 2d, at 279, and thereby violated the Commerce Clause. We affirmed summarily. C We agree with appellant and with the Healy court that a “prospective” statute such as Connecticut’s beer affirmation statute, or New York’s liquor affirmation statute, regulates out-of-state transactions in violation of the Commerce Clause. Once a distiller has posted prices in New York, it is not free to change its prices elsewhere in the United States during the relevant month. Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S., at 642 (plurality opinion); see also Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S., at 522 (regulation tending to “mitigate the consequences of competition between the states” constitutes direct regulation). While New York may regulate the sale of liquor within its borders, and may seek low prices for its residents, it may not “project its legislation into [other States] by regulating the price to be paid” for liquor in those States. Id., at 521. That the ABC Law is addressed only to sales of liquor in New York is irrelevant if the “practical effect” of the law is to control liquor prices in other States. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945). We cannot agree with New York that the practical effects of the affirmation law are speculative. It is undisputed that once a distiller’s posted price is in effect in New York, it must seek the approval of the New York State Liquor Authority before it may lower its price for the same item in other States. It is not at all counterintuitive, as the dissent maintains, post, at 588, to assume that the Liquor Authority would not permit appellant to reduce its New York price after the posted price has taken effect. The stated purpose of the prohibition on price changes during a given month is to prevent price discrimination among retailers, see ABC Law §§ 101 — b(l), (2)(a). That goal is in direct conflict with the dissent’s view of the “whole purpose” of the ABC Law, and we have no means of predicting how the Authority would resolve that conflict. We do know, however, that the Liquor Authority forbade appellant to reduce its New York prices by offering promotional allowances to New York retailers, precisely because the Authority believed that program would violate the price-discrimination provisions. App. to Juris. Statement 50a. The dissent would require us to assume that other States will adopt a flexible approach to appellant’s promotional allowance program, post, at 589, despite New York’s refusal to do so. Moreover, the proliferation of state affirmation laws following this Court’s decision in Seagram, has greatly multiplied the likelihood that a seller will be subjected to inconsistent obligations in different States. The ease with which New York’s lowest-price regulation can interfere with a distiller’s operations in other States is aptly demonstrated by the controversy that gave rise to this lawsuit. By defining the “effective price” of liquor differently from other States, New York can effectively force appellant to abandon its promotional allowance program in States in which that program is legal, or force those other States to alter their own regulatory schemes in order to permit appellant to lower its New York prices without violating the affirmation laws of those States. Thus New York has “projected] its legislation” into other States, and directly regulated commerce therein, in violation of Seelig, supra. Ill New York finally contends that the Twenty-first Amendment, which bans the importation or possession of intoxicating liquors into a State “in violation of the laws thereof,” saves the ABC Law from invalidation under the Commerce Clause. That Amendment gives the States wide latitude to regulate the importation and distribution of liquor within their territories, California Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97, 107 (1980). Therefore, New York argues, its ABC Law, which regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages within the State, is a valid exercise of the State’s authority. It is well settled that the Twenty-first Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984). Rather, the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause “each must be considered in light of the other and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.” Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 332 (1964). Our task, then, is to reconcile the interests protected by the two constitutional provisions. New York has a valid constitutional interest in regulating sales of liquor within the territory of New York. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, however, speaks only to state regulation of the “transportation or importation into any State ... for delivery or use therein” of alcoholic beverages. That Amendment, therefore, gives New York only the authority to control sales of liquor in New York, and confers no authority to control sales in other States. The Commerce Clause operates with full force whenever one State attempts to regulate the transportation and sale of alcoholic beverages destined for distribution and consumption in a foreign country, Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., supra, or another State. Our conclusion that New York has attempted to regulate sales in other States of liquor that will be consumed in other States therefore disposes of the Twenty-first Amendment issue. Moreover, New York’s affirmation law may interfere with the ability of other States to exercise their own authority under the Twenty-first Amendment. Once a distiller has posted prices in New York, it is not free to lower them in another State, even in response to a regulatory directive by that State, without risking forfeiture of its license in New York. New York law, therefore, may force other States either to abandon regulatory goals or to deprive their citizens of the opportunity to purchase brands of liquor that are sold in New York. New York’s reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment is therefore misplaced. Having found that the ABC Law on its face violates the Commerce Clause, and is not a valid exercise of New York’s powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, we reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. These States differ in the time reference for the affirmation price. Some require the distiller to set a price that is no higher than the lowest price charged previously anywhere in the United States, see, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §4-253(A) (Supp. 1985). Others, like New York, require the affirmed price to be no higher than the lowest price that will be charged during the current month. See ABC Law § 101-b(3)(d). There are 18 States, known as “control” States, that purchase all liquor that will be distributed and consumed within their borders. The control States use a standard sales contract that requires the distiller to warrant that the price the distiller charges to the State is no higher than the lowest price offered anywhere else in the United States. See Brief for Appellant 5, n. 4. The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), upon appellant’s request, ruled that appellant’s promotional allowance does not violate the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U. S. C. §§201-211. See § 205(b) (prohibiting “paying or crediting [any] retailer [of alcoholic beverages] for any advertising” if done to induce the retailer to purchase alcohol from the person providing such payment or credit to the exclusion in whole or in part of other distillers or producers). Some of the features of appellant’s promotional allowance program described herein were required by BATF in order to ensure that the program would not violate the Act. See Juris. Statement 4. See § 101-b(2)(b) (prohibiting “any discount, rebate, free goods, allowance or other inducement of any kind whatsoever” except for quantity and prompt-payment discounts of specified amounts). See § 101-b(3)(g) (in determining lowest price, “appropriate reductions shall be made to reflect all discounts . . . and all rebates, free goods, allowances and other inducements”). The Liquor Authority may “for good cause shown” permit a distiller to change its prices during a particular month, ABC Law § 101-b(3)(a), and New York speculates that the Authority would permit a distiller to lower its prices in other States in a given month so long as the distiller also lowers them in New York. However, whether to permit such a deviation from the statutory scheme is a matter left by the statute to the discretion of the Liquor Authority. We would not solve the constitutional problems inherent in New York’s statute by indulging the dissent’s assumption that the Authority will be sensitive to Commerce Clause concerns. Certainly New York could not require an out-of-state company to receive a license from New York to do business in other States, even if we were quite sure that such licenses would be granted as a matter of course. Similarly, New York simply may not force appellant to seek regulatory approval from New York before it can reduce its prices in another State. The protections afforded by the Commerce Clause cannot be made to depend on the good grace of a state agency. While we hold that New York’s prospective price affirmation statute violates the Commerce Clause, we do not necessarily attach constitutional significance to the difference between a prospective statute and the retrospective statute at issue in Seagram. Indeed, one could argue that the effects of the statute in Seagram do not differ markedly from the effects of the statute at issue in the present case. If there is a conflict between today’s decision and the Seagram decision, however, there will be time enough to address that conflict should a case arise involving a retrospective statute. Because no such statute is before us now, we need not consider the continuing validity of Seagram.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WASHINGTON, MAYOR OF WASHINGTON, D. C., et al. v. DAVIS et al. No. 74-1492. Argued March 1, 1976 Decided June 7, 1976 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blacicmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Stewart, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 252. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 256. David P. Sutton argued the cause for petitioners. With him. on the briefs were C. Francis Murphy, Louis P. Robbins, and Richard W. Barton. Richard B. Sobol argued the cause for respondents Harley et al. With him on the briefs were George Cooper, Richard T. Seymour, Marian Wright Edelman, Michael B. Trister, and Ralph J. Temple. Mark L. Evans argued the cause for the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission as respondents under this Court’s Rule 21 (4). With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Ronald R. Glancz, and Harry R. Silver. R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr., and Susan A. Cahoon filed a brief for the Executive Committee of the Division of Industrial-Organizational Psychology (Div. 14) of the American Psychological Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Barry L. Goldstein, Deborah M. Greenberg, Eric Schnapper, and 0. Peter Sherwood filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Thaddeus Holt for the American Society for Personnel Administration; and by Howard P. Widens, Deanne C. Siemer, and John S. Kramer for the Educational Testing Service. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the validity of a qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. The test was sustained by the District Court but invalidated by the Court of Appeals. We are in agreement with the District Court and hence reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I This action began on April 10, 1970, when two Negro police officers filed suit against the then Commissioner of the District of Columbia, the Chief of the District’s Metropolitan Police Department, and the Commissioners of the United States Civil Service Commission. An amended complaint, filed December 10, alleged that the promotion policies of the Department were racially discriminatory and sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction. The respondents Harley and Sellers were permitted to intervene, their amended complaint asserting that their applications to become officers in the Department had been rejected, and that the Department’s recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis of race against black applicants by a series of practices including, but not limited to, a written personnel test which excluded a disproportionately high number of Negro applicants. These practices were asserted to violate respondents’ rights “under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and under D. C. Code § 1-320.” Defendants answered, and discovery and various other proceedings followed. Respondents then filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the recruiting phase of the case, seeking a declaration that the test administered to those applying to become police officers is “unlawfully discriminatory and thereby in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . No issue under any statute or regulation was raised by the motion. The District of Columbia defendants, petitioners here, and the federal parties also filed motions for summary judgment with respect to the recruiting aspects of the case, asserting that respondents were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor statutory grounds. The District Court granted petitioners' and denied respondents’ motions. 348 F. Supp. 15 (DC 1972). According to the findings and conclusions of the District Court, to be accepted by the Department and to enter an intensive 17-week training program, the police recruit was required to satisfy certain physical and character standards, to be a high school graduate or its equivalent, and to receive a grade of at least 40 out of 80 on “Test 21,” which is “an examination that is used generally throughout the federal service,” which “was developed by the Civil Service Commission, not the Police Department,” and which was “designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension.” Id., at 16. The validity of Test 21 was the sole issue before the court on the motions for summary judgment. The District Court noted that there was no claim of “an intentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory acts” but only a claim that Test 21 bore no relationship to job performance and “has a highly discriminatory impact in screening out black candidates.” Ibid. Respondents’ evidence, the District Court said, warranted three conclusions: “(a) The number of black police officers, while substantial, is not proportionate to the population'mix of the city, (b) A higher percentage of blacks fail the Test than whites, (c) The Test has not been validated to establish its reliability for measuring subsequent job performance.” Ibid. This showing was deemed sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendants in the action, petitioners here; but the court nevertheless concluded that on the undisputed facts respondents were not entitled to relief.. The District Court relied on several factors. Since August 1969, 44% of new police force recruits had been black; that figure also represented the proportion of blacks on the total force and was roughly equivalent to 20- to 29-year-old blacks in the 50-mile radius in which the recruiting efforts of the Police Department had been concentrated. It was undisputed that the Department had systematically and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers many of whom passed the test but failed to report for duty. The District Court rejected the assertion that Test 21 was culturally slanted to favor whites and was “satisfied that the undisputable facts prove the test to be reasonably and directly related to the requirements of the police recruit training program and that it is neither so designed nor operates [sic] to discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks.” Id., at 17. It was thus not necessary to show that Test 21 was not only a useful indicator of training school performance but had also been validated in terms of job performance-— “The lack of job performance validation does not defeat the Test, given its direct relationship to recruiting and the valid part it plays in this process.” Ibid. The District Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he proof is wholly lacking that a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability” and that the Department “should not be required on this showing to lower standards or to abandon efforts to achieve excellence.” Id., at 18. Having lost on both constitutional and statutory issues in the District Court, respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals claiming that their summary judgment motion, which rested on purely constitutional grounds, should have been granted. The tendered constitutional issue was whether the use of Test 21 invidiously discriminated against Negroes and hence denied them due process of law contrary to the commands of the Fifth Amendment. The Court- of Appeals, addressing that issue, announced that it would be guided by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), a case involving the interpretation and application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and held that the statutory standards elucidated in that case were to govern the due process question tendered in this one. 168 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 512 F. 2d 956 (1975). The court went on to declare that lack of discriminatory intent in designing and administering Test 21 was irrelevant; the critical fact was rather that a far greater proportion of blacks— four times as many — failed the test than did whites. This disproportionate impact, standing alone and without regard to whether it indicated a discriminatory purpose, was held sufficient to establish a constitutional violation, absent proof by petitioners that the test was an adequate measure of job performance in addition to being an indicator of probable success in the training program, a burden which the court ruled petitioners had failed to discharge. That the Department had made substantial efforts to recruit blacks was held beside the point and the fact that the racial distribution of recent hirings and of the Department itself might be roughly equivalent to the racial makeup of the surrounding community, broadly conceived, was put aside as a “comparison [not] material to this appeal.” Id., at 46 n. 24, 512 F. 2d, at 960 n. 24. The Court of Appeals, over a dissent, accordingly reversed the judgment of the District Court and directed that respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment be granted. We granted the petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 820 (1975), filed by the District of Columbia officials. II Because the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the legal standards applicable to Title VII cases in resolving the constitutional issue before it, we reverse its judgment in respondents’ favor. Although the petition for certio-rari did not present this ground for reversal, our Rule 40 (1) (d)(2) provides that we “may notice a plain error not presented”; and this is an appropriate occasion to invoke the Rule. As the Court of Appeals understood Title VII, employees or applicants proceeding under it need not concern themselves with the employer’s possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices. This is not the constitutional rule. We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today. The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis1 of race. It is also true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954). But our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. Almost 100 years ago, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880), established that the exclusion of Negroes from grand and petit juries in criminal proceedings violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the fact that a particular jury or a series of juries does not statistically reflect the racial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Clause. “A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.” Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945). A defendant in a criminal case is entitled “to require that the State not deliberately and systematically deny to members of his race the right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice.” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972). See also Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 287-290 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 468-469 (1947). The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), upheld a New York congressional apportionment statute against claims that district lines had been racially gerrymandered. The challenged districts were made up predominantly of whites or of minority races, and their boundaries were irregularly drawn. The challengers did not prevail because they failed to prove that the New York Legislature “was either motivated by racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines”; the plaintiffs had not shown that the statute “was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin.” Id., at 56, 58. The dissenters were in agreement that the issue was whether the “boundaries . . . were purposefully drawn on racial lines.” Id., at 67. The school desegregation cases have also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. That there are both predominantly black and predominantly white schools in a community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The essential element of de jure segregation is “a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action.” Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U. S. 189, 205 (1973). “The differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate.” Id., at 208. See also id., at 199, 211, 213. The Court has also recently rejected allegations of racial discrimination based solely on the statistically disproportionate racial impact of various provisions of the Social Security Act because “[t]he acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be.” Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972). And compare Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), with James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971). This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law’s disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial discrimination in the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an “unequal application of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination.” Akins v. Texas, supra, at 404. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881). A prima facie case of discriminatory purpose may be proved as well by the absence of Negroes on a particular jury combined with the failure of the jury commissioners to be informed of eligible Negro jurors in a community, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 (1942), or with racially non-neutral selection procedures, Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967). With a prima facie case made out, “the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result.” Alexander, supra, at 632. See also Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 361 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584, 587 (1958). Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact — in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires — may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964), that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations. There are some indications to the contrary in our cases. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971), the city of Jackson, Miss., following a court decree to this effect, desegregated all of its public facilities save five swimming pools which had been operated by the city and which, following the decree, were closed by ordinance pursuant to a determination by the city council that closure was necessary to preserve peace and order and that integrated pools could not be economically operated. Accepting the finding that the pools were closed to avoid violence and economic loss, this Court rejected the argument that the abandonment of this service was inconsistent with the outstanding desegregation decree and that the otherwise seemingly permissible ends served by the ordinance could be impeached by demonstrating that racially invidious motivations had prompted the city council’s action. The holding was that the city was not overtly or covertly operating segregated pools and was extending identical treatment to both whites and Negroes. The opinion warned against grounding decision on legislative purpose or motivation, thereby lending support for the proposition that the operative effect of the law rather than its purpose is the paramount factor. But the holding of the case was that the legitimate purposes of the ordinance — to preserve peace and avoid deficits — were not open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually motivated by racial considerations. Whatever dicta the opinion may contain, the decision did not involve, much less invalidate, a statute or ordinance having neutral purposes but disproportionate racial consequences. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972), also indicates that in proper circumstances, the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor. That case involved the division of a school district. The issue was whether the division was consistent with an outstanding order of a federal court to desegregate the dual school system found to have existed in the area. The constitutional predicate for the District Court’s invalidation of the divided district was “the enforcement until 1969 of racial segregation in a public school system of which Emporia had always been a part.” Id., at 459. There was thus no need to find “an independent constitutional violation.” Ibid. Citing Palmer v. Thompson, we agreed with the District Court that the division of the district had the effect of interfering with the federal decree and should be set aside. That neither Palmer nor Wright was understood to have changed the prevailing rule is apparent from Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, supra, where the principal issue in litigation was whether and to what extent there had been purposeful discrimination resulting in a partially or wholly segregated school system. Nor did other later cases, Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, and Jefferson v. Hackney, supra, indicate that either Palmer or Wright had worked a fundamental change in equal protection law. Both before and after Palmer v. Thompson, however, various Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts, including public employment, that the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause absent some justification going substantially beyond what would be necessary to validate most other legislative classifications. The cases impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue; but, with all due respect, to the extent that those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation, we are in disagreement. As an initial matter, we have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies “any person . . . equal protection of the laws” simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups. Had respondents, along with all others who had failed Test 21, whether white or black, brought an action claiming that the test denied each of them equal protection of the laws as compared with those who had passed with high enough scores to qualify them as police recruits, it is most unlikely that their challenge would have been sustained. Test 21, which is administered generally to prospective Government employees, concededly seeks to ascertain whether those who take it have acquired a particular level of verbal skill; and it is untenable that the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where the job requires special ability to communicate orally and in writing. Respondents, as Negroes, could no more successfully claim that the test denied them equal protection than could white applicants who also failed. The conclusion would not be different in the face of proof that more Negroes than whites had been disqualified by Test 21. That other Negroes also failed to score well would, alone, not demonstrate that respondents individually were being denied equal protection of the laws by the application of an otherwise valid qualifying test being administered to prospective police recruits. Nor on the facts of the case before us would the disproportionate impact of Test 21 warrant the conclusion that it is a purposeful device to discriminate against Negroes and hence an infringement of the constitutional rights of respondents as well as other black applicants. As we have said, the test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue. Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we think the District Court correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that “a police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability.” 348 P. Supp., at 18. Under Title "VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis for the challenged practices. It is necessary, in addition, that they be “validated” in terms of job performance in any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the minimum skill, ability, or potential necessary for the position at issue and determining whether the qualifying tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants for the job in question. However this process proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this. A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white. Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps be likely to follow. However, in our view, extension of the rule beyond those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await legislative prescription. As we have indicated, it was error to direct summary judgment for respondents based on the Fifth Amendment. Ill We also hold that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the judgment of the District Court granting the motions for summary judgment filed by petitioners and the federal parties. Respondents were entitled to relief on neither constitutional nor statutory grounds. The submission of the defendants in the District Court was that Test 21 complied with all applicable statutory as well as constitutional requirements; and they appear not to have disputed that under the statutes and regulations governing their conduct standards similar to those obtaining under Title VII had to be satisfied. The District Court also assumed that Title VII standards were to control the case, identified the determinative issue as whether Test 21 was sufficiently job related and proceeded to uphold use of the test- because it was “directly related to a determination of whether the applicant possesses sufficient skills requisite to the demands of the curriculum a recruit must master at the police academy.” 348 F. Supp., at 17. The Court of Appeals reversed because the relationship between Test 21 and training school success, if demonstrated at all, did not satisfy what it deemed to be the crucial requirement of a direct relationship between performance on Test 21 and performance on the policeman’s job. We agree with petitioners and the federal parties that this was error. The advisability of the police recruit training course informing the recruit about his upcoming job, acquainting him with its demands, and attempting to impart a modicum of required skills seems conceded. It is also apparent to us, as it was to the District Judge, that some minimum verbal and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress in the training regimen. Based on the evidence before him, the District Judge concluded that Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of the police training program and that a positive relationship between the test and training-course performance was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual performance as a police officer. This conclusion of the District Judge that training-program validation may itself be sufficient is supported by regulations of the Civil Service Commission, by the opinion evidence placed before the District Judge, and by the current views of the Civil Service Commissioners who were parties to the case. Nor is the conclusion foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); and it seems to us the much more sensible construction of the job-relatedness requirement. The District Court’s accompanying conclusion that Test 21 was in fact directly related to the requirements of the police training program was supported by a validation study, as well as by other evidence of record; and we are not convinced that this conclusion was erroneous. The federal parties, whose views have somewhat' changed since the decision of the Court of Appeals and who still insist that training-program validation is sufficient, now urge a remand to the District Court for the purpose of further inquiry into whether the training-program test scores, which were found to correlate with Test 21 scores, are themselves an appropriate measure of the trainee’s mastership of the material taught in the course and whether the training program itself is sufficiently related to actual performance of the police officer’s task. We think a remand is inappropriate. The District Court’s judgment was warranted by the record before it, and we perceive no good reason to reopen it, particularly since we were informed at oral argument that although Test 21 is still being administered, the training program itself has undergone substantial modification in the course of this litigation. If there are now deficiencies in the recruiting practices under prevailing Title VII standards, those deficiencies are to be directly addressed in accordance with appropriate procedures mandated under that Title. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is reversed. So ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart joins Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. Under §4M03 of the District of Columbia Code, appointments to the Metropolitan Police force were to- be made by the Commissioner subject to the provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code relating to the classified civil service, The District of Columbia Council and the Office of Commissioner of the District of Columbia, established by Reorganization Plan No. 37 of 1967, were abolished as of January 2, 1975, and replaced by the Council of the District of Columbia and the Office of Mayor of the District of Columbia. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1981 provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” Section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code (1973) provides: “In any program of recruitment or hiring of individuals to fill positions in the government of the District of Columbia, no officer or employee of the government of the District of Columbia shall exclude or give preference to the residents of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis of residence, religion, race, color, or national origin.” One of the provisions expressly made applicable to the Metropolitan Police force by § 4M03 is 5 U. S. C. § 3304 (a), which provides: “§3304. Competitive service; examinations. “(a) The President may prescribe rules which shall provide, as nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, for— “(1) open, competitive examinations for testing applicants for appointment in the competitive service which are practical in character and as far as possible relate to matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought; and “(2) noncompetitive examinations when competent applicants do not compete after notice has been given of the existence of the vacancy.” The complaint asserted, no claim under § 3304. Those proceedings included a hearing on respondents’ motion for an order designating the case as a class action. A ruling on the motion was held in abeyance and was never granted insofar as the record before us reveals. In support of the motion, petitioners and the federal parties urged that they were in compliance with all applicable constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, including the provisions of the Civil Service Act which since 1883 were said to have established a “job relatedness” standard for employment. When summary judgment was granted, the case with respect to discriminatory promotions was still pending. The District Court, however, made the determination and direction authorized by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b). The promotion issue was subsequently decided adversely to the original plaintiffs. Davis v. Washington, 352 F. Supp. 187 (DC 1972). “Although appellants’ complaint did not allege a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which then was inapplicable to the Federal Government, decisions applying Title VII furnish additional instruction as to the legal standard governing the issues raised in this ease .... The many decisions disposing of employment discrimination claims on constitutional grounds have made no distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory standard under Title VII.” 168 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 44 n. 2, 612 F. 2d 956, 958 n. 2 (1975). The Civil Service Commissioners, defendants in the District Court, did not petition for writ of certiorari but have filed a brief as respondents. See our Rule 21 (4). We shall at times refer to them as the “federal parties.” Apparently not disputing the applicability of the Griggs and Title VII standards in resolving this case, petitioners presented issues going only to whether Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), had been misapplied by the Court of Appeals. See, e. g., Silber v. United States, 370 U. S. 717 (1962); Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 412 (1947); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1, 16 (1941); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 45 (1924); Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 362 (1910). Although Title VII standards have dominated this case, the statute was not applicable to federal employees when the complaint was filed; and although the 1972 amendments extending the Title to reach Government employees were adopted prior to the District Court’s judgment, the complaint was not amended to state a claim under that Title, nor did the case thereafter proceed as a Title VII case. Respondents’ motion for partial summary judgment, filed after the 1972 amendments, rested solely on constitutional grounds; and the Court of Appeals ruled that the motion should have been granted. At the oral argument before this Court, when respondents’ counsel was asked whether “this is just a purely Title VII case as it comes to us from the Court of Appeals without any constitutional overtones,” counsel responded: “My trouble honestly with that proposition is the procedural requirements to get into court under Title VII, and this case has not met them.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 66. To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases — as indicated in the text — are to the contrary; and very shortly after Palmer, all Members of the Court majority in that case joined the Court’s opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which dealt with the issue of public financing for private schools and which announced, as the Court had several times before, that the validity of public aid to church-related schools includes close inquiry into the purpose of the challenged statute. Cases dealing with public employment include: Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F. 2d 1167, 1176-1177 (CA2 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F. 2d 725, 732-733 (CA1 1972); Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm’n, 482 F. 2d 1333, 1337 (CA2 1973); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1200 (Md.), aff’d in pertinent part sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F. 2d 1134 (CA4 1973); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U. S. App. D. C. 62, 67, 512 F. 2d 976, 981 (1975); but cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F. 2d 1089, 1096-1097 (CA5 1975), cert. pending, No. 75-1026. There are also District Court cases: Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 (ND Miss. 1974); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 736, 737 (ND Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 553 (ND Ill. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721, 724 (Minn. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 498 F. 2d 143 (CA8 1974). In other contexts there are Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (CA2 1968) (urban renewal); Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108, 114 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (zoning); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F. 2d 291 (CA9 1970) (dictum) (zoning); Metropolitan H. D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F. 2d 409 (CA7), cert. granted, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) (zoning); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F. 2d 731, 738 (CA7 1971) (dictum) (public housing); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 (ND Ga. 1971), aff’d, 457 F. 2d 788 (CA5 1972) (public housing); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F. 2d 1286 (CA5 1971), aff’d on rehearing en banc, 461 F. 2d 1171 (1972) (municipal services). It appears beyond doubt by now that there is no single method for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship to job performance. Professional standards developed by the American Psychological Association in its Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals (1966), accept three basic methods of validation: “empirical” or “criterion” validity (demonstrated by identifying criteria that indicate successful job performance and then correlating test scores and the criteria so identified) ; “construct” validity (demonstrated by examinations structured to measure the degree to which job applicants have identifiable characteristics that have been determined to be important in successful job performance); and “content” validity (demonstrated by tests whose content closely approximates tasks to be performed on the job by the applicant). These standards have been relied upon by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in fashioning its Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR pt. 1607 (1975), and have been judicially noted in cases where validation of employment tests has been in issue. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 431 (1975); Douglas v. Hampton, 168 U. S. App. D. C., at 70, 512 F. 2d, at 984; Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm’n, 490 F. 2d 387, 394 (CA2 1973). Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 275, 300 (1972), suggests that disproportionate-impact analysis might invalidate “tests and qualifications for voting, draft deferment, public employment, jury service, and other government-conferred benefits and opportunities . . . ; [s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, and other state-imposed charges.” It has also been argued that minimum wage and usury laws as well as professional licensing requirements would require major modifications in light of the unequal-impact rule. Silverman, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, and Racial Discrimination, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (1972). See also Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N. C. L. Rev. 271 (1965). In their memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, the federal parties argued: “In Griggs, supra, the Supreme Court set a job-relationship standard for the private sector employers which has been a standard for federal employment since the passage of the Civil Service Act in 1883. In that act Congress has mandated that the federal government must use '. . . examinations for testing applicants for appointment . . . which ... as far as possible relate to matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointments sought.’ 5 U. S. C. §3304 (a)(1). Defendants contend that they have been following the job-related standards of Griggs, supra, for the past eighty-eight years by virtue of the enactment of the Civil Service Act which guaranteed open and fair competition for jobs.” They went on to argue that the Griggs standard had been satisfied. In granting the motions for summary judgment filed by petitioners and the federal parties, the District Court necessarily decided adversely to respondents the statutory issues expressly or tacitly tendered by the parties. See n. 17, infra. Current instructions of the Civil Service Commission on “Examining, Testing, Standards, and Employment Practices” provide in pertinent part: “S2-2 — Use of applicant appraisal procedures "a. Policy. The Commission’s staff develops and uses applicant appraisal procedures to assess the knowledges, skills, and abilities of persons for jobs and not persons in the abstract. “(1) Appraisal procedures are designed to reflect real, reasonable, and necessary qualifications for effective job behavior. "(2) An appraisal procedure must, among other requirements, have a demonstrable and rational relationship to important job-related performance objectives identified by management, such as: “(a) Effective job performance; “(b) Capability; “(c) Success in training; “(d) Reduced turnover; or “(e) Job satisfaction.” 37 Fed. Reg. 21557 (1972). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607.5 (b) (3) (1975), discussed in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 430-435. The record includes a validation study of Test 21’s relationship to performance in the recruit training program. The study was made by D. L. Futransky of the Standards Division, Bureau of Policies and Standards, United States Civil Service Commission. App. 99-109. Findings of the study included data “support[ing] the conclusion that T[est] 21 is effective in selecting trainees who can learn the material that is taught at the Recruit School.” Id., at 103. Opinion evidence, submitted by qualified experts examining the Futransky study and/or conducting their own research, affirmed the correlation between scores on Test 21 and success in the training program. E. g., Affidavit of Dr. Donald J. Schwartz (personnel research psychologist, United States Civil Service Commission), App. 178, 183 (“It is my opinion . . . that Test 21 has a significant positive correlation with success in the MPD Recruit School for both Blacks and whites and is therefore shown to be job related . . .”); affidavit of Diane E. Wilson (personnel research psychologist, United States Civil Service Commission), App. 185, 186 (“It is my opinion that there is a direct and rational relationship between the content and difficulty of Test 21 and successful completion of recruit school training”). The Court of Appeals was “willing to assume for purposes of this appeal that appellees have shown that Test 21 is predictive of further progress in Recruit School.” 168 U. S. App. D. C., at 48, 512 F. 2d, at 962.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. v. CRISWELL et al. No. 83-1545. Argued January 14, 1985 Decided June 17, 1985 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Powell, J., who took no part in the decision of the case. Gordon Dean Booth, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William H. Boice, Joseph W. Dorn, and Wm. John Kennedy. Raymond C. Fay argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Alan M. Serwer and Susan D. Goland. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Harriet S. Shapiro, Johnny J. Butler, and Philip B. Sklover Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Air Line Pilots Association, International, by Michael E. Abram and Jay P. Levy-Warren; for American Airlines, Inc., by Richard A. Malahowski; for Delta Air Lines, Inc., by James W. Callison, Robert S. Harkey, and Thomas J. Kassin; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby; for Pan American World Airways, Inc., by Robert S. Venning; and for Trans World Airlines, Inc., by Henry J. Oechler, Jr., Donald I. Strauber, and Peter N. Hillman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of Retired Persons by Alfred Miller and Harry P. Cohen; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Susan Deller Ross; and for the Flight Engineers International Association, American Airlines Chapter, AFL-CIO, by Asher Schwartz and David Rosen. Howard C. Eglit filed a brief for the National Council on the Aging, Inc., et al. as amici curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner, Western Air Lines, Inc., requires that its flight engineers retire at age 60. Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. §§621-634, generally prohibits mandatory retirement before age 70, the Act provides an exception “where age is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” A jury concluded that Western’s mandatory retirement rule did not qualify as a BFOQ even though it purportedly was adopted for safety reasons. The question here is whether the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the BFOQ defense. I In its commercial airline operations, Western operates a variety of aircraft, including the Boeing 727 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10. These aircraft require three crew members in the cockpit: a captain, a first officer, and a flight engineer. “The ‘captain’ is the pilot and controls the aircraft. He is responsible for all phases of its operation. The ‘first officer’ is the copilot and assists the captain. The ‘flight engineer’ usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel. He does not operate the flight controls unless the captain and the first officer become incapacitated.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 114 (1985). A regulation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prohibits any person from serving as a pilot or first officer on a commercial flight “if that person has reached his 60th birthday.” 14 CFR § 121.383(c) (1985). The FAA has justified the retention of mandatory retirement for pilots on the theory that “incapacitating medical events” and “adverse psychological, emotional, and physicial changes” occur as a consequence of aging. “The inability to detect or predict with precision an individual’s risk of sudden or subtle incapacitation, in the face of known age-related risks, counsels against relaxation of the rule.” 49 Fed. Reg. 14695 (1984). See also 24 Fed. Reg. 9776 (1959). At the same time, the FAA has refused to establish a mandatory retirement age for flight engineers. “While a flight engineer has important duties which contribute to the safe operation of the airplane, he or she may not assume the responsibilities of the pilot in command.” 49 Fed. Reg., at 14694. Moreover, available statistics establish that flight engineers have rarely been a contributing cause or factor in commercial aircraft “accidents” or “incidents.” Ibid. In 1978, respondents Criswell and Starley were captains operating DC-10s for Western. Both men celebrated their 60th birthdays in July 1978. Under the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between Western and the union, cockpit crew members could obtain open positions by bidding in order of seniority. In order to avoid mandatory retirement under the FAA’s under-age-60 rule for pilots, Criswell and Starley applied for reassignment as flight engineers. Western denied both requests, ostensibly on the ground that both employees were members of the company’s retirement plan which required all crew members to retire at age 60. For the same reason, respondent Ron, a career flight engineer, was also retired in 1978 after his 60th birthday. Mandatory retirement provisions similar to those contained in Western’s pension plan had previously been upheld under the ADEA. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U. S. 192 (1977). As originally enacted in 1967, the Act provided an exception to its general proscription of age discrimination for any actions undertaken “to observe the terms of a. . . bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act.” In April 1978, however, Congress amended the statute to prohibit employee benefit plans from requiring the involuntary retirement of any employee because of age. Criswell, Starley, and Ron brought this action against Western contending that the under-age-60 qualification for the position of flight engineer violated the ADEA. In the District Court, Western defended, in part, on the theory that the age-60 rule is a BFOQ “reasonably necessary” to the safe operation of the airline. All parties submitted evidence concerning the nature of the flight engineer’s tasks, the physiological and psychological traits required to perform them, and the availability of those traits among persons over age 60. As the District Court summarized, the evidence at trial established that the flight engineer’s “normal duties are less critical to the safety of flight than those of a pilot.” 514 F. Supp. 384, 390 (CD Cal. 1981). The flight engineer, however, does have critical functions in emergency situations and, of course, might cause considerable disruption in the event of his own medical emergency. The actual capabilities of persons over age 60, and the ability to detect disease or a precipitous decline in their faculties, were the subject of conflicting medical testimony. Western’s expert witness, a former FAA Deputy Federal Air Surgeon, was especially concerned about the possibility of a “cardiovascular event” such as a heart attack. He testified that “with advancing age the likelihood of onset of disease increases and that in persons over age 60 it could not be predicted whether and when such diseases would occur.” Id., at 389. The plaintiffs’ experts, on the other hand, testified that physiological deterioration is caused by disease, not aging, and that “it was feasible to determine on the basis of individual medical examinations whether flight deck crew members, including those over age 60, were physically qualified to continue to fly.” Ibid. These conclusions were corroborated by the nonmedical evidence: “The record also reveals that both the FAA and the airlines have been able to deal with the health problems of pilots on an individualized basis. Pilots who have been grounded because of alcoholism or cardiovascular disease have been recertified by the FAA and allowed to resume flying. Pilots who were unable to pass the necessary examination to maintain their FAA first class medical certificates, but who continued to qualify for second class medical certificates were allowed to ‘downgrade’ from pilot to [flight engineer]. There is nothing in the record to indicate that these flight deck crew members are physically better able to perform their duties than flight engineers over age 60 who have not experienced such events or that they are less likely to become incapacitated.” Id., at 390. Moreover, several large commercial airlines have flight engineers over age 60 “flying the line” without any reduction in their safety record. Ibid. The jury was instructed that the “BFOQ defense is available only if it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.” Tr. 2626. The jury was informed that “the essence of Western’s business is the safe transportation of their passengers.” Ibid. The jury was also instructed: “One method by which defendant Western may establish a BFOQ in this case is to prove: “(1) That in 1978, when these plaintiffs were retired, it was highly impractical for Western to deal with each second officer over age 60 on an individualized basis to determine his particular ability to perform his job safely; and “(2) That some second officers over age 60 possess traits of a physiological, psychological or other nature which preclude safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other than knowing their age. “In evaluating the practicability to defendant Western of dealing with second officers over age 60 on an individualized basis, with respect to the medical testimony, you should consider the state of the medical art as it existed in July 1978.” Id., at 2627. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs, and awarded damages. After trial, the District Court granted equitable relief, explaining in a written opinion why it found no merit in Western’s BFOQ defense to the mandatory retirement rule. 514 F. Supp., at 389-391. On appeal, Western made various arguments attacking the verdict and judgment below, but the Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 709 F. 2d 544 (CA9 1983). In particular, the Court of Appeals rejected Western’s contention that the instruction on the BFOQ defense was insufficiently deferential to the airline’s legitimate concern for the safety of its passengers. Id., at 549-551. We granted certiorari to consider the merits of this question. 469 U. S. 815 (1984). h-i hH Throughout the legislative history of the ADEA, one empirical fact is repeatedly emphasized: the process of psychological and physiological degeneration caused by aging varies with each individual. “The basic research in the field of aging has established that there is a wide range of individual physical ability regardless of age.” As a result, many older American workers perform at levels equal or superior to their younger colleagues. In 1965, the Secretary of Labor reported to Congress that despite these well-established medical facts there “is persistent and widespread use of age limits in hiring that in a great many cases can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination against older workers on the basis of age and regardless of ability.” Two years later, the President recommended that Congress enact legislation to abolish arbitrary age limits on hiring. Such limits, the President declared, have a devastating effect on the dignity of the individual and result in a staggering loss of human resources vital to the national economy. After further study, Congress responded with the enactment of the ADEA. The preamble declares that the purpose of the ADEA is “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.” 81 Stat. 602, 29 U. S. C. § 621(b). Section 4(a)(1) makes it “unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 81 Stat. 603, 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). This proscription presently applies to all persons between the ages of 40 and 70. 29 U. S. C. § 631(a). The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA makes quite clear that the policies and substantive provisions of the Act apply with especial force in the case of mandatory retirement provisions. The House Committee on Education and Labor reported: “Increasingly, it is being recognized that mandatory retirement based solely upon age is arbitrary and that chronological age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a job. Mandatory retirement does not take into consideration actual differing abilities and capacities. Such forced retirement can cause hardships for older persons through loss of roles and loss of income. Those older persons who wish to be re-employed have a much more difficult time finding a new job than younger persons. “Society, as a whole, suffers from mandatory retirement as well. As a result of mandatory retirement, skills and experience are lost from the work force resulting in reduced GNP. Such practices also add a burden to Government income maintenance programs such as social security.” In the 1978 Amendments, Congress narrowed an exception to the ADEA which had previously authorized involuntary retirement under limited circumstances. See supra, at 405. In both 1967 and 1978, however, Congress recognized that classifications based on age, like classifications based on religion, sex, or national origin, may sometimes serve as a necessary proxy for neutral employment qualifications essential to the employer’s business. The diverse employment situations in various industries, however, forced Congress to adopt a “case-by-case basis ... as the underlying rule in the administration of the legislation.” H. R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1967), Legislative History 80. Congress offered only general guidance on when an age classification might be permissible by borrowing a concept and statutory language from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and providing that such a classification is lawful “where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(1). Shortly after the passage of the Act, the Secretary of Labor, who was at that time charged with its enforcement, adopted regulations declaring that the BFOQ exception to the ADEA has only “limited scope and application” and “must be construed narrowly.” 33 Fed. Reg. 9172 (1968), 29 CFR §860.102(b) (1984). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted the same narrow construction of the BFOQ exception after it was assigned authority for enforcing the statute. 46 Fed. Reg. 47727 (1981), 29 CFR § 1625.6 (1984). The restrictive language of the statute and the consistent interpretation of the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the statute convince us that, like its Title VII counterpart, the BFOQ exception “was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition” of age discrimination contained in the ADEA. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 334 (1977). HH 1 — 1 H-1 In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was called upon to evaluate the merits of a BFOQ defense to a claim of age discrimination. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., had a policy of refusing to hire persons over age 40 as intercity bus drivers. At trial, the bus company introduced testimony supporting its theory that the hiring policy was a BFOQ based upon safety considerations — the need to employ persons who have a low risk of accidents. In evaluating this contention, the Court of Appeals drew on its Title VII precedents, and concluded that two inquiries were relevant. First, the court recognized that some job qualifications may be so peripheral to the central mission of the employer’s business that no age discrimination can be “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(1). The bus company justified the age qualification for hiring its drivers on safety considerations, but the court concluded that this claim was to be evaluated under an objective standard: “[T]he job qualifications which the employer invokes to justify his discrimination must be reasonably necessary to the essence of his business — here, the safe transportation of bus passengers from one point to another. The greater the safety factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to insure safe driving.” 531 F. 2d, at 236. This inquiry “adjusts to the safety factor” by ensuring that the employer’s restrictive job qualifications are “reasonably necessary” to further the overriding interest in public safety. Ibid. In Tamiami, the court noted that no one had seriously challenged the bus company’s safety justification for hiring drivers with a low risk of having accidents. Second, the court recognized that the ADEA requires that age qualifications be something more than “convenient” or “reasonable”; they must be “reasonably necessary ... to the particular business,” and this is only so when the employer is compelled to rely on age as a proxy for the safety-related job qualifications validated in the first inquiry. This showing could be made in two ways. The employer could establish that it “‘had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all [persons over the age qualifications] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.’” In Tamiami, the employer did not seek to justify its hiring qualification under this standard. Alternatively, the employer could establish that age was a legitimate proxy for the safety-related job qualifications by proving that it is “ ‘impossible or highly impractical’ ” to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis. “One method by which the employer can carry this burden is to establish that some members of the discriminated-against class possess a trait precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by means other than knowledge of the applicant’s membership in the class.” Id., at 235. In Tamiami, the medical evidence on this point was conflicting, but the District Court had found that individual examinations could not determine which individuals over the age of 40 would be unable to operate the buses safely. The Court of Appeals found that this finding of fact was not “clearly erroneous,” and affirmed the District Court’s judgment for the bus company on the BFOQ defense. Id., at 238. Congress, in considering the 1978 Amendments, implicitly endorsed the two-part inquiry identified by the Fifth Circuit in the Tamiami case. The Senate Committee Report expressed concern that the amendment prohibiting mandatory retirement in accordance with pension plans might imply that mandatory retirement could not be a BFOQ: “For example, in certain types of particularly arduous law enforcement activity, there may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all employees above a specified age would be unable to continue to perform safely and efficiently the duties of their particular jobs, and it may be impossible or impractical to determine through medical examinations, periodic reviews of current job performance and other objective tests the employees’ capacity or ability to continue to perform the jobs safely and efficiently. “Accordingly, the committee adopted an amendment to make it clear that where these two conditions are satisfied and where such a bona fide occupational qualification has therefore been established, an employer may lawfully require mandatory retirement at that specified age.” S. Rep. No. 95-493, pp. 10-11 (1977), Legislative History 443-444. The amendment was adopted by the Senate, but deleted by the Conference Committee because it “neither added to nor worked any change upon present law.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, p. 7 (1978), Legislative History 518. Every Court of Appeals that has confronted a BFOQ defense based on safety considerations has analyzed the problem consistently with the Tamiami standard. An EEOC regulation embraces the same criteria. Considering the narrow language of the BFOQ exception, the parallel treatment of such questions under Title VII, and the uniform application of the standard by the federal courts, the EEOC, and Congress, we conclude that this two-part inquiry properly identifies the relevant considerations for resolving a BFOQ defense to an age-based qualification purportedly justified by considerations of safety. hH In the trial court, Western preserved an objection to any instruction in the Tamiami mold, claiming that “any instruction pertaining to the statutory phrase ‘reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [defendant’s] business’... is irrelevant to and confusing for the deliberations of the jury.” Western proposed an instruction that would have allowed it to succeed on the BFOQ defense by proving that “in 1978, when these plaintiffs were retired, there existed a rational basis in fact for defendant to believe that use of [flight engineers] over age 60 on its DC-10 airliners would increase the likelihood of risk to its passengers.” The proposed instruction went on to note that the jury might rely on the FAA’s age-60 rule for pilots to establish a BFOQ under this standard “without considering any other evidence.” It also noted that the medical evidence submitted by the parties might provide a “rational basis in fact.” On appeal, Western defended its proposed instruction, and the Court of Appeals soundly rejected it. 709 F. 2d, at • 549-551. In this Court, Western slightly changes its course. The airline now acknowledges that the Tamiami standard identifies the relevant general inquiries that must be made in evaluating the BFOQ defense. However, Western claims that in several respects the instructions given below were insufficiently protective of public safety. Western urges that we interpret or modify the Tamiami standard to weigh these concerns in the balance. Reasonably Necessary Job Qualifications Western relied on two different kinds of job qualifications to justify its mandatory retirement policy. First, it argued that flight engineers should have a low risk of incapacitation or psychological and physiological deterioration. At this vague level of analysis respondents have not seriously disputed — nor could they — that the qualification of good health for a vital crew member is reasonably necessary to the essence of the airline’s operations. Instead, they have argued that age is not a necessary proxy for that qualification. On a more specific level, Western argues that flight engineers must meet the same stringent qualifications as pilots, and that it was therefore quite logical to extend to flight engineers the FAA’s age-60 retirement rule for pilots. Although the FAA’s rule for pilots, adopted for safety reasons, is relevant evidence in the airline’s BFOQ defense, it is not to be accorded conclusive weight. Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, ante, at 370-371. The extent to which the rule is probative varies with the weight of the evidence supporting its safety rationale and “the congruity between the . . . occupations at issue.” Ante, at 371. In this case, the evidence clearly established that the FA A, Western, and other airlines all recognized that the qualifications for a flight engineer were less rigorous than those required for a pilot. In the absence of persuasive evidence supporting its position, Western nevertheless argues that the jury should have been instructed to defer to “Western’s selection of job qualifications for the position of [flight engineer] that are reasonable in light of the safety risks.” Brief for Petitioner 30. This proposal is plainly at odds with Congress’ decision, in adopting the ADEA, to subject such management decisions to a test of objective justification in a court of law. The BFOQ standard adopted in the statute is one of “reasonable necessity,” not reasonableness. In adopting that standard, Congress did not ignore the public interest in safety. That interest is adequately reflected in instructions that track the language of the statute. When an employer establishes that a job qualification has been carefully formulated to respond to documented concerns for public safety, it will not be overly burdensome to persuade a trier of fact that the qualification is “reasonably necessary” to safe operation of the business. The uncertainty implicit in the concept of managing safety risks always makes it “reasonably necessary” to err on the side of caution in a close case. The employer cannot be expected to establish the risk of an airline accident “to a certainty, for certainty would require running the risk until a tragic accident would prove that the judgment was sound.” Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d, at 238. When the employer’s argument has a credible basis in the record, it is difficult to believe that a jury of laypersons — many of whom no doubt have flown or could expect to fly on commercial air carriers— would not defer in a close case to the airline’s judgment. Since the instructions in this case would not have prevented the airline from raising this contention to the jury in closing argument, we are satisfied that the verdict is a consequence of a defect in Western’s proof rather than a defect in the trial court’s instructions. Western’s Statutory Safety Obligation The instructions defined the essence of Western’s business as “the safe transportation of their passengers.” Tr. 2626. Western complains that this instruction was defective because it failed to inform the jury that an airline must conduct its operations “with the highest possible degree of safety.” Jury instructions, of course, “may not be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be judged in the “context of the overall charge” and the circumstances of the case. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 147 (1973). In this case, the instructions characterized safe transportation as the “essence” of Western’s business and specifically referred to the importance of “safe and efficient job performance” by flight engineers. Tr. 2627. Moreover, in closing argument counsel pointed out that because “safety is the essence of Western’s business,” the airline strives for “the highest degree possible of safety.” Viewing the record as a whole, we are satisfied that the jury’s attention was adequately focused on the importance of safety to the operation of Western’s business. Cf. United States v. Park, 421 U. S. 658, 674 (1975). Age as a Proxy for Job Qualifications Western contended below that the ADEA only requires that the employer establish “a rational basis in fact” for believing that identification of those persons lacking suitable qualifications cannot occur on an individualized basis. This “rational basis in fact” standard would have been tantamount to an instruction to return a verdict in the defendant’s favor. Because that standard conveys a meaning that is significantly different from that conveyed by the statutory phrase “reasonably necessary,” it was correctly rejected by the trial court. Western argues that a “rational basis” standard should be adopted because medical disputes can never be proved “to a certainty” and because juries should not be permitted “to resolve bona fide conflicts among medical experts respecting the adequacy of individualized testing.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 10. The jury, however, need not be convinced beyond all doubt that medical testing is impossible, but only that the proposition is true “on a preponderance of the evidence.” Moreover, Western’s attack on the wisdom of assigning the resolution of complex questions to 12 laypersons is inconsistent with the structure of the ADEA. Congress expressly decided that problems involving age discrimination in employment should be resolved on a “case-by-case basis” by proof to a jury. The “rational basis” standard is also inconsistent with the preference for individual evaluation expressed in the language and legislative history of the ADEA. Under the Act, employers are to evaluate employees between the ages of 40 and 70 on their merits and not their age. In the BFOQ defense, Congress provided a limited exception to this general principle, but required that employers validate any discrimination as “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.” It might well be “rational” to require mandatory retirement at any age less than 70, but that result would not comply with Congress’ direction that employers must justify the rationale for the age chosen. Unless an employer can establish a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all employees above an age lack the qualifications required for the position, the age selected for mandatory retirement less than 70 must be an age at which it is highly impractical for the employer to insure by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary qualifications for the job. Western argues that its lenient standard is necessary because “where qualified experts disagree as to whether persons over a certain age can be dealt with on an individual basis, an employer must be allowed to resolve that controversy in a conservative manner.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 8-9. This argument incorrectly assumes that all expert opinion is entitled to equal weight, and virtually ignores the function of the trier of fact in evaluating conflicting testimony. In this case, the jury may well have attached little weight to the testimony of Western’s expert witness. See supra, at 406, and n. 8. A rule that would require the jury to defer to the judgment of any expert witness testifying for the employer, no matter how unpersuasive, would allow some employers to give free reign to the stereotype of older workers that Congress decried in the legislative history of the ADEA. When an employee covered by the Act is able to point to reputable businesses in the same industry that choose to eschew reliance on mandatory retirement earlier than age 70, when the employer itself relies on individualized testing in similar circumstances, and when the administrative agency with primary responsibility for maintaining airline safety has determined that individualized testing is not impractical for the relevant position, the employer’s attempt to justify its decision on the basis of the contrary opinion of experts— solicited for the purposes of litigation — is hardly convincing on any objective standard short of complete deference. Even in cases involving public safety, the ADEA plainly does not permit the trier of fact to give complete deference to the employer’s decision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. Section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA provides: “It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . “(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business . . . 81 Stat. 603, 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(1). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111 (1985), decided earlier this Term, TWA allowed flight engineers to continue working past age 60, and allowed pilots to downbid to flight engineer positions provided that they were able to find an open position prior to their 60th birthdays. See id., at 115-116. Pilots who were displaced for any reason besides the Federal Aviation Administration’s age-60 rule, however, were permitted to “bump” less senior persons occupying flight engineer positions without waiting for vacancies to occur. We held that this transfer policy discriminated among pilots on the basis of age, and violated the ADEA. Since TWA did not impose an under-age-60 qualification for flight engineers, however, it had no occasion to rely on the same BFOQ theory presented here by Western. While this lawsuit was proceeding to trial, Criswell and Starley also pursued their remedies under the collective-bargaining agreement. The System Wide Board of Adjustment, over a dissent, ultimately ruled that the contract provision that appeared to authorize the pilots’ downbidding was only intended to allow senior pilots operating narrow-body equipment to bid for first officer or flight engineer positions on wide-body aircraft. App. to Pet. for Cert. A84-A90. Since Criswell and Starley were already serving on wide-body aircraft, the provision did not apply to them. The Board also concluded that the provision would not support a transfer “for the obvious purpose of evading the application of [the] agreed retirement plan.” Id., at A89. Western relied on this ground in its motion for summary judgment, but the District Court concluded that material questions of fact remained on the question of whether age was a substantial and determinative factor in the denial of the downbids. Id., at A81. The Western official who was responsible for the decision to retire the plaintiffs conceded that “the sole basis” for the denial of the applications of Criswell, Starley, and Ron was the same: “the provision in the pension plan regarding retirement at age 60.” Tr. 1163. In addition, he admitted that he had “no personal knowledge” of any safety rationale for the under-age-60 rule for flight engineers, id., at 2059, nor had it played any significant role in his decision to retire them. See id., at 61, 2027-2033, 2056-2057. The airline sent Starley and Ron form letters informing them of its “considered judgment after examining all of the applicable statutory law that since you have been a member of our Pilot retirement plan, that we cannot continue your employment beyond the normal retirement date of age 60.” See App. 89, 91. § 4(f)(2), 81 Stat. 603, 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2). 92 Stat. 189, 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2). Western also contended that its denials of the downbids by pilots Starley and Criswell were based on “reasonable factors other than age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(1); see n. 10, infra. Although the witness had served with the FAA for seven years ending in 1979, he conceded that throughout his tenure at the FAA he never had advocated that the agency extend the age-60 rule to flight engineers. Tr. 1521. After the judgment in the Criswell action, eight other pilots and one career flight officer filed a separate action seeking similar relief. A preliminary injunction was granted on behalf of the flight engineer, and Western appealed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeal with Western’s appeal in Criswell, and affirmed the preliminary injunction. 709 F. 2d 544, 558-559 (CA9 1983). The plaintiffs in the collateral action are respondents here. One of Western’s claims in the trial court was that its refusal to allow pilots to serve as flight engineers after they reached age 60 was based on “reasonable factors other than age” (RFOA), namely, a facially neutral policy embodied in its collective-bargaining agreement which prohibited downbidding. See nn. 3 and 7, supra. The jury rejected this defense in its verdict. On appeal, Western claimed that the instructions had improperly required it to bear the burden of proof on the RFOA issue inasmuch as the burden of persuasion on the issue of age discrimination is at all times on the plaintiff. Cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978). The Court of Appeals rejected this claim on the merits. 709 F. 2d, at 552-553. We granted certiorari to consider the merits of this question, 469 U. S. 815 (1984), but as we read the instructions the burden was placed on the plaintiffs on the RFOA issue. The general instruction on the question of discrimination provided that the “burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to show discriminatory treatment on the basis of age.” App. 58. The instructions expressly informed the jury when the burden shifted to the defendant to prove various issues, e. g., id., at 60 (business necessity); id., at 61 (BFOQ), but did not so inform the jury in the RFOA instruction, id., at 62-63. Because the plaintiffs were assigned the burden of proof, we need not consider whether it would have been error to assign it to the defendant. Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment 9 (1965) (hereinafter Report), EEOC, Legislative History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 26 (1981) (hereinafter Legislative History). See also S. Rep. No. 95-493, p. 2 (1977), Legislative History 435 (“Scientific research . . . indicates that chronological age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a job”). Report, at 21, Legislative History 37. “Hundreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination. Despite our present low rate of unemployment, there has been a persistent average of 850,000 people age 45 and over who are unemployed. “In economic terms, this is a serious — and senseless — loss to a nation on the move. But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their families.” H. R. Doc. No. 40, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1967), Legislative History 61. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 230 (1983). H. R. Rep. No. 95-527, pt. 1, p. 2 (1977), Legislative History 362. Cf. S. Rep. No. 95-493, p. 4 (1977), Legislative History 437 (“The committee believes that the arguments for retaining existing mandatory retirement policies are largely based on misconceptions rather than upon a careful analysis of the facts”). “Many different types of employment situations prevail. Administration of this law must place emphasis on case-by-case basis, with unusual working conditions weighed on their own merits. The purpose of this legislation, simply stated, is to insure that age, within the limits prescribed herein, is not a determining factor in a refusal to hire.” S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1967), Legislative History 111. Section 703(e) of Title VII permits classifications based on religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances “where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(e)(l). Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F. 2d 385 (CA5), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 950 (1971), provided authority for this proposition. In Diaz the court had rejected Pan American’s claim that a female-only qualification for the position of in-flight cabin attendant was a BFOQ under Title VII. The District Court had upheld the qualification as a BFOQ finding that the airline’s passengers preferred the “pleasant environment” and the “cosmetic effect” provided by female attendants, and that most men were unable to perform effectively the “non-mechanical functions” of the job. The Court of Appeals rejected the BFOQ defense concluding that these considerations “are tangential to the essence of the business involved.” 442 F. 2d, at 388. Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F. 2d 228 (CA5 1969), provided authority for this proposition. In Weeks the court rejected Southern Bell’s claim that a male-only qualification for the position of switchman was a BFOQ under Title VII. Southern Bell argued, and the District Court had found, that the job was “strenuous,” but the court observed that that “finding is extremely vague.” Id,., at 234. The court rejected the BFOQ defense concluding that “using these class stereotypes denies desirable positions to a great many women perfectly capable of performing the duties involved.” Id., at 236. Moreover, the employer had made no showing that it was “impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an individualized basis.” Id., at 235, n. 5. 531 F. 2d, at 235 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F. 2d, at 235). 531 F. 2d, at 235 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F. 2d, at 235, n. 5). Senator Javits, an active proponent of the legislation, obviously viewed the BFOQ defense as a narrow one when he explained that it could be proved when “the employer can demonstrate that there is an objective, factual basis for believing that virtually all employees above a certain age are unable to safely perform the duties of their jobs and where, in addition, there is no practical medical or performance test to determine capacity.” 123 Cong. Rec. 34319 (1977), Legislative History 506. See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-527, pt. 1, p. 12, Legislative History 372. See, e. g., Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 736 F. 2d 394 (CA7 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1004 (1985); Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 745 F. 2d 988, 993-994 (CA5 1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1271; 709 F. 2d, at 550 (case below); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F. 2d 743, 752-753 (CA7), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 992 (1983); Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F. 2d 842, 844-845 (CA6 1982); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F. 2d 303, 307 (CA4 1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 1007 (1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 1977). Cf. Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F. 2d 670, 676-677 (CA9 1980) (Title VII). 46 Fed. Reg. 47727 (1981), 29 CFR § 1625.6(b) (1984): “An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all or substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age. If the employer’s objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact.” Record, Doc. No. 164 (objections to plaintiffs proposed BFOQ instruction). Ibid. (Defendant’s Proposed Instruction No. 19) (emphasis added). In support of the “rational basis in fact” language in the proposed instruction Western cited language in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F. 2d 859 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1122 (1975), which had been criticized by the Fifth Circuit panel in Tamiami and which the Seventh Circuit later repudiated. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F. 2d, at 752-753. Western also relied on the District Court’s opinion in Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 490 F. Supp. 258 (ED Mich. 1980), which was reversed on appeal, 675 F. 2d 842 (CA6 1982). Record, Doe. No. 164 (Defendant’s Proposed Instruction No. 19.1). As the Court of Appeals noted, the “jury heard testimony that Western itself allows a captain under the age of sixty who cannot, for health reasons, continue to fly as a captain or co-pilot to downbid to a position as second officer. [In addition,] half the pilots flying in the United States are flying for major airlines which do not require second officers to retire at the age of sixty, and . . . there are over 200 such second officers currently flying on wide-bodied aircraft.” 709 F. 2d, at 552. See also supra, at 406-407. Several Courts of Appeals have recognized that safety considerations are relevant in making or reviewing findings of fact. See, e. g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F. 2d 994, 998 (CA5 1984); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F. 2d, at 755; Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F. 2d, at 845; Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 215 U. S. App. D. C. 55, 58, 667 F. 2d 98, 101 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 915 (1982); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F. 2d, at 863. Such considerations, of course, are only relevant at the margin of a close case, and do not relieve the employer from its burden of establishing the BFOQ by the preponderance of credible evidence. Moreover, we do not find that petitioner’s proposed instructions made any reference to the notion of deference to the expertise of the employer, except insofar as that concept was implicit in the “rational basis in fact” standard reflected in its proposed instructions. As we reject that standard as inconsistent with the statute, infra, at 421-423, we are somewhat reluctant to fault the trial judge for not giving an instruction that was not requested. This standard is set forth in the Federal Aviation Act, which provides, in part: “In prescribing standards, rules, and regulations, and in issuing certificates under this subchapter, the Secretary of Transportation shall give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest . . . .” 49 U. S. C. App. § 1421(b) (emphasis added). ‘We have tried to present, throughout the case, our view that safety is the essence of Western’s business. It is the core, it is what the air passenger service business is all about. We have a duty to our passengers, which we consider to be the most important duty of all the business operations that we engage in, including making money. Our first duty is that the passengers and the crews on all our aircraft are safe. And we attempt to render to them the highest degree possible of safety.” Tr. 2514. In this Court Western proposes a “factual basis” standard. We do not perceive any substantial difference between this standard and the instruction that it sought below, and we discuss the question as it was raised in the proposed instructions, and discussed in the Court of Appeals. This standard has been rejected by nearly every court to consider it. 709 F. 2d, at 550-551 (case below); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F. 2d, at 755-756; Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F. 2d, at 845; Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F. 2d, at 677; Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d, at 1271; Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d, at 235-236. Supra, at 411, and n. 16; 29 U. S. C. § 626(c)(2); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575 (1978). Indeed, under a “rational basis” standard a jury might well consider that its “inquiry is at an end” with an expert witness’ articulation of any “plausible reaso[n]” for the employer’s decision. Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. PARK No. 74-215. Argued March 18-19, 1975 Decided June 9, 1975 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 678. Allan Abbott Tuttle argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Howard E. Shapiro, and Peter Barton Hutt. Gregory M. Harvey argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Orvel Sebring Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by James F. Rill, Robert A. Collier, and John Hardin Young for the National Association of Food Chains; by H. Thomas Austern, H. Edward Dunkelberger, Jr., and Geoffrey Richard Wagner Smith for the National Canners Assn.; by Robert C. Barnard and Charles F. Let-tow for the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Assn.; and by Frederick M. Rowe, Paid M. Hyman, and Jonathan W. Sloat for the Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to consider whether the jury instructions in the prosecution of a corporate officer under § 301 (k) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1042, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 331 (k), were appropriate under United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943). Acme Markets, Inc., is a national retail food chain with approximately 36,000 employees, 874 retail outlets, 12 general warehouses, and four special warehouses. Its headquarters, including the office of the president, respondent Park, who is chief executive officer of the corporation, are located in Philadelphia, Pa. In a five-count information filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the Government charged Acme and respondent with violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Each count of the information alleged that the defendants had received food that had been shipped in interstate commerce and that, while the food was being held for sale in Acme’s Baltimore warehouse following shipment in interstate commerce, they caused it to be held in a building accessible to rodents and to be exposed to contamination by rodents. These acts were alleged to have resulted in the food’s being adulterated within the meaning of 21 U. S. C. §§ 342 (a)(3) and (4), in violation of 21 U. S. C. §331 (k). Acme pleaded guilty to each count of the information. Respondent pleaded not guilty. The evidence at trial demonstrated that in April 1970 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advised respondent by letter of insanitary conditions in Acme’s Philadelphia warehouse. In 1971 the FDA found that similar conditions existed in the firm’s Baltimore warehouse. An FDA consumer safety officer testified concerning evidence of rodent infestation and other insanitary conditions discovered during a 12-day inspection of the Baltimore warehouse in November and December 1971. He also related that a second inspection of the warehouse had been conducted in March 1972. On that occasion the inspectors found that there had been improvement in the sanitary conditions, but that “there was still evidence of rodent activity in the building and in the warehouses and we found some rodent-contaminated lots of food items.” App. 23. The Government also presented testimony by the Chief of Compliance of the FDA’s Baltimore office, who informed respondent by letter of the conditions at the Baltimore warehouse after the first inspection. There was testimony by Acme’s Baltimore division vice president, who had responded to the letter on behalf of Acme and respondent and who described the steps taken to remedy the insanitary conditions discovered by both inspections. The Government’s final witness, Acme’s vice president for legal affairs and assistant secretary, identified respondent as the president and chief executive officer of the company and read a bylaw prescribing the duties of the chief executive officer. He testified that respondent functioned by delegating “normal operating duties,” including sanitation, but that he retained “certain things, which are the big, broad, principles of the operation of the company,” and had “the responsibility of seeing that they all work together.” Id., at 41. At the close of the Government’s case in chief, respondent moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that “the evidence in chief has shown that Mr. Park is not personally concerned in this Food and Drug violation.” The trial judge denied the motion, stating that United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943), was controlling. Respondent was the only defense witness. He testified that, although all of Acme’s employees were in a sense under his general direction, the company had an “organizational structure for responsibilities for certain functions” according to which different phases of its operation were “assigned to individuals who, in turn, have staff and departments under them.” He identified those individuals responsible for sanitation, and related that upon receipt of the January 1972 FDA letter, he had conferred with the vice president for legal affairs, who informed him that the Baltimore division vice president “was investigating the situation immediately and would be taking corrective action and would be preparing a summary of the corrective action to reply to the letter.” Respondent stated that he did not “believe there was anything [he] could have done more constructively than what [he] found was being done.” App. 43-47. On cross-examination, respondent conceded that providing sanitary conditions for food offered for sale to the public was something that he was “responsible for in the entire operation of the company,” and he stated that it was one of many phases of the company that he assigned to “dependable subordinates.” Respondent was asked about and, over the objections of his counsel, admitted receiving, the April 1970 letter addressed to him from the FDA regarding insanitary conditions at Acme’s Philadelphia warehouse. He acknowledged that, with the exception of the division vice president, the same individuals had responsibility for sanitation in both Baltimore and Philadelphia. Finally, in response to questions concerning the Philadelphia and Baltimore incidents, respondent admitted that the Baltimore problem indicated the system for handling sanitation “wasn’t working perfectly” and that as Acme’s chief executive officer he was responsible for “any result which occurs in our company.” Id., at 48-55. At the close of the evidence, respondent’s renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal was denied. The relevant portion of the trial judge’s instructions to the jury challenged by respondent is set out in the margin. Respondent’s counsel objected to the instructions on the ground that they failed fairly to reflect our decision in United States v. Dotterweich, supra, and to define “ 'responsible relationship.’ ” The trial judge overruled the objection. The jury found respondent guilty on all counts of the information, and he was subsequently sentenced to pay a fine of $50 on each count. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. That court viewed the Government as arguing “that the conviction may be predicated solely upon a showing that . . . [respondent] was the President of the offending corporation,” and it stated that as “a general proposition, some act of commission or omission is an essential element of every crime.” 499 F. 2d 839, 841 (CA4 1974). It reasoned that, although our decision in United States v. Dotterweich, supra, at 281, had construed the statutory provisions under which respondent was tried to dispense with the traditional element of “ ‘awareness of some wrongdoing,’ ” the Court had not construed them as dispensing with the element of “wrongful action.” The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge’s instructions “might well have left the jury with the erroneous impression that Park could be found guilty in the absence of ‘wrongful action’ on his part,” 499 F. 2d, at 841-842, and that proof of this element was required by due process. It held, with one dissent, that the instructions did not “correctly state the law of the case,” id., at 840, and directed that on retrial the jury be instructed as to “wrongful action,” which might be “gross negligence and inattention in discharging . . . corporate duties and obligations or any of a host of other acts of commission or omission which would ‘cause’ the contamination of food.” Id., at 842. (Footnotes omitted.) The Court of Appeals also held that the admission in evidence of the April 1970 FDA warning to respondent was error warranting reversal, based on its conclusion that, “as this case was submitted to the jury and in light of the sole issue presented,” there was no need for the evidence and thus that its prejudicial effect outweighed its relevancy under the test of United States v. Woods, 484 F. 2d 127 (CA4 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 979 (1974). 499 F. 2d, at 843. We granted certiorari because of an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals with respect to the standard of liability of corporate officers under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as construed in United States v. Dotterweich, supra, and because of the importance of the question to the Government’s enforcement program. We reverse. I The question presented by the Government’s petition for certiorari in United States v. Dotterweich, supra, and the focus of this Court’s opinion, was whether “the manager of a corporation, as well as the corporation itself, may be prosecuted under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 for the introduction of misbranded and adulterated articles into interstate commerce.” Pet. for Cert., No. 5, O. T. 1943, p. 2. In Dotterweich, a jury had disagreed as to the corporation, a jobber purchasing drugs from manufacturers and shipping them in interstate commerce under its own label, but had convicted Dotterweich, the corporation’s president and general manager. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that only the drug dealer, whether corporation or individual, was subject to the criminal provisions of the Act, and that where the dealer was a corporation, an individual connected therewith might be held personally only if he was operating the corporation “as his ‘alter ego.’ ” United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F. 2d 500, 503 (CA2 1942). In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstating Dotterweich’s conviction, this Court looked to the purposes of the Act and noted that they “touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.” 320 U. S., at 280. It observed that the Act is of “a now familiar type” which “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct — awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.” Id., at 280-281. Central to the Court’s conclusion that individuals other than proprietors are subject to the criminal provisions of the Act was the reality that “the only way in which a corporation can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf.” Id., at 281. The Court also noted that corporate officers had been subject to criminal liability under the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, and it observed that a contrary result under the 1938 legislation would be incompatible with the expressed intent of Congress to “enlarge and stiffen the penal net” and to discourage a view of the Act’s criminal penalties as a “ ‘license fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business.’ ” 320 U. S., at 282-283. (Footnote omitted.) At the same time, however, the Court was aware of the concern which was the motivating factor in the Court of Appeals’ decision, that literal enforcement “might operate too harshly by sweeping within its condemnation any person however remotely entangled in the proscribed shipment.” Id., at 284. A limiting principle, in the form of “settled doctrines of criminal law” defining those who “are responsible for the commission of a misdemeanor,” was available. In this context, the Court concluded, those doctrines dictated that the offense was committed “by all who . . . have . . . a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.” Ibid. The Court recognized that, because the Act dispenses with the need to prove “consciousness of wrongdoing,” it may result in hardship even as applied to those who share “responsibility in the business process resulting in” a violation. It regarded as “too treacherous” an attempt “to define or even to indicate by way of illustration the class of employees which stands in such a responsible relation.” The question of responsibility, the Court said, depends “on the evidence produced at the trial and its submission — assuming the evidence warrants it — to the jury under appropriate guidance.” The Court added: “In such matters the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted.” Id., at 284r-285. See 21 U. S. C. § 336.’ Cf. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 694-695 (1948). II The rule that corporate employees who have “a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws” are subject to the criminal provisions of the Act was not formulated in a vacuum. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 258 (1952). Cases under the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906 reflected the view both that knowledge or intent were not required to be proved in prosecutions under its criminal provisions, and that responsible corporate agents could be subjected to the liability thereby imposed. See, e. g., United States v. Mayfield, 177 F. 765 (ND Ala. 1910). Moreover, the principle had been recognized that a corporate agent, through whose act, default, or omission the corporation committed a crime, was himself guilty individually of that crime. The principle had been applied whether or not the crime required “consciousness of wrongdoing,” and it had been applied not only to those corporate agents who themselves committed the criminal act, but also to those who by virtue, of their managerial positions or other similar relation to the actor could be deemed responsible for its commission. In the latter class of cases, the liability of managerial officers did not depend on their knowledge of, or personal participation in, the act made criminal by the statute. Rather, where the statute under which they were prosecuted dispensed with “consciousness of wrongdoing,” an omission or failure to act was deemed a sufficient basis for a responsible corporate agent’s liability. It was enough in such cases that, by virtue of the relationship he bore to the corporation, the agent had the power to prevent the act complained of. See, e. g., State v. Burnam, 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218 (1912); Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 P. 924 (1904). Cf. Groff v. State, 171 Ind. 547, 85 N. E. 769 (1908); Turner v. State, 171 Tenn. 36, 100 S. W. 2d 236 (1937); People v. Schwartz, 28 Cal. App. 2d 775, 70 P. 2d 1017 (1937); Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1930). The rationale of the interpretation given the Act in D otterweich, as holding criminally accountable the persons whose failure to exercise the authority and supervisory responsibility reposed in them by the business organization resulted in the violation complained of, has been confirmed in our subsequent eases. Thus, the Court has reaffirmed the proposition that “the public interest in the purity of its food is so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest standard of care on distributors.” Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 152 (1959). In order to make “distributors of food the strictest censors of their merchandise,” ibid., the Act punishes “neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty.” Morissette v. United States, supra, at 255. “The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities.” Id., at 256. Cf. Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 Yale L. J. 590 (1958). Similarly, in cases decided after Dotterweich, the Courts of Appeals have recognized that those corporate agents vested with the responsibility, and power commensurate with that responsibility, to devise whatever measures are necessary to ensure compliance with the Act bear a “responsible relationship” to, or have a “responsible share” in, violations. Thus Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who execute the corporate mission — and this is by no means necessarily confined to a single corporate agent or employee — the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them. Cf. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 741-745 (I960). The Act does not, as we observed in Dotterweich, make criminal liability turn on “awareness of some wrongdoing” or “conscious fraud.” The duty imposed by Congress on responsible corporate agents is, we emphasize, one that requires the highest standard of- foresight and vigilance, but the Act, in its criminal aspect, does not require that which is objectively impossible. The theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally accountable for “causing” violations of the Act permits a claim that a defendant was “powerless” to prevent or correct the violation to “be raised defensively at a trial on the merits.” United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U. S. 86, 91 (1964). If such a claim is made, the defendant has the burden of. coming forward with evidence, but this does not alter the Government’s ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s guilt, including his power, in light of the duty imposed by the Act, to prevent or correct the prohibited condition. Congress has seen fit to enforce the accountability of responsible corporate agents dealing with products which may affect the health of consumers by penal sanctions cast in rigorous terms, and the obligation of the courts is to give them effect so long as they do not violate the Constitution. Ill We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that it was incumbent upon the District Court to instruct the jury that the Government had the burden of establishing “wrongful action” in the sense in which the Court of Appeals used that phrase. The concept of a “responsible relationship” to, or a “responsible share” in, a violation of the Act indeed imports some measure of blameworthiness; but it is equally clear that the Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so. The failure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the corporate agent’s authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient causal link. The considerations which prompted the imposition of this duty, and the scope of the duty, provide the measure of culpability. Turning to the jury charge in this case, it is of course arguable that isolated parts can be read as intimating that a finding of guilt could be predicated solely on respondent’s corporate position. But this is not the way we review jury instructions, because “a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1973). See Boyd v. United States, 271 U. S. 104, 107 (1926). Reading the entire charge satisfies us that the jury’s attention was adequately focused on the issue of respondent’s authority with respect to the conditions that formed the basis of the alleged violations. Viewed as a whole, the charge did not permit the jury to find guilt solely on the basis of respondent’s position in the corporation; rather, it fairly advised the jury that to find guilt it must find respondent “had a responsible relation to the situation,” and “by virtue of his position ... had ... authority and responsibility” to deal with the situation. The situation referred to could only be “food ... held in unsanitary conditions in a warehouse with the result that it consisted, in part, of filth or . . . may have been contaminated with filth.” Moreover, in reviewing jury instructions, our task is also to view the charge itself as part of the whole trial. “Often isolated statements taken from the charge, seemingly prejudicial on their face, are not so when considered in the context of the entire record of the trial.” United States v. Bimbaum, 373 F. 2d 250, 257 (CA2), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 837 (1967). (Emphasis added.) Cf. Cupp v. Naughten, supra. The record in this case reveals that the jury could not have failed to be aware that the main issue for determination was not respondent’s position in the corporate hierarchy, but rather his accountability, because of the responsibility and authority of his position, for the conditions which gave rise to the charges against him. We conclude that, viewed as a whole and in the context of the trial, the charge was not misleading and contained an adequate statement of the law to guide the jury’s determination. Although it would have been better to give an instruction more, precisely relating the legal issue to the facts of the case, we cannot say that the failure to provide the amplification requested by respondent was an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U. S. 532, 536-537 (1947); Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121, 140 (1954). Finally, we note that there was no request for an instruction that the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent was not without the power or capacity to affect the conditions which founded the charges in the information. In light of the evidence adduced at trial, we find no basis to conclude that the failure of the trial court to give such an instruction sua sponte was plain error or a defect affecting substantial rights. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52 (b). Compare Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 436 (1963), with Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 107 (1945) (opinion of Douglas, J.). IV Our conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in its reading of the jury charge suggests as well our disagreement with that court concerning the admissibility of evidence demonstrating that respondent was advised by the FDA in 1970 of insanitary conditions in Acme’s Philadelphia warehouse. We are satisfied that the Act imposes the highest standard of care and permits conviction of responsible corporate officials who, in light of this standard of care, have the power to prevent or correct violations of its provisions. Implicit in the Court’s admonition that “the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted,” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S., at 285, however, is the realization that they may demand more than corporate bylaws to find culpability. Respondent testified in his defense that he had employed a system in which he relied upon his subordinates, and that he was ultimately responsible for this system. He testified further that he had found these subordinates to be “dependable” and had “great confidence” in them. By this and other testimony respondent evidently sought to persuade the jury that, as the president of a large corporation, he had no choice but to delegate duties to those in whom he reposed confidence, that he had no reason to suspect his subordinates were failing to insure compliance with the Act, and that, once violations were unearthed, acting through those subordinates he did everything possible to correct them. Although we need not decide whether this testimony would have entitled respondent to an instruction as to his lack of power, see supra, at 676, had he requested it, the testimony clearly created the “need” for rebuttal evidence. That evidence was not offered to show that respondent had a propensity to commit criminal acts, cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 475-476 (1948), or, as in United States v. Woods, 484 F. 2d 127, that the crime charged had been committed; its purpose was to demonstrate that respondent was on notice that he could not rely on his system of delegation to subordinates to prevent or correct insanitary conditions at Acme’s warehouses, and that he must have been aware of the deficiencies of this system before the Baltimore violations were discovered. The evidence was therefore relevant since it served to rebut respondent’s defense that he had justifiably relied upon subordinates to handle sanitation matters. Cf. United States v. Ross, 321 F. 2d 61, 67 (CA2), cert. denied, 375 U. S. 894 (1963); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, pp. 450-452 (2d ed. 1972). And, particularly in light of the difficult task of juries in prosecutions under the Act, we conclude that its relevance and persuasiveness outweighed any prejudicial effect. Cf. Research Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 410, 420-421 (CA9), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 843 (1948). Reversed. Section 402 of the Act, 21 "ü. S. C. §342, provides in pertinent part: “A food shall be deemed to be adulterated— “(a) (3) if it consists in whole or in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is otherwise unfit for food; or (4) if it has been prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered injurious to health . .. Section 301 of the Act, 21 U. S. C. § 331, provides in pertinent part: “The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: “(k) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded.” The parties stipulated in effect that the items of food described in the information had been shipped in interstate commerce and were being held for sale in Acme’s Baltimore warehouse. The witness testified with respect to the inspection of the basement of the "old building” in the warehouse complex: “We found extensive evidence of rodent infestation in the form of rat and mouse pellets throughout the entire perimeter area and along the wall. “We also found that the doors leading to the basement area from the rail siding had openings at the bottom or openings beneath part of the door that came down at the bottom large enough to admit rodent entry. There were also roden[t] pellets found on a number of different packages of boxes of various items stored in the basement, and looking at this document, I see there were also broken windows along the rail siding.” App. 20-21. On the first floor of the "old building,” the inspectors found: “Thirty mouse pellets on the floor along walls and on the ledge in the hanging meat room. There were at least twenty mouse pellets beside bales of lime Jello and one of the bales had a chewed rodent hole in the product. . . .” Id., at 22. The first four counts of the information alleged violations corresponding to the observations of the inspectors during the November and December 1971 inspection. The fifth count alleged violations corresponding to observations during the March 1972 inspection. The letter, dated January 27, 1972, included the following: “We note with much concern that the old and new warehouse areas used for food storage were actively and extensively inhabited by live rodents. ■ Of even more concern was the observation that such reprehensible conditions obviously existed for a prolonged period of time without any detection, or were completely ignored .... “We trust this letter will serve to direct your attention to the seriousness of the problem and formally advise you of the urgent need to initiate whatever measures are necessary to prevent recurrence and ensure compliance with the law.” Id., at 64-65. The bylaw provided in pertinent part: “The Chairman of the board of directors or the president shall be the chief executive officer of the company as the board of directors may from time to time determine. He shall, subject to the board of directors, have general and active supervision of the affairs, business, offices and employees of the company. . . . “He shall, from time to time, in his discretion or at the order of the board, report the operations and affairs of the company. He shall also perform such other duties and have such other powers as may be assigned to him from time to time by the board of directors.” Id., at 40. The April 1970 letter informed respondent of the following "objectionable conditions” in Acme’s Philadelphia warehouse: “1. Potential rodent entry ways were noted via ill fitting doors and door in irrepair at Southwest comer of warehouse; at dock at old salvage room and at receiving and shipping doors which were observed to be open most of the time. “2. Rodent nesting, rodent excreta pellets, rodent stained bale bagging and rodent gnawed holes were noted among bales of flour stored in warehouse. “3. Potential rodent harborage was noted in discarded paper, rope, sawdust and other debris piled in comer of shipping and receiving dock near bakery and warehouse doors. Rodent excreta pellets were observed among bags of sawdust (or wood shavings).” Id., at 70. “In order to find the Defendant guilty on any count of the Information, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt on each count.... “Thirdly, that John R. Park held a position of authority in the operation of the business of Acme Markets, Incorporated. “However, you need not concern yourselves with the first two elements of the case. The main issue for your determination is only with the third element, whether the Defendant held a position of authority and responsibility in the business of Acme Markets. "The statute makes individuals, as well as corporations, liable for violations. An individual is liable if it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the elements of the adulteration of the food as to travel in interstate commerce are present. As I have instructed you in this case, they are, and that the individual had a responsible relation to the situation, even though he may not have participated personally. “The individual is or could be liable under the statute, even if he did not consciously do wrong. However, the fact that the Defendant is pres[id]ent and is a chief executive officer of the Acme Markets does not require a finding of guilt. Though, he need not have personally participated in the situation, he must have had a-responsible relationship to the issue. The issue is, in this case, whether the Defendant, John R. Park, by virtue of his position in the company, had a position of authority and responsibility in the situation out of which these charges arose.” Id., at 61-62. Sections 303 (a) and (b) of the Act, 21 U. S. C. §§ 333 (a) and (b), provide: “(a) Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both. “(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, if any person commits such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead, such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.” Respondent’s renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial, one of the grounds of which was the alleged abuse of discretion in the initiation of the prosecution against him, had previously been denied after argument. The Court of Appeals relied upon § 303 (c) of the Act, 21 U. S. C. §333 (c), which extended immunity from the penalties provided by § 303 (a) to a person who could establish a. guaranty “signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the United States {rom whom he received in good faith the article ....”' (Emphasis added.) The court reasoned that where the drug dealer was a corporation, the protection of § 303 (c) would extend only to such dealer and not to its employees. Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768. In reinstating Dotterweich’s conviction, the Court stated: “For present purpose it suffices to say that in what the defense characterized as ‘a very fair charge’ the District Court properly left the question of the responsibility of Dotterweich for the shipment to the jury, and there was sufficient evidence to support its verdict.” 320 U. S., at 285. See, e. g., Lelies v. United States, 241 F. 2d 21 (CA9), cert. denied, 353 U. S. 974 (1957); United States v. Kaadt, 171 F. 2d 600 (CA7 1948). Cf. United States v. Shapiro, 491 F. 2d 335, 337 (CA6 1974); United States v. 3963 Bottles, 265 F. 2d 332 (CA7), cert. denied, 360 U. S. 931 (1959); United States v. Klehman, 397 F. 2d 406 (CA7 1968). We note that in 1948 the Senate passed an amendment to § 303 (a) of the Act to impose criminal liability only for violations committed “willfully or as a result of gross negligence.” 94 Cong. Rec. 6760-6761 (1948). However, the amendment was subsequently stricken in conference. Id., at 8551, 8838. In his summation to the jury, the prosecutor argued: “That brings us to the third question that you must decide, and that is whether Mr. John R. Park is responsible for the conditions persisting.. .. “The point is that, while Mr. Park apparently had a system, and I think he testified the system had been set up long before he got there — he did say that if anyone was going to change the system, it was his responsibility to do so. That very system, the system that he didn’t change, did not work in March of 1970 in Philadelphia; it did not work in November of 1971 in Baltimore; it did not work in March of 1972 in Baltimore, and under those circumstances, I submit, that Mr. Park is the man responsible. . . . “Mr. Park was responsible for seeing that sanitation was taken care of, and he had a system set up that was supposed to do that. This system didn’t work. It didn’t work three times. At some point in time, Mr. Park has to be held responsible for the fact that his system isn’t working . . . .” App. 57, 59, 60. Counsel for respondent submitted only two requests for charge: (1) “Statutes such as the ones the Government seeks to apply here are criminal statutes and should be strictly construed,” and (2) “The fact that John Park is President and Chief Executive Officer of Acme Markets, Inc. does not of itself justify a finding of guilty under Counts I through V of the Information.” 1 Record 56-57. In his summation to the jury, counsel for respondent-argued: “Now, you are Mr. Park. You have his responsibility for a thousand stores — I think eight hundred and some stores — lots of stores, many divisions, many warehouses. What are you going to do, except hire people in whom you have confidence to whom you delegate the work? . . . “. . . What I am saying to you is that Mr. Park, through his subordinates, when this was found out, did everything in the world they [sic] could.” 3 Record 201, 207. Assuming, arguendo, that it would be objectively impossible for a senior corporate agent to control fully day-to-day conditions in 874 retail outlets, it does not follow that such a corporate agent could not prevent or remedy promptly violations of elementary sanitary conditions in 16 regional warehouses.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION et al. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA No. 08-1151. Argued December 2, 2009 — Decided June 17, 2010 Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Auto, and Soto-mayor, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Auto, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Sotomayor, J., joined, post, p. 733. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 742. Stevens, J., took no part in the decision of the case. D. Kent Safriet argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard S. Brightman. Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General of Florida, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for Florida Department of Environmental Protection et al. were Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Timothy D. Osterhaus, Deputy Solicitor General, Thomas M. Beason, Teresa L. Mus-setto, and Kara L. Gross. Thomas W Merrill, Hala San-dridge, and Linda Shelley filed a brief for respondents Walton County, Florida, et al. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Acting Assistant Attorney General Cruden, Nicole A. Saharsky, and Katherine J. Barton. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Rights Union by Peter J. Ferrara; for the Coalition for Property Rights, Inc., by Menelaos K. Papólas and Sidney F. Ansbacher; for the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund by Douglas G. Smith; for the New England Legal Foundation by Benjamin G. Robbins and Martin J. Newhouse; for the Oregonians in Action Legal Center by Donald Joe Willis; for the Owners’ Counsel of America by Robert H. Thomas, Mark M. Murakami, and Tred R. Eyerly; and for Save Our Beaches et al. by Shannon Lee Goessling. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Planning Association et al. by John D. Echeverría; for the Coastal States Organization by Richard M. Frank; for the National Association of Counties et al. by Richard Ruda, Douglas T. Kendall, and Elizabeth B. Wydra; and for the Surfrider Foundation by Bruce J. Berman and Jeffrey W. Mikoni. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California et al. by Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, Daniel L. Siegel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, Solicitor General, J. Matthew Rodriquez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jan Stevens, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph Barbieri, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, by Richard S. Gebelein, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Delaware, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Tom Miller of Iowa, James D. “Buddy” Caldwell of Louisiana, Janet T. Mills of Maine, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Steve Bullock of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Michael A Delaney of New Hampshire, Anne Milgram of New Jersey, Richard Cordray of Ohio, John R. Kroger of Oregon, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, William C. Mims of Virginia, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and Bruce A Salzburg of Wyoming; for Brevard County, Florida, by Scott L. Knox; for the Cato Institute et al. by James S. Burling, Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Ilya Shapiro, Karen R. Hamed, and Elizabeth Milito; for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by Anthony T. Caso, Edwin Meese III, and John C. Eastman; for Citizens for Constitutional Property Rights Legal Foundation, Inc., by John J. Delaney and Emily J Vaias; for the Florida Shore and Beach Preservation Association et al. by Gary K. Oldehoff and Nancy E. Stroud; for the National Association of Home Builders et al. by Thomas Jon Ward and David N. Crump, Jr.; for the New Jersey Land Title Association by Michael J. Fasano; and for Save Our Shoreline by David L. Powers. Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Auto join. We consider a claim that the decision of a State’s court of last resort took property without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied against the States through the Fourteenth, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, 383-384 (1994). I A Generally speaking, state law defines property interests, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 164 (1998), including property rights in navigable waters and the lands underneath them, see United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 319-320 (1917); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm’rs, 168 U. S. 349, 358-359 (1897). In Florida, the State owns in trust for the public the land permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore (the land between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line). Fla. Const., Art. X, § 11; Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 407-409, 50 So. 826, 829-830 (1909). Thus, the mean high-water line (the average reach of high tide over the preceding 19 years) is the ordinary boundary between private beachfront, or littoral* property, and state-owned land. See Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 458-460, 193 So. 425, 427-428 (1940) (per curiam); Fla. Stat. §§ 177.27(14)-(15), 177.28(1) (2007). Littoral owners have, in addition to the rights of the public, certain “special rights” with regard to the water and the foreshore, Broward, 58 Fla., at 410, 50 So., at 830, rights which Florida considers to be property, generally akin to easements, see ibid.; Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. R. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 57, 78, 78 So. 491, 500, 507 (1918) (on rehearing). These include the right of access to the water, the right to use the water for certain purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive accretions and relictions to the littoral property. Id., at 58-59, 78 So., at 501; Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987). This is generally in accord with well-established common law, although the precise property rights vary among jurisdictions. Compare Broward, supra, at 409-410, 50 So., at 830, with 1 J. Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain § 100 (3d ed. 1909); 1 H. Farnham, Law of Waters and Water Rights § 62, pp. 278-280 (1904) (hereinafter Farnham). At the center of this case is the right to accretions and relictions. Accretions are additions of alluvion (sand, sediment, or other deposits) to waterfront land; relictions are lands once covered by water that become dry when the water recedes. F. Maloney, S. Plager, & F. Baldwin, Water Law and Administration: The Florida Experience §126, pp. 385-386 (1968) (hereinafter Maloney); 1 Farnham § 69, at 320. (For simplicity’s sake, we shall refer to accretions and relictions collectively as accretions, and the process whereby they occur as accretion.) In order for an addition to dry land to qualify as an accretion, it must have occurred gradually and imperceptibly — that is, so slowly that one could not see the change occurring, though over time the difference became apparent. Sand Key, supra, at 936; County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 66-67 (1874). When, on the other hand, there is a “sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream,” the change is called an avulsion. Sand Key, supra, at 936; see also 1 Farnham § 69, at 320. In Florida, as at common law, the littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by accretion; but formerly submerged land that has become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the owner of the seabed (usually the State). See, e. g., Sand Key, supra, at 937; Ma-loney § 126.6, at 392; 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 261-262 (1766) (hereinafter Blackstone). Thus, regardless of whether an avulsive event exposes land previously submerged or submerges land previously exposed, the boundary between littoral property and sovereign land does not change; it remains (ordinarily) what was the mean high-water line before the event. See Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 838-839 (Fla. 1970); J. Gould, Law of Waters § 158, p. 290 (1883). It follows from this that, when a new strip of land has been added to the shore by avulsion, the littoral owner has no right to subsequent accretions. Those accretions no longer add to his property, since the property abutting the water belongs not to him but to the State. See Maloney §126.6, at 393; 1 Farnham §71a, at 328. B In 1961, Florida’s Legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act, 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61-246, as amended, Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011-161.45 (2007). The Act establishes procedures for “beach restoration and nourishment projects,” § 161.088, designed to deposit sand on eroded beaches (restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand (nourishment). § 161.021(3), (4). A local government may apply to the Department of Environmental Protection (Department) for the funds and the necessary permits to restore a beach, see §§ 161.101(1), 161.041(1). When the project involves placing fill on the State’s submerged lands, authorization is required from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board), see §253.77(1), which holds title to those lands, §253.12(1). Once a beach restoration “is determined to be undertaken,” the Board sets what is called “an erosion control line.” § 161.161(3)-(5). It must be set by reference to the existing mean high-water line, though in theory it can be located seaward or landward of that. See §161.161(5). Much of the project work occurs seaward of the erosion-control line, as sand is dumped on what was once submerged land. See App. 87-88. The fixed erosion-control line replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property and state property. § 161.191(1). Once the erosion-control line is recorded, the common law ceases to increase upland property by accretion (or decrease it by erosion). § 161.191(2). Thus, when accretion to the shore moves the mean high-water line seaward, the property of beachfront landowners is not extended to that line (as the prior law provided), but remains bounded by the permanent erosion-control line. Those landowners “continue to be entitled,” however, “to all common-law riparian rights” other than the right to accretions. § 161.201. If the beach erodes back landward of the erosion-control line over a substantial portion of the shoreline covered by the project, the Board may, on its own initiative, or must, if asked by the owners or lessees of a majority of the property affected, direct the agency responsible for maintaining the beach to return the beach to the condition contemplated by the project. If that is not done within a year, the project is canceled and the erosion-control line is null and void. §161.211(2), (3). Finally, by regulation, if the use of submerged land would “unreasonably infringe on riparian rights,” the project cannot proceed unless the local governments show that they own or have a property interest in the upland property adjacent to the project site. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(b) (2009). C In 2003, the city of Destín and Walton County applied for the necessary permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach within their jurisdictions that had been eroded by several hurricanes. The project envisioned depositing along that shore sand dredged from further out. See Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2008). It would add about 75 feet of dry sand seaward of the mean high-water line (to be denominated the erosion-control line). The Department issued a notice of intent to award the permits, App. 27-41, and the Board approved the erosion-control line, id., at 49-50. Petitioner here, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation formed by people who own beachfront property bordering the project area (we shall refer to them as Members). It brought an administrative challenge to the proposed project, see id., at 10-26, which was unsuccessful; the Department approved the permits. Petitioner then challenged that action in state court under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, Fla. Stat. § 120.68 (2007). The District Court of Appeal for the First District concluded that, contrary to the Act’s preservation of “ ‘all common-law riparian rights,’ ” the order had eliminated two of the Members’ littoral rights: (1) the right to receive accretions to their property; and (2) the right to have the contact of their property with the water remain intact. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 27 So. 3d 48, 58 (2006) (emphasis deleted). This, it believed, would be an unconstitutional taking, which would “unreasonably infringe on riparian rights,” and therefore require the showing under Fla. Admin. Code Rule 18-21.004(3)(b) that the local governments owned or had a property interest in the upland property. It set aside the Department’s final order approving the permits and remanded for that showing to be made. 27 So. 3d, at 60. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the following question (as rephrased by the latter court): “On its face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation?” 998 So. 2d, at 1105 (footnotes omitted). The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, and quashed the First District’s remand. Id., at 1121. It faulted the Court of Appeal for not considering the doctrine of avulsion, which it concluded permitted the State to reclaim the restored beach on behalf of the public. Id., at 1116-1118. It described the right to accretions as a future contingent interest, not a vested property right, and held that there is no littoral right to contact with the water independent of the littoral right of access, which the Act does not infringe. Id., at 1112, 1119-1120. Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The request for rehearing was denied. We granted certiorari, 557 U. S. 903 (2009). II A Before coining to the parties’ arguments in the present case, we discuss some general principles of our takings jurisprudence. The Takings Clause — “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation,” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5 — applies as fully to the taking of a landowner’s riparian rights as it does to the taking of an estate in land. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504 (1871). Moreover, though the classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that achieve the same thing. Thus, when the government uses its own property in such a way that it destroys private property, it has taken that property. See United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 261-262 (1946); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 177-178 (1872). Similarly, our doctrine of regulatory takings “aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking.” Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 544 U. S. 528, 539 (2005). Thus, it is a taking when a state regulation forces a property owner to submit to a permanent physical occupation, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 425-426 (1982), or deprives him of all economically beneficial use of his property, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1019 (1992). Finally (and here we approach the situation before us), States effect a taking if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private property. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 163-165 (1980). The Takings Clause (unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto Clauses, see Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1) is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is eon-cerned simply with the act, and not with the governmental actor (“nor shall private property be taken” (emphasis added)). There is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation. Nor does common sense recommend such a principle. It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat. See Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U. S. 1207, 1211-1212 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the contrary. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 (1980), involved a decision of the California Supreme Court overruling one of its prior decisions which had held that the California Constitution’s guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press, and of the right to petition the government, did not require the owner of private property to accord those rights on his premises. The appellants, owners of a shopping center, contended that their private-property rights could not “be denied by invocation of a state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property,” id., at 79 (emphasis added). We held that there had been no taking, citing cases involving legislative and executive takings, and applying standard Takings Clause analysis. See id., at 82-84. We treated the California Supreme Court’s application of the constitutional provisions as a regulation of the use of private property, and evaluated whether that regulation violated the property owners’ “right to exclude others,” id., at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our opinion addressed only the claimed taking by the constitutional provision. Its failure to speak separately to the claimed taking by “judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property” certainly does not suggest that a taking by judicial action cannot occur, and arguably suggests that the same analysis applicable to taking by constitutional provision would apply. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, supra, is even closer in point. There the purchaser of an insolvent corporation had interpleaded the corporation’s creditors, placing the purchase price in an interest-bearing account in the registry of the Circuit Court of Seminole County, to be distributed in satisfaction of claims approved by a receiver. The Florida Supreme Court construed an applicable statute to mean that the interest on the account belonged to the county, because the account was “considered 'public money,’” Beckwith v. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, 374 So. 2d 951, 952-953 (1979) (per curiam). We held this to be a taking. We noted that “[t]he usual and general rule is that any interest on an inter-pleaded and deposited fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the owners of that principal,” 449 U. S., at 162. “Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree,” we said, “may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as 'public money.’” Id., at 164. In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking. To be sure, the manner of state action may matter: Condemnation by eminent domain, for example, is always a taking, while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be, depending on its nature and extent. But the particular state actor is irrelevant. If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation. “[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation.” Ibid. B Justice Breyer’s concurrence says that we need neither (1) to decide whether the judiciary can ever effect a taking, nor (2) to establish the standard for determining whether it has done so. See post, at 742-743 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The second part of this is surely incompatible with Justice Breyer’s conclusion that the “Florida Supreme Court’s decision in this case did not amount to a ‘judicial taking.’ ” Post, at 745. One cannot know whether a takings claim is invalid without knowing what standard it has failed to meet. Which means that Justice Breyer must either (1) grapple with the artificial question of what would constitute a judicial taking if there were such a thing as a judicial taking (reminiscent of the perplexing question how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?), or (2) answer in the negative what he considers to be the “unnecessary” constitutional question whether there is such a thing as a judicial taking. It is not true that deciding the constitutional question in this case contradicts our settled practice. To the contrary, we have often recognized the existence of a constitutional right, or established the test for violation of such a right (or both), and then gone on to find that the claim at issue fails. See, e. g., New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 333, 341-343 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by public-school officials, establishing the standard for finding a violation, but concluding that the claim at issue failed); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687, 698-700 (1984) (recognizing a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, establishing the test for its violation, but holding that the claim at issue failed); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 58-60 (1985) (holding that a Strickland claim can be brought to challenge a guilty plea, but rejecting the claim at issue); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 313-320, 326 (1979) (recognizing a due process claim based on insufficiency of evidence, establishing the governing test, but concluding that the claim at issue failed); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 390, 395-397 (1926) (recognizing that block zoning ordinances could constitute a taking, but holding that the challenged ordinance did not do so); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241, 255-257 (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits uncompensated takings, but concluding that the court below made no errors of law in assessing just compensation). In constitutional-tort suits against public officials, we have found the defendants entitled to immunity only after holding that their action violated the Constitution. See, e. g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 605-606 (1999). Indeed, up until last Term, we required federal courts to address the constitutional question before the immunity question. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 236 (2009). “Assuming without deciding” would be less appropriate here than it was in many of those earlier cases, which established constitutional rights quite separate from any that had previously been acknowledged. Compared to Strickland’s proclamation of a right to effective assistance of counsel, for example, proclaiming that a taking can occur through judicial action addresses a point of relative detail. In sum, Justice Breyer cannot decide that petitioner’s claim fails without first deciding what a valid claim would consist of. His agreement with Part IV of our opinion necessarily implies agreement with the test for a judicial taking (elaborated in Part II-A) which Part IV applies: whether the state court has “deelare[d] that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists,” supra, at 715. Justice Breyer must either agree with that standard or craft one of his own. And agreeing to or crafting a hypothetical standard for a hypothetical constitutional right is sufficiently unappealing (we have eschewed that course many times in the past) that Justice Breyer might as well acknowledge the right as well. Or he could avoid the need to agree with or craft a hypothetical standard by denying the right. But embracing a standard while being coy about the right is, well, odd; and deciding this case while addressing neither the standard nor the right is quite impossible. Justice Breyer responds that he simply advocates resolving this case without establishing “the precise standard under which a party wins or loses.” Post, at 744 (emphasis added). But he relies upon no standard at all, precise or imprecise. He simply pronounces that this is not a judicial taking if there is such a thing as a judicial taking. The cases he cites to support this Queen-of-Hearts approach provide no precedent. In each of them the existence of the right in question was settled, and we faced a choice between competing standards that had been applied by the courts. We simply held that the right in question had not been infringed under any of them. There is no established right here, and no competing standards. c Like Justice Breyer’s concurrence, Justice Kennedy’s concludes that the Florida Supreme Court’s action here does not meet the standard for a judicial taking, while purporting not to determine what is the standard for a judicial taking, or indeed whether such a thing as a judicial taking even exists. That approach is invalid for the reasons we have discussed. Justice Kennedy says that we need not take what he considers the bold and risky step of holding that the Takings Clause applies to judicial action, because the Due Process Clause “would likely prevent a State from doing by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat,” post, at 737 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). He invokes the Due Process Clause “in both its substantive and procedural aspects,” post, at 735, not specifying which of his arguments relates to which. The first respect in which Justice Kennedy thinks the Due Process Clause can do the job seems to sound in procedural due process. Because, he says, “[c]ourts, unlike the executive or legislature, are not designed to make policy decisions” about expropriation, “[t]he Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights” violates the Due Process Clause. Post, at 736, 737. Let us be clear what is being proposed here. This Court has held that the separation-of-powers principles that the Constitution imposes upon the Federal Government do not apply against the States. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 83-84 (1902). But in order to avoid the bold and risky step of saying that the Takings Clause applies to all government takings, Justice Kennedy would have us use procedural due process to impose judicially crafted separation-of-powers limitations upon the States: Courts cannot be used to perform the governmental function of expropriation. The asserted reasons for the due process limitation are that the legislative and executive branches “are accountable in their political capacity” for takings, post, at 734, and “[e]ourts... are not designed to make policy decisions” about takings, post, at 736. These reasons may have a lot to do with sound separation-of-powers principles that ought to govern a democratic society, but they have nothing whatever to do with the protection of individual rights that is the object of the Due Process Clause. Of course even taking those reasons at face value, it is strange to proclaim a democracy deficit and lack of special competence for the judicial taking of an individual property right, when this Court has had no trouble deciding matters of much greater moment, contrary to congressional desire or the legislated desires of most of the States, with no special competence except the authority we possess to enforce the Constitution. In any case, our opinion does not trust judges with the relatively small power Justice Kennedy now objects to. It is we who propose setting aside judicial decisions that take private property; it is he who insists that judges cannot be so limited. Under his regime, the citizen whose property has been judicially redefined to belong to the State would presumably be given the Orwellian explanation: “The court did not take your property. Because it is neither politically accountable nor competent to make such a decision, it cannot take property.” Justice Kennedy’s injection of separation-of-powers principles into the Due Process Clause would also have the ironic effect of preventing the assignment of the expropriation function to the branch of government whose procedures are, by far, the most protective of individual rights. So perhaps even this first respect in which Justice Kennedy would have the Due Process Clause do the work of the Takings Clause pertains to substantive, rather than procedural, due process. His other arguments undoubtedly pertain to that, as evidenced by his assertion that “[i]t is ... natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights,” post, at 736, his endorsement of the proposition that the Due Process Clause imposes “limits on government’s ability to diminish property values by regulation,” ibid., and his contention that “the Due Process Clause would likely prevent a State from doing by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat,” post, at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted). The first problem with using substantive due process to do the work of the Takings Clause is that we have held it cannot be done. “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266, 273 (1994) (four-Justice plurality opinion) (quoting Graham, v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395 (1989)); see also 510 U. S., at 281 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“I agree with the plurality that an allegation of arrest without probable cause must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment without reference to more general considerations of due process”). The second problem is that we have held for many years (logically or not) that the “liberties” protected by substantive due process do not include economic liberties. See, e. g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536 (1949). Justice Kennedy’s language (“If a judicial decision . . . eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be set aside as a deprivation of property without due process of law,” post, at 735) propels us back to what is referred to (usually deprecatingly) as “the Lochner era.” See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 56-58 (1905). That is a step of much greater novelty, and much more unpredictable effect, than merely applying the Takings Clause to judicial action. And the third and last problem with using substantive due process is that either (1) it will not do all that the Takings Clause does, or (2) if it does all that the Takings Clause does, it will encounter the same supposed difficulties that Justice Kennedy finds troublesome. We do not grasp the relevance of Justice Kennedy’s speculation, post, at 739, that the Framers did not envision the Takings Clause would apply to judicial action. They doubtless did not, since the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no power to “change” the common law. See 1 Blackstone 69-70 (1765); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 472-478 (2001) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Where the text they adopted is clear, however (“nor shall private property be taken for public use”), what counts is not what they envisioned but what they wrote. Of course even after courts, in the 19th century, did assume the power to change the common law, it is not true that the new “common-law tradition . . . allows for incremental modifications to property law,” post, at 736, so that “owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in property law,” post, at 738. In the only sense in which this could be relevant to what we are discussing, that is an astounding statement. We are talking here about judicial elimination of established private-property rights. If that is indeed a “common-law tradition,” Justice Kennedy ought to be able to provide a more solid example for it than the only one he cites, ibid., a state-court change (from “noxious” to “harmful”) of the test for determining whether a neighbor’s vegetation is a tortious nuisance. Fancher v. Fagella, 274 Va. 549, 555-556, 650 S. E. 2d 519, 522 (2007). But perhaps he does not really mean that it is a common-law tradition to eliminate property rights, since he immediately follows his statement that “owners may reasonably expect or anticipate courts to make certain changes in property law” with the contradictory statement that “courts cannot abandon settled principles,” post, at 738. If no “settled principl[e]” has been abandoned, it is hard to see how property law could have been “change[d],” rather than merely clarified. Justice Kennedy has added “two additional practical considerations that the Court would need to address before recognizing judicial takings,” post, at 740. One of them is simple and simply answered: the assertion that “it is unclear what remedy a reviewing court could enter after finding a judicial taking,” ibid. Justice Kennedy worries that we may only be able to mandate compensation. That remedy is even rare for a legislative or executive taking, and we see no reason why it would be the exclusive remedy for a judicial taking. If we were to hold that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an uncompensated taking in the present case, we would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the property in question. Justice Kennedy’s other point, ibid. — that we will have to decide when the claim of a judicial taking must be asserted — -hardly presents an awe-inspiring prospect. These, and all the other “difficulties,” post, at 734, “difficult questions,” post, at 737, and “practical considerations” post, at 740, that Justice Kennedy worries may perhaps stand in the way of recognizing a judicial taking, are either nonexistent or insignificant. Finally, we cannot avoid comment upon Justice Kennedy’s donning of the mantle of judicial restraint — his assertion that it is we, and not he, who would empower the courts and encourage their expropriation of private property. He warns that if judges know that their action is covered by the Takings Clause, they will issue “sweeping new rule[s] to adjust the rights of property owners,” comfortable in the knowledge that their innovations will be preserved upon payment by the State. Post, at 738. That is quite impossible. As we have said, if we were to hold that the Florida Supreme Court had effected an uncompensated taking in this case, we would not validate the taking by ordering Florida to pay compensation. We would simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act can be applied to the Members’ property. The power to effect a compensated taking would then reside, where it has always resided, not in the Florida Supreme Court but in the Florida Legislature — which could either provide compensation or acquiesce in the invalidity of the offending features of the Act. Cf. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 817-818 (1989). The only realistic incentive that subjection to the Takings Clause might provide to any court would be the incentive to get reversed, which in our experience few judges value. Justice Kennedy, however, while dismissive of the Takings Clause, places no other constraints on judicial action. He puts forward some extremely vague applications of substantive due process, and does not even say that they (whatever they are) will for sure apply. (“It is thus natural to read the Due Process Clause as limiting the power of courts to eliminate or change established property rights,” post, at 736; “courts . .. may not have the power to eliminate established property rights by judicial decision,” ibid.; “the Due Process Clause would likely prevent a State from doing by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat,” post, at 737 (internal quotation marks omitted); we must defer applying the Takings Clause until “[i]f and when future cases show that the usual principles, including constitutional principles that constrain the judiciary like due process, are somehow inadequate to protect property owners,” post, at 742.) Moreover, and more importantly, Justice Kennedy places no constraints whatever upon this Court. Not only does his concurrence only think about applying substantive due process; but because substantive due process is such a wonderfully malleable concept, see, e. g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 562 (2003) (referring to “liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions”), even a firm commitment to apply it would be a firm commitment to nothing in particular. Justice Kennedy’s desire to substitute substantive due process for the Takings Clause suggests, and the rest of what he writes confirms, that what holds him back from giving the Takings Clause its natural meaning is not the intrusiveness of applying it to judicial action, but the definiteness of doing so; not a concern to preserve the powers of the States’ political branches, but a concern to preserve this Court’s discretion to say that property may be taken, or may not be taken, as in the Court’s view the circumstances suggest. We must not say that we are bound by the Constitution never to sanction judicial elimiT nation of clearly established property rights. Where the power of this Court is concerned, one must never say never. See, e. g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 302-305 (2004) (plurality opinion); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 750-751 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The great attraction of substantive due process as a substitute for more specific constitutional guarantees is that it never means never — because it never means anything precise. Ill Respondents put forward a number of arguments which contradict, to a greater or lesser degree, the principle discussed above, that the existence of a taking does not depend upon the branch of government that effects it. First, in a case claiming a judicial taking they would add to our normal takings inquiry a requirement that the court’s decision have no “fair and substantial basis.” This is taken from our jurisprudence dealing with the question whether a state-court decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds, placing it beyond our jurisdiction to review. See E. Gress-man, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, & E. Hartnett, Supreme Court Practice, ch. 3.26, p. 222 (9th ed. 2007). To ensure that there is no “evasion” of our authority to review federal questions, we insist that the nonfederal ground of decision have “fair support.” Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U. S. 537, 540 (1930); see also Ward v. Board of Comm’rs of Love Cty., 253 U. S. 17, 22-23 (1920). A test designed to determine whether there has been an evasion is not obviously appropriate for determining whether there has been a taking of property. But if it is to be extended there it must mean (in the present context) that there is a “fair and substantial basis” for believing that petitioner’s Members did not have a property right to future accretions which the Act would take away. This is no different, we think, from our requirement that petitioner’s Members must prove the elimination of an established property right. Next, respondents argue that federal courts lack the knowledge of state law required to decide whether a judicial decision that purports merely to clarify property rights has instead taken them. But federal courts must often decide what state property rights exist in nontakings contexts, see, e. g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577-578 (1972) (Due Process Clause). And indeed they must decide it to resolve claims that legislative or executive action has effected a taking. For example, a regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial use of his property is not a taking if the restriction “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1029. A constitutional provision that forbids the uncompensated taking of property is quite simply insusceptible of enforcement by federal courts unless they have the power to decide what property rights exist under state law. Respondents also warn us against depriving common-law judging of needed flexibility. That argument has little appeal when directed against the enforcement of a constitutional guarantee adopted in an era when, as we said supra, at 722, courts had no power to “change” the common law. But in any case, courts have no peculiar need of flexibility. It is no more essential that judges be free to overrule prior cases that establish property entitlements than that state legislators be free to revise pre-existing statutes that confer property entitlements, or agency-heads pre-existing regulations that do so. And insofar as courts merely clarify and elaborate property entitlements that were previously unclear, they cannot be said to have taken an established property right. Finally, the city and county argue that applying the Takings Clause to judicial decisions would force lower federal courts to review final state-court judgments, in violation of the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 415-416 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462, 476 (1983). That does not necessarily follow. The finality principles that we regularly apply to takings claims, see Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, 186-194 (1985), would require the claimant to appeal a claimed taking by a lower court to the state supreme court, whence certiorari would come to this Court. If certiorari were denied, the claimant would no more be able to launch a lower-court federal suit against the taking effected by the state supreme-court opinion than he would be able to launch such a suit against a legislative or executive taking approved by the state supreme-court opinion; the matter would be res judicata. And where the claimant was not a party to the original suit, he would be able to challenge in federal court the taking effected by the state supreme-court opinion to the same extent that he would be able to challenge in federal court a legislative or executive taking previously approved by a state supreme-court opinion. For its part, petitioner proposes an unpredictability test. Quoting Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 296 (1967), petitioner argues that a judicial taking consists of a decision that “ ‘constitutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents.’” See Brief for Petitioner 17, 34-50. The focus of petitioner’s test is misdirected. What counts is not whether there is precedent for the allegedly confiscatory decision, but whether the property right allegedly taken was established. A “predictability of change” test would cover both too much and too little. Too much, because a judicial property decision need not be predictable, so long as it does not declare that what had been private property under established law no longer is. A decision that clarifies property entitlements (or the lack thereof) that were previously unclear might be difficult to predict, but it does not eliminate established property rights. And the predictability test covers too little, because a judicial elimination of established private-property rights that is foreshadowed by dicta or even by holdings years in advance is nonetheless a taking. If, for example, a state court held in one case, to which the complaining property owner was not a party, that it had the power to limit the acreage of privately owned real estate to 100 acres, and then, in a second case, applied that principle to declare the complainant’s 101st acre to be public property, the State would have taken an acre from the complainant even though the decision was predictable. IV We come at last to petitioner’s takings attack on the decision below. At the outset, respondents raise two preliminary points which need not detain us long. The city and the county argue that petitioner cannot state a cause of action for a taking because, though the Members own private property, petitioner itself does not; and that the claim is unripe because petitioner has not sought just compensation. Neither objection appeared in the briefs in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari, and since neither is jurisdictional, we deem both waived. See this Court’s Rule 15.2; cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 815-816 (1985). Petitioner argues that the Florida Supreme Court took two of the property rights of the Members by declaring that thosé rights did not exist: the right to accretions, and the right to have littoral property touch the water (which petitioner distinguishes from the mere right of access to the water).* Under petitioner’s theory, because no prior Florida decision had said that the State’s filling of submerged tidal lands could have the effect of depriving a littoral owner of contact with the water and denying him future accretions, the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment in the present case abolished those two easements to which littoral-property owners had been entitled. This puts the burden on the wrong party. There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future accretions and contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land. Though some may think the question close, in our view the showing cannot be made. Two core principles of Florida property law intersect in this case. First, the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral landowmers. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 1957) (right to fill conveyed by State to private party); State ex rel. Buford v. Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 210-211, 102 So. 336, 341 (1924) (same). Second, as we described supra, at 709, if an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact with the water. See Bryant, 238 So. 2d, at 837, 838-839. The issue here is whether there is an exception to this rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion. Prior law suggests there is not. In Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927), the Florida Supreme Court held that when the State drained water from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing land that was formerly below the mean high-water line to become dry land, that land continued to belong to the State. Id., at 574, 112 So., at 287; see also Bryant, supra, at 838-839 (analogizing the situation in Martin to an avulsion). “ ‘The riparian rights doctrine of accretion and reliction,”’ the Florida Supreme Court later explained, “ ‘does not apply to such lands.’ ” Bryant, supra, at 839 (quoting Martin, supra, at 578, 112 So., at 288 (Brown, J., concurring)). This is not surprising, as there can be no accretions to land that no longer abuts the water. Thus, Florida law as it stood before the decision below allowed the State to fill in its own seabed, and the resulting sudden exposure of previously submerged land was treated like an avulsion for purposes of ownership. The right to accretions was therefore subordinate to the State’s right to fill. Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. R. Co. suggests the same result. That case involved a claim by a riparian landowner that a railroad’s state-authorized filling of submerged land and construction of tracks upon it interfered with the riparian landowners’ rights to access and to wharf out to a shipping channel. The Florida Supreme Court determined that the claimed right to wharf out did not exist in Florida, and that therefore only the right of access was compensable. 75 Fla., at 58-65, 78 So., at 501-503. Significantly, although the court recognized that the riparian-property owners had rights to accretion, see id., at 64-65, 78 So., at 502-503, the only rights it even suggested would be infringed by the railroad were the right of access (which the plaintiff had claimed) and the rights of view and use of the water (which it seems the plaintiff had not claimed), see id., at 58-59, 78, 78 So., at 501, 507. The Florida Supreme Court decision before us is consistent with these background principles of state property law. Cf. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1028-1029; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900). It did not abolish the Members’ right to future accretions, but merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied. See 998 So. 2d, at 1117, 1120-1121. The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion describes beach restoration as the reclamation by the State of the public’s land, just as Martin had described the lake drainage in that case. Although the opinion does not cite Martin and is not always clear on this point, it suffices that its characterization of the littoral right to accretion is consistent with Martin and the other relevant principles of Florida law we have discussed. What we have said shows that the rule of Sand Key, which petitioner repeatedly invokes, is inapposite. There the Florida Supreme Court held that an artificial accretion does not change the right of a littoral-property owner to claim the accreted land as his own (as long as the owner did not cause the accretion himself). 512 So. 2d, at 937-938. The reason Martin did not apply, Sand Key explained, is that the drainage that had occurred in Martin did not lower the water level by “‘imperceptible degrees,’” and so did not qualify as an accretion. 512 So. 2d, at 940-941. The result under Florida law may seem counterintuitive. After all, the Members’ property has been deprived of its character (and value) as oceanfront property by the State’s artificial creation of an avulsion. Perhaps state-created avulsions ought to be treated differently from other avul-sions insofar as the property right to accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior Florida law makes such a distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the contrary. Even if there might be different interpretations of Martin and other Florida property-law cases that would prevent this arguably odd result, we are not free to adopt them. The Takings Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been established. We cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision eliminated a right of accretion established under Florida law. Petitioner also contends that the State took the Members’ littoral right to have their property continually maintain contact with the water. To be clear, petitioner does not allege that the State relocated the property line, as would have happened if the erosion-control line were landward of the old mean high-water line (instead of identical to it). Petitioner argues instead that the Members have a separate right for the boundary of their property to be always the mean high-water line. Petitioner points to dicta in Sand Key that refers to “the right to have the property’s contact with the water remain intact,” 512 So. 2d, at 936. Even there, the right was included in the definition of the right to access, ibid., which is consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s later description that “there is no independent right of contact with the water” but it “exists to preserve the upland owner’s core littoral right of access to the water,” 998 So. 2d, at 1119. Petitioner’s expansive interpretation of the dictum in Sand Key would cause it to contradict the clear Florida law governing avulsion. One cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court contravened established property law by rejecting it. V Because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision did not contravene the established property rights of petitioner’s Members, Florida has not violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Stevens took no part in the decision of this case. Many eases and statutes use “riparian” to mean abutting any body of water. The Florida Supreme Court, however, has adopted a more precise usage whereby “riparian” means abutting a river or stream and “littoral” means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake. Walton Cty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105, n. 3 (2008). When speaking of the Florida law applicable to this case, we follow the Florida Supreme Court’s terminology. We assume, as the parties agree we should, that in this ease the erosion-control line is the pre-existing mean high-water line. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. Respondents concede that, if the erosion-control line were established landward of that, the State would have taken property. Brief for Respondent Department et al. 15; Brief for Respondent Walton County et al. 6. The Florida Supreme Court seemingly took the question to refer to constitutionality under the Florida Constitution, which contains a clause similar to the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution. Compare Fla. Const., Art. X, §6, cl. (a), with U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. We ordinarily do not consider an issue first presented to a state court in a petition for rehearing if the state court did not address it. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U. S. 83, 89, n. 3 (1997) (per curiam). But where the state-court decision itself is claimed to constitute a violation of federal law, the state court’s refusal to address that claim put forward in a petition for rehearing will not bar our review. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 677-678 (1930). We thus need not resolve whether the right of accretion is an easement, as petitioner claims, or, as Florida claims, a contingent future interest. Thus, the landmark ease of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124-128, 138 (1978), held that there was no taking only after setting forth a multifactor test for determining whether a regulation restricting the use of property effects a taking. See Smith v. Spisak, 558 U. S. 139, 149-156 (2010) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978) (equal protection); Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U. S. 152, 155 (1964) (per curiam) (right to judgment notwithstanding the verdict where evidence is lacking). See Spisak, supra, at 155-156. Quilloin’s cryptic rejection of the claim “[ujnder any standard of review,” 434 U. S., at 256, could only refer to the various levels of scrutiny — such as “strict” or “rational basis” — that we had applied to equal-protection claims, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1967). And in Mercer, which found the evidence “sufficient under any standard which might be appropriate — state or federal,” 377 U. S., at 156, one of the parties had argued for an established standard under Louisiana law, and the other for an established federal standard. Compare Brief for Petitioner in Mercer v. Theriot, O. T. 1963, No. 336, pp. 18-22, with Brief for Respondent in Mercer v. Theriot, p. 5. Justice Breyer complains that we do not set forth “procedural limitations or canons of deference” to restrict federal-court review of state-court property decisions. See post, at 744. (1) To the extent this is true it is unsurprising, but (2) fundamentally, it is false: (1) It is true that we make our own determination, without deference to state judges, whether the challenged decision deprives the claimant of an established property right. That is unsurprising because it is what this Court does when determining state-court compliance with all constitutional imperatives. We do not defer to the judgment of state judges in determining whether, for example, a state-court decision has deprived a defendant of due process or subjected him to double jeopardy. (2) The test we have adopted, however (deprivation of an established property right), contains within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts. A property right is not established if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court. Petitioner meets the two requirements necessary for an association to assert the Article III standing of its Members. See Food and Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U. S. 544, 555-557 (1996). And the claim here is ripe insofar as Article III standing is concerned, since (accepting petitioner’s version of Florida law as true) petitioner has been deprived of property. Petitioner raises two other claims that we do not directly address. First, petitioner tries to revive its challenge to the beach-restoration project, contending that it (rather than the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion) constitutes a taking. Petitioner’s arguments on this score are simply versions of two arguments it makes against the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion: that the Department has replaced the Members’ littoral-property rights with versions that are inferior because statutory; and that the Members previously had the right to have their property contact the water. We reject both, infra, at 732-733, and n. 12. Seeond, petitioner attempts to raise a challenge to the Act as a deprivation of property without due process. Petitioner did not raise this challenge before the Florida Supreme Court, and only obliquely raised it in the petition for certiorari. We therefore do not reach it. See Adams, 520 U. S., at 86-87. Petitioner also argues that the Members’ other littoral rights have been infringed because the Act replaces their common-law rights with inferior statutory versions. Petitioner has not established that the statutory versions are inferior; and whether the source of a property right is the common law or a statute makes no difference, so long as the property owner continues to have what he previously had.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 463. Decided December 9, 1957. Robert W. Ginnane and Isaac K. Hay for appellant in No. 463. Guernsey Orcutt, Richard R. Bongartz and William Pepper Constable for appellant in No. 464. Sidney Ooldstein, Francis A. Mulhern, Arthur L. Winn, Jr., J. Stanley Payne and Samuel H. Moerman for appellants in No. 465. Robert D. Brooks and Richard J. Murphy for appellant in No. 466. John F. Donelan for appellants in No. 467. Warren Price, Jr. for the Delaware River Port Authority, David Berger for the City of Philadelphia, and Frederick H. Knight for the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, appellants in No. 468. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen and Daniel M. Friedman for the United States, appellant in No. 473. Edwin H. Burgess, Anthony P. Donadio, Norman C. Melvin, Jr., William C. Purnell and Jervis Langdon, Jr. for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al., William L. Marbury for the Maryland Port Authority, Harry C. Ames and Charles McD. Gillan for the Baltimore Association of Commerce, Francis D. Murnaghan, Jr. for the Canton Railroad Co. and Thomas N. Biddison for the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, appellees. Together with No. 464, Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.; No. 465, Erie Railroad Co. et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.; No. 466, New York Central Railroad Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.; No. 467, Armco Steel Corp. et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.; No. 468, Delaware River Port Authority et al. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al.; and No. 473, United States v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al., also on appeals from the same Court. Per Curiam. This litigation involves the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dealing with the proper relationship, under the National Transportation Policy (§ 1 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., at p. 7107), of railroad tariffs on imported iron ore shipped to a steel-producing area in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia (the so-called “differential territory” of the Central Freight Association) from the ports of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. A tariff differential in favor of Baltimore had existed prior to this controversy. In a succession of tariff reductions, railroads serving New York and Philadelphia filed schedules designed to establish parity of rates among the several ports, while railroads serving Baltimore filed schedules designed to maintain the differential. Upon protest against the New York and Philadelphia schedules by Baltimore civic and commercial interests and railroads serving that port, the Interstate Commerce Commission instituted an investigation as a result of which Division 2 of the Commission filed a report approving the tariff schedules giving Philadelphia parity with Baltimore but finding all other schedules that had been issued in this series of reductions to be not just and reasonable. 291 I. C. C. 527. On petition of various parties, the Commission reopened the proceedings, and on October 1,1956, the full Commission modified the findings of the Division 2 report to the extent of finding the New York schedules, as well as the Philadelphia schedules, to be just and reasonable, 299 I. C. C. 195. The full Commission’s order was challenged in a proceeding instituted under 28 U. S. C. § 1336, and an appropriate District Court held that the Commission’s approval of parity between New York and Baltimore was without basis in the record and ordered that portion of the Commission’s order vacated. The court further held that the Commission’s approval of parity between Philadelphia and Baltimore was not supported by essential findings as to ocean freight costs and anticipated traffic and remanded that portion of the Commission’s order for more explicit findings. The court also granted other relief subsidiary to these actions. 151 F. Supp. 258. These are the only portions of the decision below with which we are here concerned. We put to one side those provisions of the decree below in which the District Court affirmed other portions of the Commission’s order. From what appears, it is not precluded that the Commission may find an interrelationship, within the purview of the National Transportation Policy, supra, among lawful tariffs to be established between these three ports and the “differential territory.” In this light we deem it appropriate that, in reconsidering the relationship between the Philadelphia and Baltimore schedules pursuant to the remand of the District Court, the Commission should be free to reconsider and take action upon the New York schedules. In carrying out the District Court’s direction regarding the Philadelphia rates, the Commission should be permitted to take into account the effect of New York rates on the tariff relationship between Philadelphia and Baltimore and the effect of that relationship on New York and to enter such orders with respect to all three ports as the Commission may find to be required by their interrelationship. Accordingly, on the appeals before us, so much of the decree of the District Court as did not affirm the order of the Commission is vacated, and the cause is remanded for appropriate disposition not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. EDWARDS No. 02-1196. Argued November 4, 2003 Decided January 13, 2004 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Matthew D. Roberts, Meyer Eisenberg, Jacob H. Stillman, and Susan S. McDonald. Michael K. Wolensky argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Ethan H. Cohen Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AARP by Stacy Canan, Deborah M. Zuckerman, and Michael R. Schuster; for the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., by Mark J. Davis; for the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, Inc., by Joseph C. Long; and for Securities Regulators for the State of Florida et al. by Cynthia K. Maynard. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. “Opportunity doesn’t always knock . . . sometimes it rings.” App. 113 (ETS Payphones promotional brochure). And sometimes it hangs up. So it did for the 10,000 people who invested a total of $300 million in the payphone sale- and-leaseback arrangements touted by respondent under that slogan. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) argues that the arrangements were investment contracts, and thus were subject to regulation under the federal securities laws. In this case, we must decide whether a moneymaking scheme is excluded from the term “investment contract” simply because the scheme offered a contractual entitlement to a fixed, rather than a variable, return. I Respondent Charles Edwards was the chairman, chief executive officer, and sole shareholder of ETS Payphones, Inc. (ETS). ETS, acting partly through a subsidiary also controlled by respondent, sold payphones to the public via independent distributors. The payphones were offered packaged with a site lease, a 5-year leaseback and management agreement, and a buyback agreement. All but a tiny fraction of purchasers chose this package, although other management options were offered. The purchase price for the payphone packages was approximately $7,000. Under the leaseback and management agreement, purchasers received $82 per month, a 14% annual return. Purchasers were not involved in the day-to-day operation of the payphones they owned. ETS selected the site for the phone, installed the, equipment, arranged for connection and long-distance service, collected coin revenues, and maintained and repaired the phones. Under the buyback agreement, ETS promised to refund the full purchase price of the package at the end of the lease or within 180 days of a purchaser’s request. In its marketing materials and on its Web site, ETS trumpeted the “incomparable pay phone” as “an exciting business opportunity,” in which recent deregulation had “open[ed] the door for profits for individual pay phone owners and operators.” According to ETS, “[v]ery few business opportunities can offer the potential for ongoing revenue generation that is available in today’s pay telephone industry.” App. 114-115 (ETS brochure); id., at 227 (ETS Web site); see id., at 13 (Complaint ¶¶ 37-38). The payphones did not generate enough revenue for ETS to make the payments required by the leaseback agreements, so the company depended on funds from new investors to meet its obligations. In September 2000, ETS filed for bankruptcy protection. The SEC brought this civil enforcement action the same month. It alleged that respondent and ETS had violated the registration requirements of §§ 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 68 Stat. 684, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77e(a), (c), the antifraud provisions of both § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 114 Stat. 2763A-452, 15 U. S. C. § 77q(a), and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 114 Stat. 2763A-454, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2003). The District Court concluded that the payphone sale-and-leaseback arrangement was an investment contract within the. meaning of, and therefore was subject to, the federal securities laws. SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (ND Ga. 2000). The Court of Appeals reversed. 300 F. 3d 1281 (CA11 2002) (per curiam). It held that respondent’s scheme was not an investment contract, on two grounds. First, it read this Court’s opinions to require that an investment contract offer either capital appreciation or a participation in the earnings of the enterprise, and thus to exclude schemes, such as respondent’s, offering a fixed rate of return. Id., at 1284-1285. Second, it held that our opinions’ requirement that the return on the investment be “derived solely from the efforts of others” was not satisfied when the purchasers had a contractual entitlement to the réturn. Id., at 1285. We conclude that it erred on both grounds. II “Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U. S. 56, 61 (1990). To that end, it enacted a broad definition of “security,” sufficient “to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.” Ibid. Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(a)(l), and § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. §78c(a)(10), in slightly different formulations which we have treated as essentially identical in meaning, Reves, supra, at 61, n. 1, define “security” to include “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,... investment contract,... [or any] instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’” “Investment contract” is not itself defined. The test for whether a particular scheme is an investment contract was established in our decision in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946). We look to “whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Id., at 301. This definition “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Id., at 299. In reaching that result, we first observed that when Congress included “investment contract” in the definition of security, it “was using a term the meaning of which had been crystallized’' by the state courts’ interpretation of their “‘blue sky’” laws. Id., at 298. (Those laws were the precursors to federal securities regulation and were so named, it seems, because they were “aimed at promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple.’ ” 1 L. Loss & J. Seligman, Securities Regulation 36, 31-43 (3d ed. 1998) (quoting Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 Can. L. Times 37 (1916)).) The state courts had defined an investment contract as “a contract or scheme for ‘the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment,”’ and had “uniformly applied” that definition to “a variety of situations where individuals were led to invest money in a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely through the efforts of the promoter or [a third party].” Howey, supra, at 298 (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N. W. 937, 938 (1920)). Thus, when we held that “profits” must “come solely from the efforts of others,” we were speaking of the profits that investors seek on their investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest. We used “profits” in the sense of income or return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of the investment. There is no reason to distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of variable returns for purposes of the test, so understood. In both cases, the investing public is attracted by representations of investment income, as purchasers were in this case by ETS’ invitation to “ ‘watch the profits add up.’ ” App. 13 (Complaint ¶ 38). Moreover, investments pitched as low risk (such as those offering a “guaranteed” fixed return) are particularly attractive to individuals more vulnerable to investment fraud, including older and less sophisticated investors. See 2 S. Rep. No. 102-261, App., p. 326 (1992) (Staff Summary of Federal Trade Commission Activities Affecting Older Consumers). Under the reading respondent advances, unscrupulous marketers of investments could evade the securities laws by picking a rate of return to promise. We will not read into the securities laws a limitation not compelled by the language that would so undermine the laws’ purposes. Respondent protests that including investment schemes promising a fixed return among investment contracts conflicts with our precedent. We disagree. No distinction between fixed and variable returns was drawn in the blue sky law cases that the Howey Court used, in formulating the test, as its evidence of Congress’ understanding of the term. 328 U. S., at 298, and n. 4. Indeed, two of those cases involved an investment contract in which a fixed return was promised. People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 550-551, 12 P. 2d 1078, 1079 (1932) (agreement between defendant and investors stated that investor would give defendant $5,000, and would receive $7,500 from defendant one year later); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N. J. Eq. 61, 62-63, 161 A. 193, 193-194 (1932) (“ironclad contract” offered by defendant to investors entitled investors to $56 per year for 10 years on initial investment of $175, ostensibly in sale and leaseback of breeding rabbits). None of our post-Howey decisions is to the contrary. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975), we considered whether “shares” in a nonprofit housing cooperative were investment contracts under the securities laws. We identified the “touchstone" of an investment contract as “the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others,” and then laid out two examples of investor interests that we had previously found to be “profits.” Id., at 852. Those were “capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment” and “participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors’ funds.” Ibid. We contrasted those examples, in which “the investor is ‘attracted solely by the prospects of a return’ ” on the investment, with housing cooperative shares, regarding which the purchaser “is motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased.” Id., at 852-853 (quoting Howey, supra, at 300). Thus, Forman supports the commonsense understanding of “profits” in the Howey test as simply “financial returns on... investments.” 421 U. S., at 853. Concededly, Forman’s illustrative description of prior decisions on “profits” appears to have been mistaken for an exclusive list in a case considering the scope of a different term in the definition of a security, “note.” See Reves, 494 U. S., at 68, n. 4. But that was a misreading of Forman, and we will not bind ourselves unnecessarily to passing dictum that would frustrate Congress’ intent to regulate all of the “countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Howey, supra, at 299. Given that respondent’s position is supported neither by the purposes of the securities laws nor by our precedents, it is no surprise that the SEC has consistently taken the opposite position, and maintained that a promise of a fixed return does not preclude a scheme from being an. investment contract. It has done so in formal adjudications, e. g., In re Abbott, Sommer & Co., 44 S. E. C. 104 (1969) (holding that mortgage notes, sold with a package of management services and a promise to repurchase the notes in the event of default, were investment contracts); see also In re Union Home Loans (Dec. 16, 1982), 26 S. E. C. Docket 1517, 1519 (report and order regarding settlement, stating that sale of promissory notes secured by deeds of trust, coupled with management services and providing investors “a specified percentage return on their investment,” were investment contracts), and in enforcement actions, e. g., SEC v. Universal Service Assn., 106 F. 2d 232, 234, 237 (CA7-1939) (accepting SEC’s position that an investment scheme promising “assured profit of 30% per annum with no chance of risk or loss to the contributor” was a security because it satisfied the pertinent substance of the Howey test, “‘[t]he investment of money with the expectation of profit through the efforts of other persons’ ”); see also SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U. S. 594, 598 (1965) (noting that “the SEC advised” the respondent that its “sale and lease-back arrangements,” in which investors received “a set 2% of their investment per month for 10 years,” “were investment contracts and therefore securities” under the 1933 Act). The Eleventh Circuit’s perfunctory alternative holding, that respondent’s scheme falls outside the definition because purchasers had a contractual entitlement to a return, is incorrect and inconsistent with our precedent. We are considering investment contracts. The fact that investors have bargained for a return on their investment does not mean that the return is not also expected to come solely from the efforts of others. Any other conclusion would conflict with our holding that an investment contract was offered in Howey itself. 328 U. S., at 295-296 (service contract entitled investors to allocation of net profits). We hold that an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return can be an “investment contract” and thus a “security” subject to the federal securities laws. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Because the Court of Appeals ordered the complaint dismissed, we treat the case as we would an appeal from a successful motion to dismiss and accept as true the allegations in the complaint. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U. S. 813, 818 (2002); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U. S. 349, 351, 354 (1993).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. v. PORTER COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE IZAAK WALTON LEAGUE OF AMERICA, INC., et al. No. 75-4. Decided November 11, 1975 Per Curiam. An Atomic Energy Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board approved the issuance of a construction permit to Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (NIPSCO) for a commercial nuclear powered electrical generating plant proposed to be built on the south shore of Lake Michigan, in Porter County, Ind., RAI-74-4, p. 557 (1974). On appeal, an AEC Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, RAI-74-8, p. 244 (1974), sustained the approval. On petition for review by inter-venors in the administrative proceedings, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set aside the approval on the ground that the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board failed to follow the Commission’s own regulations governing “population center distance” in the nuclear plant siting. 515 F. 2d 513 (1975). The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Title 10 CFR § 100.10 (b) (1975) of the Commission’s regulations provides that “the Commission will take . . . into consideration in determining the acceptability of a [proposed nuclear plant] site” the “population center distance,” defined in 10 CFR § 100.3 (c) (1975) as “the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated center containing more than about 25,000 residents.” At the time of NIPSCO’s application and also at the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, 10 CFR § 100.11 (a)(3) (1975) further provided, in pertinent part, that “[a]s an aid in evaluating a proposed site” for a nuclear power plant a permit applicant should determine for the proposed unit a “population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone. In applying this guide, due consideration should be given to the population distribution within the population center.” Two miles was the minimum allowable “population center distance” determined administratively pursuant to § 100.11 (a) (3). Accepting this determination, the Court of Appeals held that issuance of the construction permit violated the agency’s own regulations because the corporate boundary of the city of Portage, Ind. — projected to have a population in excess of 25,000 by 1980 — lay within 1.1 miles of NIPSCO’s proposed site. In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals rejected the agency’s administrative interpretation of its regulations as prescribing computation of “population center distance” for § 100.11 (a) (3) purposes, where the difference is critical to the siting decision, not solely to a political boundary but to the boundary of “that portion of the population center at which the dense population starts,” RAI-74-4, at 565. Under that interpretation of the regulations the “population center distance” was an acceptable 4.5 miles. The Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. That interpretation is supported by the wording of the regulations and is consistent with prior agency decisions. The wording does not equate a “dense population center” with a city or other political entity, nor does it define a “boundary” in terms of pre-existing lines drawn for nonsiting purposes. Rather, the regulations require consideration of “population distribution within the population center” in applying the “population center distance” guide. Political boundaries, in contrast, may be drawn for many reasons irrelevant to safe reactor siting, and thus encompass areas never likely to harbor a significant population. But even if the meaning is not free from doubt, the agency’s reliance upon the actual boundaries of population density in its interpretation sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations. In that circumstance, the Court of Appeals was “obligated to regard as controlling [such] a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation . . . .” Ehlert v. United States, 402 U. S. 99, 105 (1971). See also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410, 413-414 (1945). The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for consideration of other contentions against the issuance of the construction permit not decided by the Court of Appeals. So ordered. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.; Concerned Citizens Against Bailly Nuclear Site; Businessmen for the Public Interest, Inc.; James E. Newman; Mildred Warner; and George Hanks. NIPSCO, the State of Illinois, and the city of Gary, Ind., intervened before the Court of Appeals. We do not understand the Court of Appeals' discussion of the evidence regarding population distribution within Portage to imply an alternative ground for the holding that the agency violated its own regulations. In re Consumers Power Co., 5 A. E. C. 214, 218 (1972) (although political boundary of nearby city was within low-population zone, “the reduced population distance was acceptable” since “populous areas” of the city were farther removed from the reactor site than one and one-third times the low-population zone radius); In re Consolidated Edison Co., 5 A. E. C. 43, 45 (1972); cf. In re Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Station), RAI-74-12, pp. 957, 960 n. 7 (1974). The Court of Appeals’ opinion also notes that the boundaries of 1970 census enumeration districts, including an area within Portage’s political limits, lay less than a mile from the proposed reactor site. The location of these boundaries, however, without more, has no greater significance than the location of the corporate border. Our decision does not rely upon a revision of 10 CFR § 100.11 (a)(3), 40 Fed. Reg. 26526 (1975), published after the decision of the Court of Appeals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which, pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, § 201, 88 Stat. 1242, 42 U. S. C. §5841 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), now discharges the licensing responsibility formerly exercised by the Atomic Energy Commission.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ITT CONTINENTAL BAKING CO. No. 73-1290. Argued November 13, 1974 Decided February 19, 1975 Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Howard E. Shapiro, and George Edelstein. John H. Schafer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Michael Boudin. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this case is whether violations of the prohibition of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) consent order against “acquiring” other companies constituted single violations within the meaning of the applicable civil penalty statutes, 38 Stat. 734, .as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (?); 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (?), or whether such violations constituted a “continuing failure or neglect to obey” within the meaning of those statutes, authorizing imposition of daily penalties. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado interpreted the consent order to proscribe only the initial act of acquisition and held that therefore only a single penalty might be imposed. 1972 CCH Trade Cases ¶ 73,993, p. 92,127 (Aug. 2, 1971). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court to that extent, 485 F. 2d 16 (1973). A subsequent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is in conflict, United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 493 F. 2d 1259 (1974), cert. pending No. 73-1798. In interpreting a consent order worded in its pertinent terms similarly to that in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that acquisition is a continuing offense until it is undone, noting that the construction of “acquiring” as a single rather than continuing violation “ignores the crucial effects of an acquisition and would render nonacquisition orders virtually meaningless.” Id., at 1270. We granted certiorari in order to resolve this conflict between Courts of Appeals concerning the proper application of the “continuing” violation clauses of 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (?) and 45 (?) to wording employed in a large number of FTC consent orders. Since we interpret “acquiring” as used in the consent order in this case to mean both the initial transaction and the maintaining of the rights obtained without resale, we hold that violation of the consent order is a continuing violation subject to daily penalties, and reverse. I The FTC alleged in 1960 that Continental Baking Co. (Continental), a major producer of bread and other bakery products, had violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 18, and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45, by various acquisitions which “may have the effect of substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly . . . Before any decision in the case, the parties agreed to a proposed consent order which was approved by the FTC in May 1962. The order, among other things, prohibited Continental for 10 years from “acquiring, directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries or otherwise, the whole or any part of the stock, share capital, or assets of any concern, corporate or non-corporate, engaged in any state of the United States in the production and sale of bread and bread-type rolls unless the Commission, on petition for modification of this Section III of this order, permits such an acquisition . . . Alleging that Continental had acquired assets in three companies in violation of this order, the Government brought suit in the District of Colorado under § 11 (l) of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (l) and § 5 (l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (Z), for civil penalties and other relief. The complaint prayed for penalties of $1,000 per day from the date of the contract of acquisition to the date of filing of the complaint on each of the three counts. The District Court held that two of the three transactions were in fact in violation of the consent order. It declined, however, to order daily penalties, finding that “the terms of the consent order proscribe only the act of acquisition and that the violations of the consent order . . . did not constitute a 'continuing failure or neglect to obey' [15 U. S. C. §§21(l), 45 (i)] said order. . . . Once these two acquisitions were accomplished, the violations were complete.” 1972 CCH Trade Cases, at 92,129. The District Court therefore entered a judgment against ITT Continental for $5,000 for each of the two violations found. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court only insofar as it had held one of the three transactions not in violation of the consent order. It affirmed on the matter of daily penalties, holding that “whether the order was directed to the acquisition or to the acquisition and retention of assets or interests ... [is] an interpretation of the consent order, and the result is in accordance with the prevailing standards.” 485 F. 2d, at 21. Remand to the District Court was ordered only for imposition of a penalty for the third violation. II The basic question before us is whether there has been a “continuing failure or neglect to obey” an FTC order within the meaning of 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (l) and 45 (l). The “continuing failure or neglect to obey” provision of § 45 (i) was added to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1950, and the like provision of § 21 (l) to the Clayton Act in 1959. Although the legislative history of these provisions is sparse, some examples of behavior intended to be covered by the “continuing” violation provisions do appear in the legislative history. These include continuing conspiracies to fix prices or control production, maintenance of a billboard in defiance of an order prohibiting false advertising, failure to dissolve an unlawful merger, and failure to eliminate an interlocking directorate. See letter from FTC General Counsel to Senator Fulbright, 96 Cong. Rec. 3026-3027 (1950); Hearings on H. R. 432, H. R. 2977, H. R. 6049, and S. 726 before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959). These violations share two discernible characteristics: the detrimental effect to the public and the advantage to the violator continue and increase over a period of time, and the violator could eliminate the effects of the violation if it were motivated to do so, after it had begun. Without these characteristics, daily penalties for such violations would probably have no greater deterrent effect than a single penalty and accumulating daily penalties would therefore be unfair. The legislative history also makes clear that Congress was concerned with avoiding a situation in which the statutory penalty would be regarded by potential violators of FTC orders as nothing more than an acceptable cost of violation, rather than as a deterrence to violation. For example, Senator Aiken, chief proponent of the 1950 amendment, said that if daily penalties for certain violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act were not permitted, “the fine would amount to a license in the amount of $5,000 for misrepresentation, which would be a very cheap fine, indeed.” 96 Cong. Rec. 3025 (1950). Similarly, the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee said in its report on the 1959 amendments: “Although the maximum penalty may be severe, in certain cases it would be appropriate. In the absence of the maximum penalty for a continuing offense, for example, commission and board orders with respect to mergers and interlocking directorships would be ineffective. In such cases, unless the maximum penalty applied and each day of a continuing violation considered a separate offense, an order dissolving an unlawful merger could be ignored after the mere payment of a $5,000 fine.” H. R. Rep. No. 580, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959). See also Hearings on H. R. 432, H. R. 2977, H. R. 6049, and S. 726, supra, at 30 (letter from FTC General Counsel). Thus, the “continuing failure or neglect to obey” provisions of 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (l) and 45 (J) were intended to assure that the penalty provisions would provide a meaningful deterrence against violations whose effect is continuing and whose detrimental effect could be terminated or minimized by the violator at some time after initiating the violation. It seems apparent that acquisition in violation of an FTC order banning “acquiring” certain assets could be such a violation. Any anticom-petitive effect of an acquisition continues as long as the assets obtained are retained, and the violator could undo or minimize any such effect by disposing of the assets at any time after the initial transaction. On the other hand, if violation of an order prohibiting “acquiring” assets were treated as a single violation, any deterrent effect of the penalty provisions would be entirely undermined, and the penalty would be converted into a minor tax upon a violation which could reap large financial benefits to the perpetrator. As we have seen, Congress added the continuing-penalty provisions precisely to avoid such a result. Ill Respondent insists, however, that the underlying FTC order was a consent order proscribing only the initial act of acquisition, and that therefore the imposition of daily penalties which might otherwise be mandated cannot be permitted. Its argument is that “acquiring” in the consent order unambiguously refers only to the initial transaction, and that to read it otherwise is to add the words “holding” or “retaining” assets to the literal language of the order. This addition to the language of the order, ITT Continental contends, violates the principle of a line of cases culminating in United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U. S. 673 (1971), that any command of a consent decree or order must be found “within its four corners,” id., at 682, and not by reference to any “purposes” of the parties or of the underlying statutes. See United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952). Respondent asks us to conclude that the “ac-quirings” prohibited by the consent order are not capable of persisting over time, and that therefore there can be no “continuing failure or neglect to obey” the order. The Government, on the other hand, contends that the parties meant “acquiring” to include both purchase and retention of assets, and that therefore it is unnecessary to depart from the “four corners” rule of Armour to conclude that there has been a continuing violation. In Armour, it was first determined that the construction of the consent decree urged by the Government was inconsistent with the express terms of the consent decree it was seeking to enforce. The decree involved in Armour was the Meat Packers Consent Decree of 1920, entered in settlement of an antitrust case filed in District Court. Paragraph fourth of the decree enjoined Armour from engaging in certain businesses. The Greyhound Corporation, which was engaged in some of those businesses, acquired control of Armour. The Government claimed that this acquisition was in violation of the consent decree, contending that the purpose of the decree was structurally to separate the meatpackers from the retail food business entirely, and that the relationship between Armour and Greyhound was therefore prohibited. The Court noted that the language of the decree “taken in its natural sense, bars only active conduct on the part of the defendants. . . . [T]he decree does not speak in terms of relationships in general, but, rather, prohibits certain behavior, and in doing so prohibits some but not all economic interrelationship between Armour and the retail food business. ... In short, we do not find in the decree a structural separation such as the Government claims. ... [T]he decree leaves gaps inconsistent with so complete a separation.” 402 U. S., at 678, 680. (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, in both Atlantic Refining and Hughes the Court first undertook to determine whether the language of the decree could support the construction urged by the Government and concluded that it could not. In Hughes, the decree provided that Hughes was either to dispose of his stock in a certain corporation or commit the voting rights of his stock to a trustee “until [he] shall have sold his holdings of stock.” 342 U. S., at 355 n. The Court said: “A reading of the either/or wording would make most persons believe that Hughes was to have • a choice of two different alternatives. Hughes would have no choice if the first 'alternative’ was to sell the stock and the second 'alternative’ was also to sell the stock.” Id., at 356. (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, the Court concluded, the consent decree could not be construed, as the Government desired, to require Hughes to sell his stock. In Atlantic Refining, the Court concluded that the construction urged by the Government was a “strained construction,” 360 U. S., at 22, inconsistent with the “normal meaning,” id., at 23, of the language used. It commented that if the parties had intended the meaning urged by the Government, “one can hardly think of less appropriate language.” Id., at 22. In all three of these cases, it was only after concluding that the language, fairly read, could not support the Government’s construction that the Court turned to the contention that the restrictive reading was inconsistent with the purposes of the decree and of the antitrust laws assertedly violated. It was in this context that the Court noted that, because consent decrees are normally compromises in which the parties give up something they might have won in litigation and waive their rights to litigation, it is inappropriate to search for the “purpose” of a consent decree and construe it on that basis. “[T]he decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. . . . [T]he instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation.” Armour, 402 U. S., at 681-682. Thus, the basic import of Armour, Atlantic Refining, and Hughes is that, since consent decrees and orders have many of the attributes of ordinary contracts, they should be construed basically as contracts, without reference to the legislation the Government originally sought to enforce but never proved applicable through litigation. We note that this case differs from Armour, Hughes, and Atlantic Refining in a most important respect. In each of those cases the question of whether or not the consent decree was violated was the question for decision; in this case respondent was found to have committed violations, and the issue before us affects only the manner of assigning penalties for each violation found. Thus, respondent is subject to some penalty, and there is no possibility as there was in Armour, Atlantic Refining, and Hughes that respondent will be penalized for behavior not prohibited at all by the order “within its four corners,” Armour, 402 U. S., at 682. Nothing in the consent order suggests that although the parties agreed that Continental would refrain from “acquiring,” they also agreed to limit the penalties which would otherwise apply if Continental did not refrain from that behavior. Such an agreement would be exceedingly odd, for it would undermine whatever prohibitions were imposed. As we have seen, Part II, supra, it is quite possible that under §§ 21 (1) and 45 (l) violation of an FTC adjudicated order against “acquiring” would be subject to daily penalties. It is not clear that Armour would require a different result merely because we are dealing with a consent order, since the parties reached no agreement at all concerning penalties to be applied in case of violation of the order. We need not, however, determine whether §§ 21 (l) and 45 (l) would permit the imposition of daily penalties even if the consent order must be read as respondent maintains to proscribe only the initial act of acquisition. For we agree with the Government that the order “as it is written” does support an interpretation that the act of acquisition continues until the assets acquired are disgorged. IV Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other contract. Such aids include the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any other documents expressly incorporated in the decree. Such reliance does not in any way depart from the “four corners” rule of Armour. In this case, the consent order was part of an agreement between the parties entitled “Agreement Containing Consent Order to Divest and to Cease and Desist.” The agreement incorporates by reference an “appendix,” which sets forth at length the background leading to the complaint and the proposed order. In addition, the agreement provides that “[t]he complaint may be used in construing the terms of the order.” Since the parties' themselves so provided, both the appendix and the complaint are proper aids to the construction of the order and of the agreement of which it is part. The complaint alleged that Continental had pursued “a continuous practice of acquiring various bakeries throughout the United States” (emphasis supplied), which were thereby “eliminated ... as independent competitive factors in the manufacture, sale and distribution of bread and bread-type rolls . . . .” If the “acquiring” against which the order and the complaint incorporated in it were directed were limited to the single transaction by which Continental obtained rights in another company, it is hard to see why the effect which the complaint alleged followed from acquisitions would necessarily occur. For if Continental had sold the companies acquired as soon as the initial transactions were completed to other, independent companies, the bakeries would not have been “eliminated ... as independent competitive factors.” Reference to the appendix also supports the conclusion that “acquiring” as used in the order means both the initial transaction granting Continental rights in an independent bakery and the maintaining of those rights without resale. The appendix notes: “One of the principal problems in the baking industry is the tendency towards concentration and the continuous growth of major baking companies through acquisition. Such ac-quisitional growth and tendency towards concentration places in the hands of a few large companies the means to set the pattern of competition .... If this order is adopted by the Commission, the respondent’s alleged continuous practice of acquiring companies baking and selling bread and bread-type rolls will be brought to a halt. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) It is apparent that the “acquisitional growth” referred to in the appendix cannot be achieved merely by discrete transactions without reference to what is done with the assets obtained after those transactions. If Continental were merely a speculator in baking companies, buying assets in them and selling them soon thereafter, it would not necessarily create “through acquisition” a “tendency towards concentration” giving it the “means to set the pattern of competition.” Thus, “acquiring” in both the appendix and the order, parts of the same agreement, must mean obtaining and retaining assets, not merely the former. Even without the aid of these explanatory documents properly usable to construe this particular order, we would have to conclude that “acquiring” as used in an antitrust decree or order continues until the assets obtained are disgorged. As the foregoing analysis of the ancillary documents here illustrates, “acquiring” and related words do not, as respondent insists, unambiguously refer to a single transaction. Rather, as a matter of ordinary usage they can, and in the antitrust context they do, encompass the continuing act of obtaining certain rights and treating them as one’s own. We must assume that the parties here used the words with the specialized meaning they have in the antitrust field, since they were composing a legal document in settlement of an antitrust complaint. We need not go beyond the Clayton Act itself to conclude that “acquisition” as used in § 7 of the Act means holding as well as obtaining assets. The Act provides that the FTC, if it finds a violation of § 7, can require a party to “divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or assets, held . . . contrary to the provisions of [§ 7].” 15 U. S. C. §21 (b). (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the framers of the Act did not regard the terms “acquire” and “acquisition” as unambiguously banning only the initial transaction of acquisition; rather, they read the ban against “acquisition” to include a ban against holding certain assets. This Court’s opinions reflect the same understanding. For example, in FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926), the Court, in discussing an FTC order based on a violation of § 7, said: “The order here questioned was entered when respondent actually held and owned the stock contrary to law. The Commission’s duty was to prevent the continuance of this unlawful action by an order directing that it cease and desist therefrom and divest itself of what it had no right to hold.” Id., at 559. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U. S. 587, 596-599 (1934). Similarly, this Court’s opinion in United States v. Du Pont, 353 U. S. 586 (1957), rests upon the conclusion that “acquisition” can mean, and in the context of § 7 of the Clayton Act does mean, both the purchase of rights in another company and the retention of those rights. In Du Pont, a § 7 case was brought in 1949 but based on a purchase of stock by Du Pont in 1917-1919. It was argued that “the Government could not maintain this action in 1949 because § 7 is applicable only to the acquisition of stock and not to the holding or subsequent use of stock.” 353 U. S., at 596-597. Thus, Du Pont was seeking to interpret “acquire” as used in § 7 much as respondent here seeks to read "acquiring” in the consent decree. The Court in Du Pont rejected the interpretation urged upon it. Instead, the Court held that there is a violation “any time when the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect. ... To accomplish the congressional aim, the Government may proceed at any time that an acquisition may be said with reasonable probability to contain a threat that it may lead to a restraint of commerce or tend to create a monopoly of a line of commerce.” Id., at 597. Thus, there can be a violation at some time later even if there was clearly no violation— no realistic threat of restraint of commerce or creation of a monopoly — at the time of the initial acts of acquisition. Clearly, this result can obtain only because “acquisition” under § 7 is not a discrete transaction but a status which continues until the transaction is undone. Thus, under the order “as it is written,” “acquiring” must mean both the act of first obtaining assets and the retention and use of those assets. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the flexibility of the English language, as well as the circumstances surrounding the order and the context in which the parties were operating. And, since the order bans the continuing act of obtaining and retaining certain assets, a violation of the order is a “continuing failure or neglect to obey” it, and daily penalties may be imposed under 15 U. S. C. §§ 21 (J) and 45 (J). Because the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that daily penalties could not be imposed, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. According to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 18A-22A and Brief for United States 12 n. 12 in this case, there were in all as of June 18, 1974, 67 FTC orders, of which most are consent orders but some are litigated orders, which bar acquisitions in language similar to the language of the order in this case. All of these orders bar future acquisitions but do not expressly bar the “holding” or “retention” of stock or assets acquired in violation of their terms. The Petition for Certiorari of the United States presented the single question whether its prayer for daily penalties was properly denied. Respondent did not cross-petition, yet seeks to raise several issues not presented by the petition. Respondent contends that (1) the three transactions for which penalties have been or are to be imposed did not violate the consent order; (2) the consent order was not binding upon ITT Continental as successor after Continental ceased to exist, so that daily penalties could not accrue for the period after the merger; and (3) daily penalties could not be imposed because the FTC had not advised respondent of the alleged violations prior to the filing of the complaint. We do not address any of these issues in deciding this case. Respondent recognizes that, not having cross-petitioned, it cannot attack the judgment insofar as it sustained the findings of violations and imposed penalties for such violations. United States v. American Railway Express Co., 265 U. S. 425, 435 (1924). Cf. Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U. S. 185 (1937). Respondent argues that it may nevertheless seek to sustain the Court of Appeals' limitation on the penalties on the theory that no penalty should have been awarded at all. Ordinarily, however, as a matter of practice and control of our docket, if not of our power, we do not entertain a challenge to a decision on the merits where the only petition for certiorari presents solely a question as to the remedy granted for a liability found to exist, even if the respondent is willing to accept whatever judgment has already been entered against him. Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434, 437 (1973); NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U. S. 48, 52 n. 4 (1972); NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426, 431-432 (1941). Cf. Langnes v. Green, 282 U. S. 531, 538 (1931). But see LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415 (1940). We follow that rule of practice in this case, particularly because the issue of whether there were any violations concerns only a particular order as applied to a discrete set of facts and therefore would not merit this Court’s grant of a petition for certiorari. The courts below did not decide the other two issues because they were not pertinent once it was determined that there was no continuing violation. (The District Court did express the opinion that “it would seem unreasonable to permit the Commission to knowingly let daily penalties accrue without giving notice of the Commission’s position at the earliest reasonable time,” 1972 CCH Trade Cases ¶ 73,-993, pp. 92,127, 92,129 (Aug. 2, 1971), but it said that this statement was “obiter dictum.”) In the absence of decisions on these questions by the courts below, we decline to address them. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 542 (1960); Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U. S. 280 (1957); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Flowers, 330 U. S. 464, 468 (1947). Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 476 n. 6. (1970). Continental was merged on September 13, 1968, with a wholly owned subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. called ITT Continental Baking Company (ITT Continental). While ITT Continental has never contested its liability under the merger agreement for any violations of the consent order committed by Continental before the merger, it continues to maintain in this Court, as it did below, that it is not itself bound by the consent order. See n. 2, supra. The consent order expired by its own terms on May 15, 1972. In April 1972, the FTC ordered ITT Continental to show cause why the order’s ban on acquisitions should not be extended until April 1977. Although the administrative law judge recommended the extension, the FTC declined to approve the extension because of inadequate proof of increased concentration in the relevant local markets. In re ITT Continental Baking Co., 84 F. T. C. 1349 (1974), However, the FTC did express a continuing concern with the levels of concentration in the baking industry. It issued an order requiring ITT Continental to inform the Commission “of any acquisitions of any interest in any concern engaged in the production and sale of bread and bread-type rolls, such report to be filed not less than sixty (60) days prior to each such acquisition.” Id., at 1400. ITT Continental and other members of the baking industry were informed that “[a]ny significant mergers in this industry, and particularly any that promise to raise concentration still higher in a metropolitan area that already appears to be dangerously close to the borderline between effective competition and effective monopoly, will receive the most searching attention from this agency.” Id., at 1399. Title 15 U. S. C. § 21 (i) provides: “Any person who violates any order issued by the commission or board under subsection (b) of this section after such order has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the United States. Each separate violation of any such order shall be a separate offense, except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect to obey a final order of the commission or board each day of continuance of such failure or neglect, shall be deemed a separate offense.” Title 15 U. S. C. § 45 (l) provides: “Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the Commission to cease and desist after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the United States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense, except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure or neglect to obey a final order of the Commission each day of continuance of such failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense.” The maximum penalty for each violation under 15 U. S. C. § 45 (l) has since been increased from $5,000 to $10,000. Pub. L. 93-153, § 408 (c), 87 Stat. 591. Although the Government requested $1,000 per day per violation, the statutes prescribe no minimum penalty, and the District Court has discretion to determine the amount of the penalty for each violation whether the transactions are construed as single or as continuing violations. Thus, while totaling the penalty as a series of daily violations rather than as a single violation could raise substantially the total penalty assessed, the statutory scheme does not require that result, and the trial judge’s determination would prevail in the absence of an abuse of discretion. The complaint also requested a permanent injunction commanding future compliance with the consent order. The District Court found that it was empowered in a civil penalty proceeding based on an FTC order to grant equitable relief, and it issued an injunction in the exact words of the FTC order. This injunction expired, as did the consent order, on May 15, 1972. See n. 4, supra. Since the Court of Appeals decision in this case, Congress has amended 15 U. S. C. § 45 (l) expressly to empower district courts in civil penalty proceedings to grant equitable relief. Pub. L. 93-153, §408 (c), 87 Stat. 591. Although the complaint did not request a divestiture order, the Government later requested divestiture, and this request was embodied in the District Court’s pretrial order. App. 27. However, the District Court declined to order this relief, 1972 CCH Trade Cases, at 92,129, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this denial as within the discretion of the trial court. 485 F. 2d 16, 21 (CA10 1973). The Court in Armour noted that the Government might be able to obtain the relief sought in ways other than by construction of the consent decree. First, it could have brought a new action to enjoin the acquisition under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Second, “if the Government believed that changed conditions warranted further relief against the acquisition, it could have sought modification of the Meat Packers Decree itself.” 402 U. S., at 674r-675 Respondent argues that these alternatives are also present in this case, and that it is therefore unnecessary to adopt the construction of the order urged by the Government. However, the possible availability of other means of obtaining sanctions against the acquisitions challenged here cannot preclude the Government from obtaining whatever penalties may be proper for violations of the consent order. In Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952), the Court likewise rejected an invitation to further the asserted “purposes” of the consent decree by approving an interpretation the “language cannot support.” Id., at 356. It noted that evidence might show that the sale requirement was justified, but it regarded the construction urged by the Government as effecting “a substantial modification of the original decree.” Id., at 357. (Emphasis supplied.) While it believed this modification could be had after a proper hearing proving the need for such modification under applicable standards, it would not sanction such modification in the guise of construing a consent decree. Id., at 357-358. Similarly, in United States v. Atlantic Refining Co., 360 U. S. 19 (1959), while the Court agreed that the interpretation offered by the Government might better effectuate the purposes of the acts assertedly violated, this “does not warrant our substantially changing the terms of a decree to which the parties consented without any adjudication of the issues. And we agree with the District Court that accepting the Government's present interpretation would do just that.” Id., at 23. (Emphasis supplied.) Again, the Court noted that modification might be appropriate, but modification disguised as construction was not. See also Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. United States, 350 U. S. 869 (1955), rev’g 123 F. Supp. 653 (EDNY 1954); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927). Consent decrees and orders have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees or, in this case, administrative orders. While they are arrived at by negotiation between the parties and often admit no violation of law, they are motivated by threatened or pending litigation and must be approved by the court or administrative agency. Compare United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 115 (1932), with the language in Armour cited in the text, supra, at 235-236. Because of this dual character, consent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes but not for others. See Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent Decrees, 9 Antitrust Bull. 673, 675-676 (1964); Handler, Twenty-fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1, 33-34 (1972). “Assuming that a consent decree is to be interpreted as a contract, it would seem to follow that evidence of events surrounding its negotiation and tending to explain ambiguous terms would be admissible in evidence.” Handler, supra, n. 10, at 23 n. 148. Respondent argues that even if the complaint and appendix can be used as aids to construction, they only show that the parties could use broader language than that in the order itself, making the limited language actually used highly significant and controlling. One Court of Appeals has used similar reasoning to approve a strict reading of a consent decree which was accompanied by a collateral agreement. Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Cory., 303 F. 2d 283 (CA2 1962). However, this reasoning is erroneous as applied to this ease. Where parties in one agreement include both a consent order and an explanation of that order, and also provide that the complaint is to be used to construe the order, it seems logical to conclude that, at least as to interpretations not precluded by the words of the order itself, the collateral documents can and should be used to give meaning to the words of the order. The first paragraph of § 7, at the time the Du Pont ease was brought, provided: “No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.” 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1946 ed.). The statute was amended in 1950 to provide: “No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U. S. C. § 18. While the change in the wording is substantial, no reason suggests itself why the meaning of “acquire” and “acquisition” should differ in the two versions. Du Pont was decided several years after the 1950 amendments and makes not the slightest suggestion that the result pertinent here would not obtain under the new version. The dissent in Du Pont recognized that this was the import of this holding, with which it disagreed. 353 U. S. 586, 619-621 (1957) (Burton, J., dissenting). Some lower federal courts have also recognized that the status approach to acquisition is the proper one. See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F. 2d 956, 965 (CA2 1969): “[T]he very acquisition and position of potential control which was found violative of the Clayton Act as of 1949 [in Du Pont] continued through 1961.... [W]hat was unlawful was du Pont’s status as stockholder in General Motors, and that status continued until divestiture.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also United States v. Schine, 260 F. 2d 552, 555-556 (CA2 1958): “[I]t is the maintenance of conditions in violation of the decree [prohibiting acquisitions, among other things] which is the charge against the respondents.” Therefore, the court in Schine concluded, it was irrelevant that the initial transactions occurred prior to the statutory limitations period.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHRISTIAN et al. v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT, et al. No. 72-5704. Argued November 13, 1973 Decided January 21, 1974 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. E. Richard Larson argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Dennis R. Yeager and Robert P. Roberts. Mark L. Evans argued the cause for appellees. On the brief for the federal appellees were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Keith A. Jones, and Kathryn H. Baldwin. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for appellees New York State Department of Labor et al. Mozart G. Ratner, George B. Driesen, Leo M. Pellerzi, and George Kaufmann filed a brief for the National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants, discharged federal probationary employees, were denied unemployment compensation by the New York State Department of Labor, an “agent of the United States” under agreement with the Secretary of Labor for the administration of the Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) Program, 5 U. S. C. § 8501 et seq. Appellants brought this class suit against that state agency in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, joining as defendants the United States Department of Labor, which is charged with overall responsibility for the program, and the United States Post Office Department and Department of the Treasury, which are appellants' former employing agencies. Appellants alleged that the state agency had based its adverse determinations on findings of fact made ex parte by the federal employing- agencies, and that the state agency had refused to afford either appellant a hearing at which he or she could attempt to contest those federal findings. The result, appellants claimed, was a deprivation of any opportunity to be heard, in violation of the UCFE statutes and of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought certification as representatives of the class of persons similarly situated, the convening of a three-judge court, and declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The District Court viewed the suit as a constitutional attack on 5 U. S. C. § 8506 (a), which, inter alia, makes the findings of the federal employing agency “final and conclusive” on the state agency, and on the regulations of the Secretary of Labor promulgated, pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 8508, to enforce the program. A three-judge court was convened. That court, in an opinion reported at 347 F. Supp. 1158 (1972), first examined the statutory-claim and held that § 8506 (a) does not require that appellants receive either a state or a federal hearing to contest the employing agency’s findings. Next, the court noted that jurisdiction over the claims against the federal defendants had been alleged only under 28 U. S. C. § 1361, providing for mandamus actions. Holding that § 1361 will not support a constitutional challenge to a statute, the court dismissed the constitutional claims against the federal defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Finally, turning to the constitutional claims against the state defendants, the court, apparently assuming for purposes of argument that the federal defendants were not constitutionally required to afford appellants a hearing, treated the claims as asserting that denial of a state hearing was, in effect, a denial of any hearing on the federal findings. The court held that the denial of a hearing by the state agency did not violate either the Due Process or the Equal Protection Clause. We noted probable jurisdiction of appellants’ appeal, 411 U. S. 930 (1973). We are of the view that decision upon appellants’ statutory and constitutional claims would be premature. We cannot discover in the record that the state agency, in notifying appellants of the adverse determinations, informed them, as required by 20 CPR § 609.20, of their “right to additional information or reconsideration and correction” of the findings by the employing agencies. Nor can we discover from the record whether or not appellants invoked 20 CFR § 609.23, entitling them to request their employing agencies “to reconsider and correct” those findings. The “findings” of appellant Christian’s federal employer, the United States Post Office Department, were that Christian was discharged because of excessive absences. The “findings” of appellant Green’s employer, the Department of the Treasury, were that Green was discharged for consuming an alcoholic beverage within 24 hours of going on duty as a sky marshal. It is clear that neither was afforded a prior hearing by his or her agency or any opportunity to challenge the justifications for discharge. Each then applied for unemployment compensation through the New York State Department of Labor. As required by § 8506, New York requested and obtained from each agency its “findings” describing the nature of the employment, including the reasons for the discharge. On the basis of those findings, the state officials made an initial determination that neither appellant qualified for compensation under the applicable state standards. We find nothing whatever in the record to show compliance by the state agency with 20 CFR § 609.20. All that appears is that the New York officials sent each appellant a letter that included (a) a recitation that no employment benefits could be paid, (b) the state rule that required that conclusion, (c) a short summary of the findings of the federal agency, and (d) a statement that the individual could request a hearing before an impartial state referee. Indeed, the letter appears to be a form letter appropriate in cases of private and state employee applicants, but not tailored for the situation of the federal employee applicant given rights of reconsideration and correction by the Secretary’s regulations. Appellant Christian requested and obtained a hearing before a state referee. The referee permitted her to introduce evidence-to rebut the federal findings, credited that evidence, and recommended that she be provided unemployment compensation. The state Appeals Board, however, reversed on the ground that § 8506 prohibited re-examination of the facts found by the federal agency. Appellant Green had not obtained a hearing at the time this suit was filed, and the record does not disclose whether he requested one. The UCFE Program does not, as the state Appeals Board recognized, contemplate a hearing before the state agency for correction of factual findings of the federal employer. But, while prohibiting state re-examination of the facts, § 8506 (a) also requires an opportunity for federal re-examination: “The regulations [promulgated by the Secretary of Labor] shall include provision for correction by the employing agency of errors and omissions. Findings made in accordance with the regulations are final and conclusive for the purpose of [state adjudication].” The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor plainly attach great significance to the right of the discharged employee to have the employing agency reconsider its stated reasons for his discharge. The crucial requirement that triggers this reconsideration is the obligation imposed upon the state agency to notify the applicant of the content of the federal findings, which notice “shall [also] inform the Federal civilian employee of his right to additional information or reconsideration and correction of such findings.” 20 CFR § 609.20. Thereupon, the employee may obtain additional information from the employing agency concerning the basis of its findings, § 609.22. Whether or not he avails himself of that opportunity, he may file a request for reconsideration and correction, “together with such information as supports his request, through the State agency before which the claim is pending . . . .” § 609.23. Upon receipt of such a request, the federal agency must consider any information submitted by the employee, promptly correct any errors or omissions, and either affirm, modify, or reverse its original findings in writing. § 609.9. Finally, the State is required to stay its adjudicatory process pending federal reconsideration, although it is conclusively bound by any factual findings of the federal agency, §§ 609.23 (a), 609.18 (c), when it applies its own law to redetermine eligibility. §§ 609.24 (c), (d). Appellants' contention that § 8506 (a) works a denial of due process and equal protection by depriving them of a hearing before the state agency is thus misdirected. Congress has precluded a hearing on the federal findings in any state forum, but it has required the Secretary of Labor to provide a “hearing” of some dimensions in conjunction with the mandated procedures for reconsideration. Whether a more comprehensive hearing than §§ 609.22-609.24 of the regulations now provide is required either by the language of § 8506 (a) or by the Constitution — and we intimate no views on those questions — the regulations of the Department of Labor, as implemented by the federal agencies subject to those regulations, should be the focal point of the inquiry. The absence of any indication in the record that this federal administrative procedure was followed is, in our view, a bar to our consideration of appellants’ attack upon. the validity of the regulations. It is true that the fact that the employing agency’s decision is not statutorily subject to judicial review does not preclude review of the agency’s procedure used to reach that determination. See Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 371-372 (1965). But there are sound practical reasons for declining such review where the agency has not had the opportunity to apply its challenged procedure to a determination that is clearly within its subject-matter jurisdiction. The most obvious reasons relate to economy. A favorable agency decision on the merits of the claim may moot the objections to the procedure employed. And “it is generally more' efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages,” McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 194 (1969). But there are also persuasive reasons more directly related to the presentation of the procedural claim, as we have noted in cases involving the analogous requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted prior to application for judicial review, of the merits. See McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479 (1971); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 406-407 (1970). Appellants’ criticism, on this appeal, of the federal administrative remedy as an “ex parte” determination amply demonstrates the point. The regulations clearly require that the agency receive and consider any additional information the employee submits. Thus, the question is not whether there is to be some form of adversary proceeding, but whether that proceeding must be as elaborate as appellants contend. That determination would be hazardous on the scant record before us. The regulations appear capable of accommodating various kinds of issues, and their requirements should be construed with an eye to the nature of the agencies involved and the employment relationship. We cannot know at this stage what particular procedures will be applied, whether credibility determinations will arise, how they will be treated if they do, or even what official within a federal employing agency will be responsible for the reconsideration. Removal of these uncertainties from the case may significantly advance judicial resolution of appellants’ claims, while occasioning no great cost to them. But we cannot determine on this record whether the District Court would have dismissed this suit for failure to invoke the federal administrative procedures. The adverse notification provided by New York clearly fails to satisfy the notice requirement of 20 CFR § 609.20 of the Secretary’s regulations. Without that crucial information concerning their rights, appellants could hardly be found to have waived them by proceeding in the state forum. Yet the record is silent concerning whether such information was provided, either with the state notice or otherwise. Under the circumstances, we vacate the District Court’s dismissal of the suit as to both federal and state defendants and remand to the District Court with directions to determine whether appellants should be permitted to invoke the federal procedures. In such case, the suit should be retained on the docket for final decision following the federal redetermination proceedings. So ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Code of Federal Regulations Title 20: Employees’ Benefits Part 609 — Unemployment Compensation for Federal Civilian Employees § 609.1 Definitions. (b) “Federal agency” means any department, agency, or governmental body of the United States, including any instrumentality wholly or partially owned by the United States, employing individuals in Federal civilian service. (f) “Federal findings” means the facts found by a Federal agency as to (1) whether an individual has performed Federal civilian service for such agency during the base period specified on a Form ES-931; (2) the period or periods of such Federal civilian service; (3) the individual’s Federal civilian wages for the base period specified on such form; and (4) the reasons for termination of his Federal civilian service. § 609.6 Federal findings on Form ES-931. (a) Within 4 work days after receipt from a State agency or the Secretary of a Form ES-931 a Federal agency shall make its Federal findings, complete all copies of the form, and transmit its Federal findings to the State agency or the Secretary, as appropriate, on such form or as a part thereof. If documents necessary for completion of a Form ES-931 have been assigned to an agency records center or the Federal Records Center in St. Louis the Federal agency shall obtain the necessary information from the records center. Any records center shall give priority to such request. (b) If a completed Form ES-931 cannot be returned within 4 work days of receipt the Federal agency immediately shall inform the State agency or the Secretary, as appropriate, and shall include an estimated date by which the completed form will be returned. (c) Each Federal agency shall maintain a control of the Forms ES-931 received by it that will enable it to ascertain at any time the number of such forms that have not been returned to the requesting State agency or the Secretary and the date of the Federal agency’s receipt of such unreturned forms. § 609.7 Corrected Federal findings. If a Federal agency ascertains at any time within 1 year after it has returned a completed Form ES-981 [sic] to a State agency or the Secretary that any of its Federal findings were erroneous it shall promptly correct its error and forward corrected Federal findings to the State agency or the Secretary, as appropriate. § 609.8 Answering requests for additional information. On receipt of a request for additional information under § 609.22 a Federal agency except where it would be inconsistent with general policies followed in the case of separations for security reasons shall furnish in writing to the requesting authority such additional information as (1) will enable a Federal civilian employee to understand the basis for Federal findings or (2) will enable the requesting authority to correctly apply a State unemployment compensation law. § 609.9 Answering requests for correction of Federal findings. On receipt of a request for reconsideration and correction of Federal findings under § 609.23 a Federal agency shall consider the information supplied in connection with such request and shall review its Federal findings. The Federal agency promptly shall correct any errors or omissions in its Federal findings and shall affirm, modify, or reverse any or all of its Federal findings in writing. The Federal agency then shall forward its reconsidered Federal findings to the requesting authority. § 609.18 Finality of Federal findings. (a) Federal findings under § 609.6 or § 609.7 shall be final and conclusive except that Federal findings which contradict the reasons given by a Federal civilian employee for his resignation or which relate to the validity of such reasons shall not be final and conclusive unless such employee has been afforded an opportunity for a fair hearing on any issue involved in the alleged reasons for resignation. Such opportunity for hearing may be afforded by the Federal agency or the U. S. Civil Service Commission at any appropriate stage with respect to any personnel action, or upon request for reconsideration under § 609.23. (b) Additional information submitted by a Federal agency under § 609.8 shall be considered part of the original Federal findings which, as so supplemented, shall be final and conclusive, as provided in paragraph (a) of this section. (c) Federal findings which after reconsideration under § 609.9 have been affirmed, modified, or reversed by the Federal agency shall be final and conclusive, as provided in paragraph (a) of this section. § 609.19 Determination of entitlement. (a) Entitlement. The State agency of a State whose unemployment compensation law applies to a Federal civilian employee under § 609.15 promptly shall determine such employee’s entitlement to compensation and pay such compensation in the same amounts, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions as would apply to such employee if his Federal civilian service and wages had been included as employment and wages under the State unemployment compensation law except that § 609.31 shall apply to the Virgin Islands agency in lieu of this paragraph. (b) Determination in absence of Form ES-981. (1) If a Form ES-931 has not been received from a Federal agency by the 12th day after such form was forwarded to such agency, a State agency shall determine entitlement to compensation on the basis of a Federal civilian employee’s statement under oath if in addition to furnishing such statement such employee submits for examination any document issued by a Federal agency (as for example Standard Form 50 or W-2) showing that he performed service for such agency. (2) If a Form ES-931 received from a Federal agency after such determination contains Federal findings which would result in a change in the Federal civilian employee’s entitlement to compensation the State agency promptly shall make a redetermination and give such employee notice thereof. All payments of compensation made after such redetermination shall be in accordance therewith and all payments of compensation made prior to such determination shall be adjusted in accordance therewith. If the Federal civilian employee has received compensation not in accordance with the redetermination § 609.21 shall apply. § 609.20 Notice of determination. A notice of determination or redetermination shall be given to a Federal civilian employee with respect to any determination or redetermination under § 609.19 or § 609.31. Such notice shall be given in the same manner as notice of determination or redetermination is given to claimants under the State unemployment compensation law. The notice shall include the Federal findings and shall inform the Federal civilian employee of his right to additional information or reconsideration and correction of such findings. The State agency shall set forth the Federal findings in sufficient detail to enable the Federal civilian employee to determine whether he wishes to request reconsideration or correction of any such findings.’ § 609.22 Procedure for obtaining additional information. (a) Request by Federal civilian employee. If a Federal civilian employee needs additional information in order to understand the basis for a Federal finding in connection with a claim for compensation under the UCFE program he may file a request through the State agency, or the Secretary if the State agency does not determine claims under the UCFE program, for more specific information from the Federal agency which made such Federal finding. Such request shall be mailed by the State agency or the Secretary to the appropriate Federal agency. If notice of a determination of entitlement has been given to the Federal civilian employee before a request for additional information is filed, such employee must file concurrently with such request a timely appeal or request for redetermination under the State unemployment compensation law. No hearing on such appeal shall be scheduled before the State agency receives from the Federal agency the additional information requested. (b) Request by State agency. If at any stage of determining a Federal civilian employee’s entitlement to compensation a State agency, State administrative appeal authority (including the referee in the Virgin Islands), or the Secretary determines that Federal findings do not contain sufficient information to enable correct application of the State unemployment compensation law a request may be made for additional facts from the appropriate Federal agency. § 609.23 Procedure for obtaining correction of Federal findings. (a) Bequest by Federal civilian employee. A Federal civilian employee who wishes a Federal agency to reconsider and correct Federal findings in connection with a claim for compensation under the UCFE program may file a request for such reconsideration and correction, together with such information as supports his request, through the State agency before which the claim is pending or through the Secretary if the State agency does not determine claims under the UCFE program. Such request shall be mailed by the State agency or the Secretary to the appropriate Federal agency. If notice of a determination of entitlement has been given to the Federal civilian employee before a request for reconsideration and correction of Federal findings is filed, such employee must file concurrently with such request a timely appeal under the State unemployment compensation law. No hearing on such appeal shall be scheduled before the State agency receives from the Federal agency its reconsidered Federal findings. (b) Bequest by State agency. A State agency, State administrative appeal authority (including the referee in the Virgin Islands), or the Secretary may request a Federal agency to reconsider and correct its Federal findings at any stage in determining a Federal civilian employee's entitlement to compensation. § 609.24 Procedure after correction of Federal findings. (a) A State agency shall forward to the affected Federal civilian employee a copy of reconsidered Federal findings or additional information furnished by a Federal agency. (b) If additional information or reconsidered Federal findings provide a basis under the State unemployment compensation law for the State agency to redetermine such employee’s entitlement to compensation the State agency promptly shall make a redeter-mination and give notice thereof to the affected Federal civilian employee. (c) If a State agency after reviewing additional information or reconsidered Federal findings submitted by a Federal agency does not consider that there is a basis for making a redetermination the State agency promptly shall set a date for hearing the Federal civilian employee’s appeal. (d) If Federal findings are corrected under § 609.7 a State agency shall notify the affected Federal civilian employee of such correction. If the State unemployment compensation law permits and the corrected Federal findings afford a basis for such action the State agency shall redetermine such employee’s entitlement to compensation and give notice of redetermination to such employee. § 609.25 Appeal by Federal civilian employee. (a) A determination or redetermination by a State agency as to a Federal civilian employee’s entitlement to compensation is subject to review, except for Federal findings which are final and conclusive under § 609.18, in the same manner and to the same extent as other determinations of entitlement under the State unemployment compensation law. That subsection provides: "(a) Each agency of the United States and each wholly or partially owned instrumentality of the United States shall make available to State agencies which have agreements under this subchapter, or to the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, such information concerning the Federal service and Federal wages of a Federal employee as the Secretary considers practicable and necessary for the determination of the entitlement of the Federal employee to compensation under this subchapter. The information shall include the findings of the employing agency concerning— “(1) whether or not the Federal employee has performed Federal service; “(2) the periods of Federal service; “(3) the amount of Federal wages; and “(4) the reasons for termination of Federal service. “The employing agency shall make the findings in the form and manner prescribed by regulations of the Secretary. The regulations shall include provision for correction by the employing agency of errors and omissions. Findings made in accordance with the regulations are final and conclusive for the purpose of sections 8502 (d) and 8503 (c) of this title. This subsection does not apply with respect to Federal service and Federal wages covered by subchapter II of this chapter.” The pertinent sections of 20 CFR appear in the Appendix to this opinion. The District Court stated no reasons to support this holding. Appellants attack it, arguing that mandamus jurisdiction lies where the act of a federal official, although authorized by statute, is alleged to violate the Constitution, citing Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249 (1908). Alternatively, they contend that jurisdiction over the federal defendants lies under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) so long as there has been joint participation by state and federal officers under color of state law, see Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970). At oral argument the Assistant to the Solicitor General stated: “[W]e do not contest jurisdiction under [the] mandamus statute.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also Brief for Federal Appellees 6 n. 2. We have no occasion to address appellants’ contentions that the District Court has jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claims against the federal defendants. There is jurisdiction of the federal defendants in any event for purposes of consideration of the appellants’ statutory claim that the Secretary has disobeyed a nondiscre-tionary command in § 8506 that he provide for a full hearing. See infra, at 621-622. Our remand directs that the District Court reconsider that claim as related to the availability under the Secretary’s regulations of a right of reconsideration and correction of the findings of the employing agencies. Appellant Green unsuccessfully sought review of the factual basis for his discharge by the Civil Service Commission under 5 CFR § 315.806. But, as provided by that regulation, a probationary federal employee has no right to appeal a discharge, and is only entitled to a hearing on the basis of claims that the discharge resulted from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, political persuasion, marital status, or physical handicap, or that the procedure used violated 5 CFR § 315.805. Section 8502, 5 U. S. C., provides in part: “ (b) The agreement shall provide that compensation will be paid by the State to a Federal employee in the same amount, on the same terms, and subject to the same conditions as the compensation which would be payable to him under the unemployment compensation law of the State if his Federal service and Federal wages assigned under section 8504 of this title to the State had been included as employment and wages under that State law. “ (d) A determination by a State agency with respect to entitlement to compensation under an agreement is subject to review in the same manner and to the same extent as determinations under the State unemployment compensation law, and only in that manner and to that extent.” See 20 CFR § 609.14; N. Y. Labor Law § 500 et seq. (1965). Both appellants were denied compensation on the basis of § 593, which includes as grounds for denial “voluntary separation without good cause” and “misconduct in connection with his employment.” Both appellants were entitled to a hearing, N. Y. Labor Law § 620, review by the Appeals Board, id., § 621, and state judicial review on questions of law, id., § 624. We note that an employee who resigns must, pursuant to 20 CFR § 609.18, be “afforded an opportunity for a fair hearing on any issue involved in the alleged reasons for resignation,” if the federal findings are to be final and conclusive. The Solicitor General argues that there are sound reasons for limiting such opportunities to resignees since the agency “will have no information concerning [their] reasons.” Brief for Federal Appellees 28. At this stage of the litigation, however, we have no way of knowing what protections this procedure includes, how it differs from the procedures available to discharged employees, or what kinds of "resignations” it will cover. “[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971). Cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 196-197 (1969). At oral argument the Assistant to the Solicitor General suggested that appellants might now be barred from obtaining reconsideration and correction of the findings by the passage of time. We find no such limitation in the regulations. Indeed, the only time limitation imposed with regard to corrections is to be found in 20 CFR § 609.7, which requires the federal employing agency to “promptly correct its error” if it ascertains within one year of its initial submission of findings to the State that “any of its Federal findings were erroneous.” That this is an independent obligation, imposed on the agency without regard to the receipt of a request for reconsideration by the employee, is clear both from the language of the regulation and from the fact that all other time limits imposed by the regulations are designed to protect the employee from delay by the agency. See, e. g., 20 CFR §§609.6, 609.19 (b). Compare id,., § 609.24 (a), with id., § 609.24 (d). Moreover, a construction of the regulation as barring reconsideration and correction despite the State’s failure to provide the notice required by the regulations might raise independent constitutional problems.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILSON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. GIRARD. No. 1103. Argued July 8, 1957. Decided July 11, 1957. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for petitioners in No. 1103 and respondents in No. 1108. With him on the briefs were Attorney General Brownell, Oscar H. Davis, Roger Fisher, Leonard B. Sand and Ralph S. Spritzer in No. 1103, and Mr. Fisher and Beatrice Rosenberg in No. 1108. Joseph S. Robinson and Earl J. Carroll argued the cause for Girard. With them on the brief was Dayton M. Harrington. Per Curiam. Japan and the United States became involved in a controversy whether the respondent Girard should be tried by a Japanese court for causing the death of a Japanese woman. The basis for the dispute between the two Governments fully appears in the affidavit of Robert Dechert, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, an exhibit to a government motion in the court below, and the joint statement of Secretary of State John Poster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, printed as appendices to this opinion, post, pp. 531, 544. Girard, a Specialist Third Class in the United States Army, was engaged on January 30,1957, with members of his cavalry regiment in a small unit exercise at Camp Weir range area, Japan. Japanese civilians were present in the area, retrieving expended cartridge cases. Girard and another Specialist Third Class were ordered to guard a machine gun and some items of clothing that had been left nearby. Girard had a grenade launcher on his rifle. He placed an expended 30-caliber cartridge case in the grenade launcher and projected it by firing a blank. The expended cartridge case penetrated the back of a Japanese woman gathering expended cartridge cases and caused her death. The United States ultimately notified Japan that Girard would be delivered to the Japanese authorities for trial. Thereafter, Japan indicted him for causing death by wounding. Girard sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The writ was denied, but Girard was granted declaratory relief and an injunction against his delivery to the Japanese authorities. 152 F. Supp. 21. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and, without awaiting action by that court on the appeal, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (1). Girard filed a cross-petition for certiorari to review the denial of the writ of habeas corpus. We granted both petitions. U. S. Supreme Court Rule 20; 354 U. S. 928. A Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, signed September 8, 1951, was ratified by the Senate on March 20, 1952, and proclaimed by the President effective April 28, 1952. Article III of the Treaty authorized the making of Administrative Agreements between the two Governments concerning “[t]he conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan ...” Expressly acting under this provision, the two Nations, on February 28, 1952, signed an Administrative Agreement covering, among other matters, the jurisdiction of the United States over offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States armed forces, and providing that jurisdiction in any case might be waived by the United States. This Agreement became effective on the same date as the Security Treaty (April 28, 1952) and was considered by the Senate before consent was given to the Treaty. Article XVII, paragraph 1, of the Administrative Agreement provided that upon the coming into effect of the “Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces,” signed June 19, 1951, the United States would conclude with Japan an agreement on criminal jurisdiction similar to the corresponding provisions of the NATO Agreement. The NATO Agreement became effective August 23, 1953, and the United States and Japan signed on September 29, 1953, effective October 29, 1953, a Protocol Agreement pursuant to the covenant in paragraph 1 of Article XVII. Paragraph 3 of Article XVII, as amended by the Protocol, dealt with criminal offenses in violation of the laws of both Nations and provided: “3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply: “(a) The military authorities of the United States shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over members of the United States armed forces or the civilian component in relation to “(i) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States, or offenses solely against the person or property of another member of the United States armed forces or the civilian component or of a dependent; “(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty. “(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of Japan shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction. “(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.” Article XXVI of the Administrative Agreement established a Joint Committee of representatives of the United States and Japan to consult on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Agreement; and provided that if the Committee “. . . is unable to resolve any matter, it shall refer that matter to the respective Governments for further consideration through appropriate channels.” In the light of the Senate’s ratification of the Security Treaty after consideration of the Administrative Agreement, which had already been signed, and its subsequent ratification of the NATO Agreement, with knowledge of the commitment to Japan under the Administrative Agreement, we are satisfied that the approval of Article III of the Security Treaty authorized the making of the Administrative Agreement and the subsequent Protocol embodying the NATO Agreement provisions governing jurisdiction to try criminal offenses. The United States claimed the right to try Girard upon the ground that his act, as certified by his commanding officer, was “done in the performance of official duty” and therefore the United States had primary jurisdiction. Japan insisted that it had proof that Girard’s action was without the scope of his official duty and therefore that Japan had the primary right to try him. The Joint Committee, after prolonged deliberations, was unable to agree. The issue was referred to higher authority, which authorized the United States representatives on the Joint Committee to notify the appropriate Japanese authorities, in accordance with paragraph 3 (c) of the Protocol, that the United States had decided not to exercise, but to waive, whatever jurisdiction it might have in the case. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense decided that this determination should be carried out. The President confirmed their joint conclusion. A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction. The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136. Japan’s cession to the United States of jurisdiction to try American military personnel for conduct constituting an offense against the laws of both countries was conditioned by the covenant of Article XVII, section 3, paragraph (c) of the Protocol that “. . . The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.” The issue for our decision is therefore narrowed to the question whether, upon the record before us, the Constitution or legislation subsequent to the Security Treaty prohibited the carrying out of this provision authorized by the Treaty for waiver of the qualified jurisdiction granted by Japan. We find no constitutional or statutory barrier to the provision as applied here. In the absence of such encroachments, the wisdom of the arrangement is exclusively for the determination of the Executive and Legislative Branches. The judgment of the District Court in No. 1103 is reversed, and its judgment in No. 1108 is affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. APPENDIX A IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WILLIAM S. GIRARD United States Army Specialist 3/C, Petitioner vs. CHARLES E. WILSON Secretary of Defense et al, Respondents H' °* 47-57 AFFIDAVIT WITH RESPECT TO FACTS COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA! CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA! bb‘ ROBERT DECHERT, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: I am the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Personnel of my office collect, collate, and maintain files on the arrangements with regard to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction entered into between the United States and foreign countries. I have reviewed and am familiar with the various communications relating to the incident involving Specialist Third Class William S. Girard which occurred in Japan on 30 January 1957 and state, as a result of such review, and upon information and belief, that the facts surrounding that incident are as follows: The Situation at Camp Weir Firing Range, January 30. On the afternoon of 30 January 1957, about 30 members of Company F, 8th Cavalry Regiment, were engaged in a small unit exercise at Camp Weir range area, Japan, involving an attack by one squad on a hill defended by another squad. Specialist 3/C William S. Girard was in the “attacking” force. The Commanding Officer of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, COLONEL HERBERT A. JORDAN, states that during the morning he was appalled at the large numbers of Japanese civilian trespassers present in the area and interfering with the conduct of the exercise. He estimates that their number was in excess of 150. In one case a group of six to eight civilians pounced on a machine gun position as soon as the gun ceased firing and, before the gunner could clear his weapon, physically pushed him away from the gun in order to retrieve expended cartridge cases. The maneuver area consists of approximately eight square miles. It is provided by the Japanese Government for part-time use of United States forces. The Japanese Defense Force uses the same area about 40% of the time. When the area is not in use by either the United States or Japanese armed forces, Japanese civilians are permitted to farm or otherwise use the area. The Japanese civilians of the local village follow the practice of scavenging the expended brass cartridge cases from the maneuver area. Upon the failure of efforts of military personnel to move the trespassers out of the danger area, Col. Jordan directed that all ball ammunition be withdrawn from the troops, and that blank ammunition be substituted in the afternoon exercise. He also directed that the Japanese police be contacted for assistance in clearing trespassers from the area, so that normal field training might be resumed. Up until the early afternoon, when the shooting incident occurred, this assistance was not forthcoming. The Shooting Incident. After one squad had attacked the hill and before the squads had changed their respective positions so that the attacking force became the defending force, and vice versa, two soldiers, Girard and Specialist 3/C Victor N. Nickel, of the “defending” force, were ordered by their platoon leader, SECOND LIEUTENANT BILLY M. MAHON, who was personally directing their activities to guard a machine gun and some items of personal clothing that had been left on a nearby ridge. GIRARD in an early statement made during the course of the investigation, stated that he was ordered to get the Japanese away. He is quoted as having stated that he did not receive orders to fire at them to get them away. There is no evidence, other than the statement of Girard, that he was ordered to get the Japanese away. LIEUT. MAHON stated that he was advised that a machine gun and several field jackets had been left on the other side of Hill 655 and that he instructed Specialist 3/C Girard and Specialist 3/C Nickel to guard the machine gun and keep the Japanese from stealing personal equipment. There were about 20 or 30 Japanese in the area; some were near the machine gun. SPECIALIST 3/C VICTOR N. NICKEL said the Japanese were “just collecting the cartridges, so there was no need of chasing them away”. Girard had a grenade launcher on his rifle. He had been armed with this same weapon during the morning exercises in which he had participated and during which he had fired 80 rounds of ball ammunition. After the two soldiers had arrived on the ridge, Girard, on two occasions, placed an expended 30-caliber cartridge case in the grenade launcher and projected it by firing a blank. At his second shot, a Japanese woman, Mrs. Naka Sakai, fell. An autopsy disclosed that an expended 30-caliber cartridge case had penetrated her back in an upward direction to a depth of 3%-4 inches, causing her death. The exact distance between Girard and the victim at the time of the incident is uncertain. The Japanese witnesses put it about eighteen meters (approximately 20 yards). On one occasion, Girard stepped off what he thought to be the distance and found it to be 29 feet; on other occasions, he has estimated it to be 20-30 yards. Nickel puts it as 25-30 yards. Girard has stated that he did not intentionally point the rifle at the woman and did not believe the cartridge case would injure anyone if it hit them. According to the U. S. military authorities in Japan, the act of firing an empty shell case from a grenade launcher is not authorized. ONOSAKI, a Japanese witness, stated that Girard, after enticing him and the victim toward Girard by throwing some brass on the ground and indicating that it was all right for them to pick it up, suddenly shouted for them to get out and thereupon fired one shot in the direction of Onosaki. As the victim was running away, Onosaki stated that Girard, holding his rifle at the waist, fired a second shot at the victim at a distance of about eight to ten meters. This testimony is corroborated in part by other Japanese who were located at a distance of from 100-150 meters. Both Girard and Nickel have made a number of statements. NICKEL at first denied knowing anything about the incident. GIRARD admitted only that he had fired one round over the heads of the Japanese. Both gradually changed their testimony. NICKEL, but not Girard, admits to throwing brass on the ground. GIRARD admits that he knew his weapon, fired in the manner in which he fired it, was fairly accurate at short ranges, but denies that he knew of its striking power; he further states that he fired from the waist over the woman’s head and did not intend to hit or wound her, but only to scare the Japanese away. In one statement, NICKEL, after admitting that he had collected a pile of empty cartridges and had on about five occasions thrown them toward the Japanese, the nearest of whom was a little over 10 yards away, has this to say: “To tell you the truth I don’t know if Girard had told you this or not, but Girard told me to throw those cartridges. The purpose was to scare the Japanese off by firing over their heads when they came to pick up the cartridges.” After stating that about six Japanese came down to pick up the cartridges, NICKEL concludes: “He (Girard) stood up carrying the gun, and went about two feet to my right. Japanese people started to run away, probably thinking that they were being chased. This one Mama-San also ran. Then Girard fired holding the gun at his hip ... he held the gun at the hip and fired in the direction of the woman ... at an angle of about 45 degrees from his body. He fired over the head of this person ... I regard myself as a friend of Girard in my company. If I said I saw (the incident), I would be letting him down, so I lied. Then I went to Camp Drew and received various advice from an investigator there. Then I decided to tell the truth. One other reason is that Girard told the investigator that Nickel was watching.” In this connection, GIRARD says: “. . . while I was going toward the machine gun, I did talk to Nickel. I do not recall what I talked to him about . . . but I am positive that nothing was spoken about cartridges ... I do not remember telling him to throw some cartridges. If I said I did not positively talk to him about it I’d be telling a lié . . . what I want to say is, as far as I can remember, I do not recall talking about it.” GIRARD states that he has qualified as a marksman [average shot] and a sharpshooter [better than average shot] with the M-l with which he was armed on the day in question, and that he twice has qualified as an expert with the .45 caliber pistol; that he has seen soldiers fire empty cartridges out of a grenade launcher on about 10 occasions; and he said, “I did not have an exact idea how far an empty cartridge would travel, but I knew that it travelled quite a ways . . . prior to that incident I knew that the empty cartridge fired like that would travel straight forward.” At a later time Specialist 3/C Nickel requested that he be permitted to make a further statement with respect to the case. Upon this occasion he stated that Girard had asked him to gather up some empty cartridge cases for the purpose of luring the Japanese people closer to their position; that he and Girard were in a foxhole together and that at Girard’s request, in order to draw the Japanese closer, he, Nickel, threw empty cartridge cases from the foxhole; that Girard said, “throw the brass a little closer”; that Girard motioned with his hands for the brass pickers to come closer and said, “Daijobu”, which meant for them to come closer; that Girard fired at the Japanese man, and then fired at the Japanese woman and shot her; that Girard was in a standing position and fired from the shoulder; that he (Girard) tried to get the Japanese to take the woman’s body away after he shot her; and that Girard told him (Nickel) that if “they” asked how he held his weapon to say he fired from the waist and also to say that “We did not throw any brass.” The Certificate as to Official Duty On 7 February 1957 Girard’s commanding officer filed a certificate of official duty with the local Japanese authorities. That certificate read as follows: COMPANY F 8TH CAVALRY REGIMENT 7 February 1957 SUBJECT: Certificate as to Official Duty THRU: Provost Marshal Regional Camp Whittington APO 201 TO: Chief Procurator Maebashi District Maebashi City, Honshu, Japan 1. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 43 of the Agreed Views of the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee with respect to the Protocol amending Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement between the United States and Japan, I certify that GIRARD, William S, RA 16 452 809, Specialist Third Class, Company F, 8th Cavalry Regiment, APO 201, was in the performance of his official duty at 1350 hours, 30 January 1957, Camp Weir Range Area, when he was involved in the following incident: On 30 January 1957, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, was engaged in routine training at Camp Weir Range Area. Company F was conducting blank firing exercises. Specialist Third Class William S. GIRARD was instructed by his platoon leader to move near a position near an unguarded machine gun to guard the machine gun and items of field equipment that were in the immediate area. GIRARD, following instructions, moved to the designated position near the machine gun. While performing his duties as guard, he fired an expended cartridge case, as a warning, which struck and killed SAKAI, Naka, Kami-Shinden, Somamura, Gumma Prefecture, who had entered the range area for the purpose of gathering expended cartridge cases. 2. The United States will exercise jurisdiction in this case, unless notification is given immediately that proof to the contrary exists. 3. Should this incident result in trial of the above individual by general court-martial, you will be notified of the date of trial in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 45 of the above mentioned Agreed Views. CARL C. ALLIGOOD 1st Lt. Infantry Commanding The Japanese Notice of “Existence of Contrary Proof”. On 9 February 1957 the local Japanese authorities notified the United States commanding officer who had issued the certificate of official duty that they considered that proof contrary to the certificate existed. This notification stated: MAEBASHI DISTRICT PUBLIC PROCURATOR’S OFFICE Maebashi, 9 February 1957 TO: Mr. CARL C. ALLIGOOD, 1st Lt Infantry, Command, F Co., 2nd Bn 8th Cavalry Regiment Re: Notification of the existence of the contrary proof. Dear Sir: Reference is made to the letter from you dated on 8 February 1957, regarding to the “On Duty” status of the case involving SP3 GIRARD S. WILLIAM, which we received on 8 February 1957. This is to inform you that this office considers the proof contrary thereto exists, basing upon our examinations. /s/ Nagami Sakai Chief Procurator Maebashi Public Procurator’s Office The Japanese Statement in the Criminal Jurisdiction Sub-Committee of the Joint Committee In accordance with the provisions of Agreed View No. 43, on 16 February 1957 the Japanese brought the matter up in the Joint Committee and requested that it be referred to the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee. On 7 March 1957 the United States representative agreed to this procedure. The matter was discussed in the Subcommittee on 12 March 1957 at which time the Japanese submitted a summary which contained the following: “He (Girard) and Nickel went to the gun and, about 13.15 hrs he picked up and threw expended cartridge cases in the direction of the slope south of the hill, and, beckoning Hidehara Onozeki (male) and Naka Sakai (female) who had been at a place in the south-west of Hill 655 to gather empty cartridge cases, etc., cried out to them ‘PAPA-SAN, DAIJOBU’, ‘MAMA-SAN, DAIJOBU’ (‘Old man, O.K., old lady, O.K.’), etc. in Japanese and thus let the 2 Japanese pick up expended cartridge cases he had thrown. Then he, pointing to the nearby hole for Naka Sakai, cried out to her in Japanese ‘MAMA-SAN, TAKUSAN-NE’ (‘Old lady, plenty more!’), and hinting thereby that there remained some expended cartridge cases in it, induced her to go to the hole. But, at that moment, Hideharu Onozeki who was picking up expended cartridge cases on the said slope became suspicious of the suspects behaviour and tried to run away. Then the suspect suddenly shouted to Ono-seki 'GE-ROU! HEY!’ and fired a blank shot towards him, placing an expended cartridge case in the grenade launcher attached to the rifle which he had carried with him. Then he cried out 'GE-ROU! HEY! ’ to Naka Sakai who was in the hole, and, when he saw her running off towards the north slope of the hill, he, holding the stock of the rifle under his arm, fired standing a blank shot toward her about eight (8) meters away with an expended cartridge case put in the grenade launcher, just in the same manner as he had done to Hideharu Onozeki, as the result of which he made her sustain a penetrating wound on the left side of her back which proved fatal on the spot because of the loss of blood resulting from a cut in the main artery.” The Japanese conclusion was stated as follows : “Sp-3 William S. Girard, the suspect in this case, had been instructed to guard a machine gun and equipment at the time of occurrence of the case. It is evident, however, as shown in the above finding of facts, that the incident arose when he, materially deviating from the performance of such duty of his, wilfully threw expended cartridge cases away towards Naka Sakai and Hideharu Onozeki, and, thus inviting them to come near to him, he fired towards them. Therefore, the incident is not considered to have arisen out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty.” Discussions in the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee of the Joint Committee. At the same time the following exchange occurred: U. S.: Do you agree that Girard was on duty as a guard, and that the incident arose while he was on such duty? Japan: We admit that he was on duty, but it is our position that the shooting had no connection with his duty of guarding the machine gun. The act of Girard in throwing out brass and enticing the victim toward him had no connection with guarding the machine gun. U. S.: Your statement of fact does not take into account Girard’s statement of his intent. That is, that he fired for the purpose of scaring the Japanese away and thus insure the safety of the machine gun. Japan: The evidence shows that there was no danger to the Machine gun. Nickel made a statement to this effect. Thus, we do not consider that Girard actually fired to protect the machine gun. The Japanese were only picking up brass in the vicinity; they were not interfering in any way with Girard’s mission to guard the machine ■gun. There was thus no necessity or reason for Girard to shoot at them to insure the safety of the machine gun. Its safety was never in danger. Further, according to the statement of Lt. Mahon, firing an empty cartridge from a grenade launcher is not authorized, and any superior of Girard’s observing such an action by Girard would have been obliged to interfere and prevent Girard from firing his weapon in this manner. U. S.: However, if we give full weight to Girard’s statement, we must conclude that he did, in fact, fire to scare the Japanese away and thus insure safety of the machine gun. He may have been mistaken in believing that it was necessary to act in this manner, but we cannot escape the fact that, according to his own statement, he fired for this purpose. If you were to believe Girard’s statement, would you consider that he was acting in the performance of official duty? Japan: Your question is based on a supposition that is not supported by the evidence, and we are not prepared to answer it. U. S.: In determining official duty in this case, is it not important to consider Girard’s intent as disclosed by his own statement? Japan: In determining that the incident did not arise in the performance of official duty, we considered all the evidence. A number of Japanese witnesses were interrogated immediately after the incident. We considered their testimony as well as the testimony of Girard and Nickel. In determining Girard's intent, it is necessary to consider all the evidence, not just his version of the incident. When all of the evidence is considered, it appears that Girard’s statement that he fired to scare the Japanese away and thus protect the machine gun is not worthy of belief, as the weight of the evidence contradicts Girard’s statement. It is our position that the evidence shows that the firing had no significant connection with the guarding of the machine gun. Investigation of the Incident. Investigations of the facts relating to the alleged offense were conducted by both the U. S. Army in Japan, and the local Japanese authorities. Interpretation of “Official Duty”. The following interpretation of the term “official duty” appears in a circular of the United States Army Forces, Far East which was published in January 1956: “The term 'official duty’ as used in Article XVII, Official Minutes, and the Agreed Views is not meant to include all acts by members of the armed forces and civilian component during periods while they are on duty, but is meant to apply only to acts which are required to be done as a function of those duties which the individuals are performing. Thus, a substantial departure from the acts a person is required to perform in a particular duty usually will indicate an act outside of his ‘official duty.’ ” Action in the Joint Committee. As a result of lengthy discussions extending from early March to mid-May 1957, it was finally agreed in the Joint Committee that the United States military authorities would notify the appropriate Japanese authorities, in accordance with paragraph 3c of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement, that the United States had decided not to exercise jurisdiction in the case. This action was thereafter taken. The Action of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. On June 4, 1957 the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson announced that after careful review of all available facts in the case, they had concluded that the Joint Committee’s agreement that Girard be tried in the courts of Japan was reached in full accord with procedures established by the Treaty and Agreement, and that in order to preserve the integrity of the pledges of the U. S., this determination by the Joint Committee must be carried out. Present Status of Girard. At the present time Specialist 3/C Girard is administratively restricted to the limits of Camp Whittington. Girard voluntarily enlisted in the Regular Army on October 28, 1954 for a three year term which will expire on October 27, 1957. /s/ ROBERT DECHERT ROBERT DECHERT General Counsel Department of Defense Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of June 1957. My commission expires: March 6, 1961. (SEAL) /s/ LAURA E. LITCHARD NOTARY PUBLIC APPENDIX B. JOINT STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE, JOHN FOSTER DULLES and SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CHARLES E. WILSON The case of U. S. Army Specialist 3rd Class William S. Girard has far-reaching implications, involving as it does the good faith of the United States in carrying out a joint decision reached under procedures established by treaty and agreement with Japan. The case involves actions by Girard which caused the death of Naka Sakai, a Japanese woman, on January 30, 1957. The issue arose as to whether or not Girard should be tried by U. S. court-martial or by a Japanese court. After careful deliberation in the Joint U. S.-Japan Committee established by the two Governments pursuant to treaty arrangements, the U. S. representative on this Committee was authorized to agree, and on May 16,1957, did agree, that the United States would not exercise its asserted right of primary jurisdiction in this case. In view of this completed action, attempting to prolong the dispute over the jurisdictional issue would create a situation which could basically affect U. S. relations not only with Japan, but also with many other nations. For these reasons, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson have carefully reviewed all the available facts in the case. They have now concluded that the Joint Committee's agreement that Girard be tried in the courts of Japan was reached in full accord with procedures established by the Treaty and Agreement, and that in order to preserve the integrity of the pledges of the United States, this determination by the Joint Committee must be carried out. The Secretaries’ review disclosed the following: The incident occurred in a maneuver area provided by the Japanese Government for part-time use of United States forces. The Japanese Defense Force uses the same area about 40% of the time. When the area is not in use by either the United States or Japanese armed forces, Japanese civilians are permitted to farm or otherwise use the area. Efforts to keep civilians away from the area during such military exercises have not proved effective. In this particular case, red boundary flags were, as customary, erected as a warning to civilians to keep off, and local authorities were notified of the proposed exercises. But, as was frequently the case, a number of Japanese civilians were in the area gathering empty brass cartridge cases at the time of the incident. These civilians had created such a risk of injury to themselves in the morning exercises when live ammunition was used that the American officer in charge withdrew live ammunition from the troops prior to the afternoon exercises. In the interval between two simulated attacks during the afternoon, Girard and another soldier, Specialist 3rd Class Victor M. Nickel, were ordered by their platoon leader, a Lieutenant, to guard a machine gun and several field jackets at the top of a hill. Girard and Nickel were not issued live ammunition for this duty. It was while these soldiers were performing this duty that the incident occurred. Mrs. Naka Sakai, a Japanese civilian, died a few moments after being hit in the back by an empty brass rifle shell case fired by Girard from his rifle grenade launcher. She was not over 30 yards from Girard and was going away from him when he fired the rifle. Girard had previously fired similarly in the vicinity of a Japanese man, who was not hit. Girard’s action in firing empty shell cases from the rifle grenade launcher was not authorized. He asserted that he fired from the waist, intending only to frighten the Japanese civilians. Others stated, but Girard denied, that empty shell cases were thrown out to entice the Japanese to approach. Under the U. S.-Japanese Security Treaty and Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement under that Treaty, as established by the Protocol adopted September 23, 1953, the authorities of Japan have the prior right to jurisdiction to try members of the United States armed forces for an injury caused to a Japanese national, unless such injury is one “arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.” The Japanese authorities have taken the position that Girard’s action in firing the shell cases was outside the scope of his guard duty and was, therefore, not “done in the performance of official duty.” The Commanding General of Girard’s division certified that Girard’s action was done in the performance of official duty. In accordance with the procedure established under the Treaty and Administrative Agreement, the disputed matter was, on March 7, 1957, taken before the Joint U. S.-Japan Committee established under the provisions of the Treaty and Administrative Agreement previously referred to. Various meetings were held between the United States and Japanese representatives on the Joint Committee. As is customary, a representative of the American Embassy in Tokyo also attended these meetings in the capacity of observer. Both sides continued to press their respective claims to primary jurisdiction, and the Committee was unable to reach agreement. The Commanding General, Far East Command, reported the facts to the Department of the Army, the executive agent for the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense considered having the Joint Committee refer the matter in dispute to the two Governments for settlement, but rejected this procedure as inadvisable under the circumstances. Department of Defense instructions were accordingly issued, through the Department of the Army, to the Far East Command to the effect that the U. S. representative on the Joint Committee should continue to press the claim for jurisdiction, but that, in case of continued deadlock, he was authorized to waive jurisdiction to Japan. After three weeks of additional negotiations, the U. S. representative waived jurisdiction in the name of the United States. Girard was subsequently indicted by the Japanese judicial authorities for causing a death by wounding — the least serious homicide charge for which he could have been indicted under Japanese law. In determining whether Girard’s actions were in violation of law, all the facts, as presented by both sides, must now be weighed by the Japanese court, just as they would by a U. S. court-martial, if trial were held under U. S. jurisdiction. In accordance with Public Law 777 of the 84th Congress, the United States Government will pay for counsel chosen by Girard to defend him in this trial. Pursuant to the Administrative Agreement under the Japanese Treaty, Girard will be guaranteed a prompt trial, the right to have representation by counsel satisfactory to him, full information as to all charges against him, the right to confront all witnesses, the right to have his witnesses compelled to attend court, the right to have a competent interpreter, the right of communication with United States authorities, and the presence of a United States representative as an official observer at the trial. This observer is required to report to United States authorities on all aspects of the trial and the fairness of the court proceedings. The U. S. authorities will, of course, see that all evidence is available to Girard and his counsel, and will render every proper assistance to him and his counsel in protection of his rights. United States troops are stationed in many countries as part of1 our own national defense and to help strengthen the Free World struggle against Communist imperialism. The matter of jurisdiction in cases of offenses against the laws of host countries, whether by our servicemen abroad or by servicemen of other countries in the United States, is dealt with by mutual agreements. In the operation of this system in Japan there has been the greatest measure of mutual trust and cooperation. Since the present arrangement became effective in October 1953, Japan, in the overwhelming majority of the cases in which it had primary right to try American personnel, has waived that right in favor of U. S. action. There is every reason to believe that trial of U. S. Army Specialist 3rd Class William S. Girard in the Japanese courts will be conducted with the utmost fairness. 3 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 3329; T. I. A. S. No. 2491. 3 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 3341; T. I. A. S. No. 2492. 4 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1792; T. I. A. S. No. 2846. 4 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 1846; T. I. A. S. No. 2848. This affidavit was offered by the Government and accepted by the court below under seal. In this posture it is part of the record before us. At the oral argument no objection was made by the Government or counsel for Girard against removing the seal. As the Court considers that the issues in this case should be decided on a fully disclosed record, the affidavit is ordered unsealed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUPERIOR FILMS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF OHIO, DIVISION OF FILM CENSORSHIP, HISSONG, SUPERINTENDENT. NO. 217. Argued January 6, 1954. Decided January 18, 1954. John C. Harlor argued the cause for appellant in No. 217. With him on the brief were F. J. Wright and Michael Oesas. Earl F. Morris was also of counsel. Florence Perlow Shientag argued the cause for appellant in No. 274. With her on the brief was Philip J. O’Brien, Jr. C. William O’Neill, Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for appellee in No. 217. With him on the brief were Robert E. Leach, Chief Counsel, and Gwynne B. Myers, Assistant Attorney General. Charles A. Brind, Jr. argued the cause for appellees in No. 274. With him on the brief were Nathaniel L. Gold-stein, Attorney General of New York, Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General, and Ruth Kessler Toch, Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellant in No. 217 were filed by Sidney A. Schreiber and Philip J. O’Brien, Jr. for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. et al.; and by Morris L. Ernst for the National Council on Freedom from Censorship, a Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union. Per Curiam. The judgments are reversed. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COMPANY OF MIAMI, INC. No. 217. Argued December 19, 1952. Decided January 12, 1953. Mozart G. Ratner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, George J. Bott and David P. Findling. Frank A. Constangy argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Marion A. Prowell and Albert B. Bernstein. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. Acting under § 10 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136, 147, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 160 (c), the National Labor Relations Board ordered the reinstatement of eleven dis-criminatorily discharged employees of the Seven-Up Bottling Company, with back pay “to be computed upon a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company.” 92 N. L. R. B. 1622, 1640. In the Woolworth case, 90 N. L. R. B. 289, the Board said: “The public interest in discouraging obstacles to industrial peace requires that we seek to bring about, in unfair labor practice cases, ‘a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination.’ In order that this end may be effectively accomplished through the medium of reinstatement coupled with back pay, we shall order, in the case before us and in future cases, that the loss of pay be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter or portion thereof during the period from the Respondent’s discriminatory action to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement. The quarterly periods, hereinafter called 'quarters,’ shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which [the employee] would normally have earned for each such quarter or portion thereof, [his] net earnings, if any, in other employment during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter.” 90 N. L. R. B., at 292-293. In the proceeding in which the Board sought enforcement of the order against the Seven-Up Bottling Company, the Court of Appeals sustained the claim of the Company that the Woolworth formula could not be applied against it: “The employee is entitled to be made whole, but no more. The employees here involved were not compensated on a quarterly basis. We see no sufficient reason to so compute their back pay during suspension. . . . There is nothing to indicate that the conditions apprehended by the Board in the Woolworth case, exist here.” 196 F. 2d 424, 427-428. Accordingly, the court modified the Board’s order so that back pay would be awarded on the basis of the entire period during which an employee was denied reemployment in violation of the Act rather than on a quarterly basis. Since the general method of computing back pay is obviously a matter of importance in the administration of the Act, we brought the case here. 344 U. S. 811. Section 10 (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, under which the Board made its award, derives unchanged, so far as is now relevant, from the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act. 49 Stat. 449, 454. It charges the Board with the task of devising remedies to effectuate the policies of the Act. Of course the remedies must be functions of the purposes to be accomplished, and in making back pay awards, the Board operates under a further limitation. It must have regard for considerations governing the mitigation of damages; it must, that is, heed “the importance of taking fair account, in a civilized legal system, of every socially desirable factor in the final judgment.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 198. Subject to these limitations, however, the power, which is a broad discretionary one, is for the Board to wield, not for the courts. In fashioning remedies to undo the effects of violations of the Act, the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experience. When the Board, “in the exercise of its informed discretion,” makes an order of restoration by way of back pay, the order “should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.” Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U. S. 533, 540. The Woolworth formula, as a general method of computation, is, under this test, proof against judicial challenge. The Board’s very first published order awarded as back pay wages which would normally have been earned “during the period from the date of . . . discharge to the date of [an] offer of reinstatement . . . less the amount . . . earned subsequent to discharge . . . .” Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 1, 51 (1935), enforced sub nom. Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261. For fifteen years the Board followed the practice it had laid down in that case and calculated back pay on the basis of the entire period between discharge and offer of reinstatement. In 1950, in F. W. Woolworth Company, supra, the Board said: “The cumulative experience of many years discloses that this form of remedial provision falls short of effectuating the basic purposes and policies of the Act.” 90 N. L. R. B., at 291. The Board considered that its Pennsylvania Greyhound formula for computing back pay adversely affected “the companion remedy of reinstatement.” When an employee, sometime after discharge, obtained a better paying job than the one he was discharged from, it became profitable for the employer to delay an offer of reinstatement as long as possible, since every day the employee put in on the better paying job reduced back pay liability. Again, the old formula, in the same circumstances, put added pressure on the employee to waive his right to reinstatement, since by doing so he could terminate the running of back pay and prevent the continuing reduction of the sum coming to him. To avoid these consequences the Board laid down its new method of computation. 90 N. L. R. B., at 292-293. It is not for us to weigh these or countervailing considerations. Nor should we require the Board to make a quantitative appraisal of the relevant factors, assuming the unlikely, that such an appraisal is feasible. As is true of many comparable judgments by those who are steeped in the actual workings of these specialized matters, the Board’s conclusions may “express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions . . and they are none the worse for it. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 598. It is as true of the Labor Board as it was of the agency in the Babcock case that “[t]he Board was created for the purpose of using its judgment and its knowledge.” Ibid. It will not be denied that the Board may be mindful of the practical interplay of two remedies, back pay and reinstatement, both within the scope of its authority. Surely it may so fashion one remedy that it complements, rather than conflicts with, another. It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the policies of the Act. We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering into the bog of logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate about what is “remedial” and what is “punitive.” It seems more profitable to stick closely to the direction of the Act by considering what order does, as this does, and what order does not, bear appropriate relation to the policies of the Act. Cf. Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361. Of course, Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7, dealt with a different situation, and its holding remains undisturbed. It is urged, however, that no evidence in this record supports this back pay order; that the Board’s formula and the reasons it assigned for adopting it do not rest on data which the Board has derived in the course of the proceedings before us. But in devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a particular proceeding. “Cumulative experience” begets understanding and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process. “[T]he relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence . . . .” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, 313 U. S., at 194. That competence could not be exercised if in fashioning remedies the administrative agency were restricted to considering only what was before it in a single proceeding. This is not to say that the Board may apply a remedy it has worked out on the basis of its experience, without regard to circumstances which may make its application to a particular situation oppressive and therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy of the Act. The Company in this case maintains that it operates a seasonal business, that its employees may earn three times as much in the first and fourth quarters of a year as in the second and third, and that a quarterly calculation of back pay would in this context be obviously unjust. The Board suggests that it will be time enough to deal with such special facts in this case if the Board and the Company cannot agree on the fair application of the Woolworth formula after the order is sustained. But in case of such disagreement, the Company can be heard as of right on the issue it now raises only in the course of contempt proceedings and at the risk involved in them. We do not think contempt proceedings are appropriate for the settlement of such an issue. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, 313 U. S., at 200. Indeed, the Board’s pre-Woolworth formula was adapted to varying circumstances as a result of proceedings had before the Board prior to the issuance of orders. See, e. g., Crossett Lumber Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 440, 496-498; Gullett Gin Company, Inc., 83 N. L. R. B. 1, 2, n. 4, .enforced sub nom. Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., supra. We assume that the Woolworth formula will be applied in like manner. In any event, this aspect of the problem is not now properly here. The Company never made before the Board the objection it now bases on the seasonal nature of its business. Section 10 (e) of the Act, 61 Stat. 136, 147, 148, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 160 (e), provides: “No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” In its Exception XXII to the Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, the Company objected that the recommendations as to the remedy were contrary to, and unsupported by, the evidence and contrary to law. This is not adequate notice that the Company intends to press the specific issue it now raises. Marshall Field & Co. v. Labor Board, 318 U. S. 253. The Company did not urge this issue either before the Board or in the Court of Appeals. No extraordinary circumstances are present such as would justify permitting the issue to be raised here for the first time. The Company contends, finally, that though it might have been within the authority of the Board to devise the Woolworth formula under the language of the National Labor Relations Act, the fact that that language was reenacted while the Board adhered to its pre-Woolworth formula has deprived the Board of power to depart from the latter. We are told that Congress studied with unusual care the case law which had developed under the statute Congress was revising and reenacting by the Labor Management Relations Act, and that it adopted new language whenever it desired results other than the ones reached by the cases. We are cited to Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., supra, and asked to conclude as a general proposition that whenever Congress reenacted without change provisions of the National Labor Relations Act it thereby froze administrative decisions rendered under those provisions. Gullett Gin carries no such generalization. Having held that the Board’s practice of failing to deduct unemployment compensation payments in the calculation of back pay awards did not go beyond its powers, we said in that case that our holding was supported by the fact that Congress had reenacted the relevant part of § 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act with what we took to be notice of this practice. We thought Congress could be said to have agreed that the Board was acting within the authority Congress meant it to have. Assuming Congress was aware of the Board’s pre-Woolworth practice of calculating back pay on the basis of the entire period from discharge to offer of reinstatement, we could say here, as we did in Gullett Gin, that Congress by its reenactment indicated its agreement that the Board’s practice was authorized. That leads us nowhere on the present issue, though it is only this far that what we said in Gullett Gin can lead us. In that case as here, again assuming notice, if Congress was satisfied that the Board was acting within its powers, the thing for it to do was what it did — reenact without change. In that case as here — though, of course, we had no occasion to say so in that case — if Congress had been more than satisfied with the Board’s practice, if it had wanted to be certain that the Board would not in future profit by its experience, it would have had to do more than it did; it would have had to change the language of the statute so as to take from the Board the discretionary power to mould remedies suited to practical needs which we had declared the Board to have and which the Board was asserting and exercising. We cannot infer an intent to withdraw the grant of such power from what is at most a silent approval of specific exercises of it. We hold that the Board’s order is to be enforced. Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KING et al., CONSTITUTING THE FLORIDA RAILROAD AND PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 9. Argued October 15, 1952. Decided December 22, 1952. Lewis W. Petteway argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants. Charles H. Weston argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel-lees. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Acting Assistant Attorney General Clapp, James L. Morrisson and Edward M. Reidy. Philip B. Perlman, then Solicitor General, and Daniel W. Knowlton were on a motion to affirm. Frank W. Gwathmey argued the cause for the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief was James A. Bistline. Arnold H. Olsen, Attorney General, Charles V. Huppe, Assistant Attorney General, and Edwin S. Booth filed a brief for the State of Montana et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions here are: (1) whether the Interstate Commerce Commission, in prescribing intrastate freight rates for railroads under § 13 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, may give weight to deficits in passenger revenue; and (2) whether the findings of the Commission which are involved in this proceeding are sufficient to sustain the rates it has prescribed. Our answer to each question is in the affirmative. This is an action against the United States brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1336, by appellants “as and Constituting the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.” They ask the court to enjoin, set aside and annul an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring Florida railroads to establish intrastate freight rates which will reflect the same increases as have been authorized by it for comparable interstate traffic. The underlying proceedings originated in 1940. The Interstate Commerce Commission then undertook a nationwide investigation of interstate railroad freight rates, under §§13 (2) and 15a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, in conformity with the National Transportation Policy stated in § 1 of the Transportation Act of 1940. The investigation dealt with past and future freight and passenger operations, intrastate as well as interstate. A Committee of Cooperating State Commissioners sat with the Commission and took part in its deliberations. Mounting railroad operating costs and declining passenger revenue led the Commission, in 1946, to authorize a nationwide increase of 20% in basic interstate freight rates. Ex Parte No. 162, Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 1946, 264 I. C. C. 695, 266 I. C. C. 537. In 1947, the Commission found such further increases in operating costs and decreases in passenger revenue that it authorized an additional nationwide interim increase of 10% in interstate freight rates. Soon it raised this to 20%. In a third report it varied the percentage in different areas, with the result that in the southern territory, including Florida, the increase was 25%. The 1948 final report confirmed this 25% increase. Ex Parte No. 166, Increased Freight Rates, 1947, 269 I. C. C. 33, 270 I. C. C. 81, 93, and 403. The Commission’s estimates of revenue contemplated the application of the increased rates to intrastate, as well as to interstate, transportation. The report concludes with the statement that the “Committee of Cooperating State Commissioners . . . authorize us to state that they concur in the foregoing report.” 270 I. C. C. 403, 463. Upon publication of these reports, the railroads asked their respective state authorities to authorize comparable increases in intrastate rates. The Florida Commission approved most of the increases but declined to approve the final increase from 20% to 25%. On petition of the Florida railroads, the Interstate Commerce Commission undertook its own investigation of Florida intrastate railroad rates under § 13 (3) and (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (3) and (4). A full hearing was had before a Commissioner and an examiner, followed by a hearing upon exceptions to the examiner’s report. The Commission recommended that intrastate freight rates be established “between points in Florida which will reflect the same increases as are, and for the future may be, maintained by respondents [railroads] on like interstate traffic to and from Florida, and within Florida under our authorizations in Ex Parte No. 162 and Ex Parte No. 166 .. . .” Finding No. 8, 2781. C. C. 41, 73. The Interstate Commerce Commission then gave the Florida Commission a final opportunity to permit the increased rates to be applied to intrastate transportation. Upon the latter’s failure to act, the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered the railroads “thereafter to maintain and apply for the intrastate transportation of freight from and to points in the State of Florida freight rates and charges which shall be no lower than the approved rates and charges, or on the approved rate bases, as provided in said report.” Before that order took effect, this action was filed. A three-judge District Court was convened. 28 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 2325. Two short line railroads and numerous shippers intervened as plaintiffs. The Interstate Commerce Commission and all Class I railroads operating in Florida intervened as defendants. The entire record of the proceeding before the Commission, under § 13 (4), was introduced. The court sustained the Commission and dismissed the complaint. 101 F. Supp. 941. That judgment is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 1253, 2101 (b). I. The Interstate Commerce Commission in prescribing intrastate freight rates for railroads under % 13 (4) of the Interstate Commerce Act may give weight to deficits in passenger revenue. In Ex Parte No. 168, Increased Freight Rates, 1948, 272 I. C. C. 695, 276 I. C. C. 9, the Commission reviewed the changing attitudes it has adopted concerning the role of passenger deficits and freight rates. In such cases as the Five Per Cent Case, 31 I. C. C. 351, the Commission in 1914 concluded that each class of service should completely and independently provide its own proportionate share of expenses and profits. In 1949 the Commission says: “However, because of changed theories adopted by Congress in the Transportation Act, 1920, and because as a practical matter the increasing degree of unprofitableness of the passenger traffic menaced the continuity of an adequate national system of transportation, we were forced to a more comprehensive view of this question. We observe, also, that at the time of those decisions the railroads enjoyed a practical monopoly in supplying transportation, but that situation no longer exists.” 276 I. C. C. at 34. Citing with approval its similar views in Ex Parte No. 103, Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C. 539, and Ex Parte No. 123, Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1937-1938, 226 I. C. C. 41, the Commission summarizes its present position as follows: “These cases are typical of our more recent holdings upon this question. While we regard it as 'trite to say that each particular service, coach, sleeper, parlor car, and head end, should as nearly as may be pay its own way and return a profit’ (Eastern Passenger Fares in Coaches, 227 I. C. C. 17, 25), and we have accepted the contention that there may be traffic that should not be burdened with a shortage of passenger service return (Livestock, Western District Rates, 190 I. C. C. 611, 629), yet, if passenger service inevitably and inescapably cannot bear its direct costs and its share of joint or indirect costs, we have felt compelled in a general rate case to take the passenger deficit into account in adjustment of freight rates and charges. Both the freight and passenger services are essential, and revenue losses or deficits on the one necessarily must be compensated by earnings on the other if the carriers are to continue operations. Both may be subjected to reasonable rates and charges to produce the fair aggregate return, even though thereby a higher rate of return may be exacted from the one than from the other. (Property Owners’ Committee v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 237 I. C. C. 549, 565.)” Id., at 35. See also, Ex Parte 87, Revenues in Western District, 113 I. C. C. 3, 23. This change of policy was the inevitable consequence of steadily increasing passenger operating costs, together with the growth of vigorous competition from automobiles and other forms of transportation which made it futile to compensate for the passenger deficits by increasing passenger rates. The railroads were forced to abandon passenger mileage, reduce service and improve their facilities, while fixing passenger rates at a level as adequate as competition permitted. In recent years, a nationwide passenger deficit has been obvious except during the peak of wartime passenger traffic. The ratio between passenger operating expense and revenue has varied in different areas but has been uniformly unfavorable to the railroads. Section 15a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act and the National Transportation Policy of 1940 reflect this broad concept of the unity of the Nation’s transportation system. They direct the Commission to consider, among other things, the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient railway transportation service and the need of revenues sufficient to sustain such service. It permeates such general revenue proceedings as Ex Parte Nos. 162 and 166, supra. It leaves no ground for a claim that the Commission may not give weight to passenger revenue deficits in prescribing interstate freight rates to meet over-all revenue needs. See United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70. The question remains whether that Commission may give weight to deficits in passenger revenue (either interstate or intrastate) when prescribing intrastate freight rates under § 13 (4). It is conceivable that some considerations properly given weight by the Commission in prescribing interstate freight rates in a general revenue proceeding might not be applicable equally to transportation within a particular state. In the instant case, however, there is no showing that the character of operating conditions in Florida intrastate passenger traffic differs substantially from that of interstate passenger operations in the southern territory generally. On the contrary, the Commission observes that— “Increased passenger deficits, by reason of the continuing rise in operating expenses and the growing use of other forms of transportation, is a condition bearing alike upon intrastate and interstate rates. There is here no claim or showing that the passenger deficits of the respondents do not result from intrastate as well as interstate operations, and the passenger deficit of the East Coast, which operates entirely within Florida, would appear to indicate to the contrary. “The record affords no justification for a difference in treatment in this respect [passenger deficits] between Florida intrastate traffic, on the one hand, and interstate traffic to and from Florida, on the other hand. The question of passenger deficits is a serious one for both carriers and shippers, and would become even more serious for interstate shippers if this burden were imposed entirely upon them [rather than being shared on a like basis with intrastate shippers on the same lines].” 278 I. C. C. at 67-68. See opinion below, 101 F. Supp. at 944. It appears from the report in Ex Parte No. 168, 276 I. C. C. at 40, that, in 1948, the passenger service operating ratio for the southern territory was 127.3% while the operating ratios of the three principal Florida railroads in that year were 120%, 127% and 128%. In Florida, moreover, the discontinuance of railroad passenger service would not permit the discontinuance of high-speed tracks and equipment because of the need for fast freight schedules to transport perishable fruits and vegetables from Florida. The Commission dealt with the freight and passenger revenues and properties of the Florida roads as a whole when determining the need for increases in interstate freight rates. Nothing has been demonstrated which would demand different treatment of these properties in relation to the intrastate activities. The Commission also finds that “the Florida intrastate rates [without the 5% increase] . . . are abnormally low and are not contributing their fair share to the revenues required by respondents [Florida railroads] to enable them to render adequate and efficient service and to operate profitably, and thereby accomplish the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act . . . Finding No. 5, 278 I. C. C. at 72. In the instant case there is no evidence which would require the Commission to treat Florida intrastate rates differently from interstate rates in southern territory. Instead, there are findings that it would cause unjust discrimination against interstate commerce in Florida if the intrastate freight rates are not increased so as to reflect the same increase as is applied by the Commission to like interstate traffic in the southern territory. See note 13, infra. The same National Transportation Policy applies to § 13 (4) as to § 15a (2). Whichever section is used, the same economic considerations underlie the relation between freight rates and passenger deficits, whether interstate or intrastate. This was well considered throughout the opinion of the Court in United States v. Louisiana, supra. It was there said: “This Court has consistently held that this section [§ 13 (4)] is to be construed in the light of § 15a (2) and as supplementing it, so that the forbidden discrimination against interstate commerce by intrastate rates includes those cases in which disparity of the latter rates operates to thwart the broad purpose of § 15a to maintain an efficient transportation system by enabling the carriers to earn a fair return. So construed, § 13 (4) confers on the Commission the power to raise intrastate rates so that the intrastate traffic may produce its fair share of the earnings required to meet maintenance and operating costs and to yield a fair return on the value of property devoted to the transportation service, both interstate and intrastate.” Pp. 74-75. This was confirmed in Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 5-6. We conclude that there is no reason why the Commission may not give weight to passenger deficits in prescribing the intrastate freight rates in Florida, as it does in prescribing interstate freight rates for the southern territory. II. The Commission’s findings involved in this proceeding are sufficient to sustain the rates prescribed. Several of the Commission’s findings which lend support to its order are printed in the margin. Its authority to prescribe the rates now before us rests on the provision, in § 13 (4), that when it finds that an intrastate rate causes “any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce . . .” it shall prescribe such rate as, in its judgment, will remove the discrimination. Note 1, supra. The Commission’s finding No. 7 meets this requirement. The Commission there finds that the maintenance of the existing intrastate rates within Florida “on bases lower than those herein approved causes, and in the future will cause, (1) in all instances, unjust discrimination against interstate commerce . . . .” 278 I. C. C. at 73. If supported by adequate subsidiary findings, this ultimate finding thus sustains the authority of the Commission and the validity of its order. North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 514; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1; 282 U. S. 194; United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70. The court below adds that it is “clear from the evidence in the case that it [the existing intrastate rate] did result in undue, unreasonable and unjust discrimination against interstate commerce . . . .” 101 F. Supp. 941, 945. The nature and adequacy of the findings necessary to support an ultimate finding of “unjust discrimination against interstate commerce” were considered in North Carolina v. United States, supra. In that case this Court held that the Commission’s findings were not adequate to support the Commission’s order to raise state-wide intrastate passenger rates from 1.65 cents per mile to 2.2 cents per mile, although the latter rate was prescribed by the Commission as a minimum rate for comparable interstate passenger service on the same lines and trains. The finding which was primarily needed, and was there found lacking, was one that the intrastate service at 1.65 cents per mile did not contribute its fair share of the earnings required to meet maintenance and operating costs and to yield a fair return on the value of the property directed to the transportation service, both interstate and intrastate. This Court held that the mere disparity between the rates for comparable intrastate and interstate service was not enough per se to establish the requisite unjust discrimination. Confronted with evidence that the interstate rate of 2.2 cents per mile was above a reasonable rate level for comparable intrastate passenger service, a finding supported by evidence was held to be necessary to show the contrary. Such a finding, lacking in the North Carolina case, is supplied here by finding No. 3, which states that the “intrastate rates . . . herein approved will not exceed a just and reasonable level.” 278 I. C. C. at 72. In the North Carolina case there was no finding that the existing intrastate rate was inadequate. In fact, its ample adequacy was indicated by evidence of an extraordinarily large volume of available traffic and profits. In contrast, the Commission, in the instant case, has found that the existing "Florida intrastate rates . . . which are below the [proposed] level herein authorized, are abnormally low and are not contributing their fair share to the revenues . . . and that the burden thus cast upon interstate commerce is undue to the extent that these intrastate rates . . . are less than they would be on the basis herein approved.” Finding No. 5, id., at 72-73, and see 45-59. The report adds that “the revenue loss as estimated by the respondents [railroads] because of the failure to authorize the increases herein sought is $915,325 a year.” Id., at 65. Whereas in the North Carolina case there was evidence to indicate that the conditions in that State were more favorable to profitable intrastate transportation of passengers than in the Nation at large, here the Commission’s finding No. 2 expressly states that “the transportation conditions incident to the intrastate transportation of freight in Florida are not more favorable and such conditions in the Florida peninsula are somewhat less favorable than those (1) within southern territory and (2) between Florida and interstate points.” Id., at 72, and see 63-67. Supporting the conclusion that the proposed increase in the Florida intrastate freight rates will not drive away business but will prove profitable and reasonable, the Commission in its finding No. 6 says that “the establishment of intrastate rates . . . increased sufficiently to equal the level herein approved will substantially increase respondents’ [railroads’] revenues therefrom, and will constitute not more than a fair proportion of respondents’ total income . . . .” Id., at 73. The foregoing findings cover the needs emphasized in the North Carolina case. They go far beyond the bare disparity between the existing intrastate rate and the proposed minimum rate which is in substantial uniformity with the interstate rate. These findings demonstrate that the proposed rate in Florida will be within the zone of reasonableness and, in the opinion of the Commission, will cause the intrastate freight traffic to contribute a fair share of the earnings. The Commission has applied to the Florida operations the same conclusion it reached as to the need for increased revenue on a national basis and has distributed the burden within Florida along the same lines it followed when estimating the revenues available in the southern territory from intrastate as well as interstate operations. In the absence of any showing that it is not applicable to Florida, the evidence which forms the basis of the Commission’s nationwide order becomes the natural basis for its Florida order. The Commission in the instant case has provided that these “findings are without prejudice to the right of the authorities of the State of Florida, or any other interested party, to apply for a modification thereof as to any specific intrastate rates ... on the ground that they are not related to the interstate rates ... on like traffic in such a way as to' contravene the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.” Id., at 74. Certain of the rates in the original order already have been modified or removed from that order. 101 F. Supp. at 946. No question has been raised here as to the adequacy of the evidence upon which any of the findings are based. Although no such point is urged, supporting evidence appears in the record of the “full hearing” under § 13 (4), all of which was introduced in evidence in the court below. Much of the factual material that was before the Commission in Ex Parte No. 162 and Ex Parte No. 166, and the reports in those cases, were before the Commission and the court below in the present proceedings. To permit such material and reports to be applied under § 15a but not under § 13 (4) would be contrary to the complementary nature of those sections. “The decision in the first proceeding, that the increase in interstate rates was reasonable, was made in the hope that the state commissions would bring intrastate rates into harmony. When they failed to do so, the Commission reaffirmed its finding that the new interstate rates were reasonable and found that the intrastate rates must be raised in order that the intrastate traffic may bear its fair share of the revenue burden. It is plain from the nature of the inquiry that the rate level, to which both classes of traffic were raised, was found reasonable on the basis of the trafile as a whole. Where the conditions under which interstate and intrastate traffic move are found to be substantially the same with respect to all factors bearing on the reasonableness of the rate, and the two classes are shown to be intimately bound together, there is no occasion to deal with the reasonableness of the intrastate rates more specifically, or to separate intrastate and interstate costs and revenues. Compare American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617; United States v. Louisiana, supra [290 U. S. 70]; Florida v. United States, ante [292 U. S.], p. 1.” Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 483-484. See also, Montana v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 778, 783. The appellants point out that in the North Carolina case, this Court mentioned the absence of other findings. Those, however, are not needed to sustain an order already supported by such findings as have been made in this case. For example, the North Carolina case mentions the absence in that case of a finding that the existing 1.65 cent per mile intrastate passenger rate was confiscatory. Such a finding, supported by competent evidence, would have provided a constitutional ground for enjoining the state rate. See Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Conley, 236 U. S. 605; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585. The Interstate Commerce Commission’s jurisdiction over intrastate rates, however, is not limited to cases where those rates are confiscatory. It is sufficient that the existing intrastate rates cause “unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” In that event, § 13 (4) directs the Commission to prescribe intrastate rates that will remove the discrimination without raising the rate beyond the zone of reasonableness. See United States v. Louisiana, supra, at 74-75; Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194, 211; Wisconsin R. Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 585-586. Similarly, the North Carolina case mentions, but does not make indispensable, the specific findings in dollars which were absent there. Reference was made in the North Carolina case to the absence of “findings as to what contribution from intrastate traffic would constitute a fair proportion of the railroad’s total income” and also to the absence of any “finding as to what amount of revenue was required to enable these railroads to operate efficiently.” 325 U. S. at 516. The Court emphasized the Commission’s reliance on “the mere existence of a disparity between what it said was a reasonable interstate rate and the intrastate rate fixed by North Carolina.” Ibid. In the instant case the Commission does not rely upon the mere disparity between the intrastate and interstate rates. On the contrary, the Commission states that the Florida intrastate rates “are abnormally low and are not contributing their fair share to the revenues required ... to render adequate and efficient service and to operate profitably, and thereby accomplish the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act . . . .” Finding No. 5, 278 I. C. C. at 72. Also, in finding No. 6, it says that the establishment of the proposed increases in intrastate rates “will substantially increase respondents’ revenues therefrom, and will constitute not more than a fair proportion of respondents’ total income . . . .” Id., at 73. More is not needed. It is not necessary, for general revenue purposes, to establish for each item in each freight rate a fully developed rate case. “[T]he administrative arm of the Commission [would be] paralyzed, if instead of adjudicating upon the rates in a large territory on evidence deemed typical of the whole rate structure, it were obliged to consider the reasonableness of each individual rate before carrying into effect the necessary increased schedule.” United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 75-76, and see 78-79. See also, Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, 292 U. S. 474, 483; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1, 9; Georgia P. S. Commission v. United States, 283 U. S. 765, 774; Wisconsin R. Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 588. Where the Commission seeks to deal generally with rates and revenues in a large area on evidence typical of the area as a whole, it may proceed by way of a general order supported by sufficient evidence applicable to the whole territory. At the same time it is well for it to leave the way open, as it did here, for modifications of that general order in specific situations where the general order is not justly applicable. North Carolina v. United States, supra, at 518, 535. For these reasons, we conclude that the findings before us sustain the order of the Commission and that the Commission was authorized to give the weight it did to passenger deficits when prescribing intrastate freight rates. The judgment accordingly is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black is of opinion that the facts found by the Commission were not adequate to support the order and would set aside the order on authority of North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507. “(4) Whenever in any such investigation [where rates made by authority of a state are in issue] the Commission, after full hearing, finds that any such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be observed while in effect by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding.” (Italics supplied.) 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4). §13 (2), 36 Stat. 550, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S. C. § 13 (2); § 15a (2), 54 Stat. 912, 49 U. S. C. § 15a (2); § 1 of the Transportation Act of 1940, inserting a preamble to the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., note preceding § 1. For earlier reports see Ex Parte No. 148, Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 194%, 248 I. C. C. 545. The several proceedings under §§ 15a or 13 (4) referred to in this opinion deal at length with many commodity and other rates or charges besides those which are controlled by the general percentage increases referred to in the opinion. While such variations are important and significant in adjusting each order to specific situations, their consideration is not necessary to the determination of the issues before us. The percentages used in this opinion are those which were adopted by the court below for illustrative purposes. 101 F. Supp. 941, 943-944. In Ex Parte No. 166, 270 I. C. C. 403, 421, the tabulations of overall percentage increases in freight rates include intrastate traffic. The report says: “The table which relates to class I railroads, covers all traffic, intrastate as well as interstate, and assumes increases to have been approved on intrastate traffic similarly to those upon interstate traffic in the same territory, for the whole time.” In referring to revenue from operations for a “constructive,” normal year, the report says: “This estimate is upon the assumption that timely similar adjustments will be made upon intrastate traffic.” Id., at 428. As to rates of return on property values, it adds: “They presuppose that generally similar increases will be permitted by State authorities on intrastate traffic, or may become effective otherwise.” Id., at 437. See also, 269 I. C. C. at 39, 94-95, and 270 I. C. C. at 440. In response to requests based upon Ex Parte No. 162, supra, the Florida Commission granted the original 20% general increase in intrastate freight rates but declined to allow increases in intrastate rates on logs moving to the mills, wet phosphate moving from the washer to the drying plant, waste wood moving to retort or recovery plant and sugar cane moving to the mills. It also limited rate increases on pulpwood to 9%. In response to requests to conform to Ex Parte No. 166, supra, the Florida Commission granted the additional 20% general increase in intrastate freight rates, but declined to approve the further 5% increase. It also made specific exceptions in favor of certain commodities. As the issues with which we are concerned are sufficiently raised by the Florida Commission’s action denying the final 5% increase, we confine our discussion to that item. While the Commission states that its conclusions differ from those in the proposed report of the examiner, they do not so differ on the issues before us. For other decisions of the Commission as to intrastate rates under § 13 (3) and (4), growing out of Ex Parte Nos. 162 or 166, supra, see Increases in Alabama Freight Rates and Charges, 274 I. C. C. 439; Texas Intrastate Rates, 273 I. C. C. 749; Increases in Tennessee Freight Rates and Charges, 272 I. C. C. 625. See also, Increases in Arizona Freight Rates and Charges, 270 I. C. C. 105. A recent decision, growing out of Ex Parte No. 168, Increased Freight Rates, 1948, 276 I. C. C. 9, is Montana Intrastate Freight Rates and Charges, 284 I. C. C. 167. The intrastate rates there ordered into effect by the Commission were set aside in Montana v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 778, and 786; judgment vacated and cause remanded by this Court for further consideration in the light of the instant case, post, p. 905. The Commission there said: “We know of no provision of law under which we should be justified in increasing freight rates to provide a return upon property used exclusively in the passenger service, much less to take care of losses incurred in such service. In our opinion each branch of the service should contribute its proper share of the cost of operation and of return upon the property devoted to the use of the public.” 31 I. C. C. at 392. Passenger service involves not only transportation of people but of mail, express, baggage, milk and other “head-end” services requiring the speed and service of passenger trains. These operations have shown a national operating deficit in each year from 1936 through 1948. 276 I. C. C. at 38. “. . . Between the end of 1923 and the beginning of the present year [1948], the miles of line operated in passenger service of the class I roads decreased from 224,762 to 159,373 ... or 29.1 percent in 26 years. ... In addition to total abandonments, much curtailment of service has occurred, which is impossible to portray statistically. "... From 1923 through 1933 both the number of passengers carried and the revenues from passenger fares declined uninterruptedly. Passengers carried declined from slightly less than 1 billion in the earlier year to less than half that figure, or 433 millions, in round numbers, in the later year. Revenues from passenger fares fell from $1,148 millions to $329 millions, a decline between these 2 years of more than 70 percent. This development was accompanied, except for 1 year, by an uninterrupted increase in the passenger service operating ratio from 81.29 percent in 1923 to 101.22 percent in 1930, the latter being the first year of the 11 years 1920-30 in which there was an operating deficit in this service. Since that year there has been an annual operating deficit in passenger service, except during the war years 1942-45. 276 I. C. C. at 36, 40; see also, pp. 14^31 for data as to value, revenue, expenses, operating income, rate of return, traffic, efficiency, etc., and pp. 32-40 as to passenger deficits. See Moulton, The American Transportation Problem, c. V (1933); 63d, 64th and 65th Annual Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, at pp. 3, 5 and 41, respectively. “In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Commission shall give due consideration, among other factors, to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic by the carrier or carriers for which the rates are prescribed; to the need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient railway transportation service at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service; and to the need of revenues sufficient to enable the carriers, under honest, economical, and efficient management to provide such service.” 54 Stat. 912, 49 U. S. C. § 15a (2). “It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discrimina-tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions;- — all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.” 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C., note preceding § 1. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, and Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Conley, 236 U. S. 605, favor, rather than oppose, this position. In those cases this Court enjoined state authorities from attempting to restrict an intrastate railroad to con-fiseatorily low freight or passenger rates. Such action, however, carried no implication that the United States’ authority to provide relief is limited to cases of threatened confiscation. In the instant ease the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized by Congress, under §§ 15a (2) and 13 (4), to override state-prescribed rates which unjustly discriminate against interstate commerce, whether or not the state rates are also confiscatory. “2. That the transportation conditions incident to the intrastate transportation of freight in Florida are not more favorable and such conditions in the Florida peninsula are somewhat less favorable than those (1) within southern territory and (2) between Florida and interstate points. “3. That the present interstate freight rates and charges within Florida and between points in Florida and points in other States are just and reasonable . . . and that intrastate rates, charges, and minimum weights herein approved will not exceed a just and reasonable level. “5. That the Florida intrastate rates, charges, and minimum weights, which are below the level herein authorized, are abnormally low and are not contributing their fair share to the revenues required by respondents to enable them to render adequate and efficient service and to operate profitably, and thereby accomplish the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act, and as set forth in the national transportation policy declared by the Congress, to develop and preserve a national transportation system adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the postal service, and of the national defense; and that the burden thus cast upon interstate commerce is undue to the extent that these intrastate rates and charges are less than they would be on the basis herein approved. “6. That the establishment of intrastate rates and charges increased sufficiently to equal the level herein approved will substantially increase respondents’ revenues therefrom, and will constitute not more than a fair proportion of respondents’ total income .... “7. That the maintenance of intrastate rates and charges within Florida on bases lower than those herein approved causes, and in the future will cause, (1) in all instances, unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, (2) in nearly all instances, undue preference of and advantage to localities in intrastate commerce, and undue prejudice to localities in interstate commerce; .... “8. That this unjust discrimination and undue prejudice should be removed by establishing intrastate rates and charges between points in Florida which will reflect the same increases as are, and for the future may be, maintained by respondents on like interstate traffic to and from Florida, and within Florida under our authorizations in Ex Parte No. 162 and Ex Parte No. 166, modified as herein indicated and as proposed before the Florida commission in proceedings referred to herein: ... (5) that no intrastate rate or charge shall be increased so that it will exceed the lowest level of the corresponding rates or charges contemporaneously maintained generally on interstate traffic to and from Florida points in the period from August 21, 1948, to, but not including, January 11, 1949; .... “These findings are without prejudice to the right of the authorities of the State of Florida, or any other interested, party, to apply for a modification thereof as to any specific intrastate rates or charges on the ground that they are not related to the interstate rates or charges on like traffic in such a way as to contravene the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.” (Italics supplied.) 278 I. C. C. at 72-74. An alternative provision of § 13 (4) is that whenever in such an investigation the Commission finds that an intrastate rate causes “any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand ... it shall prescribe the rate . . . thereafter to be charged ... in such manner as, in its judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination.” Note 1, supra. On this point the Commission’s finding No. 7 states that the maintenance of intrastate rates in Florida “on bases lower than those herein approved causes, and in the future will cause ... (2) in nearly all instances, undue preference of and advantage to localities in intrastate commerce, and undue prejudice to localities in interstate commerce; . . . .” 278 I. C. C. at 73. As to this alternative provision, see also, Wisconsin R. Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563; Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342. In view of the above restricted finding and of the doubt expressed by the court below as to the ability of the Commission to sustain its action on that ground, we place no reliance upon this alternative here. See Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States, supra; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1; United States v. Louisiana, supra; Louisiana P. S. Commission v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 284 U. S. 125; Alabama v. United States, 283 U. S. 776; Georgia P. S. Commission v. United States, 283 U. S. 765; New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591; Wisconsin R. Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563. In its report the Commission says “where, as is the case here, the intrastate and the interstate traffic, as a whole, moves under substantially similar conditions, and the expense of handling the two classes of traffic are inextricably woven together, an attempt to do the impossible, namely an attempt to show costs of intrastate service segregated from interstate costs, together with similarly segregated valuation of carrier property, would serve no useful purpose.” 278 I. C. C. at 66.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

POSADAS de PUERTO RICO ASSOCIATES, dba CONDADO HOLIDAY INN v. TOURISM COMPANY OF PUERTO RICO et al. No. 84-1903. Argued April 28, 1986 Decided July 1, 1986 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., 'post, p. 348, and Stevens, J., post, p. 359, filed dissenting opinions, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Maria Milagros Soto argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. Lino J. Saldana argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Inc., by David S. Versfelt and C. Evan Stewart; for the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., et al. by Carl R. Ramey, Timothy B. Dyk, Sally Katzen, Valerie G. Schulte, and L. Stanley Paige; for the American Civil Liberties Union by M. Margaret McKeown, Burt Neubome, and Charles S. Sims; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Peter O. Shinevar, and Laurence Gold; for the American Newspaper Publishers Association by P. Cameron DeVore, Marshall J. Nelson, and W. Terry Maguire; and for the National Broadcasting Co., Inc., by Floyd Abrams, Dean Ringel, Corydon B. Dunham, and Howard Monderer. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Atlantic City Casino Association by Herbert J. Miller, Jr., and David 0. Stewart; and for the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., by Gilbert H. Weil. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we address the facial constitutionality of a Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, doing business in Puerto Rico as Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, filed suit against appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section. Appellant sought a declaratory judgment that the statute and regulations, both facially and as applied by the Tourism Company, impermissibly suppressed commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment and the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court held that the advertising restrictions had been unconstitutionally applied to appellant’s past conduct. But the court adopted a narrowing construction of the statute and regulations and held that, based on such a construction, both were facially constitutional. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed an appeal on the ground that it “d[id] not present a substantial constitutional question.” We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 474 U. S. 917 (1985). We now hold that we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and we affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico with respect to the facial constitutionality of the advertising restrictions. In 1948, the Puerto Rico Legislature legalized certain forms of casino gambling. The Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act), authorized the playing of roulette, dice, and card games in licensed “gambling rooms.” §2, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §71 (1972). Bingo and slot machines were later added to the list of authorized games of chance under the Act. See Act of June 7, 1948, No. 21, § 1 (bingo); Act of July 30, 1974, No. 2, pt. 2, §2 (slot machines). The legislature’s intent was set forth in the Act’s Statement of Motives: “The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of tourism by means of the authorization of certain games of chance which are customary in the recreation places of the great tourist centers of the world, and by the establishment of regulations for and the strict surveillance of said games by the government, in order to ensure for tourists the best possible safeguards, while at the same time opening for the Treasurer of Puerto Rico an additional source of income.” Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948, § 1. The Act also provided that “[n]o gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.” §8, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §77 (1972). The Act authorized the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico to issue and enforce regulations implementing the various provisions of the Act. See § 7(a), codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §76a (1972). Appellee Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, a public corporation, assumed the regulatory powers of the Economic Development Administration under the Act in 1970. See Act of June 18, J.970, No. 10, § 17, codified at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 23, §671p (Supp. 1983). The two regulations at issue in this case were originally issued in 1957 for the purpose of implementing the advertising restrictions contained in §8 of the Act. Regulation 76-218 basically reiterates the language of § 8. See 15 R. & R. P. R. § 76-218 (1972). Regulation 76a-l(7), as amended in 1971, provides in pertinent part: “No concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the gambling parlors to the public in Puerto Rico. The advertising of our games of chance is hereby authorized through newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other publicity media outside Puerto Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by the Tourism Development Company of the advertisement to be submitted in draft to the Company.” 15 R. & R. P. R. §76a-l(7) (1972). In 1975, appellant Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, a partnership organized under the laws of Texas, obtained a franchise to operate a gambling casino and began doing business under the name Condado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino. In 1978, appellant was twice fined by the Tourism Company for violating the advertising restrictions in the Act and implementing regulations. Appellant protested the fines in a series of letters to the Tourism Company. On February 16, 1979, the Tourism Company issued to all casino franchise holders a memorandum setting forth the following interpretation of the advertising restrictions: “This prohibition includes the use of the word ‘casino’ in matchbooks, lighters, envelopes, inter-office and/or external correspondence, invoices, napkins, brochures, menus, elevators, glasses, plates, lobbies, banners, fly-ers, paper holders, pencils, telephone books, directories, bulletin boards or in any hotel dependency or object which may be accessible to the public in Puerto Rico.” App. 7a. Pursuant to this administrative interpretation, the Tourism Company assessed additional fines against appellant. The Tourism Company ordered appellant to pay the outstanding total of $1,500 in fines by March 18, 1979, or its gambling franchise would not be renewed. Appellant continued to protest the fines, but ultimately paid them without seeking judicial review of the decision of the Tourism Company. In July 1981, appellant was again fined for violating the advertising restrictions. Faced with another threatened non-renewal of its gambling franchise, appellant paid the $500 fine under protest. Appellant then filed a declaratory judgment action against the Tourism Company in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, seeking a declaration that the Act and implementing regulations, both facially and as applied by the Tourism Company, violated appellant’s commercial speech rights under the United States Constitution. The Puerto Rico Secretary of Justice appeared for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute and regulations. After a trial, the Superior Court held that “[t]he administrative interpretation and application has [sic] been capricious., arbitrary, erroneous and unreasonable, and has [sic] produced absurd results which are contrary to law.” App. to Juris. Statement 29b. The court therefore determined that it must “override the regulatory deficiency to save the constitutionality of the statute.” The court reviewed the history of casino gambling in Puerto Rico and concluded: “. . .We assume that the legislator was worried about the participation of the residents of Puerto Rico on what on that date constituted an experiment.... Therefore, he prohibited the gaming rooms from announcing themselves or offering themselves to the public — which we reasonably infer are the bona fide residents of Puerto Rico. . . . [WJhat the legislator foresaw and prohibited was the invitation to play at the casinos through publicity campaigns or advertising in Puerto Rico addressed to the resident of Puerto Rico. He wanted to protect him.” Id., at 32b. Based on this view of the legislature’s intent, the court issued a narrowing construction of the statute, declaring that “the only advertisement prohibited by the law originally is that which is contracted with an advertising agency, for consideration, to attract the resident to bet at the dice, card, roulette and bingo tables.” Id., at 33b-34b. The court also issued the following narrowing construction of Regulation 76a-l(7): “. . . Advertisements of the casinos in Puerto Rico are prohibited in the local publicity media addressed to inviting the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casinos. “We hereby allow, within the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico, advertising by the casinos addressed to tourists, provided they do not invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino, even though said announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident. Within the ads of casinos allowed by this regulation figure, for illustrative purposes only, advertising distributed or placed in landed airplanes or cruise ships in jurisdictional waters and in restricted areas to travelers only in the international airport and the docks where tourist cruise ships arrive since the principal objective of said announcements is to make the tourist in transit through Puerto Rico aware of the availability of the games of chance as a tourist amenity; the ads of casinos in magazines for distribution primarily in Puerto Rico to the tourist, including the official guide of the Tourism Company ‘Que Pasa in Puerto Rico’ and any other tourist facility guide in Puerto Rico, even though said magazines may be available to the residents and in movies, television, radio, newspapers and trade magazines which may be published, taped, or filmed in the exterior for tourism promotion in the exterior even though they may be exposed or incidentally circulated in Puerto Rico. For example: an advertisement in the New York Times, an advertisement in CBS which reaches us through Cable TV, whose main objective is to reach the potential tourist. “We hereby authorize advertising in the mass communication media of the country, where the trade name of the hotel is used even though it may contain a reference to the casino provided that the word casino is never used alone nor specified. Among the announcements allowed, by way of illustration, are the use of the trade name with which the hotel is identified for the promotion of special vacation packages and activities at the hotel, in invitations, ‘billboards/ bulletins and programs or activities sponsored by the hotel. The use of the trade name, including the reference to the casino is also allowed in the hotel’s facade, provided the word ‘casino’ does not exceed in proportion the size of the rest of the name, and the utilization of lights and colors will be allowed if the rest of the laws regarding this application are complied with; and in the menus, napkins, glasses, tableware, glassware and other items used within the hotel, as well as in calling cards, envelopes and letterheads of the hotel and any other use which constitutes a means of identification. “The direct promotion of the casinos within the premises of the hotels is allowed. In-house guests and clients may receive any type of information and promotion regarding the location of the casino, its schedule and the procedure of the games as well as magazines, souvenirs, stirrers, matchboxes, cards, dice, chips, T-shirts, hats, photographs, postcards and similar items used by the tourism centers of the world. “Since a clausus enumeration of this regulation is unforeseeable, any other situation or incident relating to the legal restriction must be measured in light of the public policy of promoting tourism. If the object of the advertisement is the tourist, it passes legal scrutiny.” Id., at 38b-40b. The court entered judgment declaring that appellant’s constitutional rights had been violated by the Tourism Company’s past application of the advertising restrictions, but that the restrictions were not facially unconstitutional and could be sustained, as “modified by the guidelines issued by this Court on this date.” Id., at 42b. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed appellant’s appeal of the Superior Court’s decision on the ground that it “d[id] not present a substantial constitutional question.” Id., at la. See P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 4, §37(a) (1978). Treating appellant’s submission as a petition for a writ of review, see §§ 37(b), (g), the Supreme Court denied the petition. One judge dissented. We hold that we have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. A federal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1258(2), specifically authorizes an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico “where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.” A careful review of the record in this case reveals that appellant’s federal constitutional claims were adequately raised at every stage of the proceedings below. In a letter to the Tourism Company on February 24, 1982, prior to filing suit, appellant warned that, absent a reinterpretation of the advertising restrictions by the Tourism Company, “we have no choice but to challenge in Court the constitutionality and or validity of the advertising prohibition of the Act and Regulations.” App. to Juris. Statement 6h. In its complaint, appellant claimed that the advertising restrictions “violat[ed] the constitutional rights of petitioner protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ...[,] the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws protected by the Constitution of the United States . . . [and] the constitutional guarantee of due process of law . . . Id., at 4i. And in the bill of appeal to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, appellant claimed that the advertising restrictions violated “the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” id., at 5c, along with “due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution” and “the equal protection of the laws,” id., at 6c. Under Puerto Rico law, appellant had the right to appeal the Superior Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on the ground that that case “involv[ed] or decid[ed] a substantial constitutional question under the Constitution of the United States.” P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 4, §37(a) (1978). The Supreme Court’s dismissal of appellant’s appeal for want of “a substantial constitutional question” therefore constituted a decision on the merits in favor of the validity of the challenged statute and regulations. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 515 (1927). In such a situation, we have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1258(2). The Tourism Company argues, however, that appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, in violation of Rule 53.1 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the Tourism Company, this flaw is fatal to appellant’s right to seek review in this Court. We do not agree. The requirement under Rule 53.1 that a notice of appeal be timely filed with the clerk of the reviewing court has been held by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to be nonjurisdictional. See Morales v. Mendez Mas, 109 P. R. R. 1136 (1980). In this case, the Supreme Court did not dismiss appellant’s appeal on timeliness grounds, so we can only assume that the court waived the timeliness requirement, as it had the power to do. Appellant’s late filing of the notice of appeal does not affect our jurisdiction. Before turning to the merits of appellant’s First Amendment claim, we must address an additional preliminary matter. Although we have not heretofore squarely addressed the issue in the context of a case originating in Puerto Rico, we think it obvious that, in reviewing the facial constitutionality of the challenged statute and regulations, we must abide by the narrowing constructions announced by the Superior Court and approved sub silentio by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. This would certainly be the rule in a case originating in one of the 50 States. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). And we believe that Puerto Rico’s status as a Commonwealth dictates application of the same rule. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 672-673 (1974) (noting with approval decisions of lower federal courts holding that Puerto Rico is to be deemed “sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution”); Wackenhut Corp. v. Aponte, 266 F. Supp. 401, 405 (PR 1966) (Puerto Rico “should have the primary opportunity through its courts to determine the intended scope of its own legislation”), aff’d, 386 U. S. 268 (1967). Because this case involves the restriction of pure commercial speech which does “no more than propose a commercial transaction,” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), our First Amendment analysis is guided by the general principles identified in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557 (1980). See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U. S. 626, 637-638 (1985). Under Central Hudson, commercial speech receives a limited form of First Amendment protection so long as it concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent. Once it is determined that the First Amendment applies to the particular kind of commercial speech at issue, then the speech may be restricted only if the government’s interest in doing so is substantial, the restrictions directly advance the government’s asserted interest, and the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 447 U. S., at 566. The particular kind of commercial speech at issue here, namely, advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading or fraudulent, at least in the abstract. We must therefore proceed to the three remaining steps of the Central Hudson analysis in order to determine whether Puerto Rico’s advertising restrictions run afoul of the First Amendment. The first of these three steps involves an assessment of the strength of the government’s interest in restricting the speech. The interest at stake in this case, as determined by the Superior Court, is the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant acknowledged the existence of this interest in its February 24, 1982, letter to the Tourism Company. See App. to Juris. Statement 2h (“The legislators wanted the tourists to flock to the casinos to gamble, but not our own people”). The Tourism Company’s brief before this Court explains the legislature’s belief that “[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents . . . would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime.” Brief for Appellees 37. These are some of the very same concerns, of course, that have motivated the vast majority of the 50 States to prohibit casino gambling. We have no difficulty in concluding that the Puerto Rico Legislature’s interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens constitutes a “substantial” governmental interest. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 54 (1986) (city has substantial interest in “preserving the quality of life in the community at large”). The last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the- “fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. Step three asks the question whether the challenged restrictions on commercial speech “directly advance” the government’s asserted interest. In the instant case, the answer to this question is clearly “yes.” The Puerto Rico Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted the advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase the demand for the product advertised. We think the legislature’s belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that appellant has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court indicates that appellant shares the legislature’s view. See Central Hudson, supra, at 569 (“There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales”); cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 509 (1981) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (finding third prong of Central Hudson test satisfied where legislative judgment “not manifestly unreasonable”). Appellant argues, however, that the challenged advertising restrictions are underinclusive because other kinds of gambling such as horse racing, cockfighting, and the lottery may be advertised to the residents of Puerto Rico. Appellant’s argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, whether other kinds of gambling are advertised in Puerto Rico or not, the restrictions on advertising of casino gambling “directly advance” the legislature’s interest in reducing demand for games of chance. See id., at 511 (plurality opinion of White, J.) (“[WJhether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising”). Second, the legislature’s interest, as previously identified, is not necessarily to reduce demand for. all games of chance, but to reduce demand for casino gambling. According to the Superior Court, horse racing, cockfighting, “picas,” or small games of chance at fiestas, and the lottery “have been traditionally part of the Puerto Rican’s roots,” so that “the legislator could have been more flexible than in authorizing more sophisticated games which are not so widely sponsored by the people.” App. to Juris. Statement 35b. In other words, the legislature felt that for Puerto Ricans the risks associated with casino gambling were significantly greater than those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto Rico. In our view, the legislature’s separate classification of casino gambling, for purposes of the advertising ban, satisfies the third step of the Central Hudson analysis. We also think it clear beyond peradventure that the challenged statute and regulations satisfy the fourth and last step of the Central Hudson analysis, namely, whether the restrictions on commercial speech are no more extensive than necessary to serve the government’s interest. The narrowing constructions of the advertising restrictions announced by the Superior Court ensure that the restrictions will not affect advertising of casino gambling aimed at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico. See also n. 7, infra; cf. Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp, 699 F. 2d 490, 501 (CA10 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691 (1984). Appellant contends, however, that the First Amendment requires the Puerto Rico Legislature to reduce demand for casino gambling among the residents of Puerto Rico not by suppressing commercial speech that might encourage such gambling, but by promulgating additional speech designed to discourage it. We reject this contention. We think it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a “counterspeech” policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising. The legislature could conclude, as it apparently did here, that residents of Puerto Rico are already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct. Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (DC 1971) (three-judge court) (“Congress had convincing evidence that the Labeling Act of 1965 had not materially reduced the incidence of smoking”), summarily aff’d sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 (1972); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F. 2d 738, 751 (CA5 1983) (en banc) (“We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place and manner restriction, such as a disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state’s concern is not that the public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol. . . . The concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption despite known dangers”), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1259 (1984). In short, we conclude that the statute and regulations at issue in this case, as construed by the Superior Court, pass muster under each prong of the Central Hudson test. We therefore hold that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico properly rejected appellant’s First Amendment claim. Appellant argues, however, that the challenged advertising restrictions are constitutionally defective under our decisions in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975). In Carey, this Court struck down a ban on any “advertisement or display” of contraceptives, 431 U. S., at 700-702, and in Bigelow, we reversed a criminal conviction based on the advertisement of an abortion clinic. We think appellant’s argument ignores a crucial distinction between the Carey and Bigelow decisions and the instant case. In Carey and Bigelow, the underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the State. Here, on the other hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether. In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite. Appellant also makes the related argument that, having chosen to legalize casino gambling for residents of Puerto Rico, the legislature is prohibited by the First Amendment from using restrictions on advertising to accomplish its goal of reducing demand for such gambling. We disagree. In our view, appellant has the argument backwards. As we noted in the preceding paragraph, it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising. It would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners such as appellant to gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico, only to thereby force the legislature into banning casino gambling by residents altogether. It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased demand. Legislative regulation of products or activities deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution, has varied from outright prohibition on the one hand, see, e. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 647(b) (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting soliciting or engaging in act of prostitution), to legalization of the product or activity with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand, see, e. g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§244.345(1), (8) (1986) (authorizing licensing of houses of prostitution except in counties with more than 250,000 population), §§201.430, 201.440 (prohibiting advertising of houses of prostitution “[i]n any public theater, on the public streets of any city or town, or on any public highway,” or “in [a] place of business”). To rule out the latter, intermediate kind of response would require more than we find in the First Amendment. Appellant’s final argument in opposition to the advertising restrictions is that they are unconstitutionally vague. In particular, appellant argues that the statutory language, “to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities,” and “the public of Puerto Rico,” are not sufficiently defined to satisfy the requirements of due process. Appellant also claims that the term “anunciarse,” which appears in the controlling Spanish version of the statute, is actually broader than the English term “to advertise,” and could be construed to mean simply “to make known.” Even assuming that appellant’s argument has merit with respect to the bare statutory language, however, we have already noted that we are bound by the Superior Court’s narrowing construction of the statute. Viewed in light of that construction, and particularly with the interpretive assistance of the implementing regulations as modified by the Superior Court, we do not find the statute unconstitutionally vague. For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico that, as construed by the Superior Court, § 8 of the Games of Chance Act of 1948 and the implementing regulations do not facially violate the First Amendment or the due process or equal protection guarantees of the Constitution, is affirmed. It is so ordered. We have held that Puerto Rico is subject to the First Amendment Speech Clause, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U. S. 298, 314 (1922), the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 668-669, n. 5 (1974), and the equal protection guarantee of either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment, Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 599-601 (1976). See generally Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465, 468-471 (1979). The hotel was purchased in 1983 by Williams Electronics Corporation, is now organized as a public corporation under Delaware law as Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, Inc., and does business in Puerto Rico as Condado Plaza Hotel and Casino. News of the Tourism Company’s decision to levy the fine against appellant reached the New Jersey Gaming Commission, and caused the Commission to consider denying a petition filed by appellant’s parent company for a franchise to operate a casino in that State. In addition to its decision concerning the advertising restrictions, the Superior Court declared unconstitutional a regulation, 15 R. & R. P. R. § 76a-4(e) (1972), that required male casino patrons to wear dinner jackets while in the casino. The court described the dinner jacket requirement as “basically a condition of sex” and found that the legislature “has no reasonable interest which would warrant a dissimilar classification” based on sex. See App. to Juris. Statement 35b-36b. Under Puerto Rico law, the notice of appeal apparently was due in the Clerk’s Office by 5 p.m. on the 30th day following the docketing of the Superior Court’s judgment. Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Rule 48(a). The certificate of the Acting Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico indicates that appellant’s notice of appeal was filed at 5:06 p.m. on the 30th day. A rigid rule of deference to interpretations of Puerto Rico law by Puerto Rico courts is particularly appropriate given the unique cultural and legal history of Puerto Rico. See Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. 102, 105-106 (1923) (Holmes, J.) (“This Court has stated many times the deference due to the understanding of the local courts upon matters of purely local concern. . . . This is especially true in dealing with the decisions of a Court inheriting and brought up in a different system from that which prevails here”). The narrowing construction of the statute and regulations announced by the Superior Court effectively ensures that the advertising restrictions cannot be used to inhibit either the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico to report on any aspect of casino gambling, or the freedom of anyone, including casino owners, to comment publicly on such matters as legislation relating to casino gambling. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U. S. 626, 637-638, n. 7 (1985) (noting that Ohio’s ban on advertising of legal services in Daikon Shield cases “has placed no general restrictions on appellant’s right to publish facts or express opinions regarding Daikon Shield litigation”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 391 (1973) (emphasizing that “nothing in our holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment”); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 35, n. 125 (1979) (such “ ‘political’ dialogue is at the core of. . . the first amendment”). The history of legalized gambling in Puerto Rico supports the Superior Court’s view of the legislature’s intent. Casino gambling was prohibited in Puerto Rico for most of the first half of this century. See Puerto Rico Penal Code, §299, Rev. Stats, and Codes of Porto Rico (1902). The Puerto Rico Penal Code of 1937 made it a misdemeanor to deal, play, carry on, open, or conduct “any game of faro, monte, roulette, fantan, poker, seven and a half, twenty one, hoky-poky, or any game of chance played with cards, dice or any device for money, checks, credit, or other representative of value.” See P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 33, §1241 (1983). This longstanding prohibition of casino gambling stood in stark contrast to the Puerto Rico Legislature’s early legalization of horse racing, see Act of Mar. 10, 1910, No. 23, repealed, Act of Apr. 13, 1916, No. 28, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 181-197 (1972 and Supp. 1985); “picas,” see Act of Apr. 23, 1927, No. 25, § 1, codified, as amended, at P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, § 80 (1972); dog racing, see Act of Apr. 20, 1936, No. 35, repealed, Act of June 4, 1957, No. 10, §1, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §231 (1972) (prohibiting dog racing); cockfighting, see Act of Aug. 12, 1933, No. 1, repealed, Act of May 12, 1942, No. 236, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 292-299 (1972); and the Puerto Rico lottery, see J. R. No. 37, May 14, 1934, repealed, Act of May 15, 1938, No. 212, see P. R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, §§ 111-128 (1972 and Supp. 1985). It should be apparent from our discussion of the First Amendment issue, and particularly the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test, that appellant can fare no better under the equal protection guarantee of the Constitution. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 55, n. 4 (1986). If there is a sufficient “fit” between the legislature’s means and ends to satisfy the concerns of the First Amendment, the same “fit” is surely adequate under the applicable “rational basis” equal protection analysis. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F. 2d 738, 752-753 (CA5 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1259 (1984). Justice Stevens, in dissent, asserts the additional equal protection claim, not raised by appellant either below or in this Court, that the Puerto Rico statute and regulations impermissibly discriminate between different kinds of publications. Post, at 359-360. Justice Stevens misunderstands the nature of the Superior Court’s limiting construction of the statute and regulations. According to the Superior Court, “[i]f the object of [an] advertisement is the tourist, it passes legal scrutiny.” See App. to Juris. Statement 40b. It is clear from the court’s opinion that this basic test applies regardless of whether the advertisement appears in a local or nonlocal publication. Of course, the likelihood that a casino advertisement appearing in the New York Times will be primarily addressed to tourists, and not Puerto Rico residents, is far greater than would be the ease for a similar advertisement appearing in the San Juan Star. But it is simply the demographics of the two newspapers’ readerships, and not any form of “discrimination” on the part of the Puerto Rico Legislature or the Superior Court, which produces this result. See also 15 U. S. C. § 1335 (prohibiting cigarette advertising “on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission”), upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), summarily aff’d sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 (1972); Fla. Stat. § 561.42(10)-(12) (1985) (prohibiting all signs except for one sign per product in liquor store windows); Mass. Gen. Laws § 138:24 (1974) (authorizing Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising); Miss. Code Ann. § 67-1-85 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting most forms of liquor sign advertising), upheld in Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., supra; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4301.03(E), 4301.211 (1982) (authorizing Liquor Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising and prohibiting off-premises advertising of beer prices), upheld in Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N. E. 2d 138, appeal dism’d for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U. S. 807 (1982); Okla. Const., Art. 27, § 5, and Okla. Stat., Tit. 37, § 516 (1981) (prohibiting all liquor advertising except for one storefront sign), upheld in Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp, 699 F. 2d 490 (CA10 1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U. S. 691 (1984); Utah Code Ann. §§ 32-7-26 to 32-7-28 (1974) (repealed 1985) (prohibiting all liquor advertising except for one storefront sign). Justice Stevens claims that the Superior Court’s narrowing construction creates an impermissible “prior restraint” on protected speech, because that court required the submission of certain casino advertising to appellee for its prior approval. See post, at 361. This argument was not raised by appellant either below or in this Court, and we therefore express no view on the constitutionality of the particular portion of the Superior Court’s narrowing construction cited by Justice Stevens.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOOVER et al. v. RONWIN et al. No. 82-1474. Argued January 16, 1984 Decided May 14, 1984 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 582. Rehnquist, J., took no part in the decision of the case. O’Connor, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Charles R. Hoover, pro se, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jefferson L. Lankford and Donn G. Kessler. Philip E. von Ammon filed a brief for the State Bar of Arizona et al. as respondents under this Court’s Rule 19.6, in support of petitioners. Respondent Edward Ronwin argued the cause and filed a brief pro se. Acting Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Baxter, John H. Garvey, Barry Grossman and Nancy C. Garrison Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Conference of Bar Examiners by Kurt W. Melchior, Allan Ashman, and Jan T. Chilton; and for the State Bar of California by Henry C. Thumann, Herbert M. Rosenthal, Truitt A. Richey, Jr., and Robert M. Sweet. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Colorado et al. by Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, Charles 0. Monk II and Linda H. Jones, Assistant Attorneys General, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Thomas P. McMahon, First Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, John R. Perkins, Assistant Attorney General, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Lloyd Constantine, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General of Tennessee, William J. Haynes, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, David R. Richards, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Michael L. Zaleski, Assistant Attorney General. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the state-action doctrine of immunity from actions under the Sherman Act applies to the grading of bar examinations by the Committee appointed by, and according to the Rules of, the Arizona Supreme Court. I Respondent Ronwin was an unsuccessful candidate for admission to the Bar of Arizona in 1974. Petitioners were four members of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Committee on Examinations and Admissions (Committee). The Arizona Constitution vests authority in the court to determine who should be admitted to practice law in the State. Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Comm’n, 127 Ariz. 259, 261-262, 619 P. 2d 1036, 1038-1039 (1980); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §32-275 (1976). Pursuant to that authority, the Arizona Supreme Court established the Committee to examine and recommend applicants for admission to the Arizona Bar. The Arizona Supreme Court Rules, adopted by the court and in effect in 1974, delegated certain responsibilities to the Committee while reserving to the court the ultimate authority to grant or deny admission. The Rules provided that the Committee “shall examine applicants” on subjects enumerated in the Rules and “recommend to th[e] court for admission to practice” applicants found to have the requisite qualifications. Rule 28(a) (1978). They also authorized the Committee to “utilize such grading or scoring system as the Committee deems appropriate in its discretion,” and to use the Multi-State Bar Examination. Rule 28(c) VII A (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxvii, xxxii (1974). Even with respect to “grading or scoring,” the court did not delegate final authority to the Committee. The Rules directed the Committee to file the formula it intended to use in grading the examination with the court 30 days prior to giving the examination. Also, after grading the examination and compiling the list of those applicants whom it considered qualified to practice law in the State, the Committee was directed to submit its recommendations to the court for final action. Rule 28(a). Under the Rules and Arizona case law, only the court had authority to admit or deny admission. Finally, a rejected applicant was entitled to seek individualized review of an adverse recommendation of the Committee by filing a petition directly with the court. The Rules required the Committee to file a response to such a petition and called for a prompt and fair decision on the applicant’s claims by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ronwin took the Arizona bar examination in February 1974. He failed to pass, the Committee recommended to the Arizona Supreme Court that it deny him admission to the Bar, and the court accepted the recommendation. Ronwin petitioned the court to review the manner in which the Committee conducted and graded the examination. In particular, he alleged that the Committee had failed to provide him with model answers to the examination, had failed to file its grading formula with the court within the time period specified in the Rules, had applied a “draconian” pass-fail process, had used a grading formula that measured group, rather than individual, performance, had failed to test applicants on an area of the law on which the Rules required testing, and had conducted the examination in a “pressure-cooker atmosphere.” He further alleged that the Committee’s conduct constituted an abuse of discretion, deprived him of due process and equal protection, and violated the Sherman Act. The court denied his petition and two subsequent petitions for rehearing. Ronwin then sought review of the Arizona Supreme Court’s action in this Court. We denied his petition for certiorari. 419 U. S. 967 (1974). Some four years later, in March 1978, Ronwin filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Petitioners were named as defendants in the suit in their capacity as individual members of the Committee. Ronwin renewed his complaint that petitioners had conspired to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, by “artificially reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona.” The gist of Ronwin’s argument is that the Committee of which petitioners constituted a majority had set the grading scale on the February examination with reference to the number of new attorneys they thought desirable, rather than with reference to some “suitable” level of competence. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In particular, petitioners alleged that, acting as a Committee, they were immune from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Petitioners also argued that Ronwin suffered no damage from the conduct of which he complained and that the Committee's conduct had not affected interstate commerce. The District Court granted petitioners' motion after finding that the complaint failed to state a justiciable claim, that the court had no jurisdiction, and that Ronwin lacked standing. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F. 2d 692 (1982). The Court of Appeals read the District Court’s ruling that Ronwin had failed to state a claim as a holding that bar examination grading procedures are immune from federal antitrust laws under Parker v. Brown. It reasoned that, although petitioners ultimately might be able to show that they are entitled to state-action immunity, the District Court should not have decided this issue on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See 686 F. 2d, at 698. The court stated that under Parker and its progeny, the mere fact that petitioners were state officials appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court was insufficient to confer state-action immunity on them. 686 F. 2d, at 697. Relying on its reading of several recent opinions of this Court, the Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners might be able to invoke the state-action doctrine, but reasoned that they first must show that they were acting pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed . . . state policy.” Id., at 696. Therefore, dismissal for failure to state a claim was improper. The court also held that Ronwin had standing to bring this action. The case was remanded to the District Court for further action. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ application of the state-action doctrine. 461 U. S. 926 (1983). We now reverse. II The starting point in any analysis involving the state-action doctrine is the reasoning of Parker v. Brown. In Parker, the Court considered the antitrust implications of the California Agriculture Prorate Act — a state statute that restricted competition among food producers in California. Relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court declined to construe the Sherman Act as prohibiting the anti-competitive actions of a State acting through its legislature: “We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.” 317 U. S., at 350-351. Thus, under the Court’s rationale in Parker, when a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the State, see id., at 351, and ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws. In the years since the decision in Parker, the Court has had occasion in several cases to determine the scope of the state-action doctrine. It has never departed, however, from Parker’s basic reasoning. Applying the Parker doctrine in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 360 (1977), the Court held that a state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the same position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 790 (1975). Closer analysis is required when the activity at issue is not directly that of the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state authorization. See, e. g., Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982) (municipal regulation of cable television industry); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980) (private price-fixing arrangement authorized by State); New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978) (new franchises controlled by state administrative board). In such cases, it becomes important to ensure that the anti-competitive conduct of the State’s representative was contemplated by the State. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 413-415 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.); see New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F. 2d 363, 369-370 (CA9 1974). If the replacing of entirely free competition with some form of regulation or restraint was not authorized or approved by the State then the rationale of Parker is inapposite. As a result, in cases involving the anticompetitive conduct of a nonsovereign state representative the Court has required a showing that the conduct is pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy” to replace competition with regulation. Boulder, supra, at 54. The Court also has found the degree to which the state legislature or supreme court supervises its representative to be relevant to the inquiry. See Midcal Aluminum, supra, at 105; Goldfarb, supra, at 791. When the conduct is that of the sovereign itself, on the other hand, the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise. Where the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of “clear articulation” and “active supervision.” Pursuant to the State Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court has plenary authority to determine admissions to the Bar. Therefore, the first critical step in our analysis must be to determine whether the conduct challenged here is that of the court. If so, the Parker doctrine applies and Ronwin has no cause of action under the Sherman Act. HH H-1 t — I At issue here is the Arizona plan of determining admissions to the bar, and petitioners’ use thereunder of a grading formula. Ronwin has alleged that petitioners conspired to use that formula to restrain competition among lawyers. His argument is that, although petitioners qualified as state officials in their capacity as members of the Committee, they acted independently of the Arizona Supreme Court. As a result, the argument continues, the Committee's actions are those of a Supreme Court representative, rather than those of the court itself, and therefore are not entitled to immunity. We cannot agree that the actions of the Committee can be divorced from the Supreme Court’s exercise of its sovereign powers. The Court’s opinion in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S., at 360, is directly pertinent. In Bates, two attorneys were suspended temporarily from the practice of law in Arizona for violating a disciplinary rule of the American Bar Association (ABA) that prohibited most lawyer advertising. The Arizona Supreme Court had incorporated the ABA’s advertising prohibition into the local Supreme Court Rules. Those Rules also provided that the Board of Governors of the Arizona State Bar Association, acting on the recommendation of a local Bar disciplinary committee, could recommend the censure or suspension of a member of the Bar for violating the advertising ban. Under the Rules, the Board of Governor’s recommendation automatically would become effective if the aggrieved party did not object to the recommendation within 10 days. If the party objected, he was entitled to have the Arizona Supreme Court review the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors and the local committee. The plaintiffs challenged the Rule on Sherman Act and First Amendment grounds. This Court ultimately concluded that the ABA Rule violated the First Amendment, but it first held that the State Bar Association was immune from Sherman Act liability because its enforcement of the disciplinary Rules was state action. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that, although only the State Bar was named as a defendant in the suit, the suspended attorneys’ complaint was with the State. The Court stated: “[T]he appellants’ claims are against the State. The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process. In re Wilson, 106 Ariz. 34, 470 P. 2d 441 (1970). Although the State Bar plays a part in the enforcement of the rules, its role is completely defined by the court; the [State Bar] acts as the agent of the court under its continuous supervision.” Id., at 361. The opinion and holding in Bates with respect to the state-action doctrine were unanimous. The logic of the Court’s holding in Bates applies with greater force to the Committee and its actions. The petitioners here were each members of an official body selected and appointed by the Arizona Supreme Court. Indeed, it is conceded that they were state officers. The court gave the members of the Committee discretion in compiling and grading the bar examination, but retained strict supervisory powers and ultimate full authority over its actions. The Supreme Court Rules specified the subjects to be tested, and the general qualifications required of applicants for the Bar. With respect to the specific conduct of which Ronwin complained — establishment of an examination grading formula— the Rules were explicit. Rule 28(c) VII A authorized the Committee to determine an appropriate “grading or scoring system” and Rule 28(c) VII B required the Committee to submit its grading formula to the Supreme Court at least 30 days prior to the examination. After giving and grading the examination, the Committee’s authority was limited to making recommendations to the Supreme Court. The court itself made the final decision to grant or deny admission to practice. Finally, Rule 28(c) XII F provided for a detailed mandatory review procedure by which an aggrieved candidate could challenge the Committee’s grading formula. In light of these provisions and the Court’s holding and reasoning in Bates, we conclude that, although the Arizona Supreme Court necessarily delegated the administration of the admissions process to the Committee, the court itself approved the particular grading formula and retained the sole authority to determine who should be admitted to the practice of law in Arizona. Thus, the conduct that Ronwin challenges was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 361. It therefore is exempt from Sherman Act liability under the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown. At oral argument, Ronwin suggested that we should not attribute to the Arizona Supreme Court an intent to approve the anticompetitive activity of petitioners in the absence of proof that the court was aware that petitioners had devised a grading formula the purpose of which was to limit the number of lawyers in the State. This argument misconceives the basis of the state-action doctrine. The reason that state action is immune from Sherman Act liability is not that the State has chosen to act in an anticompetitive fashion, but that the State itself has chosen to act. “There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act’s legislative history.” Parker, 317 U. S., at 351. The Court did not suggest in Parker, nor has it suggested since, that a state action is exempt from antitrust liability only if the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its subordinate officers. The only requirement is that the action be that of “the State acting as a sovereign.” Bates, supra, at 360. The action at issue here, whether anticompetitive or not, clearly was that of the Arizona Supreme Court. > HH The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens would, if it were adopted, alter dramatically the doctrine of state-action immunity. We therefore reply directly. The dissent concedes, as it must, that “the Arizona Supreme Court exercises sovereign power with respect to admission to the Arizona Bar,” and “if the challenged conduct were that of the court, it would be immune under Parker. ” Post, at 588. It also is conceded that the members of the court’s Commitee on Examinations and Admissions — petitioners here — are state officers. These concessions are compelled by the Court’s decision in Bates, and we think they dispose of Ronwin’s contentions. In its effort to distinguish Bates, the dissent notes that the Arizona Supreme Court “is not a petitioner [in this case], nor was it named as a defendant in respondent’s complaint,” and “because respondent is not challenging the conduct of the Arizona Supreme Court, Parker [v. Brown] is simply inapplicable.” Post, at 588, 589. The dissent fails to recognize that this is precisely the situation that existed in Bates. In that case, the Supreme Court of Arizona was not a party in this Court, nor was it named as a defendant by the complaining lawyers. Yet, in our unanimous opinion, we concluded that the claims by appellants in Bates were “against the State,” and that the “Arizona Supreme Court [was] the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it [was] the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process.” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 361; see supra, at 571. The core argument of the dissent is that Ronwin has challenged only the action of the Committee and not that of the Arizona Supreme Court. It states that “there is no claim that the court directed [the Committee] to artificially reduce the number of lawyers in Arizona,” and therefore the Committee cannot assert the sovereign’s antitrust immunity. Post, at 592 (emphasis in original). The dissent does not acknowledge that, conspire as they might, the Committee could not reduce the number of lawyers in Arizona. Only the Arizona Supreme Court had the authority to grant or deny admission to practice in the State. As in Bates “[t]he Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest.” 433 U. S., at 361. The dissent largely ignores the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court. A summary of the court’s commands suggests why the dissent apparently prefers not to address them. The Arizona Supreme Court established the Committee for the sole purpose of examining and recommending applicants for admission to the Bar. Rule 28(a). Its Rules provided: “The examination and admission of applicants . . . shall conform to this Rule. . . . The committee shall examine applicants and recommend [qualified applicants] to this court. . . . Two examinations will be held each year. . . .” Ibid.; Rule 28(c) VI (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxxii (1974) (emphasis added). The Rules also specified the subjects to be tested and required the Committee to submit its grading formula to the court in advance of each examination. Rule 28(c) VII (1973), as amended, 110 Ariz. xxxii (1974). As a further safeguard, a disappointed applicant was accorded the right to seek individualized review by filing a petition directly with the court — as Ronwin did unsuccessfully. Pursuant to Rule 28(c) XII F, Ronwin filed a complaint with the court that contained a plethora of charges including the substance of the complaint in this case. The court denied his petition as well as two petitions for rehearing. See supra, at 564. Thus, again there was state action by the court itself explicitly rejecting Ronwin’s claim. Finally, the case law, as well as the Rules, makes clear that the Arizona Supreme Court made the final decision on each applicant. See n. 6, supra. Unlike the actions of the Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb, the actions of the Committee are governed by the court’s Rules. Those Rules carefully reserve to the court the authority to make the decision to admit or deny, and that decision is the critical state action here. See Bates, 433 U. S., at 359-361. Our opinion, therefore, also is wholly consistent with the Court’s reasoning in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978) and Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982). Our holding is derived directly from the reasoning of Parker and Bates. Those cases unmistakably hold that, where the action complained of — here the failure to admit Ronwin to the Bar — was that of the State itself, the action is exempt from antitrust liability regardless of the State’s motives in taking the action. Application of that standard to the facts of this case requires that we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The reasoning adopted by the dissent would allow Sherman Act plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state sovereigns and base their claims on perceived conspiracies to restrain trade among the committees, commissions, or others who necessarily must advise the sovereign. Such a holding would emasculate the Parker v. Brown doctrine. For example, if a state legislature enacted a law based on studies performed, or advice given, by an advisory committee, the dissent would find the State exempt from Sherman Act liability but not the committee. A party dissatisfied with the new law could circumvent the state-action doctrine by alleging that the committee’s advice reflected an undisclosed collective desire to restrain trade without the knowledge of the legislature. The plaintiff certainly would survive a motion to dismiss — or even summary judgment — despite the fact that the suit falls squarely within the class of cases found exempt from Sherman Act liability in Parker. In summary, this case turns on a narrow and specific issue: who denied Ronwin admission to the Arizona Bar? The dissent argues, in effect, that since there is no court order in the record, the denial must have been the action of the Committee. This argument ignores the incontrovertible fact that under the law of Arizona only the State Supreme Court had authority to admit or deny admission to practice law: “[It] is not the function of the committee to grant or deny admission to the bar. That power rests solely in the Supreme Court. . . .” Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 338, 351 P. 2d 169, 171 (1960) (see n. 30, supra). Thus, if the dissent’s argument were accepted all decisions made with respect to admissions and denials of those who took the examination in February 1974 are void. Ronwin did not allege that he alone was a victim: his complaint avers that he “was among those artificially prevented from entering into competition as an attorney in the state of Arizona ” by the Committee’s action with respect to the February 1974 examination. We are unwilling to assume that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to comply with state law, and allowed the Committee alone to make the decisions with respect to the February 1974 examination. In any event, the record is explicit that Ronwin’s postexamination petition complaining about his denial was rejected by an order of the Arizona Supreme Court. That there was state action at least as to Ronwin could not be clearer. V We conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Ronwin’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision of this case. Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Although petitioners represent only four of the seven members of the Committee at the time of the February 1974 bar examination, Ronwin named all seven members in his original complaint. Apparently, three of the original defendants to this action did not join, for reasons not apparent, the petition for certiorari in this Court. There is no claim that these members of the Committee failed to participate in or dissented from the actions of the Committee. The procedure in Arizona is not unique to that State. In recent years, the burgeoning number of candidates for admission to practice law and the increased complexity of the subjects that must be tested have combined to make grading and administration of bar examinations a burdensome task. As a result, although the highest court in each State retains ultimate authority for granting or denying admission to the bar, each of those courts has delegated to a subordinate committee responsibility for preparing, grading, and administering the examination. See F. Klein, S. Leleiko, & J. Mavity, Bar Admission Rules and Student Practice Rules 30-33 (1978). The parties disagree on the wording of the Rules at the time Ronwin took the bar examination. The disagreement centers around the effective date of some amendments promulgated in 1974. Petitioners contend that the amendments took effect before Ronwin took the February 1974 bar examination; Ronwin submits that they became effective in March 1974. Ronwin concedes that the Supreme Court order amending the Rules provided that the amendments would become effective in January 1974. Notwithstanding this directive, he argues that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-109 (1982) provided that amendments to the Supreme Court’s Rules may not become effective until 60 days after publication and distribution. Since the Supreme Court released the amendments on January 11, Ronwin submits that the earliest possible effective date was March 12. Ronwin has misread § 12-109. That section only applied to Rules that regulated pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial proceedings in state courts. By its terms, the statute did not limit the jurisdiction of the Arizona Supreme Court to establish the terms of admission to practice law in the State. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-275 (1976). Rule 28(a) provided: “Examination and Admission. . . . The examination and admission of applicants for membership in the State Bar of Arizona shall conform to this Rule. For such purpose, a committee on examinations and admissions consisting of seven active members of the state bar shall be appointed by this court. . . . The committee shall examine applicants and recommend to this court for admission to practice applicants who are found by the committee to have the necessary qualifications and to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the rules of the board of governors as approved by this court respecting examinations and admissions. . . . The court will then consider the recommendations and either grant or deny admission.” According to Ronwin’s complaint, the Committee announced before the February examination that the passing grade on the test would be 70, but it assigned grades using a scaled scoring system. Under this system, the examinations were graded first without reference to any grading scale. Thus, each examination was assigned a “raw score” based on the number of correct answers. The Committee then converted the raw score into a score on a scale of zero to 100 by establishing the raw score that would be deemed the equivalent of “seventy.” See n. 19, infra. Rule 28(c) VII B provided: “The Committee on Examinations and Admissions will file with the Supreme Court thirty (30) days before each examination the formula upon which the Multi-State Bar Examination results will be applied with the other portions of the total examination results. In addition the Committee will file with the Court thirty (30) days before each examination the proposed formula for grading the entire examination.” 110 Ariz., at xxxii. See n. 4, supra; Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 233, 319 P. 2d 991, 993 (1957) (“[T]his court may in the exercise of its inherent powers, admit to the practice of law with or without favorable action by the Committee”); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F. 2d 499, 501 (CA9) (“[W]e find the power to grant or deny admission is vested solely in the Arizona Supreme Court”), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 960 (1966). See also Application of Burke, 87 Ariz. 336, 351 P. 2d 169 (1960). Rule 28(c) XII F provided: “1. An applicant aggrieved by any decision of the Committee “(A) Refusing permission to take an examination upon the record; “(B) Refusing permission to take an examination after hearing; “(C) For any substantial cause other than with respect to a claimed failure to award a satisfactory grade upon an examination; “may within 20 days after such occurrence file a verified petition with this Court for a review. . . . “2. A copy of said petition shall be promptly served upon the chairman or some member of the Committee and the Committee shall within 15 days of such service transmit said applicant’s file and a response to the petition fully advising this Court as to the Committee’s reasons for its decision and admitting or contesting any assertions made by applicant in said petition. Thereupon this Court shall consider the papers so filed together with the petition and response and make such order, hold such hearings and give such directions as it may in its discretion deem best adapted to a prompt and fair decision as to the rights and obligations of applicant judged in the light of the Committee’s and this Court’s obligation to the public to see that only qualified applicants are admitted to practice as attorneys at law.” 110 Ariz., at xxxv-xxxvi. Under Rule 28(c) XII G, an applicant who wished to challenge the grading of an answer to a particular question first had to submit his claim to the Committee for review. The applicant was entitled to request Arizona Supreme Court review only if three members of the Committee agreed with the applicant that his answer had not received the grade it deserved. The Rule also provided that the court could grant or deny such a request in its discretion. Id., at xxxvi-xxxvii. The Arizona Supreme Court Rules instructed the Committee to give two examinations each year — one in July and one in February. Id., at xxxii. He also alleged that the Committee had violated his constitutional rights by refusing, after the grades had been released, to provide him with the questions and answers to the Multi-State portion of the examination. Rule 28(c) XII F 2 provides, with respect to the petition of an aggrieved applicant, that the Arizona Supreme Court “shall consider” the petition and response, and “hold such hearings and give such directions as it may in its discretion deem best adapted to a prompt and fair decision.” 110 Ariz., at xxxvi. Ronwin makes no claim that the court failed to comply with its Rules, although — of course — he disagrees with the court’s judgment denying his petition. Thus, the court’s denial of his petition must be construed as a consideration and rejection of the arguments made in the petition — including Ronwin’s claim that the Sherman Act was violated. Also named as defendants were petitioners’ spouses and the Arizona State Bar. The District Court dismissed the suit as to these defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F. 2d 692, 694, n. 1 (CA91981). Ronwin challenged this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in a conditional cross-petition for certiorari. We denied the cross-petition. Ronwin v. Hoover, 461 U. S. 938 (1983). The averment of a Sherman Act violation in Ronwin’s complaint is as follows: “The aforesaid conduct [the “scoring system or formula,” see n. 4, supra], which the Defendants entered into as a conspiracy or combination, was intended to and did result in a restraint of trade and commerce among the Several States by artificially reducing the numbers of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona; and, in further consequence of said conduct, Plaintiff was among those artificially prevented from entering into competition as an attorney in the State of Arizona and thereby further deprived of the right to compete as an attorney for the legal business deriving from or involving the Several States of the United States, including Arizona.” App. 10-11. The adequacy of these conclusory averments of intent is far from certain. The Court of Appeals, however, found the complaint sufficient. Accordingly, we address the “state action” issue. The District Court also denied Ronwin’s motion requesting the trial judge to recuse himself. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion. 686 F. 2d., at 701. We declined to review that finding. Ronwin v. Hoover, supra. Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978). The Court of Appeals also held that the District Court should give Ronwin the opportunity to show that petitioners’ actions sufficiently affected interstate commerce to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Petitioners did not seek review of this holding. This case does not present the issue whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position as the state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine. Ronwin does not dispute that regulation of the bar is a sovereign function of the Arizona Supreme Court. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 361 (1977), the Court noted that “the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State’s power to protect the public.” Likewise, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975), the Court stated: “The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” See also In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 722-723 (1973). Few other professions are as close to “the core of the State’s power to protect the public.” Nor is any trade or other profession as “essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice.” Ronwin’s complaint, see supra, at 565, focuses on the grading formula as the means used to “restrain competition.” He describes it as follows: “The Defendants did not grade on a Zero to One Hundred (0 to 100) scale; rather they used a “raw score” system. After the raw scores were known, the Defendants picked a particular raw score value as equal to the passing grade of Seventy (70). Thereby the number of Bar applicants who would receive a passing grade depended upon the exact raw score value chosen as equal to Seventy (70); rather than achievement by each Bar applicant of a pre-set standard.” App. 10. Apparently Ronwin was trying to describe a “procedure commonly known as test standardization” or “sealed scoring.” See Brief for State Bar of California as Amicus Curiae 7. This method of scoring, viewed as the fairest by the Educational Testing Service (ETS) for the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), see S. Duhl, The Bar Examiners’ Handbook 61-62 (2d ed. 1980), published by The National Conference of Bar Examiners, is described as follows: “In addition to the ‘raw’ scores (number of correct answers), ETS reports a ‘scaled’ score for each applicant. In a series of tests, such as the MBE, which are intended to measure levels of competence, it is important to have a standardized score which represents the same level of competence from test to test. The raw score is not dependable for this purpose since the level of difficulty varies from test to test. It is not possible to draft two tests of exactly the same level of difficulty. Scaled scores are obtained by reusing some questions from earlier tests which have been standardized. A statistical analysis of the scores on the reused questions determines how many points are to be added to or subtracted from the raw score to provide an applicant’s scaled score. Thus a particular scaled score represents the same level of competence from examination to examination.” Although the Court of Appeals recognized the similarity between this case and Bates, it found the facts in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, supra, to be more analogous. The court’s reliance on Goldfarb was misplaced. As the dissent of Judge Ferguson noted, Goldfarb involved procedures that were not approved by the State Supreme Court or the state legislature. In contrast, petitioners here performed functions required by the Supreme Court Rules and that are not effective unless approved by the court itself. Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona provided: “The duties and obligations of members [of the Bar] shall be as prescribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association. . . Following petitioners’ request for a rehearing in the Court of Appeals, the parties debated whether and to what extent the Committee complied with this Rule. For purposes of determining the application of the state-action doctrine, it is sufficient that the Rules contained an enforceable provision calling for submission of the grading formula. Moreover, the Rules contained a review procedure that allowed an aggrieved applicant to bring to the Supreme Court’s attention any failure of the Committee to comply with the filing requirements in Rule 28(c) VIIB. The record reveals that Ronwin, in fact, alleged in his petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court that the Committee had not filed its grading formula within the time provided in the Rule. The court rejected the petition. See supra, at 564. This procedure allowed a disappointed applicant to challenge “[f ]or any substantial cause” a Committee decision other than “a claimed failure to award a satisfactory grade.” Rule 28(c) XII F 1(C). As we have noted, Ronwin took full advantage of Rule 28(c) XII F 1(C) in his challenge to the action of the Committee and the court. See supra, at 564. He did not, however, challenge the particular grade assigned to any of his answers. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States as amicus, contends that our recent opinion in Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), precludes a finding that the Committee’s action was attributable to the Arizona Supreme Court. Contrary to the Solicitor General’s suggestion, our reasoning in Boulder supports the conclusion we reach today. In Boulder, we reiterated the analysis of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389 (1978). We noted that the state-action doctrine is grounded in concepts of federalism and state sovereignty. 455 U. S., at 54. We stated that Parker did not confer state-action immunity automatically on municipalities, because the actions of a municipality are not those of the State itself. 455 U. S., at 53. Under our holding in Boulder, municipalities may be eligible for state-action immunity, but only “to the extent that they ac[t] pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.” Id., at 54; see also Lafayette, supra, at 411-412 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Consistent with our reasoning in Boulder, our decision today rests on our conclusion that the conduct Ronwin complains of clearly is the action of the State. Bates is explicit authority for this conclusion. Our holding that petitioners’ conduct is exempt from liability under the Sherman Act precludes the need to address petitioners’ contention that they are immune from liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965); Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961). We also do not address Ronwin’s contention that the Arizona method of limiting bar admissions violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As Ronwin concedes, he made this argument for the first time in his response to petitioners’ motion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals. His failure to raise this issue in a timely manner precludes our consideration. The authority of the Arizona Supreme Court to determine who shall be admitted to the Bar, and by what procedure, is even more clearly defined than the role of that court in Bates. In that case, State Bar Committee members were not appointed by the court, and the court did not expressly accept or reject each of the Committee’s actions. Under Arizona law, the responsibility is on the court — and only on it— to admit or deny admission to the practice of law. This Court certainly cannot assume that the Arizona court, in the exercise of its specifically reserved power under its Rules, invariably agrees with its Committee. Even if it did, however, it would be action of the sovereign. Even if Committee members had decided to grade more strictly, under the grading formula approved by the court, for the purpose of reducing the total number of lawyers admitted to practice, the court knew and approved the number of applicants. This was the definitive action. There is nothing in the state-action doctrine, or in antitrust law, that permits us to question the motives for the sovereign aetion of the court. The dissent recites the provisions of the Rules regulating the composition and origin of the Committee and notes that the Rules require the Committee to recommend qualified applicants to the Supreme Court. Post, at 586. The dissent does not mention, however, several critical provisions, summarized in the text infra, that articulate the Arizona Supreme Court’s intent to retain full authority over, and responsibility for, the bar admissions process. The dissent states, post, at 591-592, n. 15, that we “advanced the theory that the relevant ‘state action' ” was the State Supreme Court’s denial of Ronwin’s postexamination petitions filed with the court. (Emphasis supplied.) The dissent is inaccurate. Our holding is based on the court’s direct participation in every stage of the admissions process, including retention of the sole authority to admit or deny. The critical action in this case was the court’s decision to deny Ronwin admission to the Bar. The dissent’s suggestion that the Arizona Supreme Court never made this decision simply ignores Arizona law. The Arizona Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that it, and not the Committee, makes the decision to admit or deny admission to applicants. In Application of Burke, 87 Ariz., at 338, 351 P. 2d, at 171-172, the court stated: “[I]t is not the function of the committee to grant or deny admission to the bar. That power rests solely in the Supreme Court. . . . The committee’s bounden duty is to ’put up the red flag’ as to those applicants about whom it has some substantial doubt. If such doubt exists, then its recommendation should be withheld. The applicant may feel that any questions raised as to his character or qualifications are without substance. In such case, he may apply directly to this court for admission. In the final analysis — it being a judicial function — we have the duty of resolving those questions, one way or the other. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) In a similar vein, the court stated in Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 92, 397 P. 2d 205, 207 (1964): “If the committee fails to recommend the admission of an applicant, he may challenge the committee’s conclusions by an original application to this Court.... This Court will direct the committee to show cause why the applicant has been refused a favorable recommendation and on the applicant’s petition and the committee’s response, using our independent judgment, de novo determine whether the necessary qualifications have been shown.” See also Application of Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 327, 487 P. 2d 393, 394 (1971). Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed its responsibility as the final decisionmaker on admissions to the Bar. The dissent, relying on the absence in the record before us of a specific order of the court at the time Ronwin was not admitted, nevertheless would have us hold that the Committee rather than the court made the final decisions as to admissions and denials of the applicants who took the examination in February 1974. If the dissent were correct, there would have been no valid action with respect to those who took that examination since, under Arizona law, the Committee had no independent power to act. Ronwin’s complaint makes no such extreme averment, and certainly this Court will not assume that the Supreme Court of Arizona failed to discharge its responsibility. Moreover, as we have noted, supra, at 576-577, Ronwin’s claims were specifically rejected by the court. It is true, of course, that framing examination questions and particularly the grading of the examinations involved the exercise of judgment and discretion by the examiners. This discretion necessarily was delegated to the Arizona Committee, just as it must be unless state supreme courts themselves undertake the grading. By its Rules, the Arizona Supreme Court gave affirmative directions to the Committee with respect to every nondiscretionary function, reserving the ultimate authority to control the number of lawyers admitted to the Arizona Bar. Ronwin avers a “conspiracy to limit the number” of applicants admitted. He makes no claim of animus or discriminatory intent with respect to himself. Ronwin apparently would have us believe that grading examinations is an exact science that separates the qualified from the unqualified applicants. Ideally, perhaps, this should be true. But law schools and bar examining committees must identify a grade below which students and applicants fail to pass. No setting of a passing grade or adoption of a grading formula can eliminate — except on multiple choice exams — the discretion exercised by the grader. By its very nature, therefore, grading examinations does not necessarily separate the competent from the incompetent or — except very roughly — identify those qualified to practice law and those not qualified. At best, a bar examination can identify those applicants who are more qualified to practice law than those less qualified. Justice Stevens’ dissent states that “[a]ny possible claim that the challenged conduct is that of the State Supreme Court is squarely foreclosed by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975).” Post, at 589. At issue in Goldfarb was a Sherman Act challenge to minimum-fee schedules maintained by the Fairfax County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar. In Goldfarb, state law did not refer to lawyers’ fees, the Virginia Supreme Court Rules did not direct the State Bar to supply fee schedules, and the Supreme Court did not approve the fee schedules established by the State Bar. To the contrary, the court “directed lawyers not ‘to be controlled’ by fee schedules.” 421 U. S., at 789. Thus, even though the State Bar was a state agency, the Court concluded that “it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent.” Id., at 790. As is evident from the provisions in the Arizona Supreme Court Rules, this case arises under totally different circumstances, although the relevant legal principles are the same. The dissent’s reliance on Goldfarb simply misreads the decision in that case. The dissent relies on Boulder, arguing that the “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy” does not exist in this case. Post, at 594-596. What the dissent overlooks is that the Court in Boulder was careful to say that action is not “exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constitutes the action of the State of Colorado itself in its sovereign capacity, see Parker, or unless it constitutes municipal action in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, see City of Lafayette....” 455 U. S., at 52. Thus, unlike the dissent here, Justice BRENNAN in Boulder was careful to distinguish between action by the sovereign itself and action taken by a subordinate body. The dissent also cites Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 (1976), and California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), as presenting situations analogous to the action of the Arizona Supreme Court. This argument overlooks the fundamental difference between this case and the several cases cited by respondent. In each of those cases, it was necessary for the Court to determine whether there had been a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy because the challenged conduct was not that of the State “acting as sovereign.” Here, as we have noted above, the Arizona Supreme Court, acting in its sovereign capacity, made the final decision to deny admission to Ronwin. See n. 30, supra. The amicus curiae brief of the National Conference of Bar Examiners points out that many States have bar admission processes like those at issue in this case. See Brief for National Conference of Bar Examiners as Amicus Curiae 1, 2, 8. Typically, the state supreme court is the ultimate decisionmaker and a committee or board conducts the examinations pursuant to court rules. It is customary for lawyers of recognized standing and integrity to serve on these bodies, usually as a public duty and with little or no compensation. See S. Duhl, The Bar Examiner’s Handbook 95, 99 (2d ed. 1980). In virtually all States, a significant percentage of those who take the bar examination fail to pass. See 1982 Bar Examination Statistics, 52 Bar Examiner 24-26 (1983). Thus, every year, there are thousands of aspirants who, like Ronwin, are disappointed. For example, in 1974 (the year Ronwin first took the Arizona bar examination), of the 43,798 applicants who took bar examinations nationwide, 10,440 failed to pass. 44 Bar Examiner 115 (1975). The National Conference of Bar Examiners, in its amicus brief, cautions that affirmance of the Court of Appeals in this case could well invite numerous suits. It is no answer to say that, of course, such suits are likely to be frivolous. Ronwin, who failed the bar in 1974, has been litigating his claim for a decade on the basis of a complaint that basically challenges the motive of the Arizona Committee. His claim is that the grading formula was devised for the purpose of limiting competition. If such an allegation is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, examining boards and committees would have to bear the substantial “discovery and litigation burdens” attendant particularly upon refuting a charge of improper motive. See Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for “State Action” after Lafayette, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 435, 451 (1981). Moreover, Ronwin has brought a suit for damages under the Sherman Act, with the threat of treble damages. There can be no question that the threat of being sued for damages — particularly where the issue turns on subjective intent or motive — will deter “able citizens” from performing this essential public service. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 814 (1982). In our view, as the action challenged by Ronwin was that of the State, the motive of the Committee in its recommendations to the court was immaterial. We nevertheless think, particularly in view of the decision below, that the consequences of an affirmance should be understood. The consequences of reversal by the Court today will have only a limited effect. Our attention has not been drawn to any trade or other profession in which the licensing of its members is determined directly by the sovereign itself— here the State Supreme Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ESTATE OF HUBERT, DECEASED, C & S SOVRAN TRUST CO. (GEORGIA) N. A., CO-EXECUTOR No. 95-1402. Argued November 12, 1996 Decided March 18, 1997 Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Joan I. Oppenheimer. David D. Aughtry argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Shelley Cashion. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel by Edward F. Koren and Alvin J. Golden; for the American Council on Education et al. by Matthew J. Zinn and Carol A. Rhees; for the Baptist Foundation of Texas et-al. by Terry L. Simmons, pro se; and for the Tax Section of The Florida Bar by Jerald David August and James J. Freeland. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg join. In consequence of life’s two certainties a decedent’s estate faced federal estate tax deficiencies, giving rise to this case. The issue is whether the amount of the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests must be reduced to the extent administration expenses were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests. I The estate of Otis C. Hubert was substantial, valued at more than $30 million when he died. Considerable probate and civil litigation ensued soon after his death. The parties to the various proceedings included his wife and children; his nephew; one of the estate’s coexecutors, Citizens and Southern Trust Company (Georgia), N. A., the predecessor of respondent C & S Sovran Trust Company (Georgia), N. A.; the district attorney for Cobb County, Georgia, on behalf of certain charitable beneficiaries; and the Georgia State Revenue Commission. Hubert had made various wills and codicils, and the legal disputes for the most part concerned the distribution of estate assets; but they were not confined to this. In addition to will contests alleging fraud and undue influence, there were satellite civil suits including claims of slander and abuse of process. The principal proceedings were in the Probate and the Superior Courts of Cobb County, Georgia. The estate attracted the attention of petitioner, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The executors filed the federal estate tax return in 1987, about a year after Hubert died. In 1990, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability by some $14 million. The Commissioner’s major challenge then was to the estate’s claimed entitlement to two deductions. One was the marital deduction, under 68A Stat. 392, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 2056, for qualifying property passing from a decedent to the surviving spouse. The other was the charitable deduction, under §2055, for qualifying property passing from a decedent to a charity. The Commissioner’s notice of deficiency asserted, for reasons not relevant here, that the property passing to Hubert’s surviving wife and to charity did not qualify for the marital and charitable deductions. The estate petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Within days of the estate’s petition in the Tax Court, much of the other litigation surrounding the estate settled. The settlement agreement divided the estate’s residue principal between a marital and a charitable share, which we can assume for purposes of our discussion were worth a total of $26 million on the day Hubert died. The settlement agreement divided the $26 million principal about half to trusts for the surviving spouse and half to a trust for the charities. The Commissioner stipulated that the nature of the trusts did not prevent them from qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions. The stipulation streamlined the Tax Court litigation but did not resolve it. The settlement agreement provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or from the income of the assets that would comprise the residue and the corpus of the trusts, preserving the discretion Hubert’s most recent will had given his executors to apportion administration expenses. The apportionment provisions of the agreement and the will were consistent for all relevant purposes with the law of Georgia, the State where the decedent resided. The estate’s administration expenses, including attorney’s fees, were on the order of $2 million. The estate paid about $500,000 in expenses from principal and the rest from income. The estate recalculated its estate tax liability based on the settlement agreement and the payments from principal. The estate did not include in its marital and charitable deductions the amount of residue principal used to pay administration expenses. The parties here have agreed throughout that the marital or charitable deductions could not include those amounts. The estate, however, did not reduce its marital or charitable deductions by the amount of the income used to pay the balance of the administration expenses. The Commissioner disagreed and contended that use of income for this purpose required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the amounts of the marital and charitable deductions. In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court, with two judges concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected the Commissioner’s position. 101 T. C. 314 (1993). The court noted it had resolved the same issue against the Commissioner in Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 56 TCM 774, 57 TCM 2851 (1988), ¶ 88,553 P-H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reversed this aspect of Estate of Street, see 974 F. 2d 723, 727-729 (1992), but in the instant case the Tax Court adhered to its view and said, given all the circumstances here, no reduction was required by reason of the executors’ power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopting the latter’s opinion and noting the resulting conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Street and with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Burke v. United States, 994 F. 2d 1576, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 990 (1993). See 63 F. 3d 1083, 1084-1085 (CA11 1995). We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1166 (1996), and, in agreement with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, we now affirm the judgment. II A necessary first step in calculating the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes is to determine the property in-eluded in the gross estate, and its value. Though an alternative valuation date is authorized, the executors of the Hubert estate used the standard date-of-death valuation. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 2031(a), 2051. A later step is to compute any claimed charitable or marital deductions. See §§ 2055 (charitable), 2056 (marital). Our inquiry here involves the relationship between valuation principles and those computations. The language of the charitable and marital deduction sections differs. For instance, § 2056 requires consideration, in valuing a marital bequest, of obligations or encumbrances the decedent imposes on the bequest, “in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” § 2056(b)(4). Section 2055 has no similar language. Treasury Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a), 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1996), moreover, has amplified aspects of the marital deduction statute, as we discuss. There is no similar regulation for the charitable deduction statute. These differences notwithstanding, the Commissioner and respondent agree that, for purposes of the question presented, the two deduction statutes should be read to require the same answer. We adopt this approach. For the issue we decide, the marital deduction statute and regulation speak in more specific terms than the charitable deduction statute, so we concentrate on the marital provisions. Our holding in the case applies to both deductions. We begin with the language of the marital deduction statute. It allows an estate to deduct for federal estate tax purposes “an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate.” 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a). The statute allows deduction for qualifying property only to the extent of the property’s “value.” So when the executors value the property for gross estate purposes as of the date of death, the value of the marital deduction will be limited by its date-of-death value. This is directed by the statutory language capping the deduction at “the value of any interest . . . included in determining the value of the gross estate.” It is made explicit by Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a), which says “value, for the purpose of the marital deduction ... is to be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date].” Section 20.2056(b)-4(a) provides that “value” for marital deduction purposes is “net value,” determined by applying “the same principles ... as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined.” Section 25.2523(a)-l, entitled “Gift to spouse; in general,” includes a subsection (e), entitled “Valuation,” which parallels § 20.2056(b) — 4(d); see also § 20.2055-2(f)(l). Section 25.2523(a)-l(e) provides: “If the income from property is made payable to the donor or another individual for life or for a term of years, with remainder to the donor’s spouse . . . the marital deduction is computed . . . with respect to the present value of the remainder, determined under [26 U. S. C. § ]7520. The present value of the remainder (that is, its value as of the date of gift) is to be determined in accordance with the rules stated in § 25.2512-5 or, for certain prior periods, § 25.2512-5A.” Section 7520, in turn, refers to present-value tables located in regulation § 20.2031-7. The question presented here, involving date-of-death valuation of property or a principal amount, some of the income from which may be used to pay administration expenses, is not controlled by the exact terms of these provisions. For that reason, we do not attempt to force it into their detailed mold. It is natural, however, to apply the present-value principle to the question at hand, as we are directed to do by §20.2056(b)-4(a). In other words, assuming it were necessary for valuation purposes to take into account that income, see infra, at 106-107 (discussing materiality), this would be done by subtracting from the value of the bequest, computed as if the income were not subject to administration expense charges, the present value (as of the controlling valuation date) of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses. Our application of the present-value principle to the issue here is further supported by Justice Holmes’ explanation of valuation theory in his opinion for the Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). The decedent there bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust to charity, subject to a particular life interest in his wife. After holding that the charitable bequest qualified for the charitable deduction under the law as it stood in 1929, the Court considered how to value the bequest. The Government argued the value should be reduced to reflect the wife’s probable life expectancy as of the date the decedent died. The estate argued for a smaller reduction than the Government, because by the time of the litigation it was known that the wife had, in fact, lived for only six months after the decedent died. Justice Holmes wrote: “The first impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know the fact. But this is due to inaccurate thinking. . . . [Value] depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true.... Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be done. . . . Our opinion is not changed by the necessary exceptions to the general rule specifically made by the Act.” Id., at 155. So the charitable deduction had to be valued based on the wife’s probable life expectancy as of the date of death rather than the known fact that she died only six months after her husband. It is suggested that § 20.2056(b)-4(a)’s direction to value the marital deduction as a spousal gift refers to a gift tax qualification regulation, § 25.2523(e) — 1(f), and a Revenue Ruling interpreting it, Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 224. Post, at 116 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The suggestion misunderstands the regulations and the Revenue Ruling. Section 20.2056(b)-4(a) concerns how to determine the “value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest.” Before determining an interest’s value under § 20.2056(b)-4(a), one must decide the extent to which the interest qualifies as deductible. There is a structural problem with interpreting § 20.2056(b)-4(a) as directing reference to § 25.2523(e) — 1(f) for valuation purposes. Qualification and valuation are different steps. Section 25.2523(e) — 1(f) prescribes conditions under which an interest transferred in trust qualifies for a marital deduction under the gift tax. It tracks the language of § 20.2056(b)-5(f), which prescribes the same conditions for determining whether an interest transferred in trust qualifies for a marital deduction under the estate tax. Any interest to which § 25.2523(e) — 1(f) would apply, were its principles understood to be incorporated into § 20.2056(b)-4(a), would, of necessity, already have been analyzed under the same principles at the earlier, qualification stage of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry under § 20.2056(b)-5(f). So under the suggested interpretation, whether or not an interest passed the qualification test, there would never be a need to value it. If it failed, there would be nothing to value; if it passed, its value would never be reduced at the valuation stage. The qualification step of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry would render the valuation step superfluous. We do not think the Commissioner adopted this view of the regulations in Revenue Ruling 69-56. The Revenue Ruling held that a trustee’s power to: “charge to income or principal, executor’s or trustee’s commissions, legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and similar administration expenses ... [does] not result “[does] in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes unless the execution of such directions would or the exercise of such powers could, cause the spouse to have less than substantially full beneficial enjoyment of the particular interest transferred.” Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 224. The Revenue Ruling cites for this proposition §§ 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1) and 25.2523(e)-l(f)(l), parts of the estate and gift tax qualification regulations discussed above. The qualification regulations provide that an interest may qualify as deductible only in part. Where that happens, the deduction need not be disallowed but it must be diminished. See, e.g., § 20.2056(b)-5(b); § 25.2523(e)-l(b); see also 26 U. S. C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2523(e). It is in this qualification context that the Revenue Ruling speaks of “diminution” of the marital deduction. There is no dispute the entire interests transferred in trust here qualify for the estate tax marital and charitable deductions, respectively. The question before us is one of valuation. Sections 25.2523(e)-l(f) and 20.2056(b)-5(f) and Revenue Ruling 69-56 do not bear on our inquiry. The parties here agree that the marital and charitable deductions had to be reduced by the amount of marital and charitable residue principal used to pay administration expenses. The Commissioner contends that the estate must reduce its marital and charitable deductions by the amount of administration expenses paid not only from principal but also, and in all events, from income and by a dollar-for-dollar amount. The Commissioner cites the controlling regulation in support of her position. The regulation says: “The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date]. The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applicable as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent’s spouse but the income from the property from the date of the decedent’s death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate.” 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1996). The regulation does not help the Commissioner. It says a limitation providing that income “is to be used” throughout the administration period to pay administration expenses “may” be material in a given case and, if it is, account must be taken of it for valuation purposes as if it were a gift to the spouse, as we have discussed, see supra, at 101-102. The Tax Court was quite accurate in its description of the regulation when it said: “That section is merely a valuation provision which requires material limitations on the right to receive income to be taken into account when valuing the property interest passing to the surviving spouse. The fact that income from property is to be used to pay expenses during the administration of the estate is not necessarily a material limitation on the right to receive income that would have a significant effect on the date-of-death value of the property of the estate.” 101 T. C., at 324-325. There is no indication in the case before us that the executor’s power to charge administration expenses to income is equivalent to an express postponement of the spouse’s right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration. Cf. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) (1996) (requiring valuation of express postponements of the spouse’s right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration). By contrast, we have no difficulty conceiving of situations where a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be paid from income could be deemed a “material limitation” on the spouse’s right to income. Suppose the decedent’s other bequests account for most of the estate’s property or that most of its assets are nonincome producing, so that the corpus of the surviving spouse’s bequest, and the income she could expect to receive from it, would be quite small. In these circumstances, the amount of the estate’s anticipated administration expenses chargeable to income may be material as compared with the anticipated income used to determine the assets’ date-of-death value. If so, a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be charged to income would be a material limitation on the spouse’s right to income, reducing the marital bequest’s date-of-death value and the allowable marital deduction. Whether a limitation is “material” will also depend in part on the nature of the spouse’s interest in the assets generating income. This analysis finds strong support in the text of § 20.2056(b)-4(a). The regulation gives an example of where a limitation on the right to income “may” be material — bequests “in trust” for the benefit of a decedent’s spouse. The example suggests a significant difference between a bequest of income and an outright gift of the fee interest in the income-producing property. A fee in the same interest will almost always be worth much more. Where the value of the trust to the beneficiaries is derived solely from income, an obligation to pay administration expenses from that income is more likely to be “material.” In the case of a specific bequest of income, for example, valued only for its future income stream, a diversion of that income would be more significant. The marital property in this case, however, comprising trusts involving either a general power of appointment (the GPA trust) or an irrevocable election (the QTIP trust), was valued as being equivalent to a transfer of the fee. See Brief for Petitioner 8-9, n. 1 (“[T]he corpus of both trusts is includable in the estate of the surviving spouse”). As a result, the limitation on the right to income here is less likely to be material. The inquiry into the value of the estate’s anticipated administration expenses should be just as administrable, if not more so, than valuing property interests like going-concern businesses, see, e. g., § 20.2031-3, involving much greater complexity and uncertainty. The Tax Court concluded here: “On the facts before us, we find that the trustee’s discretion to pay administration expenses out of income is not a material limitation on the right to receive income.” 101 T. C., at 325. The Tax Court did not specify the facts it considered relevant to the materiality inquiry. As we have explained, however, the Commissioner does not contend the estate failed to give adequate consideration to expected future administration expenses as of the date of death in determining the amount of the marital deduction. We have no basis to reverse for the Tax Court’s failure to elaborate. Here, given the size and complexity of the estate, one might have expected it to incur substantial litigation costs. But the anticipated expenses could nonetheless have been thought immaterial in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate. The major disagreement in principle between the Tax Court majority and dissenters involved the distinction between expected and actual income and expenses. Judge Halpern’s opinion, joined by Judge Beghe, explained: “I believe the majority is undone by its view that income earned on estate property is not included in the gross estate. Once it is accepted that income earned on estate property (as anticipated at the appropriate valuation date) is included in the gross estate, the next question is whether, but for the use of such income to pay administration expenses, it would be received by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary. If the answer is yes, then it follows easily that, when such income is used for administration expenses, rather than received by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary, the value of the interest passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary is decreased.” Id., at 342-343 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Tax Court dissenters recognized that only anticipated, not actual, income is included in the gross estate, as the gross estate is based on date-of-death value. See also id., at 342, n. 5 (opinion of Halpern, J.) (“It is true, of course, that income actually earned on . . . property [included in valuing the gross estate] during the period of estate administration is not included in the gross estate. The gross estate, however, does’ include the discounted value of post mortem income expected to be earned during estate administration” (emphasis deleted)). The dissenters failed to recognize that following their own logic, as a general rule, assuming compliance with § 20.2056(b)-4(a)’s limitation to relevant facts on the controlling valuation date, only anticipated administration expenses payable from income, not the actual ones, affect the date-of-death value of the marital or charitable bequests. The dissenters were, in a sense, a step closer to § 25.2523(a)-l(e)’s present-value approach than the Commissioner, for they would have required the estate to reduce the marital or charitable deduction by only the discounted value of the actual administration expenses, whereas the Commissioner insists on a dollar-for-dollar reduction. The dissenters’ wait-and-see approach to the valuation inquiry, however, is still at odds with the valuation inquiry required by the regulations: What is the net value of the marital or charitable bequest on the controlling valuation date, determined as if it were a gift to the spouse? The Commissioner directs us to the language of § 2056(b)(4), which says: “In determining . .. the value of any interest in property passing to the surviving spouse for which a deduction is allowed by this section— “(B) where such interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” We interpreted this language in United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118 (1963). The husband’s will there gave property to his wife, conditioned on her relinquishing other property she owned to the couple’s children. We held that the husband’s estate was entitled to a marital deduction only to the extent the value of the property the husband gave his wife exceeded the value of the property she relinquished to receive it. The marital deduction, we explained, should not exceed the “net economic interest received by the surviving spouse.” Id., at 126. The statutory language, as we interpreted it in Stapf, is consistent with our analysis here. Where the will requires or allows the estate to pay administration expenses from income that would otherwise go to the surviving spouse, our analysis requires that the marital deduction reflect the date-of-death value of the expected future administration expenses chargeable to income if they are material as compared with the date-of-death value of the expected future income. Using this approach to valuation, the estate will arrive at the “net economic interest received by the surviving spouse.” Ibid. For the first time at oral argument, the Commissioner suggested that the reduction she seeks is necessary to avoid a “double deduction” in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 642(g). Under § 642(g), an estate may take an estate tax deduction for administration expenses under § 2053(a)(2), or it may take them, if deductible, off its taxable income, but it may not do both. The so-called double deduction argument is rhetorical, not statutory. As our colleagues in dissent recognize, “nothing in § 642(g) compels the conclusion that the marital (or charitable) deduction must be reduced whenever an estate elects to deduct expenses from income.” Post, at 137 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The Commissioner nevertheless suggests that, unless we reduce the estate’s marital deduction by the amount of administration expenses paid from income and deducted on its income tax, the estate will receive a deduction for them on its income tax as well as a deduction for them on its estate tax in the form of inflated marital and charitable deductions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 15. The marital and charitable estate tax deductions do not include income, however. When income is used, consistent with state law and the will, to pay administration expenses, this does not require that the estate tax deductions be diminished. The deductions include asset values determined with reference to expected income, but under our analysis the values must also be reduced to reflect material expected administration expense charges to which that income may be subjected. As noted above, the Commissioner has not contended the estate’s marital and charitable deductions fail to reflect such expected payments. So there is no basis for the double deduction argument. Our analysis is consistent with the design of the statute. The Commissioner also invites our attention to the legislative history of the marital deduction statute. Assuming for the sake of argument it would have relevance here, it does not support her position. The Senate Report accompanying the statute says: “The interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent by his will leaves the residue of his estate to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is acquired by purchase and not by bequest. Accordingly, the value of any additional part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the amount of the marital deduction.” S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 6 (1948). The Report supports our analysis. It underscores that valuation for marital deduction purposes occurs on the date of death. The Commissioner’s position is inconsistent with the controlling regulations. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in finding for the taxpayer on these facts, and we affirm the judgment. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALESSI et al. v. RAYBESTOS-MANHATTAN, INC., et al. No 79-1943. Argued March 4, 1981 Decided May 18, 1981 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except BreNNan, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. Theodore Sachs argued the cause for appellants in No. 79-1943. With him on the briefs were Michael S. Scarola and I. Mark Steckloff. Marc C. Gettis argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in No. 80-193. Warren John Casey argued the cause for appellees in No. 79-1943. With him on the brief was Sebastian J. Fortunato. Lawrence Reich argued the cause for respondent in No. 80-193. With him on the brief were Otis M. Smith, Eugene L. Hartwig, and David M. Davis. John J. Degan, Attorney-General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael S. Bokar, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as appellee in No. 79-1943, under this Court’s Rule 10.4, and as respondent in No. 80-193, under this Court’s Rule 19.6. Together with No. 80-193, Buczynski et al. v. General Motors Corp. et al., on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Alfred Miller for the American Association of Retired Persons et ah; by Gill Deford and Neal S. Dudovitz for the Gray Panthers; and by Leonard S. Zubrensky and Theodore Sachs for Merl D. Stong et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Murray, Stuart A. Smith, William A. Friedlander, and Michael J. Roach, for the United States; by Richard T. Wentley and Patrick W. Ritchey for Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.; by Stanley T. Kaleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by George J. Pantos for the ERISA Industry Committee; and by Charles R. Volk and William W. Scott, Jr., for the National Steel Corp. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Some private pension plans reduce a retiree’s pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation awards received subsequent to retirement. In these cases we consider whether two such offset provisions are lawful under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), and whether they may be prohibited by state law. I Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and General Motors Corp. maintain employee pension plans that are subject to federal regulation under ERISA. Both plans provide that an employee’s retirement benefits shall be reduced, or offset, by an amount equal to workers’ compensation awards for which the individual is eligible. In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature amended its Workers’ Compensation Act to expressly prohibit such offsets. The amendment states that “[t]he right of compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees’ retirement pension benefits or payments.” N. J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980-1981) (as amended by 1977 N. J. Laws, ch. 156). Alleging violations of this provision of state law, two suits were initiated in New Jersey state court. The plaintiffs in both suits were retired employees who had obtained workers’ compensation awards subject to offsets against their retirement benefits under their pension plans. The defendant companies independently removed the suits to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. There, both District Court Judges ruled that the pension offset provisions were invalid under New Jersey law, and concluded that Congress had not intended ERISA to pre-empt state laws of this sort. The District Court Judges also held that the offsets were prohibited by § 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). This section prohibits forfeitures of vested pension rights except under four specific conditions inapplicable to these cases. The judges concluded that offsets based on workers’ compensation awards would be forbidden forfeitures, and struck down a contrary federal Treasury Regulation authorizing such offsets. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals from these two decisions and reversed. 616 F. 2d 1238 (1980). It rejected the District Court Judges’ view that the offset provisions caused a forfeiture of vested pension rights forbidden by § 1053. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned, such offsets merely reduce pension benefits in a fashion expressly approved by ERISA for employees receiving Social Security benefits. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found no conflict between ERISA and the Treasury Regulation approving reductions based on workers’ compensation awards and ERISA. Finally, the court concluded that the New Jersey statute forbidding offsets of pension benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation awards could not withstand ERISA’s general pre-emption provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal taken by the former employees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and granted certiorari on the petition of former employees of General Motors Corp. 449 U. S. 949 and 950 (1980). For convenience, we refer to the former employees in both cases as retirees. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II Retirees claim that the workers’ compensation offset provisions of their pension plans contravene ERISA’s nonfor-feiture provisions and that the Treasury Regulation to the contrary is inconsistent with the Act. Both claims require examination of the relevant sections of ERISA. A As we recently observed, ERISA is a “comprehensive and reticulated statute,” which Congress adopted after careful study of private retirement pension plans. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U. S. 359, 361 (1980). In Nachman, we observed that Congress through ERISA wanted to ensure that “if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement — and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit— ... he actually receives it.” Id,., at 375. For this reason, the concepts of vested rights and nonforfeitable rights are critical to the ERISA scheme. See id., at 370, 378. ERISA prescribes vesting and accrual schedules, assuring that employees obtain rights to at least portions of their normal pension benefits even if they leave their positions prior to retirement. Most critically, ERISA establishes that “[e]ach pension plan shall provide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age.” 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). Retirees rely on this sweeping assurance that pension rights become nonforfeitable in claiming that offsetting those benefits with workers’ compensation awards violates ERISA. Retirees argue first that no vested benefits may be forfeited except as expressly provided in § 1053. Second, retirees assert that offsets based on workers’ compensation fall into none of those express exceptions. Both claims are correct; § 1053 (a) prohibits forfeitures of vested rights except as expressly provided in § 1053 (a)(3), and the challenged workers’ compensation offsets are not among those permitted in that section. Despite this facial accuracy, retirees’ argument overlooks a threshold issue: what defines the content of the benefit that, once vested, cannot be forfeited? ERISA leaves this question largely to the private parties creating the plan. That the private parties, not the Government, control the level of benefits is clear from the statutory language defining non-forfeitable rights as well as from other portions of ERISA. ERISA defines a “nonforfeitable” pension benefit or right as “a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (19). In construing this definition last Term, we observed: “[T]he term 'forfeiture’ normally connotes a total loss in consequence of some event rather than a limit on the value of a person’s rights. Each of the examples of a plan provision that is expressly described as not causing a forfeiture listed in [§ 1053 (a) (3)] describes an event — such as death or temporary re-employment— that might otherwise be construed as causing a forfeiture of the entire benefit. It is therefore surely consistent with the statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” to view it as describing the quality of the participant’s right to a pension rather than a limit on the amount he may collect.” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U. S., at 372-373. Similarly, the statutory definition of “nonforfeitable” assures that an employee’s claim to the protected benefit is legally enforceable, but it does not guarantee a particular amount or a method for calculating the benefit. As we explained last Term, “it is the claim to the benefit, rather than the benefit itself, that must be 'unconditional’ and 'legally enforceable against the plan.’ ” Id., at 371. Rather than imposing mandatory pension levels or methods for calculating benefits, Congress in ERISA set outer bounds on permissible accrual practices, 29 U. S. C. § 1054 (b)(1), and specified three alternative schedules for the vesting of pension rights, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a)(2). In so doing, Congress limited the variation permitted in accrual rates applicable across the entire period of an employee’s participation in the pension plan. And Congress disapproved pension practices unduly delaying an employee’s acquisition of a right to enforce payment of the portion of benefits already accrued, without further employment. These provisions together assure at minimum a legally enforceable claim to 100% of the pension benefits created by a covered plan for those employees who have completed 15 years of service and for those employees aged 45 or older who have completed 10 years of service. Other than these restrictions, ERISA permits the total benefit levels and formulas for determining their accrual before completion of 15 years of service to vary from plan to plan. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002 (22), (23) (benefits defined merely as those “under the plan”). It is particularly pertinent for our purposes that Congress did not prohibit “integration,” a calculation practice under which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other income streams available to the retired employees. Through integration, each income stream contributes for calculation purposes to the total benefit pool to be distributed to all the retired employees, even if the nonpension funds are available only to a subgroup of the employees. The pension funds are thus integrated with the funds from other income maintenance programs, such as Social Security, and the pension benefit level is determined on the basis of the entire pool of funds. Under this practice, an individual employee’s eligibility for Social Security would advantage all participants in his private pension plan, for the addition of his anticipated Social Security payments to the total benefit pool would permit a higher average pension payout for each participant. The employees as a group profit from that higher pension level, although an individual employee may reach that level by a combination of payments from the pension fund and payments from the other income maintenance source. In addition, integration allows the employer to attain the selected pension level by drawing on the other resources, which, like Social Security, also depend on employer contributions. Following its extensive study of private pension plans before the adoption of ERISA, ■ Congress expressly preserved the option of pension fund integration with benefits available under both the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), and the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill) ; 29 U. S. C. §§ 1054 (b)(1) (B)(iv), 1054 (b)(1)(C), 1054 (b)(1)(G). Congress was well aware that pooling of non-pension retirement benefits and pension funds would limit the total income maintenance payments received by individual employees and reduce the cost of pension plans to employers. Indeed, in considering this integration option, the House Ways and Means Committee expressly acknowledged the tension between the primary goal of benefiting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs. The Committee Report noted that the proposed bill would “not affect the ability of plans to use the integration procedures to reduce the benefits that they pay to individuals who are currently covered when social security benefits are liberalized. Your committee, however, believes that such practices raise important issues. On the one hand, the objective of the Congress in increasing social security benefits might be considered to be frustrated to the extent that individuals with low and moderate incomes have their private retirement benefits reduced as a result of the integration procedures. On the other hand, your committee is very much aware that many present plans are fully or partly integrated and that elimination of the integration procedures could substantially increase the cost of financing private plans. Employees, as a whole, might be injured rather than aided if such cost increases resulted in slowing down the growth or perhaps even eliminat[ing] private retirement plans.” H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, p. 69 (1974), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) 3189 (1976) (Leg. Hist.). The Committee called for further study of the problem and recommended that Congress impose a restriction on integration of pension benefits with Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments. Congress adopted this recommendation and forbade any reductions in pension payments based on increases in Social Security or Railroad Retirement benefits authorized after ERISA took effect. 29 U. S. C. § 1056 (b). See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1054 (b) (1) (B) (iv), 1054 (b) (1) (C) ; H. R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 69, 2 Leg. Hist. 3189. See also 26 U. S. C. §401 (a) (15). In setting this limitation on integration with Social Security and Railroad Retirement benefits, Congress acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather than prohibiting it. Moreover, in permitting integration at least with these federal benefits, Congress did not find it necessary to add an exemption for this purpose to its stringent nonforfeiture protections in 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). Under these circumstances, we are unpersuaded by retirees’ claim that the non-forfeiture provisions by their own force prohibit any offset of pension benefits by workers’ compensation awards. Such offsets work much like the integration of pension benefits with Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments. The individual employee remains entitled to the established pension level, but the payments received from the pension fund are reduced by the amount received through workers’ compensation. The nonforfeiture provision of § 1053 (a) has no more applicability to this kind of integration than it does to the analogous reduction permitted for Social Security or Railroad Retirement payments. Indeed, the same congressional purpose — promoting a system of private pensions by giving employers avenues for cutting the cost of their pension obligations — underlies all such offset possibilities. Nonetheless, ERISA does not mention integration with workers’ compensation, and the legislative history is equally silent on this point. An argument could be advanced that Congress approved integration of pension funds only with the federal benefits expressly mentioned in the Act. A current regulation issued by the Internal Revenue Service, however, goes further, and permits integration with other benefits provided by federal or state law. We now must consider whether this regulation is itself consistent with ERISA. B Codified at 26 CFR §§ 1.411 (a)-(4)(a) (1980), the Treasury Regulation provides that “nonforfeitable rights are not considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or under any other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining plan benefits.” The Regulation interprets 26 U. S. C. § 411, the section of the Internal Revenue Code which replicates for IRS purposes ERISA’s nonforfeiture provision, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a). The Regulation plainly encompasses awards under state workers’ compensation laws. In addition, in Revenue Rulings issued prior to ERISA, the IRS expressly had approved reductions in pension benefits corresponding to workers’ compensation awards. See, e. g., Rev. Rui. 69-421, Part 4 (j), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rui.. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157. Retirees contend that the Treasury Regulation and IRS rulings to this effect contravene ERISA. They object first that ERISA’s approval of integration was limited to Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments. This objection is precluded by our conclusion that reduction of pension benefits based on the integration procedure are not per se prohibited by § 1053 (a), for the level of pension benefits is not prescribed by ERISA. Retirees’ only remaining objection is that workers’ compensation awards are so different in kind from Social Security and Railroad Retirement payments that their integration could not be authorized under the same rubric. Developing this argument, retirees claim that workers’ compensation provides payments for work-related injuries, while Social Security and Railroad Retirement supply payments solely for wages lost due to retirement. Because of this distinction, retirees conclude that integration of pension funds with workers’ compensation awards lacks the rationale behind integration of pension funds with Social Security and Railroad Retirement. Retirees’ claim presumes that ERISA permits integration with Social Security or Railroad Retirement only where there is an identity between the purposes of pension payments and the purposes of the other integrated benefits. But not even the funds that the Congress clearly has approved for integration purposes share the identity of purpose ascribed to them by petitioners. Both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement Acts provide payments for disability as well as for wages lost due to retirement, and ERISA permits pension integration without distinguishing these different kinds of benefits. Furthermore, when it enacted ERISA, Congress knew of the IRS rulings permitting integration and left them in effect. These rulings do not draw the line between permissible and impermissible integration where retirees would prefer them to, and instead they include workers’ compensation offsets within the ambit of permissible integration. The IRS rulings base their allowance of pension payment integration on three factors: the employer must contribute to the other benefit funds, these other funds must be designed for general public use, and the benefits they supply must correspond to benefits available under the pension plan. The IRS employed these considerations in approving integration with workers’ compensation benefits. E. g., Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157. In contrast, the IRS has disallowed offsets of pension benefits with damages recovered by an employee through a common-law action against the employer. Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4 (j)(4), 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157-158. The IRS also has not permitted integration with reimbursement for medical expenses or with fixed sums made for bodily impairment because such payments do not match up with any benefits available under a pension plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. Rev. Rui. 78-178, 1978-1 Cum. Bull. 118. Similarly, the IRS has disapproved integration with unemployment compensation, for, as payment for temporary layoffs, it too is a kind of benefit not comparable to any permitted in a qualified pension plan. Id., at 117-118. Without speaking directly of its own rationale, Congress embraced such IRS rulings. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 277 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4544 (approving existing antidiscrimination rules). Congress thereby permitted integration along the lines already approved by the IRS, which had specifically allowed pension benefit offsets based on workers’ compensation. Our judicial function is not to second-guess the policy decisions of the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find contrary rationales. As a final argument, retirees claim that we should defer to the policy decisions of the state legislature. To this claim we now turn. Ill The New Jersey Legislature attempted to outlaw the offset clauses by providing that “[t]he right of compensation granted by [the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act] may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments but shall not be set off against employees’ retirement pension benefits or payments.” N. J. Stat. Ann. §34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). To resolve retirees’ claim that this state policy should govern, we must determine whether such state laws are pre-empted by ERISA. Our analysis of this problem must be guided by respect for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system. Although the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . ,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824), the “ 'exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed,’ ” New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 413 (1973), quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199, 203 (1952). As we recently reiterated, “[preemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored 'in the absence of persuasive reasons — either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress' has unmistakably so ordained.’ ” Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick ,& Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 317 (1981), quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963). See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525-526 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649 (1971); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); Hines v. Davidowit z, 312 U. S. 52, 61-62 (1941). In this instance, we are assisted by an explicit congressional statement about the pre-emptive effect of its action. The same chapter of ERISA that defines the scope of federal protection of employee pension benefits provides that “the provisions of this subchapter . .. shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003 (a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003 (b) of this title.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a). This provision demonstrates that Congress intended to depart from its previous legislation that “envisioned the exercise of state regulation power over pension funds,” Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 512, 514 (1978) (plurality opinion), and meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern. But for the pre-emption provision to apply here, the New Jersey law must be characterized as a state law “that relate [s] to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a). That phrase gives rise to some confusion where, as here, it is asserted to apply to a state law ostensibly regulating a matter quite’ different from pension plans. The New Jersey law governs the State’s workers’ compensation awards, which obviously are subject to the State’s police power. As a result, one of the District Court Judges below concluded that the New Jersey provision “is in no way concerned with pension plans qua pension plans. On the contrary, the New Jersey statute is solely concerned with protecting the employee’s right to worker’s compensation disability benefits.” Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, 873 (NJ 1978). Similarly, the other District Court Judge below reasoned that the New Jersey law “only has a collateral effect on pension plans.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Civ. No. 78-0434 (NJ, Feb. 15, 1979). The Court of Appeals rejected these analyses on two grounds. It read the “relate to pension plans” language in “its normal dictionary sense” as indicating a broad pre-emptive intent, and it also reasoned that the “only purpose and effect of the [New Jersey] statute is to set forth an additional statutory requirement for pension plans,” a purpose not permitted by ERISA. 616 F. 2d, at 1250 (emphasis in original). We agree with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals but arrive there by a different route. Whatever the purpose or purposes of the New Jersey statute, we conclude that it “relate [s] to pension plans” governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits — integration—that is permitted by federal law. ERISA permits integration of pension funds with other public income maintenance moneys for the purpose of calculating benefits, and the IRS interpretation approves integration with the exact funds addressed by the New Jersey workers’ compensation law. New Jersey’s effort to ban pension benefit offsets based on workers’ compensation applies directly to this cal-eulation technique. We need not determine the outer bounds of ERISA’s pre-emptive language to find this New Jersey provision an impermissible intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme. It is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers’ compensation law, rather than directly, through a statute called “pension regulation.” ERISA makes clear that even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern. For the purposes of the pre-emption provision, ERISA defines the term “State” to include: “a State, any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.” 29 U. S. C. §1144 (c)(2) (emphasis added). ERISA’s authors clearly meant to preclude the States from avoiding through form the substance of the preemption provision. Another consideration bolsters our conclusion that the New Jersey provision is pre-empted insofar as it bears on pensions regulated by ERISA. ERISA leaves integration, along with other pension calculation techniques, subject to the discretion of pension plan designers. See supra, at 514-516. Where, as here, the pension plans emerge from collective bargaining, the additional federal interest in precluding state interference with labor-management negotiations calls for pre-emption of state efforts to regulate pension terms. See Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283, 296 (1959); Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 232 (1956). Cf. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 (1971); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). As a subject of collective bargaining, pension terms themselves become expressions of federal law, requiring preemption of intrusive state law. IV We conclude that N. J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-29 (West Supp. 1980) is pre-empted by federal law insofar as it bears on pension plans governed by ERISA. We find further that Congress contemplated and approved the kind of pension provisions challenged here, which permit offsets of pension benefits based on workers’ compensation awards. The decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice BREnnan took no part in the decision of these cases. The Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., plan provides: “All Retirement Income payments shall be reduced by the entire amount of any and all payments the Member is eligible to receive under any and all statutes pertaining to workmen’s compensation, occupational disease, unemployment compensation, cash sickness benefits, and similar laws, other than primary Social Security benefits, Presently in effect or which may be enacted from time to time, which payments are paid concurrently with the Retirement Income.” The offset clause under the General Motors Corp. plan provides: “In determining the monthly benefits payable under this Plan, a deduction shall be made unless prohibited by law, equivalent to all or any part of Workmen’s Compensation (including compromise or redemption settlements) payable to such employee by reason of any law of the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, which has been or shall be enacted, provided that such deductions shall be to the extent that such Workmen’s Compensation has been provided by premiums, taxes or other payments paid by or at the expense of the Corporation, except that no deduction shall be made for the following: “(a) Workmen’s Compensation payments specifically allocated for hospitalization or medical expense, fixed statutory payments for the loss of any bodily member, or 100% loss of use of any bodily member, or payments for loss of industrial vision. “(b) Compromise or redemption settlements payable prior to the date monthly pension benefits first become payable. “(c) Workmen's Compensation payments paid under a claim filed not later than two years after the breaking of seniority.” In No. 79-1943, former employees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., sought permanently to enjoin such offsets and to recover damages for the offsets already made. Similar relief was pursued in No. 80-193, where several former employees of General Motors Corp. brought suit for themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated. See n. 8, infra. The Regulation provides that “nonforfeitable rights are not considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account benefits which are provided under the Social Security Act or under any other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining plan benefits.” 26 CFR § 1.411 (a)-4 (a) (1980). In its statement of findings and declaration of policy, Congress noted that “despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans.” 29 U. S. C. § 1001 (a). ERISA was designed to prescribe minimum vesting and accrual standards in response to such problems. Ibid. To ensure that employee pension expectations are not defeated, the Act establishes minimum rules for employee participation, §§ 1051-1061; funding standards to increase solvency of pension plans, §§ 1081-1085; fiduciary standards for plan managers, §§ 1101-1114; and an insurance program in case of plan termination, §§ 1341-1348 (1976 ed. and Supp. III). ERISA establishes three accrual techniques for pension plans covered by the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 1054 (b)(1). See n. 9, infra. Similarly, ERISA establishes several approved vesting schedules. Under any of the approved schedules, at a time prior to normal retirement age but after a given period of service or a combination of age and length of service, the employee is to be guaranteed 100% interest in the pension benefit. 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a)(2). See n. 10, infra. ERISA defines “normal retirement benefit” as “the greater of the early retirement benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan commencing at normal retirement áge.” 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (22). The statute expressly exempts from its forfeiture ban offsets that: (1) are contingent on the employee’s death, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a) (3) (A); (2) occur when the employee takes a job under certain circumstances, § 1053 (a) (3) (B); (3) are due to certain retroactive amendments to a pension plan, § 1053 (a) (3) (C); or (4) result from withdrawals of benefits derived from mandatory contributions, § 1053 (a) (3) (D). Retirees correctly point out that workers’ compensation offsets fall into none of these categories. The three different accrual practices approved for defined benefits plans are described in 29 U. S. C. § 1054 (b)(1). One prescribes a minimum percentage of the total retirement benefit that must be accrued in any given year. § 1054 (b) (1) (A). Another permits the use of any accrual formula as long as the accrual rate for a given year of service does not vary beyond a specified percentage from the accrual rate of any other year under the plan. § 1054 (b) (1) (B). The third is essentially a pro rata rule under which in any given year, the employee’s accrued benefit is proportionate to the number of years of service as compared with the number of total’ years of service appropriate to the normal retirement age. § 1054 (b) (1) (C). Congress approved some delay in an employee’s acquisition of a vested right to portions of his pension derived from employer contributions. Thus, ERISA specifies that this right could be hinged on a minimum length of service, but an employee reaching the minimum should not lose that right even if he does not continue working for that particular employer until reaching retirement age. That minimum period of service can be calculated under three different formulas, two of which permit gradual vesting of percentages of the accrued benefits over time. Compare 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a)(2)(A) with §§ 1053 (a) (2) (B), (C). See also Schiller, Proposed ERISA Vesting Regulations: Not What They Seem To Be, 6 J. Corp. L. 263 (1981) (discussing Internal Revenue Service implementation of vesting provisions). In essence, pension plans qualifying for tax treatment advantageous to the employer both must ensure non-forfeiture of all accrued benefits derived from employee contributions and must use vesting and accrual rates assuring portions of the benefits derived from the employer contributions should the employee leave the job before the normal retirement age. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1053 (a) (1), (2). This minimum results from the formulas approving gradual vesting over'time of benefits derived from employer contributions. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 1053 (a) (2) (B), (C). Alternatively, a plan may comply with ERISA “if an employee who has at least 10 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to 100 percent of his accrued benefit derived from employer contributions.” 29 U. S. C. §1053 (a)(2)(A). The vesting, nonforfeiture, and pension benefits provisions of the bill discussed in H. R. Rep. No. 93-807 were substantially identical to those portions in the bill ultimately enacted as ERISA. The bill reported out of the Conference Committee included an additional provision to restrict temporarily any increases in pension reductions due to increases in Social Security benefits occurring after December 31, 1971. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 131 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4405. Senator Harrison Williams explained that this provision ultimately was deleted because: “We have been told that this will greatly increase the costs of private pension plans, something that I am sure none of the Senators would like to see occur. This is particularly true if these increased pension costs result in the termination of private pension plans. Certainly that is not the intent of this legislation which is designed to improve and encourage the expansion of private pension plans.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29928 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4732. The Court of Appeals characterized the Treasury Regulation as a “legislative” regulation, entitled to a more restricted scope of review than is applied to “interpretive rules.” 616 F. 2d 1238, 1242. Nonetheless, the Government here represents that the Treasury Regulation is an interpretive rule. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 12. Because an agency empowered to enact legislative rules may choose to issue nonlegislative statements, we review this Treasury Regulation under the scrutiny applicable to interpretive rules, with due deference to consistent agency practice. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425, n. 9 (1977); Batterton v. Marshall, 208 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 332-333, 648 F. 2d 694, 705-706 (1980); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.8 (2d ed. 1979). Furthermore, integration with workers’ compensation has been approved by the agency created under ERISA to guarantee payment of all nonforfeitable pension benefits despite termination of the relevant pension plan. That agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, has defined the benefits it guarantees to include “a benefit payable as an annuity, or one or more payments related thereto, to a participant who permanently leaves or has permanently left covered employment, or to a surviving beneficiary, which payments by themselves or in combination with Social Security, Railroad Retirement, or workmen’s compensation benefits provide a substantially level income to the recipient.” 29 CFR §2605.2 (1980). The House Ways and Means Committee Report proposed codification of the contemporaneous administrative practice developed by the IRS. That practice included IRS approval of integration procedures. See, e. g., 26 CFR § 1.401-3 (e) (1973); Rev. Rul. 69-421, Part 4, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 70-74; Rev. Rul. 12, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 290. These IRS rulings implemented a provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 401 (a) (4), which forbids favorable tax treatment for pension plans discriminating in favor of company officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees. The Internal Revenue Code, long before the enactment of ERISA, specified that such forbidden discrimination does not include differences in benefits “because of any retirement benefits created under State or Federal law.” 26 U. S. C. §401 (a) (5) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The IRS has consistently interpreted this discrimination provision to permit pension benefit integration with Social Security and other funds receiving employer contributions and making benefits available to the general public. See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 69-4, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 118; Rev. Rul. 69-5, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 125; Rev. Rul. 68-243, 1968-1 Cum. Bull. 157; Rev. Rul. 61-75, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 140. Congress essentially approved these rulings when its Conference Committee reported: “[T]he conferees intend that the antidiscrimination rules of present law in areas other than the vesting schedule are not to be changed. Thus, the present antidiscrimination rules with respect to coverage, and with respect to contributions and benefits are to remain in effect.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 277 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist, 4544. Retirees argue that workers’ compensation should be treated the same as common-law tort damages for the purposes of integration with pension payments. Although workers’ compensation resembles tort judgments against employers for employee injuries, there are differences which could explain their different treatment by the IRS. A tort judgment typically represents a finding of the employer’s fault for the employee’s injury. Workers’ compensation, in contrast, is generally available with no showing of an employer’s fault or an employee’s lack of fault for the work-related injury. 1 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law §§ 2.10, 6.00 (1979). In treating the two sources of payments differently, the IRS may have concluded that workers’ compensation is as much an income maintenance program, responding to wage loss, as it is remuneration for injury, and therefore it may be integrated with pension benefits to the advantage of the entire employee group. See generally 4 id., §§ 96.10, 97.10, 97.50. Cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83 (1971) (reductions of Social Security based on workers’ compensation comports with due process). In this light, the agency may well have employed the very rationale proffered by retirees — that two benefits systems must have identical purposes before they may be integrated — and departed from retirees’ reasoning only in concluding that these two benefit systems share the same purpose of replacing lost wages, whatever the cause. Regardless of which view of workers’ compensation this Court finds most compelling, we must defer to the consistent agency position that is itself reasonable and consonant with the Act. We note that the General Motors offset clause avoids any ambiguity on this point. It disallows deductions for medical expenses or fixed payments for bodily impairment. See n. 1, supra. Although the Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., plan is silent on this point, it is certainly subject to IRS regulation. Adopted as an amendment to the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation-.. Act, this provision reversed New Jersey’s prior approval of workers’ compensation offsets in collectively bargained pension agreements. See Brief for Appellee New Jersey in No. 79-1943, pp. 6-7. The scope of federal concern is, however, limited by ERISA itself. The statute explicitly preserves state regulation of “insurance, banking, or securities,” 29 U. S. C. § 1144 (b) (2) (A); and “generally applicable criminal law[s] of a State,” § 1144 (b) (2) (B) (4). ERISA also exempts from its coverage several kinds of plans, which may be subject to state regulation. §§ 1144 (a), 1144 (b)(2)(B). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974), 3 Leg. Hist. 4650. ERISA’s pre-emption clause exempts state laws relating to pension plans that do not fall within the Act’s coverage, see n. 19, supra, but no such exemptions are applicable here. The only exemption with any conceivable relevance pertains to state laws governing plans “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation laws.” 29 U. S. C. § 1003 (b) (3). Retirees in No. 80-193 concede that this exception is inapplicable because the General Motors plan is not maintained solely to comply with a workmen’s compensation law. Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-193, p. 44. Retirees in No. 79-1943, however, claim that the exception should apply more generally to plans governed by state workers’ compensation laws. They reason that “if a plan which is designed to ‘comply with [an] applicable workmen’s compensation law’ is not preempted by ERISA, then a fortiori the underlying statute with which such plan is permitted to comply equally escapes coverage.” Reply Brief for Appellants in No. 79-1943, p. 18. This reasoning wreaks havoc on ERISA’s plain language, which pre-empts not plans, but “State laws.” 29 U. S. C. §1144 (a). The only relevant state laws, or portions thereof, that survive this preemption provision are those relating to plans that are themselves exempted from ERISA’s scope. And the relevant exemption from ERISA’s coverage — for plans maintained solely for compliance with state workers’ compensation laws — has no bearing on the plans involved here, which more broadly serve employee needs as a result of collective bargaining. As retirees do not, and cannot, claim that the plans involved here are free from ERISA’s coverage, they cannot claim the exception to pre-emption restricted to laws governing such exempted plans. Other courts have reached varying conclusions as to the meaning of ERISA’s pre-emptive language in other contexts. See, e. g., American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F. 2d 118 (CA2 1979) ; Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (ND Cal.1978); Gast v. State, 36 Ore. App. 441, 585 P. 2d 12 (1978). We express no views on the merits of any of those decisions. In light of its reading of ERISA, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue of pre-emption under the National Labor Relations Act. 616 F. 2d, at 1250, n. 17. The issue was, however, addressed by the District Court below in Alessi v. Raybestos-Mahattan, Inc., Civ. No. 78-0434 (NJ, Feb. 15, 1979). That court reasoned that federal labor law pre-emption does not extend so far as to preclude state regulation of conduct touching deeply rooted local concerns. Ibid, (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S., at 244). Although this reasoning may apply in other contexts, we do not find it compelling in light of the direct clash between the state statute and the federal policy to keep calculation of pension benefits a subject of either labor-management negotiations or federal legislation. In this context, integration of pension benefits with other public income maintenance funds can be forbidden only by the terms of pension plans themselves, or by new federal legislation. This conclusion follows naturally from the view of a plurality of this Court in Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497 (1978). There, because Congress preserved a state role in pension regulation before ERISA, the plurality created an exception to the general rule pre-empting state regulation of collective bargaining. Id., at 513-514. This exception no longer applies, however, now that ERISA, with express pre-emptive intent, has eliminated state regulation of most pension plans.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES ex rel. EICHENLAUB v. SHAUGHNESSY, ACTING DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION. NO. 3. Argued November 16-17, 1949. Decided January 16, 1950. George G. Shiya argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 3. Eugene H. Nickerson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 82. Harold D. Cohen argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Campbell and Robert S. Erdahl. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases present the question of whether § 1 of the Act of May 10, 1920, authorizes the deportation of an alien under the following circumstances occurring since that Act took effect: (1) The alien was naturalized; (2) while he was a naturalized citizen he was convicted of a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917; (3) thereafter, in a denaturalization proceeding, his citizenship was revoked and his certificate of naturalization canceled on the ground that he had procured it by fraud; and (4) the proper authority, after the required hearings, found the alien to be an undesirable resident of the United States and ordered him deported. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that the Act authorizes such deportation. No. 3 — The Eichenlaub Case. Richard Eichenlaub, the relator, was born in Germany in 1905, and entered the United States from there in 1930. He was naturalized as an American citizen in 1936, and has resided in the United States continuously since his reentry in 1937, when he returned from a visit to Germany. In 1941, on his plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, he was convicted of conspiring to act as an agent for a foreign government without having been registered with the Secretary of State. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 18 months and fined $1,000. In 1944, with his consent, a judgment was entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York canceling his citizenship on the ground of fraud in its procurement. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against him and, after a hearing before an Immigration Inspector and a review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General, in 1945, ordered his deportation. This proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus was then filed in the court last named. After hearing, the writ was dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 167 F. 2d 659. We denied certiorari. 335 U. S. 867. However, when the Court of Appeals affirmed the Willumeit case, now before us, on the authority of this case, but called attention to the added impression which had been made upon it by the argument in favor of Willumeit on the point above stated, we vacated our denial of certiorari in this case and granted certiorari in both. 337 U. S. 955. No. 82 — The Willumeit Case. In 1905, Otto A. Willumeit, the relator, was born in Lorraine, which at that time was a part of Germany, but at the time of his arrest for deportation had become a part of France. He entered the United States from there in 1925. In 1931 he was naturalized, and he has resided in the United States continuously since his reentry in 1941 after a visit to Mexico. In 1942, on his plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, he was convicted of having conspired to violate that portion of the Espionage Act of 1917 which made it a crime to transmit to an agent of a foreign country information relating to the national defense of this country, with intent or reason to believe that such information would be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five years. In 1944, with his consent, a judgment was entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois canceling his citizenship on the ground of fraud in its procurement. Deportation proceedings were then instituted against him and, after a hearing before an Immigration Inspector and a review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Attorney General, in 1947, ordered his deportation. This proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and, after a hearing, the writ was dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the authority of its decision in the Eichenlaub case. 171 F. 2d 773. Because of the importance of the issue to American citizenship, we granted certiorari. 337 U. S. 955. The proper scope of the Act of 1920 as applied to these cases is found in the ordinary meaning of its words. The material provisions of the Act are as follows: “. . . That aliens of the following classes . . . shall, upon the warrant of the [Attorney General], be taken into his custody and deported ... if the [Attorney General], after hearing, finds that such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States, to wit: . . . . . “(2) All aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted of any violation or conspiracy to violate any of the following Acts or parts of Acts, the judgment on such conviction having become final, namely: “(a) [The Espionage Act of 1917, as amended]." The above words require that all persons to be deported under this Act shall be “aliens.” They do not limit its scope to aliens who never have been naturalized. They do not exempt those who have secured certificates of naturalization, but then have lost them by court order on the ground of fraud in their procurement. They do not suggest that such persons are not as clearly “aliens” as they were before their fraudulent naturalization. There is no question as to the power of Congress to enact a statute to deport aliens because of past misconduct. That is what Congress did in the Act of 1920, and there is no occasion to restrict its language so as to narrow its plain meaning. The one substantial issue is whether the Act requires that the relators not only must have been “aliens” at the times when they were ordered deported, but that they must also have had that status at the times when they were convicted of designated offenses against the national security. The Government suggests that one route to a conclusion on this issue is to hold that the relators, as a matter of law, were “aliens” when so convicted. The basis it suggests for so holding is that the judicial annulment of the relators’ naturalizations on the ground of fraud in their procurement deprived them of their naturalizations ab initio. Rosenberg v. United States, 60 F. 2d 475 (C. A. 3d Cir.). They thus would be returned to their status as aliens as of the date of their respective naturalizations. Accordingly, they would come within the scope of the Act of 1920, even if that Act were held to require that all offenders subject to deportation under it also must have had an alien status when convicted of the designated offenses. In our opinion, it is not necessary, for the purposes of these cases, to give a retroactive effect to the denaturalization orders. A simpler and equally complete solution lies in the view that the Act does not require that the offenders reached by it must have had the status of aliens at the time they were convicted. As the Act does not state that necessity, it is applicable to all such offenders, including those denaturalized before or after their convictions as well as those who never have been naturalized. The convictions of the relators for designated offenses are important conditions precedent to their being found to be undesirable residents. Their status as aliens is a necessary further condition of their deport-ability. When both conditions are met and, after hearing, the Attorney General finds them to be undesirable residents of the United States, the Act is satisfied. The statutory language which says that “aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted . . (emphasis supplied) refers to the requirement that the deportations be applicable to all persons who had been convicted of certain enumerated offenses since about the beginning of World War I (August 1, 1914), whether those convictions were had before or after May 10,1920. The crimes listed were not crimes in which convictions depended upon the citizenship, or lack of citizenship, of their perpetrators. In fact, they were crimes against the national security, so that their commission by naturalized citizens might well be regarded by Congress as more reprehensible than their commission by aliens who never had been naturalized. The recognized purpose of the Act was deportation. It is difficult to imagine a reason which would have made it natural or appropriate for Congress to authorize the Attorney General to pass upon the undesirability and deportability of an alien, never naturalized, who had been convicted of espionage, but would prohibit the Attorney General from passing upon the undesirability and deportability of aliens, such as the relators in the instant cases, who had procured certificates of naturalization before their convictions of espionage, but later had been deprived of those certificates on the ground of fraud in their procurement. If there were to be a distinction made in favor of any aliens because they were at one time naturalized citizens, the logical time at which that status would be important would be the time of the commission of the crimes, rather than the purely fortuitous time of their conviction of those crimes. Not even such a distinction finds support in the statute. The failure of Congress to give expression to the distinction, here urged by the relators, between aliens who never have been naturalized and those who have been denaturalized, was not due to unfamiliarity with such matters. In 1920, Congress must have been familiar with the status of aliens denaturalized under § 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 601, see 8 U. S. C. § 736, or expatriated under § 2 of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1228, see 8 U. S. C. § 801. It had had experience with the deportation of undesirable aliens under § 19 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 889, see 8 U. S. C. § 155, as well as under other wartime Acts and Proclamations. These Acts did not distinguish between aliens who never had been naturalized, and those who had obtained naturalization by fraud only to lose it by court decree. If the Act of 1920 had been intended to initiate the distinction here urged by the relators, it is likely that the change would have been made by express provision for it. We find nothing in its legislative history that suggests a congressional intent to distinguish between two such groups of undesirable criminals. The Congressional Committee Reports demonstrate that, while this statute was framed in general language and has remained in effect for 30 years, its enactment originally was occasioned by a desire to deport some or all of about 500 aliens who were then interned as dangerous enemy aliens and who might be found, after hearings, to be undesirable residents, and also to deport some or all of about 150 other aliens who, during World War I, had been convicted of violations of the Espionage Act or other national security measures, and who might be found, after hearings, to be undesirable residents. It is hardly conceivable that, under those circumstances, Congress, without expressly saying so, intended to prevent the Secretary of Labor (or his successor, the Attorney General) from deporting alien offenders merely because they had received their respective convictions at times when they held certificates of naturalization, later canceled for fraud. To do so would permit the denaturalized aliens to set up a canceled fraudulent status as a defense, and successfully to claim benefits and advantages under it. Congress, in 1920, evidently wanted to provide a means by which to free the United States of residents who (1) had been or thereafter were convicted of certain offenses against the security of the United States, (2) had been or thereafter were found, after hearing, to be undesirable residents of the United States, and (3) being aliens were subject to deportation. Congress said just that. We have given consideration to such other points as were raised by the relators, but we find that they do not affect the result. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is therefore Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 41 Stat. 593, see 8 U. S. C. § 157. Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217. This was under § 37 of the general conspiracy statute, 35 Stat. 1096, 18 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 88, now 18 U. S. C. § 371; and under § 3 of Title VIII of the Espionage Act of 1917,40 Stat. 226,22 U. S. C. § 233, as amended by § 6 of the Act of March 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 80, 22 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 601, now 18 U. S. C. § 951. Several other defendants stood trial in this proceeding, and were convicted both on this and on a general espionage count. Their conviction was affirmed on this count, but reversed on the other. United States v. Heine, 151 F. 2d 813 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Under § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1158-1160, 8 U. S. C. § 738. Under § 1 of the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593-594, 8 U. S. C. § 157. Under the 1940 Reorganization Plan No. Y, 54 Stat. 1238, the functions and powers of the Secretary of Labor under the Act of May 10, 1920, were transferred to the Attorney General. The warrant of deportation recited that the relator had been “found to be a member of the undesirable classes of alien residents enumerated . . .” in the Act of May 10, 1920. While the administrative file is not in the printed record, it was used in argument in the Court of Appeals and is on file here. The Board of Immigration Appeals at page 5 of its opinion found as a fact that the “respondent is an undesirable resident of the United States.” The Court of Appeals, at 167 F. 2d 660, properly recognized this additional matter in the record as justifying its acceptance of the less specific finding recited in the warrant of deportation, and as distinguishing this case from Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 42-46, on that point. This conviction was under §§ 2 and 4 of Title I of the Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 218-219, 50 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) §§ 32 and 34, now 18 U. S. C. §§ 794 and 2388. See note 4, supra. In this record the final decree of denaturalization is set forth in full. Among other things, it states that the order admitting the relator to citizenship— “is hereby vacated, annulled and set aside, and that the certificate of citizenship, ... is hereby cancelled and declared null and void, . . . and the defendant Otto Albert Willumeit is hereby forever restrained and enjoined from setting up or claiming any rights or privileges, benefits or advantages whatsoever under said order, . . . or the certificate of citizenship issued by virtue of said order.” The order was based not only upon § 1 of the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593-594, 8 U. S. C. § 157, the applicability of which in turn was based upon the relator’s conviction of a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917, but also upon §§ 13 and 14 of the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 161-162, as affected by 46 Stat. 581, 50 Stat. 165, the 1940 Reorganization Plan No. V, 54 Stat. 1238, and 60 Stat. 975, 8 U. S. C. §§ 213 and 214, having to do with relator’s reentry into the United States from Mexico in 1941. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to pass on this alleged ground for deportation in view of its conclusion as to the other ground. 171 F. 2d at 775. We concur for the same reason. As in the Eichenlaub case, the warrant of deportation apparently stated that it was based on the fact that the relator “has been found to be a member of the undesirable classes of alien residents ....’’ While the warrant is not printed in the record, the findings of the Commissioner of Immigration and of the Board of Immigration Appeals are printed in full. Each contains an express finding that the relator “is an undesirable resident of the United States.” Each states reasons for so concluding. The return to the writ of habeas corpus in this case states that, in addition to issuing the above-described warrant of deportation, the Attorney General ordered the relator interned in 1945 as a dangerous alien enemy and, in 1946, ordered the relator removed from this country for that reason. That proceeding derives its authority from the Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577, as it appears in R. S. § 4067, as affected by 40 Stat. 531, and Presidential Proclamation No. 2655 of July 14, 1945, 3 C. F. R. 1945 Supp. 29; 59 Stat., Pt. 2, 870, see 50 U. S. C. § 21. It thus raises questions as to the “enemy” status of an alien born in Lorraine, which at the time of his birth was a part of Germany, but at the time of his arrest was a part of France. While the Government refers to this Act in its argument in interpreting the Act of May 10, 1920, as in pari materia, it does not press this arrest as a separate ground for dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus. See United States ex rel. Zeller v. Watkins, 167 F. 2d 279 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, 164 F. 2d 137 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States ex rel. D’Esquiva v. Uhl, 137 F. 2d 903 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States ex rel. Umecker v. McCoy, 54 F. Supp. 679 (N. D.). The court below did not find it necessary to pass on this issue (171 F. 2d at 775), nor do we. See note 6, supra. The first paragraphs of the Act of May 10, 1920, are, in full, as follows: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That aliens of the following classes, in addition to those for whose expulsion from the United States provision is made in the existing law, shall, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into his custody and deported in the manner provided in sections 19 and 20 of the Act of February 5, 1917, entitled 'An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States,’ if the Secretary of Labor, after hearing, finds that such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States, to wit: “(1) All aliens who are now interned under section 4067 of the Revised Statutes of the United States and the proclamations issued by the President in pursuance of said section under date of April 6, 1917, November 16, 1917, December 11, 1917, and April 19, 1918, respectively. “(2) All aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted of any violation or conspiracy to violate any of the following Acts or parts of Acts, the judgment on such conviction having become final, namely: “(a) An Act entitled ‘An Act to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes/ approved June 15, 1917, or the amendment thereof approved May 16, 1918; . . . .” 41 Stat. 593-594, see 8 U. S. C. § 157. The subsequent subdivisions (2) (b) to (h), inclusive, refer to the Explosives Act, 40 Stat. 385; Act Restricting Foreign Travel, 40 Stat. 559; Act Punishing Injury to War Material, 40 Stat. 533; Army Emergency Increase Act, 40 Stat. 80, 884, 955; Act Punishing Threats Against the President, 39 Stat. 919; Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411; and the Seditious Conspiracy Section of the Penal Code, 35 Stat. 1088. The word “alien” is not defined in the Act. It is, however, defined in closely related statutes. The Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, provides: “the word ‘alien’ wherever used in’this Act shall include any person not a native-born or naturalized citizen of the United States; . . . .” 39 Stat. 874, see 8 U. S. C. § 173. The Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, provides: “The term ‘alien’ includes any individual not a native-born or naturalized citizen of the United States, . . . .” 43 Stat. 168, see 8 U. S. C. § 224. These definitions are in effect today. In Title 8 of the United States Code they are included in and are made to apply to the entire chapter on Immigration and that chapter includes as § 157 the Act of May 10, 1920. While the Act also makes no express distinction between its applicability to aliens who never have been naturalized and to those who have been naturalized, but have lost their naturalized citizenship by lawful and voluntary expatriation (see 8 U. S. C. §§ 800-810), the possibility of such a distinction is not before us in the instant cases. The required finding by the Attorney General, after hearing, that any alien who is to be deported is an undesirable resident of the United States prevents the automatic deportation of anyone under this Act without such a hearing and finding. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 280; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 730. See note 12, supra. “The practice of filing proceedings to cancel certificates of naturalization became widespread immediately after The 1906 Act went into effect. In the fiscal year 1907 there were eighty-six certificates cancelled; in 1908 there were four hundred and fifty-seven; and in 1909, nine hundred and twenty-one. During the thirty years following the effective date of the 1906 Act, more than twelve thousand certificates of naturalization were cancelled on the ground of fraud or on the ground that the order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured.” Cable, Loss of Citizenship 4-5 (1943). See H. R. Rep. No. 143 and S. Rep. No. 283, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.; 58 Cong. Rec. 3362-3376 (1919); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 167-168, n. 12, 179-181. Compare the injunction included in the final decree of denaturalization quoted in note 8, sufra. Among these is the claim in the Eichenlaub case that the Act of 1920 does not apply to his conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917, because, in substance, the penalty for its violation had been increased in 1940. This contention is without merit.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HOBBIE v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION OF FLORIDA et al. No. 85-993. Argued December 10, 1986 Decided February 25, 1987 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Powell, J., post, p. 146, and Stevens, J., post, p. 147, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 146. Walter E. Carson argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Mitchell A. Tyner and Frank M. Palmour. John D. Maher argued the cause and filed a brief for appel-lee Unemployment Appeals Commission. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for The American Jewish Congress et al. by Ronald A. Krauss, Marc D. Stem, and Jack D. Novik; for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs et al. by Donald R. Brewer; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights by Steven Frederick McDowell; for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Boothby, James M. Parker, and Robert W. Nixon; and for the Rutherford Institute et al. by W. Charles Bundren, James J. Knicely, Alfred J. Lindh, and William B. Hollberg. Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carvin, and Roger Clegg filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant’s employer discharged her when she refused to work certain scheduled hours because of sincerely held religious convictions adopted after beginning employment. The question to be decided is whether Florida’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits to appellant violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. h-l Lawton and Company (Lawton), a Florida jeweler, hired appellant Paula Hobbie in October 1981. She was employed by Lawton for 214 years, first as a trainee and then as assistant manager of a retail jewelry store. In April 1984, Hobbie informed her immediate supervisor that she was to be baptized into the Seventh-day Adventist Church and that, for religious reasons, she would no longer be able to work on her Sabbath, from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. The supervisor devised an arrangement with Hobbie: she agreed to work evenings and Sundays, and he agreed to substitute for her whenever she was scheduled to work on a Friday evening or a Saturday. This arrangement continued until the general manager of Lawton learned of it in June 1984. At that time, after a meeting with Hobbie and her minister, the general manager informed appellant that she could either work her scheduled shifts or submit her resignation to the company. When Hobbie refused to do either, Lawton discharged her. On June 4, 1984, appellant filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Under Florida law, unemployment compensation benefits are available to persons who become “unemployed through no fault of their own.” Fla. Stat. §443.021 (1985). Lawton contested the payment of benefits on the ground that Hobbie was “disqualified for benefits” because she had been discharged for “misconduct connected with [her] work.” §443.101(l)(a). A claims examiner for the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation denied Hobbie’s claim for benefits, and she appealed that determination. Following a hearing before a referee, the Unemployment Appeals Commission (Appeals Commission) affirmed the denial of benefits, agreeing that Hobbie’s refusal to work scheduled shifts constituted “misconduct connected with [her] work.” App. 3. Hobbie challenged the Appeals Commission’s order in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal. On September 10, 1985, that court summarily affirmed the Appeals Commission. We postponed jurisdiction, 475 U. S. 1117 (1985), and we now reverse. II Under our precedents, the Appeals Commission’s disqualification of appellant from receipt of benefits violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981). In Sherbert we considered South Carolina’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Sabbatarian who, like Hobbie, refused to work on Saturdays. The Court held that the State’s disqualification of Sherbert “force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship.” 374 U. S., at 404. We concluded that the State had imposed a burden upon Sherbert’s free exercise rights that had not been justified by a compelling state interest. In Thomas, too, the Court held that a State’s denial of unemployment benefits unlawfully burdened an employee’s right to free exercise of religion. Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, held religious beliefs that forbade his participation in the production of armaments. He was forced to leave his job when the employer closed his department and transferred him to a division that fabricated turrets for tanks. Indiana then denied Thomas unemployment compensation benefits. The Court found that the employee had been “put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work” and that the coercive impact of the forfeiture of benefits in this situation was undeniable: “ ‘Not only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of . . . religion, but the pressure upon [the employee] to forego that practice is unmistakable.”’ Thomas, supra, at 717 (quoting Sherbert, supra, at 404). We see no meaningful distinction among the situations of Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. We again affirm, as stated in Thomas: ‘Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.” 450 U. S., at 717-718 (emphasis added). Both Sherbert and Thomas held that such infringements must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest. The Appeals Commission does not seriously contend that its denial of benefits can withstand strict scrutiny; rather it urges that we hold that its justification should be determined under the less rigorous standard articulated in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 707-708 (1986): “[T]he Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.” Five Justices expressly rejected this argument in Roy. See id., at 715-716 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id., at 728 (O’Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 733 (White, J., dissenting). We reject the argument again today. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in Roy, “[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.” Id., at 727. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion”). The Appeals Commission also suggests two grounds upon which we might distinguish Sherbert and Thomas from the present case. First, the Appeals Commission points out that in Sherbert the employee was deemed completely ineligible for benefits under South Carolina’s unemployment insurance scheme because she would not accept work that conflicted with her Sabbath. The Appeals Commission contends that, under Florida law, Hobbie faces only a limited disqualification from receipt of benefits, and that once this fixed term has been served, she will again “be on an equal footing with all other workers, provided she avoids employment that conflicts with her religious beliefs.” Brief for Appellee Appeals Commission 12. The Appeals Commission argues that such a disqualification provision is less coercive than the ineligibility determination in Sherbert, and that the burden it imposes on free exercise is therefore permissible. This distinction is without substance. The immediate effects of ineligibility and disqualification are identical, and the disqualification penalty is substantial. Moreover, Sherbert was given controlling weight in Thomas, which involved a disqualification provision similar in all relevant respects to the statutory section implicated here. See Thomas, 450 U. S., at 709-710, n. 1. The Appeals Commission also attempts to distinguish this case by arguing that, unlike the employees in Sherbert and Thomas, Hobbie was the “agent of change” and is therefore responsible for the consequences of the conflict between her job and her religious beliefs. In Sherbert and Thomas, the employees held their respective religious beliefs at the time of hire; subsequent changes in the conditions of employment made by the employer caused the conflict between work and belief. In this case, Hobbie’s beliefs changed during the course of her employment, creating a conflict between job and faith that had not previously existed. The Appeals Commission contends that “it is . . . unfair for an employee to adopt religious beliefs that conflict with existing employment and expect to continue the employment without compromising those beliefs” and that this “intentional disregard of the employer’s interests . . . constitutes misconduct.” Brief for Appellee Appeals Commission 20-21. In effect, the Appeals Commission asks us to single out the religious convert for different, less favorable treatment than that given an individual whose adherence to his or her faith precedes employment. We decline to do so. The First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert from one faith to another after they are hired. The timing of Hobbie’s conversion is immaterial to our determination that her free exercise rights have been burdened; the salient inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause is the burden involved. In Sherbert, Thomas, and the present case, the employee was forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment; the forfeiture of unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful coercion to bear on the employee’s choice. Finally, we reject the Appeals Commission’s argument that the awarding of benefits to Hobbie would violate the Establishment Clause. This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (judicial exemption of Amish children from compulsory attendance at high school); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for churches). As in Sherbert, the accommodation at issue here does not entangle the State in an unlawful fostering of religion: “In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the ‘establishment’ of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshipers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent the involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.” 374 U. S., at 409. 1 — 1 1 — \ HH We conclude that Florida s refusal to award unemployment compensation benefits to appellant violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Here, as in Sherbert and Thomas, the State may not force an employee “to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work.” Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 404. The judgment of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal is therefore Reversed. An employer’s duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees is governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Hobbie has not sought relief pursuant to Title VII in this action. It is undisputed that appellant’s conversion was bona fide and that her religious belief is sincerely held. See Record 70, 100. The Florida statute defines “misconduct” as follows: “ ‘Misconduct’ includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other: “(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee; or “(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer.” Fla. Stat. §443.036(24) (1985). The Fifth District Court of Appeal issued an order stating: “PER CU-RIAM. AFFIRMED.” App. 6. See 475 So. 2d 711 (1985). Under Florida law, a per curiam affirmance issued without opinion cannot be appealed to the State Supreme Court. See Fla. Rule App. Proc. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(i-iv). Hobbie therefore sought review directly in this Court. The parties initially disagreed about whether an appeal lay under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). The Appeals Commission maintained that the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal did not draw into question the constitutionality of the state statute and, therefore, that an appeal did not lie. See Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 7-11. However, the Appeals Commission now concedes that the appeal is proper. Brief for Appellee Appeals Commission 4-6. See R. Stem, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 112 (6th ed. 1986) (appeal lies under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2) even if the state court has not been explicit in its rejection of the constitutional claim raised); cf. Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U. S. 276, 282-283 (1932). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948). In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S. 693 (1986), the Court considered a free exercise challenge to the statutory requirement that a Social Security number be supplied by any applicant seeking certain welfare benefits. In his opinion Chief Justice Burger expressly reaffirmed Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981), and distinguished those cases from Roy. He observed that the statutes at issue in Sherbert and Thomas provided: “[A] person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, ‘without good cause,’ he had quit work or refused available work. The ‘good cause’ standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. If a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent. Thus, as was urged in Thomas, to consider a religiously motivated resignation to be ‘without good cause’ tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion. ... In those cases, therefore, it was appropriate to require the State to demonstrate a compelling reason for denying the requested exemption.” 476 U. S., at 708 (citations omitted). Thus, even if the Court had accepted the reasoning of the Chief Justice’s opinion in Roy — which it did not — we would apply strict scrutiny in this ease. Although the purpose of the statute is to provide benefits to those persons who become “unemployed through no fault of their own,” Fla. Stat. §443.021 (1985), Florida nonetheless views a religiously motivated choice which leads to dismissal as “misconduct connected with . . . work.” §443.101. This scheme — which labels and penalizes behavior dictated by religious belief as intentional misconduct — exhibits greater hostility toward religion than one deeming such resignations to be “without good cause.” When an employee voluntarily leaves a position without good cause attributable to the employer, he or she is disqualified from receipt of benefits for the week of the departure and until he or she becomes reemployed and earns 17 times the weekly benefit amount. §443.101(l)(a)(l). The penalty for discharge due to misconduct connected with work — the relevant provision here — is identical to that for voluntary departure, except that an additional penalty of a specified number of weeks may be added depending upon the severity of the employee’s offense. § 443.101(l)(a)(2). Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 87 (1944) (In applying the Free Exercise Clause, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity, or reasonableness of a claimant’s religious beliefs); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F. 2d 679, 687 (CA9 1981) (“If judicial inquiry into the truth of one’s religious beliefs would violate the free exercise clause, an inquiry into one’s reasons for adopting those beliefs is similarly intrusive. So long as one’s faith is religiously based at the time it is asserted, it should not matter, for constitutional purposes, whether that faith derived from revelation, study, upbringing, gradual evolution, or some source that appears entirely incomprehensible”) (citation omitted). In the unemployment benefits context, the majorities and those dissenting have concluded that, were a State voluntarily to provide benefits to individuals in Hobbie’s situation, such an accommodation would not violate the Establishment Clause. See Thomas, 450 U. S., at 719-720 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 409); 450 U. S., at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sherbert, supra, at 422-423 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Appeals Commission contends that this Court’s recent decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S. 703 (1985), reveals that the accommodation sought by Hobbie would constitute an unlawful establishment of religion. In Thornton, we held that a Connecticut statute that provided employees with an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause. The Court determined that the State’s “unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests . . . ha[d] a primary effect that impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious practice,” id., at 710, and placed an unacceptable burden on employers and co-workers because it provided no exceptions for special circumstances regardless of the hardship resulting from the mandatory accommodation. In contrast, Florida’s provision of unemployment benefits to religious observers does not single out a particular class of such persons for favorable treatment and thereby have the effect of implicitly endorsing a particular religious belief. Rather, the provision of unemployment benefits generally available within the State to religious observers who must leave their employment due to an irreconcilable conflict between the demands of work and conscience neutrally accommodates religious beliefs and practices, without endorsement.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PIKE v. BRUCE CHURCH, INC. No. 301. Argued January 13, 1970 Decided March 2, 1970 Rex E. Lee argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona, and Thomas A. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. Jacob Abramson argued the cause and filed briefs for appellee. George C. Lyon filed a brief for the Western Growers Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mb. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee is a company engaged in extensive commercial farming operations in Arizona and California. The appellant is the official charged with enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act. A provision of the Act requires that, with certain exceptions, all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale must “be packed in regular compact arrangement in closed standard containers approved by the supervisor . ...” Invoking his authority under that provision, the appellant issued an order prohibiting the appellee company from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from its Parker, Arizona, ranch to nearby Blythe, California, for packing and processing. The company then brought this action in a federal court to enjoin the order as unconstitutional. A three-judge court was convened. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. After first granting temporary relief, the court issued a permanent injunction upon the ground that the challenged order constituted an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce. This appeal followed. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. 396 U. S. 812. The facts are not in dispute, having been stipulated by the parties. The appellee company has for many years been engaged in the business of growing, harvesting, processing, and packing fruits and vegetables at numerous locations in Arizona and California for interstate shipment to markets throughout the Nation. One of the company’s newest operations is at Parker, Arizona, where, pursuant to a 1964 lease with the Secretary of the Interior, the Colorado River Indian Agency, and the Colorado River Indian Tribes, it undertook to develop approximately 6,400 acres of uncultivated, arid land for agricultural use. The company has spent more than $3,000,000 in clearing, leveling, irrigating, and otherwise developing this land. The company began growing cantaloupes on part of the land in 1966, and has harvested a large cantaloupe crop there in each subsequent year. The cantaloupes are considered to be of higher quality than those grown in other areas of the State. Because they are highly perishable, cantaloupes must upon maturity be immediately harvested, processed, packed, and shipped in order to prevent spoilage. The processing and packing operations can be performed only in packing sheds. Because the company had no such facilities at Parker, it transported its 1966 Parker cantaloupe harvest in bulk loads to Blythe, California, 31 miles away, where it operated centralized and efficient packing shed facilities. There the melons were sorted, inspected, packed, and shipped. In 1967 the company again sent its Parker cantaloupe crop to Blythe for sorting, packing, and shipping. In 1968, however, the appellant entered the order here in issue, prohibiting the company from shipping its cantaloupes out of the State unless they were packed in containers in a manner and of a kind approved by the appellant. Because cantaloupes in the quantity involved can be so packed only in packing sheds, and because no such facilities were available to the company at Parker or anywhere else nearby in Arizona, the company faced imminent loss of its anticipated 1968 cantaloupe crop in the gross amount of $700,000. It was to prevent this unrecoverable loss that the District Court granted preliminary relief. After discovery proceedings, an agreed statement of facts was filed with the court. It contained a stipulation that the practical effect of the appellant’s order would be to compel the company to build packing facilities in or near Parker, Arizona, that would take many months to construct and would cost approximately $200,000. After briefing and argument, the court issued a permanent injunction, finding that “the order complained of constitutes an unlawful' burden upon interstate commerce.” The appellant’s threshold contention here is that even though the challenged order expressly forbids the interstate bulk shipment of the company’s cantaloupes, it imposes no burden upon interstate commerce. If the Arizona Act is complied with, he argues, all that will be regulated will be the intrastate packing of goods destined for interstate commerce. Articles being made ready for interstate movement are not necessarily yet in interstate commerce, which, he says, begins only when the articles are delivered to the interstate shipper. In making this argument, the appellant relies on this Court’s decisions in Federal Compress Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17, and Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584. Both of those cases involved taxes imposed by Mississippi on a cotton warehouse and compress business located within that State. The taxes were nondiscriminatory and were levied both on the warehoused cotton itself and on certain processes necessary to ready it for subsequent resale. The taxes were challenged as unlawful burdens on interstate commerce, since most of the taxed cotton was ultimately to be shipped to out-of-state buyers. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Mississippi taxes. It is not entirely clear from the Court’s opinions whether their rationale was that the taxes were imposed before interstate commerce had begun, or that the burden upon commerce was at the most indirect and remote. But in any event, the decisions do not support the argument that the order in the present case does not affect interstate commerce. In the first place, those cases involved cotton that had come to rest in Mississippi, and “[b]efore shipping orders [were] given, it [had] no ascertainable destination without the state.” 291 U. S., at 21. Here, by contrast, the perishable cantaloupes were destined to be shipped to an ascertainable location in California immediately upon harvest. Even more to the point, the taxes in Federal Compress and Chassaniol were imposed on goods and operations within the State, whereas the application of the statute at issue here would require that an operation now carried on outside the State must be performed instead within the State so that it can be regulated there. If the appellant’s theory were correct, then statutes expressly requiring that certain kinds of processing be done in the home State before shipment to a sister State would be immune from constitutional challenge. Yet such statutes have been consistently invalidated by this Court under the Commerce Clause. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 16; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385. See also Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50; Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189. Thus it is clear that the appellant’s order does affect and burden interstate commerce, and the question then becomes whether it does so unconstitutionally. Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving these issues, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, but more frequently it has spoken in terms of “direct” and “indirect” effects and burdens. See, e. g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., supra. At the core of the Arizona Eruit and Vegetable Standardization Act are the requirements that fruits and vegetables shipped from Arizona meet certain standards of wholesomeness and quality, and that they be packed in standard containers in such a way that the outer layer or exposed portion of the pack does not “materially misrepresent” the quality of the lot as a whole. The impetus for the Act was the fear that some growers were shipping inferior or deceptively packaged produce, with the result that the reputation of Arizona growers generally was being tarnished and their financial return concomitantly reduced. It was to prevent this that the Act was passed in 1929. The State has stipulated that its primary purpose is to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting deceptive packaging. We are not, then, dealing here with “state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized,” or with an Act designed to protect consumers in Arizona from contaminated or unfit goods. Its purpose and design are simply to protect and enhance the reputation of growers within the State. These are surely legitimate state interests. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52, 61. We have upheld a State's power to require that produce packaged in the State be packaged in a particular kind of receptacle, Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176. And we have recognized the legitimate interest of a State in maximizing the financial return to an industry within it. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341. Therefore, as applied to Arizona growers who package their produce in Arizona, we may assume the constitutional validity of the Act. We may further assume that Arizona has full constitutional power to forbid the misleading use of its name on produce that was grown or packed elsewhere. And, to the extent the Act forbids the shipment of contaminated or unfit produce, it clearly rests on sure footing. For, as the Court has said, such produce is “not the legitimate subject of trade or commerce, nor within the protection of the commerce clause of the Constitution.” Sligh v. Kirkwood, supra, at 60; Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511. But application of the Act through the appellant’s order to the appellee company has a far different impact, and quite a different purpose. The cantaloupes grown by the company at Parker are of exceptionally high quality. The company does not pack them in Arizona and cannot do so without making a capital expenditure of approximately $200,000. It transports them in bulk to nearby Blythe, California, where they are sorted, inspected, packed, and shipped in containers that do not identify them as Arizona cantaloupes, but bear the name of their California packer. The appellant’s order would forbid the company to pack its cantaloupes outside Arizona, not for the purpose of keeping the reputation of its growers unsullied, but to enhance their reputation through the reflected good will of the company’s superior produce. The appellant, in other words, is not complaining because the company is putting the good name of Arizona on an inferior or deceptively packaged product, but because it is not putting that name on a product that is superior and well packaged. As the appellant’s brief puts the matter, “It is within Arizona’s legitimate interest to require that interstate cantaloupe purchasers be informed that this high quality Parker fruit was grown in Arizona.” Although it is not easy to see why the other growers of Arizona are entitled to benefit at the company's expense from the fact that it produces superior crops, we may assume that the asserted state interest is a legitimate one. But the State’s tenuous interest in having the company’s cantaloupes identified as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the requirement that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the State. The nature of that burden is, constitutionally, more significant than its extent. For the Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 16; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385. The appellant argues that the above cases are different because they involved statutes whose express or concealed purpose was to preserve or secure employment for the home State, while here the statute is a regulatory one and there is no hint of such a purpose. But in Toomer v. Witsell, supra, the Court indicated that such a burden upon interstate commerce is unconstitutional even in the absence of such a purpose. In Toomer the Court held invalid a South Carolina statute requiring that owners of shrimp boats licensed by the State to fish in the maritime belt off South Carolina must unload and pack their catch in that State before “shipping or transporting it to another State.” What we said there applies to this case as well: “There was also uncontradicted evidence that appellants’ costs would be materially increased by the necessity of having their shrimp unloaded and packed in South Carolina ports rather than at their' home bases in Georgia where they maintain their own docking, warehousing, refrigeration and packing facilities. In addition, an inevitable concomitant of a statute requiring that work be done in South Carolina, even though that be economically disadvantageous to the fishermen, is to divert to South Carolina employment and business which might otherwise go to Georgia; the necessary tendency of the statute is to impose an artificial rigidity on the economic pattern of the industry.” 334 U. S., at 403-404. While the order issued under the Arizona statute does not impose such rigidity on an entire industry, it does impose just such a straitjacket on the appellee company with respect to the allocation of its interstate resources. Such an incidental consequence' of a regulatory scheme could perhaps be tolerated if a more compelling state interest were involved. But here the State's interest is minimal at best — certainly less substantial than a State’s interest in securing employment for its people. If the Commerce Clause forbids a State to require work to be done within its jurisdiction to promote local employment, then surely it cannot permit a State to require a person to go into a local packing business solely for the sake of enhancing the reputation of other producers within its borders. The judgment is affirmed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 3, c. 3, Art. 4. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3-503 C (Supp. 1969). In view of the emergency situation presented, and the fact that only a narrow and specific application of the Act was challenged as unconstitutional, the court was fully justified in not abstaining from the exercise of its jurisdiction pending litigation in the state courts. Compare Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 329 with Reetz v. Bozanich, ante, p. 82. The opinion of the District Court is unreported. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-481 (7) and (8). Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 796 (Douglas, J., dissenting). California Agric. Code § 45691. The California Fruit, Nut and Vegetable Standardization Act, California Agric. Code, Division 17, is virtually identical to the Arizona Act. Each statute has the same primary purpose of preventing deceptive packs, and it is stipulated that the standard containers required for cantaloupes in the two States are exactly the same. Appellant’s Brief 43. Because of the State’s recognized common-law property interest in its fish and wild game, Toomer presented an especially strong case for state control.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DENVER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD CO. v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 117. Argued April 23-24, 1956. Decided June 11, 1956. Frank E. Holman argued the causes for the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. With him on the brief were Robert E. Quirk and Dennis McCarthy. Elmer B. Collins argued the causes for the Union Pacific Railroad Co. et al. With him on the brief were L. E. Torinus, Roland J. Lehman, Eugene S. Davis, James C. Wilson, W. R. Rouse, Lowell Hastings, Edwin C. Matthias, M. L. Countryman, Jr., J. C. Gibson and John L. Davidson, Jr. Robert W. Ginnane argued the causes for the United States et ah, appellants in Nos. 119 and 334 and appellees in No. 118. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Ralph S. Spritzer, Samuel R. Howell, Robert L. Farrington and Neil Brooks. Robert L. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the causes for the Washington Public Service Commission et al., and Bert L. Overcash argued the causes for the State of Nebraska et al., appellants in Nos. 118 and 332 and appellees in Nos. 117 and 119. On the brief were Don Eastvold, Attorney General, and Mr. Simpson for the Washington Public Service Commission, Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, and Mr. Over cash for the State of Nebraska et al., George F. Guy, Attorney General, for the State Board of Equalization and Public Service Commission of Wyoming, and C. W. Ferguson for the Public Utilities Commissioner of Oregon. The causes were submitted on briefs by John R. Barry for the Public Service Commission of Utah et al., William J. Hickey for the American Short Line Railroad Association, and Lee J. Quasey for the National Live Stock Producers Association et al., appellees in Nos. 332, 333 and 334. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases all involve the validity of a single order of the Interstate Commerce Commission establishing through railroad routes and prescribing joint through rates for carriage of certain goods over the routes. The Commission’s order was made after lengthy hearings upon complaint of the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company. The Rio Grande’s main line runs from Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Provo, Utah, across much of Colorado to Denver, Pueblo, and Trinidad. The chief controversy involved in this case is between the Rio Grande and the Union Pacific Railroad Company. The Union Pacific lines which are relevant here run from points in Washington and Oregon through Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska, going as far east as Omaha and Kansas City. The Union Pacific and Rio Grande connect at Ogden, Salt Lake City, and Provo, Utah, and at Denver, Colorado. The connection at Ogden is known as the Ogden Gateway, meaning the gateway between the northwestern states served by the Union Pacific and states to the south and east served by the Rio Grande. The Union Pacific has used its strategic position in the northwest territory in such a way that practically all traffic between the Northwest, Denver and points east and south of Denver goes over its lines. For this reason the Northwest is often referred to as “closed door” territory. This situation caused the Rio Grande to file its complaint with the Commission. It charged that the Union Pacific had agreements with other connecting railroads named defendants under which goods could be carried to and from the Northwest at joint through rates, but that the only way the Rio Grande could carry goods to and from this area was by exacting higher “combination rates,” which are the sum of local rates. These high rates practically bar the Rio Grande as a connecting carrier for through shipments to and from the Northwest. The Rio Grande asked the Commission to order the Union Pacific to establish and maintain for the future “just, reasonable and non-discriminatory competitive joint through rates” with the Rio Grande. It charged that the Union Pacific’s failure to establish and maintain such rates violated §§ 1 (4), 3, 15 (1), and 15 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 15 (1) authorizes the Commission to proscribe individual or joint rates or practices that are “unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial” and to prescribe rates and practices that are “just, fair, and reasonable.” Section 15 (3) empowers the Commission to establish through routes and joint rates whenever deemed by the Commission “to be necessary or desirable in the public interest.” Section 15 (4), which is very important in this controversy, places restrictive conditions upon the Commission’s power to establish through routes under § 15 (3) when the establishment of a through route would require a railroad “without its consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route . ...” This provision is generally referred to as a prohibition against making a railroad “short-haul” itself. Among other findings the Commission must make under § 15 (4) before establishing a through route which requires a railroad to short-haul itself is that the new route “is needed in order to provide adequate, and more efficient or more economic, transportation . . . .” The Rio Grande’s petition before the Commission alleged that through routes with the Union Pacific already existed through the Ogden Gateway. It contended that they had been created and used by the Union Pacific. On this basis Rio Grande claimed that the restrictive conditions of § 15 (4) did not apply and that the Commission need not concern itself with those conditions but should proceed to establish reasonable joint rates under § 15 (3). After hearing much evidence the Commission rejected this contention and found that the through routes claimed by Rio Grande did not exist. The Commission went on to find, however, that through routes should be established with reference to certain commodities such as fruits, perishable foods, and livestock in a limited geographical area. The Commission found in accordance with § 15 (4) that these new routes were needed “to provide adequate and more economic transportation . . . It also found as required by § 15 (3) that through routes and joint rates for the specified commodities were “necessary and desirable in the public interest." 287 I. C. C. 611, 659. On the basis of its findings the Commission ordered the Union Pacific to establish through routes for the specified commodities and to establish joint rates the same as applied on its own and other connecting lines. The Union Pacific considered itself aggrieved because the order required establishment of some through routes and joint rates. The Rio Grande considered itself aggrieved both because of the geographical limitations of the Commission’s order and because joint rates were not established for all commodities. The Union Pacific challenged the ICC order in a three-judge United States District Court in Nebraska and the Rio Grande challenged it in a three-judge United States District Court in Colorado. See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 2284, 2321-2325. The Colorado court upset the order on a single ground. It held that there was no substantial evidence to support the finding that through routes were not in existence. Had the Commission found there were established through routes, the Colorado court reasoned, much broader relief for the Rio Grande might have been ordered, since the restrictions of § 15 (4) would not have been applicable. Consequently the Colorado court remanded the case to the Commission for further consideration. 131 F. Supp. 372. The Nebraska court accepted the Commission’s finding that no through routes were in existence. It then held that there was evidence before the Commission sufficient to support the finding under § 15 (4) that through routes were needed “in order to provide adequate and more economic transportation" for specified commodities shipped from the Northwest to initial destination points on the Rio Grande for “in-transit privileges incident to reshipment to points east of Denver . . ." 132 F. Supp. 72, 82. The Nebraska court declined, however, to sustain the Commission’s action with reference to shipments not requiring such transit services. Both District Court decrees are now before us on direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b). They were consolidated for oral argument and we treat them together here. It is convenient to take up first the Colorado court’s holding. In considering the question of through routes under § 15 (4) we begin with our recent holdings and opinions in Thompson v. United States, 343 U. S. 549; United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U. S. 562. We there emphasized the purpose of § 15 (4) to bar the Commission from compelling railroads to establish through routes resulting in trunkline “short-hauls” without faithful observance of restrictive conditions imposed by that section. At the same time we recognized that Commission action is not necessary to the creation of through routes. We pointed out that a through route is ordinarily a voluntary arrangement, express or implied, between connecting carriers, and that the existence of such an arrangement depends on the circumstances of particular cases. We said in Thompson v. United States, supra, at 557, that “In short, the test of the existence of a 'through route’ is whether the participating carriers hold themselves out as offering through transportation service.” Findings of through routes can therefore be made on the basis of express agreements between carriers or on the basis of inferences drawn from continuous practices sufficient to show that through routes exist even though not provided for in formal contracts or tariffs. The question in each case is one of fact. Cf. Through Routes and Through Rates, 12 I. C. C. 163, 166-167. The Colorado court viewed the evidence here as showing beyond dispute the existence of through routes both by formal tariffs and by long railroad practices. Whether the evidence could have justified the Commission in finding the existence of through routes we need not determine. We are satisfied, however, that the evidence before the Commission did not compel it to make such a finding and that its conclusion that the through routes claimed were not in existence is supported by substantial evidence. There was evidence that as early as 1897 the Union Pacific and lines it controlled did establish through routes to and from points in the “closed” northwest territory through the Ogden Gateway, and did establish joint through rates with the Rio Grande on the same basis as the joint through rates on Union Pacific’s own lines. But these joint rates were canceled by Union Pacific in amended tariffs published between 1906 and 1912. Apparently there was no language in the published amended tariffs expressly and formally declaring that the through routes by way of the Ogden Gateway were also to be deemed closed. The amended tariffs, however, resulted in very high combination rates for northwest traffic transported by the Rio Grande. The effect of these high rates has been greatly to handicap if not actually to close the Rio Grande as an artery for through traffic between the Northwest, Denver and points south and east. Of course the effect of such rates might not be enough standing alone to show a voluntary abandonment of the through routes. See Virginian R. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 666; Thompson v. United States, supra, at 556-558. At the same time it cannot be said that the Union Pacific’s failure formally to declare the through routes abandoned in 1906 (when it canceled joint rates) automatically left the through routes in existence for § 15 (4) purposes in 1949 when this litigation started. Cancellation of the rates in 1906 without formal cancellation of the routes is only a circumstance to be considered along with other circumstances in determining whether through routes now exist. The Colorado court relied on railroad practices as other circumstances which, considered with the failure expressly to abandon through routes, were sufficient to compel the Commission to hold that through routes did exist. We turn to that. At best for the Rio Grande the evidence of railroad practices with reference to the continued existence of through routes showed the following. Despite the high combination rates a small number of shipments continue to trickle through the Ogden Gateway to and from the closed northwest territory. In 1948, which the Commission considered a representative year, a number of carload shipments moved on through bills of lading along the alleged through routes. But none of them coming from the Northwest went further than points on the Rio Grande in Colorado also served by the Union Pacific and connecting lines. There were a few shipments of various commodities from east and south of Denver which went by way of the Rio Grande through the Ogden Gateway. The total shipments over the alleged through routes, however, were no more than a fractional part of one percent of the traffic carried to and from the Northwest by way of the Union Pacific routes. It is also undisputed that through routes and joint rates exist for eastbound shipments of sheep and goats. During World War II some Army troop and supply trains moved over the Rio Grande on through bills of lading. In addition to the foregoing some traffic moved over the Rio Grande in 1949 when snow storms blocked the Union Pacific route through Wyoming. These movements were made under service orders of the Commission, which did not exercise its authority under § 15 (4) to establish emergency through routes. The Union Pacific produced evidence tending to show that there were no through routes. It quite plainly appears from the record that there has been a long-standing struggle between the Union Pacific and the Rio Grande over the efforts of the Union Pacific to keep the Ogden Gateway closed. We think the record supports the finding of the Commission that: “There is no indication that any of the defendants has ever solicited any traffic from and to the areas here concerned for routing over a Rio Grande route by which a higher combination rate applied, or has ever used such a Rio Grande route except where called upon to do so by routing specified by the shipper or by a prior connecting carrier. In other words, so far as this record shows, 'the carriers’ course of business’ has been and is to use the Union Pacific routes except where called upon to use the Rio Grande routes by force of shippers’ or connecting carriers’ routing. The whole course of conduct of the Union Pacific, so far as revealed, has been for many years and is now to guard jealously its long haul and not open commercially the Rio Grande routes on this traffic.” 287 I. C. C., at 618. We adhere to the “holding out” test of the Thompson case. The evidence before the Commission was not such as to compel it to find that the Union Pacific held itself out as offering through service over the Rio Grande lines. It was error for the Colorado District Court to set aside the Commission’s finding and to remand the case to the Commission. This brings us to a consideration of the Nebraska District Court’s action. The Commission required the Union Pacific to establish through routes and joint rates with the Rio Grande for the carriage of certain commodities including livestock, fresh fruits and vegetables, frozen foods, butter, and eggs. The order rested on the Commission’s conclusion that such through routes and joint rates were “necessary and desirable in the public interest, in order to provide adequate and more economic transportation . . . .” 287 I. C. C., at 659. This conclusion was based on findings from a vast amount of evidence both oral and written. The pertinent language of § 15 (4) allows the Commission to establish through routes where “needed in order to provide adequate, and more efficient or more economic, transportation.” The dispute in the Nebraska court and here relates principally to the adequacy of the existing transportation services. The efficiency of Union Pacific services was established beyond dispute. Section 15 (4) empowers the Commission to consider the interests of shippers and the kind of services they get and need as well as the interests of carriers in determining whether additional routes should be established to provide “adequate” and “more economic” transportation service. We have held that in determining this question the Commission should look beyond the mere adequacy of the carrier’s physical operations “to the broader public interest which embraces service to shippers and the rates they pay.” Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 588, 591-593. The duty of the Commission, as we there stated, is to try to strike a fair balance in satisfying the needs of shippers, railroads, and the public. This of course calls for the Commission to exercise its informed judgment, having in mind its statutory obligation to develop, coordinate and preserve an adequate national transportation system. This it did. Relying on our interpretation of § 15 (4) in the Pennsylvania Railroad case, the Commission considered the various interests here. It found that: “Because of their generally perishable nature, food articles . . . must be moved to market with expedition and care, and over as many routes as possible. This requires that many routes be open in order that unnecessary interruptions of the free flow of such commodities may be avoided and that as much flexibility as possible in the distribution process be permitted. A number of services, not only at origin and destination, but en route, which are not usually required in the movement of ordinary traffic, must be provided for these perishable and semiperishable commodities.” 287 I. C. C., at 656. There are facilities along the Rio Grande route for feeding and grazing livestock in transit, and for partial unloading, storing or processing other shipments in transit. As a result shippers in the northwest territory were found to be “debarred from effective participation in the widespread system developed for the marketing of such commodities” and processors, shippers and dealers along the Rio Grande were found to be at a disadvantage in competing with those on the Union Pacific. For the specified commodities the Commission found the Union Pacific routes to be “inadequate and less economical than are the Rio Grande routes.” The Nebraska District Court sustained the Commission’s order with reference to shipments which required transit services on the Rio Grande. We agree with this portion of the holding. We cannot say that the Commission acted in excess of its authority in concluding, on the mass of evidence before it, that through routes and joint rates on the specified commodities were needed to provide adequate and more economic transportation and were necessary in the public interest. But the scope of the Commission’s order was cut down by the Nebraska court insofar as it established through routes and joint rates on shipments that did not require transit services such as we have mentioned. We disagree with the Nebraska District Court in this respect. The evidence showed and the Commission found that in marketing food and other perishable products it is a general practice among railroads to allow diversion of carloads in transit as markets are found and sales are made. The successful operation of this practice requires the existence of joint through rates to the final market, since diversion or reconsignment would often, as a practical matter, be unavailable to a shipper who is compelled to reconsign his goods at high combination rates. The Commission found that “If a shipment reaches a point through which a combination of rates applies and the sale is lost, it is frequently necessary to dispose of the shipment at that point at a forced or distress price. Such points are called closed or pocket markets.” 287 I. C. C., at 642. To illustrate its conclusion that combination rates result in inadequate transportation service in situations where shippers are compelled to reconsign, the Commission noted that: “Idaho producers are in competition with shippers in other producing areas and find it difficult to compete on shipments routed over the Rio Grande via Ogden or Salt Lake City. One Idaho shipper has made few sales of potatoes in the Southwest in the last several years because of pocket markets there.” 287 I. C. C., at 643. Pocket markets, of course, exist because reconsignment is possible only at high combination rates. We see no reason why a shipper’s privilege to have his goods reconsigned at joint rates should not be considered on the same basis as transit services in determining the adequacy and economy of existing transportation. We think it was error for the Nebraska court to narrow the scope of the Commission’s order by excluding shipments of commodities which so urgently need the advantage of reconsignment privileges at joint rates. Many other arguments are made against the Commission’s order. It is pointed out, for example, that the Rio Grande road has more curves than the Union Pacific. Its grades are steeper. Consequently its traffic is sometimes slower. It is contended that the evidence as a whole is insufficient to justify the holding that the establishment of through routes will be of such great advantage to shippers and the public that the Union Pacific should be compelled to short-haul itself. We are not unmindful of the force of the arguments made by the Union Pacific and by those who have intervened on its side. It is entirely possible that the Commission could have made findings contrary to those it did make. But on the whole we are unable to say that the Commission did not strike a fair balance in finding that the evidence required the establishment of these through routes and joint rates. After consideration of all the contentions made, we hold that the Nebraska court should have sustained the Commission’s order in full. Since the Commission’s order is justified under §§ 15 (1), 15 (3) and 15 (4) we have no occasion to consider contentions raised under §§ 3 (1) and 3 (4). The judgment of the District Court of Colorado is reversed with directions to dismiss the bill. The judgment of the Nebraska District Court is affirmed insofar as it affirmed the order of the Commission, and is reversed insofar as the court refused to enforce the Commission’s order. It is so ordered. 24 Stat. 379, 380, 384, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (4), 3, 15 (1), 15 (3). Section 1 (4) makes it the duty of common carriers “to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates . . . .” And § 3 (4) enjoins carriers to “afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic” without discrimination or undue prejudice. 24 Stat. 384, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 15 (4). Five Commissioners thought that through routes were in existence; five were of the opinion that they were not. Under ICC practice this meant that the Rio Grande had failed to prove its allegation that through routes existed. The Commission ordered the railroads: “to maintain through routes, via Ogden or Salt Lake City, Utah, in connection with the line of the complainant, for the interstate transportation, in carloads, of granite and marble monuments from origins in Vermont- and Georgia to destinations in the excluded territory in the northwest area, as described in the report, and of ordinary livestock, fresh fruits and vegetables, dried beans, frozen poultry, frozen foods, butter, and eggs, in carloads, from origins in the described excluded territory to destinations in the United States south and east of a line drawn along the southern boundary of Kansas, thence the eastern boundary of Kansas to but not including Kansas City, thence immediately west of points on the Missouri River from Kansas City, Kans., to Omaha, Nebr., thence immediately north of points on the lines of the Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Chicago and North Western Railway Company from Omaha to Chicago, 111., including destinations in the lower peninsula of Michigan and in Oklahoma and Texas; and to apply on such traffic, over such through routes, joint rates the same as those maintained and applied on like traffic from and to the same points over routes embracing the lines of the Union Pacific Railroad Company through Wyoming.” 54 Stat. 899. See also New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184; United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U. S. 562, 575-576. Because of the inability of most granite and marble monument retailers to purchase entire carload lots the Commission found “an urgent need for the establishment of joint through rates on this traffic to destinations in the excluded territory with stop-oif privileges at intermediate points on the Rio Grande.” 287 I. C. C., at 638. In reaching our conclusion we have not overlooked attacks on the breadth of the order with respect to marble, granite, and livestock shipments, nor challenges to that part of the order correcting discrimination in favor of the Bamberger Railroad.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COOK et al. v. HUDSON et al. No. 75-503. Argued November 1, 1976 Decided December 7, 1976 George Colvin Cochran argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Will A. Hickman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was S. T. Rayburn Stephen J. Poliak, John Townsend Rich, Franklin D. Kramer, and David Rubin filed a brief for the National Education Assn. as amicus curiae urging reversal. Per Curiam. Certiorari was granted to consider the question presented: whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a Mississippi public school board may terminate the employment of teachers sending their children not to public schools, but to a private racially segregated school. However, since the grant of certiorari, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), held that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonseetarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes. Moreover, a Mississippi statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (Supp., 1976), enacted in 1974 after the school board action here complained of, prohibits school boards “from denying employment or reemployment to any person . . . for the single reason that any eligible child of such person does not attend the school system in which such [person] is employed.” Though § 37-9-59 was cited in the record at the time of granting the writ, examination of the merits on oral argument in light of Runyon v. McCrary and § 37-9-59 satisfies us that the grant was improvident. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Cf. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70 (1955).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JENNINGS v. MAHONEY, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF UTAH No. 71-5179. Decided November 9, 1971 Per Curiam. Appellant, a Utah motorist, was involved in a collision. Both drivers and a police officer who investigated the accident filed accident reports with Utah’s Department of Public Safety as required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Without affording appellant a hearing on fault, and based solely on the contents of the accident reports, the Director of the Financial Responsibility Division determined that there was a reasonable possibility that appellant was at fault. Appellant did not carry liability insurance and was unable to post security to show financial responsibility. The Director therefore suspended her license. A Utah District Court sustained the Director, and the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed. 26 Utah 2d 128, 485 P. 2d 1404 (1971). The proceedings were authorized under Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12-2 (b) and 41-6-35 (1953). Appellant attacks the statutory scheme as not affording the procedural due process required by our decision in Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971). We there held that the Georgia version of a motor vehicle responsibility law was constitutionally deficient for failure to afford the uninsured motorist procedural due process. We held that, although a determination that there was a reasonable possibility that the motorist was at fault in the accident sufficed, “before the State may deprive [him] of his driver’s license and vehicle registration,” the State must provide “a forum for the determination of the question” and a “meaningful . . . ‘hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” Id., at 541, 542. Appellant submits that Utah’s statutory scheme falls short of these requirements in two respects: (1) by not requiring a stay of the Director’s order pending determination of judicial review, the scheme leaves open the possibility of suspension of licenses without prior hearing; (2) in confining judicial review to whether the Director’s determination is supported by the accident reports, and not affording the motorist an opportunity to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses, the motorist is not afforded a “meaningful” hearing. There is plainly a substantial question whether the Utah statutory scheme on its face affords the procedural due process required by Bell v. Burson. This case does not, however, require that we address that question. The District Court in fact afforded this appellant such procedural due process. That court stayed the Director’s suspension order pending completion of judicial review, and conducted a hearing at which appellant was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Both appellant and the Director testified at that hearing. The testimony of the investigating police officer would also have been heard except that appellant’s service of a subpoena upon him to appear was not timely under the applicable court rules. The judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEEDOM et al., MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL & SMELTER WORKERS. No. 57. Argued November 14, 1956. Decided December 10, 1956. Theophil C. Kammholz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come. Nathan Witt argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Joseph Forer and David Rein. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 146, 65 Stat. 601, 602, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (h), provides that the Board shall make no investigation nor issue any complaint on behalf of a union unless there is on file with the Board a non-Communist oath of each officer of the union and of each officer of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit. Section 9 (h) further provides that “The provisions of section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits.” Section 35 A of the Criminal Code applies a criminal sanction to false affidavits filed under § 9 (h). The question in this case is whether criminal prosecution under that provision is the exclusive remedy for the filing of a false affidavit under § 9 (h) or whether the Board may take administrative action and, on a finding that a false affidavit has been filed, enter an order of decompliance, withholding from the union in question the benefits of the Act until it is satisfied that the union has complied. The court below held that the criminal sanction was the exclusive remedy for filing the false affidavit. 96 U. S. App. D. C. 416, 226 F. 2d 780. That decision is in conflict with a ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Labor Board v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 226 F. 2d 194. We granted the petitions for certiorari in each case in order to resolve the conflict. 351 U. S. 949; 351 U. S. 905. The union involved in the present case is the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. The union filed a complaint with the Board charging that the Precision Scientific Co. refused to bargain with it in violation of the Act. During the course of the hearing before the Board, the company challenged the veracity of affidavits filed by one Travis, an officer of the union, under § 9 (h). The Board, in accord with its practice, refused to allow that issue to be litigated in the unfair labor practice proceeding. But later on, it issued an order directing an administrative investigation and hearing. A hearing was held before an examiner who found, among other things, that the § 9 (h) affidavit filed by Travis in August 1949 was false and that the union membership knew it was false and yet continued to re-elect him as an officer., The Board agreed with the trial examiner, held that the union was not and had not been in compliance with § 9 (h) of the Act, and ordered that the union be accorded no further benefits under the Act until it had complied. Maurice E. Travis, 111 N. L. R. B. 422. The Board, thereafter, dismissed the union’s complaint against Precision Scientific Co., an action later vacated pursuant to a stay issued by the court below. The instant suit was brought in the District Court by the union, which prayed that the Board's order of decom-pliance be enjoined. Precision Scientific Co. intervened. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed, 96 U. S. App. D. C. 416, 226 F. 2d 780, on the authority of its prior decision in Farmer v. International Fur & Leather Workers Union, 95 U. S. App. D. C. 308, 221 F. 2d 862. It held that a false affidavit filed under § 9 (h) of the Act gave rise only to a criminal penalty against the guilty union officer and did not in any way alter the union’s right to the benefits of the Act, even where its members were aware of the officer’s fraud. We agree with the court below that the Board has no authority to deprive unions of their compliance status under § 9 (h) and that the only remedy for the filing of a false affidavit is the criminal penalty provided in § 35 A of the Criminal Code. We start with a statutory provision that contains only one express sanction, viz., prosecution for making a false statement. No other sections of the Act expressly supplement that one sanction. The aim of § 9 (h) is clear. It imposes a criminal penalty for filing a false affidavit so as to deter Communist officers from filing at all. The failure to file stands as a barrier to the making of an investigation by the Board and the issuance of any complaint for the benefit of the union in question. The section, therefore, provides an incentive to the members of the union to rid themselves of Communist leadership and elect officers who can file affidavits in order to receive the benefits of the Act. The filing of the required affidavits by the necessary officers is the key that makes available to the union the benefits of the Act. The Board is under a duty to determine whether a filing has been made by each person specified in § 9 (h), since its power to act on union charges is conditioned on filing of the necessary affidavits. That was the extent of our rulings in Labor Board v. Highland Park Co., 341 U. S. 322; Labor Board v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U. S. 264. The argument made by the Board would have us go further and read into the Act an implied power to determine not only whether the affidavit has been filed but also whether the affidavit filed is true or false. And for that position reliance is placed on general statements in cases like Labor Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U. S. 9, 18-19, that the Board has implied power to protect its process from abuse. We are dealing here with a special provision that has a precise history. Both the Senate and the House originally passed bills which, though the language differed one from the other, made the test of compliance the fact of nonmembership of union officers in the Communist Party. See 1 Leg. Hist., Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Nat. Labor Rel. Bd., 1948), pp. 190, 251. If those provisions had become the law, the Board would have been required to conduct an inquiry into whether the officers were in fact non-Communist, at least where the veracity of the affiant was challenged. But a fundamental change in § 9 (h) was made by the Conference Committee. As stated in the Conference Report respecting the provisions in the two bills, “In reconciling the two provisions the conferees took into account the fact that representation proceedings might be indefinitely delayed if the Board was required to investigate the character of all the local and national officers as well as the character of the officers of the parent body or federation. The conference agreement provides that no certification shall be made or any complaint issued unless the labor organization in question submits affidavits executed by each of its officers and officers of its national or international body, to the effect that they are not members or affiliates of the Communist Party or any other proscribed organization. The penal provisions of section 35 (a) of the Criminal Code (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 80) are made applicable to the execution of such affidavits.” 2 Leg. Hist., op. cit., supra, p. 1542. Senator Taft explained the change to the Senate: “This provision making the filing of affidavits with respect to Communist Party affiliation by its officers a condition precedent to use of the processes of the Board has been criticized as creating endless delays. It was to prevent such delays that this provision was amended by the conferees. Under both the Senate and House bills the Board’s certification proceedings could have been infinitely delayed while it investigated and determined Communist Party affiliation. Under the amendment an affidavit is sufficient for the Board’s purpose and there is no delay unless an officer of the moving union refuses to file the affidavit required.” Id., at 1625; 93 Cong. Rec. 6860. This explicit statement by the one most responsible for the 1947 amendments seems to us to put at rest the question raised by this case. If, in spite of the change in wording of § 9 (h) made by the Conference Committee, the Board could still investigate the truth or falsity of the affidavits filed, the unfair labor practice proceedings might be “infinitely delayed,” to use Senator Taft’s words. Under the construction presently urged by the Board, Senator Taft’s assurance that “an affidavit is sufficient for the Board’s purpose” would be disregarded. Much argument is advanced that the contrary position is favored by policy considerations. For example, it is said that if the Board can look into the truth or falsity of all § 9 (h) affidavits and enter orders of decompliance in case they are found to be false, union members will have greater incentive to rid themselves of Communist leaders. But the rule written into § 9 (h) is for the protection of unions as well as for the detection of Communists. It is not fair to read it only against the background of a case where the members knew their officer was a Communist. We are dealing with a requirement equally applicable to all unions, whether the members are innocent of such knowledge or guilty. As Judge Bazelon stated in Farmer v. United Electrical Workers, 93 U. S. App. D. C. 178, 181, 211 F. 2d 36, 39, there is no indication that Congress meant to impose on a union the drastic penalty of decompliance “because its officer had deceived the union as well as the Board by filing a false affidavit.” The penalty stated in § 9 (h) is one against the guilty officers. In view of the wording of § 9 (h) and its legislative history, we cannot find an additional sanction which in practical effect would run against the members of the union, not their guilty officers. That was the Board’s original position, and we think it is the correct one. Affirmed. “No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits.” Section 35 A provides a penalty of $10,000, or a prison term or both, for making, among other things, fraudulent statements “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” 52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. § 1001. See In the Matter of Lion Oil Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 565, 566; Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 108 N. L. R. B. 490, 491. See the colloquy between Senators Ferguson and McClellan in 2 Leg. Hist., Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Nat. Labor Rel. Bd., 1948), pp. 1434-1435. In the Matter of Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 76 N. L. R. B. 842, 843, a proceeding involving an unfair labor practice, the Board refused to entertain evidence that the affidavits filed under § 9 (h) were false, the Board saying: “In the instant case there is on file an affidavit identifying the officers of the Union, and non-Communist affidavits signed by each officer so identified. It is not the purpose of the statute to require the Board to investigate the authenticity or truth of the affidavits which have been filed. Persons desiring to establish falsification or fraud have recourse to the Department of Justice for a prosecution under Section 35 (a) of the Criminal Code. The evidence sought to be adduced under this allegation is accordingly immaterial.” And see In the Matter of Alpert and Alpert, 92 N. L. R. B. 806, 807. On March 18, 1952, Paul M. Herzog, then Chairman of the Board, testified on § 9 (h) problems in Senate hearings. He reported that in the four years ending June 30, 1951, there had been filed with the Board 232,000 non-Communist affidavits. He reviewed the history of § 9 (h) and remarked how “intolerable and delaying” the administrative process would have been if the proposals originally contained in § 9 (h), and which we have discussed, had been enacted into law: “. . . Had this provision been enacted into law, the Board would have been inundated with litigation on an issue concerning which proof is singularly difficult to obtain, to the detriment of speedy disposal of cases which cry out for early employee recourse to the ballot box. “Instead, Congress imposed an obligation on labor union 'officers’— without defining them in the statute — to take the affirmative step of forswearing Communist affiliation. The theory evidently was that if these officers’ refusal to sign affidavits deprived their constituents of all the Board’s facilities, the spotlighting of that refusal would soon generate pressure from below to remove them from office. It was apparent from the outset that the NLRB’s sole function was to make certain that the necessary persons filed these affidavits, and that, once they had done so pursuant to the rules we adopted, we were to process their cases without inquiring into the truth or falsity of the affidavits themselves. Where such an issue arose, the Board’s statutory duty was only to refer the affidavit to the Department of Justice for investigation and possible prosecution for perjury under the Criminal Code. We have made 55 such referrals since 1947.” Hearings, Senate Subcommittee of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Communist Domination of Unions and National Security, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 91. On November 10, 1953, the Board issued a Statement of Policy which overturned its previous position. The Board then concluded that a conviction for filing a false affidavit “would necessarily invalidate any certifications or other official action taken by the Board in reliance on the truth of such affidavits.” The extent of this change in policy was underscored by the Board’s further decision to hold in abeyance representation elections which concerned a union whose officers were under indictment for filing false affidavits. 18 Fed. Reg. 7185.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. HUNT et al. No. 273. Argued March 2, 1964. Decided March 30, 1964. Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Ralph S. Spritzer, Howard E. Wahrenbrock and Peter H. Schiff. Richard F. Generelly argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Robert W. Henderson, Thomas G. Crouch and Robert E. May. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the Federal Power Commission, when granting an application for a temporary certificate authorizing the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, can impose a condition that the applicant shall not increase its certificated price pending a hearing on the applicant’s petition for permanent authority. Each of the seven applications involved here requested temporary operating authority to sell natural gas in interstate commerce on emergency grounds, as provided by §§ 7 (c) and (e) of the Natural Gas Act. In each case the Federal Power Commission conditioned the temporary grant of authority upon, inter alia, the producer’s maintaining the initial price, without increase, during the period of the temporary authorization. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside this condition, holding that it was beyond the power of the Commission and conflicted with the right of a producer to initiate a higher contract rate under § 4 of the Act. 306 F. 2d 334. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question to the enforcement of the Natural Gas Act. 375 U. S. 810. We conclude that the Commission can impose such a condition in granting temporary authorizations under § 7 and therefore reverse the judgments. I. While this case involves applications for seven different temporary authorizations, the essential facts as to each, save the dates and gas fields, are the same. Since the parties and the Court of Appeals have treated the sale by the Hassie Hunt Trust as typical, we shall do likewise. The Hunts are producers of natural gas in the Alta Loma area in Galveston County in Texas Railroad District No. 3. In July 1960, the Commission issued a permanent certificate authorizing sales of natural gas from the Alta Loma and other areas to the Peoples Gulf Coast Natural Gas Pipeline Co. 24 F. P. C. 1. The authorization was conditioned upon the producer's filing an amended contract providing for an initial price of 200 per Mcf., with an escalation of 30 after 10 years. The original contract had allowed four 20 escalations at four-year intervals. The order was found defective, however, because the Public Service Commission of New York, which sought a lower initial price, had been refused intervention before the Commission. See Public Service Comm’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 111 U. S. App. D. C. 153, 295 F. 2d 140, cert. denied, sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 368 U. S. 948. Thereafter the Commission vacated its issuance of the certificate and ordered a new hearing on the question of initial price. 26 F. P. C. 689. In the meantime, after the issuance, but prior to the vacating, of the July 1960 certificate, the Commission issued General Policy No. 61-1,18 CFR § 2.56, 24 F. P. C. 818, which fixed the guideline for initial prices for Texas Railroad District No. 3 at 18¢ per Mcf., 2¢ below the initial price allowed in the July 1960 certificate. Thereafter, on February 27, 1961, the Hassie Hunt Trust applied for a permanent certificate of public convenience and necessity allowing sales from a new well in this same area to Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, the successor to Peoples Gulf Coast. It also applied for temporary authorization to begin service immediately under the emergency provisions of the Commission’s Regulations issued under § 7 (c) of the Act. 18 CFR § 157.28. The emergency was alleged to result from the “necessity of paying shut-in royalties and the incurrence of drainage through sales by others to pipeline companies other than Natural.” The new sale was covered by a 20-year contract, dated December 15, 1960, with provisions identical to those of the earlier contract, i. e., an initial price of 200 per Mcf. with 20 escalations at four-year intervals. The Commission on April 7, 1961, granted the temporary authorization subject to three conditions: (1) that the total initial price not exceed 180 per Mcf. and thus be in keeping with the guideline rate set for Texas Railroad District No. 3, (2) that within 20 days supplements to the contracts be filed consistent with this price, and (3) that the temporary authorization be accepted in writing within 20 days. Deliveries were commenced by the producer on April 19 before these conditions were met. On May 5 a conditional acceptance was filed reserving the right to seek removal of the conditions imposed and tendering an amended contract providing for an 180 initial price for 30 days with 200 per Mcf. thereafter. The Commission rejected this conditional acceptance and subsequently, in order to make clear its position, specifically provided that the initial rate was to be 180 and that there was to be no change therein pending the hearing on permanent authorization. The proposed 200 rate was rejected and thereafter this review followed. The Court of Appeals sustained the 180 initial price but held that the Commission had no power to condition temporary authorizations so as to preclude the filing and collection of increased rates pursuant to § 4 of the Act. II. Once again we are confronted with a question solely of the proper interpretation of the Natural Gas Act. This time we must determine the interplay of §§ 4 and 7. These sections are the avenues through which the natural gas producer may, by contract or otherwise, initially propose the dedication of his natural gas supply to interstate movement (§7) and, once so dedicated by order of the Federal Power Commission, thereafter initiate changes in existing rates (§4). We will proceed with separate analyses of these two sections. Section 7 (c) came into the Natural Gas Act in 1942 and provides the method by which gas may be dedicated and certificated into interstate commerce. It prohibits a natural gas producer from engaging in the transportation or sale of natural gas “unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations.” In order to secure such certificates, applications are filed with the Commission and in due course the applicants are afforded a hearing. Sections 7 (c) and (e) of the Act command that a certificate shall be issued if the Commission finds it “required by the present or future public convenience and necessity” and if the applicant meets certain tests of reliability, such as ability and willingness to perform. In issuing such certificates, the Commission has “the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.” §7(e). Hearings under § 7 (e) for permanent certification are time consuming. The Congress, realizing this, provided in § 7 (c) that “the Commission may issue a temporary certificate in cases of emergency, to assure maintenance of adequate service or to serve particular customers, without notice or hearing, pending the determination of an application for a certificate, and may by regulation exempt from the requirements of this section temporary acts or operations for which the issuance of a certificate will not be required in the public interest.” Pursuant to this authorization the Commission adopted a regulation which sets out standards for emergency authorizations and requires the applicant to file “a statement of intention to invoke this section.” 18 CFR § 157.28 (c). The Commission grants the temporary certificate, where it deems necessary,' without notice or hearing. Under the terms of the regulation, this authorization continues until final Commission action under §§ 4 and 7, “without prejudice to such rate or other condition as may be attached to the issuance of the certificate.” 18 CFR § 157.28. It must be noted, however, that § 7 does not stipulate that the Commission must find the initial rate to be just and reasonable but simply that the service proposed is required by the present and future public convenience and necessity. Nor does § 7 grant the Commission power to suspend the rate authorized in permanent or temporary certificates issued under that section. Once a permanent certificate is granted the Commission can correct an improper rate only under § 5 of the Act, 52 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 717d, which likewise has no suspension provision. In the light of this'inability to suspend the initial rate granted under a § 7 certificate, the Commission attaches conditions to the certificate of authority which it deems necessary to afford consumers the “complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges” for which we found the Act was framed in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 360 U. S. 378, 388 (1959). “The heart of the Act,” we said there, was in those provisions of § 7 (e) “requiring initially that any ‘proposed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition . . . will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity’ . . . and that all rates and charges ‘made, demanded, or received’ shall be ‘just and reasonable,’ § 4, 15 U. S. C. § 717c.” In this case, the Commission concluded that when granting temporary certificates it must look even more carefully to the present and future public convenience and necessity and interpose such conditions precedent as would, in its view, fully protect consumers from excessive rates and charges. Section 4 was included in the original Act of 1938. 52 Stat. 822,15 U. S. C. § 717c. It provides in part that “no change shall be made by any natural-gas company in any . . . rate . . . except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public.” §4(d). Whenever such new rate is filed, the Commission may, after notice, hold hearings to determine whether the rate is lawful and may suspend its operation, but only for a period of five months. §4(e). If the proceeding is not concluded within those five months, the proposed rate becomes effective and collectible, subject to subsequent refund by the natural gas company to the extent the rate is not just and reasonable. As we said in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 341 (1956), the power granted to the Commission “is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the first instance by natural gas companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy them.” And we specifically pointed out that all § 4 (e) does “is to add to this basic power, in the case of a newly changed rate . . . the further powers (1) to preserve the status quo pending review of the new rate by suspending its operation for a limited period, and (2) thereafter to make its order retroactive, by means of the refund procedure, to the date the change became effective.” Ibid. The power granted to the Commission in § 4 does not come into play until after the initial certification of the natural gas into interstate commerce has been granted under § 7. In the instant case no permanent certificates authorizing sales in interstate commerce have yet been issued. Temporary certificates have been allowed and each is conditioned upon the maintenance of the initial price. Thus, if respondents’ position is correct, then the conditions precedent to the issuance of the temporary certificates required by the Commission can be nullified by subsequent independent action of the respondents in filing a new contract under § 4. We do not believe that the Congress intended any such incongruous result. III. We find no conflict in the directives of the two sections. Indeed, they supplement one another and thereby work together in efficient conjunction to carry out the purposes of the Act. When the independent producer knocks on the door of the Commission for permission to enter his gas in interstate commerce he must submit to the requirements of § 7. His natural gas must be certificated before it can move into interstate commerce. If he wishes to avoid the delay incident to a hearing for a permanent certificate he may apply for temporary authorization, which may be granted upon ex parte application. In view of this, the Commission must have the authority to condition a temporary certificate so as to avoid irreparable injury to affected parties. This condition, once imposed, continues only during the pendency of the producer’s application for a permanent certificate. In view of the ex parte nature of the proceeding, it appears only fair to all concerned that the condition upon which the rate was temporarily certified be continued unchanged until the permanent certificate is issued. Under the procedures of the Act, it is at the point of permanent or unconditional temporary certification that the provisions of § 4 become applicable. The gas has been permanently certificated into interstate commerce and the independent producer is then free to pursue the rate-filing procedure of that section. This Court previously discussed the use of the temporary certificate procedure in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra. There we indicated that the Commission might avail itself of its power to condition the initial certification of natural gas into interstate commerce in order to prevent a triggering of general price rises. The language is unmistakably clear as to the claim made here that the vitality of § 4 of the Act is being impaired and we therefore repeat and reaffirm it: “This is not an encroachment upon the initial rate-making privileges allowed natural gas companies under the Act, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra, but merely the exercise of that duty imposed on the Commission to protect the public interest in determining whether the issuance of the certificate is required by the public convenience and necessity, which is the Act’s standard in § 7 applications. In granting such conditional certificates, the Commission does not determine initial prices nor does it overturn those agreed upon by the parties. Rather, it so conditions the certificate that the consuming public may be protected while the justness and reasonableness of the price fixed by the parties is being determined under other sections of the Act. Section 7 procedures in such situations thus act to hold the line awaiting adjudication of a just and reasonable rate.” At 391-392. Nor is it any answer to say that the suspension power under § 4 (e) will afford protection to the public. The experience since our opinion in Atlantic Refining Co., supra, indicates that a triggering of price rises often results from the out-of-line initial pricing of certificated gas. These effects become irreversible and splash over into intrastate sales, thus generating reciprocal pressures that directly affect jurisdictional rates. As we said in Federal Power Comm’n v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U. S. 145, 154, 155 (1962), the possibility of refund does not afford sufficient protection: “True, the exaction would have been subject to refund, but experience has shown this to be somewhat illusory .... It is, therefore, the duty of the Commission to look at The backdrop of the practical consequences [resulting] . . . and the purposes of the Act,’ Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 364 U. S. 137, 147 (1960), in exercising its discretion under § 16 to issue interim orders . . . .” IV. Our interpretation of the power of the Commission under §§ 7 (c) and (e) is buttressed by the legislative history. They were added to the Act in 1942, four years after its original passage. Prior to their adoption the only rate-making regulatory tools the Commission possessed were §§ 4 and 5, and they came into operation only after the natural gas was already moving in interstate commerce. Sections 7 (c) and (e) were designed to control the certification of gas destined for interstate movement. The purpose of the amendments was to give “the Commission an opportunity to scrutinize the financial set-up, the adequacy of the gas reserves, the feasibility and adequacy of the proposed services, and the characteristics of the rate structure ... at a time when such vital matters can readily be modified as the public interest may demand. . . .” House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H. R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3. Its- counterpart in the Senate likewise reported: “Provisions of the Natural Gas Act empower the Commission to prevent uneconomic extensions and waste, but it can so regulate such powers only when the extension is to ‘a market in which natural gas is already being served by another natural-gas -company.’ Thus the possibilities of waste, uneconomic and uncontrolled extensions are multiple and tremendous. The present bill would correct this glaring inadequacy of the act. It would also authorize the Commission to examine costs, finances, necessity, feasibility, and adequacy of proposed services. The characteristics of their rate structure could be studied.” Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, S. Rep. No. 948, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2. Clearly, the Commission was given the power to lay down conditions precedent to the entry of the natural gas into interstate commerce. Moreover, the Commission has long recognized this obligation and has required modification of many tariff and contract provisions as a condition to the granting of a certificate. The existence of broad discretionary power in the Commission to condition temporary certificates appears to us to be vital to its ability to hold the line in pricing. The extent of that power in permanent certification is not before us now, since each of these applications is for temporary certification. It is said that the condition of the Commission’s docket transposes, for all practical matters, temporary certificates into permanent ones. This claim arises due to the delays incident to the issuance of a permanent certificate. We spoke of the “nigh interminable” delay in § 5 proceedings in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 389. There delay operated against the consumer. Here it operates against the producer. The Commission has been making efforts in this regard, through the establishment of guidelines for determining initial prices and other administrative devices. 43 F. P. C. Ann. Rep. 13, 119-120 (1963). However, we again call to its attention the dangers inherent in the accumulation of a large backlog of cases with its accompanying irreparable injury to the parties. Moreover, consumers may become directly affected thereby through the reluctance of producers to enter interstate markets because of the long delay incident to permanent certification. Procedures must be worked out, not only to clear up this docket congestion, but also, to maintain a reasonably clear current docket so that hearings may be had without inordinate delay. In this connection the techniques of the National Labor Relations Board might be studied with a view to determining whether its exemption practices, see Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1, 3-4 (1957), might be helpful in the solution of the Commission’s problems. Reversed. Section 7 (c), 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 56 Stat. 83, 15 U. S. C. §717f (c), provides: “(c) No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations: Provided, however, That if any such natural-gas company or predecessor in interest was bona fide engaged in transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, on . . . [February 7, 1942], over the route or routes or within the area for which application is made and has so operated since that time, the Commission shall issue such certificate without requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served by such operation, and .without further proceedings, if application for such certificate'is made to the Commission within ninety days after . . . [February 7, 1942]. Pending the determination of any such application, the continuance of such operation shall be lawful. “In all other cases the Commission shall set the matter for hearing and shall give such reasonable notice of the hearing thereon to all interested persons as in its judgment may be necessary under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commission; and the application shall be decided in accordance with the procedure provided in subsection (e) of this section and such certificate shall be issued or denied accordingly: Provided, however, That the Commission may issue a temporary certificate in cases of emergency, to assure maintenance of adequate service or to serve particular customers, without notice or hearing, pending the determination of an application for a certificate, and may by regulation exempt from the requirements of this section temporary acts or operations for which the issuance of a certificate will not be required in the public interest.” Section 7 (e), 52 Stat. 824, as amended, 56 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (e), provides: “(e) Except in the cases governed by the provisos contained in subsection (c) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of the Act and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition, to the extent authorized by the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied. The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.” The Commission did have authority with reference to the entry of a natural gas company into a competitive market but not into new and unserviced markets. See, e. g., Florida Economic Advisory Council v. Federal Power Comm’n, 102 U. S. App. D. C. 152, 251 F. 2d 643, cert. denied, 356 U. S. 959; Northern Natural Gas Co., 22 F. P. C. 164, 174-175, 180, aff’d sub nom. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 36, 278 F. 2d 870, cert. denied, 364 U. S. 891 (certificate conditioned upon removal of clauses permitting cancellation depending on price relationship of gas and competitive fuels in gas purchase contracts upon which feasibility of pipeline project depended); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 22 F. P. C. 391, 394-395, modified on rehearing, 22 F. P. C. 542 (minimum bill provisions of proposed tariff required to be modified); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 10 F. P. C. 185 (conditions requiring inclusion of interruptible rate schedules in tariffs); Trans-Continental Gas Pipe Line Co., 7 F. P. C. 24, 38-40 (commencement of service conditioned upon filing of new tariff satisfactory to Commission because of disapproval of certain terms of service); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 7 F. P. C. 257 (commencement of service conditioned upon filing of tariff satisfactory to Commission).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MAGNESIUM CASTING CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 370. Argued January 18-19, 1971 Decided February 23, 1971 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Louis Chandler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Jerome H. Somers. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Wm. Terry Bray, Arnold Ordman, and Dominick L. Manoli. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Jerry Kronenberg and Alan Raywid for the Terminal Freight Cooperative Association, and by William L. Dennis for Olson Bodies, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by-Bernard Kleiman, Elliot Bredhofj, Michael H. Gottes-man, and George H. Cohen for the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and by Benjamin Rubenstein for International Union, U. A. W. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 139, 73 Stat. 542, 29 U. S. C. § 153 (b), authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to delegate to its regional directors the power to determine the unit appropriate for collective bargaining. The Board accordingly adopted rules delegating to its regional directors its powers to determine representation issues and defining the conditions when the Board will review the determination of a regional director. On filing of a representation petition, §9 (c)(1) provides that a hearing shall be held to determine if a question of representation exists and, if so, the appropriate bargaining unit. If an election is directed and the union prevails, it is certified as the employees’ bargaining representative. An employer who contests the election, including the unit determination, can only obtain court review under § 10 after an unfair labor practice charge has been made against him by the Board for refusing to bargain collectively “with the representatives of his employees” as provided in § 8 (a) (5). In that review, however, the determination of the bargaining unit by the regional director need not be reviewed by the Board. Whether the Board reviews the initial decision on the merits, see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 146, 162, or the employer fails to request review of the action of the regional director, or the Board denies a request for review, the Board has discretion to reopen the issue where newly discovered noncumulative evidence is available. The United Steelworkers filed a petition requesting a representation election among the production and maintenance employees at petitioner’s Hyde Park, Massachusetts, plant. The regional director provided a hearing and the essential issues tendered concerned four individuals classified as “assistant foremen.” The question was whether they were employees and properly within the unit or supervisors as defined in § 2 (11) of the Act and therefore excluded. The regional director found that three were employees and ordered an election in a unit consisting of all the employees, including the three. Petitioner filed a request with the Board to review the decision of the regional director that the three men in question were employees, contending that such determination was clearly erroneous. The Board denied petitioner’s request for review and an election was held. Thereafter the regional director certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. When petitioner refused to bargain, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. The trial examiner found for the union and the Board affirmed. 175 N. L. R. B. No. 68. Petitioner moved for reconsideration claiming the Board must review the regional director’s representation determination before issuing an unfair labor practice order based on it. Petitioner’s reliance was on Pepsi-Cola Co. v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 676, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Board denied that motion, noting its disagreement with the Pepsi-Cola case. The Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s order, 427 F. 2d 114, thus creating the conflict among the circuits which led us to grant the petition for certiorari. 400 U. S. 818. Petitioner argues that plenary review by the Board of the regional director’s unit determination is necessary at some point. Historically, the representation issue once fully litigated in the representation proceeding could not be relitigated in an unfair labor practice proceeding. We so held in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, supra. That case, of course, was decided when the determination of the appropriate unit was made by the Board itself. In 1959, § 3 (b) was added. Senator Goldwater, a member of the Conference Committee explained its purpose: “[Section 3 (b)] is a new provision, not in either the House or Senate bills, designed to expedite final disposition of cases by the Board, by turning over part of its caseload to its regional directors for final determination. “Under this provision, the regional directors can exercise no authority in representation cases which is greater or not the same as the statutory powers of the Board with respect to such cases. In the handling of such cases, the regional directors are required to follow the lawful rules, regulations, procedures, and precedents of the Board and to act in all respects as the Board itself would act. “This authority to delegate to the regional directors is designed, as indicated, to speed the work of the Board. . . .” We take this statement to reflect the considered judgment of Congress that the regional directors have an expertise concerning unit determinations. Or perhaps Congress was primarily motivated by a desire to lighten the Board’s workload and speed up its processes. Its recent report shows that in fiscal year 1969, a total of 1,999 formal representation decisions were issued either directing elections or dismissing election petitions; 1,872 of these were rendered by regional directors, and 127 by the Board (100 on direct transfer from the regional directors for initial decision and 27 on grant of a request for review of the regional director’s decision). But for the 1959 amendment the Board would have decided all of those cases. Whatever the reason for the delegation, Congress has made a clear choice; and the fact that the Board has only discretionary review of the determination of the regional director creates no possible infirmity within the range of our imagination. The fact that Congress in 1961 rejected a reorganization plan which would have delegated decisionmaking power in unfair labor practice cases to the hands of trial examiners subject to discretionary Board review has no bearing on the present problem. The choices Congress may make in deciding what delegation of authority is appropriate do not in the present context raise any semblance of a substantial question. For it is unmistakably plain here that by § 3 (b) Congress did allow the Board to make a delegation of its authority over determination of the appropriate bargaining unit to the regional director. The Board’s rules make clear that the regional director is required to follow the same rules as the Board respecting factfinding. The regional director’s determination if adopted by the trial examiner in the unfair labor practice proceeding accompanies the case both to the Board and to the Court of Appeals. In the present case the Court of Appeals concluded that the Board’s order was supported “by substantial evidence.” Congress has required no greater showing than that. Affirmed. Sec. 3 (b) provides in relevant part: “The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 9 to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefor with the Board by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the regional director. . . .” The rules are contained in 29 CFR § 102.67. Subsections 102.67 (c), (d), and (f) state in relevant part: “(c) The Board will grant a request for review only where compelling reasons exist therefor. Accordingly, a request for review may be granted only upon one or more of the following grounds: “(1) That a substantial question of law or policy is raised because of (i) the absence of, or (ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent. “(2) That the regional director’s decision on a substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party. “(3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error. “(4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy. “(d) . . . With respect to paragraph (c)(2) of this section, and other grounds where appropriate, said request must contain a summary of all evidence or rulings bearing on the issues together with page citations from the transcript and a summary of argument. But such request may not raise any issue or allege any facts not timely presented to the regional director.” “(f) . . . Failure to request review shall preclude such parties from relitigating, in any related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, any issue which was, or could have been, raised in the representation proceeding. Denial of a request for review shall constitute an affirmance of the regional director’s action which shall also preclude relitigating any such issues in any related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding.” See rules, supra, n. 2. The Tenth Circuit is in accord with the First. See Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F. 2d 697, 699-700. 105 Cong. Rec. 19770. 34th Annual Report, Table 3B, 201 (1970). 107 Cong. Rec. 10223, 12905-12932. See rules, supra, n. 2. 29 CFR § 102.67 (b). 29 CFR §102.45 (a). 29 CFR § 101.14. There is no different standard of review prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. §706 (1964 ed., Supp. V). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 487.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GRANITE STATE JOINT BOARD, TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1029, AFL-CIO No. 71-711. Argued November 13, 1972 Decided December 7, 1972 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 218. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 218. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Allan A. Tuttle, and Peter G. Nash. Harold B. Roitman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Milton Smith, Jerry Kronenberg, and Gerard C. Smetana filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Plato E. Papps, Louis Poulton, and Bernard Dunau filed a brief for the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent is a union that had a collective-bargaining agreement with an employer which contained a maintenance-of-membership clause providing that members were, as a condition of employment, to remain in good standing “as to payment of dues” for the duration of the contract. Neither the contract nor the Union's constitution or bylaws contained any provision defining or limiting the circumstances under which a member could resign. A few days before the collective agreement expired, the Union membership voted to strike if no agreement was reached by a given date. No agreement was reached in the specified period, so the strike and attendant picketing commenced. Shortly thereafter, the Union held a meeting at which the membership resolved that any member aiding or abetting the employer during the strike would be subject to a $2,000 fine. About six weeks later, two members sent the Union their letters of resignation. Six months or more later, 29 other members resigned. These 31 employees returned to work. The Union gave them notice that charges had been made against them and that on given dates the Union would hold trials. None of the 31 employees appeared on the dates prescribed; but the trials nonetheless took place even in the absence of the employees and fines were imposed on all. Suits were filed by the Union to collect the fines. But the outcome was not determined because the employees filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the Union. The unfair labor practice charged was that the Union restrained or coerced the employees “in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” See § 8 (b)(1) of the Act. The Board ruled that the Union had violated § 8 (b)(1). 187 N. L. R. B. 636. The Court of Appeals denied enforcement of the Board’s order. 446 F. 2d 369. The case is here on certiorari, 405 U. S. 987. We held in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 175, that a union did not violate §8 (b)(1) by fining members who went to work during a lawful strike authorized by the membership and by suing to collect the fines. The Court reviewed at length in that opinion the legislative history of §§ 7 and 8(b)(1), and concluded by a close majority vote that the disciplinary measures taken by the union against its members on those facts were within the ambit of the union’s control over its internal affairs. But the sanctions allowed were against those who “enjoyed full union membership.” Id., at 196. Yet when a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him ends. We noted in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U. S. 423, 429, that if a union rule “invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating §8 (b)(1).” On the facts, we held that Scofield) where fines were imposed on members by the union, fell within the ambit of Allis-Ghalmers. But we drew the line between permissible and impermissible union action against members as follows: . . §8 (b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule.” Id., at 430. Under § 7 of the Act the employees have “the right to refrain from any or all” concerted activities relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those concerted activities. We have here no problem of construing a union’s constitution or bylaws defining or limiting the circumstances under which a member may resign from the union. We have, therefore, only to apply the law which normally is reflected in our free institutions— the right of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit “subject of course to any financial obligations due and owing” the group with which he was associated. Communications Workers v. NLRB, 215 F. 2d 835, 838. The Scofield case indicates that the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union-member contract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct. That is to say, when there is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former member than- it has over the man in the street. The Court of Appeals gave weight to the fact that the resigning employees had participated in the vote to strike. We give that factor little weight. The first two members resigned from the Union from one to two months after the strike had begun. The others did so from seven tó 12 months after its commencement. And the strike was still in progress 18 months after its inception. Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind. The likely duration of the strike may increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease with which the employer replaces the strikers may make the strike seem less provident. We do not now decide to what extent the contractual relationship between union and member may curtail the freedom to resign. But where, as here, there are no restraints on the resignation of members, we conclude that the vitality of § 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May and that his § 7 rights are not lost by a union’s plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to its regime. Reversed. Fines equivalent to a day’s wages for each day worked during the strike were imposed. Section 7 provides in relevant part: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....’’ 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §157. Section 8 (b). “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .” 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b). Union-security arrangements requiring employees to pay dues, though not requiring membership, have been held not to be an unfair labor practice and therefore not an excuse for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively for such an agreement, at least where state law allows employees that option. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U. S. 734. The Union argues that its practice was to accept resignations of members only during an annual ten-day “escape period,” during which time the employees were allowed to revoke their “dues check-off” authorizations. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, saying there was no evidence that the employees knew of this practice or that they had consented to its limitation on their right to resign. 446 F. 2d 369, 372.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SURE-TAN, INC., et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 82-945. Argued December 6, 1983 Decided June 25, 1984 Michael R. Flaherty argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John A. McDonald and Robert A. Creamer. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and George Kaufmann; for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Kenneth Kimerling; for the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board by Manuel M. Medeiros, Nancy C. Smith, and Daniel G. Stone; for the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation by Mary K. Gillespie; for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Peter R. Taft, Allen M. Katz, Joaquin G. Avila, John E. Huerta, and Morris J. Bailer; and for the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO, by Carlos M. Alcala and Ira L. Gottlieb. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case are several questions arising from the application of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) to an employer’s treatment of its undocumented alien employees. We first determine whether the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) may properly find that an employer engages in an unfair labor practice by reporting to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) certain employees known to be undocumented aliens in retaliation for their engaging in union activity, thereby causing their immediate departure from the United States. We then address the validity of the Board’s remedial order as modified by the Court of Appeals. I Petitioners are two small leather processing firms located in Chicago that, for purposes of the Act, constitute a single integrated employer. In July 1976, a union organization drive was begun. Eight employees signed cards authorizing the Chicago Leather Workers Union, Local 431, Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (Union), to act as their collective-bargaining representative. Of the 11 employees then employed by petitioners, most were Mexican nationals present illegally in the United States without visas or immigration papers authorizing them to work. The Union ultimately prevailed in a Board election conducted on December 10, 1976. Two hours after the election, petitioners’ president, John Surak, addressed a group of employees, including some of the undocumented aliens involved in this case. He asked the employees why they had voted for the Union and cursed them for doing so. He then inquired as to whether they had valid immigration papers. Many of the employees indicated that they did not. Petitioners filed with the Board objections to the election, arguing that six of the seven eligible voters were illegal aliens. Surak executed an accompanying affidavit which stated that he had known about the employees’ illegal presence in this country for several months prior to the election. On January 19, 1977, the Board’s Acting Regional Director notified petitioners that their objections were overruled and that the Union would be certified as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative. The next day, Surak sent a letter to the INS asking that the agency check into the status of a number of petitioners’ employees as soon as possible. In response to the letter, INS agents visited petitioners’ premises on February 18, 1977, to investigate the immigration status of all Spanish-speaking employees. The INS agents discovered that five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and arrested them. Later that day, each employee executed an INS form, acknowledging illegal presence in the country and accepting INS’s grant of voluntary departure as a substitute for deportation. By the end of the day, all five employees were on a bus ultimately bound for Mexico. On February 22 and March 23, 1977, the Board’s Acting Regional Director issued complaints alleging that petitioners had committed various unfair labor practices. On March 29, 1977, petitioners sent letters to the five employees who had returned to Mexico offering to reinstate them, provided that doing so would not subject Sure-Tan to any violations of United States immigration laws. The offers were to remain open until May 1, 1977. The unfair labor practice charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose findings and conclusions as to the merits of the complaints were affirmed and adopted by the Board. Specifically, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that petitioners had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) by requesting the INS to investigate the status of their Mexican employees “solely because the employees supported the Union” and “with full knowledge that the employees in question had no papers or work permits.” Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N. L. R. B. 1187 (1978). The Board, therefore, agreed with the ALJ’s finding that “the discriminatees’ subsequent deportation was the proximate result of the discriminatorily motivated action by [petitioners] and constitutes a constructive discharge.” Id., at 1191. As a remedy for the § 8(a)(3) violations, the Board adopted the ALJ’s recommendation that petitioners be ordered to cease and desist from their various unfair labor practices, including notifying the INS of their employees’ status because of the employees’ support of the Union. However, the Board declined to adopt the ALJ’s specific recommendations as to the appropriate remedy. The ALJ had recommended that petitioners be ordered to offer the discharged employees reinstatement and that the offers be held open for six months. In addition, the ALJ had concluded that since, under past Board precedent, backpay is normally tolled during those periods in which employees are not available for employment, an ordinary backpay award could not be ordered in this case. Nevertheless, the ALJ had invited the Board to consider awarding backpay for a minimum 4-week period both to provide some measure of relief to the illegally discharged employees and to deter future violations of the NLRA. The Board, however, concluded that the ALJ’s analysis of the remedy was “unnecessarily speculative.” 234 N. L. R. B., at 1187. Since the record contained no evidence that the employees had not since returned to the United States, the Board modified the ALJ’s order by substituting the “conventional remedy of reinstatement with backpay,” thereby leaving until subsequent compliance proceedings the determination whether the employees had in fact been available for work. Ibid. On appeal, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board’s order. 672 F. 2d 592 (CA7 1982). The court fully agreed that petitioners had violated the NLRA by constructively discharging their undocumented alien employees. It also concurred in the Board’s judgment that the usual remedies of reinstatement and backpay were appropriate in these circumstances. The Court of Appeals did, however, modify the Board’s order in several significant respects. First, it concluded that reinstatement would be proper only if the discharged employees were legally present and free to be employed in the United States when they presented themselves for reinstatement. The court also decided that the reinstatement offers in their present form were deficient since they did not allow a reasonable time for the employees to make arrangements for legal reentry. The court therefore ordered that the offers be left open for a period of four years. It further concluded that the offers must be written in Spanish, and delivered so as to allow for verification of receipt. As for backpay, the court required that the discharged employees should be deemed unavailable for work during any period when they were not legally entitled to be present and employed in the United States. Recognizing that the discharged employees would most likely not have been lawfully available for employment and so would receive no backpay award at all, the court decided that “it would better effectuate the policies of the Act to set a minimum amount of backpay which the employer must pay in any event, because it was his discriminatory act which caused these employees to lose their jobs.” Id., at 606. Believing that six months' backpay would be the minimum amount appropriate for this purpose, the court suggested that the Board consider this remedy. The Board accepted the court’s suggestion, and the final judgment order approved by the court included the minimum award of six months’ backpay. We granted cer-tiorari, 460 U. S. 1021 (1983). We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it determined that petitioners violated the Act by constructively discharging their undocumented alien employees, but reverse the judgment as to some of the remedies ordered and direct that the case be remanded to the Board. A We first consider the predicate question whether the NLRA should apply to unfair labor practices committed against undocumented aliens. The Board has consistently held that undocumented aliens are “employees” within the meaning of §2(3) of the Act. That provision broadly provides that “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any employee,” 29 U. S. C. § 152(3), subject only to certain specifically enumerated exceptions. Ibid. Since the task of defining the term “employee” is one that “has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 130 (1944), the Board’s construction of that term is entitled to considerable deference, and we will uphold any interpretation that is reasonably defensible. See, e. g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 488, 496-497 (1979); NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963). The terms and policies of the Act fully support the Board’s interpretation in this case. The breadth of § 2(3)’s definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to “any employee.” The only limitations are specific exemptions for agricultural laborers, domestic workers, individuals employed by their spouses or parents, individuals employed as independent contractors or supervisors, and individuals employed by a person who is not an employer under the NLRA. See 29 U. S. C. § 152(3). Since undocumented aliens are not among the few groups of workers expressly exempted by Congress, they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of “employee.” Similarly, extending the coverage of the Act to such workers is consistent with the Act’s avowed purpose of encouraging and protecting the collective-bargaining process. See Hearst Publications, Inc., supra, at 126. As this Court has previously recognized: “[Acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 356-357 (1976). If undocumented alien employees were excluded from participation in union activities and from protections against employer intimidation, there would be created a subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity of all the employees and impeding effective collective bargaining. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 33 (1937). Thus, the Board’s categorization of undocumented aliens as protected employees furthers the purposes of the NLRA. B Counterintuitive though it may be, we do not find any conflict between application of the NLRA to undocumented aliens and the mandate of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. This Court has observed that “[t]he central concern of the INA is with the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S., at 359. The INA evinces “at best evidence of a peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants.” Id., at 360. For whatever reason, Congress has not adopted provisions in the INA making it unlawful for an employer to hire an alien who is present or working in the United States without appropriate authorization. While it is unlawful to “concea[l], harbo[r], or shiel[d] from detection” any alien not lawfully entitled to enter or reside in the United States, see 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(3), an explicit proviso to the statute explains that “employment (including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.” Ibid. See De Canas v. Bica, supra, at 360, and n. 9. Moreover, Congress has not made it a separate criminal offense for an alien to accept employment after entering this country illegally. See 119 Cong. Rec. 14184 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Dennis). Since the employment relationship between an employer and an undocumented alien is hence not illegal under the IN A, there is no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict with the terms of the IN A. We find persuasive the Board’s argument that enforcement of the NLRA with respect to undocumented alien employees is compatible with the policies of the IN A. A primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers; immigrant aliens are therefore admitted to work in this country only if they “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.” 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(14). See S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1965). Application of the NLRA helps to assure that the wages and employment conditions of lawful residents are not adversely affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not subject to the standard terms of employment. If an employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the NLRA in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any incentive to hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened. In turn, if the demand for undocumented aliens declines, there may then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter in violation of the federal immigration laws. The Board’s enforcement of the NLRA as to undocumented aliens is therefore clearly reconcilable with and serves the purposes of the immigration laws as presently written. III Accepting the premise that the provisions of the NLRA are applicable to undocumented alien employees, we must now address the more difficult issue whether, under the circumstances of this case, petitioners committed an unfair labor practice by reporting their undocumented alien employees to the INS in retaliation for participating in union activities. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(3). The Board, with the approval of lower courts, has long held that an employer violates this provision not only when, for the purpose of discouraging union activity, it directly dismisses an employee, but also when it purposefully creates working conditions so intolerable that the employee has no option but to resign — a so-called “constructive discharge.” See, e. g., NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co., 641 F. 2d 351, 358 (CA5 1981) (en banc); Cartwright Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 600 F. 2d 268, 270 (CA10 1979); J. P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F. 2d 490, 494 (CA4 1972); NLRB v. Holly Bra of California, Inc., 405 F. 2d 870, 872 (CA9 1969); Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 N. L. R. B. 10, 17 (1937). See also 3 T. Kheel, Labor Law § 12.05[1][a] (1982). Petitioners do not dispute that the antiunion animus element of this test was, as expressed by the lower court, “flagrantly met.” 672 F. 2d, at 601. “The record is replete with examples of Sure-Tan’s blatantly illegal course of conduct to discourage its employees from supporting the Union.” Id., at 601-602. Petitioners contend, however, that their conduct in reporting the undocumented alien workers did not force the workers’ departure from the country; instead, they argue, it was the employees’ status as illegal aliens that was the actual “proximate cause” of their departure. See Brief for Petitioners 13-15. This argument is unavailing. According to testimony by an INS agent before the ALJ, petitioners’ letter was the sole cause of the investigation during which the employees were taken into custody. This evidence was undisputed by petitioners and amply supports the ALJ’s conclusion that “but for [petitioners’] letter to Immigration, the discriminatees would have continued to work indefinitely.” 234 N. L. R. B., at 1191. And there can be little doubt that Surak foresaw precisely this result when, having known about the employees’ illegal status for some months, he notified the INS only after the Union’s electoral victory was assured. See supra, at 887; 672 F. 2d, at 601. We observe that the Board quite properly does not contend that an employer may never report the presence of an illegal alien employee to the INS. See, e. g., Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., 225 N. L. R. B. 766 (1976) (no violation of Act for employer to discharge illegal alien who was a union activist where the evidence showed that the reason for the discharge was not the employee’s protected collective activities, but the employer’s concern that employment of the undocumented worker violated state law). The reporting of any violation of the criminal laws is conduct which ordinarily should be encouraged, not penalized. See In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532, 535 (1895). It is only when the evidence establishes that the reporting of the presence of an illegal alien employee is in retaliation for the employee’s protected union activity that the Board finds a violation of § 8(a)(3). Absent this specific finding of antiunion animus, it would not be an unfair labor practice to report or discharge an undocumented alien employee. See Bloom/Art Textiles, Inc., supra. Such a holding is consistent with the policies of both the IN A and the NLRA. Finally, petitioners claim that this Court’s recent decision in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731 (1983), mandates the conclusion that their request for enforcement of the federal immigration laws is an aspect of their First Amendment right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” and therefore may not be burdened under the guise of enforcing the NLRA. In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the Court held that an employer’s filing of a state court suit against its employees seeking damages and injunctive relief for libelous statements and injury to its business is not an enjoinable unfair labor practice unless the suit is filed for retaliatory purposes and lacks a reasonable basis. The Court stressed that the right of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the government, concluding that the NLRA must be construed in such a way as to be “sensitive” to these First Amendment values. Id., at 741. The Court also noted that the States had a compelling interest in maintaining domestic peace by providing employers with such civil remedies for tortious conduct during labor disputes. If the Board were allowed to enjoin a state lawsuit simply because of retaliatory motive, the employer would “be totally deprived of a remedy for an actual injury,” and the strong state interest in providing for such redress would therefore be undermined. Id., at 742. The reasoning of Bill Johnson’s Restaurants simply does not apply to petitioners’ situation. The employer in that case, though similarly motivated by a desire to discourage the exercise of NLRA rights, was asserting in state court a personal interest in its own reputation that was protected by state law. If the Court had upheld the Board in the case, it would have left the employer with no forum in which to pursue a remedy for an “actual injury.” Id., at 741. The First Amendment right protected in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants is plainly a “right of access to the courts . . . ‘for redress of alleged wrongs.’” Ibid. Petitioners in this case, however, have not suffered a comparable, legally protected injury at the hands of their employees. Petitioners did not invoke the INS administrative process in order to seek the redress of any wrongs committed against them. Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508 (1972). Indeed, private persons such as petitioners have no judicially cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of the immigration laws by the INS. Cf. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619 (1973). Finally, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants was concerned about whether the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA would work to pre-empt the State from providing civil remedies for conduct touching interests “‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’” 461 U. S., at 741 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 244 (1959)). Here, where there is no conflict between the Board’s unfair labor practice finding and any asserted state interest, such federalism concerns are simply not at stake. In short, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants will not support petitioners’ efforts to avoid their obligations under the NLRA by reporting their employees to the INS. I There remains for us to consider petitioners’ challenges to the remedial order entered in this case. Petitioners attack those portions of the Court of Appeals’ order which modified the Board’s original order by providing for an irreducible minimum of six months’ backpay for each employee and by detailing the language, acceptance period, and verification method of the reinstatement offers. We find that the Court of Appeals exceeded its narrow scope of review in imposing both these modifications. A Section 10(c) of the Act empowers the Board, when it finds that an unfair labor practice has been committed, to issue an order requiring the violator to “cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies” of the NLRA. 29 U. S. C. § 160(c). The Court has repeatedly interpreted this statutory command as vesting in the Board the primary responsibility and broad discretion to devise remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act, subject only to limited judicial review. See, e. g., NLRB v. J. H. Rutber-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S. 258, 262-263 (1969); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203, 216 (1964); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941). Although the courts of appeals have power under the Act “to make and enter a decree . . . modifying, and enforcing as so modified” the orders of the Board, 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(e), (f), they should not substitute their judgment for that of the Board in determining how best to undo the effects of unfair labor practices: “Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board’s discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy.” Phelps Dodge Corp., supra, at 194. See also NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 346 (1953) (power to fashion remedies “is for the Board to wield, not for the courts”). Here, the Court of Appeals impermissibly expanded the Board’s original order to provide that each discriminatee would receive backpay for at least six months on the ground that “six months is a reasonable assumption” as to the “minimum [time] during which the discriminatees might reasonably have remained employed without apprehension by INS, but for the employer’s unfair labor practice.” 672 F. 2d, at 606. We agree with petitioners that this remedy ordered by the Court of Appeals exceeds the limits imposed by the NLRA. Not only did the court overstep the limits of its own reviewing authority, see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra, at 346-347, but it also effectively compelled the Board to take action that simply does not lie within the Board’s own powers. Under § 10(c), the Board’s authority to remedy unfair labor practices is expressly limited by the requirement that its orders “effectuate the policies of the Act.” Although this rather vague statutory command obviously permits the Board broad discretion, at a minimum it encompasses the requirement that a proposed remedy be tailored to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress. Quite early on, the Court established that “the relief which the statute empowers the Board to grant is to be adapted to the situation which calls for redress.” NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 348 (1938). See D. McDowell & K. Huhn, NLRB Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices 8-15 (1976). Of course, the general legitimacy of the back-pay order as a means to restore the situation “as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination,” Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U. S., at 194, is by now beyond dispute. Yet, it remains a cardinal, albeit frequently unarticulated assumption, that a backpay remedy-must be sufficiently tailored to expunge only the actual, and not merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor practices. Id., at 198 (“[0]nly actual losses should be made good . . To this end, we have, for example, required that the Board give due consideration to the employee’s responsibility to mitigate damages in fashioning an equitable backpay award. See, e. g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., supra, at 346; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 198. Likewise, the Board’s own longstanding practice has been to deduct from the backpay award any wages earned in the interim in another job, see Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N. L. R. B. 1, 51 (1935), enf’d, 91 F. 2d 178 (CA3 1937), rev’d on other grounds, 303 U. S. 261 (1938). By contrast, the Court of Appeals’ award of a minimum amount of backpay in this case is not sufficiently tailored to the actual, compensable injuries suffered by the discharged employees. The court itself admitted that although it sought to recompense the discharged employees for their lost wages, the actual 6-month period selected was “obviously conjectural.” 672 F. 2d, at 606. The court’s imposition of this minimum backpay award in the total absence of record evidence as to the circumstances of the individual employees constitutes pure speculation and does not comport with the general reparative policies of the NLRA. We generally approve the Board’s original course of action in this case by which it ordered the conventional remedy of reinstatement with backpay, leaving until the compliance proceedings more specific calculations as to the amounts of backpay, if any, due these employees. This Court and other lower courts have long recognized the Board’s normal policy of modifying its general reinstatement and backpay remedy in subsequent compliance proceedings as a means of tailoring the remedy to suit the individual circumstances of each discriminatory discharge. See NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U. S., at 260; Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U. S. 25, 29-30 (1952); Trico Products Corp. v. NLRB, 489 F. 2d 347, 353-354 (CA2 1973). Cf. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 371 (1977) (individual Title VII claims to be resolved at remedial hearings held by District Court on remand). These compliance proceedings provide the appropriate forum where the Board and petitioners will be able to offer concrete evidence as to the amounts of backpay, if any, to which the discharged employees are individually entitled. See NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F. 2d 170 (CA2 1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 972 (1966); 3 NLRB Casehandling Manual §10656 et seq. (1977) (preparation of backpay specification). Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the implementation of the Board’s traditional remedies at the corn-pliance proceedings must be conditioned upon the employees’ legal readmittance to the United States. In devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is obliged to take into account another “equally important Congressional ob-jectiv[e],” Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31, 47 (1942) — to wit, the objective of deterring unauthorized immigration that is embodied in the INA. By conditioning, the offers of reinstatement on the employees’ legal reentry, a potential conflict with the INA is thus avoided. Similarly, in computing backpay, the employees must be deemed “unavailable” for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States. Cf. 3 NLRB Casehandling Manual §§10612, 10656.9 (1977). The Court of Appeals assumed that, under these circumstances, the employees would receive no backpay, and so awarded a minimum amount of backpay that would effectuate the underlying purposes of the Act by providing some relief to the employees as well as a financial disincentive against the repetition of similar discriminatory acts in the future. 672 F. 2d, at 606. We share the Court of Appeals’ uncertainty concerning whether any of the discharged employees will be able either to enter the country lawfully to accept the reinstatement offers or to establish at the compliance proceedings that they were lawfully available for employment during the backpay period. The probable unavailability of the Act’s more effective remedies in light of the practical workings of the immigration laws, however, simply cannot justify the judicial arrogation of remedial authority not fairly encompassed within the Act. Any perceived deficiencies in the NLRA’s existing remedial arsenal can only be addressed by congressional action. By directing the Board to impose a minimum backpay award without regard to the employees’ actual economic losses or legal availability for work, the Court of Appeals plainly exceeded its limited authority under the Act. B The Court of Appeals similarly exceeded its limited authority of judicial review by modifying the Board’s order so as to require petitioners to draft the reinstatement offers in Spanish and to ensure verification of receipt. While such requirements appear unobjectionable in that they constitute a rather trivial burden, they represent just the type of informed judgment which calls for the Board’s superior expertise and long experience in handling specific details of remedial relief. See, e. g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 266-267 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S., at 236. If the court believed that the Board had erred in failing to impose such requirements, the appropriate course was to remand back to the Board for reconsideration. NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U. S. 1 (1974). Such action “best respects the congressional scheme investing the Board and not the courts with broad powers to fashion remedies that will effectuate national labor policy.” Id., at 10; see 2 T. Kheel, Labor Law §7.04[3][e] (1984). The court’s requirement that the reinstatement offers be held open for four years is vulnerable to similar attack. The court simply had no justifiable basis for displacing the Board’s discretionary judgment about the proper time period for acceptance of the reinstatement offers. Rather than enlarging the Board’s remedial order in this fashion, the court was required to remand for the Board to consider the alternative grounds on which the court believed the offers to have been deficient and to decide upon new forms for the reinstatement offers. NLRB v. Food Store Employees, supra. V For the reasons given above, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it imposed a minimum backpay award and mandated certain specifics of the reinstatement offers. We therefore remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand it back to the Board to permit formulation of an appropriate remedial order consistent with this Court’s opinion. It is so ordered. Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3), make it an “unfair labor practice” for an employer “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title” or “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” Section 7 grants employees the rights of self-organization, participation in labor organizations and concerted activity, and collective bargaining. See 29 U. S. C. § 157. The Board also affirmed the findings of the ALJ that petitioners had violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1) threatening employees with less work if they supported the Union and promising more work if they did not; (2) interrogating employees about their Union sentiments; (3) threatening the employees immediately after the election to notify the INS because they had supported the Union; and (4) threatening to go out of business because the Union won the election. The Board’s General Counsel then filed a motion for clarification in which he suggested that the Board’s remedial order might violate national immigration laws by requiring reinstatement and backpay without explicit regard to the legality of the employees’ immigration status. The Board denied the General Counsel’s motion, over the dissents of two members, who argued that the order’s failure to condition the offers of reinstatement on legal presence within this country would encourage illegal reentry by the employees. See Sure-Tan, Inc., 246 N. L. R. B. 788 (1979). The Board did not issue a new decision regarding the 6-month minimum backpay award, but merely submitted a proposed judgment order that was evidently intended to incorporate the proposed award. Upon reviewing the Board’s proposed order, the court still remained uncertain whether the Board had in fact adopted its suggestion, and so modified the order to make clear that the employees were entitled to a minimum award of six months’ backpay. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. A petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied, with three judges dissenting. 677 F. 2d 584 (1982). In extending the coverage of the Act to undocumented aliens, the Board has included such workers in bargaining units, see Duke City Lumber Co., 251 N. L. R. B. 53 (1980); Sure-Tan, Inc., and Surak Leather Co., 231 N. L. R. B. 138 (1977), enf’d, 583 F. 2d 355 (CA7 1978), and has found violations of the Act both in their discriminatory discharge, see Apollo Tire Co., 236 N. L. R. B. 1627 (1978), enf’d, 604 F. 2d 1180 (CA91979); Army's Bakery & Noodle Co., 227 N. L. R. B. 214 (1976), and in threats of deportation intended to deter their union activities, see Hasa Chemical, Inc., 235 N. L. R. B. 903 (1978). It is by now well established, however, that if the reason asserted by an employer for a discharge is pretextual, the fact that the action taken is otherwise legal or even praiseworthy is not controlling. See NLRB v. Transportation Management, Inc., 462 U. S. 393, 398 (1983). If the Board finds, as it did here, that the otherwise legitimate reason asserted by the employer for a discharge is a pretext, then the nature of the pretext is immaterial, even where the pretext involves a reliance on state or local laws. See, e. g., New Foodland, Inc., 205 N. L. R. B. 418, 420 (1973) (discriminatory discharge of underage employee). Indeed, as we noted in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 230, n. 8 (1963), even evidence of a “good-faith motive” for a discriminatory discharge “has not been deemed an absolute defense to an unfair labor practice charge.” Under § 10(e) of the Act, “[n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U. S. C. § 160(e). We may consider petitioners’ First Amendment argument, although not raised before the Board, because the intervening, substantial change in controlling law occasioned by Bill Johnson’s Restaurants qualifies as an “extraordinary circumstance].” See, e. g., NLRB v. Lundy Manufacturing Corp., 286 F. 2d 424, 426 (CA2 1960). As that intervening decision issued six months after the filing of the petition for certiorari in this case, we similarly countenance petitioners’ presentation of their First Amendment challenge for the first time before this Court. See, e. g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320-321, and n, 6 (1971). Petitioners do not challenge the cease and desist order imposed by the Board and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Under such an order, petitioners will be subject to contempt sanctions should they again resort to the discriminatory tactics employed here. Nor do petitioners appear to challenge the court’s modifications of the Board’s remedial order conditioning acceptance of the reinstatement offers and the accrual of any backpay upon the discharged employees’ legal presence in this country. See n. 12, infra. Justice Brennan asserts that since the Board has “fully acquiesced” in the Court of Appeals’ remedy, the case should be reviewed as if the Board itself had developed the remedial order. See post, at 907. This argument misses the mark on two levels. First, our traditional deference to such remedial orders is premised upon our appreciation that the Board has duly considered and brought to bear its “special competence” in fashioning appropriate relief in any given unfair labor practice case. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 265-266 (1975). Given the disparity between the Board’s original order and the Court of Appeals’ modified order, that premise is patently inapplicable to this case. Moreover, the Board’s mere acquiescence in the Court of Appeals’ remedial order simply cannot correct the order’s main deficiency — its development in the total absence of any record evidence as to the circumstances of the individual employees. In imposing a minimum backpay award, the Court of Appeals usurped the delegated function of the Board to decide how best to appraise the relevant factors that determine a just backpay remedy. The proper course for a reviewing court that believes a Board remedy to be inadequate is to remand the case to the Board for further consideration. See supra, at 899; NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U. S. 1, 10 (1974). We are also mindful that, prior to the instant ease, the Board itself had never claimed the power given it here by the Court of Appeals. To our knowledge, the Board has never attempted to impose a minimum backpay award that the employer must pay regardless of the actual evidence as to such issues as an employee’s availability for work or his efforts to secure comparable interim employment. In fact, in this very case, the Board had already rejected as “unnecessarily speculative” the ALJ’s recommendation that a 4-week minimum period of backpay be awarded the discharged employees. 234 N. L. R. B., at 1187. The Board now argues that the Court of Appeals’ backpay award involves no greater speculation than that which is normally involved in reconstructing what would have happened to certain employees but for their discriminatory discharge. See, e. g., NLRB v. Superior Roofing Co., 460 F. 2d 1240 (CA9 1972) (per curiam); Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F. 2d 787 (CA3 1968), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 828 (1969). In each of these cases, however, the courts enforced the Board’s orders upon finding that the Board, in the course of compliance proceedings, had applied to particular facts a reasonable formula for determining the probable length of employment and compensation due and had permitted the employer to come forward with evidence mitigating liability. See, e. g., NLRB v. Superior Roofing Co., supra, at 1240-1241 (upholding use of a “seniority formula” to compute the earnings of a “representative employee” in a reasonable approximation of discharged roofer’s earnings). In the instant case, the Court of Appeals “estimated” an appropriate period of backpay without any evidence whatsoever as to the period of time these particular employees might have continued working before apprehension by the INS and without affording petitioners any opportunity to provide mitigating evidence. In the absence of relevant factual information or adequate analysis, it is inappropriate for us to conclude, as does Justice BRENNAN, that the Court of Appeals had estimated the proper minimum backpay award “with a fair degree of precision,” see post, at 909. Conditioning the offers of reinstatement on the employees’ legal reentry and deeming the employees “unavailable” during any period when they were not lawfully present are requirements that were in fact imposed by the Court of Appeals in this case, and hence fully accepted by the Board. See 672 F. 2d, at 606 (“Consistent with our requirement that there be reinstatement only if the discriminatees are legally present and permitted by law to be employed in the United States we modify the Board’s order so as to make clear (1) that [except for the minimum backpay award] in computing backpay discriminatees will be deemed unavailable for work during any period when not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States . . .”); App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a (modified order). Contrary to Justice Brennan’s assertion, see post, at 910, the Board does not argue that it would exempt these employees from its “unavailability” policy because their unavailability is directly attributable to the employer’s own unfair labor practice. The Board refers to this limited exception to its normal rule solely to counter petitioners’ suggestion that the minimum backpay award is somehow logically “inconsistent” with normal Board policies in calculating backpay. See Brief for Respondent 45, n. 44. The Board has clearly indicated its agreement with these portions of the Court of Appeals’ remedial order by specifically noting that petitioners do not challenge these parts of the order, see id., at 43, by limiting its own argument to the minimum backpay award issue alone, see id., at 43-46, and, most importantly, by asking that the judgment below be affirmed in its entirety. According to Justice BREnnan, the Court stands guilty today of creating a “disturbing anomaly” by, on the one hand, holding that undocumented aliens are “employees” within the meaning of the Act and so entitled to bring an unfair labor practice claim, but then, on the other hand, holding that these same employees are “effectively deprived of any remedy . . . .” See post, at 911. This argument completely ignores the fact that today’s decision leaves intact the cease and desist order imposed by the Board, see n. 7, supra, one of the Act’s traditional remedies for discriminatory discharge cases. Were petitioners to engage in similar illegal conduct, they would be subject to contempt proceedings and penalties. This threat of contempt sanctions thereby provides a significant deterrent against future violations of the Act. At the same time, we fully recognize that the reinstatement and backpay awards afford both more certain deterrence against unfair labor practices and more meaningful relief for the illegally discharged employees. Nevertheless, we remain bound to respect the directives of the INA as well as the NLRA and to guard against judicial distortion of the statutory limits placed by Congress on the Board’s remedial authority. Any other solution must be sought in Congress and not the courts. In light of our disposition of this issue, we find it unnecessary to consider petitioners’ claim that the minimum backpay awards are “punitive,” and hence beyond the authority of the Board under Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 7, 9-12 (1940). We may thus avoid entering into what we have previously deemed “the bog of logomachy” as to what is “remedial” and what is “punitive.” NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 348 (1953).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. ASSOCIATED DRY GOODS CORP. No. 79-1068. Argued November 3, 1980 Decided January 26, 1981 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. BlacKmuN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 604. SteveNS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 606. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the case. RehNQüist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Barry Sullivan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Leroy D. Clark, Joseph T. Eddins, Lutz Alexander Prager, and Vella M. Fink. Roger S. Kaplan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Lewis, Joel L. Finger, and Thomas C. Greble. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leonard Rovins and Alan D. Gallay for the American Retail Federation; and by Robert E. Williams and Douglas S. McDowell for the Equal Employment Advisory Council. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 limits the authority of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to make public disclosure of information it has obtained in investigating and attempting to resolve a claim of employment discrimination. We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was correct in holding that a prelitigation disclosure of information in a Commission file to the employee who filed the Title YII claim is a “public” disclosure within the meaning of the statutory restrictions. 445 U. S. 926. I This case arose when the Commission sought evidence with respect to discrimination charges filed against the Joseph Horne Co., a division of the respondent, Associated Dry Goods Corp. Horne operates retail department stores in Pennsylvania. Between 1971 and 1973, seven Home employees filed employment discrimination charges with the Commission, six alleging sex discrimination and one alleging racial discrimination. The Commission began its investigation by requesting Horne to provide the employment records of the complainants, and statistics, documents, and other information relating to Horne’s general personnel practices. Horne refused to provide the information unless the Commission agreed beforehand not to disclose any of the requested material to the charging parties. The Commission refused to give this assurance, explaining its practice of making limited disclosure to a charging party of information in his and other files when he needs that information in connection with a potential lawsuit. When Horne continued to refuse to provide the information without an assurance of absolute secrecy, the Commission subpoenaed the material. After the Commission rejected Horne’s petition for revocation of the agency subpoena, the respondent filed this suit, asking the District Court to declare that the Commission’s limited disclosure practices violated Title VII, and to enjoin the Commission from enforcing the subpoena. The District Court, concluding that the Commission’s disclosure of confidential information to charging parties upsets Title VII’s scheme of negotiation and settlement, held that the regulations and the provisions in the Compliance Manual covering special disclosure to charging parties violate Title VII. Accordingly, the court enforced the subpoena only on the condition that the Commission treat charging parties as members of the “public” to whom it cannot disclose any information in its files. 454 F. Supp. 387 (ED Va.). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment. EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F. 2d 1075. II In enacting Title VII, Congress combined administrative and judicial means of eliminating employment discrimination. A person claiming to be the victim of discrimination must first file a charge with the Commission. The Commission must then serve notice of the charge on the employer, and begin an investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b). If it finds no such reasonable cause, the Commission must dismiss the charge. Ibid. If it does find reasonable cause, it must try to eliminate the alleged discriminatory practice “by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Ibid. If its attempts at conciliation fail, the Commission may bring a civil action against the employer. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). But Title VII also makes private lawsuits by aggrieved employees an important part of its means of enforcement. If the Commission dismisses the charge, the employee may immediately file a private action. Ibid. And regardless of whether the Commission finds reasonable cause, the employee may bring an action 180 days after filing the charge if by that time the Commission has not filed its own lawsuit. Ibid. Title VII gives the Commission two formal means of obtaining information when it investigates a charge: The Commission may examine and copy evidence in the possession of the respondent employer, § 2000e-8 (a), and subpoena evidence and documents, § 2000e-9. Congress imposed on the Commission a duty to maintain this information in. confidence. Section 706 (b) of Title VII directs that “[c]harges shall not be made public by the Commission.” If the Commission attempts informally to resolve a charge for which it has found reasonable cause, it cannot make “public” anything said or done in the course of the negotiations between the Commission and the parties; any Commission employee violating this prohibition faces criminal penalties. Ibid. Section 709 (e) of the statute supplements these prohibitions by making it a misdemeanor for any officer or employee of the Commission “to make public in any manner whatever any information” the Commission obtains through its investigative powers before the institution of any proceeding involving this information.' Title VII nowhere defines “public.” In its regulation governing disclosure, the Commission has construed the statute’s prohibition of “public” release of information to permit pre-litigation disclosure of charges and of investigative information to the parties where such disclosure “is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief.” 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979). Specifically, the Commission has also created special disclosure rules permitting release of information in its files to charging parties or their attorneys, aggrieved persons in whose behalf charges have been filed and the persons or organizations who have filed the charges in their behalf, and respondents and their attorneys, so long as the request for the information is made in connection with contemplated litigation. Though normally a person can see information in the file only for the case in which he is directly involved, the Commission sometimes allows a prospective litigant to see information in files of cases brought by other employees against the same employer where that information is relevant and material to the litigant’s case. EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.7 (c). Before disclosing any information, however, the Commission expunges the names, identifying characteristics, and statements of any witnesses who have been promised anonymity, as well as the names of any other respondents. Moreover, any person requesting confidential information must execute a written agreement not to disclose the information to any other person, except as part of the normal course of litigation after a suit is filed. Ill For the reasons that follow, we have concluded that Congress did not include charging parties within the “public” to whom disclosure of confidential information is illegal under the provisions of Title VII here at issue. Section 706 (b) states that “[c]harges shall not be made public.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b). The charge, of course, cannot be concealed from the charging party. Nor can it be concealed from the respondent, since the statute also expressly requires the Commission to serve notice of the charge upon the respondent within 10 days of its filing. Ibid. Thus, the “public” to whom the statute forbids disclosure of charges cannot logically include the parties to the agency proceeding. And we must infer that Congress intended the same distinction when it used the word “public” in § 709 (e), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e). The two statutory provisions treat essentially the same subject, and, absent any congressional indication to the contrary, we must assume that “public” means the same thing in the two sections. The very limited legislative history of the disclosure provisions supports this reading. The bill passed by the House contained no restrictions on public disclosure. See H. It. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1963). The disclosure provisions were made part of the substitute bill which Senators Dirksen and Humphrey introduced in the Senate, and which the House later passed without amendment. See 110 Cong. Rec. 12819 (1964). Senator Humphrey, the cosponsor of the bill, explained that the purpose of the disclosure provisions was to prevent wide or unauthorized dissemination of unproved charges, not limited disclosures necessary to carry out the Commission’s functions: “[T]his is a ban on publicizing and not on such disclosure as is necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s duties under the statute. . .. The amendment is not intended to hamper Commission investigations or proper cooperation with other State and Federal agencies, but rather is aimed at the making available to the general public of unproven charges.” Id., at 12723 (emphasis added). The parties to an agency proceeding are hardly members of the “general public,” especially since, as common sense and the express language of § 706 (b) show, see supra, at 598, they always have available to them the charge — proved or unproved — in the case to which they are parties. This reading of the statute, moreover, is consistent with the coordinated scheme of administrative and judicial enforcement which Congress created to enforce Title VII. See supra, at 595. First, limited disclosure to the parties can speed the Commission’s required investigation: the Commission can more readily obtain information informally — rather than through its formal powers under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-9— if it can present the parties with specific facts for them to corroborate or rebut. Second, limited disclosure enhances the Commission’s ability to carry out its statutory responsibility to resolve charges through informal conciliation and negotiation : A party is far more likely to settle when he has enough information to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent’s case as well as his own. The respondent argues vigorously that the disclosure of investigative information to charging parties may encourage many lawsuits that would not otherwise be filed, and thus contravene the congressional policy of relying on administrative resolution and settlement. But the effect of limited disclosure may be just the opposite. The employee has little to gain from filing a futile lawsuit, and indeed faces the possibility of an adverse fee award if the suit is frivolous. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421. Pointless litigation burdens both the parties and the federal courts, and it is in the interest of all concerned that the charging party have adequate information in assessing the feasibility of litigation. Under the respondent’s view of the statute, however, the charging party would be able to obtain that information only after filing a lawsuit. • See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (e). Thus, a charging party would have to file suit in a hopeless case in order to discover that the case was hopeless. The Commission’s disclosure practice may therefore help fulfill the statutory goal of maximum possible reliance upon voluntary conciliation and administrative resolution of claims. In any event, even if disclosure may encourage litigation in some instances, that result is not inconsistent with the ultimate purposes of Title VII. The private right of action remains an important part of Title VII’s scheme of enforcement, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 45. Congress considered the charging party a “private attorney general,” whose role in enforcing the ban on discrimination is parallel to that of the Commission itself. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, supra, at 421. The private litigant could hardly play that role without access to information needed to assess the feasibility of litigation. IV Nevertheless, though Congress allowed disclosure of investigative information in a charging party’s file to that party himself, nothing in the statute or its legislative history reveals any intent to allow the Commission to reveal to that charging party information in the files of other charging parties who have brought claims against the same employer. See EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.7 (c). As noted earlier, the charging party cannot logically be a member of the “public” to whom disclosure is forbidden by § 706 (b) of Title VII, and, by extension, cannot be a member of the public under § 709 (e). See supra, at 598. The reason, however, is that the charging party is obviously aware of the charge he has filed, and so cannot belong to the public to which Congress referred when it directed that “[c]harges shall not be made public.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b). But there is no reason why the charging party should know the content of any other employee’s charge, and he must be considered a member of the public with respect to charges filed by other people. With respect to all files other than his own, he is a stranger. The Commission notes that it often consolidates substantially similar charges for investigation, and in other instances draws upon information generated in an earlier investigation of the same employer. The Commission therefore argues that because information in one party’s file may be directly relevant to another party’s charge, it would be burdensome for it to have to reproduce the generally relevant information for each file, and unfair to a charging party to deny him access to generally relevant information that, by chance of timing, appears first and fully in another party’s file. But the Commission’s argument is merely one of administrative convenience, and such convenience cannot override the prohibitions in the statute. Statistics and other information about an employer’s general practices may certainly be relevant to individual charges of discrimination, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 804-805, but by including such information, in full or summary form, in each individual charging party’s file, the Commission can fully comply with the statute while giving each party the information he needs to weigh the strength of his own case. V The Court of Appeals erred, therefore, in holding that the respondent had a categorical right to refuse to comply with the EEOC subpoena unless the Commission assured it that the information supplied would be held in absolute secrecy. The respondent was entitled only to assurance that each employee filing a charge against Horne would see information in no file other than his or her own. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 706 (b) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 259, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (b), provides in relevant part: “Charges shall be made in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires. Charges shall not be made public by the Commission. ... If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or done during and as part of such informal endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the consent of the persons concerned. Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. . . Section 709 (e) of Title VII, 78 Stat. 264, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-8 (e), provides: “It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such information. Any officer or employee of the Commission who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year.” The decision of the Court of Appeals in this ease that the Commission lacks the authority to make such a disclosure, EEOC v. Joseph Horne Co., 607 F. 2d 1075 (CA4), conflicts with that of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F. 2d 1147. The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits have construed the “public” disclosure provisions of the statute in virtually the same way as did the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the present case, though in the somewhat different context of the Commission’s disclosure to individual charging parties of materials emerging from a systemwide investigation of an employer’s practices after the Commission itself has brought a charge. Burlington Northern, Inc, v. EEOC, 582 F. 2d 1097 (CA7); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 189 U. S. App. D. C. 163, 581 F. 2d 941. Since the Commission itself brought no charge in this case, the question of how the disclosure provisions apply in that context is not before the Court. The Commission’s general policy on disclosure is set out in 29 CFR §1601.22 (1979): “Neither a charge, nor information obtained pursuant to section 709 (a) of Title VII, nor information obtained from records required to be kept or reports required to be filed pursuant to section 709 (e) and (d) of Title VII, shall be made matters of public information by the Commission prior to the institution of any proceedings under this Title involving such charge or information. This provision does not apply to such earlier disclosures to charging parties, or their attorneys, respondents or their attorneys, or witnesses where disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief. This provision also does not apply to such earlier disclosures to representatives of interested Federal, State, and local authorities as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission's function under Title VII, nor to the publication of data derived from such information in a form which does not reveal the identity of charging parties, respondents, or persons supplying the information.” The Commission also has created very specific “special disclosure” rules governing the form and scope of disclosure to those persons whom the Commission treats as being separate from the “public” to whom the statute forbids any disclosure. 29 CFR § 1610.17 (d) (1979); EEOC Compliance Manual § 83 et seq. The complaint also alleged that the EEOC disclosure rules violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 551, 553, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1905, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552. In addition, it alleged that the rules were substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exceeded the Commission’s statutory authority to issue rules of the latter type only. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-12. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed any of these allegations, and the issues they raise are not now before us. In most cases, the Commission actually begins its attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement before it makes a reasonable-cause determination. 29 CFR § 1601.20 (1979); EEOC Compliance Manual §15. If it does achieve an early settlement, the agreement states that the Commission has made no judgment on the merits of the claim. Ibid. To investigate a charge as quickly as possible and to improve the chances of an early informal resolution, the Commission holds a factfinding conference well before it makes a reasonable-cause decision, with each party presenting its version of the facts. 29 CFR § 1601.15 (c) (1979). Under Commission regulations, the employee may obtain a right-to-sue letter upon request once 180 days have passed from the filing of the charge, 29 CFR § 1601.28 (a) (1) (1979), but the Commission may issue a right-to-sue letter earlier if it finds that it cannot complete its consideration of a charge within 180 days of filing, § 1601.28 (a)(2). The statute gives the employee 90 days from the Commission's notice of right to sue to file a private lawsuit. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1). See n. 1, supra. See n. 1, supra. A charging party, however, cannot obtain information under these rules until his right to sue has attached, unless he can demonstrate a compelling need for earlier disclosure. EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.3 (a). The Commission defines “relevant and material” as follows: “Information in other case files is relevant or material when other case files contain charges, investigations or determinations involving the same basis (e. g., sex, religion, national origin, race) with limited exceptions such as when the private litigant’s case alleged discrimination in promotion against females and the other case file involved a male’s claim that he was not hired because of respondent’s policy of not hiring long haired males. Other case files may be relevant or material if they involve a different basis only when the treatment afforded one protected class is probative of treatment afforded the private litigant’s class (e. g., systemic discrimination against Spanish Sumamed Americans is often probative as to treatment accorded Blacks and vice versa).” EEOC Compliance Manual § 83.7(c) (2). However, whenever the Commission discloses to a charging party information from other case files, it does not reveal the identity of the other employees who brought charges against the employer. § 83.7 (c) (4). The Commission also expunges any records of or statements obtained in its informal settlement negotiations, except for information which the Commission can otherwise obtain under its statutory power to copy or subpoena evidence. See 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-8 (a), 2000e-9. “Information in case files may be disclosed only on the condition that the person requesting disclosure agree in writing not to make the information obtained public except in the normal course of a civil action or other proceeding instituted under Title VII.” EEOC Compliance Manual §83.3 (b). The statute also forbids public disclosure of any matters arising in informal conciliation “without the written consent of the persons concerned.” § 2000-e (5) (b). This phrase suggests that the parties, the “persons” whose consent would most obviously be necessary, are not members of the “public” to whom disclosure is forbidden. The language in § 709 (e) forbidding disclosure “in any manner whatever,” seems clearly to refer to the means of publication, and not to the persons to whom disclosure is forbidden. The House bill, however, did incorporate by reference the provisions of § 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 723, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 50, which prohibit FTC employees from mating “public any information obtained from the Commission without its authority . . . See H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 710 (a) (1963). Under FTC rules construing § 10, the ban on disclosure applies only to unauthorized release of information, and does not prevent disclosure to parties to FTC proceedings. 16 CFR §§ 1.41, 1.133, 1.134 (1964) (current version at 16 CFR §§3.36, 4.10 (c) (1980)). Thus, in passing the substitute bill without amendment, the House may well have assumed that the express disclosure provisions in the Senate bill gave the Commission powers of disclosure similar to those under the FTC Act. The other cosponsor of the Senate bill, Senator Dirksen, explained § 706 (b) ’s prohibition of any “public” disclosure of matters' revealed during informal conciliation attempts as follows: “The maximum results from the voluntary approach will be achieved if the investigation and conciliation are carried on in privacy. If voluntary compliance with this title is not achieved, the dispute will be fully exposed to public view when a court suit is filed.” 110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964). Senator Dirksen’s explanation strongly suggests that the parties are considered part of the private efforts at conciliation, not members of the general public to whom the dispute will be “fully exposed” after litigation begins. The principle that courts should respect an agency’s contemporaneous construction of its founding statute, Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408, also supports this view of Title VII, since the Commission first issued its rule permitting disclosure to the charging party shortly after Congress created the EEOC in 1966. 30 Fed. Reg. 8407 (1965). Moreover, such a contemporaneous construction deserves special deference when it has remained consistent over a long period of time. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 210. The Commission’s current regulation permitting such disclosure, 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979), reflects no significant change from the original regulation. The original regulation permitted disclosure to the charging party “as may be appropriate or necessary to the carrying out of the Commission’s functions . . . .” 30 Fed. Reg. 8409 (1965). The regulation was changed in 1977 to allow disclosure to the charging party’s attorney as well as to the party himself, and to rephrase the controlling condition for disclosure as “where such disclosure is deemed necessary for securing appropriate relief.” 42 Fed. Reg. 42024 (1977) (codified at 29 CFR § 1601.22 (1979)). In the 15 years during which the Commission has consistently allowed limited disclosure to the charging party, Congress has never expressed its disapproval, and its silence in this regard suggests its consent to the Commission’s practice. United States v. Jackson, 280 U. S. 183, 196-197. In 1972 Congress made major changes in Title VII, but the only change in the disclosure provisions was a very minor one in § 706 (b): Congress amended the provision requiring consent before disclosure of conciliation matters by replacing “consent of the parties” with “consent of the persons concerned.” Section 706 (b) was also amended to permit charges to be filed “on behalf of” as well as by aggrieved parties, and the new phrase “persons concerned” .was probably intended to conform to that change. See 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972). When the Commission issues its decision on whether there is probable cause to believe the charge is true, it explains the factual bases for its conclusion. EEOC Compliance Manual §40.7. A positive finding may thereby be a spur to settlement; a negative finding may deter the employee from filing a frivolous lawsuit. If the Commission were not allowed to disclose to the parties essential facts it obtained during its investigation, it would be able to announce no more than its bare conclusion on reasonable cause, and these important benefits of the reasonable-cause determination would be lost. Moreover, a charging party who consents to a settlement negotiated by the Commission waives his right to file a civil action. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1); see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 364. Of course, anyone who settles a case gives up the right to litigate it. But Title VII places employment discrimination claimants in an especially difficult position by forcing them to yield initial control of their potential lawsuits to the Commission, which, in reaching agreement with the employer, might have interests different from those of the employee. It seems unlikely that Congress would force a Title VII charging party, who would have difficulty resisting the opportunity to enter the agreement negotiated by the Commission, to waive his statutory right to litigate when he cannot know the essential facts obtained in the Commission’s investigations. An impecunious employee would be unlikely to be able to conduct a thorough investigation of his own after he filed a charge, and therefore would be tempted to file a lawsuit so that he could request appointed counsel, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(1), if the statute did not allow the Commission to give him essential investigative information before he filed suit. The filing of a private lawsuit may actually encourage settlement. See Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F. 2d 757, 764 (CA3). The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII reflects a strong reaffirmation of the importance of the private right of action in the Title VII enforcement scheme: “The retention of the private right of action , . is intended to make clear that an individual aggrieved by a violation of Title VII should not be forced to abandon the claim merely because of a decision by the Commission or the Attorney General as the case may be, that there are insufficient grounds for the Government to file a complaint. . . . “It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule. . . . However, as the individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective relief.” 118 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1972) (Section-by-Section analysis). See n. 10, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. MEDICAL COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS No. 70-61. Argued November 10, 1971 Decided January 10, 1972 Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Daniel M. Friedman, William Terry Bray, Philip A. Loomis, Jr., David Ferber, and Richard E. Nathan. Roberts B. Owen argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Michael Boudin. Roger S. Foster and Charles R. Halpern filed a brief for the Project on Corporate Responsibility as amicus curiae urging affirmance. MR. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Medical Committee for Human Rights acquired by gift five shares of stock in Dow Chemical Co. In March 1968, the Committee’s national chairman wrote a letter to the company expressing concern over its policy with respect to the production and sale of napalm. The letter also requested that there be included in the company’s proxy statement for 1968 a proposal to amend Dow’s Certificate of Incorporation to prohibit the sale of napalm unless the purchaser gives reasonable assurance that the napalm will not be used against human beings. Dow replied that the proposal was too late for inclusion in the 1968 proxy statement and for discussion at that year’s annual meeting, but that it would be reconsidered the following year. In an exchange of letters with Dow in 1969, the Committee indicated its belief that it had a right under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR § 240.14a-8 (1970) (promulgated pursuant to § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a)), to have its proposal included in the company’s proxy statement for consideration by all shareholders. On February 7, 1969, Dow responded that it intended to omit the proposal (somewhat modified) from the 1969 statement under the authority of subsections of the SEC Rule relied on by the Committee that permitted omission of shareholder proposals under two sets of circumstances: § 240.14a-8 (c) (2) — “If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its management, or primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes”; or § 240.14a-8 (c) (5) — “If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.” The Committee requested that Dow's decision be reviewed by the staff of the SEC. On February 18, 1969, the Chief Counsel for the Division of Corporation Finance wrote both Dow and the Committee to inform them that “this Division will not recommend any action to the Commission if this proposal is omitted from the management’s proxy material.” App. 21. The SEC Commissioners granted a request by the Committee that they review the Division’s decision and affirmed it. App. 43. The Committee then sought and obtained review of the Commission’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On July 8, 1970, the Court of Appeals held that the decision of the SEC was reviewable under § 25 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78y (a); that while review of Dow’s decision was clearly available in district court, reviéw of the SEC’s decision could also be obtained in a court of appeals; that the validity of the Commission’s determination was extremely dubious, especially in light of its failure to state reasons supporting its conclusion; and that the case should be remanded to the Commission for reconsideration and a statement of reasons. 139 U. S. App. D. C. 226, 432 F. 2d 659. The Commission petitioned for review here, and we granted certiorari on March 22, 1971. 401 U. S. 973. Events have taken place, subsequent to the decision by the court below, and some subsequent to our decision to grant certiorari, that require that we dismiss this case on the ground that it has now become moot. In January 1971, the Medical Committee again submitted its napalm resolution for inclusion in Dow’s 1971 proxy-statement. This time Dow acquiesced in the Committee’s request and included the proposal. At the annual stockholder’s meeting in May 1971, Dow’s shareholders voted on the Committee’s proposal. Less than 3% of all voting shareholders supported it, and pursuant to Rule 14a-8 (c)(4) (i), 17 CFR § 240.14a-8 (c) (4) (i), Dow may exclude the same or substantially the same proposal from its proxy materials for the next three years. We find that this series of events has mooted the controversy. Respondent argues that it will continue to urge the adoption of the proposal and its inclusion in proxy statements, and that it is likely that Dow will reject inclusion in the future as it has in the past. It is true that in permitting the proposal to be included in the 1971 proxy statement Dow stated that it adhered to its opinion that the proposal might properly be omitted and that its inclusion was without prejudice to future exclusion. However, this does not create the controversy that is necessary for us to retain jurisdiction to decide the merits. Whether or not the Committee will actually resubmit its proposal or a similar one in 1974 is purely a matter of conjecture at this point, as is whether or not Dow will accept it. If Dow were likely to repeat its allegedly illegal conduct, the case would not be moot. See Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 43 (1944); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). However, in light of the meager support the proposal attracted, we can only speculate that Dow will continue to include the proposal when it again becomes eligible for inclusion, rather than to repeat this litigation. Thus, we find that "the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968). The case is therefore moot. “[I]t is well settled that federal courts may act only in the context of a justiciable cáse or controversy.” Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 788 (1969). “Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964); cf. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 434 (1952). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for dismissal. MR. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

O’KEEFFE, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SIXTH COMPENSATION DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR v. AEROJET-GENERAL SHIPYARDS, INC. No. 71-262. Decided December 14, 1971 Per Curiam. Petitioner, a Labor Department Deputy Commissioner, rejected an employee’s claim against respondent under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., on the ground that the proofs failed to establish that his disability was related to conditions of his employment. Thereafter petitioner reopened the case pursuant to § 22 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 922. On the basis of testimony by the employee’s personal physician and a commission-appointed doctor; petitioner concluded, contrary to his initial determination, that the disabling condition had in fact been “materially aggravated and hastened” by the circumstances of employment, and awarded him compensation. The District Court sustained the award but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed. 442 F. 2d 508. The Court of. Appeals held that in the absence of changed conditions or new evidence clearly demonstrating mistake in the initial determination, the “statute simply does not confer authority upon the Deputy Commissioner to receive additional but cumulative evidence and change his mind.” 442 F. 2d, at 513. Neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative history supports this “narrowly technical and impractical construction.” Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Norton, 106 F. 2d 137, 138 (CA3 1939). Section 22 of the Act provides: “Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in section 919 of this title, and in accordance with such section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation. . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 922. Thus, on its face, the section permits a reopening within one year “because of a mistake in a determination of fact.” There is no limitation to particular factual errors, or to cases involving new evidence or changed circumstances. The Act at one time did authorize reopening only on the “ground of a change in conditions,” 44 Stat. 1437, but was amended in 1934 expressly to “broaden the grounds on which a deputy commissioner can modify an award . . . when changed conditions or a mistake in a determination of fact makes such modification desirable in order to render justice under the act.” S. Rep. No. 588, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1244, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1934). The plain import of this amendment was to vest a deputy commissioner with broad discretion to correct mistakes of fact, whether demonstrated by wholly new evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on the evidence initially submitted. Nor does our construction “render meaningless the provision [of §21 of (the Act, 33 U. S. C. §921] that [a compensation] order becomes final unless proceedings for review are brought within thirty days.” Case v. Calbeck, 304 F. 2d 198, 201 (CA5 1962). The review authorized by § 21 is limited to the legal yalidity of the award; a district court may set aside an award only if it is “not in accordance with law.” Section 21 (b), 33 U. S. C. §921 (b). The 30-day limit of §21 is not “rendered meaningless” by setting a different time limit for a redetermination of fact. Moreover, the absence of a provision in § 21 for the judicial review of evidence confirms the need for a broad discretion in the deputy commissioner, to review factual errors in an effort “to render justice under the act.” The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. KIRK No. 10-188. Argued March 1,2011 — Decided May 16, 2011 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scaxja, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Sotomayor, JJ., joined, post, p. 417. Kagan, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Steven Alan Reiss argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Gregory Silbert, David Yolkut, Lisa R. Eskow, Gregory S. Coleman, and Marc S. Tabolsky. Jonathan A. Willens argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Melissa Arbus Sherry argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Katyal, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Michael S. Raab, and Charles W. Scarborough. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Catherine E. Stetson, Jessica L. Ellsworth, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Rae T. Vann and Ann Elizabeth Reesman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP by Kelly Bagby, Michael Schuster, Andrew M. Beato, and Kerrie C. Dent; for Public Citizen by Adina H. Rosenbaum and Allison M. Zieve; and for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund by Jeremy L. Friedman. Clifton S. Elgarten, Brian C. Elmer, Richard L. Beizer, and Andy Liu filed a brief for United Technologies Corp. as amicus curiae. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U. S. C. §§3729-3733, prohibits submitting false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States, § 3729(a), and authorizes qui tam suits, in which private parties bring civil actions in the Government’s name, § 3730(b)(1). This case concerns the FCA’s public disclosure bar, which generally forecloses qui tam suits that are “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions ... in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” § 3730(e)(4)(A) (footnote omitted). We must decide whether a federal agency’s written response to a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. §552, constitutes a “report” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. We hold that it does. I Petitioner Schindler Elevator Corporation manufactures, installs, and services elevators and escalators. In 1989, Schindler acquired Millar Elevator Industries, Inc., and the two companies merged in 2002. Since 1999, Schindler and the United States have entered into hundreds of contracts that are subject to the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 (VEVRAA). That Act requires contractors like Schindler to report certain information to the Secretary of Labor, in-eluding how many of its employees are “qualified covered veterans” under the statute. 38 U. S. C. § 4212(d)(1). VEVRAA regulations required Schindler to agree in each of its contracts that it would “submit VETS-100 Reports no later than September 30 of each year.” 48 CFR §52.222-37(c) (2008); see also § 22.1310(b). Respondent Daniel Kirk, a United States Army veteran who served in Vietnam, was employed by Millar and Schindler from 1978 until 2003. In August 2003, Kirk resigned from Schindler in response to what he saw as Schindler’s efforts to force him out. In March 2005, Kirk filed this action against Schindler under the FCA, which imposes civil penalties and treble damages on persons who submit false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States. 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a). The FCA authorizes both civil actions by the Attorney General and private qui tam actions to enforce its provisions. §3730. When, as here, the Government chooses not to intervene in a qui tam action, the private relator stands to receive between 25% and 30% of the proceeds of the action. § 3730(d)(2). In an amended complaint filed in June 2007, Kirk alleged that Schindler had submitted hundreds of false claims for payment under its Government contracts. According to Kirk, Schindler had violated VEVRAA’s reporting requirements by failing to file certain required VETS-100 reports and including false information in those it did file. The company’s claims for payment were false, Kirk alleged, because Schindler had falsely certified its compliance -with VEVRAA. Kirk did not specify the amount of damages he sought on behalf of the United States, but he asserted that the value of Schindler’s VEVRAA-covered contracts exceeded $100 million. To support his allegations, Kirk pointed to information his wife, Linda Kirk, received from the Department of Labor (DOL) in response to three FOIA requests. Mrs. Kirk had sought all VETS-100 reports filed by Schindler for the years 1998 through 2006. The DOL responded by letter or e-mail to each request with information about the records found for each year, including years for which no responsive records were located. The DOL informed Mrs. Kirk that it found no VETS-100 reports filed by Schindler in 1998,1999, 2000, 2002, or 2003. For the other years, the DOL provided Mrs. Kirk with copies of the reports filed by Schindler, 99 in all. Schindler moved to dismiss on a number of grounds including that the FCA’s public disclosure bar deprived the District Court of jurisdiction. See § 3730(e)(4)(A). The District Court granted the motion, concluding that most of Kirk’s allegations failed to state a claim and that the remainder were based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in an administrative “report” or “investigation.” 606 F. Supp. 2d 448 (SDNY 2009). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded. 601 F. 3d 94 (2010). The court effectively held that an agency’s response to a FOIA request is neither a “report” nor an “investigation” within the meaning of the FCA’s public disclosure bar. See id., at 103-111 (agreeing with United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare West, 445 F. 3d 1147 (CA9 2006), and disagreeing with United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186 F. 3d 376 (CA3 1999)). We granted certiorari, 561 U. S. 1058 (2010), and now reverse and remand. II Schindler argues that “report” in the FCA’s public disclosure bar carries its ordinary meaning and that the DOL’s written responses to Mrs. Kirk’s FOIA requests are therefore “reports.” We agree. A 1 Adopted in 1986, the FCA’s public disclosure bar provides: “No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.” 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (footnote omitted). Because the statute does not define “report,” we look first to the word’s ordinary meaning. See Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 175 (2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning”). A “report” is “something that gives information” or a “notification,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1925 (1986), or “[a]n official or formal statement of facts or proceedings,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1300 (6th ed. 1990). See also 13 Oxford English Dictionary 650 (2d ed. 1989) (“[a]n account brought by one person to another”); American Heritage Dictionary 1103 (1981) (“[a]n account or announcement that is prepared, presented, or delivered, usually in formal or organized form”); Random House Dictionary 1634 (2d ed. 1987) (“an account or statement describing in detail an event, situation, or the like”). This broad ordinary meaning of “report” is consistent with the generally broad scope of the FCA’s public disclosure bar. As we explained last Term, to determine the meaning of one word in the public disclosure bar, we must consider the provision’s “entire text,” read as an “integrated whole.” Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel Wilson, 559 U. S. 280, 290, 293, n. 12 (2010); see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 662 (2001) (“We do not.. . construe the meaning of statutory terms in a vacuum”). The other sources of public disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A), especially “news media,” suggest that the public disclosure bar provides “a broa[d] sweep.” Graham County, supra, at 290. The statute also mentions “administrative hearings” twice, reflecting intent to avoid underinclusiveness even at the risk of redundancy. The phrase “allegations or transactions” in § 3730(e)(4)(A) additionally suggests a wide-reaching public disclosure bar. Congress covered not only the disclosure of “allegations” but also “transactions,” a term that courts have recognized as having a broad meaning. See, e. g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 610 (1926) (“'Transaction’ is a word of flexible meaning”); Hamilton v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 310 F. 3d 385, 391 (CA5 2002) (“[T]he ordinary meaning of the term 'transaction’ is a broad reference to many different types of business dealings between parties”). 2 Nor is there any textual basis for adopting a narrower definition of “report. ” The Court of Appeals, in holding that FOIA responses were not “reports,” looked to the words “hearing, audit, or investigation,” and the phrase “criminal, civil, [and] administrative hearing[s].” It concluded that all of these sources “connote the synthesis of information in an investigatory context” to “serve some end of the government.” 601 F. 3d, at 107; cf. Brief for Respondent 30, n. 15 (“Each is part of the government’s ongoing effort to fight fraud”). Applying the noscitur a sociis canon, the Court of Appeals then determined that these “ ‘neighboring words’ ” mandated a narrower meaning for “report” than its ordinary meaning. 601 F. 3d, at 107. The Court of Appeals committed the very error we reversed in Graham, County. Like the Fourth Circuit in that case, the Second Circuit here applied the noscitur a sociis canon only to the immediately surrounding words, to the exclusion of the rest of the statute. See 601 F. 3d, at 107, n. 6. We emphasized in Graham, County that “all of the sources [of public disclosure] listed in ,§3730(e)(4)(A) provide interpretive guidance.” 559 U. S., at 289. When all of the sources are considered, the reference to “news media”— which the Court of Appeals did not consider — suggests a much broader scope. Id., at 290. The Government similarly errs by focusing only on the adjectives “congressional, administrative, or [GAO],” which precede “report.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18. It contends that these adjectives suggest that the public disclosure bar applies only to agency reports “analogous to those that Congress and the GAO would issue or conduct.” Ibid. As we explained in Graham County, however, those three adjectives tell us nothing more than that a “report” must be governmental. See 559 U. S., at 289, n. 7. The governmental nature of the FOIA responses at issue is not disputed. Finally, applying the ordinary meaning of “report” does not render superfluous the other sources of public disclosure in § 3730(e)(4)(A). Kirk argues that reading “report” to mean “something that gives information” would subsume the other words in the phrase “report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” Brief for Respondent 23. But Kirk admits that hearings, audits, and investigations are processes “to obtain information.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Those processes are thus clearly different from “something that gives information.” Moreover, the statute contemplates some redundancy: An “audit,” for example, will often be a type of “investigation.” We are not persuaded that we should adopt a “different, somewhat special meaning” of “report” over the word’s “primary meaning.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 130, 128 (1998). Indeed, we have cautioned recently against interpreting the public disclosure bar in a way inconsistent with a plain reading of its text. In Graham County, we rejected several arguments for construing the statute narrowly, twice emphasizing that the sole “touchstone” in the statutory text is “public disclosure.” 559 U. S., at 292, 301. We chose in that case simply to give the text its “most natura[l] reading],” id., at 287, and we do so again here. B A written agency response to a FOIA request falls within the ordinary meaning of “report.” FOIA requires each agency receiving a request to “notify the person making such request of [its] determination and the reasons therefor.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). When an agency denies a request in whole or in part, it must additionally “set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial,” “make a reasonable effort to estimate the volume of any [denied] matter,” and “provide any such estimate to the person making the request.” §§ 552(a)(6)(C)(i), (F). The DOL has adopted more detailed regulations implementing FOIA and mandating a response in writing. See 29 CFR § 70.21(a) (2009) (requiring written notice of the grant of a FOIA request and a description of the manner in which records will be disclosed); §§70.21(b)-(e) (requiring a “brief statement of the reason or reasons for [a] denial,” as well as written notification if a record “cannot be located or has been destroyed” (emphasis deleted)). So, too, have other federal agencies. See, e. g., 28 CFR § 16.6 (2010) (Dept, of Justice); 43 CFR §2.21 (2009) (Dept, of Interior); 7 CFR §1.7 (2010) (Dept, of Agriculture). Such an agency response plainly is “something that gives information,” a “notification,” and an “official or formal statement of facts.” Any records the agency produces along with its written FOIA response are part of that response, “just as if they had been reproduced as an appendix to a printed report.” Mistick, 186 F. 3d, at 384, n. 5. Nothing in the public disclosure bar suggests that a document and its attachments must be disaggregated and evaluated individually. If an allegation or transaction is disclosed in a record attached to a FOIA response, it is disclosed “in” that FOIA response and, therefore, disclosed “in” a report for the purposes of the public disclosure bar. The DOL’s three written FOIA responses to Mrs. Kirk, along with their attached records, are thus reports within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. Each response was an “official or formal statement” that “[gave] information” and “notified]” Mrs. Kirk of the agency’s resolution of her FOIA request. III A In interpreting a statute, “[o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous,” as we have found, and “‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 240 (1989)). We are not persuaded by assertions that it would be anomalous to read the public disclosure bar to encompass written FOIA responses. 1 The drafting history of the public disclosure bar does not contradict our holding. As originally enacted in 1863, the FCA placed no restriction on the sources from which a qui tarn relator could acquire information on which to base a lawsuit. See Graham County, supra, at 293-294. Accordingly, this Court upheld the recovery of a relator, even though the Government claimed that he had discovered the basis for his lawsuit by reading a federal criminal indictment. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943). In response, Congress amended the statute to preclude such “parasitic” qui tam actions based on “evidence or information in the possession of the United States ... at the time such suit was brought.” 559 U. S., at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted). Then, in 1986, Congress replaced the so-called Government knowledge bar with the narrower public disclosure bar. Id., at 294-295. The Court of Appeals concluded that it would be inconsistent with this drafting history to hold that written FOIA responses are reports. The court reasoned that doing so would “essentially resurrect, in a significant subset of cases, the government possession standard ... repudiated in 1986.” 601 F. 3d, at 109. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. As a threshold matter, “the drafting history of the public disclosure bar raises more questions than it answers.” Graham County, 559 U. S., at 296. In any event, it is hardly inconsistent with the drafting history to read the public disclosure bar as operating similarly to the Government knowledge bar in a “subset of cases.” 601 F. 3d, at 109. As we have observed, “[r]ather than simply repeal the Government knowledge bar,” the public disclosure bar was “an effort to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.” 559 U. S., at 294-295 (emphasis added). If anything, the drafting history supports our holding. The sort of case that Kirk has brought seems to us a classic example of the “opportunistic” litigation that the public disclosure bar is designed to discourage. Id., at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Kirk alleges that he became suspicious from his own experiences as a veteran working at Schindler, anyone could have filed the same FOIA requests and then filed the same suit. Similarly, anyone could identify a few regulatory filing and certification requirements, submit FOIA requests until he discovers a federal contractor who is out of compliance, and potentially reap a windfall in a qui tarn action under the FCA. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (“Government contractors . . . are required to submit certifications related to everything from how they dispose of hazardous materials to their affirmative action plans” (citing 40 U. S. C. § 3142 and 29 U.S.C. § 793)). 2 Nor will extending the public disclosure bar to written FOIA responses necessarily lead to unusual consequences. FOIA requires agencies to release some records even absent a request. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 552(a)(1), (2). Kirk argues that it would be strange that two relators could obtain copies of the same document but that only the relator who got the document in response to a FOIA request would find his case barred. This argument assumes that records released under FOIA, but not attached to a written FOIA response, do not fall within the public disclosure bar. We do not decide that question. But even assuming, as Kirk does, that such records are not covered by the public disclosure bar, we are not troubled by the different treatment. By its plain terms, the public disclosure bar applies to some methods of public disclosure and not to others. See Graham County, supra, at 285 (“[T]he FCA’s public disclosure bar . . . deprives courts of jurisdiction over qui tarn suits when the relevant information has already entered the public domain through certain channels” (emphasis added)). It would not be anomalous if some methods of FOIA disclosure fell within the scope of the public disclosure bar and some did not. We also are not concerned that potential defendants will now insulate themselves from liability by making a FOIA request for incriminating documents. This argument assumes that the public disclosure of information in a written FOIA response forever taints that information for purposes of the public disclosure bar. But it may be that' a relator who comes by that information from a different source has a legitimate argument that his lawsuit is not “based upon” the initial public disclosure. 31 U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). That question has divided the Courts of Appeals, and we do not resolve it here. See Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F. 3d 907, 915 (CA7 2009) (describing the split in authority). It may also be that such a relator qualifies for the “original source” exception. In any event, the notion that potential defendants will make FOIA requests to insulate themselves from liability is pure speculation. Cf. Graham County, supra, at 300 (rejecting as “strained speculation” an argument that local governments will manipulate the public disclosure bar to escape liability). There is no suggestion that this has occurred in those Circuits that have long held that FOIA responses are “reports” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. B Even if we accepted these extratextual arguments, Kirk and his amici have provided no principled way to define “report” to exclude FOIA responses without excluding other documents that are indisputably reports. The Government, for example, struggled to settle on a single definition. Compare Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (“report” must be read to “reflect a focus on situations in which the government is conducting, or has completed, some focused inquiry or analysis concerning the relevant facts”) with id., at 21 (“A FOIA response is not a ‘report’ . . . because the federal agency is not charged with uncovering the truth of any matter”), and Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“[T]he way to think about it is whether or not the agency ... is engaging in a substantive inquiry into and a substantive analysis of information”). It is difficult to see how the Department of Justice’s “Annual Report” of FOIA statistics — something that is indisputably a Government report — would qualify under the latter two definitions. See Dept, of Justice, Freedom of Information Act Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2010, http:// www.justice.gov/oip/annual_report/2010/cover.htm (as visited May 12, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 19 (Kirk conceding that the DOJ annual report is a report). And even if the first definition arguably encompasses that report, it would seem also to include FOIA responses, which convey the results of a Government agency’s “focused inquiry.” Kirk also was unable to articulate a workable definition. His various proposed definitions suffer the same deficiencies as the Government’s. Compare Brief for Respondent 27 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18 with Brief for Respondent 34-39 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. Kirk’s first suggestion would exclude “a lot of things that are labeled . . . report,” id., at 22, and the second — the definition advanced by the Court of Appeals — would seem to include written FOIA responses, id., at 28-29. In the end, it appears that the “only argument is that FOIA is a different kind of mission” — “a special case.” Id., at 31. We see no basis for that distinction and adhere to the principle that undefined statutory terms carry their ordinary meaning. * * * The DOL’s three written FOIA responses in this case, along with the accompanying records produced to Mrs. Kirk, are reports within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. Whether Kirk’s suit is “based upon ... allegations or transactions” disclosed in those reports is a question for the Court of Appeals to resolve on remand. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. During the pendency of this ease, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, amended the public disclosure bar. Because the amendments are not applicable to pending cases, Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. 280, 283, n. 1 (2010), this opinion refers to the statute as it existed when the suit was filed. The facts in this Part, which we must accept as true, are taken from the amended complaint and the filings submitted in opposition to Schindler’s motion to dismiss. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), claiming that he had been “improperly demoted and constructively terminated by Schindler despite his status as a Vietnam era veteran.” App. 23a. The OFCCP investigated Schindler’s compliance with VEVRAA and found insufficient evidence to support Kirk’s claim. In November 2009, the Department of Labor affirmed the OFCCP’s finding. 601 F. 3d 94, 99 (CA2 2010). Because we conclude that a written response to a FOIA request qualifies as a “report” within the meaning of the public disclosure bar, we need not address whether an agency’s search in response to a FOIA request also qualifies as an “investigation.” Although the statute refers to the “Government Accounting Office,” it is undisputed that Congress meant the General Accounting Office, also known as GAO and now renamed the Government Accountability Office. See Graham County, 559 U. S., at 287, n. 6. It is irrelevant whether a particular record is itself a report. The attached records do not “becomfe]” reports, 601 F. 3d, at 109, but simply are part of a report. There is no merit to the suggestion that the public disclosure bar is intended only to exclude qui tarn suits that “ride the investigatory coattails of the government’s own processes.” Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 25, 26; see Graham County, 559 U. S., at 300 (rejecting the argument that the public disclosure bar applies only to allegations or transactions that “have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer”). An “original source” is “an individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on the information.” § 3730(e)(4)(B). Some Courts of Appeals have narrowly construed the exception to limit “original sources” to those who were the cause of the public disclosure, while others have been more generous. See United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L. P, 579 F. 3d 13, 22 (CA1 2009) (describing a three-way split among the Courts of Appeals). That question is not before us, and we do not decide it.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FIDELITY FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION et al. v. DE LA CUESTA et al. No. 81-750. Argued April 28, 1982 Decided June 28, 1982 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 171. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 172. Powell, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Ernest Leff argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Andrew E. Katz. Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Carter G. Phillips, Maud Mater, Gary S. Smuckler, and Marilyn Nathanson. Robert E. Boehmer argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was John D. Meyer Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Daniel J. Goldberg and Matthew G. Ash for the American Savings and Loan League; and by Aaron M. Peck, C. Steven McMurry, Michael R. Grzanka, G. Howden Fraser, Terry O. Kelly, and Daniel H. Willick for the United States League of Savings Associations. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Michigan et al. by Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Harry G. Iwasko, Jr., and Robert Ianni, Assistant Attorneys General, John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Frederick K. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Robert Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, and Anthony B. Ching, Solicitor General, J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, and Marshall A. Snider, Assistant Attorney General, CarlR. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, and W. Robert Alderson, First Deputy Attorney General, James E. Tierney, Attorney General of Maine, Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, William A. Attain, Attorney General of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Millard Rich, Deputy Attorney General, and John R. B. Matthis, Special Deputy Attorney General, Robert O. Wefald, Attorney General of North Dakota, William J. Brown, Attorney General of Ohio, Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina, John J. Easton, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, and Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin; for the Secretary of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency of the State of California by George Deukmejian, Attorney General of California, Arthur C. De Goede, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph M. O’Heron, Deputy Attorney General, and W. Gary Kurtz; for the California Association of Realtors et al. by John R. Hetland and Charles A. Hansen; for the Consumer’s Committee to Protect Mortgage Rights by Irwin M. Alternan; for the Georgia Assocation of Realtors, Inc., by E. Catherine Kimmel; for the National Association of Realtors by William D. North and Robert D. Butters; and for Charles J. Bether et al. by Peter J. Gregora, James M. Weinberg, and Robert L. Winslow. Bruce O. Jolly, Jr., filed a brief for the Credit Union National Association, Inc., as amicus curiae. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this case is the pre-emptive effect of a regulation, issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board), permitting federal savings and loan associations to use “due-on-sale” clauses in their mortgage contracts. Appellees dispute both the Board’s intent and its statutory authority to displace restrictions imposed by the California Supreme Court on the exercise of these clauses. I A The Board, an independent federal regulatory agency, was formed in 1932 and thereafter was vested with plenary authority to administer the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA), 48 Stat. 128, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1461 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Section 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), empowers the Board, “under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as ‘Federal Savings and Loan Associations.’” Pursuant to this authorization, the Board has promulgated regulations governing “the powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate grave.” People v. Coast Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (SD Cal. 1951). In 1976, the Board became concerned about the increasing controversy as to the authority of a federal savings and loan association to exercise a “due-on-sale” clause — a contractual provision that permits the lender to declare the entire balance of a loan immediately due and payable if the property securing the loan is sold or otherwise transferred. Specifically, the Board felt that restrictions on a savings and loan’s ability to accelerate a loan upon transfer of the security would have a number of adverse effects: (1) that “the financial security and stability of Federal associations would be endangered if . . . the security property is transferred to a person whose ability to repay the loan and properly maintain the property is inadequate”; (2) that “elimination of the due on sale clause will cause a substantial reduction of the cash flow and net income of Federal associations, and that to offset such losses it is likely that the associations will be forced to charge higher interest rates and loan charges on home loans generally”; and (3) that “elimination of the due on sale clause will restrict and impair the ability of Federal associations to sell their home loans in the secondary mortgage market, by making such loans unsalable or causing them to be sold at reduced prices, thereby reducing the flow of new funds for residential loans, which otherwise would be available.” 41 Fed. Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976). The Board concluded that “elimination of the due on sale clause will benefit only a limited number of home sellers, but generally will cause economic hardship to the majority of home buyers and potential home buyers.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Board issued a regulation in 1976 governing due-on-sale clauses. The regulation, now 12 CFR §545.8-3(f) (1982), provides in relevant part: “[A federal savings and loan] association continues to have the power to include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the association’s security instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association’s prior written consent. Except as [otherwise] provided in . . . this section . . . , exercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract.” In the preamble accompanying final publication of the due-on-sale regulation, the Board explained its intent that the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loans be governed “exclusively by Federal law.” 41 Fed. Reg. 18286, 18287 (1976). The Board emphasized that “[f]ederal associations shall not be bound by or subject to any conflicting State law which imposes different. . . due-on-sale requirements.” Ibid. B Appellant Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association (Fidelity) is a private mutual savings and loan association chartered by the Board pursuant to § 5(a) of the HOLA. Fidelity’s principal place of business is in Glendale, Cal. Appellees, de la Cuesta, Moore, and Whitcombe, each made a purchase of California real property from one who had borrowed money from Fidelity. As security for the loan, the borrower had given Fidelity a deed of trust on the property. Each deed of trust contained a due-on-sale clause. Two of the deeds also included a provision, identified as ¶ 15, which stated that the deed “shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located.” App. 51, 86. Fidelity was not notified prior to each appellee’s purchase of property; when it did learn of the transfer, it gave notice of its intent to enforce the due-on-sale clause. Fidelity expressed a willingness to consent to the transfer, however, if the appellee agreed to increase the interest rate on the loan secured by the property to the then-prevailing market rate. Each appellee refused to accept this condition; Fidelity then exercised its option to accelerate the loan. When the loan was not paid, Fidelity instituted a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. In response, each appellee filed suit in the Superior Court of California for Orange County. Each asserted that, under the principles announced by the California Supreme Court in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P. 2d 970 (1978), Fidelity’s exercise of the due-on-sale clause violated California’s prohibition of unreasonable restraints on alienation, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §711 (West 1982), “unless the lender can demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to its security or the risk of default.” 21 Cal. 3d, at 953, 582 P. 2d, at 977. Each complaint sought (1) a judicial declaration that the due-on-sale clause was not enforceable unless Fidelity first showed that the transfer had harmed its security interest, (2) an injunction against any foreclosure procedures based on the clause, and (3) compensatory and punitive damages. App. 5, 49, 84. The Superior Court consolidated the three actions and granted appellants’ motion for summary judgment. The court explained that “the federal government has totally occupied the subject of regulation of Federal Savings and Loans,” and held, therefore, that the decision in Wellenkamp “cannot be extended to [federal] savings and loans.” App. to Juris. Statement 29a. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, however, reversed that judgment. In an opinion that adopted substantial portions of a parallel ruling by the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, it concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Wellenkamp was controlling. 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 331, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467, 468 (1981), quoting Panko v. Pan American Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981), cert. pending, No. 81-922. The court found that Congress had neither expressed an intent to pre-empt state due-on-sale law nor fully occupied the field of federal savings and loan regulation; for example, the court pointed out, federal associations traditionally have been governed by state real property and mortgage law with respect to title, conveyancing, recording, priority of liens, and foreclosure proceedings. The Court of Appeal likewise rejected appellants’ contention that the Board’s 1976 regulation expressly had preempted the Wellenkamp doctrine. Although the court recognized that the preamble accompanying 12 CFR § 545.8-3(f) (1982) manifested the Board’s intent that its due-on-sale regulation supersede conflicting state law, it refused to “equate the Board’s expression of intent with the requisite congressional intent.” 121 Cal. App. 3d, at 339, 175 Cal. Rptr., at 474 (emphasis in original). Finally, the Court of Appeal found no evidence that federal law impliedly had pre-empted state law, reasoning that California’s due-on-sale law was not incompatible with federal law. The Wellenkamp doctrine, the court observed, “is a substantive rule of California property and mortgage law,” and not a form of “regulation” over federal savings and loans. 121 Cal. App. 3d, at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr., at 474. Moreover, the court noted, the Board’s regulation “merely authorizes and does not compel savings and loan associations to include a due-on-sale clause in their loan contracts and to exercise their rights thereunder.” Ibid., 175 Cal. Rptr., at 475. The Court of Appeal likewise discovered no conflict between the Wellenkamp doctrine and the purposes of the HOLA because both were designed to assist financially distressed homeowners. The court derived “further support,” 121 Cal. App. 3d, at 342, 175 Cal. Rptr., at 475, for its decision from ¶ 15, which was included in two of the deeds of trust and which provided that the deeds would be “governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located.” See n. 5, supra. That language, the court ruled, evinced an unmistakable intent that state law should govern the interpretation, validity, and enforcement of the deeds. The California Supreme Court denied appellants’ petition for review. App. to Juris. Statement 28a. Because the majority of courts to consider the question have concluded, in contrast to the decision of the Court of Appeal, that the Board’s regulations, including § 545.8-3(f), do pre-empt state regulation of federal savings and loans, we noted probable jurisdiction. 455 U. S. 917 (1982). II The pre-emption doctrine, which has its roots in the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, requires us to examine congressional intent. Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and “is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ intent to supersede state law altogether may be inferred because “[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” because “the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” or because “the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment. and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S., at 526; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 773 (1947). These principles are not inapplicable here simply because real property law is a matter of special concern to the States: “The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.” Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, 666 (1962); see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46, 54-55 (1981). Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 381-382 (1961). When the administrator promulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law, the court’s inquiry is similarly limited: “If [h]is choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” Id., at 383. See also Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 145-146 (1982); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 57 (regulations must not be “unreasonable, unauthorized, or inconsistent with” the underlying statute); Free v. Bland, 369 U. S., at 668. A pre-emptive regulation’s force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law; moreover, whether the administrator failed to exercise an option to promulgate regulations which did not disturb state law is not dispositive. See United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S., at 381-383. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s narrow focus on Congress’ intent to supersede state law was misdirected. Rather, the questions upon which resolution of this case rests are whether the Board meant to pre-empt California’s due-on-sale law, and, if so, whether that action is within the scope of the Board’s delegated authority. Ill As even the Court of Appeal recognized, the Board’s intent to pre-empt the Wellenkamp doctrine is unambiguous. The due-on-sale regulation plainly provides that a federal savings and loan “continues to have the power” to include a due-on-sale clause in a loan instrument and to enforce that clause “at its option.” 12 CFR §545.8-3(f) (1982). The California courts, in contrast, have limited a federal association’s right to exercise a due-on-sale provision to those cases where the lender can demonstrate that the transfer has impaired its security. The conflict does not evaporate because the Board’s regulation simply permits, but does not compel, federal savings and loans to include due-on-sale clauses in their contracts and to enforce those provisions when the security property is transferred. The Board consciously has chosen not to mandate use of due-on-sale clauses “because [it] desires to afford associations the flexibility to accommodate special situations and circumstances.” 12 CFR § 556.9(f)(1) (1982). Although compliance with both §545.8-3(f) and the Wellenkamp rule may not be “a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S., at 142-143, the California courts have forbidden a federal savings and loan to enforce a due-on-sale clause solely “at its option” and have deprived the lender of the “flexibility” given it by the Board. Moreover, the Board recently has “reiterat[ed] its longstanding policy” of authorizing federal savings and loan associations to enforce due-on-sale clauses “subject only to express limitations imposed by the Board.” 46 Fed. Reg. 39123, 39124 (1981). The only restrictions specified in the Board’s regulation are contained in 12 CFR §545.8-3(g) (1982). That provision, unlike the Wellenkamp doctrine, does not confine a federal association’s right to accelerate a loan to cases where the lender’s security is impaired. In addition, Wellenkamp explicitly bars a federal savings and loan from exercising a due-on-sale clause to adjust a long-term mortgage’s interest rate towards current market rates — a due-on-sale practice the Board has approved and views as critical to “the financial stability of the association.” See Schott Advisory Opinion, at 27. By further limiting the availability of an option the Board considers essential to the economic soundness of the thrift industry, the State has created “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the due-on-sale regulation. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67. Cf. Franklin Nat. Bank v. New York, 347 U. S. 373, 378 (1954) (finding a “clear conflict” between federal law, which authorized national banks to receive savings deposits but did not specifically permit — much less require — advertising by such banks, and New York law, which forbade them to use the word “savings” in their advertising or business). Contending that the Wellenkamp doctrine is not inconsistent with the due-on-sale regulation, however, appellees point to the regulation’s second sentence, which provides in pertinent part: “[Ejxercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract.” 12 CFR § 545.8-3(f) (1982). Appellees interpret this language as incorporating state contract law — and therefore any state law restricting the exercise of a due-on-sale clause. We note, however, that the incorporation of state law does not signify the inapplicability of federal law, for “a fundamental principle in our system of complex national polity” mandates that “the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are as much a part of the law of every State as its own local laws and Constitution.” Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 490 (1880). See also Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386, 390-392 (1947). Moreover, in our view, the second sentence of §545.8-3(f) simply makes clear that the regulation does not empower federal savings and loans to accelerate a loan upon transfer of the security property unless the parties to the particular loan instrument, as a matter of contract, have given the lender that right. Similarly, if the parties to a given contract agree somehow to limit the association’s right to exercise a due-on-sale provision, the second sentence of §545.8-3(f) precludes the lender from relying on the first sentence as authorizing more expansive use of the clause. Any ambiguity in § 545.8 — 3(f )’s language is dispelled by the preamble accompanying and explaining the regulation. The preamble unequivocally expresses the Board’s determination to displace state law: “Finally, it was and is the Board’s intent to have . . . due-on-sale practices of Federal associations governed exclusively by Federal law. Therefore, . . . exercise of due-on-sale clauses by Federal associations shall be governed and controlled solely by [§545.8-3] and the Board’s new Statement of Policy. Federal associations shall not be bound by or subject to any conflicting State law which imposes different . . . due-on-sale requirements, nor shall Federal associations attempt to . . . avoid the limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses delineated in [§545.8-3(g)] on the ground that such . . . avoidance of limitations is permissible under State law.” 41 Fed. Reg. 18286, 18287 (1976) (emphasis added). In addition, the Board recently has “confirm[ed]” that the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loans “shall be governed exclusively by the Board’s regulations in preemption of and without regard to any limitations imposed by state law on either their inclusion or exercise.” 12 CFR § 556.9(f)(2) (1982). Thus, we conclude that the Board’s due-on-sale regulation was meant to pre-empt conflicting state limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loans, and that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Wellenkamp creates such a conflict. IV The question remains whether the Board acted within its statutory authority in issuing the pre-emptive due-on-sale regulation. The language and history of the HOLA convince us that Congress delegated to the Board ample authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans so as to further the Act’s purposes, and that §545.8~3(f) is consistent with those purposes. A The HOLA, a product of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, was intended “to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness” at a time when as many as half of all home loans in the country were in default. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 210, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1933). See 77 Cong. Rec. 2499 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Hancock); id., at 2570 (remarks of Rep. Reilly); Home Owners’ Loan Act: Hearings on S. 1317 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1933) (Senate Hearings) (statement of Horace Russell, one of the drafters of the bill and General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Atlanta, Ga.). Local institutions that had previously supplied funds to finance homes had ceased doing business or had discontinued such long-term loans, so that more than half the counties in the country, containing almost one-fifth of the total population, were without home-financing institutions. See id., at 7, 19; see also H. R. Rep. No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933); S. Rep. No. 91, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933); Home Owners’ Loan Act: Hearings on H. R. 4980 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1933) (House Hearings) (statement of William F. Stevenson, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); Comment, 11 Pac. L. J. 1085, 1103 (1980) (by 1933, 1,700 state-chartered savings and loans had failed, causing losses of some $200 million, about one-third the value of savings in these associations). In order to ameliorate these conditions, Congress enacted the HOLA, “a radical and comprehensive response to the inadequacies of the existing state systems.” Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan Assns. v. Stein, 604 F. 2d 1256, 1257 (CA9 1979), summarily aff’d, 445 U. S. 921 (1980). The Act provided for the creation of a system of federal savings and loan associations, which would be regulated by the Board so as to ensure their vitality as “permanent associations to promote the thrift of the people in a cooperative manner, to finance their homes and the homes of their neighbors.” S. Rep. No. 91, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933); see also H. R. Rep. No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933); 77 Cong. Rec. 4974 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley). Thus, in § 5(a) of the Act, Congress gave the Board plenary authority to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans: “In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as ‘Federal Savings and Loan Associations’, or ‘Federal mutual savings banks’. . . , and to issue charters therefor, giving primary consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States.” 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). The broad language of §5(a) expresses no limits on the Board’s authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans. As one court put it, “[i]t would have been difficult for Congress to give the Bank Board a broader mandate.” Glendale Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 910 (CD Cal. 1978), final summary judgment granted, 481 F. Supp. 616 (1979), order reversing and remanding, 663 F. 2d 1078 (CA9 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-1192. And Congress’ explicit delegation of jurisdiction over the “operation” of these institutions must empower the Board to issue regulations governing mortgage loan instruments, for mortgages are a central part of any savings and loan’s “operation.” See Schott Advisory Opinion, at 21; House Hearings 16 (Apr. 20, 1933) (statement of William F. Stevenson, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board) (“We are loaning [savings associations] seven million dollars a week and they are lending it pretty largely on homes of the type contemplated in the Act”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 4 (approximately 78% of savings and loan associations’ assets are invested in mortgage loan contracts). Moreover, Congress directed that, in regulating federal savings and loans, the Board consider “the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the United States,” which were at that time all state-chartered. § 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a). By so stating, Congress plainly envisioned that federal savings and loans would be governed by what the Board — not any particular State — deemed to be the “best practices.” See also First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Massachusetts Tax Comm’n, 437 U. S. 255, 258, n. 3 (1978) (observing that the HOLA “protects federal associations from being forced into the state regulatory mold”). Thus, the statutory language suggests that Congress expressly contemplated, and approved, the Board’s promulgation of regulations superseding state law. Appellees, however, point to the various sections of the HOLA explicitly pre-empting and incorporating state law, and contend that the Board has no additional authority to adopt regulations displacing state law. Although Congress made decisions about the applicability of certain aspects of state law to federal savings and loans, these provisions do not imply that Congress intended no further pre-emption of state law. Rather, Congress invested the Board with broad authority to regulate federal savings and loans so as to effect the statute’s purposes, and plainly indicated that the Board need not feel bound by existing state law. §5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). We cannot read this broad delegation of power as confining the Board’s authority to pre-empt state law to those areas “specifically described by the Act’s other provisions.” United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 172 (1968); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 193-194 (1941). Furthermore, if federal savings and loans were expected to conform to state law except where explicitly pre-empted in the Act itself, the provisions incorporating specific aspects of state law were needlessly repetitive. We decline to construe the Act so as to render these provisions nugatory, “thereby offending the well-settled rule that all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect.” American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 513 (1981). See also Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1961); cf. Franklin Nat. Bank v. New York, 347 U. S., at 378 (“We find no indication that Congress intended to make this phase of national banking [i. e., advertising] subject to local restrictions, as it has done by express language in several other instances”). B Because of the exigencies of the times, the HOLA was enacted hurriedly and its legislative history, concededly, is somewhat sparse. But that history does confirm our reading of the statutory language and the Board’s plenary authority to regulate the operations of federal savings and loans. Attempting to provide for the “relief of the man who is about to lose his home,” Congress set out the general framework and left many of the details to the Board. House Hearings 13 (Apr. 20,1933) (statement of William F. Stevenson, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board). Thus, references to the Board’s broad discretion to regulate the newly created federal savings and loans appear throughout the legislative history. Nowhere is there a suggestion of any intent somehow to limit the Board’s authority. Chairman Stevenson’s testimony during the HOLA hearings suggests that the Act contemplated that federal law would govern the terms of the loan instruments used by federal savings and loans. Discussing § 5(c) of the HOLA, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(c), Representative Hancock noted: “You are departing from uniformity with respect to loan associations throughout the United States when you say that the thrift associations cannot loan on a piece of real estate in excess of $20,000.” House Hearings 14 (Apr. 21, 1933). The Chairman replied: “That may be true. We are departing in a good many ways. We have a good many [thrift associations] that are in dire straits because they have loaned on property way up yonder in value, and they have their money tied up in hotels, apartment houses and things of that kind, which puts them in a desperate situation.” Ibid. Similarly, in response to concern expressed during the Senate hearings that the Act did not prohibit borrowers from obtaining financing and then renting the property, Chairman Stevenson observed: “That would be a matter of regulation. That could be covered by regulation under the bill.” Senate Hearings 14. Asked whether the Board would have authority to promulgate such a regulation, Stevenson replied: “If the Federal Home Loan Bank Board should choose to make that kind of a regulation it could put that in. A great many of these local private institutions would put that kind of a clause in their loans.” Ibid. See also House Hearings 5 (Apr. 20, 1933) (statement of Chairman Stevenson) (referring to “the regulations as to the use of the property after the loan is once obtained”); id., at 9 (Apr. 21, 1933) (statement of Mr. Stevenson) (“[I]t is in the discretion of the Board when it will grant [a 3-year] extension [of loan payments]”); id., at 18-19 (colloquy between Mr. Stevenson and Rep. Reilly) (noting that the Board has discretion in determining whether to charter a federal association). The subsequent debates confirm that Congress accepted Chairman Stevenson’s offer and furnished the Board with broad power to regulate the federal savings and loans. Thus, Representative Luce, ranking minority member of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, observed that the federal savings and loan associations “will be formed in accordance with the best building-and-loan practice, and I feel sure we may rely upon [Chairman Stevenson] and his Board to carry out that promise.” 77 Cong. Rec. 2480 (1933). “It is contemplated by the bill before us to put the machinery in the hands of the Home Loan Bank Board,” and “[w]e give the board great power to administer the act,” Representative Luce continued. Id., at 2480, 2481. See also id., at 2481 (“We leave such things [as limitations on conversion of federal home loan banks to federal savings and loans] to the judgment of the board”); id., at 2501 (“The prudent course is to leave this to the judgment of the board, by imposing a maximum [rate of interest] in the bill — 4 percent upon what we borrow, 5 percent upon what we lend — and trust this Board ... to get lower rates for borrowing or make lower rates for lending as the opportunity may come”); id., at 4987 (colloquy between Sens. Hebert and Bulkley) (observing that the Board has discretion in determining when savings and loans should be chartered in areas with existing local thrift institutions). Thus, the HOLA did not simply incorporate existing local loan practices. Rather, Congress delegated to the Board broad authority to establish and regulate “a uniform system of [savings and loan] institutions where there are not any now,” and to “establish them with the force of the government behind them, with a national charter.” House Hearings 15 (Apr. 21, 1933) (statement of Chairman Stevenson); id., at 17 (Apr. 20, 1933). And the Board has exercised that discretion, regulating comprehensively the operations of these associations, including their lending practices and, specifically, the terms of loan instruments. C As we noted above, a savings and loan’s mortgage lending practices are a critical aspect of its “operation,” over which the Board unquestionably has jurisdiction. Although the Board’s power to promulgate regulations exempting federal savings and loans from the requirements of state law may not be boundless, in this case we need not explore the outer limits of the Board’s discretion. We have no difficulty concluding that the due-on-sale regulation is within the scope of the Board’s authority under the HOLA and consistent with the Act’s principal purposes. Congress delegated power to the Board expressly for the purpose of creating and regulating federal savings and loans so as to ensure that they would remain financially sound institutions able to supply financing for home construction and purchase. Thus, in testifying during the House hearings on the HOLA, the Board’s Chairman observed: “The new corporations that we propose to set up, we want them set up on a sound basis as they will be of very material assistance in home financing for all time, if properly managed.” House Hearings 12 (Apr. 21, 1933). And the relevant House and Senate Reports referred to the federal associations as “permanent” institutions. S. Rep. No. 91, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933); H. R. Rep. No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1933). The due-on-sale regulation was promulgated with these purposes in mind. The Board has determined that due-on-sale clauses are “a valuable and often an indispensable source of protection for the financial soundness of Federal associations and for their continued ability to fund new home loan commitments.” 12 CFR § 556.9(f)(1) (1982). Specifically, the Board has concluded that the due-on-sale clause is “an important part of the mortgage contract” and that its elimination “will have an adverse [e]ffect on the earning power and financial stability of Federal associations, will impair the ability of Federal associations to sell their loans in the secondary markets, will reduce the amount of home-financing funds available to potential home buyers, and generally will cause a rise in home loan interest rates.” Schott Advisory Opinion, at 2, 17-18. The Board’s analysis proceeds as follows: It observes that the federal associations’ practice of borrowing short and lending long — obtaining funds on a short-term basis and investing them in long-term real estate loans, which typically have a 25- to 30-year term — combined with rising interest rates, has increased the cost of funds to these institutions and reduced their income. Exercising due-on-sale clauses enables savings and loans to alleviate this problem by replacing long-term, low-yield loans with loans at the prevailing interest rates and thereby to avoid increasing interest rates across the board. See id., at 21-22. Moreover, the Board has determined that restrictions like the Wellenkamp doctrine lengthen the expected maturity date of a lender’s mortgages, thus reducing their marketability in the secondary mortgage market. As a result, the Board fears, “the financial stability of Federal associations in California will be eroded and the flow of home loan funds into California will be reduced.” Schott Advisory Opinion, at 34. Admittedly, the wisdom of the Board’s policy decision is not uncontroverted. But neither is it arbitrary or capricious. As judges, it is neither our function, nor within our expertise, to evaluate the economic soundness of the Board’s approach. In promulgating the due-on-sale regulation, the Board reasonably exercised the authority, given it by Congress, so as to ensure the financial stability of “local mutual thrift institutions in which people . . . invest their funds and . . . [which] provide for the financing of homes.” § 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). By so doing, the Board intended to pre-empt conflicting state restrictions on due-on-sale practices like the California Supreme Court’s Wellenkamp doctrine. Our inquiry ends there. Accordingly, we hold that the Board’s due-on-sale regulation bars application of the Wellenkamp rule to federal savings and loan associations. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. It is so ordered. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Board came into being under § 17 of the earlier Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 47 Stat. 736, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 1437, the statute which created the federal home loan bank system. The three members of the Board are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for 4-year terms. See note following 12 U. S. C. § 1437. In addition to providing for the establishment of federal savings and loan associations, the HOLA, by its § 3, 48 Stat. 129, repealed § 4(d) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 47 Stat. 727, which had authorized federal home loan banks to make loans directly to homeowners. The HOLA, by its § 4, 48 Stat. 129, instructed the Board to create the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation; this agency was to exchange its bonds for mortgages held by financial institutions, including state-chartered savings and loans, and to provide funds to needy homeowners for accrued taxes, maintenance, and repairs. The due-on-sale clause used in many loan instruments is ¶ 17 of the uniform mortgage instrument developed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association. Paragraph 17 appears in two of the deeds of trust at issue in this case and reads: “17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender’s prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances, (e) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase, Lender may, at Lender’s option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17 and if Borrower’s successor in interest has executed a written assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust and the Note. “If Lender exercises such option to accelerate, Lender shall mail Borrower notice of acceleration in accordance with paragraph 14 hereof. Such notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed within which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period, Lender may, without further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof.” App. 50-51, 85-86 (emphasis added). The due-on-sale regulation was codified initially in 12 CFR § 545.6— 11(f) (1980). See 44 Fed. Reg. 39108, 39149 (1979). Even before adopting the due-on-sale regulation, the Board had interpreted 12 CFR § 545.8-3(a) (1982) — a regulation promulgated in 1948 that requires all loan instruments to “provide for full protection to the Federal association” — as authorizing federal savings and loans to exercise due-on-sale provisions, despite any state law to the contrary, because such clauses help ensure “full protection” to the lender. See the Board’s Advisory Opinion, Resolution No. 75-647, in Schott v. Mission Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (Schott Advisory Opinion), No. Civ-75-366, pp. 13-15 (CD Cal. July 30, 1975), reprinted as Exhibit A to Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Paragraph 15 is also part of the uniform mortgage instrument developed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association. See n. 2, supra. The paragraph reads in full: “15. Uniform Deed of Trust; Governing Law; Severability. This form of deed of trust combines uniform covenants for national use and nonuniform covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. In the event that any provision or clause of this Deed of Trust or the Note conflicts with applicable law, such conflicts shall not affect other provisions of this Deed of Trust or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision, and to this end the provisions of the Deed of Trust and the Note are declared to be severable.” App. 51-52, 86-87. Each complaint also included a slander count, alleging that Fidelity had maliciously published false charges that the appellee was in default under the deed of trust. Id,., at 9, 54, 89. In addition, the Court of Appeal noted that two of the three deeds of trust at issue were executed prior to the effective date of § 545.8-3(f). Therefore, the court reasoned, the Board's due-on-sale regulation was not applicable to those loan instruments and could not pre-empt state law with respect to those deeds. See 121 Cal. App. 3d, at 344, 345,175 Cal. Rptr., at 476-477. The Court of Appeal refused to ascribe any weight to the absence of ¶ 15 in the third deed of trust at issue here. The court described its earlier discussion of ¶ 15 as “not based so much on an agreement between the parties for the application of state law as on the conclusion that the general use of a provision containing such language by federal savings and loan associations with the approval of the Board persuasively evidences a recognition by the Board and federal savings and loan associations that state law would govern the interpretation, validity and enforcement of security instruments.” Id., at 346, 175 Cal. Rptr., at 477. Nor did the court find significant the fact that this deed covered commercial rather than residential property. A number of Federal District Courts have concluded that the Board’s due-on-sale regulation pre-empts state law. See, e. g., Price v. Florida Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 524 F. Supp. 175, 178 (MD Fla. 1981) (§ 545.8-3(f) is pre-emptive of any state regulation); First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 740 (ND Fla. 1981) (§ 545.8-3(f) pre-empts Florida due-on-sale restrictions similar to those imposed by California); Dantus v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 502 F. Supp. 658, 661 (Colo. 1980) (analogous ruling with respect to Colorado law); Bailey v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 461 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (CD Ill. 1979) (§545.8-3(f) forecloses any state regulation of due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loans), appeal dism’d, 636 F. 2d 1221 (CA7 1980); Glendale Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 907 (CD Cal. 1978) (same), final summary judgment granted, 481 F. Supp. 616 (1979), order reversing and remanding, 663 F. 2d 1078 (CA9 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-1192. One court appears to have agreed with the California Court of Appeal. See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 308 N. W. 2d 471 (Minn. 1981) (§ 545.8-3(f) does not pre-empt state regulation of due-on-sale clauses). In addition, at least three Federal Courts of Appeals, several District Courts, and one State Supreme Court have ruled that various other Board regulations supersede state law. See, e. g., Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan Assns. v. Stein, 604 F. 2d 1256, 1260 (CA9 1979) (“In our judgment the regulatory control of the Bank Board over federal savings and loan associations is so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory control”), summarily aff’d, 445 U. S. 921 (1980); First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Greenwald, 591F. 2d 417, 425-426 (CA7 1979) (Board regulation specifying the conditions under which federal savings and loans must pay interest on escrow accounts pre-empts state law imposing greater interest requirements); Kupiec v. Republic Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 512 F. 2d 147, 150-152 (CA7 1975) (Board regulation supersedes any common-law right to inspect savings and loan’s membership list); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 499 F. 2d 1145, 1147 (CA9 1974) (Board regulation pre-empts the field of prepayments of real estate loans to federal associations); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 405 F. Supp. 819 (ND Ill. 1975) (Board regulations and policy statements preempt the field of fiduciary duties of federal savings and loan officers); Lyons Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11 (ND Ill. 1974) (Board regulation displaces state law regarding branching of federal savings and loans); People v. Coast Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 98 F. Supp. 311, 318 (SD Cal. 1951) (federal regulation of savings and loans pre-empts the field); Kaski v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 72 Wis. 2d 132, 141-142, 240 N. W. 2d 367, 373 (1976) (federal law supersedes state regulation of federal savings and loans’ lending practices). But see Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 281 Ore. 533, 577 P. 2d 477 (Board regulation authorizing federal savings and loans to maintain reserve accounts for tax and insurance payments does not occupy the field of reserve accounts or pre-empt state law requiring payment of interest on such accounts), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1051 (1978). Cf. Gulf Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F. 2d 259, 266 (CA5 1981) (Board has authority only over internal management of federal savings and loans, and not over disputed loan agreement provisions), cert, pending, No. 81-1744. As a practical matter, however, few mortgage instruments are written without due-on-sale clauses. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association, which purchase the bulk of mortgages sold in the secondary mortgage market, both require, in the mortgages they buy, either a due-on-sale clause or a provision enabling the lender to demand payment of the loan in seven years. The marketability of a mortgage in the secondary market is critical to a savings and loan, for it thereby can sell mortgages to obtain funds to make additional home loans. See Schott Advisory Opinion, at 28-34; Kinzler, Due-on-Sale Clauses: The Economic and Legal Issues, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 441, 452-453 (1982); Comment, 9 Fla. State L. Rev. 645, 646, 650 (1981). Title 12 CFR § 545.8-3(g) (1982), which applies to loans made after July 31, 1976, and secured by a home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, prohibits the exercise of a due-on-sale clause in the same four circumstances listed in ¶ 17 of the uniform mortgage instrument, see n. 2, supra: when a lien subordinate to the lender’s security instrument is created; when a purchase money security interest for household appliances is created; when a transfer occurs by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant; or when a leasehold interest of not more than three years is granted with no option to purchase. Section 545.8-3(g) also bars the association from imposing a prepayment penalty when a loan is accelerated by means of a due-on-sale clause, and provides that, under specified circumstances, the lender waives its option to exercise a due-on-sale provision. This principle likewise leads us to reject appellees’ contention that, with respect to the two deeds of trust containing ¶ 15, see n. 5, supra, appellants did in fact agree to be bound by local law. Paragraph 15 provides that the deed is to be governed by the “law of the jurisdiction” in which the property is located; but the “law of the jurisdiction” includes federal as well as state law. Moreover, like ¶ 17 — the due-on-sale clause in the uniform mortgage instrument, see n. 2, supra — ¶ 15 typically must be included in any mortgage the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Association purchases in the secondary mortgage market. See n. 10, supra. Paragraph 15 was added to the uniform mortgage instrument not to elevate state law over federal law, but to provide a uniform choice-of-law provision to be used when interstate disputes arose regarding the interpretation of a mortgage. See App. to Brief for Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation as Amici Curiae 2a (letter from Henry L. Judy, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation); see also S. Rep. No. 91-761, p. 25 (1970) (letter from Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). Citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 315-316 (1979), appellees characterize the preamble as an interpretative regulation that does not have the binding force of law and therefore cannot pre-empt state law. But Chrysler Corp. is not on point because we conclude that § 545.8 — 3(f) itself supersedes contrary state due-on-sale law; we look to the preamble only for the administrative construction of the regulation, to which “deference is . . . clearly in order.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). We need not consider, therefore, the pre-emptive effect of the preamble standing alone. Because we find an actual conflict between federal and state law, we need not decide whether the HOLA or the Board’s regulations occupy the field of due-on-sale law or the entire field of federal savings and loan regulation. See § 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (exempting federal mutual savings banks formerly organized under state law from “any numerical limitations of State law on the establishment of branch offices and other facilities”); and § 5(h) of the Act, § 1464(h) (pre-empting state taxes on federal savings and loans greater than those imposed on “other similar local mutual or cooperative thrift and home financing institutions”). Cf. § 13 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1433 (exempting Federal Home Loan Bank bonds from taxation). See § 5(a) of the HOLA, 12 U. S. C. § 1464(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (providing that any federal mutual savings bank which was formerly a state-chartered institution is subject to state laws pertaining to discrimination in lending based on neighborhood or geographic area, and to requirements imposed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq.); § 5(b)(3) of the Act, § 1464(b)(3) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (authorizing federal savings and loans to borrow funds from a state mortgage finance agency “to the same extent as” state law permits state-chartered savings and loans to do so); and §5(c)(4)(A) of the Act, § 1464(c)(4)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (permitting federal associations to invest in, or lend to, any business development credit corporation incorporated in the State “to the same extent as” state-chartered savings and loans are authorized to do so). Likewise, we find nothing in § 8 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U. S. C. § 1428, relied on by the dissent, see post, at 173, that suggests any limit on the Board’s authority to issue regulations preempting state law. That provision, which is not even part of the HOLA, speaks only to the Board’s authority to examine state laws governing the operation of federal home loan banks, not federal savings and loans, for the purpose of ensuring “[a]dequate protection to a Federal Home Loan Bank in making or collecting advances under th[at] chapter . . . .” 12 U. S. C. § 1428. It does not purport to constrict the Board’s power to regulate the operations of federal savings and loans and does not negate the explicit language and history of the HOLA. On April 13, 1933, President F. D. Roosevelt wrote Congress, asking for “legislation to protect small home owners from foreclosure and to relieve them of a portion of the burden of excessive interest and principal payments incurred during the period of higher values and higher earning power.” H. R. Doc. No. 19, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1933). Hearings were held by the House Committee on Banking and Currency on April 20 and 21, 1933, and by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on April 20 and 22. The bill was approved by the House on April 28, see 77 Cong. Rec. 2585, and passed the Senate on June 5, see id,., at 4995. The President signed the bill into law on June 9,1933, see id,., at 6198, less than two months after he had first requested the legislation. The postenactment history of the HOEA corroborates the Board’s broad authority to regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans. As part of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, Congress amended § 5(a) of the HOLA to permit state mutual savings banks to obtain federal charters. During debate in the House, Representative Hanley introduced an amendment providing that those mutual savings banks opting to convert to federally chartered institutions would continue to be subject to state law pertaining to lending discrimination and to regulations imposed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §1601 et seq., if the Board determined that state law imposed more stringent requirements than federal law. See 124 Cong. Rec. 33847 (1978). Representative Hanley explained: “In no way, of course, would the use of State law requirements for Federal mutual savings banks be interpreted to erode the Bank Board’s long-standing plenary authority over Federal savings and loan associations; Federal law alone would continue to govern these institutions in such areas as branching, anti-discrimination, and lending authority.” Id., at 33848. Representative St Germain, chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs and chief sponsor of the bill, agreed: “This restriction applies only to converted mutual savings banks, and Congress in no way intends to interfere with the longstanding, all-inclusive power of the Bank Board over the activities of Federal savings and loan associations, including branching authority.” Id., at 33849. The amendment was agreed to. Ibid. Similar views were expressed during the Senate debate on the bill. Senator Brooke observed that “we do not intend to interfere with the Bank Board’s plenary authority over Federal savings and loan associations, and in this area, Federal law alone would continue to govern.” Id., at 36148. Then, during debate in the House on the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, one Congressman expressed concern that permitting federal savings and loans to make residential real estate loans to the same extent national banking associations were authorized to do so might be interpreted as making “federal savings and loans . . . subject to State requirements.” 126 Cong. Rec. 6981 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Patterson). Representative St Germain responded that the Act would expand the federal associations’ investment powers “[o]nly if the Federal Home Loan Bank Board permits. Under the Home Owners’ Act, the Bank Board has complete authority to determine by regulation the lending practices of Federal associations.” Ibid. Although these postenaetment events cannot be accorded the weight of contemporary history, they do provide further confirmation of Congress’ intent to delegate to the Board broad discretion in regulating the lending practices of federal savings and loans. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 275 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969). The Board’s extensive regulations govern, for example, fair credit requirements, the types and amount of loans, collateral required, repayment schedules, initial loan charges, assignment of rents, escrow accounts and interest paid on those accounts, late charges, servicing of loans, and loan payments and prepayments. See 12 CFR §§ 545.6, 545.8 (1982). The Board’s Due-on-Sale Task Force estimates that the California Supreme Court’s restrictions on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses accounted for 40% of the total losses suffered in 1981 by state-chartered associations in the State — some $200 million. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Due-on-Sale Task Force Report 2, 15 (1982). The Task Force projects that imposition of such restrictions nationwide would create, within two years, annual losses of $600 to $800 million for federal savings and loans, and $1 to $1.3 billion for all federal and state associations. See id., at 2, 18, 25. Those subscribing to the opposite view contend that the unrestricted exercise of due-on-sale clauses may preclude the assumption of mortgages at lower interest rates, thus preventing the sale of homes and transferring the burden of an inflationary market from the lender to the homeowner and prospective homeowner. See, e. g., Patton v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P. 2d 152 (1978); Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P. 2d 970 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N. W. 2d 804 (1977). A number of courts, however, have agreed with the Board’s approach. See, e. g., Williams v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 651 F. 2d 910 (CA4 1981); Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Malouff v. Midland Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 181 Colo. 294, 509 P. 2d 1240 (1973); Martin v. Peoples Mutual Sav. & Loan Assn., 319 N. W. 2d 220 (Iowa 1982); Occidental Savings & Loan Assn. v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N. W. 2d 843 (1980); Crockett v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 289 N. C. 620, 224 S. E. 2d 580 (1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S. W. 2d 529 (Tenn. 1973). We therefore reject appellees’ contention that the Board’s power to regulate federal savings and loans extends only to the associations’ internal management and not to any external matters, such as their relationship with borrowers. Although one federal and one state court have drawn this distinction, see Gulf Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F. 2d, at 266; Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 308 N. W. 2d, at 478, we find no support in the language of the HOLA or its legislative history for such a restriction on the Board’s authority. Moreover, whatever validity the distinction has in theory, it makes little sense here. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he regulation of loan practices directly affects the internal management and operations of federal associations and therefore requires uniform federal control.” Kaski v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 72 Wis. 2d, at 142, 240 N. W. 2d, at 373. In fact, as discussed in the text, the Board’s due-on-sale policy is based on the view that due-on-sale clauses are essential to the financial soundness of federal savings and loans; preservation of the associations’ very existence is obviously related to their internal management and is one of the functions delegated to the Board by Congress. Pointing out that two of the deeds of trust were executed prior to the 1976 effective date of § 545.8 — 3(f), appellees argue that the due-on-sale regulation may not be applied so as to destroy vested rights. Therefore, appellees reason, California law does not conflict with federal law with respect to those two deeds. Appellants respond that § 545.8-3(f) did not interfere with appellees’ rights because it merely codified pre-existing law. See n. 4, supra. When the two deeds of trust were executed in 1971 and 1972, California law permitted the unrestricted exercise of due-on-sale clauses upon outright transfer of the security property, as occurred here. The Board’s due-on-sale regulation was then issued in 1976, reinforcing Fidelity’s right to enforce the due-on-sale provisions. Not until Wellenkamp was decided in 1978 was a lender’s right under California law to accelerate a loan in response to an outright transfer limited to cases where the security was impaired. The California Supreme Court’s prior cases, which forbade the automatic enforcement of due-on-sale provisions when the borrower further encumbered the property securing the loan, La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P. 2d 1113 (1971), and when the borrower entered into an installment land contract covering all or part of the security property, Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Assn., 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P. 2d 1169 (1974), permitted the unrestricted exercise of due-on-sale clauses in cases of outright transfers of the security. See 5 Cal. 3d, at 880, 489 P. 2d, at 1123; 12 Cal. 3d, at 637-638, 526 P. 2d, at 1174-1175. Because we find the Wellenkamp doctrine pre-empted by a previously promulgated federal regulation and therefore inapplicable to federal savings and loans, appellees are deprived of no vested rights if Fidelity is permitted to enforce the due-on-sale clauses in the two pre-1976 deeds: the savings and loan had the right to accelerate the loans, pursuant to California law, when the deeds were executed, and that power was never diminished by state law. We have no occasion, therefore, to consider whether § 545.8-3(f) may be applied so as to give a savings and loan broader authority to enforce a due-on-sale clause than it had when the deed of trust was executed, or to address appellants’ contention that § 545.8-3(f) effected no change in the law.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?