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STANDARD OIL CO. v. PECK, TAX COMMISSIONER, et al. No. 184. Argued January 3-4, 1952. Decided February 4, 1952. Isador Grossman and Rufus S. Day, Jr. arguéd the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Isadore Topper argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were C. William O’Neill, Attorney General of Ohio, Robért E, Leach, Assistant Attorney General-; Frank T. Cullitan and Saul Danaceau. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. . Appellant, an Ohio corporation, owns boats and barges which it employs for the transportation of oil along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The vessels neither pick up oil nor discharge it in Ohio., The main terminals are in Tennessee, Indiana, Kentucky, and Louisiana. The maximum river mileage traversed by the boats and barges on any trip through waters bordering Ohio was l7% miles. These 17y2 miles were in the section of the Ohio River which had to be traversed to reach Bromley, Kentucky. While this stretch of water bordered Ohio, it was not necessarily within Ohio. The vessels were registered in Cincinnati, Ohio, but only stopped in Ohio for occasional fuel or repairs. These stops were made at Cincinnati; but none of them involved loading or unloading cargo. The Tax Commissioner of Ohio, acting under §§ 5325 and 5328 of the Ohio General Code, levied an ad valorem personal propérty tax on all of these vessels. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed (with an exception not material here), and the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the Board, 155 Ohio St. 61, 98 N. E. 2d 8, over the objection that the tax violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case is here bn appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). Under the earlier view governing the taxability of vessels moving in the inland waters (St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423; Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409; cf. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299), Ohio, the state of the domicile, would have a strong claim to the whole of the tax that has been levied. But the rationale of those cases was rejected in Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 336 U. S. 169, where we held that vessels moving in interstate operations along the inland waters were taxable by the same standards as those which Pullman’s Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, first applied to railroad cars in interstate commerce. The formula approved was one which fairly apportioned the tax to the commerce carried on within the state. In that way we placed inland water transportation on the same constitutional footing as other interstate enterprises. The Ott caáfe involved a tax by Louisiana on vessels of a foreign corporation operating in Louisiana waters. Louisiana sought to tax only that portion of the value of the vessels represented by the ratio between the total number of miles in Louisiana and the total number of miles in the entire operation. The present case is sought to be distinguished on the.ground that Ohio is the domiciliary state and therefore may tax the whole value even though the boats and barges operate outside Ohio. New York Central R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584, sustained a tax by the domiciliary state on all the rolling stock.of a railroad. But in that case it did not appear that “any specific cars or any average of cars” was so continuously in another state as to be taxable there. P. 597. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, allowed the domiciliary state to tax the entire fleet: of airplanes operating interstate; but in that case, as in the Miller case, it was not shown that “a. defined part of the domiciliary corpus” had acquired a. taxable situs elsewhere. P. 295. Those cases, though exceptional on their facts, illustrate the reach of the taxing power of the state of the domicile as contrasted to that of the other states. But they have no application here since most; if not all, of the barges and boats which Ohio has taxed were almost continuously outside Ohio during the taxable year. No one vessel may have been continuously in another state during the taxable year. But we do know that most, if not all, of them were operating in other waters and therefore under Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., supra, could be taxed by the.several states on an apportionment basis. The rule which permits taxatioft by two or more states on. an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile. See Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194. Otherwise there would be multiple taxation of interstate operations and the tax would have no relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection which the taxing state gives those operations. Reversed. Mr. Justice Black dissents.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE CO. v. MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al. No. 486. Argued, April 23, 1951. Decided May 14, 1951. Robert P. Patterson argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Clayton F. Jennings. Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for the Michigan Public Service Commission, appellee. With him on the brief were Frank C. Millard, Attorney General, Daniel J. O’Hara and Charles M. A. Martin, Assistant Attorneys General. Stephen J. Roth, then Attorney General, was also of counsel. Donald R. Richberg argued the cause for the Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., appellee. With him on the brief were Clifton G. Dyer and James W. Williams. • Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern, Bradford Ross and Bernard A. Foster, Jr. filed a memorandum for the Federal Power Commission, as amicus curiae. Me. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the affirmance of an order of the Michigan Public Service Commission requiring appellant to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before selling natural gas direct to industrial consumers in a municipality already served by a public utility. Appellant is engaged in the transportation of natural gas by pipe line from fields in Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas into areas which include the State of Michigan. Appellant is a “natural-gas company” within the coverage of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717 et seg., and subject thereunder to regulation by the Federal Power Commission. Appellee Michigan Consolidated Gas Company is a public utility of Michigan which under appropriate authorization distributes gas to domestic, commercial and industrial consumers in and around Detroit. Consolidated obtains its entire supply of natural gas for distribution in the Detroit district from appellant. In 1945 appellant publicly announced a program of securing large industrial customers for the direct sale of natural gas in Michigan. In Detroit it offered to pay the City for the right to lay and operate its pipe line along the streets and alleys directly to large industrial customers. In October of that year appellant succeeded in securing a large direct-sale contract with the Ford Motor Company for gas at its Dearborn plant, located in the Detroit district. Ford was already purchasing substantial quantities of gas for industrial use at the Dearborn plant from Consolidated. Believing its interests and those of its customers were prejudiced by appellant’s program, particularly the Ford contract, Consolidated filed a complaint with the Michigan Public Service Commission. Appellant appeared to contest the jurisdiction of the Commission over such sales. After hearing, the Commission ordered appellant to— “cease and desist from making direct sales and deliveries of natural gas to industries within the State of Michigan, located within municipalities already being served by a public utility, until such time as it shall have first obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity from this Commission to perform such services.” Appellant obtained an injunction against the order of the Commission in the Circuit Court of Ingham County, Michigan. The Circuit Court held that the order was a prohibition of interstate commerce and therefore invalid. The Supreme Court of Michigan, three judges dissenting, reversed the Circuit Court and affirmed the Commission’s order. 328 Mich. 650, 44 N. W. 2d 324. That court rejected the argument that the order of the Commission was an absolute denial of the right of appellant to sell natural gas in Michigan direct to consumers. Since appellant was free to make application to the Michigan Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity as to such sales, the order was construed as denying the right of appellant to sell direct without first obtaining such certificate. The court held this requirement to be within the State’s regulatory authority despite the interstate character of the sales. This appeal challenges the correctness of that decision. The sale to industrial consumers as proposed by appellant is clearly interstate commerce. Panhandle Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of Indiana, 332 U. S. 507, 513; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Commission, 252 U. S. 23, 28. But the sale and distribution of gas to local consumers made by one engaged in interstate commerce is “essentially local” in aspect and is subject to state regulation without infringement of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. In the absence of federal regulation, state regulation is required in the public interest. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Commission, supra, at 31. See also opinion of Cardozo, J., in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Commission, 225 N. Y. 397, 122 N. E. 260. These principles apply to direct sales for industrial consumption as well as to sales for domestic and commercial uses. Panhandle-Indiana, supra, at 514, 519-520. The facts in the instant case show that the proposed sales are primarily of local interest. They emphasize the need for local regulation and the wisdom of the principles just discussed. To accommodate its operations, appellant proposes to use the streets and alleys of Detroit and environs. A local utility already operating in the same area, Consolidated, receives its entire supply of natural gas from appellant. A substantial portion of Consolidated’s revenues is derived from sales to large industrial consumers. Appellant ignored requests of Consolidated for additional gas to meet the increased wants of its industrial customers. Instead of attempting to meet increased needs through Consolidated, appellant launched a program to secure for itself large industrial accounts from customers, some of whom were already being served by Consolidated. In connection with the Ford Motor Company, it is noteworthy that the tap line by which appellant proposed to serve Ford directly would be substantially parallel to and only a short distance from the existing tap line by which Consolidated now serves Ford. Thus, not only would there be two utilities using local facilities to accommodate their distribution systems, but they would be seeking to serve the same industrial consumers. Appellant asserts a right to compete for the cream of the volume business without regard to the local public convenience or necessity. Were appellant successful in this venture, it would no doubt be reflected adversely in Consolidated’s over-all' costs of service and its rates to customers whose only source of supply is Consolidated. This clearly presents a situation of “essentially local” concern and of vital interest to the State of Michigan. Of course, when Congress acts in this field it is supreme. It has acted. Section 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, supra, provides as follows: “The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” By this Act Congress occupied only a part of the field. As to sales, only the sale of gas in interstate commerce for resale was covered. Direct sales for consumptive use were designedly left to state regulation. Panhandle-Indiana, 332 U. S. at 516-518. Speaking further of the division of regulatory authority over interstate commerce in natural gas, this Court said in the same case: “It would be an exceedingly incongruous result if a statute so motivated, designed and shaped to bring about more effective regulation, and particularly more effective state regulation, were construed in the teeth of those objects, and the import of its wording as well, to cut down regulatory power and to do so in a manner making the states less capable of regulation than before the statute’s adoption. Yet this, in effect, is what appellant asks us to do. For the essence of its position, apart from standing directly on the commerce clause, is that Congress by enacting the Natural Gas Act has ‘occupied the field,’ i e., the entire field open to federal regulation, and thus has relieved its direct industrial sales of any subordination to state control. “The exact opposite is the fact. Congress, it is true, occupied a field. But it was meticulous to take in only territory which this Court had held the states could not reach. That area did not include direct consumer sales, whether for industrial or other uses. Those sales had been regulated by the states and the regulation had been repeatedly sustained. In no instance reaching this Court had it been stricken down. “The Natural Gas Act created an articulate legislative program based on a clear recognition of the respective responsibilities of the federal and state regulatory agencies. It does not contemplate ineffective regulation at either level. We have emphasized repeatedly that Congress meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme, complementary in its operation to those of the states and in no manner usurping their authority. . . . And, as was pointed out in Power Comm’n v. Hope Gas Co., [320 U. S. 591] at 610, ‘the primary aim of this legislation was to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.’ The scheme was one of cooperative action between federal and state agencies. It could accomplish neither that protective aim nor the comprehensive and effective dual regulation Congress had in mind, if those companies could divert at will all or the cream of their business to unregulated industrial uses.” 332 U. S. at 519, 520-521. The statutory scheme of “dual regulation” might have some overlaps or conflicts but no such exigencies appear here. There are no opposing directives and hence no necessity for us to resolve any conflicting claims as between state and federal regulation. Appellant concedes, as it must, that direct sales by it to industrial consumers are subject to state rate regulation under the Panhandle-Indiana decision. It contends, however, that that decision does not comprehend its problem, reasoning that the jurisdiction here asserted by the Michigan Commission is the power to prohibit interstate commerce in natural gas. Although the end result might be prohibition of particular direct sales, to require appellant to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it may enter a municipality already served by a public utility is regulation, not absolute prohibition. There is no intimation that appellant cannot deliver and sell available gas to Consolidated for resale to customers who have additional gas requirements. It is no discrimination against interstate commerce for Michigan to require appellant to route its sales of gas through the existing certificated utility where the public convenience and necessity would not be served by direct sales. That there is neither discrimination nor prohibition here saves this regulation from the rule of such cases as Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, relied on by appellant, where a state was said to have discriminated against interstate commerce by prohibiting it because it would subject local business to competition. And the statute under which the Michigan Commission acted does not distinguish between an interstate or intrastate agency desiring to operate in a locality already served by a utility. See Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U. S. 179, 188. It does not follow that because appellant is engaged in interstate commerce it is free from state regulation or free to manage essentially local aspects of its business as it pleases. The course of this Court’s decisions recognizes no such license. See Cities Service case, supra; Panhandle-Indiana case, supra; Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Commission, 252 U. S. 23. Such a course would not accomplish the effective dual regulation Congress intended, and would permit appellant to prejudice substantial local interests. This is not compelled by the Natural Gas Act or the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Judgment affirmed. The Commission acted under authority of Mich. Comp. Laws, 1948, § 460.502, which provides: “Sec. 2. No public utility shall hereafter begin the construction or operation of any public utility plant or system thereof nor shall it render any service for the purpose of transacting or carrying on a local business either directly, or indirectly, by serving any other utility or agency so engaged in such local business, in any municipality in this state where any other utility or agency is then engaged in such local business and rendering the same sort of service, or where such municipality is receiving service of the same sort, until such public utility shall first obtain from the commission a certificate that public convenience and necessity requires or will require such construction, operation, service, or extension.” Other relevant sections of the Michigan statute provide: “Sec. 3. Before any such certificate of convenience and necessity shall issue, the applicant therefor shall file a petition with the commission stating the name of the municipality or municipalities which it desires to serve and the kind of service which it proposes to render, and that the applicant has secured the necessary consent or franchise from such municipality or municipalities authorizing it to transact a local business.” § 460.503. “Sec. 5. In determining the question of public convenience and necessity the commission shall take into consideration the service being rendered by the utility then serving such territory, the investment in such utility, the benefit, if any, to the public in the matter of rates and such other matters as shall be proper and equitable in determining whether or not public convenience and necessity requires the applying utility to serve the territory. ...” § 460.505. See note 1, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PITTSBURGH PRESS CO. v. PITTSBURGH COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS et al. No. 72-419. Argued March. 20, 1973 — Decided June 21, 1973 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BkeNNAN, White, Marshall, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., post, p. 393, and Douglas, J., post, p. 397, filed dissenting.opinions. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, J., joined, post, p. 400. BlackmuN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 404. Charles R. Volk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Ralph T. DeStefano. Eugene B. Strassburger III argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations et al. Marjorie H. Matson argued the cause for respondent National Organization of Women, Inc. With her on the brief was Sylvia Roberts. Arthur B. Hanson and Ralph N. Albright, Jr., filed a brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Harriet S. Shapiro, John C. Hoyle, Julia P. Cooper, and Beatrice Rosenberg for the United States; by Huelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, Robert H. O’Brien and Carl Boronkay, Assistant Attorneys General, and Judith T. Ashmann, Deputy Attorney General, for the California Fair Employment Practice Commission; by George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and David S. Litwin, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of New Jersey; by Israel Packel, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Roy Yaffe and Michael L. Golden, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for the Pennsylvania Commission on the Status of Women et al.; by Norman Dorsen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Jeffrey A. Kay for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Phineas Indritz, Elizabeth Boyer, Marguerite Rawalt, Martha W. Griffiths, Margaret M. Heckler, and Donald M. Fraser for the American Veterans Committee, Inc., et al.; by Philip J. Tierney for the International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies; and by Rita Page Reuss and Jane M. Picker for the Women’s Law Fund, Inc. Me. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh (the Ordinance) has been construed below by the courts of Pennsylvania as forbidding newspapers to carry “help-wanted” advertisements in sex-designated columns except where the employer or advertiser is free to make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex. We are called upon to decide whether the Ordinance as so construed violates the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. This issue is a sensitive one, and a full understanding of the context in which it arises is critical to its resolution. I The Ordinance proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, place of birth, or sex. In relevant part, § 8 of the Ordinance declares it to be unlawful employment practice, “except where based upon a bona fide occupational exemption certified by the Commission”: “(a) For any employer to refuse to hire any person or otherwise discriminate against any person with respect to hiring . . . because of . . . sex. “(e) For any 'employer,’ employment agency or labor organization to publish or circulate, or to cause to be published or circulated, any notice or advertisement relating to 'employment’ or membership which indicates any discrimination because of . . . sex. “(j) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency or labor organization, to aid . . . in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice by this ordinance . . . .” The present proceedings were initiated on October 9, 1969, when the National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission), which is charged with implementing the Ordinance. The complaint alleged that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburgh Press) was violating § 8 (j) of the Ordinance by “allowing employers to place advertisements in the male or female columns, when the jobs advertised obviously do not have bona fide occupational qualifications or exceptions Finding probable cause to believe that Pittsburgh Press was' violating the Ordinance, the Commission held a hearing, at which it received evidence and heard argument from the parties and from other interested organizations. Among the exhibits introduced at the hearing were clippings from the help-wanted advertisements carried in the January 4, 1970, edition of the Sunday Pittsburgh Press, arranged by column. In many cases, the advertisements consisted simply of the job title, the salary, and the employment agency carrying the listing, while others included somewhat more extensive job descriptions. On July 23, 1970, the Commission issued a Decision and Order. It found that during 1969 Pittsburgh Press carried a total of 248,000 help-wanted advertisements; that its practice before October 1969 was to use columns captioned “Male Help Wanted,” “Female Help Wanted,” and “Male-Female Help Wanted”; that it thereafter used the captions “Jobs — Male Interest,” “Jobs — Female Interest,” and “Male-Female”; and that the advertisements were placed in the respective columns according to the advertiser’s wishes, either volunteered by the advertiser or offered in response to inquiry by Pittsburgh Press. The Commission first concluded that § 8 (e) of the Ordinance forbade employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations to submit advertisements for placement in sex-designated columns. It then held that Pittsburgh Press, in violation of § 8 (j), aided the advertisers by maintaining a sex-designated classification system. After specifically considering and rejecting the argument that the Ordinance violated the First Amendment, the Commission ordered Pittsburgh Press to cease and desist such violations and to utilize a classification system with no reference to sex. This order was affirmed in all relevant respects by the Court of Common Pleas. On appeal in the Commonwealth Court, the scope of the order was narrowed to allow Pittsburgh Press to carry advertisements in sex-designated columns for jobs exempt from the antidiscrimination provisions of the Ordinance. As pointed out in that court’s opinion, the Ordinance does not apply to employers of fewer than five persons, to employers outside the city of Pittsburgh, or to religious, fraternal, charitable, or sectarian organizations, nor does it apply to employment in domestic service or in jobs for which the Commission has certified a bona fide occupational exception. The modified order bars “all reference to sex in employment advertising column headings, except as may be exempt under said Ordinance, or as may be certified as exempt by said Commission.” 4 Pa. Commw. 448, 470, 287 A. 2d 161, 172 (1972). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, and we granted certiorari to decide whether, as Pittsburgh Press contends, the modified order violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. 409 U. S. 1036 (1972). We affirm. II There is little need to reiterate that the freedoms of speech and of the press rank among our most cherished liberties. As Mr. Justice Black put it: “In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 717 (1971) (concurring opinion). The durability of our system of self-government hinges upon the preservation of these freedoms. “[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. ... A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.” Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936). The repeated emphasis accorded this theme in the decisions of this Court serves to underline the narrowness of the recognized exceptions to the principle that the press may not be regulated by the Government. Our inquiry must therefore be whether the challenged order falls within any of these exceptions. At the outset, however, it is important to identify with some care the nature of the alleged abridgment. This is not a case in which the challenged law arguably disables the press by undermining its institutional viability. As the press has evolved from an assortment of small printers into a diverse aggregation including large publishing empires as well, the parallel growth and complexity of the economy have led to extensive regulatory legislation from which “[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity.” Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, 132 (1937). Accordingly, this Court has upheld application to the press of the National Labor Relations Act, ibid.; the Fair Labor Standards Act, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U. S. 178 (1946); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946); and the Sherman Antitrust Act, Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U. S. 131 (1969). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (1972). Yet the Court has recognized on several occasions the special institutional needs of a vigorous press by striking down laws taxing the advertising revenue of newspapers with circulations in excess of 20,000, Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra; requiring a license for the distribution of printed matter, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); and prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of leaflets, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943). But no suggestion is made in this case that the Ordinance was passed with any purpose of muzzling or curbing the press. Nor does Pittsburgh Press argue that the Ordinance threatens its financial viability or impairs in any significant way its ability to publish and distribute its newspaper. In any event, such a contention would not be supported by the record. Ill In a limited way, however, the Ordinance as construed does affect the makeup of the help-wanted section of the newspaper. Under the modified order, Pittsburgh Press will be required to abandon its present policy of providing sex-designated columns and allowing advertisers to select the columns in which their help-wanted advertisements will be placed. In addition, the order does not allow Pittsburgh Press to substitute a policy under which it would make an independent decision regarding placement in sex-designated columns. Respondents rely principally on the argument that this regulation is permissible because the speech is commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment. The commercial-speech doctrine is traceable to the brief opinion in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942), sustaining a city ordinance which had been interpreted to ban the distribution by handbill of an advertisement soliciting customers to pay admission to tour a submarine. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court, said: “We are . . . clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.” Id., at 54. Subsequent cases have demonstrated, however, that speech is not rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), a city official of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel action against four clergymen and the New York Times. The names of the clergymen had appeared in an advertisement, carried in the Times, criticizing police action directed against members of the civil rights movement. In holding that this political advertisement was entitled to the same degree of protection as ordinary speech, the Court stated: “That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.” Id., at 266. See also Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 474 (1966). If a newspaper’s profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its operations — from the selection of news stories to the choice of editorial position — would be subject to regulation if it could be established that they were conducted with a view toward increased sales. Such a basis for regulation clearly would be incompatible with the First Amendment. The critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v. Chrestensen was that, in the Court’s view, it did no more than propose a commercial transaction, the sale of admission to a submarine. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Mr. Justice Brennan, for the Court, found the Chrestensen advertisement easily distinguishable: “The publication here was not a ‘commercial’ advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.” 376 U. S., at 266. In the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present record resemble the Chrestensen rather than the Sullivan advertisement. None expresses a position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex, nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commission’s enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech. But Pittsburgh Press contends that Chrestensen is not applicable, as the focus in this case must be upon the exercise of editorial judgment by the newspaper as to where to place the advertisement rather than upon its commercial content. The Commission made a finding of fact that Pittsburgh Press defers in every case to the advertiser’s wishes regarding the column in which a want ad should be placed. It is nonetheless true, however, that the newspaper does make a judgment whether or not to allow the advertiser to select the column. We must therefore consider whether this degree of judgmental discretion by the newspaper with respect to a purely commercial advertisement is distinguishable, for the purposes of First Amendment analysis, from the content of the advertisement itself. Or, to put the question differently, is the conduct of the newspaper with respect to the employment want ad entitled to a protection under the First Amendment which the Court held in Chrestensen was not available to a commercial advertiser? Under some circumstances, at least, a newspaper’s editorial judgments in connection with an advertisement take on the character of the advertisement and, in those cases, the scope of the newspaper’s First Amendment protection may be affected by the content of the advertisement. In the context of a libelous advertisement, for example, this Court has held that the First Amendment does not shield a newspaper from punishment for libel when with actual malice it publishes a falsely defamatory advertisement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280. Assuming the requisite state of mind, then, nothing in a newspaper’s editorial decision to accept an advertisement changes the character of the falsely defamatory statements. The newspaper may not defend a libel suit on the ground that the falsely defamatory statements are not its own. Similarly, a commercial advertisement remains commercial in the hands of the media, at least under some circumstances. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U. S. 1000 (1972), aff’g 333 F. Supp. 582 (DC 1971), this Court summarily affirmed a district court decision sustaining the constitutionality of 15 U. S. C. § 1335, which prohibits the electronic media from carrying cigarette advertisements. The District Court there found that the advertising should be treated as commercial speech, even though the First Amendment challenge was mounted by radio broadcasters rather than by advertisers. Because of the peculiar characteristics of the electronic media, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 226-227 (1943), Capital Broadcasting is not dispositive here on the ultimate question of the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Its significance lies, rather, in its recognition that the exercise of this kind of editorial judgment does not necessarily strip commercial advertising of its commercial character. As for the present case, we are not persuaded that either the decision to accept a commercial advertisement which the advertiser directs to be placed in a sex-designated column or the actual placement there lifts the newspaper’s actions from the category of commercial speech. By implication at least, an advertiser whose want ad appears in the “Jobs — Male Interest” column is likely to discriminate against women in his hiring decisions. Nothing in a sex-designated column heading sufficiently dissociates the designation from the want ads placed beneath it to make the placement severable for First Amendment purposes from the want ads themselves. The combination, which conveys essentially the same message as an overtly discriminatory want ad, is in practical effect an integrated commercial statement. Pittsburgh Press goes on to argue that if this package of advertisement and placement is commercial speech, then commercial speech should be accorded a higher level of protection than Chrestensen and its progeny would suggest. Insisting that the exchange of information is as important in the commercial realm as in any other, the newspaper here would have us abrogate the distinction between commercial and other speech. Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case. Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned “Narcotics for Sale” and “Prostitutes Wanted” rather than stated within the four corners of the advertisement. The illegality in this case may be less overt, but we see no difference in principle here. Sex discrimination in nonexempt employment has been declared illegal under § 8 (a) of the Ordinance, a provision not challenged here. And § 8 (e) of the Ordinance forbids any employer, employment agency, or labor union to publish or cause to be published any advertisement “indicating” sex discrimination. This, too, is unchallenged. Moreover, the Commission specifically concluded that it is an unlawful employment practice for an advertiser to cause an employment advertisement to be published in a sex-designated column. Section 8 (j) of the Ordinance, the only provision which Pittsburgh Press was found to have violated and the only provision under attack here, makes it unlawful for “any person ... to aid ... in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment practice by this ordinance.” The Commission and the courts below concluded that the practice of placing want ads for nonexempt employment in sex-designated columns did indeed “aid” employers to indicate illegal sex preferences. The advertisements, as embroidered by their placement, signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions. Any Pirst Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity. IV It is suggested, in the brief of an amicus curiae, that apart from other considerations, the Commission’s order should be condemned as a prior restraint on expression. As described by Blackstone, the protection against prior restraint at common law barred only a system of administrative censorship: “To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the revolution, ... is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *152. While the Court boldly stepped beyond this narrow doctrine in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), in striking down an injunction against further publication of a newspaper found to be a public nuisance, it has never held that all injunctions are impermissible. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U. S. 143 (1951). The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment. The present order does not endanger arguably protected speech. Because the order is based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct, this is not a case in which the Court is asked to speculate as to the effect of publication. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971). Moreover, the order is clear and sweeps no more broadly than necessary. And because no interim relief was granted, the order will not have gone into effect before our final determination that the actions of Pittsburgh Press were unprotected. V We emphasize that nothing in our holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences in employment. Nor, a jortiori, does our decision authorize any restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, on stories or commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free expression of views on these and other issues, however controversial. We hold only that the Commission’s modified order, narrowly drawn to prohibit placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for nonexempt job opportunities, does not infringe the First Amendment rights of Pittsburgh Press. Affirmed. [For Appendix to opinion of the Court, see post, p. 392.] APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Among the advertisements carried in the Sunday Pittsburgh Press on January 4, 1970, was the following one, submitted by an employment agency and placed in the “JOBS — MALE INTEREST” column: ACAD. INSTRUCTORS. $13,000 ACCOUNTANTS . 10,000 ADM. ASS’T, CPA. 15,000 ADVERTISING MGR. 10,000 BOOKKEEPER F-C. 9,000 FINANCIAL CONSULTANT. 12,000 MARKETING MANAGER. 15,000 MGMT. TRAINEE. 8,400 OFFICE MGR. TRAINEE. 7,200 LAND DEVELOPMENT. 30,000 PRODUCT. MANAGER. 18,000 PERSONNEL MANAGER. OPEN SALES-ADVERTISING . 8,400 SALES-CONSUMER . 9,600 SALES-INDUSTRIAL . 12,000 SALES-MACHINERY . 8,400 RETAIL MGR. 15,000 Most Positions Fee Paid EMPLOYMENT SPECIALISTS 2248 Oliver Bldg. 261-2250 Employment Agency App. 311a. On the same day, the same agency’s advertisement in the “JOBS-FEMALE INTEREST” column was as follows: ACAD. INSTRUCTORS. $13,000 ACCOUNTANTS . 6,000 AUTO-INS. UNDERWRITER. OPEN BOOKKEEPER-INS . 5,000 CLERK-TYPIST . 4,200 DRAFTSMAN . 6,000 KEYPUNCH D. T. 6,720 KEYPUNCH BEGINNER. 4,500 PROOFREADER . 4,900 RECEPTIONIST — Mature D. T.... OPEN EXEC. SEC. 6,300 SECRETARY . 4,800 SECRETARY, Equal Oppor. 6,000 SECRETARY D. T. 5,400 TEACHERS-Pt, Time. day 33. TYPIST-Statistical . 5,000 Most Positions Fee Paid EMPLOYMENT SPECIALISTS 2248 Oliver Bldg. 261-2250 Employment Agency Ibid. Characteristic of those offering fuller job descriptions was the following advertisement, carried in the “JOBS — MALE INTEREST” column: STAFF MANAGEMENT TRAINEE TO $12,000 If you have had background in the management of small business then this could be the stepping stone you have been waiting for. You will be your own boss with no cash outlay. Call or write today. App. 313a. For the full text of the Ordinance and the 1969 amendment adding sex to the list of proscribed classifications, see App. 410a-436a. These exhibits are reproduced in App. 299a-333a. For examples of these want ads, see the Appendix to this opinion, infra, at 392-393. The full text of the Commission’s Decision and Order is set forth in the Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari, at la-18a. The Commission specifically found that: “5. The Pittsburgh Press permits the advertiser to select the column within which its advertisement is to be inserted. “6. When an advertiser does not indicate a column, the Press asks the advertiser whether it wants a male or female for the job and then inserts the advertisement in the jobs — male interest or jobs — female interest column accordingly.” Id., at 16a. See id., at 19a. Pittsburgh Press also argues that the Ordinance violates due process in that there is no rational connection between sex-designated column headings and sex discrimination in employment. It draws attention to a disclaimer which it runs at the beginning of each of the “Jobs — Male Interest” and “Jobs — Female Interest” columns: “Notice to Job Seekers” “Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience of our readers. This is done because most jobs generally appeal more to persons of one sex than the other. Various laws and ordinances — local, state, and federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because of sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement itself specifies one sex or the other, job seekers should assume that the advertiser will consider applicants of either sex in compliance with the laws against discrimination.” It suffices to dispose of this contention by noting that the Commission’s commonsense recognition that the two are connected is supported by evidence in the present record. See App. 236a-239a. See also Hailes v. United, Air Lines, 464 F. 2d 1006, 1009 (CA6 1972). The Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex of the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reflect a similar conclusion. See 29 CFR § 1604.4. See also Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). In response to questioning at oral argument, counsel for Pittsburgh Press stated only: “Now, I’m not prepared to answer whether the company makes money on [want ads] or not. I suspect it does. They charge for want-ads, and they do make a lot of their revenue in the newspaper through advertising, of course; and I suspect it is profitable.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. In Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U. S. 424 (1963), this Court upheld an injunction prohibiting a newspaper and a radio station from carrying optometrists’ advertisements which violated New Mexico law. But because the issue had not been raised in the lower courts, this Court did not consider the appellant’s First Amendment challenge. Id., at 432 n. 12. See also New York State Broadcasters Assn. v. United States, 414 F. 2d 990 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1061 (1970) (refusing to strike down a ban on broadcasts promoting a lottery). See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1191, 1195-1196 (1965). Cf. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 593 n. 42 (D. C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting); Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 389, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 475 (1945). Brief for Amicus Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Association 22 n. 32. The dissent of The Chief Justice argues that Pittsburgh Press is in danger of being “subject to summary punishment for contempt for having made an 'unlucky’ legal guess.” Post, at 396-397. The Commission is without power to punish summarily for contempt. When it concludes that its order has been violated, “the Commission shall certify the case and the entire record of its proceedings to the City Solicitor, who shall invoke the aid of an appropriate court to secure enforcement or compliance with the order or to impose [a fine of not more than $300] or both." § 14 of the Ordinance; Appendix to Pet. for Cert. 103a. But, more fundamentally, it was the newspaper’s policy of allowing employers to place advertisements in sex-designated columns without regard to the exceptions or exemptions contained in the Ordinance, not its treatment of particular want ads, which was challenged in the complaint and was found by the Commission and the courts below to be violative of the Ordinance. Nothing in the modified order or the opinions below prohibits the newspaper from relying in good faith on the representation of an advertiser that a particular job falls within an exception to the Ordinance.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FULLILOVE et al. v. KLUTZNICK, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, et al. No. 78-1007. Argued November 27, 1979 Decided July 2, 1980 Burger, C. J., announced the judgment of .the Court and delivered an opinion, in which White and Powell, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 495. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BrennaN and BlackmüN, JJ., joined, post, p. 517. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 522. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 532. Robert G. Benisch argued the cause for petitioners Fulli-love et al. With him on the briefs was Robert J. Fink. Robert J. Hickey argued the cause for petitioner General Building Contractors of New York State, Inc., the New York State Building Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. With him on the briefs was Peter G. Kilgore. Assistant Attorney General Days argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Secretary of Commerce were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Brian K. Landsberg, Jessica Dunsay Silver, and Vincent F. O’Rourke, Jr. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Shirley Adelson Siegel, Solicitor General, and Arnold D. Fleischer and Barbara E. Levy, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for respondent State of New York. Allen G. Schwartz, James G. Greilsheimer, L. Kevin Sheridan, and Frances M. Morris filed a brief for respondents City of New York et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Kenneth C. Mc-Guiness, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Julian B. Wilkins and Jewel S. Lafontant for Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc.; by E. Richard Larson, Burt Neuborne, Frank Askin, and Robert Sedler for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Ronald J. Greene for the American Savings &.Loan League, Inc., et al.; by Bill Lann Lee for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; by John B. Jones, Jr., Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Richard T. Seymour, Norman J. Chachkin, Laurence S. Fordham, Henry P. Monaghan, and Robert D. Goldstein for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; by Vilma S. Martinez, Morris J. Baüer, and Joel G. Contreras for the Mexican American/Hispanic Contractors and Truckers Association, Inc., et al.; by Daniel T. Ingram, Jr., for the Minority Contractors Assistance Project, Inc.; by Nathaniel R. Jones, J. Francis Pohlhavs, and John A. Fillion for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al.; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Eric Schnapper, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Robert L. Harris for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al.; and by Robert T. Pickett for the National Bar Association, Inc., et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Arthur Kinoy for the Affirmative Action Coordinating Center et al.; by Robert A. Helman, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Richard A. Weisz for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith; by Walter R. Echo-Hawk and Robert S. Pelcyger for the Minority Contractors Association, Inc.; and by Bernard Parks and Lem-wood A. Jackson for the National Conference of Black Mayors, Inc. Mr. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell joined. We granted certiorari to consider a facial constitutional challenge to a requirement in a congressional spending program that, absent an administrative waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects must be used' by the state or local grantee to procure services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identified minority groups. 441 Ü. S. 960 (1979). I In May 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, which amended the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999, 42 U. S. C. § 6701 et seg. The 1977 amendments authorized an additional $4 billion appropriation for federal grants to be made by the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Economic Development Administration (EDA), to state and local governmental entities for use in local public works projects. Among the changes made was the addition of the provision that has become the focus of this litigation. Section 103 (f) (2) of the 1977 Act, referred to as the “minority business enterprise” or “MBE” provision, requires that: “Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘minority business enterprise’ means a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.” In late May 1977, the Secretary promulgated regulations governing administration of the grant program which were amended two months later. In August. 1977, the EDA issued guidelines supplementing the statute and regulations with respect to minority business participation in local public works grants, and in October 1977, the EDA issued a technical bulletin promulgating detailed instructions and information to assist grantees and their contractors in meeting the 10% MBE requirement. On November 30, 1977, petitioners filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the MBE provision. Named as defendants were the Secretary of Commerce, as the program administrator, and the State and City of New York, as actual and potential project grantees. Petitioners are several associations of construction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm engaged in heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. Their complaint alleged that they had sustained economic injury due to enforcement of the 10% MBE requirement and that the MBE provision on its face violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and various statutory antidiscrimination provisions. After a hearing held the day the complaint was filed, the District Court denied a requested temporary restraining order and scheduled the matter for an expedited hearing on the merits. On December 19, 1977, the District Court issued a memorandum opinion upholding the validity of the MBE program and denying the injunctive relief sought. Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 584 F. 2d 600 (1978), holding that “even under the most exacting standard of review the MBE provision passes constitutional muster.” Id., at 603. Considered in the context of many years of governmental efforts to remedy past racial and ethnic discrimination, the court found it “difficult to imagine” any purpose for the program other than to remedy such discrimination. Id., at 605. In its view, a number of factors contributed to the legitimacy of the MBE provision, most significant of which was the narrowed focus and limited extent of the statutory and administrative program, in size, impact, and duration, id., at 607-608; the court looked also to the holdings of other Courts of Appeals and District Courts that the MBE program was constitutional, id., at 608-609. It expressly rejected petitioners’ contention that the 10% MBE requirement violated the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Id., at 609. II A The MBE provision was enacted as part of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, which made various amendments to Title I of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976. The 1976 Act was intended as a short-term measure to alleviate the problem of national unemployment and to stimulate the national economy by assisting state and local governments to build needed public facilities. To accomplish these objectives, the Congress authorized the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the EDA, to make grants to state and local governments for construction, renovation, repair, or other improvement of local public works projects. The 1976 Act placed a number of restrictions on project eligibility designed to assure that federal moneys were targeted to accomplish the legislative purposes. It established criteria to determine grant priorities and to apportion federal funds among political jurisdictions. Those criteria directed grant funds toward areas of high unemployment. The statute authorized the appropriation of up to $2 billion for a period ending in September 1977; this appropriation was soon consumed by grants made under the program. Early in 1977, Congress began consideration of expanded appropriations and amendments to the grant program. Under administration of the 1976 appropriation, referred to as “Round I” of the local public works program, applicants seeking some $25 billion in grants had competed for the $2 billion in available funds; of nearly 25,000 applications, only some 2,000 were granted. The results provoked widespread concern for the fairness of the allocation process. Because the 1977 Act would authorize the appropriation of an additional $4 billion to fund “Round II” of the grant program, the congressional hearings and debates concerning the amendments focused primarily on the politically sensitive problems of priority and geographic distribution of grants under the supplemental appropriation. The result of this attention was inclusion in the 1977 Act of provisions revising the allocation criteria of the 1976 legislation. Those provisions, however, retained the underlying objective to direct funds into areas of high unemployment. The 1977 Act also added new restrictions on applicants seeking to qualify for federal grants; among these was the MBE provision. The origin of the provision was an amendment to the House version of the 1977 Act, H. R. 11, offered on the floor of the House on February 23, 1977, by Representative Mitchell of Maryland. As offered, the amendment provided: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, materials, and supplies which will be used in such project are procured from minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘minority business enterprise’ means a business at least 50 percent of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of publicly owned businesses, at least 51 percent of the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.” The sponsor stated that the objective of the amendment was to direct funds into the minority business community, a sector of the economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience with Government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from the public works program as then formulated. He cited the marked statistical disparity that in fiscal year 1976 less than 1% of all federal procurement was concluded with minority business enterprises, although minorities comprised 15-18% of the population. When the amendment was put forward during debate on H. R. 11, Representative Mitchell reiterated the need to ensure that minority firms would obtain a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of this Government program. The amendment was put forward not as a new concept, but rather one building upon prior administrative practice. In his introductory remarks, the sponsor rested his proposal squarely on the ongoing program under § 8 (a) of the Small Business Act, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2, 72 Stat. 389, which, as will become evident, served as a model for the administrative program developed to enforce the MBE provision: “The first point in opposition will be that you cannot have a set-aside. Well, Madam Chairman, we have been doing this for the last 10 years in Government. The 8-A set-aside under SBA has been tested in the courts more than 30 times and has been found to be legitimate and bona fide. We are doing it in this bill.” Although the proposed MBE provision on its face appeared mandatory, requiring compliance with the 10% minority participation requirement “[notwithstanding any other provision of law,” its sponsor gave assurances that existing administrative practice would ensure flexibility in administration if, with respect to a particular project, compliance with the 10% requirement proved infeasible. Representative Roe of New Jersey then suggested a change of language expressing the twin intentions (1) that the federal administrator would have discretion to waive the 10% requirement where its application was not feasible, and (2) that the grantee would be mandated to achieve at least 10% participation by minority businesses unless infeasibility was demonstrated. He proposed as a substitute for the first sentence of the amendment the language that eventually was enacted: “Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 percent of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises.” The sponsor fully accepted the suggested clarification because it retained the directive that the initial burden of compliance would fall on the grantee. That allocation of burden was necessary because, as he put it, “every agency of the Government has tried to figure out a way to avoid doing this very thing. Believe me, these bureaucracies can come up with 10,000 ways to avoid doing it.” Other supporters of . the MBE amendment echoed the sponsor’s concern that a number of factors, difficult to isolate or quantify, seemed to impair access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities. Representative Con-yers of Michigan spoke of the frustration of the existing situation, in which, due to the intricacies of the bidding process and through no fault of their own, minority contractors and businessmen were unable to gain access to government contracting opportunities. Representative Biaggi of New York then spoke to the need for the amendment to “promote a sense of economic equality in this Nation.” He expressed the view that without the amendment, “this legislation may be potentially inequitable to minority businesses and workers” in that it would perpetuate the historic practices that have precluded minority businesses from effective participation in public contracting opportunities. The amendment was accepted by the House. Two weeks later, the Senate considered S. 427, its package of amendments to the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976. At that time Senator Brooke of Massachusetts introduced an MBE amendment, worded somewhat differently than the House version, but aimed at achieving the same objectives. His statement in support of the 10% requirement reiterated and summarized the various expressions on the House side that the amendment was necessary to ensure that minority businesses were not deprived of access to the government contracting opportunities generated by the public works program. The Senate adopted the amendment without debate. The Conference Committee, called to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, adopted the language approved by the House for the MBE provision. The Conference Reports added only the comment: “This provision shall be dependent on the availability of minority business enterprises located in the project area.” The device of a 10% MBE participation requirement, subject to administrative waiver, was thought to be required to assure minority business participation; otherwise it was thought that repetition of the prior experience could be expected, with participation by minority business accounting for an inordinately small percentage of government contracting. The causes of this disparity were perceived as involving the longstanding existence and maintenance of barriers impairing access by minority enterprises to public contracting opportunities, or sometimes as involving more direct discrimination, but not as relating to lack — as Senator Brooke put it — “of capable and qualified minority enterprises who are ready and willing to work.” In the words of its sponsor, the MBE provision was “designed to begin to redress this grievance that has been extant for so long.” B The legislative objectives of the MBE provision must be considered against the background of ongoing efforts directed toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equality of economic opportunity. The sponsors of the MBE provision in the House and the Senate expressly linked the provision to the existing administrative programs promoting minority opportunity in government procurement, particularly those related to § 8 (a) of the Small Business Act of 1953. Section 8 (a) delegates to the Small Business Administration (SBA) an authority and an obligation “whenever it determines such action is necessary” to enter into contracts with any procurement agency of the Federal Government to furnish required goods or services, and, in turn, to enter into subcontracts with small businesses for the performance of such contracts. This authority lay dormant for a decade. Commencing in 1968, however, the SBA was directed by the President to develop a program pursuant to its § 8 (a) authority to assist small business concerns owned and controlled by “socially or economically disadvantaged” persons to achieve a competitive position in the economy. At the time the MBE provision was enacted, the regulations governing the § 8 (a) program defined “social or economic disadvantage” as follows: “An applicant concern must be owned and controlled by one or more persons who have been deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic disadvantage. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, social, chronic economic circumstances or background, or other similar cause. Such persons include, but are not limited to, black Americans, American Indians, Spanish-Americans, oriental Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts....” The guidelines accompanying these regulations provided that a minority business could not be maintained in the program, even when owned and controlled by members of the identified minority groups, if it appeared that the business had not been deprived of the opportunity to develop and maintain a competitive position in the economy because of social or economic disadvantage. As the Congress began consideration of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, the House Committee on Small Business issued a lengthy Report summarizing its activities, including its evaluation of the ongoing § 8 (a) program. One chapter of the Report, entitled “Minority Enterprises and Allied Problems of Small Business,” summarized a 1975 Committee Report of the same title dealing with this subject matter. The original Report, prepared by the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise, observed: “The subcommittee is acutely aware that the economic policies of this Nation must function within and be guided by' our constitutional system which guarantees ‘equal protection of the laws.’ The effects of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice have not remained in the past. The Congress has recognized the reality that past discriminatory practices have, to some degree, adversely affected our present economic system. “While minority persons comprise about 16 percent of the Nation’s population, of the 13 million businesses in the United States, only 382,000, or approximately 3.0 percent, are owned by minority individuals. The most recent data from the Department of Commerce also indicates that the gross receipts of all businesses in this country totals about $2,540.8 billion, and of this amount only $16.6 billion, or about 0.65 percent was realized by minority business concerns. “These statistics are not the result of random chance. The presumption must be made that past discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In order to right this situation, the Congress has formulated certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where they may effectively participate in the business mainstream of our economy.* “*For the purposes of this report the term ‘minority’ shall include only such minority individuals as are considered to be economically or socially disadvantaged.” The 1975 Report gave particular attention to the § 8 (a) program, expressing disappointment with its limited effectiveness. With specific reference to Government construction contracting, the Report concluded, “there are substantial § 8 (a) opportunities in the area of Federal construction, but . . . the practices of some agencies preclude the realization of this potential.” The Subcommittee took “full notice ... as evidence for its consideration” of reports submitted to the Congress by the General Accounting Office and by the TJ. S. Commission on Civil Rights, which reflected a similar dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the § 8 (a) program. The Civil Rights Commission report discussed at some length the barriers encountered by minority businesses in gaining access to government contracting opportunities at the federal, state, and local levels. Among the major difficulties confronting minority businesses were deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, disabilities caused by an inadequate “track record,” lack of awareness of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, preselection before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of discretion by government procurement officers to disfavor minority businesses. The Subcommittee Report also gave consideration to the operations of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, an agency of the Department of Commerce organized pursuant to Executive Orders to formulate and coordinate federal efforts to assist the development of minority businesses. The Report concluded that OMBE efforts were “totally inadequate” to achieve its policy of increasing opportunities for subcontracting by minority businesses on public contracts. OMBE efforts were hampered by a “glaring lack of specific objectives which each prime contractor should be required to achieve,” by a “lack of enforcement provisions,” and by a “lack of any meaningful monitoring system.” Against this backdrop of legislative and administrative programs, it is inconceivable that Members of both Houses were not fully aware of the objectives of the MBE provision and of the reasons prompting its enactment. c Although the statutory MBE provision itself outlines only the bare bones of the federal program, it makes a number of critical determinations: the decision to initiate a limited racial and ethnic preference; the specification of a minimum level for minority business participation; the identification of the minority groups that are to be encompassed by the program; and the provision for an administrative waiver where application of the program is not feasible. Congress relied on the administrative agency to flesh out this skeleton, pursuant to delegated rulemaking authority, and to develop an administrative operation consistent with legislative intentions and objectives. As required by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, the Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations to set into motion “Round II” of the federal grant program. The regulations require that construction projects funded under the legislation must be performed under contracts awarded by competitive bidding, unless the federal administrator has made a determination that in the circumstances relating to a particular project some other method is in the public interest. Where competitive bidding is employed, the regulations echo the statute’s requirement that contracts are to be awarded on the basis of the “lowest responsive bid submitted by a bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility,” and they also restate the MBE requirement. EDA also has published guidelines devoted entirely to the administration of the MBE provision. The guidelines outline the obligations of the grantee to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBE’s, to provide technical assistance as needed, to lower or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, the SBA, or other sources for assisting MBE’s in obtaining required working capital, and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process. EDA regulations contemplate that, as anticipated by Congress, most local public works projects will entail the award of a predominant prime contract, with the prime contractor assuming the above grantee obligations for fulfilling the 10% MBE requirement. The EDA guidelines specify that when prime contractors are selected through competitive bidding, bids for the prime contract “shall be considered by the Grantee to be responsive only if at least 10 percent of the contract funds are to be expended for MBE’s.” The administrative program envisions that competitive incentive will motivate aspirant prime contractors to perform their obligations under the MBE provision so as to qualify as “responsive” bidders. And, since the contract is to be awarded to the lowest responsive bidder, the same incentive is expected to motivate prime contractors to seek out the most competitive of the available, qualified, bona fide minority firms. This too is consistent with the legislative intention. The EDA guidelines also outline the projected administration of applications for waiver of the 10% MBE requirement, which may be sought by the grantee either before or during the bidding process. The Technical Bulletin issued by EDA discusses in greater detail the processing, of waiver requests, clarifying certain issues left open by the guidelines. It specifies that waivers may be total or partial, depending on the circumstances, and it illustrates the projected operation of the waiver procedure by posing hypothetical questions with projected administrative responses. One such hypothetical is of particular interest, for it indicates the limitations on the scope of the racial or ethnic preference contemplated by the federal program when a grantee or its prime contractor is confronted with an available, qualified, bona fide minority business enterprise who is not the lowest competitive bidder. The hypothetical provides: “Question: Should a request for waiver of the 10% requirement based on an unreasonable price asked by an MBE ever be granted? “Answer: It is possible to imagine situations where an MBE might ask a price for its product or services that is unreasonable and where, therefore, a waiver is justified. However, before a waiver request will be honored, the following determinations will be made: “a) The MBE’s quote is unreasonably priced. This determination should, be based on the nature of the product or service of the subcontractor, the geographic location of the site and of the subcontractor, prices of similar products or services in the relevant market area, and general business conditions in the market area. Furthermore, a subcontractor’s price should not be considered unreasonable if he is merely trying to cover his costs because the price results from disadvantage which affects the MBE’s cost of doing business or results from discrimination. “b) The contractor has contacted other MBEs and has no meaningful choice but to accept an unreasonably high price.” This announced policy makes clear the administrative understanding that a waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will be granted) to avoid subcontracting with a minority business enterprise at an “unreasonable” price, i. e., a price above competitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority firm’s attempt to cover costs inflated by the present effects of disadvantage or discrimination. This administrative approach is consistent with the legislative intention. It will be recalled that in the Report of the House Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise the Subcommittee took special care to note that when using the term “minority” it intended to include “only such minority individuals as are -considered to be economically or socially disadvantaged.” The Subcommittee also was cognizant of existing administrative regulations designed to ensure that firms maintained on the lists of bona fide minority business enterprises be those whose competitive position is impaired by the effects of disadvantage and discrimination. In its Report, the Subcommittee expressed its intention that these criteria continue to govern administration of the SBA’s § 8 (a) program. The sponsors of the MBE provision, in their reliance on prior administrative practice, intended that the term “minority business enterprise” would be given that same limited application; this even found expression in the legislative debates, where Representative Roe made the point: “[W]hen we are talking about companies held by minority groups . . . [c]ertainly people of a variety of backgrounds are included in that. That is not really a measurement. They are talking about people in the minority and deprived.” The EDA Technical Bulletin provides other elaboration of the MBE provision. It clarifies the definition of “minority group members.” It also indicates EDA’s intention “to allow credit for utilization of MBEs only for those contracts in which involvement constitutes a basis for strengthening the long-term and continuing participation of the MBE in the construction and related industries.” Finally, the Bulletin outlines a procedure for the processing of complaints of “unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the MBE program,” or of improper administration of the MBE requirement. Ill When we are required to pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, we assume “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.). A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to “provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States” and “to enforce, by. appropriate legislation,” the equal protection guarantees of the-Fourteenth Amendment. Art. I, §8, cl. 1; Arndt. 14, § 5. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 102 (1973), we accorded “great weight to the decisions of Congress” even though the legislation implicated fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The rule is not different when a congressional program raises equal protection concerns. See, e. g., Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U. S. 213 (1978); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 (1976). Here we pass, not on a choice made by a single judge or a school board, but on a considered decision of the Congress and the President. However, in no sense does that render it immune from judicial scrutiny, and it “is not to say we ‘defer’ to the judgment of the Congress ... on a constitutional question,” or that we would hesitate to invoke the Constitution should we determine that Congress has overstepped the bounds of its constitutional power. Columbia Broadcasting, supra, at 103. The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by our necessarily extended review of its legislative and administrative background. The program was designed to ensure that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, grantees who elect to participate would not employ procurement practices that Congress had decided might result in perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities. The MBE program does not mandate the allocation of federal funds according to inflexible percentages solely based on race or ethnicity. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. At the outset, we must inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are within the power of Congress. If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives and does not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A (1) In enacting the MBE provision, it is clear that Congress employed an amalgam of its specifically delegated powers. The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, by its very nature, is primarily an exercise of the Spending Power. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This Court has recognized that the power to “provide for the . . . general Welfare” is an independent grant of legislative authority, distinct from other broad congressional powers. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 90-91 (1976); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 65-66 (1936). Congress has frequently employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives. This Court has repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge the use of this technique to induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy. E. g., California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974); Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U. S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). The MBE program is structured within this familiar legislative pattern. The program conditions receipt of public works grants upon agreement by the state or local governmental grantee that at least 10% of the federal funds will be devoted to contracts with minority businesses, to the extent this can be accomplished by overcoming barriers to access and by awarding contracts to bona fide MBE’s. It is further conditioned to require that MBE bids on these contracts are competitively priced, or might have been competitively priced but for the present effects of prior discrimination. Admittedly, the problems of administering this program with respect to these conditions may be formidable. Although the primary responsibility for ensuring minority participation falls upon the grantee, when the procurement practices of the grantee involve the award of a prime contract to a general or prime contractor, the obligations to assure minority participation devolve upon the private contracting party; this is a contractual condition of eligibility for award of the prime contract. Here we need not explore the outermost limitations on the objectives attainable through such an application of the Spending Power. The reach of the Spending Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers, Congress could have achieved the objectives of the MBE program, then it may do so under the Spending Power. And we have no difficulty perceiving a basis for accomplishing the objectives of the MBE program through the Commerce Power insofar as the program objectives pertain to the action of private contracting parties, and through the power to enforce the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the program objectives pertain to the action of state and local grantees. (2) We turn first to the Commerce Power. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Had Congress chosen to do so, it could have drawn on the Commerce Clause to regulate the practices of prime contractors on federally funded public works projects. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964). The legislative history of the MBE provision shows that there was a rational basis for Congress to conclude that the subcontracting practices of prime contractors could perpetuate the prevailing impaired access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities, and that this inequity has an effect on interstate commerce. Thus Congress could take necessary and proper action to remedy the situation. Ibid. It is not necessary that these prime contractors be shown responsible for any violation of antidiscrimination laws. Our cases dealing with application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, express no doubt of the congressional authority to prohibit practices “challenged as perpetuating the effects of [not unlawful] discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.” Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747, 761 (1976); see California Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598 (1980); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971). Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actions of private prime contractors, the Congress could have achieved its objectives under the Commerce Clause. We conclude that in this respect the objectives of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending Power. (3) In certain contexts, there are limitations on the reach of the Commerce Power to regulate the actions of state and local governments. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). To avoid such complications, we look to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for the power to regulate the procurement practices of state and local grantees of federal funds. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). A review of our cases persuades us that the objectives of the MBE program are within the power of Congress under § 5 “to enforce, by appropriate legislation,” the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), we equated the scope of this authority with the broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. “Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 384 U. S., at 651. In Katzenbach, the Court upheld § 4 (e) of the Voting Eights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973b (e), which prohibited application of state English-language literacy requirements to otherwise qualified voters who had completed the sixth grade in an accredited American school in which a language other than English was the predominant medium of instruction. To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court found no prerequisite that application of a literacy requirement violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U. S.. at 648-649. It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment that application of literacy qualifications within the compass of § 4 (e) would discriminate in terms of access to the ballot and consequently in terms of access to the provision or administration of governmental programs. Id., at 652-653. Four years later, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970), we upheld §201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 315, which imposed a 5-year nationwide prohibition on the use of various • voter-qualification tests and devices in federal, state, and local elections. The Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in concluding that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination, even though the use of these tests or devices might have discriminatory effects only. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 176-177 (1980). Our cases reviewing the parallel power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, TJ. S. Const., Amdt. 15, § 2, confirm that congressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); cf. City of Rome, supra. With respect to the MBE provision, Congress had abundant evidence from which it could conclude that minority businesses have been denied effective participation in public contracting opportunities by procurement practices that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimination. Congress, of course, may legislate without compiling the kind of “record” appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative proceedings. Congress had before it, among other data, evidence of a long history of marked disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to minority business enterprises. This disparity was considered to result not from any lack of capable and qualified minority businesses, but from the existence and maintenance of barriers to competitive access which had their roots in racial and ethnic discrimination, and which continue today, even absent any intentional discrimination or other unlawful conduct. Although much of this history related to the experience of minority businesses in the area of federal procurement, there was direct evidence before the Congress that this pattern of disadvantage and discrimination existed with respect to state and local construction contracting as well. In relation to the MBE provision, Congress acted within its competence to determine that the problem was national in scope. Although the Act recites no preambulary “findings” on the subject, we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement practices, when applied to minority businesses, could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Accordingly, Congress reasonably determined that the prospective elimination of these barriers to minority firm access to public contracting opportunities generated by the 1977 Act was appropriate to ensure that those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to participate in federal grants to state and local governments, which is one aspect of the equal protection of the laws. Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the actions of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its objectives by use of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that in this respect the objectives of the MBE provision are within the scope of the Spending Power. (4) There are relevant similarities between the MBE program and the federal spending program reviewed in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). In Lau, a language barrier “effectively foreclosed” non-English-speaking Chinese pupils from access to the educational opportunities offered by the San Francisco public school system. Id., at 564-566. It had not been shown that this had resulted from any discrimination, purposeful or otherwise, or from other unlawful acts. Nevertheless, we upheld the constitutionality of a federal regulation applicable to public school systems receiving federal funds that prohibited the utilization of “criteria or methods of administration which have the effect ... of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the [educational] program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.” Id., at 568 (emphasis added). Moreover, we upheld application to the San Francisco school system, as a recipient of federal funds, of a requirement that “[w]here inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students.” Ihid. It is true that the MBE provision differs from the program approved in Lau in that the MBE program directly employs racial and ethnic criteria as a means to accomplish congressional objectives; however, these objectives are essentially the same as those approved in Lau. Our holding in Lau is instructive on the exercise of congressional authority by way of the MBE provision. The MBE program, like the federal regulations reviewed in Lau, primarily regulates state action in the use of federal funds voluntarily sought and accepted by the grantees subject to statutory and administrative conditions. The MBE participation requirement is directed at the utilization of criteria, methods, or practices thought by Congress to have the effect of defeating, or substantially impairing, access by the minority business community to public funds made available by congressional appropriations. B We now turn to the question whether, as a means to accomplish these plainly constitutional objectives, Congress may use racial and ethnic criteria, in this limited way, as a condition attached to a federal grant. We are mindful that “[i]n no matter should we pay more deference to the opinion of Congress than in its choice of instrumentalities to perform a function that is within its power,” National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582, 603 (1949) (opinion of Jackson, J.). However, Congress may employ racial or ethnic classifications in exercising its Spending or other legislative powers only if those classifications do not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We recognize the need for careful judicial evaluation to assure that any congressional program that employs racial or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal. Again, we stress the limited scope of our inquiry. Here we are not dealing with a remedial decree of a court but with the legislative authority of Congress. Furthermore, petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of the MBE provision on its face; they have not sought damages or other specific relief for injury allegedly flowing from specific applications of the program; nor have they attempted to show that as applied in identified situations the MBE provision violated the constitutional or statutory rights of any party to this case. In these circumstances, given a reasonable construction and in light of its projected administration, if we find the MBE program on its face to be free of constitutional defects, it must be upheld as within congressional power. Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438-439 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964); see United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20-24 (1960). Our review of the regulations and guidelines governing administration of the MBE provision reveals that Congress enacted the program as a strictly remedial measure; moreover, it is a remedy that functions prospectively, in the manner of an injunctive decree. Pursuant to the administrative program, grantees and their prime contractors are required to seek out all available, qualified, bona fide MBE’s; they are required to provide technical assistance as needed, to lower or waive bonding requirements where feasible, to solicit the aid of the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, the SBA, or other sources for assisting MBE’s to obtain required working capital, and to give guidance through the intricacies of the bidding process. Supra, at 468-469. The program assumes that grantees who undertake these efforts in good faith will obtain at least 10% participation by minority business enterprises. It is recognized that, to achieve this target, contracts will be awarded to available, qualified, bona fide MBE’s even though they are not the lowest competitive bidders, so long as their higher bids, when challenged, are found to reflect merely attempts to cover costs inflated by the present effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination. Supra, at 470-471. There is available to the grantee a provision authorized by Congress for administrative waiver on a case-by-case basis should there be a demonstration that, despite affirmative efforts, this level of participation cannot be achieved without departing from the objectives of the program. Supra, at 469-470. There is also an administrative mechanism, including a complaint procedure, to ensure that only bona fide MBE’s are encompassed by the remedial program, and to prevent unjust participation in the program by those minority firms whose access to public contracting opportunities is not impaired by the effects of prior discrimination. Supra, at 471-472. (D As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly “color-blind” fashion. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 18-21 (1971), we rejected this argument in considering a court-formulated school desegregation remedy on the basis that examination of the racial composition of student bodies was an unavoidable starting point and that racially based attendance assignments were permissible so long as no absolute racial balance of each school was required. In McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 41 (1971), citing Swann, we observed: “In this remedial process, steps will almost invariably require that students be assigned ‘differently because of their race.’ Any other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes.” (Citations omitted.) And in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43 (1971), we invalidated a state law that absolutely forbade assignment of any student on account of race because it foreclosed implementation of desegregation plans that were designed to remedy constitutional violations. We held that “[j]ust as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy.” Id., at 46. In these school desegregation cases we dealt with the authority of a federal court to formulate a remedy for unconstitutional racial discrimination. However, the authority of a court to incorporate racial criteria into a remedial decree also extends to statutory violations. Where federal anti-discrimination laws have been violated, an equitable remedy may in the appropriate case include a racial or ethnic factor. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747 (1976); see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). In another setting, we have held that a state may employ racial criteria that are reasonably necessary to assure compliance with federal voting, rights legislation, even though the state action does not entail the remedy of a constitutional violation. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 147-165 (1977) (opinion of White, J., joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 180-187 (Burger, C. J., dissenting on other grounds). When we have discussed the remedial powers of a federal court, we have been alert to the limitation that “[t]he power of the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities ‘is not plenary. . . .’ [A] federal court is required to tailor ‘the scope of the remedy’ to fit the nature and extent of the . . . violation.” Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 419-420 (1977) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 738 (1974), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 16). Here we deal, as we noted earlier, not with the limited remedial powers of a federal court, for example, but with the broad remedial powers of Congress. It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress not only may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with existing federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimi-nation provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to declare certain conduct unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and induce state action to avoid such conduct. Supra, at 473-480. (2) A more specific challenge to the MBE program is the charge that it impermissibly deprives nonminority businesses of access to at least some portion of the government contracting opportunities generated by the Act. It must be conceded that by its objective of remedying the historical impairment of access, the MBE provision can have the effect of awarding some contracts to MBE’s which otherwise might be awarded to other businesses, who may themselves be innocent of any prior discriminatory actions. Failure of nonminority firms to receive certain contracts is, of course, an incidental consequence of the program, not part of its objective; similarly, past impairment , of minority-firm access to public contracting opportunities may have been an incidental consequence of “business as usual” by public contracting agencies and among prime contractors. It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such “a sharing of the burden” by innocent parties is not impermissible. Franks, supra, at 777; see Albemarle Paper Co., supra; United Jewish Organizations, supra. The actual “burden” shouldered by nonminority firms is relatively light in this connection when we consider the scope of this public works program as compared with overall construction contracting opportunities. Moreover, although we may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any discriminatory conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities. (3) Another challenge to the validity of the MBE program is the assertion that it is underinclusive — that it limits its benefit to specified minority groups rather than extending its remedial objectives to all businesses whose access to government contracting is impaired by the effects of disadvantage or discrimination. Such an extension would, of course, be appropriate for Congress to provide; it is not a function for the courts. Even in this context, the well-established concept that a legislature may take one step at a time to remedy only part of a broader problem is not without relevance. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). We are not reviewing a federal program that seeks to confer a preferred status upon a nondisadvantaged minority or to give special assistance to only one of several groups established to be similarly disadvantaged minorities. Even in such a setting, the Congress is not without a certain authority. See, e. g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979) ; Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313 (1977); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974). The Congress has not sought to give select minority groups a preferred standing in the construction industry, but has embarked on a remedial program to place them on a more equitable footing with respect to public contracting opportunities. There has been no showing in this case that Congress has inadvertently effected an invidious discrimination by excluding from coverage an identifiable minority group that has been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups encompassed by the MBE program. It is not inconceivable that on very special facts a case might be made to challenge the congressional decision to limit MBE eligibility to the particular minority groups identified in the Act. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 109-112 (1979); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 240 (opinion of Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.). But on this record we find no basis to hold that Congress is without authority to undertake the kind of limited remedial effort represented by the MBE program. Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social problems. (4) It is also contended that the MBE program is overin-clusive — that it bestows a benefit on businesses identified by racial or ethnic criteria which cannot be justified on the basis of competitive criteria or as a remedy for the present effects of identified prior discrimination. It is conceivable that a particular application of the program may have this effect; however, the peculiarities of specific applications are not before us in this case. We are not presented here with a challenge involving a specific award of a construction contract or the denial of a waiver request; such questions of specific application must await future cases. This does not mean that the claim of overinclusiveness is entitled to no consideration in the present case. The history of governmental tolerance of practices using racial or ethnic criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing an invidious discrimination must alert us to the deleterious effects of even benign racial or ethnic classifications when they stray from narrow remedial justifications. Even in the context of a facial challenge such as is presented in this case, the MBE provision cannot pass muster unless, with due account for its administrative program, it provides a reasonable assurance that application of racial or ethnic criteria will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress and that misapplications of the program will be promptly and adequately remedied administratively. It is significant that the administrative scheme provides for waiver and exemption. Two fundamental congressional assumptions underlie the MBE program: (1) that the present effects of past discrimination have impaired the competitive position of businesses owned and controlled by members of minority groups; and (2) that affirmative efforts to eliminate barriers to minority-firm access, and to evaluate bids with adjustment for the present effects of past discrimination, would assure that at least 10% of the federal funds granted under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 would be accounted for by contracts with available, qualified, bona fide minority business enterprises. Each of these assumptions may be rebutted in the administrative process. The administrative program contains measures to effectuate the congressional objective of assuring legitimate participation by disadvantaged MBE’s. Administrative definition has tightened some less definite aspects of the statutory identification of the minority groups encompassed by the program. There is administrative scrutiny to identify and eliminate from participation in the program MBE’s who are not ‘‘bona fide” within the regulations and guidelines; for example, spurious minority-front entities can be exposed. A significant aspect of this surveillance is the complaint procedure available for reporting “unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the MBE program.” Supra, at 472. And even as to specific contract awards, waiver is available to avoid dealing with an MBE who is attempting to exploit the remedial aspects of the program by charging an unreasonable price, i. e., a price not attributable to the present effects of past discrimination. Supra, at 469-471. We must assume that Congress intended close scrutiny of false claims and prompt action on them. Grantees are given the opportunity to demonstrate that their best efforts will not succeed or have not succeeded in achieving the statutory 10% target for minority firm participation within the limitations of the program’s remedial objectives. In these circumstances a waiver or partial waiver is available once compliance has been demonstrated. A waiver may be sought and granted at any time during the contracting process, or even prior to letting contracts if the facts warrant. Nor is the program defective because a waiver may be sought only by the grantee and not by prime contractors who may experience difficulty in fulfilling contract obligations to assure minority participation. It may be administratively cumbersome, but the wisdom of concentrating responsibility at the grantee level is not for us to evaluate; the purpose is to allow the EDA to maintain close supervision of the operation of the MBE provision. The administrative complaint mechanism allows for grievances of prime contractors who assert that a grantee has failed to seek a waiver in an appropriate case. Finally, we note that where private parties, as opposed to governmental entities, transgress the limitations inherent in the MBE program, the possibility of constitutional violation is more removed. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 200 (1979). That the use of racial and ethnic criteria is premised on assumptions rebuttable in the administrative process gives reasonable assurance that application of the MBE program will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives contemplated by Congress and that misapplications of the racial and ethnic criteria can be remedied. In dealing with this facial challenge to the statute, doubts must be resolved in support of the congressional judgment that this limited program is a necessary step to effectuate the constitutional mandate for equality of economic opportunity. The MBE provision may be viewed as a pilot project, appropriately limited in extent and duration, and subject to reassessment and reevaluation by the Congress prior to any extension or re-enactment. Miscarriages of administration could have only a transitory economic impact on businesses not encompassed by the program, and would not be irremediable. IV Congress, after due consideration, perceived a pressing need to move forward with new approaches in the continuing effort to achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity. In this effort, Congress has necessary latitude to try new techniques such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria to accomplish remedial objectives; this is especially so in programs where voluntary cooperation with remedial measures is induced by placing conditions on federal expenditures. That the program may press the outer limits of congressional authority affords no basis for striking it down. Petitioners have mounted a facial challenge to a program developed by the politically responsive branches of Government. For its part, the Congress must proceed only with programs narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives, subject to continuing evaluation and reassessment; administration of the programs must be vigilant and flexible; and, when such a program comes under judicial review, courts must be satisfied that the legislative objectives and projected administration give reasonable assurance that the program will function within constitutional limitations. But as Mr. Justice Jackson admonished in a different context in 1941: “The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed in its tasks only if the counsels of self-restraint urged most earnestly by members of the Court itself are humbly and faithfully heeded. After the forces of conservatism and liberalism, of radicalism and reaction, of emotion and of self-interest are all caught up in the legislative process and averaged and come to rest in some compromise measure such as the Missouri Compromise, the N. R. A., the A. A. A., a minimum-wage law, or some other legislative policy, a decision striking it down closes an area of compromise in which conflicts have actually, if only temporarily, been composed. Each such decision takes away from our democratic federalism another of its defenses against domestic disorder and violence. The vice of judicial supremacy, as exerted for ninety years in the field of policy, has been its progressive closing of . the avenues to peaceful and democratic conciliation of our social and economic conflicts.” Mr. Justice Jackson reiterated these thoughts shortly before his death in what was to be the last of his Godkin Lectures: “I have said that in these matters the Court must respect the limitations on its own powers because judicial usurpation is to me no more justifiable and no more promising of permanent good to the country than any other kind. So I presuppose a Court that will not depart from the judicial process, will not go beyond resolving cases and controversies brought to it in conventional form, and will not consciously encroach upon the functions of its coordinate branches.” In a different context to be sure, that is, in discussing the latitude which should be allowed to states in trying to meet social and economic problems, Mr. Justice Brandéis had this to say: “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion). Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees. This case is one which requires, and which has received, that kind of examination. This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). However, our analysis demonstrates that the MBE provision would survive judicial review under either “test” articulated in the several Bakke opinions. The MBE provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 does not violate the Constitution. Affirmed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BURGER, C. J. ¶ 1. The EDA Guidelines, at 2-7, provide in relevant part: “The primary obligation for carrying out the 10% MBE participation requirement rests with EDA Grantees. . . . The Grantee and those of its contractors which will make subcontracts or purchase substantial supplies from other firms (hereinafter referred to as ‘prime contractors’) must seek out all available bona fide MBE’s and make every effort to use as many of them as possible on the project. “An MBE is bona fide if the minority group ownership interests are real and continuing and not created solely to meet 10% MBE requirements. For example, the minority group owners or stockholders should possess control over management, interest in capital and interest in earnings commensurate with the percentage of ownership on which the claim of minority ownership status is based. , . . “An MBE is available if the project is located in the market area of the MBE and the MBE can perform project services or supply project materials at the time they are needed. The relevant market area depends on the kind of services or supplies which are needed. . . . EDA will require that Grantees and prime contractors engage MBE’s from as wide a market area as is economically feasible. “An MBE is qualified if it can perform the services or supply the materials that are needed. Grantees and prime contractors will be expected to use MBE’s with less experience than available nonminority enterprises and should expect to provide technical assistance to MBE’s as needed. Inability to obtain bonding will ordinarily not disqualify an MBE. Grantees and prime contractors are expected to help MBE’s obtain bonding, to include MBE’s in any overall bond or to waive bonding where feasible. The Small Business Administration (SBA) is prepared to provide a 90% guarantee for the bond of any MBE participating in an LPW [local public works] project. Lack of working capital will not ordinarily disqualify an MBE. SBA is prepared to provide working capital assistance to any MBE participating in an LPW project. Grantees and prime contractors are expected to assist MBE’s in obtaining working capital through SBA or otherwise. “. . . [E] very Grantee should make sure that it knows the names, addresses and qualifications of all relevant MBE’s which would include the project location in their market areas. . . . Grantees should also hold prebid conferences to which they invite interested contractors and representatives of . . . MBE support organizations. “Arrangements have been made through the Office of Minority Business Enterprise ... to provide assistance to Grantees and prime contractors in fulfilling the 10% MBE requirement. . . . “Grantees and prime contractors should also be aware of other support which is available from the Small Business Administration. . . . “. . . [T]he Grantee must monitor the performance of its prime contractors to make sure that their commitments to expend funds for MBE’s are being fulfilled. . . . Grantees should administer every project tightly. . . .” If2. The EDA guidelines, at 13-15, provide in relevant part: “Although a provision for waiver is included under this section of the Act, EDA will only approve a waiver under exceptional circumstances. The Grantee must demonstrate that there are not sufficient, relevant, qualified minority business enterprises whose market areas include the project location to justify a waiver. The Grantee must detail in its waiver request the efforts the Grantee and potential contractors have exerted to locate and enlist MBE’s. The request must indicate the specific MBE’s which were contacted and the reason each MBE was not used. . .. “Only the Grantee can request a waiver. . . . Such a waiver request would ordinarily be made after the initial bidding or negotiation procedures proved unsuccessful.... “[A] Grantee situated in an area where the minority population is very small may apply for a waiver before requesting bids on its project or projects....” ¶ 3. The EDA Technical Bulletin, at 1, provides the following definitions: “a) Negro — An individual of the black race of African origin. “b) Spanish-speaking — An individual of a Spanish-speaking culture and origin or parentage. “c) Oriental — An individual of a culture, origin or parentage traceable to the. areas south of the Soviet Union, East of Iran, inclusive of islands adjacent thereto, and out to the Pacific including but not limited to Indonesia, Indochina, Malaysia, Hawaii and the Philippines. “d) Indian — An individual having origins in any of the original people of North America and who is recognized as an Indian by either a tribe, tribal organization or a suitable authority in the community. (A suitable authority in the community may be: educational institutions, religious organizations, or state agencies.) “e) Eskimo — An individual having origins in any of the original peoples of Alaska. “f) Aleut — An individual having origins in any of the original peoples of the Aleutian Islands.” ¶[ 4. The EDA Technical Bulletin, at 19, provides in relevant part: “Any person or organization with information indicating unjust participation by an enterprise or individuals in the MBE program or who believes that the MBE participation requirement is being improperly applied should contact the appropriate EDA grantee and provide a detailed statement of the basis for the complaint. “Upon receipt of a complaint, the grantee should attempt to resolve the issues in dispute. . In the event the grantee requires assistance in reaching a determination, the grantee should contact the Civil Rights Specialist in the appropriate Regional Office. “If the complainant believes that the grantee has not satisfactorily resolved the issues raised in his complaint, he may personally contact the EDA Regional Office.” 91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. § 6705 (f) (2) (1976 ed, Supp. II). 42 Fed. Reg. 27432 (1977), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 35822 (1977); 13 CFR Part 317 (1978). U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Local Public Works Program, Round II, Guidelines For 10% Minority Business Participation In LPW Grants (1977) (hereinafter Guidelines); App. 156a-167a. U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, EDA Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) Technical Bulletin (Additional Assistance and Information Available to Grantees and Their Contractors In Meeting The 10% MBE Requirement) (1977) (hereinafter Technical Bulletin); App. 129a-155a. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985; Title VI, § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §,2000d; Title VII, § 701 et seq. of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.' 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Economic Development Administration, 580 F. 2d 213 (CA6 1978); Constructors Assn. v. Kreps, 573 F. 2d 811 (CA3 1978); Rhode Island Chapter, Associated General Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (RI 1978); Associated General Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-4218 (Kan. Feb. 9, 1978); Carolinas Branch, Associated General Contractors v. Kreps, 442 F. Supp. 392 (SC 1977); Ohio Contractors Assn. v. Economic Development Administration, 452 F. Supp. 1013 (SD Ohio 1977); Montana Contractors’ Assn. v. Secretary of Commerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331 (Mont. 1977); Florida East Coast Chapter v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-8351 (SD Fla. Nov. 3, 1977); but see Associated General Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (CD Cal. 1977), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 438 U. S. 909 (1978), on remand, 459 F. Supp. 766 (CD Cal.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Armistead v. Associated General Contractors of California, post, p. 908. Both the Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected petitioners’ various statutory arguments without extended discussion. 584 F. 2d, at 608, n. 15; 443 F. Supp., at 262. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1077, p. 2 (1976). The bill discussed in this Report was accepted by the Conference Committee in preference to the Senate version. S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-939, p. 1 (1976); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94r-1260, p. 1 (1976). 90 Stat. 999, 42 U. S. C. § 6702. 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S. C. § 6705. 90 Stat. 1000, 42 U. S. C. § 6707. 90 Stat. 1001, 42 U. S. C. § 6707 (c). 90 Stat. 1002, 42 U. S. C. § 6710. The actual appropriation of the full amount authorized was made several weeks later. Pub. L. 94r-447, 90 Stat. 1497. 123 Cong. Rec. 2136 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 11 and Related Bills before the Subcommittee on Economic Development of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H. R. Rep. No. 95-20 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-38 (1977). 91 Stat, 119, 42 U. S. C. §6710 (1976 ed., Supp. II). The actual appropriation of the full authorized amount was made the same day. Pub. L. 95-29, 91 Stat. 123. E. g., Hearings, supra n. 15; 123 Cong. Rec. 5290-5353 (1977); id., at 7097-7176. 91 Stat. 117, 42 U. S. C. § 6707 (1976 ed., Supp. II). 91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. § 6705 (1976 ed., Supp. II). 123 Cong. Rec. 5097 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell). Id., at 5098. Id., at 5097-5098. Id., at 5098. Id:, at 5327. As reintroduced, the first sentence of the amendment was modified to provide: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless at least 10 per centum of the dollar volume of each contract shall be set aside for minority business enterprise and, or, unless at least 10 per centum of the articles, materials, and supplies which will be used in such project are procured from minority business enterprises.” Id., at 5327-5328. Id., at 5327. Id., at 5327-5328. Id., at 5328 (remarks of Rep. Roe). Ibid. Id., at 6329 (remarks of Rep. Mitchell). Id., at 5330 (remarks of Rep. Conyers). Id., at 5331 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi). Id., at 5332. Id., at 7155-7156 (remarks of Sen. Brooke). The first paragraph of Senator Brooke’s formulation was identical to the version originally offered by Representative Mitchell, quoted in the text, supra, at 458-459. A second paragraph of Senator Brooke’s amendment provided: “This section shall not be interpreted to defund projects with less'than 10 percent minority participation in areas with minority population of less than 5 percent. In that event, the correct level of minority participation will be predetermined by the Secretary in consultation with EDA and based upon its lists of qualified minority contractors and its solicitation of competitive bids from all minority firms on those lists.” 123 Cong. Rec. 7156 (1977). Ibid. Ibid. S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-110, p. 11 (1977); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-230, p. 11 (1977). Ibid. The Conference Committee bill was agreed to by the Senate, 123 Cong. Rec. 12941-12942 (1977), and by the House, id., at 13242-13257, and was signed into law on May 13, 1977. Id., at 7156 (remarks of Sen. Brooke). Id., at 5330 (remarks of Rep. Mitchell). Id., at 5327; id., at 7156 (remarks of Sen. Brooke). Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11518, 3 CFR 907 (1966-1970 Comp.). 13 CFR §124.8-1 (c)(1) (1977). TJ. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Business Development, Section 8 (a) Program, Standard Operating Procedure 15-16 (1976); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975) (“[T]he relevant rules and regulations require such applicant to identify with the disadvantages of his or her racial group generally, and that such disadvantages must have personally affected the applicant’s ability to enter into the mainstream of the business system”); TJ. S. Small Business Administration, Office of Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development, MSB & COD Programs, Standard Operating Procedure 20 (1979) (“The social disadvantage of individuals, including those within the above-named [racial and ethnic] groups, shall be determined by SBA on a case-by-case basis. Membership alone in any group is not conclusive that an individual is socially disadvantaged”). H. R. Rep. No. 94-1791 (1977). Id., at 124-149. H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 1-2 (1975) (emphasis added). Another chapter of the 1977 Report of the House Committee on Small Business summarized a review of the SBA’s Security Bond Guarantee Program, making specific reference to minority business participation in the construction industry: “The very basic problem disclosed by the testimony is that, over the years, there has developed a business system which has traditionally excluded measurable minority participation. In the past more than the present, this system of conducting business transactions overtly precluded minority input. Currently, we more often encounter a business system which is racially neutral on its face, but because of past overt social and economic discrimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate these past inequities. Minorities, until recently, have not participated to any measurable extent, in our total business system generally, or in the construction industry, in particular.” H. R. Rep. No. 94r-1791, p. 182 (1977), summarizing H. R. Rep. No. 94-840, p. 17 (1976). H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 28-30 (1975). Id., at 29. Id., at 11; TJ. S. General Accounting Office, Questionable Effectiveness of the § 8 (a) Procurement Program, GGD-75-57 (1975); TJ. S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Minorities and Women as Government Contractors (May 1975). Id., at 16-28, 86-88. Ibid. Exec. Order No. 11458, 3 CFR 779 (1966-1970 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 11625, 3 CFR 616 (1971-1975 Comp.). H. R. Rep. No. 94 — 468, p. 32 (1975). For other congressional observations with respect, to the effect of past discrimination on current business opportunities for minorities, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 92-1615, p. 3 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 95-949, p. 8 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-1070, pp. 14-15 (1978); S. Rep. No. 96-31, pp. 107, 123-124 (1979); see also, e. g., H. R. Doc. No. 92-169, p. 4 (1971); H. R. Doc. No. 92-194, p. 1 (1972). 91 Stat. 117, 42 U. S. C. § 6706 (1976 ed., Supp. II); 13 CFR Part 317 (1978). 91 Stat. 116, 42 U. S. C. § 6705 (e) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II); 13 CFR §317.19 (1978). Guidelines 2-7; App. 157a-160a. The relevant portions of the Guidelines are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ¶ 1. Guidelines 2; App. 157a; see 123 Cong. Rec. 5327-5328 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell and Rep. Roe). Guidelines 8; App. 161a. See 123 Cong. Rec. 5327-5328 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell and Rep. Roe). Guidelines 13-16; App. 165a-167a. The relevant portions of the Guidelines are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ¶ 2. Technical Bulletin 5; App. 136a. Technical Bulletin 9-10; App. 143a. Text accompanying n. 48, supra. H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, p. 30 (1975). 123 Cong. Rec. 5330 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Roe). Technical Bulletin 1; App. 131a-132a. These definitions are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ¶ 3. Technical Bulletin 3; App. 135a. Technical Bulletin 19; App. 155a. The relevant portions of the Technical Bulletin are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ¶ 4. In their complaint, in order to establish standing to challenge the validity of the program, petitioners alleged as “[s]peeific examples” of economic injury three instances where one of their number assertedly would have been awarded a public works contract but for enforcement of the MBE provision. Petitioners requested only declaratory and injunctive relief against continued enforcement of the MBE provision; they did not seek any remedy for these specific instances of assertedly unlawful discrimination. App. 12a-13a, 17a-19a. The Court of Appeals relied upon Department of Commerce statistics to calculate that the $4.2 billion in federal grants conditioned upon compliance with the MBE provision amounted to about 2.5% of the total of nearly $170 billion spent on construction in the United States during 1977. Thus, the 10% minimum minority business participation contemplated by this program would account for only 0.25% of the annual expenditure for construction work in the United States. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F. 2d, at 607. The MBE provision, 42 TJ. S. C. §6705 (f)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. II), classifies as a minority business enterprise any “business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in the case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members.” Minority group members are defined as “citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts.” The administrative definitions are set out in the Appendix to this opinion, ¶ 3. These categories also are classified as minorities in the regulations implementing the nondiscrimination requirements of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 45 U. S. C. § 803, see 49 CFR § 265.5 (i) (1978), on which Congress relied as precedent for the MBE provision. See 123 Cong. Rec. 7156 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke). The House Subcommittee on SBA Overnight and Minority Enterprise, whose activities played a significant part in the legislative history of the MBE provision, also recognized that these categories were included within the Federal Government’s definition of “minority business enterprise.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-468, pp. 20-21 (1975). The specific inclusion of these groups in the MBE provision demonstrates that Congress concluded they were victims of discrimination. Petitioners did not press any challenge to Congress’ classification categories in the Court of Appeals; there is no reason for this Court to pass upon the issue at this time. Cf. GAO, Report to the Congress, Minority Firms on Local Public Works Projects — Mixed Results, CED-79-9 (Jan. 16, 1979); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Economic Development Administration, Local Public Works Program Interim Report on 10 Percent Minority Business Enterprise Requirement (Sept. 1978). R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 321 (1941). R. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government 61-62 (1955). Although the complaint alleged that the MBE program violated several federal statutes, n. 5, supra, the only statutory argument urged upon us is that the MBE provision is inconsistent with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We perceive no inconsistency between the requirements of Title VI and those of the MBE provision. To the extent any statutory inconsistencies might be asserted, the MBE provision — the later, more specific enactment — must be deemed to control. See, e. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U S. 535, 550-551 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U. S. 753, 758 (1961); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-202 (1939).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al. v. JEAN et al. No. 89-601. Argued April 23, 1990 Decided June 4, 1990 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Harriet S. Shapiro, William G. Kanter, and Michael J. Singer. Ira J. Kurzban argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Bruce J. Winick, Irwin P. Stotzky, Robert E. Juceam, Terrence A. Corrigan, and Sandra M. Lipsman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Lawrence H. Rudnick; for the National Immigration Project et al. by Robert L. King and Niels W. Frenzen; and for the National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives by James E. Coleman, Jr., Joseph E. Killory, Jr., and Nancy G. Shor. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) directs a court to award “fees and other expenses” to private parties who prevail in litigation against the United States if, among other conditions, the position of the United States was not “substantially justified.” In many cases parties are able to resolve by stipulation a claim for fees under the EAJA. In some cases, however, a fee application will prompt the Government to litigate aspects of the fee request or require the court to convene a hearing before deciding if an award of fees and expenses is authorized. The question in this case is whether a prevailing party is ineligible for fees for the services rendered during such a proceeding unless the Government’s position in the fee litigation itself is not “substantially justified.” Because the question for decision is so narrow—affecting only eligibility for compensation for services rendered for fee litigation rather than the amount that may be appropriately awarded for such services—it is not necessary to restate the protracted history of this vigorously contested litigation. It is sufficient to note that the District Court expressly found that respondents “were the prevailing parties within the meaning of the Act, that the government’s position was not substantially justified and that there are no other special circumstances that would make an award unjust.” The Court of Appeals upheld these findings. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F. 2d 759, 765-769 (CA11 1988). After an extensive review of the record developed at the fee hearing, however, the Court of Appeals decided that certain errors required that the case “be remanded for recalculation of attorney’s fees and expenses.” Id., at 780. In view of this holding, we must assume that at least some of the positions petitioners took regarding the proper fee were substantially justified, even though their position on the merits of the litigation was not. Thus, the record squarely presents the question whether the District Court must make a second finding of no “substantial justification” before awarding respondents any fees for the fee litigation. Petitioners concede that fees for time and expenses incurred in applying for fees are appropriate, but take the position that, unless the court finds that their position in the fee litigation itself was not substantially justified, fees for any litigation about fees are not recoverable. It is respondents’ position that fee litigation is a component part of an integrated case and that if the statutory prerequisites for an award of fees for prevailing in the case are satisfied, the award presumptively encompasses services for fee litigation. Because the Courts of Appeals have resolved this question differently, we granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 1055 (1990). I Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of Title 28 provides: “Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” Thus, eligibility for a fee award in any civil action requires: (1) that the claimant be a “prevailing party”; (2) that the Government’s position was not “substantially justified”; (3) that no “special circumstances make an award unjust”; and, (4) pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), that any fee application be submitted to the court within 30 days of final judgment in the action and be supported by an itemized statement. Only the application of the “substantially justified” condition is at issue in this case. The most telling answer to petitioners’ submission that they may assert a “substantial justification” defense at multiple stages of an action is the complete absence of any textual support for this position. Subsection (d)(1)(A) refers to an award of fees “in any civil action” without any reference to separate parts of the litigation, such as discovery requests, fees, or appeals. The reference to “the position of the United States” in the singular also suggests that the court need make only one finding about the justification of that position. In 1985, Congress amended the EAJA, adding the following definition: “(D) ‘position of the United States’ means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings.” Pub. L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 185, § 2(c)(2)(B), 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(D). The fact that the “position” is again denominated in the singular, although it may encompass both the agency’s pre-litigation conduct and the Department of Justice’s subsequent litigation positions, buttresses the conclusion that only one threshold determination for the entire civil action is to be made. The language Congress chose in describing the fee application procedure in § 2412(d)(1)(B) corroborates the statute’s other references to a single finding. A fee application must contain an allegation “that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.” Ibid. Again, the reference is to only one position, and it is to a position that the Government took in the past. There is no reference to the position the Government may take in response to the fee application. Moreover, the 1985 amendment to § 2412(d)(1)(B) directs a court to determine whether the Government’s past position was substantially justified “on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.” Pub. L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 184-185, § 2(b), 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The reference to “the record” in the civil action is again in the singular. The single finding that the Government’s position lacks substantial justification, like the determination that a claimant is a “prevailing party,” thus operates as a one-time threshold for fee eligibility. In EAJA cases, the court first must determine if the applicant is a “prevailing party” by evaluating the degree of success obtained. If the Government then asserts an exception for substantial justification or for circumstances that render an award unjust, the court must make a second finding regarding these additional threshold conditions. As we held in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), the “prevailing party” requirement is “a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the district court to determine what fee is ‘reasonable.’” Id., at 433. Similarly, once a private litigant has met the multiple conditions for eligibility for EAJA fees, the district court’s task of determining what fee is reasonable is essentially the same as that described in Hensley. See id., at 433-437. In Hensley, we emphasized that it is appropriate to allow the district court discretion to determine the amount of a fee award, given its “superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.” Id., at 437. The EAJA prescribes a similar flexibility. Section § 2412(d)(1)(C) empowers the district court, “in its discretion,” to “reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.” This exception to a fee award was repeated in the 1985 amendment that added a definition of “position of the United States,” by there excluding fees and expenses “for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings.” Supra, at 159; § 2412(d)(2)(D). Thus, absent unreasonably dilatory conduct by the prevailing party in “any portion” of the litigation, which would justify denying fees for that portion, a fee award presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action. Any given civil action can have numerous phases. While the parties’ postures on individual matters may be more or less justified, the EAJA—like other fee-shifting statutes —favors treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items. See, e. g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877, 888 (1989) (where administrative proceedings are “necessary to the attainment of the results Congress sought to promote by providing for fees, they should be considered part and parcel of the action for which fees may be awarded”). Cf. Gagne v. Maher, 594 F. 2d 336, 344 (CA2 1979) (“[D]enying attorneys’ fees for time spent in obtaining them would ‘dilute the value of a fees award by forcing attorneys into extensive, uncompensated litigation in order to gain any fees’ ” under 42 U. S. C. § 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 448 U. S. 122 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U. S. 546, 559 (1986) (fees for postjudgment proceedings to enforce consent decree properly compensable as a cost litigation under § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54 (1980) (fees for administrative proceedings included under § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Petitioners acknowledge that the EAJA may provide compensation for all aspects of fee litigation; they only dispute the finding necessary to support such an award. They would allow, without a specific threshold determination, fees for “‘the time spent preparing the EAJA fee application . . . because it is “necessary for the preparation of the party’s case[,]” 28 U. S. C. § 2414(d)(2) (A),”’ but they would subject a fee request for any further work in pursuing that application to an additional substantial justification defense. Brief for Petitioners 16, n. 17 (quoting Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F. 2d 1333, 1334 (CA8 1988)); see n. 4, supra. We find no textual or logical argument for treating so differently a party’s preparation of a fee application and its ensuing efforts to support that same application. II Petitioners further argue, as a matter of policy, that the allowance of an automatic award of “fees for fees” will encourage exorbitant fee requests, generate needless litigation, and unreasonably burden the federal fisc. Brief for Petitioners 26-31. The terms of the statute, as well as its structure and purpose, identify at least two responses to these arguments. First, no award of fees is “automatic.” Eligibility for fees is established upon meeting the four conditions set out by the statute, but a district court will always retain substantial discretion in fixing the amount of an EAJA award. Exorbitant, unfounded, or procedurally defective fee applications—like any other improper position that may unreasonably protract proceedings—are matters that the district court can recognize and discount. Petitioners’ fear that such requests will receive “automatic” approval is unfounded. In contrast, requiring courts to make a separate finding of “substantial justification” regarding the Government’s opposition to fee requests would multiply litigation. “A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U. S., at 437. As petitioners admit, allowing a “substantial justification” exception to fee litigation theoretically can spawn a “Kafkaesque judicial nightmare” of infinite litigation to recover fees for the last round of litigation over fees. Brief for Petitioners 29; Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 234 U. S. App. D. C. 315, 324, 729 F. 2d 801, 810 (1984). Second, the specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S., at 883. The EAJA applies to a wide range of awards in which the cost of litigating fee disputes would equal or exceed the cost of litigating the merits of the claim. If the Government could impose the cost of fee litigation on prevailing parties by asserting a “substantially justified” defense to fee applications, the financial deterrent that the EAJA aims to eliminate would be resurrected. The Government’s general interest in protecting the federal fisc is subordinate to the specific statutory goals of encouraging private parties to vindicate their rights and “curbing excessive regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government authority.” The “substantial justification” requirement of the EAJA establishes a clear threshold for determining a prevailing party’s eligibility for fees, one that properly focuses on the governmental misconduct giving rise to the litigation. The EAJA further provides district courts discretion to adjust the amount of fees for various portions of the litigation, guided by reason and statutory criteria. The purpose and legislative history of the statute reinforce our conclusion that Congress intended the EAJA to cover the cost of all phases of successful civil litigation addressed by the statute. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA, Pub. L. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325, and its extension and amendment, Pub. L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183, authorized fee awards to prevailing parties in both federal agency adjudications and certain civil actions. It therefore amended relevant portions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 504 et seq., as well as the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 2412 et seq. This case involves only the latter portion of the EAJA. The fee litigation is the subject of Louis v. Nelson, 624 F. Supp. 836 (SD Fla. 1985) (initial order), Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300 (SD Fla. 1986) (corrected memorandum after hearing), and Jean v. Nelson, 863 F. 2d 759 (CA11 1988). The history of the litigation of the merits is traced in a dozen other opinions. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924 (SD Fla. 1981); Louis v. Meissner, 532 F. Supp. 881 (SD Fla. 1982); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (SD Fla. 1982); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004 (SD Fla. 1982); Jean v. Nelson, 683 F. 2d 1311 (CA11 1982); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F. 2d 1455 (CA11 1983); Louis v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 896 (SD Fla. 1983); Louis v. Nelson, 560 F. Supp. 899 (SD Fla. 1983); Louis v. Nelson, 570 F. Supp. 1364 (SD Fla. 1983); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F. 2d 957 (CA11 1984) (en banc); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846 (1985); Jean v. Nelson, 854 F. 2d 405 (CA11 1988). 624 F. Supp., at 837. With respect to the lack of substantial justification, the court explained: “In light of prior precedent and the advice of counsel, [the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s] refusal to comply with the APA was not reasonable; nor was the position of the United States Attorney’s Office in defending these actions by claiming that the change in policy was not a rule subject to the rulemaking requirements of the APA.” Id., at 839. Petitioners divide the consideration of EAJA fee awards into two stages: “In our view, it is appropriate to include reasonable fees and expenses incurred in preparing a fee application as part of any award of fees for the merits phase of the litigation. But . . . the government should not be required to pay for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in separate litigation over the availability and size of the fee award unless the position of the government in this distinct phase of the ease was not substantially justified.” Brief for Petitioners 15-16 (footnote omitted). Compare Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 234 U. S. App. D. C. 315, 729 F. 2d 801 (1984); McDonald v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 884 F. 2d 1468 (CA1 1989); Trichilo v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 823 F. 2d 702 (CA2 1987); Powell v. Commissioner, 891 F. 2d 1167 (CA5 1990) (no additional finding of substantial justification required), with Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 767 P. 2d 321 (CA7 1985); Cornella v. Schweiker, 741 F. 2d 170 (CA8 1984); National Wildlife Federation v. FERC, 870 P. 2d 542 (CA9 1989) (additional finding required). We have held that the term “substantially justified” means “‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from the ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact’ formulation adopted by the Ninth Circuit and the vast majority of other Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue. To be ‘substantially justified’ means, of course, more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 565-566 (1988) (citations omitted). Congress’ emphasis on the underlying Government action supports a single evaluation of past conduct. See H. R. Rep. No. 98-992, pp. 9, 13 (1984) (“[T]he amendment will make clear that the Congressional intent is to provide for attorney fees when an unjustifiable agency action forces litigation, and the agency then tries to avoid such liability by reasonable behavior during the litigation”); S. Rep. No. 98-586, p. 10 (1984) (“Congress expressly recognized ‘that the expense of correcting error on the part of the Government should not rest wholly on the party whose willingness to litigate or adjudicate has helped to define the limits of Federal authority.’ [H. R. Rep. No. 96-1418, p. 10 (1980).] The ‘Government error’ referred to is not one of the Department of Justice’s representatives litigating the case, but is rather the government action that led the private party to the decision to litigate”). The House Report on the amendment echoes this finality: “When the case is litigated to a final decision by a court or adjudicative officer (or even when the case is settled after only some litigation procedures) the evaluation of the government’s position will be straightforward, since the parties will have already aired the facts that led the agency to bring the action. No additional discovery of the government’s position will be necessary, for EAJA petition purposes.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-120, p. 13 (1985) (emphasis added). A cursory review of EAJA fee awards in 1989 (prior to appellate review) reveals that district courts substantially reduced the amounts of fees requested by parties. Out of 502 applications in 1989, the 413 that were granted requested a total of $2,419,123 in fees and expenses, of which only $1,850,906 were awarded. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Report of Fees and Expenses Awarded Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 99, Table 32 (1989) (hereinafter 1989 Report of Fees). Because Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 437 (1983), requires the district court to consider the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained, fees for fee litigation should be excluded to the extent that the applicant ultimately fails to prevail in such litigation. For example, if the Government’s challenge to a requested rate for paralegal time resulted in the court’s recalculating and reducing the award for paralegal time from the requested amount, then the applicant should not receive fees for the time spent defending the higher rate. Congress prefaced the EAJA with this statement of its findings and purposes: ‘“(a) The Congress finds that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations, and labor and other organizations may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights in civil actions and in administrative proceedings. “‘(b) The Congress further finds that because of the greater resources and expertise of the United States the standard for an award of fees against the United States should be different from the standard governing an award against a private litigant, in certain situations. “‘(c) It is the purpose of this title— “‘(1) to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award of attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other costs against the United States; and “‘(2) to insure the applicability in actions by or against the United States of the common law and statutory exceptions to the ‘American rule’ respecting the award of attorney fees.’ ” Congressional Findings and Purposes, note following 5 U. S. C. § 504. Ninety percent of EAJA fee awards are made in cases involving the Department of Health and Human Services. In 1989, these awards averaged less than $3,000 each. 1989 Report of Fees, p. 100, Table 32. EAJA awards have remained comfortably under the Congressional Budget Office’s 1985 Cost Estimate of 1,000 awards annually, averaging $6,000 each, by 1990. H. Supp. Rep. No. 99-120, pt. 2, p. 3 (1985). Although this ease involves an exceptionally large award (the District Court’s initial fee award totaled more than $1 million, 646 F. Supp., at 1323), in 1986 the average fee award under the EAJA, prior to appellate review, was $3,821. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Report of Fees and Expenses Awarded Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 93, Table 31 (1986). The average of the 413 awards granted in 1989, prior to appellate review, was $4,482. 1989 Report of Fees, p. 97, Table 31. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1418, p. 12 (1980). The Committee Reports of both the House and the Senate reflect the dual concerns of access for individuals and improvement of Government policies. “[T]he Government with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce compliance with its position. Where compliance is coerced, precedent may be established on the basis of an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presentation and consideration of opposing views. In fact, there is evidence that small businesses are the target of agency action precisely because they do not have the resources to fully litigate the issue. This kind of truncated justice undermines the integrity of the decision-making process. “The exception created by [the EAJA] focuses primarily on those individuals for whom cost may be a deterrent to vindicating their rights. The bill rests on the premise that a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the Government is not only representing his or her own vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy. An adjudication or civil action provides a concrete, adversarial test of Government regulation and thereby insures the legitimacy and fairness of the law. An adjudication, for example, may show that the policy or factual foundation underlying an agency rule is erroneous or inaccurate, or it may provide a vehicle for developing or announcing more precise rules. . . . Where parties are serving a public purpose, it is unfair to ask them to finance through their tax dollars unreasonable Government action and also bear the costs of vindicating their rights.” Id., at 10. “Providing an award of fees to a prevailing party represents one way to improve citizen access to courts and administrative proceedings. When there is an opportunity to recover costs, a party does not have to choose between acquiescing to an unreasonable Government order or prevailing to his financial detriment. . . . By allowing a decision to contest Government action to be based on the merits of the case rather than the cost of litigating, [the EAJA] helps assure that administrative decisions reflect informed deliberation.” S. Rep. No. 96-253, p. 7 (1979).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McKESSON CORPORATION v. DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION OF FLORIDA, et al. No. 88-192. Argued March 22, 1989 Reargued December 6, 1989 Decided June 4, 1990 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. David G. Robertson reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Walter Hellerstein. H. Bartow Farr III reargued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Joseph C. Mellichamp III, Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel C. Brown, Special Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Crow Tribe of Indians by Daniel M. Rosenfelt; for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. by Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Mark I. Levy, Andrew J. Pincus, Peter G. Kumpe, Daniel R. Barney, Robert Digges, Jr., Laurie T. Baulig, and William S. Busker; for the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce by Jean A. Walker and William D. Peltz; for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Timothy J. McCormally; and for U. S. Oil & Refining Co. by Franklin G. Dinces. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, and Richard F. Finn, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Coffill, Jim Jones, Attorney General of Idaho, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General of North Dakota, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Herbert O. Reid, Sr., Acting Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia; for the State of Georgia et al. by Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General of Virginia, H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Walter A. McFarlane, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Michael Moore of Mississippi, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Brian McKay of Nevada, John P. Arnold of New Hampshire, Peter N. Perretti, Jr., of New Jersey, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Robert H. Henry of Oklahoma, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, R. Paul Van Dam of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, and Godfrey R. de Castro of the Virgin Islands; for Caterpillar Inc. by Don S. Harnack; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Charles Rothfeld. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner McKesson Corporation brought this action in Florida state court, alleging that Florida’s liquor excise tax violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the tax scheme unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce because it provided preferences for distributors of certain local products. Although the court enjoined the State from giving effect to those preferences in the future, the court also refused to provide petitioner a refund or any other form of relief for taxes it had already paid. Our precedents establish that if a State penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their taxes in timely fashion, thus requiring them to pay first and obtain review of the tax’s validity later in a refund action, the Due Process Clause requires the State to afford taxpayers a meaningful opportunity to secure postpayment relief for taxes already paid pursuant to a tax scheme ultimately found unconstitutional. We therefore agree with petitioner that the state court’s decision denying such relief must be reversed. I For several decades until 1985, Florida’s liquor excise tax scheme, which imposes taxes on manufacturers, distributors, and in some cases vendors of alcoholic beverages, provided for preferential treatment of beverages that were manufactured from certain “Florida-grown” citrus and other agricultural crops and then bottled in state. See, e. g., Fla. Stat. §§ 564.02, 564.06, 565.12, 565.14 (1983). After this Court held in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984), that a similar preference scheme employed by the State of Hawaii violated the Commerce Clause (because it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of local products), the Florida Legislature revised its excise tax scheme and enacted the statutory provisions at issue in this litigation. See Fla. Stat. §§ 564.06, 565.12 (1989) (hereafter Liquor Tax). The legislature deleted the previous express preferences for “Florida-grown” products and replaced them with special rate reductions for certain specified citrus, grape, and sugarcane products, all of which are commonly grown in Florida and used in alcoholic beverages produced there. Petitioner McKesson Corporation is a licensed wholesale distributor of alcoholic beverages whose products did not qualify for the rate reductions. Petitioner paid the applicable taxes every month as required after the revised Liquor Tax went into effect, but in June 1986, petitioner filed an application with the Florida Office of the Comptroller seeking a refund on the ground that the tax scheme was unlawful. In September, after the Comptroller denied its application, petitioner (along with other distributors not present here) brought suit in Florida state court against respondents Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation, and Office of the Comptroller. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the tax under the Commerce Clause as well as under various other provisions of the United States and Florida Constitutions, and petitioner sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the continued enforcement of the discriminatory tax scheme. Pursuant to Florida’s “Repayment of Funds” statute, which provides for a refund of “[a]n overpayment of any tax, license or account due” and “[a]ny payment made into the State Treasury in error,” §§ 215.26(1)(a), (c), and in apparent compliance with the statutory requisites for preserving a claim thereunder, petitioner also sought a refund in the amount of the excess taxes it had paid as a result of its disfavored treatment. On petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment, the Florida trial court invalidated the discriminatory tax scheme on Commerce Clause grounds because the revised “legislation failed to surmount the constitutional violations addressed in Bacchus [Imports, supra]” App. 263. The trial court enjoined future enforcement of the preferential rate reductions, leaving all distributors subject to the Liquor Tax’s nonpreferred rates. The court, however, declined to order a refund or any other form of relief for the taxes previously paid and timely challenged under the discriminatory scheme. The court’s order of prospective relief was stayed pending respondents’ appeal of the Commerce Clause ruling to the Florida Supreme Court. Petitioner McKesson cross-appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing that as a matter of both federal and state law it was entitled at least to “a refund of the difference between the disfavored product’s tax rate and the favored product’s tax rate.” 524 So. 2d 1000, 1009 (1988). The State Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Liquor Tax unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce and upheld the trial court’s order that the preferential rate reductions be given no future operative effect. The Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court’s refusal to order a tax refund, declaring that “the prospective nature of the rulings below was proper in light of the equitable considerations present in this case.” Id., at 1010. The court noted that the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco had collected the Liquor Tax in “good faith reliance on a presumptively valid statute.” Ibid. Moreover, the court suggested that, “if given a refund, [petitioner] would in all probability receive a windfall, since the cost of the tax has likely been passed on to [its] customers.” Ibid. After petitioner’s request for rehearing was denied, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court, presenting the question whether federal law entitles it to a partial tax refund. We granted the petition, 488 U. S. 954 (1988), and consolidated the case with American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, No. 88-325, which we also decide today. Post, p. 167. II Respondents first ask us to hold that, though the Florida courts accepted jurisdiction over this suit which sought monetary relief from various state entities, the Eleventh Amendment nevertheless precludes our exercise of appellate jurisdiction in this case. We reject respondents’ suggestion. Almost 170 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected a State’s Eleventh Amendment challenge to this Court’s power on writ of error to review the judgment of a state court involving an issue of federal law. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821). Although Cohens involved a proceeding commenced in the first instance by the State itself against a citizen, such that the Court’s holding might be read as limited to that circumstance, the decision has long been understood as supporting a broader proposition: “[I]t was long ago settled that a writ of error to review the final judgment of a state court, even when a State is a formal party [defendant] and is successful in the inferior court, is not a suit within the meaning of the Amendment.” General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 233 (1908) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 585 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting). Our consistent practice since Cohens confirms this broader understanding. We have repeatedly and without question accepted jurisdiction to review issues of federal law arising in suits brought against States in state court; indeed, we frequently have entertained cases analogous to this one, where a taxpayer who had brought a refund action in state court against the State asked us to reverse an adverse state judicial decision premised upon federal law. Respondents correctly note that, since Cohens, the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over cases arising in state court has only infrequently been discussed in our cases. But those discussions uniformly reveal an understanding that the Amendment does not circumscribe our appellate review of state-court judgments. Moreover, that this Court has had little occasion to discuss the issue merely reflects the extent to which States, though frequently interjecting Eleventh Amendment objections to suits initiated against them in federal court, have understood the time-honored practice of appellate review of state-court judgments to be consistent with this Court’s role in our federal system. “[I]t is plain that the framers of the constitution did contemplate that cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States not only might but would arise in the state courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340 (1816). To secure state-court compliance with, and national uniformity of, federal law, the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over cases encompassing issues of federal law is subject to two conditions: State courts must interpret and enforce faithfully the “supreme Law of the Land,” and their decisions are subject to review by this Court. Whereas the Eleventh Amendment has been construed so that a State retains immunity from original suit in federal court, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 237-240 (1985), it is “inherent in the constitutional plan,” Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), that when a state court takes cognizance of a case, the State assents to appellate review by this Court of the federal issues raised in the case “whoever may be the parties to the original suit, whether private persons, or the state itself.” We recognize what has long been implicit in our consistent practice and uniformly endorsed in our cases: The Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases arising from state courts. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of petitioner’s claim. Ill It is undisputed that the Florida Supreme Court, after holding that the Liquor Tax unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce because of its preferences for liquor made from “‘crops which Florida is adapted to growing,”’ 524 So. 2d, at 1008, acted correctly in awarding petitioner declaratory and injunctive relief against continued enforcement of the discriminatory provisions. The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax’s legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. A We have not had occasion in recent years to explain the scope of a State’s obligation to provide retrospective relief as part of its postdeprivation procedure in cases such as this. Our approach today, however, is rooted firmly in precedent dating back to at least early this century. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912), involved a suit by a railroad company to recover taxes it had paid under protest, alleging that the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause because most of the franchise tax was apportioned to business conducted wholly outside the State. The Court agreed that the franchise tax was unconstitutional and concluded that the railroad company was entitled to a refund of the portion of the tax imposed on out-of-state activity. Justice Holmes explained: “It is reasonable that a man who denies the legality of a tax should have a clear and certain remedy. The rule being established that apart from special circumstances he cannot interfere by injunction with the State’s collection of its revenues, an action at law to recover back what he has paid is the alternative left. Of course we are speaking of those cases where the State is not put to an action if the citizen refuses to pay. In these latter he can interpose his objections by way of defence, but when, as is common, the State has a more summary remedy, such as distress, and the party indicates by protest that he is yielding to what he cannot prevent, courts sometimes perhaps have been a little too slow to recognize the implied duress under which payment is made. But even if the State is driven to an action, if at the same time the citizen is put at a serious disadvantage in the assertion of his legal, in this case of his constitutional, rights, by defence in the suit, justice may require that he should be at liberty to avoid those disadvantages by paying promptly and bringing suit on his side.” Id., at 285-286. After finding that the railroad company’s tax payment “was made under duress,” id., at 287, the Court issued a judgment entitling the company to a “refunding of the tax.” Ibid. Thus was the taxpayer provided a “clear and certain remedy” for the State’s unlawful extraction of tax moneys under duress. In Ward v. Love County Board of Comm’rs, 253 U. S. 17 (1920), we reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s refusal to award a refund for an unlawful tax. A subdivision of the State sought to tax lands allotted by Congress to members of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indian Tribes despite a provision of the allotment treaty making the “‘lands allotted . . . nontaxable while the title remains in the original allottee, but not to exceed twenty-one years from date of patent.’” Id., at 19, quoting Act of June 28, 1898, § 29, 30 Stat. 507. To avoid a distress sale of its lands, the Choctaw Tribe paid the taxes under protest and then brought suit in state court to obtain a refund. We observed that “it is certain that the lands were nontaxable” by the State and its subdivisions under the allotment treaty and, therefore, the taxes were assessed in violation of federal law. 253 U. S., at 21. After finding that the Tribe paid the taxes under duress, id., at 23, we ordered a refund. We explained the State’s duty to remit the tax as follows: “To say that the county could collect these unlawful taxes by coercive means and not incur any obligation to pay them back is nothing short of saying that it could take or appropriate the property of these Indian allottees arbitrarily and without due process of law. Of course this would be in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, which binds the county as an agency of the State.” Id., at 24. See also Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 369 (1930) (holding, in a case analogous to Ward, that “a denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment”). In Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499 (1928), we applied the same due process analysis to a tax that was unlawful because it was discriminatory, though otherwise within the State’s power to impose. Montana officials had imposed a tax on shares of banks incorporated under federal law but not on shares of state-incorporated banks, relying on a Montana Supreme Court decision interpreting state law to preclude such taxation of state bank shares. The Montana National Bank of Billings paid its tax under protest and then brought suit for a refund. The bank contended that the different tax treatment violated § 5219 of the Revised Statutes, a federal statute requiring equal taxation of the shares of state and national banks. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court overruled its previous interpretation of state law and held that thereafter shares of state banks could also be taxed, thus enabling state officials to comply with § 5219. Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 78 Mont. 62, 252 P. 876 (1926). The court declined, however, to order a refund of the taxes that the Montana National Bank of Billings had paid during the period when state officials had exempted state banks in reliance on the court’s earlier decision. Id., at 86, 252 P., at 883. On writ of error, this Court acknowledged that the Montana Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its previous interpretation of state law ensured for the future the equal treatment demanded by federal law. The Court noted, however, that prospective relief alone “d[id] not cure the mischief which had been done under the earlier construction.” 276 U. S., at 504. We held that the Montana National Bank of Billings “c[ould not] be deprived of its legal right to recover the amount of the tax unlawfully exacted of it by the later [Montana Supreme Court] decision which, while repudiating the construction under which the unlawful exaction was made, le[ft] the monies thus exacted in the public treasury,” id., at 504-505, and therefore the bank enjoyed “an undoubted right to recover” the moneys it had paid. Id., at 504. The Court in Montana National Bank recognized that the federal mandate of equal treatment could have been satisfied by collecting back taxes from state banks rather than by granting a refund to national banks. Id., at 505. But as to this possibility, the Court remarked: “[I]t is unnecessary to say more than that it nowhere appears that these [taxing] officers, if they possess the power [to assess back taxes], have undertaken to exercise it or that they have any intention of ever doing so. It will be soon enough to invite consideration of this purely speculative suggestion when, if ever, the taxing officials shall have put it into practical effect.” Ibid. Montana National Bank thus held that one forced to pay a discriminatorily high tax in violation of federal law is entitled, in addition to prospective relief, to a refund of the excess tax paid—at least unless the disparity is removed in some other manner. We again applied this analysis to a discriminatory tax in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 (1931). The Court held unanimously that the State of Iowa’s taxation of the shares of state and national banks at a higher rate than those of competing domestic corporations violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 245-246. With respect to the banks’ claim for a refund of excess taxes paid, Justice Brandeis explained: “The [banks’] rights were violated, and the causes of action arose, when taxes at the lower rate were collected from their competitors. It may be assumed that all ground for a claim for refund would have fallen if the State, promptly upon discovery of the discrimination, had removed it by collecting the additional taxes from the favored competitors. By such collection the [banks’] grievances would have been redressed, for these are not primarily overassessment. The right invoked is that to equal treatment; and such treatment will be attained if either their competitors’ taxes are increased or their own reduced.” Id., at 247. But the State did not elect to set matters right by collecting additional taxes from the banks’ competitors for the four tax years encompassed by the suit. And the Court found it “well settled” that the banks could not be “remitted to the necessity of awaiting such action by the state officials upon their own initiative.” Ibid. The Court held, therefore, that the banks were “entitled to obtain in these suits refund of the excess of taxes exacted from them.” Ibid. B These cases demonstrate the traditional legal analysis appropriate for determining Florida’s constitutional duty to provide relief to petitioner McKesson for its payment of an unlawful tax. Because exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property, the State must provide procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions in order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause. The State may choose to provide a form of “predeprivation process,” for example, by authorizing taxpayers to bring suit to enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its payment, or by allowing taxpayers to withhold payment and then interpose their objections as defenses in a tax enforcement proceeding initiated by the State. However, whereas “[w]e have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest,’” Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985) (citation omitted), it is well established that a State need not provide pre-deprivation process for the exaction of taxes. Allowing taxpayers to litigate their tax liabilities prior to payment might threaten a government’s financial security, both by creating unpredictable interim revenue shortfalls against which the State cannot easily prepare, and by making the ultimate collection of validly imposed taxes more difficult. To protect government’s exceedingly strong interest in financial stability in this context, we have long held that a State may employ various financial sanctions and summary remedies, such as distress sales, in order to encourage taxpayers to make timely payments prior to resolution of any dispute over the validity of the tax assessment. Florida has availed itself of this approach, establishing various sanctions and summary remedies designed so that liquor distributors tender tax payments before their objections are entertained and resolved. As a result, Florida does not purport to provide taxpayers like petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to withhold payment and to obtain a predeprivation determination of the tax assessment’s validity; rather, Florida requires taxpayers to raise their objections to the tax in a postdeprivation refund action. To satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, therefore, in this refund action the State must provide taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also a “clear and certain remedy,” O’Connor, 223 U. S., at 285, for any erroneous or unlawful tax collection to ensure that the opportunity to contest the tax is a meaningful one. Had the Florida courts declared the Liquor Tax invalid either because (other than its discriminatory nature) it was beyond the State’s power to impose, as was the unapportioned tax in O’Connor, or because the taxpayers were absolutely immune from the tax, as were the Indian Tribes in Ward and Carpenter, no corrective action by the State could cure the invalidity of the tax during the contested tax period. The State would have had no choice but to “undo” the unlawful deprivation by refunding the tax previously paid under duress, because allowing the State to “collect these unlawful taxes by coercive means and not incur any obligation to pay them back . . . would be in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ward, 253 U. S., at 24; see also Carpenter, 280 U. S., at 369. Here, however, the Florida courts did not invalidate the Liquor Tax in its entirety; rather, they declared the tax scheme unconstitutional only insofar as it operated in a manner that discriminated against interstate commerce. The State may, of course, choose to erase the property deprivation itself by providing petitioner with a full refund of its tax payments. But as both Montana National Bank and Bennett illustrate, a State found to have imposed an impermissibly discriminatory tax retains flexibility in responding to this determination. Florida may reformulate and enforce the Liquor Tax during the contested tax period in any way that treats petitioner and its competitors in a manner consistent with the dictates of the Commerce Clause. Having done so, the State may retain the tax appropriately levied upon petitioner pursuant to this reformulated scheme because this retention would deprive petitioner of its property pursuant to a tax scheme that is valid under the Commerce Clause. In the end, the State’s postdeprivation procedure would provide petitioner with all of the process it is due: an opportunity to contest the validity of the tax and a “clear and certain remedy” designed to render the opportunity meaningful by preventing any permanent unlawful deprivation of property. More specifically, the State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. Cf. Montana National Bank and Bennett (curing discrimination through such refunds). Alternatively, to the extent consistent, with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner’s competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. Cf. Bennett, 284 U. S., at 247 (suggesting State could erase the unconstitutional discrimination by “collecting the additional taxes from the favored competitors”). Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render petitioner’s resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause’s requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. Respondents suggest that, in order to redress fully petitioner’s unconstitutional deprivation, the State need not actually impose a constitutional tax scheme retroactively on all distributors during the contested tax period. Rather, they claim, the State need only place petitioner in the same tax position that petitioner would have been placed by such a hypothetical scheme. Specifically, respondents contend that the State, had it known that the Liquor Tax would be declared unconstitutional, would have imposed the higher flat tax rate on all distributors. Because petitioner would have paid the same tax under this hypothetical scheme as it did under the Liquor Tax, respondents claim that petitioner is not entitled to any retrospective relief (at least in the form of a refund); such relief would confer a “windfall” on petitioner by leaving it with a smaller tax burden than it would have borne were there no Commerce Clause violation in the first place. We implicitly rejected this line of reasoning in Montana National Bank and Bennett, and we expressly do so today. Even aside from the contrived and self-serving nature of the baseline against which respondents propose to measure petitioner’s “deprivation,” respondents’ approach is inconsistent with the nature of the State’s due process obligation. The deprivation worked by the Liquor Tax violated the Commerce Clause because the tax scheme’s purpose and effect was to impose a relative disadvantage on a category of distributors (those dealing with nonpreferred products) largely composed of out-of-state companies, not because its treatment of this category of distributors diverged from some fixed substantive norm. Hence, the salient feature of the position petitioner “should have occupied” absent any Commerce Clause violation is its equivalence to the position actually occupied by petitioner’s favored competitors. But the State’s offer to restore petitioner only to the same absolute tax position it would have enjoyed if taxed according to a “hypothetical” nondiscriminatory scheme does not in hindsight avoid the unlawful deprivation: It still in fact treats petitioner worse than distributors using the favored local products, thereby perpetuating the Commerce Clause violation during the contested tax period. Respondents are therefore correct that petitioner’s “claim for a refund thus asks for much more than prompt injunctive relief would have achieved” only in the narrow sense that petitioner’s absolute tax burden might be lower after the refund than if the tax preferences had immediately been enjoined such that all distributors were taxed at the higher rates. However, only an actual refund (or other retroactive adjustment of the tax burdens borne by petitioner and/or its favored competitors during the contested tax period) can bring about the nondiscrimination that “prompt injunctive relief would have achieved.” If, through the State’s own choice of relief, petitioner ends up paying a smaller tax than it would have paid if the State initially had imposed the highest rate on everyone, petitioner would not enjoy an unpalatable “windfall.” Rather, petitioner would merely be protected from the comparative economic disadvantage proscribed by the Commerce Clause. Hence, the State’s duty under the Due Process Clause to provide a “clear and certain remedy” requires it to ensure that the tax as actually imposed on petitioner and its competitors during the contested tax period does not deprive petitioner of tax moneys in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce. c The Florida Supreme Court cites two “equitable considerations” as grounds for providing petitioner only prospective relief, but neither is sufficient to override the constitutional requirement that Florida provide retrospective relief as part of its postdeprivation procedure. The Florida court first mentions that “the tax preference scheme [was] implemented by the [Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco] in good faith reliance on a presumptively valid statute.” 524 So. 2d, at 1010. This observation bespeaks a concern that a State’s obligation to provide refunds for what later turns out to be an unconstitutional tax would undermine the State’s ability to engage in sound fiscal planning. However, leaving aside the fact that the State might avoid any such disruption by choosing (consistent with constitutional limitations) to collect back taxes from favored distributors rather than to offer refunds, we do not find this concern weighty in these circumstances. A State’s freedom to impose various procedural requirements on actions for postdeprivation relief sufficiently meets this concern with respect to future cases. The State might, for example, provide by statute that refunds will be available only to those taxpayers paying under protest or providing some other timely notice of complaint; execute any refunds on a reasonable installment basis; enforce relatively short statutes of limitations applicable to such actions; refrain from collecting taxes pursuant to a scheme that has been declared invalid by a court or other competent tribunal pending further review of such declaration on appeal; and/or place challenged tax payments into an escrow account or employ other accounting devices such that the State can predict with greater accuracy the availability of undisputed treasury funds. The State’s ability in the future to invoke such procedural protections suffices to secure the State’s interest in stable fiscal planning when weighed against its constitutional obligation to provide relief for an unlawful tax. And in the present case, Florida’s failure to avail itself of certain of these methods of self-protection weakens any “equitable” justification for avoiding its constitutional obligation to provide relief. Moreover, even were we to assume that the State’s reliance on a “presumptively valid statute” was a relevant consideration to Florida’s obligation to provide relief for its unconstitutional deprivation of property, we would disagree with the Florida court’s characterization of the Liquor Tax as such a statute. The Liquor Tax reflected only cosmetic changes from the prior version of the tax scheme that itself was virtually identical to the Hawaii scheme invalidated in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984). See App. 263 (trial court held that the revised “legislation failed to surmount the constitutional violations addressed in Bacchus [Imports]”). The State can hardly claim surprise at the Florida courts’ invalidation of the scheme. The Florida Supreme Court also speculated that “if given a refund, [petitioner] would in all probability receive a windfall, since the cost of the tax has likely been passed on to [its] customers.” 524 So. 2d, at 1010. The court’s premise seems to be that the State, faced with an obligation to cure its discrimination during the contested tax period and choosing to meet that obligation through a refund, could legitimately choose to avoid generating a “windfall” for petitioner by refunding only that portion of the tax payment not “passed on” to customers (or even suppliers). Even were we to accept this premise, the State could not refuse to provide a refund based on sheer speculation that a “pass-on” occurred. We repeatedly have recognized that determining whether a particular business cost has in fact been passed on to customers or suppliers entails a highly sophisticated theoretical and factual inquiry; a court certainly cannot withhold part of a refund otherwise required to rectify an unconstitutional deprivation without first satisfactorily engaging in this inquiry. In any event, however, we reject respondents’ premise that “equitable considerations” justify a State’s attempt to avoid bestowing this so-called “windfall” when redressing a tax that is unconstitutional because discriminatory. In United States v. Jefferson Electric Mfg. Co., 291 U. S. 386 (1934), we enforced a statutorily created pass-on defense in a refund action designed to redress a tax overassessment. Comparing such an action to one in assumpsit for “money had and received,” we affirmed the Federal Government’s power in this equitable action to withhold the amount that the taxpayer had already passed on to others, on the theory that the taxpayer ought not be “unjustly enriched” by his recovery from the Government after he has already “recovered” his losses through the pass-on. We observed that if the taxpayer “has shifted the [economic] burden [of the tax] to the purchasers, they and not he have been the actual sufferers and are the real parties in interest,” id., at 402, and he ought not receive a windfall for their injury. But petitioner does not challenge here a tax assessment that merely exceeded the amount authorized by statute; petitioner’s complaint was that the Florida tax scheme unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The tax injured petitioner not only because it left petitioner poorer in an absolute sense than before (a problem that might be rectified to the extent petitioner passed on the economic incidence of the tax to others), but also because it placed petitioner at a relative disadvantage in the marketplace vis-a-vis competitors distributing preferred local products. See n. 25, supra; see also Bacchus Imports, supra, at 267 (“[E]ven if the tax [was] completely and successfully passed on, it increase[d] the price of [petitioner’s] products as compared to the exempted beverages”). To whatever extent petitioner succeeded in passing on the economic incidence of the tax through higher prices to its customers, it most likely lost sales to the favored distributors or else incurred other costs (e. g., for advertising) in an effort to maintain its market share. The State cannot persuasively claim that “equity” entitles it to retain tax moneys taken unlawfully from petitioner due to its pass-on of the tax where the pass-on itself furthers the very competitive disadvantage constituting the Commerce Clause violation that rendered the deprivation unlawful in the first place. We thus reject respondents’ reliance on a pass-on defense in this context. D Respondents assert that requiring the State to rectify its unconstitutional discrimination during the contested tax period “would plainly cause serious economic and administrative dislocation for the State.” Brief for Respondents on Rearg. 20. We agree that, within our due process jurisprudence, state interests traditionally have played, and may play, some role in shaping the contours of the relief that the State must provide to illegally or erroneously deprived taxpayers, just as such interests play a role in shaping the procedural safeguards that the State must provide in order to ensure the accuracy of the initial determination of illegality or error. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 347-348 (1976). We have already noted that States have a legitimate interest in sound fiscal planning and that this interest is sufficiently weighty to allow States to withhold predeprivation relief for allegedly unlawful tax assessments, providing postdeprivation relief only. See supra, at 37. But even if a State chooses to provide partial refunds as a means of curing the unlawful discrimination (as opposed to increasing the tax assessment of those previously favored), the State’s interest in financial stability does not justify a refusal to provide relief. As noted earlier, see supra, at 46, the State here does not and cannot claim that the Florida courts’ invalidation of the Liquor Tax was a surprise, and even after the trial court found a Commerce Clause violation the State failed to take reasonable precautions to reduce its ultimate exposure for the unconstitutional tax. And in the future, States may avail themselves of a variety of procedural protections against any disruptive effects of a tax scheme’s invalidation, such as providing by statute that refunds will be available to only those taxpayers paying under protest, or enforcing relatively short statutes of limitation applicable to refund actions. See supra, at 45. Such procedural measures would sufficiently protect States’ fiscal security when weighed against their obligation to provide meaningful relief for their unconstitutional taxation. Respondents also observe that the State’s choice of relief may entail various administrative costs (apart from the “cost” of any refund itself). Cf. Mathews, supra, at 348 (“[T]he Government’s interest...in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed” when determining precise contours of process due). The State may, of course, consider such costs when choosing between the various avenues of relief open to it. Because the Florida Supreme Court did not recognize in its refund proceeding the State’s obligation under the Due Process Clause to rectify the invalidity of its deprivation of petitioner’s property, the court did not consider how any administrative costs might influence the selection and fine-tuning of the relief afforded petitioner. We leave this to the state court on remand. IV When a State penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their taxes in timely fashion, thus requiring them to pay first before obtaining review of the tax’s validity, federal due process principles long recognized by our cases require the State’s postdeprivation procedure to provide a “clear and certain remedy,” O’Connor, 223 U. S., at 285, for the deprivation of tax moneys in an unconstitutional manner. In this case, Florida may satisfy this obligation through any form of relief, ranging from a refund of the excess taxes paid by petitioner to an offsetting charge to previously favored distributors, that will cure any unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce during the contested tax period. The State is free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined. The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. “The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce ... among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Under the Liquor Tax, the tax rate for each of several categories of preferred products is calculated according to a sliding scale. The rate varies directly with the total volume of such products sold by all distributors during the preceding month. If the volume of preferred products sold within any category is low, the tax rate is very favorable compared to the generally applicable rate for nonpreferred products. Conversely, at a relatively high volume of sales, the tax rate for preferred products equals the nonpreferred rate. The Liquor Tax also contains “retaliation” provisions which declare that the rate reductions applicable to the preferred products do not apply when they are imported from a State that imposes discriminatory taxes or provides agricultural price supports or export subsidies benefiting its own locally produced alcoholic beverages. Fla. Stat. §§ 564.06(9), 565.12(1)(c), 565.12(2)(c) (1989). Florida law divides traffic in alcoholic beverages into three tiers: (1) manufacture or importation; (2) wholesale distribution; and (3) retail sales. § 561.14. Manufacturers may not sell directly to retail dealers, and dis tributors therefore serve as necessary intermediaries. The State places the legal incidence of the excise taxes on distributors, who must remit the taxes monthly. Distributors may choose to sell beverage products receiving the tax preferences, nonpreferred products, or both. §§ 561.50, 561.506, 565.13. The record is unclear whether and how, prior to petitioner’s refund application to the Comptroller in September 1986, petitioner protested its tax payments or otherwise put the State on notice of its position that the Liquor Tax was unconstitutional. It appears, however, that Florida law does not require a taxpayer to pay under protest in order to preserve the right to challenge a remittance in a postpayment refund action, as long as the action is initiated within the applicable limitations period. See § 215.26 (2) (generally applicable 3-year limitations period for refund actions containing no protest requirement); Miami v. Florida Retail Federation, Inc., 423 So. 2d 991, 993 (Fla. App. 1982) (“[T]he involuntary payment of an invalid tax, which has been promulgated without an authorized procedure for protest, presents no bar to recovery by a taxpayer who has paid without protest”). We assume for present purposes that petitioner satisfied whatever protest requirements might exist, though as we explain, infra, at 45, upon remand the State may invoke, as an independent basis for refusing to provide a refund, petitioner’s failure to comply with a notice requirement that was in effect at the time of petitioner’s tax payments. The appeal and cross-appeal were certified directly to the Florida Supreme Court by the District Court of Appeal. The State’s immediate filing of its Notice of Appeal automatically stayed the trial court’s order. Fla. Rule App. Proc. 9.310(b)(2). Petitioner requested the trial court to vacate the stay, arguing that continued enforcement of the unconstitutional tax scheme pending State Supreme Court review would continue to expose Florida’s treasury to claims for tax refunds. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Pending the State Supreme Court’s final decision, therefore, respondents continued to collect taxes under the Liquor Tax with the unconstitutional preferences still in effect. Hence, in this case petitioner contests the validity of the taxes it paid from July 1985 until the State Supreme Court’s final decision was given effect in February 1988 (the contested tax period). Both cases were argued in October Term 1988 and then reargued in October Term 1989 after supplemental briefing was requested. 492 U. S. 915 (1989). “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 11. See, e. g., Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803 (1989); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232 (1987); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221 (1987); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (1985); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 464 U. S. 7 (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176 (1983); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136 (1980); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64 (1963); Laurens Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 365 U. S. 517 (1961); Mem phis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U. S. 389 (1952); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 (1931); International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135 (1918); State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204 (1871); cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981) (reversing state-court decision against claimant in suit against state entity seeking payment of unemployment benefits); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U. S. 313 (1973) (reversing state-court decision against claimant in suit against State seeking to quiet title). In several recent cases, we have exercised appellate jurisdiction to review issues of federal law arising in suits brought against States or state entities in state court even after noting that the Eleventh Amendment would have precluded federal jurisdiction as an original matter. See, e. g., Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65, n. 5 (1989) (“Had the present § 1983 action been brought in federal court,” the District Court would have “dismissed the plaintiff’s damages claim as barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 9, n. 7 (1980) (“[N]o Eleventh Amendment question is present, of course, where an action is brought in a state court”); cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 420 (1979) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over action brought in state court against State but noting that the Eleventh Amendment “places explicit limits on the powers of federal courts to entertain suits against a State”). See also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U. S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[S]tate courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States”); The Federalist No. 82, p. 555 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (“[I]n every case in which [state courts] were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.... [T]he inference seems to be conclusive that the state courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was not expressly prohibited”). “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” U. S. Const., Art. VI. “Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them .... If they fail therein, and withhold or deny rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the party aggrieved may bring the case from the highest court of the State in which the question could be decided to this court for final and conclusive determination.” Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637 (1884). See also Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 681 (1930) (“[T]he plaintiff’s claim is one arising under the Federal Constitution and, consequently, one on which the opinion of the state court is not final”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 347-348 (1816) (plenary appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court motivated in part by “the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution”). In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234 (1985), the Court responded to the dissent’s concern that state courts might inadequately protect federal rights despite the Supremacy Clause by adverting to the dissent’s description, id., at 256, n. 8, of a “longstanding, though un-articulated, rule that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit exercise of otherwise proper federal appellate jurisdiction over suits [against States] from state courts.” Id., at 240, n. 2. Of course, though the Eleventh Amendment does not constrain this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over such suits, appellate jurisdiction may be constrained for other reasons not apposite here. For example, a state-court judgment would be unreviewable were it to rest on an independent and adequate state-law ground. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1038, n. 4 (1983). Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 585 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting), citing Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821). For example, in Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900), the Court dismissed a suit brought in federal court by an aggrieved taxpayer seeking a refund for a State’s illegal assessment. We explained, however, that the State’s decision to consent to suit only in state, but not federal, court is “subject always to the condition, arising out of the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of the State in any action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or reexamined [by this Court], as prescribed by the act of Congress, if it denies to the plaintiff any right, title, privilege or immunity secured to him and specially claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id., at 445. Similarly, in Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590 (1904), the Court dismissed a quiet title suit brought in federal court by a citizen with respect to lands that had been taken by a State and sold to recoup compensation for certain tax deficiencies. The Court found that the State was a necessary party defendant and that the Eleventh Amendment barred initiation of the suit in federal court. The Court simultaneously declared, however, that “[o]f course, a taxpayer denied rights secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and specially set up by him, could bring the case here [to the Supreme Court] by writ of error from the highest courts of the State.” Id., at 592. See also Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 515-516, n. 19 (1981) (under state tax refund scheme, “a taxpayer may raise all constitutional objections, including those based on the State’s failure to pay interest or to return all unconstitutionally collected taxes, in the [state] legal refund proceeding, . . . after which the litigants have an opportunity to seek review in this Court”). “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1. Respondents do not question the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that the Liquor Tax violated the Commerce Clause. And it is clear that, under the approaches advanced today in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, post, p. 167, the Florida Supreme Court’s holding governs the validity of respondents’ taxation of petitioner prior to the date of the court’s decision. Under Justice O’Connor’s approach, see post, at 177-178, the Florida court’s decision applies retroactively because it rested on established principles of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See infra, at 45-46. Under Justice Stevens’ approach, post, at 212-218, the Florida court’s decision, like all judicial decisions, applies retroactively. See also Justice Scalia’s separate opinion, post, at 204-205; the circumstances present in that case warranting in his view a departure from stare decisis are not present here. In the recent past, after invalidating a state tax scheme on Commerce Clause grounds, we have left state courts with the initial duty upon remand of crafting appropriate relief in accord with both federal and state law. See, e. g., American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 297-298 (1987); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S., at 251-253; Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S., at 28; Bacchus Imports, 468 U. S., at 277. See, e. g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest”); Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 138-142 (1907); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104-105 (1878). See, e. g., Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 746 (1974); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 595-597 (1931); Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 122 (1916). See, e. g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S. 393, 410 (1982) (“‘During [prepayment litigation] the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer insolvency’”), quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871) (“It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public”). If a distributor fails to pay the tax on time, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco may issue a warrant which, when filed in a local circuit court, directs the county sheriff to levy upon and sell the delinquent taxpayer’s goods and chattels to recover the amount of the unpaid tax plus a penalty of 50%, along with interest of 1% per month and the costs of executing the warrant. Fla. Stat. § 210.14(1) (1989). In addition, the Division may revoke, § 561.29(l)(a), or decline to renew, § 561.24(5), a distributor’s license for failure to abide by Florida law, including the statutory requirement that the Liquor Tax be timely paid. We have long held that, when a tax is paid in order to avoid financial sanctions or a seizure of real or personal property, the tax is paid under “duress” in the sense that the State has not provided a fair and meaningful predeprivation procedure. See, e. g., United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm’n, 412 U. S. 363, 368 (1973) (economic sanctions for nonpayment); Ward v. Love County Board of Comm’rs, 253 U. S. 17, 23 (1920) (distress sale of land); Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U. S. 468, 471 (1912) (both). Justice Holmes suggested in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912), that a taxpayer pays “under duress” when he proffers a timely payment merely to avoid a “serious disadvantage in the assertion of his legal. . . rights” should he withhold payment and await a state enforcement proceeding in which he could challenge the tax scheme’s validity “by defence in the suit.” Id., at 286. In contrast, if a State chooses not to secure payments under duress and instead offers a meaningful opportunity for taxpayers to withhold contested tax assessments and to challenge their validity in a predeprivation hearing, payments tendered may be deemed “voluntary.” The availability of a predeprivation hearing constitutes a procedural safeguard against unlawful deprivations sufficient by itself to satisfy the Due Process Clause, and taxpayers cannot complain if they fail to avail themselves of this procedure. See Mississippi Tax Comm’n, supra, at 368, n. 11 (“[W]here voluntary payment [of a tax] is knowingly made pursuant to an illegal demand, recovery of that payment may be denied”). See n. 17, supra; see also, e. g., Mathews, 424 U. S., at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”) (citation omitted). The adequacy of this aspect of Florida’s postdeprivation procedure is not in dispute. We previously have held that the retroactive assessment of a tax increase does not necessarily deny due process to those whose taxes are increased, though beyond some temporal point the retroactive imposition of a significant tax burden may be “so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation,” depending on “the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid.” Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 147 (1938). See United States v. Hemme, 476 U. S. 558 (1986); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U. S. 292 (1981); cf. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52, 65 (1989) (“It is surely proper for Congress to legislate retrospectively to ensure that costs of a program are borne by the entire class of persons that Congress rationally believes should bear them”); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16 (1976) (“[L]egislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts”) (citations omitted). Because we do not know whether the State will choose in this case to assess and collect back taxes from previously favored distributors, we need not decide whether this choice would violate due process by unduly interfering with settled expectations. Should the State choose this remedial alternative, the State’s effort to collect back taxes from previously favored distributors may not be perfectly successful. Some of these distributors, for example, may no longer be in business. But a good-faith effort to administer and enforce such a retroactive assessment likely would constitute adequate relief, to the same extent that a tax scheme would not violate the Commerce Clause merely because tax collectors inadvertently missed a few in-state taxpayers. Whether the State would have taxed all distributors at the highest rate authorized by the Liquor Tax depends upon counterfactual assumptions regarding the many complex variables that affect legislative judgment, and therefore respondents’ prediction is not easily proved. It is quite possible, for example, that had the legislature been unable to enact the discriminatory Liquor Tax, the legislature instead would have extended universally the lower tax rate because it would have preferred to keep to a minimum the absolute economic burden on Florida growers of the preferred products as well as on the (mostly in-state) distributors of those products—even though this particular aspect of the tax scheme would generate less total revenue. The Florida Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is undisputed that manufacturers and distributors of beverages which qualify for preferential treatment under [the Liquor Tax] are in direct competition with manufacturers and distributors of alcoholic beverages which do not. . . . With these facts in mind it becomes quite apparent that. . . Florida’s alcoholic beverage tax scheme clearly raises the relative cost of doing business for a manufacturer or distributor of alcoholic beverages which are not made from base crops which are ‘adapted to growing in Florida.’” 524 So. 2d 1000, 1008 (1988). Brief for Respondents on Rearg. 15. Respondents also assert that no refund is appropriate because petitioner most likely would pay the same amount of tax even if the preferred sliding scale tax schedules were retroactively extended to petitioner. As explained earlier, see n. 2, supra, the tax rate on preferred products under the Liquor Tax varies with the total volume of such products sold. Respondents suggest that, were the sliding scale schedule applied to petitioner, then “the gallons of alcoholic beverages sold by petitioner (and the other distributors who previously paid the generally-applicable tax) [would have to be] included in the calculation” of the appropriate tax rate. Brief for Respondents 28. Cf. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 719-720, n. 36 (1978) (suggesting that it would be within district court’s equitable discretion, when devising remedy for Title VII violation arising from sex-based determination of insurance premiums, to determine appropriate relief based on recalculation of the premium required for an actuarially sound and nondiscriminatory insurance plan). Were the total volume of all sales included in the rate calculation, “it is virtually certain that the maximum rates under the scales would routinely apply.... It appears highly likely, therefore, that petitioner would owe the same amount of tax.” Brief for Respondents 28. We agree with respondents, that the State might remedy the invalidity of petitioner’s deprivation by extending to petitioner the sliding scale schedule in a nondiscriminatory fashion—but respondents’ proposal would appear not to accomplish this result. If, as proposed, the State were to calculate the tax rate applicable to petitioner based on the total volume of sales of both preferred and nonpreferred goods, but leave untouched the taxes actually collected from the favored distributors based on the volume of sales of only preferred goods, the resulting tax scheme would itself raise questions under the Commerce Clause due to the State’s use of a different “volume” variable for the preferred and nonpreferred goods in a manner that clearly disadvantages the latter. In order to cure the illegality of the tax as originally imposed, the State must ultimately collect a tax for the contested tax period that in no respect impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce. See Ward v. Love County Board of Comm’rs, 253 U. S., at 25 (recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was “any valid local [limitations] law in force when the claim was filed”); see also Fla. Stat. § 215.26(2) (1989) (generally applicable 3-year limitations period for tax refund actions). For example, even after the Florida trial court held that the Liquor Tax violated the Commerce Clause and enjoined the tax preferences for local products, the State did not join petitioner’s motion to vacate the stay automatically imposed pending appeal, thus continuing the unconstitutional tax assessment for an extra 11 months. See n. 5, supra. The State also opposed the suggestion that it place into a separate escrow account the discriminatory portion of taxes collected during this period of time, on the ground that “[t]here is a statutory mechanism in place . . . allowing for refunds.” App. 286. The state trial court, after ruling favorably upon petitioner’s motions for a preliminary injunction and partial summary judgment based on its holding that the Liquor Tax violated the Commerce Clause, ruled sua sponte that its judgment would have only prospective effect, and this ruling was upheld on direct appeal. At no time has any party had the opportunity to present evidence concerning the extent, if any, of petitioner’s ability to pass on the economic burden of the excise tax to its consumers or suppliers. The Florida Supreme Court’s statement that the tax “has likely been passed on” by petitioner therefore is purely speculative. We have expressed particular concern about the theoretical, factual, and practical difficulties in engaging in satisfactory “pass-on” analysis in the context of antitrust doctrine. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 741-745 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 492-493 (1968). See generally A. Atkinson & J. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics 160-226 (1980); R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, Public Finance In Theory and Practice 256-300 (3d ed. 1980); McLure, Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court: Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 69 (1982); D. Phares, Who Pays State and Local Taxes? (1980). For this reason, we have observed that determining whether a particular business cost has been passed on “would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories.” Hanover Shoe, supra, at 493. Petitioner’s relative market share might have stayed constant if the favored distributors reacted by raising their own prices to the same extent as did petitioner when trying to pass on its excess tax burden. If so, however, petitioner still would have suffered a comparative economic injury because the tax pass-on would have enabled the favored distributors alone to derive an increase in total revenue from the discriminatory tax. Petitioner’s market share and total revenue also might have stayed constant, at least in the short run, had all of its sales to liquor retailers been pursuant to cost-plus contracts. See Hanover Shoe, supra, at 494. But respondents do not claim that petitioner was in this position. It is conceivable that a particular distributor’s economic injury may be quite severe, for example, if the tax drives it out of the market entirely (though a rational disfavored distributor would not allow itself to incur any greater economic injury through a pass-on than it would have incurred had it simply shouldered the entire burden of the tax deprivation itself). However, the State’s obligation under the Due Process Clause to provide a refund (should it choose this avenue of relief) extends only to refunding the excess taxes collected under the Liquor Tax. Petitioner has not sought in this action to recover any actual damages it may have suffered. See Brief for Petitioner on Rearg. 3, n. 2; id., at 7. Respondents suggest that a pass-on defense may nevertheless be invoked as a matter of state law. While they concede that the State waived any sovereign immunity from suit through Fla. Stat. § 215.26’s authorization of a state-court refund action, they contend that this waiver extends only to refunds sought where the taxpayer has borne the actual economic burden of the tax, citing State ex rel. Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Dickinson, 286 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1973). We need not consider the import of this contention, however, because respondents misdescribe state law. In this case, the Florida Supreme Court characterized its concern about petitioner receiving a “windfall” due to the alleged pass-on of its tax burden as only an “equitable consideration,” not a state-law prohibition on relief. Moreover, no such state-law prohibition was recognized in Szabo Food Service, supra. There, the Florida Supreme Court refused to entertain a refund action brought by a distributor of food products to challenge a sales tax alleged to have been imposed erroneously as a matter of state law. The court noted that the legal incidence of the sales tax was placed not on the distributor but rather on its customers and that state law required the economic burden of the tax to be borne by the customers as well. Id., at 532. The court held that under these unique circumstances the distributor lacked standing to seek a refund, explaining that “[o]ne who does not himself bear the financial burden of a wrongfully extracted tax suffers no loss or injury, and accordingly, would not have standing to demand a refund.” Ibid. The court in Szabo did not mention, let alone rely on, a state-law immunity bar to the refund action. We reject respondents’ intimation that the cost of any refund considered by the State might justify a decision to withhold it. Just as a State may not object to an otherwise available remedy providing for the return of real property unlawfully taken or criminal fines unlawfully imposed simply because it finds the property or moneys useful, so also Florida cannot object to a refund here just because it has other ideas about how to spend the funds. The State is free, of course, to provide broader relief as a matter of state law than is required by the Federal Constitution. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U. S., at 277, n. 14.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. ALLARD et al. No. 78-740. Argued October 1, 1979 Decided November 27, 1979 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, BlackmuN, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., concurred in the judgment. Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Robert L. Klarquist, and Edward J. Shawaker. John P. Akolt III argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was John P. Akolt, Jr. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act are conservation statutes designed to prevent the destruction of certain species of birds. Challenged in this ease is the validity of regulations promulgated by appellant Secretary of the Interior that prohibit commercial transactions in parts of birds legally killed before the birds came under the protection of the statutes. The regulations provide in pertinent part: 50 CFR § 21.2 (a) (1978): “Migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs, lawfully acquired prior to the effective date of Federal protection under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act . . . may be possessed or transported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade, or barter. . . 50 CFR § 22.2 (a) (1978): “Bald eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired prior to June 8, 1940, and golden eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired prior to October 24, 1962, may be possessed, or transported without a Federal permit, but may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold, traded, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade or barter. . . .” Appellees are engaged in the trade of Indian artifacts: several own commercial enterprises, one is employed by such an enterprise, and one is a professional appraiser. A number of the artifacts are partly composed of the feathers of currently protected birds, but these artifacts existed before the statutory protections came into force. After two of the ap-pellees who had sold “pre-existing” artifacts were prosecuted for violations of the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, appellees brought this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of Colorado. The complaint alleged that the statutes do not forbid the sale of appellees’ artifacts insofar as the constituent birds’ parts were obtained prior to the effective dates of the statutes. It further alleged that if the statutes and regulations do apply to such property, they violate the Fifth Amendment. A three-judge court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (1970 ed.), held that because of “grave doubts whether these two acts would be constitutional if they were construed to apply to pre-act bird products,” the Acts were to be interpreted as “not applicable to preexisting, legally-obtained bird parts or products therefrom. . . .” App. to Juris. Statement 13ar-14a. Accordingly, the court ruled that “the interpretive regulations, 50 C. F. R. §§ 21.2 (a) and 22.2 (a) '[are] void as unauthorized extensions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act and1 [are] violative of the [appellees’] Fifth Amendment property rights.” Id., at 14a. Judgment was entered declaring “the subject regulations to be invalid and unenforceable as against the [appellees’] property rights in feathers and artifacts owned before the effective date of the subject statute,” and enjoining appellants “from any interference with the exercise of such rights, including the rights of sale, barter or exchange.” Id., at 16a-17a. We noted probable jurisdiction. 440 U. S. 905 (1979). We reverse. I Appellant Secretary of the Interior contends that both the Eagle Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts contemplate regulatory prohibition of commerce in the parts of protected birds, without regard to when those birds were originally taken. ■ Appellees respond that such a prohibition serves no purpose, arguing that statutory protection of wildlife is not furthered by an embargo upon traffic in avian artifacts that existed before the statutory safeguards came into effect. A Our point of departure in statutory analysis is the language of the enactment. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 405 (1979). “Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed statute, one certainly begins there.” F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes 16 (1947). The terms of the Eagle Protection Act plainly must be read as appellant Secretary argues. The sweepingly framed prohibition in § 668 (a) makes it unlawful to “take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import” protected birds. Congress expressly dealt with the problem of pre-existing bird products by qualifying that general prohibition with the proviso that “nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit possession or transportation” of bald or golden eagle parts taken prior to the effective date of coverage under the Act. (Emphasis supplied.) In view of the exhaustive and careful enumeration of forbidden acts in § 668 (a), the narrow limitation of the proviso to “possession or transportation” compels the conclusion that, with respect to pre-existing artifacts, Congress specifically declined to except any activities other than possession and transportation from the general statutory ban. To read a further exemption • for pre-existing artifacts into the Eagle Protection Act, “we would be forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 173 (1978). Nor can there be any question of oversight or drafting error. Throughout the statute the distinct concepts of possession, transportation, taking, and sale or purchase are treated with precision. The broad proscriptive provisions of the Eagle Protection Act were consistently framed to encompass a full catalog of prohibited acts, always including sale or purchase. See §§ 668 (a), 668 (b), 668b (b). In contrast, the exemptions created were specifically limited to possession or transportation, § 668 (a), taking, § 668a, or taking, possession, or transportation, ibid. That this precise, use of terminology was intentional is clear from the legislative history. An explanatory letter from the Department of Agriculture that was adopted in the Senate Report on the bill defines the reach of the Eagle Protection Act to make it unlawful to "take, possess, sell, purchase, transport, or otherwise deal with the bald eagle . . . with the proviso to the effect that it will not apply to the possession or transportation of any such eagle . . . taken prior to the effective date of the bill.” S. Rep. No. 1589, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1940). (Emphasis added.) Further, when Congress amended the Eagle Protection Act in 1962 to cover golden eagles, it once again excepted only possession and transportation of pre-existing artifacts from the general ban. 76 Stat. 1246. And it is particularly relevant that Congress has twice reviewed and amended the statute without rejecting the Department’s view that it is authorized to bar the sale of pre-existing artifacts. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S, 267, 275 (1974). The prohibition against the sale of bird parts lawfully taken before the effective date of federal protection is fully consonant with the purposes of the Eagle Protection Act. It was reasonable for Congress to conclude that the possibility of commercial gain presents a special threat to the preservation of the eagles because that prospect creates a powerful incentive both to evade statutory prohibitions against taking birds and to take a large volume of birds. The legislative draftsmen might well view evasion as a serious danger because there is no sure means by which to determine the age of bird feathers; feathers recently taken can easily be passed off as having been obtained long ago. Appellees argue that even if the age of feathers cannot be ascertained, it is still possible to date the Indian artifacts of which the feathers are a constituent. Thus, they contend that the goal of preventing evasion of the statute could have been achieved by means less onerous than a general sales ban: for example, by requiring documentation and appraisal of feathered artifacts. The short answer is that this legislation is not limited to the sale of feathers as part of artifacts; it broadly addresses sale or purchase of feathers and other bird parts in any shape or form. The prohibitions of the statute were devised to resist any evasion, whether in the sale of feathers as part of datable artifacts or in the sale of separate undatable bird products. Moreover, even if there were alternative ways to insure against statutory evasion, Congress was free to choose the method it found most efficacious and convenient. “[T]he legislature ... is authorized to pass measures for the protection of the people ... in the exercise of the police power, and is itself the judge of the necessity or expediency of the means adopted.” New York ex rel. Site v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 40 (1908). B The fundamental prohibition in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act is couched in language as expansive as that employed in the Eagle Protection Act. Title 16 U. S. C. § 703 provides that “[ujnless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful ... to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export” protected birds. But the Migratory Bird Treaty Act contains no explicit exception for the possession or transportation of bird parts obtained before the federal protection became effective: that exception is created by the Secretary’s regulation. 50 CFR § 21.2 (1978). Unlike our analysis under the Eagle Protection Act, therefore, reliance upon the negative inference from a narrow statutory exemption for the transportation or possession of pre-existing artifacts is precluded. Nevertheless, the text, context, and purpose of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act support the Secretary’s interpretative regulations of that enactment. On its face, the comprehensive statutory prohibition is naturally read as forbidding transactions in all bird parts, including those that compose pre-existing artifacts. While there is no doubt that regulations may exempt transactions from the general ban, nothing in the statute requires an exception for the sale of pre-existing artifacts. And no such statutory exception can be implied. When Congress wanted an exemption from the statutory prohibition, it provided so in unmistakable terms. Cf. 16 U. S. C, § 711. The structure and context of this enactment — to the extent that they enlighten — also suggest congressional understanding that regulatory authorities could ban the sale of lawfully taken birds, except where otherwise expressly instructed by the statute. If Congress had assumed that lawfully taken birds could automatically be sold under the Act, it would have been unnecessary to specify in § 711 that it is permissible under certain circumstances to sell game birds lawfully bred on farms and preserves. Furthermore, Congress could not have been unaware that a traditional legislative tool for enforcing conservation policy was a flat proscription on the sale of wildlife, without regard to the legality of the taking. At the time, a number of States, for example, simply prohibited or restricted possession or sale of wildlife during seasons closed to hunting. See New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, supra, at 40. Also before Congress was the Canadian law implementing the Migratory Bird Treaty, and that law itself contained a provision barring the purchase, sale, or possession of protected bird parts “during the time when the capturing, killing, or taking of such bird, nest, or egg is prohibited by law,” 55 Cong. Rec. 5412 (1917). (Emphasis added.) The Canadian sale ban — of which Congress was aware — thus applied not to illegally taken birds, but rather to all protected birds during the season in which hunting was prohibited. Against this background, the absence of a statutory exemption for pre-existing avian artifacts implies that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was intended to embrace the traditional conservation technique of banning transactions in protected birds, whenever taken. Related statutes may sometimes shed light upon a previous enactment. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429 (CA2 1945) (L. Hand, J.). Other conservation legislation enacted by Congress has employed the enforcement technique of forbidding the sale of protected wildlife without respect to the lawfulness of the taking. The Eagle Protection Act is a notable example. The more recent Endangered Species Act of 1973, as originally framed, prohibited the sale of products or parts of endangered species, without an exception for those products legally held for commercial purposes at the time of the Act’s passage. See 16 U. S. C. § 1538; United States v. Kepler, 531 F. 2d 796 (CA6 1976); Delbay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637, 641-642, 644 (DC 1976); see also H. R. Rep. No. 94-823, pp. 3—4 (1976) (discussing an amendment to the Endangered Species Act). And when Congress has meant to exempt lawfully taken items from the retroactive application of statutory prohibitions, it has taken care to do so explicitly, see 16 U. S. C. § 1372 (Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972); 16 U. S, C. § 1538 (b) (Endangered Species Act of 1973), or it has specifically amended the statute for that purpose, see 90 Stat. 911, amending 16 U. S. Cj § 1539 (Endangered Species Act); 92 Stat. 3760, amending 16 U. S. C. §§ 1538 and 1539 (Endangered Species Act). In contrast, Congress has never established a preexisting-artifacts exception to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, even though it has amended the statute on several occasions. We are therefore persuaded that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act empowers the Secretary of the Interior to bar commercial transactions in covered bird parts in spite of the fact that the parts were lawfully taken before the onset of federal protection. We see no indication to the contrary. It follows that the Secretary could properly permit the possession or transportation, and not the sale or purchase, of pre-existing bird artifacts. Accordingly, we disagree with the District Court’s interpretation of the Act as inapplicable to pre-exist-ing legally obtained bird parts. II We also disagree with the District Court’s holding that, as construed to authorize the prohibition of commercial transactions in pre-existing avian artifacts, the Eagle Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts violate appellees’ Fifth Amendment property rights because the prohibition wholly deprives them of the opportunity to earn a profit from those relics. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123-128 (1978), is our most recent exposition on the Takings Clause. That exposition need not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that government regulation— by definition — involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase. “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922); see Penn Central, supra, at 124. The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of “ ‘justice and fairness.’ ” Ibid.; see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962). There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. See Penn Central, supra, at 123-128. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic. The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full “bundle” of property rights, the destruction of one “strand” of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. Compare Penn Central, supra, at 130-131, and United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222 (1956), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, and United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U. S. 624 (1961). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1230-1233 (1967). In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds. It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees’ property. Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking. Compare Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, at 594, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra. In the instant case, it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge. At any rate, loss of future profits—unaccompanied by any physical property restriction—provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim. Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests. Cf., e. g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L. J. 52 (1936). Regulations that bar trade in certain goods have been upheld against claims of unconstitutional taking. For example, the Court has sustained regulations prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages despite the fact that individuals were left with previously acquired stocks. Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1924), involved a federal statute that forbade the sale of liquors manufactured before passage of the statute. The claim of a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment was tersely rejected. Id., at 563. Similarly, in Jacob Rwppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920), a federal law that extended a domestic sales ban from intoxicating to nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages “on hand at the time of the passage of the act,” id., at 302, was upheld. Mr. Justice Brandéis dismissed the takings challenge, stating that “there was no appropriation of private property, but merely a lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed upon its use.” Id., at 303. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887). It is true that appellees must bear the costs of these regulations. But, within limits, that is a burden borne to secure “the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We hold that the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property in this case does not effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Reversed. The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment of the Court. The Eagle Protection Act, § 1, 54 Stat. 250, as amended, as set forth in 16 U. S. C. § 668 (a), provides in pertinent part: “Whoever, within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, without being permitted to do so as provided in this sub-chapter, shall knowingly, or with wanton disregard 'for the consequences of his act take, possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any time or in any manner any bald eagle commonly known as the American eagle or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation issued pursuant to this subehapter, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both: . . . Provided further, That nothing herein shaE be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any bald eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfully taken prior to June 8, 1940, and that nothing herein shaE be construed to prohibit possession or transportation of any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, lawfuUy taken prior to the addition to this subchapter of the provisions relating to preservation of the golden eagle.” The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, § 2, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, as set forth in 16 U. S. C. § 703, similarly provides: “Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or eggs of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16, 1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the United States and the United Mexican States for the protection of migratory birds and game mammals concluded February 7, 1936, and the United States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment concluded March 4, 1972.” Appellee L. Douglas Allard was convicted and fined for violating the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U. S. C. §668 (a), which establishes criminal penalties for unpermitted eagle sales. United States v. Allard, 397 F. Supp. 429 (Mont. 1975). Appellee Pierre Bovis was prosecuted under the Eagle Protection Act and under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U. S. C. § 707, which provides criminal penalties for the unlawful sale of migratory birds. United States v. Bovis, Nos. 75-CR-63 and 75-CR-66 (Colo. 1975). Appellees also alleged that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and regulations thereunder were unconstitutionally vague and involved an improper delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch. These allegations were not passed on by the District Court and are not pressed here. We therefore do not address them. The Secretary contends that appellees’ constitutional claims are insubstantial and did not justify convention of a three-judge court. We disagree. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 536-538 (1974). Exemption for pre-existing artifacts. Exemption for takings necessary to protect wildlife, livestock, or agriculture from predation. Exemption for scientific, zoological, or religious needs and, in certain circumstances, for falconry. In 1962, Congress extended the Eagle Protection Act to cover golden, as well as bald, eagles, 76 Stat. 1246, and in 1972 penalties under the statute were reinforced, 86 Stat. 1064. On each occasion — especially the latter—the purposes and scheme of the bill were considered. S. Rep. No. 1986, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H. R. Rep. No. 1450, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); S. Rep. No. 92-1159 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-817 (1972). Regulations preventing the sale of pre-existing artifacts had been in force for some time preceding these amendments, see 50 CFR § 6.1 (Cum. Supp. 1944); 50 CFR §§ 11.1 and 11.8 (b) (1964); 50 CFR § 22.2 (1978), although the wording of the 1960 regulation may suggest otherwise, 50 CFR §§ 11.1 and 11.6 (b) (1961). See Affidavit of Dr. Alan H. Brush, App. 44-46. Our reading of the Eagle Protection Act is not shaken by the fact that, until 1959, Alaska was exempted from the strictures of § 668. See 54 Stat. 250, amended by § 14, 73 Stat. 143. The fact that eagles could be taken, possessed, sold, and purchased in the Territory of Alaska in no way undercut the general ban on sales in the 48 States; we do not read the pre-1959 Alaska exemption as a license to sell Alaska eagles in the rest of the country, or vice versa. We are also unpersuaded by appellees’ argument that the Eagle Protection Act does not apply to feathers that have lost their “identities” as elements in artifacts. This contention is bottomed on the statutory use of the word bird “part” instead of bird “product.” The distinction between the terms is immaterial: for example, when Congress amended the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to specify that it applied to bird products as well as bird parts, Pub. L. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190, the Senate Report indicated that the change was a clarification rather than a substantive change in the reach of the law. S. Rep. No. 93-851, p. 3 (1974). The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, passed in 1918, 40 Stat. 755, predates the Eagle Protection Act by 22 years. Originally the legislation implementing a Migratory Bird Convention between Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) and the United States, the Act now implements similar treaties between this country and other nations. See generally Coggins & Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 Colo. L. Rev. 165, 169-174 (1979); M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law 68-74 (1977). The § 703 prohibition is, by its own terms, subject to regulatory exception. See also 16 U. S. C. § 704. “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the breeding of migratory game birds on farms and preserves and the sale of birds so bred under proper regulation for the purpose of increasing the food supply.” In fact, the Conference Report accepting the floor amendment that became § 711 was actually withdrawn in order to add language indicating that lawfully bred birds could be sold. See 56 Cong. Rec. 8015 (1918); id., at 8130, 8430. 55 Cong. Rec. 5412-5413 (1917) (Senate); 56 Cong. Rec. 7372 (1918) (House). Britain entered into the treaty on behalf of Canada. The Canadian statute indicates that there might be a lawful excuse for possessing or selling birds out of season, but not what such an excuse would be. In 1976, Congress specifically amended the Act to establish a very limited sales exemption for products of animals lawfully owned for commercial purposes before the Act came into effect. Pub. L. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911, amending 16 U. S. C. § 1539. The amendment was circumscribed in scope and merely authorized but did not order the Secretary of Commerce to grant exemptions for pre-Act animal products. In arguing the position that the statute prevents only the sale of illegally taken birds, appellees rely upon the language of the 1972 Migratory Bird Convention with Japan, incorporated into the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1974. Pub. L. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190. The Convention provides that “[a]ny sale, purchase or exchange of these [migratory] birds or their eggs, taken illegally, alive or dead, and any sale, purchase or exchange of the products thereof or their parts shall ... be prohibited.” (Emphasis added.) But the language of the Convention, like the terms of the other Conventions, does not carry great- weight in the interpretation of the statute. There are material variations in the particulars of each of the Conventions, see Coggins & Patti, supra n. 11, at 173-174; Bean, supra n. 11, at 70-73; it is therefore hazardous to look to- any single Convention for definitive resolution of a statutory construction problem. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Conventions represent binding international commitments, they establish minimum protections for wildlife; Congress could and did go further in developing domestic conservation measures. See id., at 74-76. Our interpretation of the statute does not depart from any course of construction adopted by other courts. Although appellees argue that several courts have determined that lawfully taken birds may be sold under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, we do not read the cases as supporting appellees’ position. Two of the cited cases, United States v. Hamel, 534 F. 2d 1354 (CA9 1976) (per curiam), and United States v. Blanket, 391 F. Supp. 15 (WD Okla. 1975), neither decide nor imply a decision as to the statutory question posed here. Language favorable to appellees in United States v. Aitson, No. 74-1588 (CA10, July 21, 1975), is merely dictum in an unpublished opinion. Contrast also United States v. Richards, 583 F. 2d 491 (CA10 1978). United States v. Marks, 4 F. 2d 420 (SD Tex. 1925), did hold it impermissible to punish the sale of birds taken before the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was passed. But that ruling rested upon the court’s view that Congress’ authority to regulate the birds must rest wholly upon the treaty rather than the commerce power. Whatever the logic of that ruling, the underlying assumption that the national commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed. See, e. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979). Thus, only two early District Court cases, both authored by the same judge, sustain the statutory proposition advanced by appellees. United States v. Fuld Store Co., 262 F. 836 (Mont. 1920); In re Informations Under Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 281 F. 546 (Mont. 1922). The cases involved no more than a cursory inquiry into the statute, and we find them unconvincing. Indeed, heightened restrictions on the sale or purchase of migratory bird parts were appropriate in light of congressional recognition of the danger to wildlife posed by commercial exploitation. The 1960 amendments to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act specifically addressed that problem by stiffening penalties for the taking of protected birds with intent to sell and for the sale of protected birds. 74 Stat. 866; see H. R. Rep. No. 1787, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. Rep. No. 1779, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). Although this argument appears to have been cast in the District Court in terms of economic substantive due process, before this Court appellees have used the terminology of the Takings Clause. The Secretary has raised the question of appellees’ standing to assert a takings claim with respect to their artifacts. He asserts that appellees have not clearly stated that they acquired their property interest in the bird artifacts before the sales ban came into force. If they have not, the Secretary argues, then the “value of any artifacts purchased by appellees after the effective date of the Act had already been diminished by the applicability of the Act.” Brief for Appellants 30. This contention is misplaced. Even assuming that appellees have not sufficiently alleged pre-effectiveness possession, they have standing to urge their constitutional claim. Because the regulation they challenge restricts their ability to dispose of their property, appellees have a personal, concrete, live interest in the controversy. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The timing of acquisition of the artifacts is relevant to a takings analysis of appellees’ investment-backed expectations, but it does not erect a jurisdictional obstacle at the threshold. Of course, there is no standing to assert a takings claim by those who are merely employed in selling artifacts owned by others. All appellees, however, may face future criminal prosecutions for violations of the statutes, and that, of itself, suffices to give them standing to litigate their interest in the construction of the statutes. It should be emphasized that in Pennsylvania Cod the loss of profit opportunity was accompanied by a physical restriction against the removal of the coal. It is not significant that the statute considered in Everard’s Breweries had been passed under the Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment. The Court did not suggest that the Amendment gave Congress a special prerogative to override ordinary Fifth Amendment limitations. Although the beverage owner in Jacob Ruppert retained the ability to export his product or to sell it domestically for purposes other than consumption, see 251 U. S., at 303; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 157 (1919), the domestic sales ban was undoubtedly commercially crippling. No importance should be attached to the fact that the enactment in Jacob Ruppert was promulgated pursuant to the war power. But cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958). Appellees also briefly argue that the regulations in this case interfere with their right to engage in a lawful occupation. Even if we were inclined to exhume this variant of the theory of substantive due process, it would not be applicable here. Appellees may still sell artifacts that do not consist in part of protected bird products.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF TACOMA v. TAXPAYERS OF TACOMA et al. No. 509. Argued April 30, 1958. Decided June 23, 1958. Northcutt Ely argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Marshall McCormick, Paul J. Nolan, Robert L. McCarty, C. Emerson Duncan, II, and Charles F. Wheatley, Jr. By special leave of Court, 356 U. S. 916, Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States and the Federal Power Commission, as amici curiae, urging reversal. Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade, Lionel Kestenbaum, Willard D. Gatchell and Howard E. Wahrenbrock filed a brief for the Federal Power Commission, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. John S. Lynch, Jr. and E. P. Donnelly, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for respondents. Mr. Lynch filed a brief for the Taxpayers of Tacoma, Washington, respondents. With Mr. Donnelly on a brief were John J. O’Connell, Attorney General, and Philip R. Meade, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington et al., respondents; and joining them in this brief were the States of Iowa, by Norman A. Erbe, Attorney General; Michigan, by Paul L. Adams, Attorney General; Montana, by Forrest H. Anderson, Attorney General; Nevada, by Harvey Dickerson, Attorney General; New Mexico, by Fred M. Standley, Attorney General; Vermont, by Frederick M. Reed, Attorney General; Virginia, by A. S. Harrison, Jr., Attorney General; and Wisconsin, by Stewart G. Honeck, Attorney General, and Roy G. Tulane and James H. McDermott, Assistant Attorneys General. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. This is the latest episode in litigation beginning in 1948 which has been waged in five tribunals and has produced more than 125 printed pages of administrative and judicial opinions. It concerns the plan of the City of Tacoma, a municipal corporation in the State of Washington, to construct a power project on the Cowlitz River, a navigable water of the United States, in accordance with a license issued by the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Power Act. The question presented for decision here is whether under the facts of this case the City of Tacoma has acquired federal eminent domain power and capacity to take, upon the payment of just compensation, a fish hatchery owned and operated by the State of Washington, by virtue of the license issued to the City under the Federal Power Act and more particularly § 21 thereof. The project cannot be built without taking the hatchery because it necessarily must be inundated by a reservoir that will be created by one of the project’s dams. The question has arisen under the following circumstances and proceedings. Having earlier filed its declaration of intention to construct the project, the City of Tacoma, a “municipality” in the State of Washington, on December 28, 1948, filed with the Commission, under § 4 (e) of the Federal Power Act, an application for a federal license to construct a power project, including two dams (known as Mossyrock and Mayfield) and appurtenant facilities, on the Cowlitz River. The Mossyrock development was proposed to be located at Mile 65 and to consist of a concrete dam across the Cowlitz rising 510 feet above bedrock (creating a reservoir covering about 10,000 acres extending 21 miles upstream) and an integral powerhouse containing, initially, three generators each of 75,000-kilowatt capacity and provisions for a fourth generator of like capacity. The Mayfield development was proposed to be located at Mile 52 and to consist of a concrete dam across the Cowlitz rising 240 feet above bedrock (creating a reservoir covering about 2,200 acres extending 13.5 miles upstream to the tailwaters of the Mossyrock Dam, which would inundate the State’s fish hatchery) and an integral powerhouse containing, initially, three generators each of 40,000-kilowatt capacity and provisions for a fourth generator of like capacity. The project — estimated to cost $146,000,000, including $9,465,000 for devices to enable anadromous fish to pass to spawning grounds upstream and their young to pass to the sea, and for new fish hatcheries — would thus have initial capacity to produce 345,000 kilowatts or 474,000 horsepower, and eventually 460,000 kilowatts or 632,000 horsepower, of electrical energy. The Commission ordered a public hearing to determine whether the license should issue, and gave notice of the hearing to the Governor of the State of Washington. In response, the Attorney General of the State filed an intervening petition, in the names of the State’s Directors of Fisheries and of Game, alleging in substance that the State’s Departments of Fisheries and of Game are subdivisions of the sovereign State, and that the respective Directors are charged with the duty of enforcing its laws concerning the conservation of fish and game; that the dams and fish-handling facilities proposed by the City would destroy fishery resources of the State; that construction of proposed dams would violate Wash. Rev. Code 90.28.060, requiring the State’s permission to construct any dam for the storage of 10 acre-feet or more of water, and Wash. Rev. Code 75.20.010, prohibiting the construction of any dam higher than 25 feet across any river tributary to the Columbia, downstream from the McNary Dam, within the migratory range of anadromous fish; and “[t]hat the reservoirs which would be created by the proposed dams would inundate a valuable and irreplaceable fish hatchery owned by the State of Washington, as well as . . . productive spawning areas.” The City's answer admitted that the State’s fish hatchery would be inundated by the Mayfield Reservoir. The State’s Attorney General also appointed a Special Assistant Attorney General to represent all persons of the State whose views were in conflict with the State’s official position. Upon the issues thus framed a hearing, consuming 24 days, was conducted by a Commission examiner, throughout which the Attorney General of the State, by his designated assistant, actively participated in opposition to the application, and the Special Assistant Attorney General, appointed for the purpose stated, also participated in the proceedings before the Commission. Thereafter the Commission, on November 28,1951, rendered its opinion, findings, and order granting the license. Re City of Tacoma, 92 P. U. R. (N. S.) 79. The State petitioned for a rehearing which was denied. Pursuant to § 313 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 825i, the State, in its proper name and also on behalf of its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, petitioned for review of the Commission's order by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The City intervened. The State there challenged the Commission’s authority to issue the license principally upon the grounds that the City had not complied with applicable state laws nor obtained state permits and approvals required by state statptes; that “Tacoma, as a creature of the State of Washington, cannot act in opposition to the policy of the State or in derogation of its laws” (emphasis added); and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the Commission’s findings and order. The Court of Appeals, holding that “state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States” and that there was ample evidence to sustain the Commission’s findings and its order, affirmed. Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm’n, 207 F. 2d 391, 396. (Emphasis added.) The State then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied. 347 U. S. 936. While the petition for review was pending in the Ninth Circuit, the City, on February 3, 1952, commenced an action in the Superior Court of Pierce County, Washington, against the taxpayers of Tacoma and the State's Directors of Fisheries and of Game, seeking a judgment declaring valid a large issue of revenue bonds, authorized by the City’s Ordinance (No. 14386) of January 9, 1952, to be issued and sold by Tacoma to finance the construction of the Cowlitz project — a proceeding specifically authorized by Wash. Rev. Code 7.25.010 through 7.25.040. As required by those statutes the court named representative taxpayers of Tacoma as class defendants and also appointed their counsel who .demurred to the City’s complaint. The State’s Directors of Fisheries and of Game, acting through an Assistant Attorney General- of the State, filed an answer and also a cross-complaint (reasserting substantially the same objections that they and the State had made before the Commission, and that had been made in, and rejected by, the Court of Appeals on their petition for review) to which the City demurred. The judge of the Superior Court sustained the Taxpayers’ demurrer and dismissed the suit. Tacoma appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington. That court, three justices dissenting, reversed the judgment and remanded the cause with instructions to overrule the Taxpayers’ demurrer and to proceed further consistently with the court’s opinion. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 43 Wash. 2d 468, 262 P. 2d 214. Following that opinion the City, on June 21, 1955, accepted bids for a block of its revenue bonds totaling $15,000,000, and on the next day it awarded contracts for construction of the Mayfield Dam aggregating $16,120,870. Two days later, June 24, 1955, the Directors “acting for and on behalf of the State” moved in the Superior Court for, and obtained, ex parte, an order enjoining the City, pending determination of the suit, from proceeding to construct the Cowlitz project or to sell any of its revenue bonds. That order was modified on June 30, 1955, to permit such construction work as would not in any manner interfere with the bed or waters of the Cowlitz River. Promptly thereafter the City began construction of the project, within the limits of the injunction, and had expended about $7,000,000 thereon to the time the work was completely enjoined as later stated. On July 27, 1955, Tacoma amended its complaint merely to assert the intervening facts that the Commission, upon application of the City which was opposed by the State, had, on the basis of delays entailed by this litigation, entered an order on February 24, 1954, amending Articles 28 and 33 of the City’s license by extending the time for commencing and for completing the project to December 31, 1955, and December 31, 1958, respectively, and that the City had amended its pertinent ordinance (No. 14386) accordingly and in other minor respects. On August 8, 1955, on motion made by .the State’s Attorney General (in the names of the Directors of Fisheries and of Game), the State, “in its sovereign capacity,” was formally made a defendant in the action. The State and those Directors answered, and also filed a cross-complaint again reviving the objections previously made by the Directors in their earlier cross-complaint and alleging further that the project would interfere with navigation of the Cowlitz River in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.010. Upon pretrial conference the Superior Court found that the navigation issue was the only one open and ordered that the evidence at the trial be limited to that issue. On January 11, 1956, the case was tried and the testimony taken was limited solely to the navigation issue. On March 6, 1956, the court, holding that the State’s statutes proscribing the construction of dams (note 11) are “inapplicable,” but that the City “is acting illegally and in excess of its authority in the construction of the . . . project as presently proposed for the reason that said project would necessarily impede, obstruct or interfere with public navigation contrary to the proviso of R. C. W. 80.40.010 et seq.,” entered judgment in favor of the Taxpayers and the State, and enjoined the City from proceeding to construct the project. Tacoma appealed, and the Taxpayers, the State and its Directors cross-appealed, to the Supreme Court of Washington. On February 7, 1957, that court, three justices dissenting, affirmed. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P. 2d 567. It agreed that the Washington-statutes proscribing the construction of dams (note 11) were “inapplicable . . . insofar as the same conflict with the provisions of the Federal Power Act or the terms and conditions of [the City’s] License for said project, or insofar as they would enable State officials to exercise a veto over said project” (49 Wash. 2d, at 801, 307 P. 2d, at 577), but it disapproved the action of the trial court in sustaining the State’s objection that the project would interfere with navigation in violation of Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.010. However, upon the declared premise that though the trial court’s judgment was based upon an erroneous ground it would sustain it if correct on any ground within the pleadings and established by proof, it held that, though the State Legislature has given the City the right to construct and operate facilities for the production and distribution of electric power and a general power of condemnation for those purposes, “the legislature has [not] expressly authorized a municipal corporation to condemn state-owned land previously dedicated to a public use [and] that the city of Tacoma has not been endowed with [State] statutory capacity to condemn [the State’s fish hatchery]”; that “the city of Tacoma [may not] receive the power and capacity to condemn [the State’s fish hatchery] previously dedicated to a public use, from the license issued to it by the Federal power commission in the absence of such power and capacity under state statutes” (emphasis added); and that the City’s “inability so to act can be remedied only by state legislation that expands its capacity.” (Emphasis in original.) 49 Wash. 2d, at 798, 799, 307 P. 2d, at 576, 577. This, it said, “is not a question of the right of the Federal government to control all phases of activity on navigable streams, nor a question of its power, under the Federal power act, to delegate that right. It only questions the capacity of a municipal corporation of this state to act under such license when its exercise requires the condemnation of state-owned property dedicated to a public use.” 49 Wash. 2d, at 798, 307 P. 2d, at 576. (Emphasis added.) We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 888. At the outset respondents ask dismissal of our writ on the ground that the case is moot. They argue that it is evident the Cowlitz project cannot be completed by December 31, 1958, which is the date now stated in the license for its completion. There is no merit in this contention because § 13 of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1071, 16 U. S. C. § 806, expressly provides that “the period for the completion of construction carried on in good faith and with reasonable diligence may be extended by the Commission when not incompatible with the public interests,” and an application by the City is now pending before the Commission for an extension of completion time based upon delays entailed by these proceedings. We come now to the core of the controversy between the parties, namely, whether the license issued by the Commission under the Federal Power Act to the City of Tacoma gave it capacity to act under that federal license in constructing the project and delegated to it federal eminent domain power to take, upon the payment of just compensation, the State’s fish hatchery — essential to the construction of the project — in the absence of state legislation specifically conferring such authority. At the threshold of this controversy petitioner, the City, asserts that, under the express terms of § 313 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 8251 (b), this question has been finally determined by the decision of the Court of Appeals (207 F. 2d 391) and this Court’s denial of certiorari (347 U. S. 936); and that respondents’ cross-complaints, and proceedings thereon, in the subsequent bond validation suit in the Washington courts have been only impermissible collateral attacks upon the final judgment of the Court of Appeals. If this assertion is correct, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington now before us would necessarily have to be reversed, for obviously that court, like this one, may not, in such a case, re-examine and decide a question which has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in earlier litigation between the parties. We must turn then to an examination of petitioner’s contention. It is no longer open to question that the Federal Government under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) has dominion, to the exclusion of the States, over navigable waters of the United States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 337; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 424; First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm’n, 328 U. S. 152, 173; United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222, 224-225. Congress has elected to exercise this power under the detailed and comprehensive plan for development of the Nation’s water resources, which it prescribed in the Federal Power Act, to be administered by the Federal Power Commission. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Comm’n, supra; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., supra. Section 313 (b) of that Act, upon which petitioner’s claim of finality depends, provides, in pertinent part: “(b) Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the United States court of appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee or public utility to which the order relates is located ... by filing in such court, within 60 days after the order of [the] Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of such petition shall forthwith be served upon any member of the Commission and thereupon the Commission shall certify and file with the court a transcript of the record upon which the order complained of was entered. Upon the filing of such transcript such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do. The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . . The judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in sections 846 and 8Iff of Title 28.” 16 U. S. C. § 825Z (b). (Emphasis added.) This statute is written in simple words of plain meaning and leaves no room to doubt the congressional purpose and intent. It can hardly be doubted that Congress, acting within its constitutional powers, may prescribe the procedures and conditions under which, .and the courts in which, judicial review of administrative orders may be had. Cf. Labor Board v. Cheney California Lumber Co., 327 U. S. 385, 388. So acting, Congress in § 313 (b) prescribed the specific, complete and exclusive mode for judicial review of the Commission’s orders. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 124 F. 2d 800, 804, cert. denied, 316 U. S. 663. It there provided that any party aggrieved by the Commission’s order may have judicial review, upon all issues raised before the Commission in the motion for rehearing, by the Court of Appeals which “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part,” and that “[t]he judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It thereby necessarily precluded de novo litigation between the parties of all issues inhering in the controversy, and all other modes of judicial review. Hence, upon judicial review of the Commission’s order, all objections to the order, to the license it directs to be issued, and to the legal competence of the licensee to execute its terms, must be made in the Court of Appeals or not at all. For Congress, acting within its powers, has declared that the Court of Appeals shall have “exclusive jurisdiction” to review such orders, and that its judgment “shall be final,” subject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification. Such statutory finality need not be labeled res judicata, estoppel, collateral estoppel, waiver or the like either by Congress or the courts. The State participated in the hearing before the Commission. It there vigorously objected to the issuance of the license upon the grounds, among others, “[t]hat the reservoirs which would be created by the proposed dams would inundate a valuable and irreplaceable fish hatchery owned by the State” and, hence, necessarily require the taking of it by the City under the license sought; that the City had not complied with the applicable laws of the State respecting construction of the project and performance of the acts necessarily incident thereto (note 11); and that the City was not authorized by the laws of the State to engage in such business. The Commission rejected these contentions of the State and made all the findings required by the Act to support its order granting the license (note 9) including the finding that: “The Applicant . . . has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable State laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project; and it is a municipality within the meaning of Section 3 (7) of the Act.” The State then petitioned the Commission for a rehearing, reviving the foregoing contentions and raising others. The petition was denied. Thereafter, the State, following the procedures prescribed by § 313 (b), petitioned the proper Court of Appeals for review of the Commission’s findings and order. After full hearing, that court rejected all contentions there raised by the State, did not disturb any of the Commission’s findings, and affirmed its order without modification. Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Comm’n, 207 F. 2d 391. It made particular mention of, and approved, the Commission’s finding, as rephrased by the court, that the City had submitted “such evidence of compliance with state law as, in the Commission’s judgment, would be ‘appropriate to effect the purposes of a Federal license on the navigable waters of the United States.’ ” Id., at 396. Moreover, in its briefs in the Court of Appeals, the State urged reversal of the Commission’s order on the grounds that the City “has not shown, nor could it show, that [it] has availed itself of . . . any right to take or destroy the property of the State of Washington [and that] Tacoma, as a creature of the State of Washington, cannot act [under the license] in opposition to the policy of the State or in derogation of its laws.” (Emphasis added.) In rejecting these contentions — that the City does not have “any right to take or destroy property of the State” and “cannot act” in accordance with the terms of its federal license — the Court of Appeals said: “Again, we turn to the First Iowa case, supra. There, too, the applicant for a federal license was a creature of the state and the chief opposition came from the state itself. Yet, the Supreme Court permitted the applicant to act inconsistently with the declared policy of its creator, and to prevail in obtaining a license. “Consistent with the First Iowa case, supra, we conclude that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States.” Id., at 396. (Emphasis added.) We think these recitals show that the very issue upon which respondents stand here was raised and litigated in the Court of Appeals and decided by its judgment. But even if it might be thought that this issue was not raised in the Court of Appeals, it cannot be doubted that it could and should have been, for that was the court to which Congress had given “exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside” the Commission’s order. And the State may not reserve the point, for another round of piecemeal litigation, by remaining silent on the issue while its action to review and reverse the Commission’s order was pending in that court — which had “exclusive jurisdiction” of the proceeding and whose judgment therein as declared by Congress “shall be final,” subject to review by this Court upon certiorari or certification. After the Court of Appeals’ judgment was rendered, the State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied. 347 U. S. 936. These were precisely the proceedings prescribed by Congress in § 313 (b) of the Act for judicial review of the Commission’s findings and order. They resulted in affirmance. That result, Congress has declared, “shall be final.” But respondents say that the Court of Appeals did not decide the question of legal capacity of the City to act under the license and, therefore, its decision is not final on that question, but left it open to further litigation. They rely upon the following language of the opinion: “However, we do not touch the question as to the legal capacity of the City of Tacoma to initiate and act under the license once it is granted. There may be limitations in the City Charter, for instance, as to indebtedness limitations. Questions of this nature may be inquired into by the Commission as relevant to the practicability of the plan, but the Commission has no power to adjudicate them.” Id., at 396-397. We believe that respondents’ construction of this language is in error. The questioned language expressly refers to possible “indebtedness limitations” in the City’s Charter and “questions of this nature,” not to the right of the City to receive and perform, as licensee of the Federal Government under the Federal Power Act, the federal rights determined by the Commission and delegated to the City as specified in the license. That this was the meaning of the court, if its meaning might otherwise be doubtful, is made certain by the facts that the court did not disturb a single one of the Commission’s findings; affirmed its order without modification; and said, in the sentence immediately preceding the questioned language: “Consistent with the First Iowa case, supra, we conclude that the state laws cannot prevent the Federal Power Commission from issuing a license or bar the licensee from acting under the license to build a dam on a' navigable stream since the stream is under the dominion of the United States.” Id., at 396. (Emphasis added.) The final judgment of the Court of Appeals was effective, not only against the State, but also against its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma, for they, in their common public rights as citizens of the State, were represented by the State in those proceedings, and, like it, were bound by the judgment. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U. S. 494, 506-509; cf. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125, 142; s. c. 206 U. S. 46, 49; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237; Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 591, 595; North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 373. We conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals, upon this Court’s denial of the State’s petition for certiorari, became final under § 313 (b) of the Act, and is binding upon the State of Washington, its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, and its citizens, including the taxpayers of Tacoma; and that the objections and claims to the contrary asserted in the cross-complaints of the State, its Directors of Fisheries and of Game, and the Taxpayers of Tacoma, in this bond validation suit, were impermissible collateral attacks upon, and de novo litigation between the same parties of issues determined by, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. 41 Stat. 1063 et seq., 16 U. S. C. § 791a et seq. 41 Stat. 1074, 16 U. S. C. § 814. On August 6, 1948, the City filed with the Commission its declaration of intention to build this power project. On March 18, 1949, the Commission ruled that the Cowlitz River was navigable below the proposed project and that its construction would affect navigation and interstate commerce and, hence, could not be built without a license from the Commission, because of the provisions of §23 of the Federal Power Act. 41 Stat. 1075, 16 U. S. C. §816. “ ‘Municipality’ [as used in the Federal Power Act] means a city, county, irrigation district, drainage district, or other political subdivision or agency of a State competent under the laws thereof to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing, or distributing power.” §3 (7), 41 Stat. 1063, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (7). By a Washington statute all cities and towns of that State are made legally competent to “construct, condemn and purchase, purchase, acquire, add to, maintain, and operate works, plants, and facilities for the purpose of furnishing the city or town and its inhabitants, and any other persons, with gas, electricity, and other means of power and facilities for lighting, heating, fuel, and power purposes . . . .” Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.050. Tacoma has exercised such powers since 1893. 41 Stat. 1065, 16 U. S. C. § 797 (e). That subsection, so far as presently pertinent, provides: "The commission is authorized and empowered— “(e) To issue licenses to citizens of the United States, or to any association of such citizens, or to any corporation organized under the- laws of the United States or any State thereof, or to any State or municipality for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, powerhouses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States . . . .” The application was accompanied by the maps, plans, specifications and estimates of cost covering the proposed project, as required by § 9 (a) of the Act. 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (a). Those maps, plans and specifications made clear that the State’s hatchery would be inundated by the proposed Mayfield Reservoir. The Cowlitz River is a tributary of the Columbia in southwestern Washington. It drains an area of 2,490 square miles of the western slope of the Cascade Range, and flows westerly for about 100 miles and thence southerly for 30 miles to its confluence with the Columbia at Longview which is about 65 miles above the mouth of the Columbia. It is conceded to be navigable at all points below the projected May-field Dam and, at the point of confluence with the Columbia, is a tidal river with an average flow of about 10,000 cubic feet per second. The Commission’s opinion discussed at length the State’s basic contention that the river should be left in its natural state for the unobstructed use and propagation of anadromous fish and, upon that contention, concluded: “The question posed does not appear to us to be between all power and no fish but rather between large power benefits (needed particularly for defense purposes), important flood control benefits and navigation benefits, with incidental recreation and intangible benefits, balanced against some fish losses, or a retention of the stream in its present natural condition until such time in the fairly near future when economic pressures will force its full utilization. With proper testing and experimentation by the city of Tacoma, in co-operation with interested state and.Federal agencies, a fishery protective program can be evolved which will prevent undue loss of fishery values in relation to the other values. For these reasons we are issuing the license with certain conditions which are set forth in our accompanying order.” 92 P. U. R. (N. S.) 79, 85. In its order granting the license the Commission made 66 findings in which, among other things, it found that the Cowlitz is a navigable water of the United States below the site of the proposed project and that the dams and reservoirs will affect the interests of interstate or foreign commerce (see §§ 4 (e) and 23 of the Act, 41 Stat. 1065, 1075, 16 U. S. C. §§ 797 (e), 816); that a critical shortage of electric* power exists on the west side of the Cascade Range; that the project “will be an exceptionally valuable addition to the Northwest Region power supply”; that “none of the hydroelectric projects suggested for construction in lieu of the Cowlitz Project can be constructed as quickly or as economically as the Cowlitz Project”; that the project has been approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Army (see §4 (e), 41 Stat. 1065, 16 U. S. C. §797 (e)); that the project is financially and economically feasible; that “the Applicant . . . has submitted satisfactory evidence of compliance with the requirements of all applicable State laws insofar as necessary to effect the purposes of a license for the project [see § 9 (b), 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (b)] and it is a municipality within the meaning of Section 3 (7) of the Act”; and that “[u]nder present circumstances and conditions and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter included in the license, the project is best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing the waterway involved for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, for the conservation and preservation of fish and wildlife resources, and for other beneficial public uses including recreational purposes.” See § 10 (a), 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (a). (Emphasis added.) The license was issued on November 28, 1951, for a period of 50 years from January 1, 1952 — the first day of the month in which the City filed with the Commission its ordinance, No. 14386, enacted on January 9, 1952, formally accepting the license and all its requirements and conditions. See § 6, 41 Stat. 1067, 16 U. S. C. § 799. The license, among other things, incorporated the City’s maps, plans, specifications, and estimates of cost for the construction of the project (see § 9 (a), 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (a)); incorporated by reference all provisions of the Federal Power Act (see § 6, 41 Stat. 1067, 16 U. S. C. § 799); required construction of the project to be commenced within two years from the effective date of the license and to be completed within 36 months (see § 13, 41 Stat. 1071, 16 U. S. C. § 806); required the City to construct, maintain and operate such fish-handling facilities and fish hatcheries as may be prescribed by the Commission, but, before doing so, to make further studies, tests and experiments in cooperation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the Departments of Fisheries and of Game of the State of Washington to determine the effectiveness of such facilities, and to submit the plans therefor to the Commission and obtain its approval. The Washington statutes relied upon were Wash. Rev. Code 75.20.050, proscribing the diversion or use of water without a state permit; Wash. Rev. Code 75.20.100, requiring the State’s approval of plans for the protection of fish in connection with the construction of dams; and Wash. Rev. Code 75.20.010, proscribing the construction of any dam higher than 25 feet across any stream tributary to the Columbia, downstream from the McNary Dam, within the migration range of anadromous fish. This order was entered by the Superior Court of Thurston County to which the cause had been transferred. The court, in answering the contentions of the Taxpayers and the State’s Directors of Fisheries and of Game that the State’s statutes proscribing the diversion of water and the construction of dams (see note 11) “are a valid exercise of the [State’s] police power” (43 Wash. 2d, at 483, 262 P. 2d, at 222) and “must be complied with before [the City] can proceed with the construction of its project” (43 Wash. 2d, at 477, 262 P. 2d, at 219), said: “[Tjhese state laws are in direct conflict with the Federal power act, they are invalid under the terms of the supremacy clause contained in article VI of the United States Constitution, [and] [wjhere, as here, the state and Federal acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together, thé action of a state even under its police power must give way.” 43 Wash. 2d, at 483, 262 P. 2d, at 222. And in answering the further contention that the City, “being a municipal corporation created by the state, may not defy the laws of its creator” (43 Wash. 2d, at 491, 262 P. 2d, at 227), the court said: “The Federal power act defines the term municipal corporation and authorizes the power commission to issue a license to such an entity. Appellant has complied with the state law with respect to the right of a municipality to engage in the business of developing, transmitting and distributing power. Having been granted a license by the power commission, we hold that appellant is at the present time in the same position as any other licensee under the act.’’ 43 Wash. 2d, at 492, 262 P. 2d, at 227. (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Washington was then somewhat differently constituted than when it rendered its decision on October 14, 1953, reversing the Superior Court's judgment sustaining the Taxpayers’ demurrer to the City’s complaint. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 43 Wash. 2d 468, 262 P. 2d 214. For a summary of the detailed and comprehensive plan of the Act see First Iowa case, supra, at 181, note 25. Cf., e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 48-50; United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435; Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 124 F. 2d 235. See § 9 (b) of the Act, 41 Stat. 1068, 16 U. S. C. § 802 (b). Under § 3 (7) of the Act “municipality” means, among other things, a city “competent under the laws [of the State] to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing, or distributing power.” 41 Stat. 1063, 16 U. S. C. § 796 (7). It is no longer disputed that Tacoma is expressly authorized by Wash. Rev. Code 80.40.050 to carry on such business, and that it has done so for many years. In fact the State’s brief in this Court goes much further, saying that “[i]mplicit in the state court’s ruling is that petitioner, if licensed, could build a dam on a plan which would not necessitate the destruction of the state fish hatchery,” and that “Tacoma . . . has the right to build the dam in such a way that the fish hatchery will not be damaged.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. MARY CARTER PAINT CO. et al. No. 15. Argued October 21, 1965. Decided November 8, 1965. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, James Mcl. Henderson and Charles C. Moore, Jr. David W. Peck argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Mary Carter Paint Company manufactures and sells paint and related products. The Federal Trade Commission ordered respondent to cease and desist from the use of certain representations found by the Commission to be deceptive and in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 52 Stat. 111. 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1964 ed.). 60 F. T. C. 1830, 1845. The representations appeared in advertisements which stated in various ways that for every can of respondent’s paint purchased by a buyer, the respondent would give the buyer a “free” can of equal quality and quantity. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the Commission’s order. 333 F. 2d 654. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 957. We reverse. Although there is some ambiguity in the Commission’s opinion, we cannot say that its holding constituted a departure from Commission policy regarding the use of the commercially exploitable word “free.” Initial efforts to define the term in decisions were followed by “Guides Against Deceptive Pricing.” These informed businessmen that they might advertise an article as “free,” even though purchase of another article was required, so long as the terms of the offer were clearly stated, the price of the article required to be purchased was not increased, and its quality and quantity were not diminished. With specific reference to two-for-the-price-of-one offers, the Guides required that either the sales price for the two be “the advertiser’s usual and customary retail price for the single article in the recent, regular course of his business,” or where the advertiser has not previously sold the article, the price for two be the “usual and customary” price for one in the relevant trade areas. These, of course, were guides, not fixed rules as such, and were designed to inform businessmen of the factors which would guide Commission decision. Although Mary Carter seems to have attempted to tailor its offer to come within their terms, the Commission found that it failed; the offer complied in appearance only. The gist of the Commission’s reasoning is in the hearing examiner’s finding, which it adopted, that “the usual and customary retail price of each can of Mary Carter paint was not, and is not now, the price designated in the advertisement [$6.98] but was, and is now, substantially less than such price. The second can of paint was not, and is not now, ‘free,’ that is, was not, and is not now, given as a gift or gratuity. The offer is, on the contrary, an offer of two cans of paint for the price advertised as ór purporting to be the list price or customary and usual price of one can.” 60 F. T. C., at 1844. In sum, the Commission found that Mary Carter had no history of selling single cans of paint; it was marketing twins, and in allocating what is in fact the price of two cans to one can, yet calling one “free,” Mary Carter misrepresented. It is true that respondent was not permitted to show that the quality of its paint matched those paints which usually and customarily sell in the $6.98 range, or that purchasers of paint estimate quality by the price they are charged. If both claims were established, it is arguable that any deception was limited to a representation that Mary Carter has a usual and customary price for single cans of paint, when it has no such price. However, it is not for courts to say whether this violates the Act. “[T]he Commission is often in a better position than are courts to determine when a practice is ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of the Act.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U. S. 374, 385. There was substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s finding; its determination that the practice here was deceptive was neither arbitrary nor clearly wrong. The Court of Appeals should have sustained it. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra; Carter Products, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 323 F. 2d 523, 528. The Commission advises us in its brief that it believes it would be appropriate here “to remand the case to it for clarification of its order.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed and the case is remanded to that court with directions to remand to the Commission for clarification of its order. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case. Hereinafter Mary Carter or respondent. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 48 F. T. C. 1297 (1952); Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F. T. C. 225 (1953); Puro Co., 50 F. T. C. 454 (1953); Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 50 F. T. C. 778 (1954); Ray S. Kalwajtys, 52 F. T. C. 721, enforced, 237 F. 2d 654 (1956). Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, Guide V, adopted October 2, 1958, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965; see also policy statement, December 3, 1953, 4 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 40,210. For the current guide, Guide IV, effective January 8, 1964, see 29 Fed. Reg. 180.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUGARMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, et al. v. DOUGALL et al. No. 71-1222. Argued January 8, 1973 — Decided June 25, 1973 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Douglas, BreNnan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. RehNQUIst, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 649. Samuel A. Hirshowits, First Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General. Lester Evens argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. J. Shane Creamer, Attorney General, and James R. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mb. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 53 (1) of the New York Civil Service Law reads: “Except as herein otherwise provided, no person shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United States.” The four appellees, Patrick McL. Dougall, Esperanza Jorge, Teresa Vargas, and Sylvia Castro, are federally registered resident aliens. When, because of their alien-age, they were discharged in 1971 from their competitive civil service positions with the city of New York, the appellees instituted this class action challenging the constitutionality of § 53. The named defendants, and appellants here, were the Administrator of the city’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), and the city’s Director of Personnel and Chairman of its Civil Service Commission. The appellees sought (1) a declaration that the statute was invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) injunctive relief against any refusal, on the ground of alienage, to appoint and employ the appellees, and all persons similarly situated, in civil service positions in the competitive class, and (3) damages for lost earnings. A defense motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was denied by Judge Tenney, 330 F. Supp. 265 (SDNY 1971). A three-judge court was convened. That court ruled that the statute was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause, and granted injunctive relief. 339 F. Supp. 906 (SDNY 1971). Judge Lumbard joined the court’s opinion and judgment, but wrote separately in concurrence. Id., at 911. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 407 U. S. 908 (1972). I Prior to December 28, 1970, the appellees were employed by nonprofit organizations that received funds through HRA from the United States Office of Economic Opportunity. These supportive funds ceased to be available about that time and the organizations, with approximately 450 employees, including the appellees and 16 other noncitizens, were absorbed by the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of HRA. The appellant Administrator advised the transferees that they would be employed by the city. The appellees in fact were so employed in MCDA. In February, however, they were informed that they were ineligible for employment by the city and that they would be dismissed under the statutory mandate of § 53 (1). Shortly thereafter, they were discharged from MCDA solely because of their alienage. Appellee Dougall was born in Georgetown, Guyana, in September 1927. He has been a resident of New York City since 1964. He was employed by MCDA as an administrative assistant in the staff Development Unit. Appellee Jorge was born in November 1948 in the Dominican Republic. She has been a resident of New York City since 1967. She was employed by the Puerto Rican Forum as a clerk-typist and, later, as a human resources technician. She worked in the latter capacity for MCDA. Appellee Vargas was born in the Dominican Republic in June 1946. She has been a resident of New York City since 1963. She worked as a clerk-typist for the Puerto Rican Forum and in the same capacity for MCDA. Appellee Castro was born in El Salvador in June 1944. She has resided in New York City since 1967. She was employed by the Puerto Rican Forum as an assistant counselor and then as a human resources technician and worked in the latter capacity for MCDA. The record does not disclose that any of the four appellees ever took any step to attain United States citizenship. The District Court, in reaching its conclusion that § 53 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, placed primary reliance on this Court’s decisions in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971), and Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948), and, to an extent, on Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P. 2d 645 (1969). On the basis of these cases, the court also concluded that § 53 was in conflict with Congress’ comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization because, in effect, it denied appellees entrance to, and abode in, New York. Accordingly, the court held, § 53 encroached upon an exclusive federal power and was constitutionally impermissible under Art. VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution. II As is so often the case, it is important at the outset to define the precise and narrow issue that is here presented. The Court is faced only with the question whether New York’s flat statutory prohibition against the employment of aliens in the competitive classified civil service is constitutionally valid. The Court is not asked to decide whether a particular alien, any more than a particular citizen, may be refused employment or discharged on an individual basis for whatever legitimate reason the State might possess.. Neither is the Court reviewing a legislative scheme that bars some or all aliens from closely defined and limited classes of public employment on a uniform and consistent basis. The New York scheme, instead, is indiscriminate. The general standard is enunciated in the State’s Constitution, Art. Y, § 6, and is to the effect that appointments and promotions in the civil service “shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive.” In line with this rather flexible constitutional measure, the classified service is divided by statute into four classes. New York Civil Service Law § 40. The first is the exempt class. It includes, generally, the higher offices in the state executive departments, certain municipal officers, certain judicial employees, and positions for which a competitive or noncompetitive examination may be found to be impracticable. The exempt class contains no citizenship restriction whatsoever. § 41. The second is the noncompetitive class. This includes positions, not otherwise classified, for which a noncompetitive examination would be practicable. There is no citizenship requirement. § 42. The third is the labor class. This includes unskilled laborers holding positions for which competitive examinations would be impracticable. No alienage exclusion is imposed. § 43. The fourth is the competitive class with which we are here concerned. This includes all positions for which it is practicable to determine merit and fitness by a competitive examination. § 44. Only citizens of the United States may hold positions in this class. § 53. The limits of these several classes, particularly the competitive class from which the appellees were deemed to be disqualified, are not readily defined. It would appear, however, that, consistent with the broad scope of the cited constitutional provision, the competitive class reaches various positions in nearly the full range of work tasks, that is, all the way from the menial to the policy making. Apart from the classified civil service, New York has an unclassified service. § 35. This includes, among others, all elective offices, offices filled by legislative appointment, employees of the legislature, various offices filled by the Governor, and teachers. No citizenship requirement is present there. Other constitutional and statutory citizenship requirements round out the New York scheme. The constitution of the State provides that voters, Art. II, §1, members of the legislature, Art. Ill, § 7, the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, Art. IV, § 2, and the Comptroller and Attorney-General, Art. V, § 1, are to be United States citizens. And Public Officers Law § 3 requires that any person holding “a civil office” be a citizen of the United States. A “civil office” is apparently one that “possesses any of the attributes of a public officer or . . . involve [s] some portion of the soverign [sic] power.” 1967 Op. N. Y. Atty. Gen. 60; New York Post Corp. v. Moses, 12 App. Div. 2d 243, 250, 210 N. Y. S. 2d 88, 95, rev’d on other grounds, 10 N. Y. 2d 199, 176 N. E. 2d 709 (1961). We thus have constitutional provisions and a number of statutes that, together, constitute New York’s scheme for the exclusion of aliens from public employment. The present case concerns only § 53 of the Civil Service Law. The section’s constitutionality, however, is to be judged in the context of the State’s broad statutory framework and the justifications the State presents. III It is established, of course, that an alien is entitled to the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 371 (1971); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 39 (1915); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). See In re Griffiths, post, p. 7l7. This protection extends, specifically, in the words of Mr. Justice Hughes, to aliens who “work for a living in the common occupations of the community.” Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S., at 41. A. Appellants argue, however, that § 53 does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute “establishes a generic classification reflecting the special requirements of public employment in the career civil service.” The distinction drawn between the citizen and the alien, it is said, “rests on the fundamental concept of identity between a government and the members, or citizens, of the state.” The civil servant “participates directly in the formulation and execution of government policy,” and thus must be free of competing obligations to another power. The State’s interest in having an employee of undivided loyalty is substantial, for obligations attendant upon foreign citizenship “might impair the exercise of his judgment or jeopardize public confidence in his objectivity.” Emphasis is placed on our decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947), upholding the Hatch Act and its proscription of political activity by certain public employees, and it is said that the public employer “has broad discretion to establish qualifications for its employees related to the integrity and efficiency of the operations of government.” It is at once apparent, however, that appellants’ asserted justification proves both too much and too little. As the above outline of the New York scheme reveals, the State’s broad prohibition of the employment of aliens applies to many positions with respect to which the State’s proffered justification has little, if any, relationship. At the same time, the prohibition has no application at all to positions that would seem naturally to fall within the State’s asserted purpose. Our standard of review of statutes that treat aliens differently from citizens requires a greater degree of precision. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 372, we observed that aliens as a class “are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority (see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938)),” and that classifications based on alienage are “subject to close judicial scrutiny.” And as long as a quarter century ago we held that the State’s power “to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.” Takahashi v. Fish Comm’n, 334 U. S., at 420. We therefore look to the substantiality of the State’s interest in enforcing the statute in question, and to the narrowness of the limits within which the discrimination is confined. Applying this standard to New York’s purpose in confining civil servants in the competitive class to those persons who have no ties of citizenship elsewhere, § 53 does not withstand the necessary close scrutiny. We recognize a State’s interest in establishing its own form of government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within “the basic conception of a political community.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 344 (1972). We recognize, too, the State’s broad power to define its political community. But in seeking to achieve this substantial purpose, with discrimination against aliens, the means the State employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose. Section 53 is neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application. Its imposed ineligibility may apply to the “sanitation man, class B,” Perotta v. Gregory, 4 Misc. 2d 769, 158 N. Y. S. 2d 221 (1957), to the typist, and to the office worker, as well as to the person who directly participates in the formulation and execution of important state policy. The citizenship restriction sweeps indiscriminately. Viewing the entire constitutional and statutory framework in the light of the State’s asserted interest, the great breadth of the requirement is even more evident. Sections 35 and 41 of the Civil Service Law, relating generally to persons holding elective and high appointive offices, contain no citizenship restrictions. Indeed, even § 53 permits an alien to hold a classified civil service position under certain circumstances. In view of the breadth and imprecision of § 53 in the context of the State’s interest, we conclude that the statute does not withstand close judicial scrutiny. B. Appellants further contend, however, that the State’s legitimate interest is greater than simply limiting to citizens those high public offices that have to do with the formulation and execution of state policy. Understandably relying on this Court’s decisions in Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195 (1915), Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915), and Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927), appellants argue that a State constitutionally may confine public employment to citizens. Mr. Justice (then Judge) Cardozo accepted this “special public interest” argument because of the State’s concern with “the restriction of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit of the members of the state.” People v. Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 161, 108 N. E. 427, 429, aff’d, 239 U. S. 195 (1915). We rejected that approach, however, in the context of public assistance in Graham, where it was observed that “the special public interest doctrine was heavily grounded on the notion that '[wjhatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship.’ People v. Crane .... But this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right’ or as a 'privilege.’ ” 403 U. S., at 374. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1971). Appellants argue that our rejection of the special-public-interest doctrine in a public assistance case does not require its rejection here. That the doctrine has particular applicability with regard to public employment is demonstrated, according to appellants, by the decisions in Crane and Heim that upheld, under Fourteenth Amendment challenge, those provisions of the New York Labor Law that confined employment on public works to citizens of the United States. See M. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law, c. 6 (1946). We perceive no basis for holding the special-public-interest doctrine inapplicable in Graham and yet applicable and controlling here. A resident alien may reside lawfully in New York for a long period of time. He must pay taxes. And he is subject to service in this country’s Armed Forces. 50 U. S. C. App. § 454 (a). See Astrup v. Immigration Service, 402 U. S. 509 (1971). The doctrine, rooted as it is in the concepts of privilege and of the desirability of confining the use of public resources, has no applicability in this case. To the extent that Crane, Heim, and Clarke intimate otherwise, they were weakened by the decisions in Takahashi and Graham, and are not to be considered as controlling here. C. The State would tender other justifications for § 53’s bar to employment of aliens in the competitive civil service. It is said that career civil service is intended for the long-term employee, and that the alien, who is subject to deportation and, as well, to conscription by his own country, is likely to remain only temporarily in a civil service position. We fully agree with the District Court’s response to this contention: “There is no offer of proof on this issue and [appellants] would be hard pressed to demonstrate that a permanent resident alien who has resided in New York or the surrounding area for a number of years, as have [appellees], and whose family also resides here, would be a poorer risk for a career position in New York . . . than an American citizen who, prior to his employment with the City or State, had been residing in another state.” 339 F. Supp., at 909. Appellants further assert that employment of aliens in the career civil service would be inefficient, for when aliens eventually leave their positions, the State will have the expense of hiring and training replacements. Even if we could accept the premise underlying this argument — that aliens are more likely to leave their work than citizens — and assuming that this rationale could be logically confined to the classified competitive civil service, the State’s suggestion does not withstand examination. As we stated in Graham, noting the general identity of an alien’s obligations with those of a citizen, the “ 'justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens.’ ” 403 U. S., at 376. We hold that § 53, which denies all aliens the right to hold positions in New York’s classified competitive civil service, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. Because of this conclusion, we need not reach the issue whether the citizenship restriction is in conflict with Congress’ comprehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 376-380. IV While we rule that § 53 is unconstitutional, we do not hold that, on the basis of an individualized determination, an alien may not be refused, or discharged from, public employment, even on the basis of noncitizenship, if the refusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on legitimate state interests that relate to qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee. We hold only that a flat ban on the employment of aliens in positions that have little, if any, relation to a State’s legitimate interest, cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither do we hold that a State may not, in an appropriately defined class of positions, require citizenship as a qualification for office. Just as “the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections,” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 124-125 (1970) (footnote omitted) (opinion of Black, J.); see id., at 201 (opinion of Harlan, J.), and id., at 293-294 (opinion of Stewart, J.), “[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen.” Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 161 (1892). See Lather v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 41 (1849); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 632-633 (1904). Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already noted above, “to preserve the basic conception of a political community.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 344. And this power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government. There, as Judge Lumbard phrased it in his separate concurrence, is “where citizenship bears some rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position.” 339 F. Supp., at 911. We have held, of course, that such state action, particularly with respect to voter qualifications, is not wholly immune from scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See, for example, Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969). But our scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within a State’s constitutional prerogatives. Id., at 625; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965). This is no more than a recognition of a State’s historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions, Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S., at 632-634; Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S., at 161, and a recognition of a State’s constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an appropriately designated class of public office holders. U. S. Const. Art. IV, §4; U. S. Const. Arndt. X; Luther v. Borden, supra; see In re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449, 461 (1891). This Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high public office under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, implicit in many of this Court’s voting rights decisions is the notion that citizenship is a permissible criterion for limiting such rights. Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S., at 625; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 567, 568 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 666-667 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S., at 91, 93-94, 96; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U. S. 45, 50-51 (1959); Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 335 (1900). A restriction on the employment of noncitizens, narrowly confined, could have particular relevance to this important state responsibility, for alienage itself is a factor that reasonably could be employed in defining “political community.” The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. The restriction has its statutory source in Laws of New York, 1939, c. 767, § 1. We are advised that the legislation was declarative of an administrative practice that had existed for many years. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 45. Section 53 (2) of N. Y. Civ. Serv. Law (Supp. 1972-1973) makes a temporary exception to the citizenship requirement: “2. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this chapter or of any other law, whenever a department head or appointing authority deems that an acute shortage of employees exists in any particular class or classes of positions by reason of a lack of a sufficient number of qualified personnel available for recruitment, he may present evidence thereof to the state or municipal civil service commission having jurisdiction which, after due inquiry, may determine the existence of such shortage and waive the citizenship requirement for appointment to such class or classes of positions. The state commission or such municipal commission, as the case may be, shall annually review each such waiver of the citizenship requirement, and shall revoke any such waiver whenever it finds that a shortage no longer exists. A non-citizen appointed pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be eligible for continued employment unless he diligently prosecutes the procedures for citizenship.” It is to be observed that an appointment under this exception permits the alien to continue his employment only until, on annual review, it is deemed that “a shortage no longer exists.” And, in any event, the alien ‘'shall not be eligible for continued employment unless he diligently prosecutes the procedures for citizenship.” The court found jurisdiction in the Civil Rights Statutes, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4). 339 F. Supp. 906, 907 n. 5. It held that the suit was properly maintainable as a class action and defined the class as consisting of “all permanent resident aliens residing in New York State who, but for the enforcement of Section 53, would otherwise be eligible to compete for employment in the competitive class of Civil Service.” Id., at 907 n. 4. Affidavit of Harold 0. Basden, Director of Personnel of the Human Resources Administration, App. 31-33. Section 45 of the New York Civil Service Law, applicable to employees of a private institution acquired by the State or a public agency, contains a restriction, similar to that in §53 (1), against the employment of an alien in a position classified in the competitive class. The appellants in their answer alleged that appellee Castro was terminated for the additional reason that she lacked sufficient experience to qualify for the position of senior human resources technician. App. 49. The three-judge court in its order, App. 93, excluded appellee Castro from the recognized class. That exclusion is not contested here. Brief for Appellants 17. Id., at 22. Id., at 23. Ibid. Id., at 13. In the past, the Court has invoked the special-public-interest doctrine to uphold statutes that, in the absence of overriding treaties, limit the right of noncitizens to exploit a State’s natural resources, McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877), Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914); to inherit real property, Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1880), Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333 (1901); and to acquire and own land, Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923), Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U. S. 225 (1923), Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U. S. 313 (1923), Frick v. Webb, 263 U. S. 326 (1923); but see Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948). We are aware that citizenship requirements are imposed in certain aspects of the federal service. See 5 U. S. C. §3301; Exec. Order No. 10577, 19 Fed. Reg. 7521, §2.1 (1954); 5 CFR §§ 338.101, 302.203 (g) (1973); and, for example, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriation Act, 1972, § 602, Pub. L. 92-49, 85 Stat. 122, and Public Works Appropriations Act, 1971, § 502, Pub. L. 91-439, 84 Stat. 902. In deciding the present case, we intimate no view as to whether these federal citizenship requirements are or are not susceptible of constitutional challenge. See Jalil v. Hampton, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 415, 460 F. 2d 923, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 887 (1972); Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 Geo. L. J. 207 (1972). In congressional debates leading to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is clear evidence that Congress not only knew that as a matter of local practice aliens had not been granted the right to vote, but that under the amendment they did not receive a constitutional right of suffrage or a constitutional right to participate in the political process of state government, and that, indeed, the right to vote and the concomitant right of participation in the political process were matters of local law. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 141-142, 2766-2767 (1866). It is noteworthy, as well, that the 40th Congress considered and very nearly proposed a version of the Fifteenth Amendment that expressly would have prohibited discriminatory qualifications not only for voting but also for holding office. The provision was struck in conference. It is evident from the debate that, for whatever motive, its opponents wanted the States to retain control over the qualifications for office. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., at 1425-1426, 1623-1633 (1869). And, of course, the Fifteenth Amendment applies by its terms only to “citizens.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION et al. v. GARFINKEL, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, et al. No. 87-2127. Argued March 20, 1989 Decided April 18, 1989 Patti A. Goldman argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were Alan B. Morrison, Paul Alan Levy, and Susan Z. Holik. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Barbara L. Herwig, and Freddi Lipstein. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Kate Martin, Gary M. Stem, Steven R. Shapiro, and John A. Powell; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter Kamiat, Laurence Gold, George Kaufmann, Mark Roth, and Charles A. Hobbie; and for the Government Accountability Project et al. by Joseph B. Kennedy. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States Senate by Michael Davidson, Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., and Morgan J. Frankel; and for the Speaker and Leadership Group of the United States House of Representatives by Steven R. Ross and Charles Tiefer. Per Curiam. As a condition of obtaining access to classified information, employees in the Executive Branch are required to sign “nondisclosure agreements” that detail the employees’ obligation of confidentiality and provide for penalties in the event of unauthorized disclosure. Two such nondisclosure forms are at issue in this case. One, Standard Form 189, was devised by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (DISOO) (now appellee Garfinkel); the other, Form 4193, was created by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (now appellee Webster). Both of these forms forbade employees to reveal classified or “classifiable” information to persons not authorized to receive such information, App. 15, 19, and made clear that employees who disclosed information in violation of these agreements could lose their security clearances, their jobs, or both. Id., at 16, 21. Neither form defined the term “classifiable.” The DISOO eventually promulgated a regulation that defined the term “classifiable” in Form 189 to include only unmarked classified information or unclassified information that was “in the process of a classification determination.” Under this regulation, moreover, an employee would violate the nondisclosure agreement by disclosing unclassified information only if that employee “knows, or reasonably should know, that such information is in the process of a classification determination and requires interim protection.” 52 Fed. Reg. 48367 (1987). For those employees who signed Form 4193, however, the DCI did not attempt to define “classifiable.” More than half of the Federal Government’s civilian and military employees have signed either Form 189 or 4193. Brief for Appellants 5. Section 630 of the Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-432, enacted by Congress in 1987, prohibited the expenditure of funds in fiscal year 1988 for the implementation or enforcement of Form 189, Form 4193, or any other form that violated one of its five subsections. In response to this statute, appellee Garfinkel ordered agencies to cease using Form 189, but several agencies nevertheless required approximately 43,000 employees to sign the form after § 630 was enacted. Brief for Appellants 10. The DCI, in contrast, continued to require employees to sign Form 4193, but attached a paragraph to the form stating that the nondisclosure agreement would “be implemented and enforced in a manner consistent with” the statute of which § 630 was a part. App. 26-27. Three months after § 630 became law, the DCI replaced Form 4193 with Form 4355, which eliminated the term “classifiable.” National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 680, n. 11 (DC 1988). Appellant American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and several Members of Congress brought the present lawsuit challenging appellees’ use of Forms 189 and 4193 on the ground that they violated §630. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would (1) bar appellees from requiring employees to execute or sign Form 4193 during fiscal year 1988; (2) compel appellees to treat any Form 4193 agreement signed after December 22, 1987 (the effective date of § 630), as void; and (3) direct appellees to notify all employees who signed Form 189 or 4193 after December 22, 1987, that these agreements were void and that the terms of such forms signed before that date could not be enforced in fiscal year 1988. App. 10. This lawsuit was consolidated with two other cases, brought by the National Federation of Federal Employees and the American Federation of Government Employees, which sought to enjoin the use of Forms 189 and 4193 because, among other things, they violated § 630 and because the term “classifiable” was so vague and overbroad that it inhibited employees’ speech in violation of the First Amendment. The District Court for the District of Columbia concluded that appellant AFSA had standing to challenge the nondisclosure forms on behalf of its members, but that the Members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the use of the forms. 688 F. Supp., at 678-682. The court then assumed that “the Executive’s actions since enactment of section 630 do not comply with the requirements of that legislation,” id., at 683, and n. 16, because the DCI had continued to require employees to sign Form 4193 for three months after enactment of § 630 despite § 630’s specific prohibition on the use of that form. Acknowledging that, during that time, the DCI had added a paragraph to Form 4193 stating that the agreement would be enforced in a manner consistent with § 630, the District Court nevertheless concluded that this action was not “‘true to the congressional mandate from which it derives authority,’” id., at 683-684, n. 16, quoting Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. v. FERC, 236 U. S. App. D. C. 203, 217, 734 F. 2d 1486, 1500 (1984), and that review of the Executive’s action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §706, “likely” would show that the Executive’s action was contrary to law, 688 F. Supp., at 684, n. 16. Having thus skirted the statutory question whether the Executive Branch’s implementation of Forms 189 and 4193 violated § 630, the court proceeded to address appellees’ argument that the lawsuit should be dismissed because §630 was an unconstitutional interference with the President’s authority to protect the national security. Concluding that § 630 “impermissibly restricts the President’s power to fulfill obligations imposed upon him by his express constitutional powers and the role of the Executive in foreign relations,” id., at 685, the court entered summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellants took a direct appeal from the District Court’s judgment pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S. 923 (1988). In spite of the importance of the constitutional question whether § 630 impermissibly intrudes upon the Executive’s authority to regulate the disclosure of national security information — indeed, partly because of it — we remand this case to the District Court without expressing an opinion on that issue. Events occurring since the District Court issued its ruling place this case in a light far different from the one in which that court considered it. Since issuing the decision that we now review, the District Court has ruled on the constitutional challenge presented by the cases with which the present one was consolidated, and has decided that the unadorned term “classifiable” used in Forms 189 and 4193 is unconstitutionally vague. See National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1196, 1201-1203 (DC 1988). The court further held that the DISOO’s definition of the term “classifiable,” see supra, at 155, would remedy this vagueness, and ordered appellees to notify employees either that this definition was in force or that no penalties would be imposed for the disclosure of “classifiable” information. 695 F. Supp., at 1203-1204. Appellees thereafter deleted the word “classifiable” — a primary focus of appellants’ challenge to Forms 189 and 4193 — from all nondisclosure forms, and replaced it with the definition given in the DISOO’s regulation. They also furnished individualized notice of this change to employees who signed either Form 189 or Form 4193. 53 Fed. Reg. 38278 (1988); Motion to Affirm 13. According to appellants, however, appellees have notified only current employees of the refinement of the term “classifiable”; former employees, who signed Form 189 or 4193 but have left the employment of the Federal Government, have not received such notice. Brief for Appellants 15. The controversy as it exists today is, in short, quite different from the one that the District Court considered. Indeed, appellees urge us to hold the case moot to the extent that it challenges the use of the term “classifiable” in Forms 189 and 4193. Brief for Appellees 31-32. As to current employees who have been notified that the term “classifiable” no longer controls their disclosure of information, the controversy is indeed moot. Appellants emphasize, however, that former employees have not been informed of the switch in terminology; as to them, the controversy whether they should have received notice of this change remains alive. Brief for Appellants 20. We decline to decide the merits of appellants’ request for individualized notice to these employees, however, because the questions whether individual notice is required by § 630 and whether appellants’ complaint can be read to request such notice for former employees, see Brief for Appellees 32, n. 24 (arguing that it cannot be so read), are questions best addressed in the first instance by the District Court. A second reason why we remand this case for further proceedings rather than ordering it dismissed is that appellants argue that the definition of “classified information” now supplied by the DISOO, 53 Fed. Reg. 38279 (1988) (to be codified in 32 CFR § 2003.20(h)(3)), does not comply with § 630. They contend that the DISOO’s definition prohibits disclosure of information that an employee reasonably should have known was classified, whereas subsection (1) of § 630 refers only to information that is “known by the employee” to be classified or in the process of being classified. Brief for Appellants 19-20. In contrast, appellees and the Senate as amicus argue that there is no inconsistency between § 630(1) and this new definition. Brief for Appellees 39-41; Brief for United States Senate as Amicus Curiae 17-18. It appears that, in order to press this issue, appellants would be forced to amend their complaint in order to take into account the new definition of the term “classified.” Brief for Appellees 41. Because the decision whether to allow this amendment is one for the District Court, and because appellants’ argument raises a question of statutory interpretation not touched upon by the District Court, we leave these matters for that court to decide in the first instance. In addition, there remains a question whether the forms comply with subsections (3), (4), and (5) of § 630, dealing with disclosure of classified information to Congress. Both appellants and appellees apparently agree that these subsections simply preserve pre-existing rights, rights guaranteed by other statutes and constitutional provisions. Brief for Appellants 38-40; Brief for Appellees 48. The only relief appellants request with respect to this portion of the case is notice to employees informing them that Forms 189 and 4193 did not alter those pre-existing rights. Brief for Appellants 38. No actual instance in which an employee sought to disclose information to Congress, and was prohibited from doing so, has been brought to our attention. There thus exists a substantial possibility that this last portion of the case is not ripe for decision, and this is exactly the argument pressed by several amici. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae 28-48; Brief for Speaker and Leadership Group of House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae 12-16; Brief for United States Senate as Amicus Curiae 15-21. We are not, however, disposed to decide for ourselves whether this is so. Since the District Court analyzed the interaction between §630 and the Executive Branch’s nondisclosure policy only in abbreviated fashion, we do not have the benefit of a lower court’s interpretation of the statute and of Executive policy to help us decide whether the case is ready for decision or, if it is, to guide our own resolution of the merits. Again, therefore, we return these questions to the District Court to allow it to sort them out in the first instance. Because part of the controversy has become moot but other parts of it may retain vitality, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See, e. g., United States Dept. of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U. S. 556, 560 (1986); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39-40 (1950). In doing so, we emphasize that the District Court should not pronounce upon the relative constitutional authority of Congress and the Executive Branch unless it finds it imperative to do so. Particularly where, as here, a case implicates the fundamental relationship between the Branches, courts should be extremely careful not to issue unnecessary constitutional rulings. On remand, the District Court should decide first whether the controversy is sufficiently live and concrete to be adjudicated and whether it is an appropriate case for equitable relief, and then decide whether the statute and forms are susceptible of a reconciling interpretation; if they are not, the court may turn to the constitutional question whether § 630 impermissibly intrudes upon the Executive Branch’s authority over national security information. See, e. g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345-356 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 549 (1947); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 459 (1988). The judgment of the District Court for the District of Columbia is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Seetion 630 provides: “No funds appropriated in this or any other Act for fiscal year 1988 may be used to implement or enforce the agreements in Standard Forms 189 and 4193 of the Government or any other nondisclosure policy, form or agreement if such policy, form or agreement: “(1) concerns information other than that specifically marked as classified; or, unmarked but known by the employee to be classified; or, unclassified but known by the employee to be in the process of a classification determination; “(2) contains the term ‘classifiable’; “(3) directly or indirectly obstructs, by requirement of prior written authorization, limitation of authorized disclosure, or otherwise, the right of any individual to petition or communicate with Members of Congress in a secure manner as provided by the rules and procedures of the Congress; “(4) interferes with the right of the Congress to obtain executive branch information in a secure manner as provided by the rules and procedures of the Congress; “(5) imposes any obligations or invokes any remedies inconsistent with statutory law: Provided, That nothing in this section shall affect the enforcement of those aspects of such nondisclosure policy, form or agreement that do not fall within subsections (1) — (5) of this section.” Section 630 applied only to fiscal year 1988; however, § 619 of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. 100-440, 102 Stat. 1756, includes restrictions on expenditures of funds during fiscal year 1989 that are identical to those contained in § 630.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McCOMB, WAGE AND HOUR ADMINISTRATOR, v. JACKSONVILLE PAPER CO. et al. No. 110. Argued December 14-15, 1948. Decided February 14, 1949. Bessie Margolin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern and William S. Tyson. Louis Kurz argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a civil contempt proceeding arising out of Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U. S. 564, which we decided January 18, 1943. The District Court had held that none of respondents’ employees in specified classes were covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201. We sustained a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals which reversed the District Court, modifying it slightly to include a larger class of employees than the United States Court of Appeals had held to be covered. On remand the District Court, without a further hearing, entered a decree enjoining respondents from violating the Act in any of the following particulars: (1) by paying the designated classes of employees less than 300 an hour from the date of the judgment to October 24, 1945, or less than 400 an hour thereafter, except as permitted by orders of the Administrator under § 8 or § 14 of the Act; (2) by employing such employees for a workweek longer than 40 hours unless they receive compensation for employment in excess of 40 hours in the workweek at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which they are employed; and (3) by failing to keep and preserve records as prescribed by the Administrator, particularly records of the hours worked each workday and each workweek by each of the employees and of the total wages paid to each for each workweek. Respondent took no appeal from this order. This was in 1943. In 1946 the Administrator instituted this contempt proceeding alleging that respondents had not complied with the minimum wage, overtime, and record-keeping provisions of the judgment in many specified respects. He prayed that respondents be required to termínate their continuing violations and in order to purge themselves of their contempts to make payment of the amounts of unpaid wages due the affected employees. The District Court found violations of the provisions of the decree. It found that (1) respondents had set up a completely false and fictitious method of computing compensation without regard to the hours actually worked which were unlawful under the Act; (2) respondents had adopted a plan which gave the employees a wage increase in the guise of a bonus and yet excluded that increase from the regular rate of pay for the purpose of computing overtime; (3) respondents had classified some employees as executive or administrative employees in plain violation of the regulations of the Administrator adopted under § 13 (a) (1) of the Act; and (4) one of the respondents had employed pieceworkers in excess of the maximum workweek without paying them overtime compensation. The District Court held that a civil contempt required a “wilful” violation of a decree; and that there was in this case no showing of any “wilful” violation of any “specific” provision of the former decree “prohibiting the doing of any specific thing.” The District Court further held that it had no power on the application of the Administrator to enforce compliance with its former decree by ordering the payment of unpaid statutory wages. It accordingly considered the application of the Administrator as an amended complaint seeking a broadening of the previous decree and entered such an injunction. 69 F. Supp. 599. All parties appealed. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. It ruled that respondents had violated the provisions of the decree couched in terms of the Act in the respects found by the District Court. It also held that the District Court was warranted in concluding that there was no “wilful contempt” since neither the law nor the injunction specifically referred to or condemned the practices which were found to violate the Act. 167 F. 2d 448. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the problem in the administration of the Act. First. The absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt. Civil as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303-304; Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 330 U. S. 585, 590; Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 68. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act. The decree was not fashioned so as to grant or withhold its benefits dependent on the state of mind of respondents. It laid on them a duty to obey specified provisions of the statute. An act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently. The force and vitality of judicial decrees derive from more robust sanctions. And the grant or withholding of remedial relief is not wholly discretionary with the judge, as Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote for a unanimous Court in Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 111-112. The private or public rights that the decree sought to protect are an important measure of the remedy. Second. As we have noted, the decree directed respondents to obey the provisions of the Act dealing with minimum wages, overtime, and the keeping of records. There was no appeal from it. By its terms it enjoined any practices which were violations of those statutory provisions. Decrees of that generality are often necessary to prevent further violations where a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been shown. See May Stores Co. v. Labor Board, 326 U. S. 376, 390, 391; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 186. Respondents’ record of continuing and persistent violations of the Act would indicate that that kind of a decree was wholly warranted in this case. Yet if there were extenuating circumstances or if the decree was too burdensome in operation, there was a method of relief apart from an appeal. Respondents could have petitioned the District Court for a modification, clarification or construction of the order. See Regal Knitwear Co. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 9, 15. But respondents did not take that course either. They undertook to make their own determination of what the decree meant. They knew they acted at their peril. For they were alerted by the decree against any violation of specified provisions of the Act. It does not lie in their mouths to say that they have an immunity from civil contempt because the plan or scheme which they adopted was not specifically enjoined. Such a rule would give tremendous impetus to the program of experimentation with disobedience of the law which we condemned in Maggio v. Zeitz, supra, at 69. The instant case is an excellent illustration of how it could operate to prevent accountability for persistent contumacy. Civil contempt is avoided today by showing that the specific plan adopted by respondents was not enjoined. Hence a new decree is entered enjoining that particular plan. Thereafter the defendants work out a plan that was not specifically enjoined. Immunity is once more obtained because the new plan was not specifically enjoined. And so a whole series of wrongs is perpetrated and a decree of enforcement goes for naught. That result not only proclaims the necessity of decrees that are not so narrow as to invite easy evasion; it also emphasizes the danger in the attitude expressed by the courts below that the remedial benefits of a decree will be withheld where the precise arrangement worked out to discharge the duty to pay which both the statute and the decree imposed was not specifically enjoined. We need not impeach the findings of the lower courts that respondents had no purpose to evade the decree, in order to hold that their violations of it warrant the imposition of sanctions. They took a calculated risk when under the threat of contempt they adopted measures designed to avoid the legal consequences of the Act. Respondents are not unwitting victims of the law. Having been caught in its toils, they were endeavoring to extricate themselves. They knew full well the risk of crossing the forbidden line. Accordingly where as here the aim is remedial and not punitive, there can be no complaint that the burden of any uncertainty in the decree is on respondents’ shoulders. Third. We have no doubts concerning the power of the District Court to order respondents, in order to purge themselves of contempt, to pay the damages caused by their violations of the decree. We can lay to one side the question whether the Administrator, when suing to restrain violations of the Act, is entitled to a decree of restitution for unpaid wages. Cf. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395. We are dealing here with the power of a court to grant the relief that is necessary to effect compliance with its decree. The measure of the court’s power in civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief. They may. entail the doing of a variety of acts, such as the production of books. Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, supra. They may also require the payment of money as in the alimony cases. See Gompers v. Bucks S. & R. Co., 221 U. S. 418, 442; Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 36A-365. The decree that was violated in the present case relates to the payment of wages and overtime pay required by § § 6 and 7 of the Act. It does not, however, compute the weekly and monthly amount that is due each employee under the correct construction of the Act. Nor does it contain the names of the payees. But it provides the formula by which the amounts can be simply computed. If it had gone one step further and made the computation, listing the amounts due each employee, the case would then be on all fours with the alimony cases. Yet the circumstance that changing payrolls and fluctuating rates of pay make that impractical in this type of case does not mark a material difference. The direction of the court was that respondents make payments of wages to their employees pursuant to a prescribed formula. If the court is powerless tó require the prescribed payments to be made, it has lost the most effective sanction for its decree and a premium has been placed on violations. The fact that another suit might be brought to collect the payments is, of course, immaterial. For the court need not sit supinely by waiting for some litigant to take the initiative. Vindication of its authority through enforcement of its decree does not depend on such whimsical or fortuitous circumstances. The fact that the Administrator is the complainant and that the back wages go to the employees is not material. It is the power of the court with which we are dealing — the power of the court to enforce compliance with the injunction which the Act authorizes, which the court has issued, and which respondents have long disobeyed. Reversed. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Mr. Justice Jackson concurs, dissenting. Obedience must of course be secured for the command of a court. To secure such obedience is the function of a proceeding for contempt. But courts should be explicit and precise in their commands and should only then be strict in exacting compliance. To be both strict and indefinite is a kind of judicial tyranny. In such a case as this, only after an administrative order has been formulated and a court has adjudicated that the order is within the administrator’s statutory authority does the command of a court come into existence, disobedience of which may be punished as contempt. For violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act as such, one may be made to suffer civil penalties or imprisonment, but the latter only after conviction by a jury. For violation of the command of an injunction issued under the Act, however, he may not only be exposed to more severe civil penalties than the Act by its own terms imposes, but made to suffer imprisonment without benefit of jury trial. It is for such reasons that this Court has indicated again and again that a statute cannot properly be made the basis of contempt proceedings merely by incorporating a reference to its broad terms into a court order. See, e. g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 200 U. S. 361, 404; Labor Board v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U. S. 426, 435. These considerations become increasingly important as there is increasing use of injunctions for the enforcement of administrative orders and statutory duties. These are general principles but their application governed the decisions of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals; they should control the decision here. The two lower courts found that while the practices now complained of by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor constituted violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, they were not on any fair consideration covered by the injunction, contempt of which is now charged. The injunction underlying this proceeding takes eight pages of a printed record and particularizes in great detail the violations which were enjoined. It also contains omnibus clauses prohibiting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. On full consideration, the District Court treated the application for an adjudication of civil contempt “as an amended complaint seeking a broadening of the injunctive orders heretofore entered in this case, and will enter an amended judgment enjoining defendants from violating the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as adjudicated in this Memorandum Opinion.” 69 F. Supp. 599, 608. The Court of Appeals agreed with this view of the District Court (with a minor modification not here relevant). 167 F. 2d 448. In short, both courts found no contempt. They did so because there was lacking that clearness of command in the court’s order which warranted a finding of its disobedience, if due regard were paid to the proper construction of the injunction as the starting point of the contempt proceedings. At the least, such was a warrantable interpretation of the circumstances of this case, and we are disentitled to set our interpretation against theirs. In reversing the conclusion of the two lower courts that there was no contempt because there was no disobedience of the injunction, the Court is rendering a decision of far-reaching import to the law of injunctions. Today’s ruling happens to concern an injunction against an employer. Tomorrow it may be an injunction against employees, as it was yesterday and too often in the past. One of the grievances which led to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was the generality of the terms of labor injunctions. Ambiguity lurks in generality and may thus become an instrument of severity. Behind the vague inclusiveness of an injunction like the one before us is the hazard of retrospective interpretation as the basis of punishment through contempt proceedings. The two lower courts, in finding that generally to enjoin obedience to a law is too vague a foundation for proceedings in contempt, were avoiding the very evil with which labor injunctions were justly charged. And of course it is not to be assumed that the allowable vagueness of an injunction varies with the use to which the injunction is put. This Court ought not to encourage injunctions couched in such indefinite terms by setting aside the findings of the courts below that the injunction did not forbid with explicitness sufficient to justify a finding of contempt. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It also found violations of the record-keeping provisions of the decree, some of which it held to be trivial and others of which had been discontinued. See 2 High on Injunctions (4th ed., 1905) §§ 1416 et seq. Section 16 (b) authorizes suits by employees to recover wages and overtime unlawfully withheld. It is the Administrator who is directed and authorized by § 11 (a) of the Act to bring actions to restrain violations of the Act of the character involved here. Cf. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 157; United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 193-194; Commission v. Brashear Lines, 312 U. S. 621, 628-630. See §17.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SCHLANGER v. SEAMANS, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, et al. No. 5481. Argued February 22, 1971 Decided March 23, 1971 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, BrennaN, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Harlan, J., concurred in the result. Stewart, J., dissented. Herbert P. Schlanger, petitioner, argued the cause and filed a brief pro se. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Gray, Morton Hollander, and Robert E. Kopp. Melvin L. Wulj filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question in this case is whether the District Court for the District of Arizona had jurisdiction to entertain on the merits petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus. He is an enlisted man who was accepted in the Airman’s Education and Commissioning Program, an officer training project, and was assigned to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), Ohio, “with duty at Arizona State University” for training. While studying in Arizona and before completion of the course, he was removed from the program, allegedly for engaging in civil rights activities on the campus. While he was seeking administrative relief through command channels, he was reassigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, to complete the remainder of his six-year reenlistment in a noncommissioned status. After exhausting those remedies he was given permissive temporary duty to attend Arizona State for study, this time by his superiors at Moody AFB under a different program called Operation Bootstrap, and at his own expense. Thereafter he filed his application for habeas corpus in Arizona alleging that his enlistment contract had been breached and that he was being detained unlawfully. The District Court denied the application. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F. 2d 213. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted. 400 U. S. 865. The respondents to this suit are the Secretary of the Air Force, the Commander of Moody AFB, and the Commander of the AF ROTC program on the Arizona State campus. The last respondent was the only one of the three present in Arizona and he had no control over petitioner who concededly was not in his chain of command, since petitioner was not in the AF ROTC program, but in Operation Bootstrap. The commanding officer at Moody AFB in Georgia did have custody and control over petitioner; but he was neither a resident of the Arizona judicial district nor amenable to its process. It is true, of course, that the commanding officer at Moody AFB exerted control over petitioner in the sense that his arm was long and petitioner was effectively subject to his orders and directions. There are cases which suggest that such control to establish custody may be adequate for habeas corpus jurisdiction even though the control is exercised from a point located outside the State, as long as the petitioner is in the district or the State. Donigian v. Laird, 308 F. Supp. 449. For reasons to be stated, we do not reach that question. The procedure governing issuance of the writ is provided by statute. The federal courts may grant the writ “within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (a). While the Act speaks of “a prisoner” (28 U. S. C. § 2241 (c)), the term has been liberally construed to include members of the armed services who have been unlawfully detained, restrained, or confined. Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U. S. 304, 312. The Act extends to those “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2241 (c)(1). The question in the instant case is whether any custodian, or one in the chain of command, as well as the person detained, must be in the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court. In Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188, we held that it was not sufficient if the custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction where the persons detained were outside the jurisdiction and that jurisdiction over the respondent was territorial. The dissent in that case thought that the critical element was not where the applicant was confined but where the custodian was located; that if the custodian were in the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court, then appropriate relief could be effected. Whichever view is taken of the problem in Ahrens v. Clark, the case is of little help here. For while petitioner is within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court, the custodian — the Commander of Moody AFB— is not. In other words, even under the minority view in Ahrens v. Clark, the District Court in Arizona has no custodian within its reach against whom its writ can run. Hence, even if we assume that petitioner is “in custody” in Arizona in the. sense that he is subject to military orders and control which act as a restraint on his freedom of movement (Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 240), the absence of his custodian is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Arizona District Court. Cf. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F. 2d 16, 21. Had petitioner, at the time of the filing of the petition, been under the command of the Air Force officer assigned as liaison officer at Arizona State to supervise the Education and Commissioning Program, we would have a different question. We do not reach it nor do we reach any aspects of the merits, viz., whether, if petitioner be right in contending that his contract of enlistment was breached, habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Stewart dissents. Headquarters at Moody AFB assigned petitioner to temporary duty at Arizona State University. By its terms, the order “permitted [petitioner] to proceed from Moody AFB, GA. to Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, effective on or about 4 June 1969 for approximately 70 days for the purpose of attending the University under Operation Bootstrap and then return to Moody AFB, GA.” The travel authorized was to be “at no expense to the Government.” Petitioner attended Arizona State in the summer of 1969 and obtained his degree. This action was started shortly after petitioner had obtained his degree at Arizona State and while he was still in Arizona. Shortly thereafter Congress provided that a prisoner, no matter where held, could by motion invoke the jurisdiction of the sentencing court and be released on a showing that the sentence was unlawful. 28 U. S. C. § 2255. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 220; Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217. Later Congress made an exception to the jurisdictional requirement noted in Ahrens by allowing a state prisoner to seek habeas corpus in the district where he was sentenced, as well as in the district where he is confined, provided both are within the same State. 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. V). As respects that amendment the Court said in Nelson v. George, 399 U. S. 224, 228 n. 5: “The legislative history of the 1966 amendments to 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (d) (1964 ed., Supp. V) suggests that Congress may have intended to endorse and preserve the territorial rule of Ahrens to the extent that it was not altered by those amendments. See H. R. Rep. No. 1894, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1966). See also S. Rep. No. 1502, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).” Although by 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (e) (1964 ed., Supp. V), Congress has provided for nationwide service of process in a “civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States,” the legislative history of that section is barren of any indication that Congress extended habeas corpus jurisdiction. That section was enacted to broaden the venue of civil actions which could previously have been brought only in the District of Columbia. See H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1; S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 2. Though habeas corpus is technically “civil,” it is not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286. The concept of “custody” has been an evolving one as Judge Northrop shows in Donigian v. Laird, 308 F. Supp. 449, 451. And see Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 64-66. In Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 238, 240, 243, we said: “While limiting its availability to those 'in custody,' the statute does not attempt to mark the boundaries of ‘custody’ nor in any way other than by use of that word attempt to limit the situations in which the writ can be used. . . . “History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus. . . . “It [the Great Writ] is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose — the protection of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty. While petitioner’s parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this is enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the members of the Virginia Parole Board within the meaning of the habeas corpus statute; if he can prove his allegations this custody is in violation of the Constitution, and it was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss his case as moot instead of permitting him to add the Parole Board members as respondents.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. OREGON PACIFIC INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. No. 73-1210. Argued November 20, 1974 Decided February 19, 1975 Charles H. White, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Fritz R. Kahn and Betty Jo Christian. Seymour L. Coblens argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. James H. Clarke filed a brief for Western Railroad Traffic Assn, as amicus curiae urging reversal. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas, announced by Mr. Chief Justice Burger. This is an appeal from a judgment of a three-judge District Court, 28 U. S. C. § 1253, which held invalid an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgating a car Service Order under § 1 (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 41 Stat. 476, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (15). Oregon Pacific Industries v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 609 (Ore. 1973). Lumber is often moved to market on a wholesalers' sale-in-transit schedule. Cars are sent to hold points, where in time reconsignment orders are received for shipment to customers of wholesalers. The tariffs allow indefinite holding, subject to demurrage charges for detention in excess of 24 hours, but the Commission found that these demurrage charges never discouraged shippers from lengthy holding of cars. In 1973 there was, according to the Commission, a transportation “emergency” which required “immediate action to promote car service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the people.” Accordingly, on May 8, 1973, the Commission, sua sponte, without notice and hearing, entered its Service Order No. 1134 which limited the hold time at reconsignment points to five days (120 hours), exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. If the lumber cars were held at reconsignment points longer than five working days, the reconsignment privilege would be lost and the shippers would be subject to local or joint tariff rates from the point of origin to the hold point, and from the hold point to the ultimate destination. The District Court held that there were four, categories of emergency action which the Commission could take under § 1 (15): “(a) to suspend . . . rules, regulations, or practices then established with respect to car service . . . , “(b) to make . . . directions with respect to car service ... during such emergency as ... will best promote . . . service . . . [and provide compensation as between carriers]. “(c) to require . . . common use of terminals, . . . and ■ “(d) to give directions for preference or priority in transportation . . . The District Court held that the Commission’s authority under (b), (c), or (d) would not support the order in this case and that the order could be sustained, if at all, only under (a). It concluded that (a) was not adequate since the challenged order did not “suspend” any rule or regulation “with respect to car service.” It reasoned that the order “condones the practice of sales-in-transit” for an indefinite time but requires shippers employing the practice to pay a higher rate to the carriers than the demurrage rate under the prior order. That was, in its view, a rate order having no place under § 1 (15), which gives the Commission power to act sua sponte in an “emergency” in a narrow group of cases. 365 F. Supp., at 612. The District Court pointed out that § 1 (10) defines “car service” as “the use . . . movement . . . and return of . . . cars . . . used in the transportation of property . . . by any carrier by railroad”; and it emphasized that “ 'car service’ connotes the use to which the vehicles of transportation are put [by a carrier]; not the transportation service rendered by means of them,” 365 F. Supp., at 611 ; Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 528, 533. We emphasized in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742, 743, that car service rules dealt with the management of “a single common pool” of cars “used by all roads,” and that they pertain to railroad use of cars. Since “railroad use” involves shippers, we think the District Court read § 1 (15) too narrowly. We noted in Allegheny-Ludlum that § 1 (15) traces back to the Esch Car Service Act of 1917, 40 Stat 101. 406 U. S., at 744. The use of freight cars as warehouses — the practice which prompted the Commission to act in the present case — was one of the evils at which the original Car Service Act was aimed. Mr. Esch, sponsor of the legislation, said: “Another cause of car shortage is the holding of cars on the part of shippers themselves, using the car as a species of warehouse, instead of promptly unloading it. I think that is quite a universal evil throughout the United States, but it is due in some measure to the lack of warehouse and elevator facilities at the terminals. “Mr. MADDEN. If the gentleman will yield to me, I would like to ask him one question. I would like to ask the gentleman if there is any provision in this bill to compel railroad companies to pay demurrage to the shippers in case they failed to furnish the cars within the time they were required for the shipment of the goods? “Mr. ESCH. The gentleman means reciprocal demurrage? “Mr. MADDEN. This gives the Interstate Commerce Commission the right to authorize them to charge certain demurrage of the shipper if he fails to unload the car. Ought not the shipper to have a claim against the railroad company in case they fail to furnish the cars? “Mr. ESCH. I have no doubt under the proposed amendment, in case of emergency, the commission could make any rules or regulations that they saw fit that would promote the transit of freight, because the power is very broad, and necessarily so.” And the Reports make clear that one aim of the Act was “to the end that the public may receive the best possible service in transportation.” Car shortages, it was found, resulted in short supplies of basic foods in the markets “with attendant high prices.” The interests of shippers and consumers — not the carriers alone— were very much in the forefront. As we have noted, Peoria & P. U. R. Co., supra, emphasized that the car service authority extends to the “use” of cars and not to a “transportation service,” but there the issue was whether one carrier was bound to perform switching services for another carrier. The Court held that it was not; power over the “use” of cars, however, was left undisturbed. In this connection it is obvious that a shipper by rail does not “rent” a vehicle as do shippers by truck. The cars are all “used” under the management of carriers, who naturally receive directions or requests from shippers. The cars cannot be used efficiently to serve the needs of shippers and consumers if they are used not as carriers but as warehouses. In Turner Lumber Co.v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 271 U. S. 259, demurrage to prevent “undue detention” of cars “loaded with lumber held for reconsignment” was fixed by the Commission without notice. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandéis, upheld the charge saying: “All demurrage charges have a double purpose. One is to secure compensation for the use of the car and of the track which it occupies. The other is to promote car efficiency by providing a deterrent against undue detention.” Id., at 262. In Iversen v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 1001, aff'd per curiam, 327 U. S. 767, the Commission entered a car Service Order limiting reconsignment privileges to a specific number of days and providing that cars held in excess of that time would be subject to the sum of the local rates from origin to reconsignment point to destination. It was held that the demurrage item was a “rule” respecting “car service” within the meaning of § 1 (15). The holding in Iversen was implicit in the holding in Turner. The District Court suggested that the .Service Order was invalid because its effect was to “fix” rates and charges during an emergency — a power not covered by § 1 (15). That precise point was raised in Iversen, 63 F. Supp., at 1006, and the ruling, which we affirmed, was contra. Suspending or changing demurrage charges may increase the transportation charges; but, as Turner makes clear, demurrage charges have a dual purpose; and it is enough if one of them is a deterrent against undue detention of cars. As we said in Turner, at times the cause of “undue detention” of freight cars is that they are used “as a place of storage, either at destination or at reconsignment points, for a long period while seeking a market for the goods stored therein.” 271 U. S., at 262. The substitution of tariff rates already fixed and on file for the old demurrage rate is not an unreasonable method of accelerating the movement of freight cars. That was the aim and purpose of the present Service Order; and it was promulgated in an “emergency” which the Commission, using its expertise, found to exist. We cannot say the order was unreasonable on the record before us. Insofar as appellees raise questions of unfairness, they are precluded by the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, and of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Turner Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., supra, which disposed of due process questions under § 1 (15). We therefore hold that the Commission had the power to promulgate Service Order No. 1134 summarily. Reversed. This Service Order by its original terms was to expire July 31, 1973, unless otherwise modified or changed by the Commission. 38 Fed. Reg. 12606. The Commission twice extended the deadline, id., at 19831, 31681, and on April 11, 1974, made it effective “until further order of the Commission,” 39 Fed. Reg. 13971, on each occasion having found “good cause” for the extension. The April 11 amendment also suspended the Service Order indefinitely, effective April 15, 1974. The Solicitor General without citation of any authority expressed his view that the District Court’s decision was correct and moved that its judgment be affirmed. The Western Railroad Traffic Association has filed an amicus brief taking the opposing view. Section 1 (15), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (15), provides: “Whenever the Commission is of opinion that shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic, or other emergency requiring immediate action exists in any section of the country, the Commission shall have, and it is hereby given, authority, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, if it so orders, without answer or other formal pleading by the interested carrier or carriers, and with or without notice, hearing, or the making or filing of a report, according as the Commission may determine: (a) to suspend the operation of any or all rules, regulations, or practices then established with respect to car service for such time as may be determined by the Commission; (b) to make such just and reasonable directions with respect to car service without regard to the ownership as between carriers of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles, during such emergency as in its opinion will best promote the service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the people, upon such terms of compensation as between the carriers as they may agree upon, or, in the event of their disagreement, as the Commission may after subsequent hearing find to be just and reasonable; (c) to require such joint or common use of terminals, including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance outside of such terminals, as in its opinion will best meet the emergency and serve the public interest, and upon such terms as between the carriers as they may agree upon, or, in the event of their disagreement, as the Commission may after subsequent hearing find to be just and reasonable; and (d) to give directions for preference or priority in transportation, embargoes, or movement of traffic under permits, at such time and for such periods as it may determine, and to modify, change, suspend, or annul them. In time of war or threatened war the President may certify to the Commission that it is essential to the national defense and security that certain traffic shall have preference or priority in transportation, and the Commission shall, under the power herein conferred, direct that such preference or priority be afforded.” See H. R. Rep. No. 18, 65th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 43, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 Cong. Reo. 2020-2021. S. Rep., supra, n. 3, at 2. H. R. Rep., supra, n. 3, at 1. Iversen v. United States, involved four Service Orders of the Commission. Service Order No. 396 in that case was on all fours with the one in the instant case. In Iversen, Judge Prettyman, speaking for a three-judge District Court, said: “[Demurrage charges are in part compensation and in part penalty; ... in full character they are neither, not being rates as that term is used in connection with rate-making, nor penalties as that term is used in respect to penal impositions. They are sui generis. Historically, textually, in purpose and in content, they are an integral part of the established rules and regulations relating to the use and movement of cars. From the beginning they have been sustained as rules and regulations. They could not have been sustained as carrier charges or as penalties. As an integral part of the rules and regulations in respect to car service, they fall within the provisions of Section 1 (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act. It follows that when an emergency exists, the Commission can, without hearing, issue, effective for a limited time, orders in respect to these charges.” 63 F. Supp., at 1005-1006. The District Court distinguished Turner on the ground that it involved a “demurrage tariff duly filed,” 271 U. S., at 260. But it was filed by reason of § 1 (15) during an “emergency” and, as in the present case, “without notice.” 271 U. S., at 260. A car Service Order of the Commission issued July 25, 1922, because of an “emergency” without notice and hearing was sustained in Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, against the claim that the order violated the Fifth Amendment. This is the only question we decide today. The Commission’s present obligation with respect to the promulgation of car service rules, the issue that concerns our Brother Powell, has not been raised by counsel here or in the court below, and, accordingly, is a matter we do not address.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. FANT MILLING CO. No. 482. Argued May 20, 1959. Decided June 15, 1959. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Jerome D. Fenton, Thomas J. McDermott and Frederick U. Reel. O. B. Fisher argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to .bargain in good faith _with the representative of' his employees. The question presented by this case is the extent to which the Labor Board may, in formulating a complaint and in finding a violation of this section of the Act, take cognizance of events occurring subsequent to the filing of the charge upon which the complaint is based. Pursuant to an election a union was certified in June 1953 as the exclusive bargaining representative for an appropriate unit of the respondent’s employees at its .plant in Sherman, Texas.' During the ensuing months agents of the union and of the respondent met on several occasions for the supposed purpose of working out a collective bargaining contract. By May 20, 1954, several such meetings had taken place, but no agreement had been reached. On that date the union .filed a charge with the Regional Director ofSthe Board, alleging that the respondent had violated § 8 (a) (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain collectively with the union. Two months later the Regional Director advised the union that he was refusing' to issue a complaint on the ground that “it does not appear that there is sufficient evidence of violations to warrant further proceedings at this time.” The union requested the General Counsel of the Board to review this refusal. . In the meantime and until October 1954 more than a dozen further meetings were held between representatives of the union and of the responden^. No real progress towards reaching an agreement was made.. In October, while negotiations were still going on, the respondent unilaterally put into effect a general wage increase without prior notice to the union. A few weeks later the respondent advised the union that it was withdrawing recognition and that it would refuse any further bargaining conferences. Thereafter, in January 1955, the Regional Director informed the union that “upon reconsideration of the facts .and circumstances, and additional evidence furnished us in connection with our investigation in the above matter, we have decided to and are hereby withdrawing our refusal to issue Complaint with respect to the 8 (a) (5) allegation of refusal to bargain .... We shall proceed ■faith our investigation in due course.” Later the Board’s General Counsel advised the union as follows: “With respect to the 8 (a)(5) allegation of refusal to bargain; the Regional Director advised the parties by letter dated January 24, 1955, that he was withdrawing his dismissal of the 8 (a) (5) portion of the charge and was continuing with the investigation thereof. All further inquiries with respect to the 8 (a)(5) allegation should be addressed to the Regional Director.” Five days afterwards the Regional Director issued a complaint, alleging that “on or about November 21, 1953, and at all times thereafter, Respondent did refuse and continues to refuse to bargain collectively . . . ; that “On or about October 7, 1954, Respondent, without notice to the Union, put into effect á general wage increase ... and that by those acts “Respondent did engage in and is hereby engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a), subsection (5) of the'Act.” The Board, agreeing with its Trial Examiner, held that the respondent had refused to bargain collectively with the union within the meaning of the Act, finding that-“after November 21, 1953, . . ..the Respondent was merely going through the motions of collective bargaining without a genuine intention of trying to negotiate an agreement with the Union as required by the provisions of the Act.” An appropriate order was accordingly issued. 117 N. L. R. B. 1277. The Board expressly held that the respondent’s unilateral grant of a general wage increase in October of 1954, although occurring subsequent to the original charge and not the subject of ah amended charge, was. properly included as a subject of the complaint. Moreover,, its finding of a refusal to bargain was largely influenced by this specific conduct on the part of the respondent. One member of the Board dissented upon the ground that the October wage increase could not lawfully be made the basis of a finding that the respondent had violated the Act. The Court of Appeals denied the Board’s petition for enforcement. 258 F. 2d 851. Substantially agreeing with the reasoning of the dissenting Board member, the court held that § 10 (b) of the Act requires “that a charge must set up facts showing an unfair labor practice . . . , and the facts must be predicated on actions which have already been taken.” (Emphasis in original.) It further held that “the complaint must faithfully reflect the facts constituting the unfair labor practices as presented in the charge.” To attribute so tightly restricted a function to a Board Complaint is, as this Court pointed out in National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350, not consonant with the basic scheme of the Act. One-of the issues in that case was substantially identical to the issue presented here— “whether the jurisdiction of the Board is limited to such unfair labor practices as are set up in the charge presented to the Board so as to preclude its determination that [certain actions on the part of the employer] involved unfair labor practices, since both occurred after the charge was lodged, with the Board. . . .” 309 U. S., at 357. The Court’s resolution of the issue was unambiguous: “It is unnecessary for us to consider now how far the statutory requirement of a charge as a condition precedent to a complaint excludes from the subsequent proceedings matters existing when the charge was filed, but not included in it. Whatever restrictions the requirements of a charge may be thought to place upon subsequent proceedings by the Board, we can find no warrant in the language or purposes of the Act for saying that it precludes the Board from dealing adequately with unfair labor .practices which are related to those alleged in the charge and which grow out of them while the proceeding is pending before the Board. The violations alleged in the complaint and found by the Board were but a prolongation of the attempt to form the company union and to secure.the contracts alleged-in the charge. All are of the same class of violations as those set up in the charge and were continuations of them in pursuance of the sgme objects. The Board’s jurisdiction having been invoked to deal with the first steps, it had authority.to deal with those which followed as a consequence of those already taken. We think the court below correctly held that ‘the Board was within its power in treating the whole sequence as one.’ ” 309 U. S. 350, at 369. In the present case, as in National Licorice, the unilateral wage increase was “of the same class of violations as those set up in the charge . . . .” The wage increase was “related to” the conduct alleged in thé charge and developed as one aspect of that conduct “while the proceeding [was] pending before the Board.” A charge filed with the Labor Board is not to be measured by the standards applicable to a pleading in a private lawsuit. Its purpose is merely to set in motion the machinery of an inquiry. Labor Board v. I. & M. Electric Co., 318 U. S. 9, 18. The responsibility of making that inquiry, and of framing the issues in the case is one that Congress has imposed upon the Board, not the charging party. To confine the Board in its inquiry and in framing the complaint to the specific matters alleged in thé charge would reduce the statutory machinery to a vehicle for the vindication of private rights. This would be alien to the basic purpose of the Act. The Board was created not to adjudicate private controversies but to advance the public interest in eliminating obstructions to interstate commerce, as this Court has recognized from the beginning. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1. Once its jurisdiction is invoked the Board must be left free to make full inquiry under its broad investigatory power in order properly to discharge the duty of protecting public rights which Congress has imposed upon it. There can be, no justification for confining such an inquiry to the precise particularizations of.a charge. For these reasons we adhere to the views expressed in National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board. What has been said is not to imply that the Board is, in the words of the Court of Appeals, to be left “carte blanche to expand the charge as they might please, or to ignore it altogether.” 258 F. 2d., at 856. Here we hold only that the Board is not precluded from “dealing adequately with unfair labor practices which are related to those alleged in the charge and which grow out of them while the proceeding is pending before the Board.” National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350, at 369. It follows in the present case that the October wage increase was a proper subject of the Board’s complaint and was properly considered by the Board in reaching its decision. Reversed, “Sec. 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— . ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a). . . . (d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in' good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or thp negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and’the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . ." 29 U. S. C. §158 (a). The respondent continues here to press the claim that this request was not timely under § 102.19 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, although the uncontroverted evidence shows that the request was filed within an extension of- time that had.been granted. The chronology of these events refutes the respondent’s claim that the Regional Director acted while the matter was under review by the General Counsel. The General Counsel had exercised his reviewing authority prior to the time the complaint issued. The Board ordered the respondent to cease and desist from refusing to bargain; to refrain from interfering with the union’s, efforts to bargain; upon request, to bargain collectively with the union; and to post appropriate notices. The language of the Board’s decision makes- clear how strongly it relied upon the October 1954. wage increase in reaching its conclusion, e. g.: “We have no difficulty in determining the Respondent’s bad faith throughout these protracted negotiations, particularly in view of the Respondent’s unilateral effectuation of a general wage increase early in October 1954, while the negotiations were still in progress but without consultation with or even notice to the Union. . . . “We find, rather, that the giving of this general increase while negotiations were still continuing, and in complete disregard of the Union’s representative status, provides .the final insight into the Respondent’s conduct of negotiations with the Union.”' Section 10 (b) of the Act provides: “Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in. any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a' designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon.” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (b). Judge Cameron wrote the prevailing opinion for the court. Chief Judge Hutcheson wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he agreed with Judge Cameron’s view: “In short, what has happened here is that by the device of injecting "into the case entirely new. matter completely unrelated to the charge, the regional director, in violation of the provisions of the Act, that no complaint can be filed except one' based upon a charge, has filed a complaint, and the Board has heard and condemned the respondent in respect of matters which, because of the lack of a charge, were not before it.” Judge Rives dissented, expressing the view that “the . . . construction ... by the majority Seems to me excessively technical and restrictive^ and, if sustained, I believe that it will seriously cripple the Board in any effective enforcement of the Act.” Section 11 of the Act provides: “Investigatory powers of Board. For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by section 9 and section 10 — (1) 'Documentary evidence; summoning witnesses and taking testimony. “The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. The' Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceeding or investigation requested in such application. Within five days after the service of a subpena on any person requiring the production of any evidence in his possession or under his control, such person may petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke, such subpena if in its opinion the evidence whose production is required does not relate to any matter under investigation, or any matter in question in such proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpena does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence whose production is required. Any member of the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the „ production of such evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any Territory or possession thereof, at any designated place of hearing.” 29 U. S. C. § 161. The 1947 amendments to the National'Labor Relations Act made no change with respect to the respective functions of a charge and a complaint. The only change in § 10 (b) was the addition of the provisions that “No. complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to. the filing of the charge, etc.”. See note 6, supra. This limitation extinguishes liability for unfair labor practices committed more than six months prior to the filing of the charge. It' does not relate to conduct subsequent to the filing of the charge. The Board urges that we instruct the Court of Appeals to enforce the Board’s order. We decline to do so. Cf. Labor Board v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498. However, we think it appropriate to state that if the factual summary contained in Judge Rives’ dissenting opinion finds support in the record as a whole, the Board’s order should be enforced “even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo." Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, 488.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CO. No. 508. Argued April 8, 1953. Decided May 4, 1953. Philip Elman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson and Cecelia H. Goetz. Malcolm I. Frank argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Irl B. Rosenblum. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent, a Missouri corporation, owns a leasehold of a plot of ground together with an office building erected on it. In 1942 the Commissioner assessed deficiencies against respondent for the taxable years 1933, 1938, and 1939, determining that it had claimed an excessive value as its basis for depreciating the property. These deficiencies were predicated on a basis of $385,000 amortized over the life of the lease. Respondent, who claimed a base of $860,000 amortized over a shorter period, filed petitions for review with the Tax Court. Meanwhile respondent filed a petition under ch. X of the Bankruptcy Act which ended in a confirmed plan of reorganization. Although the Collector filed proof of claim for the deficiencies in those proceedings, he later withdrew the claim under a stipulation that the withdrawal was "without prejudice” and did not constitute a determination of or prejudice the rights of the United States to any taxes with respect to any year other than those involved in the claim. Shortly thereafter respondent and the Commissioner filed stipulations in the pending Tax Court proceedings stating that "there is no deficiency in Federal income tax due” from respondent for the taxable years in question, that the tax liability for each of the years was nil, and that the jeopardy assessment was abated. The Tax Court, pursuant to the stipulation, entered formal decisions that there were no deficiencies for the taxable years in question. The Tax Court, however, held no hearing; no stipulations of fact were entered into; no briefs were filed or argument had. The issue as to the correctness of the basis of depreciation used by respondent was, however, the basis of its appeal to the Tax Court. And so, when the Commissioner in 1948 ■ assessed deficiencies for the years 1943, 1944, and 1945, challenging once more the correctness of the basis of depreciation, respondent paid the deficiencies and brought this suit to recover, alleging inter alia that the decisions of the Tax Court for the years 1933, 1938, and 1939 were res judicata of the fact that the basis for depreciation was $860,000. The District Court held against respondent. 97 F. Supp. 595. The Court of Appeals reversed. 199 F. 2d 12'. Because of a conflict between that decision and Trapp v. United States, 177 F. 2d 1, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, we granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 927. The governing principle is stated in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352-353. A judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. “But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.” And see Tait v. Western Md. R. Co., 289 U. S. 620, 623; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 671; Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 597-598. Estoppel by judgment, or collateral estoppel as it is often called, is applicable in the federal income tax field. Tait v. Western Md. R. Co., supra, at 624; Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra, at 598. We conclude that the decisions entered by the Tax Court for the years 1933, 1938, and 1939 were only a pro forma acceptance by the Tax Court of an agreement between the parties to settle their controversy for reasons undisclosed. There is no showing either in the record or by extrinsic evidence (see Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 608) that the issues raised by the pleadings were submitted to the Tax Court for determination or determined by that court. They may or may not have been agreed upon by the parties. Perhaps, as the Court of Appeals inferred, the parties did agree on the basis for depreciation. Perhaps the settlement was made for a different reason, for some exigency arising out of the bankruptcy proceeding. As the case reaches us, we are unable to tell whether the agreement of the parties was based on the merits or on some collateral consideration. Certainly the judgments entered are res judicata of the tax claims for the years 1933, 1938 and 1939, whether or not the basis of the agreements on which they rest reached the merits. But unless we can say that they were an adjudication of the merits, the doctrine of estoppel by judgment would serve an unjust cause: it would become a device by which a decision not shown to be on the merits would forever foreclose inquiry into the merits. Estoppel by judgment includes matters in a second proceeding which were actually presented and determined in an earlier suit. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, supra, at 598. A judgment entered with the consent of the parties may involve a determination of questions of fact and law by the court. But unless a showing is made that that was the case, the judgment has no greater dignity, so far as collateral estop-pel is concerned, than any judgment entered only as a compromise of the parties. Reversed. The stipulation for the year 1933, which is typical, reads as follows: “It is hereby stipulated that there is no deficiency in Federal income tax due from the petitioner for the taxable year 1933 and that the following statement shows the petitioner’s Federal income tax liability for the taxable year 1933: “Tax liability. None “Assessment (Jeopardy): “January 23, 1942 (not paid). $2,188.12 “Assessment to be abated. $2,188.12”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MacDONALD, SOMMER & FRATES v. COUNTY OF YOLO et al. No. 84-2015. Argued March 26, 1986 Decided June 25, 1986 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined and in Parts I, II, and III of which Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 353. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 364. Howard N. Ellman argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Gus Bauman, Kenneth N. Burns, Scott C. Verges, and Edward R. MacDonald. William L. Owen argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Richard W. Sherwood, Charles R. Mack, and P. Lawrence Klose Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Adirondack Park Local Government Review Board et al. by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robert K. Best, and Thomas W. Birmingham; for the American College of Real Estate Lawyers by Robert 0. Hetlage, Eugene J. Morris, John P. Tre-vaskis, Jr., and Edward I. Cutler; for the California Building Industry Association by Rex E. Lee, Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., and Carter G. Phillips; for the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale, Cal., et al. by J err old A. Fadem and Michael M. Berger; for Lodestar Co. by Gideon Kanner; and for the Mid-America Legal Foundation by John M. Cannon, Susan W. Wanat, and Ann Plunkett Sheldon. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the city of Mountain View, Cal., et al. by Peter D. Bulens, Robert J. Logan, Carter J. Stroud, Albert E. Polonsky, R. R. Campagna, Robert J. Lanzone, Mary Jo Levinger, Steven F. Nord, K. Duane Lyders, John W. Witt, Hadden Roth, and Robert Rogers; for the American Farmland Trust et al. by Fred P. Bosselman and Clijford L. Weaver; for the County Supervisors Association of California by Mark A. Wasser; and for the National Association of Counties et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Joyce Holmes Benjamin. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Marzulla, and Peter R. Steen-land; for the State of California ex reí. John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, et al. by Mr. Van de Kamp, Richard C. Jacobs, N. Gregory Taylor, and Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorneys General, and Craig C. Thompson and Richard M. Frank, Deputy Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General of their respective jurisdictions as follows: Harold M. Brown of Alaska, Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Charles M. Oberly III of Delaware, Jim Smith of Florida, L. Su’ esu’ Lutu of American Samoa, Leroy Mercer of the Virgin Islands, Richard Opper of Guam, Corinne K. A. Watanabe of Hawaii, James T. Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, James E. Tierney of Maine, Stephen H. Sachs of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, William L. Webster of Missouri, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Robert Abrams of New York, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Jim Maddox of Texas, David L. Wilkenson of Utah, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and Archie G. McClintock of Wyoming; for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers et al. by Roy D. Bates, Wil liam I. Thornton, Jr., John W. Witt, Roger F. Cutter, George Agnost, J. Lamar Shelley, Robert J. Alfton, James K. Baker, Frank B. Gummey III, James D. Montgomery, Clifford D. Pierce, Jr., William H. Taube, and Charles S. Rhyne; and for the Conservation Foundation et al. by Charles L. Siemon, Wendy U. Larsen, and Christopher J. Duerksen. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether rejection of a subdivision proposal deprived appellant of its property without just compensation contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. h — I This appeal is taken from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a property owner’s complaint for money damages for an alleged “taking” of its property. In 1975, appellant submitted a tentative subdivision map to the Yolo County Planning Commission. Under appellant’s proposal, the subject property, at least part of which was planted with corn, would be subdivided into 159 single-family and multifamily residential lots. The Yolo County Planning Commission rejected the subdivision plan, however, and the Board of Supervisors of the county affirmed that determination. The Board found numerous reasons why appellant’s tentative subdivision map was neither “consistent with the General Plan of the County of Yolo, nor with the specific plan of the County of Yolo embodied in the Zoning Regulations for the County.” App. 73. Appellant focuses our attention on four of those reasons. See id., at 45-46 (fourth amended complaint). First, the Board criticized the plan because it failed to provide for access to the proposed subdivision by a public street: the city of Davis, to which the subdivision would adjoin, refused to permit the extension of Cowell Boulevard into the development. See id., at 74. Even ignoring this obstacle, “[t]he map presented ma[de] no provision for any other means of access to the subdivision,” and the Board calculated that relying on an extension of Cowell Boulevard alone would “constitute] a real and substantial danger to the public health in the event of fire, earthquake, flood, or other natural disaster.” Id., at 77. Second, the Board found that appellant’s “Tentative Map as presented [did] not provide for sewer service by any governmental entity”: “The only means for provision of sewer services by the El Macero interceptor sewer require that the proposed subdivision anne[x] to the existing Community Services Area. Said annexation is subject to Local Agency Formation Commission jurisdiction. The Board finds that no proceedings currently are pending before LAFCO for the annexation of the proposed subdivision.” Id., at 75. Third, the Board rejected the development plan because “[t]he level of [police] protection capable of being afforded to the proposed site by the [Yolo County] Sheriff’s Department is not intense enough to meet the needs of the proposed subdivision.” Id., at 76. Fourth, the Board found inadequate the provision for water service for the reason that there was “no provision made in the proposed subdivision for the provision of water or maintenance of a water system for the subdivision by any governmental entity.” Ibid. After this rebuff, appellant filed the present action and, on the same day, a petition for a writ of mandate. The mandate action, which is still pending, seeks to set aside the Board’s decision and to direct the Board to reconsider appellant’s subdivision proposal. See id,., at 32-33 (amended petition for writ of mandate). This action, in contrast, seeks declaratory and monetary relief. In it, appellant accuses appellees County of Yolo and city of Davis of “restricting the Property to an open-space agricultural use by denying all permit applications, subdivision maps, and other requests to implement any other use,” id., at 46, and thereby of appropriating the “entire economic use” of appellant’s property “for the sole purpose of [providing] ... a public, open-space buffer,” id., at 51. In particular, the fourth amended complaint challenges the Board’s decision with respect to the adequacy of public access, sanitation services, water supplies, and fire and police protection. Because appellees denied these services, according to the complaint, “none of the beneficial uses” allowed even for agricultural land would be suitable for appellant’s property. Id., at 52. The complaint alleged, in capital letters and “Without limitation by the foregoing ENUMERATION,” that “ANY APPLICATION FOR A ZONE CHANGE, VARIANCE OR OTHER RELIEF WOULD BE FUTILE.” Id., at 58. The complaint also alleged that appellant had “exhausted all of its administrative remedies” and that its seven causes of action were “ripe” for adjudication. Id., at 58, 59. In response to these charges appellees demurred. Pointing to “its earlier Order Sustaining Demurrers and Granting Leave to Amend,” the California Superior Court contended that “the property had obvious other uses than agriculture under the Yolo County Code,” id., at 115, and referenced sections permitting such uses, among others, as ranch and farm dwellings and agricultural storage facilities, see Yolo County Code §§8-2.502, 8-2.503. The court rejected appellant’s “attemp[t] to overcome that defect by alleging as conclusion-ary fact that each and every principal use and each and every multiple accessory use is no longer possible so that the property does have no value as zoned.” App. 115. It concluded that, irrespective of the insufficiency of appellant’s factual allegations, monetary damages for inverse condemnation are foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 274-277, 598 P. 2d 25, 29-31 (1979), aff’d, 447 U. S. 255 (1980). App. 116, 118. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. It “accepted] as true all the properly pled factual allegations of the complaint,” id., at 126, and did “not consider whether the complaint was barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies or by res judicata,” id., at 125-126. But it “f[ou]nd the decision in Agins to be controlling herein,” id., at 130: “In that case the [California] Supreme Court specifically and clearly established, for policy reasons, a rule of law which precludes a landowner from recovering in inverse condemnation based upon land use regulation. We emphasize that the Court did not hold that regulation cannot amount to a taking without compensation, it simply held that in such event the remedy is not inverse condemnation. The remedy instead is an action to have the regulation set aside as unconstitutional. Plaintiff has filed a mandate action in the trial court which is currently pending. That is its proper remedy. The claim for inverse condemnation cannot be maintained.” Id., at 130-131 (citation and footnote omitted). In the alternative, the California Court of Appeal determined that appellant would not be entitled to monetary relief even if California law provided for this remedy: “In any event, even if an inverse condemnation action were available in a land use regulation situation, we would be constrained to hold that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action. Pared to their essence, the allegations are that plaintiff purchased property for residential development, the property is zoned for residential development, plaintiff submitted an application for approval of development of the property into 159 residential units, and, in part at the urging of the City, the County denied approval of the application. In these allegations plaintiff is not unlike the plaintiffs in Agins ... [a case in which] both the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to allege facts which would establish an unconstitutional taking of private property. “The plaintiff’s claim here must fail for the same reasons the claims in Agins failed. Here plaintiff applied for approval of a particular and relatively intensive residential development and the application was denied. The denial of that particular plan cannot be equated with a refusal to permit any development, and plaintiff concedes that the property is zoned for residential purposes in the County general plan and zoning ordinance. Land use planning is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A governmental entity is not required to permit a landowner to develop property to [the] full extent he might desire or be charged with an unconstitutional taking of the property. Here, as in Agins, the refusal of the defendants to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development. Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a cause of action.” Id,., at 132-133 (citation omitted). The California Supreme Court denied appellant’s petition for hearing, and appellant perfected an appeal to this Court. Because of the importance of the question whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is constitutionally required in appropriate cases involving regulatory takings, we noted probable jurisdiction. 474 U. S. 917 (1985). On further consideration of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, aided by briefing and oral argument, we find ourselves unable to address the merits of this question. I — I I — I The regulatory takings claim advanced by appellant has two components. First, appellant must establish that the regulation has in substance “taken” his property — that is, that the regulation “goes too far.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922). See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 178 (1979). Second, appellant must demonstrate that any proffered compensation is not “just.” It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and authoritative determination of the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject property. A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how far the regulation goes. As Justice Holmes emphasized throughout his opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 416, “this is a question of degree — and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.” Accord, id., at 413. To this day we have no “set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.” Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962). Instead, we rely “as much [on] the exercise of judgment as [on] the application of logic.” Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65 (1979). Our cases have accordingly “examined the ‘taking’ question by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors — such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action — that have particular significance.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S., at 175. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978) (“ad hoc, factual inquiries”); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958) (“question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case”). Until a property owner has “obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property,” “it is impossible to tell whether the land retain[s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing] expectation interests ha[ve] been destroyed.” Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172, 186, 190, n. 11 (1985). As we explained last Term: “[T]he difficult problem [is] how to define “too far,” that is, how to distinguish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or physical possession. . . . [Resolution of that question depends, in significant part, upon an analysis of the effect the Commission’s application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the value of respondent’s property and investment-backed profit expectation. That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be applied to respondent’s property.” Id., at 199-200 (footnote omitted). Accord, id., at 191. For similar reasons, a court cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide “just compensation” until it knows what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative body intends to provide. See id., at 195 (“[T]he State’s action here is not ‘complete’ until the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking” (footnote omitted)). The local agencies charged with administering regulations governing property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they take with the one hand they may give back with the other. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, for example, we recognized that the Landmarks Preservation Commission, the administrative body primarily responsible for administering New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law, had authority in appropriate circumstances to authorize alterations, remit taxes, and transfer development rights to ensure the landmark owner a reasonable return on its property. See 438 U. S., at 112-115, and n. 13. Because the railroad had “not sought approval for the construction of a smaller structure” than its proposed 50-plus story office building, id., at 137; see id., at 137, n. 34, and because its development rights in the airspace above its Grand Central Station Terminal were transferable “to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which ha[d] been found suitable for the construction of a new office building,” id., at 137, we concluded that “the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law ha[d] not effected a ‘taking’ of [the railroad’s] property,” id., at 138. Whether the inquiry asks if a regulation has “gone too far,” or whether it seeks to determine if proffered compensation is “just,” no answer is possible until a court knows what use, if any, may be made of the affected property. Our cases uniformly reflect an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to limit it. Thus, in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), we held that zoning ordinances which authorized the development of between one and five single-family residences on appellants’ 5-acre tract did not effect a taking of their property on their face, and, because appellants had not made application for any improvements to their property, the constitutionality of any particular application of the ordinances was not properly before us. See id., at 260. Similarly, in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621 (1981), we dismissed the appeal because it did not appear that the city’s rezoning and adoption of an open space plan had deprived the utility of all beneficial use of its property. See id., at 631-632, and n. 12. Because the California Court of Appeal had “not decided whether any taking in fact ha[d] occurred, . . . further proceedings [were] necessary to resolve the federal question whether there has been a taking at all.” Id., at 633. As a consequence, the judgment was not final for purposes of our jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Ibid. Most recently, in Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, we held that the developer’s failure either to seek variances that would have allowed it to develop the property in accordance with its proposed plat, or to avail itself of an available and facially adequate state procedure by which it might obtain “just compensation,” meant that its regulatory taking claim was premature. Here, in comparison to the situations of the property owners in the three preceding cases, appellant has submitted one subdivision proposal and has received the Board’s response thereto. Nevertheless, appellant still has yet to receive the Board’s “final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.” Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S., at 191. In Agins, San Diego Gas & Electric, and William son Planning Comm’n, we declined to reach the question whether the Constitution requires a monetary remedy to redress some regulatory takings because the records in those cases left us uncertain whether the property at issue had in fact been taken. Likewise, in this case, the holdings of both courts below leave open the possibility that some development will be permitted, and thus again leave us in doubt regarding the antecedent question whether appellant’s property has been taken. The judgment is therefore Affirmed. The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment prohibition applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 236, 239, 241 (1897). See also Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172, 175, n. 1 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 623, n. 1 (1981). “25. In determining that Plaintiff’s land could only be used for agricultural purposes, notwithstanding its general planning and zoning designation for residential use and its suitability therefor, County determined that (i) the Property lacked access by means of suitable public streets, a condition resulting from City’s deliberate refusal to permit or approve available access; (ii) the [Property lacked sanitary sewer service, a condition resulting directly from the wrongful acts of City, County and District above alleged[;] (iii) the Property lacked adequate water supply, a finding directly contrary to the fact (in evidence before County) that there are proven sources of supply on the Property and in the vicinity thereof which serve the immediately adjacent residential areas[;] and (iv) that the Property lacked adequate fire and police services, conditions attributable in part to refusal on part of County and City to provide such services.” App. 51-52. In California, “those factual allegations of the complaint which are properly pleaded are deemed admitted by defendant’s demurrer.” Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 746, 614 P. 2d 728, 730 (1980). “However,” a demurrer “does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged therein.” Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 713, 433 P. 2d 732, 745 (1967) (citations omitted). See, e. g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591, 487 P. 2d 1241, 1245 (1971); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 327, 444 P. 2d 481, 495 (1968); Sych v. Insurance Co. of North America, 173 Cal. App. 3d 321, 326, 220 Cal. Rptr. 692, 695 (1985); Read v. City of Lynwood, 173 Cal. App. 3d 437, 442, 219 Cal. Rptr. 26, 28 (1985). Thus, one intermediate California appellate court has sustained a demurrer to a complaint alleging a regulatory taking on jurisdictional grounds, notwithstanding an “allegation in [appellants’] complaint that they ‘have exhausted their administrative remedies’”; for “while a demurrer admits all material facts which are properly pleaded, it does not admit conclusions of fact or law alleged therein. Appellants’ conclusionary statement that they exhausted their administrative remedies therefore cannot avail them.” Pan Pacific Properties, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 251, 146 Cal. Rptr. 428, 432 (1978) (citation omitted). Cf. Hecton v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, 58 Cal. App. 3d 653, 657, 130 Cal. Rptr. 230, 232 (1976) (same; allegations of taking and damage). We understand the Superior Court to have sustained the demurrer both because the complaint failed properly to plead facts amounting to a taking and because California law does not provide a monetary remedy for a regulatory taking. The Superior Court, after explaining these two reasons, concluded simply that “[t]he complaint fails to state a proper cause of action for inverse condemnation.” App. 116. Although Justice White’s dissent treats the first reason as dicta and the second as the actual basis of decision, see post, at 355-356, since the Superior Court did not rest its holding on only one of its two stated reasons, it is appropriate to treat them as alternative bases of decision. In answer to appellant’s 42 U. S. C. § 1983 claim, the California Court of Appeal similarly held that a monetary judgment was foreclosed by Agins, and that “[e]ven if a cause of action for monetary damages could be stated under the Civil Rights Act based upon the regulation of the use of property, the allegations would be insufficient in this case: “Plaintiff seeks compensation because the County refused approval of the intensive development it desires, but that refusal does not mean that other, less intensive uses would also be denied. Accordingly plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish an uncompensated taking of its property.” App. 135. We accept for the purposes of deciding this case that any taking was for a public purpose, as alleged in the complaint. See id., at 50. See also id., at 51, 60. A property owner is of course not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain this determination. See Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S., at 205-206 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 749 (1947). Appellant’s current complaint — as authoritatively construed by the California Court of Appeal — alleged the denial of only one intense type of residential development. Appellant does not contend that only improvements along the lines of its 159-home subdivision plan would avert a regulatory taking. Rather, the complaint alleged that appellant was deprived of all beneficial use of its property. See App. 51, 60, 65. The California Court of Appeal, whose opinion on matters of local law and local pleading we must respect, cf. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 259-260, n. 5 (1980), apparently rejected what the Superior Court labeled a “conclusionary” allegation of futility, and explained that appellant could seek an administrative application of the Yolo County General Plan and Zoning Ordinances to its property which, for aught that appears, would allow development to proceed. Justice White’s dissent reluctantly concludes that our understanding of the Court of Appeal’s decision is “plausible” and “sensible,” but insists that the Court of Appeal’s decision is “most properly read as taking as true all of the allegations in the complaint, including the allegations of futility, and as rejecting those allegations as insufficient as a matter of substantive takings law.” Post, at 363. We disagree. Both state courts upheld ap-pellees’ demurrer on the ground that not all development had been foreclosed. Thus, the Superior Court apparently accepted appellant’s submission that its property was restricted to agricultural use but held that, even so, valuable use might still be made of the land. The Court of Appeal was unwilling to concede even this much: it noted that appellant’s property was zoned residential and held that valuable residential development was open to it. These holdings that there is no total prohibition against the productive use of appellant’s land cannot possibly be reconciled with the allegations in the complaint that “any beneficial use” is precluded, App. 46, and that future applications would be futile, id., at 58. In view of the fact that these allegations were necessarily rejected by the state courts, and that the parties’ briefs disclose a permissible basis for this disposition in settled California demurrer law, see n. 3, supra; see also Brief for Respondents in 3 Civil 22306 (Cal. Ct. App., Third App. Dist., July 10, 1984), pp. 25, 27; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer to Fourth Amended Complaint in No. 36655 (Cal. Super. Ct., Yolo County, Dec. 18, 1981), 4 Clerk’s Tr., pp. 888-889, 912, n. 2, 914, it does not matter that the state courts neglected to “expressly disapprove” the deficient allegations or to detail the particular reasons why, see post, at 357. Remarkably, the dissent implies that the Court of Appeal accepted the complaint’s allegations that local regulations denied appellant all beneficial use of its property and that further regulatory proceedings would be fruitless, but nonetheless required it to file further “useless” applications to state a taking claim. Ibid. Whatever purpose such a requirement might serve, futile reapplications are not contemplated by the Court of Appeal. To begin with, this requirement is not, as the dissent maintains, suggested by the Court of Appeal’s reliance on the decisions of the California Supreme Court and of this Court in Agins. See App. 132. To the contrary, the Court of Appeal relied on the decisions in Agins to illustrate that the property owners there — as here — had not “attempt[ed] to obtain approval to . . . develop the land” in accordance with applicable zoning regulations and for this reason had “failed to allege facts which would establish an unconstitutional taking of private property.” Id., at 132-133. See 447 U. S., at 259-263; 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 598 P. 2d 25, 31 (1979). The implication is not that future applications would be futile, but that a meaningful application has not yet been made. The dissent’s supposition that the Court of Appeal accepted the allegations of taking and futility is further contradicted by the court’s express denial that submission of a less intensive application would be futile: “the refusal of the [appellees] to permit the intensive development desired by the landowner does not preclude less intensive, but still valuable development.” App. 133. Appellant is thus in the same position Mr. and Mrs. Agins would have occupied if they had requested and been denied the opportunity to build five Victorian mansions for their single-family residences, or if San Diego Gas & Electric Co. had asked and been denied the option of building a nuclear powerplant. Rejection of exceedingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews. In this case, of course, we have statements from both courts below dispelling any doubt on this point.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BROWN et al., dba BROWN FOOD STORE, et al. No. 7. Argued January 19, 1965. Decided March 29, 1965. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Arnold Ord-man, Dominick L. Manoli, Gary Green and Nathan Lewin. William L. Keller argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Allen Butler. S. G. Lippman and Tim L. Bornstein filed a brief for the Retail Clerks International Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Joseph M. McLaughlin and Frederick A. Morgan filed a brief for Food Employers Council, Inc., et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The respondents, who are members of a multiemployer bargaining group, locked out their employees in response to a whipsaw strike against another member of the group. They and the struck employer continued operations with temporary replacements. The National Labor Relations Board found that the struck employer’s use of temporary replacements was lawful under Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, but that the respondents had violated §§8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by locking out their regular employees and using temporary replacements to carry on business. 137 N. L. R. B. 73. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed and refused to enforce the Board’s order. 319 F. 2d 7. We granted certiorari, 375 U. S. 962. We affirm the Court of Appeals. Five operators of six retail food stores in Carlsbad, New Mexico, make up the employer group. The stores had bargained successfully on a group basis for many years with Local 462 of the Retail Clerks International Association. Negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement to replace the expiring one began in January 1960. Agreement was reached by mid-February on all terms except the amount and effective date of a wage increase. Bargaining continued without result, and on March 2 the Local informed the employers that a strike had been authorized. The employers responded that a strike against any member of the employer group would be regarded as a strike against all. On March 16, the union struck Food Jet, Inc., one of the group. The four respondents, operating five stores, immediately locked out all employees represented by the Local, telling them and the Local that they would be recalled to work when the strike against Food Jet ended. The stores, including Food Jet, continued to carry on business by using management personnel, relatives of such personnel, and a few temporary employees; all of the temporary replacements were expressly told that the arrangement would be discontinued when the whipsaw strike ended. Bargaining continued until April 22 when an agreement was reached. The employers immediately released the temporary replacements and restored the strikers and the locked-out employees to their jobs. The Board and the Court of Appeals agreed that the case was to be decided in light of our decision in the so-called Buffalo Linen case, Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87. There we sustained the Board’s finding that, in the absence of specific proof of unlawful motivation, the use of a lockout by members of a multiem-ployer bargaining unit in response to a whipsaw strike did not violate either § 8 (a) (1) or § 8 (a) (3). We held that, although the lockout tended to impair the effectiveness of the whipsaw strike, the right to strike “is not so absolute as to deny self-help by employers when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide. . . . The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests.” 353 U. S., at 96. We concluded that the Board correctly balanced those interests in upholding the lockout, since it found that the nonstruck employers resorted to the lockout to preserve the multiemployer bargaining unit from the disintegration threatened by the whipsaw .strike. But in the present case the Board held, two members dissenting, that the respondents’ continued operations with temporary replacements constituted a “critical difference” from Buffalo Linen — where all members of the employer group shut down operations — and that in this circumstance it was reasonable to infer that the respondents did not act to protect the multiemployer group, but “for the purpose of inhibiting a lawful strike.” 137 N. L. R. B., at 76. Thus the respondents’ act was both a coercive practice condemned by §8 (a)(1) and discriminatory conduct in violation of § 8 (a)(3). The Board’s decision does not rest upon independent evidence that the respondents acted either out of hostility toward the Local or in reprisal for the whipsaw strike. It rests upon the Board’s appraisal that the respondents’ conduct carried its own indicia of unlawful intent, thereby establishing, without more, that the conduct constituted an unfair labor practice. It was disagreement with this appraisal, which we share, that led the Court of Appeals to refuse to enforce the Board’s order. It is true that the Board need not inquire into employer motivation to support a finding of an unfair labor practice where the employer conduct is demonstrably destructive of employee rights and is not justified by the service of significant or important business ends. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221; Labor Board v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U. S. 21. We agree with the Court of Appeals that, in the setting of this whipsaw strike and Food Jet’s continued operations, the respondents’ lockout and their continued operations with the use of temporary replacements, viewed separately or as a single act, do not constitute such conduct. We begin with the proposition that the Act does not constitute the Board as an “arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands.” Labor Board v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 497. In the absence of proof of unlawful motivation, there are many economic weapons which an employer may use that either interfere in some measure with concerted employee activities, or which are in some degree discriminatory and discourage union membership, and yet the use of such economic weapons does not constitute conduct that is within the prohibition of either § 8 (a)(1) or § 8 (a)(3). See, e. g., Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., supra; Labor Board v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F. 2d 886, 896. Even the Board concedes that an employer may legitimately blunt the effectiveness of an anticipated strike by stockpiling inventories, readjusting contract schedules, or transferring work from one plant to another, even if he thereby makes himself “virtually strikeproof.” As a general matter he may completely liquidate his business without violating either §8 (a)(1) or §8 (a)(3), whatever the impact of his action on concerted employee activities. Texile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., Nos. 37 and 41, decided today, ante, p. 263. Specifically, he may in various circumstances use the lockout as a legitimate economic weapon. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, supra; Labor Board v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., supra; Leonard v. Labor Board, 205 F. 2d 355; Betts Cadillac Old's, Inc., 96 N. L. R. B. 268; International Shoe Co., 93 N. L. R. B. 907; Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 601, 602; Duluth Bottling Assn., 48 N. L. R. B. 1335; Link-Belt Co., 26 N. L. R. B. 227. And in American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, No. 255, decided today, post, p. 300, we hold that a lockout is not an unfair labor practice simply because used by an employer to bring pressure to bear in support of his bargaining position after an impasse in bargaining negotiations has been reached. In the circumstances of this case, we do not see how the continued operations of respondents and their use of temporary replacements imply hostile motivation any more than the lockout itself; nor do we see how they are inherently more destructive of employee rights. Rather, the compelling inference is that this was all part and parcel of respondents’ defensive measure to preserve the multiemployer group in the face of the whipsaw strike. Since Food Jet legitimately continued business operations, it is only reasonable to regard respondents’ action as evincing concern that the integrity of the employer group was threatened unless they also managed to stay open for business during the lockout. For with Food Jet open for business and respondents’ stores closed, the prospect that the whipsaw strike would succeed in breaking up the employer association was not at all fanciful. The retail food industry is very competitive and repetitive patronage is highly important. Faced with the prospect of a loss of patronage to Food Jet, it is logical that respondents should have been concerned that one or more of their number might bolt the group and come to terms with the Local, thus destroying the common front essential to multiemployer bargaining. The Court of Appeals correctly pictured the respondents’ dilemma in saying, “If . . . the struck employer does choose to operate with replacements and the other employers cannot replace after lockout, the economic advantage passes to the struck member, the non-struck members are deterred in exercising the defensive lockout, and the whipsaw strike . . . enjoys an almost inescapable prospect of success.” 319 F. 2d, at 11. Clearly respondents’ continued operations with the use of temporary replacements following the lockout were wholly consistent with a legitimate business purpose. Nor are we persuaded by the Board’s argument that justification for the inference of hostile motivation appears in the respondents’ use of temporary employees rather than some of the regular employees. It is not commonsense, we think, to say that the regular employees were “willing to work at the employers’ terms.” 137 N. L. R. B., at 76. It seems probable that this “willingness” was motivated as much by their understandable desire to further the objective of the whipsaw strike — to break through the employers’ united front by forcing Food Jet to accept the Local’s terms — as it was by a desire to work for the employers under the existing unacceptable terms. As the Board’s dissenting members put it, “These employees are willing only to receive wages while their brethren in the rest of the associationwide unit are exerting whipsaw pressure on one employer to gain benefits that will ultimately accrue to all employees in the asso-ciationwide unit, including those here locked out.” 137 N. L. R. B., at 78. Moreover, the course of action to which the Board would limit the respondents would force them into the position of aiding and abetting the success of the whipsaw strike and consequently would render “largely illusory,” 137 N. L. R. B., at 78-79, the right of lockout recognized by Buffalo Linen; the right would be meaningless if barred to nonstruck stores that find it necessary to operate because the struck store does so. The Board’s finding of a § 8 (a)(1) violation emphasized the impact of respondents’ conduct upon the effectiveness of the whipsaw strike. It is no doubt true that the collective strength of the stores to resist that strike is maintained, and even increased, when all stores stay open with temporary replacements. The pressures on the employees are necessarily greater when none of the union employees is working and the stores remain open. But these pressures are no more than the result of the Local’s inability to make effective use of the whipsaw tactic. Moreover, these effects are no different from those that result from the legitimate use of any economic weapon by an employer. Continued operations with the use of temporary replacements may result in the failure of the whipsaw strike, but this does not mean that the employers’ conduct is demonstrably so destructive of employee rights and so devoid of significant service to any legitimate business end that it cannot be tolerated consistently with the Act. Certainly then, in the absence of evidentiary findings of hostile motive, there is no support for the conclusion that respondents violated § 8 (a)(1). Nor does the record show any basis for concluding that respondents violated § 8 (a) (3). Under that section both discrimination and a resulting discouragement of union membership are necessary, but the added element of unlawful intent is also required. In Buffalo Linen itself the employers treated the locked-out employees less favorably because of their union membership, and this may have tended to discourage continued membership, but we rejected the notion that the use of the lockout violated the statute. The discriminatory act is not by itself unlawful unless intended to prejudice the employees’ position because of their membership in the union; some element of antiunion animus is necessary. See Radio Officers’ Union v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 42-44; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, at 46. We have determined that the “real motive” of the employer in an alleged § 8 (a)(3) violation is decisive, Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103, 132; if any doubt still persisted, we laid it to rest in Radio Officers’ Union v. Labor Board, supra, where we reviewed the legislative history of the. provision and concluded that Congress clearly intended the employer’s purpose in discriminating to be controlling. Id., at 44. See also Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., ante, at 275, 276; American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, post, at 311— 313; Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667, 674-676. We recognize that, analogous to the determination of unfair practices under § 8 (a) (1), when an employer practice is inherently destructive of employee rights and is not justified by the service of important business ends, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a violation of §8 (a)(3). This principle, we have said, is “but an application of the common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct.” Radio Officers’ Union v. Labor Board, supra, at 45. For example, in Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, we held that an employer’s action in awarding superseniority to employees who worked during a strike was discriminatory conduct that carried with it its own indicia of improper intent. The only reasonable inference that could be drawn by the Board from the award of superseniority— balancing the prejudicial effect upon the employees against any asserted business purpose — was that it was directed against the striking employees because of their union membership; conduct so inherently destructive of employee interests could not be saved from illegality by an asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good faith. But where, as here, the tendency to discourage union membership is comparatively slight, and the employers’ conduct is reasonably adapted to achieve legitimate business ends or to deal with business exigencies, we enter into an area where the improper motivation of the employers must be established by independent evidence. When so established, antiunion motivation will convert an otherwise ordinary business act into an unfair labor practice. Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra, at 227, and cases there cited. We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondents’ conduct here clearly fits into the latter category, where actual subjective intent is determinative, and where the Board must find from evidence independent of the mere conduct involved that the conduct was primarily motivated by an antiunion animus. While the use of temporary nonunion personnel in preference to the locked-out union members is discriminatory, we think that any-resulting tendency to discourage union membership is comparatively remote, and that this use of temporary personnel constitutes a measure reasonably adapted to the effectuation of a legitimate business end. Here discontent on the part of the Local’s membership in all likelihood is attributable largely to the fact that the membership was locked out as the result of the Local’s whipsaw stratagem. But the lockout itself is concededly within the rule of Buffalo Linen. We think that the added dissatisfaction, with its resultant pressure on membership, attributable to the fact that the nonstruck employers remain in business with temporary replacements is comparatively insubstantial. First, the replacements were expressly used for the duration of the labor dispute only; thus, the displaced employees could not have looked upon the replacements as threatening their jobs. At most the union would be forced to capitulate and return its members to work on terms which, while not as desirable as hoped for, were still better than under the old contract. Second, the membership, through its control of union policy, could end the dispute and terminate the lockout at any time simply by agreeing to the employers’ terms and returning to work on a regular basis. Third, in light of the union-shop provision that had been carried forward into the new contract from the old collective-bargaining agreement, it would appear that a union member would have nothing to gain, and much to lose, by quitting the union. Under all these circumstances, we cannot say that the employers’ conduct had any great tendency to discourage union membership. Not only was the prospect of discouragement of membership comparatively remote, but the respondents’ attempt to remain open for business with the help of temporary replacements was a measure reasonably adapted to the achievement of a legitimate end — preserving the integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit. When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus comparatively slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employers’ conduct is prima facie lawful. Under these circumstances the finding of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) (3) requires a showing of improper subjective intent. Here, there is no assertion by either the union or the Board that the respondents were motivated by antiunion animus, nor is there any evidence that this was the case. On the contrary, the background of the employer association’s relations with the union and all the circumstances of the respondents’ behavior during the dispute tend to support the contrary conclusion: the history of labor relations between the employers and the Local divulges that the relationship has always been more than amicable; union-shop provisions have been incorporated in the collective-bargaining agreement between the Local and the employers for many years; in these very negotiations, the employers’ association waived the failure of the Local to give timely notice of its desire to bargain over new terms of employment and consented to hear the Local’s claims at the bargaining table; the record contains undisputed testimony by the store owners that they had no bone to pick with the Local, that on the contrary they thought that unions were a good thing, but felt forced to take action in order to preserve the multiemployer group from disintegration and to save their considerable stock of perishable food produce. Even the struck member of the association did not resort to permanent replacements for the striking workers, though it could have under Mackay; rather it sought to ride out the dispute with temporary replacements to avoid depriving the regular employees of their jobs. Thus, not only is there absent in the record any independent evidence of improper motive, but the record contains positive evidence of the employers’ good faith. In sum, the Court of Appeals was required to conclude that there was not sufficient evidence gathered from the record as a whole to support the Board’s finding that respondents’ conduct violates § 8 (a)(3). See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. It is argued, finally, that the Board’s decision is within the area of its expert judgment and that, in setting it aside, the Court of Appeals exceeded the authorized scope of judicial review. This proposition rests upon our statement in Buffalo Linen that in reconciling the conflicting interests of labor and management the Board’s determination is to be subjected to “limited judicial review.” 353 U. S., at 96. When we used the phrase “limited judicial review” we did not mean that the balance struck by the Board is immune from judicial examination and reversal in proper cases. Courts are expressly empowered to enforce, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, the Board’s orders, except that the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §§10 (e), (f), 29 U. S. C. §§ 160 (e), (f) (1958 ed.). Courts should be “slow to overturn an administrative decision,” Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 112, but they are not left “to 'sheer acceptance’ of the Board’s conclusions,” Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, 803. Reviewing courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute. Such review is always properly within the judicial province, and courts would abdicate their responsibility if they did not fully review such administrative decisions. Of course due deference is to be rendered to agency determinations of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in the record as a whole. But where, as here, the review is not of a question of fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance to be struck between conflicting interests, “[t]he deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.” American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, post, at 318. Courts must, of course, set aside Board decisions which rest on an “erroneous legal foundation.” Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra, at 112-113. Congress has not given the Board untrammelled authority to catalogue which economic devices shall be deemed freighted with indicia of unlawful intent. Labor Board v. Insurance Agents, supra, at 498. In determining here that the respondents’ conduct carried its own badge of improper motive, the Board’s decision, for the reasons stated, misapplied the criteria governing the application of §§ 8 (a) (1) and (3). Since the order therefore rested on an erroneous legal foundation, the Court of Appeals properly refused to enforce it. Affirmed National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §8 (a), 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (1958 ed.) provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .” National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 7, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1958 ed.) provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment . . . .” Food Jet used supervisory personnel and hired some “sack boys”; respondent Safeway Stores, which operated two stores in Carlsbad, closed one and transferred its managerial personnel to the other; respondent Thrifty Way Food Stores used management personnel and their wives and also hired some part-time “box boys”; respondent Brown Food Store relied on management personnel and their relatives, and a “sack boy” transferred from an out-of-town branch store; respondent Cashway Food Stores also relied on management personnel and their relatives and some transferees from out-of-town branches. See brief for the National Labor Relations Board in American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, No. 255, post, p. 300, also decided today, at p. 17. See also 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1494, 1497. For a history of rejection by Congress of proposals to limit or outlaw multiemployer bargaining see Buffalo Linen, 353 U. S., at 95-96. This is evident from the authorities cited in Buffalo Linen, 353 U. S., at 96, n. 28. In Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, we set aside, as resting on an erroneous legal foundation, a Board decision finding that the employer’s refusal to allow distribution of union literature on a company-owned parking lot violated §8 (a)(1). In Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, we sustained the Board’s decision but emphasized that judicial review is contemplated by 29 U. S. C. §§ 160 (e), (f), 324 U. S., at 799. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, involved a question of remedy as to which the statute expressly grants the Board broad authority, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c). Since Buffalo Linen numerous Board orders have been set aside as outside of the. Board’s statutory authority. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477; Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274; Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667; Labor Board v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58. Even where the Board is sustained, its anatysis in support of its conclusion is subjected to full, independent judicial review. See Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra. We do not here decide whether the case would be the same had the struck employer exercised its prerogative to hire permanent replacements for the strikers under our rule in Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, and the nonstruck employers had then hired permanent replacements for their locked-out employees.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES ex rel. CHAPMAN, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al. NO. 28. Argued October 22, 1952. Decided March 16, 1953. Gregory Rankin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 28. Robert Whitehead argued the cause and filed a brief for the Virginia REA Association et al., petitioners in No. 29. Bradford Ross argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission, respondent. With him on the brief were Willard W. Gatchell, John Mason and Howard E. Wahrenbrock. T. Justin Moore argued the cause for the Virginia Electric & Power Co., respondent. With him on the brief were George D. Gibson and Patrick A. Gibson. Charles F. Rouse and David W. Robinson submitted on brief for the Carolina Power & Light Co., respondent. Herbert B. Cohn submitted on brief for the Appalachian Electric Power Co., respondent. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. In these two cases, the Secretary of the Interior and an association of nonprofit rural electric cooperatives have challenged the authority of the Federal Power Commission to grant to the respondent power company, VEPCO, a license to construct a hydroelectric generating station at Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina. They claim that Congress, by approving a comprehensive plan set out in the Flood Control Act of 1944 for improvement of the Roanoke River Basin, has withdrawn all eleven sites proposed for development in the plan, including Roanoke Rapids, from the licensing jurisdiction of the Commission and has reserved them for public construction. The underlying premise, that the plan approved by Congress presupposed federal development of all sites included in the plan, also underlies petitioners’ other main contention here, that the Commission’s concurrence in the plan constituted a determination by the Commission that the development of these water resources should be undertaken by the United States itself. Such a determination, they say, requires the Commission under § 7 (b) of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1067, as amended, 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 800 (b), to make investigations and submit its findings together with appropriate recommendations to Congress and in any event bars the Commission from approving applications for private construction of the project. Petitioners unsuccessfully raised these contentions, along with attacks on the Commission’s findings not pressed here, before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which denied their petitions to set aside the Commission’s order granting a license to YEPCO. United States v. Federal Power Comm’n, 191 F. 2d 796. We granted certiorari, 343 U. S. 941. The cases present questions of importance in that they involve a conflict of view between two agencies of the Government having duties in relation to the development of national water resources. Determination of the issues may affect a substantial number of important potential sites for the development of hydroelectric power. Cf. Rules Sup. Ct. 38 (5)(b). Both here and in the court below, petitioners’ standing to raise these issues has been questioned. The Secretary of the Interior points to his statutory duty to act as sole marketing agent of power developed at public hydroelectric projects and not required for the operation of the project; § 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 directs him to transmit and dispose of such power in a manner calculated to “encourage the most widespread use thereof at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business principles.” 58 Stat. 890, 16 U. S. C. § 825s. This provision, it is said, announces a congressional policy for the guidance of the Secretary that would be disturbed by the respondent company’s plan; thus a specific interest of the Secretary, in addition to his more general duties relating to the conservation and utilization of the Nation’s water resources, is said to be adversely affected by the Commission’s order. The REA Association, an association of cooperatives, asserts that, as an organization of consumers entitled, along with “public bodies,” to a preference in sales by the Secretary under § 5, it has a substantial interest in the development of low-cost power at the Roanoke Rapids site and consequently in the kind of instrumentality, public or private, to which power development at this site is committed. Respondents say, however, that decisions of policy in the construction of power projects have been entrusted to the Commission, or at most also to the Secretary of the Army, under whom the Corps of Engineers performs its statutory functions of making surveys and constructing public works, and that the interests of petitioners arise only after a public project has been constructed and the Secretary of the Army has determined that there is excess power to be distributed and sold. We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences of view, however, preclude a single opinion of the Court as to both petitioners. It would not further clarification of this complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations, to set out the divergent grounds in support of standing in these cases. Petitioners’ main contention, that Congress has, by a series of enactments to be construed as part of an evolving assumption by the Federal Government of comprehensive authority over navigable waters, reserved the Roanoke Rapids site for public development and so has placed it beyond the licensing power of the Federal Power Commission, requires us to consider with some particularity the steps by which plans for the Roanoke Rapids project have unfolded. Petitioners’ contention reduces itself to the claim that the authority of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for safeguarding the public interest in the private development of power resources has been revoked pro tanto by congressional action as to this particular site. In 1927, the Army Engineers were authorized to make a specific survey of the Roanoke River by § 1 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 44 Stat. 1010, 1015, which “adopted and authorized” enumerated “works of improvement” including “surveys in accordance with” H. R. Doc. No. 308, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). That document, a milestone in the development of integrated federal planning for the use of the Nation’s water resources, had recommended surveys of a large number of streams throughout the country, including the Roanoke River, “either for the preparation of plans for improvement to be undertaken by the Federal Government alone or in connection with private enterprise, or to secure adequate data to insure that waterway developments by private enterprise would fit into a general plan for the full utilization of the water resources of a stream.” H. R. Doc. No. 308, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. The detailed survey of the Roanoke River was transmitted to Congress in 1934; in it the Chief of Engineers stated that a comprehensive plan for navigation and power, flood control or irrigation “is not economically justifiable at the present time,” H. R. Doc. No. 65, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935), and concurred in the judgment of the investigating engineer that “[t]here is no justification for any Federal expenditures for either flood control or power.” Id., at 53; cf. id., at 14-15. In 1936, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1570, defining the public interest in flood control as follows: “It is hereby recognized that destructive floods upon the rivers of the United States . . . constitute a menace to national welfare; that it is the sense of Congress that flood control on navigable waters or their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government . . .; that the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected.” 49 Stat. 1570, 33 U. S. C. § 701a. In the same Act, the Secretary of War was authorized to continue surveys at a number of localities, including “Reservoirs in Roanoke and Tar Rivers, North Carolina.” § 7, Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1596. In § 6 of the Act, Congress provided that “the Government shall not be deemed to have entered upon any project for the improvement of any waterway mentioned in this Act until the project for the proposed work shall have been adopted by law.” 49 Stat. 1592. Following a destructive flood on the Roanoke River in 1940, the House Committee on Flood Control adopted a resolution requesting reappraisal of the previous reports on the Roanoke River to determine “whether any improvements in the interests of flood control and allied purposes are advisable at this time.” See H. R. Doc. No. 650, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1944). A similar resolution was adopted later by the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, see ibid., and as a result, the Corps of Engineers submitted its recommendations in a report which became H. R. Doc. No. 650, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). This report recommended the comprehensive Roanoke Basin plan here in issue. The report proposed a system of eleven dams and reservoirs, eight of them on the Roanoke River, and recommended authorization of two of those projects, designated Buggs Island and Phil-pott, “as the initial step.” Id., at 2. Petitioners rely most strongly on two features of this report for their claim that Congress has, by approving the plan outlined in the report, withdrawn all sites in the plan from the licensing jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. As the report moved up through the hierarchy of the Corps of Engineers, comments upon the plan were made by the different responsible officers. The detailed report of the investigating engineer estimated costs, including interest, on bases obviously contemplating federal financing. These figures were accepted in the comments of each forwarding officer. Further, the Chief of Engineers, in submitting the report, stated, “To safeguard the interests of navigation and flood control, the dams and power facilities should be constructed, operated, and maintained under the direction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers.” Ibid. Neither the reports nor the comments of subordinates had contained any such suggestion or any engineering or other reasons why such a recommendation might be made, and the Chief of Engineers gave no reasons for his suggestion. Further, it is not clear from the context that the statement referred to all the projects and not simply to the two dams to be authorized, that is, the ones with flood-control features, or even that the words “under the direction . . . and the supervision” precluded construction by a private applicant; indeed, the order here granting the license specifically requires the licensee to “operate its project in such a manner as the Chief of Engineers, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, or his authorized representative, may prescribe.” We do not think these disconnected statements would justify us in saying that the report as it went to Congress plainly proposed that the Government construct all the projects in the plan. There are contrary indications in the report itself; particularly pertinent in the light of congressional practice is the strong emphasis put on the flood-control aspects of the two projects recommended for authorization. In any event, we do not have a recommendation for public construction that is clearly an integral part of the plan, and the decisive question is not what this or that isolated statement in the report or the comments thereon imply but how Congress may fairly be said to have received and read the report in the light of the legislative practice in relation to such public works. It deserves mention that the Roanoke Rapids site, although comprehended in the plan and found to be the most desirable power site of all eleven units, was to be developed simply for the production of power. The District Engineer pointed out that the two projects recommended for early authorization would provide practically all the flood-control benefits to be derived from the plan ; installations at the two sites, Buggs Island and Philpott, would “eliminate over 90 percent of the flood losses to the two main flood-damage areas in the Roanoke River Basin.” Id., at 88. At those two sites were to be built multiple-purpose reservoirs for flood control, water power, and low-water regulation, while at the other nine sites, with one minor exception, there were simply to be power projects. As is customary, the Federal Power Commission was asked to comment on the proposal; by letter to the Chief of Engineers dated May 3, 1944, the Commission suggested some technical changes but concurred substantially in the recommendations of the Engineers, “that the comprehensive development of the Roanoke River Basin, in general accordance with the plans prepared therefor by the district engineer consisting of 11 dam and reservoir projects with power, is desirable and that the Buggs Island and Philpott projects would constitute a desirable initial step in the development of the Roanoke River Basin.” Id., at 4. The report was presented to Congress while the bill that became the Flood Control Act of 1944 was under consideration; although the House had already closed its hearings, the Senate Report proposed amending the bill to include provision for the Roanoke Basin, recommending “approval of the comprehensive plan and authorization for construction of the Buggs Island and Philpott Reservoirs in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers.” S. Rep. No. 1030, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 8. The proposal was accepted, and § 10 of the Act contains a corresponding provision. It provides that “the following works of improvement . . . are hereby adopted and authorized.” Included in an omnibus listing of such “works of improvement” is the following: “The general plan for the comprehensive development” of the Roanoke Basin recommended in H. R. Doc. No. 650 “is approved” and construction of Buggs Island and Philpott is “hereby authorized substantially in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers in that report at an estimated cost of $36,140,000.” It is this statutory language that petitioners say withdrew the Roanoke Rapids site from the licensing jurisdiction of the Commission. They ask us to read the word “approved” as a reservation of the site for public construction and, by necessary implication, a withdrawal of the site from the Commission’s licensing authority. A flat “approval” of a plan clearly recommending public construction as an indispensable constituent of the plan might indeed have that effect, but, as indicated above, we do not find that the plan made any such recommendation. A separate argument of petitioners is based in part on the language of a proviso commonly inserted in authorizations for flood-control surveys, that the Government shall not be deemed to have entered upon a project until the project is “adopted by law.” From this language petitioners infer that the Government’s entry upon a project so as to preclude private construction occurs when Congress adopts a project, and they ask us to say that such adoption occurred here when Congress “approved” the plan comprehending the Roanoke Rapids site. We do not think the word “approval” carries the implication of “adoption” or “authorization” by its own force. Read together with other legislative action concerning water resources and with the history of federal activity in that regard, congressional “approval” without more cannot be taken, we think, to indicate in this case more than a legislative finding that the proposed projects, no matter by whom they may be built, are desirable and consistent with congressional standards for the ordered development of the Nation’s water resources. Such a finding has meaning in conveying the congressional purpose and expressing a congressional attitude. Concretely it means that Congress has adopted a basic policy for the systematic development of a river basin. Decision is made on such questions as the locations of projects, the purposes they are to serve, their approximate size and the desirable order of construction; because of the necessary interrelationship of many technical engineering and economic features of the several dams in a single river basin, early choice among possible alternatives is imperative. The policy chosen by Congress when it approves a plan is, in the first place, directed to Congress itself in its appropriating function. Approval also tells the Federal Power Commission — the executant of congressional policy — how to exercise its authority in relation to the authorization of sites in the Roanoke Basin. The finding had utility in this case in the guidance it gave the Commission in determining whether a private applicant would adequately develop all the benefits that should be derived from the proposed site. In so interpreting the language Congress has used, we gain some light from the action Congress has taken to set projects in motion following enactment of statutes “approving” a comprehensive plan and “authorizing” certain projects set out in the plan. For the Roanoke River Basin itself, although Buggs Island and Philpott were specifically “authorized” in the Flood Control Act of 1944, separate steps were taken by Congress to complete the authorization; “planning money” was appropriated, a “Definite Project Report” was received for Buggs Island, and then funds for construction of Buggs Island were appropriated. Equally illuminating is the procedure by which Congress recently set in motion plans to build a project “approved” exactly as was the Roanoke Rapids project. At approximately the same time as the engineering reports on the Roanoke River were submitted, a comparable report was submitted concerning the Savannah River, Georgia, and recommending a comprehensive plan much like the Roanoke River Basin plan. Like Buggs Island and Philpott in the Roanoke plan, Clark Hill in the Savannah plan was recommended for immediate authorization, “as the initial step.” See H. R. Doc. No. 657, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 6. As the demand for power increased, other projects included in the plan were to follow, the first to be the Hartwell site. The Senate Report accepted this recommendation, S. Rep. No. 1030, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, just as it had the Roanoke Basin recommendation, and called for “approval of the comprehensive plan and authorization for construction of the Clark Hill project.” Id., at 10. Section 10 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 contains a corresponding provision. 58 Stat. 894. Thus, the background as well as the precise terms of the provisions relating to projects in the Savannah River plan are closely parallel to those relating to the Roanoke projects. Recently, when further construction on the Savannah River was proposed and authorization of Hartwell, the site next in fine, was recommended, neither Congress nor the Engineers treated the earlier “approval” of the comprehensive plan as a final step making unnecessary other than automatic appropriations for Hartwell. Rather, hearings were held, see Hearings before House Committee on Public Works on H. R. 5472 (Title II), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 37-85 (May 16, 1949), and a separate authorization for construction was included in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 171. Respondents further point out that at the same time hearings were held on the Hartwell project, there were also hearings on further construction in the Roanoke Basin, and the Corps of Engineers proposed the authorization of Smith Mountain, a project with minor flood-control benefits but not next in line under the plan as approved in the Flood Control Act of 1944. That plan had put the Roanoke Rapids site here involved and the Gaston site ahead of Smith Mountain. The reason given by the Engineers for changing the order of construction was that private applications, including the application here, had been made or contemplated for the Roanoke Rapids and Gaston sites. While we do not attach weight to subsequent statements by the Engineers that the Flood Control Act of 1944 did not preclude private construction of some projects in the plan, it is pertinent to note that a Committee of Congress responsible for water resources legislation was informed that an application was pending for private construction. Whether or not the Committee agreed that the Flood Control Act of 1944 allowed private construction of projects comprehended in plans there approved, in fact no action was taken by it to prevent the Commission from proceeding to hear the VEPCO application, although the Committee learned that the application was pending over a year and a half before the order was handed down by the Commission. Whatever light these subsequent proceedings in Congress afford, both as to the Roanoke Basin and as to the comparable Hartwell site in the Savannah River plan, we find no solid ground for concluding that Congress has taken over the entire river basin for public development with such definiteness and finality so as to warrant us in holding that Congress has withdrawn as to this whole river basin its general grant of continuing authority to the Federal Power Commission to act as the responsible agent in exercising the licensing power of Congress. Extensive review of the need for integration of federal activities affecting waterways, see, e. g., Report of Secretary of War Stimson, H. R. Doc. No. 929, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 32-35 (1912), and of the breadth of authority granted to the Commission by Congress in response to that need is hardly necessary to establish the role of the Commission in hydroelectric power development. See, e. g., First Iowa Coop. v. Power Comm’n, 328 U. S. 152, 180, 181, and cases cited. From the time that the importance of power sites was brought to public and congressional consciousness during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, the significant development has been the devising of a general power policy instead of ad hoc action by Congress, with all the difficulties and dangers of local pressures and logrolling to which such action gave rise. See the Yeto Messages of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, e. g., 36 Cong. Rec. 3071 (Muscle Shoals, Ala., 1903); 42 Cong. Rec. 4698 (Rainy River, 1908); H. R. Doc. No. 1350, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (James River, 1909); H. R. Doc. No. 899, 62d Cong., 2d sess. (White River, 1912); S. Doc. No. 949, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (Coosa River, 1912). It soon became clear that indispensable to a wise national policy was the creation of a commission with functions and powers comparable to those of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the field of transportation. It took the usual time for such a commission to come into being, and the process was step-by-step. Originally Congress entrusted its policy to a commission composed of three Cabinet officers. 41 Stat. 1063. An agency so burdened with other duties was naturally found inadequate as the instrument of these important water-power policies. And so, in 1930, the Commission was reorganized as an expert body of five full-time commissioners. 46 Stat. 797, 16 U. S. C. § 792. These enactments expressed general policies and granted broad administrative and investigative power, making the Commission the permanent disinterested expert agency of Congress to carry out these policies. Cf. 41 Stat. 1065, as amended, 49 Stat. 839, 16 U. S. C. § 797; 3 Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Comm’n 501 (1950). A principal responsibility of the Commission has always been that of determining whether private construction is consistent with the public interest. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. Express provision is made to charge the Commission with the task, of deciding whether construction ought to be undertaken by the United States itself. 41 Stat 1067, as amended, 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 800 (b). Further, even if private construction is to be allowed, approval of private applications requires a determination that the proposed project is “best adapted to a comprehensive plan” for water resources development. 41 Stat. 1068, as amended, 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (a). Thus, congressional approval of a comprehensive plan can be read, as we think it should in this case, simply as saying that a plan such as that here, recommended by the Corps of Engineers for the fullest realization of the potential benefits in the river basin, should be accepted by the Commission as the comprehensive plan to be used in the application of these statutory provisions. That “approval” as such does not reserve all projects in the plan for public construction is perhaps further indicated by the fact that when Congress has wished to reserve particular sites for public construction, it has chosen to say so. See 41 Stat. 1353, 45 Stat. 1012, 45 Stat. 1062. Of course it is not for us to intimate a preference between private or public construction at this site. Nor are we even asked to review the propriety of the Commission’s determination in this case that private construction is “in harmony with” the comprehensive plan for the Roanoke Basin. Re Virginia Electric & Power Co., 87 P. U. R. (N. S.) 469, 483. We are simply asked to decide whether Congress has withdrawn the power to decide this question from the Commission. To conclude that Congress has done so by approving a general plan for development that may be, and in this case wás, a plan for long-term development, would be to contract, by a tenuous chain of inferences, the broad standing powers of the Commission. Particularly relevant in this regard is the estimate that public development at this site would not in the normal course be undertaken for many years. See Examiner’s Decision of March 17, 1950, R., I, 109. Congress was of course aware that, by granting a license to private enterprise, the Federal Power Commission would not commit the site permanently to private development and preclude all further congressional action. The Commission would, as it did here, simply express its judgment that, at the time, private development of the site was consistent with the general conception of the way in which the Roanoke River Basin should be developed. For, at any time short of the fifty years in which a site automatically becomes available to the Government without compensation, the Government may determine that the public interest makes it more desirable that the project be operated publicly and has the right then, by appropriate steps, to take over the project. 41 Stat. 1071, as amended, 49 Stat. 844, 16 U. S. C. § 807. The purpose of Congress would have to be much more clearly manifested to justify us in inferring that Congress revoked the Commission’s power to decide whether a private license consonant with the general scheme of development for this river basin ought now to be granted in the public interest. Our conclusion is in accord with the implications of the manifest reluctance of Congress to enter upon power projects having no flood-control or navigational benefits. It cannot be said that as unclear a term as “approval” was to have settled, for this entire river basin, a major controversy that has arisen again and again in connection with legislation authorizing public construction of hydroelectric projects. The declaration of policy in the Flood Control Act of 1936, supra, pp. 157-158, puts strong emphasis on the flood-control aspects of plans for sites that would also produce power; no change in this policy can be read into § 10 of the Flood Control Act of 1944. Cf., e. g., 90 Cong. Rec. 4126; id., at 4127. And the sponsor in the House of the Flood Control Act of 1944 stated in answer to a question: “. . . we have repeatedly stated during the debate that no project, reservoir, or dam, or other improvement is embraced in this bill unless it is primarily for flood control. If power can be developed as an incident, or if reclamation can be provided, they are cared for in the bill.” 90 Cong. Rec. 4199; cf. id., at 4202. In the light of this history and these specific declarations, it strains belief that “approval” of the comprehensive plan for the Roanoke Basin reserves all projects named in the plan for federal construction when the two projects that provided the chief flood-control features of the plan were the only ones specifically authorized. Subordinate arguments are made, bearing partly on the power of the Commission to issue any license for private development and partly on the Commission’s exercise of its power in granting this license. The arguments involve technical engineering and economic details which it would serve no useful purpose to canvass here. Once recognizing, as we do, that the Commission was not deprived of its power to entertain this application for a license, we cannot say, within the limited scope of review open to us, that the Commission’s findings were not warranted. Judgment upon these conflicting engineering and economic issues is precisely that which the Commission exists to determine, so long as it cannot be said, as it cannot, that the judgment which it exercised had no basis in evidence and so was devoid of reason. At the heart of these arguments is the fact that the Roanoke Rapids site is, under present estimates, the most desirable site for power in the Roanoke Basin. For that reason, as petitioners argue, removal of the Roanoke Rapids site from a government-operated system would result in loss to the Federal Government of the potential benefits of that site and a decrease, but only by the amount of the Roanoke Rapids profits, in the potential profits of the system as a whole. But it has never been suggested that such is the criterion under which the Commission is to determine whether a project ought to be undertaken by the United States, let alone that such considerations could demonstrate that Congress withdrew the Roanoke Rapids site from the licensing jurisdiction of the Commission. If it could be shown that the plan could not be executed successfully without the Roanoke Rapids site, it would be arguable that congressional approval of the plan presupposed that all units of the plan be centrally administered. The findings are to the contrary. The Commission has found that the proposed private project is consistent with the plan contained in the Flood Control Act of 1944, Re Virginia Electric & Power Co., supra, at 483; that there is no reason to believe that the “interest of the public at large will not be fully protected and promoted” by the issuance of this license, id., at 472; and that there was no showing that the Roanoke Rapids site would “at any time” be developed by the United States. Id., at 483. Further, there is express recognition of the possibility that the site may be benefited by government projects in operation and consequently of the fact that VEPCO may be required to compensate the Government for any such “headwater benefits” conferred. Id., at 477-478. Finally, we do not find merit in the contention that the Commission was required by § 7 (b) of the Federal Power Act to recommend public construction of the project. As the report of the Corps of Engineers does not clearly recommend that all projects be constructed by the United States, the Commission’s concurrence in that report cannot provide a basis for invoking the provisions of § 7 (b). Section 7 (b) is a direction to the Commission not to approve a private application for a project “affecting” any development of water resources which, in the judgment of the Commission, should be undertaken by the United States itself. Petitioners in effect ask us to tell the Commission what it thought — to say to the Commission that it was its judgment that Roanoke Rapids, as well as all the other seven projects in the Roanoke plan not yet under consideration, should be built by the Government. It is not clear that the Commission’s concurrence in the general plan would have been much more than simple approval of the location of the dams, the purposes they would serve, and the engineering characteristics of the projects, even if the report had clearly recommended public construction. Primary responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions of §7 (b) must remain with the Commission; we cannot infer a judgment of the Commission that it never expressed and now specifically disavows. For these reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Commission’s order must stand. In the bits and pieces of legislative history which we have set out, we find no justification for inferring that Congress withdrew the Commission’s authority regarding the Roanoke River Basin from the general authority given the Commission to grant licenses for private construction of hydroelectric projects with appropriate safeguards of the public interest. Whatever the merits of the controversy as to which agency — the Government or a private party— should construct this project, that question is not within our province. Affirmed. Section 6 of the Flood Control Act of 1938 authorized the Secretary of War to make surveys “for flood control” of the Smith River, a tributary of the Roanoke on which two of the eleven projects in the comprehensive Roanoke Basin plan are located. 52 Stat. 1223. The full text of the provisions, so far as they are relevant, is as follows: "Sec. 10. That the following works of improvement for the benefit of navigation and the control of destructive flood waters and other purposes are hereby adopted and authorized in the interest of the national security and with a view toward providing an adequate reservoir of useful and worthy public works for the post-war construction program, to be prosecuted under the direction of the Secretary of War and supervision of the Chief of Engineers in accordance with the plans in the respective reports hereinafter designated and subject to the conditions set forth therein: [Provisos omitted]. “RoaNOKE River BasiN “The general plan for the comprehensive development of the Roanoke River Basin for flood control and other purposes recommended by the Chief of Engineers in House Document Numbered 650, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, is approved and the construction of the Buggs Island Reservoir on the Roanoke River in Virginia and North Carolina, and the Philpott Reservoir on the Smith River in Virginia, are hereby authorized substantially in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers in that report at an estimated cost of $36,140,000.” 58 Stat. 891-892, 894. See, e. g., § 6 of the Flood Control Act of 1936, quoted p. 158, supra. There is little force in the argument that the words “adopted and authorized” in § 10, see note 2, supra, apply to the Roanoke Rapids site. Not only is the specific provision as to the Roanoke Basin to control over the general, but that which is adopted and authorized is not “the following plans” but “the following works of improvement,” which patently refers to such projects as Buggs Island and Philpott, rather than to all sites named in a comprehensive plan. This answers that part of petitioners’ argument which relies on the language of § 10 speaking of prosecution of the projects “under the direction of the Secretary of War” when “budgetary requirements” permit. As a matter of language, apart from all other considerations, the “works of improvement” to which such language refers is better read as the projects authorized rather than as all projects named in plans that were approved. The Rules of both the Senate and the House in 1944, as now, called for previous choice of policy through authorization by law before any item of appropriations might be included in a general appropriations bill. Rule XVI, Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 239, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 20; Rule XXI, Rules of the House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No. 812, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 384. The importance of this distinction in the context of authorization of power projects is brought out in the following colloquy between a representative of the Corps of Engineers and Chairman Whittington of the House Committee on Public Works: “The ChairmaN. ... Is not the word ‘approved’ an authorization for the plan but without appropriation, or without an authorization for the appropriation? “What is the difference between approving and authorizing a plan ? “Colonel Gee. We have never construed the approval of the plan to carry with it the authorization to construct the elements of that plan. “The Chairman. Nor do we.” Hearings before the House Committee on Public Works on H. R. 5472 (Title II), 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 42. The general enacting provision, § 204, 64 Stat. 170, is substantially the same as § 10 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, supra, note 2. The specific provision as to the Savannah River is as follows: “SAVANNAH RlVER BaSIN “There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of $50,000,000 for the construction of the Hartwell project in the general plan for the comprehensive development of the Savannah River Basin, approved in the Act of December 22, 1944, in addition to the authorization for project construction in the Act of December 22, 1944.” 64 Stat. 171. Thus, whatever benefits may be conferred by such government projects as Buggs Island on the Roanoke Rapids site will not be lost to the United States. The Commission is required by § 10 (f) of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1070, as amended, 49 Stat. 843, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (f), to determine the charges to be paid by the licensee. The parties are in dispute over the value of tbie benefits, but, as the Commission said, “[t]he amount of the payments for headwater benefits due under the Federal Power Act cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy until after the project has been placed in operation for such time as necessary to demonstrate what actual benefits are being conferred.” Re Virginia Electric & Power Co., supra, at 478. We do not consider the correct basis for ascertaining the amount due to the United States, because, as the Commission’s statement indicates, the question is not before us in this case. Section 7 (b) of the Federal Power Act provides: “Whenever, in the judgment of the Commission, the development of any water resources for public purposes should be undertaken by the United States itself, the Commission shall not approve any application for any project affecting such development, but shall cause to be made such examinations, surveys, reports, plans, and estimates of the cost of the proposed development as it may find necessary, and shall submit its findings to Congress with such recommendations as it may find appropriate concerning such development.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. SCRIVENER, dba AA ELECTRIC CO. No. 70-267. Argued January 12, 1972 Decided February 23, 1972 BlacemuN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. William, Terry Bray argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Peter G. Nash, Norton J. Come, and Paul J. Spielberg. Donald W. Jones argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. William B. Barton and Harry J. Lambeth filed a brief for Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158, provides: “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; “(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.” Section 7 of the Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157, provides: “Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” This case presents the issue whether an employer’s retaliatory discharge of an employee who gave a written sworn statement to a National Labor Relations Board field examiner investigating an unfair labor practice charge filed against the employer, but who had not filed the charge or testified at a formal hearing on it, constitutes a violation of §8 (a)(1) or of §8 (a) (4) of the Act. The Board, with one member not participating, unanimously held that it was. 177 N. L. R. B. 504 (1969). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, by a unanimous panel vote, held otherwise and denied enforcement. 435 F. 2d 1296 (1971). The Court of Appeals did not reach other issues raised by the employer. We granted certiorari in order to review a decision that appeared to have an important impact upon the administration of the Act. 404 U. S. 821 (1971). I There is testimony in the record, credited by the trial examiner and adopted by the Board, to the following effect: The respondent Robert Scrivener is a small electrical contractor in Springfield, Missouri. He does business as an individual proprietor under the name of AA Electric Company. On March 18, 1968, five of Scrivener’s six employees signed cards authorizing a union to represent them in collective bargaining. The next day business agent Moore advised Mr. Scrivener of the union’s majority status and asked to negotiate a contract. Scrivener examined the cards, but refused the request. Mr. Scrivener then visited his jobsites and complained to his employees about their action. On March 20 he dismissed card-signers Cockrum, Smith, and Wilson, and hired Hunt, a journeyman, and Station, a helper. Hunt had worked for Scrivener on prior occasions. On March 21 the union filed charges with the Board alleging that the company had violated §§8 (a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act. On March 26 the three dischargees returned to work. The next day, however, Cockrum and Smith again were released on the ground that there was a lack of work. The two new employees and Perry-man, the sole nonsigner among the six original employees, were retained. Smith was again recalled on April 1 and, with the other card-signers, except Cockrum, continued to work until April 18. On April 17 a field examiner from the Board’s regional office met with Mr. Scrivener and discussed the charges that had been filed. That evening the examiner interviewed the five card-signers at the union hall. He took affidavits or sworn statements from all except Cockrum who was not then working for Scrivener. On April 18 Scrivener inquired of at least two of the men whether they had met and been interviewed by the examiner the evening before. At the end of the day Scrivener dismissed the four who had given the statements; he did so with the explanation that he had no work for them to do. Perryman, Hunt, and Statton continued to work on the three houses and the 11-unit apartment building the company had under construction at the time. On May 13 the union filed an amended charge adding the allegation that the dismissal of the four men on April 18 was because they had given the statements to the examiner in connection with the earlier charge, and that this was a violation of § 8 (a)(1) and §8 (a)(4). Three of the men returned to work in May or early June. The fourth was never recalled. A complaint was issued on both the original charge and the added allegation. II The Board, in agreement with the trial examiner, concluded that the April 18 dismissal of the four employees was “in retaliation against them for having met with and given evidence to a Board field examiner investigating unfair labor practice charges which had been filed against” Scrivener; that “[t]he investigation of charges filed is an integral and essential stage of Board proceedings”; and that this conduct violated § 8 (a)(1) and § 8 (a)(4). 177 N. L. R. B., at 504. The customary order to cease and desist, to reinstate the four employees with back pay, and to post notices was issued. The Board concluded, however, in disagreement with the trial examiner and with one member dissenting, “that it will not effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction herein over the alleged independent and unrelated violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act,” and dismissed those portions of the complaint. Id., at 504, 505. The Court of Appeals, per curiam, relying on its earlier decision in NLRB v. Ritchie Mfg. Co., 354 F. 2d 90 (CA8 1965), held that §8 (a) (4) does not “encompass discharge of employees for giving written sworn statements to Board field examiners.” In Ritchie the court had stated, “We are reluctant to hold that § 8 (a) (4) can be extended to cover preliminary preparations for giving testimony.” 854 F. 2d, at 101. In the present case, the court refused to uphold the Board’s finding that the challenged discharges violated §8 (a)(1) as well as § 8 (a)(4) since “[t]o do so would be to overrule Ritchie implicitly, and we are not prepared to take that action.” 435 F. 2d, at 1297. Ill The view of the Court of Appeals is that § 8 (a) (4) of the Act serves to protect an employee against an employer’s reprisal only for filing an unfair labor practice charge or for giving testimony at a formal hearing, and that it affords him no protection for otherwise participating in the investigative stage or, in particular, for giving an affidavit or sworn statement to the investigating field examiner. We disagree for several reasons. 1. Construing § 8 (a) (4) to protect the employee during the investigative stages, as well as in connection with the filing of a formal charge or the giving of formal testimony, comports with the objective of that section. Mr. Justice Black, in no uncertain terms, spelled out the congressional purpose: “Congress has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about such practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board. This is shown by its adoption of § 8 (a) (4) which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges. And it has been held that it is unlawful for an employer to seek to restrain an employee in the exercise of his right to file charges” (citations omitted). Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, 389 U. S. 235, 238 (1967). This complete freedom is necessary, it has been said, “to prevent the Board’s channels of information from being dried up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witnesses.” John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 261, 263, 191 F. 2d 483, 485 (1951). It is also consistent with the fact that the Board does not initiate its own proceedings; implementation is dependent “upon the initiative of individual persons.” Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm’n, supra, 389 U. S., at 238; NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U. S. 418, 424 (1968). 2. The Act’s reference in § 8 (a) (4) to an employee who “has filed charges or given testimony,” could be read strictly and confined in its reach to formal charges and formal testimony. It can also be read more broadly. On textual analysis alone, the presence of the preceding words “to discharge or otherwise discriminate” reveals, we think, particularly by the word “otherwise,” an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than narrow protection to the employee. This would be consistent with § 8 (a)(4)’s purpose and objective hereinabove described. A similar question with respect to the word “evidence” in §§ 11 (1) and (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 161 (1) and (2), was considered in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U. S. 759, 768-769 (1969), and was resolved by a broad and not a narrow construction. That precedent is pertinent here. 3. This broad interpretation of § 8 (a) (4) accords with the Labor Board’s view entertained for more than 35 years. Section 8 (a) (4) had its origin in the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195. Executive Order No. 6711, issued May 15, 1934, under that Act (10 NRA Codes of Fair Competition 949), provided, “No employer . . . shall dismiss or demote any employee for making a complaint or giving evidence with respect to an alleged violation . . . The first Labor Board interpreted that phrase to protect the employee not only as to formal testimony, but also as to the giving of information relating to violations of the NIRA. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 1 N. L. R. B. Dec. 192 (1934) (affidavits); Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. Dec. 147, 148 (1935) (state court testimony). In § 8 (a)(4) the word “testimony,” rather than “evidence,” appears. But the new language was described as “merely a reiteration” of the Executive Order language and it was stated that the “need for this provision is attested” by the above-cited Board decisions. Comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th Cong.), Senate Committee Print 29, 1 Leg. Hist, of National Labor Relations Act 1319, 1355 (1949). 4. This interpretation, in our view, also squares with the practicalities of appropriate agency action. An employee who participates in a Board investigation may not be called formally to testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could testify. His contribution might be merely cumulative or the case may be settled or dismissed before hearing. Which employees receive statutory protection should not turn on the vagaries of the selection process or on other events that have no relation to the need for protection. It would make less than complete sense to protect the employee because he participates in the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or in the final, formal presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important developmental stages that fall between these two points in time. This would be unequal and inconsistent protection and is not the protection needed to preserve the integrity of the Board process in its entirety. 5. The Board’s subpoena power also supports this interpretation. Section 11 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 161, gives the Board this power for “the purpose of all hearings and investigations.” Once an employee has been subpoenaed he should be protected from retaliatory action regardless of whether he has filed a charge or has actually testified. Judge Lumbard pertinently described it: “It is, we think, a permissible inference that Congress intended the protection to be as broad as the [subpoena] power.” Pedersen v. NLRB, 234 F. 2d 417, 420 (CA2 1956). Under this reasoning, if employees of Scrivener had been subpoenaed, they would have been protected. There is no basis for denying similar protection to the voluntary participant. 6. The approach to § 8 (a) (4) generally has been a liberal one in order fully to effectuate the section’s remedial purpose. In M & S Steel Co. v. NLRB, 353 F. 2d 80 (CA5 1965), the court sustained the Board’s finding, 148 N. L. R. B. 789, 792-795 (1964), that § 8 (a) (4) was violated by the discharge of an employee, Williams, because he gave a statement to a field examiner. In NLRB v. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 310 F. 2d 58, 60-61 (CA5 1962), the court sustained the Board, 131 N. L. R. B. 715, 721 (1961), in affording protection to an employee, Whitaker, who appeared but did not testify at a Board hearing. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, supra, and NLRB v. Syracuse Stamping Co., 208 F. 2d 77, 79-80 (CA2 1953). We are aware of no substantial countervailing considerations. We therefore conclude that an employer’s discharge of an employee because the employee gave a written sworn statement to a Board field examiner investigating an unfair labor practice charge filed against the employer constitutes a violation of § 8 (a) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act. Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the employer’s action is also a violation of § 8 (a)(1), and we expressly refrain from so doing. IY A final comment about the jurisdictional aspects of the case is perhaps in order. The Board found that Scrivener’s operations were too small to satisfy the Board’s self-imposed and published $50,000 outflow-inflow jurisdictional standard for non-retail enterprises. See Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N. L. R. B. 81, 85 (1958). It also found, however, that Scrivener’s operations were sufficient to “have an impact on and affect interstate commerce,” 177 N. L. R. B., at 504, and thus were within the Board’s statutory jurisdiction as defined by § 10 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a). This prompted the Board to assert jurisdiction over the §§ 8 (a)(1) and (4) claim of retaliation, but to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the original §§ 8 (a)(1), (3), and (5) claims on the ground that the latter would have “no immediate impact on the vindication of the right of an individual to resort to the Board’s processes . . . 177 N. L. R. B., at 505. Scrivener, as a consequence, complains that relief for him against a claimed unfair labor practice on the part of the union is unavailable. The employer’s complaint of jurisdictional unfairness is understandable. See, however, Pedersen v. NLRB, supra, 234 F. 2d 417. As we read the opinion of the Court of Appeals, this issue and that of the sufficiency of the evidence, and perhaps others, were not reached when that court decided the § 8 (a) (4) issue as it did. We note that that court described the Board’s jurisdiction to act as “marginal.” 435 F. 2d, at 1296. In any event, this and any other issues may be canvassed on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Local 453, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AEL-CIO. Apparently all the Ritchie employee did was “to prepare to testify.” 354 F. 2d, at 101. The three Justices who concurred in the result joined Part III of the plurality opinion. 394 U. S., at 769. We do not regard three Board cases, Albert J. Bartson, 23 N. L. R. B. 666, 673-674 (1940); F. W. Poe Mfg. Co., 27 N. L. R. B. 1257, 1270 (1940); and The Kramer Co., 29 N. L. R. B. 921, 935 (1941), cited by the amicus, as indicative of a contrary Board interpretation. In each of those cases the employee had filed a charge. The Board’s reference, in each opinion, to that fact and its further reference, in the last two cases, to the “express statutory protection afforded employees” by § 8 (a) (4), are expected and natural references and do not, in our view, indicate a narrow approach to the statute. We are not persuaded that the reach of § 8 (a) (3), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (3), and the criminal penalty provided by § 12, 29 U. S. C. § 162, provide the required protection that justifies a narrow reading of §8 (a) (4). But cf. Hoover Design Corp. v. NLRB, 402 F. 2d 987 (CA6 1968) (employee who “threatened to go to the Board” or file charges).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. SPERRY & HUTCHINSON CO. No. 70-70. Argued November 15, 1971 Decided March 1, 1972 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ali Members joined except Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Assistant Attorney General McLaren argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Harold D. Rhynedance, Jr., Karl H. Buschmann, and Richard H. Stern. Harold L. Russell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Samuel K. Abrams, Claus Motulsky, J. Sam Winters, Alan R. Wentzel, and Wayne T. Elliott. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In June 1968 the Federal Trade Commission held that the largest and oldest company in the trading stamp industry, Sperry & Hutchinson (S&H), was violating § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §45 (a)(1), in three respects. The Commission found that S&H improperly regulated the maximum rate at which trading stamps were dispensed by its retail licensees; that it combined with others to regulate the rate of stamp dispensation throughout the industry; and that it attempted (almost invariably successfully) to suppress the operation of trading stamp exchanges and other “free and open” redemption of stamps. The Commission entered cease- and-desist orders accordingly. S&H appealed only the third of these orders. Before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit it conceded that it acted as the Commission found, but argued that its conduct is beyond the reach of § 5 of the Act. That section provides, in pertinent part, that: “The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.” 15 U. S. C. §45 (a)(6). As S&H sees it, § 5 empowers the Commission to restrain only such practices as are either in violation of the antitrust laws, deceptive, or repugnant to public morals. In S&H’s view, its practice of successfully prosecuting stamp exchanges in state and federal courts cannot be restrained under any of these theories. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed the Commission, Judge Wisdom dissenting. 432 F. 2d 146 (1970). In the lower court’s view: “To be the type of practice that the Commission has the power to declare 'unfair’ the act complained of must fall within one of the following types of violations: (1) a per se violation of antitrust policy; (2) a violation of the letter of either the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman Acts; or (3) a violation of the spirit of these Acts as recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id., at 150 (footnote omitted). Holding that the FTC had not demonstrated that S&H’s conduct violated either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws, the Court of Appeals vacated the Commission’s order. The FTC petitioned for review in this Court. We granted certiorari to determine the questions presented in the petition. 401 U. S. 992 (1971). I The Challenged Conduct S&H has been issuing trading stamps — small pieces of gummed paper about the size of postage stamps— since 1896. In 1964, the year from which data in this litigation are derived, the company had about 40% of the business in an industry that annually issued 400 billion stamps to more than 200,000 retail establishments for distribution in connection with retail sales of some 40 billion dollars. In 1964, more than 60% of all American consumers saved S&H Green Stamps. In the normal course, the trading stamp business operates as follows. S&H sells its stamps to retailers, primarily to supermarkets and gas stations, at a cost of about $2.65 per 1200 stamps; retailers give the stamps to consumers (typically at a rate of one for each 100 worth of purchases) as a bonus for their patronage; consumers paste the stamps in books of 1,200 and exchange the books for “gifts” at any of 850 S&H Redemption Centers maintained around the country. Each book typically buys between $2.86 and $3.31 worth of merchandise depending on the location of the redemption center and type of goods purchased. Since its development of this cycle 75 years ago, S&H has sold over one trillion stamps and redeemed approximately 86% of them. A cluster of factors relevant to this litigation tends to disrupt this cycle and, in S&H’s view, to threaten its business. An incomplete book has no redemption value. Even a complete book is of limited value because most “gifts” may be obtained only on submission of more than one book. For these reasons a collector of another type of stamps who has acquired a small number of green stamps may benefit by exchanging with a green stamp collector who has opposite holdings and preferences. Similarly, because of the seasonal usefulness or immediate utility of an object sought, a collector may want to buy stamps outright and thus put himself in a position to secure redemption merchandise immediately though it is “priced” beyond his current stamp holdings. Or a collector may seek to sell his stamps in order to use the resulting cash to make more basic purchases (food, shoes, etc.) than redemption centers normally provide. Periodically over the past 70 years professional exchanges have arisen to service this demand. Motivated by the prospect of profit realizable as a result of serving as middlemen in swaps, the exchanges will sell books of S&H stamps previously acquired from consumers, or, for a fee, will give a consumer another company’s stamps for S&H’s or vice versa. Further, some regular merchants have offered discounts on their own goods in return for S&H stamps. Retailers do this as a means of competing with merchants in the area who issue stamps. By offering a price break in return for stamps, the redeeming merchant replaces the incentive to return to the issuing merchant (to secure more stamps so as to be able to obtain a gift at a redemption center) with the attraction of securing immediate benefit from the stamps by exchanging them for a discount at his store. S&H fears these activities because they are believed to reduce consumer proclivity to return to green-stamp-issuing stores and thus lower a store’s incentive to buy and distribute stamps. The company attempts to pre-empt “trafficking” in its stamps by contractual provisions reflected in a notice on the inside cover of every S&H stamp book. The notice reads: “Neither the stamps nor the books are sold to merchants, collectors or any other persons, at all times the title thereto being expressly reserved in the Company .... The stamps are issued to you as evidence of cash payment to the merchants issuing the same. The only right which you acquire in said stamps is to paste them in books like this and present them to us for redemption. You must not dispose of them or make any further use of them without our consent in writing. We will in every case where application is made to us give you permission to turn over your stamps to any other bona-fide collector of S&H Green . . . Stamps; but if the stamps or the books are transferred without our consent, we reserve the right to restrain their use by, or take them from other parties. It is to your interest that you fill the book, and personally derive the benefits and advantages of redeeming it.” (Reproduced at 2 App. 230.) S&H makes no effort to enforce this condition when consumers casually exchange stamps with each other, though reportedly some 20%' of all the company's stamps change hands in this manner. But S&H vigorously moves against unauthorized commercial exchanges and redeemers. Between 1957 and 1965, by its own account the company filed for 43 injunctions against merchants who redeemed or exchanged its stamps without authorization, and it sent letters threatening legal action to 140 stamp exchanges and 175 businesses that redeemed S&H stamps. In almost all instances the threat or the reality of suit forced the businessmen to abandon their unauthorized practices. II The Reach of Section 5 The Commission presented two questions in its petition for certiorari, the first being “[w]hether Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which directs the Commission to prevent ‘unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices,’ is limited to conduct which violates the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws.” The other issue relates to the significance of state court holdings that the practices challenged here are lawful. Neither question requests review of the Court of Appeals’ decision that the business conduct proscribed by the Commission violates neither the letter nor spirit of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, we intimate no opinion on that issue and turn to the question of the reach of § 5. In reality, the question is a double one: First, does § 5 empower the Commission to define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws? Second, does § 5 empower the Commission to proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or quality as competitive practices or their effect on competition? We think the statute, its legislative history, and prior cases compel an affirmative answer to both questions. When Congress created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 and charted its power and responsibility under § 5, it explicitly considered, and rejected, the notion that it reduce the ambiguity of the phrase “unfair methods of competition” by tying the concept of unfairness to a common-law or statutory standard or by enumerating the particular practices to which it was intended to apply. Senate Report No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1914), presents the reasoning that led the Senate Committee to avoid the temptations of precision when framing the Trade Commission Act: “The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the better, for the reason, as stated by one of the representatives of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association, that there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible to invent others.” The House Conference Report was no less explicit. “It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again. If Congress were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1914). See also Rublee, The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade Commission, 11 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc. 666, 667 (1926); Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 517 (1962). Since the sweep and flexibility of this approach were thus made crystal clear, there have twice been judicial attempts to fence in the grounds upon which the FTC might rest a finding of unfairness. In FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920), the Court over the strong dissent of Mr. Justice Brandéis (who had been involved in drafting the Trade Commission Act), wrote that while the “exact meaning” of the phrase “ ‘unfair method of competition’... is in dispute,” the only practices that were subject to this characterization were those that were “heretofore regarded as opposed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly.” Id., at 427. This view was reiterated in other opinions over the next decade. See, e. g., FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 (1923), and FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 475-476 (1923). The opinion of the Court of Appeals’ majority, citing Sinclair in support of its narrow view of the FTC’s leeway, is in the tradition of these authorities. In FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 (1931), a unanimous Court held that: “The paramount aim of the act is the protection of the public from the evils likely to result from the destruction of competition or the restriction of it in a substantial degree .... Unfair trade methods are not per se unfair methods of competition.” (Italics in original.) “It is obvious,” the Court continued, “that the word ‘competition’ imports the existence of present or potential competitors, and the unfair methods must be such as injuriously affect or tend thus to affect the business of these competitors— that is to say, the trader whose methods are assailed as unfair must have present or potential rivals in trade whose business will be, or is likely to be, lessened or otherwise injured. It is that condition of affairs which the Commission is given power to correct, and it is against that condition of affairs, and not some other, that the Commission is authorized to protect the public. ... If broader powers be desirable they must be conferred by Congress.” Id., at 647-649. Neither of these limiting interpretations survives to buttress the Court of Appeals’ view of the instant case. Even if the first fine of cases, Gratz and its progeny, stood unimpaired, their deference to action taken to constrain “deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression” would grant the FTC greater power to set right what it perceives as wrong than the panel of the Court of Appeals acknowledges. But frequent opportunity for reconsideration has consistently and emphatically led this Court to the view that the perspective of Gratz is too confined. As we recently unanimously observed: “Later cases of this Court . . . have rejected the Gratz view and it is now recognized in line with the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandéis in Gratz that the Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair.” FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U. S. 316, 320-321 (1966). The leading case that recognized a role for the FTC beyond that mapped out in Gratz, FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304 (1934), also brought Raladam into question; on both counts it sets the standard by which the range of FTC jurisdiction is to be measured today. Keppel & Brothers sold penny candies in “break and take” packs, a form of merchandising that induced children to buy lesser amounts of concededly inferior candy in the hope of by luck hitting on bonus packs containing extra candy and prizes. The FTC issued a cease-and-desist order under § 5 on the theory that the popular marketing scheme contravened public policy insofar as it tempted children to gamble and compelled those who would successfully compete with Keppel to abandon their scruples by similarly tempting children. The Court had no difficulty in sustaining the FTC’s conclusion that the practice was “unfair,” though any competitor could maintain his position simply by adopting the challenged practice. “[H]ere,” the Court said, “the competitive method is shown to exploit consumers, children, who are unable to protect themselves .... [I]t is clear that the practice is of the sort which the common law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public policy.” Id., at 313. En route to this result the Court met Keppel’s arguments that, absent an antitrust violation or at least incipient injury to competitors, Gratz and Raladam so strait jacketed the FTC that the Commission could not issue a cease-and-desist order proscribing even an immoral practice. It held: “Neither the language nor the history of the Act suggests that Congress intended to confine the forbidden methods to fixed and unyielding categories. The common law afforded a definition of unfair competition and, before the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Sherman Act had laid its inhibition upon combinations to restrain or monopolize interstate commerce which the courts had construed to include restraints upon competition in interstate commerce. It would not have been a difficult feat of draftsmanship to have restricted the operation of the Trade Commission Act to those methods of competition in interstate commerce which are forbidden at common law or which are likely to grow into violations of the Sherman Act, if that had been the purpose of the legislation.” Id., at 310. Thenceforth, unfair competitive practices were not limited to those likely to have anticompetitive consequences after the manner of the antitrust laws; nor were unfair practices in commerce confined to purely competitive behavior. The perspective of Keppel, displacing that of Rala-dam, was legislatively confirmed when Congress adopted the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendment, 52 Stat. Ill, to § 5. The amendment added the phrase “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” to the section’s original ban on “unfair methods of competition” and thus made it clear that Congress, through § 5, charged the FTC with protecting consumers as well as competitors. The House Report on the amendment summarized congressional thinking: “[T]his amendment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.” H. R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). See also S. Rep. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1936). Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws. III The general conclusion just enunciated requires us to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Ordinarily we would simply reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it limited the unfair practices proscribed by § 5 to those contrary to the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws and we would remand the case for consideration of whether the challenged practices, though posing no threat to competition within the precepts of the antitrust laws, are nevertheless either (1) unfair methods of competition or (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. What we deem to be proper concerns about the interaction of administrative agencies and the courts, however, counsels another course in this case. In this Court the Commission argues that, however correct the Court of Appeals may be in holding the challenged S&H practices beyond the reach of the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, the Court of Appeals nevertheless erred in asserting that the FTC could measure and ban conduct only according to such narrow criteria. Proceeding from this premise, with which we agree, the Commission’s major submission is that its order is sustainable as a proper exercise of its power to proscribe practices unfair to consumers. Its minor position is that it also properly found S&H’s practices to be unfair competitive methods apart from their propriety under the antitrust laws. The difficulty with the Commission’s position is that we must look to its opinion, not to the arguments of its counsel, for the underpinnings of its order. “Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.” Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 628 (1971). We cannot read the FTC opinion on which the challenged order rests as premised on anything other than the classic antitrust rationale of restraint of trade and injury to competition. The Commission urges reversal of the Court of Appeals and approval of its own order because, in its words, “[t]he Act gives the Commission comprehensive power to prevent trade practices which are deceptive or unfair to consumers, regardless of whether they also are anticompetitive.” Brief for the FTC 15. It says the Court of Appeals was “wrong in two ways: you can have an anticompetitive impact that is not a violation of the antitrust laws and violate Section 5. You can also have an impact upon consumers without regard to competition and you can uphold a Section 5 violation on that ground.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. Though completely accurate, these statements cannot be squared with the Commission’s holding that “[i]t is essential in this matter, we believe, and as we have heretofore indicated, to determine whether or not there has been or may be an impairment of competition,” Opinion of Commission, 1 App. 175; its conclusion that “ [respondent . . . prevents . . . competitive reaction [s] and thereby it has restrained trade. We believe this is an unfair method of competition and an unfair act and practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and so hold,” 1 App. 178; its observation that: “Respondent’s individual acts and its acts with others taken to suppress trading stamp exchanges and other stamp redemption activity are all part of a clearly defined restrictive policy pursued by the respondent. In the circumstances surrounding this particular practice it is difficult to wholly separate the individual acts from the collective acts for the purpose of making an analysis of the consequences under the antitrust laws.” 1 App. 179; and like statements throughout the opinion, see, e. g., 1 App. 176-178, passim. There is no indication in the Commission’s opinion that it found S&H’s conduct to be unfair in its effect on competitors because of considerations other than those at the root of the antitrust laws. For its part, the theory that the FTC’s decision is derived from its concern for consumers finds support in only one line of the Commission’s opinion. The Commission’s observation that S&H’s conduct limited “stamp collecting consumers’ . .. freedom of choice in the disposition of trading stamps,” 1 App. 176, will not alone support a conclusion that the FTC has found S&H guilty of unfair practices because of damage to consumers. Arguably, the Commission’s findings, in contrast to its opinion, go beyond concern with competition and address themselves to noncompetitive and consumer injury as well. It may also be that such findings would have evidentiary support in the record. But even if the findings were considered to be adequate foundation for an opinion and order resting on unfair consequences to consumer interests, they still fail to sustain the Commission action; for the Commission has not rendered an opinion which, by the route suggested, links its findings and its conclusions. The opinion is barren of any attempt to rest the order on its assessment of particular competitive practices or considerations of consumer interests independent of possible or actual effects on competition. Nor were any standards for doing so referred to or developed. Our view is that “the considerations urged here in support of the Commission’s order were not those upon which its action was based.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 92 (1943). At the least the Commission has failed to “articulate any rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962). The Commission’s action being flawed in this respect, we cannot sustain its order. “[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.” Chenery, supra, at 94. Burlington Truck Lines, supra, at 169. A court cannot label a practice “unfair” under 15 U. S. C. § 45 (a)(1). It can only affirm or vacate an agency’s judgment to that effect. “If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it .has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.” Chenery, supra, at 88. And as was repeated on other occasions: “For the courts to substitute their or counsel’s discretion for that of the Commission is incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial review. This is not to deprecate, but to vindicate (see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 197), the administrative process, for the purpose of the rule is to avoid ‘propel [ling] the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.’ 332 U. S., at 196.” Burlington Truck Lines, supra, at 169. In these circumstances, because the Court of Appeals’ judgment that S&H’s practices did not violate either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws was not attacked and remains undisturbed here, and because the Comm ission’s order could not properly be sustained on other grounds, the judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the Commission’s order is affirmed. The Court of Appeals erred, however, in its construction of § 5; had it entertained the proper view of the reach of the section, the preferable course would have been to remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings. Chenery, supra, at 95; Burlington, supra, at 174; FPC v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 393 U. S. 71 (1968). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to this extent and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand it to the Commission for such further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion, as may be appropriate. So ordered. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. On the nature of the industry, see generally Comment, Trading Stamps, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1090 (1962). The Commission proceedings in the instant case are discussed in Comment, The Attack on Trading Stamps — An Expanded Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 57 Geo. L. J. 1082 (1969). Often merchandise obtained by redemption is used as a gift. The efforts of some retailers to reissue S&H stamps are not involved in this case. The FTC explicitly left S&H free to seek injunctions against reissuance. 1 App. 169. Though the Court of Appeals referred to state and federal court decisions that approved S&H’s practice, our reading of its opinion leaves no doubt that it did not reverse the FTC order on the erroneous theory that such determinations might foreclose a contrary FTC § 5 decision. We therefore put aside the Government's second question as irrelevant and focus on its first contention. The Commission has described the factors it considers in determining whether a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive is nonetheless unfair: “(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).” Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking. 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964). S&H argues that a later portion of this statement commits the FTC to the view that misconduct in respect of the third of these criteria is not subject to constraint as “unfair” absent a concomitant showing of misconduct according to the first or second of these criteria. But all the FTC said in the statement referred to was that “[t]he wide variety of decisions interpreting the elusive concept of unfairness at least makes clear that a method of selling violates Section 5 if it is exploitive or inequitable and if, in addition to being morally objectionable, it is seriously detrimental to consumers or others.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The Commission did explicitly decline to assess S&H’s conduct in light of one leading antitrust case. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365, 379 (1967), this Court held that: “Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it. White Motor [v. United States, 372 U. S. 253 (1963)]; Dr. Miles [Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911)]. Such restraints are so obviously destructive of competition that their mere existence is enough. If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or the conditions of its resale.” Arguably, S&H’s practice is proscribed by this doctrine. When the FTC declined to rely on this precedent, however, it did so not to turn to considerations other than those embedded in the antitrust laws, but instead to look for considerations less “technical” and more deeply rooted in antitrust policy: “We do not believe it appropriate to decide the broad competitive questions presented in this record on the narrow and technical basis of a restraint on alienation. The circumstances here are much different from that where products are transferred to a dealer for resale. They are complicated by the nature of the trading stamp scheme. It is essential in this matter, we believe, and as we have heretofore indicated, to determine whether or not there has been or may be an impairment of competition. Thus, we intend to look at the substance of the allegedly illegal practice rather than to decide the case by application of a technical formula.” 1 App. 175-176.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AFROYIM v. RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE. No. 456. Argued February 20, 1967. Decided May 29, 1967. Edward J. Ennis argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs was Nanette Dembits. Charles Gordon argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit. Me. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, born in Poland in 1893, immigrated to this country in 1912 and became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. He went to Israel in 1950, and in 1951 he voluntarily voted in an election for the Israeli Knesset, the legislative body of Israel. In 1960, when he applied for renewal of his United States passport, the Department of State refused to grant it on the sole ground that he had lost his American citizenship by virtue of § 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 which provides that a United States citizen shall “lose” his citizenship if he votes “in a political election in a foreign state.” Petitioner then brought this declaratory judgment action in federal district court alleging that § 401 (e) violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and § 1, cl. 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment which grants American citizenship to persons like petitioner. Because neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to take away that citizenship once it has been acquired, petitioner contended that the only way he could lose his citizenship was by his own voluntary renunciation of it. Since the Government took the position that § 401 (e) empowers it to terminate citizenship without the citizen's voluntary renunciation, petitioner argued that this section is prohibited by the Constitution. The District Court and the Court of Appeals, rejecting this argument, held that Congress has constitutional authority forcibly to take away citizenship for voting in a foreign country based on its implied power to regulate foreign affairs. Consequently, petitioner was held to have lost his American citizenship regardless of his intention not to give it up. This is precisely what this Court held in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44. Petitioner, relying on the same contentions about voluntary renunciation of citizenship which this Court rejected in upholding § 401 (e) in Perez, urges us to reconsider that case, adopt the view of the minority there, and overrule it. That case, decided by a 5-4 vote almost 10 years ago, has been a source of controversy and confusion ever since, as was emphatically recognized in the opinions of all the judges who participated in this case below. Moreover, in the other cases decided with and since Perez, this Court has consistently invalidated on a case-by-case basis various other statutory sections providing for involuntary expatriation. It has done so on various grounds and has refused to hold that citizens can be expatriated without their voluntary renunciation of citizenship. These cases, as well as many commentators, have cast great doubt upon the soundness of Perez. Under these circumstances, we granted certiorari to reconsider it, 385 U. S. 917. In view of the many recent opinions and dissents comprehensively discussing all the issues involved, we deem it unnecessary to treat this subject at great length. The fundamental issue before this Court here, as it was in Perez, is whether Congress can consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a law stripping an American of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given up. The majority in Perez held that Congress could do this because withdrawal of citizenship is “reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of Congress to achieve.” 356 U. S., at 60. That conclusion was reached by this chain of reasoning: Congress has an implied power to deal with foreign affairs as an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; this implied power, plus the Necessary and Proper Clause, empowers Congress to regulate voting by American citizens in foreign elections; involuntary expatriation is within the “ample scope” of “appropriate modes” Congress can adopt to effectuate its general regulatory power. Id., at 57-60. Then, upon summarily concluding that “there is nothing in the . . . Fourteenth Amendment to warrant drawing from it a restriction upon the power otherwise possessed by Congress to withdraw citizenship,” id., at 58, n. 3, the majority specifically rejected the “notion that the power of Congress to terminate citizenship depends upon the citizen’s assent,” id., at 61. First we reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen’s citizenship without his assent. This power cannot, as Perez indicated, be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty possessed by all nations. Other nations are governed by their own constitutions, if any, and we can draw no support from theirs. In our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship. Our Constitution governs us and we must never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones. The Constitution, of course, grants Congress no express power to strip people of their citizenship, whether in the exercise of the implied power to regulate foreign affairs or in the exercise of any specifically granted power. And even before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, views were expressed in Congress and by this Court that under the Constitution the Government was granted no power, even under its express power to pass a uniform rule of naturalization, to determine what conduct should and should not result in the loss of citizenship. On three occasions, in 1794, 1797, and 1818, Congress considered and rejected proposals to enact laws which would describe certain conduct as resulting in expatriation. On each occasion Congress was considering bills that were concerned with recognizing the right of voluntary expatriation and with providing some means of exercising that right. In 1794 and 1797, many members of Congress still adhered to the English doctrine of perpetual allegiance and doubted whether a citizen could even voluntarily renounce his citizenship. By 1818, however, almost no one doubted the existence of the right of voluntary expatriation, but several judicial decisions had indicated that the right could not be exercised by the citizen without the consent of the Federal Government in the form of enabling legislation. Therefore, a bill was introduced to provide that a person could voluntarily relinquish his citizenship by declaring such relinquishment in writing before a district court and then departing from the country. The opponents of the bill argued that Congress had no constitutional authority, either express or implied, under either the Naturalization Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, to provide that a certain act would constitute expatriation. They pointed to a proposed Thirteenth Amendment, subsequently not ratified, which would have provided that a person would lose his citizenship by accepting an office or emolument from a foreign government. Congressman Anderson of Kentucky argued: “The introduction of this article declares the opinion . . . that Congress could not declare the acts which should amount to a renunciation of citizenship; otherwise there would have been no necessity for this last resort. When it was settled that Congress could not declare that the acceptance of a pension or an office from a foreign Emperor amounted to a disfranchisement of the citizen, it must surely be conceded that they could not declare that any other act did. The cases to which their powers before this amendment confessedly did not extend, are very strong, and induce a belief that Congress could not in any case declare the acts which should cause ‘a person to cease to be a citizen.’ The want of power in a case like this, where the individual has given the strongest evidence of attachment to a foreign potentate and an entire renunciation of the feelings and principles of an American citizen, certainly establishes the absence of all power to pass a bill like the present one. Although the intention with which it was introduced, and the title of the bill declare that it is to insure and foster the right of the citizen, the direct and inevitable effect of the bill, is an assumption of power by Congress to declare that certain acts when committed shall amount to a renunciation of citizenship.” 31 Annals of Cong. 1038-1039 (1818). Congressman Pindall of Virginia rejected the notion, later accepted by the majority in Perez, that the nature of sovereignty gives Congress a right to expatriate citizens: “[Ajllegiance imports an obligation on the citizen or subject, the correlative right to which resides in the sovereign power: allegiance in this country is not due to Congress, but to the people, with whom the sovereign power is found; it is, therefore, by the people only that any alteration can be made of the existing institutions with respect to allegiance.” Id., at 1045. Although he recognized that the bill merely sought to provide a means of voluntary expatriation, Congressman Lowndes of South Carolina argued: “But, if the Constitution had intended to give to Congress so delicate a power, it would have been expressly granted. That it was a delicate power, and ought not to be loosely inferred, . . . appeared in a strong light, when it was said, and could not be denied, that to determine the manner in which a citizen may relinquish his right of citizenship, is equivalent to determining how he shall be divested of that right. The effect of assuming the exercise of these powers will be, that by acts of Congress a man may not only be released from all the liabilities, but from all the privileges of a citizen. If you pass this bill, . . . you have only one step further to go, and say that such and such acts shall be considered as presumption of the intention of the citizen to expatriate, and thus take from him the privileges of a citizen. . . . [QJuestions affecting the right of the citizen were questions to be regulated, not by the laws of the General or State Governments, but by Constitutional provisions. If there was anything essential to our notion of a Constitution, ... it was this: that while the employment of the physical force of the country is in the hands of the Legislature, those rules which determine what constitutes the rights of the citizen, shall be a matter of Constitutional provision.” Id., at 1050-1051. The bill was finally defeated. It is in this setting that six years later, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 827, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, declared in what appears to be a mature and well-considered dictum that Congress, once a person becomes a citizen, cannot deprive him of that status: “[The naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.” Although these legislative and judicial statements may be regarded as inconclusive and must be considered in the historical context in which they were made, any doubt as to whether prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment Congress had the power to deprive a person against his will of citizenship once obtained should have been removed by the unequivocal terms of the Amendment itself. It provides its own constitutional rule in language calculated completely to control the status of citizenship: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States . . . .” There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at any time. Rather the Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or any other governmental unit. It is true that the chief interest of the people in giving permanence and security to citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to protect Negroes. The Dred Scott decision, 19 How. 393, had shortly before greatly disturbed many people about the status of Negro citizenship. But the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, had already attempted to confer citizenship on all persons born or naturalized in the United States. Nevertheless, when the Fourteenth Amendment passed the House without containing any definition of citizenship, the sponsors of the Amendment in the Senate insisted on inserting a constitutional definition and grant of citizenship. They expressed fears that the citizenship so recently conferred on Negroes by the Civil Rights Act could be just as easily taken away from them by subsequent Congresses, and it was to provide an insuperable obstacle against every governmental effort to strip Negroes of their newly acquired citizenship that the first clause was added to the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Howard, who sponsored the Amendment in the Senate, thus explained the purpose of the clause: “It settles the great question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States. . . . We desired to put this question of citizenship and the rights of citizens . . . under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power . . . Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2890, 2896 (1866). This undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and secure would be frustrated by holding that the Government can rob a citizen of his citizenship without his consent by simply proceeding to act under an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs or some other power generally granted. Though the framers of the Amendment were not particularly concerned with the problem of expatriation, it seems undeniable from the language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any governmental unit to destroy. In 1868, two years after the Fourteenth Amendment had been proposed, Congress specifically considered the subject of expatriation. Several bills were introduced to impose involuntary expatriation on citizens who committed certain acts. With little discussion, these proposals were defeated. Other bills, like the one proposed but defeated in 1818, provided merely a means by which the citizen could himself voluntarily renounce his citizenship. Representative Van Trump of Ohio, who proposed such a bill, vehemently denied in supporting it that his measure would make the Government “a party to the act dissolving the tie between the citizen and his country . . . where the statute simply prescribes the manner in which the citizen shall proceed to perpetuate the evidence of his intention, or election, to renounce his citizenship by expatriation.” Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1804 (1868). He insisted that “inasmuch as the act of expatriation depends almost entirely upon a question of intention on the part of the citizen,” id., at 1801, “the true question is, that not only the right of expatriation, but the whole power of its exercise, rests solely and exclusively in the will of the individual,” id., at 1804. In strongest of terms, not contradicted by any during the debates, he concluded: “To enforce expatriation or exile against a citizen without his consent is not a power anywhere belonging to this Government. No conservative-minded statesman, no intelligent legislator, no sound lawyer has ever maintained any such power in any branch of the Government. The lawless precedents created in the delirium of war ... of sending men by force into exile, as a punishment for political opinion, were violations of this great law ... of the Constitution. . . . The men who debated the question in 1818 failed to see the true distinction. . . . They failed to comprehend that it is not the Government, but that it is the individual, who has the right and the only power of expatriation. ... [I] t belongs and appertains to the citizen and not to the Government; and it is the evidence of his election to exercise his right, and not the power to control either the election or the right itself, which is the legitimate subject matter of legislation. There has been, and there can be, no legislation under our Constitution to control in any manner the right itself.” Ibid. But even Van Trump’s proposal, which went no further than to provide a means of evidencing a citizen’s intent to renounce his citizenship, was defeated. The Act, as finally passed, merely recognized the “right of expatriation” as an inherent right of all people. The entire legislative history of the 1868 Act makes it abundantly clear that there was a strong feeling in the Congress that the only way the citizenship it conferred could be lost was by the voluntary renunciation or abandonment by the citizen himself. And this was the unequivocal statement of the Court in the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. The issues in that case were whether a person born in the United States to Chinese aliens was a citizen of the United States and whether, nevertheless, he could be excluded under the Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58. The Court first held that within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States, and then pointed out that though he might “renounce this citizenship, and become a citizen of . . . any other country,” he had never done so. Id., at 704-705. The Court then held that Congress could not do anything to abridge or affect his citizenship conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s well-considered and oft-repeated dictum in Osborn to the effect that Congress under the power of naturalization has “a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away,” the Court said: “Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no act ... of Congress . . . can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself .... The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.” Id., at 703. To uphold Congress’ power to take away a man’s citizenship because he voted in a foreign election in violation of § 401 (e) would be equivalent to holding that Congress has the power to “abridge,” “affect,” “restrict the effect of,” and “take . . . away” citizenship. Because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from doing any of these things, we agree with The Chief Justice’s dissent in the Perez case that the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under § 401 (e). Because the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and of the expatriation proposals which preceded and followed it, like most other legislative history, contains many statements from, which conflicting inferences can be drawn, our holding might be unwarranted if it rested entirely or principally upon that legislative history. But it does not. Our holding we think is the only one that can stand in view of the language and the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, and our construction of that Amendment, we believe, comports more nearly than Perez with the principles of liberty and equal justice to all that the entire Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to guarantee. Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the name of one of its general or implied grants of power. In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world — as a man without a country. Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship. Perez v. Brownell is overruled. The judgment is Reversed. 54 Stat. 1168, as amended, 58 Stat. 746, 8 U. S. C. § 801 (1946 ed.): “A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: “(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." This provision was re-enacted as § 349 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 267, 8 U. S. C. § 1481 (a)(5). “All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . 250 F. Supp. 686; 361 F. 2d 102, 105. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86; Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 129. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144; Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163. In his concurring opinion in Mendoza-Martinez, Mr. Justice BreNNan expressed “felt doubts of the correctness of Perez 372 U. S., at 187. See, e. g., Agata, Involuntary Expatriation and Schneider v. Rusk, 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1965); Hurst, Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 62 (1956); Kurland, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 169-175 (1964); Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1142 (1958); Note, Forfeiture of Citizenship Through Congressional Enactments, 21 U. Cin. L. Rev. 59 (1952); 40 Cornell L. Q. 365 (1955); 25 S. Cal. L. Rev. 196 (1952). But see, e. g., Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 Yale L. J. 1164 (1955). See Perez v. Brownell, supra, at 62 (dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice), 79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas); Trop v. Dulles, supra, at 91-93 (part I of opinion of Court); Nishikawa v. Dulles, supra, at 138 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black). For a history of the early American view of the right of expatriation, including these congressional proposals, see generally Roche, The Early Development of United States Citizenship (1949); Tsiang, The Question of Expatriation in America Prior to 1907 (1942); Dutcher, The Right of Expatriation, 11 Am. L. Rev. 447 (1877); Roche, The Loss of American Nationality — The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 25 (1950); Slay-maker, The Right of the American Citizen to Expatriate, 37 Am. L. Rev. 191 (1903). 4 Annals of Cong. 1005, 1027-1030 (1794); 7 Annals of Cong. 349 et seq. (1797). See, e. g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133. 31 Annals of Cong. 495 (1817). Id., at 1036-1037, 1058 (1818). Although some of the opponents, believing that citizenship was derived from the States, argued that any power to prescribe the mode for its relinquishment rested in the States, they were careful to point out that “the absence of all power from the State Legislatures would not vest it in us.” Id., at 1039. The amendment had been proposed by the 11th Cong., 2d Sess. See The Constitution of the United States of America, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess,, 77-78 (1964). Id., at 1071. It is interesting to note that the proponents of the bill, such as Congressman Cobb of Georgia, considered it to be “the simple declaration of the manner in which a voluntary act, in the exercise of a natural right, may be performed” and denied that it created or could lead to the creation of “a presumption of relinquishment of the right of citizenship.” Id., at 1068. The dissenting opinion here points to the fact that a Civil War Congress passed two Acts designed to deprive military deserters to the Southern side of the rights of citizenship. Measures of this kind passed in those days of emotional stress and hostility are by no means the most reliable criteria for determining what the Constitution means. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768-2769, 2869, 2890 et seq. (1866). See generally, Flack, Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 88-94 (1908). Representative Jenckes of Rhode Island introduced an fl.-mp.ndment that would expatriate those citizens who became naturalized by a foreign government, performed public duties for a foreign government, or took up domicile in a foreign country without intent to return. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 968, 1129, 2311 (1868). Although he characterized his proposal as covering “cases where citizens may voluntarily renounce their allegiance to this country,” id., at 1159, it was opposed by Representative Chanler of New York who said, “So long as a citizen does not expressly dissolve his allegiance and does not swear allegiance to another country his citizenship remains in statu quo, unaltered and unimpaired.” Id., at 1016. Proposals of Representatives Pruyn of New York (id., at 1130) and Van Trump of Ohio (id., at 1801, 2311). While Van Trump disagreed with the 1818 opponents as to whether Congress had power to prescribe a means of voluntary renunciation of citizenship, he wholeheartedly agreed with their premise that the right of expatriation belongs to the citizen, not to the Government, and that the Constitution forbids the Government from being party to the act of expatriation. Van Trump simply thought that the opponents of the 1818 proposal failed to recognize that their mutual premise would not be violated by an Act which merely prescribed “how . . . [the rights of citizenship] might be relinquished at the option of the person in whom they were vested.” Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1804 (1868). Id., at 2317. Representative Banks of Massachusetts, the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which drafted the bill eventually enacted into law, explained why Congress refrained from providing a means of expatriation: “It is a subject which, in our opinion, ought not to be legislated upon. . . . [T]his comes within the scope and character of natural rights which no Government has the right to control and which no Government can confer. And wherever this subject is alluded to in the Constitution— ... it is in the declaration that Congress shall have no power whatever to legislate upon these matters.” Id., at 2316. 15 Stat. 223, R. S. § 1999. Some have referred to this part of the decision as a holding, see, e. g., Hurst, supra, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev., at 78-79; Comment, 56 Mich. L. Rev., at 1153-1154; while others have referred to it as obiter dictum, see, e. g., Roche, supra, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 26-27. Whichever it was, the statement was evidently the result of serious consideration and is entitled to great weight. Of course, as The Chief Justice said in his dissent, 356 U. S., at 66, naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside. See, e. g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U. S. 654; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665; Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. AKINS et al. No. 96-1590. Argued January 14, 1998 Decided June 1, 1998 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 29. Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Malcolm L. Stewart, Lawrence M. Noble, Richard B. Bader, and David Kolker. Daniel M. Schember argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Abdeen Jabara. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Ovil Liberties Union et al. by Joel M. Gora, Steven R. Shapiro, and Arthur N. Eisenberg; and for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr. A. Stephen But, Jr., Roger M. Witten, Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, and Donald J. Simon filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee by Theodore B. Olson, Mel Levine, Thomas G. Hungar, and Philip Friedman; and for the Brennan Center for Justice by Burt Neubome. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has determined that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a “political committee” as defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §481(4), and, for that reason, the FEC has refused to require AIPAC to make disclosures regarding its membership, contributions, and expenditures that FECA would otherwise require. We hold that respondents, a group of voters, have standing to challenge the Commission’s determination in court, and we remand this ease for further proceedings. I In light of our disposition of this ease, we believe it necessary to describe its procedural background in some detail. As commonly understood, the FECA seeks to remedy any actual or perceived corruption of the political process in several important ways. The Act imposes limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, “political committees” (including political action committees), and political parties can contribute to a candidate for federal political office. §§441a(a), 441a(b), 441b. The Act also imposes limits on the amount these individuals or entities can spend in coordination with a candidate. (It treats these expenditures' as “contributions to” a candidate for purposes of the Act.) §441a(a)(7)(B)(i). As originally written, the Act set limits upon the total amount that a candidate could spend of his own money, and upon the amounts that other individuals, corporations, and “political committees” could spend independent of a candidate—though the Court found that certain of these last-mentioned limitations violated the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985); cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 613-619 (1996) (opinion of Breyer, J.). This case concerns requirements in the Act that extend beyond these better-known contribution and expenditure limitations. In particular, the Act imposes extensive rec-ordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon groups that fall within the Act’s definition of a “political committee.” Those groups must register with the FEC, appoint a treasurer, keep names and addresses of contributors, track the amount and purpose of disbursements, and file complex FEC reports that include lists of donors giving in excess of $200 per year (often, these donors may be the group’s members), contributions, expenditures, and any other disbursements irrespective of their purposes. §§ 432-434. The Act’s use of the word “political committee” calls to mind the term “political action committee,” or “PAC,” a term that normally refers to organizations that corporations or trade unions might establish for the purpose of making contributions or expenditures that the Act would otherwise prohibit. See §§431(4)(B), 441b. But, in fact, the Act’s term “political committee” has a much broader scope. The Act states that a “political committee” includes “any committee, club, association or other group of persons which receives” more than $1,000 in “contributions” or “which makes” more than $1,000 in “expenditures” in any given year. § 431(4)(A) (emphasis added). This broad definition, however, is less universally encompassing than at first it may seem, for later definitional subsections limit its scope. The Act defines the key terms “contribution” and “expenditure” as covering only those contributions and expenditures that are made “for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” §§431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Moreover, the Act sets forth detailed categories of disbursements, loans, and assistance-in-kind that do not count as a “contribution” or an “expenditure,” even when made for election-related purposes. §§ 431(8)(B), (9)(B). In particular, assistance given to help a candidate will not count toward the $1,000 “expenditure” ceiling that qualifies an organization as a “political committee” if it takes the form of a “communication” by an organization “to its members” — as long as the organization at issue is a “membership organization or corporation” and it is not “organized primarily for the purpose of influencing the nomination ... or eleetiofn] of any individual.” §431(9)(B)(iii). This case arises out of an effort by respondents, a group of voters with views often opposed to those of AIPAC, to persuade the FEC to treat AIPAC as a “political committee.” Respondents filed a complaint with the FEC, stating that AIPAC had made more than $1,000 in qualifying “expenditures” per year, and thereby became a “political committee.” 1 Record, Exh. B, p. 4. They added that AIPAC had violated the FEC provisions requiring “political committee[s]” to register and to make public the information about members, contributions, and expenditures to which we have just referred. Id., at 2, 9-17. Respondents also claimed that AIPAC had violated § 441b of FECA, which prohibits corporate campaign “contribution[s]” and “expenditure^].” Id., at 2, 16-17. They asked the FEC to find that AIPAC had violated the Act, and, among other things, to order AIPAC to make public the information that FECA demands of a “political committee.” Id., at 33-34. AIPAC asked the FEC to dismiss the complaint. AIPAC described itself as an issue-oriented organization that seeks to maintain friendship and promote goodwill between the United States and Israel. App. 120; see also Brief for AIPAC as Amicus Curiae (AIPAC Brief) 1,3. AIPAC conceded that it lobbies elected officials and disseminates information about candidates for public office. App. 43,120; see also AIPAC Brief 6. But in responding to the § 441b charge, AIPAC denied that it had made the kinds of “expenditures” that matter for FECA purposes (i e., the kinds of election-related expenditures that corporations cannot make, and which count as the kind of expenditures that, when they exceed $1,000, qualify a group as a “political committee”). To put the matter more specifically: AIPAC focused on certain “expenditures” that respondents had claimed were election related, such as the costs of meetings with candidates, the introduction of AIPAC members to candidates, and the distribution of candidate position papers. AIPAC said that its spending on such activities, even if election related, fell within a relevant exception. They amounted, said AIPAC, to communications by a membership organization with its members, App. 164-166, which the Act exempts from its definition of “expenditures,” § 481(9)(B)(iii). In AIPAC’s view, these communications therefore did not violate §441b’s corporate expenditure prohibition. 2 Record, Doc. No. 19, pp. 2-6. (And, if AIPAC was right, those expenditures would not count toward the $1,000 ceiling on “expenditures” that might transform an ordinary issue-related group into a “political committee.” §431(4).) The FEC’s General Counsel concluded that, between 1983 and 1988, AIPAC had indeed funded communications of the sort described. The General Counsel said that those expenditures were campaign related, in that they amounted to advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. App. 106-108. He added that these expenditures were “likely to have crossed the $1,000 threshold.” Id., at 146. At the same time, the FEC closed the door to AIPAC’s invocation of the “communications” exception. The FEC said that, although it was a “close question,” these expenditures were not membership communications, because that exception applies to a membership organization’s communications with its members, and most of the persons who belonged to AIPAC did not qualify as “members” for purposes of the Act. App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a-98a; see also App. 170-173. Still, given the closeness of the issue, the FEC exercised its discretion and decided not to proceed further with respect to the claimed “corporate contribution” violation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a. ■ The FEC’s determination that many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC were not “members” effectively foreclosed any claim that AIPAC’s communications did not count as “expenditures” for purposes of determining whether it was a “political committee.” Since AIPAC’s activities fell outside the “membership communications” exception, AIPAC could not invoke that exception as a way of escaping the scope of the Act’s term “political committee” and the Act’s disclosure provisions, which that definition triggers. The FEC nonetheless held that AIPAC was not subject to the disclosure requirements, but for a different reason. In the FEC’s view, the Act’s definition of “political committee” includes only those organizations that have as a “major purpose” the nomination or election of candidates. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 79. AIPAC, it added, was fundamentally an issue-oriented lobbying organization, not a campaign-related organization, and hence AIPAC fell outside the definition of a “political committee” regardless. App. 146. The FEC consequently dismissed respondents’ complaint. Respondents filed a petition in Federal District Court seeking review of the FEC’s determination dismissing their complaint. See §§487g(a)(8)(A), 437g(a)(8)(C). The District Court granted summary judgment for the FEC, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. 66 F. 3d 348 (CADC 1995). The en bane Court of Appeals reversed, however, on the ground that the FEC’s “major purpose” test improperly interpreted the Act’s definition of a “political committee.” 101 F. 3d 731 (CADC 1997). We granted the FEC’s petition for certiorari, which contained the following two questions: “1. Whether respondents had standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission’s decision not to bring an enforcement action in this case. “2. Whether an organization that spends more than $1,000 on contributions or coordinated expenditures in a calendar year, but is neither controlled by a candidate nor has its major purpose the nomination or election of candidates, is a ‘political committee’ within the meaning of the [Act].” Brief for Petitioner I.. We shall answer the first of these questions, but not the second. II The Solicitor General argues that respondents lack standing to challenge the FEC’s decision not to proceed against AIPAC. He claims that they have failed to satisfy the “prudential” standing requirements upon which this Court has insisted. See, e. g., National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U. S. 479, 488 (1998) (NCUA); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970) (Data Processing). He adds that respondents have not shown that they “suffe[r] injury in fact,” that them injury is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision, or that a judicial decision in their favor would “redres[s]” the injury. E.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 162 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992). In his view, respondents’ District Court petition consequently failed to meet Article Ill’s demand for a “case” or “controversy.” We do not agree with the FEC’s “prudential standing” claim. Congress has specifically provided in FECA that “[a]ny person who believes a violation of this Act . . . has occurred, may file a complaint with the Commission.” § 437g(a)(l). It has added that “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party... may file a petition” in district court seeking review of that dismissal. § 437g(a)(8)(A). History associates the word “aggrieved” with a congressional intent to east the standing net broadly — beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights upon which “prudential” standing traditionally rested. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 (1940); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F. 2d 994 (CADC 1966) (Burger, J.); Associated Industries of New York State v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (CA2 1943) (Frank, J.). Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §702 (stating that those “suffering legal wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning of a relevant statute” may seek judicial review of agency action). Moreover, prudential standing is satisfied when the injury asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.' ” NCUA, supra, at 488 (quoting Data Processing, supra, at 153). The injury of which respondents complain— their failure to obtain relevant information — is injury of a kind that FECA seeks to address. Buckley, supra, at 66-67 (“political committees” must disclose contributors and disbursements to help voters understand who provides which candidates with financial support). We have found nothing in the Act that suggests Congress intended to exclude voters from the benefits of these provisions, or otherwise to restrict standing, say, to political parties, candidates, or their committees. Given the language of the statute and the nature of the injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect voters such as respondents from suffering the kind of injury here at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit. Consequently, respondents satisfy “prudential” standing requirements. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820, n. 3 (1997) (explicit grant of authority to bring suit “eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch"). Nor do we agree with the FEC or the dissent that Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit. Article III, of course, limits Congress' grant of judicial power to “cases" or “controversies." That limitation means that respondents must show, among other things, an “injury in fact” — a requirement that helps assure that courts will not “pass upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems,” but adjudicate “concrete, living contests] between adversaries.” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Bennett, supra, at 167; Lujan, supra, at 560-561. In our view, respondents here have suffered a genuine “injury in fact.” The “injury in fact” that respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain information — lists of AIPAC donors (who are, according to AIPAC, its members), and campaign-related contributions and expenditures — that, on respondents’ view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public. There is no reason to doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, especially candidates who received assistance from AIPAC, and to evaluate the role that AIPAC’s financial assistance might play in a specific election. Respondents’ injury consequently seems concrete and particular. Indeed, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff suffers an “injury in fact” when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 449 (1989) (failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under Federal Advisory Committee Aet “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”). See also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 373-374 (1982) (deprivation of information about housing availability constitutes “specific injury” permitting standing). The dissent refers to United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), a case in which a plaintiff sought information (details of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expenditures) to which, he said, the Constitution’s Accounts Clause, Art. I, §9, cl. 7, entitled him. The Court held that the plaintiff there lacked Article III standing. 418 U. S., at 179-180. The dissent says that Richardson and this ease are “indistinguishable.” Post, at 34. But as the parties’ briefs suggest — for they do. not mention Richardson — that ease does not control the outcome here. Richardson’s plaintiff claimed that a statute permitting the CIA to keep its expenditures nonpublic violated the Accounts Clause, which requires that “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” 418 U. S., at 167-169. The Court held that the plaintiff lacked standing because there was “no ‘logical nexus’ between the [plaintiff’s] asserted status of taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed report of the [CIA’s] expenditures.” Id., at 175; see also id., at 174 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 102 (1968), for the proposition that in “taxpayer standing” cases, there must be “‘a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated’”). In this ease, however, the “logical nexus” inquiry is not relevant. Here, there is no constitutional provision requiring the demonstration of the “nexus” the Court believed must be shown in Richardson and Flast. Rather, there is a statute which, as we previously pointed out, supra, at 19-20, does seek to protect individuals such as respondents from the kind of harm they say they have suffered, i. e., failing to receive particular information about campaign-related activities. Cf. Richardson, 418 U. S., at 178, n. 11. The fact that the Court in Richardson focused upon taxpayer standing, id., at 171-178, not voter standing, places that case at still a greater distance from the case before us. We are not suggesting, as the dissent implies, post, at 32-34, that Richardson would have come out differently if only the plaintiff had asserted his standing to sue as a voter, rather than as a taxpayer. Faced with such an assertion, the Richardson Court would simply have had to consider whether “the Framers . . . ever imagined that general directives [of the Constitution]... would be subject to enforcement by an individual citizen.” 418 U. S., at 178, n. 11 (emphasis added). But since that answer (like the answer to whether there was taxpayer standing in Richardson) would have rested in significant part upon the Court’s view of the Accounts Clause, it still would not control our answer in this case. All this is to say that the legal logic which critically determined Richardson’s outcome is beside the point here. The FEC’s strongest argument is its contention that this lawsuit involves only a “generalized grievance.” (Indeed, if Richardson is relevant at all, it is because of its broad discussion of this matter, see id., at 176-178, not its basic rationale.) The FEC points out that respondents’ asserted harm (their failure to obtain information) is one which is “ ‘shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 28 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975)). This Court, the FEC adds, has often said that “generalized grievanee[s]” are not the kinds of harms that confer standing. Brief for Petitioner 28; see also Lujan, 504 U. S., at 573-574; Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755-756 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 475-479 (1982); Richardson, supra, at 176-178; Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 487 (1923); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam). Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance. Warth, supra, at 500; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974); Richardson, 418 U. S., at 179; id., at 188-189 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Flast, supra, at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The kind of judicial language to which the FEC points, however, invariably appears in eases where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature — for example, harm to the “common concern for obedience to law.” L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. 295, 303 (1940); see also Allen, supra, at 754; Schlesinger, supra, at 217. Cf. Lujan, supra, at 572-578 (injury to interest in seeing that certain procedures are followed not normally sufficient by itself to confer standing); Frothingham, supra, at 488 (party may not merely assert that “he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally”); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 125 (1940) (plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to show injury to “a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of the law”). The abstract nature of the harm — for example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed — deprives the case of the concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were “the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster,” Coleman, 307 U. S., at 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and which today prevents a plaintiff from obtaining what would, in effect, amount to an advisory opinion. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). Often the fact that an interest is abstract and the fact that it is widely shared go hand in hand. But their association is not invariable, and where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found “injury in fact.” See Public Citizen, 491 U. S., at 449-450 (“The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure . . . does not lessen [their] asserted injury”). Thus the fact that a political forum may be more readily available where an injury is widely shared (while counseling against, say, interpreting a statute as conferring standing) does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an “injury in fact.” This conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to use a hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights conferred by law. Cf. Lujan, supra, at 572; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 905 (1996). We conclude that, similarly, the informational injury at issue here, direetly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts. Respondents have also satisfied the remaining two constitutional standing requirements. The harm asserted is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision about which respondents complain. Of course, as the FEC points out, Brief for Petitioner 29-31, it is possible that even had the FEC agreed with respondents’ view of the law, it would still have decided in the exercise of its discretion not to require AIPAC to produce the information. Cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a (deciding to exercise prosecutorial discretion, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985), and “take no further action” on §441b allegation against AIPAC). But that fact does not destroy Article III “causation,” for we cannot know that the FEC would have exercised its proseeutorial discretion in this way. Agencies often have discretion about whether or not to take a particular action. Yet those adversely affected by a discretionary agency decision generally have standing to complain that the agency based its decision upon an improper legal ground. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (discussing presumption of review-ability of agency action); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971). If a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the case — even though the agency (like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawffil discretion, reach the same result for a different reason. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943). Thus respondents’ “injury in fact” is “fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision not to issue its complaint, even though the FEC might reach the same result exercising its discretionary powers lawfully. For similar reasons, the courts in this case can “redress” respondents’ “injury in fact.” Finally, the FEC argues that we should deny respondents standing because this case involves an agency’s decision not to undertake an enforcement action — an area generally not subject to judicial review. Brief for Petitioner 23, 29. In Heckler, this Court noted that agency enforcement decisions “ha[ve] traditionally been ‘committed to agency discretion,’ ” and concluded that Congress did not intend to alter that tradition in enacting the APA. 470 U. S., at 832; cf. 5 U. S. C. § 701(a) (courts will not review agency actions where “statutes preclude judicial review,” or where the “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law”). We deal here with a statute that explicitly indicates the contrary. In sum, respondents, as voters, have satisfied both prudential and constitutional standing requirements. They may bring this petition for a declaration that the FEC’s dismissal of their complaint was unlawful. See 2 U. S. C. §437g(a)(8)(A). Ill The second question presented in the FEC’s petition for certiorari is whether an organization that otherwise satisfies the Act’s definition of a “political committee,” and thus is subject to its disclosure requirements, nonetheless falls outside that definition because “its major purpose” is not “the nomination or election of candidates.” The question arises because this Court, in Buckley, said: “To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the term ‘political committee’] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.” 424 U. S., at 79. The Court reiterated in Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 252, n. 6 (1986): “[A]n entity subject to regulation as a ‘political committee’ under the Act is one that is either ‘under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.’” The FEC here interpreted this language as narrowing the scope of the statutory term “political committee,” wherever applied. And, as we have said, the FEC’s General Counsel found that AIPAC fell outside that definition because the nomination or election of a candidate was not AIPAC’s “major purpose.” App. 146. The en banc Court of Appeals disagreed with the FEC. It read this Court’s narrowing construction of the term “political committee” as turning on the First Amendment problems presented by regulation of “independent expenditures” (•i. e., “an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate,” § 431(17)). 101 F. 3d, at 741. The Court of Appeals concluded that the language in this Court’s prior decisions narrowing the definition of “political committee” did not apply where the special First Amendment “independent expenditure” problem did not exist. Id., at 742-743. The Solicitor General argues that this Court’s narrowing definition of “political committee” applies not simply in the context of independent expenditures, but across the board. We cannot squarely address that matter, however, because of the unusual and complex circumstances in which this case arises. As we previously mentioned, supra, at 16-17, the FEC considered a related question, namely, whether AIPAC was exempt from §441b’s prohibition of corporate campaign expenditures, on the grounds that the so-called “expenditures” involved only AIPAC’s communications with its members. The FEC held that the statute’s exception to the “expenditure” definition for communications by a “membership organization” did not apply because many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC were not “members” as defined by FEC regulation. The FEC acknowledged, however, that this was a “close question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a; see also App. 144-146, 170-171. In particular, the FEC thought that many of the persons who belonged to AIPAC lacked sufficient control of the organization’s policies to qualify as “members” for purposes of the Act. A few months later, however, the Court of Appeals overturned the FEC’s regulations defining “members,” in part because that court thought the regulations defined membership organizations too narrowly in light of an organization’s “First Amendment right to communicate with its ‘members.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Election Comm’n, 69 F. 3d 600, 605 (CADC 1995). The FEC has subsequently issued proposed rules redefining “members.” Under these rules, it is quite possible that many of the persons who belong to AIPAC would be considered “members.” If so, the communications here at issue apparently would not count as the kind of “expenditures” that can turn an organization into a “political committee,” and AIPAC would fall outside the definition for that reason, rather than because of the “major purpose” test. 62 Fed. Reg. 66832 (1997) (proposed 11 CFR pts. 100 and 114). The consequence for our consideration of Question Two now is that the FEC’s new rules defining “membership organization” could significantly affect the interpretive issue presented by this question. If the Court of Appeals is right in saying that this Court’s narrowing interpretation of “political committee” in Buckley reflected First Amendment concerns, 101 F. 3d, at 741, then whether the “membership communications” exception is interpreted broadly or narrowly could affect our evaluation of the Court of Appeals’ claim that there is no constitutionally driven need to apply Buckley’s, narrowing interpretation in this context. The scope of the “membership communications” exception could also affect our evaluation of the Solicitor General’s related argument that First Amendment concerns (reflected in Buckley’s narrowing interpretation) are present whenever the Act requires disclosure. In any event, it is difficult to decide the basic issue that Question Two presents without considering the special' eonnnunicative nature of the “expenditures” here at issue, cf. United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 121 (1948) (describing relation between membership communications and constitutionally protected rights of association). And, a considered determination of the scope of the statutory exemption that Congress enacted to address membership communications would helpfully inform our consideration of the “major purpose” test. The upshot, in our view, is that we should permit the FEC to address, in the first instance, the issue presented by Question Two. We can thereby take advantage of the relevant agency’s expertise, by allowing it to develop a more precise rule that may dispose of this case, or at a minimum, will aid the Court in reaching a more informed conclusion. In our view, the FEC should proceed to determine whether or not AIPAC’s expenditures qualify as “membership communications,” and thereby fall outside the scope of “expenditures” that could qualify it as a “political committee.” If the FEC decides that despite its new rules, the communications here do not qualify for this exception, then the lower courts, in reconsidering respondents’ arguments, can still evaluate the significance of the communicative context in which the case arises. If, on the other hand, the FEC decides that AIPAC’s activities fall within the “membership communications” exception, the matter will become moot. For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORP. v. BARBOUR et al. No. 73-2055. Argued March 17-18, 1975 Decided May 19, 1975 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., dissented. Wilfred R. Caron argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Theodore H. Focht. W. Ovid Collins, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Barbour. Solicitor General Bork, William L. Patton, Lawrence E. Nerheim, and David Ferber filed briefs for respondent Securities and Exchange Commission. Me. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) was established by Congress as a nonprofit membership corporation for the purpose, inter alia, of providing financial relief to the customers of failing broker-dealers with whom they had left cash or securities on deposit. The question presented by this case is whether such customers have an implied private right of action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (Act or SIPA), 84 Stat. 1636, 15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seg., to compel the SIPC to exercise its statutory authority for their benefit. I In December 1970 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint in District Court against Guaranty Bond and Securities Corp., a registered broker-dealer, to enjoin continued violation of the Commission’s net capital and other rules. On January 6, 1971, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction, and on January 29 it granted the Commission’s motion for appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of Guaranty Bond. James C. Barbour (hereafter respondent) was appointed receiver. On April 6, 1972, respondent, alleging that customers of Guaranty Bond would sustain a loss at least equal to the costs of administering the receivership, obtained from the court an order directing the SEC and SIPC to show cause “why the remedies afforded by the [SIPA] should not be made available in this proceeding.” In its answer the SEC took the position that respondent had not demonstrated that Guaranty’s customers would in fact sustain any loss since it appeared that the receiver would have a cause of action for damages or restitution against Guaranty’s parent company and principals. The SIPC, on the other hand, challenged the receiver’s standing to maintain an action to compel its intervention and, in direct opposition to the position of the SEC, argued that Guaranty’s insolvency prior to the December 30, 1970, date on which the SIPA took effect meant that application of the Act to this case would give it an unlawful retroactive effect. The District Court upheld the receiver’s right of action, but denied relief on the ground that Guaranty’s hopeless insolvency prior to the effective date of the SIPA rendered the Act inapplicable. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Since Guaranty had conducted 101 transactions after December 30, and the SEC did not move to prevent its carrying on business as a broker-dealer until January 6, it held that Guaranty qualified as a broker-dealer on the effective date of the Act. The court then rejected the SIPC’s argument that the provision for SEC enforcement actions to compel the SIPC to perform its functions was meant to be exclusive of such actions by protected customers or their representative, and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted certiorari, limited to the questions whether customers have an implied right of action to compel the SIPC to act and, if so, whether a receiver has standing to maintain it. 419 U. S. 894 (1974). Since we now reverse the Court of Appeals on the ground that no implied right of action exists, we do not address the second question. II Following a period of great expansion in the 1960’s, the securities industry experienced a business contraction that led to the failure or instability of a significant number of brokerage firms. Customers of failed firms found their cash and securities on deposit either dissipated or tied up in lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to its disastrous effects on customer assets and investor confidence, this situation also threatened a “domino effect” involving otherwise solvent brokers that had substantial open transactions with firms that failed. Congress enacted the SIPA to arrest this process, restore investor confidence in the capital markets, and upgrade the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and dealers. S. Rep. No. 91-1218, pp. 2-4 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1613, pp. 2-4 (1970). The Act apportions responsibility for these tasks among the SEC, the securities industry self-regulatory organizations, and the SIPC, a nonprofit, private membership corporation to which most registered brokers and dealers are required to belong. 15 U. S. C. § 78ccc. Most important for present purposes, the Act creates a new form of liquidation proceeding, applicable only to member firms, designed to accomplish the completion of open transactions and the speedy return of most customer property. To this end, the SIPC is required to establish and maintain a fund for customer protection by laying assessments on the annual gross revenues of its members. The SEC and the securities industry self-regulatory organizations are required to notify the SIPC whenever it appears that a member is in or approaching financial difficulty. If the SIPC determines that a member has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers, and finds any one of five specified conditions suggestive of financial irresponsibility, then it “may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction ... for a decree adjudicating that customers of such member are in need of the protection provided by [the Act].” § 78eee (a) (2). The mere filing of an SIPC application gives the court in which it is filed exclusive jurisdiction over the member and its property, wherever located, and requires the court to stay “any pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, equity receivership, or other proceeding to reorganize, conserve, or liquidate the [member] or its property and any other suit against any receiver, conservator, or trustee of the [member] or its property.” § 78eee (b) (2). If the SEC has pending any action against the member, it may, with the Commission’s consent, be combined with the SIPC proceeding. If no such action is pending, the SEC may intervene as a party to the SIPC proceeding. If the court finds any of the five conditions on which an SIPC application may be based, it must grant the application and issue the decree, and appoint as trustee for the liquidation of the business and as attorney for the trustee, “such persons as SIPC shall specify.” §§ 78eee (b)(1), (3). The trustee is empowered and directed by the Act to return customer property, complete open transactions, enforce rights of subrogation, and liquidate the business of the member, § 78fff (a); he is not empowered to reorganize or rehabilitate the business. The SIPC is required to advance him such sums as are necessary to complete open transactions, and to accomplish the return of customer property up to a value of $50,000. § 78fff (f). The role of the SEC in this scheme’ insofar as relevant to the present case, is one of “plenary authority” to supervise the SIPC. S. Rep. No. 91-1218, supra, at 1; see H. R. Rep. No. 91-1613, supra, at 12. For example, it may disapprove in whole or in part any bylaw or rule adopted by the Board of Directors of the SIPC, or require the adoption of any rule it deems appropriate, in order to promote the public interest and the purposes of the Act. 15 U. S. C. § 78ccc (e). It may inspect and examine the SIPC’s records and require that any information it deems appropriate be furnished to it, and it receives the corporation’s annual report for inspection and transmission, with its comments, to the President and Congress. §78ggg(c). It may participate in any liquidation proceeding initiated by the SIPC, but even more important, § 7 (b) of the Act, § 78ggg (b), provides: “Enforcement of actions. — In the event of the refusal of SIPC to commit its funds or otherwise to act for the protection of customers of any member of SIPC, the Commission may apply to the district court of the United States in which the principal office of SIPC is located for an order requiring SIPC to discharge its obligations under [the Act] and for such other relief as the court may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the Act].” It is against this background relationship between the SIPC and the SEC that we must approach the question whether, in addition to the Commission, a member’s customers or their representative may seek in district court to compel the SIPC “to commit its funds or otherwise to act for the protection” of such customers. Ill The respondent contends that since the SIPA does not in terms preclude a private cause of action at the instance of a member broker’s customers, and since such customers are the intended beneficiaries of the Act, the Court should imply a right of action by which customers can compel the SIPC to discharge its obligations to them. As we said only last Term in analyzing a similar contention: “It goes without saying . . . that the inference of such a private cause of action not otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act.” Passenger Corp. v. Passengers Assn., 414 U. S. 453, 457-458 (1974) (hereinafter Amtrak). In Amtrak itself the petitioner was a corporation created by Congress to assume from private railroads certain intercity rail passenger service responsibilities. The respondent passenger association brought an action to enjoin the discontinuance of a particular service as announced by the corporation pursuant to its authority under § 404 (b) (2) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act), 45 U. S. C. § 564 (b)(2). That Act made express provision for suits against Amtrak to enforce its duties and obligations only “upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States or, in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any employee affected” by the agreement. 45 U. S. C. § 547 (a). There, as here, the plaintiff-respondent argued that statutory authorization for one type of action against the congressionally created corporation did not preclude another at the instance of the intended beneficiaries of the law. The Court’s analysis of the claim in Amtrak began with the observation that express statutory provision for one form of proceeding ordinarily implies that no other means of enforcement was intended by the Legislature. That implication would yield, however, to “clear contrary evidence of legislative intent,” 414 U. S., at 458, for which we turned to the legislative history and the overall structure of the Amtrak Act. Inspection revealed that the legislative history of the Amtrak Act was entirely consonant with the implication of the statutory language that no private right of action was intended. The general structure and purpose of the Act gave further support to that conclusion. Congress had expected that, in creating an economically viable rail passenger system, some rail service would have to be discontinued by Amtrak; it had provided an efficient and expeditious means to that end, which seemed incompatible with an intent to allow a private action by any passenger affected by a discontinuance decision. Nor would the absence of a private right of action leave Amtrak free to disregard the public interest in its decisionmaking. In addition to investing the Attorney General with “authority to police the Amtrak system and to enforce the various duties and obligations imposed by the Act” by court action, Congress provided for “substantial scrutiny” over Amtrak’s operations by requiring it to make periodic reports to Congress and the President and to open its books to the Comptroller General for auditing. 414 U. S., at 464. The similarities between the present case and Amtrak are undeniable and for the respondent, we think, insurmountable. As with Amtrak, so with the SIPC, Congress has created a corporate entity to solve a public problem; it has provided for substantial supervision of its operations by an agency charged with protection of the public interest — here the SEC — and for enforcement by that agency in court of the obligations imposed upon the corporation. The corporation is required to report to Congress and the President, and to open its books and records to the SEC and the Comptroller General. Farther, Congress has chartered the SIPC, unlike Amtrak, as a nonprofit corporation, and it has put its direction in the hands of a publicly chosen board of directors. Beyond the inference to be drawn from the structure of the SIPC, there is no extrinsic evidence that Congress intended to allow an action such as that before us. As the respondent concedes, there is no indication in the legislative history of the SIPA that Congress ever contemplated a private right of action parallel to that expressly given to the SEC. Additionally, as in Amtrak, it is clear that the overall structure and purpose of the SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied right. Congress’ primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and creating the SIPC was, of course, the protection of investors. It does not follow, however, that an implied right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in need of the Act’s protection, is either necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that purpose. The SIPC properly treats an application for the appointment of a receiver and liquidation of a brokerage firm as a last resort. It maintains an early-warning system and monitors the affairs of any firm that it is given reason to believe may be in danger of failure. Its experience to date demonstrates that more often than not an endangered firm will avoid collapse by infusion of new capital or merger with a stronger firm. Even failing those alternatives, a firm may be able to liquidate under the supervision of one of the self-regulatory organizations, or the district court, without danger of loss to customers. The SIPC’s policy, therefore, is to defer intervention “until there appear[s] to be no reasonable doubt that customers would need the protection of the Act.” SIPC 1973 Annual Report 7 (1974). By this policy, the SIPC avoids unnecessarily engendering the costs of precipitate liquidations — the costs not only of administering the liquidation, but also of customer illiquidity and additional loss of confidence in the capital markets — without sacrifice of any customer protection that may ultimately prove necessary. A customer, by contrast, cannot be expected to consider, or have adequate information to consider, these public interests in timing his decision to apply to the courts. The respondent in this case does not, of course, claim any right to make the decision that a firm should be liquidated; the Act makes that a judicial decision. He seeks only the right to ask the District Court to make that decision when both the SIPC and the SEC have refused or simply failed to do so. In practical effect, however, the difference is slight. Except with respect to the solidest of houses, the mere filing of an action predicated upon allegations of financial insecurity might often prove fatal. Other customers could not be expected to leave their cash and securities on deposit, nor other brokers to initiate new transactions that the firm might not be able to cover when due if a receiver is appointed, nor would suppliers be likely to continue dealing with such a firm. These consequences are too grave, and when unnecessary, too inimical to the purposes of the Act, for the Court to impute to Congress an intent to grant to every member of the investing public control over their occurrence. On the contrary, they seem to be the very sorts of considerations that motivated Congress to put the SIPC in the hands of a public board of directors, responsible to an agency experienced in regulation of the securities markets. We need not pause long over the distinctions between this case and those, such as J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964), and Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), in which the Court held that an implied private cause of action was maintainable. In J. I. Case a stockholder sought damages against his corporation for its alleged misrepresentations, violative of § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in soliciting proxy votes for the approval of a merger. In light of the “broad remedial purposes” of the Act and the SEC’s representation that private enforcement was necessary to effectuate those purposes, the Court held that the action for damages could be maintained. The Court first concluded that it was “clear that private parties have a right under § 27 [of the Act] to bring suit for violation of § 14 (a),” since § 27 specifically granted the district courts jurisdiction over “ ‘all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created’ ” under the Act. 377 U. S., at 430-431. The more difficult question was whether the private parties, once in court, could seek damages as well as equitable relief. On this point, the Court agreed with the SEC that private enforcement of the proxy rules was a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement. Since there was no contrary indication from Congress, the Court so held, relying on the statement from Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946), that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Unlike the Securities Exchange Act, the SIPA contains no standards of conduct that a private action could help to enforce, and it contains no general grant of jurisdiction to the district courts. As in Amtrak, a private right of action under the SIPA would be consistent neither with the legislative intent, nor with the effectuation of the purposes it is intended to serve. The Allen case arose under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The question there was whether a private citizen could sue to set aside a state or local election law on the ground of its repugnancy to the Act. The federal statute provided that the Attorney General may bring such suits, but was silent as to the rights of others. It was clear to the Court — and to the Attorney General — that the Act would be practically unenforceable against the many local governments subject to its strictures if only the Attorney General were authorized to sue. We thus found it “consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his city or county government complies with” its requirements. 393 U. S., at 557. There is not the slightest reason to think that, the SIPA, in contrast to the Voting Rights Act, imposes such burdens on the parties charged with its administration that Congress must either have intended their efforts to be supplemented by those of private investors or enacted a statute incapable of achieving its purpose. Instead of enlisting the aid of investors in achieving that purpose, Congress imposed upon the SEC, the exchanges, and the self-regulatory organizations the obligation to report to the SIPC any situation that might call for its intervention. For these reasons we are unable to agree with the proposition that the customers of a member broker may sue to compel the SIPC to perform its statutory functions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions that the receiver’s petition for an order to show cause be dismissed. It is so ordered. Mb. Justice Douglas dissents. Both the Secretary of Transportation, who was given primary responsibility for implementing the law, and spokesmen for organized labor had interpreted the bill as enacted to preclude private actions other than those specifically authorized. The drafting subcommittee to which these views had been expressed found nothing in them to correct. See 414 U. S., at 462: “If, however, [the Act] were to be interpreted as permitting private lawsuits to prevent the discontinuance of passenger trains, then the only effect of . the Act in this regard would have been to substitute the federal district courts for the state or federal administrative bodies formerly required to pass upon proposed discontinuances.” Respondent argues that because Congress provided that the SIPC can “sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name and through its own counsel, in any court, State, or Federal,” 15 U. S. C. §78cce (b)(1), it must have contemplated occasions when an aggrieved customer of a member firm would be able to sue. In light of the specific terms of the more relevant section governing suits to compel the SIPC to act for the benefit of investors, that conclusion is unwarranted. It is also incompatible with the limitation of SEC actions “to the district court of the United States in which the principal office of SIPC is located.” 15 U. S. C. § 78ggg (b). It would be anomalous for Congress to have centralized SEC suits for the apparent convenience of the SIPC while exposing the corporation to substantively identical suits by investors “in any court, State or Federal.” Of the 266 firms brought to the attention of the SIPC by the exchanges, self-regulatory organizations, and the SEC between the effective date of the SIPA and the end of 1973, only 32 were subjected to SIPC liquidation as of December 31, 1973. Sixty-six withdrew from the business of carrying customer accounts, 26 self-liquidated, 20 became inactive without customer loss, 11 merged with other firms, 62 corrected their problems, and 49 remained under surveillance. SIPC 1973 Annual Report 17 (1974). See Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 897 (1967): “The moment you bring a public proceeding against a broker-dealer who depends upon public confidence in his reputation, he is to all intents and purposes out of business.” See sources collected at Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 33 n. 162 (1972), and Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1380, 1394-1397 (1973). There may, of course, be less reason for public reaction to a private, as opposed to an SEC, suit to compel the SIPC’s protective measures, but there is little reason to think that the investing public, with its assets at risk, would be interested in the distinction. The sequence of events giving rise to this case provided no opportunity for a run on Guaranty because the attempt to compel the SIPC’s intervention occurred after the firm had ceased doing business and had come within the jurisdiction of the District Court for liquidation, at the instance of the SEC. In these limited circumstances Congress could reasonably have provided for a private action by a receiver against the SIPC, but it did not and we are not at liberty to do so. There is, after all, a real difference between a court’s implying a right of action to effectuate the purposes of a statute and its cutting a code of procedure out of whole cloth. The SEC suggests in its brief that a determination by it not to proceed against the SIPC with respect to a member broker-dealer whose customers have incurred a loss of the type against which the SIPA is directed might be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act for an abuse of discretion. We need express no opinion on that matter today.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ALCEA BAND OF TILLAMOOKS et al. No. 26. Argued January 31, February 1, 1946. — Reargued October 25, 1946. Decided November 25, 1946. Walter J. Cummings, Jr. argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McGrath, Assistant Attorney General Bazelon and Roger P. Marquis. J. Edward Williams and John C. Harrington were also on the brief on the original argument. Everett Sanders argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were L. A. Gravelle, Douglas Whit-lock and Edward F. Howrey. Ernest L. Wilkinson and John W. Cragun filed a brief, as amici curiae, and James E. Curry and C. M. Wright filed a brief for the National Congress of American Indians, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Murphy joined. Eleven Indian tribes have sued the United States in the Court of Claims under the Act of August 26, 1935, which gives that court jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate cases involving “any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title, claim, or rights in . . . the lands . . . occupied by the Indian tribes and bands described in” certain unratified treaties negotiated with Indian tribes in the Territory of Oregon. Four of the tribes, the Tillamooks, Coquilles, Too-too-to-neys and Chetcos, successfully identified themselves as entitled to sue under the Act, proved their original Indian title to designated lands, and demonstrated an involuntary and uncompensated taking of such lands. The Court of Claims thereupon held that original Indian title was an interest the taking of which without the consent of the Indian tribes entitled them to compensation. In answer to government contentions that original Indian title, in the absence of some form of official “recognition,” could be appropriated without liability upon the part of the sovereign, the Act of 1848, establishing the Territory of Oregon, was cited by the Court of Claims as affording any recognition required to support the claim for compensation. The issues decided, not previously passed upon by this Court and being of importance to the administration of Indian affairs, prompted this Court to grant certiorari. The case was argued during the 1945 term and on April 1, 1946, was restored to the docket for reargument before a full bench. The events giving rise to the claims here occurred as part of the opening and development of the Territory of Oregon. After creating a government for that territory by the Act of 1848, Congress in 1850 authorized the negotiation of treaties with Indian tribes in the area. Under the latter Act, Anson Dart, later succeeded by General Joel Palmer, was appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Oregon region and was instructed to negotiate treaties for the extinguishment of Indian claims to lands in that district. On August 11,1855, Palmer and respondent tribes concluded a treaty providing for the cession of Indian lands in return for certain money payments and the creation of a reservation. The treaty was to be operative only upon ratification. It was not submitted to the Senate until February, 1857, and was never ratified. Pending expected ratification, and following recommendations from Palmer, the President on November 9, 1855, created a reservation, subject to future diminution and almost identical with that provided for in the treaty. A large part of this reservation, called the Coast or Siletz Reservation, consisted of lands to which the Tillamook Tribe held original Indian title. Almost immediately the Tillamooks were confined to that portion of their land within the reservation, and the other three respondent tribes, as well as other tribes, were moved from their original possessions to the reservation. In 1865 an Executive Order reduced the size of the reservation; in 1875 Congress by statute approved the Executive Orders of 1855 and 1865, and in order to open more land for public settlement, removed additional land from the reservation. By an Act of 1894, Congress officially accepted and approved the reservation as it then existed, and thenceforward did not take reservation lands without compensation. The claims of respondent tribes are for the wrongful taking which occurred when they were deprived of their original possessions by the Executive Order of November 9, 1855. Even as to the Tillamooks, the Court of Claims found the taking complete as of November 9, 1855, since this tribe was forced to share its former lands with other Indians, and since the reservation was, in any event, only a conditional one, subject to being opened for public settlement at the will of the President. Petitioner disputes neither this finding nor the proof of original Indian title as of 1855. Other than the benefits flowing from the Act of 1894, none of the four respondent tribes has received any compensation for the loss of its lands. Until the present jurisdictional act of 1935, these tribes, lacking consent of the United States to be sued, were forbidden access to the courts. They alone of the tribes with whom Dart and Palmer negotiated some twenty-odd treaties between 1850 and 1855 have yet to receive recognition for the loss of lands held by original Indian title. Until now this Court has had no opportunity or occasion to pass upon the precise issue presented here. In only one Act prior to 1935 has Congress authorized judicial determination of the right to recover for a taking of nothing more than original Indian title; and no case under that Act, passed in 1929, reached this Court. In 1930 Congress again authorized adjudication of Indian claims arising out of original Indian title, but expressly directed an award of damages if a taking of lands held by immemorial possession were shown. This Act thus eliminated any judicial determination of a right to recover, once original Indian title was established. Prior to 1929, adjudications of Indian claims against the United States were limited to issues arising out of treaties, statutes, or other events and transactions carefully designated by Congress. This Court has always strictly construed such jurisdictional acts and has not offered judicial opinion on the justness of the handling of Indian lands, except in so far as Congress in specific language has permitted its justiciable recognition. The language of the 1935 Act is specific, and its consequences are clear. By this Act Congress neither admitted nor denied liability. The Act removes the impediments of sovereign immunity and lapse of time and provides for judicial determination of the designated claims. No new right or cause of action is created. A merely moral claim is not made a legal one. The cases are to be heard on their merits and decided according to legal principles pertinent to the issues which might be presented under the Act. Accordingly the 1935 statute permits judicial determination of the legal and equitable claims growing out of original Indian title. That which was within the power of Congress to withhold from judicial scrutiny has now been submitted to the courts. If, as has many times been said, the manner of extinguishing Indian title is usually a political question and presents a non-justiciable issue, Congress has expressly and effectively directed otherwise by seeking in the 1935 Act judicial disposition of claims arising from original Indian title. “By consenting to be sued, and submitting the decision to judicial action, they have considered it as a purely judicial question, which we are now bound to decide, as between man and man . . United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 711 (1832). It has long been held that by virtue of discovery the title to lands occupied by Indian tribes vested in the sovereign. This title was deemed subject to a right of occupancy in favor of Indian tribes, because of their original and previous possession. It is with the content of this right of occupancy, this original Indian title, that we are concerned here. As against any but the sovereign, original Indian title was accorded the protection of complete ownership; but it was vulnerable to affirmative action by the sovereign, which possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will. Termination of the right by sovereign action was complete and left the land free and clear of Indian claims. Third parties could not question the justness or fairness of the methods used to extinguish the right of occupancy. Nor could the Indians themselves prevent a taking of tribal lands or forestall a termination of their title. However, it is now for the first time asked whether the Indians have a cause of action for compensation arising out of an involuntary taking of lands held by original Indian title. We cannot but affirm the decision of the Court of Claims. Admitting the undoubted power of Congress to extinguish original Indian title compels no conclusion that compensation need not be paid. In speaking of the original claims of the Indians to their lands, Marshall had this to say: “It is difficult to comprehend the proposition . . . that the discovery . . . should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing right of its ancient possessors. ... It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell. . . . The king purchased their lands, . . . but never coerced a surrender of them.” Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 543, 544, 547 (1832). In our opinion, taking original Indian title without compensation and without consent does not satisfy the “high standards for fair dealing” required of the United States in controlling Indian affairs. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339, 356 (1941). The Indians have more than a merely moral claim for compensation. A contrary decision would ignore the plain import of traditional methods of extinguishing original Indian title. The early acquisition of Indian lands, in the main, progressed by a process of negotiation and treaty. The first treaties reveal the striking deference paid to Indian claims, as the analysis in Worcester v. Georgia, supra, clearly details. It was usual policy not to coerce the surrender of lands without consent and without compensation. The great drive to open Western lands in the 19th Century, however productive of sharp dealing, did not wholly subvert the settled practice of negotiated extinguishment of original Indian title. In 1896, this Court noted that, “. . . nearly every tribe and band of Indians within the territorial limits of the United States was under some treaty relations with the government.” Marks v. United States, 161 U. S. 297, 302 (1896). Something more than sovereign grace prompted the obvious regard given to original Indian title. Long before the end of the treaty system of Indian government and the advent of legislative control in 1871, Congress had evinced its own attitude toward Indian relations. The Ordinance of 1787 declared, “the utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent ...” 1 Stat. 50, 52. When in 1848 the territorial government of Oregon was created, § 14 of that Act secured to the inhabitants of the new territory all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Ordinance of 1787. Nor did congressional regard for Indian lands change in 1871. In providing for the settlement of Dakota Territory, Congress in 1872 directed the extinguishment of the interests of Indians in certain lands and the determination of what “compensation ought, in justice and equity, to be made to said bands ... for the extinguishment of whatever title they may have to said lands.” 17 Stat. 281; Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U. S. 55, 59 (1886). The latest indicia of congressional regard for Indian claims is the Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050, § 2 (5), in which not only are claims similar to those of the case at bar to be heard, but “claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity” may be submitted to the Commission with right of judicial review. Congressional and executive action consistent with the prevailing idea of non-coercive, compensated extinguishment of Indian title is clear in the facts of the present case. The Act of 1848 declared a policy of extinguishing Indian claims in Oregon only by treaty. The statute of 1850 put in motion the treaty-making machinery. Respondent tribes were among those with whom treaties were negotiated. In many cases, expected ratification did not follow. In the case of respondent tribes alone have no steps been taken to make amends for the taking of Indian lands pending treaty ratification. To determine now that compensation must be paid is only a fair result. Petitioner would admit liability only if, in addition to clear proof of original Indian title, some act of official “recognition” were shown. Original Indian title would not attain the status of a compensable interest until some definite act of sovereign acknowledgment followed. Apparently petitioner has seized upon language of the Court of Claims in Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934), and from it has fashioned a full-blown concept of “recognized Indian title.” The jurisdictional act in that case authorized suits on “all claims of whatsoever nature, both legal and equitable.” Claims based solely on original Indian title were held to be outside the limits of the act; and unless a treaty or act of Congress recognizing the Indians’ title by right of occupancy were shown, recovery could not be had. A more specific jurisdictional act was deemed necessary to authorize a suit based upon original Indian title alone. Petitioner reads into the Duwamish case far too much. When the first jurisdictional act specifically allowing suit on original Indian title in language identical with that of the 1935 Act later came before the Court of Claims in Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143 (1938), the court clearly recognized the specific directives of the act and denied recovery solely because original Indian title had not been proved. “Recognition” appeared to count only as a possible method of proving Indian title itself, not as a requisite in addition to proof of that title. Furthermore, in the case at bar, the unmistakable language of the Court of Claims stands squarely against the significance petitioner would attach to the Duwamish decision: “The Duwamish case did not hold or intend to hold that an Indian tribe could not recover compensation on the basis of original Indian use and occupancy title as for a taking if the jurisdictional act authorized the bringing of a suit and rendition of judgment for compensation on the basis of such original title.” Alcea Band of Tillamooks v. United States, 103 Ct. Cl. 494, 556, 59 F. Supp. 934 (1945). Authority for petitioner’s position is not found in Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U. S. 335 (1945). The jurisdictional act there limited suits to those claims “arising under or growing out of the treaty of July 2, 1863 . . .” Suits based upon original Indian title were not authorized, but we thought a claim would properly arise under the treaty if it were based upon a taking of land which the treaty had in any way “recognized” or acknowledged as belonging to the Indians. The Court thrice noted that claims based upon original Indian title were not involved, and made no attempt to settle controversies brought under other jurisdictional acts authorizing the litigation of claims arising from the taking of original Indian title. Nor do other cases in this Court lend substance to the dichotomy of “recognized” and “unrecognized” Indian title which petitioner urges. Many cases recite the paramount power of Congress to extinguish the Indian right of occupancy by methods the justice of which “is not open to inquiry in the courts.” United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., supra, at 347. Lacking a jurisdictional act permitting judicial inquiry, such language cannot be questioned where Indians are seeking payment for appropriated lands; but here in the 1935 statute Congress has authorized decision by the courts upon claims arising out of original Indian title. Furthermore, some cases speak of the unlimited power of Congress to deal with those Indian lands which are held by what petitioner would call “recog-nizecT title; yet it cannot be doubted that, given the consent of the United States to be sued, recovery may be had for an involuntary, uncompensated taking of “recognized” title. We think the same rule applicable to a taking of original Indian title. “Whether this tract . . . was properly called a reservation ... or unceded Indian country, ... is a matter of little moment . . . the Indians’ right of occupancy has always been held to be sacred; something not to be taken from him except by his consent, and then upon such consideration as should be agreed upon.” Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 388-89 (1902). Requiring formal acknowledgment of original Indian title as well as proof of that title would nullify the intended consequences of the 1935 Act. The rigors of “recognition,” according to petitioner’s view, would appear to require in every case some definite act of the United States guaranteeing undisturbed, exclusive and perpetual occupancy, which, for example, a treaty or statute could provide. Yet it was the very absence of such acknowledgment which gave rise to the present statute. Congress was quite familiar with the precision advisable when drafting statutes giving jurisdiction to the Court of Claims in Indian cases. In 1925 an act authorizing the litigation of any and all claims of certain Indian tribes was passed. In June, 1934, that act was held, for lack of specificity, not to extend to claims based on original title. The following year Congress passed the present Act, employing the specific language used once before in the Act of 1929, under which Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, supra, arose. The considered attention given to the many ramifications of Indian affairs in the 1930’s suggests that Congress well realized the import of the words used in the jurisdictional act of 1935, and that Congress did not expect respondent tribes to be turned out of court either because congressional power over Indian title was deemed to have no limits or because there was, as was obvious to all, no formal guarantee of perpetual and exclusive possession prior to the taking of respondents’ lands in 1855. Respondents have satisfactorily proved their claim of original Indian title and an involuntary taking thereof. They are entitled to compensation under the jurisdictional act of 1935. The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute. It does not “enable the United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation for them.” United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935). In view of the grounds upon which decision rests, it is not necessary to consider the alternate holding of the court below relative to the 1848 act affording sufficient “recognition” of respondents’ Indian title. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 49 Stat. 801. The pertinent section in full provides: “That jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the Court of Claims with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States by either party, as in other cases, to hear, examine, adjudicate, and render final judgment . . . (b) any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title, claim, or rights in, to, or upon the whole or any part of the lands and their appurtenances occupied by the Indian tribes and bands described in the unratified treaties published in Senate Executive Document Numbered 25, Fifty-third Congress, first session (pp. 8 to 15), at and long prior to the dates thereof, except the Coos Bay, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Tribes, it being the intention of this Act to include all the Indian tribes or bands and their descendants, with the exceptions named, residing in the then Territory of Oregon west of the Cascade Range at and long prior to the dates of the said unratified treaties, some of whom, in 1855, or later, were removed by the military authorities of the United States to the Coast Range, the Grande Ronde, and the Siletz Reservations in said Territory.” The remaining seven plaintiff tribes failed to state a cause of action under the jurisdictional act and the rules of the Court of Claims. “Original Indian title” is used to designate the Indian right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession. 9 Stat. 323. The Act created a territorial government and declared: “That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Territory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the United States and such Indians, or to affect the authority of the government of the United States to make any regulation respecting such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights, by treaty, law, or otherwise, which it would have been competent to the government to make if this act had never passed . . .” 9 Stat. 323. 9 Stat. 437. 28 Stat. 286,323. 28 Stat. 286, 323. In 1851 Dart and Palmer negotiated treaties with nineteen tribes other than respondents. None of these treaties was ratified; but twelve of the nineteen tribes were included in further treaties made in 1853, 1854, and 1855, and Congress in 1897 and 1912 provided for paying the remaining seven tribes for their lands taken under the unratified treaties. 45 Stat. 1256, as amended in respects immaterial here, 47 Stat. 307. Coos Bay Indian Tribe v. United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143 (1938), discussed infra p. 50, arose under the 1929 Act. 46 Stat. 531, amending 44 Stat. 1263. Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 347 (1933) was litigated under this jurisdictional act. United States v. Mille Lac Chippewas, 229 U. S. 498, 500 (1913); The Sac and Fox Indians, 220 U. S. 481, 489 (1911). United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339, 347 (1941), and cases note 27 infra. Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 573-74 (1823). United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339 (1941). Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517 (1877). The “moral” obligation upon Congress, of which the cases speak, refers more to the obligation to open the courts to suit by the Indians. It does not mean that there is no substantive right in the Indians. So in United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U. S. 180, 194 (1894) it was held that, “While there may be a moral obligation on the part of the government to reimburse the money embezzled by the Indian superintendent . . the jurisdictional act in point did not extend to such a claim. Yet, given consent to suit, it would hardly be said that there was no substantive right against the United States for embezzlement of Indian funds. “The practical admission of the European conquerors of this country renders it unnecessary for us to speculate on the extent of that right which they might have asserted from conquest . . . The conquerors have never claimed more than the exclusive right of purchase from the Indians ...” 1 Op. A. G. 465, 466 (1821) (William Wirt). See the analysis in Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1945) 51-66. 16 Stat. 544. 9 Stat. 323, 329, § 14. 43 Stat. 886. Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530, 600 (1934). 45 Stat. 1407. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U. S. 335, 337, 339, 354 (1945). The statements in many cases are directed to disputes between third parties, one of whom attempts to raise a defect in the other’s title by tracing it to a government grant out of Indian territory and attacking the power or the method used by the sovereign to convey Indian lands. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517, 525 (1877); Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 119 U. S. 55, 66 (1886); Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 409 (1842); Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 201 (1839). And in other cases, the issue was not the right of Indian tribes to be compensated for an extinguishment of original Indian title by the United States. Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U. S. 335 (1945); United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339 (1941); Conley v. Ballinger, 216 U. S. 84 (1910); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294 (1902). Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 566 (1903); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517, 525 (1877). The Lone Wolf case was properly assessed in Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476, 497 (1937): “Power to control and manage the property and affairs of Indians in good faith for their betterment and welfare may be exerted in many ways and at times even in derogation of the provisions of a treaty.” See also Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 592 (1922). In Barker v. Harvey, 181 .U. S. 481 (1901), the Indian claims were deemed extinguished by non-presentment to the land commission, and this was true even if the claims had been “recognized” by the Mexican government priol- to the cession of lands to the United States. United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U. S. 119 (1938); Chippewa Indians v. United States, 301 U. S. 358 (1937); Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935). Other cases also draw no distinction between original Indian title and “recognized” Indian title. “The Indian title as against the United States was merely a title and right to the perpetual occupancy of the land with the privilege of using it in such mode as they saw fit until such right of occupation had been surrendered to the government. When Indian reservations were created, either by treaty or executive order, the Indians held the land by the same character of title, to wit, the right to possess and occupy the lands for the uses and purposes designated.” Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S. 394, 403 (1896). Of similar tenor is Conley v. Ballinger, 216 U. S. 84, 90-91 (1910). The older cases explaining and giving substance to the Indian right of occupancy contain no suggestion that only “recognized” Indian title was being considered. Indeed, the inference is quite otherwise. Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711,746 (1835); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 543-48 (1832); Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 573-74 (1823). Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934). 45 Stat. 1256, as amended in respects immaterial here, 47 Stat. 307. “The decade from 1930 to 1939 is as notable in the history of Indian legislation as that of the 1830’s or the 1880's.” Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1945) 83. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478 (1899).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEBER et al. v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC. No. 97. Argued February 2-3, 1955. Decided March 28, 1955. Robert A. Roessel argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Plato E. Papps. David E. Feller argued the cause for the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief was Arthur J. Goldberg. Mark D. Eagleton argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Solicitor General Sobeloff, George J. Bott, David P. Findling and Dominick L. Manoli filed a brief for the National Labor Relations Board, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Me. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. This case grew out of a dispute between petitioner, the International Association of Machinists (IAM), affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and the Millwrights, affiliated with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners (Carpenters), which in turn was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, over millwright work being performed for respondent, each union claiming the work for its own members. Respondent is engaged in the interstate manufacture and sale of beer and other commodities, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Its employees include members of both the IAM and the Carpenters. Respondent has always required a large amount of millwright work to be performed by outside contractors in the expansion of its facilities. After the IAM was certified in 1948 by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of respondent’s machinists, respondent executed a collective bargaining contract with the IAM for 1949 which provided in part that when the repair or replacement of machinery was necessary, this work would be given only to those contractors who had collective agreements with the IAM. As a result of protests from the Carpenters, who claimed the same type of work for their own members, the clause was deleted from the 1950 contract between respondent and the IAM, but it was later reinstated in the 1951 contract. The Carpenters again protested, this time threatening that they would sign no contract with respondent covering those employees who were members of the Carpenters until the clause was deleted from the IAM contract. When the 1951 IAM contract expired and negotiations for a 1952 contract began, respondent refused to agree to the insertion of the clause in the new contract. An impasse was reached in the negotiations, and finally the IAM went on strike. At the time the strike was called, only one contractor was actually engaged in respondent’s millwright work, and the employees of that one contractor were covered by a contract with the IAM. On April 8, 1952, the day after the strike was called, respondent filed a charge of an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Taft-Hartley Act against the IAM. On November 18, 1952, the National Labor Relations Board quashed the notice of a hearing, holding that no “dispute” existed within the meaning of the invoked subsection. The Board reasoned that at the time of the strike, the IAM could not have been requesting the assignment of “particular” work to IAM members, because the IAM was not complaining about the assignment of work by respondent to its own employees, and as to work assigned by respondent’s contractors, (1) the IAM had made no demand on those contractors to give their work to IAM labor, and (2) no millwright work performed by respondent’s contractors at that time was in fact being performed by other than IAM labor. -District No. 9, International Association of Machinists, 101 N. L. R. B. 346. It must be emphasized that the only unfair labor practice charge filed with the Board, and the only one upon which the Board acted, was that prescribed in Subsection (D) of §8 (b)(4). In the meantime, on April 19, 1952, after it had filed the charge with the Board but before the Board had acted upon it, respondent sought an injunction against the IAM in the State Circuit Court in St. Louis. In its complaint, respondent alleged that the strike constituted “a secondary boycott under the common law of the State of Missouri,” and also was in violation of Subsections (A), (B) and (D) of § 8 (b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act and of § 303 (a) (1), (2) and (4) of that same Act. A temporary injunction issued. On April 30, respondent amended its complaint with the additional claim that the IAM’s conduct constituted an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade under Missouri common law and conspiracy statutes. Mo. Rev. Stat., 1949, § 416.010. The temporary injunction was thereupon made permanent on September 30, 1952, some time before the Board, it will be recalled, held that there was no violation of § 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Taft-Hartley Act. This injunction was vacated, but immediately re-entered, on October 3, 1952. The IAM appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court from the Circuit Court’s injunction. That court affirmed the permanent injunction on February 8, 1954, more than a year after the Board found no violation of § 8 (b) (4)(D). The Missouri Supreme Court held that the IAM’s conduct constituted a violation of the State’s restraint of trade statute and as such was enjoinable. It referred to the ruling of the Board as a determination that “no labor dispute existed between these parties and that no unfair labor practices were there involved, and the Board, upon such ruling, quashed the notice of the hearing.” The court then stated: “The cases relied on by the defendants [the IAM] are largely cases involving existing labor disputes and unfair labor practices. We think those cases are not in point.” The court concluded: “A jurisdictional quarrel between two rival labor unions is not a labor dispute within the Norris-LaGuardia Act, . . . the Wagner Act or the Taft-Hartley Act.” 364 Mo. 573, 584, 586, 265 S. W. 2d 325, 332, 333. The State Supreme Court thus treated the Board’s holding as a determination that the allegation on which the injunction issued excluded the basis for a charge of an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act. The principal question that the case raises, whether the state court had jurisdiction to enjoin the IAM’s conduct or whether its jurisdiction had been pre-empted by the authority vested in the National Labor Relations Board, has an importance in the federal-state relations regarding industrial controversies that led us to grant certiorari. 348 U. S. 808. The Court has had numerous occasions to deal with this delicate problem of the interplay between state and federal jurisdiction touching labor relations. It is helpful to a consideration of this latest phase briefly to summarize where our decisions, under both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, have brought us. 1. The Court has ruled that a State may not prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect. Thus, in Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, the State enjoined a labor union from functioning until it had complied with certain statutory requirements. The injunction was invalidated on the ground that the Wagner Act included a “federally established right to collective bargaining” with which the injunction conflicted. International Union v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454, involved the strike-vote provisions of a state act which prohibited the calling of a strike until a specific statutory procedure had been followed. The state act was held to conflict not only with the procedure and other requirements of the Taft-Hartley strike provisions but also with the protection afforded by § 7 of that Act. In Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S. 383, the state court issued an injunction under a statute which made it a misdemeanor to interrupt by strike any essential public utility services. It was held that the state statute was invalid in that it denied a right which Congress had guaranteed under § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act — the right to strike peacefully to enforce union demands for wages, hours and working conditions. Last Term the Court noted in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499, that “The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For., the policy of the national Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.” 2. A State may not enjoin under its own labor statute conduct which has been made an “unfair labor practice” under the federal statutes. Such was the holding in the Garner case, supra. The Court pointed out that exclusive primary jurisdiction to pass on the union’s picketing is delegated by the Taft-Hartley Act to the National Labor Relations Board. See also Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U. S. 953; Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U. S. 933. And in Capital Service, Inc. v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 501, a picket line established at retail stores to induce the organization of a manufacturer’s employees was enjoined by the State as contrary to its public policy. This Court granted a limited certiorari which assumed that exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board. The Board was allowed to obtain an injunction against enforcement of the conflicting state court injunction. 3. The federal Board’s machinery for dealing with certification problems also carries implications of exclusiveness. Thus, a State may not certify a union as the collective bargaining agent for employees where the federal Board, if called upon, would use its own certification procedure. La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 18. The same result is reached even if the federal Board has refused certification, if the employer is subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767. 4. On the other hand, in the following cases the authority which the State exercised was found not to have been exclusively absorbed by the federal enactments. In Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, the State was allowed to enjoin mass picketing, threats of bodily injury and property damage to employees, obstruction of streets and public roads, the blocking of entrance to and egress from a factory, and the picketing of employees’ homes. The Court held that such conduct was not subject to regulation by the federal Board, either by prohibition or by protection. International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 245, involved recurrent, unannounced work stoppages. The Court upheld the state injunction on the ground that such conduct was neither prohibited nor protected by the Taft-Hartley Act and thus was open to state control. The Court allowed a State to forbid enforcement of a maintenance-of-membership clause in a contract between employer and union in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U. S. 301. Since nothing in the Wagner or Taft-Hartley Acts sanctioned or forbade these clauses, they were left to regulation by the State. Finally, United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656, was an action for damages based on violent conduct, which the state court found to be a common-law tort. While assuming that an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act was involved, this Court sustained the state judgment on the theory that there was no compensatory relief under the federal Act and no federal administrative relief with which the state remedy conflicted. We come, then, to the facts in this case. Contrary to the assumption of the Missouri Supreme Court, the Board had not ruled that no unfair labor practice was involved in the conduct by the IAM of which respondent complained. The Board had determined only that there was no violation of Subsection (D) of § 8 (b) (4). That was, in fact, the extent of the ruling it was empowered to make, because (D) was the only subsection alleged to have been violated. In its complaint in the state court, however, respondent broadened its allegations to include violations of Subsections (A) and (B). We do not mean to pass on the question whether the Board, by finding that no violation of (D) was involved, inferentially ruled that other subsections were or were not violated. The point is rather that the Board, and not the state court, is empowered to pass upon such issues in the first instance. If a ruling on (D) necessarily encompassed a ruling on the other subsections, we would have a different case. But the ruling on (D) was based on the finding that no “particular work” was involved— a phrase of (D) that is absent in (A) and (B). Congress has lodged in the Board responsibility for determining in the first instance whether the same considerations apply to (A) or (B) as apply to (D). Nor is it within our competence now to determine whether the conduct in controversy is subject to the authority of Subsections (A) or (B). Under the Board’s decisions, for example, it may become pertinent whether this is eventually deemed primary pressure, directed at respondent to force insertion of the disputed clause in its contract with the IAM, rather than secondary pressure, aimed at subcontractors to force them to use IAM labor. We are not now ruling on that distinction. However, the point is pertinent to our discussion, because even if it were clear that no unfair labor practices were involved, it would not necessarily follow that the State was free to issue its injunction. If this conduct does not fall within the prohibitions of § 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, it may fall within the protection of § 7, as concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. Respondent itself alleged that the union conduct it was seeking to stop came within the prohibitions of the federal Act, and yet it disregarded the Board and obtained relief from a state court. It is perfectly clear that had respondent gone first to a federal court instead of the state court, the federal court would have declined jurisdiction, at least as to the unfair labor practices, on the ground that exclusive primary jurisdiction was in the Board. As pointed out in the Garner case, 346 U. S., at 491, the same considerations apply to the state courts. • The Missouri Supreme Court oversimplified the factual situation when it called this merely a “jurisdictional quarrel between two rival labor unions.” A jurisdictional dispute and a secondary boycott are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as respondent itself showed by alleging, inter alia, that this was a secondary boycott prohibited by Missouri common law. Even the Board has not always been consistent in its interpretations of the various subsections of § 8 (b)(4). Respondent argues that Missouri is not prohibiting the IAM’s conduct for any reason having to do with labor relations but rather because that conduct is in contravention of a state law which deals generally with restraint of trade. It distinguishes Garner on the ground that there the State and Congress were both attempting to regulate labor relations as such. We do not think this distinction is decisive. In Garner the emphasis was not on two conflicting labor statutes but rather on two similar remedies, one state and one federal, brought to bear on precisely the same conduct. And in Capital Service, Inc. v. Labor Board, supra, we did not stop to inquire just what category of “public policy” the union's conduct allegedly violated. Our approach was emphasized in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, Construction Corp., supra, where the violent conduct was reached by a remedy having no parallel in, and not in conflict with, any remedy afforded by the federal Act. Moreover, we must not forget that this case is not clearly one of “unfair labor practices.” Certainly if the conduct is eventually found by the National Labor Relations Board to be protected by the Taft-Hartley Act, the State cannot be heard to say that it is enjoining that conduct for reasons other than those having to do with labor relations. In Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra, the statute was directed at the preservation of public utility services and not at maintenance of sound labor relations, but the State's injunction was reversed. Controlling and therefore superseding federal power cannot be curtailed by the State even though the ground of intervention be different than that on which federal supremacy has been exercised. By the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause. Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed some aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation of economic forces. As to both categories, the areas that have been pre-empted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds. Obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to easy judicial exclusion of state action. Such was the situation in Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra. But as the opinion in that case recalled, the Labor Management Relations Act “leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.” 346 U. S., at 488. This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of litigation. Regarding the conduct here in controversy, Congress has sufficiently expressed its purpose to bring it within federal oversight and to exclude state prohibition, even though that with which the federal law is concerned as a matter of labor relations be related by the State to the more inclusive area of restraint of trade. We realize that it is not easy for a state court to decide, merely on the basis of a complaint and answer, whether the subject matter is the concern exclusively of the federal Board and withdrawn from the State. This is particularly true in a case like this where the rulings of the Board are not wholly consistent on the meaning of the sections outlawing “unfair labor practices,” and where the area of free “concerted activities” has not been clearly bounded. But where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance. The state decree granting the permanent injunction found that “Defendants’ [IAM’s] picket line was so placed and maintained that it prevented the movement of railroad cars into and out of plaintiff’s [respondent’s] premises by a common carrier without danger of physical injury to the pickets, and movement of the cars was stopped for that reason.” The Missouri Supreme Court stated that “the transportation into and out of the plant was stopped ‘because it endangered their [presumably the pickets’] lives and limbs’; . . . .” 364 Mo., at 581, 265 S. W. 2d, at 330. We do not read this as an unambiguous determination that the IAM’s conduct amounted to the kind of mass picketing and overt threats of violence which under the Allen-Bradley Local case give the state court jurisdiction. It does not preclude the conclusion that the transportation was stopped for fear of crossing an otherwise peaceful picket line. In any event, the state injunction enjoined all picketing. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 61Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (D). The subsection is quoted in footnote 2, infra. “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; . . . (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work . . . .” 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4) (A), (B) and (D). “(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is— “(1) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; “(2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act ; “(4) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the National Labor Relations Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work. . . .” 61 Stat. 158, 29 U. S. C. § 187 (a)(1), (2) and (4). In view of the questions involving unfair labor practices and protected activity which are present in this case, it is not necessary to discuss the possible effect on state jurisdiction of §303 (a)(1), (2) and (4). Section 7 provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).” 61 Stat. 140,29 U. S. C. § 157. The complaint in the state court charged the defendant unions with engaging in “an unlawful conspiracy combination and agreement, contrary to the common law of the State of California and contrary to the provisions of the Cartwright Act (Stats. 1907, p. 1835, Ch. 530), now constituting Chapter 2 of Part 2, Division 7, of the Business and Professions Code, sections 16720, et seq., to create and carry out restrictions in trade and commerce and to prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transporting, selling and purchasing of bakery products as hereinafter set forth.” The state court, however, reasoned that primary picketing was as much a combination in restraint of trade as secondary picketing, and primary picketing had been held legal by numerous state decisions. The court instead enjoined the conduct on the ground that "secondary picketing is contrary to the public policy of this state. . , .” Capital Service, Inc. v. Bakery Drivers Local Union, Civil No. 595892, Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles. The Court granted certiorari limited to the following question, propounded by the Court: “In view of the fact that exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485), could the Federal District Court, on application of the Board, enjoin Petitioners from enforcing an injunction already obtained from the State Court?” 346 U. S. 936. Cf., e. g., Reilly Cartage Co., 110 N. L. R. B., No. 233; Oil Workers International Union, 84 N. L. R. B. 315; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 84 N. L. R. B. 360, rev'd sub nom. International Rice Milling Co. v. Labor Board, 183 F. 2d 21, rev’d 341 U. S. 665. See, e. g., Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F. 2d 183, 188-190; Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ International Union v. National Biscuit Co., 177 F. 2d 684; see also Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 491. The Missouri Supreme Court relied upon Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, for the proposition that a state court retains jurisdiction over this type of suit. But Giboney was concerned solely with whether the State’s injunction against picketing violated the Fourteenth Amendment. No question of federal preemption was before the Court; accordingly, it was not dealt with in the opinion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JABEN v. UNITED STATES. No. 347. Argued March 9, 1965. Decided May 17, 1965. Morris A. Shenker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Bernard J. Mellman and Emanuel Shapiro. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Bruce J. Terris, Joseph M. Howard and Norman Sepenuk. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The statute of limitations on the felony of willfully attempting to evade federal income taxes requires the Government to obtain an indictment for that offense within six years of the date of its commission, with the proviso: “. . . Where a complaint is instituted before a commissioner of the United States within the period above limited, the time shall be extended until the date which is 9 months after the date of the making of the complaint before the commissioner of the United States. . . .” Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 6531. On April 15, 1963, the day before the six-year period was to expire, the Government filed a complaint against petitioner Jaben charging him with willfully filing a false return for the year 1956. The Commissioner determined that the complaint showed probable cause for believing that Jaben had committed the offense, and, at the Government’s request, issued a summons ordering Jaben to appear at a preliminary hearing on May 15, 1963. On May 11, 1963, the preliminary hearing on the complaint was continued to May 22, 1963, at the request of the United States Attorney, and without objection by petitioner. The preliminary hearing was never held since, on May 17, 1963, the grand jury superseded the complaint procedure by returning an indictment against Jaben, one count of which covered the 1956 attempted evasion which the complaint had charged. The indictment was not returned within the normal six-year limitation period, but if the complaint filed with the Commissioner was valid for the purpose of bringing the nine-month extension into play, then the indictment was timely. Jaben moved to dismiss the count of the indictment pertaining to 1956, arguing that the complaint was insufficient because it did not show probable cause for believing that he had committed the offense. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this claim, 333 F. 2d 535. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 878, to resolve a conflict with United States v. Greenberg, 320 F. 2d 467, decided by the Ninth Circuit, in which an identical claim, based on a virtually identical complaint, was accepted. For reasons that follow we agree with the Eighth Circuit and affirm its judgment. I. Under the Government’s interpretation of § 6531, probable cause is not relevant to the complaint’s ability to initiate the extension of the limitation period. Section 6531 provides that the nine-month extension is brought into play “[w]here a complaint is instituted before a commissioner of the United States” within the six-year period of limitations (supra, pp. 215-216). Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure defines a complaint as “. . . a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It shall be made upon oath before a commissioner or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the United States.” Since the Government’s complaint stated the essential facts constituting the offense of attempted tax evasion and was made upon oath before a Commissioner, the Government contends that regardless of the complaint’s adequacy for any other purposes, it was valid for the purpose of triggering the nine-month extension of the limitation period whether or not it showed probable cause. The Government would, thus, totally ignore the further steps in the complaint procedure required by Rules 4 and 5. Indeed it follows from its position that once having filed a complaint, the Government need not further pursue the complaint procedure at all, and, in the event that the defendant pressed for a preliminary hearing and obtained a dismissal of the complaint, that the Government could nonetheless rely upon the complaint as having extended the limitation period. We do not accept the Government’s interpretation. Its effort to look solely to Rule 3 and ignore the requirements of the Rules that follow would deprive the institution of the complaint before the Commissioner of any independent meaning which might rationally have led Congress to fasten upon it as the method for initiating the nine-month extension. The Commissioner’s function, on that view, would be merely to rubber-stamp the complaint. The Government seeks to give his role importance in its version of § 6531 by pointing out that he would administer the oath, receive the complaint, and make sure that it stated facts constituting the offense (a requirement which would be met by a charge in the words of the statute); but surely these matters are essentially formalities. The argument ignores the fact that the Commissioner’s basic functions under the Rules are to make the judgment that probable cause exists and to warn defendants of their rights. Furthermore, if we do not look beyond Rule 3, there is no provision for notifying the defendant that he has been charged and the period of limitations extended. (Indeed, it is not until we reach Rule 4 that we find a requirement that the complaint must show who it was that committed the offense.) Notice to a criminal defendant is usually achieved by service upon him of the summons or arrest warrant provided for in Rule 4. Neither is appropriate absent a judgment by the Commissioner that the complaint shows probable cause, and no other form of notice is specified by the Rules. More basically, the evident statutory purpose of the nine-month extension provision is to afford the Government an opportunity to indict criminal tax offenders in the event that a grand jury is not in session at the end of the normal limitation period. This is confirmed by the immediate precursor of the present section which provided for an extension “until the discharge of the grand jury at its next session within the district.” I. R. C. 1939, § 3748 (a). Clearly the statute was not meant to grant the Government greater time in which to make its case (a result which could have been accomplished simply by making the normal period of limitation six years and nine months), but rather was intended to deal with the situation in which the Government has its case made within the normal limitation period but cannot obtain an indictment because of the grand jury schedule. The Government’s interpretation does not reflect this statutory intention, for it provides no safeguard whatever to prevent the Government from filing a complaint at a time when it does not have its case made, and then using the nine-month period to make it. The better view of § 6531 is that the complaint, to initiate the time extension, must be adequate to begin effectively the criminal process prescribed by the Federal Criminal Rules. It must be sufficient to justify the next steps in the process — those of notifying the defendant and bringing him before the Commissioner for a preliminary hearing. To do so the complaint must satisfy the probable cause requirement of Rule 4. Furthermore, we think that the Government must proceed through the further steps of the complaint procedure by affording the defendant a preliminary hearing as required by Rule 5, unless before the preliminary hearing is held, the grand jury supersedes the complaint procedure by returning an indictment. This interpretation of the statute reflects its purpose by insuring that within a reasonable time following the filing of the complaint, either the Commissioner will decide whether there is sufficient cause to bind the defendant over for grand jury action, or the grand jury itself will have decided whether or not to indict. A dismissal of the complaint before the indictment is returned would vitiate the time extension. In this case the Government obtained a superseding indictment before any preliminary hearing took place. Under the interpretation which we have adopted it follows that if the complaint satisfied the requirements of Rules 3 and 4, in particular the probable cause standard of Rule 4, then the nine-month extension had come into play and had not been cut off by any later dismissal of the complaint. We turn then to the question whether the complaint showed probable cause. II. The Jaben complaint read as follows: “The undersigned complainant, being duly sworn, states: “That he is a Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service and, in the performance of the duties imposed on him by law, he has conducted an investigation of the Federal income tax liability of Max Jaben for the calendar year 1956, by examining the said taxpayer’s tax return for the year 1956 and other years; by identifying and interviewing third parties with whom the said taxpayer did business; by consulting public and private records reflecting the said taxpayer’s income; and by interviewing third persons having knowledge of the said taxpayer’s financial condition. “That based on the aforesaid investigation, the complainant has personal knowledge that on or about the 16th day of April, 1957, at Kansas City, Missouri, in the Western District of Missouri, Max Jaben did unlawfully and wilfully attempt to evade and defeat the income taxes due and owing by him to the United States of America for the calendar year 1956, by filing and causing to be filed with the District Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Kansas City, Missouri, at Kansas City, Missouri, a false and fraudulent income tax return, wherein he stated that his taxable income for the calendar year 1956 was $17,665.31, and that the amount of tax due and owing thereon was the sum of $6,017.32, when in fact his taxable income for the said calendar year was the sum of $40,001.76 upon which said taxable income he owed to the United States of America an income tax of $14,562.99. “[Signed] David A. Thompson “Special Agent “Internal Revenue Service “Kansas City, Missouri.” Petitioner argues that the complaint is basically indistinguishable from that which the Court found wanting in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480. The Giordenello complaint read in relevant part: “The undersigned complainant being duly sworn states: That on or about January 26, 1956, at Houston, Texas in the Southern District of Texas, Veto Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, to-wit: heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importation; in violation of Section 174, Title 21, United States' Code. “And the complainant further states that he believes that- are material witnesses in relation to this charge.” The complaints there and here are materially distinguishable. Information in a complaint alleging the commission of a crime falls into two categories: (1) that information which, if true, would directly indicate commission of the crime charged, and (2) that which relates to the source of the directly incriminating information. The Giordenello complaint gave no source information whatsoever. Its directly incriminating information consisted merely of an allegation in the words of the statute, and even then incomplete, supplemented by “on or about January 26, 1956, at Houston.” If the Jaben complaint were as barren, it would have stated simply that “on or about April 16, 1957, at Kansas City, Missouri, Jaben willfully filed a false income tax return.” In fact, it gave dollars-and-cents figures for the amounts which allegedly should have been returned and the amounts actually returned. As to sources, the affiant indicated that he, in his official capacity, had personally conducted an investigation in the course of which he had examined the taxpayer’s returns for 1956 and other years, interviewed third persons with whom the taxpayer did business and others having knowledge of his financial condition, and consulted public and private records reflecting the taxpayer’s income; and that the conclusion that Jaben had committed the offense was based upon this investigation. Beyond the substance of the complaint there is a material distinction in the nature of the offense charged. Some offenses are subject to putative establishment by blunt and concise factual allegations, e. g., “A saw narcotics in B’s possession,” whereas “A saw B file a false tax return” does not mean very much in a tax evasion case. Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion has been committed often requires a reconstruction of the taxpayer’s income from many individually unrevealing facts which are not susceptible of a concise statement in a complaint. Furthermore, unlike narcotics informants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect, the sources in this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy information. Thus, whereas some supporting information concerning the credibility of informants in narcotics cases or other common garden varieties of crime may be required, such information is not so necessary in the context of the case before us. Giordenello v. United States, supra, and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, established that a magistrate is intended to make a neutral judgment that resort to further criminal process is justified. A complaint must provide a foundation for that judgment. It must provide the affiant’s answer to the magistrate’s hypothetical question, “What makes you think that the defendant committed the offense charged?” This does not reflect a requirement that the Commissioner ignore the credibility of the complaining witness. There is a difference between disbelieving the affiant and requiring him to indicate some basis for his allegations. Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some degree of reliance upon the credibility of the source. See, e. g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13. Nor does it indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. Compare United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102. It simply requires that enough information be presented to the Commissioner to enable him to make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal process. In this instance the issue of probable cause comes down to the adequacy of the basis given for the allegation that petitioner’s income was $40,001.76 instead of the $17,665.31 he had reported. This is not the type of fact that can be physically observed. The amount of petitioner’s income could only be determined by examining records and interviewing third persons familiar with petitioner’s financial condition. Compare Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121. Here the affiant, a Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, swore that he had conducted just such an investigation and thereafter swore that he had personal knowledge as to petitioner’s actual income. In such circumstances, the magistrate would be justified in accepting the agent’s judgment of what he “saw” without requiring him to bring the records and persons to court, to list and total the items of unreported income or to otherwise explain how petitioner’s actual income was calculated. We conclude that the challenged count of this indictment is not time-barred. Affirmed. Rule 4 (a) provides: “If it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it. Upon the request of the attorney for the government a summons instead of a warrant shall issue. ... If a defendant fails to appear in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue.” Rule 5 (c) provides: “. . . If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. . . .” This provision was introduced into the tax laws in 1884 by way of an amendment to a bill providing for a limitation period. In proposing the amendment on the floor of the Senate, Senator Hoar stated: “As has already been said, this limitation which purports to be a limitation of two years is in point of fact in many districts but a limitation of one year, because the indictment must be found by a grand jury within two years within the commission of the offense. If the offense be concealed, or if it be discovered a year before the grand jury meet, it would be too late to make the prosecution. I move this amendment: “ ‘Provided, That where a complaint shall be instituted before a commissioner of the United States within the period above limited, the period shall be extended until the discharge of the grand jury at its next session within the district.’ “I think there will be no objection to that.” 15 Cong. Rec. 5771. The time for which the period was extended was changed to nine months in 1954. A dissenting opinion accepts our interpretation of the statute, but, likening petitioner’s position to one who is incarcerated awaiting a preliminary hearing, argues that petitioner was not scheduled to have a preliminary hearing within the “reasonable time” required by Rule 5 (c). We reject this view of the case. (1) Although the statute should be interpreted to reflect its intent, it greatly overplays that intent to invest the procedure required to effectuate it with the same sense of urgency which might be thought to attend a preliminary hearing for an incarcerated prisoner. (2) A defendant can fully protect himself from unreasonable delay by moving for advancement of the preliminary hearing date and by objecting to any postponements. Petitioner made no such motion or objection, and at no point in the trial or appellate review of this case has he objected to the scheduling of the preliminary hearing. Mallory v. United, States, 354 U. S. 449, did not deal with preliminary hearings under Rule 5 (c), but with the requirement of Rule 5 (a) that a person who is arrested must be taken “without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner” so that he can be apprised of his rights. So in original.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RICE et al. v. BOARD OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO. NO. 471. Argued February 14,1947. — Decided May 5, 1947. Lee A. Freeman argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 471. William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 473. With him on the brief was George F. Barrett, Attorney General. Howard Ellis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Weymouth Kirkland. Acting Solicitor General Washington, Assistant Attorney General Berge, Robert C. Barnard, W. Carroll Hunter and Lewis A. Sigler filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas, announced by Mr. Justice Black. These are companion cases to Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. and Illinois Commerce Commission v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., ante, p. 218, decided this day. Respondent in these cases, the Chicago Board of Trade, was joined as a defendant in the proceeding brought by Rice before the Illinois Commerce Commission. As we have noted in our opinion in the companion cases, the Rice complaint charged the defendant ware-housemen with maintaining excessive, unreasonable and discriminatory rates and practices, with operating inadequate and unsafe facilities and services, and with failure to comply with other requirements of Illinois law. The Board of Trade, organized under a special Act of the Illinois legislature, operates a commercial grain exchange and has adopted rules and regulations governing transactions on the exchange. The complaint of Rice charges (1) that the rules and regulations of the Board are unreasonable and unsatisfactory in that, among other things, they favor warehousemen and sellers of grain and discriminate against grain buyers; and (2) that the Board has from time to time adopted rules and regulations, relating to the warehousing of grain in public warehouses and the custody of grain in private warehouses without securing the prior approval of the Illinois Commission. Under Illinois law, it is alleged, such rules may not become operative without approval by the Commission; and the Commission in turn has authority to adopt and promulgate rules of its own. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 114, § 194b. Relief asked on this phase of the proceeding was a declaration that the Board’s rules, which did not have the prior approval of the Commission, were void; and an order that the Board adopt and submit rules which were fair, equitable, adequate and specific. The Board moved to dismiss the proceeding before the Commission on the ground that the Commodity Exchange Act, 49 Stat. 1491, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and the regulations thereunder superseded the provisions of Illinois law which Rice sought to invoke. That motion was denied. Thereupon, these suits were instituted in the District Court to enjoin the proceedings before the Illinois Commerce Commission. The District Court dismissed the complaints. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 156 F. 2d 33. The cases are here on certiorari. The Chicago Board of Trade is “the greatest grain market in the world.” Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 33. Its activities have been regulated by Congress by the Future Trading Act, 42 Stat. 187, by the Grain Futures Act, 42 Stat. 998, and by the Commodity Exchange Act. See H. R. Rep. No. 421, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. The Board of Trade claims a status under the Commodity Exchange Act which, it is contended, precludes the Illinois Commission from entertaining the Rice complaint. The Commodity Exchange Act provides comprehensive regulation of trading in futures on commodity exchanges which are designated as “contract markets” by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Secretary is authorized to designate any board of trade as a contract market on its compliance with prescribed terms and conditions. § 5. The Chicago Board of Trade has been so designated. The Act contemplates that each contract market will adopt rules governing transactions in futures contracts. Approval of a board of trade as a contract market may be made only when “the governing board thereof provides for the prevention of manipulation of prices and the cornering of any commodity by the dealers or operators upon such board.” § 5 (d). The Act contains provisions which prohibit certain types of trading practices (see for example §§ 4b, 4c, 4h) and other provisions (as for example those dealing with excessive speculation, see § 4a) which limit or control buying and selling on contract markets. But we are not particularly concerned with those phases of the federal regulatory scheme. So far as the problem of supersedure is concerned, this Act is unlike the one considered in the companion cases, as we shall see. Moreover, the subject matter of the complaint filed by Rice with the Illinois Commission against the Board of Trade relates only to the warehousing of grain. On that matter the Act has only two specific provisions. It provides in the first place that receipts issued under the United States Warehouse Act, 39 Stat. 486, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 241 et seq., shall be accepted without discrimination in satisfaction of futures contracts made on or subject to the rules of the contract market, even though the warehouseman is not also licensed under state law or enjoys different privileges than those accorded by state law, provided inter alia, that “the warehouse in which the commodity is stored meets such reasonable requirements as may be imposed by such contract market on other warehouses as to location, accessibility, and suitability for warehousing and delivery purposes.” § 5a (7). Moreover, each contract market has some control over warehouses in which or out of which any commodity is deliverable on any contract for future delivery made on or subject to the rules of the contract market. Thus the contract market must require the warehouse operators “to make such reports, keep such records, and permit such warehouse visitation” as the Secretary may prescribe. § 5a (3). All rules and regulations of a contract market, and all changes and proposed changes, must be filed with the Secretary. § 5a (1). Enough of the Act has been summarized to show that it imposes on contract markets, under the supervision of the Secretary, (1) duties of preventing or controlling certain trading practices and of supervising transactions in futures contracts, and (2) some responsibility for standardizing deliverable warehouse receipts and assuring their integrity. The failure or refusal of a board of trade to comply with the provisions of the Act or any of the rules and regulations of the Secretary is cause for suspension or revocation of the authority of the board to act as a contract market. § 5b. And see § 6 (a). Criminal penalties are provided for certain violations of the Act, or of rules or regulations of the Secretary, by a board of trade or any of its directors, officers, agents or employees. § § 6b, 9. The Secretary has the power to “make such investigations as he may deem necessary to ascertain the facts regarding the operations of boards of trade . . . .” § 8. And the Secretary is given broad rule-making powers. § 8a (5). The Secretary has promulgated numerous rules and regulations covering a variety of subjects pertaining to contract markets and their activities. The following are relevant here, since they relate to the warehousing of grain: (1) a requirement that each contract market file information concerning warehouses in which or out of which commodities are deliverable in satisfaction of futures contracts made on the contract market, § 1.43; and (2) a provision that each contract market shall require operators of warehouses whose receipts are deliverable in satisfaction of futures contracts made on or subject to the rules of the contract market (a) to keep specified records, (b) to furnish information concerning stocks of commodities in warehouses, (c) to permit visitation of the premises and inspection of the books and records by duly authorized representatives of the Federal Government. § 1.44. In pursuance of the latter regulation of the Secretary, the Board of Trade enacted the rules and regulations which Rice challenged in the proceedings before the Illinois Commission. One rule provides that deliveries shall be made by delivery of warehouse receipts issued by warehouses which have been declared “regular” by the Board. Rule 281. The Board’s regulations relating to warehousing of grain set forth the procedure and standards by which warehouses may be made “regular.” It is apparent that the federal scheme of regulation of futures trading extends to the whole futures contract— to its satisfaction, as well as to its execution. It is also apparent that the Act provides some control over (1) warehouse receipts which are acceptable in satisfaction of sales and purchases on the contract market, and (2) the qualifications of the warehouses whose receipts will be accepted for such deliveries. But there is not contained in the Commodity Exchange Act, as there is in the United States Warehouse Act, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, a declaration by Congress that the system which it has adopted for the regulation of trading on contract markets is exclusive of state regulation. Here Congress has gone no further than to write into the Act prohibitions and controls and to give the force of law both to them and to rules and regulations of the Secretary made within the scope of his statutory authority. With exceptions which we will note, state regulations which conflict with the requirements of the Act or with the rules and regulations of the Secretary would be superseded under the familiar rule. Congress treated the rules and regulations of the Board of Trade differently from those of the Secretary. It did not undertake to put behind them civil or criminal sanctions. It merely furnished standards (or authorized the Secretary to do so) to which the rules and regulations of the Board were to conform. And while there is provision in some instances for disapproval of the Board’s rules by the Secretary of Agriculture (see § 4c), there is no provision for his approval or disapproval of the rules challenged in the Illinois proceeding. Insofar as those rules are concerned, all that the Act and the regulations of the Secretary do is to define the area in which the Board may provide standards for warehouses whose receipts are acceptable in satisfaction of futures contracts. By the terms of § 5a (7) the requirements fixed by the Board must be “reasonable” and they must relate to “location, accessibility, and suitability for warehousing and delivery purposes.” If the Board transcends those bounds, it violates the Act. See § 6b. But within that area it has considerable discretion. Hence it seems to us that no action of the Illinois Commission within the zone where the Board has freedom to act would contravene the federal scheme of regulation. It would be quite a different matter if the Illinois Commission adopted rules for the Board which either violated the standards of the Act or collided with rules of the Secretary. But such collision is not necessary; and we cannot assume that the Illinois Commission will take any action which in any way impairs the federal regulatory scheme. There is other intrinsic evidence that Congress did not preclude state regulation which supplements or bolsters the federal scheme. Sections 4b and 4c of the Act make unlawful a variety of fraudulent and deceptive practices on contract markets. And § 4c provides that “nothing in this section or section 4b shall be construed to impair any State law applicable to any transaction enumerated or described in such sections.” These fraudulent practices, or many of them, have long been the occasion for the exercise by the States of their historic police powers. Federal regulation in those fields would therefore almost certainly conflict with state laws. Thus the provision in § 4c serves the function of preventing supersedure and preserving state control in two areas where state and federal law overlap. Where Congress used such care to preserve specific state authority, even when it duplicated federal regulation, it is a fair inference not only that supersedure was to take its natural course where rights not saved to the States were involved, First Iowa HydroElectric Coop. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, 175, but also that non-conflicting state authority was left undisturbed. Moreover the provision in § 12 of the Act that the Secretary “may cooperate with any department or agency of the Government, any State ... or political subdivision thereof” supports the inference that Congress did not design a regulatory system which excluded state regulation not in conflict with the federal requirements. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 454; Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, 209. Respondents’ claim of supersedure is, therefore, premature. Until it is known what rules the Illinois Commission will approve or adopt, it cannot be known whether there will be any conflict with the federal law. Any claim of supersedure can be preserved in the state proceedings. And the question of supersedure can be determined in light of the impact of a specific order of the state agency on the Federal Act or the regulations of the Secretary thereunder. Only if that procedure is followed can there be preserved intact the whole state domain which in actuality functions harmoniously with the federal system. For even action which seems pregnant with possibilities of conflict may, as consummated, be wholly barren of it. Reversed. That section provides: “No rule or regulation of any board of trade or grain exchange which relates to the warehousing of grain in any public grain warehouse, or which relates to the custody of grain in any private warehouse, or the use or negotiation of custodian’s receipts for such grain, shall be or become operative until such rule or regulation is approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Illinois Commerce Commission may adopt and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations consistent with the provisions of this Act for the purpose of making this Act effective.” The rules and regulations are to be found in 17 C. F. R., Part 1. These regulations provide, inter alia, that the warehouses must be “conveniently approachable by vessels of ordinary draft,” have “customary shipping facilities,” and charge rates not exceeding a specified maximum (Reg. 1620); must file a bond satisfactory to the Board (Reg. 1621); must have proprietors or managers in “unquestioned good financial standing and credit” (Reg. 1624); must be “connected by railroad tracks with one or more of the eastern railway lines” (Reg. 1625); and must be “provided with modern improvements and appliances for the convenient and expeditious receiving, handling, and shipping of grain in bulk.” (Reg. 1626.) Any “regular” warehouse may be declared “irregular” by the Board at any time for violation of the laws of Illinois or the rules and regulations of the Board (Reg. 1623), or because of any important change in the conditions of any warehouse or disregard or evasion of the requirements governing regular warehouses (Reg. 1629). We therefore have no attempt here to endow private groups with law-making functions. Cf. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 225-227; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 350-352. In the present proceeding the question of the validity of the existing rules and regulations of the Board of Trade under the Commodity Exchange Act is not in issue, and we intimate no opinion upon it. It is suggested that the regulations of the Board of Trade or those which the Illinois Commerce Commission may impose on it are automatically invalid insofar as they relate to warehouses. For in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra, we have held that the United States Warehouse Act excludes all state regulation, no matter how complementary, of those subjects touched by the federal regulatory scheme. But the situation here is quite different. In the first place, we are dealing with a measure of regulation over warehouse receipts not federal warehousemen; and the regulations which the Board of Trade is authorized to formulate do not carry civil or criminal sanctions. In the second place, Congress by granting the Board of Trade freedom to regulate within this narrow field has by that very act negatived any inference that the Federal Government has preempted it by requirements of its own.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

O’BANNON, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TOWN COURT NURSING CENTER et al. No. 78-1318. Argued November 6, 1979 Decided June 23, 1980 SteveNS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. BlackmuN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 790. BrenNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 805. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Norman J. Watkins, Special Deputy Attorney General of Pennsylvania, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Edward G. Biester, Jr. Richard A. Allen argued the cause for the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, respondent under this Court’s Rule 21 (4), in support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, and William Ranter. Nathan L. Posner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were William F. Coyle, Jeffrey B. Albert, and Abraham C. Reich Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Michael H. Mar cus, Gary Roberts, John L. Carroll, and Morris Dees for Jill Harris et al.; by Kalman Finkel, John E. Kirklin, and Philip M. Gassel for the Legal Aid Society of New York City et al.; and by Toby S. Edelman and Edward C. King for the National Citizens’ Coalition for Nursing Home Reform. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether approximately 180 elderly residents of a nursing home operated by Town Court Nursing Center, Inc., have a constitutional right to a hearing before a state or federal agency may revoke the home’s authority to provide them with nursing care at government expense. Although we recognize that such a revocation may be harmful to some patients, we hold that they have no constitutional right to participate in the revocation proceedings. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. (Town Court), operates a 198-bed nursing home in Philadelphia, Pa. In April 1976 it was certified by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) as a “skilled nursing facility,” thereby becoming eligible to receive payments from HEW and from the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), for providing nursing care services to aged, disabled, and poor persons in need of medical care. After receiving its certification, Town Court entered into formal “provider agreements” with both HEW and DPW. In those agreements HEW and DPW agreed to reimburse Town Court for a period of one year for care provided to persons eligible for Medicare or Medicaid benefits under the Social Security Act, on the condition that Town Court continue to qualify as a skilled nursing facility. On May 17, 1977, HEW notified Town Court that it no longer met the statutory and regulatory standards for skilled nursing facilities and that, consequently, its Medicare provider agreement would not be renewed. The HEW notice stated that no payments would be made for services rendered after July 17, 1977, explained how Town Court might request reconsideration of the decertification decision, and directed it to notify Medicare beneficiaries that payments were being discontinued. Three days later DPW notified Town Court that its Medicaid provider agreement would also not be renewed. Town Court requested HEW to reconsider its termination decision. While the request was pending, Town Court and six of its Medicaid patients filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that both the nursing home and the patients were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the decer-tification decision before the Medicaid payments were discontinued. The complaint alleged that termination of the payments would require Town Court to close and would cause the individual plaintiffs to suffer both a loss of benefits and “immediate and irreparable psychological and physical harm.” App. 11a. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against DPW and HEW, requiring payments to be continued for new patients as well as for patients already in the home and prohibiting any patient transfers until HEW acted on Town Court’s petition for reconsideration. After HEW denied that petition, the District Court dissolved the injunction and denied the plaintiffs any further relief, except that it required HEW and DPW to pay for services actually provided to patients. Town Court and the six patients filed separate appeals from the denial of the preliminary injunction, as well as a motion, which was subsequently granted, for reinstatement of the injunction pending appeal. The Secretary of HEW cross-appealed from the portion of the District Court’s order requiring payment for services rendered after the effective date of the termination. The Secretary of DPW took no appeal and, though named as an appellee, took no position on the merits. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held that there was no constitutional defect in the HEW procedures that denied Town Court an evidentiary hearing until after the termination had become effective and the agency had ceased paying benefits. The Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion, however, with respect to the patients’ claim to a constitutional right to a pretermination hearing. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F. 2d 280 (1978). Relying on the reasoning of Klein v. Califano, 586 F. 2d 250 (CA3 1978) (en banc), decided the same day, a majority of the court concluded that the patients had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued residence at Town Court that gave them a right to a pretermination hearing. In Klein the court identified three Medicaid provisions — a statute giving Medicaid recipients the right to obtain services from any qualified facility, a regulation prohibiting certified facilities from transferring or discharging a patient except for certain specified reasons, and a regulation prohibiting the reduction or termination of financial assistance without a hearing — which, in its view, created a “legitimate entitlement to continued residency at the home of one’s choice absent specific cause for transfer.” Id., at 258. It then cited the general due process maxim that, whenever a governmental benefit may be withdrawn only for cause, the recipient is entitled to a hearing as to the existence of such cause. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11. Finally, it held that, since the inevitable consequence of decertifying a facility is the transfer of all its residents receiving Medicaid benefits, a decision to decertify should be treated as a decision to transfer, thus triggering the patients’ right to a hearing on the issue of whether there is adequate cause for the transfer. Applying this reasoning in Town Court, six judges held that the patients were entitled to a pretermination hearing on the issue of whether Town Court’s Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements should be renewed. The court thus reinstated that portion of the preliminary injunction that prohibited patient transfers until after the patients had been granted a hearing and affirmed that portion that required HEW and DPW to continue paying benefits on behalf of Town Court residents. It then remanded, leaving the nature of the hearing to be accorded the patients to be determined, in the first instance, by the District Court. Three judges dissented, concluding that neither the statutes nor the regulations granted the patients any substantive interest in decertification proceedings and that they had no constitutionally protected property right in uninterrupted occupancy. The Secretary of DPW filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. 441 U. S. 904. We now reverse, essentially for the reasons stated by Chief Judge Seitz in his dissent. At the outset, it is important to remember that this case does not involve the question whether HEW or DPW should, as a matter of administrative efficiency, consult the residents of a nursing home before making a final decision to decertify it. Rather, the question is whether the patients have an interest in receiving benefits for care in a particular facility that entitles them, as a matter of constitutional law, to a hearing before the Government can decertify that facility. The patients have identified two possible sources of such a right. First, they contend that the Medicaid provisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals give them a property right to remain in the home of their choice absent good cause for transfer and therefore entitle them to a hearing on whether such cause exists. Second, they argue that a transfer may have such severe physical or emotional side effects that it is tantamount to a deprivation of life or liberty, which must be preceded by a due process hearing. We find both arguments unpersuasive. Whether viewed singly or in combination, the Medicaid provisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals do not confer a right to continued residence in the home of one’s choice. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (23) (1976 ed., Supp. II) gives recipients the right to choose among a range of qualified providers, without government interference. By implication, it also confers an absolute right to be free from government interference with the choice to remain in a home that continues to be qualified. But it clearly does not confer a right on a recipient to enter an unqualified home and demand a hearing to certify it, nor does it confer a right on a recipient to continue to receive benefits for care in a home that has been decertified. Second, although the regulations do protect patients by limiting the circumstances under which a home may transfer or discharge a Medicaid recipient, they do not purport to limit the Government’s right to make a transfer necessary by decertifying a facility. Finally, since decerti-fication does not reduce or terminate a patient's financial assistance, but merely requires him to use it for care at a different facility, regulations granting recipients the right to a hearing prior to a reduction in financial benefits are irrelevant. In holding that these provisions create a substantive right to remain in the home of one's choice absent specific cause for transfer, the Court of Appeals failed to give proper weight to the contours of the right conferred by the statutes and regulations. As indicated above, while a patient has a right to continued benefits to pay for care in the qualified institution of his choice, he has no enforceable expectation of continued benefits to pay for care in an institution that has been determined to be unqualified. The Court of Appeals also erred in treating the Government’s decision to decertify Town Court as if it were equivalent in every respect to a decision to transfer an individual patient. Although decertification will inevitably necessitate the transfer of all those patients who remain dependent on Medicaid benefits, it is not the same for purposes of due process analysis as a decision to transfer a particular patient or to deny him financial benefits, based on his individual needs or financial situation. In the Medicare and the Medicaid Programs the Government has provided needy patients with both direct benefits and indirect benefits. The direct benefits are essentially financial in character; the Government pays for certain medical services and provides procedures to determine whether and how much money should be paid for patient care. The net effect of these direct benefits is to give the patients an opportunity to obtain medical services from providers of their choice that is comparable, if not exactly equal, to the opportunity available to persons who are financially independent. The Government cannot withdraw these direct benefits without giving the patients notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the issue of their eligibility for benefits. This case does not involve the withdrawal of direct benefits. Rather, it involves the Government’s attempt to confer an indirect benefit on Medicaid patients by imposing and enforcing minimum standards of care on facilities like Town Court. When enforcement of those standards requires decertification of a facility, there may be an immediate, adverse impact on some residents. But surely that impact, which is an indirect and incidental result of the Government’s enforcement action, does not amount to a deprivation of any interest in life, liberty, or property. Medicaid patients who are forced to move because their nursing home has been decertified are in no different position for purposes of due process analysis than financially independent residents of a nursing home who are forced to move because the home’s state license has been revoked. Both groups of patients are indirect beneficiaries of government programs designed to guarantee a minimum standard of care for patients as a class. Both may be injured by the closing of a home due to revocation of its state license or its decertification as a Medicaid provider. Thus, whether they are private patients or Medicaid patients, some may have difficulty locating other homes they consider suitable or may suffer both emotional and physical harm as a result of the disruption associated with their move. Yet none of these patients would lose the ability to finance his or her continued care in a properly licensed or certified institution-. And, while they might have a claim against the nursing home for damages, none would have any claim against the responsible governmental authorities for the deprivation of an interest in life, liberty, or property. Their position under these circumstances would be comparable to that of members of a family who have been dependent on an errant father; they may suffer serious trauma if he is deprived of his liberty or property as a consequence of criminal proceedings, but surely they have no constitutional right to participate in his trial or sentencing procedures. The simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen’s legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally, provides a sufficient answer to all of the cases on which the patients rely in this Court. Thus, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, involved the direct relationship between a publicly owned utility and its customers; the utility had provided its customers with a legal right to receive continued service as long as they paid their bills. We held that under these circumstances the utility’s customers had a constitutional right to a hearing on a disputed bill before their service could be discontinued. But nothing in that case implies that if a public utility found it necessary to cut off service to a nursing home because of delinquent payments, it would be required to offer patients in thé home an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the credit dispute. This would be true even if the termination of utility service required the nursing home to close and caused serious inconvenience or harm to patients who would therefore have to move. As in this case, such patients might have rights against the home, and might also have direct relationships with the utility concerning their own domestic service, but they would have no constitutional right to interject themselves into the dispute between the public utility and the home. Over a century ago this Court recognized the principle that the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect adverse effects of governmental action. Thus, in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551, the Court stated: “That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.” More recently, in Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, we rejected the argument made by the parents of a girl murdered by a parolee that a California statute granting absolute immunity to the parole board for its release decisions deprived their daughter of her life without due process of law: “A legislative decision that has an incremental impact on the probability that death will result in any given situation — such as setting the speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour instead of 45 — cannot be characterized as state action depriving a person of life just because it may set in motion a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random death of an innocent bystander.” Id., at 281. Similarly, the fact that the decertification of a home may lead to severe hardship for some of its elderly residents does not turn the decertification into a governmental decision to impose that harm. Whatever legal rights these patients may have against Town Court for failing to maintain its status as a qualified skilled nursing home — and we express no opinion on that subject — we hold that the enforcement by HEW and DPW of their valid regulations did not directly affect the patients’ legal rights or deprive them of any constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The certification in 1976 was Town Court’s second; it had first been certified in 1967. It was decertified in 1974 as a result of substantial noncompliance with both state and federal requirements. The Medicare Program, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq., which is primarily for the benefit of the aged and the disabled, is financed and administered entirely by the Federal Government (HEW); the Medicaid Program, see 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., which is primarily designed for the poor, is a cooperative federal-state program. HEW based its determination on a survey conducted by DPW, which recommended that the home be decertified. In its notice to Town Court HEW stated in part: “In order to participate in the Medicare Program, a skilled nursing facility must meet the statutory requirements contained in section 1861 (j) of the Act, 42 USC 1395 x (j), as well as all other health and safety requirements established by the Secretary in subpart J, part 405, title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations. A participating skilled nursing facility is required to be in compliance with all of the eighteen conditions of participation for such facilities contained in subpart J. “On May 8-11, 1977, the Pennsylvania Department of Health performed a survey of your facility. That survey found that your facility does not comply with seven of the eighteen conditions of participation. The seven conditions not being complied with are: “II. Governing Body and Management (405.1121) “HI. Medical Direction (405.1122) “IV. Physical Services (405.1123) “V. Nursing Services (405.1124) “VIII. Pharmaceutical Services (405.1127) “XIII. Medical Records (405.1132) “XV. Physical Environment (405.1134) “Your facility’s failure to comply with these conditions of participation precludes renewal of your agreement. Renewal is also precluded by the fact that your facility has failed to maintain compliance with numerous standards which had previously been determined to be met. Please refer to 20 CFR 405.1908 (d).” App. 295a-296a. The state agency’s letter read in part: “Because the Medicare Program has terminated your participation, the Department of Public Welfare has no alternative but to likewise ter-mínate your participation under the Medical Assistance Program. The Federal regulations, 45 C. F. R. § 249.33 (a) (9), require that a State medical assistance plan must: “ ‘Provide that in the case of skilled nursing facilities certified under the provisions of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, the term of a provider agreement shall be subject to the same terms and conditions and coterminous with the period of approval of eligibility specified by the Secretary pursuant to that title, and upon notification that an agreement with a facility under title XVIII of the Act has been terminated or cancelled, the single State agency will take appropriate action to terminate the facility’s participation under the plan. A facility whose agreement has been can- celled or otherwise terminated may not be issued another agreement until the reasons which cause the cancellation or termination have been removed and reasonable assurance provided the survey agency that they will not recur.’ (emphasis supplied) “Because of the requirements of HEW, your facility must be terminated from participation in the Medical Assistance Program effective June 18, 1977.” Id., at 291ar-292a. At the time the suit was filed, no Town Court residents were Medicare recipients. However, Town Court did have a Medicare provider agreement with HEW, the nonrenewal of which automatically triggered the nonrenewal of its Medicaid agreement. See n. 4, supra. Although the plaintiffs filed their action on behalf of a class of all Medicaid recipients in the home, the District Court never certified the class. Thus, the action has proceeded throughout the Court of Appeals and in this Court as an individual action on behalf of the six named plaintiffs. Relying on this Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, the Court of Appeals held that Town Court’s property interests were sufficiently protected by informal pretermination procedures and by the opportunity for an administrative hearing and federal-court review after benefits had been terminated: “As was true in Eldridge, the decision not to renew a provider agreement is an easily documented, sharply focused decision in which issues of credibility and veracity play little role. It is based in most cases upon routine, standard, unbiased reports by health care professionals. Those professionals evaluate the provider in light of well-defined criteria that were developed in the administrative rule-making process. Written submissions are adequate to allow the provider to present his case. Given the extensive documentation that the provider is able to submit in response to the findings of the survey teams, the provider is unlikely to need an eviden-tiary hearing in order to present his position more effectively. In any event, there is ample opportunity to expand orally upon written submissions during the exit interview or in discussions during the survey itself. There is opportunity to submit additional evidence after notice of deficiencies is given, and the evidence upon which the recommendation of the survey team is based is disclosed fully to the provider. Moreover, the criteria used to evaluate the provider are well known in advance to the provider, and compliance is readily proved or disproved by written submission. Finally, review by an administrative law judge, by the Appeals Council of HEW, and ultimately by the federal courts; insures that the decision of the Secretary will be thoroughly examined before becoming final. “As stated in Eldridge, the public interest in preserving scarce financial and administrative resources is strong. Given the large number of providers participating in Medicare and the frequent surveys that are required, we believe that the costs of providing pre-termination hearings would be substantial. Further, the public has a strong interest in insuring that elderly and infirm nursing home patients are not required to stay in noncomplying homes longer than is necessary to assure that the provider had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to charges of deficiencies.” Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F. 2d 266, 277-278 (1978). Town Court did not seek further review of this determination. At the time the litigation began Frank S. Beal was the Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare. He has since been replaced in that position by Helen B. O’Bannon, the petitioner in this Court. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (23) (1976 ed., Supp. II) provides, in relevant part: “[A]ny individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required (including an organization which provides such services, or arranges for their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes to provide him such services. . . .” The same “free choice of providers” is also guaranteed by 42 CFR § 431.51 (1979). Title 42 CFR §405.1121 (k) (4) (1979) requires skilled nursing facilities that are licensed either as Medicaid or Medicare providers to establish written policies and procedures to ensure that each patient admitted to the facility “[i]s transferred or discharged only for medical reasons, or for his welfare or that of other patients, or for nonpayment of his stay (except as prohibited by titles XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act), and is given reasonable advance notice to ensure orderly transfer or discharge. . . .” Title 45 CFR § 205.10 (a)(5) (1979) provides, in relevant part, that an “opportunity for a hearing shall be granted to any applicant who requests a hearing because his or her claim for financial assistance . . . or medical assistance is denied, . . . and to any recipient who is aggrieved by any agency action resulting in suspension, reduction, discontinuance, or termination of assistance.” “Because a decision to decertify a nursing home as an unqualified provider is tantamount to an order to transfer a patient for his welfare, Medicaid residents threatened with transfer are entitled to some form of hearing on the existence of the condition or cause for transfer — whether the home is a qualified provider and whether decertification is for the patients’ welfare.” 586 F. 2d, at 258. Three judges joined a brief opinion announcing the judgment of the court authored by Judge Aldisert, which disposed of the case in a summary fashion based on the reasoning of Klein v. Calijano. Judge Adams wrote a concurring opinion, which was also joined by three judges (two of whom also joined Judge Aldisert), in which he attempted to explain more fully the reasoning in Klein. Referring to the three provisions relied upon in Klein, Judge Adams stated that they “. . . paint three distinct points in the landscape of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ that Medicaid beneficiaries can assert. Taken alone, the interest created by each of these clauses might be dismissed as not rising to the level of a cognizable property interest. However, when viewed together, they compel the conclusion that they identify three aspects of an ‘underlying substantive interest’ that enjoys the stature of ‘property.’ ” (Footnote omitted.) 586 F. 2d, at 287. Judge Adams also relied, to some extent, on the hardship that nursing home residents might suffer if forced to transfer to another home, stating that the “health” and “home” interests the residents possess in remaining in a particular nursing home are “among those that most persons would regard as being encompassed by the protections of the due process clause.” Id., at 289. Finally, unlike Judge Aldisert, Judge Adams went on to suggest what types of procedures would be necessary before Medicaid patients could be transferred. Chief Judge Seitz summarized his response to the three parts of the majority’s analysis as follows: “The majority finds that continued residency in the nursing home of one’s choice absent specific cause for transfer is an underlying substantive interest created by three Medicaid provisions. Under the first, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (23), a Medicaid recipient may obtain medical care ‘from any institution . . . qualified to perform the service or services required.’ Clearly, what the majority characterizes as a recipient’s right to obtain medical care from a ‘freely selected provider’ is limited to a choice among institutions which have been determined by the Secretary to be ‘qualified.’ Next, the majority’s reliance on 45 C. F. R. § 205.10 (a) (5), ensuring a notice and hearing to a recipient whose benefits are suspended, reduced, discontinued or terminated, is obviously misplaced. As ^he majority itself notes, the decertification of these facilities did not reduce or suspend the residents’ rights to continued benefits. “Finally, the majority relies upon 45 C. F. R. §249.12 (a) (1) (ii) (B) (4), which establishes as one requirement for an institution's certification that each resident admitted to that institution be ‘transferred or discharged only for medical reasons or for his welfare or that of other patients, or for nonpayment for his stay.' The majority reads this provision as a limitation on the Secretary’s power to interrupt a recipient’s residence at a particular institution. Clearly, however, this provision is a standard of conduct imposed by the Secretary upon the provider. Violation of this standard is one of many grounds for decertifying the offending institution. See 45 C. F. R. §§249.33 (a)(2), 249.10 (b)(15). The provision creates no 'substantive interest' in the residents vis-a-vis the Secretary. “Moving to its minor premise, the majority postulates that a decision to decertify is tantamount to a decision to transfer individual residents. Practically, of course, this may be a consequence in most cases, at least where an institution fails to remedy its insufficiencies. Analytically, however, the two decisions are different. Decertification focuses on the institution’s noncompliance with HEW's standards. The majority does not and cannot contend that recipients have a right to remain in an institution that the Secretary has found, by appropriate procedures, to be in substantial noncompliance with the standards. ‘Transfer trauma,’ although a legitimate concern for some residents, is necessarily subordinate to the threat posed to all residents by substandard conditions.” Id., at 295-296. The patients urge us to dismiss the petition without reaching the merits on the ground that there is no one before the Court who may properly argue the petitioner’s position. Thus, they contend that DPW is foreclosed from arguing here because, although its Secretary was formally an appellee in the Court of Appeals, it deliberately took a neutral position on the merits in that court. And they argue that HEW, which did argue the merits below, is foreclosed from arguing them here because its Secretary did not petition for certiorari. While we accept the patients’ argument with respect to the portion of the injunction requiring continued payments for Medicaid patients, we reject it insofar as the main issue presented bv the petition — the right of the patients to a pretermination hearing — is concerned. When the District Court ruled against the patients and Town Court on their right to a pretermination hearing, it nevertheless ordered HEW and DPW to continue making navments for services actually rendered, no doubt to ensure that there would be no break in care or benefits while the patients were being transferred. The patients appealed on the hearing issue, but the HEW Secretary alone cross-appealed on the issue of whether HEW should continue paying benefits assuming that there was no right to a pretermination hearing. The DPW Secretary did not file a cross-appeal, thus accepting the District Court’s order that DPW continue paying its share of benefits. Under these circumstances, the DPW Secretary’s petition for certiorari could not revive the issue of the propriety of that order. And, since the HEW Secretary did not file a petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to review it now. However, the patients’ jurisdictional argument fails insofar as the hearing issue is concerned. Because it contributes funds to the Medicaid program and has joint supervisory responsibilities with the Federal Government over Medicaid providers, DPW clearly has a sufficient interest in this question to give it standing to argue the merits. And, since it was victorious in the District Court on this issue, there was no need for it to file an appeal in order to keep it alive. Finally, although we would not normally allow a party to make an argument it had not raised below, the fact that the same argument was vigorously asserted by HEW and fully addressed by the Court of Appeals removes any prudential barrier to review that might otherwise exist. Because he was a party to the proceeding below, the HEW Secretary was automatically joined as a respondent when the DPW Secretary filed his petition in this Court. See this Court’s Rule 21 (4). In that capacity, he may seek reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground urged in that court. As Judge Adams pointed out in his concurring opinion, HEW and DPW would no doubt benefit from patient input on the questions whether the facility meets the applicable standards and, if not, whether decertification should be postponed pending attempts to bring the home into compliance. 586 F. 2d, at 292-293. Indeed, HEW recognizes the value of patient input, requiring patient interviews to be conducted under some circumstances as a part of the periodic review of a facility’s qualifications. See 42 CFR §456.608 (1979). The fact that a person may be an important, or even critical, witness does not, however, give him a constitutional right to testify. The patients cite a number of studies indicating that removal to another home may cause “transfer trauma,” increasing the possibility of death or serious illness for elderly, infirm patients. They also argue that associational interests, such as friendship among patients and staff and family ties, may be disrupted if the patients are scattered to other nursing homes, perhaps in other areas of the country. In denying the motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court did not take evidence or make any findings on the harm that might result from a transfer. Nevertheless, we assume for purposes of this decision that there is a risk that some residents may encounter severe emotional and physical hardship as a result of a transfer. The patients also argue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the provider agreement between DPW and Town Court and that this status somehow entitles them to more than Town Court itself is entitled to— namely, a pretermination hearing. They also argue that a legitimate entitlement to continued care in the home of their choice arises out of Pennsylvania’s long history of providing free medical care for those who are indigent. Nothing in the cited Pennsylvania statutes or court decisions, however, purports to create the kind of broad entitlement that the patients claim. In any event, neither of these state-law arguments was advanced in the courts below and therefore neither may provide the basis for an affirmance in this Court. This regulation is clearly designed to prevent abuses by providers and not to define the Government’s obligations or limit its powers in any way. Although the regulation allows a home to transfer or discharge a patient for medical reasons, we may assume that the Government could not order a patient transferred out of a qualified facility simply because it believed such a transfer was medically indicated. In other words, we assume that the statute referred to above would prohibit any such interference with the patient’s free choice among qualified providers. 45 CFR § 205.10 (a) (5) (1979). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254. This would, of course, depend on the contract between the patients and the nursing home, if any, and the provisions of the applicable state law. Similarly, in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, the Court was concerned with the direct relationship between a public employer and its employees. The character of that relationship determined whether the employee possessed an expectancy of continued employment that was legally enforceable against his employer— or at least could not be terminated by the employer without observing certain minimal safeguards. But those eases raised no question concerning the right of an employee who loses his job as a result of government action directed against a third party. We, of course, need not and do not hold that a person may never have a right to a hearing before his interests may be indirectly affected by government action. Conceivably, for example, if the Government were acting against one person for the purpose of punishing or restraining another, the indirectly affected individual might have a constitutional right to some sort of hearing. But in this case the Government is enforcing its regulations against the home for the benefit of the patients as a whole and the home itself has a strong financial incentive to contest its enforcement decision; under these circumstances the parties suffering an indirect adverse effect clearly have no constitutional right to participate in the enforcement proceedings.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MATHEWS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. DIAZ et al. No. 73-1046. Argued January 13, 1975 Reargued January 12, 1976 Decided June 1, 1976 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Harriet S. Shapiro reargued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief on reargument were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, and David M. Cohen. On the brief on the original argument were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Hills, Gerald P. Norton, and Mr. Cohen. Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees on reargument. Alfred Feinberg argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees on the original argument. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Jack Was-serman and Esther Kaufman for the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers; by Robert Allen Sedler and Melvin L. Wulj for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Jonathan A. Weiss for Legal Services for the Elderly Poor; and by Edith Lowenstein for Migration and Refugee Services, U. S. Catholic Conference, Inc., et al. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by the Secretary’s appeal is whether Congress may condition an alien’s eligibility for participation in a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the United States for a five-year period and admission for permanent residence. The District Court held that the first condition was unconstitutional and that it could not be severed from the second. Since we conclude that both conditions are constitutional, we reverse. Each of the appellees is a resident alien who was lawfully admitted to the United States less than five years ago. Appellees Diaz and Clara are Cuban refugees who remain in this country at the discretion of the Attorney General; appellee Espinosa has been admitted for permanent residence. All three are over 65 years old and have been denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance program established by § 1831 et seq. of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, as added, 79 Stat. 301, and as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). They brought this action to challenge the statutory basis for that denial. Specifically, they attack 42 U. S. C. § 1395o (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which grants eligibility to resident citi-zents who are 65 or older but denies eligibility to comparable aliens unless they have been admitted for permanent residence and also have resided in the United States for at least five years. Appellees Diaz and Clara meet neither requirement; appellee Espinosa meets only the first. On August 18, 1972, Diaz filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that his application for enrollment had been denied on the ground that he was not a citizen and had neither been admitted for permanent residence nor resided in the United States for the immediately preceding five years. He further alleged that numerous other persons had been denied enrollment in the Medicare Part B program for the same reasons. He sought relief on behalf of a class of persons who have been or will be denied enrollment in the Medicare insurance program for failure to meet the requirements of 42 U. S. C. § 1395o (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Since the complaint prayed for a declaration that § 1395o (2) was unconstitutional and for an injunction requiring the Secretary to approve all applicants who had been denied eligibility solely for failure to comply with its requirements, a three-judge court was constituted.. On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint. That pleading alleged that Clara had been denied enrollment for the same reasons as Diaz, but explained that Espinosa, although a.permanent resident since 1971, had not attempted to enroll because he could not meet the durational residence requirement, and therefore any attempt would have been futile. The amended complaint sought relief on behalf of a subclass represented by Espinosa — that is, aliens admitted for permanent residence who have been or will be denied enrollment for failure to meet the five-year continuous residence requirement — as well as relief on behalf of the class represented by Diaz and Clara. On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because none of the plaintiffs had exhausted his administrative remedies under the Social Security Act. Two days later, on October 26, 1972, Espinosa filed his application for enrollment with the Secretary. He promptly brought this fact to the attention of the District Court, without formally supplementing the pleadings. None of the appellees completely exhausted available avenues for administrative review. Nevertheless, the Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara raised no disputed issues of fact and therefore the interlocutory denials of their applications should be treated as final for the purpose of this litigation. This satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of 42 U. S. C. §405 (g). Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763-767; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 641 n. 8. The Secretary did not make an equally unambiguous concession with respect to Espinosa, but in colloquy with the court he acknowledged that Espinosa had filed an application which could not be allowed under the statute. The District Court overruled the Secretary’s motion to dismiss and decided the merits on cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that since it could not be severed from the requirement of admission for permanent residence, the alien-eligibility provisions of § 1395o (2) (B) were entirely unenforceable. Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1 (1973). The District Court reasoned that “even though fourteenth amendment notions of equal protection are not entirely congruent with fifth amendment concepts of due process,” id., at 9, the danger of unjustifiable discrimination against aliens in the enactment of welfare programs is so great, in view of their complete lack of representation in the political process, that this federal statute should be tested under the same pledge of equal protection as a state statute.. So tested, the court concluded that the statute was invalid because it was not both rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. It rejected the desire to preserve the fiscal integrity of the program, or to treat some aliens as less deserving than others, as adequate justification for the statute. Accordingly, the court enjoined the Secretary from refusing to enroll members of the class and subclass represented by appellees. The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. Weinberger v. Diaz, 416 U. S. 980. After hearing argument last Term, we set the case for reargument. 420 U. S. 959. We now consider (1) whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa’s claim; (2) whether Congress may discriminate in favor of citizens and against aliens in providing welfare benefits; and (3) if so, whether the specific discriminatory provisions in § 1395o (2) (B) are constitutional. I Espinosa’s claim squarely raises the question whether the requirement of five years’ continuous residence is constitutional, a question that is not necessarily presented by the claims of Diaz and Clara. For if the requirement of admission for permanent residence is valid, their applications were properly denied even if the durational residence requirement is ineffective. We must therefore decide whether the District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa’s claim. We have little difficulty with Espinosa’s failure to file an application with the Secretary until after he was joined in the action. Although 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) establishes fifing of an application as a nonwaivable condition of jurisdiction, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 328; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 764, Espinosa satisfied this condition while the case was pending in the District Court. A supplemental complaint in the District Court would have eliminated this jurisdictional issue; since the record discloses, both by affidavit and stipulation, that the jurisdictional condition was satisfied, it is not too late, even now, to supplement the complaint to allege this fact. Under these circumstances, we treat the pleadings as properly supplemented by the Secretary’s stipulation that Espinosa had filed an application. A further problem is presented by the absence of any formal administrative action by the Secretary denying Espinosa’s application. Section 405 (g) requires a final decision by the Secretary after a hearing as a prerequisite of jurisdiction. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 328-330; Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 763-765. However, we held in Salfi that the Secretary could waive the exhaustion requirements which this provision contemplates and that he had done so in that case. Id., at 765-767; accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 328-330 (dictum); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 641 n. 8. We reach a similar conclusion here. The plaintiffs in Salfi alleged that their claims had been denied by the local and regional Social Security offices and that the only question was one of constitutional law, beyond the competence of the Secretary to decide. These allegations did not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of § 405 (g) or the Secretary's regulations, but the Secretary failed to challenge the sufficiency of the allegations on this ground. We interpreted this failure as a determination by the Secretary that exhaustion would have been futile and deferred to his judgment that the only issue presented was the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act. The same reasoning applies to the present case. Although the Secretary moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, at the hearing on the motion he stipulated that no facts were in dispute, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary judgment, and that the only issue before the District Court was the constitutionality of the statute. As in Salfi, this constitutional question is beyond the Secretary’s competence. Indeed, the Secretary has twice stated in this Court that he stipulated in the District Court that Espinosa’s application would be denied for failure to meet the durational residence requirement. For jurisdictional purposes, we treat the stipulation, in the District Court as tantamount to a decision denying the application and as a waiver of the exhaustion requirements. Cf. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 640 n. 6, 641 n. 8. We conclude, as we did in Salfi, that the Secretary’s submission of the question for decision on the merits by the District Court satisfied the statutory requirement of a hearing and final decision. We hold that Espinosa’s claim, as well as the claims of Diaz and Clara, must be decided. II There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 48-51; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238; see Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 489. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. Wong Yang Sung, supra; Wong Wing, supra. The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country. In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rulés that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government’s power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is “invidious.” In particular, the fact that Congress has provided some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens. Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its guests. The decision to share that bounty with our guests may take into account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country: Congress may decide that as the alien’s tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that munificence. The real question presented by this case is not whether discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather, it is whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens — allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others — is permissible. We turn to that question. III For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the need for flexibility in policy choices rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudication. Appellees Diaz and Clara are but two of over 440,000 Cuban refugees who arrived in the United States between 1961 and 1972. And the Cuban parolees are but one of several categories of aliens who have been admitted in order to make a humane response to a natural catastrophe or an international political situation. Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization. Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to citizens, the party challenging the constitutionality of the particular line Congress has drawn has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line separating some aliens from others. In this case the appellees have challenged two requirements — first, that the alien be admitted as a permanent resident, and, second, that his residence be of a duration of at least five years. But if these requirements were eliminated, surely Congress would at least require that the alien's entry be lawful; even then, unless mere transients are to be held constitutionally entitled to benefits, some durational requirement would certainly be appropriate. In short, it is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien’s eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his residence. Since neither requirement is wholly irrational, this case essentially involves nothing more than a claim that it would have been more reasonable for Congress to select somewhat different requirements of the same kind. We may assume that the five-year line drawn by Congress is longer than necessary to protect the fiscal integrity of the program. We may also assume that unnecessary hardship is incurred by persons just short of qualifying. But it remains true that some fine is essential, that any line must produce some harsh and apparently arbitrary consequences, and, of greatest importance, that those who qualify under the test Congress has chosen may reasonably be presumed to have a greater affinity with the United States than those who do not. In short, citizens and those who are most like citizens qualify. Those who are less like citizens do not. The task of classifying persons for medical benefits, like the task of drawing lines for federal tax purposes, inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line; the differences between the eligible and the ineligible are differences in degree rather than differences in the character of their respective claims. When this kind of policy choice must be made, we are especially reluctant to question the exercise of congressional judgment. In this case, since appellees have not identified a principled basis for prescribing a different standard than the one selected by Congress, they have, in effect, merely invited us to substitute our judgment for that of Congress in deciding which aliens shall be eligible to participate in the supplementary insurance program on the same conditions as citizens. We decline the invitation. IV The cases on which appellees rely are consistent with our conclusion that this statutory classification does not deprive them of liberty or property without due process of law. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, provides the strongest support for appellees’ position. That case holds that state statutes that deny welfare benefits to resident aliens, or to aliens not meeting a requirement of dura-tional residence within the United States, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and encroach upon the exclusive federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens. Of course, the latter ground of decision actually supports our holding today that it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens. The equal protection analysis also involves significantly different considerations because it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal Government. Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, there is little, if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State differently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are noncitizens as far as the State’s interests in administering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its business. Furthermore, whereas the Constitution inhibits every State’s power to restrict travel across its own borders, Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over travel across the borders of the United States. The distinction between the constitutional limits on state power and the constitutional grant of power to the Federal Government also explains why appellees’ reliance on Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, is misplaced. That case involved Arizona’s requirement of durational residence within a county in order to receive nonemergency medical care at the county’s expense. No question of alienage was involved. Since the sole basis for the classification between residents impinged on the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel within the United States, the holding in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, required that it be justified by a compelling state interest. Finding no such justification, we held that the requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause. This case, however, involves no state impairment of the right to travel — nor indeed any impairment whatever of the right to travel within the United States; the predicate for the equal protection analysis in those cases is simply not present. Contrary to appellees’ characterization, it is not “political hypocrisy” to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and naturalization. Finally, we reject the suggestion that U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, lends relevant support to appellees’ claim. No question involving alienage was presented in that case. Rather; we found that the denial of food stamps to households containing unrelated members was not only unsupported by any rational basis but actually was intended to discriminate against certain politically unpopular groups. This case involves no impairment of the freedom of association of either citizens or aliens. We hold that § 1395o(2)(B) has not deprived ap-pellees of liberty or property without due process of law. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. The Medicare Part B medical insurance program for the aged covers a part of the cost of certain physicians’ services, home health care, outpatient physical therapy, and other medical and health care. 42 TJ, S. C. § 1395k (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). The program supplements the Medicare Part A hospital insurance plan, § 1811 et seq. of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, as added, 79 Stat. 291, and as amended, 42 U. S. C, § 1395c et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), and it is financed in equal parts by the United States and by monthly premiums paid by individuals aged 65 or older who choose to enroll. 42 U. S. C. § 1395r (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Title 42 U. S. C. § 1395c (1970 ed. and Supp. IV) provides: “Every individual who — (1) is entitled to hospital insurance benefits under Part A, or (2) has attained age 65 and is a resident of the United States, and is either (A) a citizen or (B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence who has resided in the United States continuously during the 5 years immediately preceding the month in which he applies for enrollment under this part, is eligible to enroll in the insurance program established by this part.” This case does not raise any issues involving subsection (1). The District Court certified a class and a subclass, defined, respectively, as follows: “All immigrants residing in the United States who have attained the age of 65 and who have been or will be denied enrollment in the supplemental medical insurance program under Medicare, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1970), because they are not aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who have resided in the United States continuously during the five years immediately preceding the month in which they apply for enrollment as required by [42 U. S. C. § 1395o (2) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)]. “All immigrants lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States who have attained the age of 65 and who have been or will be denied enrollment in the supplemental medical insurance program under Medicare, 42 U. S. C. § 1395j et seq. (1970), solely because of their failure to meet the five-year continuous residency requirement of [42 U. S. C. § 1395o (2) (B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)].” Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp., 1, 7 (1973) (footnote omitted). These class certifications are erroneous. The District Court did not possess jurisdiction over the claims of the members of the plaintiff class and subclass who “will be denied” enrollment. Those who “will be denied” enrollment, as the quoted phrase is used in the certification, are those who have yet to be denied enrollment by formal administrative decision. See id., at 6-7, and n. 7. But the complaint does not allege, and the record does not show, that the Secretary has taken any action with respect to such persons that is tantamount to a denial. It follows that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over their claims, see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 764, and that the class and subclass are too broadly defined. In view of our holding that the statute is constitutional, we need not decide whether a narrower class and subclass could have been properly certified. See infra, at 76-77, and n. 11. “[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. The Secretary asserted jurisdiction in this Court by direct appeal under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1252, 1253. Since we possess jurisdiction under § 1252, which provides for direct appeal to this Court from a judgment of a federal court holding a federal statute unconstitutional in a civil action to which a federal officer is a party, we need not decide whether an appeal lies under § 1253. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 763 n. 8. Diaz and Clara contend that the requirement of lawful admission for permanent residence should be construed SO' that it is satisfied by aliens, such as they, who have been paroled into the United States at the discretion of the Attorney General. However, such aliens remain in the United States at the discretion of the Attorney General, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (d) (5), and hence cannot have been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” as § 1395o (2) (B) requires. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (d); Security Ins. Co. of New Haven v. United States ex rel. Haydis, 338 F. 2d 444, 447-449 (CA9 1964). “Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.” 28 U. S. C. § 1653. Although the defect in Espinosa's allegations must be cured by supplemental pleading, instead of amended pleading, the statutory purpose of avoiding needless sacrifice to defective pleading applies equally to this case. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 744 n. 9; Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 407-408, and n. 3. Despite Espinosa’s failure to supplement the complaint, the District Court was aware that he had filed his application; since the Secretary stipulated that the application had been filed, the defect in the pleadings surely did not prejudice him. Record on Appeal 224-227. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Record on Appeal 259-260. Jurisdictional Statement 3 n. 3; Brief for Appellant 5 n. 5. In his Supplemental Brief, filed after our decision in Salfi, the Secretary argues that the District Court did not possess jurisdiction over Espinosa’s claim because it was not until after the District Court had issued its injunction that the Secretary resolved an unspecified factual issue presented by Espinosa’s application, and that such a belated confirmation that Espinosa’s application should be denied could not confer jurisdiction upon the District Court nunc -pro tunc. Supplemental Brief for Appellant 4, and n. 1. However, the District Court’s jurisdiction was not founded upon the Secretary’s subsequent confirmation that Espinosa's application should be denied, but rather upon the Secretary’s stipulation in the District Court that no factual issues remained, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary judgment, and that the only issue was the constitutionality of the statute. Even though Salfi had not been decided when he so stipulated, he is not now free to withdraw his stipulation, and no reason appears why he should be permitted to do so. The Constitution protects the privileges and immunities only of citizens, Arndt. 14, § 1; see Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the right to vote only of citizens. Arndts. 15, 19, 24, 26. It requires that Representatives have been citizens for seven years, Art. I, §2, cl. 2, and Senators citizens for nine, Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, and that the President be a “natural bom Citizen.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 5. A multitude of federal statutes distinguish between citizens and aliens. The whole of Title 8 of the United States Code, regulating aliens and nationality, is founded on the legitimacy of distinguishing between citizens and aliens. A variety of other federal statutes provide for disparate treatment of aliens and citizens. These include prohibitions and restrictions upon Government employment of aliens, e. g., 10 U. S. C. § 5571; 22 U. S. C. § 1044 (e), upon private employment of aliens, e. g., 10 U. S. C. § 2279; 12 U. S. C. § 72, and upon investments and businesses of aliens, e. g., 12 U. S. C. §619; 47 U. S. C. § 17; statutes excluding aliens from benefits available to citizens, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 931 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV); 46 U. S. C. § 1171 (a), and from protections extended to citizens, e. g., 19 U.S. C. § 1526; 29 U. S. C. § 633a (1970 ed., Supp. IV); and statutes imposing added burdens upon aliens, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 6851 (d); 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (d). Several statutes treat certain aliens more favorably than citizens. E. g., 19 U. S. C. § 1586 (e); 50 U. S. C. App. § 453 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Other statutes, similar to the one at issue in this case, provide for equal treatment of citizens and aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 10 U. S. C. § 8253; 18 U. S. C. §613 (2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Still others equate citizens and aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens. E. g., 43 U. S. C. § 161; 30 U. S. C. § 22. Yet others condition equal treatment of an alien upon reciprocal treatment of United States citizens by the alien’s own country. E. g., 10 U. S. C. § 7435 (a); 28 U. S. C. § 2502. The classifications among aliens established by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 ei seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), illustrate the diversity of aliens and their ties to this country. Aliens may be immigrants or non-immigrants. 8 U. S. C. §1101 (a) (15). Immigrants, in turn, are divided into those who are subject to numerical limitations upon admissions and those who are not. The former are subdivided into preference classifications which include: grown unmarried children of citizens; spouses and grown unmarried children of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; professionals and those with exceptional ability in the sciences or arts; grown married children of citizens; brothers and sisters of citizens; persons who perform specified permanent skilled or unskilled labor for which a labor shortage exists; and certain victims of persecution and catastrophic natural calamities who were granted conditional entry and remained in the United States at least two years. 8U. S. C. §§ 1153 (a)(l)-(7). Immigrants not subject to certain numerical limitations include: children and spouses of citizens and parents of citizens at least 21 years old; natives of independent countries of the Western Hemisphere; aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence returning from temporary visits abroad; certain former citizens who may reapply for acquisition of citizenship; certain ministers of religion; and certain employees or former employees of the United States Government abroad. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101 (a) (27), 1151 (a), (b). Nonimmigrants include: officials and employees of foreign governments and certain international organizations; aliens visiting temporarily for business or pleasure; aliens in transit through this country; alien crewmen serving on a vessel or aircraft; aliens entering pursuant to a treaty of commerce and navigation to carry on trade or an enterprise in which they have invested; aliens entering to study in this country; certain aliens coming temporarily to perform services or labor or to serve as trainees; alien representatives of the foreign press or other information media; certain aliens coming temporarily to participate in a program in their field of study or specialization; aliens engaged to be married to citizens; and certain alien employees entering temporarily to continue to render services to the same employers. 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15). In addition to lawfully admitted aliens, there are, of course, aliens who have entered illegally. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 765-770. Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 530-532; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 584-591. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 13-16; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 505-514; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 125-130. “[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 588-689 (footnote omitted). Accord, e. g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, at 765-767; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 711-713. Cuban Refugee Center — Weekly Statistical Report for November 13-17, 1972, App, 40. See 8 U. S. C. §§1153 (a)(7), 1182 (d)(5). An unlikely, but nevertheless possible, consequence of holding that appellees are constitutionally entitled to welfare benefits would be a further extension of similar benefits to over 440,000 Cuban parolees. “It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibilty of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Baker v Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217. The District Court held that the durational residence requirement was not rationally related to maintaining the fiscal integrity of the Medicare Part B program because the program is financed on a “current cost” basis, half by appropriations from the general revenues and half by premiums from enrolled individuals; because aliens who do not meet the residence requirement would constitute no greater burden on the general revenues than enrolled citizens who have not paid federal taxes or who pay their premiums from federally subsidized welfare benefits; because aliens, like citizens, must pay federal taxes; and because the residency requirement only postpones treatment of aliens until costlier medical care is necessary. Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp., at 10-12. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 768-774; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 483-487. We have left open the question whether a State may prohibit aliens from holding elective or important nonelective positions or whether a State may, in some circumstances, consider the alien status of an applicant or employee in making an individualized employment decision. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 646-649; In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 728-729, and n. 21. “State alien residency requirements that either deny welfare benefits to noncitizens or condition them on longtime residency, equate with the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance and abode. Since such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power, they are constitutionally impermissible.” Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 380. In Shapiro v. Thompson, we held that state-imposed requirements of durational residence within the State for receipt of welfare benefits denied equal protection because such requirements unconstitutionally burdened the right to travel interstate. Since the requirements applied to aliens and citizens alike, we did not decide whether the right to travel interstate was conferred only upon citizens. However, our holding was predicated expressly on the requirement “that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” 394 U. S., at 629. See Graham v. Richardson, supra, at 375-376, 377-380. Appellees also gain no support from Washington v. Legrant, 394 U. S. 618, a case decided with Shapiro v. Thompson. Legrant involved a congressionally imposed requirement of one year’s residence within the District of Columbia for receipt of welfare benefits. As in Shapiro v. Thompson, no question of alienage was involved. We held that the requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for the same reasons that the state-imposed dura-tional residency requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 394 U. S., at 641-642. Unlike the situation in Shapiro and Legrant, the durational residency requirement in this case could at most deter only the travel of aliens into the United States. The power of Congress to prevent the travel of aliens into this country cannot seriously be questioned.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

February 28, 1957. No. 153. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board. Argued February 28, 1957. Decided February 28, 1957. Wm. A. Stuart argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was H. W. Stull. Solicitor General Rankin, Stephen Leonard and Dominick L. Manoli were on the brief for respondent. Per Curiam: The judgment is affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. L. A. TUCKER TRUCK LINES, INC. No. 18. Argued October 20, 1952. Decided November 10, 1952. Edward M. Reidy argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Acting Assistant Attorney General Clapp, Robert W. Gin-nane and Charles H. Weston. Philip B. Perlman, then Solicitor General, and Daniel W. Knowlton, then Chief Counsel for the Interstate Commerce Commission, were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction. B. W. La Tourette argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was G. M. Rebman. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. One Cunningham applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to authorize extension of his existing motor carrier route. A railroad and eleven motor carriers, including appellee, intervened to oppose. The issues were referred to an examiner who after hearing recommended that, with exceptions not material here, a certificate be granted. Appellee excepted, whereupon Division 5 of the Commission, in substance, approved the recommendation. Appellee requested reconsideration by the full Commission, which was denied, and then petitioned for “extraordinary relief,” which also was refused. The Commission thereupon issued a certificate to Cunningham. Appellee, upon the ground that .the evidence did not show need for the additional transportation service, petitioned the District Court to set aside the certificate and order. The Commission and the United States answered and a three-judge court was convened. On the day appointed for hearing, appellee moved for leave to amend its petition to raise, for the first time, a contention that the Commission’s action was invalid for want of jurisdiction because the examiner had not been appointed pursuant to § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The District Court allowed amendment and, upon proof that the appointment had not been in accordance with that Act, invalidated the order and certificate without going into the merits of the issue tendered in the original complaint. This appeal by the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission raises but a single question — whether such an objection, first made at that stage of the proceedings, was not erroneously entertained. We hold that it was. Appellee did not offer nor did the court require any excuse for its failure to raise the objection upon at least one of its many opportunities during the administrative proceeding. Appellee does not claim to have been misled or in any way hampered in ascertaining the facts about the examiner’s appointment. It did not bestir itself to learn the facts until long after the administrative proceeding was closed and months after the case was at issue in the District Court, at which time the Commission promptly supplied the facts upon which the contention was based and sustained. The apparent reason for complacency was that it was not actually prejudiced by the conduct or manner of appointment of the examiner. There is no suggestion that he exhibited bias, favoritism or unfairness. Nor is there ground for assuming it from the relationships in the proceeding. He did not act and was not expected to act both as prosecutor and judge. The Commission, which appointed him, did not institute or become a party in interest to the proceeding. Neither it nor its examiner had any function except to decide justly between contestants in an adversary proceeding. The issue is clearly an afterthought, brought forward at the last possible moment to undo the administrative proceedings without consideration of the merits and can prevail only from technical compulsion irrespective of considerations of practical justice. In Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 907, this Court held that officers hearing applications for certificates of convenience and necessity under § 207 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act are subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. But timeliness of the objection was not before us, because in that case the examiner’s appointment had been twice challenged in the administrative proceedings, once, as it should have been, before the examiner at the hearings and again before the Commission on a petition for rehearing. That decision established only that a litigant in such a case as this who does make such demand at the time of hearing is entitled to an examiner chosen as the Act prescribes. We have recognized in more than a few decisions, and Congress has recognized in more than a few statutes, that orderly procedure and good administration require that objections to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it has opportunity for correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the courts. It is urged in this case that the Commission had a predetermined policy on this subject which would have required it to overrule the objection if made. While this may well be true, the Commission is obliged to deal with a large number of like cases. Repetition of the objection in them might lead to a change of policy, or, if it did not, the Commission would at least be put on notice of the accumulating risk of wholesale reversals being incurred by its persistence. Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice. It is argued, however, that this case falls outside of this general rule and the result below is technically compelled because, if the appointment of the hearing examiner was irregular, the Commission in some manner lost jurisdiction and its order is totally void. This inference is drawn from our decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, for it is contended we could not have sustained a collateral attack by writ of habeas corpus in that case unless we found the defect in that examiner’s appointment to be one of jurisdictional magnitude. We need not inquire what should have been the result upon that case had the Government denied or the Court considered whether the objection there sustained was taken in time. The effect of the omission was not there raised in briefs or argument nor discussed in the opinion of the Court. Therefore, the case is not a binding precedent on this point. Even as to our own judicial power or jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio. The question not being foreclosed by precedent, we hold that the defect in the examiner’s appointment was an irregularity which would invalidate a resulting order if the Commission had overruled an appropriate objection made during the hearings. But it is not one which deprives the Commission of power or jurisdiction, so that even in the absence of timely objection its order should be set aside as a nullity. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for determination on the merits. Reversed. 49 U. S. C. § 307. 5 U. S. C. §1010. 100 F. Supp. 432. Our decision in the Riss case was announced after the administrative proceeding herein, but before the District Court’s hearing. Riss apparently prompted appellee to raise the point about the examiner’s qualifications in the District Court. Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117, 130; United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103, 113; United States v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 288 U. S. 490, 494; Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 155. Section 9 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. §77i; §25 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78y; § 24 of the Public Utility Plolding Company Act, 15 U. S. C. § 79x; § 10 of the Pair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. §210; § 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). The Government informs us that in about five thousand cases commenced after the effective date of the Administrative Procedure Act, orders are for an indefinite period vulnerable to attack if no timely objection during the administrative process is required. The policy of the Commission is to grant application for rehearing in cases where applicant made the objection before the examiner. Since its established practice is not to consider issues not raised before the examiner, it will refuse rehearings in other cases. Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507. United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 172; Snow v. United States, 118 U. S. 346, 354; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 87; Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S. 225, 236; Arant v. Lane, 245 U. S. 166, 170.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORP. et al. No. 45. Argued November 15, 1960. Decided January 23, 1961. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 45. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Alan S. Rosenthal, Anthony L. Mon-dello, John C. Mason, Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Robert L. Russell, David J. Bardin, Samuel D. Slade and Willard W. Gatchell. Jerome J. McGrath argued the cause for petitioners in No. 46. With him on the brief were Robert M. Landis, Robert E. Lee Hall and Welly K. Hopkins.. Randall J. LeBoeuf, Jr. and Richard J. Connor argued the cause for respondents. With them on the briefs were John T. Miller, Jr., James B. Henderson, William N. Bonner, Jr., Thomas F. Brosnan, Seymour B. Quel and Francis I. Howley. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal in No. 45, were filed by William M. Bennett for the State of California et al.; T. J. Reynolds, L. T. Rice, Henry F. Lippitt II, Milford Springer, Joseph R. Rensch, W. James Mac-Intoshj J. David Mann, Jr. and William W. Ross for the Southern California Gas Co. et al.; Paul L. Adams, Attorney General of Michigan, Samuel J. Torina, Solicitor General, and A. C. Stoddard, Assistant Attorney General, for the Michigan Public Service Commission; and John W. Reynolds, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and William E. Torkelson for the State of Wisconsin et al. Together with No. 46, National Coal Association et al. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in these cases is whether the Federal Power Commission has gone beyond the scope of its delegated authority in denying a certificate of public convenience and necessity under § 7 (e) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. The principal respondents are Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (Transco), a pipeline company engaged in transporting natural gas in interstate commerce, and Consolidated Edison Co. (Con. Ed.), a public utility in New York City which uses gas under its boilers and also sells gas to domestic consumers. In 1957 Con. Ed. contracted to purchase gas from producers in the Nor-manna and Sejita fields in Texas at 19% cents per Mcf., the contracts of sale containing a prohibition on resale of the gas by Con. Ed. This transaction is commonly labeled a “direct” sale and, because it does not entail a sale for resale in interstate commerce, is not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction except insofar as § 7 requires the Commission to certificate the transportation of gas pursuant to the sale. Con. Ed. then arranged with Transco for what is called in the record “X-20” service. Under the contract, Transco agreed to transport 50,000 Mcf. daily to Con. Ed. in New York for use under Con. Ed.’s boilers, principally two boilers at Con. Ed.’s Waterside station which were then being fired by coal. Additionally, during a 60-day peak period, Transco agreed to sell 50,000 Mcf. to Con. Ed. from Transco’s own reserves without restrictions as to resale. This 60-day supply was designed for use by Con. Ed.’s customers during the-winter period when heating demands were at their highest. Transco sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the proposed X-20 service in connection with its plan to conduct a major expansion of its pipeline capacity and storage facilities. Before the hearing examiner, Transco’s application was opposed by the FPC staff and groups representing the coal industry. Con. Ed. intervened in favor of Transco’s proposal. Transco offered proof that its application met all the conventional tests — adequate gas reserves, pipeline facilities and market for the gas — and this showing, with one immaterial exception, has never been challenged. However, the FPC’s staff argued vigorously that the public interest would suffer were Transco’s petition granted. Among the grounds advanced were that the gas was to be transported for use under industrial boilers, this disposition being an “inferior” use from the standpoint of conserving a valuable natural resource; that authorization of this and similar direct sales to major industrial users would result in pre-emption of pipeline capacity and gas reserves to the detriment of domestic consumers competing for gas supply; and that the effect of this sale, as well as the resulting increase in direct sales, would effect a general rise in field prices. These contentions were presented as “policy” arguments and no testimony was taken in support. Con. Ed. contended in return that certification was in the public interest, principally because a firm supply of natural gas under the Waterside boilers would reduce the air pollution problem then being aggravated by fly-ash and sulphur dioxide emissions from these boilers. The Waterside station is located near the headquarters building of the United Nations, and Con. Ed. introduced expert testimony indicating that the Waterside boilers were major contributors to the air pollution problem in the area. Respondents also contended that the factors propounded by the FPC’s staff were not open for consideration in a § 7 proceeding. The hearing examiner agreed with respondents that his determination was limited to conventional factors and consequently recommended certification. He qualified his recommendation, however, with a statement that, if he were authorized to consider the policy argument related to the end use of the gas advanced by the FPC staff, he would come to the opposite conclusion. He indicated that respondents’ proof concerning the air pollution problem was not sufficienty compelling to overcome this contrary argument. On review before the full FPC, the Commission held that the broad considerations advanced by its staff were cognizable in a § 7 proceeding. The Commission agreed with respondents that the “idea of ameliorating a smoke condition found unpleasant and annoying ... is an attractive one” but concluded that “more weighty considerations compel the denial of the grant.” 21 F. P. C. 138, 142. Respondents sought a rehearing before the Commission and, upon denial of that petition, 21 F. P. C. 399, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reinstated the conclusion of the hearing examiner that the policy considerations advanced by the FPC were outside the scope of a § 7 proceeding. The court relied principally on § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717 (b), which provides: “The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” The court also expressed sympathy with respondents’ contention that the Commission had given inadequate weight to the air pollution factor; but the holding below does not appear to be based on that ground. 271 F. 2d 942. The principal question before this Court, then, is whether Congress intended to preclude the Commission from denying certification on the basis of the policy considerations advanced by its staff. For purposes of analysis, the litigants have grouped these factors into two broad categories. The first has been, labeled the “end use” factor and reflects the Commission’s concern that Con. Ed.’s proposed “inferior” use of gas under its industrial boilers would be wasteful of gas committed to the Commission’s jurisdiction and, by the same token, would pre-empt space in pipelines that might otherwise be used for transportation of gas for superior uses. The second may be called the “price” consideration and involves the Commission’s fear that this sale — which was executed at a price higher than the maximum fixed by the Commission in the producing districts here involved — would increase the price of natural gas in the field, thus triggering a rise in the price provisions in other contracts. In light of what this Court has said on prior occasions concerning the term “public convenience and necessity” in analogous statutes, the ready inference is that the Commission has the power to consider the “end use” and “price” factors. For example, in United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U. S. 236, 241, the Court concluded that: “The Commission is the guardian of the public interest in determining whether certificates of convenience and necessity shall be granted. For the performance of that function the Commission has been entrusted with a wide range of discretionary authority. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60. Its function is not only to appraise the facts and to draw inferences from them but also to bring to bear upon the problem an expert judgment and to determine from its analysis of the total situation on which side of the controversy the public interest lies. Its doubt that the public interest will be adequately served if resumption of service is left to existing carriers is entitled to the same respect as its expert judgment on other complicated transportation problems. . . .” See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 315 U. S. 373, 376-377. In fact, in interpreting this very section, we said that “§ 7 (e) requires the Commission to evaluate all factors bearing on the public interest.” Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 360 U. S. 378, 391. (Emphasis added.) However, respondents correctly point out that Congress, in enacting the Natural Gas Act, did not give the Commission comprehensive powers over every incident of gas production, transportation and sale. Rather, Congress was “meticulous” only to invest the Commission with authority over certain aspects of this field, leaving the residue for state regulation. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507. Therefore, it is necessary to consider with care whether, despite the accepted meaning of the term “public convenience and necessity,” the Commission has trod on forbidden ground in making its decision. End use. No one disputes that natural gas is a wasting resource and that the necessity for conserving it is paramount. As we see it, the question in this case is whether the Commission, through its certification power, may prevent the waste of gas committed to its jurisdiction. One apparent method of preventing waste of gas is to limit the uses to which it may be put, uses for which another, more abundant fuel may serve equally well. Thus the Commission in this case, as it often has in the past, has declared that the use of gas under industrial boilers is an “inferior” use, the assumption being that other fuels, particularly coal, are an adequate substitute in areas where such other fuels abound. However, respondents, while conceding the premise that gas may be wasted where coal is readily available, argue that Congress has not awarded the' Commission any powers over conservation; rather, this authority has been reserved to the States. This contention is based on the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act. When Congress initially enacted the Natural Gas Act in 1938, all the indications were that Congress intended the States to be the primary arbiters of conservation problems. The 1938 Act was based on a 1936 report rendered by the Federal Trade Commission and the section in that report devoted to conservation stresses the powers of state bodies to adopt corrective measures. The final recommendation of the Federal Trade Commission in regard to conservation contemplated primary state authority, with federal agencies being relegated to a reporting function. This recommendation formed the basis for § 11 of the Act as ultimately passed and that section reveals a secondary role for the Commission in this regard. However, in 1940, the Commission reported its dissatisfaction with the limited scope of § 7. The 1938 version of § 7 restricted the Commission's jurisdiction to certification of transportation into areas where the market was already being served by another natural gas company; if a pipeline wished to extend service into virgin territory, the Commission had no power to act. The Commission felt that this limitation barred it from considering “the broad social and economic effect of the use of various fuels” in a § 7 proceeding, Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 2 F. P. C. 29, 57, and, in its 1940 Annual Report, the Commission urged that the restriction be deleted in order that conservation considerations might be weighed. The language used by the Commission is particularly relevant to this case: “The Natural Gas Act as presently drafted does not enable the Commission to treat fully the serious implications of such a problem. The question should be raised as to whether the proposed use of natural gas would not result in displacing a less valuable fuel and create hardships in the industry already supplying the market, while at the same time rapidly depleting the country’s natural-gas reserves. Although, for a period of perhaps 20 years, the natural gas could be so priced as to appear to offer an apparent saving in fuel costs, this would mean simply that social costs which must eventually be paid had been ignored. “Careful study of the entire problem may lead to the conclusion that use of natural gas should be restricted by functions rather than by areas. Thus, it is especially adapted to space and water heating in urban homes and other buildings and to the various industrial heat processes which require concentration of heat, flexibility of control, and uniformity of results. Industrial uses to which it appears particularly adapted include the treating and annealing of metals, the operation of kilns in the ceramic, cement, and lime industries, the manufacture of glass in its various forms, and use as a raw material in the chemical industry. General use of natural gas under boilers for the production of steam is, however, under most circumstances of véry questionable social economy.” 20 F. P. C. Ann. Rep. 79 (1940). The Commission implemented its recommendation by submitting to Congress a proposed amendment to § 7 with the restrictive language eliminated, and an amendment substantially similar to the one drafted by the Commission was enacted in 1942. During the course of the hearings on the amendment, the Commission reiterated the position it had taken in its 1940 report, Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5249, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 82, and the language used by the Committees reporting the bill indicates that the amendment was framed in response to the Commission’s complaint. H. R. Rep. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3; S. Rep. No. 948, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2. It is true, of course, that-the Committee reports do not set out the Commission’s position in haec verba. For example, the pertinent language of the House Committee Report states that: “The bill, as amended, eliminates the objections to the present section 7 (c) above mentioned. By this legislation, the present jurisdictional disputes are eliminated, and the door is opened to the consideration by the Commission of the effect of construction and extensions upon the interests of producers of competing fuels and competitive transportation interests. This result is accomplished, moreover, without undue disturbance of existing operating arrangements of natural-gas companies.” H. R. Rep. No. 1290, supra. Consequently, respondents argue that Congress only authorized the Commission to look at one side of the coin — the health of the coal industry — because that is the only point mentioned explicitly. However, this contention does not take adequate account of the position the Commission had consistently pressed upon Congress both prior to and during the hearings on the amendment — that the use of gas for purposes adequately served by other fuels was undesirable not only because it injured the competing industry but, what is more important, because it was wasteful to use a fuel in short supply in place of an abundant fuel. See 20 F. P. C. Ann. Rep. 79 (1940). The history of the amendment reveals no voice raised in opposition to the Commission’s position and there is no other indication that Congress was unwilling to give the chief proponent of the amendment anything less than it sought. Thus, it would be curious were we to infer such an intent from the language of the House Committee Report quoted above. Rather, we think it plain the Congress acquiesced in the Commission’s position and the excerpted language signifies acquiescence. It should be noted that this is not the first time this Court has addressed itself to the effect of the 1942 amendment to § 7. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 617, n. 30, and Federal Power Comm’n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U. S. 464, 468-469. And, while it must be conceded that the language pertinent here was not necessary to the decision in either Hope or East Ohio, the clear conclusion of the Court in those cases is directly opposed to respondents’ present argument. Respondents, however, vigorously contend that, subsequent to the 1942 amendment, the Commission itself has made statements on occasion which are inconsistent with the Commission’s position in this case. In particular, respondents point to an excerpt from the Commission’s 1944 Report to Congress, entitled The First Five Years Under the Natural Gas Act, where the Commission stated: “In its hearings on certificate cases, under section 7 (c) of the act, as amended, the Commission has freely permitted the intervention of representatives of coal, railroad, labor, and other interests concerned with the production or transportation of competing fuels. These interests have presented extensive evidence on the economic, sociological, and technological aspects of fuel competition, and their representatives have strongly urged the Commission either to deny certificates on the general grounds of conservation or to attach restrictions which would severely limit the uses for which natural gas might be sold. “It has been the unanimous view of the Commission that, inasmuch as the Congress had not given it comprehensive powers to deal with the end uses for which natural gas is consumed, and had granted the Commission no authority to regulate rates for the direct sales of natural gas to industry, it was the duty of the Commission not to seek to exercise such authority until the Congress amended the Natural Gas Act to confer on the Commission such specific powers as Congress desired it to exercise.” F. P. C., The First Five Years Under the Natural Gas Act 15. This statement was relied on heavily by the Court of Appeals and it would be idle to contend that the report is irrelevant to the present inquiry. However, it is necessary to note the precise limit of the Commission’s admissions. The Commission said that it had not been given “comprehensive” authority to deal with “the end uses for which natural gas is consumed” and that it would not deny certification on that ground alone. The Commission did not say that it had no authority over the use to which certificated gas might be put nor did it say that end use was a factor beyond its power of notice. In view of contemporaneous statements by the Commission which would be inconsistent with the reading respondents press upon us, we think that the 1944 report should be construed as admitting only a lack of comprehensive power to formulate a flat rule against direct sales for use-under industrial boilers. In this connection, it must be realized that the Commission’s powers under § 7 are, by definition, limited. See Koplin, Conservation and Regulation: The Natural Gas Allocation Policy of the Federal Power Commission, 64 Yale L. J. 840, 862. The Commission cannot order a natural gas company to sell gas to users that it favors; it can only exercise a veto power'over proposed transportation and it can only do this when a balance of all the circumstances weighs against certification. Moreover, the Commission has no authority over intrastate sales under any section of the Act and, since a large percentage of the gas sold for so-called “inferior” uses is sold within the producing States, this restriction further curtails the Commission’s power over conservation. In light of this, the Commission’s position since the 1942 amendment is both consistent and rational. On the one hand, the Commission has stated that it does have power to consider end use in a § 7 proceeding. On the other hand, the Commission has sought, but has not been awarded, comprehensive authority over all aspects of gas conservation. A most striking example of the Commission’s thinking is revealed by its reasons for opposition to H. R. 982, a bill proposed in 1949 which would have declared that: . . the public interest requires the establishment of, and adherence to, a policy with respect to the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof in interstate commerce, which will— “(1) promote and safeguard, so far as possible, the national defense; “(2) conserve the reserves of natural gas for utilization which affords the highest social benefits to the public, consistent with reasonable rates and adequate service.” The Commission argued against passage on, among others, the following ground: “The 10-point policy would— “(2) Conserve the reserves of natural gas for utilization which affords the highest social benefits to the public, consistent with reasonable rates and adequate service; “This, of course, proposes a limitation on the purposes for which gas may be utilized. In order to be fully effective it would be necessary to extend the Commission’s jurisdiction to intrastate sales because the great bulk of gas sold for so-called inferior industrial uses is either sold in the field or by distributing companies over which the Commission does not have jurisdiction. The Commission, however, is aware of the problem and in certificate cases it does give consideration to the proposed uses of the gas in question. The Commission believes that, under the present act, it may give proper consideration to this matter in certificate proceedings.” In light of this language, it is clear that the Commission fully realizes the distinction between the power it enjoys under § 7 and complete allocation power. And we feel that this distinction entirely disposes of those contentions of respondents based on the Commission’s purported ambivalent behavior. There is a broader principle here which also stands in opposition to respondents’ contentions. When Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act, it was motivated by a desire “to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies.” Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 364 U. S. 137, 147. To that end, Congress “meant to create a comprehensive and effective regulatory scheme.” Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507, 520. See Public Utilities Comm’n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456, 467. It is true, of course, that Congress did not desire comprehensive federal regulation; much authority was reserved for the States. But, it is equally clear that Congress did not desire that an important aspect of this field be left unregulated. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra. Therefore, when a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to approach the problem negatively, thus raising the possibility that a “no man’s land” will be created. Compare Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U. S. 1. That is to say, in a borderline case where congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs. In this case, the dispute is over the “economic” waste of gas which has been committed to transportation in interstate commerce outside the producing State. The Commission has not attempted to exert its influence over such “physically” wasteful practices as improper well spacing and the flaring of unused gas which result in the entire loss of gas and are properly of concern to the producing State; nor has the Commission attempted to regulate the “economic” aspects of gas used within the producing State. Respondents contend that, even in this posture, the Commission has usurped the functions of state regulating bodies but we cannot agree. In the 1936 Federal Trade Commission Report, upon which respondents so heavily rely, there was some mention of control of the end use of gas and, as we have said, this report was strongly oriented towards state regulation. However, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, the primary emphasis was on physical waste of gas within the producing State and the reference to end use probably contemplated the use of gas in gasoline extraction and the manufacture of carbon black. 271 F. 2d, at 947. There is no indication that the Federal Trade Commission or Congress was thinking in "terms of state-controlled “economic” conservation of gas committed to interstate commerce. Moreover, it is questionable whether any State could be expected to take the initiative in enforcing this type of “economic” conservation. A producing State might wish to prolong its gas reserves for as long as possible but producing States have no control over the use to which gas is put in another State. See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U. S. 157; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553; Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229. Consuming States may control the end use of gas, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm’n, 341 U. S. 329, but the deficiencies of this system in the present context are apparent — -unless all States cooperate in enforcing a common regulation, the producer may pick a State which is sufficiently anxious for this scarce resource that it will take gas irrespective of the use. Therefore, it appears that, consistent with the congressional purpose of leaving no “attractive gap” in regulation, we must conclude that the “end-use” factor was properly of concern to the Commission. Price. As we read the opinion, the Commission’s second objection to certification was based on its forecast that this and similar direct sales of gas at unregulated prices higher than those allowed in sales for resale would attract gas to the high-bidding direct purchasers and thus lever upwards field prices both in direct sales and sales for resale. Respondents claim that this "policy” consideration masks the Commission’s true purpose in this proceeding, which, according to respondents, is to bar direct sales absolutely, thus forcing all gas transactions into regulated channels. And respondents argue that such an absolute bar runs contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in § 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act quoted supra, the section which limits the FPC’s jurisdiction to sales for resale in interstate commerce. Were respondents correct in their interpretation of the Commission’s action in this case, we would be forced to agree that the Commission had overstepped its bounds. Certainly such action would be contrary to our previous statements that the term “public convenience and necessity” connotes a flexible balancing process, in the course of which all the factors are weighed prior to final determination. United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., supra. Indeed, as respondents argue, such a fiat rule would be doubly objectionable here because Congress has not given the Commission jurisdiction over direct sales. However, we cannot agree that the Commission propounded an absolute rule in this case. Examination of the opinion reveals recurrent reference to the absence of any one controlling factor; as the Commission stated, “countervailing factors suffice to tip the balance against the grant of the authority requested by Transco.” 21 F. P. C., at 141. (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to find any indication of the flat rule mentioned by respondents in language such as this. Furthermore, if there were any lingering doubt on this point, it is dispelled by the fact that the Commission has, on many occasions, held that transportation of gas sold directly to the consumer is in the public interest when the reasons advanced by the applicant have been sufficiently strong. See, e. g., Houston Texas Gas & Oil Corp., 16 F. P. C. 118. On this point, the Commission’s actions speak louder than respondents’ unsupported allegations. See Northern Natural Gas Co., 15 F. P. C. 1634. Respondents also argue that the Commission is opposed to this transaction merely because the underlying sale is a direct sale not subject to the Commission’s primary jurisdiction. However, a fair reading of the Commission’s opinion as a whole reveals that the Commission did not exalt form over substance in an attempt to aggrandize the scope of its jurisdiction; rather, whenever the Commission discussed the non jurisdictional nature of this sale, it tied this discussion into an analysis of one or the other of the substantive evils it was seeking to prevent — “inferior” use or increased prices to consumers generally. The question for consideration in this section, therefore, is whether in a § 7 proceeding the Commission may consider sales price or, more accurately, the effect the inflated price charged in one sale will have on future field prices. We have recently answered this question in favor of the Commission’s jurisdiction. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 391, where we stated that the Commission could decide whether: “[T]he proposed price is not in keeping with the public interest because it is out of line or because its approval might result in a triggering of general price rises However, respondents point out that the underlying sale in that case was a sale for resale and thus independently subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction. Where such independent jurisdiction does not exist because of the bar in § 1 (b), respondents claim that the Commission’s power of notice is curtailed. This Court has never been faced with precisely this problem, but on several occasions we have been called upon to consider arguments very similar to the one advanced here. For example, in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 581, it was held that, in fixing a rate base for the measurement of interstate wholesale rates, ■ the Commission might take into account the value of the pipeline company’s production and gathering facilities, even though the Commission had no direct jurisdiction over these facilities because of the bar in § 1 (b). The contention which was rejected in Colorado Interstate has a familiar ring in the present context: According to the unsuccessful litigant, when the FPC includes production and gathering facilities in a rate base, “it regulates the production and gathering of natural gas contrary to the provisions of § 1 (b) of the Act.” Id., at 600. Similarly, in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 324 U. S. 635, 646, it was said in dictum that: “The Commission, while it lacks authority to fix rates for direct industrial sales, may take those rates into consideration when it fixes the rates for interstate wholesale sales which are subject to its jurisdiction.” These cases, while not in themselves controlling, indicate at least that respondents’ argument is overly broad. However, to decide a particular case we must return to the consideration discussed in the previous section — the Act contemplates comprehensive regulation in the public interest and the critical inquiry is whether Congress intended state or federal authority to govern. In the present case, the Commission was concerned with the effects this certification might have in the future on field prices generally. The Commission was attempting to consider not only the interests of consumers in New York but those in all States. To be compared with the problem before the Commission are the determinations that a consuming state commission may properly make in exercising authority over a direct sale. Certainly, the consuming State can regulate retail rates at which gas can be sold within the State. E. g., Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507. This power was recognized at the time the Act was passed, see Pow'ell, Note, Physics and Law — Commerce in Gas and Electricity, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, and it is clear that Congress excepted federal regulation of direct sales precisely for this reason. See H. R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2. But, in this case the Commission has not objected to the retail rate and we need not decide whether there are limits on the Commission’s power in this hypothetical situation. The very nature of the present problem, entailing as it does considerations that overstep the bounds of any one State, illustrates the improbability that state commissions could or would attempt to deal with it; it seems clear that considerations of this sort are uniquely fitted for federal scrutiny. Particularly relevant in this connection is this Court’s decision in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507. In that case, it was held that a state commission may regulate retail sales, even though the gas was brought from out-of-state sources. The pipeline company argued that conflicting regulations enforced by different state bodies, particularly regulations concerned with interruption of service, might place it in an untenable position. The Court answered this argument by stating that: “There is no evidence thus far of substantial conflict in either respect and we do not see that the probability of serious conflict is so strong as to outweigh the vital local interests to which we have referred requiring regulation by the states. Moreover, if such conflict should develop, the matter of interrupting service is one largely related, as appellees say, to transportation and thus within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to control, in accommodation of any conflicting interests among various states.” Id., at 523. (Emphasis added.) The point is, as we have stated, that Congress did not desire an “attractive gap” in its regulatory scheme; rather, Congress intended to impose a comprehensive regulatory system on the transportation, production, and sale of this valuable natural resource. Therefore, when we are presented with an attempt by the federal authority to control a problem that is not, by its very nature, one with which state regulatory commissions can be expected to deal, the conclusion is irresistible that Congress desired regulation by federal authority rather than nonregulation. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 232 F. 2d 467. Respondents’ final argument on this point is that the Commission abused its discretion in denying certification because it took cognizance of facts dehors the record and because it did not pay sufficient attention to the recorded testimony of respondents’ expert concerning air pollution. The first objection — that the Commission erred in going outside the record — was rejected by the Court of Appeals and we concur in that conclusion. According to the statute, the Commission is required to determine whether certification is in the “present or future public convenience and necessity.” (Emphasis added.) Obedient to this command, the Commission did forecast the future and concluded that widespread direct sales at high prices would probably result in price increases. Respondents appear to be claiming that the Commission should have adduced testimonial and documentary evidence to the effect that this forecast would come true. However, we do not think that the Commission is so limited in its formulation of policy considerations. Rather, we think that a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 391. It should also be noted that there has been a considerable showing made by the petitioners and state regulatory commissions appearing as amici curiae to the effect that the Commission’s forecast is well founded. Moreover, as a matter of common sense, it would seem difficult to deny that the channeling of vast quantities of a wasting resource into unregulated transactions at a high price will result in scarcity to other consumers and a general price increase. Cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 332 U. S. 507, 521, n. 19. Respondents’ last point is that insufficient weight was afforded the evidence concerning air pollution. Con-cededly, the testimony of Con. Ed.’s expert witness, the Commissioner of the Department of Air Pollution Control in New York City, was entitled to great weight. However, as the New York Commissioner himself admitted, it was not possible for him to establish a definite relation between injury to health and the stack emissions at the Waterside station.. More importantly, it was not shown that other methods — particularly the use of gas presently available to Con. Ed. under other forms of service— could not be used to solve the problem. Consequently, we cannot say that the Commission acted irrationally in concluding that Con. Ed.’s proof was insufficient. See Charleston & Western Carolina R. Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 241, 234 F. 2d 62. Neither this Court nor the Commission holds in this case that sales to pipelines are generally more in accord with the public interest than other sales; nor do we authorize the elimination of direct sales of gas under appropriate circumstances nor the denial of a certificate to any arbitrarily chosen group of purchasers. All we hold is that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in considering, among other factors, those of end use, preemption of pipeline facilities and price in deciding that the public convenience and necessity did not require the issuance of the certificate requested. The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be Reversed. Section 7 (e), 15 U. S. C. § 717f (e), provides: “(e) Except in the cases governed by the provisos contained in subsection (c) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application, if it is found that the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of the Act and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, sale, operation, construction, extension, or acquisition, to the extent authorized by the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied. The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.” In addition to the petitioning Federal Power Commission and respondents Transco and Con. Ed., several other parties have been involved in this litigation. The City of New York is a named respondent and the petitioners in No. 46 include the National Coal Association, the United Mine Workers of America, and the Fuels Research Council, Inc. Several parties have filed briefs as amici curiae in this Court, including the regulatory commissions of California, Michigan, and Wisconsin. These state commissions have argued in support of the Federal Power Commission’s position. See F. P. C., Natural Gas Investigation (1948), Docket G-580, Olds-Draper Report, pp. 6-14. The cases in which the Commission has considered the end-use factor are collected in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 271 F. 2d, at 949, n. 27. The Commission’s long-standing conclusion that the use of gas under industrial boilers is an inferior use is amply supported by authority. See, e. g., Blachly and Oatman, Natural Gas and the Public Interest, 142. Federal Trade Commission, Final Report to the Senate of the United States, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 84-A. Section 1 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §717 (a), refers explicitly to this report. Section 11 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717j, provides: “(a) In case two or more States propose to the Congress compacts dealing with the conservation, production, transportation, or distribution of natural gas it shall be the duty of the Commission to assemble pertinent information relative to the matters covered in any such proposed compact, to make public and to report to the Congress information so obtained, together with such recommendations for further legislation as may appear to be appropriate or necessary to carry out the purposes of such proposed compact and to aid in the conservation of natural-gas resources within the United States and in the orderly, equitable, and economic production, transportation, and distribution of natural gas. “ (b) It shall be the duty of the Commission to assemble and keep current pertinent information relative to the effect and operation of any compact between two or more States heretofore or hereafter approved by the Congress, to make such information public, and to report to the Congress, from time to time, the information so obtained, together with such recommendations as may appear to be appropriate or necessary to promote the purposes of such compact. “(c) In carrying out the purposes of this chapter, the Commission shall, so far as practicable, avail itself of the services, records, reports, and information of the executive departments and other agencies of the Government, and the President may, from time to time, direct that such services and facilities be made available to the Commission.” Other indications that Congress initially contemplated state control over conservation are found in the remarks of Congressman Mapes, a member of the committee reporting the bill that became the Natural Gas Act, 81 Cong. Rec. 6726, and Col. Chantland, counsel representing the Federal Trade Commission before Congress, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67. Section 7 (c) of the Act, as originally enacted in 1938, provided, in part, that: “(e) No natural-gas company shall undertake the construction or extension of any facilities for the transportation of natural gas to a market in which natural gas is already being served by another natural-gas company, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, or engage in transportation by means of any new or additional facilities, or sell natural gas in any such market, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require such new construction or operation of any such facilities or extensions thereof . . . .” 52 Stat. 825. The Commission’s proposed amendment was first introduced as H. R. 4819, 87 Cong. Rec. 4301, and later resubmitted as H. R. 5249. The bill, as proposed by the Commission, insofar as here pertinent read: “No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . . .” Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5249, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1. This section, as finally enacted, reads: “(c) No natural-gas company or person which will be a natural-gas company upon completion of any proposed construction or extension shall engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or undertake the construction or extension of any facilities therefor, or acquire or operate any such facilities or extensions thereof, unless there is in force with respect to such natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts or operations . . . .” S. Rep. No. 948 states that: “The bill (H. R. 5249) would require a certificate from the Federal Power Commission to engage in the transportation or sale of natural gas or the construction, extension, or operation of natural-gas facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. At the present time the Natural Gas Act requires a certificate of public convenience, only for the extension of construction or extension of service 'to a market in which natural gas is already being served by another natural-gas company.’ The terms of this limitation are not defined by the act. Long preliminary investigations are required to determine whether or not the Federal Power Commission has jurisdiction to grant or to deny a certificate. Too, the Commission has held in the case of an extension by a gas company to a market already served by a competing company that the views or interests of competing fuel companies cannot be considered. “Provisions of the Natural Gas Act empower the Commission to prevent uneconomic extensions and waste, but it can so regulate such powers only when the extension is to ‘a market in which natural gas is already being served by another natural-gas company.’ Thus the possibilities of waste, uneconomic and uncontrolled extensions are multiple and tremendous. The present bill would correct this glaring inadequacy of the act. It would also authorize the Commission to examine costs, finances, necessity, feasibility, and adequacy of proposed services. The .characteristics of their rate structure could be studied. Obviously these are powers that Federal Power Commission should have and should exercise in the public interest.” The passage excerpted and relied upon by the Court of Appeals should be read with reference to the footnote appended thereto. In this footnote, the Commission stated: “In its Opinion No. 93-A, which accompanied its order of September 24, 1943, issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. for the construction and operation of a natural-gas pipe line from Texas to West Virginia, the commission stated: “ 'Interveners representing coal operators, labor unions, and railroads, having a vital stake in the coal industry in the Appalachian area, oppose the granting of a certificate for the construction of applicant’s proposed natural-gas pipe line principally on the ground that the present and future fuel needs of that area can be adequately met by coal. It is contended that the use of natural gas for industrial and space-heating purposes constitutes a dissipation of the natural-gas resources, and threatens the coal industry with ruinous competition. Considerable evidence was adduced by these interveners for the purpose of supporting such contentions. “ ‘We recognize the force of these arguments and are not unmindful of the economic and social aspects of the problem posed by these interveners. We are not authorized, however, to regulate rates for natural gas sold directly to industrial consumers, which class of gas sales furnishes the keenest competition to the coal industry. Nor does our power to suspend rates extend to indirect sales of natural gas for industrial purposes. It appears, therefore, that the Natural Gas Act does not vest this Commission with complete and comprehensive authority which would permit us to act as arbiter over the end uses of natural gas.’ ” F. P. C., The First Five Years Under the Natural Gas Act 15, n. 14. (Emphasis added.) See the Commission’s statement reproduced in S. Rep. No. 1234, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6. The Senate Committee itself recognized that, following the 1942 amendment to the Act, the Commission was directly concerned with conservation problems. Id., at 1-2. Under § 7 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (a), the Commission has authority to compel extensions, though not enlargements, of a natural gas company’s transportation facilities unless “to do so would impair its ability to render adequate service to its customers.” See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 79, H. R. 1758, and H. R. 982, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 165. Id., at 3. Id., at 165. During the course of hearings held in 1947 on proposed amendments to the Natural Gas Act, Commissioner Smith summed up the position of the Commission and explained the language used in the 1944 report along substantially the same lines as we have pursued. Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 2185, H. R. 2235, H. R. 2292, H. R. 2569, and H. R. 2956, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 685-686. The helplessness of a consuming State in this regard is dramatically illustrated by the opinion of the New York Public Service Commission in In re Cabot Gas Corp., 16 P. U. R. (N. S.) 443 (1936). The language used by the Chairman of the Commission is particularly relevant in this context: “There can be but one opinion among those who believe in the conservation of natural resources. They should be developed not to benefit a few individuals but in the interests of public welfare present and future. Our natural gas resources ought to be conserved and there is probably no field where the Federal government acting in the interests of the entire country and to protect the welfare of the future could accomplish more than in the natural gas industry. From a conservation viewpoint, I thoroughly agree with Commissioner Burritt, and if I could see how a denial of the present petition would work to this end, I would vote to refuse the application; but will such denial produce the desired results ? “The field from which gas is to be taken by the petitioner is in northern Pennsylvania and southern New York. Apparently, far more of the gas will come from Pennsylvania than from New York and over the extraction of gas in the state of Pennsylvania, this Commission has practically no control. It is possible for Pennsylvania companies to take all of the gas from this field unless the New York companies remove the gas before the field is exhausted. “Further, the Public Service Commission has been given no adequate authority to determine how the natural gas resources of this state, to say nothing of the resources of Pennsylvania, shall be developed. We have no powers directly to control the amount of gas that is taken from any field and our indirect powers are so limited that it is doubtful if much could be accomplished. The state of New York receives far more gas from sources located beyond its boundaries than it exports to any adjoining state and the conservation of natural gas • resources in the various states cannot be properly brought about except through voluntary action of the states or by the Federal government. Neither one is yet operative and while attention has been given to electric interstate commerce, no effective steps have been taken to conserve or regulate the distribution of natural gas, where it is so urgently needed. “In view of the lack of authority conferred upon this Commission to conserve natural resources, the question becomes primarily what will be gained to consumers in the state of New York if the petition is denied. It is stated that about 80 or 90 per cent of the gas furnished by the petitioner will be used for industrial purposes and that only from 10 to 20 per cent will go to the general public, the inference being that the saving to the companies purchasing the gas will go to enrich a few stockholders. Let us assume such are the facts. Who will gain if those benefited by the petition are deprived of their profits or advantages by a denial of the petition? This Commission does not control the use that will be made of the gas from the field tapped by the petitioner. There are many other companies tapping the supply and we have no means of determining where, when, or to whom the gas will be sold. If restriction is imposed on the use of it in New York, it may go to Pennsylvania; and if the petitioner is not allowed to supply the areas which it is proposed to serve, the gas will go to other areas and there is no assurance that it will be used any more beneficially from a public viewpoint than it will be if the petition is granted. “As stated, I am heartily in favor of the conservation of natural gas as well as other natural resources; but in this specific case, will the granting or the denial of the petition work to the benefit of the people of New York? The benefit to the area to be supplied by the petitioner is definite, it is known, it is sure. But if the petition is denied, who will be benefited? There is no assurance upon this point. The answer is speculative and uncertain. There is nothing to assure us that the denial of the petition would conserve the gas supply. Is it not likely that the benefits would merely be diverted from one group or one locality to another?” It might be argued that this attitude is out of date since the Commissioner was speaking prior to the enactment of § 11 of the Natural Gas Act. See note 7, supra. However, the success of § 11 can be measured by examination of the Olds-Draper Report, note 3, supra, at pp. 75-78. The Commission has recently set field prices for sales for resale in the area where this gas was bought at 18 cents per Mcf. See 25 Fed. Reg. 9578. The sales price to Con. Ed. in this direct sale was 1% cents per Mcf. over the line at which the Commission is trying to hold field prices. Any reading of the Commission’s opinion which does not keep this fact in mind is, we believe, bound to be incomplete. Compare the cases which have held that it was error for the Commission to refuse to consider certain factors within its power of notice. E. g., City of Pittsburgh v. Federal Power Comm’n, 237 F. 2d 741. Many of the cases in which the Commission has certificated the transportation of gas pursuant to direct sales are listed in Brief for Respondent Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, pp. 24-30, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n, No. 369, 1956 Term. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that certain language used by the Commission indicated that the Commission was per se opposed'to direct sales. The Court concentrated on the passage in which the Commission stated that certification would have the adverse effect of: “[Mjaking it more difficult to meet the requirements of smaller purchasers in the event arrangements of this type become widespread.” 21 F. P. C., at 399-400. and it felt that this was tantamount to saying that: “[0]nly pipe lines should purchase gas for only they engage in interstate transportation and thereby come under authority of the Commission.” 271 F. 2d, at 953. However, the thrust of the Commission’s reasoning on this point can be better grasped by reviewing the proposition as it was argued to the Commission by its staff. The Commission’s staff contended that: “The purchase of natural gas by and transportation for the ultimate consumer, as proposed herein, may make it difficult for pipe line companies to purchase gas at reasonable prices for resale to other customers who require the gas for superior domestic and commercial mes and thus may be contrary to the public interest.” (Emphasis added.) Cf. United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U. S. 236, 241, where the Court upheld the Interstate Commerce Commission’s forecast of the future public convenience and necessity over an objection that there was no absolute showing that the forecast would come true. The amicus briefs of two California public utilities, Southern California Gas and Southern Counties Gas, reveal that the competitive bidding of California Edison Co., a large industrial user, for direct purchases in the field has already forced up the prices to domestic consumers in California. Brief Amici Curiae of the Southern California Gas Co. and the Southern Counties Gas Co. of California, pp. 13-14. Several other industrial users are also contemplating taking advantage of an X-20 type service. See Reply Brief for the Federal Power Commission, pp. A-5. In fact, the record reveals that Transco has suggested the possibility of providing X-20 service to its other customers, R. 71a, and several of these customers are negotiating for such service. R. 63a-71a. It is interesting to note that an Assistant to the Vice President of Con. Ed. testified that the producers sold the gas directly to Con. Ed. with a limitation on resale because “they (the producers) were allergic to proceedings before the Federal Power Commission.” R. 108a. R. 48a, 111a. At the time certification for the X-20 service was sought, Con. Ed. was using gas on an interruptible basis at a rate that averaged 78,578 Mcf. per day. A substantial amount of this gas was fired under Con. Ed.’s boilers, although not under the boilers at the Waterside station. No reason appears in the record why Con. Ed. could not have used the gas it was then receiving under its Waterside boilers to alleviate, if not solve, the air pollution problem. See R. 89a-92a.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. MOTION PICTURE ADVERTISING SERVICE CO., INC. No. 75. Argued December 8, 1952. Decided February 2, 1953. James L. Morrisson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Acting Assistant Attorney General Clapp, Charles H. Weston and W. T. Kelley. Louis L. Rosen argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles Rosen and William B. Cozad. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent is a producer and distributor of advertising motion pictures which depict and describe commodities offered for sale by commercial establishments. Respondent contracts with theatre owners for the display of these advertising films and ships the films from its place of business in Louisiana to theatres in twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia. These contracts run for terms up to five years, the majority being for one or two years. A substantial number of them contain a provision that the theatre owner will display only advertising films furnished by respondent, with the exception of films for charities or for governmental organizations, or announcements of coming attractions. Respondent and three other companies in the same business (against which proceedings were also brought) together had exclusive arrangements for advertising films with approximately three-fourths of the total number of theatres in the United States which display advertising films for compensation. Respondent had exclusive contracts with almost 40 percent of the theatres in the area where it operates. The Federal Trade Commission, the petitioner, filed a complaint charging respondent with the use of “unfair methods of competition” in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717, 719, 52 Stat. Ill, 15 U. S. C. § 45. The Commission found that respondent was in substantial competition with other companies engaged in the business of distributing advertising films, that its exclusive contracts have limited the outlets for films of competitors and have forced some competitors out of business because of their inability to obtain outlets for their advertising films. It held by a divided vote that the exclusive contracts are unduly restrictive of competition when they extend for periods in excess of one year. It accordingly entered a cease and desist order which prohibits respondent from entering into any such contract that grants an exclusive privilege for more than a year or from continuing in effect any exclusive provision of an existing contract longer than a year after the date of service in the Commission’s order. 47 F. T. C. 378. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusive contracts are not unfair methods of competition and that their prohibition would not be in the public interest. 194 F. 2d 633. The “unfair methods of competition,” which are condemned by § 5 (a) of the Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304. Congress advisedly left the concept flexible to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business. Id., pp. 310-312. It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act (see Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 453) — to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts (see Fashion Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457, 463, 466), as well as to condemn as “unfair methods of competition” existing violations of them. See Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 691. The Commission found in the present case that respondent’s exclusive contracts unreasonably restrain competition and tend to monopoly. Those findings are supported by substantial evidence. This is not a situation where by the nature of the market there is room for newcomers, irrespective of the existing restrictive practices. The number of outlets for the films is quite limited. And due to the exclusive contracts, respondent and the three other major companies have foreclosed to competitors 75 percent of all available outlets for this business throughout the United States. It is, we think, plain from the Commission’s findings that a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an “unfair method of competition” within the meaning of § 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. An attack is made on that part of the order which restricts the exclusive contracts to one-year terms. It is argued that one-year contracts will not be practicable. It is said that the expenses of securing these screening contracts do not warrant one-year agreements, that investment of capital in the business would not be justified without assurance of a market for more than one year, that theatres frequently demand guarantees for more than a year or otherwise refuse to exhibit advertising films. These and other business requirements are the basis of the argument that exclusive contracts of a duration in excess of a year are necessary for the conduct of the business of the distributors. The Commission considered this argument and concluded that, although the exclusive contracts were beneficial to the distributor and preferred by the theatre owners, their use should be restricted in the public interest. The Commission found that the term of one year had become a standard practice and that the continuance of exclusive contracts so limited would not be an undue restraint upon competition, in view of the compelling business reasons for some exclusive arrangement. The precise impact of a particular practice on the trade is for the Commission, not the courts, to determine. The point where a method of competition becomes “unfair” within the meaning of the Act will often turn on the exigencies of a particular situation, trade practices, or the practical requirements of the business in question. Certainly we cannot say that exclusive contracts in this field should have been banned in their entirety or not at all, that the Commission exceeded the limits of its allowable judgment (see Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608, 612; Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 726-727) in limiting their term to one year. The Court of Appeals held that the contracts between respondent and the theatres were contracts of agency and therefore governed by Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568. This was on the theory that respondent furnishes the films by bailment to the exhibitors in exchange for a contract for personal services which the exhibitors undertake to perform. But the Curtis case would be relevant here only if § 3 of the Clayton Act were involved. The vice of the exclusive contract in this particular field is in its tendency to restrain competition and to develop a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. And when the Sherman Act is involved the crucial fact is the impact of the particular practice on competition, not the label that it carries. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 280. Finally, respondent urges that the sole issue raised in the Commission’s complaint had been adjudicated in a former proceeding instituted by the Commission which resulted in a cease and desist order. 36 F. T. C. 957. But that was a proceeding to put an end to a conspiracy between respondent and other distributors involving the use of these exclusive agreements. The present proceeding charges no conspiracy; it is directed against individual acts of respondent. The plea of res judicata is therefore not available since the issues litigated and determined in the present case are not the same as those in the earlier one. Cf. Tait v. Western Maryland R. Co., 289 U. S. 620, 623. Reversed. Comparable findings and like orders were entered in each of the three companion cases. In the Matter of Reid H. Ray Film, Industries, 47 F. T. C. 326; In the Matter of Alexander Film Co., 47 F. T. C. 345; In the Matter of United Film Ad Service, Inc., 47 F. T. C. 362. The Commission said: “Under the general practice the representative of the respondent first contacts the theater to determine if space is available for screen advertising and makes such arrangements as conditions warrant with respect to such space. In this way respondent’s representative is able to show prospective advertisers where space is available. In contacting the theater it is necessary for the respondent to estimate the amount of space it will be able to sell to advertisers. Since film advertising space in theaters is limited to four, five, or six advertisements, it is not unreasonable for respondent to contract for all space available in such theaters, particularly in territories canvassed by its salesmen at regular and frequent intervals. “It is therefore the conclusion of the Commission in the circumstances here that an exclusive screening agreement for a period of 1 year is not an undue restraint upon competition.” 47 F. T. C., at 389. A suggestion is made that respondent needs a period longer than one year in view of the fact that the contracts with advertisers are often not coterminous with the exclusive screening agreements, due in large part to the delays in obtaining advertising contracts after the exclusive screening agreements have been executed. The Commission rejected this contention, stating that by custom and by the terms of the exclusive contracts the theatre completes the screening of advertisements as required by the advertising contracts, even though those contracts extend beyond the expiration date of the exclusive screening agreement. We have concluded that the order which the Commission entered in this case is consistent with that construction. It does not prevent the completion of any particular advertising contract after the expiration of the exclusive screening agreement. The order merely prevents respondent from requiring the theatre owner to show only its films after that date. It does not prevent the theatre owner from making an otherwise exclusive agreement with another distributor at that time. No theatre owner is a party to this proceeding. The cease and desist order binds only respondent. This section makes unlawful a lease, sale, or contract for sale which substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly. 15 U. S. C. § 14.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. FOOD STORE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 347, AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS & BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO No. 73-370. Argued March 18-19, 1974 Decided May 20, 1974 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Mark L. Evans, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Patrick Hardin, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Mozart G. Ratner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the. brief were Bernard Ries, Joseph M. Jacobs, and Judith A. Lonnquist. Fred Holroyd and Jerry Kronenberg filed a brief for Heck’s Inc., intervenor below. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Board refused to include, in a cease-and-desist order against Heck’s Inc., a provision sought by respondent union, as charging party, that Heck’s reimburse respondent’s litigation expenses and excess organizational costs incurred as a result of Heck’s unlawful conduct. The Board’s stated reason was that “it would not on balance effectuate the policies of the [National Labor Relations] Act to require reimbursement with respect to such costs in the circumstances here.” Heck’s Inc., 191 N. L. R. B. 886, 889 (1971). Respondent prevailed, however, in enforcement and review proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court enlarged the Board’s order by adding provisions, paragraphs 2 (e) and (f), that Heck’s “[p]ay to the Union any extraordinary organizational costs which the Union incurred by reason of Heck’s policy of resisting organizational efforts and refusing to bargain, such costs to be determined at the compliance stage of these proceedings,” and “[p]ay to the Board and the Union the costs and expenses incurred by them in the investigation, preparation, presentation, and conduct of these cases before the National Labor Relations Board and the courts, such costs to be determined at the compliance stage of these proceedings.” 155 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 476 F. 2d 546 (1973). We granted certiorari to consider whether the enlargement of this order was a proper exercise of the authority of courts of appeals under §§ 10 (e) and (f) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146,, 29 U. S. C. §§ 160 (e) and (f), to “make and enter a decree . . . modifying, and enforcing as so modified” the order of the Board, 414 U. S. 1062 (1973). We reverse. Heck’s Inc. operates a chain of discount stores in the Southeast section of the country. Its resistance to union organization has resulted in some 11 proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board. This case grew out of its efforts to prevent organization by respondent union of Heck’s employees at its store in Clarksburg, West Virginia. The case was twice before the Board. In its first decision, the Board determined that Heck’s violated § 8 (a) (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (1), by threatening and coercively interrogating employees during respondent’s organizational campaign, and by conducting a nonsecret poll to ascertain employee support for the union. Further, the Board found that Heck’s “flagrant repetition” of similar unfair labor practices at its other stores and its “extensive violations of the Act” in the Clarksburg store justified an inference that Heck’s did not entertain any good-faith doubt concerning majority support for respondent union when the company refused to recognize and bargain with the union on the basis of authorization cards signed by a majority of employees. Accordingly, the Board found that Heck’s violated §§ 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5) and (1). Finally, because Heck’s extensive violations were found to have made a free and fair election impossible, an order directing Heck’s to bargain with the union was entered. The Board rejected, however, the union’s argument that adequate relief required certain additional remedies, including reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs incurred as a result of Heck’s unlawful behavior. Heck’s Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 2231 n. 2 (1968). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enforced the Board’s order, but remanded to the Board for further consideration of additional remedies including reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs. 139 U. S. App. D. C. 383, 433 F. 2d 541 (1970). On remand, the Board amended its original order to encompass certain supplemental remedies, but again refused to order reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs. 191 N. L. R. B. 886. Although the Board found that Heck’s unfair labor practices were "aggravated and pervasive” and that its intransigence had probably caused the union to incur greater litigation expenses and organizational costs, the Board’s rationale, previously mentioned, was that the provision would not effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board reasoned that its “orders must be remedial, not punitive, and collateral losses are not considered in framing a reimbursement order.” Id., at 889 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, a charging party’s participation in the case is, the Board found, primarily for the purpose of protecting its private interests, whereas the Board has the primary responsibility for protecting the public interest. The Board therefore concluded that, although the public interest might also arguably be served “in allowing the Charging Party to recover the costs of its participation in this litigation,” that consideration did not “override the general and well-established principle that litigation expenses are ordinarily not recoverable.” Ibid. (Footnote omitted.) Prior to review of its supplementary decision by the Court of Appeals, the Board issued its decision in Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N. L. R. B. 1234 (1972), in which the Board ordered reimbursement of litigation expenses in the context of a finding that an employer had engaged in “frivolous litigations.” The Board’s opinion in Tiidee reasoned that industrial peace could be best achieved if “speedy access to uncrowded Board and court dockets [were] available” and therefore that an assessment of legal fees would serve the public interest by “discouraging] future frivolous litigation,” id., at 1236. The Board did not explain why those considerations had not led it to order similar relief in this case. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded in the present case that the Board had abandoned its policy against award of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs, stating: “Although the Board in its Supplemental Decision in this case has nowhere characterized the litigation as frivolous, it has used the language of ‘clearly aggravated and pervasive’ misconduct; and in its original opinion it questioned Heck’s good faith because of its ‘flagrant repetition of conduct previously found unlawful’ at other Heck’s stores. It would appear that the Board has now recognized that employers who follow a pattern of resisting union organization, and who to that end unduly burden the processes of the Board and the courts, should be obliged, at the very least, to respond in terms of making good the legal expenses to which they have put the charging parties and the Board. We hold that the case before us is an appropriate one for according such relief.” 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 106, 476 F. 2d, at 551. The Court of Appeals also viewed Tiidee as the signal of a shift in the Board’s attitude toward excess organizational costs. In Tiidee, the Board refused to order reimbursement of excess organizational costs because “ ‘no nexus between [the employer’s] unlawful conduct’ ” had been proved. Ibid. Since, in the instant case, the Board had indicated that Heck’s violations had probably caused respondent to incur excess organizational costs, a nexus' was proved and accordingly the court held that respondent was entitled to an order directing reimbursement of organizational costs. In the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals, in our view, improperly exercised its authority under §§10 (e) and (f) to modify Board orders, and the case must therefore be returned to the Board. Congress has invested the Board, not the courts, with broad discretion to order a violator “to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of [the Act].” 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c); see, e. g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U. S. 168, 176 (1973). This case does not present the exceptional situation in which crystal-clear Board error renders a remand an unnecessary formality. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426 (1941); Communications Workers v. NLRB, 362 U. S. 479 (1960). For it cannot be gainsaid that the finding here that Heck’s asserted at least “debatable” defenses to the unfair labor practice charges, whereas objections to the representation election in Tiidee were “patently frivolous,” might have been viewed by the Board as putting the question of remedy in a different light. We cannot say that the Board, in performing its appointed function of balancing conflicting interests, could not reasonably decide that where “debatable” defenses are asserted, the public and private interests in affording the employer a determination of his “debatable” defenses, unfettered by the prospect of bearing his adversary’s litigation costs, outweigh the public interest in uncrowded dockets. There are, however, facial inconsistencies between the Board’s opinion in this case and the Tiidee decision, and the Court of Appeals therefore correctly declined to resolve those inconsistencies by substituting Board counsel’s rationale for that of the Board. 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 107 n. 8, 476 F. 2d, at 552 n. 8; see NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U. S. 438, 444 (1965); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962). The integrity of the administrative process demands no less than that the Board, not its legal representative, exercise the discretionary judgment which Congress has entrusted to it. But since a plausible reconciliation by the Board of the seeming inconsistency was reasonably possible, it was “incompatible with the orderly function of the process of judicial review,” NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, at 444, for the Court of Appeals to enlarge the Heck’s order without first affording the Board an opportunity to clarify the inconsistencies. It is a guiding principle of administrative law, long recognized by this Court, that “an administrative determination in which is imbedded a legal question open to judicial review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative agency, after its error has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy committed to its charge.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145 (1940); see Fly v. Heitmeyer, 309 U. S. 146, 148 (1940); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 55 (1948); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 20 (1952); Konigs- berg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 43-44 (1961). Thus, when a reviewing court concludes that an agency invested with broad discretion to fashion remedies has apparently abused that discretion by omitting a remedy justified in the court’s view by the factual circumstances, remand to the agency for reconsideration, and not enlargement of the agency order, is ordinarily the reviewing court’s proper course. Application of that general principle in this case best respects the congressional scheme investing the Board and not the courts with broad powers to fashion remedies - that will effectuate national labor policy. It also affords the Board the opportunity, through additional evidence or findings, to reframe its order better to effectuate that policy. See FPC v. Idaho Power Co., supra, at 20; FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra, at 55. Moreover, in this case, if the Court of Appeals correctly read Tiidee as having signaled a change of policy in respect of reimbursement, a remand was necessary, because the Board should be given the first opportunity to determine whether the new policy should be applied retroactively. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as paragraphs 2 (e) and (f) were added to the Board’s order, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with direction that it be remanded to the Board for further proceedings. It is so ordered. The many proceedings are cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 101, 102 n. 1, 476 F. 2d 546, 547 n. 1. The Board also rejected respondent’s requests for provisions directing the mailing of notices to employees; either a company-wide bargaining order or a shifting of the burden of proof in future cases to require Heck’s to demonstrate its good faith in rejecting authorization cards; injunctions under § 10 (j) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §160(j); increased access to employees; and a “make-whole” provision directing compensation to employees for collective-bargaining benefits lost as a result of the employer’s unlawful conduct. The remand was ordered in light of the Court of Appeals’ intervening decision in International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 138 U. S. App. D. C. 249, 426 F. 2d 1243 (1970), known as the Tiidee Products case, in which the court had remanded for further Board consideration a union’s submission that similar supplementary remedies were necessary where an employer’s refusal to bargain was found to be "a clear and flagrant violation of the law,” and its objections to a representation election were determined to be “patently frivolous.” Id., at 254, 426 F. 2d, at 1248. The Board directed Heck’s to mail notices of the Board’s amended order to the homes of all employees at each of Heck’s store locations; to provide the union with reasonable access for a one-year period to bulletin boards and other places where union notices are normally posted; and to provide the union with a list of names and addresses of all employees at all locations, to be kept current for one year. The Board also refused to order, as sought by respondent, that notices of the Board’s decision be read to assembled groups of employees; that a company wide bargaining order be issued; that the company be required to bargain whenever the union obtained an authorization card majority at other locations; that greater access to employees on company property be granted; and that a “make-whole” provision for reimbursement of dues and fees, and collective-bargaining benefits, lost as a result of the unlawful refusal to bargain, be ordered. In support of this proposition, the Board relied upon Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 7, 11-12 (1940), and NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361, 364 (1951). The Board’s decision in Tiidee was issued after supplementary proceedings following a remand from the Court of Appeals. See n. 3, supra. In an opinion filed April 25, 1974, the Court of Appeals, on review of the Board’s supplementary decision in Tiidee, enforced as modified the Board’s" amended order. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 163 U. S. App. D. C. 347, 502 F. 2d 349. The Court of Appeals made clear that the enlargement of the Board order was based squarely on the Board’s change of policy perceived to have been made by Tiidee. The court refused to decide the question argued by respondent union that, independently of Tiidee, an order of reimbursement should be directed. The Court of Appeals said: “There are, it seems to us, obvious difficulties [in relying upon the subsidiary role of the charging party as a basis for denial of litigation expenses], certainly in the case of an employer who appears to look upon litigation as a convenient means of delaying — and thereby perhaps avoiding — the fatal day of union recognition and collective bargaining. We need not pursue those difficulties in detail, however, for the reason that the Board itself has subsequently departed from the rationale upon which its refusal of litigation expenses in this case is based.” 155 U. S. App. D. C., at 105, 476 F. 2d, at 550 (emphasis added). We thus have no occasion at this time to address the question whether the Board’s broad powers under § 10 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c), to fashion remedies include power to order reimbursement of litigation expenses and excess organizational costs. Appellate courts ordinarily apply the law in effect at the time of the appellate decision, see Bradley v. School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 711 (1974). However, a court reviewing an agency decision following an intervening change of policy by the agency should remand to permit the agency to decide in the first instance whether giving the change retrospective effect will best effectuate the policies underlying the agency’s governing act. In its present posture the case does not, of course, present the question whether Board failure, on remand, to clarify the apparent inconsistency in its decisions would warrant reversal on review. Compare Barrett Line v. United States, 326 U. S. 179 (1945), with FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1946). See L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 587-588 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 947-950 (1965).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THRYV, INC., fka Dex Media, Inc., Petitioner v. CLICK-TO-CALL TECHNOLOGIES, LP, et al. No. 18-916 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued December 9, 2019 Decided April 20, 2020 Mitchell G. Stockwell, Thurston Webb, Amanda N. Brouillette, Kilpatrick Townsend, & Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, Shannon Straw, Thryv, Inc., Glendale, CA, Adam H. Charnes, Jason P. Steed, Kilpatrick Townsend, & Stockton LLP, Dallas, TX, for Petitioner. Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. Inter partes review is an administrative process in which a patent challenger may ask the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to reconsider the validity of earlier granted patent claims. This case concerns a statutorily prescribed limitation of the issues a party may raise on appeal from an inter partes review proceeding. When presented with a request for inter partes review, the agency must decide whether to institute review. 35 U.S.C. § 314. Among other conditions set by statute, if the request comes more than a year after suit against the requesting party for patent infringement, "[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted." § 315(b). "The determination by the [PTO] Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable." § 314(d). In this case, the agency instituted inter partes review in response to a petition from Thryv, Inc., resulting in the cancellation of several patent claims. Patent owner Click-to-Call Technologies, LP, appealed, contending that Thryv's petition was untimely under § 315(b). The question before us: Does § 314(d)'s bar on judicial review of the agency's decision to institute inter partes review preclude Click-to-Call's appeal? Our answer is yes. The agency's application of § 315(b)'s time limit, we hold, is closely related to its decision whether to institute inter partes review and is therefore rendered nonappealable by § 314(d). I The Patent and Trademark Office has several ways "to reexamine-and perhaps cancel-a patent claim that it had previously allowed." Cuozzo Speed Technologies , LLC v. Lee , 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2137, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016). Congress established the procedure at issue here, inter partes review, in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 125 Stat. 284, enacted in 2011. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq. Inter partes review allows third parties to challenge patent claims on grounds of invalidity specified by statute. § 311(b). For inter partes review to proceed, the agency must agree to institute review. § 314. Any person who is not the patent's owner may file a petition requesting inter partes review. § 311(a). The patent owner may oppose institution of inter partes review, asserting the petition's "failure ... to meet any requirement of this chapter." § 313. The AIA sets out prerequisites for institution. Among them, "[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines ... that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition." § 314(a). Most pertinent to this case, "[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent." § 315(b). After receiving the petition and any response, the PTO "Director shall determine whether to institute an inter partes review under this chapter." § 314(b). The Director has delegated institution authority to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board). 37 CFR § 42.4(a) (2019). As just noted, the federal agency's "determination ... whether to institute an inter partes review under this section" is "final and nonappealable." 35 U.S.C. § 314(d). Upon electing to institute inter partes review, the Board conducts a proceeding to evaluate the challenged claims' validity. See § 316. At the conclusion of the proceeding-if review "is instituted and not dismissed"-the Board "issue[s] a final written decision with respect to the patentability of" the challenged claims. § 318(a). "A party dissatisfied with the final written decision ... may appeal the decision" to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. § 319. II Respondent Click-to-Call owns a patent relating to a technology for anonymous telephone calls, U.S. Patent No. 5,818,836 ('836 patent). In 2013, petitioner Thryv sought inter partes review, challenging several of the patent's claims. In opposition, Click-to-Call urged that § 315(b) barred institution of inter partes review because Thryv filed its petition too late. Click-to-Call pointed to an infringement suit filed in 2001, which ended in a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. In Click-to-Call's view, that 2001 suit started § 315(b)'s one-year clock, making the 2013 petition untimely. The Board disagreed. Section 315(b) did not bar the institution of inter partes review, the Board concluded, because a complaint dismissed without prejudice does not trigger § 315(b)'s one-year limit. Finding no other barrier to institution, the Board decided to institute review. After proceedings on the merits, the Board issued a final written decision reiterating its rejection of Click-to-Call's § 315(b) argument and canceling 13 of the patent's claims as obvious or lacking novelty. Click-to-Call appealed, challenging only the Board's determination that § 315(b) did not preclude inter partes review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, agreeing with Thryv and the Director (who intervened on appeal) that § 314(d)'s bar on appeal of the institution decision precludes judicial review of the agency's application of § 315(b). Citing our intervening decision in Cuozzo , see infra , at 1372 - 1373, we granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP v. Oracle Corp. , 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2508, 195 L.Ed.2d 837 (2016). On remand, the Court of Appeals again dismissed the appeal on the same ground. Thereafter, in another case, the en banc Federal Circuit held that "time-bar determinations under § 315(b) are appealable" notwithstanding § 314(d). Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp. , 878 F.3d 1364, 1367 (2018). The majority opinion construed § 314(d)'s reference to the determination whether to institute inter partes review "under this section" as trained on the likelihood-of-success requirement stated in § 314(a). Id. , at 1372. The § 315(b) timeliness determination, the majority concluded, "is not 'closely related' to the institution decision addressed in § 314(a)." Id. , at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo , 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142 ). The majority therefore held that for § 315(b) appeals, § 314(d) does not displace the usual presumption favoring judicial review of agency action. Wi-Fi One , 878 F.3d at 1374-1375. In a concurring opinion, Judge O'Malley emphasized a "simpler" basis for the same conclusion. Id. , at 1375. In her view, § 314(d) shields from review only the agency's assessment of a petition's "substantive adequacy," not questions about the agency's "authority to act." Id. , at 1376. Judge Hughes, joined by Judges Lourie, Bryson, and Dyk, dissented, expressing a position that today's dissent characterizes as "extraordinary." Post , at 1380 - 1381. Those judges concluded that § 314(d) conveys Congress' "clear and unmistakable" "intent to prohibit judicial review of the Board's [inter partes review] institution decision." Wi-Fi One , 878 F.3d at 1378. That prohibition applies to § 315(b) issues, the Federal Circuit dissenters maintained, because § 315(b) "describes when an [inter partes review] may be 'instituted.' " Id. , at 1377, 1378-1379 (quoting § 315(b)). In light of its en banc decision in Wi-Fi One , the Court of Appeals granted panel rehearing in this case. Treating the Board's application of § 315(b) as judicially reviewable, the panel's revised opinion held that the Board erred by instituting review. The petition for inter partes review here was untimely, the Court of Appeals held, because the 2001 infringement complaint, though dismissed without prejudice, started the one-year clock under § 315(b). The court therefore vacated the Board's final written decision, which had invalidated 13 of Click-to-Call's claims for want of the requisite novelty and nonobviousness, and remanded with instructions to dismiss. We granted certiorari to resolve the reviewability issue, 587 U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 2742, 204 L.Ed.2d 1129 (2019), and now vacate the Federal Circuit's judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. III A To determine whether § 314(d) precludes judicial review of the agency's application of § 315(b)'s time prescription, we begin by defining § 314(d)'s scope. Section 314(d)'s text renders "final and nonappealable" the "determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section." § 314(d) (emphasis added). That language indicates that a party generally cannot contend on appeal that the agency should have refused "to institute an inter partes review." We held as much in Cuozzo . There, a party contended on appeal that the agency should have refused to institute inter partes review because the petition failed § 312(a)(3)'s requirement that the grounds for challenging patent claims must be identified "with particularity." 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139 (internal quotation marks omitted). This "contention that the Patent Office unlawfully initiated its agency review is not appealable," we held, for "that is what § 314(d) says." Id. , at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139. Section 314(d), we explained, "preclud[es] review of the Patent Office's institution decisions" with sufficient clarity to overcome the " 'strong presumption' in favor of judicial review." Id. , at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140-2141 (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC , 575 U.S. 480, 486, 135 S.Ct. 1645, 191 L.Ed.2d 607 (2015) ). See Cuozzo , 579 U.S., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140 (finding " 'clear and convincing' indications ... that Congress intended to bar review" (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Institute , 467 U.S. 340, 349-350, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984) )). We reserved judgment in Cuozzo , however, on whether § 314(d) would bar appeals reaching well beyond the decision to institute inter partes review. 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2141-2142. We declined to "decide the precise effect of § 314(d) on," for example, "appeals that implicate constitutional questions." Ibid. Instead, we defined the bounds of our holding this way: "[O]ur interpretation applies where the grounds for attacking the decision to institute inter partes review consist of questions that are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office's decision to initiate inter partes review." Ibid. B We therefore ask whether a challenge based on § 315(b) ranks as an appeal of the agency's decision "to institute an inter partes review." § 314(d). We need not venture beyond Cuozzo 's holding that § 314(d) bars review at least of matters "closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to" the institution decision, 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2141, for a § 315(b) challenge easily meets that measurement. Section 315(b)'s time limitation is integral to, indeed a condition on, institution. After all, § 315(b) sets forth a circumstance in which "[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted." Even Click-to-Call and the Court of Appeals recognize that § 315(b) governs institution. See Brief for Respondent Click-to-Call 1 (§ 315(b) is "a clear limit on the Board's institution authority"); Wi-Fi One , 878 F.3d at 1373 ("§ 315(b) controls the Director's authority to institute [inter partes review]"). Because § 315(b) expressly governs institution and nothing more, a contention that a petition fails under § 315(b) is a contention that the agency should have refused "to institute an inter partes review." § 314(d). A challenge to a petition's timeliness under § 315(b) thus raises "an ordinary dispute about the application of " an institution-related statute. Cuozzo , 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139. In this case as in Cuozzo , therefore, § 314(d) overcomes the presumption favoring judicial review. C The AIA's purpose and design strongly reinforce our conclusion. By providing for inter partes review, Congress, concerned about overpatenting and its diminishment of competition, sought to weed out bad patent claims efficiently. See id ., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139-2140 ; H. R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, p. 40 (2011) ("The legislation is designed to establish a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs."). Allowing § 315(b) appeals would tug against that objective, wasting the resources spent resolving patentability and leaving bad patents enforceable. A successful § 315(b) appeal would terminate in vacatur of the agency's decision; in lieu of enabling judicial review of patentability, vacatur would unwind the agency's merits decision. See Cuozzo , 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139-2140. And because a patent owner would need to appeal on § 315(b) untimeliness grounds only if she could not prevail on patentability, § 315(b) appeals would operate to save bad patent claims. This case illustrates the dynamic. The agency held Click-to-Call's patent claims invalid, and Click-to-Call does not contest that holding. It resists only the agency's institution decision, mindful that if the institution decision is reversed, then the agency's work will be undone and the canceled patent claims resurrected. Other features of the statutory design confirm that Congress prioritized patentability over § 315(b)'s timeliness requirement. A petitioner's failure to satisfy § 315(b) does not prevent the agency from conducting inter partes review of the challenged patent claims; the agency can do so at another petitioner's request. § 311(a). Nor does failure to satisfy § 315(b) prevent the original initiator from participating on the merits; the § 315(b)-barred party can join a proceeding initiated by another petitioner. § 315(b), (c). And once inter partes review is instituted, the agency may issue a final written decision even "[i]f no petitioner remains in the inter partes review." § 317(a). It is unsurprising that a statutory scheme so consistently elevating resolution of patentability above a petitioner's compliance with § 315(b) would exclude § 315(b) appeals, thereby preserving the Board's adjudication of the merits. Judicial review of § 315(b) rulings, moreover, would do little to serve other statutory goals. The purpose of § 315(b), all agree, is to minimize burdensome overlap between inter partes review and patent-infringement litigation. Brief for Petitioner 24; Brief for Federal Respondent 36; Brief for Respondent Click-to-Call 37. Judicial review after the agency proceedings cannot undo the burdens already occasioned. Nor are § 315(b) appeals necessary to protect patent claims from wrongful invalidation, for patent owners remain free to appeal final decisions on the merits. § 319. IV Click-to-Call advances a narrower reading of § 314(d). In Click-to-Call's view, which the dissent embraces, post , at 1380 - 1387, the bar on judicial review applies only to the agency's threshold determination under § 314(a) of the question whether the petitioner has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Section 314(d) addresses the "determination by the Director whether to institute inter partes review under this section " (emphasis added), and, Click-to-Call maintains, § 314(a) contains "the only substantive determination referenced in" the same section as § 314(d). Brief for Respondent Click-to-Call 16. This interpretation, Click-to-Call argues, supplies a clear rule consonant with the presumption favoring judicial review. Cf. supra , at 1371 - 1372 (Federal Circuit's en banc Wi-Fi One decision). Cuozzo is fatal to Click-to-Call's interpretation. Section 314(d)'s review bar is not confined to the agency's application of § 314(a), for in Cuozzo we held unreviewable the agency's application of § 312(a)(3). 579 U.S., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139-2140. Far from limiting the appeal bar to § 314(a) and "nothing else" as Click-to-Call urges, Brief for Respondent 29, the Court's opinion in Cuozzo explained that the bar extends to challenges grounded in "statutes related to" the institution decision. 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2141. The text of § 314(d) offers Click-to-Call no support. The provision sweeps more broadly than the determination about whether "there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail." § 314(a). Rather, it encompasses the entire determination "whether to institute an inter partes review." § 314(d). And § 314(d) refers not to a determination under subsection (a), but to the determination "under this section." That phrase indicates that § 314 governs the Director's institution of inter partes review. Titled "Institution of inter partes review," § 314 is the section housing the command to the Director to "determine whether to institute an inter partes review," § 314(b). Thus, every decision to institute is made "under" § 314 but must take account of specifications in other provisions-such as the § 312(a)(3) particularity requirement at issue in Cuozzo and the § 315(b) timeliness requirement at issue here. Similar clarifying language recurs throughout the AIA. See, e.g. , § 315(c) (referring to the Director's determination regarding "the institution of an inter partes review under section 314 " (emphasis added)); § 314(b) (referring to "a petition filed under section 311 ," the section authorizing the filing of petitions (emphasis added)); § 314(b)(1) (referring to "a preliminary response to the petition under section 313 ," the section authorizing the filing of preliminary responses to petitions (emphasis added)). If Congress had intended Click-to-Call's meaning, it had at hand readymade language from a precursor to § 314(d) : "A determination by the Director under subsection (a) shall be final and non-appealable." 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2006 ed.) (emphasis added) (governing inter partes reexamination). Or Congress might have borrowed from a related provision: "A determination by the Director pursuant to subsection (a) of this section that no substantial new question of patentability has been raised will be final and nonappealable." 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (emphasis added) (governing ex parte reexamination). Instead, Congress chose to shield from appellate review the determination "whether to institute an inter partes review under this section ." § 314(d) (emphasis added). That departure in language suggests a departure in meaning. See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. , 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1718, 1723, 198 L.Ed.2d 177 (2017). Click-to-Call doubts that Congress would have limited the agency's institution authority in § 315(b) without ensuring judicial supervision. Congress entrusted the institution decision to the agency, however, to avoid the significant costs, already recounted, of nullifying a thoroughgoing determination about a patent's validity. See supra , at 1374 - 1375. That goal-preventing appeals that would frustrate efficient resolution of patentability-extends beyond § 314(a) appeals. Click-to-Call also contends that we adopted its interpretation of § 314(d) in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 200 L.Ed.2d 695 (2018). Neither of our holdings in that case assists Click-to-Call, and both holdings remain governing law. SAS Institute first held that once the agency institutes an inter partes review, it must "resolve all of the claims in the case." Id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1353. SAS Institute located that rule in § 318(a), which requires the agency to decide "the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner." Ibid. (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). SAS Institute next held that § 314(d) did not bar judicial review of § 318(a)'s application. Id. , at ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1358-1360. Our decision explained that "nothing in § 314(d) or Cuozzo withdraws our power to ensure that an inter partes review proceeds in accordance with the law's demands." Id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1359. That reviewability holding is inapplicable here, for Click-to-Call's appeal challenges not the manner in which the agency's review "proceeds" once instituted, but whether the agency should have instituted review at all. Click-to-Call homes in on a single sentence from SAS Institute 's reviewability discussion: " Cuozzo concluded that § 314(d) precludes judicial review only of the Director's 'initial determination' under § 314(a) that 'there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted' and review is therefore justified." Id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1359 (quoting Cuozzo , 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140 ). But that sentence's account of Cuozzo is incomplete. Recall that Cuozzo itself applied § 314(d)'s appeal bar to a challenge on grounds other than § 314(a). See supra , at 1374 - 1375. To understand how far beyond § 314(a) the bar on judicial review extends, we look to the statute and Cuozzo ; for the reasons stated above, they establish that § 314(d) bars challenges resting on § 315(b). V Click-to-Call presses an alternative reason why the Board's ruling on its § 315(b) objection is appealable. The Board's final written decision addressed the § 315(b) issue, so Click-to-Call argues that it may appeal under § 319, which authorizes appeal from the final written decision. But even labeled as an appeal from the final written decision, Click-to-Call's attempt to overturn the Board's § 315(b) ruling is still barred by § 314(d). Because § 315(b)'s sole office is to govern institution, Click-to-Call's contention remains, essentially, that the agency should have refused to institute inter partes review. As explained, § 314(d) makes that contention unreviewable. * * * For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remand the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. It is so ordered. APPENDIX OF KEY STATUTORY PROVISIONS 35 U.S.C. § 314 : "Institution of inter partes review "(a) THRESHOLD .-The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition. "(b) TIMING .-The Director shall determine whether to institute an inter partes review under this chapter pursuant to a petition filed under section 311 within 3 months after- "(1) receiving a preliminary response to the petition under section 313; or "(2) if no such preliminary response is filed, the last date on which such response may be filed. "(c) NOTICE .-The Director shall notify the petitioner and patent owner, in writing, of the Director's determination under subsection (a), and shall make such notice available to the public as soon as is practicable. Such notice shall include the date on which the review shall commence. "(d) NO APPEAL .-The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable." 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) : " PATENT OWNER'S ACTION .-An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c)." Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR joins as to Parts I, II, III, and IV, dissenting. Today the Court takes a flawed premise-that the Constitution permits a politically guided agency to revoke an inventor's property right in an issued patent-and bends it further, allowing the agency's decision to stand immune from judicial review. Worse, the Court closes the courthouse not in a case where the patent owner is merely unhappy with the merits of the agency's decision but where the owner claims the agency's proceedings were unlawful from the start. Most remarkably, the Court denies judicial review even though the government now concedes that the patent owner is right and this entire exercise in property-taking-by-bureaucracy was forbidden by law. It might be one thing if Congress clearly ordained this strange result. But it did not. The relevant statute, the presumption of judicial review, and our precedent all point toward allowing, not forbidding, inventors their day in court. Yet, the Court brushes past these warning signs and, in the process, carries us another step down the road of ceding core judicial powers to agency officials and leaving the disposition of private rights and liberties to bureaucratic mercy. I Our story stretches back to the 1990s, when Stephen DuVal invented a system for anonymizing telephone calls. Believing in the promise of his idea, Mr. DuVal hired an attorney to secure a patent and sought avenues to bring his invention to market. Initially, both efforts met with success. In 1998, Mr. DuVal was awarded a U.S. Patent, which he licensed to a company called InfoRocket.com, Inc. But problems soon emerged. In 2001, InfoRocket accused Ingenio, Inc., a predecessor of today's petitioner Thryv, Inc., of infringing Mr. DuVal's patent. The case carried on in federal district court for more than a year before InfoRocket and Ingenio decided to merge. The companies then jointly persuaded the court to dismiss InfoRocket's lawsuit without prejudice. Still, the quiet did not last long. Following the merger, the surviving entity-for simplicity, call it Thryv-sought to turn the tables on Mr. DuVal by asking the Patent Office to reconsider the validity of his patent in an ex parte reexamination. That agency-led process dragged on for four more years, and ended with a mixed verdict: The Patent Office canceled a few claims, but amended others and permitted Mr. DuVal to add some new ones too. Even the ex parte reexamination wasn't enough to put the parties' disputes to rest. During the reexamination, Thryv terminated its license with Mr. DuVal and stopped paying him royalties. But it seems that Thryv continued using the patented technology all the same. So Mr. DuVal transferred his patent to respondent Click-to-Call Technologies LP (CTC), which swiftly took the patent back to court. CTC noted that Thryv couldn't exactly plead ignorance about this patent, given that the company or its predecessors had previously licensed the patent, been sued for infringing it, and asked the Patent Office to reexamine it. When it came to Mr. DuVal's patent, CTC alleged, Thryv had done just about everything one can do to a patent except invent it. Thryv responded by opening another new litigation front of its own. One year after CTC filed its federal lawsuit, Thryv lodged another administrative petition with the Patent Office, this time seeking inter partes review. Echoing some of the same arguments that led to its push for an ex parte administrative reexamination nine years earlier, and adding other arguments too, Thryv (again) asked the agency to cancel Mr. DuVal's patent on the grounds that it lacked novelty and was obvious. At the same time, Thryv sought to stay proceedings in CTC's infringement suit. Thryv argued that the district court should defer to the newly initiated inter partes review. Like many district courts facing the prospect of parallel administrative proceedings, this one obliged. Why at this late hour did Thryv prefer to litigate before the agency rather than a federal district court? The agency's ex parte reexamination years earlier hadn't helped Thryv much. But since then, Congress had adopted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq. That law created the inter partes review process, which provides a number of benefits to accused infringers such as Thryv. Like federal court litigation, inter partes review holds the advantage of allowing a private party attacking a patent's validity to participate in adversarial proceedings, rather than rely on the agency to direct its own investigation as it does in ex parte reexamination. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 316 with §§ 302, 304, 305. Inter partes review also allows a party challenging a patent all manner of discovery, including depositions and the presentation of expert testimony. § 316 ; 37 CFR §§ 42.51 - 42.65 (2019). At the same time, the burden of proof is lower-requiring challengers like Thryv to prove unpatentability only by a preponderance of the evidence, § 316(e), rather than under the clear and convincing standard that usually applies in court. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P. , 564 U.S. 91, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011). Perhaps most appealing, proceedings take place before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, rather than in an Article III court, so there is no jury trial before a tenure-protected judge, only a hearing before a panel of agency employees. Some say the new regime represents a particularly efficient new way to "kill" patents. Certainly, the numbers tell an inviting story for petitioners like Thryv. In approximately 80% of cases reaching a final decision, the Board cancels some or all of the challenged claims. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Trial Statistics 10 (Feb. 2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_2020_02_29.pdf. The Board has been busy, too, instituting more than 800 of these new proceedings every year. See id., at 6. Still, Thryv faced a hurdle. Inter partes review "may not be instituted" based on an administrative petition filed more than a year after "the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent" in federal court. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). So, while Congress sought to move many cases out of court and into its new administrative process, it thought patent owners who have already endured long challenges in court shouldn't have to face another layer of administrative review. After all, some repose is due inventors. Patents typically last 20 years; what happens to the incentive to invent if litigation over them lasts even longer (as it has for Mr. DuVal)? By anyone's estimation, too, § 315(b)'s time bar was sure to pose a special problem for Thryv. Yes, Thryv had petitioned for inter partes review one year after being served with CTC's complaint. But nearly 12 years had passed since Thryv's predecessor and privy first found itself on the business end of a lawsuit alleging that it had infringed Mr. DuVal's patent. Despite this apparently fatal defect, the Board plowed ahead anyway. No one could dispute that Thryv's predecessor and privy had been "served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent" more than a decade earlier. But that complaint didn't count, the Board declared, because it was dismissed without prejudice. The Board cited nothing in § 315(b) suggesting this distinction makes a difference under the statute's plain terms. Instead, the Board tiptoed past the problem and proceeded to invalidate almost all of the patent claims before it, even those the Patent Office itself had affirmed in its own ex parte proceeding years before. No doubt this was exactly what Thryv hoped for in its second bite at the administrative apple. Thryv's victory may have taken years to achieve, but it didn't seem calculated to last long. Predictably, CTC appealed the Board's interpretation of § 315(b) to the Federal Circuit. And just as unsurprisingly, the court held that dismissed complaints do count as complaints, so Thryv's inter partes administrative challenge was time barred from the start. Mr. DuVal's patent had already survived one ex parte reexamination Thryv instigated. The patent had been the subject of long and repeated litigation in federal courts. The agency had no business opening yet another new inquiry into this very old patent. But Thryv had one maneuver left. It sought review in this Court, insisting that Article III courts lack authority even to say what the law demands. According to Thryv, a different provision, § 314(d), renders the agency's interpretations and applications of § 315(b) immune from judicial review. So the Board can err; it can even act in defiance of plain congressional limits on its authority. But, in Thryv's view, a court can do nothing about it. Enforcement of § 315(b)'s time bar falls only to the very Patent Office officials whose authority it seeks to restrain. Inventors like Mr. DuVal just have to hope that the bureaucracy revoking their property rights will take the extra trouble of doing so in accordance with law. That's the strange place we now find ourselves. Thryv managed to persuade the Court to grant its petition for certiorari to consider its extraordinary argument. And today the Court vindicates its last and most remarkable maneuver. II A How could § 314(d) insulate from judicial review the agency's-admittedly mistaken-interpretation of an entirely different provision, § 315(b) ? The answer is that it doesn't. To see why, look no further than § 314(d). The statute tells us that "[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable." So the only thing § 314(d) insulates from judicial review is "[t]he determination" made "by the Director" "under this section"-that is, a determination discussed within § 314. Nothing in the statute insulates agency interpretations of other provisions outside § 314, including those involving § 315(b). This arrangement makes sense. Given that § 314(d) speaks of "[t]he" determination by the Director "under this section," it comes as no surprise that the section mentions just one such "determination." It is found in § 314(a), where the Director "determines" whether the parties' initial pleadings suggest "a reasonable likelihood" the petitioner will prevail in defeating at least some aspect of the challenged patent. And it is easy to see why Congress might make a preliminary merits assessment like that exempt from further view: If the Director institutes a meritless petition, the Board can summarily affirm the patent's validity. See § 318(a); 37 CFR §§ 42.71 - 42.73. In any event, the Board is obligated to render a final-and judicially reviewable-decision within a year. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 316(a)(11), 318(a), 319. So judicial review of the Director's initial appraisal of the merits isn't really eliminated as much as it is channeled toward the Board's final decision on those merits. That process finds a ready analogue elsewhere in our law. Much as here, an indicted criminal defendant unhappy with a grand jury's finding of probable cause isn't permitted to challenge that preliminary assessment, but may instead move the court for acquittal after the government has presented all its evidence. See Costello v. United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) ; Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(a). Matters outside § 314 are different. Take the provision before us, § 315(b). It promises that an inter partes review "may not be instituted" more than a year after the initiation of litigation. This stands as an affirmative limit on the agency's authority. Much like a statute of limitations, this provision supplies an argument a party can continue to press throughout the life of the administrative proceeding and on appeal. Nothing in § 315(b) speaks of a "determination by the Director," let alone suggests that the agency's initial ruling on a petition's timeliness is "final and nonappealable." To pretend otherwise would invite a linguistic nonsense. We would have to read § 314's language speaking of "[t]he" "determination" "under this section" to include not one determination but two-and to include not only the determination actually made under "this section" but also a second assessment made about the effect of an entirely different section. To pretend otherwise would invite a practical nonsense as well. Because the Director's initial "reasonable likelihood" determination under § 314(a) relates to the merits, it will be effectively reviewed both by the Board and courts as the case progresses. But when does the Director's application of § 315(b)'s time bar get another look? Under Thryv's interpretation, a provision that reads like an affirmative limit on the agency's authority reduces to a mere suggestion. No matter how wrong or even purposefully evasive, the Director's assessment of a petition's timeliness is always immune from review. And even that's not the end of it. In other cases, the Board has claimed it has the right to review these initial timeliness decisions, and Thryv seems content with those rulings. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Healthcare Systems, Inc. , 839 F.3d 1382 (CA Fed. 2016). So it turns out the company doesn't really want to make an initial administrative timeliness decisions final ; it just wants to make them unreviewable in court , defying once more § 314's plain language and any rational explanation, except maybe as an expedient to win the day's case. B Confronting so many problems in the statute's text, Thryv seeks a way around them by offering a competing account of the law's operation. While § 314 empowers the Director to make an institution decision, Thryv asserts that various provisions scattered throughout the chapter-such as §§ 314(a), 315(a)(1), and 315(b) -help guide the decision. And on Thryv's interpretation, all questions related to the Director's institution decision should be insulated from review, no matter where those rules are found. What about the fact § 314 speaks of insulating only "[t]he" "determination" "under this section"? Thryv says this language serves merely to indicate which institution authority is unreviewable-namely, the Director's authority to institute an inter partes proceeding pursuant to § 314, rather than pursuant to some other provision. This interpretation, however, makes a nullity of the very language it purports to explain. Section 314 is the only section that authorizes the Director to institute inter partes review, making it pointless for Congress to tell us that we're talking about the Director's § 314 inter partes review institution authority as opposed to some other inter partes review institution authority. In fact, you can strike "under this section" from § 314(d) and Thryv's interpretation remains unchanged. That's a pretty good clue something has gone wrong. Faced with this problem of surplusage, Thryv alludes to the possibility that Congress included redundant language to be "double sure." But double sure of what? Thryv does not identify any confusion that the phrase "under this section" might help avoid. Given the lack of any other provision, anywhere in the U.S. Code, authorizing anyone to institute inter partes review, even the most obtuse reader would never have any use for the clarification supposedly provided by "under this section" on Thryv's account. Maybe so, Thryv replies, but we shouldn't worry about the surplusage here because the AIA contains surplusage elsewhere. The other putative examples of surplusage Thryv identifies, however, have no bearing on the provision now before us. And even a passing glance reveals no surplusage in them either. Consider § 315(c). It says that "the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 ..., determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314 ." (Emphasis added.) Thryv argues that all these cross-references are unnecessary. But look closely: Each of § 315(c)'s cross-references does important work to establish the rules for joinder. Strike the first and the requirements of a joinder petition become undefined. Strike the second and it's a mystery what kind of response the patent owner is entitled to file. Strike the third and the Director's determination whether to grant joinder becomes standardless. All of this language has a point to it-just as "under this section" does under a faithful interpretation of § 314(d). That leaves Thryv only one more tenuous textual lifeline left to toss. If Congress had wanted to insulate from review only "[t]he" "determination" that a petition has a "reasonable likelihood" of success, the company suggests, Congress could have spoken of insulating "the determination under subsection (a)" rather than "the determination under this section." And Thryv reminds us that Congress used that latter formulation in nearby and predecessor statutes. See, e.g., § 303(c) ("[a] determination by the Director pursuant to subsection (a) of this section ... will be final and nonappealable"); § 312(c) (2006 ed.; repealed 2011) ("[a] determination by the Director under subsection (a) shall be final and non-appealable"). But so what? One could replace the phrase "my next-door neighbor to the west" with "my neighbor at 123 Main Street" (assuming that is her address) and the meaning would be the same. Likewise, it hardly matters whether Congress spoke of the "determination" "under this section" or "under subsection (a)." Either way, our attention is directed within, not beyond, § 314. And what's Thryv's alternative? It would have us read language speaking of the Director's determination "under this section" to encompass any decision related to the initiation of inter partes review found anywhere in the AIA-an entire chapter of the U.S. Code. That's sort of like reading "my next-door neighbor to the west" to include "anyone in town." Nor do things get better for Thryv with a careful assessment of nearby and predecessor statutes. They reveal that Congress knew exactly how to give broader directions like the one Thryv imagines when it wished to do so. See, e.g., § 314(b) (directing our attention to the Director's decision whether to institute inter partes review "under this chapter" rather than "under this section"). Without any plausible textual or contextual hook for its position, Thryv finishes by advancing a parade of policy horribles. It notes that the AIA imposes lots of other constraints on inter partes review besides the § 315(b) timing provision now before us. For example, the law bars petitioners who have filed declaratory judgment actions from challenging the same patent in inter partes review proceedings, § 315(a)(1), and it estops petitioners from seeking other forms of review once an inter partes proceeding finishes, § 315(e). If courts are going to review the agency's application of § 315(b), Thryv wonders, are they going to have to review the agency's application of these other provisions too? But we could just as easily march this parade in the opposite direction. Even assuming (without deciding) that Thryv is right and the reviewability of all these provisions stands or falls together, that seems at least as good an argument for as against judicial review. If so much more is at stake, if many more kinds of agency errors could be insulated from correction, isn't that a greater reason to pay assiduous attention to the statute's terms? Surely, Thryv's professed concern for judicial economy supplies no license to ignore our duty to decide the cases properly put to us in accord with the statute's terms. III This last point leads to another reason why we should reject Thryv's reading of the statute. Even if the company could muster some doubt about the reach of § 314(d), it wouldn't be enough to overcome the "well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action." McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. , 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). As this Court has long explained, "we will ... find an intent to preclude such review only if presented with clear and convincing evidence." Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. , 509 U.S. 43, 64, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The presumption of judicial review is deeply rooted in our history and separation of powers. To guard against arbitrary government, our founders knew, elections are not enough: "An elective despotism was not the government we fought for." The Federalist No. 48, p. 311 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis deleted). In a government "founded on free principles," no one person, group, or branch may hold all the keys of power over a private person's liberty or property. Ibid. Instead, power must be set against power, "divided and balanced among several bodies ... checked and restrained by the others." Ibid. As Chief Justice Marshall put it: "It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle ... a department whose appropriate duty it is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals," a statute might leave that individual "with no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust." United States v. Nourse , 9 Pet. 8, 28-29, 9 L.Ed. 31 (1835). It should come as an equal surprise to think Congress might have imposed an express limit on an executive bureaucracy's authority to decide the rights of individuals, and then entrusted that agency with the sole power to enforce the limits of its own authority. Yet on Thryv's account, § 315(b)'s command that "inter partes review may not be instituted" would be left entrusted to the good faith of the very executive officials it is meant to constrain. (Emphasis added.) We do not normally rush to a conclusion that Congress has issued such " 'blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer.' " Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians , 476 U.S. 667, 671, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)). That usually may be the case, Thryv counters, but this statute's unusually modest purpose makes it plausible to think Congress meant to shield its application from judicial review. After all, the company submits, § 315(b) is not really a firm limit on the agency's authority, only a claim processing rule. For proof, the company reminds us that § 315(b) bars challengers who have already spent a year litigating in court from petitioning the agency, but leaves open the possibility that the agency might still institute inter partes review if a different, eligible petitioner happens to come along. And this theoretical possibility, Thryv tells us, suggests that the agency was meant to be allowed to act as it wants. But Thryv's reply here is like saying Article III's "case or controversy" requirement isn't really a limit on the power of federal courts, because it's always possible that some litigant with a live dispute will come forward and require the court to settle a particular legal question. The implacable fact is that nothing in the AIA gives the Director or the Board freewheeling authority to conduct inter partes review. The statute demands the participation of a real party in interest, a petitioner who is not barred by prior litigation and who is willing to face estoppel should he lose. §§ 311(a), 315. And if, as seems likely in our case and many others, no one is willing and able to meet those conditions, the law does not permit inter partes review. So rather than a claim processing rule, § 315 is both a constraint on the agency's power and a valuable guarantee that a patent owner must battle the same foe only once. Realizing that its textual arguments are too strained to demonstrate clearly and convincingly that Congress meant to displace judicial review, Thryv asks us to draw "inferences" from the AIA "as a whole." Brief for Petitioner 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, the company tells us that Congress's "overriding purpose" in creating inter partes review was to "weed out poor quality patents," and that judicial enforcement of § 315(b) would slow this progress. Id., at 24 (quotation altered). But to support its thematic account of the law's goals, Thryv rests on one thin reed after another-a House Report here, a floor statement there, and a few quotations from Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee , 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016), that summarize these same sources. All the rest is generously filled in by the company's own account about how inter partes review ought to work. That's far from enough. The historic presumption of judicial review has never before folded before a couple stray pieces of legislative history and naked policy appeals. Besides, Thryv's submissions cannot withstand the mildest inspection even on their own terms. No one doubts that Congress authorized inter partes review to encourage further scrutiny of already issued patents. But lost in Thryv's telling about the purposes of the AIA is plenty of evidence that Congress also included provisions to preserve the value of patents and protect the rights of patent owners. For example, Congress sharply limited the legal grounds that might be pursued in inter partes review, § 311(b) ; afforded patent owners an opportunity to respond to petitions prior to institution, § 313; and, most relevant today, protected patent owners from the need to fight a two-front war before both the Board and federal district court, § 315. Legislating involves compromise and it would be naive to think that, as the price for their zealous new procedures for canceling patents, those who proposed the AIA didn't have to accept some protections like these for patent holders. Yet, Thryv glides past all these provisions without comment. Worse, taking the company's argument to its logical conclusion could render these protections into " 'merely advisory' " features of the law. Bowen , 476 U.S. at 671, 106 S.Ct. 2133. If adopted, Thryv's vision of an administrative regime singularly focused on the efficient canceling of patents could become self-fulfilling. A case decided just weeks ago supplies a telling point of comparison. In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 589 U.S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 1062, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2020), Congress sought to expedite the removal of aliens convicted of certain aggravated felonies by foreclosing judicial review of their cases unless they raised "questions of law." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). But the statute there was ambiguous about mixed questions of law and fact: Were these (reviewable) questions of law, or (unreviewable) determinations of fact? Because the statute could be interpreted either way, this Court held, the presumption of reviewability preserved the aliens' ability to argue mixed questions on appeal. Today, the textual arguments for shielding the agency's decision from review are even weaker, and the same presumption that preserved judicial review for felons seeking discretionary relief from removal should do no less work for patent holders seeking to defend their inventions. IV Even if the statute's plain language and the presumption in favor of review dictate a ruling against it, Thryv finishes by suggesting we must ignore all that and rule for it anyway because precedent commands it. Maybe our precedent is wrong, the company says, but it binds us all the same. In particular, Thryv points us to Cuozzo . There, the Court suggested that § 314(d) could preclude review in cases: (1) where a litigant challenges the Director's reasonable likelihood of success determination under § 314(a), or (2) where a litigant "grounds its claim in a statute closely related to that decision to institute inter partes review." 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142. That first path is faithful to the plain language of § 314(d). The second appears nowhere in the statute but is, instead, a product of the judicial imagination. Still, Thryv says, we must follow that path wherever it leads and, because § 315(b) decisions are "closely related" to § 314(a) decisions, we shouldn't review them. But Cuozzo hardly held so much. In fact, Cuozzo had no need to explore the second path it imagined, for it quickly concluded that the argument before it was "little more than a challenge to the Patent Office's conclusion under § 314(a)," a decision shielded from judicial review under any interpretation of § 314(d). Id ., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142. So all the discussion about the reviewability of decisions outside § 314(a) turned out to be nothing more than dicta entirely unnecessary to the decision. Nor did anything in Cuozzo directly address § 315(b) decisions, let alone declare them to be "close enough" to § 314(a) decisions to preclude judicial review. That's just the beginning of Thryv's precedent problems, too. In SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 200 L.Ed.2d 695 (2018), an inter partes review petitioner challenged the Director's practice of instituting review of some, but not all, of the claims challenged in a single petition. The government argued there-much as Thryv argues today-that § 314(d) shielded this unlawful practice from judicial review. In advancing this argument, the government seized on the same language in Cuozzo that Thryv now embraces, claiming that its opponent's "grounds for attacking the decision ... are closely tied" to the § 314(a) institution decision. Brief for Federal Respondent in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu , O. T. 2017, No. 16969, p. 13. Because no one could say that the petitioner's argument in SAS Institute was "little more than a challenge to the Patent Office's conclusion under § 314(a)," 584 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1359, we were forced to confront whether Cuozzo and the relevant statutes actually barred not just institution decisions under § 314(a) but things "closely related" to them. We held they did not. We began, as we did in Cuozzo , by noting the "strong presumption in favor of judicial review." SAS Institute , 584 U.S., at ----138 S.Ct., at 1359 (internal quotation marks omitted). We then put an end to any doubt about what the dicta in that case might mean: "Given the strength of this presumption and the statute's text, Cuozzo concluded that § 314(d) precludes judicial review only of the Director's 'initial determination' under § 314(a)." Ibid. (quoting Cuozzo , 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140 ; emphasis added). We did not need to overrule Cuozzo , because the language the government seized upon from that opinion was dicta from the start. Still, we made it clear that dicta's day had come: To read Cuozzo as "foreclosing judicial review of any legal question bearing on the institution decision," we explained, would "overrea[d] both the statute and our precedent." SAS Institute, 584 U.S., at ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1359. The petitioner's challenge to the Director's partial institution practice could go forward exactly because it was something other than a disagreement about the Director's initial determination under § 314(a). Id ., at ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1359-1360. It's not surprising that litigants would invite us to overread dicta or overlook an unfavorable precedent. What is surprising is that the Court would accept the invitation. In ''cases involving property," after all, "considerations favoring stare decisis are at their acme." Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 576 U.S. 446, 457, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we are often reminded that "stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision ... interprets a statute." Id ., at 456, 135 S.Ct. 2401. But rather than searching for the kind of "superspecial justification," id. , at 458, 135 S.Ct. 2401, this Court supposedly requires to overrule a precedent like SAS Institute , today's majority quibbles with a few sentences and quietly walks away. If, as some have worried, "[e]ach time the Court overrules a case, the Court ... cause[s] the public to become increasingly uncertain about which cases the Court will overrule," Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt , 587 U.S. ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1485, 1506, 203 L.Ed.2d 768 (2019), (Breyer, J., dissenting), one can only imagine what a judicial shrug of the shoulders like this might yield. Litigants and lower courts will also have to be forgiven for the confusion to come about the meaning of § 314(d)'s review bar. Whether it is limited to the § 314(a) determination (as SAS Institute held and parts of Cuozzo suggested) or also reaches to challenges grounded in "closely related" statutes (as other parts of Cuozzo suggested and the Court insists today)-who can say? And even supposing that "closely related to institution" really is the test we'll apply next time, does anyone know what this judicially concocted formulation even means? Despite three opinions interpreting the same provision in under five years, only one thing is clear: Neither the statute nor our precedent can be counted upon to give the answer. Litigants and lower courts alike will just have to wait and see. V It's a rough day when a decision manages to defy the plain language of a statute, our interpretative presumptions, and our precedent. But today that's not the worst of it. The Court's expansive reading of § 314(d) takes us further down the road of handing over judicial powers involving the disposition of individual rights to executive agency officials. We started the wrong turn in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1365, 200 L.Ed.2d 671 (2018). There, a majority of this Court acquiesced to the AIA's provisions allowing agency officials to withdraw already-issued patents subject to very limited judicial review. As the majority saw it, patents are merely another public franchise that can be withdrawn more or less by executive grace. So what if patents were, for centuries, regarded as a form of personal property that, like any other, could be taken only by a judgment of a court of law. So what if our separation of powers and history frown on unfettered executive power over individuals, their liberty, and their property. What the government gives, the government may take away-with or without the involvement of the independent Judiciary. Today, a majority compounds that error by abandoning a good part of what little judicial review even the AIA left behind. Just try to imagine this Court treating other individual liberties or forms of private property this way. Major portions of this country were settled by homesteaders who moved west on the promise of land patents from the federal government. Much like an inventor seeking a patent for his invention, settlers seeking these governmental grants had to satisfy a number of conditions. But once a patent issued, the granted lands became the recipient's private property, a vested right that could be withdrawn only in a court of law. No one thinks we would allow a bureaucracy in Washington to "cancel" a citizen's right to his farm, and do so despite the government's admission that it acted in violation of the very statute that gave it this supposed authority. For most of this Nation's history it was thought an invention patent holder "holds a property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock." Hovey v. Henry , 12 F.Cas. 603, 604 (No. 6,742) (C.C. Mass. 1846) (Woodbury, J., for the court). Yet now inventors hold nothing for long without executive grace. An issued patent becomes nothing more than a transfer slip from one agency window to another. Some seek to dismiss this concern by noting that the bureaucracy the AIA empowers to revoke patents is the same one that grants them. But what comfort is that when the Constitution promises an independent judge in any case involving the deprivation of life, liberty, or property? Would it make things any better if we assigned the Department of the Interior the task of canceling land patents because that agency initially allocated many of them? The relevant constitutional fact is not which agency granted a property right, but that a property right was granted. The abdication of our judicial duty comes with a price. The Director of the Patent and Trademark Office is a political appointee. The AIA vests him with unreviewable authority to institute (or not) inter partes review. Nothing would prevent him, it seems, from insulating his favorite firms and industries from this process entirely. Those who are not so fortunate proceed to an administrative "trial" before a panel of agency employees that the Director also has the means to control. The AIA gives the Director the power to select which employees, and how many of them, will hear any particular inter partes challenge. It also gives him the power to decide how much they are paid. And if a panel reaches a result he doesn't like, the Director claims he may order rehearing before a new panel, of any size, and including even himself. No one can doubt that this regime favors those with political clout, the powerful and the popular. But what about those who lack the resources or means to influence and maybe even capture a politically guided agency? Consider Mr. DuVal, who 25 years ago, came up with something the Patent Office agreed was novel and useful. His patent survived not only that initial review but a subsequent administrative ex parte review, a lawsuit, and the initiation of another. Yet, now, after the patent has expired, it is challenged in still another administrative proceeding and retroactively expunged by an agency that has, by its own admission, acted unlawfully. That is what happens when power is not balanced against power and executive action goes unchecked by judicial review. Rather than securing incentives to invent, the regime creates incentives to curry favor with officials in Washington. Nor is it hard to imagine what might lie around the corner. Despite repeated lawsuits, no court ever ruled definitively on Mr. DuVal's patents. But suppose one had-and suppose he had prevailed. According to the agency, even that judgment might not matter much. In other cases, the Board has claimed the power through inter partes review to overrule final judicial judgments affirming patent rights. In the Director's estimation, it appears, even this Court's decisions must bow to the Board's will. See XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L. C. , 890 F.3d 1282, 1285-1286, 1294-1295 (CA Fed. 2018) ; Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc. , 721 F.3d 1330, 1340-1344 (CA Fed. 2013). It's no wonder, then, that district courts sometimes throw up their hands and let the Board take over whenever inter partes review and patent litigation begin to overlap. Why bother with a trial if "the finality of any judgment rendered by [a] Court will be dubious"? Order Granting Stay in Click-to-call Technologies LP v. Ingenio, Inc. , No. 12-cv-00465 (WD Tex.), Doc. No. 147, p. 4. It's understandable, too, why the agency might think so much is up for grabs. Not only did this Court give away much of its Article III authority in Oil States on a mistaken assessment that patents were historically treated as public franchises rather than private rights. Some would have had the Court go even further. Rather than looking to history to determine how patents were treated, as both the majority and dissent sought to do, these Members of the Court suggested that agencies should be allowed to withdraw even private rights if "a number of factors"-taken together, of course-suggest it's a good idea. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor , 478 U.S. 833, 851, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) ; see also Oil States , 584 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1380 (Breyer, J., concurring). These "factors" turn out to include such definitive and easily balanced considerations as the "nature of the claim," the "nature of the non-Article III tribunal," and the "nature and importance of the legislative purpose served by the grant of adjudicatory authority to a tribunal with judges who lack Article III's tenure and compensation protections." Stern v. Marshall , 564 U.S. 462, 513, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In other words, Article III promises that a person's private rights may be taken only in proceedings before an independent judge, unless the government's goals would be better served by a judge who isn't so independent. Thryv seeks to assure us that affected parties can still file writs of mandamus in courts if the Patent Office gets really out of hand. But the Court today will not say whether mandamus is available where the § 314(d) bar applies, and the Federal Circuit has cast doubt on that possibility. In re Power Integrations, Inc. , 899 F.3d 1316, 1319 (2018) ("We have held that the statutory prohibition on appeals from decisions not to institute inter partes review cannot be sidestepped simply by styling the request for review as a petition for mandamus"); In re Procter & Gamble Co. , 749 F.3d 1376 (2014) ; In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC. , 749 F.3d 1379 (2014). Even assuming mandamus is available, it is a "drastic [remedy], to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal. , 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). To be eligible for this discretionary relief, a petitioner must first show a "clear and indisputable" right. Id., at 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119 (internal quotation marks omitted). But how often could a litigant show such a "clear and indisputable" right in an area where courts shirk their duty to say what the law is in the first place? And how would a court find the will to call a situation "extraordinary" once the agency has been free for so long to ignore the limits on its power? If the case before us doesn't qualify as "extraordinary," and if the Board's admitted flouting of § 315(b) isn't "clear and indisputable," then what extralegal act wouldn't be just another day at the office? * Two years ago, this Court sanctioned a departure from the constitutional plan, one in which the Executive Branch assumed responsibilities long reserved to the Judiciary. In so doing, we denied inventors the right to have their claims tried before independent judges and juries. Today we compound that error, not only requiring patent owners to try their disputes before employees of a political branch, but limiting their ability to obtain judicial review when those same employees fail or refuse to comply with the law. Nothing in the statute commands this result, and nothing in the Constitution permits it. Respectfully, I dissent. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. Justice THOMAS and Justice ALITO join all but Part III-C of this opinion. Key statutory provisions are reproduced in an appendix to this opinion. More precisely, the petition was filed by four companies, including YellowPages.com, LLC, and Ingenio, LLC. Through "a series of mergers, sales, and name changes," both became Thryv. Brief for Petitioner 8. For simplicity, we refer to Thryv and its predecessor entities as "Thryv." The 2001 suit was brought by Inforocket.Com, Inc.-then the exclusive licensee of the '836 patent -against Keen, Inc. See Inforocket.Com , Inc. v. Keen , Inc. , No. 1:01-cv-05130 (SDNY). While the suit was pending, Keen acquired Inforocket and the District Court dismissed the suit without prejudice. By the time of the inter partes review petition, Keen had become Ingenio (now Thryv). A footnote in the panel's opinion noted that the Court of Appeals sitting en banc had considered and agreed with the panel majority's conclusion that a complaint voluntarily dismissed without prejudice can trigger § 315(b)'s time bar. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP v. Ingenio, Inc. , 899 F.3d 1321, 1328, n. 3 (CA Fed. 2018). On that issue, Judge Taranto issued a concurring opinion, id. , at 1343-1347, and Judge Dyk, joined by Judge Lourie, issued a dissenting opinion, id. , at 1350-1355. That question is outside the scope of our review. We do not decide whether mandamus would be available in an extraordinary case. Cf. Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee , 579 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, n. 5, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2151, n. 5, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) The dissent acknowledges that "Congress authorized inter partes review to encourage further scrutiny of already issued patents." Post, at 1385. Yet the dissent, despite the Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of such review in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1365, 200 L.Ed.2d 671 (2018), appears ultimately to urge that Congress lacks authority to permit second looks. Patents are property, the dissent several times repeats, and Congress has no prerogative to allow "property-taking-by-bureaucracy." Post , at 1378, 1387 - 1389. But see Oil States , 584 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1373 ("patents are public franchises" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The second look Congress put in place is assigned to the very same bureaucracy that granted the patent in the first place. Why should that bureaucracy be trusted to give an honest count on first view, but a jaundiced one on second look? See post , at 1387 - 1388. Defending Click-to-Call's interpretation, the dissent takes a view of our precedent that neither Click-to-Call nor the Federal Circuit advances. See post , at 1385 - 1387. The dissent does not consider itself bound by Cuozzo 's conclusion that § 314(d) bars appeal of "questions that are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the Patent Office's decision to initiate inter partes review," 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2141. According to the dissent, that statement is dicta later repudiated in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu , 584 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 200 L.Ed.2d 695 (2018). But Cuozzo concerned an appeal resting on a "related statutory section": § 312(a)(3). 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139. That § 312(a)(3) challenge was tied to institution, the Court explained, for two reasons: first, because it "attack[ed] a 'determination ... whether to institute' review," id. , at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139 ; second, because the § 312(a)(3) challenge was related to invoking § 314(a)'s condition on institution, id. , at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142. Cuozzo 's recognition that § 314(d) can bar challenges rooted in provisions other than § 314(a) was hardly "dicta," post , at 1386 -it was the Court's holding. And SAS Institute purported to adhere to Cuozzo , not to overrule it. 584 U.S., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142-2143. The Court in SAS Institute said, specifically, that it discerned "nothing in ... Cuozzo " inconsistent with its conclusion. Id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1359. We do not so lightly treat our determinations as dicta and our decisions as overruling others sub silentio . Nor can we countenance the dissent's dangerous insinuation that today's decision is not "really" binding precedent. Post , at 1386 - 1387 ("[W]ho can say?"); post , at 1387 ("Litigants and lower courts alike will just have to wait and see."). Lest any "confusion" remain, post , at 1386 - 1387, we reaffirm today our holding in Cuozzo : Section 314(d) generally precludes appeals of the agency's institution decision, including, beyond genuine debate, appeals "consist[ing] of questions that are closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to" the institution decision. 579 U.S., at ----, ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139, 2141. The appeal bar, we therefore reiterate, is not limited to the agency's application of § 314(a).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al. No. 82-1913. Argued March 19, 1984 Reargued October 1, 1984 Decided February 19, 1985 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 557. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 579. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 580. Solicitor General Lee reargued the cause and filed briefs on reargument for appellant in No. 82-1951. Assistant Attorney General Olson argued the cause for appellants in both cases on the original argument. With him on the briefs on the original argument were Mr. Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Joshua I. Schwartz, Michael F. Hertz, and Douglas Letter. Laurence Gold reargued the cause for appellant in No. 82-1913. With him on the briefs were Earle Putnam, Linda R. Hirsh-man, Robert Chanin, and George Kaufmann. William T. Coleman, Jr., reargued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the briefs for appellee American Public Transit Association were Donald T. Bliss and Zoé E. Baird. George P. Parker, Jr., filed briefs for appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. Together with No. 82-1951, Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al., also on appeal from the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by the Attorneys General of their respective States as follows: Francis X. Bellotti of Massachusetts, John K. Van de Kamp of California, Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut, Michael A. Lilly of Hawaii, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Robert T. Stephen of Kansas, David L. Armstrong of Kentucky, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, Stephen H. Sachs of Maryland, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, John Ashcroft of Missouri, Michael P. Greely of Montana, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman of New Jersey, LeRoy Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, David Wilkinson of Utah, John J. Easton, Jr., of Vermont, Gerald L. Baliles of Virginia, Chauncey H. Browning of West Virginia, Bronson C. La Follette of Wisconsin, and A. G. McClintock of Wyoming; for the Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association by Endicott Peabody and Jeffrey N. Martin; for the Legal Foundation of America by David Crump; for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by John W. Witt, Roger F. Cutler, Benjamin L. Brown, J. Lamar Shelley, William H. Taube, William I. Thornton, Jr., Henry W. Underhill, Jr., Charles S. Rhyne, Roy D. Bates, George Agnost, Robert J. Alfton, James K. Baker, and Clifford D. Pierce, Jr.; for the National League of Cities et al. by Lawrence R. Velvel and Elaine Kaplan; and for the National Public Employer Labor Relations Association et al. by R. Theodore Clark, Jr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). In that litigation, this Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the States “in areas of traditional governmental functions.” Id., at 852. Although National League of Cities supplied some examples of “traditional governmental functions,” it did not offer a general explanation of how a “traditional” function is to be distinguished from a “nontraditional” one. Since then, federal and state courts have struggled with the task, thus imposed, of identifying a traditional function for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause. In the present cases, a Federal District Court concluded that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a traditional governmental function and thus, under National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations imposed by the FLSA. Faced with the identical question, three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate court have reached the opposite conclusion. Our examination of this “function” standard applied in these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of “traditional governmental function” is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled. I The history of public transportation in San Antonio, Tex., is characteristic of the history of local mass transit in the United States generally. Passenger transportation for hire within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis by a local transportation company. In 1913, the Texas Legislature authorized the State’s municipalities to regulate vehicles providing carriage for hire. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 147, § 4, ¶ 12, now codified, as amended, as Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 1963). Two years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance setting forth franchising, insurance, and safety requirements for passenger vehicles operated for hire. The city continued to rely on such publicly regulated private mass transit until 1959, when it purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Company and replaced it with a public authority known as the San Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS operated until 1978, when the city transferred its facilities and equipment to appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority organized on a countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA currently is the major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles traveled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million passengers. As did other localities, San Antonio reached the point where it came to look to the Federal Government for financial assistance in maintaining its public mass transit. SATS managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations for the first decade of its existence without federal or local financial aid. By 1970, however, its financial position had deteriorated to the point where federal subsidies were vital for its continued operation. SATS’ general manager that year testified before Congress that “if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal Government, San Antonio may . . . join the growing ranks of cities that have inferior [public] transportation or may end up with no [public] transportation at all.” The principal federal program to which SATS and other mass-transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. § 1601 et seq., which provides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit programs. See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15 (1982). UMTA now authorizes the Department of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the capital outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses of qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its first UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December 1970. From then until February 1980, SATS and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants — more than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in operating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance. During SAMTA’s first two fiscal years, it received $12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from sales taxes, and only $10.1 million from fares. Federal subsidies and local sales taxes currently account for about 75 percent of SAMTA’s operating expenses. The present controversy concerns the extent to which SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was enacted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not apply to local mass-transit employees or, indeed, to employees of state and local governments. §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060, 1067. In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage to employees of any private mass-transit carrier whose annual gross revenue was not less than $1 million. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 71. Five years later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state and local-government employees for the first time by withdrawing the minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80 Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other than drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 836. The application of the FLSA to public schools and hospitals was ruled to be within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously brought the States and their subdivisions further within the ambit of the FLSA by extending FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local-government employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (6), 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA’s overtime requirements until 1976, when this Court, in National League of Cities, overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the FLSA could not be applied constitutionally to the “traditional governmental functions” of state and local governments. Four months after National League of Cities was handed down, SATS informed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its overtime obligations under the FLSA. Matters rested there until September 17, 1979, when the Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion that SAMTA’s operations “are not constitutionally immune from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act” under National League of Cities. Opinion WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138. On November 21 of that year, SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. It sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to the Wage and Hour Administration’s determination, National League of Cities precluded the application of the FLSA’s overtime requirements to SAMTA’s operations. The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. §217 for enforcement of the overtime and recordkéeping requirements of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action, appellant Garcia and several other SAMTA employees brought suit against SAMTA in the same District Court for overtime pay under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil Action No. SA 79 CA 458. The District Court has stayed that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA brought suit, the Department of Labor formally amended its FLSA interpretive regulations to provide that publicly owned local mass-transit systems are not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75630 (1979), codified as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1984). On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted SAMTA’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Secretary’s and Garcia’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Without further explanation, the District Court ruled that “local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) constitute integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions” under National League of Cities. App. D to Juris. Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia both appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), was decided. In that case, the Court ruled that commuter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road did not constitute a “traditional governmental function” and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under National League of Cities, from the requirements of the Railway Labor Act. Thereafter, it vacated the District Court’s judgment in the present cases and remanded them for further consideration in the light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102 (1982). On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view and again entered judgment for SAMTA. 557 F. Supp. 445 (1983). The court looked first to what it regarded as the “historical reality” of state involvement in mass transit. It recognized that States not always had owned and operated mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged in a longstanding pattern of public regulation, and that this regulatory tradition gave rise to an “inference of sovereignty.” Id., at 447-448. The court next looked to the record of federal involvement in the field and concluded that constitutional immunity would not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus make the withdrawal of federal regulatory power over public mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at 448-450. Although the Federal Government’s authority over employee wages under the FLSA obviously would be eroded, Congress had not asserted any interest in the wages of public mass-transit employees until 1966 and hence had not established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal regulatory presence in the railroad industry found significant for the decision in Long Island. Finally, the court compared mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities and concluded that it did not differ from those functions in any material respect. The court stated: “If transit is to be distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities] functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state function in the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when they see it, but they can’t describe it.” 557 F. Supp., at 453. The Secretary and Garcia again took direct appeals from the District Court’s judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 464 U. S. 812 (1983). After initial argument, the cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the parties were requested to brief and argue the following additional question: “Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amendment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?” 468 U. S. 1213 (1984). Reargument followed in due course. II Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from regulation under the FLSA on the ground that it is a local transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. In a practical sense, SAMTA’s operations might well be characterized as “local.” Nonetheless, it long has been settled that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause extends to intrastate economic activities that affect interstate commerce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately owned and operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers in prescribing minimum wages and overtime rates for SAMTA’s employees. Any constitutional exemption from the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on SAMTA’s status as a governmental entity rather than on the “local” nature of its operations. The prerequisites for governmental immunity under National League of Cities were summarized by this Court in Hodel, supra. Under that summary, four conditions must be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. First, it is said that the federal statute at issue must regulate “the ‘States as States.’” Second, the statute must “address matters that are indisputably ‘attribute[s] of state sovereignty.’” Third, state compliance with the federal obligation must “directly impair [the States’] ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’ ” Finally, the relation of state and federal interests must not be such that “the nature of the federal interest . . . justifies state submission.” 452 U. S., at 287-288, and n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845, 852, 854. The controversy in the present cases has focused on the third Hodel requirement — that the challenged federal statute trench on “traditional governmental functions.” The District Court voiced a common concern: “Despite the abundance of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are immune remains difficult.” 557 F. Supp., at 447. Just how troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CA8 1983), cert. pending, No. 83-138; licensing automobile drivers, United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978); operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway authority, Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CA1 1982), are functions protected under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts have held that issuance of industrial development bonds, Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intrastate natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff’d, 661 F. 2d 832 (CA10 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads, Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation, Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 644 F. 2d 1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system, Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CA1 1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. of N. C. v. FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CA11), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA9 1983), are not entitled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first group on one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on the other side. The constitutional distinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between operating a highway authority and operating a mental health facility, is elusive at best. Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under National League of Cities. In that case the Court set forth examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426 U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how those examples were identified. The only other case in which the Court has had occasion to address the problem is Long Island. We there observed: “The determination of whether a federal law impairs a state’s authority with respect to ‘areas of traditional [state] functions’ may at times be a difficult one.” 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of that statement is demonstrated by this Court’s own difficulties in Long Island in developing a workable standard for “traditional governmental functions.” We relied in large part there on “the historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by state and local governments,” but we simultaneously disavowed “a static historical view of state functions generally immune from federal regulation.” 455 U. S., at 686 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original). We held that the inquiry into a particular function’s “traditional” nature was merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at issue unduly handicaps “basic state prerogatives,” id., at 686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes one state function a “basic prerogative” and another function not basic. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, we nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended historical record of federal involvement in the field of rail transportation. Id., at 687-689. Many constitutional standards involve “undoubte[d] . . . gray areas,” Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558 (1975) (dissenting opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-case development would lead to a workable standard for determining whether a particular governmental function should be immune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. A further cautionary note is sounded, however, by the Court’s experience in the related field of state immunity from federal taxation. In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the first time that the state tax immunity recognized in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871), extended only to the “ordinary” and “strictly governmental” instrumentalities of state governments and not to instrumentalities “used by the State in the carrying on of an ordinary private business.” 199 U. S., at 451, 461. While the Court applied the distinction outlined in South Carolina for the following 40 years, at no time during that period did the Court develop a consistent formulation of the kinds of governmental functions that were entitled to immunity. The Court identified the protected functions at various times as “essential,” “usual,” “traditional,” or “strictly governmental.” While “these differences in phraseology . . . must not be too literally contradistinguished,” Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937), they reflect an inability to specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function made it necessary to the “unimpaired existence” of the States. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the Court ultimately chose “not, by an attempt to formulate any general test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision of cases [concerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the future.” Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 365. If these tax-immunity cases had any common thread, it was in the attempt to distinguish between “governmental” and “proprietary” functions. To say that the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary” proved to be stable, however, would be something of an overstatement. In 1911, for example, the Court declared that the provision of a municipal water supply “is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State.” Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the Court simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the provision of a municipal water supply was immune from federal taxation as an essential governmental function, even though municipal waterworks long had been operated for profit by private industry. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 370-373. At the same time that the Court was holding a municipal water supply to be immune from federal taxes, it had held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). Justice Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938), was moved to observe: “An implied constitutional distinction which taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal water works system manifests the uncertainty created by the ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ test” (concurring opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), unanimously to conclude that the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary” functions was “untenable” and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (opinion of Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.); id., at 590-596 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457, and n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 101 (1946). Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine the Court never explained the constitutional basis for that distinction. In South Carolina, it expressed its concern that unlimited state immunity from federal taxation would allow the States to undermine the Federal Government’s tax base by expanding into previously private sectors of the economy. See 199 U. S., at 454-455. Although the need to reconcile state and federal interests obviously demanded that state immunity have some limiting principle, the Court did not try to justify the particular result it reached; it simply concluded that a “line [must] be drawn,” id., at 456, and proceeded to draw that line. The Court’s elaborations in later cases, such as the assertion in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), that “[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto,” sound more of ipse dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give principled content to the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary,” no less significantly than its unworkability, led the Court to abandon the distinction in New York v. United States. The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative standards that might be employed to distinguish between protected and unprotected governmental functions appear manageable. We rejected the possibility of making immunity turn on a purely historical standard of “tradition” in Long Island, and properly so. The most obvious defect of a historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes in the historical functions of States, changes that have re-suited in a number of once-private functions like education being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. At the same time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an organizing principle results in line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority to be defeated. A nonhistorical standard for selecting immune governmental functions is likely to be just as unworkable as is a historical standard. The goal of identifying “uniquely” governmental functions, for example, has been rejected by the Court in the field of government tort liability in part because the notion of a “uniquely” governmental function is unmanageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (dissenting opinion). Another possibility would be to confine immunity to “necessary” governmental services, that is, services that would be provided inadequately or not at all unless the government provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at 172. The set of services that fits into this category, however, may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated market produces less of some service than a State deems desirable! does not mean that the State itself must provide the service'; in most if not all cases, the State can “contract out” by hiring private firms to provide the service or simply by providing subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to question how well equipped courts are to make this kind of determination about the workings of economic markets. We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental problem at work here, a problem that explains why the Court was never able to provide a basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax-immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distinctions with respect to federal regulatory authority under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed regardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The problem is that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other .that purports to separate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society. The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else— including the judiciary — deems state involvement to be. Any rule of state immunity that looks to the “traditional,” “integral,” or “necessary” nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. “The science of government ... is the science of experiment,” Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an added price when they meet the changing needs of their citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a different society left in private hands. In the words of Justice Black: “There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental functions. Many governmental functions of today have at some time in the past been nongovernmental. The genius of our government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the people — acting not through the courts but through their elected legislative representatives — have the power to determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires.” Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion). We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional.” Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those principles. If there are to be limits on the Federal Government’s power to interfere with state functions — as undoubtedly there are — we must look elsewhere to find them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that confronted this Court in National League of Cities — the manner in which the Constitution insulates States from the reach of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. Ill The central theme of National League of Cities was that the States occupy a special position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position. Of course, the Commerce Clause by its specific language does not provide any special limitation on Congress’ actions with respect to the States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 248 (1983) (concurring opinion). It is equally true, however, that the text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism, for “[bjehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.” Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities reflected the general conviction that the Constitution precludes “the National Government [from] devouring] the essentials of state sovereignty.” Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205 (dissenting opinion). In order to be faithful to the underlying federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for the “postulates which limit and control.” What has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution’s federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Congress’ authority to regulate the States under the Commerce Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States’ “separate and independent existence.” Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach obviously underlay the Court’s use of the “traditional governmental function” concept in National League of Cities. It also has led to the separate requirement that the challenged federal statute “address matters that are indisputably ‘attribute^] of state sovereignty.’” Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845. In National League of Cities itself, for example, the Court concluded that decisions by a State concerning the wages and hours of its employees are an “undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.” 426 U. S., at 845. The opinion did not explain what aspects of such decisions made them such an “undoubted attribute,” and the Court since then has remarked on the uncertain scope of the concept. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 238, n. 11. The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to single out particular features of a State’s internal governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty. We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for “fundamental” elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have witnessed in the search for “traditional governmental functions.” There is, however, a more fundamental reason: the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself. A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legislative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails the sovereign power of the States’judiciaries to make authoritative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application, through the Fourteenth Amendment, of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the States limits the sovereign authority that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect to their citizens and to conduct their own affairs. The States unquestionably do “retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 269 (Powell, J., dissenting). They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government. In the words of James Madison to the Members of the First Congress: “Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitution of the States.” 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense of state autonomy in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401 (1893), a defense quoted with approval in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-79 (1938): “[T]he Constitution of the United States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States — independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.” As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the nature of that role. Only recently, this Court recognized that the purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in National League of Cities is not to preserve “a sacred province of state autonomy.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 236. With rare exceptions, like the guarantee, in Article IV, § 3, of state territorial integrity, the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace. James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787: “It is true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the existence of state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose them to be the sole power to be respected.” 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power of the Federal Government is a “power to be respected” as well, and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between state and federal power lies. In short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. When we look for the States’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty,” The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The States were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, § 1. They were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The significance attached to the States’ equal representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation without the State’s consent. Art. V. The extent to which the structure of the Federal Government itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madison explained that the Federal Government “will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments.” The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B. Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson observed that “it was a favorite object in the Convention” to provide for the security of the States against federal encroachment and that the structure of the Federal Government itself served that end. 2 Elliot, at 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which he saw as “at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty.” The Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). He further noted that “the residuary sovereignty of the States [is] implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the [federal] legislature” (emphasis added). The Federalist No. 43, p. 315 (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power. The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States’ interests is apparent even today in the course of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues into their own treasuries in the form of general and program-specific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided federal land grants to finance state governments from the beginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. In the past quarter century alone, federal grants to States and localities have grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. As a result, federal grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local government expenditures. The States have obtained federal funding for such services as police and fire protection, education, public health and hospitals, parks and recreation, and sanitation. Moreover, at the same time that the States have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the Sherman Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States and their subdivisions. The fact that some federal statutes such as the FLSA extend general obligations to the States cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of the States in the federal system has served to minimize the burdens that the States bear under the Commerce Clause. We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of which has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the States in the federal political process. Nonetheless, against this background, we are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the “States as States” is one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a “sacred province of state autonomy.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 236. Insofar as the present cases are concerned, then, we need go no further than to state that we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision. SAMTA faces nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, public as well as private, have to meet. In these cases, the status of public mass transit simply underscores the extent to which the structural protections of the Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed burdens. When Congress first subjected state mass-transit systems to FLSA obligations in 1966, and when it expanded those obligations in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding for state and local mass transit through UMTA. In the two decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided over $22 billion in mass-transit aid to States and localities. In 1983 alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. As noted above, SAMTA and its immediate predecessor have received a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over $12 million during SAMTA’s first two fiscal years alone. In short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on the shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit systems, but has provided substantial countervailing financial assistance as well, assistance that may leave individual mass-transit systems better off than they would have been had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress’ treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction that the national political process systematically protects States from the risk of having their functions in that area handicapped by Commerce Clause regulation. IV This analysis makes clear that Congress’ action in affording SAMTA employees the protections of the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. The judgment of the District Court therefore must be reversed. Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position. But the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action — the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated. In the factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the political process have performed as intended. These cases do not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). We note and accept Justice Frankfurter’s observation in New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 583 (1946): “The process of Constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising doctrines sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency. Nor need we go beyond what is required for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now before the Court.” Though the separate concurrence providing the fifth vote in National League of Cities was “not untroubled by certain possible implications” of the decision, 426 U. S., at 856, the Court in that case attempted to articulate affirmative limits on the Commerce Clause power in terms of core governmental functions and fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. But the model of democratic decisionmaking the Court there identified underestimated, in our view, the solicitude of the national political process for the continued vitality of the States. Attempts by other courts since then to draw guidance from this model have proved it both impracticable and doctrinally barren. In sum, in National League of Cities the Court tried to repair what did not need repair. We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. We have not hesitated, however, when it has become apparent that a prior decision has departed from a proper understanding of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941). Due respect for the reach of congressional power within the federal system mandates that we do so now. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is overruled. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and these cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 701 F. 2d 50 (CA6 1983), cert. pending sub nom. City of Macon v. Joiner, No. 82-1974; Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, Ga., 699 F. 2d 1060 (CA111983), cert. pending, No. 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Authority, 677 F. 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146 (1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982). Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill). Neither SATS nor SAMTA appears to have attempted to avoid the FLSA’s minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage levels in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the minimum wages prescribed by the FLSA. See Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to (1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is its principal provider; and (4) whether government is particularly suited to perform it because of a community-wide need. Id., at 1037. See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 154, n. 6 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 781, and n. 7 (1982) (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558, and n. 2 (1975) (dissenting opinion). See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) (“essential”); Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) (“usual”); United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 185 (1936) (“activities in which the states have traditionally engaged”); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905) (“strictly governmental”). In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of “strictly governmental” functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated: “The true distinction is between . . . those operations of the States essential to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private character”; under this standard, “[i]t is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial light, water and the like.” 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monopoly, the Court stated that “the business of buying and selling commodities ... is not the performance of a governmental function,” and that “[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned.” Id., at 369. In Powers, the Court upheld the application of the federal income tax to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court reiterated that “the State cannot withdraw sources of revenue from the federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a departure from usual governmental functions and to which, by reason of their nature, the federal taxing power would normally extend,” regardless of the fact that the proprietary enterprises “are undertaken for what the State conceives to be the public benefit.” 293 U. S., at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938). That concern was especially weighty in South Carolina because liquor taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over one-fourth of the Federal Government’s revenues. See New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion). Indeed, the “traditional” nature of a particular governmental function can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today’s self-evidently “traditional” function is often yesterday’s suspect innovation. Thus, National League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been provided not for recreation but for grazing domestic animals “in common,” and that “[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private property [by eminent domain] for a public park . . . would have been regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power.” Id,, at 297. For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of federal involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate standard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government’s current regulatory activity originated less than 50 years ago with the New Deal, and a good portion of it has developed within the past two decades. The recent vintage of this regulatory activity does not dimmish the strength of the federal interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it affect the strength of the States’ interest in being free from federal supervision. Although the Court’s intergovernmental tax-immunity decisions ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation because those activities “ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing] power from the beginning,” New York v. United States, 326 U. S., at 588 (Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.), the Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long historical records in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Powers, supra, took effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was challenged, while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New York v. United States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years later. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity—A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J. 3, 34, n. 116 (1950). See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982). See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovernmental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Future of Federalism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981). A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) (Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Gov-eminent Accounts and Reports, Fiscal Service — Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Dept, of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 rev. ed.). Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984). See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1535, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3538, 16 U. S. C. § 2501 et seq.; the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 300f et seq.; the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 3701 et seq.; the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq.; and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1109, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures 2-15. See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1002(32); and Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Even as regards the FLSA, Congress incorporated special provisions concerning overtime pay for law enforcement and firefighting personnel when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take account of the special concerns of States and localities with respect to these positions. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on state and local governments with respect to policymaking personnel who are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii). See, e. g., Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868 (1979). See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years 1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983). Ibid. Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that regulation under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The application of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal funding under UMTA. But see United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 86-87 (1978).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1181. Argued January 7, 2008 Decided June 16, 2008 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scaua, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 23. Auto, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 31. Christopher J. Meade argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Seth P. Waxman and Raed Gonzalez. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Dupree, Toby J. Hey tens, Donald E. Keener, and Quynh Bain. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Immigration Law Foundation et al. by Nadine Wettstein and Beth Werlin; and for Adil Chedad by David C. Frederick, Michael F. Sturley, and Saher Joseph Macarius. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide in this case whether an alien who has requested and been granted voluntary departure from the United States, a form of discretionary relief that avoids certain statutory penalties, must adhere to that election and depart within the time prescribed, even if doing so causes the alien to forgo a ruling on a pending, unresolved motion to reopen the removal proceedings. The case turns upon the interaction of relevant provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (IIRIRA or Act). The Act provides that every alien ordered removed from the United States has a right to file one motion to reopen his or her removal proceedings. See 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). The statute also provides, however, that if the alien’s request for voluntary departure is granted after he or she is found removable, the alien is required to depart within the period prescribed by immigration officials, which cannot exceed 60 days. See §1229c(b)(2) (2000 ed.). Failure to depart within the prescribed period renders the alien ineligible for certain forms of relief, including adjustment of status, for a period of 10 years. § 1229c(d)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Pursuant to regulation, however, departure has the effect of withdrawing the motion to reopen. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(d) (2007). Without some means, consistent with the Act, to reconcile the two commands — one directing voluntary departure and the other directing termination of the motion to reopen if an alien departs the United States — an alien who seeks reopening has two poor choices: The alien can remain in the United States to ensure the motion to reopen remains pending, while incurring statutory penalties for overstaying the voluntary departure date; or the alien can avoid penalties by prompt departure but abandon the motion to reopen. The issue is whether Congress intended the statutory right to reopen to be qualified by the voluntary departure process. The alien, who is petitioner here, urges that filing a motion to reopen tolls the voluntary departure period pending the motion’s disposition. We reject this interpretation because it would reconfigure the voluntary departure scheme in a manner inconsistent with the statutory design. We do not have the authority to interpret the statute as petitioner suggests. Still, the conflict between the right to file a motion to reopen and the provision requiring voluntary departure no later than 60 days remains untenable if these are the only two choices available to the alien. Absent a valid regulation resolving the dilemma in a different way, we conclude the alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw the motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before the departure period expires. Petitioner attempted to avail himself of this opportunity below. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not disturb the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) denial of petitioner’s request to withdraw the voluntary departure election. We now reverse its decision and remand the case. I Petitioner Samson Taiwo Dada, a native and citizen of Nigeria, came to the United States in April 1998 on a temporary nonimmigrant visa. He overstayed it. In 1999, petitioner alleges, he married an American citizen. Petitioner’s wife filed an 1-130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf. The necessary documentary evidence was not provided, however, and the petition was denied in February 2003. In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged petitioner with being removable under § 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as redesignated by IIRIRA § 305(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-598, and as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2000 ed., Supp. V), for overstaying his visa. Petitioner’s wife then filed a second 1-130 petition. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner’s request for a continuance pending adjudication of the newly filed 1-130 petition and noted that those petitions take an average of about three years to process. The IJ found petitioner to be removable but granted the request for voluntary departure under § 1229c(b) (2000 ed.). The BIA affirmed on November 4, 2005, without a written opinion. It ordered petitioner to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties, including a civil fine of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000 and ineligibility for relief under §§ 240A, 240B, 245, 248, and 249 of the INA for a period of 10 years. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5-6. Two days before expiration of the 30-day period, on December 2, 2005, petitioner sought to withdraw his request for voluntary departure. At the same time he filed with the BIA a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). He contended that his motion recited new and material evidence demonstrating a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until the second 1-130 petition was resolved. On February 8, 2006, more than two months after the voluntary departure period expired, the BIA denied the motion to reopen on the ground that petitioner had overstayed his voluntary departure period. Under § 240B(d) of the INA, 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(d) (2000 ed. and Supp. V), the BIA reasoned, an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but fails to depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from applying for and receiving certain forms of discretionary relief, including adjustment of status. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-4. The BIA did not address petitioner’s motion to withdraw his request for voluntary departure. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Dada v. Gonzales, 207 Fed. Appx. 425 (2006) (per curiam). Relying on its decision in Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F. 3d 387 (2006), the court held that the BIA’s reading of the applicable statutes as rendering petitioner ineligible for relief was reasonable. The Fifth Circuit joined the First and Fourth Circuits in concluding that there is no automatic tolling of the voluntary departure period. See Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F. 3d 57 (CA1 2007); Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F. 3d 500 (CA4 2006). Four other Courts of Appeals have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e. g., Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F. 3d 330 (CA3 2005); Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F. 3d 950 (CA8 2005); Marte v. Ashcroft, 394 F. 3d 1278 (CA9 2005); Ugokwe v. United States Atty. Gen., 453 F. 3d 1325 (CA11 2006). We granted certiorari, see Dada v. Keisler, 551 U. S. 1188 (2007), to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals. After oral argument we ordered supplemental briefing, see 552 U. S. 1138 (2008), to address whether an alien may withdraw his request for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. Also after oral argument, on January 10, 2008, petitioner’s second 1-130 application was denied by the IJ on the ground that his marriage is a sham, contracted solely to obtain immigration benefits. II Resolution of the questions presented turns on the interaction of two statutory schemes — the statutory right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings and the rules governing voluntary departure. A Voluntary departure is a discretionary form of relief that allows certain favored aliens — either before the conclusion of removal proceedings or after being found deportable — to leave the country willingly. Between 1927 and 2005, over 42 million aliens were granted voluntary departure; almost 13 million of those departures occurred between 1996 and 2005 alone. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Aliens Expelled: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2005, Table 38 (2005), online at http:// Avww.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/YrBk05En.shtm (all Internet materials as visited June 13, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Voluntary departure was “originally developed by administrative officers, in the absence of a specific mandate in the statute.” 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure § 74.02[1], p. 74-15 (rev. ed. 2007) (hereinafter Gordon). The practice was first codified in the Alien Registration Act of 1940, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. The Alien Registration Act amended §19 of the Immigration Act of Feb. 5,1917,39 Stat. 889, to provide that an alien “deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years” may be permitted by the Attorney General to “depart the United States to any country of his choice at his OAvn expense, in lieu of deportation.” § 20(c), 54 Stat. 672. In 1996, perhaps in response to criticism of immigration officials who had expressed frustration that aliens granted voluntary departure were “permitted to continue their illegal presence in the United States for months, and even years,” Letter from Benjamin G. Habberton, Acting Commissioner on Immigration and Naturalization, to the Executive Director of the President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, reprinted in Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954 (Comm. Print 1952), Congress curtailed the period of time during which an alien may remain in the United States pending voluntary departure. The Act, as pertinent to voluntary departures requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, provides: “The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense if, at the conclusion of a proceeding under section 1229a of this title, the immigration judge enters an order granting voluntary departure in lieu of removal and finds that— “(A) the alien has been physically present in the United States for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the date the notice to appear was served under section 1229(a) of this title; “(B) the alien is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least 5 years immediately preceding the alien’s application for voluntary departure; “(C) the alien is not deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 1227(a)(4) of this title; and “(D) the alien has established by clear and convincing evidence that the alien has the means to depart the United States and intends to do so.” 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(l). See also § 1229c(a)(1) (“The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection” in lieu of being subject to removal proceedings or prior to the completion of those proceedings; the alien need not meet the requirements of § 1229c(b)(1) if removability is conceded). When voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, as it was in this case, the statute provides a voluntary departure period of not more than 60 days. See § 1229c(b)(2). The alien can receive up to 120 days if he or she concedes removability and requests voluntary departure before or during removal proceedings. See § 1229c(a)(2)(A). Appropriate immigration authorities may extend the time to depart but only if the voluntary departure period is less than the statutory maximum in the first instance. The voluntary departure period in no event may exceed 60 or 120 days for §§ 1229c(b) and 1229c(a) departures, respectively. See 8 CFR § 1240.26(f) (2007) (“Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs.... In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed 120 days or 60 days as set forth in section 240B of the Act”). The voluntary departure period typically does not begin to run until administrative appeals are concluded. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(47)(B) (“The order ... shall become final upon the earlier of — (i) a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the [BIA]”); § 1229c(b)(1) (Attorney General may permit voluntary departure at conclusion of removal proceedings); see also 8 CFR § 1003.6(a) (2007) (“[T]he decision in any proceeding . . . from which an appeal to the Board may be taken shall not be executed during the time allowed for the filing of an appeal . . . ”). In addition some Federal Courts of Appeals have found that they may stay voluntary departure pending consideration of a petition for review on the merits. See, e. g., Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F. 3d 323, 329-332 (CA2 2006); Obale v. Attorney General of United States, 453 F. 3d 151, 155-157 (CA3 2006). But see Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 182, 194 (CA4 2004). This issue is not presented here, however, and we leave its resolution for another day. Voluntary departure, under the current structure, allows the Government and the alien to agree upon a quid pro quo. From the Government’s standpoint, the alien’s agreement to leave voluntarily expedites the departure process and avoids the expense of deportation — including procuring necessary documents and detaining the alien pending deportation. The Government also eliminates some of the costs and burdens associated with litigation over the departure. With the apparent purpose of ensuring that the Government attains the benefits it seeks, the Act imposes limits on the time for voluntary departure, see supra, at 10, and prohibits judicial review of voluntary departure decisions, see 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229c(f) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Benefits to the alien from voluntary departure are evident as well. He or she avoids extended detention pending completion of travel arrangements; is allowed to choose when to depart (subject to certain constraints); and can select the country of destination. And, of great importance, by departing voluntarily the alien facilitates the possibility of readmission. The practice was first justified as involving “no warrant of deportation ... so that if [the alien reapplies] for readmission in the proper way he will not be barred.” 2 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement: Report on the Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States 57, 102-103 (1931) (Report No. 5). The current statute likewise allows an alien who voluntarily departs to sidestep some of the penalties attendant to deportation. Under the current Act, an alien involuntarily removed from the United States is ineligible for readmission for a period of 5, 10, or 20 years, depending upon the circumstances of removal. See 8 U. S. C. §1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (“Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 1225(b)(1) of this title or at the end of proceedings under section 1229a of this title initiated upon the alien’s arrival in the United States and who again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of a second or subsequent removal.. .) is inadmissible”); § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (“Any alien not described in clause (i) who — (I) has been ordered removed under section [240] or any other provision of law, or (II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal.. . is inadmissible”). An alien who makes a timely departure under a grant of voluntary departure, on the other hand, is not subject to these restrictions — although he or she otherwise may be ineligible for readmission based, for instance, on an earlier unlawful presence in the United States, see § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). B A motion to reopen is a form of procedural relief that “asks the Board to change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing.” 1 Gordon §3.05[8][c], at 3-76.32. Like voluntary departure, reopening is a judicial creation later codified by federal statute. An early reference to the procedure was in 1916, when a Federal District Court addressed an alien’s motion to reopen her case to provide evidence of her marriage to a United States citizen. See Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579 (ND Cal.); see also Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 244 F. 749, 750 (CA9 1917) (addressing an application to reopen to correct discrepancies in testimony). “The reopening of a case by the immigration authorities for the introduction of further evidence” was treated then, as it is now, as “a matter for the exercise of their discretion”; where the alien was given a “full opportunity to testify and to present all witnesses and documentary evidence at the original hearing,” judicial interference was deemed unwarranted. Wong Shong Been v. Proctor, 79 F. 2d 881, 883 (CA9 1935). In 1958, when the BIA was established, the Attorney General promulgated a rule for the reopening and reconsideration of removal proceedings, 8 CFR § 3.2, upon which the current regulatory provision is based. See 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9118-9119 (1958), final rule codified at 8 CFR § 3.2 (1959) (“The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision” upon a “written motion”); see also BIA: Powers; and Reopening or Reconsideration of Cases, 27 Fed. Reg. 96-97 (1962). Until 1996, there was no time limit for requesting the reopening of a case due to the availability of new evidence. Then, in 1990, “fear[ful] that deportable or excludable aliens [were] try[ing] to prolong their stays in the U. S. by filing one type of discretionary relief . . . after another in immigration proceedings,” Justice Dept. Finds Aliens Not Abusing Requests for Relief, 68 Interpreter Releases 907, 908 (July 22, 1991) (No. 27), Congress ordered the Attorney General to “issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceedings,” including “a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions,” Immigration Act of 1990, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 5066. The Attorney General found little evidence of abuse, concluding that requirements for reopening are a disincentive to bad faith filings. See 68 Interpreter Releases, supra. Because “Congress . . . neither rescinded [n]or amended its mandate to limit the number and time frames of motions,” however, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a regulation imposing new time limits and restrictions on filings. The new. regulation allowed the alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18900, 18901, 18905 (1996); see 8 CFR § 3.2 (1996). With the 1996 enactment of the Act, Congress adopted the recommendations of the DOJ with respect to numerical and time limits. The current provision governing motions to reopen states: “(A) In general “An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section .... “(B) Contents “The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. “(C) Deadline “(i) In general “Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed., Supp. V). To qualify as “new,” § 1229a(c)(7)(B), the facts must be “material” and of the sort that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1) (2007); 1 Gordon § 3.05[8][c], at 3-76.34 (“Evidence is not previously unavailable merely because the movant chose not to testify or to present evidence earlier, or because the IJ refused to admit the evidence”). There are narrow exceptions to the 90-day filing period for asylum proceedings and claims of battered spouses, children, and parents, see 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv) (2000 ed., Supp. V), which are not applicable here. The Act, to be sure, limits in significant ways the availability of the motion to reopen. It must be noted, though, that the Act transforms the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien. Nowhere in § 1229c(b) or § 1229a(c)(7) did Congress discuss the impact of the statutory right to file a motion to reopen on a voluntary departure agreement. And no legislative history indicates what some Members of Congress might have intended with respect to the motion’s status once the voluntary departure period has elapsed. But the statutory text is plain insofar as it guarantees to each alien the right to file “one motion to reopen proceedings under this section.” § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Ill The Government argues that, by requesting and obtaining permission to voluntarily depart, the alien knowingly surrenders the opportunity to seek reopening. See Brief for Respondent 29-30. Further, according to the Government, petitioner’s proposed rule for tolling the voluntary departure period would undermine the “carefully crafted rules governing voluntary departure,” including the statutory directive that these aliens leave promptly. Id., at 18, 46-47. To be sure, 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(2) contains no ambiguity: The period within which the alien may depart voluntarily “shall not be valid for a period exceeding 60 days.” See also 8 CFR § 1240.26(f) (2007) (“In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed” the statutory periods prescribed by 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229c(a) and 1229c(b)); § 1229c(d) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (imposing statutory penalties for failure to depart). Further, § 1229a(c)(7) does not forbid a scheme under which an alien knowingly relinquishes the right to seek reopening in exchange for other benefits, including those available to the alien under the voluntary departure statute. That does not describe this case, however. Nothing in the statutes or past usage with respect to voluntary departure or motions to reopen indicates they cannot coexist. Neither § 1229a(c)(7) nor § 1229e(b)(2) says anything about the filing of a motion to reopen by an alien who has requested and been granted the opportunity to voluntarily depart. And there is no other statutory language that would place the alien on notice of an inability to seek the case’s reopening in the event of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances bearing upon eligibility for relief. In reading a statute we must not “look merely to a particular clause,” but consider “in connection with it the whole statute.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857); internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395,407 (1991) (“ 'In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy’” (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 158 (1990))); United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1850) (“[W]e must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy”). Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside the statutory right granted to the alien by 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. V) to pursue “one motion to reopen proceedings,” the Government’s position that the alien is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen if the alien agrees to voluntarily depart is unsustainable. It would render the statutory right to seek reopening a nullity in most cases of voluntary departure. (And this group is not insignificant in number; between 2002 and 2006,897,267 aliens were found removable, of which 122,866, or approximately 13.7%, were granted voluntary departure. See DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2006 Statistical Year Book, p. Q1 (Feb. 2007).) It is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the time allowed for voluntary departure will expire long before the BIA issues a decision on a timely filed motion to reopen. See Proposed Rules, DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion To Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition for Review, 72 Fed. Reg. 67674, 67677, and n. 2 (2007) (“As a practical matter, it is often the case that an immigration judge or the Board cannot reasonably be expected to adjudicate a motion to reopen or reconsider during the voluntary departure period”). These practical limitations must be taken into account. In the present case the BIA denied petitioner’s motion to reopen 68 days after he filed the motion — and 66 days after his voluntary departure period had expired. Although the record contains no statistics on the average disposition time for motions to reopen, the number of BIA proceedings has increased over the last two decades, doubling between 1992 and 2000 alone; and, as a result, the BIA’s backlog has more than tripled, resulting in a total of 63,763 undecided cases in 2000. See Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Study Conducted for: the American Bar Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono Re: Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management 13 (2003), online at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/Dorsey StudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf. Since 2000, the BIA has adopted new procedures to reduce its backlog and shorten disposition times. In 2002, the DOJ introduced rules to improve case management, including an increase in the number of cases referred to a single Board member and use of summary disposition procedures for cases without basis in law or fact. See BIA: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878 (2002), final rule codified at 8 CFR § 1003.1 et seq. (2006); see also § 1003.1(e)(4) (summary affirmance procedures). Nevertheless, on September 30,2005, there were 33,063 cases pending before the BIA, 18% of which were more than a year old. See FY 2006 Statistical Year Book, supra, at Ul. On September 30,2006, approximately 20% of the cases pending had been filed during fiscal year 2005. See ibid. Whether an alien’s motion will be adjudicated within the 60-day statutory period in all likelihood will depend on pure happenstance — namely, the backlog of the particular Board member to whom the motion is assigned. Cf. United States v. Wil son, 503 U. S. 329, 334 (1992) (arbitrary results are “not to be presumed lightly”). Absent tolling or some other remedial action by the Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: He or she can leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order; but, pursuant to regulation, the motion to reopen will be deemed withdrawn. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(d); see also 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9118, final rule codified at 8 CFR § 3.2 (1958). Alternatively, if the alien wishes to pursue reopening and remains in the United States to do so, he or she risks expiration of the statutory period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. See 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(d)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (failure to timely depart renders alien “ineligible, for a period of 10 years,” for cancellation of removal under § 240A, adjustment of status under §245, change of nonimmigrant status under § 248, and registry under § 249 of the INA); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-4 (treating petitioner’s motion to reopen as forfeited for failure to depart). The purpose of a motion to reopen is to ensure a proper and lawful disposition. We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was designed to remove this important safeguard for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229c(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (barring aliens who have committed, inter alia, aggravated felonies or terrorism offenses from receiving voluntary departure); § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (requiring an alien who obtains voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceedings to demonstrate “good moral character”). This is particularly so when the plain text of the statute reveals no such limitation. See Costello v. INS, 376 U. S. 120, 127-128 (1964) (counseling long hesitation “before adopting a construction of [the statute] which would, with respect to an entire class of aliens, completely nullify a procedure so intrinsic a part of the legislative scheme”); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 399 (1995) (“Congress might not have wished to impose on the alien” the difficult choice created by treating a motion to reopen as rendering the underlying order nonfinal for purposes of judicial review); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 320 (2001) (recognizing “ ‘the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien’ ” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 449 (1987))). IV A It is necessary, then, to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the quid pro quo of the voluntary departure arrangement. Some solutions, though, do not conform to the statutory design. Petitioner, as noted, proposes automatic tolling of the voluntary departure period during the pendency of the motion to reopen. We do not find statutory authority for this result. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. In return for anticipated benefits, including the possibility of readmission, an alien who requests voluntary departure represents that he or she “has the means to depart the United States and intends to do so” promptly. 8 U. S. C. § 1229c(b)(1)(D); 8 CFR §§ 1240.26(c)(1)-(2) (2007); cf. § 1240.26(c)(3) (the judge may impose additional conditions to “ensure the alien’s timely departure from the United States”). Included among the substantive burdens imposed upon the alien when selecting voluntary departure is the obligation to arrange for departure, and actually depart, within the 60-day period. Cf. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352 (1997) (substantive limitations are not subject to equitable tolling). If the alien is permitted to stay in the United States past the departure date to wait out the adjudication of the motion to reopen, he or she cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure; for the benefit to the Government — a prompt and costless departure — would be lost. Furthermore, it would invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are not likely to be reopened by immigration authorities. B Although a statute or regulation might be adopted to resolve the dilemma in a different manner, as matters now stand the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw the request for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. The DOJ, which has authority to adopt regulations relevant to the issue at hand, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw an application for voluntary departure before expiration of the departure period. According to this proposal, there is nothing in the Act or the implementing regulations that makes the grant of voluntary departure irrevocable. See 72 Fed. Reg. 67679. Accordingly, the DOJ has proposed an amendment to 8 CFR § 1240.26 that, prospectively, would “provide for the automatic termination of a grant of voluntary departure upon the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider, as long as the motion is filed prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period.” 72 Fed. Reg. 67679, Part IV-D; cf. id., at 67682, Part VI (“The provisions of this proposed rule will be applied prospectively only, that is, only with respect to immigration judge orders issued on or after the effective date of the final rule that grant a period of voluntary departure”). Although not binding in the present case, the DOJ’s proposed interpretation of the statutory and regulatory scheme as allowing an alien to withdraw from a voluntary departure agreement “warrants respectful consideration.” Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473, 497 (2002) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 (2001), and Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U. S. 504 (1994)). We hold that, to safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before expiration of the departure period, without regard to the underlying merits of the motion to reopen. As a result, the alien has the option either to abide by the terms, and receive the agreed-upon benefits, of voluntary departure; or, alternatively, to forgo those benefits and remain in the United States to pursue an administrative motion. If the alien selects the latter option, he or she gives up the possibility of readmission and becomes subject to the IJ’s alternative order of removal. See 8 CFR § 1240.26(d). The alien may be removed by the DHS within 90 days, even if the motion to reopen has yet to be adjudicated. See 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). But the alien may request a stay of the order of removal, see BIA Practice Manual § 6.3(a), http://www. usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm; cf. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (providing that a removal order entered in absentia is stayed automatically pending a motion to reopen); and, though the BIA has discretion to deny the motion for a stay, it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to do so where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening. Though this interpretation still confronts the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the Government’s proposal and the elimination of benefits to the Government that would follow from petitioner’s tolling rule. Contrary to the Government’s assertion, the rule we adopt does not alter the quid pro quo between the Government and the alien. If withdrawal is requested prior to expiration of the voluntary departure period, the alien has not received benefits without costs; the alien who withdraws from a voluntary departure arrangement is in the same position as an alien who was not granted voluntary departure in the first instance. Allowing aliens to withdraw from their voluntary departure agreements, moreover, establishes a greater probability that their motions to reopen will be considered. At the same time, it gives some incentive to limit filings to non-frivolous motions to reopen; for aliens with changed circumstances of the type envisioned by Congress in drafting § 1229a(c)(7) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) are the ones most likely to forfeit their previous request for voluntary departure in return for the opportunity to adjudicate their motions. Cf. Supp. Brief for Respondent 1-2 (“[I]t is extraordinarily rare for an alien who has requested and been granted voluntary departure by the BIA to seek to withdraw from that arrangement within the voluntary departure period”). A more expeditious solution to the untenable conflict between the voluntary departure scheme and the motion to reopen might be to permit an alien who has departed the United States to pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture, much as Congress has permitted with respect to judicial review of a removal order. See IIRIRA § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (repealing 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(c) (1994 ed.), which prohibited an alien who “departed from the United States after the issuance of the order” to seek judicial review). As noted previously, 8 CFR § 1003.2(d) provides that the alien’s departure constitutes withdrawal of the motion to reopen. This regulation, however, has not been challenged in these proceedings, and we do not consider it here. * * * Petitioner requested withdrawal of his motion for voluntary departure prior to expiration of his 30-day departure period. The BIA should have granted this request, without regard to the merits of petitioner’s 1-130 petition, and permitted petitioner to pursue his motion to reopen. We find this same mistake implicit in the Court of Appeals’ decision. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LICHTER et al., doing business as SOUTHERN FIREPROOFING CO., v. UNITED STATES. NO. 105. Argued November 20-21, 1947. Decided June 14, 1948. Paul W. Steer argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners in No. 105. Leo R. Friedman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 74. With him on the brief was Jos. I. McMullen. Edward C. Park argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 95. Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Herbert A. Bergson, Newell A. Clapp, Paul A. Sweeney, Oscar H. Davis and Ellis Lyons.- O. R. McGuire and Julius C. Smith filed a brief for the Spindale Mills, Inc., as amicus curiae, in Nos. 74 and 95, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The Renegotiation Act, in time of crisis, presented to this nation a new legislative solution of a major phase of the problem of national defense against world-wide aggression. Through its contribution to our production program it sought to enable us to take the leading part in winning World War II on an unprecedented scale of total global warfare without abandoning our traditional faith in and reliance upon private enterprise and individual initiative devoted to the public welfare. In each of the three cases before us the principal issue is the constitutionality, on its face, of the Renegotiation Act insofar as it is authority for the recovery of the excessive profits sought to be recovered by the United States from the respective petitioners. In each case the secondary issue is whether the failure of the respective petitioners to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the amount, if any, of their excessive profits excludes from consideration here the coverage of the Act, the amount of the profits and other comparable issues which could have been presented to the Tax Court. In each of these cases the District Court has held that the Act was constitutional and that, by failure to petition the Tax Court for their redetermination, the existing orders have become final as claimed by the Government. Each Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed, unanimously, the judgment appealed to it. We agree with the courts below. In each of these cases the United States obtained a judgment for a sum alleged to be owed to it pursuant to a determination of excessive profits under the Renegotiation Act. The determinations of excessive profits in the respective cases were made by the Under Secretary of War or by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board after the Revenue Act of 1943 had been approved, February 25, 1944. That Act contained, in its Title VII, the so-called Second Renegotiation Act which included provisions for the filing with the Tax Court of petitions for the redeterminations of excess profits. None of these petitioners, however, filed such a petition with the Tax Court. On the other hand, the respective petitioners have relied upon their claims that, as a matter of law, the Renegotiation Act is unconstitutional on its face insofar as it purports to authorize the judgments which have been taken against the respective petitioners. The petitioners contend also that their failures to file petitions with the Tax Court have not foreclosed their respective rights to contest here the coverage of the Act, the amount of the excess profits found against them and other comparable issues which they might have presented to the Tax Court. NO. 105 (THE LICHTER CASE). In May, 1945, the United States filed its complaint in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio against the petitioners, Jacob Lichter and Jennie L. Lichter, engaged in the construction business in Cincinnati, Ohio, under the name of the Southern Fireproofing Company, a copartnership. The complaint was founded upon the determination by the Under Secretary of War, dated October 20, 1944, that $70,000 of the profits realized by petitioners during the calendar year 1942- from nine subcontracts, executed in 1942 for a total price of $710,224.16, were, under the Renegotiation Act, excessive profits. The complaint showed that the petitioners were entitled to a tax credit of $42,980.61 against such excessive profits. It alleged, moreover, that the petitioners had not, within the required period, petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the order in question and had not paid or otherwise eliminated the amount of $27,019.39 thus due to the United States. The petitioners admitted that the Under Secretary had made the determination as alleged; that if his order were valid the petitioners were entitled to the tax credit specified; and that they had not paid the sum demanded nor had they filed a petition with the Tax Court for a rede-termination of the excessive profits, if any. They put in issue, on specifically stated grounds, the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act insofar as it might be authority for the recovery of the profits sought to be recovered, and they put in issue the applicability to them of any requirement that they seek in the Tax Court a redetermination of the profits which they had been ordered to repay to the United States. They alleged also that: of the nine subcontracts which were made the basis of renegotiation, all were executed during the calendar year 1942; four were executed before April 28, 1942, the date of the original Renegotiation Act; none contained clauses permitting or requiring their renegotiation; only two of them were for amounts in excess of $100,000 each; these two were among those which had been executed before April 28, 1942; and no excessive profits had been in fact earned by the petitioners during 1942. Finally they alleged that the several contracts referred to were subcontracts entered into under prime contracts which had been awarded by a department of the Government as the result of competitive bidding for the construction of buildings and facilities and the subcontracts themselves had been obtained by petitioners after further competitive bidding. For these and other reasons stated in the answer the contracts were claimed to be exempt from renegotiation. The United States moved for judgment on the pleadings and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Affidavits were filed in' support of those motions. These included particularly the comprehensive affidavits of Robert P. Patterson, then Under Secretary of War, and of H. Struve Hensel, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy. These affidavits set forth the general background of the Renegotiation Act and the basis for- claiming that the renegotiation of war contracts was necessary in order to sustain this nation’s share of the burden of winning World War II. Counterparts of these two affidavits were filed in each of the other cases before us. The petitioners, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the profits in question were exempt from the Act. The District Court made findings of fact substantially as stated in the complaint and admitted in the answer. It concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the United States was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for $27,019.39, with interest at six percent per annum from November 6,1944. 68 F. Supp. 19. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment. It held expressly that the Renegotiation Act was valid on its face and that the petitioners, by reason of their failure to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination of the amount of the excessive profits, if any, were barred from making their other attacks on the Secretary’s determination of such excessive profits. 160 F. 2d 329. Because of the basic significance of the constitutional questions involved we granted certiorari. 331 U. S. 802. NO. 74 (THE POWNALL CASE). In September, 1945, the United States filed its complaint in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California against the petitioners, A. V. Pownall, Grace M. Pownall, and Henes-Morgan Machinery Company, Limited, a California corporation, all three doing business in Los Angeles, California, as co-partners under the name of General Products Company. The record indicates that they were there engaged in the production of precision parts, machinery and tools for use by war contractors. The complaint was founded upon a determination made by the Under Secretary of War, on behalf of the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board, dated December 27, 1944, to the effect that $628,373.14 of the profits realized by petitioners during the calendar year 1943 on their contracts and subcontracts, subject to renegotiation pursuant to the Renegotiation Act, were excessive profits. The complaint showed that the petitioners were entitled to a tax credit of $514,663.95 against such profits. It alleged, moreover, that the petitioners had not, within the required period, petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the order in question and had not paid the sum of $113,709.19 thus claimed by the United States. The petitioners admitted that the Under Secretary had made the determination as alleged; that the Board had adopted his order; that the appropriate tax credit was as alleged; that no petition for redetermination had been filed with the Tax Court; that the time for filing had expired; and that no payment of the amount claimed had been made. The petitioners alleged, however, that the Renegotiation Act was invalid on its face on numerous specifically stated constitutional grounds; that the Under Secretary’s order was invalid in that it was based on undisclosed data and contained no findings; and that no single contract under consideration exceeded in amount the sum of $99,000. The United States moved for judgment on the pleadings and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The petitioners did the same. Under the stipulations of the parties there were no disputed issues of fact and the only questions left for decision were those as to the constitutional validity of the Act and as to its interpretation if found to be valid. The District Court denied the motions of both parties. However, ruling on the merits of the cause thus before it, it found the facts to be substantially as alleged in the complaint and as stipulated. It held the Act to be valid on its face and held the unappealed determination of excessive profits to be final. It rendered judgment for the United States for $121,043.39, evidently representing $113,709.19, with interest at six percent per annum from March 13, 1945. 65 F. Supp. 147, and see findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment of the court. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. It followed its earlier decision in Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 154 F. 2d 419, in upholding the constitutionality of the Act and expressly holding that the petitioners, by not having petitioned the Tax Court for relief, had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Accordingly, it held that the District Court was without jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ contentions as to the coverage of the Act. 159 F. 2d 73. We granted certiorari. 331 U. S. 802. NO. 9 5 (THE ALEXANDER CASE). In August, 1945, the United States filed its complaint in the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts against the petitioner, Alexander Wool Combing Company, a Massachusetts corporation doing business at Lowell, Massachusetts, and there engaged in the business of scouring wool and combing it into tops and noils for commissions paid to it by the owners of the wool. The complaint was founded upon two determinations by the Under Secretary of War, both dated September 6, 1944. One determined that $22,500 of the profits realized by the petitioner during its fiscal year ended June 30, 1942, and the other that $45,000 of the profits realized by the petitioner during its fiscal year ended June 30, 1943, under its contracts and subcontracts which were alleged to be subject to the provisions of the Renegotiation Act, were excessive. The complaint showed that the petitioner was entitled to a tax credit of $15,020.80 against such excessive profits for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1942, and of $36,596.42 against those for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1943. The complaint alleged, moreover, that the petitioner had not, within the required periods, petitioned the Tax Court for a redeter-mination of either of the orders in question; that the respective periods for filing such petitions had expired; and that the petitioner had not paid, or otherwise eliminated, the amount of $15,882.78 thus due to the United States. The petitioner admitted the factual allegations of the complaint but denied that any amount was owing to the United States. It claimed that the determinations made by the Under Secretary were void because made without due process of law and were unenforcible as to the petitioner because, as applied to it, they were unconstitutional for several specifically stated reasons. The United States moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In support of these motions the above-mentioned affidavits of Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, and of H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and several others were filed. Evidence both oral and in affidavit form was submitted in opposition. The District Court stated in its opinion, 66 F. Supp. 389, 391, that the petitioner “had no direct contracts with any department or agency of the United States. It combed wool for different private companies. It knew that some of the wool it combed for the companies was destined for use in government contracts, but it was and is ignorant as to the destination of other wool.” That court, nevertheless, rendered judgment in favor of the United States, for $15,882.78, with interest at six percent per annum from September 6, 1944. It held that the war powers of Congress were sufficient to enable it to authorize the recapture of excessive profits such as these; that the standard of “excessive profits” was sufficient to satisfy the constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to delegate authority; that any defects in the departmental proceedings were immaterial in view of the opportunity afforded the petitioner for a trial de novo and for a redetermination of excessive profits, if any, in the Tax Court; and that petitioner’s defenses on the ground of lack of coverage or of retroactivity of the application of the Renegotiation Act to the petitioner were lost to it by its failure to seek relief from the Tax Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said, per curiam: “We think the court below adequately covered all the issues in this case and we affirm its judgment upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in its opinion . . . .” 160 F. 2d 103. We granted certiorari. 331U. S.802. THE BACKGROUND. We have two main issues before us: (1) the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act on its face and (2) the finality of the determination of the excessive profits made under it in the absence of a petition, filed with the Tax Court within the required time, seeking a redetermination of those profits. In the Lichter case we have issues as to profits made in the calendar year 1942, in the Pownall case as to profits made in the calendar year 1943, and in the Alexander case as to certain profits made in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1942, and as to other profits made in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1943. In each case we uphold the constitutionality of the Act as providing the necessary authorization for the judgments rendered. We also accept the finality given by the courts below to the administrative determinations made of the excessive profits, although the statutory situation as a basis for the finality of such determinations is not precisely the same in each case. By reason of the finality thus attached to the determinations made as to excessive profits in these cases, we do not pass upon the issues attempted to be raised here as to the coverage of the Act, the amount of the profits, or other matters which the petitioners might have presented to the Tax Court but did not. In procedure which affects property rights as directly and substantially as that authorized by the Renegotiation Act, the governmental action authorized, although resting on valid constitutional grounds, is capable of gross abuse. The very finality of the administrative determinations here upheld emphasizes the seriousness of the injustices which can result from the abuse of the large powers vested in the administrative officials. We do not minimize the seriousness of complaints which thus may be cut off without relief in the name of the necessities of war and for the sake of the defense of the nation when its survival is at stake. We re-emphasize that, under these conditions, there is great need both for adequate channels of procedural due process and for careful conformity to those channels. In total war it is necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of his property and profits with at least the same fortitude as that with which a drafted soldier makes his traditional sacrifices of comfort, security and life itself. Within procedure thus authorized by the Constitution, the Congress and the Administration, and here affirmed, resulting injustices can and should be carefully examined and as far as possible relieved. In war both the raising and the support of the armed forces are essential. Both require mobilization and control under the authority of Congress. Both are entitled also to such postwar relief as may be authorized by Congress. The Renegotiation Act was developed as a major wartime policy of Congress comparable to that of the Selective Service Act. The authority of Congress to authorize each of them sprang from its war powers. Each was a part of a national policy adopted in time of crisis in the conduct of total global warfare by a nation dedicated to the preservation, practice and development of the maximum measure of individual freedom consistent with the unity of effort essential to success. With the advent of such warfare, mobilized property in the form of equipment and supplies became as essential as mobilized manpower. Mobilization of effort extended not only to the uniformed armed services but to the entire population. Both Acts were a form of mobilization. The language of the Constitution authorizing such measures is broad rather than restrictive. It says “The Congress shall have Power ... To raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; . . . Art. I, § 8, Cl. 12. This places emphasis upon the supporting as well as upon the raising of armies. The power of Congress as to both is inescapably express, not merely implied. The conscription of manpower is a more vital interference with the life, liberty and property of the individual than is the conscription of his property or his profits or any substitute for such conscription of them. For his hazardous, full-time service in the armed forces a soldier is paid whatever the Government deems to be a fair but modest compensation. Comparatively speaking, the manufacturer of war goods undergoes no such hazard to his personal safety as does a front-line soldier and yet the Renegotiation Act gives him far better assurance of a reasonable return for his wartime services than the Selective Service Act and all its related legislation give to the men in the armed forces. The constitutionality of the conscription of manpower for military service is beyond question. The constitutional power of Congress to support the armed forces with equipment and supplies is no less clear and sweeping. It is valid, a fortiori. In view of this power “To raise and support Armies, ...” and the power granted in the same Article of the Constitution “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, . . .” the only question remaining is whether the Renegotiation Act was a law “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the war powers of Congress and especially its power to support armies. It is impossible here to picture adequately all that might have been “necessary and proper” in 1942-1944 to meet the unprecedented responsibility facing Congress in this field. We do, however, catch a glimpse of it in authoritative, contemporaneous descriptions of the situation. Accordingly, we have set forth in the margin excerpts from the message of the President to the Congress upon the State of the Union, January 6, 1942, from a report of the Special Committee of the Senate Investigating the National Defense Program under the chairmanship of Senator Harry S. Truman, of Missouri, March 30, 1943, and from the affidavit of Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, dated August 3, 1945, in the form filed in each of the three cases before us. The above-mentioned excerpts describe a demand for production of war supplies in proportions previously unimagined. They call for production in a volume never before approximated and at an undreamed of speed. The results amply demonstrated the infinite value of that production in winning the war. It proved to be a sine qua non condition of the survival of the nation. Not only was it “necessary and proper” for Congress to provide for such production in the successful conduct of the war, but it was well within the outer limits of the constitutional discretion of Congress and the President to do so under the terms of the Renegotiation Act. Accordingly, the question before us as to the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act is not that of the power of the government to renegotiate and recapture war profits. The only questions are whether the particular method of renegotiation and the administrative procedure prescribed conformed to the constitutional limitations under which Congress was permitted to exercise its basic powers. Our first question relates to the method of adjusting net compensation for war services through the compulsory “renegotiation” of profits under existing contracts between private parties, including recourse to unilateral orders for payments into the Treasury of the United States of such portions of those profits as were determined by the administrative officials of that Government to be “excessive profits.” There were added the limitations that the contracts were for war goods in time of war, the ultimate payment for which -was, in any event, to come from the Government and that, at the time of this impingement of the Renegotiation Act upon them, the contracts must not have been completed to the extent that final payments had been made on them. One approach to the question of the constitutional power of Congress over the profits on these contracts is to recognize that Congress, in time of war, unquestionably has the fundamental power, previously discussed, to conscript men and to requisition the properties necessary and proper to enable it to raise and support its Armies. Congress furthermore has a primary obligation to bring about whatever production of war equipment and supplies shall be necessary to win a war. Given this mission, Congress then had to choose between possible alternatives for its performance. In the light of the compelling necessity for the immediate production of vast quantities of war goods, the first alternative, all too clearly evident to the world, was that which Congress did not choose, namely, that of mobilizing the productive capacity of the nation into a governmental unit on the totalitarian model. This would have meant the conscription of property and of workmen. It would have meant the raising of supplies for the Armies in much the same manner as that in which Congress raised the manpower for such Armies. Already the nation had some units of production of military supplies in the form of arsenals, navy yards, and in the increasing number of governmentally owned, if not operated, war material plants. The production of the atomic bombs was one example of a war industry owned and operated exclusively by the Government. Faced with this ironical alternative of converting the nation in effect into a totalitarian state in order to preserve itself from totalitarian domination, that alternative was steadfastly rejected. The plan for Renegotiation of Profits which was chosen in its place by Congress appears in its true light as the very symbol of a free people united in reaching unequalled productive capacity and yet retaining the maximum of individual freedom consistent with a general mobilization of effort. Somewhat crude in its initial statutory simplicity, the Renegotiation Act developed rapidly as the demand for war production increased beyond precedent. First approved April 28, 1942, less than five months after our declaration of war, the Act was adjusted and strengthened in its effectiveness and fairness by the numerous amendments made to it. The nation previously had experienced different, but fundamentally comparable, federal regulation of civilian liberty and property in proportion to the increasing demands of modern warfare. The demands for war equipment and supplies were so great in volume, were for such new types of products, were subject to so many changes in specifications and were subject to such pressing demands for delivery that accurate advance estimates of cost were out of the question. Laying aside as undesirable the complete governmental ownership and operation of the production of war goods of all kinds, many alternative solutions were attempted. Often these called for capital expenditures by the Government in building new plant facilities. Adhering, however, to the policy of private operation of these facilities, Congress and the Administration sought to promote a policy of wide distribution of prime contracts and subcontracts, even to comparatively high cost marginal producers of unfamiliar products. Congress sought to do everything possible to retain and encourage individual initiative in the world-wide race for the largest and quickest production of the best equipment and supplies. It clung to its faith in private enterprise. The problem was to find a fair means of compensation for the services rendered and the goods purchased. Contracts were awarded by negotiation wherever competitive bidding no longer was practicable. Contracts were let at cost-plus-a-fixed-fee. Escalator clauses were inserted. Price ceilings were established. A flat percentage limit on the profits in certain lines of production was tried. Excess profits taxes were imposed. Appeals were made for voluntary refunds of excessive profits. However, experience with these alternatives convinced the Government that contracts at fixed initial prices still provided the best incentive to production. On February 16, 1942, this Court in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, pointed to the possibility of legislative relief. It said (p. 309): “The problem of war profits is not new. In this country, every war we have engaged in has provided opportunities for profiteering and they have been too often scandalously seized. See Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 3 and H. R. 5293, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 590-598. To meet this recurrent evil, Congress has at times taken various measures. It has authorized price fixing. It has placed a fixed limit on profits, or has recaptured high profits through taxation. It has expressly reserved for the Government the right to cancel contracts after they have been made. Pursuant to Congressional authority, the Government has requisitioned existing production facilities or itself built and operated new ones to provide needed war materials. It may be that one or some or all of these measures should be utilized more comprehensively, or that still other measures must be devised. But if the Executive is in need of additional laws by which to protect the nation against war profiteering, the Constitution has given to Congress, not to this Court, the power to make them.” Finally the compulsory renegotiation of contracts was authorized. The procedure outlined in the Original Renegotiation Act, April 28, 1942, was rapidly perfected. As it developed it required advance consents to such renegotiation to be written into the respective contracts and subcontracts for war goods prior to their award and finally it made express provision for a redetermination of the excessive profits, in a proceeding de novo before the Tax Court, wherever a war goods contractor or subcontractor was aggrieved by the administrative order. Throughout these developments extended congressional and public consideration was given to the issues presented. The plan proved itself readily adaptable to the needs of the time. It called for initial contract estimates based upon the best available information at the time of entering into the contracts. Production proceeded at once on the basis of those estimates. Many factors were incapable of exact advance determination. The final net compensation, however, resulted from a renegotiation made after both parties had had the benefit of actual experience under the contract. This determination of the allowable profit was guided by many relevant factors. A list of commonly relevant factors was presented in an early administrative directive. Later such a list was enacted into the statute. Each administrative determination was made subject to a redetermination in a proceeding de novo in the Tax Court provided a timely petition for it was filed by the aggrieved contractor or subcontractor. The Act always has been limited in duration to a period during and shortly following the war. In most instances the Act has resulted in a disposition of cases by agreements reached between the parties. The controversies which have survived to this day are, in large measure, not those dealing with the constitutionality of the general effect of the plan or even with the finality of redetermination under the prescribed administrative procedure, but are those arising out of an alleged abuse of discretion in its administration. THE RENEGOTIATION ACT. While there have been six legislative steps in the development of the Renegotiation Act, the portions of it that are especially material here consist of certain language in the so-called Original Renegotiation Act contained in § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental Defense Appropriations Act, approved April 28, 1942; in the amendments made by the Revenue Act of 1942, October 21, 1942; and its further amendment and substantial expansion by § 701 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1943, February 25, 1944. In that form it is sometimes called the Second Renegotiation Act, but the entire § 403, both in its original and amended forms may be properly cited as the “Renegotiation Act.” In the proceedings leading up to the enactment of the Original Renegotiation Act, an alternative in the form of a rigid limitation of profits was rejected in favor of the more flexible definition embodied in the term “excessive profits.” The War Department Directive of August 10, 1942, entitled “Principles, Policy and Procedure to be Followed in Renegotiation” promptly stated the factors to be stressed in determining excessive profits. This directive was introduced in the hearings held by the Finance Committee of the Senate in September and thus was before the Senate at the time of thé passage of the above-mentioned Revenue Act of 1942, October 21, 1942, which made important amendments in the Renegotiation Act. The “Joint Statement by the War, Navy, and Treasury Departments and the Maritime Commission — Purposes, Principles, Policies, and Interpretations” dealing with the Renegotiation Act was issued March 31, 1943. This was considered at the Hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2, pp. 469, et seq., 1025-1039, especially 1028-1029 (1943). Finally the above-mentioned Revenue Act of 1943, 58 Stat. 21, on February 25, 1944, largely incorporated these views in § 403 (a) (4) (A), thus indicating congressional approval of this administrative practice and further assuring continuity of it during the balance of the life of the Act. DELEGATION OP AUTHORITY UNDER THE RENEGOTIATION ACT. The petitioners contend that the Renegotiation Act unconstitutionally attempted to delegate legislative power to administrative officials. The United States does not contest the right of the courts to decide the issues as to the validity of the Act on its face in the present cases, each of which was instituted after the petitioners’ respective rights to a Tax Court redetermination had been forfeited. We find no reason for not reaching here the constitutionality of the Act. Cf. Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752; Wade v. Stimson, 331 U. S. 793; Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U. S. 540; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414. The constitutional argument is based upon the claim that the delegation of authority contained in the Act carried with it too slight a definition of legislative policy and standards. Accordingly, it is contended that the resulting determination of excessive profits which were claimed by the United States amounted to an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by an administrative official instead of a mere exercise of administrative discretion under valid legislative authority. We hold that the authorization was constitutional. Certainly as spelled out in § 403 (a) (4) (A) of the Second Renegotiation Act with respect to fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943, there can be no objection on this ground. This question, therefore, relates to the delegation of authority as made by the Act before the effective date of the Second Renegotiation Act. The argument on this question is limited to the Lichter and Alexander cases, inasmuch as the excessive profits determined to exist in the Pownall case were so found by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board under the Second Renegotiation Act. 1. The Statutory Language. The Original Renegotiation Act, approved April 28, 1942, provided in § 403 (b), (c), (d) and (e) for the renegotiation of all contracts and subcontracts thereafter made and also of all contracts and subcontracts theretofore made by the War Department, the Navy Department or the Maritime Commission, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contained a renegotiation or recapture clause, provided the final payment pursuant thereto had not been made prior to April 28,1942. The renegotiation was to be done by the Secretary of the Department concerned. For this purpose the Chairman of the Maritime Commission was included in the term “Secretary.” The services of the Bureau of Internal Revenue were made available upon the request of each Secretary, subject to the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purposes of making examinations and determinations with respect to profits under the Section. The Secretary of each Department was authorized and directed, whenever in his opinion excessive profits had been realized or were likely to be realized from any contract with such Department or from any subcontract thereunder, to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price. In case any amount of the contract price was found as a result of such renegotiation to represent “excessive profits” which had been paid to the contractor or subcontractor, the Secretary was authorized to recover them. There was no express definition of the term “excessive profits” in the Original Renegotiation Act. However, in its § 403 (b), there was a relevant statement in connection with the renegotiation clauses required to be inserted in future contracts and subcontracts for an amount in excess of $100,000 each. The Secretary was required to insert in such contracts, thereafter made by his Department, “a provision for the renegotiation of the contract price at a period or periods when, in the judgment of the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty; . . . .” Contractors were also to be required to insert a like provision in their subcontracts. This statement indicated a relationship between current “excessive profits” and those which later might be determined with “reasonable certainty.” Also, in § 403 (d) it was provided that, in renegotiating a contract price or determining excessive profits, the Secretaries of the respective Departments should not make allowances “for any salaries, bonuses, or other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or employees in excess of a reasonable amount, . . .” nor “for any excessive reserves set up by the contractor or for any costs incurred by the contractor which are excessive and unreasonable.” The amendments made to this Section by the Revenue Act of 1942, approved October 21, 1942, were made effective as of April 28, 1942. At the time they were approved, Congress had knowledge of the War Department Directive of August 10, 1942, which had been put into effect stressing certain factors which the Secretary emphasized in determining excessive profits. While Congress then made several amendments to § 403, those amendments did not alter the effect of such directive in this particular. Among the amendments that were then added there was the following purported definition of “excessive profits”: “The term 'excessive profits’ means any amount of a contract or subcontract price which is found as a result of renegotiation to represent excessive profits.” In the light of the existing administrative practices this at least expressed a congressional satisfaction with the existing specificity of the Act. The amendment made to § 403 (c) (3) required the recognition of exclusions and deductions of the character afforded by certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. The amendment to § 403 (c) (5) provided also that the Secretaries, by joint regulation, might prescribe the form and detail in which certain data might be filed by contractors and subcontractors bearing upon their profits under their contracts. This material concerned “statements of actual costs of production” and “other financial statements for any prior fiscal year or years.” Under some circumstances, in the absence of a notice from the Secretary and in the absence of the commencement of renegotiations, it was provided that “the contractor or subcontractor shall not thereafter be required to renegotiate to eliminate excessive profits realized from any such contract or subcontract during such fiscal year or years and any liabilities of the contractor or subcontractor for excessive profits realized during such period shall be thereby discharged.” A new subsection (i) was added containing new exceptions and exemptions from the Act. The “Joint Statement by the War, Navy, and Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission — Purposes, Principles, Policies, and Interpretations” issued March 31, 1943, similarly contributed definiteness to the current administrative practice. 2. The Validity of the Delegation of Authority. It is in the light of these statutory provisions and administrative practices that we must determine whether the Renegotiation Act made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. On the basis of (a) the nature of the particular constitutional powers being employed, (b) the current administrative practices later incorporated into the Act and (c) the adequacy of the statutory term “excessive profits” as used in this context, we hold that the authority granted was a lawful delegation of administrative authority and not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. (a) A constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes. — This power is especially significant in connection with constitutional war powers under which the exercise of broad discretion as to methods to be employed may be essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress. The degree to which Congress must specify its policies and standards in order that the administrative authority granted may not be an unconstitutional delegation of its own legislative power is not capable of precise definition. In peace or in war it is essential that the Constitution be scrupulously obeyed, and particularly that the respective branches of the Government keep within the powers assigned to each by the Constitution. On the other hand, it is of the highest importance that the fundamental purposes of the Constitution be kept in mind and given effect in order that, through the Constitution, the people of the United States may in time of war as in peace bring to the support of those purposes the full force of their united action. In time of crisis nothing could be more tragic and less expressive of the intent of the people than so to construe their Constitution that by its own terms it would substantially hinder rather than help them in defending their national safety. In an address by Honorable Charles E. Hughes, of New York, on “War Powers Under The Constitution,” September 5, 1917, 42 A. B. A. Rep. 232, 238-239, 247-248, he said: “The power to wage war is the power to wage war successfully. The framers of the constitution were under no illusions as to war. They had emerged from a long struggle which had taught them the weakness of a mere confederation, and they had no hope that they could hold what they had won save as they established a Union which could fight with the strength of one people under one government entrusted with the common defence. In equipping the National Government with the needed authority in war, they tolerated no limitations inconsistent with that object, as they realized that the very existence of the Nation might be at stake and that every resource of the people must be at command. . . . “The extraordinary circumstances of war may bring particular business [es] and enterprises clearly into the category of those which are affected with a public interest and which demand immediate and thoroughgoing public regulation. The production and distribution of foodstuffs, articles of prime necessity, those which have direct relation to military efficiency, those which are absolutely required for the support of the people during the stress of conflict, are plainly of this sort. Reasonable regulations to safeguard the resources upon which we depend for military success must be regarded as being within the powers confided to Congress to enable it to prosecute a successful war. “In the words of the Supreme Court: 'It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not self-destructive. In other words, that the power which it confers on the one hand it does not immediately take away on the other. . . .’ This was said in relation to the taxing power. Having been granted in express terms, the Court held it had not been taken away by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the Supreme Court put it in another case: 'the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process clause.’ “Similarly, it may be said that the power has been expressly given to Congress to prosecute war, and to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution. That power explicitly conferred and absolutely essential to the safety of the Nation is not destroyed or impaired by any later provision of the constitution or by any one of the amendments. These may all be construed so as to avoid making the constitution self-destructive, so as to preserve the rights of the citizen from unwarrantable attack, while assuring beyond all hazard the common defence and the perpetuity of our liberties. These rest upon the preservation of the nation. “It has been said that the constitution marches. That is, there are constantly new applications of unchanged powers, and it is ascertained that in novel and complex situations, the old grants contain, in their general words and true significance, needed and adequate authority. So, also, we have a fighting constitution. We cannot at this time fail to appreciate the wisdom of the fathers, as under this charter, one hundred and thirty years old — the constitution of Washington — the people of the United States fight with the power of unity, — as we fight for the freedom of our children and that hereafter the sword of autocrats may never threaten the world.” The war powers of Congress and the President are only those which are to be derived from the Constitution but, in the light of the language just quoted, the primary implication of a war power is that it shall be an effective power to wage the war successfully. Thus, while the constitutional structure and controls of our Government are our guides equally in war and in peace, they must be read with the realistic purposes of the entire instrument fully in mind. In 1942, in the early stages of total global warfare, the exercise of a war power such as the power “To raise and support Armies, . . .” and “To provide and maintain a Navy; . . . ,” called for the production by us of war goods in unprecedented volume with the utmost speed, combined with flexibility of control over the product and with a high degree of initiative on the part of the producers. Faced with the need to exercise that power, the question was whether it was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to delegate to the high officials named therein the discretion contained in the Original Renegotiation Act of April 28,1942, and the amendments of October 21, 1942. We believe that the administrative authority there granted was well within the constitutional war powers then being put to their predestined uses. (b) The administrative practices developed und.er the Renegotiation Act demonstrated the definitive adequacy of the term “excessive profits” as used in the Act. — The administrative practices currently developed under the Act in interpreting the term “excessive profits” appear to have come well within the scope of the congressional policy. We have referred above to the War Department Directive of August 10, 1942, and to the Joint Departmental Statement of March 31, 1943, both of which were placed before appropriate Congressional Committees. These clearly stated practices are evidence of a current correct understanding of the congressional intent. This appears from the fact that the congressional action.of October 21, 1942, made effective as of April 28, 1942, was taken in the light of the above-mentioned directive and without restricting its effect. Furthermore, the congressional action taken February 25, 1944, and made effective for the fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943, substantially incorporated into the statute the administrative practice shown in the Joint Departmental Statement of March 31, 1943. It thus became an express congressional definition of the factors appropriate for consideration in determining excessive profits, whereas before it was an administrative interpretation of “excessive profits” to the same effect. (c) The statutory term “excessive profits,” in its context, was a sufficient expression of legislative policy and standards to render it constitutional. — The fact that this term later was further defined both by administrative action and by statutory amendment indicates the probable desirability of such added definition, but it does not demonstrate that such further definition was a constitutional necessity essential to the validity of the original exercise by Congress of its war powers in initiating a new solution of an unprecedented problem. The fact that the congressional definition confirmed the administrative practice which already was in effect under the original statutory language tends to show that a statutory definition was not necessary in order to give effect to the congressional intent. In 1942 the imposition of excess profits taxes was a procedure already familiar to Congress, both as an emergency procedure to raise funds for extraordinary wartime expenditures, and as one to meet the needs of peace. The recapture of excess income as applied by Congress to the railroads had been upheld by this Court in 1924. Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456. The opinions of this Court in Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529-542; and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 413-433, are not in conflict with our present position. The policy and purpose of Congress in choosing the renegotiation of profits as an alternative to cost-plus contracts, to flat percentage limitations of profits, and to 100% excess profits taxes was an attempt to determine a fair return on war contracts, under conditions where actual experience alone could disclose what was fair and when the primary national need was for the immediate production of unprecedented quantities of new products. The action of Congress was an expression of its well-considered judgment as to the degree of administrative authority which it was necessary to grant in order to effectuate its policy. This action of Congress came within the scope of its discretion as described by Chief Justice Hughes in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra, at p. 421: “Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility.” It is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials with a specific formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program. “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle . . . such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Hampton Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409. Standards prescribed by Congress are to be read in the light of the conditions to which they are to be applied. “They derive much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its factual background and the statutory context in which they appear.” American Power & Light Co. v. S. E. C., 329 U. S. 90, 104. The purpose of the Renegotiation Act and its factual background establish a sufficient meaning for “excessive profits” as those words are used in practice. The word “excessive” appears twice in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, . . . .” In the Original Renegotiation Act, § 403 (d), there were expressly disallowed to the contractor in determining his profits “compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or employees in excess of a reasonable amount, . . .” and “any costs incurred by the contractor which are excessive and unreasonable.” “Excessive profits are those in excess of reasonable profits.” Spaulding v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 154 F. 2d 419, 423. The following, somewhat comparable, legislative specifications are among those which have been held to state a sufficiently definite standard for administrative action: “Just and reasonable” rates for sales of natural gas, Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600-601; “public interest, convenience, or necessity” in establishing rules and regulations under the Federal Communications Act, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226; prices yielding a “fair return” or the “fair value” of property, Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 397-398; “unfair methods of competition” distinct from offenses defined under the common law, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304, 311-312, 314; “just and reasonable” rates for the services of commission men, Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 431; and “fair and reasonable” rent for premises, with final determination in the courts, Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242, 243, 248-250. 3. Methods Prescribed and Limitations Imposed on the Administration. The methods prescribed and the limitations imposed by Congress upon the contemplated administrative action are helpful. The Act is confined to the duration of the war or to a short time thereafter. Renegotiation, from the beginning, has been confined to the elimination of excessive profits from contracts and subcontracts with certain governmental departments directly related to the conduct of the war. By subsequent amendments the scope of the Act was limited by further express exceptions and exemptions. The administrative officials to whom authority was granted were clearly specified and were all officials of high governmental responsibility. Each was required to act whenever he found excessive profits existed under the conditions defined. The provisions for a redetermination of excess profits by the Tax Court de novo are discussed later. They likewise imposed important limitations on the allowable recoveries. Accordingly, we hold that the delegation of authority here in issue, under the Renegotiation Act in its several forms, was a constitutional definition of administrative authority and not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. THE RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS WAS NOT A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE. The recovery by the Government of excessive profits received or receivable upon war contracts is in the nature of the regulation of maximum prices under war contracts or the collection of excess profits taxes, rather than the requisitioning or condemnation of private property for public use. One of the primary purposes of the renegotiation plan for redetermining the allowable profit on contracts for the production of war goods by private persons was the avoidance of requisitioning or condemnation proceedings leading to governmental ownership and operation of the plants producing war materials. A refund to the Government of excessive earnings of railroad carriers under the recapture provisions of § 15a of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 488, has been sustained by this Court. Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456. The collection of renegotiated excessive profits on a war subcontract also is not in the nature of a penalty and is not a deprivation of a subcontractor of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. THE RENEGOTIATION ACT, INCLUDING ITS AMENDMENTS, HAS BEEN PROPERLY APPLIED TO CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BEFORE ITS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ENACTMENTS. The excessive profits claimed by the Government in these cases arose out of contracts between the respective petitioners and other private parties. None arose out of contracts made directly with the Government itself. All the contracts, however, related to subject matter within the meaning of the Renegotiation Act in its respective stages. The contracts all were of the type which came to be known, under the Act, as subcontracts. All, except four in the Lichter case, were entered into after the enactment of the Original Renegotiation Act, April 28, 1942, and on those four, the final payment had not been made by that date. We therefore do not have before us an issue as to the recovery of excessive profits on any contract made directly with the Government nor on any subcontract upon which final payment had been made before April 28, 1942, although relating to war goods made or services performed after the declaration of war, December 8, 1941. Congress limited- the Renegotiation Act to future contracts and to contracts already existing but pursuant to which final payments had not been made prior to the date of enactment of the original Act. These included contracts made directly with the Government and also subcontracts such as those here involved. We uphold the right of the Government to recover excessive profits on each of the contracts before us. This right exists as to such excessive profits whether they arose from contracts made before or after the passage of the Act. A contract is equally a war contract in either event and, if uncompleted to the extent that the final payment has not yet been made, the recovery of excessive profits derived from it may be authorized as has been done here. While the Original Renegotiation Act may not have expressly defined some of the contracts before us as subcontracts, the Act of October 21, 1942, in its amendments effective as of April 28, 1942, did so. Accordingly, the contracts entered into between private parties in the Alexander case between April 28, 1942, and October 21, 1942, come within the scope of the Renegotiation Act. THE TAX COURT REMEDY. Before the amendments incorporated in it on February 25,1944, by the Revenue Act of 1943 (the so-called Second Renegotiation Act) the Original Renegotiation Act, as theretofore amended, did not provide expressly for a review or redetermination of the initial determination of the excess profits authorized to be made by the respective Secretaries. The 1944 amendments added not merely an express statement of factors to be taken into consideration in determining excessive profits (§ 403 (a) (4) (A)), but also created a War Contracts Price Adjustment Board (§ 403 (d) (l)) to make such determinations in the future. Also, it provided expressly for petitions to be filed with the Tax Court to secure redeterminations of the orders of such Board. (§ 403 (e) (l).) It expressly stated that “A proceeding before the Tax Court to finally determine the amount, if any, of excessive profits shall not be treated as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board, but shall be treated as a proceeding de novo.” (§ 403 (e) (1).) It provided also that “In the absence of the filing of a petition with The Tax Court of the United States under the provisions of and within the time limit prescribed in subsection (e) (1), such order [of the Board] shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review or redetermination by any court or other agency.” (§ 403 (c) (l).) All of the determinations in the cases before us were made after February 25, 1944, and those in the Pownall case were made on behalf of the Board. The above procedure under § 403 (e) (1) accordingly was open to the petitioners in the Pownall case but they did not file a petition with the Tax Court. In addition to the above procedures affecting future determinations of excessive profits to be made by the Board, the Second Renegotiation Act also made express provisions, in § 403 (e) (2), for a redetermination by the Tax Court of excessive profits determined to exist by the respective Secretaries. These provisions applied first to any determinations made by a Secretary prior to February 25, 1944, with respect to a fiscal year ending before July 1, 1943. In those instances a petition for redetermination by the Tax Court was permitted to be filed within 90 days after February 25,1944. We have no such case before us. These provisions applied also to any determination made by a Secretary after February 25, 1944, with respect to a fiscal year ending before July 1, 1943. In that event, a petition for redetermination by the Tax Court was permitted to be filed within 90 days after the date of the redetermination. We have such situations in the Lichter and Alexander cases. No petitions were filed with the Tax Court in any of the cases before us, and the time for doing so has expired. Accordingly, here, as in Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 771, we do not have before us, and we do not express an opinion upon, the finality which would .have attached to a redetermination by the Tax Court if such a redetermination had been sought and made. We have only the situations presented by the respective failures of the petitioners to resort to the Tax Court in the face of the express statutory provisions made for such administrative relief. As to the effect of the statute and of the course of action taken, we hold that the statute did afford procedural due process to the respective petitioners but that none of them made use of the procedure so provided for them. Consistent with the primary need for speed and definiteness in these matters, the original administrative determinations by the respective Secretaries or by the Board were intended primarily as renegotiations in the course of which the interested parties were to have an opportunity to reach an agreement with the Government or in connection with which the Government, in the absence of such an agreement, might announce its unilateral determination of the amount of excessive profit claimed by the United States. This initial proceeding was not required to be a formal proceeding producing a record for review by some other authority. In lieu of such a procedure for review, the Second Renegotiation Act provided an adequate opportunity for a redetermination of the excessive profits, if any, de novo by the Tax Court. “The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective.” Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152-153. We uphold the decisions below and the contentions of the Government to the effect that the statutory provision thus made for a petition to the Tax Court was not, in any case before us, an optional or alternative procedure. It provided the one and only procedure to secure a rede-termination of the excessive profits which had been determined to exist by the orders of the respective Secretaries or of the Board in the cases before us. Failure of the respective petitioners to exhaust that procedure has left them with no right to present here issues such as those as to coverage and the amount of profits which might have been presented there. Accordingly, there is excluded from our consideration in this proceeding the contention in the Lichter case that the petitioners’ subcontracts were exempt from renegotiation on the ground that they were subcontracts under prime contracts with a Department of the Government and had been awarded to them as the result of competitive bidding for the construction of buildings and facilities. There is excluded also, for example, the contention in the Pownall case that petitioners’ contracts which were for amounts under $100,000 each were not subject to renegotiation. Likewise, in the Alexander case, there is excluded the petitioner’s contention that it had not made excessive profits within the meaning of the statute and that its contracts for processing wool were not “subcontracts” within the meaning of the Original Renegotiation Act. For these reasons, we uphold the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act on its face as authority for the recovery of excessive profits as ordered in the three respective cases before us, and we hold that the respective petitioners do not have the right to present questions as to the coverage of that Act, as to the amount of excessive profits adjudged to be due from them or as to other comparable issues which might have been presented by them to the Tax Court upon a timely petition to that court for a redetermination of excessive profits, if any. Accordingly, in each of the cases before us, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Murphy concurs in the' result in these cases. Mr. Justice Jackson concurs in the result in the Pow-nall case, but dissents in the Lichter and Alexander cases. [For opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, see post, p. 802.] APPENDIX. I. Excerpts from the so-called Original or First Renegotiation Act, § 403, Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, approved April 28,1942, c. 247, 56 Stat. 226,245-246. “(a) . . . For the purposes of subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the term ‘contract’ includes a subcontract and the term ‘contractor’ includes a subcontractor. “(b) The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed to insert in any contract for an amount in excess of $100,000 hereafter made by such Department (1) a provision for the renegotiation of the contract price at a period or periods when, in the judgment of the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty; (2) a provision for the retention by the United States or the repayment to the United States of (A) any amount of the contract price which is found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits and (B) an amount of the contract price equal to the amount of the reduction in the contract price of any subcontract under such contract pursuant to the renegotiation of such subcontract as provided in clause (3) of this subsection; and (3) a provision requiring the contractor to insert in each subcontract for an amount in excess of $100,000 made by him under such contract (A) a provision for the renegotiation by such Secretary and the subcontractor of the contract price of the subcontract at a period or periods when, in the judgment of the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty, (B) a provision for the retention by the United States or the repayment to the United States of any amount of the contract price of the subcontract which is found as a result of such renegotiation, to represent excessive profits, and (C) a provision for relieving the contractor from any liability to the subcontractor on account of any amount so retained by or repaid to the United States. “(c) The Secretary of each Department is authorized and directed, whenever in his opinion excessive profits have been realized, or are likely to be realized, from any contract with such Department or from any subcontract thereunder, (1) to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price, (2) to withhold from the contractor or subcontractor any amount of the contract price which is found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits, and (3) in case any amount of the contract price found as a result of such renegotiation to represent excessive profits shall have been paid to the contractor or subcontractor, to recover such amount from such contractor or subcontractor. Such contractor or subcontractor shall be deemed to be indebted to the United States for any amount which such Secretary is authorized to recover from such contractor or subcontractor under this subsection, and such Secretary may bring actions in the appropriate courts of the United States to recover such amount on behalf of the United States. All amounts recovered under this subsection shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. This subsection shall be applicable to all contracts and subcontracts hereafter made and to all contracts and subcontracts heretofore made, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contain a renegotiation or recapture clause, provided that final payment pursuant to such contract or subcontract has not been made prior to the date of enactment of this Act. “(d) In renegotiating a contract price or determining excessive profits for the purposes of this section, the Secretaries of the respective Departments shall not make any allowance for any salaries, bonuses, or other compensation paid by a contractor to its officers or employees in excess of a reasonable amount, nor shall they make allowance for any excessive reserves set up by the contractor or for any costs incurred by the contractor which are excessive and unreasonable. For the purpose of ascertaining whether such unreasonable compensation has been or is being paid, or whether such excessive reserves have been or are being set up, or whether any excessive and unreasonable costs have been or are being incurred, each such Secretary shall have the same powers with respect to any such contractor that an agency designated by the President to exercise the powers conferred by title XIII of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, has with respect to any contractor to whom such title is applicable. . . . “(e) In addition to the powers conferred by existing law, the Secretary of each Department shall have the right to demand of any contractor who holds contracts with respect to which the provisions of this section are applicable in an aggregate amount in excess of $100,000, statements of actual costs of production and such other financial statements, at such times and in such form and detail, as such Secretary may require. . . .” 56 Stat. 245. II. Excerpts from Title VIII, Renegotiation of War Contracts, Revenue Act of 1942, approved October 21, 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 798, 982-985, 26 U. S. C. A. Internal Revenue Acts Beginning 1940, Revenue Act of 1942, § 801, p. 376. Section 801 of the Revenue Act of 1942 amended the Section in several particulars, all effective as of April 28, 1942. Among the amendments were certain additions or changes contained in § 403 (a), § 403 (c) and § 403 (i) and reading as follows: “SEC. 801. RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS. “(a) Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Public 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.), are amended to read as follows: “Sec. 403. (a) For the purposes of this section— “(4) The term 'excessive profits’ means any amount of a contract or subcontract price which is found as a result of renegotiation to represent excessive profits. “(5) The term 'subcontract’ means any purchase order or agreement to perform all or any part of the work, or to make or furnish any article, required for the performance of another contract or subcontract. The term ‘article’ includes any material, part, assembly, machinery, equipment, or other personal property. “For the purposes of subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the term 'contract’ includes a subcontract and the term 'contractor’ includes a subcontractor. “(c) (1) Whenever, in the opinion of the Secretary of a Department, the profits realized or likely to be realized from any contract with such Department, or from any subcontract-thereunder whether or not made by the contractor, may be excessive, the Secretary is authorized and directed to require the contractor or subcontractor to renegotiate the contract price. When the contractor or subcontractor holds two or more contracts or subcontracts the Secretary in his discretion, may renegotiate to eliminate excessive profits on some or all of such contracts and subcontracts as a group without separately renegotiating the contract price of each contract or subcontract. “(2) Upon renegotiation, the Secretary is authorized and directed to eliminate any excessive profits under such contract or subcontract (i) by reductions in the contract price of the contract or subcontract, or by other revision in its terms; or (ii) by withholding, from amounts otherwise due to the contractor or subcontractor, any amount of such excessive profits; or (iii) by directing a contractor to withhold for the account of the United States, from amounts otherwise due to the subcontractor, any amount of such excessive profits under the subcontract; or (iv) by recovery from the contractor or subcontractor, through repayment, credit or suit, of any amount of such excessive profits actually paid to him; or (v) by any combination of these methods, as the Secretary deems desirable. The Secretary may bring actions on behalf of the United States in the appropriate courts of the United States to recover from such contractor or subcontractor, any amount of such excessive profits actually paid to him and not withheld or eliminated by some other method under this subsection. The surety under a contract or subcontract shall not be liable for the repayment of any excessive profits thereon. All money recovered by way of repayment or suit under this subsecftion shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. “(3) In determining the excessiveness of profits realized or likely to be realized from any contract or subcontract, the Secretary shall recognize the properly applicable exclusions and deductions of the character which the contractor or subcontractor is allowed under Chapter 1 and Chapter 2E of the Internal Revenue Code. In determining the amount of any excessive profits to be eliminated hereunder the Secretary shall allow the contractor or subcontractor credit for Federal income and excess profits taxes as provided in section 3806 of the Internal Revenue Code. “(4) Upon renegotiation pursuant to this section, the Secretary may make such final or other agreements with a contractor or subcontractor for the elimination of excessive profits and for the discharge of any liability for excessive profits under this section, as the Secretary deems desirable. Such agreements may cover such past and future period or periods, may apply to such contract or contracts of the contractor or subcontractor, and may contain such terms and conditions, as the Secretary deems advisable. . . . “(5) Any contractor or subcontractor who holds contracts or subcontracts, to which the provisions of this section are applicable, may file with the Secretaries of all the Departments concerned statements of actual costs of production and such other financial statements for any prior fiscal year or years of such contractor or subcontractor, in such form and detail, as the Secretaries shall prescribe by joint regulation. Within one year after the filing of such statements, or within such shorter period as may be prescribed by such joint regulation, the Secretary of a Department may give the contractor or subcontractor written notice, in form and manner to be prescribed in such joint regulation, that the Secretary is of the opinion that the profits realized from some or all of such contracts or subcontracts may be excessive, and fixing a date and place for an initial conference to be held within sixty days thereafter. If such notice is not given and renegotiation commenced by the Secretary within such sixty days the contractor or subcontractor shall not thereafter be required to renegotiate to eliminate excessive profits realized from any such contract or subcontract during such fiscal year or years and any liabilities of the contractor or subcontractor for excessive profits realized during such period shall be thereby discharged. “(6) This subsection (c) shall be applicable to all contracts and subcontracts hereafter made and to all contracts and subcontracts heretofore made, whether or not such contracts or subcontracts contain a renegotiation or recapture clause, unless (i) final payment pursuant to such contract or subcontract was made prior to April 28, 1942, ...” “(c) [SEC. 801.] Section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Public 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following subsections: "(i) • • ■ “(2) The Secretary of a Department is authorized, in his discretion, to exempt from some or all of the provisions of this section— “(i) any contract or subcontract to be performed outside of the territorial limits of the continental United States or in Alaska; “(ii) any contracts or subcontracts under which, in the opinion of the Secretary, the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty when the contract price is established, such as certain classes of agreements for personal services, for the purchase of real property, perishable goods, or commodities the minimum price for the sale of which has been fixed by a public regulatory body, of leases and license agreements, and of agreements where the period of performance under such contract or subcontract will not be in excess of thirty days; and “(iii) a portion of any contract or subcontract or performance thereunder during a specified period or periods, if in the opinion of the Secretary, the provisions of the contract are otherwise adequate to prevent excessive profits. “The Secretary may so exempt contracts and subcontracts both individually and by general classes or types.” 56 Stat. 982. III. Excerpts from the so-called Second Renegotiation Act, Title VII, Renegotiation of War Contracts, passed notwithstanding the objections of the President, February 25, 1944, e. 63, 58 S,tat. 21, 78-92, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 1191; also 26 U. S. C. A. Internal Revenue Acts Beginning 1940, Revenue Act of 1943, § 701, p. 491. While § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, as expanded by § 701 (b) of the Revenue Act, 1943, is too long for reproduction here, the following excerpts from it are especially relevant: §403 (a) (4) (A); §403 (c) (1); §403 (d) (1); § 403 (d) (4); § 403 (e) (1); § 403 (e) (2); § 403 (1); see also, § 701 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1943: “SEC. 701. RENEGOTIATION OF WAR CONTRACTS. “(b) RenegotiatioN op War Contracts. — Section 403, as amended, of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, is amended to read as follows: “Sec. 403. (a) For the purposes of this section— “(4) (A) The term ‘excessive profits’ means the portion of the profits derived from contracts with the Departments and subcontracts which is determined in accordance with this section to be excessive. In determining excessive profits there shall be taken into consideration the following factors: “(i) efficiency of contractor, with particular regard to attainment of quantity and quality production, reduction of costs and economy in the use of materials, facilities, and manpower; “ (ii) reasonableness of costs and profits, with particular regard to volume of production, normal pre-war earnings, and comparison of war and peacetime products; “(iii) amount and source of public and private capital employed and net worth; “(iv) extent of risk assumed, including the risk incident to reasonable pricing policies; “(v) nature and extent of contribution to the war effort, including inventive and developmental contribution and cooperation with the Government and other contractors in supplying technical assistance; “(vi) character of business, including complexity of manufacturing technique, character and extent of subcontracting, and rate of turn-over; “(vii) such other factors the consideration of which the public interest and fair and equitable dealing may require, which factors shall be published in the regulations of the Board from time to time as adopted. “(c) (1) Whenever, in the opinion of the Board, the amounts received or accrued under contracts with the Departments and subcontracts may reflect excessive profits, the Board shall give to the contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be, reasonable notice of the time and place of a conference to be held with respect thereto. The mailing of such notice by registered mail to the contractor or subcontractor shall constitute the commencement of the renegotiation proceeding. At the conference, which may be adjourned from time to time, the Board shall endeavor to make a final or other agreement with the contractor or subcontractor with respect to the elimination of excessive profits received or accrued, and with respect to such other matters relating thereto as the Board deems advisable. Any such agreement, if made, may, with the consent of the contractor or subcontractor, also include provisions with respect to the elimination of excessive profits likely to be received or accrued. If the Board does not make an agreement with respect to the elimination of excessive profits received or accrued, it shall issue and enter an order determining the amount, if any, of such excessive profits, and forthwith give notice thereof by registered mail to the contractor or subcontractor. In the absence of the filing of a petition with The Tax Court of the United States under the provisions of and within the time limit prescribed in subsection (e) (1), such order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review or redetermination by any court or other agency. The Board shall exercise its powers with respect to the aggregate of the amounts received or accrued during the fiscal year (or such other period as may be fixed by mutual agreement) by a contractor or subcontractor under contracts with the Departments and subcontracts, and not separately with respect to amounts received or accrued under separate contracts with the Departments or subcontracts, except that the Board may exercise such powers separately with respect to amounts received or accrued by the contractor or subcontractor under any one or more separate contracts with the Departments or subcontracts at the request of the contractor or subcontractor. Whenever the Board makes a determination with respect to the amount of excessive profits, whether such determination is made by order or is embodied in an agreement with the contractor or subcontractor, it shall, at the request of the contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be, prepare and furnish such contractor or subcontractor with a statement of such determination, of the facts used as a basis therefor, and of its reasons for such determination. Such statement shall not be used in The Tax Court of the United States as proof of the facts or conclusions stated therein. "(d) (1) There is hereby created a War Contracts Price Adjustment Board (in this section called the ‘Board’), which shall consist of six members. . . . “(4) The Board may delegate in whole or in part any power, function, or duty to the Secretary of a Department, and any power, function, or duty so delegated may be delegated in whole or in part by the Secretary to such officers or agencies of the United States as he may designate, and he may authorize successive redelegations of such powers, functions, and duties. “(e) (1) Any contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by an order of the Board determining the amount of excessive profits received or accrued by such contractor or subcontractor may, within ninety days (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day) after the mailing of the notice of such order under subsection (c) (1), file a petition with The Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination thereof. Upon such filing such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction, by order, to finally determine the amount, if any, of such excessive profits received or accrued by the contractor or subcontractor, and such determination shall not be reviewed or redetermined by any court or agencjr. The court may determine as the amount of excessive profits an amount either less than, equal to, or greater than that determined by the Board. A proceeding before the Tax Court to finally determine the amount, if any, of excessive profits shall not be treated as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board, but shall be treated as a proceeding de novo. . . . “(2) Any contractor or subcontractor . . . aggrieved by a determination of the Secretary made prior to the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1943, with respect to a fiscal year ending before July 1, 1943, as to the existence of excessive profits, which is not embodied in an agreement with the contractor or subcontractor, may, within ninety days (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day) after the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1943, file a petition with The Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination thereof, and any such contractor or subcontractor aggrieved by a determination of the Secretary made on or after the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1943, with respect to any such fiscal year, as to the existence of excessive profits, which is not embodied in an agreement with the contractor or subcontractor, may, within ninety days (not counting Sunday or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day) after the date of such determination, file a petition with The Tax Court of the United States for a redetermination thereof. Upon such filing such court shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties, and the proceeding shall be subject to the same provisions, as in the case of a petition filed with the court under paragraph (1), except that the amendments made to this section by the Revenue Act of 1943 which are not made applicable as of April 28, 1942, or to fiscal years ending before July 1,1943, shall not apply. “(1) This section may be cited as the ‘Renegotiation Act'.” “(d) [SEC. 701.] Effective Date. — The amendments made by subsection (b) shall be effective only with respect to the fiscal years ending after June 30, 1943, except that (1) the amendments inserting subsections (a) (4) (C), (a) (4) (D), (i) (1) (C), (i) (1) (D), (i) (1) (F), (i) (3), and (1) in section 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, shall be effective as if such amendments and subsections had been a part of section 403 of such Act on the date of its enactment, and (2) the amendments adding subsection (d) and (e) (2) to section 403 of such Act shall be effective from the date of the enactment of this Act.” 58 Stat. 78. The Renegotiation Act, including its amendments, is here treated as consisting of: I. Section 403, Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, approved April 28, 1942, c. 247, 56 Stat. 226, 245-246. Sometimes this is called the Original or First Renegotiation Act. For relevant excerpts from its text see Appendix I, infra, p. 793. II. Title VIII, Renegotiation of War Contracts, Revenue Act of 1942, approved October 21, 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 798, 982-985, 26 U. S. C. A. Internal Revenue Acts Beginning 1940, Revenue Act of 1942, § 801, p. 376. For relevant excerpts from its text see Appendix II, infra, p. 795. III. Section 1, Military Appropriation Act, 1944, approved July 1,1943, c. 185, 57 Stat. 347-348. IV. An Act to prevent the payment of excessive fees or compensation in connection with the negotiation of war contracts, approved July 14,1943, c. 239,57 Stat. 564-565. V. Title VII, Renegotiation of War Contracts, and Title VIII, Repricing of War Contracts, Revenue Act of 1943, passed notwithstanding the objections of the President, February 25, 1944, c. 63, 58 Stat. 21, 78-93, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) §§ 1191, 1192; also 26 U. S. C. A. Internal Revenue Acts Beginning 194-0, Revenue Act of 1943, §§ 701 and 801, pp. 491 and 508. For relevant excerpts from its text see Appendix III, infra, p. 798. Sometimes this is called the Second Renegotiation Act. Section 701 (b), of the foregoing Chapter 63, added to § 403 of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, a final subsection as follows: “(1) This section may be cited as the 'Renegotiation Act’.” 58 Stat. 90. Section 701 (d) also provided that this subsection (1) of § 403, and certain others, “shall be effective as if such amendments and subsections had been a part of section 403 of such Act on the date of its enactment." 58 Stat. 92. VI. An Act to extend through December 31, 1945, the termination date under the Renegotiation Act, approved June 30, 1945, c. 210, 59 Stat. 294^295, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 1191. In addition to the opinions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and District Courts cited in the text, see Ring Construction Corp. v. Secretary of War, 8 T. C. 1070; Cohen v. Secretary of War, 7 T. C. 1002; Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of War, 7 T. C. 863. For discussions of the Renegotiation Act by this Court, stopping short of passing upon its constitutionality, see Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752; and Macauley v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 327 U. S. 540. Among the many other provisions implementing the Congress and the President with powers to meet the varied demands of war, the following obviously command attention: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, . . . provide for the common defence, . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” U. S. Const. Preamble. “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; . . . “To declare War, . . . “To provide and maintain a Navy; “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, . . . .” Id. Art. I, § 8. “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, . . . .” Id. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 1. Madison said in The Federalist, Number XLI, — General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution: “Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.” Hamilton said in The Federalist, Number XXIII, — The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union: “The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence.” “The Constitution grants to Congress power To raise and support Armies,’ ‘to provide and maintain a Navy,’ and to make all laws necessary and proper to carry these powers into execution. Under this authority Congress can draft men for battle service. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366. Its power to draft business organizations to support the fighting men who risk their lives can be no less.” United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 305. In writing of the power of Congress to pass a Conscription Act, President Lincoln said, with characteristic clearness: “Whether a power can be implied when it is not expressed has often been the subject of controversy; but this is the first case in which the degree of effrontery has been ventured upon of denying a power which is plainly and distinctly written down in the Constitution. The Constitution declares that ‘The Congress shall have power . . . to raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.’ The whole scope of the conscription act is ‘to raise and support armies.’ There is nothing else in it. . . . “. . . Do you admit that the power is given to raise and support armies, and yet insist that by this act Congress has not exercised the power in a constitutional mode? — has not done the thing in the right way? Who is to judge of this? The Constitution gives Congress the power, but it does not prescribe the mode, or expressly declare who shall prescribe it. In such case Congress must prescribe the mode, or relinquish the power. There is no alternative. . . . The power is given fully, completely, unconditionally. It is not a power to raise armies if State authorities consent; nor if the men to compose the armies are entirely willing; but it is a power to raise and support armies given to Congress by the Constitution, without an ‘if.’ ” 9 Nicolay and Hay, Works of Abraham Lincoln 75-77 (1894). The foregoing quotation is from an opinion by President Lincoln, which was not actually issued or published by him but which was quoted to the above extent by Honorable Charles Evans Hughes, of New York, in his address on “War Powers Under the Constitution” before the American Bar Association, September 5, 1917, 42 A. B. A. Rep. 232,234-235. The draft was put in force both by the Union and by the Confederacy during the Civil War and its validity was sustained by the courts in both North and South. “The power of coercing the citizen to render military service, is indeed a transcendent power, in the hands of any government; but so far from being inconsistent with liberty, it is essential to its preservation.” Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Graft. 470, 473. See cases cited in 42 A. B. A. Rep. 234 n. 1, and see Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11,29; In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 153. “Our own objectives are clear: The objective of smashing the militarism imposed by war lords upon their enslaved peoples; the objective of liberating the subjugated nations; the objective of establishing and securing freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear everywhere in the world. “We shall not stop short of these objectives; nor shall we be satisfied merely to gain them and call it a day. I know that I speak for the American people — and I have good reason to believe I speak also for all the other peoples who fight with us — when I say that this time we are determined not only to win the war, but also to maintain the security of the peace which will follow. “But modern methods of warfare make it a task, not only of shooting and fighting, but an even more urgent one of working and producing. “Victory requires the actual weapons of war and the means of transporting them to a dozen points of combat. “It will not be sufficient for us and the other united nations to produce a slightly superior supply of munitions to that of Germany, Japan, Italy, and the stolen industries in the countries which they have overrun. “The superiority of the united nations in munitions and ships must be overwhelming — so overwhelming that the Axis nations can never hope to catch up with it. In order to attain this overwhelming superiority the United States must build planes and tanks and guns and ships to the utmost limit of our national capacity. We have the ability and capacity to produce arms not only for our own forces but also for the armies, navies, and air forces fighting on our side. “And our overwhelming superiority of armament must be adequate to put weapons of war at the proper time into the hands of those men in the conquered nations, who stand ready to seize the first opportunity to revolt against their German and Japanese oppressors, and against the traitors in their own ranks, known by the already infamous name of ‘Quislings.’ As we get guns to the patriots in those lands, they too will fire shots heard ’round the world. “This production of ours in the United States must be raised far above its present levels, even though it will mean the dislocation of the lives and occupations of millions of our own people. We must raise our sights all along the production line. Let no man say it cannot be done. It must be done — and we have undertaken to doit. “I have just sent a letter of directive to the appropriate departments and agencies of our Government, ordering that immediate steps be taken: “1. To increase our production rate of airplanes so rapidly that in this year, 1942, we shall produce 60,000 planes, 10,000 more than the goal set a year and a half ago. This includes 45,000 combat planes — bombers, dive-bombers, pursuit planes. The rate of increase will be continued, so that next year, 1943, we shall produce 125,000 airplanes, including 100,000 combat planes. “2. To increase our production rate of tanks so rapidly that in this year, 1942, we shall produce 45,000 tanks; and to continue that increase so that next year, 1943, we shall produce 75,000 tanks. “3. To increase our production rate of antiaircraft guns so rapidly that in this year, 1942, we shall produce 20,000 of them; and to continue that increase so that next year, 1943, we shall produce 35,000 antiaircraft guns. “4. To increase our production rate of merchant ships so rapidly that in this year, 1942, we shall build 8,000,000 deadweight tons as compared with a 1941 production of 1,100,000. We shall continue that increase so that next year, 1943, we shall build 10,000,000 tons. “These figures and similar figures for a multitude of other implements of war will give the Japanese and Nazis a little idea of just what they accomplished in the attack on Pearl Harbor. “Our task is hard — our task is unprecedented — and the time is short. We must strain every existing armament-producing facility to the utmost. We must convert every available plant and tool to war production. That goes all the way from the greatest plants to the smallest — from the huge automobile industry to the village machine shop. “Production for war is based on men and women — the human hands and brains which collectively we call labor. Our workers stand ready to work long hours; to turn out more in a day’s work; to keep the wheels turning and the fires burning 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week. They realize well that on the speed and efficiency of their work depend the lives of their sons and their brothers on the fighting fronts. “Production for war is based on metals and raw materials — steel, copper, rubber, aluminum, zinc, tin. Greater and greater quantities of them will have to be diverted to war purposes. Civilian use of them will have to be cut further and still further — and, in many cases, completely eliminated. “War costs money. So far, we have hardly even begun to pay for it. We have devoted only 15 percent of our national income to national defense. As will appear in my Budget Message tomorrow, our war program for the coming fiscal year will cost $56,000,000,000 or, in other words, more than one-half of the estimated annual national income. This means taxes and bonds and bonds and taxes. It means cutting luxuries and other nonessentials. In a word, it means an all-out war by individual effort and family effort in a united country. “Only this all-out scale of production will hasten the ultimate all-out victory. Speed will count. Lost ground can always be regained — lost time never. Speed will save lives; speed will save this Nation which is in peril; speed will save our freedom and civilization — and slowness has never been an American characteristic.” 88 Cong. Rec. 32,33-34 (1942). “Ever since the beginning of the last war there has been a constant effort to find an effective method of controlling war profits without impeding war production. The renegotiation law is the latest product of such efforts. To obtain speed we have had to use contracting methods that would never have been tolerated in peacetime. We granted cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts where the specifications were not known or had to be subject to numerous changes or where there was no time to prepare detailed specifications. We also granted lump-sum contracts for many items which had never before been made in quantity and for which estimates of cost were mere guesses. This was particularly true of the billions of dollars of war contracts which were hastily 'shoveled’ out early in January 1942. “Is the renegotiation law a necessary and desirable method of counteracting the wasteful effects of such necessary practices in early wartime procurement? Is it being administered in such a way as to give effect to the statutory intent? What changes, if any, are needed? “As to the necessity and desirability of the renegotiation law: “(1) Because of the wartime need for rapid procurement of materials of war, new materials with which there has been no previous manufacturing experience and other articles previously manufactured only in relatively small quantities, some procedure for subsequent price adjustment is necessary and desirable if excessive war profits and costs are to be avoided. “(2) Taxes alone will not do the job because (a) higher corporate tax rates are likely to encourage higher costs and discourage economical production; (b) no scheme of taxation has been devised which is sufficiently flexible to provide an incentive for efficient low-cost production; (c) a profit percentage which would fairly reward one war contractor with one type of financial structure would bankrupt a second contractor with a different financial set-up, and would provide inordinately excessive profits for a third contractor with a still different financial problem. “ (3) War contractors in most cases can protect themselves against loss by escalator clauses and other contract provisions for contingencies. The people can obtain protection in many cases only through some procedure such as renegotiation. “(4) Experience has shown 'cost-plus’ contracts to be worse than worthless in the effort to prevent excessive costs. They strongly tend to increase costs instead of the reverse. “The administration of the renegotiation law during the first 10 months of its existence has been characterized by two significant accomplishments: “(1) The assembly in Government of an unusual group of able, conscientious, and patriotic lawyers, accountants, and businessmen as administrators of renegotiation; “(2) The gradual education of war contractors as to the reasons for and importance of their adopting a policy- of tailoring their own profits to levels which, in their own special situations, are fair both to them and to the Government. “On the other hand, the administration of the renegotiation law and the law itself are properly subject to certain constructive criticisms: “(1) Substantial variations in administrative policy and attitude still exist among the four departments charged with responsibility for renegotiation, although this condition has been noticeably improved in recent weeks. The existence of such a condition has created wholly unnecessary confusion, uncertainty, and misunderstanding among contractors. “(2) Results of Navy renegotiations to date justify an inference that in its early proceedings the Navy Price Adjustment Board may have been too strongly influenced by a desire to achieve the same kind of mathematical exactness which results from a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract, a result which is inconsistent with the flexibility which was the basic purpose of the renegotiation law. “(3) Army administration has been rendered unnecessarily cumbersome by use of military channels in the handling of an essentially. business and financial enterprise. “(4) The principles and results of renegotiation have been shrouded with entirely too much secrecy not only as to the public but as to the renegotiators themselves, causing many war contractors to be distracted by wholly unwarranted but nevertheless natural fears of the unknown. "(5) In some cases the cost audits incident to renegotiation and taxation have been unnecessarily duplicatory. “(6) It is impossible to recover every last dollar of excessive war profits without unnecessarily interfering with war production, and overzealous administration of the vast powers delegated by this law could be seriously detrimental to war procurement.” S. Rep. No. 10, Part 5,78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1943). “5. The necessary result of this combination of circumstances is that the war procuring agencies cannot use normal methods of procurement. The pressing need for speed requires the abandonment of drawn-out negotiation and the careful surveys of all relevant factors which sound purchasing would otherwise require. Competition necessarily wanes and no longer offers an adequate guide to the prices which should be paid. Above all, the forecasting of costs of production becomes, in large measure, a matter of informed guessing rather than of real cost analysis. This is true in the case of new products, new plants, and new producers; it is likewise true, though perhaps in lesser degree, wherever the quantities to be manufactured are sharply increased over pre-war amounts. Accordingly, advance prices quoted in good faith by manufacturers in a large number of cases have little relation to costs actually experienced in the course of production. Furthermore, many manufacturers feel unable to quote firm prices without including reserves to cover many contingencies the occurrence of which might skyrocket their costs, and so overturn all their estimates. “6. These were the conditions of wartime procurement, after December 7, 1941, and the War Department had to force its procurement activities into their mold. Efforts were made, of course, to develop contractual devices which would minimize the paramount difficulty in estimating production costs. The cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was used where unavoidable, but this form has the disadvantage of removing financial incentives to efficiency and of imposing a heavy burden of auditing upon the Government and the contractor. Escalator clauses, permitting prices to be adjusted according to fluctuations in indices of labor and material costs, were also used but proved unworkable. Letters of intent, under which manufacture was commenced prior to the negotiation of a formal contract, helped to speed production, but could not, of course, solve the ultimate problem of decreasing costs and preventing excessive profits. “7. Shortly after the declarations of war, both the legislative and the executive branches of the Government realized that excessive wartime profits were certain to accrue unless counter measures were taken. The evil effect of such wartime excessive profit on the morale of the fighting forces and the civilian population, as well as the unnecessary financial burden upon the Government, could not be ignored. The example of the last war was still fresh. Many war contractors realized the dangers and inequities resulting from such excessive profit, and some of them made refunds of excessive profits or voluntarily reduced their prices. In the spring of 1942, the War Department developed cost analysis units to check, so far as practicable, on production costs, and set up a price adjustment board to negotiate with contractors for voluntary price reductions and refunds of past payments. Tentative policies as to what profits were excessive were established and meetings with contractors had. At the same time, there came into use contract clauses providing for the renegotiation or redetermination of contract prices after an initial period of production had laid a basis for the proper estimation of costs. We hoped that these means would keep incentives to efficiency alive and at the same time would tend to eliminate undue profits such as were then coming to light. “8. The Congress apparently felt, however, that these contractual measures, resting as they did upon the voluntary cooperation of a relatively small number of war contractors, did not provide enough certainty that excessive profits would be eliminated. The Vinson-Trammel Act, limiting profits on aircraft and ship construction, had been repealed in 1940, but an effort was made to revive it. In March, 1942, the War Department and the War Production Board opposed such legislation on the ground that a flat percentage profit limitation would impede production and would be unfair to many contractors and too generous to others. After .the Case amendment imposing such a flat percentage limitation on profits from war contracts had been adopted by the House of Representatives late in March, 1942, the armed services and the War Production Board offered a substitute proposal giving statutory authority to the process of voluntary renegotiation which had been developing. Congress adopted the principle of renegotiation with which the armed services were in accord (rather than the principle of a flat percentage limitation of profits), and it also endowed the procuring agencies with power to determine excessive profits when no bilateral agreement could be reached with the contractor. I believe that this addition by the Congress of the power of unilateral action was a wise and a necessary one, and that without it renegotiation would not have accomplished anything like the results that have been achieved. “12. . . . Some conception of the vast scope of the procurement activity of the armed services after the attack on Pearl Harbor can be gained from the fact that the total expenditures of the War and Navy Departments for the one fiscal year ending June 30, 1942 ($22,905,000,000) considerably exceeded the total military and naval expenditures of the Government from 1789 through the end of World War I." Affidavit of Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, sworn to August 3,1945. See note 1, supra. McKinley v. United States, 249 U. S. 397 (regulations of local activities near federal military stations); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135 (seizure and operation of railroads) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and W. Co., 251 U. S. 146 (local liquor traffic); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (seizure of enemy property); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (curfew regulations); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (Emergency Price Control Act); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (rent control); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (exclusion of civilians from west coast military area). In Hirabayashi v. United States, supra, this Court said (p. 93): “The war power of the national government is ‘the power to wage war successfully.’ See Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 42 A. B. A. Rep. 232, 238. It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. . . . Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. . . . Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.” “20. At the beginning of the limited emergency in 1939, the only applicable statutory limits on profits from the sale of military or naval supplies were contained in the Vinson-Trammel Act of March 27, 1934, as amended (relating to naval vessels) and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended (relating to construction of merchant ships). The Act of April 3, 1939, extended percentage profit limitation to cover Army aircraft contracts. The percentage of profit allowed to contractors was lowered to approximately 8% by the Act of June 28, 1940, but the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, enacted September 9, 1940, provided that as to aircraft the old limitation of 12% was to prevail. “21. . . . Accordingly, the Second Revenue Act of 1940, containing the excess profits tax, suspended the profit limitation statutes applicable to Army and Navy contracts entered into after December 31, 1939, or uncompleted on that date by contractors and subcontractors subject to the new excess profits tax. Thereafter, until the passage of the Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942, the only statutory provisions concerning war or defense contracts were those of the excess profits tax.” Affidavit of Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, sworn to August 3, 1945. And see Hensel and McClung, Profit Limitation Controls Prior to the Present War, 10 Law & Contemp. Prob. 187 (1943-1944). The following significant congressional hearings were .publicly-held: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on §403 of Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (September 22 and 23,1942) ; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Finance on § 403 of Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (September 29 and 30,1942); Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on Mil. Est. App. Bill for 1944, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 483-518, 571-580 (June 10,1943); Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. R. 2996 (Mil. Est. App. Bill for 1944), 78th .Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 30-33, 125-138, 150-151 (1943); Hearings before the House Committee on Naval Aiffairs, pursuant to H. R. Res. 30, Vol. 2, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 10-30, 1943) ; Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 2324, 2698 and 3015 (Renegotiation of War Contracts), 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (September 9-23,1943); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H. R. 3687 (Revenue Act of 1943), 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 388-392, 402-424, 443-452, 465, 469, 598-601, 620-629, 669-684, 690-696, 925-926, 987-1111, 1121-1132 (November 29-December 15, 1943); Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 2628 (extension of termination date of Renegotiation Act), 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 12-16,1945). In addition, private hearings and interviews appear to have been had by Congressional Committees. The following major reports on the operation of the Renegotiation Act were issued by Congressional Committees: H. R. Rep. No. 733, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (October 7, 1943). Report of the Committee on Naval Affairs, pursuant to H. R. Res. 30 (Renegotiation of War Contracts); Sen. Rep. No. 10, Part 5, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 30, 1943). Additional Report of the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (Renegotiation of War Contracts) ; Sen. Rep. No. 10, Part 16, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-64, 192-199 (March 4, 1944). Additional Report of the Special Senate Committee ' Investigating the National Defense Program (Third Annual Report); H. R. Rep. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 75-90 (November 18, 1943), on H. R. 3687 (Revenue Bill of 1943); Sen. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-119 (December 22, 1943), on H. R. 3687 (Revenue Bill of 1943); H. R. Rep. No. 1079, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-39, 76-88 (February 4, 1944), on H. R. 3687 (Conference Report on Revenue Act of 1943). See also: Renegotiation of War Contracts — Law, Debates and Other Legislative Materials — Compiled for the use of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Data on Renegotiation of Contracts, Senate Committee on Finance (December 9,1943). In its brief filed jointly in the present cases the Government has submitted the following statement as to the results of renegotiation : “11. The results of renegotiation: We are advised by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board that as of June 30, 1947, 118,101 contractors had been assigned for renegotiation with respect to 1942 through 1946 fiscal years, and contracts aggregating over $190,000,-000,000 (excluding contractors eliminated because of exemptions or non-coverage) were subjected to renegotiation. Of the total assignments, 115,535 (or 97.8%) were completed as of June 30, 1947.' Out of the 115,535 completed assignments, 85,037 (or 73.6%) resulted in cancellations or clearances indicating that no excessive profits had been made or that the contractor was found to be exempt from renegotiation; 28,889 (or 25%) resulted in bilateral refund agreements between the Government and the contractor; 1,609 (or 1.4%) resulted in unilateral determinations by the Departments or the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board. Of the 30,498 assignments involving determinations of excessive profits, 1,609 (or 5.28%) were unilateral determinations and 28,889 (or 94.72%) were bilateral. “Also as of June 30,1947, the gross recoveries through renegotiation amounted to some $10,434,637,000, and the estimated net recovery (after deduction of the federal tax credit allowed contractors on renegotiation refunds) amounted to $3,130,391,000. Of the total gross recoveries of $10,434,637,000, some $895,493,000 (or 8.58%) were involved in unilateral determinations and the rest were recovered by voluntary agreement.” See note 1, supra. For relevant excerpts from its text, see Appendix I, infra, p. 793. For relevant excerpts from its text, see Appendix II, infra, p. 795. For relevant excerpts from its text, see Appendix III, infra, p. 798. See § 403 (1) in note 1, supra. In the House of Representatives, the Case Amendment, providing in effect a limitation of 6% on war profits was adopted without debate. 88 Cong. Rec. 3139-3140 (1942). Before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations strong objection was made to this provision by the representatives of the Government and its omission was recommended by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. After ample consideration it was omitted in the Act as passed. 88 Cong. Rec. 3378-3405; 3582-3599; 3647-3662; 3666 (1942), and see H. R. Rep. No. 2030, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1942). Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Finance on Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-28 (September 29,1942). See Appendix III, infra, p. 798. See Appendix III, infra, p. 798. See Appendix I, infra, p. 793. See Appendix I, infra, p. 793. See Appendix I, infra, p. 794. See Appendix II, infra, p. 795. Published as part of the material submitted by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson at the Hearings on the Renegotiation of Contracts before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Finance on §403 of Pub. L. No. 528, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 34-43 (September 29,1942). See Appendix II, infra, p. 796. See Appendix II, infra, p. 797. See Appendix II, infra, p. 798. See Hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2, pp. 469, et seq., 1025-1039, especially 1028-1029 (1943). “The question remains: What may be deemed to be the force and effect in time of war of the restrictive provisions contained in the constitution with respect to the exercise of federal authority? It is manifest, at once, that the great organs of the National Government retain and perform their functions as the constitution prescribes. Senators and Representatives are qualified and chosen as provided in the constitution and the legislative power vested in the Congress must be exercised in the required manner. The President is still the constitutional Executive, elected in the manner provided and subject to the restraints imposed upon his office. The judicial power of the United States continues to be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress has ordained. Again, apart from the provisions fixing the framework of the Government, there are limitations which by reason of their express terms or by necessary implication must be regarded as applicable as well in war as in peace. Thus one of the expressed objects of the power granted to Congress ‘to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises’ is to ‘provide for the common defence,’ and it cannot be doubted that taxes laid for this purpose, that is, to support the army and navy and to provide the means for military operations, must be laid subject to the constitutional restrictions.” Address by Honorable Charles E. Hughes, of New York, on “War Powers Under the Constitution,” September 5,1917, 42 A. B. A. Rep. 232, 241-242. Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 24. “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” (Italics supplied.) U. S. Const. Preamble. See notes 19 and 26, supra. See note 30, supra. Excessive means: “Characterized by, or exhibiting, excess; as: a Exceeding what is usual or proper; overmuch, b Greater than the usual amount or degree; exceptional; very great.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed. (1938). See Appendix I, infra, p. 794. See Appendix III, infra, p. 799. See Appendix III, infra, p. 801. See Appendix III, infra, p. 801. See Appendix III, infra, p. 800. See Appendix III, infra, p. 801.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GISSEL PACKING CO., INC., et al. No. 573. Argued March 26, 1969. Decided June 16, 1969 Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner in No. 573. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Peter L. Strauss, Arnold Ordman, and Norton J. Come. Albert Gore argued the cause for petitioner in No. 691. With him on the brief was Joseph M. Jacobs. Edward J. Simerka argued the cause for petitioner in No. 585. With him on the brief was Eugene B. Schwartz. John E. Jenkins, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for Gissel Packing Co., Inc., respondent in Nos. 573 and 691. Lewis P. Hamlin, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for General Steel Products, Inc., et al., respondents in No. 573. Fred F. Holroyd argued the cause for Heck’s, Inc., respondent in No. 573. With him on the brief was Charles E. Hurt. Lawrence G. Wallace argued the cause for respondent in No. 585. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Dominick L. Manoli, and Messrs. Strauss, Ordman, and Come. Briefs of amici curiae in Nos. 573 and 691 were filed by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations, and by the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae in No. 585 were filed by Lambert H. Miller for the National Association of Manufacturers; by Harry L. Browne for the American Retail Federation; and by Stanley E. Tobin for the Mechanical Specialties Co., Inc. Together with No. 691, Food Store Employees Union, Local No. 347, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., also on certiorari to the same court, argued March 26, 1969, and No. 585, Sinclair Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, argued March 26-27, 1969. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases involve the extent of an employer’s duty under the National Labor Relations Act to recognize a union that bases its claim to representative status solely on the possession of union authorization cards, and the steps an employer may take, particularly with regard to the scope and content of statements he may make, in legitimately resisting such card-based recognition. The specific questions facing us here are whether the duty to bargain can arise without a Board election under the Act; whether union authorization cards, if obtained from a majority of employees without misrepresentation or coercion, are reliable enough generally to provide a valid, alternate route to majority status; whether a bargaining order is an appropriate and authorized remedy where an employer rejects a card majority while at the same time committing unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the union’s majority and make a fair election an unlikely possibility; and whether certain specific statements made by an employer to his employees constituted such an election-voiding unfair labor practice and thus fell outside the protection of the First Amendment and § 8 (c) of the Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (c). For reasons given below, we answer each of these questions in the affirmative. I. Of the four eases before us, three — Gissel Packing Co., Heck’s Inc., and General Steel Products, Inc. — were consolidated following separate decisions in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and brought here by the National Labor Relations Board in No. 573. Food Store Employees Union, Local No. 347, the petitioning Union in Gissel, brought that case here in a separate petition in No. 691. All three cases present the same legal issues in similar, uncomplicated factual settings that can be briefly described together. The fourth case, No. 585 (Sinclair Company), brought here from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and argued separately, presents many of the same questions and will thus be disposed of in this opinion; but because the validity of some of the Board’s factual findings are under attack on First Amendment grounds, detailed attention must be paid to the factual setting of that case. Nos. 573 and 691. In each of the cases from the Fourth Circuit, the course of action followed by the Union and the employer and the Board’s response were similar. In each case, the Union waged an organizational campaign, obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, and then, on the basis of the cards, demanded recognition by the employer. All three employers refused to bargain on the ground that authorization cards were inherently unreliable indicators of employee desires; and they either embarked on, or continued, vigorous antiunion campaigns that gave rise to numerous unfair labor practice charges. In Gissel, where the employer’s campaign began almost at the outset of the Union’s organizational drive, the Union (petitioner in No. 691), did not seek an election, but instead filed three unfair labor practice charges against the employer, for refusing to bargain in violation of §8 (a) (5), for coercion and intimidation of employees in violation of §8 (a)(1), and for discharge of Union adherents in violation of § 8 (a) (3). In Heck’s an election sought by the Union was never held because of nearly identical unfair labor practice charges later filed by the Union as a result of the employer’s antiunion campaign, initiated after the Union’s recognition demand. And in General Steel, an election petitioned for by the Union and won by the employer was set aside by the Board because of the unfair labor practices committed by the employer in the pre-election period. In each case, the Board’s primary response was an order to bargain directed at the employers, despite the absence of an election in Gissel and Heck’s and the employer’s victory in General Steel. More specifically, the Board found in each case (1) that the Union had obtained valid authorization cards from a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit and was thus entitled to represent the employees for collective bargaining purposes; and (2) that the employer’s refusal to bargain with the Union in violation of § 8 (a) (5) was motivated, not by a “good faith” doubt of the Union’s majority status, but by a desire to gain time to dissipate that status. The Board based its conclusion as to the lack of good faith doubt on the fact that the employers had committed substantial unfair labor practices during their antiunion campaign efforts to resist recognition. Thus, the Board found that all three employers had engaged in restraint and coercion of employees in violation of § 8 (a)(1) — in Gissel, for coercively interrogating employees about Union activities, threatening them with discharge, and promising them benefits; in Heck’s, for coercively interrogating employees, threatening reprisals, creating the appearance of surveillance, and offering benefits for opposing the Union; and in General Steel, for coercive interrogation and threats of reprisals, including discharge. In addition, the Board found that the employers in Gissel and Heck’s had wrongfully discharged employees for engaging in Union activities in violation of § 8 (a) (3). And, because the employers had rejected the card-based bargaining demand in bad faith, the Board found that all three had refused to recognize the Unions in violation of § 8 (a) (5). Only in General Steel was there any objection by an employer to the validity of the cards and the manner in which they had been solicited, and the doubt raised by the evidence was resolved in the following manner. The customary approach of the Board in dealing with allegations of misrepresentation by the Union and misunderstanding by the employees of the purpose for which the cards were being solicited has been set out in Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N. L. R. B. 1268 (1963) and reaffirmed in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N. L. R. B. No. 57, 68 L. R. R. M. 1338 (1968). Under the Cumberland Shoe doctrine, if the card itself is unambiguous (i. e., states on its face that the signer authorizes the Union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes and not to seek an election), it will be counted unless it is proved that the employee was told that the card was to be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an election. In General Steel, the trial examiner considered the allegations of misrepresentation at length and, applying the Board’s customary analysis, rejected the claims with findings that were adopted by the Board and are reprinted in the margin. Consequently, the Board ordered the companies to cease and desist from their unfair labor practices, to offer reinstatement and back pay to the employees who had been discriminatorily discharged, to bargain with the Unions on request, and to post the appropriate notices. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in per curiam opinions in each of the three cases (398 F. 2d 336, 337, 339), sustained the Board’s findings as to the §§8(a)(l) and (3) violations, but rejected the Board’s findings that the employers’ refusal to bargain violated § 8 (a) (5) and declined to enforce those portions of the Board’s orders directing the respondent companies to bargain in good faith. The court based its § 8 (a) (5) rulings on its 1967 decisions raising the same fundamental issues, Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F. 2d 367, cert. denied, 390 U. S. 1028 (1968) ; NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F. 2d 562; NLRB v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., Inc., 386 F. 2d 551. The court in those cases held that the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act, which permitted the Board to resolve representation disputes by certification under § 9 (c) only by secret ballot election, withdrew from the Board the authority to order an employer to bargain under § 8 (a) (5) on the basis of cards, in the absence of NLRB certification, unless the employer knows independently of the cards that there is in fact no representation dispute. The court held that the cards themselves were so inherently unreliable that their use gave an employer virtually an automatic, good faith claim that such a dispute existed, for which a secret election was necessary. Thus, these rulings established that a company could not be ordered to bargain unless (1) there was no question about a Union’s majority status (either because the employer agreed the cards were valid or had conducted his own poll so indicating), or (2) the employer’s §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3) unfair labor practices committed during the representation campaign were so extensive and pervasive that a bargaining order was the only available Board remedy irrespective of a card majority. Thus based on the earlier decisions, the court’s reasoning in these cases was brief, as indicated by the representative holding in Heck’s: “We have recently discussed the unreliability of the cards, in the usual case, in determining whether or not a union has attained a majority status and have concluded that an employer is justified in entertaining a good faith doubt of the union’s claims when confronted with a demand for recognition based solely upon union authorization cards. We have also noted that the National Labor Relations Act after the Taft-Hartley amendments provides for an election as the sole basis of a certification and restricts the Board to the use of secret ballots for the resolution of representation questions. This is not one of those extraordinary cases in which a bargaining order might be an appropriate remedy for pervasive violations of § 8 (a) (1). It is controlled by our recent decisions and their reasoning. . . . There was not substantial evidence to support the findings of the Board that Heck’s, Inc. had no good faith doubt of the unions’ claims of majorities.” 398 F. 2d, at 338-339. No. 585. In No. 585, the factual pattern was quite similar. The petitioner, a producer of mill rolls, wire, and related products at two plants in Holyoke, Massachusetts, was shut down for some three months in 1952 as the result of a strike over contract negotiations with the American Wire Weavers Protective Association, the representative of petitioner’s journeymen and apprentice wire weavers from 1933 to 1952. The Company subsequently reopened without a union contract, and its employees remained unrepresented through 1964, when the Company was acquired by an Ohio corporation, with the Company’s former president continuing as head of the Holyoke, Massachusetts, division. In July 1965, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 404, began an organizing campaign among petitioner’s Holyoke employees and by the end of the summer had obtained authorization cards from 11 of the Company’s 14 journeymen wire weavers choosing the Union as their bargaining agent. On September 20, the Union notified petitioner that it represented a majority of its wire weavers, requested that the Company bargain with it, and offered to submit the signed cards to a neutral third party for authentication. After petitioner’s president declined the Union’s request a week later, claiming, inter alia, that he had a good faith doubt of majority status because of the cards’ inherent unreliability, the Union petitioned, on November 8, for an election that was ultimately set for December 9. When petitioner’s president first learned of the Union’s drive in July, he talked with all of his employees in an effort to dissuade them from joining a union. He particularly emphasized the results of the long 1952 strike, which he claimed “almost put our company out of business,” and expressed worry that the employees were forgetting the “lessons of the past.” He emphasized, secondly, that the Company was still on “thin ice” financially, that the Union’s “only weapon is to strike,” and that a strike “could lead to the closing of the plant,” since the parent company had ample manufacturing facilities elsewhere. He noted, thirdly, that because of their age and the limited usefulness of their skills outside their craft, the employees might not be able to find re-employment if they lost their jobs as a result of a strike. Finally, he warned those who did not believe that the plant could go out of business to “look around Holyoke and see a lot of them out of business.” The president sent letters to the same effect to the employees in early November, emphasizing that the parent company had no reason to stay in Massachusetts if profits went down. During the two or three weeks immediately prior to the election on December 9, the president sent the employees a pamphlet captioned: “Do you want another 13-week strike?” stating, inter alia, that: “We have no doubt that the Teamsters Union can again close the Wire Weaving Department and the entire plant by a strike. We have no hopes that the Teamsters Union Bosses will not call a strike. . . . The Teamsters Union is a strike happy outfit.” Similar communications followed in late November, including one stressing the Teamsters’ “hoodlum control.” Two days before the election, the Company sent out another pamphlet that was entitled: “Let’s Look at the Record,” and that purported to be an obituary of companies in the Holyoke-Springfield, Massachusetts, area that had allegedly gone out of business because of union demands, eliminating some 3,500 jobs; the first page carried a large cartoon showing the preparation of a grave for the Sinclair Company and other headstones containing the names of other plants allegedly victimized by the unions. Finally, on the day before the election, the president made another personal appeal to his employees to reject the Union. He repeated that the Company’s financial condition was precarious; that a possible strike would jeopardize the continued operation of the plant; and that age and lack of education would make re-employment difficult. The Union lost the election 7-6, and then filed both objections to the election and unfair labor practice charges which were consolidated for hearing before the trial examiner. The Board agreed with the trial examiner that the president’s communications with his employees, when considered as a whole, “reasonably tended to convey to the employees the belief or impression that selection of the Union in the forthcoming election could lead [the Company] to close its plant, or to the transfer of the weaving production, with the resultant loss of jobs to the wire weavers.” Thus, the Board found that under the “totality of the circumstances” petitioner’s activities constituted a violation of §8 (a)(1) of the Act. The Board further agreed with the trial examiner that petitioner’s activities, because they “also interfered with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in the election,” and “tended to foreclose the possibility” of holding a fair election, required that the election be set aside. The Board also found that the Union had a valid card majority (the unambiguous cards, see n. 4, supra, went unchallenged) when it demanded recognition initially and that the Company declined recognition, not because of a good faith doubt as to the majority status, but, as the §8 (a)(1) violations indicated, in order to gain time to dissipate that status — in violation of § 8 (a)(5). Consequently, the Board set the election aside, entered a cease-and-desist order, and ordered the Company to bargain on request. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sustained the Board’s findings and conclusions and enforced its order in full. 397 F. 2d 157. The court rejected the Company’s proposition that the inherent unreliability of authorization cards entitled an employer automatically to insist on an election, noting that the representative status of a union may be shown by means other than an election; the court thus reaffirmed its stance among those circuits disavowing the Fourth Circuit’s approach to authorization cards. Because of the conflict among the circuits on the card issues and because of the alleged conflict between First Amendment freedoms and the restrictions placed on employer speech by § 8 (a)(1) in Sinclair, No. 585, we granted certiorari to consider both questions. 393 U. S. 997 (1968). For reasons given below, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. II. In urging us to reverse the Fourth Circuit and to affirm the First Circuit, the National Labor Relations Board contends that we should approve its interpretation and administration of the duties and obligations imposed by the Act in authorization card cases. The Board argues (1) that unions have never been limited under § 9 (c) of either the Wagner Act or the 1947 amendments to certified elections as the sole route to attaining representative status. Unions may, the Board contends, impose a duty to bargain on the employer under § 8 (a) (5) by reliance on other evidence of majority employee support, such as authorization cards. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s holding, the Board asserts, the 1947 amendments did not eliminate the alternative routes to majority status. The Board contends (2) that the cards themselves, when solicited in accordance with Board standards which adequately insure against union misrepresentation, are sufficiently reliable indicators of employee desires to support a bargaining order against an employer who refuses to recognize a card majority in violation of §8 (a) (5). The Board argues (3) that a bargaining order is the appropriate remedy for the § 8 (a) (5) violation, where the employer commits other unfair labor practices that tend to undermine union support and render a fair election improbable. Relying on these three assertions, the Board asks us to approve its current practice, which is briefly as follows. When confronted by a recognition demand based on possession of cards allegedly signed by a majority of his employees, an employer need not grant recognition immediately, but may, unless he has knowledge independently of the cards that the union has a majority, decline the union’s request and insist on an election, either by requesting the union to file an election petition or by filing such a petition himself under §9 (c)(1)(B). If, however, the employer commits independent and substantial unfair labor practices disruptive of election conditions, the Board may withhold the election or set it aside, and issue instead a bargaining order as a remedy for the various violations. A bargaining order will not issue, of course, if the union obtained the cards through misrepresentation or coercion or if the employer’s unfair labor practices are unrelated generally to the representation campaign. Conversely, the employers in these cases urge us to adopt the views of the Fourth Circuit. There is more at issue in these cases than the dispute outlined above between the Board and the four employers, however, for the Union, petitioner in No. 691, argues that we should accord a far greater role to cards in the bargaining area than the Board itself seeks in this litigation. In order to understand the differences between the Union and the Board, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the Board’s approach to authorization cards from its early practice to the position it takes on oral argument before this Court. Such an analysis requires viewing the Board’s treatment of authorization cards in three separate phases: (1) under the Joy Silk doctrine, (2) under the rules of the Aaron Brothers case, and (3) under the approach announced at oral argument before this Court. The traditional approach utilized by the Board for many years has been known as the Joy Silk doctrine. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N. L. R. B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 360, 185 F. 2d 732 (1950). Under that rule, an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status through possession of authorization cards if he had a “good faith doubt” as to the union’s majority status; instead of bargaining, he could insist that the union seek an election in order to test out his doubts. The Board, then, could find a lack of good faith doubt and enter a bargaining order in one of two ways. It could find (1) that the employer’s independent unfair labor practices were evidence of bad faith, showing that the employer was seeking time to dissipate the union’s majority. Or the Board could find (2) that the employer had come forward with no reasons for entertaining any doubt and therefore that he must have rejected the bargaining demand in bad faith. An example of the second category was Snow & Sons, 134 N. L. R. B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F. 2d 687 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962), where the employer reneged on his agreement to bargain after a third party checked the validity of the card signatures and insisted on an election because he doubted that the employees truly desired representation. The Board entered a bargaining order with very broad language to the effect that an employer could not refuse a bargaining demand and seek an election instead “without a valid ground therefor,” 134 N. L. R. B., at 710-711. See also Dixon Ford Shoe Co., Inc., 150 N. L. R. B. 861 (1965); Kellogg Mills, 147 N. L. R. B. 342, 346 (1964), enforced, 347 F. 2d 219 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1965). The leading case codifying modifications to the Joy Silk doctrine was Aaron Brothers, 158 N. L. R. B. 1077 (1966). There the Board made it clear that it had shifted the burden to the General Counsel to show bad faith and that an employer “will not be held to have violated his bargaining obligation . . . simply because he refuses to rely upon cards, rather than an election, as the method for determining the union’s majority.” 158 N. L. R. B., at 1078. Two significant consequences were emphasized. The Board noted (1) that not every unfair labor practice would automatically result in a finding of bad faith and therefore a bargaining order; the Board implied that it would find bad faith only if the unfair labor practice was serious enough to have the tendency to dissipate the union’s majority. The Board noted (2) that an employer no longer needed to come forward with reasons for rejecting a bargaining demand. The Board pointed out, however, that a bargaining order would issue if it could prove that an employer’s “course of conduct” gave indications as to the employer’s bad faith. As examples of such a “course of conduct,” the Board cited Snow & Sons, supra; Dixon Ford Shoe Co., Inc., supra, and Kellogg Mills, supra, thereby reaffirming John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N. L. R. B. 99 (1965), where the Board had limited Snow & Sons to its facts. Although the Board’s brief before this Court generally followed the approach as set out in Aaron Brothers, supra, the Board announced at oral argument that it had virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine altogether. Under the Board’s current practice, an employer’s good faith doubt is largely irrelevant, and the key to the issuance of a bargaining order is the commission of serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the election processes and tend to preclude the holding of a fair election. Thus, an employer can insist that a union go to an election, regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct; he need give no affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request, and he can demand an election with a simple “no comment” to the union. The Board pointed out, however, (1) that an employer could not refuse to bargain if he knew, through a personal poll for instance, that a majority of his employees supported the union, and (2) that an employer could not refuse recognition initially because of questions as to the appropriateness of the unit and then later claim, as an afterthought, that he doubted the union’s strength. The Union argues here that an employer’s right to insist on an election in the absence of unfair labor practices should be more circumscribed, and a union’s right to rely on cards correspondingly more expanded, than the Board would have us rule. The Union’s contention is that an employer, when confronted with a card-based bargaining demand, can insist on an election only by filing the election petition himself immediately under i 9 (c)(1)(B) and not by insisting that the Union file the election petition, whereby the election can be subjected to considerable delay. If the employer does not himself petition for an election, the Union argues, he must recognize the Union regardless of his good or bad faith and regardless of his other unfair labor practices, and should be ordered to bargain if the cards were in fact validly obtained. And if this Court should continue to utilize the good faith doubt rule, the Union contends that at the least we should put the burden on the employer to make an affirmative showing of his reasons for entertaining such doubt. Because the employers’ refusal to bargain in each of these cases was accompanied by independent unfair labor practices which tend to preclude the holding of a fair election, we need not decide whether a bargaining order is ever appropriate in cases where there is no interference with the election processes. With the Union’s arguments aside, the points of difference between the employers and the Board will be considered in the following manner. The validity of the cards under the Act, their intrinsic reliability, and the appropriateness of a bargaining order as a response to violations of § 8 (a)(5) as well as §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3) will be discussed in the next section. The nature of an employer’s reaction to an organizational campaign, and particularly the Board’s conclusion that the employer’s statements in No. 585 contained threats of reprisal and thus constituted restraint and coercion in violation of § 8 (a)(1) and not protected speech, will be covered in the final section. III. A. The first issue facing us is whether a union can establish a bargaining obligation by means other than a Board election and whether the validity of alternate routes to majority status, such as cards, was affected by the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments. The most commonly traveled route for a union to obtain recognition as the exclusive bargaining representative of an unorganized group of employees is through the Board’s election and certification procedures under § 9 (c) of the Act (29 ü. S. C. § 159(c)); it is also, from the Board’s point of view, the preferred route. A union is not limited to a Board election, however, for, in addition to § 9, the present Act provides in § 8 (a) (5) (29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(5)), as did the Wagner Act in § 8 (5), that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a).” Since § 9 (a), in both the Wagner Act and the present Act, refers to the representative as the one “designated or selected” by a majority of the employees without specifying precisely how that representative is to be chosen, it was early recognized that an employer had a duty to bargain whenever the union representative presented “convincing evidence of majority support.” Almost from the inception of the Act, then, it was recognized that a union did not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining obligation; it could establish majority status by other means under the unfair labor practice provision of §8 (a) (5) — by showing convincing support, for instance, by a union-called strike or strike vote, or, as here, by possession of cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. We have consistently accepted this interpretation of the Wagner Act and the present Act, particularly as to the use of authorization cards. See, e. g., NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U. S. 318, 339-340 (1940); Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 702 (1944); United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62 (1956). Thus, in United Mine Workers, supra, we noted that a “Board election is not the only method by which an employer may satisfy itself as to the union’s majority status,” 351 U. S., at 72, n. 8, since § 9 (a), “which deals expressly with employee representation, says nothing as to how the employees’ representative shall be chosen,” 351 U. S., at 71. We therefore pointed out in that case, where the union had obtained signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees, that “[i]n the absence of any bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required majority of eligible employees, the employer’s denial of recognition of the union would have violated §8 (a) (5) of the Act.” 351 U. S., at 69. We see no reason to reject this approach to bargaining obligations now, and we find unpersuasive the Fourth Circuit’s view that the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, enacted some nine years before our decision in United Mine Workers, supra, require us to disregard that case. Indeed, the 1947 amendments weaken rather than strengthen the position taken by the employers here and the Fourth Circuit below. An early version of the bill in the House would have amended § 8 (5) of the Wagner Act to permit the Board to find a refusal-to-bargain violation only where an employer had failed to bargain with a union “currently recognized by the employer or certified as such [through an election] under section 9.” Section 8 (a)(5) of H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The proposed change, which would have eliminated the use of cards, was rejected in Conference (H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 41 (1947)), however, and we cannot make a similar change in the Act simply because, as the employers assert, Congress did not expressly approve the use of cards in rejecting the House amendment. Nor can we accept the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the change was wrought when Congress amended § 9 (c) to make election the sole basis for certification by eliminating the phrase “any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives,” under which the Board had occasionally used cards as a certification basis. A certified union has the benefit of numerous special privileges which are not accorded unions recognized voluntarily or under a bargaining order and which, Congress could determine, should not be dispensed unless a union has survived the crucible of a secret ballot election. The employers rely finally on the addition to § 9 (c) of subparagraph (B), which allows an employer to petition for an election whenever “one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section 9 (a).” That provision was not added, as the employers assert, to give them an absolute right to an election at any time; rather, it was intended, as the legislative history indicates, to allow them, after being asked to bargain, to test out their doubts as to a union’s majority in a secret election which they would then presumably not cause to be set aside by illegal antiunion activity. We agree with the Board's assertion here that there is no suggestion that Congress intended §9 (c)(1)(B) to relieve any employer of his § 8 (a) (5) bargaining obligation where, without good faith, he engaged in unfair labor practices disruptive of the Board's election machinery. And we agree that the policies reflected in § 9 (c) (1) (B) fully support the Board's present administration of the Act (see supra, at 591-592); for an employer can insist on a secret ballot election, unless, in the words of the Board, he engages “in contemporaneous unfair labor practices likely to destroy the union’s majority and seriously impede the election.” Brief for Petitioner, the Board, in No. 573, p. 36. In short, we hold that the 1947 amendments did not restrict an employer’s duty to bargain under § 8 (a)(5) solely to those unions whose representative status is certified after a Board election. B. We next consider the question whether authorization cards are such inherently unreliable indicators of employee desires that, whatever the validity of other alternate routes to representative status, the cards themselves may never be used to determine a union’s majority and to support an order to bargain. In this context, the employers urge us to take the step the 1947 amendments and their legislative history indicate Congress did not take, namely, to rule out completely the use of cards in the bargaining arena. Even if we do not unhesitatingly accept the Fourth Circuit’s view in the matter, the employers argue, at the very least we should overrule the Cumberland Shoe doctrine (see supra, at 584) and establish stricter controls over the solicitation of the cards by union representatives. The objections to the use of cards voiced by the employers and the Fourth Circuit boil down to two contentions: (1) that, as contrasted with the election procedure, the cards cannot accurately reflect an employee’s wishes, either because an employer has not had a chance to present his views and thus a chance to insure that the employee choice was an informed one, or because the choice was the result of group pressures and not individual decision made in the privacy of a voting booth; and (2) that quite apart from the election comparison, the cards are too often obtained through misrepresentation and coercion which compound the cards’ inherent inferiority to the election process. Neither contention is persuasive, and each proves too much. The Board itself has recognized, and continues to do so here, that secret elections are generally the most satisfactory — indeed the preferred — method of ascertaining whether a union has majority support. The acknowledged superiority of the election process, however, does not mean that cards are thereby rendered totally invalid, for where an employer engages in conduct disruptive of the election process, cards may be the most effective — perhaps the only — way of assuring employee choice. As for misrepresentation, in any specific case of alleged irregularity in the solicitation of the cards, the proper course is to apply the Board’s customary standards (to be discussed more fully below) and rule that there was no majority if the standards were not satisfied. It does not follow that because there are some instances of irregularity, the cards can never be used; otherwise, an employer could put off his bargaining obligation indefinitely through continuing interference with elections. That the cards, though admittedly inferior to the election process, can adequately reflect employee sentiment when that process has been impeded, needs no extended discussion, for the employers’ contentions cannot withstand close examination. The employers argue that their employees cannot make an informed choice because the card drive will be over before the employer has had a chance to present his side of the unionization issues. Normally, however, the union will inform the employer of its organization drive early in order to subject the employer to the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act; the union must be able to show the employer’s awareness of the drive in order to prove that his contemporaneous conduct constituted unfair labor practices on which a bargaining order can be based if the drive is ultimately successful. See, e. g., Hunt Oil Co., 157 N. L. R. B. 282 (1966); Don Swart Trucking Co., 154 N. L. R. B. 1345 (1965). Thus, in all of the cases here but the Charleston campaign in Heck’s the employer, whether informed by the union or not, was aware of the union’s organizing drive almost at the outset and began its antiunion campaign at that time; and even in the Heck’s Charleston case, where the recognition demand came about a week after the solicitation began, the employer was able to deliver a speech before the union obtained a majority. Further, the employers argue that without a secret ballot an employee may, in a card drive, succumb to group pressures or sign simply to get the union “off his back” and then be unable to change his mind as he would be free to do once inside a voting booth. But the same pressures are likely to be equally present in an election, for election cases arise most often with small bargaining units where virtually every voter’s sentiments can be carefully and individually canvassed. And no voter, of course, can change his mind after casting a ballot in an election even though he may think better of his choice shortly thereafter. The employers’ second complaint, that the cards are too often obtained through misrepresentation and coercion, must be rejected also in view of the Board’s present rules for controlling card solicitation, which we view as adequate to the task where the cards involved state their purpose clearly and unambiguously on their face. We would be closing our eyes to obvious difficulties, of course, if we did not recognize that there have been abuses, primarily arising out of misrepresentations by union organizers as to whether the effect of signing a card was to designate the union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes or merely to authorize it to seek an election to determine that issue. And we would be equally blind if we did not recognize that various courts of appeals and commentators have differed significantly as to the effectiveness of the Board’s Cumberland Shoe doctrine (see supra, at 584) to cure such abuses. Thus, even where the cards are unambiguous on their face, both the Second Circuit (NLRB v. S. E. Nichols Co., 380 F. 2d 438 (1967)) and the Fifth Circuit (Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 376 F. 2d 482 (1967)) have joined the Fourth Circuit below in rejecting the Board’s rule that the cards will be counted unless the solicitor’s statements amounted under the circumstances to an assurance that the cards would be used only for an election, or for no other purpose than an election. And even those circuits which have adopted the Board’s approach have criticized the Board for tending too often to apply the Cumberland rule too mechanically, declining occasionally to uphold the Board’s application of its own rule in a given case. See, e. g., NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 380 F. 2d 851 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Sandy’s Stores, Inc., 398 F. 2d 268 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384 F. 2d 609 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Dan Howard Mfg. Co., 390 F. 2d 304 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1968); Furr’s, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. 2d 562 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1967); UAW v. NLRB, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 196, 392 F. 2d 801 (1967). Among those which reject the Cumberland rule, the Fifth Circuit agrees with the Second Circuit (see S. E. Nichols Co., supra), that a card will be vitiated if an employee was left with the impression that he would be able to resolve any lingering doubts and make a final decision in an election, and further requires that the Board probe the subjective intent of each signer, an inquiry expressly avoided by Cumberland. See NLRB v. Southland Paint Co., 394 F. 2d 717, 728, 730 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968); Engineers & Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, supra. Where the cards are ambiguous on their face, the Fifth Circuit, joined by the Eighth Circuit (see, e. g., NLRB v. Peterson Bros., 342 F. 2d 221 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1965), and Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 358 F. 2d 766 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1966)), departs still further from the Board rule. And there is a conflict among those courts which otherwise follow the Board as to single-purpose cards (compare NLRB v. Lenz Co., 396 F. 2d 905, 908 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1968), with NLRB v. C. J. Glasgow Co., 356 F. 2d 476, 478 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1966)). We need make no decision as to the conflicting approaches used with regard to dual-purpose cards, for in each of the five organization campaigns in the four cases before us the cards used were single-purpose cards, stating clearly and unambiguously on their face that the signer designated the union as his representative. And even the view forcefully voiced by the Fourth Circuit below that unambiguous cards as well present too many opportunities for misrepresentation comes before us somewhat weakened in view of the fact that there were no allegations of irregularities in four of those five campaigns (Gissel, the two Heck’s campaigns, and Sinclair). Only in General Steel did the employer challenge the cards on the basis of misrepresentations. There, the trial examiner, after hearing testimony from over 100 employees and applying the traditional Board approach (see n. 5, supra), concluded that “all of these employees not only intended, but were fully aware, that they were thereby designating the Union as their representative.” Thus, the sole question before us, raised in only one of the four cases here, is whether the Cumberland Shoe doctrine is an adequate rule under the Act for assuring employee free choice. In resolving the conflict among the circuits in favor of approving the Board’s Cumberland rule, we think it sufficient to point out that employees should be bound by the clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly canceled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature. There is nothing inconsistent in handing an employee a card that says the signer authorizes the union to represent him and then telling him that the card will probably be used first to get an election. Elections have been, after all, and will continue to be, held in the vast majority of cases; the union will still have to have the signatures of 30% of the employees when an employer rejects a bargaining demand and insists that the union seek an election. We cannot agree with the employers/ here that employees as a rule are too unsophisticated to be bound by what they sign unless expressly told that their act of signing represents something else. In addition to approving the use of cards, of course, Congress has expressly authorized reliance on employee signatures alone in other areas of labor relations, even where criminal sanctions hang in the balance, and we should not act hastily in disregarding congressional judgments that employees can be counted on to take responsibility for their acts. We agree, however, with the Board’s own warnings in Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N. L. R. B. No. 57, 68 L. R. R. M. 1338, 1341, and n. 7 (1968), that in hearing testimony concerning a card challenge, trial examiners should not neglect their obligation to ensure employee free choice by a too easy mechanical application of the Cumberland rule. We also accept the observation that employees are more likely than not, many months after a card drive and in response to questions by company counsel, to give testimony damaging to the union, particularly where company officials have previously threatened reprisals for union activity in violation of § 8 (a) (1). We therefore reject any rule that requires a probe of an employee’s subjective motivations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry. We nevertheless feel that the trial examiner’s findings in General Steel (see n. 5, supra) represent the limits of the Cumberland rule’s application. We emphasize that the Board should be careful to guard against an approach any more rigid than that in General Steel. And we reiterate that nothing we say here indicates our approval of the Cumberland Shoe rule when applied to ambiguous, dual-purpose cards. The employers argue as a final reason for rejecting the use of the cards that they are faced with a Hobson’s choice under current Board rules and will almost inevitably come out the loser. They contend that if they do not make an immediate, personal investigation into possible solicitation irregularities to determine whether in fact the union represents an uncoerced majority, they will have unlawfully refused to bargain for failure to have a good faith doubt of the union’s majority; and if they do make such an investigation, their efforts at polling and interrogation will constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of §8 (a)(1) and they will again be ordered to bargain. As we have pointed out, however, an employer is not obligated to accept a card check as proof of majority status, under the Board’s current practice, and he is not required to justify his insistence on an election by making his own investigation of employee sentiment and showing affirmative reasons for doubting the majority status. See Aaron Brothers, 158 N. L. R. B. 1077, 1078. If he does make an investigation, the Board’s recent cases indicate that reasonable polling in this regard will not always be termed violative of § 8 (a)(1) if conducted in accordance with the requirements set out in Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N. L. R. B. No. 102, 65 L. R. R. M. 1385 (1967). And even if an employer’s limited interrogation is found violative of the Act, it might not be serious enough to call for a bargaining order. See Aaron Brothers, supra; Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N. L. R. B. 1071 (1965). As noted above, the Board has emphasized that not “any employer conduct found violative of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act, regardless of its nature or gravity, will necessarily support a refusal-to-bargain finding,” Aaron Brothers, supra, at 1079. C. Remaining before us is the propriety of a bargaining order as a remedy for a §8 (a)(5) refusal to bargain where an employer has committed independent unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact undermined a union’s majority and caused an election to be set aside. We have long held that the Board is not limited to a cease-and-desist order in such cases, but has the authority to issue a bargaining order without first requiring the union to show that it has been able to maintain its majority status. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736, 748, n. 16 (1962); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U. S. 512 (1942). And we have held that the Board has the same authority even where it is clear that the union, which once had possession of cards from a majority of the employees, represents only a minority when the bargaining order is entered. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 702 (1944). We see no reason now to withdraw this authority from the Board. If the Board could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it would in effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him “to profit from [his] own wrongful refusal to bargain,” Franks Bros., supra, at 704, while at the same time severely curtailing the employees’ right freely to determine whether they desire a representative. The employer could continue to delay or disrupt the election processes and put off indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any election held under these circumstances would not be likely to demonstrate the employees’ true, undistorted desires. The employers argue that the Board has ample remedies, over and above the cease-and-desist order, to control employer misconduct. The Board can, they assert, direct the companies to mail notices to employees, to read notices to employees during plant time and to give the union access to employees during working time at the plant, or it can seek a court injunctive order under § 10 (j) (29 U. S. C. § 160 (j)) as a last resort. In view of the Board’s power, they conclude, the bargaining order is an unnecessarily harsh remedy that needlessly prejudices employees’ § 7 rights solely for the purpose of punishing or restraining an employer. Such an argument ignores that a bargaining order is designed as much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct. If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union’s strength and destroying the laboratory conditions necessary for a fair election, he may see no need to violate a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity. The damage will have been done, and perhaps the only fair way to effectuate employee rights is to re-establish the conditions as they existed before the employer’s unlawful campaign. There is, after all, nothing permanent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of the employer’s acts have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by filing a representation petition. For, as we pointed out long ago, in finding that a bargaining order involved no “injustice to employees who may wish to substitute for the particular union some other . . . arrangement,” a bargaining relationship “once rightfully established must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed,” after which the “Board may, . . . upon a proper showing, take steps in recognition of changed situations which might make appropriate changed bargaining relationships.” Frank Bros., supra, at 705-706. Before considering whether the bargaining orders were appropriately entered in these cases, we should summarize the factors that go into such a determination. Despite our reversal of the Fourth Circuit below in Nos. 573 and 691 on all major issues, the actual area of disagreement between our position here and that of the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practical matter. While refusing to validate the general use of a bargaining order in reliance on cards, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless left open the possibility of imposing a bargaining order, without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of cards or otherwise, in “exceptional” cases marked by “outrageous” and “pervasive” unfair labor practices. Such an order would be an appropriate remedy for those practices, the court noted, if they are of “such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had.” NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F. 2d 562, 570 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1967); see also NLRB v. Heck’s, Inc., 398 F. 2d 337, 338. The Board itself, we should add, has long had a similar policy of issuing a bargaining order, in the absence of a§8(a)(5) violation or even a bargaining demand, when that was the only available, effective remedy for substantial unfair labor practices. See, e. g., United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 215, 376 F. 2d 770 (1967); J. C. Penney Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 384 F. 2d 479, 485-486 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1967). The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board’s use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes. The Board’s authority to issue such an order on a lesser showing of employer misconduct is appropriate, we should reemphasize, where there is also a showing that at one point the union had a majority; in such a case, of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free choice becomes as important a goal as deterring employer misbehavior. In fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion, then, the Board can properly take into consideration the extensiveness of an employer’s unfair practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue (see n. 32, supra). We emphasize that under the Board’s remedial power there is still a third category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining order. There is, the Board says, no per se rule that the commission of any unfair practice will automatically result in a § 8 (a) (5) violation and the issuance of an order to bargain. See Aaron Brothers, supra. With these considerations in mind, we turn to an examination of the orders in these cases. In Sinclair, No. 585, the Board made a finding, left undisturbed by the First Circuit, that the employer’s threats of reprisal were so coercive that, even in the absence of a §8 (a)(5) violation, a bargaining order would have been necessary to repair the unlawful effect of those threats. The Board therefore did not have to make the determination called for in the intermediate situation above that the risks that a fair rerun election might not be possible were too great to disregard the desires of the employees already expressed through the cards. The employer argues, however, that its communications to its employees were protected by the First Amendment and § 8 (c) of the Act (29 U. S. C. § 158 (c)), whatever the effect of those communications on the union’s majority or the Board’s ability to ensure a fair election; it is to that contention that .we shall direct our final attention in the next section. In the three cases in Nos. 573 and 691 from the Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, the Board did not make a similar finding that a bargaining order would have been necessary in the absence of an unlawful refusal to bargain. Nor did it make a finding that, even though traditional remedies might be able to ensure a fair election, there was insufficient indication that an election (or a rerun in General Steel) would definitely be a more reliable test of the employees’ desires than the card count taken before the unfair labor practices occurred. The employees argue that such findings would not be warranted, and the court below ruled in General Steel that available remedies short of a bargaining order could guarantee a fair election. 398 F. 2d 339, 340, n. 3. We think it possible that the requisite findings were implicit in the Board’s decisions below to issue bargaining orders (and to set aside the election in General Steel); and we think it clearly inappropriate for the court below to make any contrary finding on its own (see n. 32, supra). Because the Board’s current practice at the time required it to phrase its findings in terms of an employer’s good or bad faith doubts (see Part II, supra), however, the precise analysis the Board now puts forth was not employed below, and we therefore remand these cases for proper findings. IV. We consider finally petitioner Sinclair’s First Amendment challenge to the holding of the Board and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. At the outset we note that the question raised here most often arises in the context of a nascent union organizational drive, where employers must be careful in waging their anti-union campaign. As to conduct generally, the above-noted gradations of unfair labor practices, with their varying consequences, create certain hazards for employers when they seek to estimate or resist unionization efforts. But so long as the differences involve conduct easily avoided, such as discharge, surveillance, and coercive interrogation, we do not think that employers can complain that the distinctions are unreasonably difficult to follow. Where an employer’s antiunion efforts consist of speech alone, however, the difficulties raised are not so easily resolved. The Board has eliminated some of the problem areas by no longer requiring an employer to show affirmative reasons for insisting on an election and by permitting him to make reasonable inquiries. We do not decide, of course, whether these allowances are mandatory. But we do note that an employer’s free speech right to communicate his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the Board. Thus, § 8 (c) (29 U. S. C. § 158 (c)) merely implements the First Amendment by requiring that the expression of “any views, argument, or opinion” shall not be “evidence of an unfair labor practice,” so long as such expression contains “no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit” in violation of §8 (a)(1). Section 8(a)(1), in turn, prohibits interference, restraint or coercion of employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by §8 (a)(1) and the proviso to § 8 (c). And any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. Stating these obvious principles is but another way of recognizing that what is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically dependent employee and his union agent, not the election of legislators or the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimately defined and where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a class freer to talk. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). Within this framework, we must reject the Company’s challenge to the decision below and the findings of the Board on which it was based. The standards used below for evaluating the impact of an employer’s statements are not seriously questioned by petitioner and we see no need to tamper with them here. Thus, an employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” He may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U. S. 263, 274, n. 20 (1965). If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the protection of the First Amendment. We therefore agree with the court below that “[conveyance of the employer’s belief, even though sincere, that unionization will or may result in the closing of the plant is not a statement of fact unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing is capable of proof.” 397 F. 2d 157, 160. As stated elsewhere, an employer is free only to tell “what he reasonably believes will be the likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his control,” and not “threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own volition.” NLRB v. River Togs, Inc., 382 F. 2d 198, 202 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1967). Equally valid was the finding by the court and the Board that petitioner’s statements and communications were not cast as a prediction of “demonstrable ‘economic consequences,’ ” 397 F. 2d, at 160, but rather as a threat of retaliatory action. The Board found that petitioner’s speeches, pamphlets, leaflets, and letters conveyed the following message: that the company was in a precarious financial condition; that the “strike-happy” union would in all likelihood have to obtain its potentially unreasonable demands by striking, the probable result of which would be a plant shutdown, as the past history of labor relations in the area indicated; and that the employees in such a case would have great difficulty finding employment elsewhere. In carrying out its duty to focus on the question: “[W]hat did the speaker intend and the listener understand?” (A. Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy 44 (I960)), the Board could reasonably conclude that the intended and understood import of that message was not to predict that unionization would inevitably cause the plant to close but to threaten to throw employees out of work regardless of the economic realities. In this connection, we need go no further than to point out (1) that petitioner had no support for its basic assumption that the union, which had not yet even presented any demands, would have to strike to be heard, and that it admitted at the hearing that it had no basis for attributing other plant closings in the area to unionism; and (2) that the Board has often found that employees, who are particularly sensitive to rumors of plant closings, take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest forecasts. Petitioner argues that the line between so-called permitted predictions and proscribed threats is too vague to stand up under traditional First Amendment analysis and that the Board’s discretion to curtail free speech rights is correspondingly too uncontrolled. It is true that a reviewing court must recognize the Board’s competence in the first instance to judge the impact of utterances made in the context of the employer-employee relationship, see NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 479 (1941). But an employer, who has control over that relationship and therefore knows it best, cannot be heard to complain that he is without an adequate guide for his behavior. He can easily make his views known without engaging in “ ‘brinkmanship’ ” when it becomes all too easy to “overstep and tumble [over] the brink,” Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F. 2d 369, 372 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967). At the least he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding conscious overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employees. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in No. 585, and we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Nos. 573 and 691 insofar as they decline enforcement of the Board’s orders to bargain and remand those cases to that court with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. r. . , , J r. J It is so ordered. At the outset of the Union campaign, the Company vice president informed two employees, later discharged, that if they were caught talking to Union men, “you God-damned things will go.” Subsequently, the Union presented oral and written demands for recognition, claiming possession of authorization cards from 31 of the 47 employees in the appropriate unit. Rejecting the bargaining demand, the Company began to interrogate employees as to their Union activities; to promise them better benefits than the Union could offer; and to warn them that if the “union got in, [the vice president] would just take his money and let the union run the place,” that the Union was not going to get in, and that it would have to “fight” the Company first. Further, when the Company learned of an impending Union meeting, it arranged, so the Board later found, to have an agent present to report the identity of the Union’s adherents. On the first day following the meeting, the vice president told the two employees referred to above that he knew they had gone to the meeting and that their work hours were henceforth reduced to half a day. Three hours later, the two employees were discharged. The organizing drive was initiated by the employees themselves at Heck’s Charleston warehouses. The Union first demanded recognition on the basis of 13 cards from 26 employees of the Company’s three Charleston warehouses. After responding “No comment” to the Union’s repeated requests for recognition, the president assembled the employees and told them of his shock at their selection of the Union; he singled out one of the employees to ask if he had signed an authorization card. The next day the Union obtained the additional card necessary to establish a majority. That same day, the leading Union supporter (the employee who had first established contacts with the Union and had solicited a large number of the cards) was discharged, and another employee was interrogated as to his Union activities, encouraged to withdraw his authorization, and warned that a Union victory could result in reduced hours, fewer raises, and withdrawal of bonuses. A second demand for recognition was made two days later, and thereafter the president summoned two known Union supporters to his office and offered them new jobs at higher pay if they would use their influence to “break up the union.” The same pattern was repeated a year later at the Company’s Ashland, Kentucky, store, where the Union obtained cards from 21 of the 38 employees by October 5, 1965. The next day, the assistant store manager told an employee that he knew that the Union had acquired majority status. When the Union requested recognition on October 8, however, the Company refused on the ground that it was not sure whether department heads were included in the bargaining unit — even though the cards represented a majority with or without the department heads. After a second request for recognition and an offer to submit the cards to the employer for verification, respondent again refused, on grounds of uncertainty about the definition of the unit and because a poll taken by the Company showed that a majority of the employees did not want Union representation. Meanwhile, the Company told the employees that an employee of another company store had been fired on the spot for signing a card, warned employees that the Company knew which ones had signed cards, and polled employees about their desire for Union representation without giving them assurances against reprisals. Throughout the Union’s six-month organizational campaign— both before and after its demand for recognition based on possession of cards from 120 of the 207 employees in the appropriate unit— the Company’s foremen and supervisors interrogated employees about their Union involvement; threatened them with discharge for engaging in Union activities or voting for the Union; suggested that unionization might hurt business and make new jobs more difficult to obtain; warned that strikes and other dire economic consequences would result (a supervisor informed a group of employees that if the Union came in, “a nigger would be the head of it,” and that when the Company put in 10 new machines, “the niggers would be the operators of them”); and asserted that, although the Company would have to negotiate with the Union, it could negotiate endlessly and would not have to sign anything. The cards used in all four campaigns in Nos. 573 and 691 and in the one drive in No. 585 unambiguously authorized the Union to represent the signing employee for collective bargaining purposes; there was no reference to elections. Typical of the cards was the one used in the Charleston campaign in Heck’s, and it stated in relevant part: “Desiring to become a member of the above Union oí the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, I hereby make application for admission to membership. I hereby authorize you, your agents or representatives to act for me as collective bargaining agent on all matters pertaining to rates of pay, hours, or any other conditions of employment.” “Accordingly, I reject Respondent’s contention 'that if a man is told that his card will be secret, or will be shown only to the Labor Board for the purpose of obtaining election, that this is the absolute equivalent of telling him that it will be used “only” for purposes of obtaining an election.’ “With respect to the 97 employees named in the attached Appendix B Respondent in its brief contends, in substance, that their cards should be rejected because each of these employees was told one or more of the following: (1) that the card would be used to get an election (2) that he had the right to vote either way, even though he signed the card (3) that the card would be kept secret and not shown to anybody except to the Board in order to get an election. For reasons heretofore explicated, I conclude that these statements, singly or jointly, do not foreclose use of the cards for the purpose designated on their face.” See, e. g., Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 360, 185 F. 2d 732 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 914 (1951); NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc., 359 F. 2d 684 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Quality Markets, Inc., 387 F. 2d 20 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Phil-Modes, Inc., 396 F. 2d 131 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968); Atlas Engine Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 396 F. 2d 775 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1968), petition for certiorari pending; NLRB v. Clark Products, Inc., 385 F. 2d 396 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 379 F. 2d 687 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F. 2d 842 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1967); Furr’s, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. 2d 562 (C. A. 10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 840 (1967). In addition to the First Circuit below, four courts of appeals have subsequently considered the Fourth Circuit’s view of the cards and specifically rejected it. NLRB v. United Mineral & Chemical Corp., 391 F. 2d 829, 836, n. 10 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 394 F. 2d 711, 712-713 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Atco-Surgical Supports, 394 F. 2d 659, 660 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Ozark Motor Lines, 403 F. 2d 356 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1968). In 1967, for instance, the Board conducted 8,116 elections but issued only 157 bargaining orders based on a card majority. Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N. L. R. B. No. 57, 68 L. R. R. M. 1338, 1342, n. 9 (1968). See also Sheinkman, Recognition of Unions Through Authorization Cards, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 319 (1969). The number of card cases that year, however, represents a rather dramatic increase over previous years, from 12 such cases in 1964, 24 in 1965, and about 117 in 1966. Browne, Obligation to Bargain on Basis of Card Majority, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 334, 347 (1969). See, e. g., Aaron Brothers, 158 N. L. R. B. 1077 (1966); cf., General Shoe Corp., 77 N. L. R. B. 124 (1948). An employer, of course, may not, even if he acts in good faith, recognize a minority union, Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731 (1961). NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F. 2d 756, 757 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1940). See, e. g., Denver Auto Dealers Assn., 10 N. L. R. B. 1173 (1939); Century Mills, Inc., 5 N. L. R. B. 807 (1938). The right of an employer lawfully to refuse to bargain if he had a good faith doubt as to the Union’s majority status, even if in fact the Union did represent a majority, was recognized early in the administration of the Act, see NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 868 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576 (1938). See n. 11, supra. Section 9 (c) of the Wagner Act had provided: “Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify . . . the name or names of the representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board . . . may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.” E. g., protection against the filing of new election petitions by rival unions or employees seeking decertification for 12 months (§9 (c)(3)), protection for a reasonable period, usually one year, against any disruption of the bargaining relationship because of claims that the union no longer represents a majority (see Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96 (1954)), protection against recognitional picketing by rival unions (§8 (b)(4)(C)), and freedom from the restrictions placed in work assignments disputes by § 8 (b) (4) (D), and on recognitional and organizational picketing by §8 (b)(7). Under the Wagner Act, which did not prescribe who would file election petitions, the Board had ruled that an employer could seek an election only when two unions presented conflicting bargaining requests on the ground that if he were given the same election petition rights as the union, he could interrupt union drives by demanding an election before the union had obtained majority status. The 1947 amendments resolved the difficulty by providing that an employer could seek an election only after he had been requested to bargain. See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1947). The Senate report stated that the “present Board rules . . . discriminate against employers who have reasonable grounds for believing that labor organizations claiming to represent their employees are really not the choice of the majority.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1947). Senator Taft stated during the debates: “Today an employer is faced with this situation. A man comes into his office and says, ‘I represent your employees. Sign this agreement, or we strike tomorrow.’. . . The employer has no way in which to determine whether this man really does represent his employees or does not. The bill gives him the right to go to the Board . . . and say, ‘I want an election. I want to know who is the bargaining agent for my employees.’” 93 Cong. Rec. 3838 (1947). As aptly stated in Lesniek, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 851, 861-862 (1967): “Cards have been used under the act for thirty years; [this] Court has repeatedly held that certification is not the only route to representative status; and the 1947 attempt in the House-passed Hartley Bill to amend section 8 (a) (5) . . . was rejected by the conference committee that produced the Taft-Hartley Act. No amount of drum-beating should be permitted to overcome, without legislation, this history.” In dealing with the reliability of cards, we should re-emphasize what issues we are not confronting. As pointed out above, we are not here faced with a situation where an employer, with “good” or “bad” subjective motivation, has rejected a card-based bargaining request without good reason and has insisted that the Union go to an election while at the same time refraining from committing unfair labor practices that would tend to disturb the “laboratory conditions” of that election. We thus need not decide whether, absent election interference by an employer’s unfair labor practices, he may obtain an election only if he petitions for one himself; whether, if he does not, he must bargain with a card majority if the Union chooses not to seek an election; and whether, in the latter situation, he is bound by the Board’s ultimate determination of the card results regardless of his earlier good faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a Union-sought election if he makes an affirmative showing of his positive reasons for believing there is a representation dispute. In short, a union’s right to rely on cards as a freely interchangeable substitute for elections where there has been no election interference is not put in issue here; we need only decide whether the cards are reliable enough to support a bargaining order where a fair election probably could not have been held, or where an election that was held was in fact set aside. The Board’s reliance on authorization cards has provoked considerable scholarly controversy. Compare criticism of Board policy, particularly its treatment of ambiguous, dual-purpose cards, in Browne, supra, n. 7, and Comment, Union Authorization Cards, 75 Yale L. J. 805 (1966), with defense of Board practice in Lesnick, supra, n. 17; Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 349 (1969); and Comment, Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable Basis for an NLRB Order To Bargain?, 47 Texas L. Rev. 87 (1968). For a comparison of the card procedure and the election process, see discussion in NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F. 2d 562, 564-566 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1967). See nn. 7-8, supra. See Comment, Union Authorization Cards: A Reliable Basis for an NLRB Order To Bargain?, supra, at 94 and n. 32. See n. 19, supra. In the Charleston campaign in Heck’s, the employees handled the card drive themselves from beginning to end, contacting the union, obtaining the blank authorization cards, and soliciting their fellow employees on that basis; no union agents were involved in the card signing. See 1969 CCH Guidebook to Labor Relations ¶ 402.4. Criminal sanctions are imposed by § 302 (29 U. S. C. § 186) which makes it unlawful for an employer to pay to and for a union representative to receive “any money or other thing of value.” Section 302 (c) (4) (29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (4)) exempts payments by employers to union representatives of union dues, however, where an employee has executed a “written assignment” of the dues, 2. e., a check-off authorization. Signatures are also relied on in §9 (c)(1) (A) (29 U. S. C. § 159 (c) (1) (A)), which provides for Board processing of representation and decertification petitions when each is supported by a “substantial number of employees” (the basis for the 30% signature requirement, see n. 25, supra), and in § 9 (e) which specifically provides for 30% of the signatures in the bargaining unit to empower the Board to hold a union shop de-authorization election. In explaining and reaffirming the Cumberland Shoe doctrine in the context of unambiguous cards, the Board stated: “Thus the fact that employees are told in the course of solicitation that an election is contemplated, or that a purpose of the card is to make an election possible, provides in our view insufficient basis in itself for vitiating unambiguously worded authorization cards on the theory of misrepresentation. A different situation is presented, of course, where union organizers solicit cards on the explicit or indirectly expressed representation that they will use such cards only for an election and subsequently seek to use them for a different purpose . . . .” The Board stated further in a footnote: “The foregoing does not of course imply that a finding of misrepresentation is confined to situations where employees are expressly told in haec verba that the ‘sole’ or ‘only’ purpose of the cards is to obtain an election. The Board has never suggested such a mechanistic application of the foregoing principles, as some have contended. The Board looks to substance rather than to form. It is not the use or nonuse of certain key or ‘magic’ words that is controlling, but whether or not the totality of circumstances surrounding the card solicitation is such, as to add up to an assurance to the card signer that his card will be used for no purpose other than to help get an election.” 172 N. L. R. B. No. 57, 68 L. R. R. M. 1338, 1341-1342, and n. 7. See Sheinkman, supra, n. 7, at 332-333. See Judge Brown’s “Scylla and Charybdis” analogy in NLRB v. Dan River Mills, 274 F. 2d 381, 388 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1960). The Board indicates here that its records show that in the period between January and June 1968, the median time between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and a Board decision in a contested case was 388 days. But the employer can do more than just put off his bargaining obligation by seeking to slow down the Board’s administrative processes. He can also affect the outcome of a rerun election by delaying tactics, for figures show that the longer the time between a tainted election and a rerun, the less are the union’s chances of reversing the outcome of the first election. See n. 31, infra. A study of 20,153 elections held between 1960 and 1962 shows that in the 267 cases where rerun elections were held over 30% were won by the party who caused the election to be set aside. See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N. C. L. Rev. 209, 212 (1963). The study shows further that certain unfair labor practices are more effective to destroy election conditions for a longer period of time than others. For instance, in cases involving threats to close or transfer plant operations, the union won the rerun only 29% of the time, while threats to eliminate benefits or refuse to deal with the union if elected seemed less irremediable with the union winning the rerun 75% of the time. Id., at 215-216. Finally, time appears to be a factor. The figures suggest that if a rerun is held too soon after the election before the effects of the unfair labor practices have worn off, or too long after the election when interest in the union may have waned, the chances for a changed result occurring are not as good as they are if the rerun is held sometime in between those periods. Thus, the study showed that if the rerun is held within 30 days of the election or over nine months after, the chances that a different result will occur are only one in five; when the rerun is held within 30-60 days after the election, the chances for a changed result are two in five. Id., at 221. The employers argue that the Fourth Circuit correctly observed that, “in the great majority of cases, a cease and desist order with the posting of appropriate notices will eliminate any undue influences upon employees voting in the security of anonymity.” NLRB v. Logan Packing Co., 386 F. 2d, at 570. It is for the Board and not the courts, however, to make that determination, based on its expert estimate as to the effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity. In fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of § 10 (c) of the Act (29 U. S. C. § 160(c)), the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964). “[I]t is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency.” Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 621 (1966). It has been pointed out that employee rights are affected whether or not a bargaining order is entered, for those who desire representation may not be protected by an inadequate rerun election, and those who oppose collective bargaining may be prejudiced by a bargaining order if in fact the union would have lost an election absent employer coercion. See Lesnick, supra, n. 17, at 862. Any effect will be minimal at best, however, for there “is every reason for the union to negotiate a contract that will satisfy the majority, for the union will surely realize that it must win the support of the employees, in the face of a hostile employer, in order to survive the threat of a decertification election after a year has passed.” Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 135 (1964). Under the doctrine of Bernel Foam Products Co., 146 N. L. R. B. 1277 (1964), there is nothing inconsistent in the Union’s filing an election petition and thereby agreeing that a question of representation exists, and then filing a refusal-to-bargain charge after the election is lost because of the employer’s unfair labor practices. See Bok, supra, n. 33, at 77; n. 31, supra. See, e. g., Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 159 N. L. R. B. 805, 807-810, and cases (relied on by the trial examiner here) cited at 809, n. 3, enforced, 387 F. 2d 833 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1967); Surprenant Mfg. Co., 144 N. L. R. B. 507, 510-511, enforced, 341 F. 2d 756, 761 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1965).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DAVIS et ux. v. UNITED STATES No. 89-98. Argued March 26, 1990 Decided May 21, 1990 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips and Bart M. Davis. Assistant Attorney General Peterson argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Alan I. Horowitz, David I. Pincus, and Francis M. Allegra. Wilford W. Kirton, Jr., Raeburn G. Kennard, and Robert P. hunt filed a brief for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. We are called upon in this case to determine whether the funds petitioners transferred to their two sons while they served as full-time, unpaid missionaries for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church) are deductible as charitable contributions “to or for the use of” the Church, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 170 (1982 ed.). I Petitioners, Harold and Enid Davis, and their sons, Benjamin and Cecil, are members of the Church. According to the stipulated facts, the Church operates a worldwide missionary program involving 25,000 persons each year. Most of these missionaries are young men between ages 19 and 22. If the Church determines that a candidate is qualified to become a missionary, the president of the Church sends a letter calling the candidate to missionary service in a specified geographical location. A follow-up letter from the missionary department lists the items of clothing the missionary will need, provides specific information relating to the mission, and sets forth the estimated amount of money needed to support the missionary service. This amount varies according to the location of the mission and reflects an estimate of the amount the missionary will actually need. The missionary’s parents generally provide the necessary funds to support their son or daughter during the period of missionary service. If they are unable to do so, the Church will locate another donor from the local congregation or use money donated to the Church’s general missionary funds. The Church believes that having individual donors send the necessary funds directly to the missionary benefits the Church in several important ways. Specifically, it “fosters the Church doctrine of sacrifice and consecration in the lives of its people” as well as reducing the administrative and bookkeeping requirements which would otherwise be imposed upon the Church. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. After accepting the call, the missionary candidate receives priesthood ordinances to serve as an official missionary and minister of the Church. During the missionary service, the mission president (leader of the mission) controls many aspects of the missionaries’ lives, including the manner of dress and grooming. Missionaries are required to conform to a daily schedule which calls for at least 10 hours per day of actual missionary work in addition to study time, mealtime, and planning time. Mission rules forbid dating, movies, plays, certain sports, and other activities; missionaries are not allowed to take vacations or travel for personal purposes. Missionaries receive some supervision over their use of funds. The Missionary Handbook instructs missionaries that “[t]he money you receive for your support is sacred and should be spent wisely and only for missionary work. Keep expenses at a minimum. . . . Keep a financial record of all expenditures.” App. 13. The mission presidents give similar instructions to the missionaries under their supervision. Although missionaries are not required to obtain advance approval of each expenditure they make from their personal checking account, they do submit weekly reports to their group leader listing the amount of time spent in Church service, the type of missionary work accomplished, and a report of the total expenses for the week and month to date. If a missionary begins to accumulate surplus funds, he is expected to take action to reduce the amount of donations sent to him. The mission president may alter his estimates of the amounts required each month to take into account changing circumstances. Benjamin and Cecil Davis both applied to become missionaries. In 1979, the Church notified Benjamin by letter that he had been called to missionary service at the New York Mission. A second letter informed him of the estimated amount of money which would be needed to support his service. In 1980, Cecil Davis was notified that he had been called to missionary service at the New Zealand-Cook Island Mission. Cecil also received a second letter informing him about the mission and the amount of money he would need. Petitioners notified their bishop that they would provide the funds requested by the Church to meet their sons’ mission expenses. According to petitioners, both sons made a commitment with them to use the money only in accordance with the Church’s instructions. Petitioners transferred to Benjamin’s personal checking account, on which he was the sole authorized signatory, $8,480.89 in 1980 and $4,135 in 1981. During 1981, petitioners transferred $1,518 to Cecil’s personal checking account, on which he was the sole authorized signatory. Benjamin and Cecil used this money primarily to pay for rent, food, transportation, and personal needs while on their missions. Benjamin also spent approximately $20 per month to purchase religious tracts and other materials used during his missionary work. Neither Benjamin nor Cecil was required to seek or sought specific approval of each expenditure made from his personal checking account. However, each week Benjamin and Cecil submitted a report of the total expenses for the week and month to date. At the end of their service, Cecil had no money remaining in his account; Benjamin had $150 which he used to purchase a camera. (Petitioners do not claim a deduction for this amount.) In their joint tax returns filed in 1980 and 1981, petitioners claimed their sons as dependents, but did not claim a charitable contribution deduction under 26 U. S. C. § 170 for the funds sent their sons during their missionary service. On April 16, 1984, petitioners filed an amended income tax return for the years 1980 and 1981, claiming additional charitable contributions of the $3,480.89 and $4,882 paid to their sons during the missionary service. In J anuary 1985, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the refunds. Petitioners filed a refund suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. In September 1986, petitioners filed a second set of amended returns, limiting their charitable deductions to the amounts indicated by the Church and correcting the number of dependents claimed for each year. In District Court, petitioners and the United States both moved for summary judgment. 664 F. Supp. 468 (Idaho 1987). Petitioners argued that the payments they made to support their sons’ missionary services were charitable contributions “for the use of” the Church. Alternatively, they claimed the payments were deductible under Treas. Reg. 1.170A-l(g), 26 CFR §1.170A-l(g) (1989), which allows the deduction of “unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to an organization contributions to which are deductible.” The District Court ruled in favor of the United States. It rejected petitioners’ claimed deduction for unreimbursed expenditures because petitioners were not themselves performing donated services, and it held that petitioners’ payments to their sons were not “for the use of” the Church because the Church lacked sufficient possession and control of the funds. 664 F. Supp., at 471-472. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 861 F. 2d 558 (1988). The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners’ claim that the transferred funds were deductible contributions because they conferred a benefit on the Church. Id., at 561. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that contributions are deductible only when the recipient charity exercises control over the donated funds. Id., at 562. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the beneficiary of a charitable contribution must be indefinite, see Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163, 167 (1883), and that this requirement cannot be met when the taxpayer makes a contribution directly to the intended beneficiary. In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Church lacked actual control over the disposition of the funds and thus they were not deductible. 861F. 2d, at 562. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that § 1.170A-l(g) did not apply to petitioners, as the regulation permits a deduction for unreimbursed expenses only by the taxpayer who performed the charitable service. Id., at 564. Because the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicted with White v. United States, 725 F. 2d 1269, 1270-1272 (CA10 1984), and Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F. 2d 1326, 1336 (CA5 1986), we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 953 (1990), and now affirm. II Under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 58, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 170 (1982 ed.), a taxpayer may claim a deduction for a charitable contribution only if the contribution is made “to or for the use of” a qualified organization. This section provides, in pertinent part: “(a) Allowance of deduction. “(1) General rule. —There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. “(c) Charitable contribution defined. — For purposes of this section, the term ‘charitable contribution’ means a contribution or gift to or for the use of— “(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation— “(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Petitioners contend that the funds they transferred to their sons’ accounts are deductible as contributions “for the use of” the Church. Alternatively, petitioners claim these funds are unreimbursed expenditures under Treasury Regulation §1.170A-l(g) and therefore are deductible as contributions “to” the Church. We first consider whether the payments at issue here are “for the use of” the Church within the meaning of § 170. On its face, the phrase “for the use of” could support any number of different meanings. See, e. g., Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1950) (“use” defined in general usage as “to convert to one’s service”; “to employ”; or, in law, “use imports a trust” relationship). Petitioners contend that the phrase “for the use of” must be given its broadest meaning as describing “the entire array of fiduciary relationships in which one person conveys money or property to someone else to hold or employ in some manner for the benefit of a third person.” Brief for Petitioners 17. Under this reading, no legally enforceable relationship need exist between the recipient of the donated funds and the qualified donee; in effect, any intermediary may handle the funds in any way that would arguably benefit a charitable organization, regardless of how indirect or tangential the benefit might be. Petitioners also advance a second, somewhat narrower interpretation, specifically that a contribution is “for the use of” a qualified organization within the meaning of § 170 so long as the donee has “a reasonable ability to ensure that the contribution primarily serves the organization’s charitable purposes.” Id., at 26. In this case, petitioners argue that their payments at least meet this second interpretation. They point to the Church’s role in requesting the funds, setting the amount to be donated, and requiring weekly expense sheets from the missionaries. The Service, on the other hand, has historically defined “for the use of” as conveying “a similar meaning as ‘in trust for.’” See, e. g., I. T. 1867, II — 2 Cum. Bull. 155 (1923). Although the language of § 170 would support the interpretation of either the Service or petitioners, the events leading to the enactment of the 1921 amendment adding the phrase “for the use of” to § 170 indicate that Congress had a specific meaning of “for the use of” in mind. The original version of § 170, promulgated in the War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330, did not allow deductions for gifts “for the use of” a qualified donee. Rather, it allowed individuals to deduct only “[contributions or gifts . . . to corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes. ...” In interpreting this provision in the Act (and in the subsequent Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §214(a)(ll), 40 Stat. 1068), the Bureau of Internal Revenue stated that “[contributions to a trust company (a corporation) in trust to invest and disburse them for a charitable purpose are not allowable deductions under [§ 170].” O. D. 669, 3 Cum. Bull. 187 (1920). In hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on the proposed Revenue Act of 1921, representatives of charitable foundations requested an amendment making gifts to trust companies and similar donees deductible even though a trustee, rather than a charitable organization, held legal title to the funds. Hearings on Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 521 (1921). Testimony before the Committee indicated that numerous communities had established charitable trusts, charitable foundations, or community chests so that individuals could donate money to a trustee who held, invested, and reinvested the principal, and then turned the principal over to a committee that distributed the funds for charitable purposes. Id., at 522-526; see also H. R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1921) (House Comm, on Ways and Means) (amendments “would allow the deduction, under proper restriction, of contributions or gifts to a community chest fund or foundation”); S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1921). Responding to these concerns, Congress overruled the Bureau’s interpretation of § 170 (then § 214(a)(ll)) by adding the phrase “for the use of. . . any corporation, or community chest, fund, or foundation. . .’’to the charitable deduction provision of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(ll), 42 Stat. 241. In light of these events, it can be inferred that Congress’ use of the phrase “for the use of” related to its purpose in amending § 170 of allowing taxpayers to deduct contributions made to trusts, foundations, and similar donees. An interpretation of “for the use of” as conveying a similar meaning as “in trust for” would be consistent with this goal. It would have been quite natural for Congress to use the phrase “for the use of” to indicate its intent of allowing deductions for donations in trust, as this phrase would have suggested a trust relationship to the members of the 67th Congress. From the dawn of English common law through the present, the word “use” has been employed to refer to various forms of trust arrangements. See 1 G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 2, p. 9 (1935); Black’s Law Dictionary 1382 (5th ed. 1979) (“Uses and trusts are not so much different things as different aspects of the same subject. A use regards principally the beneficial interest; a trust regards principally the nominal ownership”). In the early part of this century, the word “use” was technically employed to refer to a passive trust, but less formally used as a synonym for the word “trust.” See Bogert, swpra, at 9 (“The words ‘use’ and ‘trust’ are employed as synonyms frequently by writers and judges”); 1 R. Baldes, Perry on Trusts and Trustees §298 (7th ed. 1929) (“A use, a trust, and a confidence is one and the same thing . . .”); 1 Restatement of Trusts §§67-72 (Effect of Statute of Uses) (1935). The phrases “to the use of” or “for the use of” were frequently used in describing trust arrangements. See, e. g., United States v. Bowling, 256 U. S. 484, 486 (1921); Blanset v. Cardin, 256 U. S. 319, 321 (1921); Rand v. United States, 249 U. S. 503, 508 (1919). Given that this meaning of the word “use” precisely corresponded with Congress’ purpose for amending the statute, it appears likely that in choosing the phrase “for the use of” Congress was referring to donations made in trust or in a similar legal arrangement. This understanding is confirmed by the Bureau’s initial interpretation of the phrase. It is significant that almost immediately following the amendment of §170, the Commissioner interpreted the phrase “for the use of” as “intended to convey a similar meaning as ‘in trust for.’” I. T. 1867, II — 2 Cum. Bull. 155 (1923). Rejecting a taxpayer’s claim that a gift to a volunteer fire company was deductible as a contribution for the use of the municipality, the Bureau noted that “[i]t does not appear that the municipality in any way has any control over the property of the incorporated volunteer fire company or that it has any voice in the manner in which such property should be used. Upon dissolution of the company, the property would not escheat to the State. A right of appropriation or enjoyment of the property of the fire company does not rest in the municipality.” Ibid. The Service adhered to its interpretation that “for the use of” conveys “a similar meaning as ‘in trust for’ ” in subsequent rulings permitting taxpayers to deduct the value of gifts irrevocably transferred to a trust for the benefit of qualified organizations. See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 55-275, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 295; Rev. Rul. 194, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 128; I. T. 3707, 1945 Cum. Bull. 114. Numerous judicial decisions have relied on this interpretation. See, e. g., Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F. 2d 35, 40 (CA2 1982); Orr v. United States, 343 F. 2d 553, 557-558 (CA5 1965); Thomason v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 441, 444 (1943); Danz v. Commissioner, 18 T. C. 454, 464 (1952), aff’d on other grounds, 231 F. 2d 673 (CA9 1955), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 828 (1956). Congress’ reenactment of the statute in 1954, using the same language, indicates its apparent satisfaction with the prevailing interpretation of the statute. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498, 510 (1959); McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488, 492-493 (1931). The Commissioner’s interpretation of “for the use of” thus appears to be entirely faithful to Congress’ understanding and intent in using that phrase. Moreover, the Commissioner’s interpretation is consistent with the purposes of § 170 as a whole. In enacting § 170, “Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.” Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 588 (1983). The Commissioner’s interpretation of “for the use of” assures that contributions will in fact foster such development because it requires contributions to be made in trust or in some similar legal arrangement. A defining characteristic of a trust arrangement is that the beneficiary has the legal power to enforce the trustee’s duty to comply with the terms of the trust. See, e. g., 3 W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts § 200 (4th ed. 1988); 1 Restatement of Trusts § 200 (1935). A qualified beneficiary of a bona fide trust for charitable purposes would have both the incentive and legal authority to ensure that donated funds are properly used. If the trust contributes funds to a range of charitable organizations so that no single beneficiary could enforce its terms, the trustee’s duty can be enforced by the Attorney General under the laws of most States. See 4A W. Fratcher, Scott on Trusts §391 (4th ed. 1989); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §411 (2d ed. 1977). Although the Service’s interpretation does not require that the qualified organization take actual possession of the contribution, it nevertheless reflects that the beneficiary must have significant legal rights with respect to the disposition of donated funds. Petitioners argue that any interpretation of “for the use of” that requires a qualified donee to have the same degree of control over contributed funds as a beneficiary would have over a trust res would make “for the use of” redundant, meaning no more than “to.” We disagree. When Congress amended § 170, it was fully aware of the Bureau’s ruling that the original statutory deduction for contributions “to” a qualified organization could not be claimed for contributions made in trust for the organization. See O. D. 669, 3 Cum. Bull. 187 (1920). Accordingly, Congress amended the statute specifically to overcome this interpretation. Moreover, a contribution made in trust for a charity does not give the charity immediate possession and control, as does a donation directly to a charity. Unlike a contribution that must go “to” a qualified organization, a contribution “for the use of” a donee may go to a trustee with the discretion to select among a number of qualified donees to whom the funds may be disbursed. See, e. g., Bowman v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 1157, 1163-1164 (1929). Furthermore, a taxpayer may generally claim an immediate deduction for a gift to a trustee, even though receipt of the gift by the charity is delayed. Recognizing this characteristic of gifts in trust, Congress further amended § 170 in 1964 in order to encourage donations “to” a charity, because donations “in trust for” a charity “often do not find their way into operating philanthropic endeavors for extended periods of time.” S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 59-60 (1964). Although the Service’s interpretive rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations, see Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U. S. 126, 132 (1947), we give an agency’s interpretations and practices considerable weight where they involve the contemporaneous construction of a statute and where they have been in long use. See, e. g., Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933). Under the circumstances presented here, we think there is good reason to accept the Service’s interpretation of “for the use of.” The denial of deductions for donations in trust that prompted Congress to amend § 170, the accepted meaning of “use” as synonymous with the term “trust,” and the Service’s contemporaneous and longstanding construction of § 170 constitute strong evidence in favor of this interpretation. Although the language of the statute may also bear petitioners’ interpretation, they have failed to establish that their interpretation is compelled by the statutory language. To the contrary, there is no evidence that Congress intended the phrase “for the use of” to be interpreted as referring to fiduciary relationships in general or as referring to a type of relationship that gives a qualified organization a reasonable ability to supervise the use of contributed funds. Rather, as noted above, there are strong indications that Congress intended a more specific meaning. Moreover, petitioners’ interpretations would tend to undermine the purposes of § 170 by allowing taxpayers to claim deductions for funds transferred to children or other relatives for their own personal use. Because a recipient of donated funds need not have any legal relationship with a qualified organization, the Service would face virtually insurmountable administrative difficulties in verifying that any particular expenditure benefited a qualified donee. Cf. § 170(a)(1). Although there is no suggestion whatsoever in this case that the transferred funds were used for an improper purpose, it is clear that petitioners’ interpretation would create an opportunity for tax evasion that others might be eager to exploit. See, e. g., Scialabba, Kurtzman, & Steinhart, Mail-Order Ministries Under the Section 170 Charitable Contribution Deduction: The First Amendment Restrictions, the Minister’s Burden of Proof, and the Effect of TRA ’86, 11 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1988); Note, “I Know It When I See It”: Mail-Order Ministry Tax Fraud and the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable Definition of Religion, 25 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 113 (1987). We need not determine whether petitioners’ interpretation of “for the use of” would have been a permissible one had the Service decided to adopt it, though we note that the Service may retain some flexibility to adopt other interpretations in the future. It is sufficient to decide this case that the Service’s longstanding interpretation is both consistent with the statutory language and fully implements Congress’ apparent purpose in adopting it. Accordingly, we conclude that a gift or contribution is “for the use of” a qualified organization when it is held in a legally enforceable trust for the qualified organization or in a similar legal arrangement. Viewing the record here in the light most favorable to petitioners, as we must after a grant of summary judgment for the United States, we discern no evidence that petitioners transferred funds to their sons “in trust for” the Church. It is undisputed that petitioners transferred the money to their sons’ personal bank accounts on which the sons were the sole authorized signatories. Nothing in the record indicates that petitioners took any steps normally associated with creating a trust or similar legal arrangement. Although the sons may have promised to use the money “in accordance with Church guidelines,” see App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a, they did not have any legal obligation to do so; there is no evidence that the guidelines have any legally binding effect. Nor does the record support the assertion, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-20, that the Church might have a legal entitlement to the money or a civil cause of action against missionaries who used their parents’ money for purposes not approved by the Church. We conclude that, because petitioners did not donate the funds in trust for the Church, or in a similarly enforceable legal arrangement for the benefit of the Church, the funds were not donated “for the use of” the Church for purposes of § 170. Ill Petitioners contend, in the alternative, that their transfer of funds into their sons’ account was a contribution “to” the Church under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g), 26 CFR §1.170A-l(g) (1989), which provides: “Contributions of services. No deduction is allowable under section 170 for a contribution of services. However, unreimbursed expenditures made incident to the rendition of services to an organization contributions to which are deductible may constitute a deductible contribution. For example, the cost of a uniform without general utility which is required to be worn in performing donated services is deductible. Similarly, out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily incurred in performing donated services are deductible. Reasonable expenditures for meals and lodging necessarily incurred while away from home in the course of performing donated services also are deductible. For the purposes of this paragraph, the phrase ‘while away from home! has the same meaning as that phrase is used for purposes of section 162 and the regulations thereunder.” Petitioners assert that this regulation allows them to claim deductions for their sons’ unreimbursed expenditures incident to their sons’ contribution of services. We disagree. The plain language of § 1.170A-l(g) indicates that taxpayers may claim deductions only for expenditures made in connection with their own contributions of service to charities. Unless there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary, a taxpayer ordinarily reports his own income and takes his own deductions. See, e. g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 739-740 (1949) (“[T]he first principle of income taxation [is] that income must be taxed to him who earns it”); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440-441 (1934) (“[T]axpayer who sustain[s] the loss is the one to whom the deduction shall be allowed”). Section 1.170A-l(g) is thus most naturally read as referring to the individual taxpayer, who may deduct only those “unreimbursed expenditures” incurred in connection with the taxpayer’s own “rendition of services to [a qualified] organization.” This interpretation of the regulation is consistent with the Revenue Ruling that was the precursor to § 1.170A-l(g). See Rev. Rul. 55-4, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 291 (“A taxpayer who gives his services gratuitously to an association, contributions to which are deductible under [§ 170] and who incurs unreimbursed traveling expenses . . . may deduct the amount of such unreimbursed expenses in computing his net income . . .”). It would strain the language of the regulation to read it, as petitioners suggest, as allowing a deduction for expenses made incident to a third party’s rendition of services rather than to the taxpayer’s own contribution of services. Similarly, the taxpayer is clearly intended to be the subject of the other provisions in the regulation. For example, it is most natural to read the regulation as referring to a taxpayer who incurs expenditures for meals and lodging while away from his home, not while a third party is away from his home. Petitioners’ interpretation not only strains the language of the statute, but would also allow manipulation of §1.170A-1(g) for tax evasion purposes. See Note, Does Charity Begin at Home? The Tax Status of a Payment to an Individual as a Charitable Deduction, 83 Mich, L. Rev. 1428, 1434-1435 (1985); Brinley v. Commissioner, 782 F. 2d, at 1338 (Hill, J. dissenting). For example, parents might be tempted to transfer funds to their children in amounts greater than needed to reimburse reasonable expenses incurred in donating services to a charity. Parents and children might attempt to claim a deduction for the same expenditure. Controlling such abuses would place a heavy administrative burden on the Service, which would not only have to monitor the taxpayer’s records, but also correlate them with the records of the third party. To the extent petitioners’ interpretation lessens the likelihood that claimed charitable contributions actually served a charitable purpose, it is inconsistent with § 170. Petitioners cite judicial decisions that allowed taxpayers to claim deductions for the expenses of third parties who assisted the taxpayers in rendering services to qualified organizations. See, e. g., Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F. 2d 35 (CA2 1982); McCollum v. Commissioner, 37 TCM 1817 (1978); Smith v. Commissioner, 60 T. C. 988 (1973). These cases are inapposite, as petitioners do not claim that they were independently rendering services to the Church, assisted by their sons. We conclude that § 1.170A-l(g) does not allow taxpayers to claim a deduction for expenses not incurred in connection with the taxpayers’ own rendition of services to a qualified organization. Therefore, petitioners are not entitled to a deduction under § 1.170A-l(g). Petitioners also assert that because their sons are agents of. the Church authorized to receive payments to support their own missionary efforts, payments made to their sons are payments to the Church. Because this argument was neither raised before nor decided by the Court of Appeals, we decline to address it here. See, e. g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U. S. 346, 362 (1981); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 551-552, n. 5 (1980). Accordingly, we hold that petitioners’ transfer of funds into their sons’ accounts was not a contribution “to or for the use of” the Church for purposes of § 170. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The Commissioner has adopted the holding in Rockefeller v. Commissioner, 676 F. 2d 35, 42 (CA2 1982), that unreimbursed expenses are contributions “to” the Church rather than “for the use of” the Church. See Rev. Rui. 84-61, 1984-1 Cum. Bull. 40.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEW JERSEY et al. v. NEW YORK, SUSQUEHANNA & WESTERN RAILROAD CO. No. 104. Argued December 11, 1962. Decided February 18, 1963. William Gural, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General. Vincent P. Biunno argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Charles H. Hoens, Jr. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Loev-inger, Robert B. Hummel, Irwin A. Seibel, Robert W. Ginnane and H. Neil Garson filed a brief for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr. and James L. Highsaw, Jr. for Railway Labor Executives’ Association, and by Austin L. Roberts, Jr. for National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. This direct appeal from a three-judge District Court involves the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to permit discontinuance of trains operated by the appellee railroad wholly within the State of New Jersey. At issue is whether the discontinuance procedures of § 13a (1) or § 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act (72 Stat. 571-572, 49 U. S. C. §§ 13a (1), 13a (2)) are to be followed. Appellee, New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Co., operates passenger trains between Butler, New Jersey, and Susquehanna Transfer, in North Bergen, New Jersey. Connecting buses, carrying only train passengers, run between North Bergen and the Port of New York Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan. The buses are owned and operated by Public Service Coordinated Transport, a New Jersey corporation unaffiliated but under contract with appellee. According to appellee, nearly 90% of its passengers travel to and from New York. As recently as 1956, appellee operated 30 passenger trains eastbound and 30 westbound on weekdays and 17 or 18 in each direction on weekends. Because of financial difficulties and continued losses on passenger train operations, appellee has, with the permission of the Public Utilities Commission of New Jersey, reduced the number of trains from time to time so that it now operates only three trains in each direction on weekdays and none on weekends. The last reduction was authorized on July 14, 1960. On December 30, 1960, appellee filed a notice with the Interstate Commerce Commission stating that it would discontinue all passenger train service on January 30, 1961. On January 9, 1961, appellants petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission to dismiss the case without prejudice. Since appellee operated trains solely in New Jersey, appellants argued that the case was not, in the first instance, within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The Commission agreed and, on January 18, dismissed the notice for want of jurisdiction. Appellee then brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to challenge the dismissal. A three-judge court was designated in accordance with 28 U. S. C. §§ 2321-2325 and 2284. The court, one judge dissenting, set aside the Commission’s order. 200 F. Supp. 860. New Jersey appealed directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 370 U. S. 933. The question presented is whether the procedure for discontinuing trains set forth in § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act is available to the appellee railroad as the court below held, or whether it must follow that set forth in § 13a (2) of the Act. Section 13a (1) relates to “the discontinuance ... of the operation or service of any train or ferry operating from a point in one State to a point in any other State.” A railroad proceeding under this section must first file notices of the proposed discontinuance with the Interstate Commerce Commission, with the Governors of the States in which the train operates, and in every station served by the train. After 30 days, the railroad may discontinue the train unless the Commission has decided to investigate the discontinuance. The Commission may require the railroad to continue operations, pending its investigation, for an additional four months. It also may, at the conclusion of the investigation, order service continued for another year, if it is “required by public convenience and necessity” and if it “will not unduly burden interstate . . . commerce.” Section 13a (2) governs “the discontinuance ... of the operation or service of any train or ferry operated wholly within the boundaries of a single State.” Under this section, the railroad is first required to seek relief from the appropriate state agency. Only after the state agency has denied the application of discontinuance, or has let 120 days elapse from the time the application was filed without acting, can the railroad seek authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission to discontinue the train. The Commission “may grant such authority only after full hearing.” A comparison of the language of § 13a (1), which applies to “any train . . . operating from a, point in one State to a point in any other State” (italics supplied), and of § 13a (2), which applies to “any train . . . operated wholly within the boundaries of a single State” (italics supplied), makes it clear that the statute, on its face, requires appellee to proceed under the latter section. Appellee's trains do not run “from a point in one State to a point in any other State.” That appellee’s passengers, by other conveyances, cross a state line does not alter the conclusion; the statute speaks not of interstate commerce but of the physical limits of a train’s or ferry’s operations. Any doubt about this construction of the statute is dispelled by an examination of its legislative history. Section 13a was enacted by Congress as part of the Transportation Act of 1958. The legislative history of that Act reveals Congress’ concern about the financial plight of railroads, attributable in part to the losses sustained in operating passenger trains. To discontinue these trains before the enactment of § 13a, the railroads were required in all cases to seek authority from each of the States served. See 104 Cong. Rec. 10842-10843, 10851. Without concurrence of all the States affected, the railroad might be compelled to continue operations despite serious losses. The Interstate Commerce Commission was able to give only partial relief. It could authorize the total abandonment of a line of railroad under § 1 (18) of the Act, even if the line was wholly within the boundaries of one State. Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153. However the Commission could not permit partial discontinuance of service over a line of railroad, whether the line crossed state boundaries or not. Board of Public Utility Comm’rs of New Jersey v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 98, probable jurisdiction noted, 357 U. S. 917, dismissed as moot, 359 U. S. 982. See Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 84-85. Thus the Commission could not permit discontinuance of passenger operations while the railroad continued to carry-freight over the same line. As initially proposed in the Senate, the Interstate Commerce Commission would have had power under § 13a to permit discontinuance “of the operation or service of any train or ferry engaged in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate, foreign and intrastate commerce ... or of the operation or service of any station, depot or other facility.” S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. Opposition to the bill focused upon the reduction of state powers to control local train operations. E. g., 104 Cong. Rec. 10850. A compromise amendment in the Senate changed § 13a so that the Commission’s power would extend only to “any train or ferry engaged in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce.” 104 Cong. Rec. 10862-10866. Reference to intrastate transportation was eliminated. And as finally reported out of conference, the Act was in its present form. The Interstate Commerce Commission’s jurisdiction was limited, in the first instance, to the “discontinuance ... of the operation or service of any train or ferry operating from a point in one State to a point in any other State.” Senator Smathers, the Chairman of the Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, said, in describing the Senate compromise amendment, that: “any train which operates within a State, whose origin and destination are within the State — that is, any train with intrastate characteristics — together with the facilities used by the train, shall be completely under the authority of the State public utilities commission.” 104 Cong. Rec. 10852. Congressman Harris, Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, similarly interpreted the more restrictive House version, H. R. 12832. He said the Interstate Commerce Commission was limited to authorizing the discontinuance “of a train or ferry on a line of railroad not located wholly within a single State. This limitation is contained in the bill being reported because the committee feels that the record at this time does not support the broader change in venue, requested by the railroads, which would have covered Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction also over operations more local in character, such as those of a branch line or other line of railroad located solely within one State.” 104 Cong. Rec. 12533. Congressman Harris repeatedly stated that even if the train in question operated on an interstate line, the state regulatory agency would have jurisdiction if the train started and ended within the State. 104 Cong. Rec. 12530, 12542. Finally, Senator Smathers’ comments, made after the Senate-House Conference changed the bill to its present form, should be noted. He said: “we protected the right of the States ... by leaving to the State regulatory agencies the right to regulate and have a final decision with respect to the discontinuance of train service which originated and ended within one particular State, except when it could be established that intrastate service was a burden on interstate commerce. “In addition, the Senate receded on a provision under which we had given the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction also to discontinue service in depots, terminals, and other such facilities in connection with the operation of railroads. We left that matter in the hands of the State regulatory agencies.” 104 Cong. Rec. 15528. It is clear to us from this history, as it was to the Commission, that Congress intended to, and did, leave “[jurisdiction over trains operating wholly within a single State . . . with State regulatory commissions.” The court below disregarded the plain words of the statute and what we believe is the pertinent legislative history and rested its decision on the ground that to apply § 13a (1) so restrictively would “thwart the apparent purpose of the Congress in adopting it.” 200 F. Supp., at 864. That purpose was, as the court below observed, remedial. But it was conditioned by a desire to protect state jurisdiction over local operations. To ignore this we conclude was error. Therefore the judgment of the court below must be Reversed. Apparently one ground for the decision below was the belief (1) that “operation or service” of a train included bus service or (2) that “train” included a bus extension. As to the first, it should be noted that the Interstate Commerce Commission has decided, in interpreting § 1 (18) of the Act, that appellee’s bus service to New York is not part of a “line of railroad” and that appellee need not obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before providing the bus transportation. New York, S. & W. R. Co. Common Carrier Application, 46 M. C. C. 713, 725. Admittedly “line of railroad” is a different term from “operation or service of any train.” However we should be loath to suggest that a train could operate where no line of railroad existed. As to the second alternative, it is answer enough to note that the statute reads “any train or ferry.” No mention of “bus” is made. The railroads appealing to this Court did not take issue with the Interstate Commerce Commission decisions holding that the Commission lacked power to authorize partial discontinuances. They argued that instead of partially discontinuing service they were abandoning a line of railroad. In the Board of Public Utility Comm’rs of New Jersey case the three-judge District Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission could not allow the New York Central Railroad to discontinue its passenger ferries across the Hudson River, while continuing to operate ferries for freight, if the ferries were all part of the same line of railroad. (Under § 1 (3) of the Act, the term “railroad” includes “ferries used by or operated in connection with any railroad.”) After Congress passed § 13a, the New York Central Railroad, among others, succeeded in eliminating its Hudson River passenger ferries. See New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, aff’d per curiam, 359 U. S. 27. In fact, the New York Central Railroad claimed that its inability to discontinue the passenger ferries was the reason Congress enacted § 13a. 168 F. Supp., at 337, n. 1. Apparently those who were concerned with the protection of the rights of the States were not satisfied with the compromise amendment, perhaps because it retained the phrase “engaged in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate . . . commerce.” In any event, they were successful in obtaining the omission of any reference to transportation in interstate commerce, since the Act as passed limited Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction, in the first instance, to the discontinuance of “any train . . . operating from a point in one State to a point in any other State.” H. R. 12832 provided that: “this section [§ 13a] shall not apply to the operations of or services performed by any carrier by railroad on a fine of railroad located wholly within a single State.” 104 Cong. Rec. 12547. Also, the House bill eliminated the Interstate Commerce Commission’s jurisdiction over discontinuance of stations, depots and other facilities, leaving the state regulatory agencies’ power untouched. This change, embodied in the Act, is additional evidence of Congress’ intent to leave regulation of local operations to the States.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. HOPKINS, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR No. 75-246. Argued April 19-20, 1976 Decided June 24, 1976 Robert B. Reich argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, and Ronald R. Glancz. Thomas H. McGrail argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Per Curiam. This case involves a suit by respondent’s decedent, a civilian employee of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), claiming wrongful discharge from his employment. He asserted jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, which provides for suits in the Court of Claims upon any express or implied contract with such military exchanges. The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Claims concluded that it had jurisdiction because respondent’s decedent’s relationship with the AAFES was based upon an implied contract of employment and such a contract is covered, since 1970, by the Tucker Act. 206 Ct. Cl. 303, 513 F. 2d 1360. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between this decision and a contrary holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Young v. United States, 498 F. 2d 1211 (1974). 423 U. S. 821. The status of claims against military post exchanges has been in some doubt since the decision of this Court in Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481 (1942). There the Court, in striking down a state tax on the distribution of motor fuel by Army post exchanges, held that such exchanges “are arms of the Government deemed by it essential for the performance of governmental functions. They are integral parts of the War Department ....’’ However, the Court also observed that the “Government assumes none of the ’financial obligations of the exchange.” Id., at 485. The latter observation was the basis of a series of decisions by the Court of Claims to the effect that it lacked jurisdiction over claims concerning the activities of non-appropriated fund instrumentalities. That court held that it could not entertain suits based on a contract for services with such an entity, because, since the Government had assumed no liability for the entity’s financial obligations it could not be said to have consented to a suit designed to vindicate such obligations. Therefore, no “claim against the United States” existed under the Tucker Act which is the source of Court of Claims jurisdiction, Borden v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 902, 116 F. Supp. 873 (1953); Pulaski Cab Co. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 160, 157 F. Supp. 955 (1958); Kyer v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 747, 369 F. 2d 714 (1966), cert. denied, 387 U. S. 929 (1967). The Court of Claims, while denying jurisdiction, recognized the harsh consequences of this result since it could leave claimants against the exchanges with no forum in which to seek relief. However, the court recognized that “it is up to Congress to remedy this apparent harsh result.... [T]he courts should refrain from legislating by judicial fiat.” Keetz v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 205, 207 (1964). In 1970 Congress amended the Tucker Act and provided: “For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service . . . shall be considered an express or implied contract with the United States.” Pub. L. 91-350, 84 Stat. 449. The purpose of this amendment, as the reports of both Houses made clear, was to afford contractors a federal forum in which to sue nonappropriated fund instru-mentalities by doing away with the inequitable “loophole” in the Tucker Act. S. Rep. No. 91-268, p. 2 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-933, p. 2 (1970). Borden, supra; Pulaski, supra; Keetz, supra; and Kyer, supra, were cited as examples of the “harsh result” which the amendment would correct. The purpose of the bill was clearly to provide a remedy to “contractors” with non-appropriated fund instrumentalities, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-268, pp. 4-5, and there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate, as the Government contends, that “contractors” did not include anyone who had formed a contractual employment relationship. Since the statute applies, by its terms, to “any express or implied contract” we hold that it is applicable to employment contracts as well as those for goods or other services. The fact that Congress has dealt specifically with exchange employees when it wanted to bring them within or leave them without the provisions of a law dealing with federal employees generally (e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 8171 (b)) is not of controlling weight here. This statute deals with those who have a contractual relationship with military exchanges rather than with different classes of federal employees. If employees of military exchanges are within its general language, they are not removed from its effect by congressional practices in enacting other kinds of statutes. The Government alternatively contends that AAFES employees do not have a contractual relationship with their employer, and that like orthodox federal employees they serve by “appointment” to a particular position. While there is some ambiguity in the opinion of the Court of Claims, that court apparently agreed that plaintiff and others like him did have a contractual employment relationship with the AAFES. We think it would be both unnecessary and unwise for us to decide the question at this stage of the case, and we think that the Court of Claims gave insufficient attention to applicable administrative regulations when it undertook to decide the question. The exchange services are created and administered pursuant to the general authority granted the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force by 10 U. S. C. §§ 3012 and 8012. The nonappropriated-fund status of the exchanges places them in a position whereby the Federal Government, absent special legislation, does not assume the obligations of those exchanges in the manner that contracts entered into by appropriated fund agencies are assumed. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S., at 485. The nonappropriated-fund status of the exchanges, however, does not alter the fact that the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force may engage employees by “appointment,” in the same manner as other personnel hired by the Secretaries may be employed. See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, supra; Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99 (1890); Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402 (1851). The regulations governing the AAFES, state that ordinary employees are deemed employees of an instrumentality of the United States, and hold their positions by appointment. AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, c. 1, § I, ¶ 1-7; c. 2, § I (Nov. 12, 1974) , There is congressional reeognition of the power of the Secretaries to employ exchange employees by appointment. The House and Senate Reports on Pub. L. 91-350 explicitly recognized that employees of nonappropriated-fund activities, when performing their official duties, are employees of the United States. S. Rep. No. 91-268, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 91-933, supra, at 2. Further, Congress has specifically granted exchange employees certain rights afforded only appointed employees, and, more important, has specifically excluded them from the coverage of certain statutes granting rights to appointed federal employees. See statutes cited in AR 60-21/AFR 147-15, c. 1, § I, ¶ 1-8. Of particular import is their exclusion, through the operation of 5 U. S. C. § 2105 (c), from the provisions of the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5596. The Back Pay Act is the means by which appointed employees subjected to unjustified personnel action are given a cause of action against the United States. The Act is made necessary by the fact that, absent specific command of statute or authorized regulation, an appointed employee subjected to unwarranted personnel action does not have a cause of action against the United States. Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293-296 (1900); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1974); United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 405-407 (1976). Since the Act deals only with appointees, the specific exclusion of AAFES employees from the coverage of the Act would seem to indicate a congressional recognition that they may be appointed, but that appointed AAFES employees should not be allowed to sue under the Act. This is not to say that an exchange may never employ a person pursuant to a contract of employment. The Secretaries have provided, by separate regulation, for a process under which a person may be employed by contract. AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, c. 4, §§ II and III (Mar. 21, 1974). Such employment is subject to different procedures for negotiation, approval, and administrative remedies from those applicable to employment under AR 60-21/AFR 147-15. The regulation governing contracts defines “service contract” as including contracts both for services performed off a military installation and “direct services such as janitorial and window cleaning service.” AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, App. A, ftA-6e. Under the regulation in effect at the time of plaintiff’s discharge, it was specifically provided that exchanges “will not enter into [a service contract] with military personnel on active duty, civil service employees, or exchange employees.” AR 60-20/AFR 147-14, § XIX, ¶ 886 (Apr. 14, 1965) (emphasis added). The regulation thus clearly distinguished between employment pursuant to appointment and employment pursuant to contract, a distinction that existed prior to plaintiff’s hiring and continues today in the use of separate regulations for “contracting” and “appointment.” When Congress enacted Pub. L. 91-350, making contracts entered into by the post exchanges cognizable in the Court of Claims, it did not change in any way the other provisions of the United States Code dealing with exchange employees, nor did it purport to require that the exchanges employ all persons pursuant to contract. The Court of Claims, in reaching its conclusion that plaintiff held his position by virtue of an express or implied contract assumed that once it was determined he was not an appointed federal employee this result followed as a matter of course. It concluded that in such event his employment status was governed by a series of cases from the private sector of the economy holding that the typical employee-employer relationship was contractual in nature. While we do not question the relevance of these cases by way of analogy should plaintiff be determined not to have been an appointee we hold that the Court of Claims erred in its threshold determination that AAFES employees could never serve by appointment. Rather, the question depends upon an analysis of the statutes and regulations previously described in light of whatever evidence is adduced on remand as to plaintiff's particular status in this case. It is thus apparent that the question of whether plaintiff was employed by virtue of a contract or by appointment is not susceptible of determination at this time. Rather, the issue is one which must receive additional consideration from the Court of Claims after development of a fuller record. Respondent in her brief in this Court advanced a second theory upon which the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case could be sustained. She urged that plaintiff’s discharge in violation of executive regulations constituted a claim enforceable under the Tucker Act, and that his discharge without due process constituted a claim founded on the Constitution and therefore enforceable under the Tucker Act. Brief for Respondent 51. At oral argument, counsel conceded that our decision in United States v. Testan, supra, which had been handed down between the time of the filing of his brief and the oral argument, foreclosed such a claim. Plaintiff’s allegation that his discharge constituted a breach of a contract of employment was sufficient, under the provisions of Pub. L. 91-350, to withstand the Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Claims, and the judgment of the court so holding is therefore affirmed. That portion of its judgment deciding that plaintiff held his employment position by virtue of an express or implied contract, rather than by appointment, is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings on that question. It is so ordered. The named respondent is the widow of the original plaintiff. A “nonappropriated fund instrumentality” is one which does not receive its monies by congressional appropriation. See 10 U. S. G. §§ 4779(e), 9779 (e). Except where otherwise noted, the regulations cited are those presently in effect. These differ in some respects from the regulations in effect at the time of respondent’s decedent’s hiring and at the time of his discharge. On remand it will be necessary for the Court of Claims to determine which regulations are applicable to this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SAVORGNAN v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 48. Argued November 7-8, 1949. Decided January 9, 1950. Suel O. Arnold and Carl A. Flom argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Campbell, Robert S. Erdahl and Philip R. Monahan. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Walbridge S. Taft for Margaret Trimble Revedin, and by Jack Wasserman and Gaspare Cusumano for the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether, under the special circumstances of this case, a native-born American citizen who became an Italian citizen in 1940, and lived in Italy with her Italian husband from 1941 to 1945, nevertheless retained her American citizenship. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that she did not. The controlling statutes are § 2 of the Citizenship Act of 1907, and §§ 401, 403 and 104 of its successor, the Nationality Act of 1940. The petitioner, Rosette Sorge Savorgnan, brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, under § 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1171, 8 U. S. C. § 903, for a judgment declaring her to be an American citizen. That court decided in her favor. 73 F. Supp. 109. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the petition against the United States because it had not consented to be sued, and to enter judgment in favor of the other defendants in conformity with its opinion. 171 F. 2d 155. Because of the importance of this decision in determining American citizenship, we granted certiorari. 337 U. S. 914. Insofar as material, the undisputed facts and those found by the District Court are as follows: The petitioner was born in Wisconsin in 1915 of native-born parents and resided in the United States until July, 1941. In March, 1940, her intended husband, Alessandro Savorgnan, was an Italian citizen, serving as Italian Vice Consul at St. Louis, Missouri. He informed her that, under Italian law, she would have to become an Italian citizen before he could obtain the necessary royal consent to their marriage. She applied for Italian citizenship. He prepared her application. It was in Italian which he understood, but which she did not understand. In August, the petitioner was granted Italian citizenship. In November, she appeared with Savorgnan at the Italian Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, and, in his presence, signed an instrument which contained an oath, in Italian, expressly renouncing her American citizenship and swearing her allegiance to the King of Italy. No ceremony or formal administration of the oath accompanied her signature and apparently none was required. She and Savorgnan understood that her signing of this instrument had to do with her citizenship and with securing the required royal consent for Savorgnan to marry her, but he did not translate the instrument or explain its contents to her. The District Court found as a fact that, at the time of signing each of the documents mentioned, the petitioner, although intending to obtain Italian citizenship, had no intention of endangering her American citizenship or of renouncing her allegiance to the United States. December 26, 1940, the petitioner and Savorgnan were married. In July, 1941, when Italian diplomatic officials were required to leave the United States, an Italian diplomatic passport was issued to the petitioner, and she embarked for Italy with her husband. She remained in Italy until November, 1945, except for six months spent in Germany. While in Italy she lived with her husband and his family in Rome, where he worked in the Italian Foreign Ministry. In November, 1945, she returned to America on an Italian diplomatic passport and later requested the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to correct the records of his office to show that she was an American citizen at the time of her return to America. The request was denied and she instituted the present proceeding. There is no evidence of her maintaining, at any time after her marriage, a residence, dwelling place or place of general abode apart from her husband. The District Court, however, found that, at the times of signing her application for Italian citizenship and the instrument containing her oath of allegiance to the King of Italy, she did not intend to establish a “permanent residence” in any country other than the United States. It found also that when she left America for Italy, “she did so without any intention of establishing a permanent residence abroad or abandoning her residence in the United States, or of divesting herself of her American citizenship.” See 73 F. Supp. at 110. We thus face two principal questions: I. What was the effect upon the petitioner’s American citizenship of her applying for and obtaining Italian citizenship? The Government contends that she thereby was naturalized in a foreign state in conformity with its laws within the meaning of either § 2 of the Act of 1907 or § 401 (a) of the Act of 1940. It contends further that § 2 of the Act of 1907 did not require residence abroad as a condition of expatriation, and that she, therefore, was, then and there, effectively expatriated under that Act, merely upon becoming naturalized as an Italian citizen while still remaining in the United States. We agree that she was thus naturalized, but we do not find it necessary to pass upon the further contention that, by obtaining such naturalization in 1940, she then and there expatriated herself, and lost her American citizenship without taking up residence abroad. II. What was the effect upon the petitioner’s American citizenship of her residence in Italy from 1941 to 1945? The Government contends that, even if the petitioner did not lose her American citizenship, in 1940, when she became a naturalized Italian citizen, she lost it when she took up her residence in Italy. We agree. The Government contends that this expatriation was effected either under the Act of 1940 or under the Act of 1907 as continued in effect by a saving clause in the Act of 1940. We find it unnecessary to choose between these contentions because each leads to the same conclusion in this case. I. What was the effect upon the petitioner’s American citizenship of her applying for and obtaining Italian citizenship? The requirements for expatriation under § 2 of the Citizenship Act of 1907 are objective. That section provides that “any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state.” Traditionally the United States has supported the right of expatriation as a natural and inherent right of all people. Denial, restriction, impairment or questioning of that right was declared by Congress, in 1868, to be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this Government. From the beginning, one of the most obvious and effective forms of expatriation has been that of naturalization under the laws of another nation. However, due to the common-law prohibition of expatriation without the consent of the sovereign, our courts hesitated to recognize expatriation of our citizens, even by foreign naturalization, without the express consent of our Government. Congress finally gave its consent upon the specific terms stated in the Citizenship Act of 1907 and in its successor, the Nationality Act of 1940. Those Acts are to be read in the light of the declaration of policy favoring freedom of expatriation which stands unrepealed. 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law §§242-250 (1942). A. One contention of the petitioner is the novel one that her naturalization did not meet the requirements of § 2 of the Act of 1907, because it did not take place within the boundaries of a foreign state. The answer is that the phrase in § 2 which states that “any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, . . .” (emphasis supplied) refers merely to naturalization into the citizenship of any foreign state. It does not refer to the place where the naturalization proceeding occurs. The matter is even more clearly dealt with in the Act of 1940. Section 401 (a) there lists “Obtaining naturalization in a foreign state, . . .” as a means of losing nationality. Section 403 (a) then states that expatriation shall result from the performance of the acts listed in § 401 “within the United States . . .” if and when the national performing them “thereafter takes up a residence abroad.” Thus Congress expressly recognized that “naturalization in a foreign state” included naturalization proceedings which led to citizenship in a foreign state, but took place within the United States. B. The petitioner’s principal contention is that she did not intend to give up her American citizenship, although she applied for and accepted Italian citizenship, and that her intent should prevail. However, the acts upon which the statutes expressly condition the consent of our Government to the expatriation of its citizens are stated objectively. There is no suggestion in the statutory language that the effect of the specified overt acts, when voluntarily done, is conditioned upon the undisclosed intent of the person doing them. The United States has long recognized the general undesirability of dual allegiances. Since 1795, Congress has required any alien seeking American citizenship to declare “that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whatever, and particularly by name, the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, whereof he was before a citizen or subject; . . . .” 1 Stat. 414, see 8 U. S. C. § 735 (a). Temporary or limited duality of citizenship has arisen inevitably from differences in the laws of the respective nations as to when naturalization and expatriation shall become effective. There is nothing, however, in the Act of 1907 that implies a congressional intent that, after an American citizen has performed an overt act which spells expatriation under the wording of the statute, he, nevertheless, can preserve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing his intent or understanding to have been contrary to the usual legal consequences of such an act. This Court, in interpreting § 3 of the Act of 1907 as it existed from 1907 to 1922, has passed upon substantially this question. Section 3 then provided that “any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband.” 34 Stat. 1228, repealed in 42 Stat. 1022. While that provision was in effect, a woman who was a native-born citizen of the United States married a subject of Great Britain residing in California. The woman had not intended to give up, her American citizenship. On being advised that she had done so, she sought a writ of mandamus to compel the local Board of Elections to register her as a voter and she showed that she had the necessary qualifications for registration, provided she established her American citizenship. The Court held that, during her coverture, her expatriation was binding upon her as the statutory consequence of her marriage to a foreigner in spite of her contrary intent and understanding as to her American citizenship. She accordingly was denied relief. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299. See also, Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445 (N. D. N. Y.). Cf. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325. The petitioner, in the instant case, was a competent adult. She voluntarily and knowingly sought and obtained Italian citizenship. Her application for naturalization and her oath of allegiance were in Italian, which she did not understand, but Savorgnan did understand Italian, and he was with her and able to translate and explain them to her when she signed them. She knew that the instruments related to her citizenship and that her signature of them was an important condition upon which her marriage depended. She thus was as responsible for understanding them as if they had been in English. On that basis, she was married. Whatever the legal consequences of those acts may be, she is bound by them. C. The Government contends vigorously that the petitioner’s Italian naturalization, in 1940, then and there expatriated her. It contends that this provides sufficient basis, under the Act of 1907, to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals without reference to the petitioner’s subsequent residence abroad. While recognizing the force of this alternative ground for affirmance, we do not rest our decision upon it. It is, however, entitled to be noted. The Government’s argument is that, while residence abroad may have been required before the Act of 1907 and is now expressly required by the Act of 1940, it was not required under the Act of 1907. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299. The Government concedes, however, that, at least since 1933, the State Department has considered residence abroad to be a necessary element of expatriation. 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law §§ 242-250 (1942). In our view, the petitioner’s residence abroad from 1941 to 1945 makes it unnecessary to determine, in this case, what would have been her status if she had not taken up her residence abroad. We accordingly do not do so. II. What was the effect upon the petitioner’s American citizenship of her residence in Italy from 1941 to 1945? A. The Nationality Act of 1940, including its repeal of § 2 of the Citizenship Act of 1907, took effect January 13, 1941. The petitioner’s residence abroad began after that date. It is contended that the effect of such residence may be determined either by the terms of the Act of 1940, or by those of the Act of 1907 continued in force by a saving clause in the Act of 1940. We find, however, that the petitioner’s residence and her naturalization have the same effect whether or not resort is had to the saving clause. Accordingly, it is not necessary to determine here whether the petitioner’s residence and naturalization are to be tested under the saving clause or under the rest of the Act of 1940. B. The petitioner’s residence abroad met the requirements of the Act of 1940. Sections 403 (a) and 104 used the terms “residence” and “place of general abode” without mention of the intent of the person concerned. The Act cleared up the uncertainties which had been left by early decisions as to the type and amount, if any, of residence abroad that was required to establish expatriation. In contrast to such terms as: “temporary residence,” “domicile,” “removal, with his family and effects,” “absolute removal” or “permanent residence,” the new Act used the term “residence” as plainly as possible to denote an objective fact. To identify the required “place of residence,” it required only that it be the “place of general abode.” Confirmation of this intended simplification appears in the Report on Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United States, submitted by the Secretary of State, Attorney General and Secretary of Labor to Congress on the bill which became the Nationality Act of 1940: “Definitions of ‘residence’ frequently include the element of intent as to the future place of abode. However, in section 104 hereof no mention is made of intent, and the actual ‘place of general abode’ is the sole test for determining residence. The words ‘place of general abode,’ which are taken from the second paragraph of section 2 of the Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. 1228), seem to speak for themselves. They relate to the principal dwelling place of a person.” The District Court did not find that the petitioner failed to take up an actual residence or place of general abode abroad. It found merely that in “July 1941 when she left this country for Italy she did so without any intention of establishing a permanent residence abroad or abandoning her residence in the United States, . . . (Emphasis supplied.) See 73 F. Supp. at 110. Under the Act of 1940, the issue is not what her intent was on leaving the United States, nor whether, at any later time, it was her intent to have a permanent residence abroad or to have a residence in the United States. The issue is only whether she did, at any time between July, 1941, and November, 1945, in fact “reside” abroad. The test of such “residence” is whether, at any time during that period, she did, in fact, have a “principal dwelling place” or “place of general abode” abroad. She testified that, from 1941 to 1945, she lived with her husband and his family in Rome, except for six months’ internment in Salzburg, Germany. Whatever may have been her reasons, wishes or intent, her principal dwelling place was in fact with her husband in Rome where he was serving in his Foreign Ministry. Her intent as to her “domicile” or as to her “permanent residence,” as distinguished from her actual “residence,” “principal dwelling place,” and “place of abode,” is not material. She expatriated herself under the laws of the United States by her naturalization as an Italian citizen followed by her residence abroad. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the petition against the United States and to enter judgment in favor of the other defendants in conformity with this opinion. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom Mr. Justice Black joins, is of opinion that the judgment of the District Court should be reinstated. Law of course determines the legal consequences of conduct. But both the Citizenship Act of 1907 and the Nationality Act of 1940 raise issues of fact, and the District Court allowably found the facts in favor of the petitioner. Since expatriation does not follow on the basis of such finding, the judgment of the District Court should not have been disturbed. 73 F. Supp. 109. “Sec. 2. That any American citizen shall he deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state. “When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the place of his general abode shall be deemed his place of residence during said years: Provided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe: And provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.” (Emphasis supplied.) 34 Stat. 1228, 8 U. S. C. (1934 ed.) § 17. “Sec. 401. A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: “(a) Obtaining naturalization in a foreign state, either upon his own application or through the naturalization of a parent having legal custody of such person: ... or “(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 54 Stat. 1168-1169, 8 U. S. C. § 801 (a) and (b). “Sec. 403. (a) Except as provided in subsections (g), (h), and (i) of section 401, no national can expatriate himself, or be expatriated, under this section [] while within the United States or any of its outlying possessions, but expatriation shall result from the performance within the United States or any of its outlying possessions of any of the acts or the fulfillment of any of the conditions specified in this section [*] if and when the national thereafter takes up a residence abroad.” (Emphasis supplied.) 54 Stat. 1169-1170, 58 Stat. 677, 8 U. S. C. § 803 (a). “Sec. 104. For the purposes of sections 201, 307 (b), 403, 404, 405, 406, and 407 of this Act, the place of general abode shall be deemed the place of residence." (Emphasis supplied.) 54 Stat. 1138, 8 U. S. C. § 504. The words “this section” as used in § 403 refer to § 401. This not only is evident from the context but a ready explanation appears from the fact that the language of § 403 originally appeared as a proviso in §401 (h) of H. R. 6127, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940). Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 6127, superseded by H. R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1940). H. R. 9980 became the Nationality Act of 1940. A translation shows that this instrument included the following statement: “The person in question [Rosetta Andrus Sorge, who, as Rosette Sorge Savorgnan, later became the petitioner in the instant case], having been requested to take an oath . . . pronounced the following words: “ ‘I, Rosetta Andrus Sorge, born an American citizen, declare I renounce and in truth do renounce my American citizenship, and swear to be faithful to H. M. the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia, to his royal successors, and to loyally observe the statutes and other laws of the Kingdom of Italy! ” (Emphasis supplied.) See notes 1 and 2, supra. The Government further claims that the petitioner's signing of the instrument containing her oath of allegiance to the King of Italy was an oath of allegiance to a foreign state within the meanings of § 2 of the Act of 1907, and of § 401 (b) of the Act of 1940. We agree. See note 2, supra. Section 347 (a) of the Act of 1940 is set out in full in note 20, infra. The same is true of the requirements for expatriation under §§ 401 (a) and (b) and 403 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940. See notes 1 and 2, supra. See also, Bauer v. Clark, 161 F. 2d 397 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Reynolds v. Haskins, 8 F. 2d 473 (C. A. 8th Cir.); United States ex rel. De Cicco v. Longo, 46 F. Supp. 170 (Conn.); United States ex rel. Wrona v. Karnuth, 14 F. Supp. 770 (W. D. N. Y.). For full text, see note 1, supra. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283; Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64; Case of Isaac Williams, opinion of Ellsworth, C. J., see 2 Cranch 82-83, n.; Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133; Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445 (N. D. N. Y.); Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556 (C. C. E. D. La.); 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 295 (1872-1874); 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 139 (1856-1857). "Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendents, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore, “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.” 15 Stat. 223-224, R. S. § 1999, 8 U. S. C. § 800. The above language, when enacted, was intended to apply especially to immigrants into the United States. It sought to emphasize the natural and inherent right of such people to expatriate themselves from their native nationalities. It sought also to secure for them full recognition of their newly acquired American citizenship. The language is also broad enough to cover, and does cover, the corresponding natural and inherent right of American citizens to expatriate themselves. See note 10, supra. See note 1, supra. See note 2, supra. See note 8, supra. The present statute requires an oath in the following form : “I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion: So help me God. In acknowledgment whereof I have hereunto affixed my signature.” 54 Stat. 1157, 8 U. S. C. § 735 (b). See 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law §§ 243, 244 (1942). The Citizenship Board of 1906, appointed by the Secretary of State, proposed the expatriation provisions of the Act of 1907, and said in support of them: “It is true that because of conflicting laws on the subject of citizenship in different countries a child may be born to a double allegiance; but no man should be permitted deliberately to place himself in a position where his services may be claimed by more than one government and his allegiance be due to more than one.” H. R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1906-1907). Similarly, the legislative history of the Nationality Act of 1940 contains no intimation that subjective intent is material to the issue of expatriation. On the other hand, it makes it clear that the relevant provisions of the new Act are a restatement of those in § 2 of the Act of 1907, and of the historic policy of the United States. Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 6127, superseded by H. R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 489, 408 (1940). In § 401 of the Act of 1940, Congress added a number of per se acts of expatriation. These included, among others, entering the armed forces of a foreign state, accepting office in a foreign state to which only nationals of such state were eligible, and voting in a political election of a foreign state. Lack of intent to abandon American citizenship certainly could not offset any of these. A fortiori a mature citizen who accepted naturalization into the full citizenship of a foreign state could not have been intended by Congress to have greater freedom to establish duality of citizenship. Congress found it necessary after World War I to enact special legislation to assist men to regain their American citizenship after they had expatriated themselves by taking a foreign oath of allegiance required to permit them to enlist in the armies of certain foreign nations. 40 Stat. 340, 542 et seq. See 55 Cong. Rec. 6935, 7665-7666 (1917); S. Rep. No. 388, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1917-1918); H. R. Rep. No. 532, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1917-1918); 56 Cong. Rec. 6008-6009, 6011-6012 (1917-1918). “. . . the forsaking of American citizenship, even in a difficult situation, as a matter of expediency, with attempted excuse of such conduct later when crass material considerations suggest that course, is not duress.” Doreau v. Marshall, 170 F. 2d 721, 724 (C. A. 3d Cir.); but see, in cases of real duress, Dos Reis v. Nicolls, 161 F. 2d 860 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Schioler v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 353 (N. D. Ill.); In re Gogol, 75 F. Supp. 268 (W. D. Pa.). See §§ 504, 601 of the Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1172, 1174, 8 U. S. C. §§ 904, 906. It is apparent that Congress did not intend to leave a gap in the statutory coverage of acts of expatriation. “Sec. 347. (a) Nothing contained in . . . chapter V [including § 504 which expressly repealed § 2 of the Act of 1907] of this Act, unless otherwise provided therein, shall be construed to affect the validity of any declaration of intention, petition for naturalization, certificate of naturalization or of citizenship, or other document or proceeding which shall be valid at the time this Act shall take effect; or to affect any prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings, civil or criminal, brought, or any act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or existing, at the time this Act shall take effect; but as to all such prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts, things, or matters, the statutes or parts of statutes repealed by this Act, are hereby continued in force and effect.” 54 Stat. 1168,8 U. S. C. § 747 (a). Section 504 also included the following clause: “The repeal herein provided shall not terminate nationality heretofore lawfully acquired, nor restore nationality heretofore lost under any law of the United States or any treaty to which the United States may have been a party.” 54 Stat. 1174,8 U. S. C. § 904. Section 403 (a) of the Act of 1940 (see note 2, supra) may apply to antecedent naturalizations and oaths of allegiance, as well as to future ones. “A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.” Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427, 435. See also, Reynolds v. United States, 292 U. S. 443; United States v. Bradley, 83 F. 2d 483 (C. A. 7th Cir.); United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F. 2d 219 (W. D. Pa.); 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 474 (1937-1940). See note 2, supra. See note 10, supra. Where “permanent residence” was intended, the statute used that term. E. g., §§ 308 and 407 of the Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1143, 1170, 8 U. S. C. §§ 708, 807. Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization on H. R. 6127, superseded by H. R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 417 (1940). If the test is to be made under the saving clause quoted in note 20, supra, that may mean that the need and character of her residence are to be determined under the Act of 1907. Under the contention of the Department of Justice no residence abroad would be required. Under the practice of the Department of State some residence abroad would be required. 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law §§ 242-250 (1942). But we believe that the provisions of §§ 403 (a) and 104 of the Act of 1940 substantially reflect the requirements of that residence.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WATSON v. FORT WORTH BANK & TRUST No. 86-6139. Argued January 20, 1988 Decided June 29, 1988 ' O’ConnoRí J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and ScALiAj JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-C and II-D in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Scalia, JJ., joined. Black-mun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Brennan and Marshall,' JJ., joined, post, p. 1000. Stevens-, J.,'filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 1011. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Art Brender argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Bruce W. McGee argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas et al. by Jim Mattox, Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and James C. Todd; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Deborah A. Ellis, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, and Joan E. Beriin; for the American Psychological Association by Donald N. Bersoff; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law by John Townsend Rich, Conrad K. Harper, Stuart J. Land, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Judith A. Winston, and Richard T. Seymour; and for the NAAC-P Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al. by Bill Lann Lee, Stephen M. Cutler, Joan M. Graff, Patricia A. Shiu, Julius LeVonne Chambers, Ronald L. Ellis, Charles Stephen Ralston, Antonia Hernandez, and E. Richard Larson. Briefs of amici curia.e urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor Generat Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clegg, David K. Flynn, and Charles A. Shanor; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, Edward E. Potter, and Gam¡ E. Dodge; for the American Society for Personnel Administration et'al. by Lawrence Z. Lorber and J. Robert Kirk; for the Landmark Legal Foundation by Jerald L. Hill and.Mark J. Bredemeier; and for the Merchants and Manufacturers Association by Paid Grossman. Justice O’Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III, and an opinion with respect to parts II-C and II-D, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia join. This case requires us to decide what evidentiary standards should be applied under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., in determining whether an employer’s practice of committing promotion decisions to -the subjective discretion of supervisory employees has led to illegal discrimination. I Petitioner Clara Watson, who is black, was hired by respondent Fort Worth Bank and Trust (the Bank) as a proof operator in August 1973. In January 1976, Watson was promoted to a position as teller in the Bank’s drive-in facility. In February 1980, she sought to become supervisor of the tellers in the main lobby; a white male, however, was selected for this job. Watson then sought a position as supervisor of the drive-in bank, but this position was given to a white female. In February 1981, after, Watson had served for about a year as a commercial teller in the Bank’s main lobby, and informally as assistant to the supervisor of tellers, the man holding that position was promoted. • Watson applied for the vacancy, but the white female who was the supervisor of the drive-in bank was selected instead. Watson then applied for the vacancy created at the drive-in; a white male was selected for that job. The Bank, which has about 80 employees, had not developed precise and formal criteria for evaluating candidates for the positions for which Watson unsuccessfully applied. It relied instead on the subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be filled. All the supervisors inv-olved in denying Watson the four promotions at issue were white. Watson filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After exhausting her administrative remedies, she filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged that the Bank had unlawfully discriminated against blacks in hiring, compensation, initial placement, promotions,' terminations, and other terms and conditions of employment. On Watson’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the District Court certified a class consisting of “blacks who applied to or were employed by [respondent] on or after October* 21, 1979 or- who may submit employment applications to [respondent] in the future.” App. 190. The District Court later decertified this broad class because it concluded, in light of the evidence presented at trial, that there was not a common question of law or fact uniting the groups of applicants and employees. After splitting the class along this line, the court found that the class of black employees did not meet the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a); accordingly, this subclass was decertified. The court also concluded that Watson was not an adequate representative of the applicant class because her promotion claims were not typical of the claims of the member's-of that group. Because Watson had proceeded zealously on behalf of the job applicants, however, the court werrt on to address the merits of their claims. It concluded that Watson had failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring: the percentage of blacks irr the Bank's work force approximated the percentage of blacks in the metropolitan area where the Bank is located. App. 199-202. The District Court addressed Watson’s individual claims under the evidentiary standards that apply irr a discriminatory treatment case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981). It concluded, on the evidence presented at trial, that Watson had established a prima facie case of employment discrimination, but that the Bank had met its rebuttal burden by presenting legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the challenged promotion decisions. The court also concluded that Watson had failed to show that these reasons were pretexts for racial discrimination. Accordingly, the action was dismissed. App. 195-197, 203. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part. 798 F. 2d 791 (1986). The majority concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s class decertification decisions. In order to avoid unfair prejudice to members of the class of black job applicants, however, the Court of Appeals vacated the portion of the judgment affecting them and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The majority affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that Watson had failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination under the standards set out in McDonnell Douglas, supra, and Burdine, supra. Watson argued that the District Court had erred in failing to apply “disparate impact” analysis to her claims of discrimination in promotion. Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the majority of the Court of Appeals panel held that “a Title VII challenge to an allegedly discretionary promotion system is properly analyzed under the disparate treatment model rather than the disparate impact model.” 798 F. 2d, at 797. Other Courts of Appeals have held that disparate impact analysis may be applied to hiring or promotion systems that involve the use of “discretionary” or “subjective” criteria. See, e. g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F. 2d 1477 (CA9) (en banc), on return to panel, 827 F. 2d 439. (1987), cert denied, No. 87-1388, 485 U. S. 989 (1988), cert. pending, No. 87-1387; Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F. 2d 1516, 1522-1525 (CA11 1985). Cf. Segar v. Smith, 238 U. S. App. D. C. 103, 738 F. 2d 1249(1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1115 (1985). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 483 U. S. 1004 (1987). II A Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §20Q0e-2, provides: “(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— “(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or . “(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an. employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. “(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub-chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. ...” Several of our decisions have dealt with the evidentiary standards that apply when an individual alleges that an employer has treated that particular person less favorably than others beeause of the plaintiff’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In such “disparate treatment” cases,' which involve “the most easily understood type of discrimination,” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1977), the plaintiff is required to' prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive. In order to facilitate the orderly consideration of relevant evidence, we have devised a series of shifting evidentiary burdens that are “intended'progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S., at 255, n. 8. Under that scheme, a prima facie case is ordinarily established by proof that the employer, after having rejected the plaintiff’s application for a job or promotion, continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to the plaintiff’s. Id., at 253, and n. 6. The burden of proving a prima facie case is “not onerous,” id., at 253, and the employer in turn may rebut it simply by producing some evidence that it had legitimate, noncliscriminatory reasons for the decision. Id., at 254-255. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of all the evidence in the case that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 253, 255, n. 10. We have cautioned that these shifting burdens are meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging the presentation of evidence: “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id., at 253. See also United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 715 (1983). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), this Court held that a plaintiff need not necessarily prove intentional discrimination in order top establish that an employer has violated § 703.' In certain cases, facially neutral employr ment practices that have significant adverse effects on protected groups have been held to violate the Act without proof that the employer adopted those practices-with-a discriminatory intent. The factual issues- and the character of the evidence are inevitably somewhat different when the plaintiff is-exempted”from the need to prove intentional discrimination. See Burdine, supra, at 252, n. 5; see also United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, supra, at 713, n. 1; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Teamsters, supra, at 335-336, n. 15. The evidence in these “disparate impact” cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather, than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for.those disparities. The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where dispárate treatment analysis is used. See, e. g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253-254 (1976) (Stevens, J.. concurring). Nor do we think it is appropriate to hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination on the basis of less evidence than is required to prove intentional discrimination. Rather, the necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination. Perhaps the most obvious examples of such functional equivalence have been found where facially neutral job requirements necessarily operated to perpetuate the effects of intentional discrimination that occurred before Title VII was enacted. In Griggs itself,, for example, the employer had a history of overt racial discrimination that predated the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 401 U. S., at 426-428; Such conduct had apparently ceased thereafter, but the-employer continued to follow employment policies that had “a markedly disproportionate” adverse effect on blacks. Id., at 428-429. Cf. Teamsters, supra, at 349, and n, 32. The Griggs Court found that these policies, which involved the use of general aptitude tests and a high school diploma requirement, were not demonstrably related to the jobs for which they were used. 401 U. S., at 431-432. Believing that diplomas and tests could become “masters of reality,” id., at 433, which would perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination, the Court concluded that such practices could not be defended simply on the basis of their facial neutrality or on the basis of the employer’s lack of discriminatory intent. This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that some facially neutral employment practices may violate Title VII even in the absence of a demonstrated discriminatory intent. We have not limited this principle to cases in which the challenged practice served to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act intentional discrimination. Each of our subsequent decisions, however, like Griggs itself, involved standardized employment tests or criteria. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975) (written aptitude tests); Washington v. Davis, supra (written test of verbal skills); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568 (1979) (rule against employing drug addicts); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440 (1982) (written examination). In contrast, we have consistently used conventional disparate treatment theory, in which proof of intent to discriminate is required, to review hiring and promotion decisions that were based on the exercise of personal judgment or the application of inherently subjective criteria. See, e. g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra (discretionary decision not to rehire individual who engaged in criminal acts against employer while laid off); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978) (hiring decisions based on personal knowledge of candidates and recommendations); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra (discretionary decision to fire individual who was said not to get along with co-workers); United States Postal Serv ice Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S., at 715 (discretion-ary promotion decision). Our decisions have not addressed the question whether disparate impact analysis may be applied to cases in which subjective criteria are used to make employment decisions. As noted above, the Courts of Appeals are in conflict on the issue. In order to resolve this conflict, we must determine whether the reasons that support the use of disparate impact analysis apply to subjective employment practices, and whether such analysis can be applied in this new context under workable evidentiary standards. . B The parties present us with stark and uninviting alternatives. Petitioner contends that subjective selection methods are at least as likely to havé discriminatory effects as are the kind of objective tests at issue in Griggs and our other disparate impact cases. Furthermore, she argues, if disparate impact analysis is confined to objective tests, employers will be able to substitute subjective criteria having substantially identical effects, and Griggs will become a dead letter. Respondent and the United States (appearing as amicus curiae) argue that conventional disparate treatment analysis is adequate to accomplish Congress’ purpose in enacting Title VII. They also argue that subjective selection practices would be so impossibly difficult to defend under disparate impact analysis that employers would be forced to adopt numerical quotas in order to avoid liability. We are persuaded that our decisions in Griggs and succeeding cases could largely be nullified if disparate impact analysis were applied only to standardized selection practices. However one might distinguish “subjective” from “objective” criteria, it is apparent that selection systems that combine both types would generally have to be considered subjective in nature. Thus, for example, if the employer in Griggs had consistently preferred applicánts who had a high school diploma and who passed the company’s general aptitude test, its selection system could nonetheless have been considered “subjective’’ if it also included brief interviews with the candidates. So long as an employer refrained from making standardized criteria absolutely determinative, it would remain free to give such tests almost as much weight as it chose without risking a disparate impact challenge. If we announced a rule that allowed employers so easily to insulate themselves from liability under Griggs, disparate impact analysis might effectively be abolished. We are also persuaded that disparate impact analysis is in principle no less applicable to subjective employment criteria than to objective or standardized tests. In either case, a facially neutral practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, may have effects that are indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices. It is true, to be sure, that an employer’s policy of leaving promotion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct. Especially in relatively small businesses like respondent’s, it may be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate employment decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the jobs to be filled and with the candidates for those jobs. It does not follow, however, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if one assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain. In this case, for example, petitioner was apparently told at one point that the teller position was a big responsibility. with “a lot of money . . . for blacks to have to count.” App. 7. Such remarks may not prove discriminatory intent, but they do suggest a lingering form of the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat. If an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory actions should not apply. In both circumstances, the employer’s practices may be said to “adversely affect [an individual’s] status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42-U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). We conclude, accordingly, that subjective or discretionary employment practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach in appropriate cases. C Having decided that disparate impact analysis may in principle be applied to subjective as well as to objective practices, we turn to the evidentiary standards that should apply in such cases. It is here that the concerns raised by respondent have their greatest force. • Respondent contends that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate impact through the use of bare statistics, and that the defendant can rebut this statistical showing only by justifying the challenged practice in terms of “business necessity,” Griggs, 401 U. S., at 431, or “job relatedness,” Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U. S., at 426. Standardized tests and criteria, like those at issue in our previous disparate impact cases, can often be justified through formal “validation studies,” which seek to determine whether discrete selection criteria predict actual on-the-job performance. See generally id., at 429-436. Respondent warns, however, that “validating” subjective selection criteria in this way is impracticable. Some qualities — for example, common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact — cannot be measured accurately through standardized testing techniques. Moreover, success at many jobs in which such qualities are crucial cannot itself be measured directly. Opinions often differ when managers and supervisors are evaluated, and the same can be said for many jobs that involve close cooperation with one’s co-workers or complex and subtle tasks like the provision of professional services or personal counseling. Because of these difficulties, we are told, employers will find it impossible to eliminate subjective selection criteria and impossibly expensive to defend such practices in litigation. Respondent insists, and the United States agrees, that employers’ only alternative will be to adopt surreptitious quota systems in order to ensure that no plaintiff can establish a statistical prima facie case. We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures. It is completely unrealistic to assume that unlawful discrimination is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers in accord with the laws of chance. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 489 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may leád to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces. Congress has specifically provided that employers are not required to avoid “disparate impact” as such: “Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer ... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available'work force in any community, State, section, or other area.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(j). Preferential treatment and the use of quotas by public employers subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution, see, e. g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U. S. 267 (1986), and it has long been recognized that legal rules leaving any class of employers with “little choice” but to adopt such measures would be.“far from the intent of Title VII.” Albemarle Paper Co., supra, at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). Respondent and the United States are thus correct when they argue that extending disparate impact analysis to subjective employment practices has the potential to create a Hobson’s choice for employers and thus to lead in practice to perverse results. If quotas and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are discussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful to ensure that the quotas are met. Allowing the evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead to this result would be contrary to Congress’ clearly expressed intent, and it should not be the effect of our decision today. D We do not believe that disparate impact theory need have any chilling effect on legitimate business practices. We rec.ognize, however, that today’s extension of that theory into the context of subjective selection practices could increase the risk that employers will be given incentives to adopt quotas or to engage in preferential treatment. Because Congress has so clearly and emphatically expressed its intent that Title VII not lead to this result, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(j), we think it imperative to explain in some detail why the evi-dentiary standards that apply in these cases should serve as adequate safeguards against the danger that Congress recognized. Our previous decisions offer guidance, but today’s extension of disparate impact analysis calls for a fresh and somewhat closer examination of the constraints that operate to keep that analysis within its proper bounds. First, we note that the plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to show that there are statistical disparities in the employer’s work force. The plaintiff must begin by identifying the specific employment practice that is challenged. Although this has been relatively easy to do in challenges to standardized tests, it may sometimes be more difficult when subjective selection criteria are at issue. Especially in cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440 (1982). Once the employment practice at issue has been identified, causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group. Our formulations, which have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation. In Griggs, for example, we examined “requirements [that] operate[d] to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants.” 401 U. S., at 426. Similarly, we said in Albemarle Paper Co. that plaintiffs are required to show “that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants.” 422 U. S., at 425. Later cases have framed the test in similar terms. See, e. g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 246-247 (“hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks”); Dothard, 433 U. S., at 329 (employment standards that “select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern”); Beazer, 440 U. S., at 584 (“statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members of one race equal access to. employment opportunities”); Teal, supra, at 446 (“significantly discriminatory.impact”). Nor are courts or defendants obliged to assume that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable. “If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own.” Dothard, 438 U. S., at 331. See also id., at 338-339 (Rehn-QUIST, J., concurring in result and concurring in part) (“If the defendants in a Title VII suit believe there to be any reason to discredit plaintiffs’ statistics that does not appear on their face, the opportunity to challenge them is available to the defendants just as in any other lawsuit. They may endeavor to impeach the reliability of the statistical evidence, they may offer rebutting evidence, or they may disparage in arguments or in briefs the probative weight which the plaintiffs’ evidence should be accorded”). Without attempting to catalog all the weaknesses that may be found in such evidence, we may note that typical examples include small or incomplete data sets and inadequate statistical techniques. See, e. g., Fudge v. Providence Fire Dept., 766 F. 2d 650, 656-659 (CA1 1985). Similarly, statistics based on an applicant pool containing individuals lacking minimal qualifications for the job would be of little probative value. See, e. g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U. S. 299, 308 (1977) (“[P]roper comparison was between the racial composition of [the employer’s] teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor market”) (footnote omitted). Other kinds of deficiencies in' facially plausible statistical evidence may emerge from the facts of particular cases. See, e. g., Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F. 2d 183, 189 (CA5 1983) (“The flaw in the plaintiffs’ proof was its failure to establish the required causal connection between the challenged employment practice (testing) and discrimination in the work force. Because the test does not have a cut-off and is only one of many factors in decisions to hire or promote, the fact that blacks score lower does not automatically result in disqualification of disproportionate numbers of blacks as in cases involving cutoffs”) (citation omitted); Contreras v. Los Angeles, 656 F. 2d 1267, 1273-1274 (CA9 1981) (probative value of statistics impeached by evidence that plaintiffs failed a written examination at a disproportionately high rate because they did not study seriously for it), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1021 (1982). A second constraint on the application of disparate impact theory lies in the nature of the “business necessity” or “job relatedness” defense. Although we have said that an employer has “the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question,” Griggs, 401 U. S., at 432, such a formulation should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of proof can be shifted to the defendant. On the contrary, the ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff at all times. Thus, when a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and when the defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that its employment practices are based on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff must “show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship.” Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U. S., at 425 (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate business goals. The same factors would also be relevant in determining whether the challenged practice has operated as the functional equivalent of a pretext for discriminatory treatment. Cf. ibid. Our cases make it clear that employers are not required, even when defending standardized or objective tests, to introduce formal “validation studies” showing that particular criteria predict actual on-the-job performance. In Beazer, for example, the Court considered it obvious that “legitimate employment goals of safety and efficiency” permitted the exclusion of methadone users from employment with the New York City Transit Authority; the Court indicated that the “manifest relationship” test was satisfied even with respect to non-safety-sensitive jobs because those legitimate goals were “significantly served by” the exclusionary rule at issue in that case even though the rule was not required by those goals. 440 U. S., at 587, n. 31. Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, the Court held that the “job relatedness” requirement was satisfied when the employer demonstrated that a written test was related to success at a police training academy “wholly aside from [the test’s] possible relationship to actual performance as a police officer.” 426 U. S., at 250. See also id., at 256 (Stevens, j., concurring) (“[A]s a matter of law, it is permissible for the police department to use a test for the purpose of predicting ability to master a training program even if the test does not otherwise predict ability to perform on the job”). In the context of subjective or discretionary employment decisions, the employer will often find it easier than in the case of standardized tests to produce evidence of a “manifest rélationship to the employment in question.” It is self-evident that many jobs, for example those involving managerial responsibilities, réquire personal qualities that have never been considered amenable to standardized testing. In evaltiatingclaims that discretionary employment practices are insufficiently related to legitimate business purposes, it must be borne in mind that “[cjourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.” Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 578. See also Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F. 2d 85, 96 (CA2 1984) (“[The] criteria [used by a university to award tenure], however difficult to apply and however much disagreement they generate in particular cases, are job related. ... It would be a most radical interpretation of Title VII for a court to enjoin use of an historically settled process and plainly relevant criteria largely because they lead to decisions which are difficult for a court to review”). In sum, the high standards of proof in disparate impact cases are sufficient in our view to avoid giving employers incentives to modify any normal and legitimate practices by introducing quotas or preferential treatment. Ill We granted certiorari to determine whether the court below properly held disparate impact analysis inapplicable to a subjective or discretionary promotion system, and we now hold that such analysis may be applied. We express no opinion as to the other rulings of the Court of Appeals. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has evaluated the statistical evidence to determine whether petitioner made out a prima facie case of discriminatory promotion practices under disparate impact theory. It may be that the relevant data base is too small to permit any meaningful statistical analysis, but we leave the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance, on the basis of the record and the principles announced today, whether this case can be resolved without further proceedings in the District Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The dissenting judge argued that the District Court had abused its discretion in decertifying the broad class of black employees and applicants. He also argued that Watson had succeeded in proving that the Bank had discriminated against this class, and that the case should be remanded so that appropriate relief could be ordered. 798 F. 2d, at 800-815. Both concurrences agree that we should, for the first time, approve the use of disparate impact analysis in evaluating subjective selection practices. Unlike Justice Stevens, we believe that this step requires usTo provide the lower courts with appropriate evidentiary guidelines, as we have previously done for disparate treatment cases. Moreover, we do not believe that each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to describe the evidentary standards in disparate impact cases is automatically applicable in light of today’s decision. Cf. post, at 1000-1001, 1005-1006 (Black-MUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Congress expressly provided that Title VII not be read to require preferential treatment or numerical quotas. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(j). This congressional mandate requires in our view that a decision to extend the reach of disparate impact theory be accompanied by safeguards against the result that Congress clearly said it did not intend. Faced with the task of applying these general statements to particular cases, the lower courts have sometimes looked for more specific direction in the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR pt. 1607 (1987). See, e. g., Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Comm’n, 733 F. 2d 220, 225-226 (CA2 1984), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1117 (1985); Firefighters Institute v. St. Louis, 616 F. 2d 350, 356-357 (CA8 1980), cert. denied sub nom. St. Louis v. United States, 452 U. S. 938 (1981). These Guidelines have adopted an enforcement rule under which adverse impact will not ordinarily be inferred unless the members of a particular race, sex, or ethnic group are selected at a rate that is less than four-fifths of the rate at which the group with the highest rate is selected. 29 CFR § 1607.4(D) (1987). This enforcement standard has been criticized on technical grounds, see, e. g., Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 Law & Contemp. Prob., No. 4, pp. 189,205-207 (1983); Shoben,- Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 793, 805-811 (1978), and it has hot provided more than a rule of thumb for the courts, see, e. g., Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F. 2d 1421, 1428-1429 (CA9 1985), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1109 (1986). Courts have also referred to the “standard deviation” analysis sometimes used injury-selection cases. See, e. g., Rivera v. Wichita Falls, 665 F. 2d 531, 536, n. 7 (CA5 1982) (citing Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977)); Guardians Association of New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Service Comm’n of New York, 630 F. 2d 79, 86, and n. 4 (CA2 1980) (same), cert. denied, 452 U. S. 940 (1981). We have emphasized the useful role that statistical methods can have in Title VII cases, but we have not suggested that any particular number of “standard deviations” can determine whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in the complex area of employment discrimination. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U. S. 299, 311, n. 17 (1977). Nor has a consensus developed around any alternative mathematical standard. Instead, courts appear generally to have judged the “significance” or “substantiality” of numerical disparities on a case-by-case basis. See Clady, supra, at 1428-1429; B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 98-99, and n. 77 (2d ed. 1983); id., at 18-19, and n. 33 (Supp. 1983-1985). At least at this stage of the law’s development, we believe that such a case-by-case approach properly reflects our recognition that statistics “come in infinite variety and . . . their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and eh’cumstances.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 340 (1977).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. COUNTY OF FRESNO No. 75-1262. Argued November 8-9, 1976 Decided January 25, 1977 Howard E. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States et al. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Crampton, Stuart A. Smith, Crombie J. D. Garrett, and David English Carmack. James B. Waterman argued the cause for appellee County of Fresno. With him on the brief was Robert M. Wash. Stephen Dietrich, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee County of Tuolumne. Together with United States et al. v. County of Tuolumne, also on appeal from the same court (see this Court’s Rule 15 (3)). Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether, consistent with the Federal Government’s immunity from state taxation inherent in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, see M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), the State of California may tax federal employees on their possessory interests in housing owned and supplied to them by the Federal Government as part of their compensation. We hold that it may. I The individual appellants in this case are employees of the Forest Service, a branch of the United States Department of Agriculture responsible for administering the national forests. These appellants work in the Sierra, Sequoia, and Stanislaus National Forests which are located in Fresno and Tuolumne Counties in California. During the year 1967 each appellant lived with his family in a house which was built and owned by the Forest Service in one of these national forests. Appellants were required by the Forest Service to live in these houses so that they would be nearer to the place where they performed their duties and so that they would be better able to perform those duties. Structurally, the houses were very similar to residential houses of the same size available in the private sector. The Forest Service viewed the occupancy of these houses as partial compensation for the services of its employees, and made a deduction from the salary of the employee for each two-week pay period in which the employee occupied such a house. The Forest Service fixed the amount of the deduction by estimating the fair rental value of a similar house in the private sector and then discounting that figure to take account of the distance between the Forest Service house and the nearest established community and the absence, if any, of any customary amenities in or near the house. Adjustment was also made for the fact that the Forest Service reserved the right to remove employees from their houses at any time, to enter the houses with or without notice for inspection purposes, and to use part or all of the houses for official purposes in an emergency. Pursuant to 16 U. S. C. § 480, the States retain civil and criminal jurisdiction over the national forests notwithstanding the fact that the national forests are owned by the Federal Government. Under the California Revenue and Taxation Code, §§ 104, 107 (West 1970), and § 21 (b) of Title 18 of the California Administrative Code (1971), counties in California are authorized to impose an annual use or property tax on possessory interests in improvements on tax-exempt land. The Counties of Fresno and Tuolumne imposed such a tax on the appellants — Forest Service employees who live in the federally owned houses in the national forests located in those counties. In computing the value of the possessory interests on which the tax is imposed, the counties used the annual estimated fair rental value of the houses, discounted to take into account essentially the same factors considered by the Forest Service in computing the amount that it deducted from the salaries of employees who used the houses. Appellants paid the taxes under protest and they, together with the United States, sued for a refund in California courts in Fresno and Tuolumne Counties. They claimed, inter alia, that the tax interfered with a federal function — i. e., the running of the Forest Service — that it discriminated against employees of the Federal Government, and that it was therefore forbidden by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. E. g., M‘Culloch v. Maryland, supra. The trial courts each sustained appellants' claims, holding, inter alia, that appellants had no taxable possessory interest under state law. The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1975) (County of Fresno case, followed in County of Tuolumne case (unreported)). It held that each appellant had a possessory interest in the houses owned by the Forest Service that was subject to taxation under state law. The court then held that the tax on such possessory interests is not a tax on the Federal Government, on Government property, or on a “federal function.” Rather, it is a tax imposed on “the private citizen, and it is the private citizen’s usufructuary interest in the government land and improvements alone that is being taxed. (City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489 . . . ; United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U. S. 484 . . . ; United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 .. . .)” Id., at 640, 123 Cal. Rptr., at 552. Consequently, the court held, the tax is not barred by the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. The California Court of Appeal also rejected appellants’ contention that the tax operates to discriminate against the Federal Government and its employees. The Supreme Court of California denied review. We noted probable jurisdiction to review the decision of the California Court of Appeal, 425 U. S. 970 (1976). Appellants argue that the tax is “a levy upon the activities of the United States” because the occupancy of the houses by the Forest Service employees was “for the sole purpose of discharging their governmental function of running the national forests.” Brief for Appellants 11. Consequently, the Government argues, the tax is forbidden by the doctrine announced in M‘Culloch v. Maryland, that under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution the States may not tax the properties, functions, or instrumentalities of the Federal Government. We disagree with the Government, and affirm the judgment below. II The Government relies principally on the landmark case of M‘Culloch v. Maryland. There the State of Maryland imposed a tax on notes issued by “any Bank ... established without authority from the State.” ' The only such bank in Maryland was the Bank of the United States, created and incorporated by Act of Congress in order to carry out Congress’ enumerated powers. No similar tax was imposed on the issuance of notes by any other bank in Maryland. The Court held the tax to violate that part of the Federal Constitution which declares that the laws of the United States are the “supreme law of the land.” An Act of Congress had created the bank in order to carry out functions of the National Government enumerated in the United States Constitution. The Court noted that the power to tax the bank “by the States may be exercised so as to destroy it,” 4 Wheat., at 427, and consequently that the power to tax, if admitted, could be exercised so as effectively to repeal the Act of Congress which created the bank. If the State’s power to tax the bank were recognized in principle, the Court doubted 'the ability of federal courts to review each exercise of such power to determine whether the tax would or would not destroy a federal function. Finally, the Court rejected the State’s argument that the power to tax involves the power to destroy only where the taxing power is abused, and that the Court should simply trust the States not to abuse their power to tax a federal function just as it must trust a State not to abuse its power to tax its own citizens. The Court rejected the argument because the political check against abuse of the power to tax a State’s constituents is absent when the State taxes only a federal function. A State’s constituents can be rebed on to vote out of office any legislature that imposes an abusively high tax on them. They cannot be relied upon to be similarly motivated when the tax is instead solely on a federal function. The Court was careful to limit the reach of its decision. It stated that its opinion does not _ “extend to a tax . . . imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution [the bank], in common with other property of the same description throughout the State.” Id., at 436. (Emphasis added.) Since M‘Culloch, this Court has adhered to the rule that States may not impose taxes directly on the Federal Government, nor may they impose taxes the legal incidence of which falls on the Federal Government. The decisions of this Court since M‘Culloch have been less uniform on the question whether taxes, the economic but not the legal incidence of which falls in part or in full on the Federal Government, are invalid. For many years the Court read the decision in M‘Culloch as forbidding taxes on those who had contractual relationships with the Federal Government or with its instrumentalities whenever the <■ feet of the tax was or might be to increase the cost to the Federal Government of performing its functions. In later years, however, the Court departed from this interpretation of M'Culloch. In James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937), a contractor sought immunity from a state occupation tax measured by the gross receipts, insofar as those receipts had been received under a contract with the Federal Government. The Court declared the tax valid even if “the gross receipts tax may increase the cost to the Government” under the contract. Id., at 160. So long as the tax is not directly laid on the Federal Government, it is valid if nondiscriminatory, id., at 150, or until Congress declares otherwise. Id., at 161. Similarly, in Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939), the Court sustained a nondiscriminatory tax on the income of a federal employee, thereby overruling Dobbins v. Commis sioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842). See also Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941), overruling Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928). Finally, and for the purposes of this case dispositively, in City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 356 U. S. 489 (1958), United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 (1958), and United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U. S. 484 (1958), this Court sustained state use taxes on the use by private companies of machinery and other property owned by the United States and leased to them .for use in their businesses — even though in two of these cases the companies had cost-plus contracts with the Government requiring the Government to reimburse them for state taxes paid by them. These cases make clear that a State may, in effect, raise revenues on the basis of property owned by the United States as long as that property is being used by a private citizen or corporation and so long as it is the possession or use by the private citizen that is being taxed. See also Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U. S. 495 (1953). The rule to be derived from the Court’s more recent decisions, then, is that the economic burden on a federal function of a state tax imposed on those who deal with the Federal Government does not render the tax unconstitutional so long as the tax is imposed equally on the other similarly situated constituents of the State. This rule returns to the original intent of M‘Culloch v. Maryland. The political check against abuse of the taxing power found lacking in M'Culloch, where the tax was imposed solely on the Bank of the United States, is present where the State imposes a nondiscriminatory tax only on its constituents or their artificially owned entities; and M'Culloch foresaw the unfairness in forcing a State to exempt private individuals with beneficial interests in federal property from taxes imposed on similar interests held by others in private property. Accordingly, M‘Culloch expressly excluded from its rule a tax on “the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold [in a federal instrumentality] in common with other property of the same description throughout the State.” 4 Wheat., at 436. Ill Applying the rule set forth above, decision of this case is relatively simple. The “legal incidence” of the tax involved in this case falls neither on the Federal Government nor on federal property. The tax is imposed solely on private citizens who work for the Federal Government. The tax threatens to interfere with federal laws relating to the functions of the Forest Service only insofar as it may impose an economic burden on the Forest Service — causing it to reimburse its employees for the taxes legally owed by them or, failing reimbursement, removing an advantage otherwise enjoyed by the Federal Government in the employment market. There is no other respect in which the tax involved in this case threatens to obstruct or burden a federal function. The tax can be invalidated, then, only if it discriminates against the Forest Service or other federal employees, which it does not do. Although .the tax is imposed by the appellee counties on renters of real property only if the owner is exempt from taxation — and consequently is not imposed on the vast majority of renters of real property in California — the tax is not for that reason discriminatory. In this respect this case is governed by United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 (1958). There the city of Detroit imposed a use tax on those who used tax-exempt property owned by the United States. The tax was measured by the value of the property. With respect to nonexempt property, a similar tax was imposed on the owner and none on the user. In answering an argument that the tax discriminated against those dealing with the Federal Government, the Court said: “As suggested before the legislature apparently was trying to equate the tax burden imposed on private enterprise using exempt property with that carried by similar businesses using taxed property. Those using exempt property are required to pay no greater tax than that placed on private owners or passed on by them to their business lessees.” Id., at 473-474. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, here the State of California imposes a property tax on owners of nonexempt property which is “passed on by them to their . . . lessees.” Consequently, the appellants who rent from the Forest Service are no worse off under California tax laws than those who work for private employers and rent houses in the private sector. The Government argues nonetheless that the appellants are required to occupy the houses owned by the Forest Service not for their own personal benefit but for the sole benefit of the Forest Service and that “[t]here is accordingly no constitutionally permissible way to isolate any 'personal residence’ portion of these possessory interests that could be deemed to be unrelated to the official duties of these Forest Service employees.” Brief for United States 18. The argument is at odds with the Government’s own concessions during this lawsuit, with its treatment of its employees apart from this lawsuit, and with common sense. The Government’s complaint in this case alleges that the occupancy of the Forest Service houses constitutes part of appellants’ “compensation” for services performed- — -thus conceding that the occupancy is of personal benefit to the employee. At oral argument the Government conceded that a state income tax could be imposed on the employees for the value of the occupancy — thus conceding that its value to the employee is capable of being severed from its value to the Forest' Service and of being accurately measured. The Forest Service itself purports to measure the personal benefit of the occupancy to the employee and collects rent in such an amount through deductions from the employee’s paycheck. Since virtually everyone in this country pays for housing for himself or herself and family, common sense compels the conclusion that the occupancy of a house provided by an employer for an employee’s family is of personal financial benefit to the employee — relieving him of the expense of paying for housing elsewhere. The disadvantages attendant on living in Forest Service housing may affect the amount of the value of the house to the employee, but it is unquestionably of some value to him. Here both appellees have sought to take account of these disadvantages and to tax the employees only on the portion of the total value of the houses which may be properly attributed to their possessory interest. In this respect, the taxes are valid even under United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174 (1944), see n. 10, supra, so heavily relied on by the Government. There the Court invalidated a tax on use by a private corporation of Government-owned property because “the State has made no effort to segregate [the corporation’s] interest and tax it.” Id., at 187. The Court stated, however: “Actual possession and custody of Government property nearly always are in someone who is not himself the Government but acts in its behalf and for its purposes. . . . His personal advantages from the relationship by way of salary, profit or beneficial personal use of the property may be taxed as we have held.” Id., at 187-188. (Emphasis added.) This statement ripened into holdings in United States v. City of Detroit, supra, at 472, and United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U. S. 484 (1958). The only difference between Township of Muskegon — where Government-owned property was being used by a private corporation in complying with a Government contract — and this case is that there the property was being used by business for “profit” and here the property is being put to “beneficial personal use.” Under the rule of United States v. Allegheny County and United States v. City of Detroit, this difference is inconsequential. The two types of interests are equally taxable. In conclusion, as the Court said in City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S., at 495: “There was no discrimination against the Federal Government, its property or those with whom it does business. There was no crippling obstruction of any of the Government’s functions, no sinister effort to hamstring its power, not even the slightest interference with its property. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. In such circumstances the Congress is the proper agency, as we pointed,out in United States v. City of Detroit, to make the difficult policy decisions o necessarily involved in determining whether and to what extent private parties who do business with the Government should be given immunity from states taxes.” Affirmed. Some of the appellants were not required but simply permitted to live in houses owned by the Forest Service, in the sense that these particular appellants might have been able to live in a privately owned house outside the forest if they had so elected. However, the Forest Service required that some employee occupy each house owned by the Forest Service, and if no employee had volunteered, some employee, perhaps including some of these appellants, would have been required to live there. In light of our disposition of this case, the distinction between employees required to live in Forest Service housing and those permitted to live there is unimportant and we will not refer to it again. Examples of the amenities considered are, according to the testimony of a Forest Service official: “Paved streets, street lighting at least at intersections, sidewalks, lawns, trees and landscaping, general attractiveness of the neighborhood, community sanitation services, reliability and adequacy of water safe for household use, reliability of [sic] adequacy of electrical service, reliability and adequacy of telephone service, reliability and adequacy of fuel for heating, hot water and cooking, police protection, fire protection, unusual design features of a dwelling, absence of disturbing noises or offensive odors and standards of maintenance.” App. 32. Section 107, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code (West 1970), provides: ■‘“Possessory interests’ means the following: “(a) Possession of, claim to, or right to the possession of land or improvements, except when, coupled with ownership of the land or improvements in the same person.” Title 18 Cal. Adm. Code § 21 (b) (1971) provides: “ ‘Taxable possessory interest’ means a possessory interest in nontaxable publicly owned real property, as such property is defined in section 104 of the Revenue and Taxation Code . . . .” Section 104, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code (West 1970), provides: “ ‘Real estate’ or ‘real property’ includes: “(a) The possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land.” All parties agree that the national forests owned by the Federal Government are tax-exempt land by reason of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, e. g., United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174 (1944), and that no tax may be imposed either on the land itself or on the United States. With respect to non-tax-exempt land, California imposes a property tax on the owner. No tax is imposed directly on a renter of non-tax-exempt land. However, the tax on the owner is presumably reflected in the rent and the renter may thus pay the tax indirectly. In computing the value of appellants’ possessory interests on which the tax was imposed, Fresno County used the value of one year of occupancy. Tuolumne County used the present discounted value of five years’ occupancy — the length of time which it estimated the average Forest Service employee remained in a Forest Service house. The tax was in the form of a forced purchase from a state official of stamped paper on which such notes were required to be printed. The tax could be avoided by an annual lump-sum payment to the state official of $15,000. The Court stated: '‘[Normally in] imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. “The people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property, . . . resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard them against its abuse.” 4 Wheat., at 428. “. . . When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their constituents; and these taxes must be uniform. But, when a State taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control.” Id., at 435. Accordingly, the Court concluded: “The result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared.” Id., at 436. Thus the Court invalidated a state law which required a seller of liquor to United States post exchanges to collect a markup — the practical equivalent of a tax — from the post exchange and to remit it to the State Tax Commission. United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm’n, 421 U. S. 599 (1975). There, although the tax was nominally collected from the seller, the legal incidence of the tax was said to fall on the United States because state law required it to be charged to and collected from the United States by the seller. See First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968). Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110 (1954), heavily relied on by appellants, also stands only for the proposition that the State may not impose a tax the legal incidence of which falls on the Federal Government. Id., at 122. There the State imposed a sales tax on purchasers. Kern-Limerick, Inc., had a cost-plus contract with the Department of the Navy which provided that all purchases made in furtherance of the contract were made by the Department of the Navy, with Kern-Limerick acting only as its agent. The Court held that the question of who was the purchaser for state-tax purposes was a federal question, and it held the Department of the Navy to be the purchaser and the tax to be thus unenforceable. See also Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 (1941); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886). E. g., Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842) (holding unconstitutional a state tax on the income of a federal employee); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) (holding unconstitutional a sales tax imposed on one who made sales to the Federal Government); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922) (holding unconstitutional a state income tax as it applied to income generated from property leased from the Federal Government). See also United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903). In Graves, the Court said: “The theory, which once won a qualified approval, that a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable.” 306 U. S., at 480. “[T]he only possible basis for implying a constitutional immunity from state income tax of the salary of an employee of the national government or of a governmental agency is that the economic burden of the tax is in some way passed on so as to impose a burden on the national government tantamount to an interference by one government with the other in the performance of its functions.” Id., at 481. (Emphasis added.) The Court rejected this economic burden as a justification for immunizing the employee from income taxation: “[T]he purpose of the immunity was not to confer benefits on the employees by relieving them from contributing their share of the financial support of the other government, whose benefits they enjoy, or to give an advantage to a government by enabling it to engage employees at salaries lower than those paid for like services by other employers, public or private, but to prevent undue interference with the one government by imposing on it the tax burdens of the other. “[A] non-discriminatory tax laid on the income of all members of the community could not be assumed to obstruct the function which [a government entity] had undertaken to perform, or to cast an economic burden upon them, more than does the general taxation of property and income which, to some extent, incapable of measurement by economists, may tend to raise the price level of labor and materials.” Id., at 483-484. “So much of the burden of a non-discriminatory general tax upon the incomes of employees of a government, state or national, as may be passed on economically to that government, through the effect of the tax on the price level of labor or materials, is but the normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two governments, each possessing the taxing power.” Id., at 487. The single arguable departure from this principle since 1937 is United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174 (1944). There the Mesta Machine Company had a contract with the Federal Government to produce field guns for the War Department during 1941. Some of the machinery with which Mesta produced the guns was owned by the United States and was in the possession of Mesta. There were limitations on Mesta’s right to use this machinery: Mesta’s “leasehold interest [in the machines] is subject to some qualification of the right to use the property except for gun manufacture . . . and is perhaps burdened by other contractual conditions.” Id., at 186-187. Pennsylvania, the State in which Mesta’s factory was located, imposed a property tax on Mesta’s land and machinery attached thereto, including the machinery owned by the United States. This Court ruled the tax invalid, stating: “Mesta has some legal and beneficial interest in this property. It is a bailee for mutual benefit. Whether such a right of possession and use in view of all the circumstances could be taxed by appropriate proceedings we do not decide. . . . [T]he state has made no effort to segregate Mesta’s interest [in the machinery] and tax it. The full value of the property including the whole ownership interest, as well as whatever value proper appraisal might attribute to the leasehold, was included in Mesta’s assessment.” Ibid. Insofar as United States v. Allegheny County, supra, holds that a tax measured by the value of Government-owned property may never be imposed on a private party who is using it, that decision has been overruled by United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S. 466 (1958), and its companion cases. See id., at 495 (Frankfurter, J., concurring and dissenting). Insofar as it stands for the proposition that Government property used by a private citizen may not be taxed at its full value where contractual restrictions on its use for the Government’s benefit render the property less valuable to the user, the case has no application here. Appellee counties have sought to tax only the individual appellants’ interests in the Forest Service houses and have reduced their assessments to take account of the limitations on the use of the houses imposed by the Government. A tax on the income of federal employees, or a tax on the possessory interest of federal employees in Government houses, if imposed only on them, could be escalated by a State so as to destroy the federal function performed by them either by making the Federal Government unable to hire anyone or by causing the Federal Government to pay prohibitively high salaries. This danger would never arise, however, if the tax is also imposed on the income and property interests of all other residents and voters of the State. The Federal Government would otherwise have had the power— enjoyed by no other employer — of giving its employees housing on which no property tax is paid by them either directly or indirectly as rent paid to a landlord who himself paid a property tax. The Government has expressly abandoned its claim, made below, that the tax treats federal employees who live in federally owned houses differently from state employees who lived in state-owned houses. If it were factually accurate that the use of Forest Service housing is of no personal benefit to appellants, the tax would chscrhninate against those who work for the Federal Government since California imposes no other tax on its citizens with respect to property in which those citizens have no beneficial personal or business interest. The tax would thus run afoul at least of the Supremacy Clause. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U. S., at 473. An attempt by California to impose a use tax on a Forest Service employee for his fire ax — which he used only in performing his job — or on' a fire tower inhabited by such employee in the daytime and solely in order to- perform his job would present a different question. The employee does not put either the ax or the tower to “‘beneficial personal use,’ ” and it is not part of his “ ‘profit’ ” or his “ ‘salary.’ ” United States v. City of Detroit, supra, at 471. See n. 14, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, petitioner v. HAWKES CO., INC., et al. No. 15-290. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 30, 2016. Decided May 31, 2016. David R. Cooper, Chief Counsel, United States Army, Corps of Engineers, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Ginger D. Anders, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Aaron P. Avila, Jennifer Scheller Neumann, Robert J. Lundman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for petitioner. Nancy Quattlebaum Burke, Gregory R. Mertz, of counsel, Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis, MN, M. Reed Hopper, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA, Mark Miller, Pacific Legal Foundation, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for respondents. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants into "the waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), (12). Because it can be difficult to determine whether a particular parcel of property contains such waters, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will issue to property owners an "approved jurisdictional determination" stating the agency's definitive view on that matter. See 33 CFR § 331.2 and pt. 331, App. C (2015). The question presented is whether that determination is final agency action judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704. I A The Clean Water Act prohibits "the discharge of any pollutant" without a permit into "navigable waters," which it defines, in turn, as "the waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), (12). During the time period relevant to this case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers defined the waters of the United States to include land areas occasionally or regularly saturated with water-such as "mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, [and] playa lakes"-the "use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (2012). The Corps has applied that definition to assert jurisdiction over "270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United States-including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States." Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 165 L.Ed.2d 159 (2006) (plurality opinion). It is often difficult to determine whether a particular piece of property contains waters of the United States, but there are important consequences if it does. The Clean Water Act imposes substantial criminal and civil penalties for discharging any pollutant into waters covered by the Act without a permit from the Corps. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c), (d), 1344(a). The costs of obtaining such a permit are significant. For a specialized "individual" permit of the sort at issue in this case, for example, one study found that the average applicant "spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process," without "counting costs of mitigation or design changes." Rapanos, 547 U.S., at 721, 126 S.Ct. 2208. Even more readily available "general" permits took applicants, on average, 313 days and $28,915 to complete. Ibid. See generally 33 CFR § 323.2(h) (limiting "general" permits to activities that "cause only minimal individual and cumulative environmental impacts"). The Corps specifies whether particular property contains "waters of the United States" by issuing "jurisdictional determinations" (JDs) on a case-by-case basis. § 331.2. JDs come in two varieties: "preliminary" and "approved." Ibid. While preliminary JDs merely advise a property owner "that there may be waters of the United States on a parcel," approved JDs definitively "stat[e] the presence or absence" of such waters. Ibid. (emphasis added). Unlike preliminary JDs, approved JDs can be administratively appealed and are defined by regulation to "constitute a Corps final agency action." §§ 320.1(a)(6), 331.2. They are binding for five years on both the Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency, which share authority to enforce the Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1344(s) ; 33 CFR pt. 331, App. C ; EPA, Memorandum of Agreement: Exemptions Under Section 404(F) of the Clean Water Act § VI-A (1989) (Memorandum of Agreement). B Respondents are three companies engaged in mining peat in Marshall County, Minnesota. Peat is an organic material that forms in waterlogged grounds, such as wetlands and bogs. See Xuehui & Jinming, Peat and Peatlands, in 2 Coal, Oil Shale, Natural Bitumen, Heavy Oil and Peat 267-272 (G. Jinsheng ed. 2009) (Peat and Peatlands). It is widely used for soil improvement and burned as fuel. Id., at 277. It can also be used to provide structural support and moisture for smooth, stable greens that leave golfers with no one to blame but themselves for errant putts. See Monteith & Welton, Use of Peat and Other Organic Materials on Golf Courses, 13 Bulletin of the United States Golf Association Green Section 90, 95-100 (1933). At the same time, peat mining can have significant environmental and ecological impacts, see Peat and Peatlands 280-281, and therefore is regulated by both federal and state environmental protection agencies, see, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 103G.231 (2014). Respondents own a 530-acre tract near their existing mining operations. The tract includes wetlands, which respondents believe contain sufficient high quality peat, suitable for use in golf greens, to extend their mining operations for 10 to 15 years. App. 8, 14-15, 31. In December 2010, respondents applied to the Corps for a Section 404 permit for the property. Id., at 15. A Section 404 permit authorizes "the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). Over the course of several communications with respondents, Corps officials signaled that the permitting process would be very expensive and take years to complete. The Corps also advised respondents that, if they wished to pursue their application, they would have to submit numerous assessments of various features of the property, which respondents estimate would cost more than $100,000. App. 16-17, 31-35. In February 2012, in connection with the permitting process, the Corps issued an approved JD stating that the property contained "water of the United States" because its wetlands had a "significant nexus" to the Red River of the North, located some 120 miles away. Id., at 13, 18, 20. Respondents appealed the JD to the Corps' Mississippi Valley Division Commander, who remanded for further factfinding. On remand, the Corps reaffirmed its original conclusion and issued a revised JD to that effect. Id., at 18-20; App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a-45a. Respondents then sought judicial review of the revised JD under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. The District Court dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the revised JD was not "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," as required by the APA prior to judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 704. 963 F.Supp.2d 868, 872, 878 (Minn.2013). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, 782 F.3d 994, 1002 (2015), and we granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 615, 193 L.Ed.2d 495 (2015). II The Corps contends that the revised JD is not "final agency action" and that, even if it were, there are adequate alternatives for challenging it in court. We disagree at both turns. A In Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997), we distilled from our precedents two conditions that generally must be satisfied for agency action to be "final" under the APA. "First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process-it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow." Id., at 177-178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Corps does not dispute that an approved JD satisfies the first Bennett condition. Unlike preliminary JDs-which are "advisory in nature" and simply indicate that "there may be waters of the United States" on a parcel of property, 33 CFR § 331.2 -an approved JD clearly "mark[s] the consummation" of the Corps' decisionmaking process on that question, Bennett, 520 U.S., at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is issued after extensive factfinding by the Corps regarding the physical and hydrological characteristics of the property, see U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jurisdictional Determination Form Instructional Guidebook 47-60 (2007), and is typically not revisited if the permitting process moves forward. Indeed, the Corps itself describes approved JDs as "final agency action," see 33 CFR § 320.1(a)(6), and specifies that an approved JD "will remain valid for a period of five years," Corps, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 05-02, § 1(a), p. 1 (June 14, 2005) (2005 Guidance Letter); see also 33 CFR pt. 331, App. C. The Corps may revise an approved JD within the five-year period based on "new information." 2005 Guidance Letter § 1(a), at 1. That possibility, however, is a common characteristic of agency action, and does not make an otherwise definitive decision nonfinal. See Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 1372, 182 L.Ed.2d 367 (2012) ; see also National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 981, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005). By issuing respondents an approved JD, the Corps for all practical purposes "has ruled definitively" that respondents' property contains jurisdictional waters. Sackett, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1374-1375 (GINSBURG, J., concurring). The definitive nature of approved JDs also gives rise to "direct and appreciable legal consequences," thereby satisfying the second prong of Bennett , 520 U.S., at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154. Consider the effect of an approved JD stating that a party's property does not contain jurisdictional waters-a "negative" JD, in Corps parlance. As noted, such a JD will generally bind the Corps for five years. See 33 CFR pt. 331, App. C ; 2005 Guidance Letter § 1. Under a longstanding memorandum of agreement between the Corps and EPA, it will also be "binding on the Government and represent the Government's position in any subsequent Federal action or litigation concerning that final determination." Memorandum of Agreement §§ IV-C-2, VI-A. A negative JD thus binds the two agencies authorized to bring civil enforcement proceedings under the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1319, creating a five-year safe harbor from such proceedings for a property owner. Additionally, although the property owner may still face a citizen suit under the Act, such a suit-unlike actions brought by the Government-cannot impose civil liability for wholly past violations. See §§ 1319(d), 1365(a) ; Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58-59, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). In other words, a negative JD both narrows the field of potential plaintiffs and limits the potential liability a landowner faces for discharging pollutants without a permit. Each of those effects is a "legal consequence[ ]" satisfying the second Bennett prong. 520 U.S., at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 ; see also Sackett, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1371. It follows that affirmative JDs have legal consequences as well: They represent the denial of the safe harbor that negative JDs afford. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining "agency action" to include an agency "rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent," or the "denial thereof"). Because "legal consequences ... flow" from approved JDs, they constitute final agency action. Bennett, 520 U.S., at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (internal quotation marks omitted). This conclusion tracks the "pragmatic" approach we have long taken to finality. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). For example, in Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 76 S.Ct. 569, 100 L.Ed. 910 (1956), we considered the finality of an order specifying which commodities the Interstate Commerce Commission believed were exempt by statute from regulation, and which it believed were not. Although the order "had no authority except to give notice of how the Commission interpreted" the relevant statute, and "would have effect only if and when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier," Abbott, 387 U.S., at 150, 87 S.Ct. 1507 we held that the order was nonetheless immediately reviewable, Frozen Food, 351 U.S., at 44-45, 76 S.Ct. 569. The order, we explained, "warns every carrier, who does not have authority from the Commission to transport those commodities, that it does so at the risk of incurring criminal penalties." Id., at 44, 76 S.Ct. 569. So too here, while no administrative or criminal proceeding can be brought for failure to conform to the approved JD itself, that final agency determination not only deprives respondents of a five-year safe harbor from liability under the Act, but warns that if they discharge pollutants onto their property without obtaining a permit from the Corps, they do so at the risk of significant criminal and civil penalties. B Even if final, an agency action is reviewable under the APA only if there are no adequate alternatives to APA review in court. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Corps contends that respondents have two such alternatives: either discharge fill material without a permit, risking an EPA enforcement action during which they can argue that no permit was required, or apply for a permit and seek judicial review if dissatisfied with the results. Brief for Petitioner 45-51. Neither alternative is adequate. As we have long held, parties need not await enforcement proceedings before challenging final agency action where such proceedings carry the risk of "serious criminal and civil penalties." Abbott, 387 U.S., at 153, 87 S.Ct. 1507. If respondents discharged fill material without a permit, in the mistaken belief that their property did not contain jurisdictional waters, they would expose themselves to civil penalties of up to $37,500 for each day they violated the Act, to say nothing of potential criminal liability. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), (d) ; Sackett, 566 U.S., at ----, n. 1, 132 S.Ct., at 1370, n. 1 (citing 74 Fed.Reg. 626, 627 (2009) ). Respondents need not assume such risks while waiting for EPA to "drop the hammer" in order to have their day in court. Sackett, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1372. Nor is it an adequate alternative to APA review for a landowner to apply for a permit and then seek judicial review in the event of an unfavorable decision. As Corps officials indicated in their discussions with respondents, the permitting process can be arduous, expensive, and long. See Rapanos, 547 U.S., at 721, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (plurality opinion). On top of the standard permit application that respondents were required to submit, see 33 CFR § 325.1(d) (detailing contents of permit application), the Corps demanded that they undertake, among other things, a "hydrogeologic assessment of the rich fen system including the mineral/nutrient composition and pH of the groundwater; groundwater flow spatially and vertically; discharge and recharge areas"; a "functional/resource assessment of the site including a vegetation survey and identification of native fen plan communities across the site"; an "inventory of similar wetlands in the general area (watershed), including some analysis of their quality"; and an "inventory of rich fen plant communities that are within sites of High and Outstanding Biodiversity Significance in the area." App. 33-34. Respondents estimate that undertaking these analyses alone would cost more than $100,000. Id., at 17. And whatever pertinence all this might have to the issuance of a permit, none of it will alter the finality of the approved JD, or affect its suitability for judicial review. The permitting process adds nothing to the JD. The Corps nevertheless argues that Congress made the "evident [ ]" decision in the Clean Water Act that a coverage determination would be made "as part of the permitting process, and that the property owner would obtain any necessary judicial review of that determination at the conclusion of that process." Brief for Petitioner 46. But as the Corps acknowledges, the Clean Water Act makes no reference to standalone jurisdictional determinations, ibid., so there is little basis for inferring anything from it concerning the reviewability of such distinct final agency action. And given "the APA's presumption of reviewability for all final agency action," Sackett, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1373, "[t]he mere fact" that permitting decisions are "reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to other[ ]" agency actions, such as approved JDs, Abbott, 387 U.S., at 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sackett, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1373 ("[I]f the express provision of judicial review in one section of a long and complicated statute were alone enough to overcome the APA's presumption of reviewability ..., it would not be much of a presumption at all"). Finally, the Corps emphasizes that seeking review in an enforcement action or at the end of the permitting process would be the only available avenues for obtaining review "[i]f the Corps had never adopted its practice of issuing standalone jurisdictional determinations upon request." Reply Brief 3; see also id., at 4, 23. True enough. But such a "count your blessings" argument is not an adequate rejoinder to the assertion of a right to judicial review under the APA. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice ALITO join, concurring. My join extends to the Court's opinion in full. The following observation seems appropriate not to qualify what the Court says but to point out that, based on the Government's representations in this case, the reach and systemic consequences of the Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern. As Justice ALITO has noted in an earlier case, the Act's reach is "notoriously unclear" and the consequences to landowners even for inadvertent violations can be crushing. See Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1367, 1374-1375, 182 L.Ed.2d 367 (2012) (concurring opinion). An approved Jurisdictional Determination (JD) gives a landowner at least some measure of predictability, so long as the agency's declaration can be relied upon. Yet, the Government has represented in this litigation that a JD has no legally binding effect on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement decisions. It has stated that the memorandum of agreement between the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, which today's opinion relies on, does not have binding effect and can be revoked or amended at the Agency's unfettered discretion. Reply Brief 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. If that were correct, the Act's ominous reach would again be unchecked by the limited relief the Court allows today. Even if, in an ordinary case, an agency's internal agreement with another agency cannot establish that its action is final, the Court is right to construe a JD as binding in light of the fact that in many instances it will have a significant bearing on whether the Clean Water Act comports with due process. The Act, especially without the JD procedure were the Government permitted to foreclose it, continues to raise troubling questions regarding the Government's power to cast doubt on the full use and enjoyment of private property throughout the Nation. In 2015, the Corps adopted a new rule modifying the definition of the scope of waters covered by the Clean Water Act in light of scientific research and decisions of this Court interpreting the Act. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States," 80 Fed.Reg. 37054, 37055-37056. That rule is currently stayed nationwide, pending resolution of claims that the rule is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. See In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804, 807-809 (C.A.6 2015). Because we determine that a JD satisfies both prongs of Bennett, we need not consider respondents' argument that an agency action that satisfies only the first may also constitute final agency action. See Brief for Respondents 19-20. The Corps asserts that the Memorandum of Agreement addresses only "special case" JDs, rather than "mine-run" ones "of the sort at issue here." Reply Brief 12, n. 3. But the memorandum plainly makes binding "[a]ll final determinations," whether in "[s]pecial" or "[n]on-special" cases. Memorandum of Agreement §§ IV-C, VI-A; see also Corps, Memorandum of Understanding Geographical Jurisdiction of the Section 404 Program, 45 Fed.Reg. 45019, n. 1 (1980) ("[U]nder this [memorandum], except in special cases previously agreed to, the [Corps] is authorized to make a final determination ... and such determination shall be binding.").

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY, et al. No. 80-2078. Argued June 24, 1981 Decided July 2, 1981 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined; in all but n. 6 of which Powell, J., joined; and in all but Part V of which Stevens, J., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 690. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 690. C. Stephen Howard argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Raymond C. Fisher and Stanley C. Fickle. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for the federal respondents. On the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Edwin S. Kneedler, Robert E. Kopp, and Michael F. Hertz. Thomas G. Shack, Jr., argued the cause for intervenor-respondent Islamic Republic of Iran. With him on the briefs were Raymond J. Kimball and Christine Cook Nettsheim. Eric M. Lieberman argued the cause for intervenor-respond-ent Bank Markazi Iran. With him on the briefs were Leon ard B. Boudin, Gordon J. Johnson, Michael Krinsky, Ellen J. Winner, Edward Copeland, and Judith Levin. Elihu Insel-buch filed a brief for intervenor-respondent Atomic Energy-Organization of Iran. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Carol Goodman and Samuel Hoar for Chas. T. Main International, Inc.; by Gerald M. Singer for Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall; and by Edward N. Costikyan and George P. Felleman for Marschalk Co., Inc. Daniel P. Levitt, Michael S. Oberman, Greg A. Danilow, Alan B. Friedman, and Martin S. Zohn filed a brief for Bank Melli Iran et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by David Ginsburg, Lee R. Marks, Alan S. Weitz, James A. DeBois, and Frank M. Steadman, Jr., for American Bell International Inc.; by Thomas W. Luce III, M. David Bryant, Jr., Eugene Zemp DuBose, Monroe Leigh, and Michael Sandler for Electronic Data Systems Corporation Iran; by Brice M. Clagett and Paul G. Gaston for FLAG, Inc.; by Bartlett H. McGuire, Karen E. Wagner, George M. Duff III, Ralph L. McAfee, George F. Hritz, Robert B. von Mehren, Richard J. Medalie, Joseph S. Heilman, Norman R. Nelson, Richard C. Tufaro, A. H. Wilcox, Gilbert J. Helwig, John E. Hoffman, Jr., Thomas W. Cashel, Edwin McAmis, John W. Dickey, Michael M. Maney, and Peter H. Kaminer for Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York; by Michael Burrows, Robert B. Davidson, Lawrence W. Newman, David R. Hyde, Michael P. Tierney, Powell Pierpoint, Joseph S. Heilman, Kurt J. Wolff, Jeremiah D. Lambert, William Coston, Edward' A. Woolley, James Schreiber, and James M. McHale for Reading & Bates Corp. et ah; by Alan Raywid and Margaret E. Rolnick for Sperry Corp. et al.; by John Carey and Jerry L. Siegel for Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc.; and by Alan I. Rothenberg and Robert E. Mangels for Jerry Plotkin. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally upon the manner in which our Republic is to be governed. Throughout the nearly two centuries of our Nation’s existence under the Constitution, this subject has generated considerable debate. We have had the benefit of commentators such as John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison writing in The Federalist Papers at the Nation’s very inception, the benefit of astute foreign observers of our system such as Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first century of the Nation’s existence, and the benefit of many other treatises as well as more than 400 volumes of reports of decisions of this Court. As these writings reveal it is doubtless both futile and perhaps dangerous to find any epi-grammatical explanation of how this country has been governed. Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, “[a] judge . . . may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 634 (1952) (concurring opinion). Our decision today will not dramatically alter this situation, for the Framers “did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government.” Id., at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). We are confined to a resolution of the dispute presented to us. That dispute involves various Executive Orders and regulations by which the President nullified attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against Iran that may be presented to an International Claims Tribunal. This action was taken in an effort to comply with an Executive Agreement between the United States and Iran. We granted certiorari before judgment in this case, and set an expedited briefing and argument schedule, because lower courts had reached conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President’s actions and, as the Solicitor General informed us, unless the Government acted by July 19, 1981, Iran could consider the United States to be in breach of the Executive Agreement. But before turning to the facts and law which we believe determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which have considered the President’s actions makes us acutely aware of the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the case. Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This does not mean that reasoned analysis may give way to judicial fiat. It does mean that the statement of Justice Jackson— that we decide difficult cases presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our competence — is especially true here. We attempt to lay down no general “guidelines” covering other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case. Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the foregoing definition of Art. Ill judicial power with the broad range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential value for subsequent cases. The tensions present in any exercise of executive power under the tripartite system of Federal Government established by the Constitution have been reflected in opinions by Members of this Court more than once. The Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-320 (1936): “[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations — a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.” And yet 16 years later, Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area, focused not on the “plenary and ex-elusive power of the President” but rather responded to a claim of virtually unlimited powers for the Executive by noting: “The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the forefathers .was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his image.” 343 U. S., at 641. As we now turn to the factual and legal issues in this case, we freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one more episode in the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive authority in a world that presents each day some new challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances. I On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized and our diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage. In response to that crisis, President Carter, acting pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626, 50 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) (hereinafter IEEPA), declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979, and blocked the removal or transfer of “all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States . . . .” Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457 (1980), note following 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (1976 ed., Supp. III). President Carter authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations carrying out the blocking order. On November 15, 1979, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a regulation providing that “[u]nless licensed or authorized . . . any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or since [November 14, 1979,] there existed an interest of Iran.” 31 CFR § 535.203 (e) (1980). The regulations also made clear that any licenses or authorizations granted could be “amended, modified, or revoked at any time.” § 535.805. On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general license authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran but which did not allow the “entry of any judgment or of any decree or order of similar or analogous effect. . . § 535.504 (a). On December 19, 1979, a clarifying regulation was issued stating that “the general authorization for judicial proceedings contained in § 535.504 (a) includes pre-judgment attachment.” § 535.418. On December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned subsidiary, Dames & Moore International, S. R. L., was a party to a written contract with the Atomic Energy Organization, and that the subsidiary’s entire interest in the contract had been assigned to petitioner. Under the contract, the subsidiary was to conduct site studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran. As provided in the terms of the contract, the Atomic Energy Organization terminated the agreement for its own convenience on June 30, 1979. Petitioner contended, however, that it was owed $3,436,694.30 plus interest for services performed under the contract prior to the date of termination. The District Court issued orders of attachment directed against property of the defendants, and the property of certain Iranian banks was then attached to secure any judgment that might be entered against them. On January 20, 1981, the Americans held hostage were released by Iran pursuant to an Agreement entered into the day before and embodied in two Declarations of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (App. to Pet. for Cert. 21-29), and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (id., at 30-35). The Agreement stated that “[i]t is the purpose of [the United States and Iran] ... to terminate all litigation as between the Government of each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.” Id., at 21-22. In furtherance of this goal, the Agreement called for the establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claims not settled within six months. Awards of the Claims Tribunal are to be “final and binding” and “enforceable ... in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.” Id., at 32. Under the Agreement, the United States is obligated “to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration.” Id., at 22. In addition, the United States must “act to bring about the transfer” by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets held in this country by American banks. Id., at 24-25. One billion dollars of these assets will be deposited in a security account in the Bank of England, to the account of the Algerian Central Bank, and used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by the Claims Tribunal. Ibid. On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of Executive Orders implementing the terms of the agreement. Exec. Orders Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932. These Orders revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of “any right, power, or privilege” with regard to Iranian funds, securities, or deposits; “nullified” all non-Iranian interests in such assets acquired subsequent to the blocking order of November 14, 1979; and required those banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them “to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.” Exec. Order No. 12279, 46 Fed. Reg. 7919. On February 24, 1981, President Reagan issued an Executive Order in which he “ratified” the January 19th Executive Orders. Exec! Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14111. Moreover, he “suspended” all “claims which may be presented to the . . . Tribunal” and provided that such claims “shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United States.” Ibid. The suspension of any particular claim terminates if the Claims Tribunal determines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim; claims are discharged for all purposes when the Claims Tribunal either awards some recovery and that amount is paid, or determines that no recovery is due. Ibid. Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for summary judgment in the District Court against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization, but not against the Iranian banks. The District Court granted petitioner’s motion and awarded petitioner the amount claimed under the contract plus interest. Thereafter, petitioner attempted to execute the judgment by obtaining writs of garnishment and execution in state court in the State of Washington, and a sheriff’s sale of Iranian property in Washington ■was noticed to satisfy the judgment. However, by order of May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, the District Court stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization. The District Court also ordered that all prejudgment attachments obtained against the Iranian defendants be vacated and that further proceedings against the bank defendants be stayed in light of the Executive Orders discussed above. App. to Pet. for Cert. 106-107. On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed this action in the District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran were beyond their statutory and constitutional powers and, in any event, were unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect petitioner’s final judgment against the Government of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its ability to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks. Id., at 1-12. On May 28, 1981, the District Court denied petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id., at 106-107. Prior to the District Court’s ruling, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and the District of Columbia Circuits upheld the President’s authority to issue the Executive Orders and regulations challenged by petitioner. See Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F. 2d 800 (CA1 1981); American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U. S. App. D. C. 468, 657 F. 2d 430 (1981). On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s order, and the appeal was docketed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 4, the Treasury Department amended its regulations to mandate “the transfer of bank deposits and certain other financial assets of Iran in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by noon, June 19.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 151-152. The District Court, however, entered an injunction pending appeal prohibiting the United States from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to “any writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy, or other judicial lien”, issued by any court in favor of petitioner. Id., at 168. Arguing that this is a case of “imperative public importance,” petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari before judgment. Pet. for Cert. 10. See 28 U. S. C.' § 2101 (e); this Court’s Rule 18. Because the issues presented here are of great significance and demand prompt resolution, we granted the petition for the writ, adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and set the case for oral argument on June 24, 1981. 452 U. S. 932 (1981). II The parties and the lower courts, confronted with the instant questions, have all agreed that much relevant analysis is contained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in that case, involving the validity of President Truman’s effort to seize the country’s steel mills in the wake of a nationwide strike, recognized that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Id., at 585. Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion elaborated in a general way the consequences of different types of interaction between the two democratic branches in assessing Presidential authority to act in any given case. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by Congress. In such a case the executive action “would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” Id., at 637. When the President acts in the absence of congressional authorization he may enter “a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Ibid. In such a case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity of the President’s action, at least so far as separation-of-powers principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration of all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch toward such action, including “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.” Ibid. Finally, when the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb,” and the Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id., at 637-638. Although we have in the past found and do today find Justice Jackson’s classification of executive actions into three general categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of Justice Holmes’ admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, supra, at 597 (concurring opinion), that “[t]he great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.” Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (dissenting opinion). Justice Jackson himself recognized that his three categories represented “a somewhat over-simplified grouping,” 343 U. S., at 635, and it is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects cases such as the one before us, involving responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any detail. Ill - In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and directing those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and securities to transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for ultimate transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five sources of express or inherent power. The Government, however, has principally relied on § 203 of the IEEPA, 91 Stat. 1626, 50 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), as authorization for these actions. Section 1702 (a)(1) provides in part: “At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise— “(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit— “(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, “(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof, “(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, and “(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; “by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The Government contends that the acts of “nullifying” the attachments and ordering the “transfer” of the frozen assets are specifically authorized by the plain language of the above statute. The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue agreed with this contention. In Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained: “The President relied on his IEEPA powers in November 1979, when he ‘blocked’ all Iranian assets in this country, and again in January 1981, when he ‘nullified’ interests acquired in blocked property, and ordered that property’s transfer. The President’s actions, in this regard, are in keeping with the language of IEEPA: initially he ‘prevented] and prohibit[ed]’ ‘transfers’ of Iranian assets; later he ‘direct [ed] and compel [led]’ the 'transfer’ and 'withdrawal’ of the assets, 'nullify[ing]’ certain 'rights’ and 'privileges’ acquired in them. “Main argues that IEEPA does not supply the President with power to override judicial remedies, such as attachments and injunctions, or to extinguish 'interests’ in foreign assets held by United States citizens. But we can find no such limitation in IEEPA’s terms. The language of IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. It provides broadly that the President may void or nullify the ‘exercising [by any person of] any right, power or privilege with respect to . . . any property in which any foreign country has any interest . . . .’ 50 U. S. C. § 1702 (a)(1)(B).” 651 F. 2d, at 806-807 (emphasis in original). In American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit employed a similar rationale in sustaining President Carter’s action: “The Presidential revocation of the license he issued permitting prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets is an action that falls within the plain language of the IEEPA. In vacating the attachments, he acted to 'nullify [and] void . . . any . . . exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to . . . any property in which any foreign country . . . has any interest ... by any person . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’ ” 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 477, 657 F. 2d, at 439 (footnote omitted). Petitioner contends that we should ignore the plain language of this statute because an examination of its legislative history as well as the history of § 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (hereinafter TWEA), 40 Stat. 411, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 5 (b) (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), from which the pertinent language of § 1702 is directly drawn, reveals that the statute was not intended to give the President such extensive power over the assets of a foreign state during times of national emergency. According to petitioner, once the President instituted the November 14, 1979, blocking order, § 1702 authorized him “only to continue the freeze or to discontinue controls.” Brief for Petitioner 32. We do not agree and refuse to read out of § 1702 all meaning to the words “transfer,” “compel,” or “nullify.” Nothing in the legislative history of either § 1702 or § 5 (b) of the TWEA requires such a result. To the contrary, we think both the legislative history and cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive when acting under this congressional grant of power. See, e. g., Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U. S. 183 (1953). Although Congress intended to limit the President’s emergency power in peacetime, we do not think the changes brought about by the enactment of the IEEPA in any way affected the authority of the President to take the specific actions taken here. We likewise note that by the time petitioner instituted this action, the President had already entered the freeze order. Petitioner proceeded against the blocked assets only after the Treasury Department had issued revocable licenses authorizing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury Regulations provided that “unless licensed” any attachment is null and void, 31 CER § 535.203 (e) (1980), and all licenses “may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time.” § 535.805. As such, the attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically made subordinate to further actions which the President might take under the IEEPA. Petitioner was on notice of the contingent nature of its interest in the frozen assets. This Court has previously recognized that the congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders is “to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President . . . .” Prosper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 493 (1949). Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a “bargaining chip” to be used'by the President when dealing with a hostile country. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept petitioner’s argument because the practical effect of it is to allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or wholly eliminate this “bargaining chip” through attachments, garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the purpose the statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports such a result. Because the President’s action in nullifying the attachments and ordering the transfer of the assets was taken pursuant to specific congressional authorization, it is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that petitioner has sustained that heavy burden. A contrary ruling would mean that the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power exercised by the President, see id., at 636-637, and that we are not prepared to say. IV Although we have concluded that the IEEPA constitutes specific congressional authorization to the President to nullify the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets, there remains the question of the President’s authority to suspend claims pending in American courts. Such claims have, of course, an existence apart from the attachments which accompanied them. In terminating these claims through Executive Order No. 12294, the President purported to act under authority of both the IEEPA and 22 U. S. C. § 1732, the so-called “Hostage Act.” 46 Fed. Reg. 14111 (1981). We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nullification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authorize the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citizens against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving Iranian property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to such property. An in personam lawsuit, although it might eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might be executed upon, is an effort to establish liability and fix damages and does not focus on any particular property within the jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not authorize the President to suspend claims in American courts. This is the view of all the courts which have considered the question. Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F. 2d, at 809-814; American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 481, n. 15, 657 F. 2d, at 443, n. 15; The Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 79 (SDNY 1981); Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Security Organization of Iran, 508 F. Supp. 1350, 1361 (ND Tex. 1981). The Hostage Act, passed in 1868, provides: “Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign . government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.” Rev. Stat. § 2001, 22 U. S. C. § 1732. We are reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in American courts. Although the broad language of the Hostage Act suggests it may cover this case, there are several difficulties with such a view. The legislative history indicates that the Act was passed in response to a situation unlike the recent Iranian crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned with the activity of certain countries refusing to recognize the citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, and repatriating such citizens against their will. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4331 (1868) (Sen. Fessenden); id., at 4354 (Sen. Conness); see also 22 U. S. C. § 1731. These countries were not interested in returning the citizens in exchange for any sort of ransom. This also explains the reference in the Act to imprisonment “in violation of the rights of American citizenship.” Although the Iranian hostage-taking violated international law and common decency, the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize their American citizenship — they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship. The legislative history is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Congress contemplated Presidential action such as that involved here or rather simply reprisals directed against the offending foreign country and its citizens. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4205 (1868); American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, at 490-491, 657 F. 2d, at 452-453 (opinion of Mikva, J.). Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act constitutes specific authorization of the President’s action suspending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the validity of the President’s action. We think both statutes highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those presented in this case. As noted in Part III, supra, at 670-672, the IEEPA delegates broad authority to the President to act in times of national emergency with respect to property of a foreign country. The Hostage Act similarly indicates congressional willingness that the President have broad discretion when responding to the hostile acts of foreign sovereigns. As Senator Williams, draftsman of the language eventually enacted as the Hostage Act, put it: “If you propose any remedy at all, you must invest the Executive with some discretion, so that he may apply the remedy to a case as it may arise. As to England or France he might adopt one policy to relieve a citizen imprisoned by either one of those countries; as to the Barbary powers, he might adopt another policy; as to the islands of the ocean, another. With different countries that have different systems of government he might adopt different means.” Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4359 (1868). Proponents of the bill recognized that it placed a “loose discretion” in the President’s hands, id., at 4238 (Sen. Stewart), but argued that “[s]omething must be intrusted to the Executive” and that “[t]he President ought to have the power to do what the exigencies of the case require to rescue [a] citizen from imprisonment.” Id., at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams). An original version of the Act, which authorized the President to suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest citizens of that country in the United States in retaliation, was rejected because “there may be a great variety of cases arising where other and different means would be equally effective, and where the end desired could be accomplished without resorting to such dangerous and violent measures.” Id., at 4233 (Sen. Williams). Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the Hostage Act directly authorizes the President’s suspension of claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress’ legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action taken by the Executive. Haig v. Agee, ante, at 291. On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to “invite” “measures on independent presidential responsibility,” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President. It is to that history which we now turn. Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another country are “sources of friction” between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 225 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the government of another “are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory.” L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. Though those settlements have sometimes been made by treaty, there has also been a longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the advice and consent of the Senate. Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since a claimant’s only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the “United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole.” Henkin, supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213 (1965) (President “may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state . . . [even] without the consent of the [injured] national”). It is clear that the practice of settling claims continues today. Since 1952, the President has entered into at least 10 binding settlements with foreign nations, including an $80 million settlement with the People’s Republic of China. Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress’ enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 13, as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 1621 et seg. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The Act had two purposes: (1) to allocate to United States nationals funds received in the course of an executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be distributed. To achieve these ends Congress created the International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and gave it jurisdiction to make final and binding decisions with respect to claims by United States nationals against settlement funds. 22 U. S. C. § 1623 (a). By creating a procedure to implement future settlement agreements, Congress placed its stamp of approval on such agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act observed that the United States was seeking settle-mente with countries other than Yugoslavia and that the bill contemplated settlements of a similar nature in the future. H. R. Rep. No. 770, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 4, 8 (1949). Over the years Congress has frequently amended the International Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular problems arising out of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating Congress’ continuing acceptance of the President’s claim settlement authority. With respect to the Executive Agreement with the People’s Republic of China, for example, Congress established an allocation formula for distribution of the funds received pursuant to the Agreement. 22 U. S. C. § 1627 (f) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As with legislation involving other executive agreements, Congress did not question the fact of the settlement or the power of the President to have concluded it. In 1976, Congress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the merits of claims by United States nationals against East Germany, prior to any settlement with East Germany, so that the Executive would “be in a better position to negotiate an adequate settlement ... of these claims.” S. Rep. No. 94-1188, p. 2 (1976); 22 U. S. C. § 1644b. Similarly, Congress recently amended the International Claims Settlement Act to facilitate the settlement of claims against Vietnam. 22 U. S. C. §§ 1645, 1645a (5) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The House Report stated that the purpose of the legislation was to establish an official inventory of losses of private United States property in Vietnam so that recovery could be achieved “through future direct Government-to-Government negotiation of private property claims.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-915, pp. 2-3 (1980). Finally, the legislative history of the IEEPA further reveals that' Congress has accepted the authority of the Executive to enter into settlement agreements. Though the IEEPA was enacted to provide for some limitation on the President’s emergency powers, Congress stressed that “[n]oth-ing in this act is intended ... to interfere with the authority of the President to [block assets], or to impede the settlement of claims of U. S. citizens against foreign countries.” S. Rep. No. 95-466, p. 6 (1977); 50 U. S. C. § 1706 (a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President’s power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also recognized that the President does have some measure of power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate. In United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), for example, the Court upheld the validity of the Litvinov Assignment, which was part of an Executive Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assigned to the United States amounts owed to it by American nationals so that outstanding claims of other American nationals could be paid. The Court explained that the resolution of such claims was integrally connected with normalizing United States’ relations with a foreign state: “Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest implied power of the President .... No such obstacle can be placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another nation, unless the historic conception of the powers and responsibilities ... is to be drastically revised.” Id., at 229-230. Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized: “The constitutional power of the President extends to the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government and the United States, at least when it is an incident to the recognition of that government; and it would be unreasonable to circumscribe it to such controversies. The continued mutual amity between the nation and other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such compromises has existed from the earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of all civilized nations.” Ozanic v. United States, 188 F. 2d 228, 231 (CA2 1951). Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the proposition that Congress has acquiesced in this longstanding practice of claims settlement by executive agreement. First, it suggests that all pre-1952 settlement claims, and corresponding court cases such as Pink, should be discounted because of the evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Petitioner observes that prior to 1952 the United States adhered to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity, so that absent action by the Executive there simply would be no remedy for a United States national against a foreign government. When the United States in 1952 adopted a more restrictive notion of sovereign immunity, by means of the so-called “Tate” letter, it is petitioner's view that United States nationals no longer needed executive aid to settle claims and that, as a result, the President's authority to settle such claims in some sense “disappeared.” Though petitioner’s argument is not wholly without merit, it is refuted by the fact that since 1952 there have been at least 10 claims settlements by executive agreement. Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases should be disregarded, congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that time supports the President’s power to act here. Petitioner next asserts that Congress divested the President of the authority to settle claims when it enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1330,1602 et seq. The FSIA granted personal and subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal district courts over commercial suits brought by claimants against those foreign states which have waived immunity. 28 U. S. C. § 1330. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, a foreign government’s immunity to suit was determined by the Executive Branch on a case-by-case basis. According to petitioner, the principal purpose of the FSIA was to depoliticize these commercial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of foreign affairs — where the Executive Branch is subject to the pressures of foreign states seeking to avoid liability through a grant of immunity — and by placing them within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the President, by suspending its claims, has circumscribed the jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of Art. Ill of the Constitution. We disagree. In the first place, we do not believe that the President has attempted to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to “suspend” the claims, not divest the federal court of “jurisdiction.” • As we read the Executive Order, those claims not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will “revive” and become judicially enforceable in United States courts. This case, in short, illustrates the difference between modifying federal-court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801). The President has exercised the power, acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims and, as such, has simply effected a change in the substantive law governing the lawsuit. Indeed, the very example of sovereign immunity belies petitioner’s argument. No one would suggest that a determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of “jurisdiction.” Yet, petitioner’s argument, if accepted, would have required courts prior to the enactment of the FSIA to reject as an encroachment on their jurisdiction the President’s determination of a foreign state’s sovereign immunity. Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. The principal purpose of the FSIA was to codify contemporary concepts concerning the scope of sovereign immunity and withdraw from the President the authority to make binding determinations of the sovereign immunity to be accorded foreign states. See Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F. 2d, at 813-814; American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 482, 657 F. 2d, at 444. The FSIA was thus designed to remove one particular barrier to suit, namely sovereign immunity, and- cannot be fairly read as prohibiting the President from settling claims of United States nationals against foreign governments. It is telling that the 'Congress which enacted the FSIA considered but rejected several proposals designed to limit the power of the President to enter into executive agreements, including claims settlement agreements. It is quite unlikely that the same Congress that rejected proposals to limit the President’s authority to conclude executive agreements sought to accomplish that very purpose sub silentio through the FSIA. And, as noted above, just one year after enacting the FSIA, Congress enacted the IEEPA, where the legislative history stressed that nothing in the IEEPA was to impede the settlement of claims of United States citizens. It would be surprising for Congress to express this support for settlement agreements had it intended the FSIA to eliminate the President’s authority to make such agreements. In light of all of the foregoing — the inferences to be drawn from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the area, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and from the history of acquiescence in executive claims settlement — we conclude that the President was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 610-611, “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.” Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but "long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .” United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 474 (1915). See Haig v. Agee, ante, at 291-292. Such practice is present here and such a presumption is also appropriate. In light of the fact that Congress may be considered to have consented to the President’s action in suspending claims, we cannot say that action exceeded the President’s powers. Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the means chosen by the President to settle the claims of American nationals provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal, which is capable of providing meaningful relief. The Solicitor General also suggests that the provision of the Claims Tribunal will actually enhance the opportunity for claimants to recover their claims, in that the Agreement removes a number of jurisdictional and procedural impediments faced by claimants in United States courts. Brief for Federal Respondents 13-14. Although being overly sanguine about the chances of United States claimants before the Claims Tribunal would require a degree of naiveté which should not be demanded even of judges, the Solicitor General’s point cannot be discounted. Moreover, it is important to remember that we have already held that the President has the statutory authority to nullify attachments and to transfer the assets out of the country. The President’s power to do so does not depend on his provision of a forum whereby claimants can recover on those claims. The fact that the President has provided such a forum here means that the claimants are receiving something in return for the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an international tribunal before which they may well recover something on their claims. Because there does appear to be a real “settlement” here, this case is more easily analogized to the more traditional claim settlement cases of the past. Just as importantly, Congress has not disapproved of the action taken here. Though Congress has held hearings on the Iranian Agreement itself, Congress has not enacted legislation, or even passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure with the Agreement. Quite the contrary, the relevant Senate Committee has stated that the establishment of the Tribunal is “of vital importance to the United States.” S. Rep. No. 97-71, p. 5 (1981). We are thus clearly not confronted with a situation in which Congress has in some way resisted the exercise of Presidential authority. Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign governmental entities. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stressed, “[t]he sheer magnitude of such a power, considered against the background of the diversity and complexity of modern international trade, cautions against any broader construction of authority than is necessary.” Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F. 2d, at 814. But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claims. V We do not think it appropriate at the present time to address petitioner’s contention that the suspension of claims, if authorized, would constitute a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the absence of just compensation. Both petitioner and the Government concede that the question whether the suspension of the claims constitutes a taking is not ripe for review. Brief for Petitioner 34, n. 32; Brief for Federal Respondents 65. Accord, Chas. T. Main Int’l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, supra, at 814-815; American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U. S. App. D. C., at 485, 657 F. 2d, at 447. However, this contention, and the possibility that the President’s actions may effect a taking of petitioner’s property, make ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), in such an event. That the fact and extent of the taking in this ease is yet speculative is inconsequential because “there must be at the time of taking ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.’ ” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 124-125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 659 (1890); see also Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 330, 335-336 (1952); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 94, n. 39 (1978). It has been contended that the “treaty exception” to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 U. S. C. § 1502, might preclude the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over any takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argument, however, the Government conceded that § 1502 would not act as a bar to petitioner’s action in the Court of Claims. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-42, 47. We agree. See United States v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427 (1893); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 209 Ct. Cl. 446, 534 F. 2d 889 (1976). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner believes it has suffered an unconstitutional taking by the suspension of the claims, we see no jurisdie-tional obstacle to an appropriate action in the United States Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed, and the mandate shall issue forthwith. It is so ordered. Title 50 U. S. C. § 1701 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) states that the President’s authority under the Act “may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” Petitioner does not challenge President Carter’s declaration of a national emergency. Title 50 U. S. C. § 1702 (a) (1) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) empowers the President to “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest . . . Title 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980) provides in full: “The provisions of this part and any rulings, licenses, authorizations, instructions, orders, or forms issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time.” The contract stated that any dispute incapable of resolution by agreement of the parties would be submitted to conciliation and that, if either party was unwilling to accept the results of conciliation, “the matter shall be decided finally by resort to the courts Of Iran.” Pet. for Cert. 7, n. 2. In its complaint, which was based on breach of contract and related theories, petitioner alleged that it had sought a meeting with the Atomic Energy Organization for purposes of settling matters relating to the contract but that the Organization “has continually postponed [the] meeting and obviously does not intend that it take place.” Complaint in Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. CV 79-04918 LEW (Px) (CD Cal.), ¶27. Petitioner argues that under the TWEA the President was given two powers: (1) the power temporarily to freeze or block the transfer of foreign-owned assets; and (2) the power summarily to seize and permanently vest title to foreign-owned assets. It is contended that only the “vesting” provisions of the TWEA gave the President the power permanently to dispose of assets and when Congress enacted the IEEPA in 1977 it purposefully did not grant the President this power. According to petitioner, the nullification of the attachments and the transfer of the assets will permanently dispose of the assets and would not even be permissible under the TWEA. We disagree. Although it is true the IEEPA does not give the President the power to “vest” or to take title to the assets, it does not follow that the President is not authorized under both the IEEPA and the TWEA to otherwise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done here. Petitioner errs in assuming that the only power granted by the language used in both § 1702 and § 5(b) of the TWEA is the power temporarily to freeze assets. As noted above, the plain language of the statute defies such a holding. Section 1702 authorizes the President to “direct and compel” the “transfer, withdrawal, transportation, ... or exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign country . . . has any interest . . . .” We likewise reject the contention that Orvis v. Brownell and Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 446 (1951), grant petitioner the right to retain its attachments on the Iranian assets. To the contrary, we think Orvis supports the proposition that an American claimant may not use an attachment that is subject to a revocable license and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to limit in any way the actions the President may take under § 1702 respecting the frozen assets. An attachment so obtained is in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA. Although petitioner concedes that the President could have forbidden attachments, it nevertheless argues that once he allowed them the President permitted claimants to acquire property interests in their attachments. Petitioner further argues that only the licenses to obtain the attachments were made revocable, not the attachments themselves. It is urged that the January 19, 1981, order revoking all licenses only affected petitioner’s right to obtain future attachments. We disagree. As noted above, the regulations specifically provided that any attachment is null and void “unless licensed,” and all licenses may be revoked at any time. Moreover, common sense defies petitioner’s reading of the regulations. The President could hardly have intended petitioner and other similarly situated claimants to have the power to take control of the frozen assets out of his hands. Our construction of petitioner’s attachments as being “revocable,” “contingent,” and “in every sense subordinate to the President’s power under the IEEPA,” in effect answers petitioner’s claim that even if the President had the authority to nullify the attachments and transfer the assets, the exercise of such would constitute an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment absent just compensation. We conclude that because of the President’s authority to prevent or condition attachments, and because of the orders he issued to this effect, petitioner did not acquire any “property” interest in its attachments of the sort that would support a constitutional claim for compensation. Judge Mikva, in his separate opinion in American Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U. S. App. D. C. 468, 490, 657 F. 2d 430, 452 (1981), argued that the moniker “Hostage Act” was newly coined for purposes of this litigation. Suffice it to say that we focus on the language of 22 U. S. C. § 1732, not any shorthand description of it. See W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, scene 2, line 43 (“What’s in a name?”). At least since the case of the “Wilmington Packet” in 1799, Presidents have exercised the power to' settle claims of United States nationals by executive agreement. See Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 69 Am. J. Int’l L. 837, 844 (1975). In fact, during the period of 1817-1917, “no fewer than eighty executive agreements were entered into by the United States looking toward the liquidation of claims of its citizens.”- W. McClure, International Executive Agreements 53 (1941). See also 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 247 (1970). Those agreements are [1979] 30 U. S; T. 1957 (People’s Republic of China); [1976] 27 U. S. T. 3933 (Peru); [1976] 27 U. S. T. 4214 (Egypt); [1974] 25 U. S. T. 227 (Peru); [1973] 24 U. S. T. 522 (Hungary); [1969] 20 U. S. T. 2654 (Japan); [1965] 16 U. S. T. 1 (Yugoslavia); [1963] 14 U. S. T. 969 (Bulgaria); [1960] 11 U. S. T. 1953 (Poland); [1960] 11 U. S. T. 317 (Rumania). Indeed, Congress has consistently failed to object to this longstanding practice of claim settlement by executive agreement, even when it has had an opportunity to do so. In 1972, Congress entertained legislation relating to congressional oversight of such agreements. But Congress took only limited action, requiring that the text of significant executive agreements be transmitted to Congress. 1 U. S. C. § 112b. In Haig v. Agee, ante, p. 280, we noted that “[d] espite the longstanding and officially promulgated view' 'that the Executive has the power to withhold passports for reasons of national security and foreign policy, Congress in 1978, ‘though it once again enacted legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the broad rule-making authority granted in the earlier Act.’” Ante, at 301, quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 12 (1965). Likewise in this case, Congress, though legislating in the area, has left “untouched” the authority of the President to enter into settlement agreements. The legislative history of 1 U. S. C. § 112b further reveals that Congress has accepted the President’s authority to settle claims. During the hearings on the bill, Senator Case, the sponsor of the Act, stated with respect to executive claim settlements: “I think it is a most interesting [area] in which we have accepted the right of the President, one individual, acting through his diplomatic force, to adjudicate and settle claims of American nationals against foreign countries. But that is a fact.” Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings on S. 596 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 74 (1971). The rejected legislation would typically have required congressional approval of executive agreements before they would be considered effective. See Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 243-261, 302-311 (1975); Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 167, 246 (1976). See Hearings on the Iranian Agreements before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Hearings on the Iranian Asset Settlement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Hearings on the Algerian Declarations before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Contrast congressional reaction to the Iranian Agreements with congressional reaction to a 1973 Executive Agreement with Czechoslovakia. There the President sought to settle over $105 million in claims against Czechoslovakia for $20.5 million. Congress quickly demonstrated its displeasure by enacting legislation requiring that the Agreement be renegotiated. See Lillich, supra n. 8, at 839-840. Though Congress has shown itself capable of objecting to executive agreements, it has rarely done so and has not done so in this case. Though we conclude that the President has settled petitioner’s claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the settlement has terminated petitioner’s possible taking claim against the United States. We express no views on petitioner’s claims that it has suffered a taking.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 790 v. ROBBINS & MYERS, INC., et al. No. 75-1264. Argued November 9, 1976 Decided December 20, 1976 Winn Newman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 75-1264. With him on the briefs were Ruth Weyand, Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, J. Albert Woll, and Laurence Gold. Barry L. Goldstein argued the cause for petitioner in No. 75-1276. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Eric Schnapper, and Albert J. Rosenthal. Fletcher L. Hudson argued the cause for respondent Robbins & Myers, Inc., in both cases pro hac vice. With him on the brief was Charles A. Lawrence, Jr. Together with No. 75-1276, Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., also on certiorari to the same court. Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Walter W. Barnett, Abner W. Sibal, Joseph T. Eddins, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Charles S. P. Hodge filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both eases. Jay S. Siegel and Douglas S. McDowell filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Me. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners seek review of a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that a claim brought by petitioner Dortha Guy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was barred by her failure to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutory limitations period. They present three contentions: The existence and utilization of grievance procedures postpone the date on which an allegedly discriminatory firing took place; the existence and utilization of grievance procedures toll the running of the limitations period which would otherwise begin on the date of the firing; and the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103 (Mar. 24, 1972), extending the limitations period from 90 to 180 days, apply to the charge in this case. I Respondent Robbins & Myers, Inc. (hereinafter respondent), terminated the employment of petitioner Guy on October 25, 1971, and assigned as its reason for doing so her failure to comply with procedures contained in the collective-bargaining agreement pertaining to leaves of absence. Two days later petitioner caused a grievance alleging an “unfair action” of the company in firing her to be filed on her behalf in accordance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement then in force between petitioner Local 790 of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (Local 790) and respondent. That agreement’s dispute-resolution procedure, which is to be commenced within “five (5) working days of the commission of the act originating the grievance,” consists of three grievance steps followed by one arbitration step. Guy’s grievance was processed through the third step of the grievance procedure where it was denied on November 18, 1971, with the finding that her termination had been in accordance with the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. On February 10, 1972, a date 84 days after the denial of her grievance at the third stage, but 108 days after the date of her discharge, Guy, who is black, filed a charge of racial discrimination with the EEOC directed against both respondent and Local 790. The EEOC in November 1973 issued its determination and “right to sue” letter, finding that there was “no reason to believe that race was a factor in the decision to discharge” Guy. Her suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5, was met by a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that it was barred because of her failure to file a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of her discharge, § 706 (d), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (d). The District Court dismissed her action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment by a divided vote, 525 F. 2d 124 (1975). That court felt that it would be “utterly inconsistent” with our opinions in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454 (1975) and in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), to hold that the pursuit of a contractual grievance procedure operates to toll a Title VII remedy “which the employee has a right to resort to concurrently.” 525 F. 2d, at 126. Then, noting the question of the applicability of the 1972 amendments to Title VII raised by the EEOC as amicus curiae (also noting without more that “[s]ince this issue was not raised in the District Court by any party to the case, we are not required to consider it”), the Court of Appeals stated: “Plaintiff Guy’s claim was barred on January 24, 1972. She did not file her charge with EEOC until February 10, 1972. The amendments to Title VII, increasing the time within which to file her charge to 180 days, did not become effective until March 24, 1972. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e) [1970 ed., Supp. V], The subsequent increase of time to file the charge enacted by Congress could not revive plaintiff’s claim which had been previously barred and extinguished.” 525 F. 2d, at 128. The dissenting judge disagreed on this point, believing that the case should be remanded for consideration of the effect of the 1972 amendments. We granted certiorari, 425 U. S. 950, to resolve an apparent Circuit conflict on two of these issues: tolling during the pendency of a collective-bargaining-contract’s grievance mechanism, and the applicability of the 1972 amendments to charges filed more than 90 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory act but less than 180 days before the time the amendments became effective. II Before reaching either of those questions, however, petitioners Guy and Local 790 assert that the complaint with the EEOC was timely filed, not because of any tolling concept, but simply because the date “the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” is the date of the conclusion of the collective-bargaining agreement’s grievance-arbitration procedures. Until that time, we are told, the October 25 discharge of Guy (although itself an “occurrence” allowing immediate resort to the EEOC) was “tentative” and “non-final,” and remained so until she terminated the grievance and arbitration process, at which time the “final” occurrence transpired. As a consequence, according to petitioners, the unfavorable termination of the grievance procedures, making the discharge “final,” constituted an “occurrence” enabling Guy to start the 90-day period running from that date. While the parties could conceivably have agreed to a contract under which management’s ultimate adoption of a supervisor’s recommendation would be deemed the relevant statutory “occurrence,” this was not such a contract. For all that appears Guy was fired as of October 25, 1971, and all parties so understood. She stopped work and ceased receiving pay and benefits as of that date. Unless the grievanee procedures resulted in her reinstatement, she would not be entitled to be paid for the period during which the grievance procedures were being implemented. The grievance lodged on October 27, 1971, protests the “unfair action of Co. for discharge” (emphasis added), while the complaint filed in the District Court alleges Guy’s disagreement, after learning of her discharge, “with the Company’s determination that she had Voluntarily quit,”’ (emphasis added). Throughout the proceedings both in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals, both sides appear to have assumed, as did the courts, that the date of discharge was October 25, 1971. There being no indication that either party viewed the October 25 discharge as anything other than “final,” there is certainly no reason for us to now torture this mutual understanding by accepting the bare assertions to the contrary raised by petitioners for the first time before this Court. Ill We think that petitioners’ arguments for tolling the statutory period for filing a claim with the EEOC during the pendency of grievance or arbitration procedures under the collective-bargaining contract are virtually foreclosed by our decisions in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), and in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454 (1975). In Alexander we held that an arbitrator’s decision pursuant to provisions in a collective-bargaining contract was not binding on an individual seeking to pursue his Title VII remedies in court. We reasoned that the contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agreement and the statutory right provided by Congress under Title VII “have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee,” 415 U. S., at 52, and for that reason we concluded: “[I]n instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator’s decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process.” Id., at 54. One Term later, we reaffirmed the independence of Title VII remedies from other pre-existing remedies available to an aggrieved employee. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, we held that the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC pursuant to § 706 of Title VII did not toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable to an action, based on the same facts, brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. In reaffirming the independence of Title VII remedies from other remedies, we noted that such independence might occasionally be a two-edged sword, but “in the face of congressional emphasis upon the existence and independence of the two remedies,” we were disinclined “to infer any positive preference for one over the other, without a more definite expression in the legislation Congress has enacted,” 421 U. S., at 461. Petitioners insist that notwithstanding these decisions, equitable tolling principles should be applied to this litigation, and that the application of such principles would toll the 90-day period pending completion of the grievance procedures. This is so, they say, because here the “policy of repose, designed to protect defendants,” Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428 (1965), is “outweighed [because] the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s rights.” But this is quite a different situation from Burnett, supra. There the plaintiff in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act action had asserted his FELA claim in the state courts, which had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, but he had the misfortune of filing his complaint in an Ohio State court where venue did not lie under Ohio law. This Court held that such a filing was sufficient to toll the statutory limitations period, even though the state-court action was dismissed for improper venue and a new complaint ultimately filed in the United States District Court. The Court said: “Petitioner here did not sleep on his rights but brought an action within the statutory period in a state court of competent jurisdiction. Service of process was made upon the respondent notifying him that petitioner was asserting his cause of action.” Id., at 429. Here petitioner Guy in the grievance proceedings was not asserting the same statutory claim in a different forum, nor giving notice to respondent of that statutory claim, but was asserting an independent claim based on a contract right, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at 53-54, 56-58. Burnett cannot aid this petitioner, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 467, and n. 14. Petitioners advance as a corollary argument for tolling the premise that substantial policy considerations, based on the central role of arbitration in labor-management relations, see Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), also dictate a finding that the Title VII limitations period is tolled in this situation. Similar arguments by the employer in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., urging the superiority and pre-eminence of the arbitration process were rejected by us in that case, and we find the reasoning of that case controlling in rejecting this claim made by petitioners. Petitioners also advance a related argument that the danger of possible conflict between the concurrent pursuit of both collective-bargaining and Title VII remedies should result in tolling the limitations period for the latter while the former proceeds to conclusion. Similar arguments to these, albeit relating to 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and not to private labor agreements, were however, raised and rejected in Johnson. We think the language we used in that case is sufficient to dispose of this claim: “[I]t is conceivable, and perhaps almost to be expected, that failure to toll will have the effect of pressing a civil rights complainant who values his § 1981 claim into court before the EEOC has completed its administrative proceeding. One answer to this, although perhaps not a highly satisfactory one, is that the plaintiff in his § 1981 suit may ask the court to stay proceedings until the administrative efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance have been completed. But the fundamental answer to petitioner’s argument lies in the fact — presumably a happy one for the civil rights claimant — that Congress clearly has retained § 1981 as a remedy against private employment discrimination separate from and independent of the more elaborate and time-consuming procedures of Title VII.” 421 U. S., at 465-466. Petitioners contend at some length that tolling would impose almost no costs, as the delays occasioned by the grievance-arbitration process would be "slight,” noting that the maximum delay in invoking the three-stage grievance procedure (although not including the arbitration step) under the collective-bargaining agreement in force in this case would be 35 days. But the principal answer to this contention is that Congress has already spoken with respect to what it considers acceptable delay when it established a 90-day limitations period, and gave no indication that it considered a “slight” delay followed by 90 days equally acceptable. In defining Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites “with precision,” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 47, Congress did not leave to courts the decision as to which delays might or might not be “slight.” Congress did provide in § 706 (b) one exception for this 90-day limitations period, when it provided that the limitations period should run for a maximum additional 120 days when there existed “a State or local law prohibiting the. unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof.” Where Congress has spoken with respect to a claim much more closely related to the Title VII claim than is the contractual claim pursued under the grievance procedure, and then firmly limited the maximum possible extension of the limitations period applicable thereto, we think that all of petitioners' arguments taken together simply do not carry sufficient weight to overcome the negative implication from the language used by Congress, cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S., at 461. IV Guy filed her charge with the EEOC on February 10, 1972, 108 days after her October 25, 1971, discharge. On March 24, 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, extended to 180 days the time within which to file a claim with the EEOC, § 706 (e). Petitioners contend that this expanded limitations period should apply to Guy’s charge, as the occurrence she was complaining of took place within 180 days of the enactment of the 1972 amendments. We agree. Section 14 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 113, states: “The amendments made by this Act to section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed thereafter.” Respondent asserts that § 14, which was added by amendment to the bill on the floor of the House by Senator Javits, 118 Cong. Rec. 4816 (1972), was designed for the sole purpose of having the new enforcement powers given to the EEOC apply to pending charges, see letter of Feb, 14, 1972, from David L. Norman, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, to Senator Dominick, quoted in EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (WD Va. 1974). However, the explicit statutory language used applies to all amendments made by the Act to § 706, not simply to the new enforcement provisions. As Senator Javits did not limit his remarks on the floor so as to indicate that § 14’s retroactivity was designed to apply only to the new enforcement provisions, the legislative history does not make this one of those unusual cases in which a court may infer, contrary to the language actually used, that Congress intended to so limit the scope of § 14, cf. also S. Rep. No. 91-1137, p. 31 (1970). Respondent also contends that the amendment is not applicable to the charge filed by Guy with the EEOC, since, being untimely when filed, her charge could not have been “pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act.” This reading of “pending” — confining it to charges still before the Commission and timely when filed — is not the only possible meaning of the word, is largely rebutted by the legislative history, and renders the language of § 14 virtually meaningless insofar as the enlarged limitations period is concerned. Since Congress also applied the enlarged limitations period to charges, whether or not untimely on March 24, “filed thereafter,” we should not presume Congress created this odd hiatus in retroactivity suggested by respondent unless congressional intent to do so was conveyed by language more precise than “pending,” cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972). “Pending” is simply not a term of art that unambiguously carries with it a meaning precisely suited for this situation; equally logical, for example, would be an interpretation that read “pending” to mean “filed and not yet rejected,” cf. Leg. Hist., supra, n. 16, at 1851. We hold that Congress intended the 180-day period to be applicable to charges such as that filed by Guy, where the charge was filed with the EEOC prior to March 24, 1972, and alleged a discriminatory occurrence within 180 days of the enactment of the Act. Respondent contends, finally, that Congress was without constitutional power to revive, by enactment, an action which, when filed, is already barred by the running of a limitations period. This contention rests on an unwarrantedly broad reading of our opinion in William Danzer Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. Co., 268 U. S. 633 (1925). Danzer was given a narrow reading in the later case of Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 312 n. 8 (1945). The latter case states the applicable constitutional test in this language: “The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation. What it does forbid is taking of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . . Assuming that statutes of limitation, like other types of legislation, could be so manipulated that their retroactive effects would offend the Constitution, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 315-316. Applying that test to this litigation, we think that Congress might constitutionally provide for retroactive application of the extended limitations period which it enacted. We thus resolve against petitioners their first two contentions, but resolve the third in their favor. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens agree that the expanded 180-day limitations period enacted by 86 Stat. 103 applied to Guy’s charge and would reverse the Court of Appeals on that ground without addressing the questions discussed in Parts II and III of the Court’s opinion. At the time of her discharge, and at the time the charge was filed with the EEOC, § 706 (d) stated, in pertinent part: “A charge under subsection (a) of this section shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. . . .” Section 706 (d) was renumbered as §706 (e), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), as a result of the 1972 amendments to the Act. Whenever § 706 (d) is cited in this opinion, it refers to the pre-1972 version of what is now §706 (e). Guy also alleged a cause ’of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. By order dated May 30, 1974, the District Court dismissed this cause of action because of a failure to meet the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations. No appeal was taken from this decision. The question of the tolling of Title VII’s limitations period during the pendency of grievance proceedings was noted in our opinion in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U. S. 273, 277-278 (1976), but had not been decided in the lower courts, and was not presented for us to decide. This assertion, which is also adopted by the EEOC as amicus curiae, is premised on the proposition that “[u]se of the grievance resolution process is not an ‘appeal’ of a ‘final’ decision, but is a method of obtaining the judgment of higher management on whether the employee should be retained,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21; Brief for Petitioner Local 790, pp. 17-18. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. Nor is there any indication that, should the grievance mechanism not be utilized, any sort of “formalized” final determination by management was required before Guy’s discharge would have been considered final. As the EEOC acknowledges, “the employer’s foremen usually can fire an individual employee such as Guy,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. Even while raising the contrary arguments in their briefs before this Court, petitioners place the October 25 discharge as the action of respondent. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner Local 790, p. 4 (“The following day [October 25, 1971) the Company discharged her on the ground that she had not complied with procedures embodied in the collective bargaining agreement pertaining to return from leaves of absence”); Brief for Petitioner Guy 5 (“The Company discharged Guy on October 25 for having 'voluntarily quit’ ”). At oral argument, we were told that while this assertion was not articulated as a separate argument before the Court of Appeals, pertinent language in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F. 2d 811 (CA7 1972), was cited to that court, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. This is hardly a precise way to get an issue before a Court of Appeals, and there is no indication that the Court of Appeals recognized any such implicit contention, assuming, arguendo, that petitioners thought they were raising it. See also 415 U. S., at 48-49: “Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.” We felt that the legislative history was quite clear in this respect, see, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7205, 13650-13652 (1964); H. R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H. R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971). “Conciliation and persuasion through the administrative process [e. g., Title VII], to be sure, often constitute a desirable approach to settlement of disputes based on sensitive and emotional charges of invidious employment discrimination. We recognize, too, that the filing of a lawsuit might tend to deter efforts at conciliation, that lack of success in the legal action could weaken the Commission’s efforts to induce voluntary compliance, and that a suit is privately oriented and narrow, rather than broad, in application, as successful conciliation tends to be. But these are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one,” 421 U. S., at 461. In no way is this a situation in which a party has “been prevented from asserting” his or her rights, Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S., at 429. There is no assertion that Guy was “prevented” from filing a charge with the EEOC within 90 days of October 25,1971; indeed, it is conceded and even urged that .she could have filed it the following day, had she so wished. We concluded in Johnson that “[o]nly where there is complete identity of the causes of action will the protections suggested by petitioner necessarily exist and will the courts have an opportunity to assess the influence of the policy of repose inherent in a limitation period,” 421 U. S., at 468 n. 14. See n. 14, infra. Petitioners contend that the vast majority of collective-bargaining agreements have stringent time restrictions on the resolution of disputes through the grievance stages, see, e. g., Brief for Petitioner Local 790, pp. 38-39; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23 n. 13. Even taken on its own ground, this argument is not unambiguously favorable to petitioners. If the collective-bargaining dispute-settlement procedures are as speedy as suggested, no real need for tolling has been shown. In the instant case, for example, at the conclusion of stage three of the grievance procedure, Guy still had 66 days in which to file a charge with the EEOC, and no reason has been advanced as to why this was not ample time. Adherence to the limitations period assures prompt notification to the employer of a charge of an alleged violation of Title VII, see § 706 (b). The grievance process assures no such comparable notice. In the instant case, the grievance alleged only an “unfair action.” Even if racial discrimination is explicitly discussed, however, the grievance procedure properly involves only contractual questions, and would but fortuitously implicate the Title VII standards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 53-54, 56-58; see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S., at 467-468, n. 14. Petitioners’ arguments respecting the policies behind private resolution of labor disputes through collective bargaining, moreover, apply equally to the arbitration stage as they do to the grievance stage, cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Community Org., 420 U. S. 50, 66-67 (1975) ; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at 56, 59-60; Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). Yet, at the arbitration stage the assurance of but a “slight” delay is lacking. Indeed, the comment of Senator Javits implied precisely the opposite: “MR. JAVITS. Mr. President, this amendment would make whatever we do enact into law applicable to pending cases. The Department of Justice has requested it in a letter to the minority leader; that is my reason for offering it.” 118 Cong. Rec. 4816 (1972). Section 14 was stated to be designed to cover “charges filed with the Commission prior to the effective date of the Act," Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of Equal Employment Act of 1972, p. 1851 (Comm. Print 1972); see. also id., at 1777. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the enlarged limitations period also redounds to the benefit of persons who filed a charge more than 90, but less than 180, days from the date of the alleged “occurrence,” where the 180 days had run prior to March 24, 1972.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MINNICK et al. v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. No. 79-1213. Argued December 2, 1980 Decided June 1, 1981 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Réhnquist, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 127. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 127. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 128. Ronald Yank argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Gary M. Messing. Stuart R. Poliak argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Steven Lee Mayer Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert A. Reiman, Douglas A. Poe, Meyer Eisenberg, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Richard A. Weisz for the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B'Rith; and by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson for the Equal Employment Advisory Council. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Edwin S. Kneedler, Brian K. Landsberg, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Leroy D. Clark, Lutz Alexander Prager, and Paul E. Mirengoff for the United States et al.; by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Shirley Adelson Siegel, Solicitor General, Robert Hermann and Peter Bienstock, Assistant Attorneys General, and Daniel Berger, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for the New York State Department of Correctional Services; by Charles Stephen Ralston, Jack Greenberg, Eric Schnapper, O. Peter Sherwood, and Barry L. Goldstein for the City of Detroit; by E. Richard Larson, Isabelle Katz Pinzler, and Bruce J. Ennis for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by Mark N. Aaronson and Thomas A. Seaton for the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, Michael H. Gottesman, and Robert M. Weinberg for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners contend that an affirmative-action plan adopted by the California Department of Corrections in 1974 is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in petitioners’ favor. The California Court of Appeal reversed, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 260, holding that the trial court’s rationale was no longer tenable in light of this Court’s intervening decision in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265. The Court of Appeal’s opinion, however, also identified certain problems that “require examination if the case is to be retried.” Thus although we granted certiorari to review the merits of the Court of Appeal’s deci^iqn, 448 U. S. 910, we first must confront the question whether'.the writ should be dismissed because the judgment did not finally determine the legal status of the challenged plan. I The 1974 “Affirmative Action Program,” as revised in 1975, is a lengthy and somewhat ambiguous document. Much of the plan relates to the Department’s commitment to the eradication of discrimination on the basis of race and sex. The plan’s first section, which describes the program in general terms, states: “It is the policy of the Department of Corrections to provide equal employment opportunities for all persons on the basis of merit and fitness and to prohibit discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry in every aspect of personnel policy and practices in the employment, career development, advancement and treatment of employees.” This section of the plan then identifies specific means of implementing this general nondiscriminatory policy. The second section of the plan, which establishes guidelines for the implementation of the program within the existing organizational structure and defines the affirmative-action roles of Department employees, also contains a number of provisions suggesting that the plan was intended to remove any barriers to equal employment opportunities. Finally, the third section, which identifies specific objectives of the plan, also refers to departmental efforts to eliminate discrimination in hiring and in employment practices. The plan does, however, contain some indication that the Department intended to go beyond the eradication of discriminatory practices. The second section states that deputy directors, assistant directors, and division chiefs were to be responsible for developing a plan to "correct identifiable . . . deficiencies through specific, measurable, attainable hiring and promotional goals with target dates in each area of underutilization.” The plan also refers to “guidelines” issued by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice (LEAA) indicating “that an Agency’s percentage of minority personnel should be at least 70% of that minority in its service (inmate population).” Moreover, the plan notes that in “the total labor force in California, 38.1% are female; Department of Corrections’ personnel reflect a total of only 17.3%.” The section of the plan containing objectives indicates a commitment by the Department to “[ijncrease departmental efforts to employ minorities and women to achieve the percentages . . . per LEAA guidelines within five (5) years,” and to achieve a work force containing 36% minorities and 38% women. The plan does not identify what means, in addition to eradicating discriminatory practices, the Department would employ to achieve these percentages. Thus, the plan may be interpreted as predicting that a nondiscriminatory policy would result in a work force including 36% minority and 38% female employees by 1979; alternatively, it may be read as mandating affirmative action to achieve these percentages by the target date. •II In December 1975 the three petitioners commenced this litigation in a California Superior Court. Minnick and Dar-den, the individual petitioners, are white male correctional officers. The third petitioner, the California Correction Officers Association (CCOA), is an employee organization that represents correctional officers and some other employees of the Department. In their complaint petitioners alleged that the affirmative-action plan unlawfully discriminated against white males and that the individual petitioners had been denied promotions because they were white. The California Department of Corrections and various state officers named as defendants, respondents here, denied in the trial court that they had discriminated in hiring and promotion and claimed that the Department’s central policy was to hire and promote only the most qualified persons. Alternatively, however, the respondents contended that the State’s interest in the efficient and safe operation of the corrections system justifies an attempt to obtain a work force containing a proportion of minority employees amounting to at least 70% of any minority’s proportional representation in the inmate population, and also containing as large a percentage of female employees as are found in the total California work force. During pretrial discovery, respondents also indicated that the impact of their past practices had resulted in a disproportionate hiring and promotion of white males, but stated “for the purposes of this litigation” that they did not allege that the Department had engaged in any past intentional discrimination against minority or female workers. After a trial at which over 30 witnesses testified, the case was argued at length and submitted to the trial judge for decision on November 23, 1976. At that time the Supreme Court of California had only recently held in Bakke v. University of California Regents, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P. 2d 1152 (1976), that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited a state university from giving any consideration to an applicant’s race in making admissions decisions. On January 5, 1977, the trial judge issued a “notice of intended decision” which tersely summarized the parties’ respective positions: “The testimony and documentary evidence herein show, and defendants admit, that defendants have carried on a campaign to, and they do now, select applicants for employment and for promotion based on their sex and on their racial background or ancestry. “Defendants seek to justify their actions on the basis that while the sex of an applicant is one of the factors considered, the applicant must be otherwise qualified for the duties to be performed. Sex or racial background is not the sole factor considered. Plaintiffs on the other hand assert that the hiring or promotion of a person based in whole or in part on sex or racial background or ancestry is unconstitutional and void. “The Court agrees with plaintiffs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. D-l — D-2. The notice then directed that an injunction issue enjoining the respondents “from considering as a factor for employment or for the promotion of a candidate his sex, race or national origin.” Id., at D-2. The court directed counsel to prepare an appropriate order and to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Before any further order was entered, respondents filed a motion to reopen the record and to receive detailed evidence of past discriminatory practices. Presumably the proffered evidence would provide support for a defense based on the theory that the plan was justified as a remedy for past discrimination. The evidence was, however, quite plainly irrelevant to the theory of the trial judge’s intended decision which was, of course, wholly consistent with the rationale of the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Bakke, supra. The trial judge summarily denied the motion to reopen. On October 11, 1977, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, a declaratory judgment, and a permanent injunction. Id., at F-l, G-l. The court did not find that either of the individual petitioners had been denied a promotion on the basis of his race or sex. Nor did the court find that the CCOA had standing to bring the action. Two of the findings that the court did enter (No. 8 relating to hiring and promotions and No. 19 relating to job assignments) are especially relevant to the procedural issue before us. Finding No. 8 provides, in part: “Defendants Department of Corrections and Jeri J. Enomoto have discriminated and are continuing to discriminate by reason of sex and by reason of ethnic background in hiring and promotion of employees in the Department. “In so doing, preferences result in favor of certain ethnic groups, or in favor of one sex to the detriment of the other, and not solely on the qualifications of the individuals involved, or their merits.” Id., at F-4. Finding No. 19 provides: "The unique and sensitive nature of the functions of the Department of Corrections and the peculiar difficulties inherent in the administration of California’s prison system require the Department to exercise broad discretion in making job assignments and in determining the employment responsibilities of its employees. Because of the conditions and circumstances within California prisons and throughout the Department of Corrections, in making job assignments and in determining employment responsibilities it is necessary for the Department to consider, among other factors, the composition of the existing work force and of the inmate population, and the race and sex of employees, in order to serve the compelling state interest in promoting the safety of correctional officers and inmates, encouraging inmate rehabilitation, minimizing racial tensions, and furthering orderly and efficient prison management.” Id., at F-6 — F-7. In the conclusions of law and in the permanent injunction, the trial court distinguished hiring and promotion decisions, on the one hand, from job assignments and determination of employment responsibilities, on the other. Finding No. 19 relates only to the latter and provides the basis for the trial court’s conclusion that respondents could lawfully consider race and sex as factors in determining job assignments and job responsibilities. That finding also explains the proviso in the permanent injunction allowing the use of race or sex as a factor in making job assignments. Finding No. 8, however, provides the central support for the permanent injunction against giving any preference, advantage, or benefit on the basis of race or sex in hiring or promoting any employee. Ill Respondents appealed to the California Court of Appeal. While their appeal was pending, this Court issued its decision in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265. Although we affirmed the judgment of the California Supreme Court to the extent that it had ordered the University to admit Bakke to its medical school, the opinions supporting that decision indicated that at least five Members of the Court rejected the legal theory on which the California Supreme Court had relied. Specifically, both the opinion of Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun and the opinion of Justice Powell unequivocally stated that race may be used as a factor in the admissions process in some circumstances. To the extent that those opinions demonstrated that the California Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was erroneous, they also demonstrated that the trial judge’s faithful application of that court’s Bakke rationale in this case was an insufficient basis for supporting the injunction. With the guidance of this Court’s decision in Bakke, the California Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and the injunction entered by the trial court in this case. Relying largely on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, the Court of Appeal concluded that race or sex could be used as a “plus” factor in personnel decisions that promoted a compelling state interest. The court seemed to indicate that the trial court’s finding No. 19 supported a conclusion that the State’s interest in a safe arid efficient prison system constituted such an interest. With respect to the challenge to hiring procedures, the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support finding No. 8 insofar as that finding related to preferences in favor of males over females or insofar as it related to the hiring of any employees. References to the possibility of a retrial in other portions of the opinion, imply that petitioners will have an opportunity to remedy any deficiencies in their proof of sex discrimination or racial discrimination in hiring. With respect to the challenge to promotion practices, the Court of Appeal apparently believed that the trial court’s finding of discrimination in finding No. 8 was inconsistent with the trial court’s finding No. 19. Although finding No. 19 clearly applies only to transfers, the court seems to have read that finding to identify a compelling state interest and then to have determined that the evidence adequately justified the use of race as a plus factor for promotions as well as transfers. The court, however, may have merely intended to identify a permissible analysis of the record that will be open to the trial court on remand. If a final and definitive determination of the federal issue was actually intended, it is difficult to understand why the court left open the possibility of retrial and did not unequivocally direct that judgment be entered in favor of respondents. Recognizing that the evidence of past discrimination that had been proffered by respondents might be relevant in support of a defense that the affirmative-action program was justified as a remedy for past discrimination within the Department of Corrections, the Court of Appeal also left open for the retrial the question whether that evidence should be received. Finally, the Court of Appeal rejected each of petitioners’ contentions that a violation of state law or federal statutory law had been proved, and then concluded by noting that jurisdictional problems concerning petitioners’ standing “require examination if the case is to be retried.” “Vacancies in specific positions were occasionally left open, and promotions or transfers to them were sometimes delayed, until qualified female or minority employees could be found to fill them. Some of these positions were labelled ‘female only,’ or with words similarly referring to sex (including ‘male only’) or to race or ethnic background. There was no evidence that any specific number or percentage of positions were reserved for members of either sex or of any racial or ethnic group.” Id., at 514 — 515, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 264. IV In this Court respondents, as well as the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, urge us to dismiss the writ because the judgment of the Court of Appeal is not final. See Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 543. The judgment is clearly not final in the sense that no further proceedings can possibly take place in the state judicial system. Petitioners argue, however, that there is finality under our cases because the ultimate judgment on the federal issue is for all practical purposes preordained. This argument is supported by a representation made by petitioners’ counsel at oral argument in this Court that the record already contains all of the evidence that they are prepared to offer. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that the outcome of further proceedings in the trial court can be characterized as “certain” or that these proceedings will not have a significant effect on the federal constitutional issues presented by the certiorari petition. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, this Court' identified four categories of cases in which a state court’s decision of a federal issue had been treated as a final judgment even though additional proceedings in the state trial court were anticipated. Petitioners contend that this case falls within the first of those categories — that it is a case in which “for one reason or another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings is preordained.” That category is, however, delimited by a preliminary comment in the Cox opinion: “In the cases in the first two categories considered below, the federal issue would not be mooted or otherwise affected by the proceedings yet to be had because those proceedings have little substance, their outcome is certain, or they are wholly unrelated to the federal question.” Id., at 478. The answer to the question whether the further proceedings in the state trial court “have little substance” or are “wholly unrelated to the federal question” is affected not only by the specifics of the particular litigation but also by the extent to which the “policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues,” Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568, is implicated. In that case, notwithstanding a conclusion that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, id., at 565-568, the Court’s analysis of the policy of strict necessity provided “compelling reasons for not exercising” its mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Id., at 568. Those reasons were the “highly abstract form” in which the constitutional issues were presented, id., at 575-580, the “ambiguous” character of the California court’s construction of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, id., at 581-584, and a belief that further proceedings in the state court would ultimately tender “the underlying constitutional issues in clean-cut and concrete form.” Id., at 584. In this case our analysis of the question whether the federal constitutional issues may be affected by additional proceedings in the state courts — and therefore take the case out of the first category of final judgments described in Cox — is similarly affected by ambiguities in the record, both as to the character of the petitioners’ prima facie case and as to the character of the respondents’ justification for their program. Petitioners contend that the program was designed to give minority employees specific proportions of the available jobs in the Corrections Department. The trial court found that respondents “have discriminated and are continuing to discriminate by reason of sex and by reason of ethnic background in hiring and promotion of employees in the Department.” Although that finding also recited that the discrimination was “motivated at least in part” by the affirmative-action plan, it did not indicate the extent to which such discrimination had occurred. Because the trial court interpreted the relevant constitutional law absolutely to prohibit any such discrimination in hiring or promotion, the court did not need to make any more specific finding. Several assumptions would therefore be consistent with the general finding of discrimination. One could assume either that all hiring and promotion decisions have been affected by the goal of achieving certain percentage quotas as to race and sex, or that race or sex has been a factor in only certain specific decisions. Included in the latter assumption are the two possibilities that race or sex was a factor in a fairly large number of random decisions, or that race or sex was a motivating factor only in connection with certain types of jobs with respect to which the Superior Court expressly permitted transfers or job assignments motivated by either the race or sex of the employee. In sum, the Superior Court’s findings do not go beyond a determination that there was some discrimination in hiring and promotion. If we accept the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the record, we must assume that the respondents have used race as a factor in making promotion decisions but not in making hiring decisions. Like the findings of the Superior Court, however, the opinion of the Court of Appeal does not indicate whether race was considered relevant for all promotions or just in connection with promotions to particular positions. The fact that the Court of Appeal relied on the finding that race was a relevant factor in making certain job assignments to justify the use of race or sex in connection with promotions implies that the court thought race or sex had been a factor only in making promotions to a limited number of positions. But the court did not so state expressly and it did not identify any specific position to which promotions or transfers motivated by race or sex had been made. Thus on the one hand, if the first interpretation of the opinion is correct, and race was relevant only in making certain specific decisions, then adequate review of a narrow holding of that kind would require a more detailed identification of the particular positions involved than is now contained in findings that were prepared by the trial judge to support a quite different disposition of the case. On the other hand, if the Court of Appeal concluded that respondents had followed a general policy of using race as a factor in making promotions, and that such a policy was justified by the State’s interest in a safe and efficient prison system, adequate review of a broad holding of that kind would require an understanding of how such a sweeping policy was implemented and why such a policy should be applied in the promotion context and not in the hiring context. The trial court’s findings contain no such explanation because the trial court did not find that respondents had engaged in any such bifurcated policy. An additional uncertainty concerning the precise issue to be decided is that the Court of Appeal expressed doubt concerning the trial court’s jurisdiction over any claims asserted by CCOA and noted that petitioners Minnick and Darden were not entitled to damages or injunctive relief as individuals. 95 Cal. App. 3d, at 526, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 272. Because the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion to certify the case as a class action was predicated on a stipulation that the court had jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief without any such certification, and because the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction could not be conferred by stipulation, it is at least possible that claims on behalf of additional employees or job applicants may be asserted on remand. They, as well as the present petitioners, will have the right — even though petitioners’ counsel have no such present intent — to adduce additional evidence in support of the complaint, or to amend their pleadings in the light of the developments in the law that have occurred since the original complaint was filed. Moreover, whether or not additional evidence is taken, the trial judge is unquestionably free to recast his findings in response to those legal developments. Accordingly, because of significant developments in the law — and perhaps in the facts as well — and because of significant ambiguities in the record concerning both the extent to which race or sex has been used as a factor in making promotions and the justification for such use, we conclude that we should not address the constitutional issues until the proceedings in the trial court are finally concluded and the state appellate courts have completed their review of the trial court record. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed. So ordered. App. 3. “Specific actions required by [the] plan” include, inter alia, increasing the number of female and minority employees through “programs for recruiting, selecting, hiring, and promoting minorities and women,” monitoring employment practices related to employment of women and minorities, establishing goals for measuring success in complying with nondiscrimination laws, training staff to “develop a sensitivity ... to recognize and positively deal with discriminatory practices,” and training women and minority employees to assure their full participation at all employment levels. Id., at 3-4. The plan, for example, provides for the creation of various new posi- • tions, including a supervisor for the human relations section: “The Supervisor, Human Relations Section, under the direct supervision of the Assistant Director, Personnel Management, and Training Division, shall have authority and responsibility for the following duties: “7. Provide assistance to the Departmental Training Officer and local Training Officers in developing training relative to human relations and affirmative action. ■ “8. Review the department’s programs and procedures related to personnel activities and make recommendations for any changes necessary to remove barriers to attainment of equal employment opportunity. "9. Develop procedures with the Assistant Director, Womens Affairs for the receipt and the investigation of allegations and complaints by individuals, organizations, employees, or other third parties of discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex or national origin.” Id., at 8-10. Each division, institution, and parole region was to appoint an Affirmative Action Representative, whose duties include acting as liaison between “management and program staff, various organization units, special interest groups and organizations, [and] community leaders,” analyzing discrimination complaints to identify problem areas and assist in their resolution, and assisting in the development of a written recruitment plan. Id., at 11. The plan has as some of its objectives recruitment programs designed to reach minority communities and schools with significant minority enrollments, id., at 20-21, continuous review of job requirements to insure that qualification standards “are based upon the minimum required to perform necessary duties,” id., at 23, on-the-job training to prepare employees to meet the requirements of their jobs, id., at 25, and the communication to managers, supervisors, and employees of the commitment of the Department to equal employment opportunity. Id., at 27. Id., at 6. Id., at 28. The plan then continues: “On this basis, Black personnel should represent at least 22.5% of the departmental work force, whereas they apparently comprise 8.8%. Similarly, Spanish surname personnel should represent 12.1%, but actually comprise 7.4%. Native American personnel should comprise .7%, while they actually make up .2%. Only the Asian and other extraction are represented in accord with the guidelines.” Id., at 28-29. Id., at 31. Id., at 16-17. The plan contains detailed statistics relating to the number of employees of different groups referred to as “Black,” “Asian,” “Spanish surnamed,” “native American,” and “other extraction,” as well as breakdowns by sex, in different positions and in the various facilities operated by the Department of Corrections. Id., at 28-65. For example, one of the stated objectives of the plan is "to increase significantly the utilization of minorities and women across organizational units of the CDC and at all levels possible as vacancies occur.” The first “specific action” listed to accomplish this objective relates to the elimination of discrimination by committing the department to "[djjevelop recruitment plans and public relations activities with specific focus on minority communities, organizations, and women organizations, to inform them of career opportunities within CDC and the desire to employ minorities and women.” The second “specific action” is to “increase departmental efforts to employ minorities and women” to achieve the LEAA percentages and the 36% minority and 38% female percentages. Id., at 16. No specific means of achieving this goal are indicated. The plan’s use of the LEAA guidelines does not clarify the intended implementation of the plan. In discussing the LEAA guidelines, the plan states: “To provide agencies goals, equal employment opportunity guidelines have been issued by the U. S. Department of Justice. They specify that the percentage of minority staff in the employment of the agency be at least 70% of the percentage of the minorities in the service (inmate) population.” Id., at 38 (footnote omitted). The LEAA guidelines’ explanation of their purpose states, in part, that the experience of the LEAA “has demonstrated that the full and equal participation of women and minority individuals in employment opportunities in the criminal justice system is a necessary component to the Safe Streets Act’s program to reduce crime and delinquency in the United States.” Id., at 71. See 28 CFR §42.301 (1980). See Tr. 194, 203-206, 383, 452-453, 487-488, 548, 563-564, 591, 666, 668, 672, 773, 792, 882. George C. Jackson, then the Deputy Director of the Department, testified that the program’s goal was “to make the Department of Corrections a fair place to work.” Id., at 665. The Deputy Attorney General defending the case on behalf of the respondents stated at trial: “Our defense is on two levels, your honor. “First of all, we’re contending in this case that the Department only hires the most qualified people, and that’s their policy. There may be exceptions down below, but that’s their policy. “On the other hand, if the Court so should find that they’re using race as a factor in the hiring process as a qualification process, then we have the burden of showing that they must demonstrate a real reason for doing this. And that’s what we’ve been trying to do with these witnesses, showing they have a real problem. “I have a compelling state interest if the Court should find that race is being used as a factor. To do that, I have to show that they have a real problem that they’re trying to solve, the violence in the prisons, the operation of the prisons. “And the next step is to show that they’re trying to solve it by hiring minorities in the ratios they’re trying to hire.” Id., at 660-661. Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal 121-122. Tr. 670-671. Conclusion of Law No. 4 reads as follows: “It is not contrary to law for the Department, in determining job assignments and job responsibilities of its employees, to consider, among other relevant factors, the composition by race and sex of the existing work force and of the inmate population, and the race and sex of the employees in question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. F-8. The permanent injunction contains the following proviso: “(a) Provided, however, that nothing in this Order shall prevent any person, in determining the assignments and job responsibilities of employees of the Department of Corrections, from considering, among other relevant factors, the race and sex of the employees in question.” Id., at G-2. The permanent injunction enjoins respondents “ [¶] rom hiring or promoting any employee in the Department of Corrections in which preference, advantage, or benefit is given to race, color, sex, or national origin.” Ibid. Justice BreNNAN, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice BlackmuN joined Part V-C of Justice Powell’s opinion, which stated: “In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court’s judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.” 438 U. S., at 320. See also id., at 325 (opinion of BeeNNAN, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ.). The court interpreted Justice Powell’s opinion to permit consideration of race in the school admissions process to serve the compelling state interest of promoting ethnic diversity among the students if “(1) ‘. . . race or ethnic background may be deemed a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file, yet . . . does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats’; and (2) a candidate not credited • with that ‘plus’ will be ‘fairly and competitively’ evaluated for all the seats without being ‘totally excluded from a specific percentage’ of them which has been restricted to a particular racial or ethnic group. [438 IT. S., at] 316-319.” 95 Cal. App. 3d, at 520, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 268. Although finding No. 19 related only to transfer and assignment policies, the court seemed to rely on that finding to support the threshold proposition that the State has a compelling state interest in the safe operation of its prison system: “In its finding no. 19, the trial court effectively determined that the practices apply the prison-related realities of race and sex to the point of promoting a ‘compelling state interest’ in a safe and efficient correctional system.” Id,., at 520-521, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 268. “The terminal question is whether this record supports the declaration, in paragraph 1 of the judgment, that the department and Enomoto violated the Equal Protection Clause by ‘discriminating’ on the bases of race and sex in the ‘hiring and promotion of employees.’ The declaration rests on the trial court’s finding (No. 8) that they had ‘discriminated’ in those respects by applying personnel practices from which ‘preferences result in favor of certain ethnic groups or ... of one sex.’ (See fn. 5, ante.) According to our review of the evidence, it does not support a finding that ‘preferences result’ from the practices in favor of males or in the ‘hiring’ of employees. Finding No. 8 therefore fails to support the declaration in either respect.” Id., at 521, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 269. “If the case is to be retried, Justice Powell’s decision in U. S. Bakke will be pertinent to the determination of either question. (See U. S. Bakke, supra, 438 U. S. 265 at pp. 307-310 . . . .) “These problems require examination if the case is to be retried.” Id., at 526, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 272. After the court cited finding No. 19 and identified the compelling state interest in the safe and efficient operation of the prison system, the court stated: “The department is pursuing those objectives by assigning a female or minority employee a ‘plus’ in competition for promotion or transfer. The qualifications of other employees in the competition are still ‘weighed fairly and competitively.’ ” Id., at 521, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 268. After concluding that the proof of discrimination was insufficient as to the hiring challenge, the court stated: “The practices otherwise identified in [finding No. 8] have just been examined in light of U. S. Bakke and under the ‘strict scrutiny’ it commands. We conclude that they are permitted by the Equal Protection Clause within the limited extent that noncontrolling 'preferences result in favor of certain ethnic groups’ for purposes of promotion or transfer of personnel within the department, because they are necessary to promote the compelling interest of this state in the proper management of its correctional system. For the same reasons, they are permitted insofar as the same limited ‘preferences result’ in favor of women. Finding No. 8 accordingly fails to support the declaration that the Department and Enomoto violated the Equal Protection Clause in any respect.” Id,., at 521-522, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 269. In its discussion of finding No. 19, which applied only to transfers and work assignments, the court indicated that the record established that the Department was assigning minority employees a “ 'plus’ in competition for promotion or transfer.” In its discussion of finding No. 8, which did relate to promotions, the court stated only that the Department’s promotion practices are justified “within the limited extent that noncontrolling preferences result in favor of certain ethnic groups” and “insofar as the same limited ‘preferences result’ in favor of women.” In its discussion of finding No. 8, the court did not state that such preferences in fact existed. Even in its discussion of what the evidence at trial indicated, the Court of Appeal was somewhat equivocal: “There was evidence that various male Caucasian employees had been denied promotion or transfer in instances where preference had been given to female or minority members. “Various supervisory employees of the department testified that preference for promotion or transfer was not given to female or minority employees -in specified segments of the department after 1974. There was thus a conflict in the evidence as to how widely the preferential policies expressed in the AAP had been pursued within the department. According to all the evidence of instances where they had been applied, ‘preference’ was given to female sex or minority status only to the extent that each was considered a ‘plus’ factor in the assessment of a particular employee for promotion or transfer. Some evidence supported the inference that this 'plus’ had occasionally contributed to the promotion or transfer of the preferred employee ahead of nonpreferred candidates who were otherwise more qualified for the new position. There was no evidence that such ‘preference’ had ever resulted in the promotion or transfer of an employee who was not qualified to hold the position. The trial court had found that the plan could not be justified as a remedy for past societal discrimination but had not addressed the question whether it would be justified by past departmental discrimination. See finding No. 13, App. to Pet. for Cert. F-5. 95 Cal. App. 3d, at 526, 157 Cal. Rptr., at 272. The Court of Appeal noted that the petitioners had not been permitted to maintain a class action, that the individuals had not proved that they were entitled to relief, and that CCOA did not represent all employees of the Department. Although the respondents had stipulated that the petitioners had standing, the Court of Appeal stated that the trial court’s jurisdiction could not be created by stipulation. Ibid. Petitioners have invoked this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3), which provides: “Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: “(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. The questions presented in the petition for certiorari are: “1. Whether a state agency may, absent proof that it has engaged in previous intentional discrimination, voluntarily establish goals, set aside positions and grant preferences, for the hiring and promotion of less qualified minorities and women, to the detriment of all other applicants and employees. “2. Whether the safe and efficient operation of correctional facilities constitutes a sufficient compelling interest to justify the use of racial and sex-based preferences in hiring and promotion, and if so, whether proof of that interest was sufficiently supported by the record. “3. Whether it is sufficient for a state agency to adopt preferential employment practices based solely upon conclusory allegations of the discriminatory impact of its past policies and practices on minorities and women. “4. Whether it is appropriate for a state correctional institution to institute employment goals for minorities based upon inmate population rather than the relevant labor market or applicant flow. “5. Whether the relevant labor force for the hiring of women should be based on state-wide employment statistics for women as opposed to applicant flow or the labor force statistics for women in the relevant geographic area in which the institutions are located.” Pet. for Cert. 2-3. “In the first category are those cases in which there are further proceedings — even entire trials — yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained. In these circumstances, because the case is for all practical purposes concluded, the judgment of the state court on the federal issue is deemed final. In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966), for example, a demurrer to a criminal complaint was sustained on federal constitutional grounds by a state trial court. The State Supreme Court reversed, remanding for jury trial. This Court took jurisdiction on the reasoning that the appellant had no defense other than his federal claim and could not prevail at trial on the facts or any nonfederal ground. To dismiss the appeal 'would not only be an inexcusable delay of the benefits Congress intended to grant by providing for appeal to this Court, but it would also result in a completely unnecessary waste of time and energy in judicial systems already troubled by delays due to congested dockets.' Id., at 217-218 (footnote omitted)420 U. S., at 479. Commenting on the close connection between the policy of avoiding the premature adjudication of constitutional issues and the limitations on our jurisdiction, the Court wrote: “Indeed in origin and in practical effects, though not in technical function, it is a corollary offshoot of the case and controversy rule. And often the line between applying the policy or the rule is very thin. They work, within their respective and technically distinct areas, to achieve the same practical purposes for the process of constitutional adjudication, and upon closely related considerations. “The policy’s ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation, he in all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system. “All these considerations and perhaps others, transcending specific procedures, have united to form and sustain the policy. Its execution has involved a continuous choice between the obvious advantages it produces for the functioning of government in all its coordinate parts and the very real disadvantages, for the assurance of rights, which deferring decision very often entails. On the other hand it is not altogether speculative that a contrary policy, of accelerated decision, might do equal or greater harm for the security of private rights, without attaining any of- the benefits of tolerance and harmony for the functioning of the various authorities in our scheme. For premature and relatively abstract decision, which such a policy would be most likely to promote, have their part too in rendering rights uncertain and insecure.” 331 U. S., at 570-572 (footnote omitted). Finding No. 8, App. to Pet. for Cert. F-4. A third possibility is that a certain number of positions were “set aside” for particular ethnic groups or for females. Although the Court of Appeal decision seems to indicate that the Department did not establish such “controlling preferences,” and that no evidence of any quota or percentage of positions set aside was introduced at trial, it is not entirely clear that the trial court would be foreclosed from making such a finding, nor is it entirely clear what the evidence at the first trial showed on this point. See n. 23, supra; n. 37, infra; Brief for Petitioners 5-9. The Court of Appeal opinion states that the evidence did not indicate that the Department employed “preferences” in hiring. See n. 20, supra. It may be that preferences similar to the ones applied in the promotion context were used in the hiring context, but the Court of Appeal did not so conclude because petitioners failed in their proof of this issue. Thus although we must assume for purposes of this opinion that race and sex were not a factor in hiring, petitioners might be able to demonstrate the contrary on retrial. See n. 37, infra. Because the trial court had found, in finding No. 19, that consideration of race in making job assignments or transfers to certain specific positions may serve a compelling state interest, the Court of Appeal may have assumed that promotions motivated by race or sex took place only with respect to jobs to which racially motivated transfers would have been permissible. Of course, if respondents did not really distinguish between hiring and promotion, then petitioners will need another opportunity to demonstrate respondents’ unified policy. The text of the affirmative-action plan adopted in 1974 and revised in 1975 draws no such distinction between hiring and promotion. Under California law, an appellate court reversal of a trial court-decision has the effect of vacating the judgment and returning the case to the trial court for a new trial “as if no judgment had ever been rendered.” See Erlin v. National Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. 2d 547, 549, 61 P. 2d 756, 757 (1936); Salaman v. Bolt, 74 Cal. App. 3d 907, 914, 141 Cal. Rptr. 841, 844 (1977). Thus the losing party on appeal may introduce additional evidence. See Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U. S. 543, 547-548, quoting Erlin, supra, at 549, 61 P. 2d, at 757. Although this rule regarding new trials does not apply if the appellate court did not intend a new trial, Stromer v. Browning, 268 Cal. App. 2d 513, 518-519, 74 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (1968), such as when the appellate court decides a dispositive issue which does not turn on facts which might change on retrial, id., at 519, 74 Cal. Rptr., at 160, the Court of Appeal clearly contemplated a possible retrial here. Respondents have lodged with the Court a copy of a revised affirmative-action plan adopted in 1979. Further developments as to the Department’s implementation of the AAP and changes reflected in the 1979 revision might affect the question of whether the petitioners’ are now entitled to injunctive relief.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HAGANS et al. v. LA VINE, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. No. 72-6476. Argued December 11, 1973 Decided March 25, 1974 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BrenNAN, Stewart, Marshall, and BlacicmuN, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 550. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., joined, post, p. 552. Carl Jay Nathanson argued the cause for petitioners, With him on the briefs were Steven J. Cole and Henry A. Freedman. Michael Colodner, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for respondent Lavine. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lejkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General. Me. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners, recipients of public assistance under the cooperative federal-state Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program, brought this action in the District Court for themselves and their infant children and as representatives of other similarly situated AFDC recipients. Their suit challenged a provision of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations permitting the State to recoup prior unscheduled payments for rent from subsequent grants under the AFDC program. They alleged that the recoupment regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and contravened the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act governing AFDC and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the administering federal agency, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The action sought injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. § 2201, and jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4). The District Court found that the equal protection claim was substantial and provided a basis for pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate the so-called “statutory” claim — the alleged conflict between state and federal law. After hearing, the trial court declared the recoupment regulation contrary to the Social Security Act and HEW regulations and enjoined its implementation or enforcement. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because petitioners had failed to present a substantial constitutional claim, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain either the equal protection or the statutory claim. 471 F. 2d 347 (CA2 1973). The jurisdictional question being an important one, we granted certiorari. 412 U. S. 938 (1973). For reasons set forth below, we hold that the District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) to consider petitioners’ attack on the recoupment regulation. I Petitioners brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” By its terms, § 1983 embraces petitioners’ claims that the challenged regulation enforced by respondent state and county welfare officials deprives them of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws,” viz., the equal protection of the laws. But the federal cause of action created by the section does not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to adjudicate these claims. Accordingly, petitioners relied principally upon 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3): “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: “(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . Concededly, § 1343 authorizes a civil action to “redress the deprivation, under color of any State . . . regulation ... of any right . . . secured by the Constitution of the United States." Section 1343 (3) therefore conferred jurisdiction upon the District Court to entertain the constitutional claim if it was of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction. If it was, it is also clear that the District Court could hear as a matter of pendent jurisdiction the claim of conflict between federal and state law, without determining that the latter claim in its own right was encompassed within § 1343. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 402-405 (1970); see also N. Y. Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 412 n. 11 (1973). The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners had not tendered a substantial constitutional claim and ordered dismissal of the entire action for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The principle applied by the Court of Appeals — that a “substantial” question was necessary to support jurisdiction — was unexceptionable under prior cases. Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U. S. 561, 579 (1904); “wholly insubstantial,” Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 33 (1962); “obviously frivolous,” Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U. S. 285, 288 (1910); “plainly unsubstantial,” Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 105 (1933); or “no longer open to discussion,” McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 80 (1909). One of the principal decisions on the subject, Ex ;parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30, 31-32 (1933), held, first, that “[i]n the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal question should be presented”; second, that a three-judge court was not necessary to pass upon this initial question of jurisdiction; and third, that “[t]he question may be plainly unsubstantial, either because it is 'obviously without merit’ or because 'its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’ Levering & Garrigues Co. v.” Morrin, supra; Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U. S. 285, 288; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 80.” Only recently this Court again reviewed this general question where it arose in the context of convening a three-judge court under 28 U. S. C. § 2281: “ 'Constitutional insubstantiality’ for this purpose has been equated with such concepts as ‘essentially fictitious,’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S., at 33; ‘wholly insubstantial,’ ibid,.; ‘obviously frivolous,’ Hannis Distilling Co. y. Baltimore, 216 U. S. 285, 288 (1910); and ‘obviously without merit,’ Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30, 32 (1933). The limiting words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2281. A claim is insubstantial only if ' “its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” ’ Ex parte Poresky, supra, at 32, quoting from Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, supra, at 288; see also Levering & Garri-gues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 105-106 (1933); McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 80 (1909).” Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512, 518 (1973). The substantiality doctrine as a statement of jurisdictional principles affecting the power of a federal court to adjudicate constitutional claims has been questioned, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 683 (1946), and characterized as “more ancient than analytically sound,” Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 404. But it remains the federal rule and needs no re-examination here, for we are convinced that within accepted doctrine petitioners' complaint alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the District Court to pass on the controversy. Jurisdiction is essentially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a given type of case one way or the other. The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913). Here, §§ 1343 (3) and 1983 unquestionably authorized federal courts to entertain suits to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights. It is also plain that the complaint formally alleged such a deprivation. The District Court’s jurisdiction, a matter for threshold determination, turned on whether the question was too insubstantial for consideration. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), AFDC recipients challenged the Maryland maximum grant regulation on equal protection grounds. We held that the issue should be resolved by inquiring whether the classification had a rational basis. Finding that it did, we sustained the regulation. But Dandridge evinced no intention to suspend the operation of the Equal Protection Clause in the field of social welfare law. State laws and regulations must still “be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination.” Id., at 487. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546 (1972); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972); cf. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). Judged by this standard, we cannot say that the equal protection issue tendered by the complaint was either frivolous or so insubstantial as to be beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court. We are unaware of any cases in this Court specifically dealing with this or any similar regulation and settling the matter one way or the other. Nor is it immediately obvious to us from the face of the complaint that recouping emergency rent payments from future welfare disbursements, which petitioners argue deprived needy children because of parental default, was so patently rational as to require no meaningful consideration. The Court of Appeals rightly felt obliged to measure petitioners’ complaint that the challenged regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause “by discriminating irrationally and invidiously between different classes of recipients” against the standard prescribed by Dan-dridge. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that without the recoupment regulation, those who were subject to it would be preferred over those who had paid their full rent out of their normal monthly grant. The court further reasoned that the regulation provided an incentive for welfare recipients to properly manage their grants and not become delinquent in their rent. It concluded that the regulation was rationally based and that no substantial constitutional question within the jurisdiction of the District Court had been presented. This reasoning with respect to the rationality of the regulation and its propriety under the Equal Protection Clause may ultimately prove correct, but it is not immediately obvious from the decided cases or so “very plain” under the Equal Protection Clause. We think the admonition of Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), should be followed here: “Jurisdiction ... is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the aver-ments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction.” Id., at 682 (citations omitted). As was the case in Bell v. Hood, we cannot “say that the cause of action alleged is so patently without merit as to justify, even under the qualifications noted, the court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Id., at 683. Nor can we say that petitioners’ claim is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits.” Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 666-667 (1974). (Citations omitted.) II Given a constitutional question over which the District Court had jurisdiction, it also had jurisdiction over the “statutory” claim. See supra, at 536. The latter was to be decided first and the former not reached if the statutory claim was dispositive. California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121, 124 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 475-476; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 402; King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968). The constitutional claim could be adjudicated only by a three-judge court, but the statutory claim was within the jurisdiction of a single district judge. Swift & Co.v. Wickham, 382 U. S. Ill (1965); Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 403. Thus, the District Judge, sitting alone, moved directly to the statutory claim. His decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, although had a three-judge court been convened, an injunction issued, and the statutory ground alone decided, the appeal would be only to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. The procedure followed by the District Court — initial determination of substantiality and then adjudication of the “statutory” claim without convening a three-judge court — may appear at odds with some of our prior decisions. See, e. g., Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U. S. 423 (1966); Florida Lime & Avocado Grow ers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73 (1960). But, we think it accurately reflects the recent evolution of three-judge-court jurisprudence, “this Court's concern for efficient operation of the lower federal courts,” and “the constrictive view of the three-judge [court] jurisdiction which this Court has traditionally taken.” Swift & Co. v. Wickham, supra, at 128, 129 (citations omitted). In Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 403, we suggested that “[e]ven had the constitutional claim not been declared moot, the most appropriate course may well have been to remand to the single district judge for findings and the determination of the statutory claim rather than encumber the district court, at a time when district court calendars are overburdened, by consuming the time of three federal judges in a matter that was not required to be determined by a three-judge court. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. Ill (1965).” It is true that the constitutional claim would warrant convening a three-judge court and that if a single judge rejects the statutory claim, a three-judge court must be called to consider the constitutional issue. Nevertheless, the coincidence of a constitutional and statutory claim should not automatically require a single-judge district court to defer to a three-judge panel, which, in view of what we have said in Rosado v. Wyman, supra, could then merely pass the statutory claim back to the single judge. See Kelly v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 325 F. 2d 148, 151 (CA7 1963); Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co. v. Nims, 252 F. 2d 317, 319-320 (CA6 1958); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357, 359-360 (SDNY 1972); cf. Bryant v. Carleson, 444 F. 2d 353, 358-359 (CA9 1971). “In fact, it would be grossly inefficient to send a three-judge court a claim which will only be sent immediately back. This inefficiency is especially apparent if the single judge’s decision resolves the case, for there is then no need to convene the three-judge court.” Norton v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 596, 599 (Md. 1972) (citations omitted). Section 2281 does not forbid this practice, and we are not inclined to read that statute “in isolation with mutilating literalness . . . .” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, supra, at 94 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Ill Taking a jaundiced view of the constitutional claim, the dissenters would have the District Court dismiss the Supremacy Clause (“statutory”) issue, convene a three-judge court, and reject the constitutional claim, all of this, apparently, as an exercise of the discretion which the District Court, under Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), is claimed to have over the pendent federal claim. But Gibbs was oriented to state law claims pendent to federal claims conferring jurisdiction on the District Court. Pendent jurisdiction over state claims was described as a doctrine of discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants. For, “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id., at 726 (footnote omitted). In light of the dissent’s treatment of Gibbs, several observations are appropriate. First, it is evident from Gibbs that pendent state law claims are not always, or even almost always, to be dismissed and not adjudicated. On the contrary, given advantages of economy and convenience and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudication of these claims. Second, it would reasonably follow that other considerations may warrant adjudication rather than dismissal of pendent state claims. In Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909) the Court held that the state issues should be decided first and because these claims were dispositive, federal questions need not be reached: “Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons. In this case we think it much better to decide it with regard to the question of a local nature, involving the construction of the state statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record.” Id., at 193. Siler is not an oddity. The Court has characteristically dealt first with possibly dispositive state law claims pendent to federal constitutional claims. See, e. g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303-304, 310 (1913); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 508-509 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482, 485 (1922); Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449 (1930); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946). The doctrine is not ironclad, see Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393-394, 396 (1932), but it is recurringly applied, and, at the very least, it presumes the advisability of deciding first the pendent, nonconstitutional issue. Gibbs did not cite Siler or like cases, nor did it purport to change the ordinary rule that a federal court should not decide federal constitutional questions where a dis-positive nonconstitutional ground is available. The dissent uncritically relies on Siler but ignores the preference stated in that case for deciding nonconstitutional claims even though they are pendent and, standing alone, are beyond the jurisdiction of the federal court. Third, the rationale of Gibbs centers upon considerations of comity and the desirability of having a reliable and final determination of the state claim by state courts having more familiarity with the controlling principles and the authority to render a final judgment. These considerations favoring state adjudication are wholly irrelevant where the pendent claim is federal but is itself beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy. In such cases, the federal court’s rendition of federal law will be at least as sure-footed and lasting as any judgment from the state courts. The most relevant cases for our purposes, of course, are those decisions such as King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), where the jurisdictional claim arises under the Federal Constitution and the pendent claim, although denominated “statutory,” is in reality a constitutional claim arising under the Supremacy Clause. In these cases the Court has characteristically dealt with the “statutory” claim first “because if the appellees’ position on this question is correct, there is no occasion to reach the constitutional issues. Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347 (Brandéis, J., concurring); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449.” Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 475-476. In none of these cases did the Court think that with jurisdiction fairly established, a federal court, under Gibbs, must nevertheless decide the constitutional issue and avoid the statutory claim if, upon weighing the two claims, the statutory claim is strong and the constitutional claim weak. On the contrary, Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court in Rosado v. Wyman, and with the principles of Gibbs well in mind, noted that the pendent statutory question was essentially one of federal policy and that the argument for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was “ ‘particularly strong.’ ” 397 U. S., at 404. And Gibbs itself observed the “special reason for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction” where the Supremacy Clause is implicated: “the federal courts are particularly appropriate bodies for the application of pre-emption principles.” 383 U. S., at 729. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. AFDC is one of several major categorical public assistance programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935, and as we described in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316-317 (1968), it is founded on a scheme of cooperative federalism: “It is financed largely by the Federal Government, on a matching fund basis, and is administered by the States. States are not required to participate in the program, but those which desire to take advantage of the substantial federal funds available for distribution to needy children are required to submit an AFDC plan for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). 49 Stat. 627, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601, 602, 603, and 604. See [U. S. Advisory Commission Report on Intergovernmental Relations, Statutory and Administrative Controls Associated with Federal Grants for Public Assistance 21-23 (1964)]. The plan must conform with several requirements of the Social Security Act and with rules and regulations promulgated by HEW. 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (1964 ed., Supp. II). See also HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §§2200, 2300 . . . See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 407-409 (1970). Under the Social Security Act, HEW withholds federal funds for implementation of a state AFDC plan until compliance with the Act and the Department's regulations. HEW may also terminate partially or entirely federal payments if "in the administration of the [state] plan there is a failure to comply substantially with an)provision required by section 602 (a) of [the Act] to be included in the plan.” 42 U. S. C. § 604. See King v. Smith, supra, at 317 n. 12; Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 420-422. The challenged regulation provides, in pertinent part: “(g) Payment for services and supplies already received. Assistance grants shall be made to meet only current needs. Under the following specified circumstances payment for services or supplies already received is deemed a current need: “(7) For a recipient of public assistance who is being evicted for nonpayment of rent for which a grant has been previously issued, an advance allowance may be provided to prevent such eviction or rehouse the family; and such advance shall be deducted from subsequent grants in equal amounts over not more than the next six months. When there is a rent advance for more than one month, or more than one rent advance in a 12 month period, subsequent grants for rent shall be provided as restricted payments in accordance with Part 381 of this Title.” 18 N. Y. C. R. R. § 352.7 (g) (7). As AFDC recipients, petitioners receive monthly grants calculated to provide 90% of their family needs for shelter, fuel, and other basic necessities. For one reason or another, each petitioner was unable to pay her rent, and faced with imminent eviction, she received emergency rent payments from the Nassau Count}' Department of Social Services. Because the State characterized these payments as “advances,” the amount of these disbursements was deducted or recouped from petitioners’ subsequent monthly familial assistance grants pursuant to § 352.7 (g) (7). Petitioners alleged that the New York State recoupment regulation was contrary to the following provisions of the federal statute and regulations because it assumed, contrary to fact, that those funds, extended to a recipient to satisfy a current emergency rent need, remain available as income for the family’s need during the mandated six-month recoupment period. Title 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (7) and (a) (10) state in pertinent part: “(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must ... (7) except as may be otherwise provided in clause (8), provide that the [administering] State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, or any other individual (living in the same home as such child and relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of the child or relative claiming such aid, as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income .... “(10) provide, effective July 1, 1951, that all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals . . . .” 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii) (c): “(a) Requirements for State Plans. A State Plan for OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD or AABD must, as specified below: “(3) .... (ii) Provide that, in establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment: . . . (c) only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and only currently available resources will be considered . . . .” On appeal from the District Court’s entry of the injunction, the Court of Appeals without extended discussion found jurisdiction for the § 1983 action under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). Without passing on the merits of the District Court’s findings and conclusions, the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, ordered a remand to that court to determine whether the recoupment of prior advance rent payments from current grants is a “reduction in grant” that would trigger the New York fair-hearing procedures under 18 N. Y. C. R. R. § 351.26. 462 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1972). On remand, the District Court allowed additional parties who had received fair hearings to intervene and file a complaint. At the invitation of the court, HEW filed an amicus curiae brief which concluded that “the New York regulation does contravene federal requirements because it assumes for particular months the existence of income and resources which by definition are not currently available for such months.” Brief for Petitioners Appendix 2. The District Court once again held the recoupment regulation invalid as violative of the Social Security Act and HEW regulations and enjoined its enforcement and implementation. In view of our disposition of this case, we do not reach the question whether, wholly aside from the pendent-jurisdiction rationale relied upon by the District Court, other valid grounds existed for sustaining its jurisdiction to entertain and decide the claim of conflict between federal and state law. It has been suggested, for example, that the conflict question is itself a constitutional matter within the meaning of § 1343 (3). Connecticut Union of Welfare Employees v. White, 55 F. R. D. 481, 486 (Conn. 1972). For purposes of interpreting and applying 28 U. S. C. § 2281, the three-judge-court provision, a claim of conflict between federal and state law has been denominated a claim not requiring a three-judge court. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. Ill (1965). But Swift itself recognized that a suit to have a state statute declared void and to secure the benefits of the federal statute with which the state law is allegedly in conflict cannot succeed without ultimate resort to the Federal Constitution — “to be sure, any determination that a state statute is void for obstructing a federal statute does rest on the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution.” Id., at 125. Moreover, when we have previously determined that state AFDC laws do not conform to the Social Security Act or HEW regulations, they have been invalidated under the Supremacy Clause. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286 (1971). It is therefore urged that the “secured by the Constitution” language of § 1343 (3) should not be construed to exclude Supremacy Clause issues. That question we leave for another day. Petitioners contend that § 1983 authorizes suits to vindicate rights under the “laws” of the United States as well as under the Constitution and that a suit brought under § 1983 to vindicate a statutory right under the Social Security Act, is a suit under an Act of Congress “providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote” within the meaning of § 1343 (4). They further argue that in any event, § 1343 (3) in particular, and § 1343 in general, should be construed to invest the district courts with jurisdiction to hear any suit authorized by § 1983. These issues we also do not reach. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 405 n. 7; see also Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction Over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1, 16-18 (1970); Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Challenges to State Welfare Programs, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1404, 1405-1435 (1972); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 Col. L. Rev. 84, 109-115 (1967). Several past decisions of this Court concerning challenges by-federal categorical assistance recipients to state welfare regulations have either assumed that jurisdiction existed under § 1343 or so stated without analysis. See, e. g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 671 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S., at 284 n. 2; California Human Resources Dept. v. Java, 402 U. S. 121 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 312 n. 3; Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967). In none of these cases was the jurisdictional issue squarely raised as a contention in the petitions for certiorari, jurisdictional statements, or briefs filed in this Court. See Edelman v. Jordan, post, at 670-671. Moreover, when questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us. United States v. More, 3 Cranch 159, 172 (1805); King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U. S. 100, 134-135, n. 21 (1928) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). We therefore approach the question of the District Court’s jurisdiction to entertain this suit as an open one calling for a canvass of the relevant jurisdictional considerations. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 88 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those district courts that have ruled on similarly drafted state recoupment provisions have found that they were not rationally related to the declared purposes of the AFDC program and were therefore invalid under the Social Security Act and HEW regulations. In Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264 (ED Pa. 1970), the District Court, after finding the equal protection claim substantial, invalidated a Pennsjdvania regulation that recouped over a two-month period alleged overpayments from a family’s assistance grants. The court found the regulation inconsistent with the Social Security Act for several reasons, including, inter alia, the punishment of the dependent child by depriving him of a substantial amount of his AFDC assistance because his mother either mistakenly or fraudulently obtained an extra payment months ago. “[T]he state cannot justify its [arbitrary] method of restitution by asserting that proper management of funds would produce such a [cash] reserve. The state cannot permit a child to starve or be deprived of aid that he needs because of the mother’s budgetary mismanagement. The Social Security Act specifies remedies for such a situation . . . .” Id., at 269. In Bradford v. Juras, 331 F. Supp. 167 (Ore. 1971), the District Court found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the constitutional and statutory challenge to an Oregon regulation authorizing recoupment of overpayments from current assistance grants. Measuring the regulation against the goals of the AFDC program, the court invalidated it as inconsistent with federal law. “The primary concern of Congress in establishing the AFDC program was the welfare and protection of the needy dependent child. 42 U. S. C. §601; King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 313 .. . (1968). This concern is thwarted when recoupment from current grants takes money from the-child to penalize the misconduct of its parent. ". . . The child-oriented policy of the AFDC program requires that children with equal needs be treated equally. The fact that a parent-recipient- has acted wrongfully in the past by withholding information does not justify reducing the subsistence level of her children below that of other needy children.” 331 F. Supp., at 170. In Holloway v. Parham, 340 F. Supp. 336 (ND Ga. 1972), an equal protection and due process challenge to a Georgia statute mandating recoupment from future grants for past unlawful payments was deemed substantial enough to warrant the convening of a three-judge court. Addressing the pendent claim of inconsistency with the Social Security Act and HEW regulations, the court ruled that the law was valid because it required a prerecoupment determination that all or part of the overpayments are currently available to the parent and the children. Although it did not explore the question in depth, the first Court of Appeals panel in this case that passed upon the injunction found jurisdiction in the District Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) on the authority of the Court’s decision in Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669 (1972). There we noted in a suit challenging a state welfare regulation that “if the [federal district] court’s characterization of the [Fourteenth Amendment] question presented as insubstantial was based on the face of the complaint, as it seems to have been, it was error.” Id., at 671. The dissent did not question the majority’s jurisdictional determination. 462 F. 2d, at 930-931, 932. App. 5. “The regulation in question, 18 NYCRR § 352.7 (g) (7), has a rational basis. Since the state has a limited amount of funds available to allocate to welfare recipients, the recoupment regulation is reasonably designed to ensure that there are sufficient funds available to all recipients on the level set by the state legislature. By receiving the advance payment plaintiffs have gotten more than the normal grant. Without the recoupment regulation, the plaintiffs would be in a preferred position over all the other welfare recipients who have paid their full rent out of the normal grant. The purposes of equal protection are served by treating all alike without granting special favor to those who have misappropriated their rent allowance. If there were no recoupment provision, there would be a disincentive for welfare recipients to manage their grants so as to have funds available to pay their rent each month. The recoupment provision encourages proper money management, an entirely acceptable, if incidental, purpose of the welfare legislation. “No doubt there are other ways in which the state could accomplish the ends served by the use of the recoupment regulation. However it is not for us to evaluate the wisdom of the state’s choice of means. If these means are rationally related to a proper end, as they are in this case, we have no power to go further.” 471 F. 2d 347, 349-350. Hart v. Keith Exchange, 262 U. S. 271, 274 (1923). Once a federal court has ascertained that a plaintiff’s jurisdiction-conferring claims are not “insubstantial on their face,” Engineers v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 382 U. S. 423, 428 (1966), “no further consideration of the merits of the claim [s] is relevant to a determination of the court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,199 (1962). The Court also cited with approval Chief Judge Magruder’s concurrence in Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F. 2d 427, 431 (CA1 1949), advising that “‘[f]ederal courts should not be overeager to hold on to the determination of issues that might be more appropriately left to settlement in state court litigation.' ” 383 U. S., at 726 n. 15. Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the general proposition endorsed in Siler — that a federal court properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the state or local law question without deciding the federal constitutional issues — and have then proceeded to dispose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See, e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630 (1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S. 113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387 (1926). These and other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where not absolutely essential to disposition of a case. Other decisions have addressed both the federal and state claims in a random fashion, see, e. g., Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Laughton, 262 U. S. 413, 421-426 (1923); Southern R. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 525-531 (1923); but they have generally denied relief on both the federal and nonfederal grounds asserted, the nonfederal claim not being dispositive. Daughton and Watts were both written by Mr. Justice Brandéis, who in his celebrated concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936), relied upon Siler in summarizing the general rule that “if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.” The dissent also relies upon Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933), but Hurn expressly took account of one aspect of the rule stated in Siler: once a federal court acquires jurisdiction of a case by virtue of the federal questions involved, it may omit to decide the federal issues and decide the case on local or state questions alone. With unmistakable clarity, the Court reaffirmed Siler: “The Siler and like cases announce the rule broadly, without qualification; and we perceive no sufficient reason- for the exception suggested. It is stated in these decisions as a rule of general application, and we hold it to be such .. . .” Id., at 245. The dissent properly notes Hurn’s warning that Siler does not “permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause of action Ibid. However, the Siler rule certainly allows the trial court to adjudicate “a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, only one of which presents a federal question . . . .” Id., at 246 (emphasis added). We can thus see that here, as in Hurn, "[t]he [complaint] alleges the violation of a single right [here the right to nondiscriminatory treatment as to receipt of public assistance]. And it is this violation which constitutes the cause of action. Indeed, the claims of [violation of equal protection and the Social Security Act] so precisely rest upon identical facts as to be little more than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances. The primary relief sought is an injunction to put an end to an essentially single wrong, however differently characterized, not to enjoin distinct wrongs constituting the basis for independent causes of action.” Id., at 246. See also Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315, 324-325 (1938). In a closely analogous context, this Court has recognized the special capability of federal courts to adjudicate pendent federal claims. In Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354 (1959), an injured Spanish seaman filed suit in federal court claiming damages under the Jones Act and under the general maritime law of the United States for unseaworthiness of the ship, maintenance and cure, and negligence. Jurisdiction was invoked under the Jones Act (46 U. S. C. § 688) and under general federal-question (28 U. S. C. § 1331) and diversity (28 U. S. C. § 1332) jurisdiction. After expressing its view that petitioner alleged a Jones Act claim substantial enough to confer jurisdiction under that statute, the Court held that his general maritime law claims were not cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. By no means, however, was this the end of the inquiry. “[T]he District Court may have jurisdiction of [petitioner’s general maritime law claims] ‘pendent’ to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Of course the considerations which call for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction of a state claim related to a pending federal cause of action within the appropriate scope of the doctrine of Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, are not the same when, as here, what is involved are related claims based on the federal maritime law. We perceive no barrier to the exercise of ‘pendent jurisdiction’ in the very limited circumstances before us.” 358 U. S., at 380-381 (emphasis added).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFANO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE v. WEBSTER No. 76-457. Decided March 21, 1977 Per Curiam. Under § 215 of the Social Security Act, as added, 64 Stat. 506, and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 415 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), old-age insurance benefits are computed on the basis of the wage earner’s “average monthly wage” earned during his “benefit computation years” which are the “elapsed years” (reduced by five) during which the wage earner’s covered wages were highest. Until a 1972 amendment, “elapsed years” depended upon the sex of the wage earner. Section 215 (b) (3) prescribed that the number of “elapsed years” for a male wage earner would be three higher than for an otherwise similarly situated female wage earner; for a male, the number of “elapsed years” equaled the number of years that elapsed after 1950 and before the year in which he attained age 65; for a female the number of “elapsed years” equaled the number of years that elapsed after 1950 and before the year in which she attained age 62. Thus, a male born in 1900 would have 14 “elapsed years” on retirement at age 65 but a female born in the same year would have only 11. Accordingly, a female wage earner could exclude from the computation of her “average monthly wage” three more lower earning years than a similarly situated male wage earner could exclude. This would result in a slightly higher “average monthly wage” and a correspondingly higher level of monthly old-age benefits for the retired female wage earner. A single-judge District Court for the Eastern District of New York, on review under § 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), of a denial, after hearing, of appellee’s request that the more favorable formula be used to compute his benefits, held that, on two grounds, the statutory scheme violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment: (1) that to give women who reached age 62 before 1975 greater benefits than men of the same age and earnings record was irrational, and (2) that in any event the 1972 amendment was to be construed to apply retroactively, because construing the amendment to give men who reach age 62 in 1975 or later the benefit of the 1972 amendments but to deny older men the same benefit would render the amendment irrational, and therefore unconstitutional. 413 F. Supp. 127 (1976). We reverse. To withstand scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, “classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized as such an important governmental objective. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974). But “the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 648 (1975). Accordingly, we have rejected attempts to justify gender classifications as compensation for past discrimination against women when the classifications in fact penalized women wage earners, Califano v. Goldfarb, ante, at 209 n. 8; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645, or when the statutory structure and its legislative history revealed that the classification was not enacted as compensation for past discrimination. Califano v. Goldfarb, ante, at 212-216 (plurality opinion), 221-222 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 648. The statutory scheme involved here is more analogous to those upheld in Kahn and Ballard than to those struck down in Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb. The more favorable treatment of the female wage earner enacted here was not a result of “archaic and overbroad generalizations” about women, Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, at 508, or of “the role-typing society has long imposed” upon women, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 15 (1975), such as casual assumptions that women are “the weaker sex” or are more likely to be child-rearers or dependents. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, supra; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra. Rather, “the only discernible purpose of [§ 215’s more favorable treatment is] the permissible one of redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women.” Califano v. Goldfarb, ante, at 209 n. 8. The challenged statute operated directly to compensate women for past economic discrimination. Retirement benefits under the Act are based on past earnings. But as we have recognized: “Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs.” Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S., at 353. See generally id., at 353-354, and nn. 4-6. Thus, allowing women, who as such have been unfairly hindered from earning as much as men, to eliminate additional low-earning years from the calculation of their retirement benefits works directly to remedy some part of the effect of past discrimination. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, at 508. The legislative history of § 215 (b) (3) also reveals that Congress directly addressed the justification for differing treatment of men and women in the former version of that section and purposely enacted the more favorable treatment for female wage earners to compensate for past employment discrimination against women. Before 1956, the sexes were treated equally by § 215 (b) (3); the computation it required turned on the attainment of “retirement age,” which was then defined in 42 U. S. C. § 416 (a) (1952 ed.) as 65 for both sexes. In 1956, however, retirement age was redefined as 62 for women and 65 for men, Social Security Amendments of 1956, § 102 (a), 70 Stat. 809, thereby changing the calculation under § 215 (b) (3). A House Report emphasizes that this reduction in the retirement age for women was purposely made to remedy discrimination against women in the job market: “Your committee believes that the age of eligibility should be reduced to 62 for women workers. . . . A recent study by the United States Employment Service in the Department of Labor showed that age limits are applied more frequently to job openings for women than for men and that the age limits applied are lower.” H. R. Rep. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1955). The effect of this change on § 215 (b) (3) was also discussed in connection with the amendment of that section in 1961. Social Security Amendments of 1961, § 102 (d) (2), 75 Stat. 135. During the hearings on that amendment Representative Watts asked why a woman would draw more benefits than a similarly situated man. After it was noted that this did not change the law as it had existed since 1956, Representative Boggs confirmed that the difference in treatment was not inadvertent: “If I may interrupt, I think we went into this at great length some years ago when we adopted the 62-year provision for women and the theory was that a woman at that age was less apt to have employment opportunities than a man and despite the fact of some statistics to the effect that women live longer than men, I think the other fact is equally commanding, so there is some justification for a distinction between men and women.” Executive Hearings on Social Security Amendments of 1961, before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 146-147 (1961). Thus, the legislative history is clear that the differing treatment of men and women in former § 215 (b) (3) was not “the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females,” Califano v. Goldfarb, ante, at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), but rather was deliberately enacted to compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women. That Congress changed its mind in 1972 and equalized the treatment of men and women does not, as the District Court concluded, constitute an admission by Congress that its previous policy was invidiously discriminatory. 413 F. Supp., at 129. Congress has in recent years legislated directly upon the subject of unequal treatment of women in the job market. Congress may well have decided that “[t]hese congressional reforms . . . have lessened the economic justification for the more favorable benefit computation formula in § 215 (b) (3).” Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (ED Pa. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U. S. 1050 (1975). Moreover, elimination of the more favorable benefit computation for women wage earners, even in the remedial context, is wholly consistent with those reforms, which require equal treatment of men and women in preference to the attitudes of “romantic paternalism” that have contributed to the “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 684 (1973). Finally, there is no merit in appellee’s argument that the failure to make the 1972 amendment retroactive constitutes discrimination on the basis of date of birth. Old-age benefit payments are not constitutionally immunized against alterations of this kind. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603 (1960). Congress expressly reserved “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1304, and the Fifth Amendment “does not forbid . . . statutory changes to have a beginning and thus to discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.” Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U. S. 502, 505 (1911). It follows that Congress may replace one constitutional computation formula with another and make the new formula prospective only. Reversed. Under § 202 (a) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (a) (1970 ed. and Supp. V), a fully insured individual who- has reached retirement age is entitled upon application to a monthly old-age insurance benefit equal to his “primary insurance amount.” Section 215 (a) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 415 (a) (1970 ed. and Supp. V), sets out a table for determining the primary insurance amount. This amount is based on an individual’s “average monthly wage” as defined in § 215 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 415 (b) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). Before it was amended in 1972, § 215 (b) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 415 (b), provided in part: “(1) . . . [A]n individual’s‘average monthly wage’shall be the quotient obtained by dividing— “(A) the total of his wages paid in and self-employment income credited to his ‘benefit computation years’ (determined under paragraph (2)), by “ (B) the number of months in such years. “ (2) (A) The number of an individual’s ‘benefit computation years’ shall be equal to the number of elapsed years (determined under paragraph (3) of this subsection), reduced by five; except that the number of an individual’s benefit computation years shall in no case be less than two. “ (B) An individual’s ‘benefit computation years’ shall be those computation base years, equal in number to the number determined under subpara-graph (A), for which the total of his wages and self-employment income is the largest. “(C) For purposes of subparagraph (B), ‘computation base years’ include only calendar years in the period after 1950 and prior to the earlier of the following years— “(i) the year in which occurred . . . the first month for which the individual was entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or “ (ii) the year succeeding the year in which he died. “(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the number of an individual’s elapsed years is the number of calendar years after 1950 . . . and before— “(A) in the case of a woman, the year in which she died or, if it occurred earlier but after 1960, the year in which she attained age 62. “(C) in the case of a man who has not died, the year occurring after 1960 in which he attained (or would attain) age 65.” Gongress eliminated the distinction in 1972. As amended by § 104 (b), 86 Stat. 1340, 42 U. S. C. § 415 (b) (3) (1970 ed., Supp. V), now provides: “[T]he number of an individual’s elapsed years is the number of calendar years after 1950 . . . and before the year in which he died, or if it occurred earlier but after 1960, the year in which he attained age 62.” The amendment, however, does not apply to men who reached age 62 before its effective date in 1972, and so the former statute continues to govern the determination of this and some other claims of male wage earners. For example, in this case, the District Court found that appellee was awarded a monthly benefit of $185.70, but that a similarly situated female wage earner would have been awarded $204 per month. 413 F. Supp. 127, 128. Four other federal courts have reached a contrary conclusion. Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F. 2d 591 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Gruenwald v. Cohen, 393 U. S. 982 (1968); Kohr v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 1299 (ED Pa. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U. S. 1050 (1975); Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, 386 F. Supp. 443 (ND Ill. 1974); McEvoy v. Weinberger, CCH Unempl. Ins. Rep. ¶ 17,414 (SD Fla., Aug. 28, 1973). Even with the advantage provided by former § 215 (b) (3), women on the average received lower retirement benefits than men. “As of December 1972, the average monthly retirement insurance benefit for males was $179.60 and for females, $140.50.” Polelle v. Secretary of HEW, supra, at 444 (emphasis omitted). At that time, the calculation of the “average monthly wage” under § 215 (b) was somewhat different from the scheme set out in n. 1, supra, which was not adopted until Social Security Amendments of 1960, § 303 (a), 74 Stat. 960. The role of § 215 (b) (3) in the computation was similar under the old scheme, however, and the differences between the old and new methods of computation are essentially irrelevant to the effect of the 1956 change in the definition of retirement age on § 215 (b) (3). Congress deliberately adopted the change notwithstanding the argument urged upon it that reducing the retirement age would not benefit women. S. Rep. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 14-15 (1956). In 1961, in connection with the extension of reduced retirement benefits to men at age 62, the definition of retirement age in 42 U. S. C. § 416 (a) was repealed, and the differing ages for the computation of “elapsed years” under § 215 (b) (3) were written explicitly into that section for the first time. §§ 102 (c) (1), 102 (d) (2), 75 Stat. 134, 135. It was at that time that § 215 (b) (3) took on the form it was to retain until 1972. See nn. 1-2, supra. See, e. g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DOW CHEMICAL CO. et al. v. STEPHENSON et al. No. 02-271. Argued February 26, 2003 Decided June 9, 2003 Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Louis R. Cohen, Andrew L. Frey, Philip Allen Lacovara, Charles A. Rothfeld, Rickard B. Katslcee, Michele L. Odorizzi, Steven Brock, and John C. Sabetta. Gerson H. Smoger argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mark R. Cuker and Ronald Simon. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Insurance Association et al. by Herbert M. Wachtell, Jeffrey M. Wintrier, Craig A Berrington, Lynda S. Mounts, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Rie-gel, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Product Liability Advisory Council by John H. Beisner; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Rickard A Samp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Louisiana et al. by Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, and Mike McGrath of Montana; for the American Legion et al. by William A Rossbach and P. B. Onderdonk, Jr.; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for Law Professors by David L. Shapiro, John Leubsdorf, and Henry P. Monaghan; for the Lymphoma Foundation of America et al. by Raphael Metzger; for Public Citizen by Brian Wolfman; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by Brent M. Rosenthal, Leslie Brueckner, and Misty A Farris. Patrick Lysaught filed a brief for the Defense Research Institute as amicus curiae. Per Curiam. With respect to respondents Joe Isaacson and Phyllis Lisa Isaacson, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28 (2002). With respect to respondents Daniel Raymond Stephenson, Susan Stephenson, Daniel Anthony Stephenson, and Emily Elizabeth Stephenson, the judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEAL v. UNITED STATES No. 94-9088. Argued December 4, 1995 Decided January 22, 1996 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Donald Thomas Bergerson, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 963, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Michael J. Costello. Paul R. Q. Wolf son argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben. Peter Goldberger and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The policy of sentencing drug offenders based on the amount of drugs involved, straightforward enough in its simplest formulation, gives rise to complexities, requiring us again to address the methods for calculating the weight of LSD sold by a drug trafficker. We reject petitioner’s contention that the revised system for determining LSD amounts under the United States Sentencing Guidelines requires reconsideration of the method used to determine statutory minimum sentences, and we adhere to our former decision on the subject. I LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) is such a powerful narcotic that the average dose contains only 0.05 milligrams of the pure drug. The per-dose amount is so minute that in most instances LSD is transferred to a carrier medium and sold at retail by the dose, not by weight. In the typical case, pure LSD is dissolved in alcohol or other solvent, and the resulting solution is applied to paper or gelatin. The solvent evaporates; the LSD remains. The dealer cuts the paper or gel into single-dose squares for sale on the street. Users ingest the LSD by swallowing or licking the squares or drinking a beverage into which the squares have been mixed. In 1988, petitioner Meirl Neal was arrested for selling 11,456 doses of LSD on blotter paper. The combined weight of the LSD and the paper was 109.51 grams. Following a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, petitioner was convicted of one count of possession of LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841, and one count of conspiracy to possess LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. At the initial sentencing, the method for determining the weight of the illegal mixture or substance was the same under the Guidelines and the statute directing minimum sentences. The determinative amount was the whole weight of the blotter paper containing the drug. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, n: * (Nov. 1987) (1987 USSG). Because the total weight of the LSD and blotter paper exceeded 10 grams, the District Court found petitioner subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence specified in 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(v). Under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, the indicated sentence was even greater than the statutory minimum: The quantity of the drugs and petitioner’s prior convictions resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, even after an adjustment for petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility for the crime. The District Court imposed concurrent sentences of 192 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be followed by five years of supervised release. In November 1993, the United States Sentencing Commission revised the method of calculating the weight of LSD in the Sentencing Guidelines. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, App. C., Arndt. 488 (Nov. 1995) (1995 USSG). Departing from its former approach of weighing the entire mixture or substance containing LSD, the amended Guideline instructed courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight of 0.4 milligrams. Id., §2Dl.l(c), n. (H). The revised Guideline was retroactive, id., App. C, Arndt. 502, and one month later petitioner filed a motion to modify his sentence, see 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(2). He contended that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was 4.58 grams (11,456 doses x 0.4 milligrams). For that amount, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines would be 70 to 87 months of imprisonment. The 10-year statutory minimum of § 841(b)(l)(A)(v) was no bar to a reduced sentence, petitioner argued, because the presumptive-weight method of the Guidelines should also control the mandatory minimum calculation. The 4.58 grams attributable to him by the Guidelines method would be well short of the 10 grams necessitating a 10-year minimum sentence. The District Court, following our recent decision in Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991), ruled that the blotter paper must be weighed in determining whether petitioner crossed the 10-gram threshold of § 841(b)(l)(A)(v). It held that the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years still applied to petitioner notwithstanding the sentencing range under the Guidelines. Since the Guidelines no longer authorized a sentence above the statutory minimum, the District Court reduced petitioner’s sentence to 120 months on each count. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this, and it affirmed petitioner’s sentence. 46 F. 3d 1405 (1995). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether the revised Guideline governs the calculation of the weight of LSD for purposes of § 841(b)(1). 515 U. S. 1141 (1995). Compare United States v. Muschik, 49 F. 3d 512, 518 (CA9 1995) (Guideline method should be used under § 841(b)(1)), cert. pending, No. 95-156, with United States v. Boot, 25 F. 3d 52, 55 (CA1 1994); United States v. Kinder, 64 F. 3d 757, 759 (CA2 1995), cert. pending, No. 95-6746; United States v. Hanlin, 48 F. 3d 121, 124 (CA3 1995); United States v. Pardue, 36 F. 3d 429, 431 (CA5 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1113 (1995); United States v. Andress, 47 F. 3d 839, 840 (CA6 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Stoneking, 60 F. 3d 399, 402 (CA8 1995) (en banc), cert. pending, No. 95-5410; United States v. Mueller, 27 F. 3d 494, 496-497 (CA10 1994); United States v. Pope, 58 F. 3d 1567, 1570 (CA11 1995). II Congress has tried different punishment schemes to combat the menace of drug trafficking. Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, penalties depended upon whether or not a drug was classified as a narcotic. Chagrined by the resulting sentencing disparities, Congress amended the narcotics laws in 1984 to calculate penalties by the weight of the pure drug involved. See Chapman, 500 U. S., at 460-461. Focusing on the pure drug, however, often allowed retail traffickers, who supplied street markets with mixed or diluted drugs ready for consumption, to receive sentences lighter than what Congress deemed necessary. Id., at 461. In passing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, “Congress adopted a ‘market-oriented’ approach to punishing drug trafficking, under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence.” Chapman, supra, at 461; H. R. Rep. No. 99-845, pt. 1, pp. 11-12, 17 (1986). The Act provided for mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of “a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of various controlled substances, including LSD. 21 U. S. C. §§841(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) and (B)(i)-(viii). Trafficking in 10 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing LSD earns the offender at least 10 years in prison. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). In Chapman, we interpreted the provision of the Act that provided a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for trafficking in an LSD “mixture or substance” that weighed one gram or more, see § 841(b)(l)(B)(v). We construed “mixture” and “substance” to have their ordinary meaning, observing that the terms had not been defined in the statute or the Sentencing Guidelines and had no distinctive common-law meaning. 500 U. S., at 461-462. Reasoning that the “LSD is diffused among the fibers of the paper . . . [and] cannot be distinguished from the blotter paper, nor easily separated from it,” id., at 462, we held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, is determinative under the statute, id., at 468. Petitioner contends that the method approved in Chapman is no longer appropriate. In his view, the Commission intended its dose-based method to supplant the actual-weight method used in Chapman, and we should not presume that the Commission would recognize two inconsistent schemes for sentencing LSD traffickers, cf. 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d (stating purposes of making offense levels in §2D1.1 “proportional to the levels established by statute” and providing “a logical sentencing structure for drug offenses”). Petitioner concedes, as he must, that the Commission does not have the authority to amend the statute we construed in Chapman. He argues, nonetheless, that the Commission is the agency charged with interpretation of penalty statutes and expert in sentencing matters, so its construction of § 841(b)(1) should be given deference. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 887 (1984). Congress intended the Commission’s rulemaking to respond to judicial decisions in developing a coherent sentencing regime, see Braxton v. United States, 500 U. S. 344, 348 (1991), so, petitioner contends, deference is appropriate even though the Commission’s interpretation postdated Chapman. In the alternative, he urges that we reassess Chapman in light of the Commission’s revised method, which was formed from careful study of retail drug markets. Although Chapman established that the weight of the blotter paper must be taken into account, it did not address how courts should do so. The Commission has filled the gap, petitioner maintains, by assigning a constructive weight to the LSD and carrier for each dose. While acknowledging that the Commission’s expertise and the design of the Guidelines may be of potential weight and relevance in other contexts, we conclude that the Commission’s choice of an alternative methodology for weighing LSD does not alter our interpretation of the statute in Chapman. In any event, principles of stare decisis require that we adhere to our earlier decision. The Commission was born of congressional disenchantment with the vagaries of federal sentencing and of the parole system. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 366 (1989) (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and its legislative history). The Commission is directed to “establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system” that meet congressional goals set forth in 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2) and that, within a regime of individualized sentencing, eliminate unwarranted disparities in punishment of similar defendants who commit similar crimes. See 28 U. S. C. §§991(b)(l)(A)-(B). Congress also charged the Commission with the duty to measure and monitor the effectiveness of various sentencing, penal, and correctional practices. § 991(b)(2). In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission has the authority to promulgate, review, and revise binding guidelines to “establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according to various specified factors, among others.” Mistretta, supra, at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 28 U. S. C. §§ 994(a), (b), (c), and (o). Like 21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1), the Sentencing Guidelines calibrate the punishment of drug traffickers according to the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. From their inception in 1987, the Guidelines have used a detailed Drug Quantity Table as a first step in determining the sentence. See 1995 USSG §2D1.1(c); 1987 USSG §2D1.1. The current Table has 17 tiers, each with specified weight ranges for different controlled substances. The weight ranges reflect the Commission’s assessment of equivalent culpability among defendants who traffic in different types of drugs, and so all defendants in the same tier are assigned the same base offense level. See 1995 USSG § 2D 1.1(c). Once the base offense level is adjusted for other factors, it yields a specific sentencing range depending on the defendant’s criminal history. See 1995 USSG § 1B1.1. Although the mandatory-minimum statute and the Guidelines both turn upon drug quantities, the Commission itself has noted that “mandatory mínimums are both structurally and functionally at odds with sentencing guidelines and the goals the guidelines seek to achieve.” United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 26 (Aug. 1991). “The sentencing guidelines system is essentially a system of finely calibrated sentences. For example, as the quantity of drugs increases, there is a proportional increase in the sentence. In marked contrast, the mandatory mínimums are essentially a flat, tariff-like approach to sentencing. Whereas guidelines seek a smooth continuum, mandatory mínimums result in ‘cliffs.’ The ‘cliffs’ that result from mandatory mínimums compromise proportionality, a fundamental premise for just punishment, and a primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act.” Id., at iii. Despite incongruities between the Guidelines and the mandatory sentencing statute, the Commission has sought to make the Guidelines parallel to the scheme of § 841(b)(1) in most instances. See 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., n. 10 (“The Commission has used the sentences provided in, and equivalences derived from, the statute (21 U. S. C. § 841(b)(1)), as the primary basis for the guideline sentences”). As a general rule, the Commission adopts the same approach to weighing drugs as the statute does: “Unless otherwise specified, the' weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance.” 1995 USSG §2D1.1(c), n. (A); see also 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., n. 1 (“‘Mixture or substance’ as used in this guideline has the same meaning as in 21 U. S. C. § 841, except as expressly provided”); 1987 USSG §2D1.1, n. * (weighing rule intended to be “[consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act”). For most narcotics, there will be no inconsistency in the calculations of drug quantities. After study of the LSD trade, however, the Commission in 1993 decided it could no longer follow that general rule for LSD offenses and fulfill the statutory directive to promote proportionate sentencing. The Commission determined that “[bjecause the weights of LSD carrier media vary widely and typically far exceed the weight of the controlled substance itself,... basing offense levels on the entire weight of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwarranted disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of actual LSD (but different carrier weights), as well as sentences disproportionate to those for other, more dangerous controlled substances, such as PCP.” 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d. To remedy the problem, the Commission revised its Guideline to provide: “In the case of LSD on a carrier medium (e. g., a sheet of blotter paper), do not use the weight of the LSD/carrier medium. Instead, treat each dose of LSD on the carrier medium as equal to 0.4 mg of LSD for the purposes of the Drug Quantity Table.” 1995 USSG §2Dl.l(c), n. (H). Under the amendment, a court determines the defendant’s base offense level in the Drug Quantity Table by multiplying the number of doses of LSD involved by 0.4 milligrams. The Commission submitted the amendment to Congress, which did not disapprove it in the 180 days allotted by statute. See 28 U. S. C. § 994(p). The amended Guideline took effect on November 1,1993, and was in force when petitioner was resentenced. As a threshold matter, it is doubtful that the Commission intended the constructive-weight method of the Guidelines to displace the actual-weight method that Chapman requires for statutory minimum sentences. The commentary, which is the authoritative construction of the Guidelines absent plain inconsistency or statutory or constitutional infirmity, Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36, 38 (1993), states that the new method is to be used “for purposes of determining the base offense level.” 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d. The next paragraph of the commentary repeats the point: The new method will make “the offense level for LSD on a carrier medium . . . [less than] that for the same number of doses of PCP,” “harmonize offense levels for LSD offenses with those for other controlled substances,” and “avoid an undue influence of varied carrier weight on the applicable offense level.” Ibid. This would be obscure language to choose if the Commission were attempting an interpretation of the statute as well as a revision of the Guidelines, for offense levels are not relevant to the mandatory-minimum calculation. Furthermore, after a catalog of reasons for adopting the dose-based method, the Commission ends with the observation that “[Nonetheless, this approach does not override the applicability of ‘mixture or substance’ for the purpose of applying any mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman; §5Gl.l(b)).” Ibid. The citation of Chapman in tandem with § 5G1.1(b), which advises that “[w]here a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence,” suggests that the Guidelines calculation is independent of the statutory calculation, and that the statute controls if they conflict. The Commission seems to do no more than acknowledge that, whether or not its method would be preferable for the statute and Guideline alike, it has no authority to override the statute as we have construed it. Were we, for argument’s sake, to adopt petitioner’s view that the Commission intended the commentary as an interpretation of § 841(b)(1), and that the last sentence of the commentary states the Commission’s view that the dose-based method is consistent with the term “mixture or substance” in the statute, he still would not prevail. The Commission’s dose-based method cannot be squared with Chapman. The Guideline does take into account some of the weight of the carrier medium (because the average weight of an LSD dose is 0.05 milligrams, 0.35 of the Commission’s constructive weight per dose of 0.4 milligrams is attributable to the medium, see 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d), but we held in Chapman that § 841(b)(1) requires “the entire mixture or substance ... to be weighed when calculating the sentence.” 500 U. S., at 459. In these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the Commission in order to reject its alleged contrary interpretation. Once we have determined a statute’s meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency’s later interpretation of the statute against that settled law. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U. S. 527, 536-537 (1992); Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 131 (1990). Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from institutional concerns about the relationship of the Judiciary to Congress. One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construction is that “Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation.” Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720, 736 (1977). We have overruled our precedents when the intervening development of the law has “removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173 (1989) (citations omitted). Absent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress’ original intent, NLRB v. Longshoremen, 473 U. S. 61, 84 (1985), our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes. Entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, the Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed a more desirable “approach” to calculating LSD quantities, cf. 1995 USSG §2D1.1, comment., backg’d. We, however, do not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a statute. True, there may be little in logic to defend the statute’s treatment of LSD; it results in significant disparity of punishment meted out to LSD offenders relative to other narcotics traffickers. (Although the number of doses petitioner sold seems high, the quantities of other narcotics a defendant would have to sell to receive a comparable sentence under the statute yield far more doses, see United States v. Marshall, 908 F. 2d 1312, 1334 (CA7 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991).) Even so, Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair. Like Chapman, this case involves a petitioner who sold LSD on blotter paper, the “carrier of choice” involved in “the vast majority of cases.” 500 U. S., at 466. Just as we declined in Chapman to entertain “hypothetical cases ... involving very heavy carriers and very little LSD” in resolving a due process challenge, ibid., we do not address how § 841(b)(1) should be applied in those cases. We hold that § 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the Sentencing Guidelines require a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KISSINGER v. REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS et al. No. 78-1088. Argued October 31, 1979 Decided March 3, 1980 RehNQUist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, and Powell, JJ., joined. BrenNan, J., post, p. 158, and Stevens, J., post, p. 161, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Blackmun, J., took no part in the decision of the cases. David Ginsburg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 78-1088 and respondent in No. 78-1217. With him on the briefs was James E. Wesner. William Alsup argued the cause for the federal parties in both cases. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, and Michael Kimmel. Robert M. Sussman argued the cause for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in both cases. With him on the brief were Charles A. H'orsky and Peter Barton Hutt. William.A. Dobrovir argued- the cause for the Military Audit Project in both cases. With him on the brief was Andra N. Oakes. Together with No. 78-1217, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. v. Kissinger, also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Jtjstice'Rehnqtjist delivered.the opinion of the Court. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) vests jurisdiction in federal district courts to enjoin an “agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(4)(B). We hold today that even if a. document requested under, the FOIA is wrongfully in the possession of a party not an “agency,” the . agency which received the request does not “improperly withhold” those materials by its refusal to institute a retrieval action. When an agency has demonstrated that it has not “withheld” requested records in violation of the standards established by Congress,, the federal courts have no authority to order the production of such records under the FOIA. I This litigation arises out of FOIA requests seeking access to various transcriptions of petitioner. Kissinger’s telephone conversations. The questions presented by the petition necessitate a thorough review of the facts. A Henry Kissinger served in the Nixon and Ford administrations for eight years. He assumed the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in January 1969. In September 1973, Kissinger was appointed to the office of Secretary of State, but retained his National Security Affairs advisory position until November 3, 1975. After his resignation from the latter position, Kissinger continued to serve as Secretary of State until January 20, 1977. Throughout this period of Government service, Kissinger’s secretaries generally monitored his telephone conversations and recorded their contents either by shorthand or on tape. The stenographic notes or tapes were used to prepare detailed summaries, and sometimes verbatim transcripts, of Kissinger’s conversations. Since Kissinger’s secretaries generally monitored all of his conversations, the summaries discussed official business as well as personal matters. The summaries and transcripts prepared from the electronic or stenographic recording of his telephone conversations throughout his entire tenure in Government service were stored in his office at the State Department in personal files. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the telephone notes from his office in the State Department to the New York estate of Nelson Rockefeller. Before removing the notes, Kissinger did not consult the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center (FADRC), the center responsible for implementing the State Department’s record maintenance and disposal program. Nor did he consult the Nat’onal Archives and Records Service (NARS), a branch of the General Services Administration (GSA) which is responsible for records preservation throughout the Federal Government. Kissinger had obtained an opinion from the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, however, advising him that the telephone summaries were not agency records but were his personal papers which he would be free to take when he left office. After Kissinger effected this physical transfer of the notes, he entered into two agreements with the Library of Congress deeding his private papers. In the first agreement, dated November 12, 1976, Kissinger deeded to the United States, in care of the Library of Congress, one collection of papers. Kissinger’s telephone notes were not included in this collection. The agreement established terms obligating Kissinger to comply with certain restrictions on the inclusion of official documents in the collection and obligating the Library to respect restrictions on access. The agreement required that official materials in the collection would consist of “copies of government papers of which there is an original or record copy in government files.” It also provided that all such materials must have been “approved for inclusion in the Collection” by “authorized officials.” Public access to the collection, under the terms of the deed, will not begin until 25 years after the transfer or 5 years after Kissinger’s death, whichever is later. Until that time, access is restricted to (1) employees of the Library of Congress who have been jointly approved by the Library of Congress and Mr. Kissinger; (2) persons who have received the written permission of Mr. Kissinger; and (3) after Kissinger’s death, persons who have received the written permission of a committee to be named in his will. Kissinger and all .of his research assistants who have appropriate security clearance retain unrestricted access to the collection. After this agreement was executed, the Department of State formulated procedures for the review of the documents and their transfer to the Library of Congress. Employees reviewed the collection and retained (a) original or record copies of documents belonging to the agency, and (b) any materials containing classified information. In the donation process, Kissinger was also required to sign the Department’s Standard Separation Statement affirming that he had “surrendered to responsible officials . . . documents or material containing classified or administratively controlled information furnished . . . during the course of [Government] employment or developed as a consequence thereof, including any diaries, memorandums of conversations, or other documents of a personal nature. . . .” On December 24, 1976, by a second deed, Kissinger donated a second collection consisting of his telephone notes. This second agreement with the Library of Congress incorporated by reference all of the terms and conditions of the first agreement. It provided in addition, however, that public access to the transcripts would be permitted only with the consent, or upon the death, of the other parties to the telephone conversations in question. On December 28, 1976, the transcripts were transported directly to the Library from the Rockefeller estate. Thus the transcripts were not reviewed by the Department of State Document and Reference Center with the first collection of donated papers before they were delivered into the possession of the Library of Congress. Several weeks after they were moved to the Library, however, one of Kissinger’s personal aides did extract portions of the transcripts for inclusion in the files of the State Department and the National Security Council. Pursuant to the instructions of the State Department Legal Adviser, the aide included in the extracts, “any significant policy decisions or actions not otherwise reflected in the Department’s records.” B Three separate FOIA requests form the basis of this litigation. All three requests were filed while Kissinger was Secretary of State, but only one request was filed prior to the removal of the telephone notes from the premises of the State Department. This first request was filed by William Safire, a New York Times columnist, on January 14, 1976. Safire requested the Department of State to produce any transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations between January 21, 1969,. and February 12, 1971, in which (1) Safire’s name appeared or (2) Kissinger discussed the subject of information “leaks” with certain named White House officials. The Department denied Safire’s FOIA request by letter of February 11, 1976. The Department letter reasoned that the requested notes had been made while Kissinger was National Security Adviser and therefore were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure. The second FOIA request was filed on December 28 and 29, 1976, by the Military Audit Project (MAP) after Kissinger publicly announced the gift of his telephone notes to the United States and their placement in the Library of Congress. The MAP request, filed with the Department of State, sought records of all Kissinger’s conversations made while Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. On January 18, 1977, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State denied the request on two grounds. First,, he found that the notes were not agency records. Second, the deposit of the notes with the Library of .Congress prior to the request terminated the Department’s custody and control. The denial was affirmed on administrative appeal. The third FOIA request was filed on January 13, 1977, by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the American Historical Association, the American Pol'tical Science Association, and a number of other journalists (collectively referred to as the RCFP requesters). This request also sought production of the telephone notes made by Kissinger both while he was National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. The request was denied for the same reasons given to the MAP requesters. The United States has taken some action to seek recovery of the notes for record processing. On January 4, 1977, the Government Archivist wrote to Kissinger, requesting that he be permitted to inspect the telephone notes so that he could determine whether they were Department records, and to determine whether Kissinger had authority to remove them from Department custody. The State Department Legal Adviser, however, analyzed the Archivist’s request and issued a memorandum concluding that so long as extracts of the official business contained in the notes were filed as agency records, Kissinger had complied with the Department’s regulations. The Legal Adviser also concluded that the inspection procedures suggested by the Archivist would compromise the Department’s policy of respecting the privacy of such secretarial notes and would discourage the creation of historical materials in the first instance. On January 18, 1977, Kissinger replied to the Archivist, declining to permit access. The Archivist renewed his request for an inspection on February 11, 1977, by which time Kissinger was no longer Secretary of State. With the request, he enclosed a memorandum of law prepared by the General Counsel of the GSA concluding that the materials in question might well be records rather than personal files and that the Archivist was entitled to inspect them under the Federal Records and Records Disposal Acts, 44 U. S. C. §§2901-2909, 3101-3107; 44 U. S. C. §§ 3301-3314 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). Kissinger did not respond to the Archivist’s second request. C Proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia commenced February 8, 1977. The RCFP requesters and Safire instituted an action under the FOIA, seeking enforcement of their FOIA requests. On March 8, 1977, MAP filed a similar suit. Both suits named Kissinger, the Library of Congress, the Secretary of State and the Department of State as defendants. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the summaries were agency records that had been unlawfully removed and were being improperly withheld. Plaintiffs requested as ultimate relief that the court require the Library to return the transcripts to the Department with directions to process them for disclosure under the FOIA. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by all plaintiffs and by Kissinger. The District Judge ruled in plaintiffs’ favor as to transcripts produced while Kissinger was Secretary of State, but denied relief as to transcripts of conversations produced while Kissinger was Special Assistant to the President. The court first found that the transcripts of telephone conversations were “agency records” subject to disclosure under the FOIA. The court also found that Kissinger had wrongfully removed these records by not obtaining the prior approval of the Administrator of General Services. The court recognized that the FOIA did not directly provide for relief since the records were in the custody of the Library of Congress, which is not an “agency” under the Act. Nevertheless, the court held that the FOIA permitted the court to invoke its equitable powers “to order the return of wrongfully removed agency documents where a statutory retrieval action appears unlikely.” An order was entered requiring the Library to return the documents to the Department of State; requiring the Department of State to determine which of the summaries are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, and to provide the required materials to the plaintiffs. The court denied the production of summaries made during Kissinger’s tenure as National Security Adviser on the basis of a mistaken assumption that plaintiffs had withdrawn their request for these summaries. Both Kissinger and the private parties appealed from the lower court judgment. The Court of Appeals, without discussion, affirmed the trial court judgment ordering production of the summaries made while Kissinger was Secretary of State. The Court of Appeals also held that the summaries made during Kissinger’s service as National Security Adviser need not be produced. The court found that this request had not been withdrawn, and reasoned that three considerations supported nonproduction: (1) the FOIA does not cover those Presidential advisers “who are so close to him as to be within the White House”; (2) the relocation of the transcripts to the State Department did not bring them within its disclosure responsibilities under the FOIA; and (3) the fact that portions of the transcripts may reflect the affairs of the NSC, an agency to which the FOIA does apply, provided no basis for disclosure in the absence of an FOIA request directed to that agency. Kissinger filed a petition for certiorari requesting this Court to review the Court of Appeals’ determination that the State Department had improperly withheld agency records, thereby permitting their production from the Library of Congress. The RCFP requesters filed a cross-petition seeking review of that court’s judgment denying production of the conversations transcribed while Kissinger served as National Security Adviser. We granted both petitions, 441 U. S. 904, and we now affirm in part and reverse in part. II We first address the issue presented by Kissinger — whether the District Court possessed the authority to order the transfer of that portion of the deeded collection, including the transcripts of all conversations Kissinger made while Secretary of State, from the Library of Congress to the Department of State at the behest of the named plaintiffs. The lower courts premised this exercise of jurisdiction on their findings that the papers were “agency records” and that they had been wrongfully removed from State Department custody in violation of the Federal Records Disposal Act, 44 U. S. C. § 3303. We need not, and do not, decide whether the telephone notes are agency records, or were wrongfully removed, for even assuming an affirmative answer to each of these questions, the FOIA plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. The question must be, of course, whether Congress has conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to impose this remedy. Two statutory schemes are relevant to this inquiry. First, if Congress contemplated a private right of action under the Federal Records Act and the Federal Records Disposal Act, this would in itself justify , the remedy imposed if Kissinger in fact wrongfully removed the documents. In the alternative, the lower court order could be sustained if authorized by the FOIA. A The Federal Records Act of 1950, 44 U. S. C. § 2901 et seq., authorizes the “head of each Federal agency” to establish a “records management program” and to define the extent to which documents are “appropriate for preservation” as agency records. The records management program requires that adequate documentation of agency policies and procedures be retained. The Records Disposal Act, a complementary records management Act, provides the exclusive means for record disposal. 44 U. S. C. § 3314. Under the Records Disposal Act, once a document achieves the- status of a “record” as defined by the Act, it may not be alienated or disposed of without the consent of the Administrator of General Services, who has delegated his authority in such matters to the Archivist of the United States. 44 U. S. C. §§ 3303, 3303a, 3308-3314 (1976 ed. and Supp. II); GSA, Delegations of Authority Manual, ADM P. 5450.39A. Thus if Kissinger’s telephone notes were “records” within the meaning of the Federal Records Act, a question we do not reach, then Kissinger’s transfer might well violate the Act since he did not seek the approval of the Archivist prior to transferring custody to himself and then to the Library of Congress. We assume such a wrongful removal arguendo for the purposes of this opinion. But the Federal Records Aet establishes only one remedy for the improper removal of a “record” from the agency. The head of the agency is required under 44 U. S. C. § 3106 to notify the Attorney General if he determines or “has reason to believe” that records have been improperly removed from the agency. The Administrator of General Services is obligated to assist in such actions. 44 U. S. C. § 2905. At the behest of these administrators, the Attorney General may bring suit to recover the records. The Archivist did request return of the telephone notes from Kissinger on the basis of his belief that the documents may have been wrongfully removed under the Act. Despite Kissinger’s refusal to comply with the Archivist’s request, no suit has been instituted against Kissinger to retrieve the records under 44 U. S. C. § 3106. Plaintiff requesters effectively seek to enforce these requirements of the Acts by seeking the return of the records to State Department custody. No provision of either Act, however, expressly confers a right of action on private parties. Nor do we believe that such a private right of action can be implied. This Court has spent too many pages identifying the factors relevant to uncovering congressional intent to imply a private cause of action to belabor the topic here. Our most recent pronouncement on the subject, Transamerica Mortgage Ad-visors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979), readily disposes of the question. First, the language of the Records Acts merely “proscribes certain conduct” and does not “create or alter any civil liabilities.” Id., at 19. The Records Act also expressly provides administrative remedies for violations of the duties it imposes, implicating our conclusion in Transamerica Mortgage that it is “an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.” Ibid. Finally, the legislative history does not detract from the inference to be drawn from congressional silence, but rather confirms that such silence is purposeful. The legislative history of the Acts reveals that their purpose was not to benefit private parties, but solely to benefit the agencies themselves and the Federal Government as a whole. The Senate Report to the Federal Records Act of 1950 reveals this focus. S. Rep. No. 2140, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1950). The Report states: “It is well to emphasize that records come into existence, or should do so, not in order to fill filing cabinets or occupy floor space, or even to satisfy the archival needs of this and future generations, but first of all to serve the administrative- and executive purposes of the organization that creates them. There is danger of this simple, self-evident fact being lost for lack of emphasis. The measure of effective records management should be its usefulness to the executives who are responsible for accomplishing the substantive purposes of the organization. . . . [The] first interest is in the establishment of a useful system of documentation that will enable [the executive] to have the information he needs available when he needs it.” Congress expressly recognized the need for devising adequate statutory safeguards against the unauthorized removal of agency records, and opted in favor of a system of administrative standards and enforcement. See U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Records Management 27 (1949). Thus, regardless of whether Kissinger has violated the Records and Records Disposal Acts, Congress has not vested federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate that question upon suit by a private party. That responsibility is vested in the administrative authorities. B The plaintiff requesters contend that even though the Federal Records and Records Disposal Acts do not contemplate a private right of action, the FOIA nevertheless supplies what was missing from those Acts — congressional intent to permit private actions to recover records wrongfully removed from Government custody. We are, however, unable to read the FOIA as supplying that congressional intent. The FOIA represents a carefully balanced scheme of public rights and agency obligations designed to foster greater access to agency records than existed prior to its enactment. That statutory scheme authorizes federal courts to ensure private access to requested materials when three requirements have been met. Under 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (4) (B) federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) “improperly”; (2) “withheld”; (3) “agency records.” Judicial authority to devise remedies and enjoin agencies can only be invoked, under the jurisdictional grant conferred by § 552, if the agency has contravened all three components of this obligation. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the telephone notes were “agency records” since we conclude that a covered agency — here the State Department — has not “withheld” those documents from the plaintiffs. We also need not decide the full contours of a prohibited “withholding.” We do decide, however, that Congress did not mean that an agency improperly withholds a document which has been removed from the possession of the agency prior to the filing of the FOIA request. In such a case, the agency has neither the custody nor control necessary to enable it to withhold. In looking for congressional intent, we quite naturally start with the usual meaning of the word “withhold” itself. The requesters would have us read the “hold” out of “withhold.” The act described by this word presupposes the actor’s possession or control of the item withheld. A refusal to resort to legal remedies to obtain possession is simply not conduct subsumed by the verb “withhold.” The Act and its legislative history do not purport to define the word. An examination of the structure and purposes of the Act, however, indicates that Congress used the word in its usual sense. An agency’s failure to sue a third party to obtain possession is not a withholding under the Act. Several sources suggest directly that agency possession or control is prerequisite to triggering any duties under the FOIA. In the debates, the Act was described as ensuring “access to the information possessed by [Government] servants.” (Emphasis added.) 112 Cong. Rec. 13652 (1966), reprinted in Freedom of Information Act Source Book, S. Doc. No. 93-82, p. 69 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Monagan) (hereinafter Source Book I). Following FOIA’s enactment in 1966, the Attorney General issued guidelines for the use of all federal departments and agencies in complying with the new statute. The guidelines state that FOIA “refers, of course, only to records in being and in the possession or control of an agency. . . . [It] imposes no obligation to compile or procure a record in response to a request.” Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act 23-24 (June 1967), Source Book I, pp. 222-223. Most courts which have considered the question have concluded that the FOIA is only directed at requiring agencies to disclose those “agency records” for which they have chosen to retain possession or control. See also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 221 (1978), describing the Act as reaching “records and material in the possession of federal agencies. ...” The conclusion that possession or control is a prerequisite to FOIA disclosure duties is reinforced by an examination of the purposes of the Act. The Act does not obligate agencies to create or retain documents; it only obligates them to provide access to those which it in fact has created and retained. It has been settled by decision of this Court that only the Federal Records Act, and not the FOIA, requires an agency to actually create records, even though the agency’s failure to do so deprives the public of information which might have otherwise been available to it. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 421 U. S. 132, 161-162 (1975); Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U. S. 168, 192 (1975). If the agency is not required to create or to retain records under the FOIA, it is somewhat difficult to determine why the agency is nevertheless required to retrieve documents which have escaped its possession, but which it has not endeavored to recover. If the document is of so little interest to the agency that it does not believe the retrieval effort to be justified, the effect of this judgment on an FOIA request seems little different from the effect of an agency determination that a record should never be created, or should be discarded. The procedural provisions of the Act, in particular, reflect the nature of the obligation which Congress intended to impose on agencies in the production of agency records. First, Congress has provided that agencies normally must decide within 10 days whether to comply with an FOIA request unless they can establish “unusual circumstances” as defined in the Act. 5 U. S. C. §§ 552 (a)(6)(A), (B). The “unusual circumstances” specified by the Act include “the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities and other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request.” This exception for searching and collecting certainly does not suggest that Congress expected an agency to commence lawsuits in order to obtain possession of documents requested, particularly when it is seen that where an extension is allowable, the period of the extension is only for 10 days. Either Congress was operating under the assumption that lawsuits could be waged and won in 10 days, or it was operating under the assumption that agencies would not be obligated to file lawsuits in order to comply with FOIA requests. A similarly strong expression of congressional expectations emerges in 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(4)(A) providing for recovery of certain costs incurred in complying with FOIA requests. This section was included in the Act in order to reduce the burdens imposed on the agencies. The agency is authorized to establish fees for the “direct costs” of “document search and duplication.” The costs allowed reflect the congressional judgment as to the nature of the costs which would be incurred. Congress identified these costs, and thus the agency burdens, as consisting of “search” and “duplication.” During the enactment of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, it was emphasized that agencies generally are not obligated to provide extensive services in fulfilling FOIA requests. S. Rep. No. 93-854, p. 12 (1974), reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974: Source Book, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 164 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) (hereinafter Source Book II). When agencies do provide additional services in conducting a search, they are clearly authorized to allocate that cost to the requester. Ibid. It is doubtful that Congress intended that a “search” include legal efforts to retrieve wrongfully removed documents, since such an intent would authorize agency assessment to the private requester of its litigation costs in such an endeavor. It is therefore clear that Congress never intended, when it enacted the FOIA, to displace the statutory scheme embodied in the Federal Records Act and the Federal Records Disposal Act providing for administrative remedies to safeguard against wrongful removal of agency records as well as to retrieve wrongfully removed records. This result is buttressed by our decisions in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U. S. 1 (1974), and NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., supra, both demonstrating reluctance to construe the FOIA as silently departing from prior longstanding practice. Banner-craft, supra, of course held that Congress intended federal district courts to retain traditional equitable jurisdiction in adjudicating FOIA actions. But historic equitable practice has long recognized that an individual does not improperly withhold a document sought pursuant to a subpoena by his refusal to sue a third party to obtain or recover possession. Amey v. Long, 9 East 473, 482, 103 Eng. Rep. 653, 657 (K. B. 1808). C This construction of “withholding” readily disposes of the RCFP and MAP requests. Both of these requests were filed after Kissinger’s telephone notes had been deeded to the Library of Congress. The Government, through the Archivist/ has requested return of the documents from Kissinger. The request has been refused. The facts make it apparent that Kissinger, and the Library of Congress as his donee, are holding the documents under a claim of right. Under these circumstances, the State Department cannot be said to have had possession or control of the documents at the time the requests were received. It did not, therefore, withhold any agency records, an indispensable prerequisite to liability in. a suit under the FOIA. Ill The Safire request raises a separate question. At the time when Safire submitted his request for certain notes of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, all the notes were still located in Kissinger’s office at the State Department. For this reason, we do not rest our resolution of his claim on the grounds that there was no withholding by the State Department. As outlined above, the Act only prohibits the withholding of “agency records.” We conclude that the Safire request sought disclosure of documents which were not “agency records” within the meaning of the FOIA. Safire’s request sought only a limited category of documents. He requested the Department to produce all transcripts of telephone conversations made by Kissinger from his White House office between January 21, 1969, and February 12, 1971, in which (1) Safire’s name appeared; or (2) in which Kissinger discussed the subject of information “leaks” with General Alexander-Haig, Attorney General John Mitchell, President Richard Nixon, J. Edgar Hoover, or any other official of the FBI. The FOIA does render the “Executive Office of the President” an agency subject to the Act. 5 U. S. C. § 552 (e). The legislative history is unambiguous, however, in explaining that the “Executive Office” does not include the Office of the President. The Conference Report for the 1974 FOIA Amendments indicates that “the President’s immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President” are not included within the term “agency” under the FOIA. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, p. 15 (1974), reprinted in Source Book II, p. 232. Safire’s request was limited to a period of time in which Kissinger was serving as Assistant to the President. Thus these telephone notes were not “agency records” when they were made. The RCFP requesters have argued that since some of the telephone notes made while Kissinger was adviser to the President may have related to the National Security Council they may have been National Security Council records and therefore subject to the Act. See H. R. Rep No. 93-876, p. 8 (1974), Source Book II, p. 128, indicating that the National Security Council is an executive agency to which the FOIA applies. We need not decide when records which, in the words of the RCFP requesters, merely “relate to” the affairs of an FOIA agency become records of that agency. To the extent Safire sought discussions concerning information leaks which threatened the internal secrecy of White House policy-making, he sought conversations in which Kissinger had acted in his capacity as a Presidential adviser, only. Nor does his request for conversations in which his name appeared require a different conclusion. Safire never identified the request as implicating any National Security Council records. The request did not mention the National Security Council or any subject relating to the NSC. To the contrary, he requested to see transcripts Kissinger made from his White House office. Moreover, after the State Department denied the request on the grounds that these were White House records, Safire’s appeal argued these were State Department records, again never suggesting they were NSC records. The FOIA requires the requester to adequately identify the records which are sought. 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a)(3)(A). Safire’s request did not describe the records as relating to the NSC or in any way put the agency on notice that it should refer the request to the NSC. See 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (6) (B) (iii). Therefore, we also need not address the issue of when an agency violates the Act by refusing to produce records of another agency, or failing to refer a request to the appropriate agency. The RCFP requesters nevertheless contend that if the transcripts of telephone conversations made while adviser to the President were not then “agency records,” they acquired that status under the Act when they were removed from White House files and physically taken to Kissinger’s office at the Department of State. We simply decline to hold that the physical location of the notes of telephone conversations renders them “agency records.” The papers were not in the control of the State Department at any time. They were not generated in the State Department. They never entered the State Department’s files, and they were not used by the Department for any purpose. If mere physical location of papers and materials could confer status as an “agency record” Kissinger’s personal books, speeches, and all other memorabilia stored in his office would have been agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA. It requires little discussion or analysis to conclude that the lower courts correctly resolved this question in favor of Kissinger. See also Forsham v. Harris, post, p. 169. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Court of Appeals compelling production of the telephone manuscripts made by Kissinger while Secretary of State and affirm the order denying the requests for transcripts produced while Kissinger served as National Security Adviser. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of these cases. Tapes and stenographic notes were always destroyed immediately after they were summarized or transcribed. This conclusion was premised on the Adviser’s finding that the notes were covered by a Department regulation providing that a retiring official may retain papers “explicitly designated or filed as personal at the time of origin or receipt.” 5 FAM § 417.1 (a) (1974). Safire filed an administrative appeal from this decision, contending that the notes were agency records by virtue of their relocation to the State Department. The appeal was denied. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979). We need not decide what remedies might be available to private plaintiffs complaining that the administrators and the Attorney General have breached a duty to enforce the Records Act, since no such action was brought here. See 5 U. S. C. §§ 704, 701 (a) (2), 706 (1). See Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F. 2d 890, 891 (CA5 1976) (suit “seeking production of missing records ... is not within the purview of the Freedom of Information Act”), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1104 (1977); Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 137 (Kan. 1971) (“the Court may not require production of records not in [the] custody or control of an agency”), aff’d, 460 F. 2d 671 (CA10), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 966 (1972); Ciba-Oeigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523, 531 (SDNY 1977) (“[T]he government cannot be compelled to obtain possession of documents not under its control or furnish an opinion when none is written”). Congress has imposed some very limited record-creating obligations with regard to indexing under the FOIA. See 5 U. S. C. § 552 (a) (2). This is not to suggest that this discretionary determination by the agency relieves it of other obligations imposed by the records management Acts. The observation goes only to the nature of the public right of access provided by the FOIA. There is no question that a “withholding” must here be gauged by the time at which the request is made since there is no FOIA obligation to retain records prior to that request. This temporal factor has always governed requests under the subpoena power, Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935), as well as under other access statutes. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 34, 45. We need not decide whether this standard might be displaced in the event that it was shown that an agency official purposefully routed a document out of agency possession in order to circumvent a FOIA request. No such issue is presented here. We also express no opinion as to whether an agency withholds documents which have been wrongfully removed by an individual after a request is filed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FIALLO, A MINOR, BY RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. BELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. No. 75-6297. Argued December 7, 1976 Decided April 26, 1977 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 816. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 800. Janet M. Calvo argued the cause for appellants pro hac vice. With her on the briefs were Kalman Finkel, John E. Kirklin, and Anita Fisher Barrett. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Thornburgh, Kenneth S. Getter, and Sidney M. Glazer. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. This case brings before us a constitutional challenge to §§ 101 (b) (1) (D) and 101 (b) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act), 66 Stat. 182, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101 (b) (1) (D) and 1101 (b) (2). I The Act grants special preference immigration status to aliens who qualify as the “children” or “parents” of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Under § 101 (b) (1), a “child” is defined as an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother. The definition does not extend to an illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural father. Moreover, under § 101 (b) (2), a person qualifies as a “parent” for purposes of the Act solely on the basis of the person’s relationship with a “child.” As a result, the natural father of an illegitimate child who is either a United States citizen or permanent resident alien is not entitled to preferential treatment as a “parent.” The special preference immigration status provided for those who satisfy the statutory “parent-child” relationship depends on whether the immigrant’s relative is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. A United States citizen is allowed the entry of his “parent” or “child” without regard to either an applicable numerical quota or the labor certification requirement. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1151 (a), (b), 1182 (a) (14). On the other hand, a United States permanent resident alien is allowed the entry of the “parent” or “child” subject to numerical limitations but without regard to the labor certification requirement. 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (14); see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 2.40 n. 18 (rev. ed. 1975). Appellants are three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate offspring who sought, either as an alien father or an alien child, a special immigration preference by virtue of a relationship to a citizen or resident alien child or parent. In each instance the applicant was informed that he was ineligible for an immigrant visa unless he qualified for admission under the general numerical limitations and, in the case of the alien parents, received the requisite labor certification. Appellants filed this action in July 1974 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York challenging the constitutionality of §§ 101 (b)(1) and 101 (b) (2) of the Act under the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Appellants alleged that the statutory provisions (i) denied them equal protection by discriminating against natural fathers and their illegitimate children “on the basis of the father’s marital status, the illegitimacy of the child and the sex of the parent without either compelling or rational justification”; (ii) denied them due process of law to the extent that there was established “an unwarranted conclusive presumption of the absence of strong psychological and economic ties between natural fathers and their children born out of wedlock and not legitimated”; and (iii) “seriously burden[ed] and infringe [d] upon the rights of natural fathers and their children, born out of wedlock and not legitimated, to mutual association, to privacy, to establish a home, to raise natural children and to be raised by the natural father.” App. 11-12. Appellants sought to enjoin permanently enforcement of the challenged statutory provisions to the extent that the statute precluded them from qualifying for the special preference accorded other “parents” and “children.” A three-judge District Court was convened to consider the constitutional issues. After noting that Congress’ power to fashion rules for the admission of aliens was “exceptionally broad,” the District Court held, with one judge dissenting, that the statutory provisions at issue were neither “wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose” nor “fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration.” Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 165, 166 (1975). The court therefore granted judgment for the Government and dismissed the action. We noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Fiallo v. Levi, 426 U. S. 919 (1976), and for the reasons set forth below we affirm. II At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909); accord, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 766 (1972). Our cases “have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 210 (1953); see, e. g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889). Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established rule. Just last Term, for example, the Court had occasion to note that “the power over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 101 n. 21 (1976), citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra, at 713; accord, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 81-82 (1976). And we observed recently that in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, “Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Id., at 80. Appellants apparently do not challenge the need for special judicial deference to congressional policy choices in the immigration context, but instead suggest that a “unique coalescing of factors” makes the instant case sufficiently unlike prior immigration cases to warrant more searching judicial scrutiny. Brief for Appellants 52-55. Appellants first observe that since the statutory provisions were designed to reunite families wherever possible, the purpose of the statute was to afford rights not to aliens but to United States citizens and legal permanent residents. Appellants then rely on our border-search decisions in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), for the proposition that the courts must scrutinize congressional legislation in the immigration area to protect against violations of the rights of citizens. At issue in the border-search cases, however, was the nature of the protections mandated by the Fourth Amendment with respect to Government procedures designed to stem the illegal entry of aliens. Nothing in the opinions in those cases suggests that Congress has anything but exceptionally broad power to determine which classes of aliens may lawfully enter the country. See 413 U. S., at 272; 422 U. S., at 883-884. Appellants suggest a second distinguishing factor. They argue that none of the prior immigration cases of this Court involved “double-barreled” discrimination based on sex and illegitimacy, infringed upon the due process rights of citizens and legal permanent residents, or implicated “the fundamental constitutional interests of United States citizens and permanent residents in a familial relationship.” Brief for Appellants 53-54; see id., at 16-18. But this Court has resolved similar challenges to immigration legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has rejected the suggestion that more searching judicial scrutiny is required. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra, for example, United States citizens challenged the power of the Attorney General to deny a visa to an alien who, as a proponent of “the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of World communism,” was ineligible to receive a visa under 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (28) (D) absent a waiver by the Attorney General. The citizen-appellees in that case conceded that Congress could prohibit entry of all aliens falling into the class defined by § 1182 (a) (28) (D). They contended, however, that the Attorney General’s statutory discretion to approve a waiver was limited by the Constitution and that their First Amendment rights were abridged by the denial of Mandel’s request for a visa. The Court held that “when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant.” 408 U. S., at 770. We can see no reason to review the broad congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in Kleindienst v. Mandel, a First Amendment case. Finally, appellants characterize our prior immigration cases as involving foreign policy matters and congressional choices to exclude or expel groups of aliens that were “specifically and clearly perceived to pose a grave threat to the national security,” citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952), “or to the general welfare of this country,” citing Boutilier v. INS, 387 U. S. 118 (1967). Brief for Appellants 54. We find no indication in our prior cases that the scope of judicial review is a function of the nature of the policy choice at issue. To the contrary, “[s]ince decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary,” and “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S., at 81-82. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 588-589. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurrence in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy: “The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” 342 U. S., at 596-597. III As originally enacted in 1952, §101 (b) (1) of the Act defined a “child” as an unmarried legitimate or legitimated child or stepchild under 21 years of age. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney General subsequently concluded that the failure of this definition to refer to illegitimate children rendered ineligible for preferential nonquota status both the illegitimate alien child of a citizen mother, Matter of A, 5 I. & N. Dec. 272, 283-284 (A. G. 1953), and the alien mother of a citizen born out of wedlock, Matter of F, 7 I. & N. Dec. 448 (B. I. A. 1957). The Attorney General recommended that the matter be brought to the attention of Congress, Matter of A, supra, at 284, and the Act was amended in 1957 to include what is now 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b) (1) (D). See n. 1, supra. Congress was specifically concerned with the relationship between a child born out of wedlock and his or her natural mother, and the legislative history of the 1957 amendment reflects an intentional choice not to provide preferential immigration status by virtue of the relationship between an illegitimate child and his or her natural father. This distinction is just one of many drawn by Congress pursuant to its determination to provide some—but not all—families with relief from various immigration restrictions that would otherwise hinder reunification of the family in this country. In addition to the distinction at issue here, Congress has decided that children, whether legitimate or not, cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or are over 21 years of age. 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b) (1). Legitimated children are ineligible for preferential status unless their legitimation occurred prior to their 18th birthday and at a time when they were in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents. § 1101 (b) (1) (C). Adopted children are not entitled to preferential status unless they were adopted before the age of 14 and have thereafter lived in the custody of their adopting or adopted parents for at least two years, § 1101 (b) (1) (E). And stepchildren cannot qualify unless they were under 18 at the time of the marriage creating the stepchild relationship. § 1101 (b) (1) (B). With respect to each of these legislative policy distinctions, it could be argued that the line should have been drawn at a different point and that the statutory definitions deny preferential status to parents and children who share strong family ties. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, supra, at 83-84. But it is clear from our cases, see Part II, supra, that these are policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress. Appellants suggest that the distinction drawn in § 101 (b) (1) (D) is unconstitutional under any standard of review since it infringes upon the constitutional rights of citizens and legal permanent residents without furthering legitimate governmental interests. Appellants note in this regard that the statute makes it more difficult for illegitimate children and their natural fathers to be reunited in this country than for legitimate or legitimated children and their parents, or for illegitimate children and their natural mothers. And appellants also note that the statute fails to establish a procedure under which illegitimate children and their natural fathers could prove the existence and strength of their family relationship. Those are admittedly the consequences of the congressional decision not to accord preferential status to this particular class of aliens, but the decision nonetheless remains one “solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S., at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Congress obviously has determined that preferential status is not warranted for illegitimate children and their natural fathers, perhaps because of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties as well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations. See Trimble v. Gordon, ante, at 771. In any event, it is not the judicial role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications for the legislative decision. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S., at 770. IV We hold that §§ 101 (b) (1) (D) and 101 (b) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 are not unconstitutional by virtue of the exclusion of the relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father from the preferences accorded by the Act to the “child” or “parent” of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Affirmed. Section 101 (b) (1), as set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b), provides: “(1) The term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is— “(A) a legitimate child; or “(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred; or “(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, or under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of such legitimation. “(D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother; “(E) a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years: Provided, That no natural parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter. “(F) a child, under the age of fourteen at the time a petition is filed in his behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section 1151 (b) of this title [§ 201 (b)], who is an orphan because of the death or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or for whom the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care which will be provided the child if admitted to the United States and who has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption; who has been adopted abroad by a United States citizen and his spouse who personally saw and observed the child prior to or during the adoption proceedings; or who is coming to the United States for adoption by a United States citizen and spouse who have complied with the preadoption requirements, if any, of the child’s proposed residence: Provided, That no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any such child shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this chapter.” Effective January 1, 1977, the parent-child relationship no longer triggers an exemption from the labor certification requirement. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, § 5, 90 Stat. 2705. The 1976 amendments contain a saving clause, § 9, however, which provides that the amendments “shall not operate to affect the entitlement to immigrant status or the order of consideration for issuance of an immigrant visa of an alien entitled to a preference status, under section 203 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act, on the basis of a petition filed with the Attorney General prior to such effective date.” Appellant Ramon Martin Fiallo, a United States citizen by birth, currently resides in the Dominican Republic with his natural father, appellant Ramon Fiallo-Sone, a citizen of that country. The father initiated procedures to obtain an immigrant visa as the “parent” of his illegitimate son, but the United States Consul for the Dominican Republic informed appellant Fiallo-Sone that he could not qualify for the preferential status accorded to “parents” unless he legitimated Ramon Fiallo. Appellant Cleophus Warner, a naturalized United States citizen, is the unwed father of appellant Serge Warner, who was born in 1960 in the French West Indies. In 1972 Cleophus Warner petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization Service to classify Serge as Warner’s “child” for purposes of obtaining an immigrant visa, but the petition was denied on the ground that there was no evidence that Serge was Warner’s legitimate or legitimated offspring. Appellants Trevor Wilson and Earl Wilson, permanent resident aliens, are the illegitimate children of appellant Arthur Wilson, a citizen of Jamaica. Following the death of their mother in 1974, Trevor and Earl sought to obtain an immigrant visa for their father. We are informed by the appellees that although the application has not yet been rejected, denial is certain since the children are neither legitimate nor legitimated offspring of Arthur Wilson. Writing for the Court in Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that “much could be said for the view” that due process places some limitations on congressional power in the immigration area, “were we writing on a clean slate.” “But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history’ . . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. . . . But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . . “We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens . . . .” Id., at 530-532. We are no more inclined to reconsider this line of cases today than we were five years ago when we decided Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 767 (1972). The appellees argue that the challenged sections of the Act, embodying as they do “a substantive policy regulating the admission of aliens into the United States, [are] not an appropriate subject for judicial review.” Brief for Appellees 15, 19-24. Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens, and there is no occasion to consider in this case whether there may be actions of the Congress with respect to aliens that are so essentially political in character as to be nonjusticiable. The thoughtful dissenting opinion of our Brother Marshall would be persuasive if its basic premise were accepted. The dissent is grounded on the assumption that the relevant portions of the Act grant a “fundamental right” to American citizens, a right “given only to the citizen” and not to the putative immigrant. Post, at 806, 808, 816. The assumption is facially plausible in that the families of putative immigrants certainly have an interest in their admission. But the fallacy of the assumption is rooted deeply in fundamental principles of sovereignty. We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation’s sovereign power to admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests. Although few, if any, countries have been as generous as the United States in extending the privilege to immigrate, or in providing sanctuary to the oppressed, limits and classifications as to who shall be admitted are traditional and necessary elements of legislation in this area. It is true that the legislative history of the provision at issue here establishes that congressional concern was directed at “the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united.” H. R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1952) (statute implements “the underlying intention of our immigration laws regarding the preservation of the family unit”). To accommodate this goal, Congress has accorded a special “preference status” to certain aliens who share relationships with citizens or permanent resident aliens. But there are widely varying relationships and degrees of kinship, and it is appropriate for Congress to consider not only the nature of these relationships but also problems of identification, administration, and the potential for fraud. In the inevitable process of “line drawing,” Congress has determined that certain classes of aliens are more likely than others to satisfy national objectives without undue cost, and it has granted preferential status only to those classes. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote years ago, the formulation of these “[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens . . . is entrusted exclusively to Congress.” Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S., at 531. This is not to say, as we make clear in n. 5, supra, that the Government’s power in this area is never subject to judicial review. But our cases do make clear that despite the impact of these classifications on the interests of those already within our borders, congressional determinations such as this one are subject only to limited judicial review. S. Rep. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1957) (the amendment was designed “to clarify the law so that the illegitimate child would in relation to his mother enjoy the same status under the immigration laws as a legitimate child”) (emphasis added) ; H. R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1957) (the amendment was designed “to alleviate hardship and provide for a fair and humanitarian adjudication of immigration cases involving children born out of wedlock and the mothers of such children”) (emphasis added); 103 Cong. Rec. 14659 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) (the amendment “would clarify the law so that an illegitimate child would, in relation to his mother, enjoy the same status under immigration laws as a legitimate child”) (emphasis added). The inherent difficulty of determining the paternity of an illegitimate child is compounded when it depends upon events that may have occurred in foreign countries many years earlier. Congress may well have given substantial weight, in adopting the classification here challenged, to these problems of proof and the potential for fraudulent visa applications that would have resulted from a more generous drawing of the line. Moreover, our cases clearly indicate that legislative distinctions in the immigration area need not be as “ 'carefully tuned to alternative considerations,’ ” Trimble v. Gordon, ante, at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 513 (1976)), as those in the domestic area. Appellants insist that the statutory distinction is based on an overbroad and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children, and that existing administrative procedures, which had been developed to deal with the problems of proving paternity, maternity, and legitimation with respect to statutorily recognized “parents” and “children,” could easily handle the problems of proof involved in determining the paternity of an illegitimate child. We simply note that this argument should be addressed to the Congress rather than the courts. Indeed, in that regard it is worth noting that a bill introduced in the 94th Congress would have eliminated the challenged distinction. H. R. 10993, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MORRIS et al. v. GRESSETTE, PRESIDENT PRO TEM, SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE, et al. No. 75-1583. Argued April 18-19, 1977 Decided June 20, 1977 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, RehNquist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN, J., joined, post, p. 507. BlackmuN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 517. J. Roger Wollenberg argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Armand Derfner, Max O. Truitt, Jr., Timothy N. Black, William L. Lake, Frank Epstein, Ray P. McClain, Robert A. Murphy, and William E. Caldwell. Randall T. Bell argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Treva G. Ashworth, Kenneth L. Childs, and Katherine W. Hill, Assistant Attorneys General. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Turner argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Howard E. Shapiro, and John C. Hoyle. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case concerns the scope of judicial review of the Attorney General’s failure to interpose a timely objection under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to a change in the voting laws of a jurisdiction subject to that Act. I The events leading up to this litigation date back to November 11, 1971, when South Carolina enacted Act 932 reapportioning the State Senate. South Carolina promptly submitted Act 932 to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance review pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). That section forbids States subject to the Act to implement any change in “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without first (i) obtaining a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia that the proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or (ii) submitting the change to the Attorney General and receiving no objection within 60 days. While the Attorney General had Act 932 under review, several suits were filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina challenging that Act as violative of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and seeking to enjoin its enforcement until preclearance had been obtained under § 5. The cases were consolidated and a three-judge District Court was convened. On March 6, 1972, the Attorney General interposed an objection to Act 932. Although the South Carolina District Court was aware of this objection — an objection that, standing alone, would have justified an injunction against enforcement of the Act — the court proceeded to address the constitutional validity of the reapportionment plan. That court rejected the Fifteenth Amendment claim for lack of evidence that Act 932 was racially motivated, but held that the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment due to malapportionment. The court retained jurisdiction and allowed South Carolina 30 days to enact an acceptable substitute reapportionment plan. Twiggs v. West, Civ. No. 71-1106 (SC, Apr. 7, 1972). On May 6, 1972, a new senate reapportionment plan was enacted into law as § 2 of Act 1205. This new plan was filed with the District Court, and it was submitted to the Attorney General on May 12 for preclearance review. On May 23 the District Court found the plan constitutional. By letter dated June 30, the Attorney General notified South Carolina that he would not interpose an objection to the new plan because he felt “constrained to defer to the . . . determination of the three-judge District Court” in Twiggs v. West, supra. App. 48. Thus, as of June 30, 1972, § 2 of Act 1205 had been declared constitutional by a three-judge District Court, and the Attorney General had declined to interpose an objection under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Not content with the Attorney General’s decision to defer to the judicial determination of the three-judge District Court, several of the named plaintiffs in the consolidated Twiggs action commenced another suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on August 10, 1972, in which they challenged the Attorney General’s failure to object to the new senate reapportionment plan. On May 16, 1973, that court ordered the Attorney General to make “a reasoned decision in accordance with his statutory responsibility.” Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742, 746 (1973). In response to this order, the Attorney General stated that in his view the plan violated the Fifteenth Amendment, but he reaffirmed his refusal to interpose an objection on the ground that he was constrained to defer to the ruling of the District Court in Twiggs v. West. App. to Brief for Appellants 4a. On July 19, 1973, the District of Columbia District Court directed the Attorney General to consider Act 1205 without regard to the decision in Twiggs v. West. The next day the Attorney General interposed an objection because he was “unable to conclude that Act No. 1205 does not have the effect of abridging voting rights on account of race.” App. 52. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. It held that the Attorney General’s decision not to interpose an objection was reviewable under the circumstances of this case, and that § 5 requires him to make an independent determination on the merits of § 5 issues. Harper v. Levi, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 520 F. 2d 53 (1975). Armed with the decision of the Court of Appeals and the belated objection interposed by the Attorney General, two South Carolina voters filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina as a class action under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 557-563 (1969). The plaintiffs, appellants here, sought an injunction against implementation of § 2 of Act 1205 on the ground that the Attorney General had interposed an objection and the State had not subsequently obtained a favorable declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The three-judge District Court convened under § 5 dismissed the complaint. 425 F. Supp. 331 (1976). It held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not preclude it from considering South Carolina’s contention that, notwithstanding the decision in Harper v. Levi, supra, the requirements of § 5 were satisfied when the Attorney General failed to interpose an objection within 60 days after submission to him of Act 1205. The District Court also ruled that the Administrative Procedure Act did not authorize judicial review of the Attorney General’s initial determination to defer to the ruling of the three-judge District Court in Twiggs v. West. In light of these considerations, the District Court concluded that the failure of the Attorney General to interpose an objection within the applicable 60-day period left South Carolina free to implement the new senate reapportionment plan. We noted probable jurisdiction to determine the review-ability of the Attorney General’s failure to interpose a timely objection under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 429 U. S. 997 (1976). For the reasons stated below, we affirm. II The ultimate issue in this case concerns the implementation of South Carolina’s reapportionment plan for the State Senate. Since that plan has not been declared by the District Court for the District of Columbia to be without racially discriminatory purpose or effect, it can be implemented only if the Attorney General “has not interposed an objection” to the plan within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. It is conceded that no objection was entered within the 60-day period. 425 F. Supp., at 333. But appellants insist that the Attorney General’s nunc pro tunc objection of July 20, 1973, is effective under the Act and thus bars implementation of the reapportionment plan. Since that objection was interposed pursuant to the District Court’s order in Harper v. Kleindienst, its validity depends on whether the Harper court had jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review the Attorney General’s failure to object. The Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that the provisions of that Act authorizing judicial review apply “except to the extent that — (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U. S. C. § 701 (a). It is now well settled that “judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967). The reviewing court must determine whether “Congress has in express or implied terms precluded judicial review or committed the challenged action entirely to administrative discretion.” Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, 165 (1970). As no provision of the Voting Eights Act expressly precludes judicial review of the Attorney General’s actions under § 5, it is necessary to determine “whether nonreviewability can fairly be inferred.” 397 U. S., at 166. See Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 157 (1970); Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943). That inquiry must address the role played by the Attorney General within “the context of the entire legislative scheme.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 141. The nature of the § 5 remedy, which this Court has characterized as an “unusual” and “severe” procedure, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 556 (1969), strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the Attorney General’s actions under that provision to be subject to judicial review. Section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to delay implementation of validly enacted state legislation until federal authorities have had an opportunity to determine whether that legislation conforms to the Constitution and to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334 (1966). Section 5 establishes two alternative methods by which covered jurisdictions can comply with this severe requirement of federal preclearance review. First, a covered jurisdiction may file a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia and subsequently may implement the change in voting laws if that court declares that the change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). Second, a covered jurisdiction may submit a change in voting laws to the Attorney General and subsequently may enforce the change if “the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission.” Ibid. According to the terms of § 5, a covered jurisdiction is in compliance pursuant to the latter alternative once it has (i) filed a complete submission with the Attorney General, and (ii) received no objection from that office within 60 days. This second method of compliance under § 5 is unlike the first in that implementation of changes in voting laws is not conditioned on an affirmative statement by the Attorney General that the change is without discriminatory purpose or effect. To the contrary, compliance with § 5 is measured solely by the absence, for whatever reason, of a timely objection on the part of the Attorney General. And this Court has recognized that “[o]nce the State has successfully complied with the § 5 approval requirements, private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment only in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality; there is no further remedy provided by § 5.” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, supra, at 549-550. Although there is no legislative history bearing directly on the issue of reviewability of the Attorney General’s actions under § 5, the legislative materials do indicate a desire to provide a speedy alternative method of compliance to* covered States. Section 8 of the original bill provided for preclearance review only by means of a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Hearings on S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (hereafter Senate Hearings). Justified concerns arose that the time required to pursue such litigation would unduly delay the implementation of validly enacted, nondiscriminatory state legislation. Cognizant of the problem, Attorney General Katzenbach suggested that the declaratory judgment procedure “could be improved by applying it only to those laws which the Attorney General takes exception to within a given period of time.” Senate Hearings 237. The legislation was changed to incorporate this suggestion. In light of the potential severity of the § 5 remedy, the statutory language, and the legislative history, we think it clear that Congress intended to provide covered jurisdictions with an expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions. The congressional intent is plain: The extraordinary remedy of postponing the implementation of validly enacted state legislation was to come to an end when the Attorney General failed to interpose a timely objection based on a complete submission. Although there was to be no bar to subsequent constitutional challenges to the implemented legislation, there also was to be “no dragging out” of the extraordinary federal remedy beyond the period specified in the statute. Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S., at 305. Since judicial review of the Attorney General's actions would unavoidably extend this period, it is necessarily precluded. Our conclusions in this respect are reinforced by the fact that the Attorney General’s failure to object is not conclusive with respect to the constitutionality of the submitted state legislation. The statute expressly provides that neither “an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General’s failure to object . . . shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement” of the newly enacted legislation or voting regulation. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 569-570 (1975). It is true that it was the perceived inadequacy of private suits under the Fifteenth Amendment that prompted Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 556 n. 21; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 309. But it does not follow that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of Attorney General actions under § 5. The initial alternative requirement of submission to the Attorney General substantially reduces the likelihood that a discriminatory enactment will escape detection by federal authorities. Where the discriminatory character of an enactment is not detected upon review by the Attorney General, it can be challenged in traditional constitutional litigation. But it cannot be questioned in a suit seeking judicial review of the Attorney General's exercise of discretion under § 5, or his failure to object within the statutory period. Ill For these reasons, we hold that the objection interposed by the Attorney General to § 2 of Act 1205 on July 20, 1973, nunc pro tunc, is invalid. South Carolina is therefore free to implement its reapportionment plan for the State Senate. Affirmed. Act 932 provided for multimember districts, required each candidate to run for a single, numbered post, and specified that primary elections be decided by a majority vote. See Harper v. Levi, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 325-326, 520 F. 2d 53, 57-58 (1975). Section 5, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V), provides in pertinent part: “Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set forth in section 1973b (a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first sentence of section 1973b (b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964, . . . such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this title, and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, or upon good cause shown, to facilitate an expedited approval within sixty days after such submission, the Attorney General has affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made. Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General’s failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such' qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. In the event the Attorney General affirmatively indicates that no objection will be made within the sixty-day period following receipt of a submission, the Attorney General may reserve the right to reexamine the submission if additional information comes to his attention during the remainder of the sixty-day period which would otherwise require objection in accordance with this section. Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.” The constitutionality of this procedure was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966). It has been held applicable when a State or political subdivision adopts a legislative reapportionment plan. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969). See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 319-320; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, supra, at 548-550; Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U. S. 358, 366, and n. 5 (1969); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 380-382 (1971); Georgia v. United States, supra, at 529; City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 361-362 (1975); Beer v. United States, supra, at 131-133; United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 147-148 (1977) (plurality opinion). The objection was entered within the 60-day statutory period since the submission on Act 932 was not considered to be complete until January 5, 1972. See Georgia v. United States, supra, at 539-541; n. 19, infra. The Attorney General interposed an objection because he had been “unable to conclude . . . that the combination of multi-member districts, numbered posts, and a majority (run-off) requirement would not occasion an abridgement of minority voting rights in South Carolina.” App. 27. The District Court declined to rule on the claims under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act: “Prior to final arguments, the Attorney General of the United States had refused to approve the Act under the terms of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The defendants stated, during argument, that they intended to contest that decision of the Attorney General in the District Court of the District of Columbia, which, by law, is the proper forum for review under the terms of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. We shall accordingly not consider the claims of the plaintiff McCollum, under the Voting Rights Act, but shall confine our consideration to the claims of invalidity under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which admittedly are properly before this Court.” App. to Jurisdictional Statement 30a. Section 2 reapportioned the State’s senatorial districts. It established two alternative reapportionments — Plan A and Plan B — and provided that if Plan A did not meet the constitutional guidelines as set forth by the District Court, Plan B would be put into effect. Act 1205 retained the provisions of Act 932 calling for multimember districts, numbered posts, and a majority vote in primaries. See Harper v. Levi, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 326, 520 F. 2d, at 58. Section 3 of Act 1205 extended the numbered-post requirement to existing multimember districts in the State’s House of Representatives, the other chamber of the South Carolina General Assembly. This Court summarily affirmed the'decision of the District Court. Powell v. West, 413 U. S. 901 (1973). This Court held in Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975), that reapportionment legislation adopted by the legislature on its own authority in the course of litigation is not effective in a covered jurisdiction until after compliance with § 5’s preclearance review provisions. (Such legislation is to be distinguished from a “reapportionment scheme . . . submitted and adopted pursuant to court order,” for which preclearance is not required. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636, 638 n. 6 (1976).) In light of the decision in Waller, the Attorney General has now abandoned his earlier policy of deference to district court decisions on constitutionality. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10, 16. While the Attorney General was considering Act 1205, South Carolina submitted for preclearance review Act 1204, which extended the numbered-post requirement to “all multi-member elective districts” in the State. See Harper v. Levi, supra, at 326, 520 F. 2d, at 58. On the same day that he declined to interpose an objection to § 2 of Act 1205, the Attorney General did interpose an objection to Act 1204 and to that portion of Act 1205 that required numbered posts for the State’s House of Representatives. See n. 6, supra. The District Court in Twiggs v. West had not considered any provisions relating to the House. The Court of Appeals stressed that the Harper plaintiffs contended only that “the Attorney General improperly relinquished his responsibility to independently evaluate the submitted legislation . . . .” Since they were “not challenging findings by the Attorney General on issues of fact, or an ultimate decision as to whether the submitting authority has discharged its burden of proving lack of discriminatory purpose or effect,” the court found it unnecessary to decide whether such findings and decisions would be reviewable. 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 335, 520 F. 2d, at 67. See also n. 24, infra. Appellants have not pressed the collateral-estoppel argument in this Court. See Brief for Appellants 17-20. Although appellants at one point argued in the District Court that Act 1205 was a court-ordered plan outside the scope of § 5, see East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, supra; n. 8, supra, the parties now agree that § 5 is applicable. Brief for Appellants 3 n. 1; Brief for Appellees 14, and n. 7. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14 n. 8. Appellants suggest that it is unnecessary for this Court to reach the issue of reviewability since the single-judge District Court in Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742 (DC 1973), issued an interlocutory order on August 11, 1972, declaring that the Attorney General’s time to object had not expired and extending the time until the Attorney General acted or until further order of the District Court. Relying on United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 289-295 (1947), appellants contend that the Attorney General’s objection of July 20, 1973, is valid regardless of the District Court’s jurisdiction since it was entered pursuant to that court’s order preserving the status quo pending its determination of jurisdiction. The Mine Workers case involved the power of a district court to hold a party in contempt for disobedience of an order directed to that party. Appellants’ reliance on that case is misplaced, for South Carolina was not a party to the Harper litigation and was not under a court order restraining enforcement of § 2 of Act 1205. Here the validity of the District Court’s interlocutory order in Harper v. Kleindienst eventually turns on the re-viewability of the Attorney General’s initial decision not to enter an objection to §2 of Act 1205. If Congress has precluded judicial review of the Attorney General’s actions under § 5, the Harper court’s interlocutory order cannot validate the Attorney General’s nunc pro tunc objection of July 20, 1973. With several exceptions not relevant here, the Act defines an agency as “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency ...” 5 U. S. C. §701 (b)(1). Accord, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971); Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U. S. 598, 606 (1970); Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 156-157 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970). Nor has this Court read § 5 to condition the interposition of an objection by the Attorney General on an affirmative finding that he has reason to believe that the change in voting laws has the prohibited purpose or effect. Compare Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S., at 540-541, with id., at 544-545 (White, J., dissenting), and id., at 545 (Powell, J., dissenting). Our prior cases have so described the statutory scheme. See, e. g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S., at 362 (change in voting laws cannot be implemented unless “such change has either been approved by the Attorney General or that officer has failed to act within 60 days after submission to him”); Georgia v. United States, supra, at 529 (change in voting laws can be implemented upon “submitting the plan to the Attorney General of the United States and receiving no objection within 60 days”). Compliance by means' of submission to the Attorney General was added to the bill, but neither the Committee Reports nor the debates discussed the addition. S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 711, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The legislative history is summarized in Harper v. Levi, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 333, 520 F. 2d, at 65. The Attorney General has promulgated regulations providing that the 60-day period shall commence from the time that the Department of Justice receives a submission satisfying certain enumerated requirements. 28 CFR § 51.3 (b)-(d) (1976). These regulations were reviewed and found valid by this Court in Georgia v. United States, supra. The Court noted that “[t]he judgment that the Attorney General must make is a difficult and complex one, and no one would argue that it should be made without adequate information.” 411 U. S., at 540. To deny the Attorney General the power to suspend the 60-day period until a complete submission was tendered would leave him no choice but to interpose an objection to incomplete submissions, a result which “would only add acrimony to the administration of § 5.” Id., at 541. Nothing in our opinion in Georgia v. United States suggests that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review of the Attorney General's failure to interpose an objection within 60 days of a complete submission. The factors relied on in that case are inapplicable once a complete submission has been pending before the Attorney General for 60 days. Indeed, subsequent judicial review of the Attorney General’s failure to interpose a timely objection to a complete submission would itself “add acrimony” by denying covered jurisdictions the statutorily prescribed “rapid method of rendering a new state election law enforceable.” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 549; see Georgia v. United States, supra, at 538. Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent voices concern over a perceived “unique[ness]” of today’s decision. Post, at 514, and n. 10. But the decision is unique only in the sense that every judicial holding with respect to implied preclusion of judicial review is unique; “the context of the entire legislative scheme,” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967), differs from statute to statute. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 (1975), the case cited by the dissent, illustrates the point. In that case, the Court did not confront anything analogous to the potential severity of the § 5 remedy at issue here. See supra, at 504. Moreover, the statute at issue in Dunlop provided that suit by the Secretary of Labor would be the exclusive post-election remedy. In the instant case, on the other hand, objection by the Attorney General is not the exclusive method of challenging changes in a State’s voting laws, since the Attorney General’s failure to object is not conclusive with respect to the constitutionality of submitted state legislation. See infra, this page. Similarly, an objection on the part of the Attorney General is not conclusive with respect to the invalidity of the submitted state legislation under the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. After receiving an objection from the Attorney General, a covered jurisdiction retains the option of seeking a favorable declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia. See Beer v. United States, supra; City of Petersburg v. United States, 410 U. S. 962 (1973), summarily aff’g 354 F. Supp. 1021 (DC 1972). Relying on the fact that § 4 of the Voting Rights Act expressly precludes judicial review of the Attorney General’s actions under that section, post, at 509-510, and n. 3, see Briscoe v. Bell, ante, p. 404, MR. Justice Marshall’s dissent would formulate a new mechanical rule of statutory construction: If one section of a statute expressly forbids judicial review, it would not be open for the courts to inquire whether Congress also intended to preclude review under other sections of the same statute. Application of such a rule of statutory construction would prevent a court from giving effe'ct to congressional intent that otherwise was clear from “the context of the entire legislative scheme.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 141. The existence of an express preclusion of judicial review in one section of a statute is a factor relevant to congressional intent, but it is not conclusive with respect to reviewability under other sections of the statute. Here, we simply conclude that other factors — the harsh nature of the § 5 remedy, the statutory language, and the legislative materials — are sufficiently strong indications of congressional intent to override any contrary inference that might be drawn from the fact that Congress expressly precluded judicial review in a different section of the same statute. Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent opens with a “floodgates” argument: If there is no judicial review when the Attorney General misunderstands his legal duty, there also will be no judicial review when-at sometime in the future the Attorney General bargains acquiescence in a discriminatory change in a covered State’s voting laws in return for that State’s electoral votes. Post, at 508, and n. 1. That “floodgates” concern is equally applicable to Congress’ express preclusion of judicial review under § 4 of the Act, see n. 22, supra, a fact which suggests that Congress — like the courts— operates on the assumption that the Attorney General of the United States will perform faithfully his statutory responsibilities. In determining whether preclusion of judicial review can fairly be inferred from the context of the entire legislative scheme, we place no weight on the prospect that an Attorney General someday will trade electoral votes for preclearance under §5. The United States suggests that there should be limited judicial reveiw only when the Attorney General improperly relinquishes his responsibility to evaluate independently the submitted legislation in light of the standards established by § 5. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30-31. For the reasons stated in text, we think Congress intended to preclude all judicial review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion or failure to act. We note, however, that there is no evidence in this case that the Attorney General improperly “relinquished” his statutory responsibilities. The record is clear that the Attorney General reviewed the submitted legislation as well as the judicial determination in Twiggs v. West and decided not to interpose an objection to § 2 of Act 1205. That decision may have been erroneous, see n. 8, supra, but it nonetheless was a decision exercised pursuant to the Attorney General's § 5 responsibilities. In light of this disposition of the case, we find it unnecessary to address the argument advanced by South Carolina that the single judge in Harper v. Kleindienst, 362 F. Supp. 742 (DC 1973), had no jurisdiction to determine questions arising under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S., at 560-563.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARCLAYS BANK PLC v. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA No. 92-1384. Argued March 28, 1994 Decided June 20, 1994 Ginsbukg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV-B of which Scalia, J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 331. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 331. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 332. Joanne M. Garvey argued the cause for petitioner in No. 92-1384. With her on the briefs were Joan K. Irion, Miles N. Ruthberg, and Teresa A. Maloney. James P. Kleier argued the cause for petitioner in No. 92-1839. With him on the briefs were Walter Hellerstein, Prentiss Willson, Jr., Clare M. Rathbone, and Franklin C. Latcham. Timothy G. Laddish, Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief for respondent in No. 92-1384 were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Robert D. Milam, Deputy Attorney General, and Benjamin F. Miller. Mr. Lungren, Lawrence K. Keethe, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, John D. Schell, Deputy Attorney General, and Claudia K. Land filed a brief for respondent in No. 92-1839. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Argrett and Deputy Solicitor General Wallace. Together with No. 92-1839, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, also on certiorari to the same court. Kendall L. Houghton and William D. Peltz filed a brief for the Committee on State Taxation as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 92-1384 were filed for the Government of the United Kingdom by Jerome B. Libin and William H. Morris; for the Member States of the European Communities et al. by Messrs. Libin and Morris; for Banque Nationale de Paris by Roy E. Crawford and Russell D. Uzes; for the Confederation of British Industry by Lee H. Spence; for the Council of Netherlands Industrial Federations by F. Eugene Wirwahn; for the Federation of German Industries et al. by Mr. Wirwahn; for Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) by C. David Swenson, Dennis I. Meyer, Leonard B. Terr, and Harry A Franks, Jr.; for the Japan Tax Association by John A. Sturgeon; for the Organization for International Investment Inc. et al. by James Merle Carter; for Reuters Ltd. by Steven Alan Reiss and Philip T. Kaplan; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 92-1839 were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Timothy B. Dyk, Beth Heifetz, Robin S. Conrad, Mona C. Zeiberg, and Jan S. Amundson; and for the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., et al. by Philip D. Morrison and Mary C. Bennett. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska, and Lauri J. Adams, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, and Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon; for the State of New Mexico et al. by Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Daniel Yohalen, Assistant Attorney General, and Bruce J. Fort and Frank D. Katz, Special Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Larry EchoHawk of Idaho, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, and Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island; for the State of North Dakota et al. by M. K. Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, and Donnita A Wald, Assistant Attorney General, Robert A. Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Kevin T. Wakayama, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas; for the California Legislature by Bion M. Gregory, James A. Marsala, Baldev S. Heir, and Michael R. Kelly; for the California Tax Reform Association et al. by Jack A. Blum and Martin Lobel; for Citizens for Tax Justice by Jonathan P. Hiatt; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and Lee Fennell; for the Multistate Tax Commission by Alan H. Friedman and Pauli Mines; for Senator Dorgan et al. by Charles Rothwell Nesson; and for Congressman Edwards et al. by Martin Lobel, Jack A. Blum, and Dina R. Lassow. Eric J. Miethke, John E. Mueller, and Sheridan M. Cranmer filed a brief for Litton Industries, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 92-1839. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Eleven years ago, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159 (1983), this Court upheld California’s income-based corporate franchise tax, as applied to a multinational enterprise, against a comprehensive challenge made under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. Container Corp. involved a corporate taxpayer domiciled and headquartered in the United States; in addition to its stateside components, the taxpayer had a number of overseas subsidiaries incorporated in the countries in which they operated. The Court’s decision in Container Corp. did not address the constitutionality of California’s taxing scheme as applied to “domestic corporations with foreign parents or [to] foreign corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries.” Id., at 189, n. 26. In the consolidated cases before us, we return to the taxing scheme earlier considered in Container Corp. and resolve matters left open in that case. The petitioner in No. 92-1384, Barclays Bank PLC (Bar-clays), is a United Kingdom corporation in the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. The petitioner in No. 92-1839, Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Colgate), is the United States-based parent of a multinational manufacturing and sales enterprise. Each enterprise has operations in California. During the years here at issue, California determined the state corporate franchise tax due for these operations under a method known as “worldwide combined reporting.” California’s scheme first looked to the worldwide income of the multinational enterprise, and then attributed a portion of that income (equal to the average of the proportions of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located in California) to the California operations. The State imposed its tax on the income thus attributed to Barclays’ and Colgate’s California business. Barclays urges that California’s tax system distinctively burdens foreign-based multinationals and results in double international taxation, in violation of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses. Both Barclays and Colgate contend that the scheme offends the Commerce Clause by frustrating the Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.” Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 449 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). We reject these arguments, and hold that the Constitution does not. impede application of California’s corporate franchise tax to Barclays and Colgate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the California Court of Appeal. I A The Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, this Court has held, prevent States that impose an income-based tax on nonresidents from “tax[ing] value earned outside [the taxing State’s] borders.” ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307, 315 (1982). But when a business enterprise operates in more than one taxing jurisdiction, arriving at “precise territorial allocations of ‘value’ is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice.” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 164. Every method of allocation devised involves some degree of arbitrariness. See id., at 182. One means of deriving locally taxable income, generally used by States that collect corporate income-based taxes, is the “unitary business” method. As explained in Container Corp., unitary taxation “rejects geographical or transactional accounting,” which is “subject to manipulation” and does not fully capture “the' many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value that take place among the components of a single enterprise.” Id., at 164-165. The “unitary bu'siness/formula apportionment” method “calculates the local tax base by first defining the scope of the ‘unitary business’ of which the taxed enterprise’s activities in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then apportioning the total income of that ‘unitary business’ between the taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world on the basis of a formula taking into account objective measures of the corporation’s activities within and without the jurisdiction.” Id., at 165. During the income years at issue in these cases — 1977 for Barclays, 1970-1973 for Colgate — California assessed its corporate franchise tax by employing a “worldwide combined reporting” method. California’s scheme required the taxpayer to aggregate the income of all corporate entities composing the unitary business enterprise, including in the aggregation both affiliates operating abroad and those operating within the United States. Having defined the scope of the “unitary business” thus broadly, California used a long-accepted method of apportionment, commonly called the “three-factor” formula, to arrive at the amount of income attributable to the operations of the enterprise in California. Under the three-factor formula, California taxed a percentage of worldwide income equal to the arithmetic average of the proportions of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the State. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 25128 (West 1992). Thus, if . a unitary business had 8% of its payroll, 3% of its property, and 4% of its sales in California, the State took the average — 5%—and imposed its tax on that percentage of the business’ total income. B The corporate income tax imposed by the United States employs a “separate accounting” method, a means of apportioning income among taxing sovereigns used by all major developed nations. In contrast to combined reporting, separate accounting treats each corporate entity discretely for the purpose of determining income tax liability. Separate accounting poses the risk that a conglomerate will manipulate transfers of value among its components to minimize its total tax liability. To guard against such manipulation, transactions between affiliated corporations must be scrutinized to ensure that they are reported on an “arm’s-length” basis, i. e., at a price reflecting their true market value. See 26 U. S. C. §482; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-lT(b), 26 CFR § 1.482-lT(b) (1993). Assuming that all transactions are assigned their arm’s-length values in the corporate accounts, a jurisdiction using separate accounting taxes corporations that operate within its borders only on the income those corporations recognize on their own books. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 185. At one time, a number of States used worldwide combined reporting, as California did during the years at issue. In recent years, such States, including California, have modified their systems at least to allow corporate election of some variant of an approach that confines combined reporting to the United States’ “water’s edge.” See 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra n. 1, ¶ 8.16, at 8-185 to 8-187. California’s 1986 modification of its corporate franchise tax, effective in 1988, 1986 Cal. Stats., ch. 660, §6, made it nearly the last State to give way. 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra n. 1, ¶ 8.16, at 8-187. California corporate taxpayers, under the State’s water’s edge alternative, may elect to limit their combined reporting group to corporations in the unitary business whose individual presence in the United States surpasses a certain threshold. . Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 25110 (West 1992); see Leegstra, Eager, & Stolte, The California Water’s-Edge Election, 6 J. St. Tax’n 195 (1987) (explaining operation of California’s water’s edge system). The 1986 amendment conditioned a corporate group’s water’s edge election on payment of a substantial fee, and allowed the California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) to disregard a water’s edge election under certain circumstances. In 1993, California again modified its corporate franchise tax statute, this time to allow domestic and foreign enterprises to elect water’s edge treatment without payment of a fee and without the threat of disregard. 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 31, § 53; id., ch. 881, §22. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §25110 (West Supp. 1994). The new amendments became effective in January 1994. C The first of these consolidated cases, No. 92-1384, is a tax refund suit brought by two members of the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. Based in the United Kingdom, the Barclays Group includes more than 220 corporations doing business in some 60 nations. The two refund-seeking members of the Barclays corporate family did business in California and were therefore subject to California’s franchise tax. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal), one of the two taxpayers, was a California banking corporation wholly owned by Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI), the second taxpayer. BBI, a United Kingdom corporation, did business in the United Kingdom and in more than 33 other nations and territories. In computing its California franchise tax based on 1977 income, Barcal reported only the income from its own operations. BBI reported income on the assumption that it participated in a unitary business composed of itself and its subsidiaries, but not its parent corporation and the parent’s other subsidiaries. After auditing BBI’s and Barcal’s 1977 income year franchise tax returns, the Tax Board, respondent here, determined that both were part of a worldwide unitary business, the Barclays Group. Ultimately, the Tax Board assessed additional tax liability of $1,678 for BBI and $152,420 for Barcal. Barcal and BBI paid the assessments and sued for refunds. They prevailed in California’s lower courts, but were unsuccessful in California’s Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court held that the tax did not impair the Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice” in regulating foreign commerce, see Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S., at 449, and therefore did not violate the Commerce Clause. Having so concluded, the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeal for further development of Barclays’ claim that the compliance burden on foreign-based multinationals imposed by California’s tax violated both the Due Process Clause and the nondiscrimination requirement of the Commerce Clause. Barclay’s Bank Int’l, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal. 4th 708, 829 P. 2d 279, cert. denied, 506 U. S. 870 (1992). On remand, the Court of Appeal decided the compliance burden issues against Barclays, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537 (3d Dist. 1992), and the California Supreme Court denied further review. The ease is therefore before us on writ of certiorari to the California Court of Appeal. 510 U. S. 942 (1993). Barclays has conceded, for purposes of this litigation, that the entire Barclays Group formed a worldwide unitary business in 1977. The petitioner in No. 92-1839, Colgate-Palmolive Co., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York. Colgate and its subsidiaries doing business in the United States engaged principally in the manufacture and distribution of household and personal hygiene products. In addition, Colgate owned some 75 corporations that operated entirely outside the United States; these foreign subsidiaries also engaged primarily in the manufacture and distribution of household and personal hygiene products. When Colgate filed California franchise tax returns based on 1970-1973 income, it reported the income earned from its foreign operations on a separate accounting basis. Essentially, Colgate maintained that the Constitution compelled California to limit the reach of its unitary principle to the United States’ water’s edge. See supra, at 306. The Tax Board determined that Colgate’s taxes should be computed on the basis of worldwide combined reporting, and assessed a 4-year deficiency of $604,765. Colgate paid the tax and sued for a refund. Colgate prevailed in the California Superior Court, which found that the Federal Government had condemned worldwide combined reporting as impermissibly intrusive upon the Nation’s ability uniformly to regulate foreign commercial relations. No. 319715 (Super. Ct. Sacramento Cty., Apr. 19, 1989) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 92-1839, pp. 88a-102a). The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that evidence of the Federal Executive’s opposition to the tax was insufficient. 4 Cal. App. 4th 1681, 1700-1712, 284 Cal. Rptr. 780, 792-800 (3d Dist. 1991). The California Supreme Court returned the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions “to vacate its decision and to refile the opinion after modification in light of” that Court’s decision in Barclays. 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 831 P. 2d 798 (1992). In its second decision, the Court of Appeal again ruled against Colgate. 10 Cal. App. 4th 1768, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761 (3d Dist. 1992). The California Supreme Court denied further review, and the case is before us on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal. 510 U. S. 942 (1993). Like Barclays, Colgate concedes, for purposes of this litigation, that during the years in question, its business, worldwide, was unitary. II The Commerce Clause expressly gives Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It has long been understood, as well, to provide “protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not acted . . . .” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945); see also South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U. S. 177, 185 (1938) (Commerce Clause “by its own force prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce”). The Clause does not shield interstate (or foreign) commerce from its “fair share of the state tax burden.” Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978). Absent congressional approval, however, a state tax on such commerce will not survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if the taxpayer demonstrates that the tax (1) applies to an activity lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing State; (2) is not fairly apportioned; (3) discriminates against interstate commerce; or (4) is not fairly related to the services provided by the State. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977). In “the unique context of foreign commerce,” a State’s power is further constrained because of “the special need for federal uniformity.” Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1, 8 (1986). “ ‘In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single government with unified and adequate national power.’” Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los. Angeles, 441 U. S., at 448, quoting Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 59 (1933). A tax affecting foreign commerce therefore raises two concerns in addition to the four delineated in Complete Auto. The first is prompted by “the enhanced risk of multiple taxation.” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 185. The second relates to the Federal Government’s capacity to “‘speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.’” Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 449, quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, 285 (1976). California’s worldwide combined reporting system easily meets three of the four Complete Auto criteria. The nexus requirement is met by the business all three taxpayers— Barcal, BBI, and Colgate—did in California during the years in question. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 436-437 (1980). The “fair apportionment” standard is also satisfied. Neither Barclays nor Colgate has demonstrated the lack of a “rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise,” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 180-181 (internal quotation marks omitted); nor have the petitioners shown that the income attributed to California is “out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the [taxpayers] in that State.” Id., at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). We note in this regard that, “if applied by every jurisdiction,” California’s method “would result in no more than all of the unitary business’ income being taxed.” Id., at 169. And surely California has afforded Colgate and the Barclays taxpayers “protection, opportunities and benefits” for which the State can exact a return. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940); see ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S., at 315. Barclays (but not Colgate) vigorously contends, however, that California’s worldwide combined reporting scheme violates the antidiscrimination component of the Complete Auto test. Barclays maintains that a foreign owner of a taxpayer filing a California tax return “is forced to convert its diverse financial and accounting records from around the world into the language, currency, and accounting principles of the United States” at “prohibitiv[e]” expense. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 44. Domestic-owned taxpayers, by contrast, need not incur such expense because they “already keep most of their records in English, in United States currency, and in accord with United States accounting principles.” Id., at 45. Barclays urges that imposing this “prohibitive administrative burden,” id., at 43, on foreign-owned enterprises gives a competitive advantage to their United States-owned counterparts and constitutes “economic protectionism” of the kind this Court has often condemned. Id., at 43-46. Compliance burdens, if disproportionately imposed on out-of-jurisdiction enterprises, may indeed be inconsonant with the Commerce Clause. See, e. g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 350-351 (1977) (increased costs imposed by North Carolina statute on out-of-state apple producers “would tend to shield the local apple industry from the competition of Washington apple growers,” thereby discriminating against those growers). The factual predicate of Barclays’ discrimination claim, however, is infirm. Barclays points to provisions of California’s implementing regulations setting out three discrete means for a taxpayer to fulfill its franchise tax reporting requirements. Each of these modes of compliance would require Barclays to gather and present much information not maintained by the unitary group in the ordinary course of business. California’s regulations, however, also provide that the Tax Board “shall consider the effort and expense required to obtain the necessary information” and, in “appropriate cases, such as when the necessary data cannot be developed from financial records maintained in the regular course of business,” may accept “reasonable approximations.” Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, § 25137-6(e)(l) (1985). As the Court of Appeal comprehended, in determining Barclays’ 1977 worldwide income, Barclays and the Tax Board “used these [latter] provisions and [made] computations based on reasonable approximations,” 10 Cal. App. 4th, at 1756,14 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 545, thus allowing Barclays to avoid the large compliance costs of which it complains. Barclays has not shown that California’s provision for “reasonable approximations” systematically “overtaxes” foreign corporations generally or BBI or Barcal in particular. In sum, Barclays has not demonstrated that California’s tax system in fact operates to impose inordinate compliance burdens on foreign enterprises. Barclays’ claim of unconstitutional discrimination against foreign commerce therefore fails. Ill Barclays additionally argues that California’s “reasonable approximations” method of reducing the compliance burden is incompatible with due process. “Foreign multinationals,” Barclays maintains, “remain at peril in filing their tax returns because there is no standard to determine what ‘approximations’ will be accepted.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, at 49. Barclays presents no substantive grievance concerning the treatment it has received, i. e., no example of an approximation rejected by the Tax Board as unreasonable. Barclays instead complains that “[t]he grant of standardless discretion itself violates due process,” so that the taxpayer need not show “actual harm from arbitrary application.” Ibid. We note, initially, that “reasonableness” is a guide admitting effective judicial review in myriad settings, from encounters between the police and the citizenry, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27 (1968) (Fourth Amendment permits police officer’s limited search for weapons in circumstances where “reasonably prudent man . . . would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger” based upon “reasonable inferences ... draw[n] from the facts in light of [officer’s] experience”), to the more closely analogous federal income tax context. See, e. g., 26 U. S. C. § 162(a)(1) (allowing deductions for ordinary business expenses, including a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation”); § 167(a) (permitting a “reasonable allowance” for wear and tear as a depreciation deduction); see also United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 522 (1942) (noting that determinations “by reference to a standard of ‘reasonableness’ [are] not unusual under federal income tax laws”). We next observe that California’s judiciary has construed the California law to curtail the discretion of California tax officials. See 10 Cal. App. 4th, at 1762, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 549 (the Tax Board must consider “regularly-maintained or other readily-accessibly corporate documents” in deciding whether the “cost and effort of producing [worldwide combined reporting] information” justifies submission of “reasonable approximations”). We note, furthermore, that California has afforded Barclays the opportunity “to clarify the meaning of the regulation^] by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.” See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 498 (1982). Taxpayers, under the State’s scheme, may seek “an advance determination” from the Tax Board regarding the tax consequences of a proposed course of action. Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, § 25137-6(e)(2) (1985). Rules governing international multijurisdictional income allocation have an inescapable imprecision given the complexity of the subject matter. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 192 (allocation “bears some resemblance ... to slicing a shadow”). Mindful that rules against vagueness are not “mechanically applied” but depend, in their application, on “the nature of the enactment,” Hoffman Estates, 455 U. S., at 498, we hold that California’s scheme does not transgress constitutional limitations in this regard, and that Barclays’ due process argument is no more weighty than its claim of discrimination first placed under a Commerce Clause heading. IV A Satisfied that California’s corporate franchise tax is “proper and fair” as tested under Complete Auto’s guides, see Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 184, we proceed to the “additional scrutiny” required when a State seeks to tax foreign commerce. Id., at 185. First of the two additional considerations is “the enhanced risk of multiple taxation.” Ibid. In Container Corp., we upheld application of California’s combined reporting obligation to “foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations,” id., at 193 (emphasis added), against a charge that such application unconstitutionally exposed those subsidiaries to a risk of multiple international taxation. Barclays contends that its situation compels a different outcome, because application of the combined reporting obligation to foreign multinationals creates a “ ‘more aggravated’ risk ... of double taxation.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, at 32, quoting Nos. 325059 and 325061 (Super. Ct. Sacramento Cty., Aug. 20, 1987) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 92-1384, p. A-26). Barclays rests its argument on the observation that “foreign multinationals typically have more of their operations and entities outside of the United States [compared to] domestic multinationals, which typically have a smaller share of their operations and entities outside of the United States.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, at 33. As a result, a higher proportion of the income of a foreign multinational is subject to taxation by foreign sovereigns. This reality, Barclays concludes, means that for the foreign multinational, which must include all its foreign operations in the California combined reporting group, “the breadth of double taxation and the degree of burden on foreign commerce are greater than in the case of domestic multinationals.” Ibid. We do not question Barclays’ assertion that multinational enterprises with a high proportion of income taxed by jurisdictions with wage rates, property values, and sales prices lower than California’s face a correspondingly high risk of multiple international taxation. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 187; cf. id., at 199-200 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing how formulary apportionment leads to multiple taxation). Nor do we question that foreign-based multinationals have a higher proportion of such income, on average, than do their United States counterparts. But Container Corp.’s approval of this very tax, in the face of a multiple taxation challenge, did not rest on any insufficiency in the evidence that multiple taxation might occur; indeed, we accepted in that case the taxpayer’s assertion that multiple taxation in fact had occurred. Id., at 187 (“[T]he tax imposed here, like the tax in Japan Line, has resulted in actual double taxation, in the sense that some of the income taxed without apportionment by foreign nations as attributable to appellant’s foreign subsidiaries was also taxed by California as attributable to the State’s share of the total income of the unitary business of which those subsidiaries are a part.”); see also id., at 187, n. 22. Container Corp.’s holding on multiple taxation relied on two considerations: first, that multiple taxation was not the “inevitable result” of the California tax; and, second, that the “alternative] reasonably available to the taxing State” (i. e., some version of the separate accounting/“arm’s length” approach), id., at 188-189, “could not eliminate the risk of double taxation” and might in some cases enhance that risk. Id., at 191. We underscored that “even though most nations have adopted the arm’s-length approach in its general outlines, the precise rules under which they reallocate income among affiliated corporations often differ substantially, and whenever that difference exists, the possibility of double taxation also exists.” Ibid, (emphasis added); see also id., at 192 (“California would have trouble avoiding multiple taxation even if it adopted the ‘arm’s-length’ approach . . . .”). These considerations are not dispositively diminished when California’s tax is applied to the components of foreign, as opposed to domestic, multinationals. Multiple taxation of such entities because of California’s scheme is not “inevitable”; the existence vel non of actual multiple taxation of income remains, as in Container Corp., dependent “on the facts of the individual case.” Id., at 188. And if, as we have held, adoption of a separate accounting system does not dispositively lessen the risk of multiple taxation of the income earned by foreign affiliates of domestic-owned corporations, we see no reason why it would do so in respect of the income earned by foreign affiliates of foreign-owned corporations. We refused in Container Corp. “to require California to give up one allocation method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another allocation method that also sometimes results in double taxation.” Id., at 193. The foreign domicile of the taxpayer (or the taxpayer’s parent) is a factor inadequate to warrant retraction of that position. Recognizing that multiple taxation of international enterprise may occur whatever taxing scheme the State adopts, Justice O’Connor, dissenting in No. 92-1384, finds impermissible under “the [dormant] Foreign Commerce Clause” only double taxation that (1) burdens a foreign corporation in need of protection for lack of access to the political process, and (2) occurs “because [the State] does not conform to international practice.” Post, at 336. But the image of a politically impotent foreign transactor is surely belied by the battalion of foreign governments that has marched to Bar-clays’ aid, deploring worldwide combined reporting in diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation. See infra, at 324, n. 22; post, at 337. Indeed, California responded to this impressive political activity when it eliminated mandatory worldwide combined reporting. See supra, at 306. In view of this activity, and the control rein Congress holds, see infra, at 329-331, we cannot agree that “international practice” has such force as to dictate this Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence. We therefore adhere to the precedent set in Container Corp. B We turn, finally, to the question ultimately and most energetically presented: Did California’s worldwide combined reporting requirement, as applied to Barcal, BBI, and Colgate, “impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential,” Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 448; in particular, did the State’s taxing scheme “preven[t] the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice’ in international trade”? Id., at 453, quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S., at 285. 1 Two decisions principally inform our judgment: first, this Court’s 1983 determination in Container Corp.; and second, our decision three years later in Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1 (1986). Container Corp. held that California’s worldwide combined reporting requirement, as applied to domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries, did not violate the “one voice” standard. Container Corp. bears on Colgate’s case, but not Barcal’s or BBI’s, to this extent: “[T]he tax [in Container Corp.] was imposed, not on a foreign entity . . . , but on a domestic corporation.” 463 U. S., at 195. Other factors emphasized in Container Corp., however, are relevant to the complaints of all three taxpayers in the consolidated cases now before us. Most significantly, the Court found no “specific indications of congressional intent” to preempt California’s tax: “First, there is no claim here that the federal tax statutes themselves provide the necessary pre-emptive force. Second, although the United States is a party to a great number of tax treaties that require the Federal Government to adopt some form of ‘arm’s-length’ analysis in taxing the domestic income of multinational enterprises, that requirement is generally waived with respect to the taxes imposed by each of the contracting nations on its own domestic corporations. ... Third, the tax treaties into which the United States has entered do not generally cover the taxing activities of subnational governmental units such as States, and in none of the treaties does the restriction on ‘non-arm’s-length’ methods of taxation apply to the States. Moreover, the Senate has on at least one occasion, in considering a proposed treaty, attached a reservation declining to give its consent to a provision in the treaty that would have extended that restriction to the States. Finally, . . . Congress has long debated, but has not enacted, legislation designed to regulate state taxation of income.” Id., at 196-197 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court again confronted a “one voice” argument in Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U. S. 1 (1986), and there rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to Florida’s tax on the sale of fuel to common carriers, including airlines. Air carriers were taxed on all aviation fuel purchased in Florida, without regard to the amount the carrier consumed within the State or the amount of its in-state business. The carrier in Wardair, a Canadian airline that operated charter flights to and from the United States, conceded that the challenged tax satisfied the Complete Auto criteria and entailed no threat of multiple international taxation. Joined by the United States as amicus curiae, however, the carrier urged that Florida’s tax “threatened] the ability of the Federal Government to ‘speak with one voice.’” 477 U. S., at 9. There is “a federal policy,” the carrier asserted, “of reciprocal tax exemptions for aircraft, equipment, and supplies, including aviation fuel, that constitute the instrumentalities of international air traffic”; this policy, the carrier argued, “represents the statement that the ‘one voice’ of the Federal Government wishes to make,” a statement “threatened by [Florida’s tax].” Ibid. This Court disagreed, observing that the proffered evidence disclosed no federal policy of the kind described and indeed demonstrated that the Federal Government intended to permit the States to impose sales taxes on aviation fuel. The international convention and resolution and more than 70 bilateral treaties on which the carrier relied to show a United States policy of tax exemption for the instrumentalities of international air traffic, the Court explained, in fact indicated far less: “[WJhile there appears to be an international aspiration on the one hand to eliminate all impediments to foreign air travel — including taxation of fuel — the law as it presently stands acquiesces in taxation of the sale of that fuel by political subdivisions of countries.” Id., at 10 (emphasis in original). Most of the bilateral agreements prohibited the Federal Government from imposing national taxes on aviation fuel used by foreign carriers, but none prohibited the States or their subdivisions from taxing the sale of fuel to foreign airlines. The Court concluded that “[b]y negative implication arising out of [these international accords,] the United States has at least acquiesced in state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international travel,” and therefore upheld Florida’s tax. Id., at 12. In both Wardair and Container Corp., the Court considered the “one voice” argument only after determining that the challenged state action was otherwise constitutional. An important premise underlying both decisions is this: Congress may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not “impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential,” Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 448; it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete Auto inspection. See, e. g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 139 (1986) (requiring an “unambiguous indication of congressional intent” to insulate “otherwise invalid state legislation” from judicial dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 373, and n. 19 (1994) (same). 2 As in Container Cory, and Wardair, we discern no “specific indications of congressional intent” to bar the state action here challenged. Our decision upholding California’s franchise tax in Container Cory, left the ball in Congress’ court; had Congress, the branch responsible for the regulation of foreign commerce, see U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, considered nationally uniform use of separate accounting “essential,” Jayan Line, 441 U. S., at 448, it could have enacted legislation prohibiting the States from taxing corporate income based on the worldwide combined reporting method. In the 11 years that have elapsed since our decision in Container Cory., Congress has failed to enact such legislation. In the past three decades — both before and after Container Cory. — Congress, aware that foreign governments were displeased with States’ worldwide combined reporting requirements, has on many occasions studied state taxation of multinational enterprises. The numerous bills introduced have varied, but all would have prohibited the California reporting requirement here challenged. One group of bills would have prohibited States using combined reporting from compelling inclusion, in the combined reporting group, of corporate affiliates whose income was derived substantially from sources outside the United States. Another set would have barred the States from requiring taxpayers to report any income that was not subject to federal income tax; thus, “foreign source income” of foreign corporations ordinarily would not be reported. See supra, at 306, n. 5. None of these bills, however, was enacted. The history of Senate action on a United States/United Kingdom tax treaty, to which we referred in Container Corp., see 463 U. S., at 196, reinforces our conclusion that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method. As originally negotiated by the President, this treaty — known as the Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains — would have precluded States from requiring that United Kingdom-controlled corporate taxpayers use combined reporting to compute their state income. See Art. 9(4), 31 U. S. T. 5670,5677, T. I. A. S. No. 9682. The Senate rejected this version of the treaty, 124 Cong. Rec. 18670 (1978), and ultimately ratified the agreement, id., at 19076, “subject to the reservation that the provisions of [Article 9(4)] . . . shall not apply to any political subdivision or local authority of the United States,” id., at 18416. The final version of the treaty prohibited state tax discrimination against British nationals, Art. 2(4), 31 U. S. T. 5671; Art. 24, id., at 5687-5688, but did not require States to use separate accounting or water’s edge apportionment of income, id., at 5709. Given these indicia of Congress’ willingness to tolerate States’ worldwide combined reporting mandates, even when those mandates are applied to foreign corporations and domestic corporations with foreign parents, we cannot conclude that “the foreign policy of the United States — whose nuances ... are much more the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this Court — is [so] seriously threatened,” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 196, by California’s practice as to warrant our intervention. For this reason, Barclays’ and its amici’s argument that California’s worldwide combined reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it is likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign governments is directed to the wrong forum. The judiciary is not vested with power to decide “how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.” Id., at 194. 3 To support its argument that California’s worldwide combined reporting method impermissibly interferes with the Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice,” and to distinguish Container Corp., Colgate points to a series of Executive Branch actions, statements, and amicus filings, made both before and after our decision in Container Corp. Colgate contends that, taken together, these Executive pronouncements constitute a “clear federal directive” proscribing States’ use of worldwide combined reporting. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1839, p. 36, quoting Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 194. The Executive statements to which Colgate refers, however, cannot perform the service for which Colgate would enlist them. The Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3. As we have detailed, supra, at 324-327, and nn. 23-27, Congress has focused its attention on this issue, but has refrained from exercising its authority to prohibit state-mandated worldwide combined reporting. That the Executive Branch proposed legislation to outlaw a state taxation practice, but encountered an unreceptive Congress, is not evidence that the practice interfered with the Nation’s ability to speak with one voice, but is rather evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor to others. Cf. Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U. S. 60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[The President] is better able to decide than we are which state regula-, tory interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that decision, but only Congress.”). Congress may “delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the President,” who “also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs.” Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 109 (1948). We need not here consider the scope of the President’s power to preempt state law pursuant to authority delegated by a statute or a ratified treaty; nor do we address whether the President may displace state law pursuant to legally binding executive agreements with foreign nations made “in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, [where] he can only rely upon his own independent powers.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Executive Branch actions — press releases, letters, and amicus briefs — on which Colgate here relies are merely precatory. Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting. * * * The Constitution does “ ‘not make the judiciary the overseer of our government.’” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 660 (1981), quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S., at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Having determined that the taxpayers before us had an adequate nexus with the State, that worldwide combined reporting led to taxation which was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, fairly related to the services provided by the State, and that its imposition did not result inevitably in multiple taxation, we leave it to Congress — whose voice, in this area, is the Nation’s — to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy. Accordingly, the judgments of the California Court of Appeal are Affirmed. This Court first considered the “unitary business principle” in 1897, Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220-221; we revisited this “settled jurisprudence” most recently in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U. S. 768, 779-788 (1992). See generally 1 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes ¶ 8.03, p. 8-29 (2d ed. 1993); id., ¶ 8.05. On the determination whether a business is “unitary,” see Allied-Signal, 504 U. S., at 781-782 (business may be treated as unitary, compatibly with constitutional limitations, if it exhibits functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale); Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 481, 183 P. 2d 16, 21 (1947) (“If the operation of (the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, the operations are unitary.”); Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P. 2d 334, 341 (1941) (A business is unitary if there is “(1) [ujnity of ownership; (2) [ujnity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity of use of its centralized executive force and general system of operation.”), aff’d, 315 U. S. 501 (1942). In 1993, California modified the formula to double the weight of the sales factor. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §25128 (West Supp. 1994); 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 946, § 1. An affiliated group of domestic corporations may, however, elect to file a consolidated federal tax return in lieu of separate returns. 26 U. S. C. § 1501. Effective enforcement of arm’s-length standards requires exacting scrutiny by the taxing jurisdiction, and some commentators maintain that the results are arbitrary in any event. See 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra, ¶ 8.03 (describing “three inherent defects” of separate accounting: compliance expense, impracticability, and the difficulty of arriving at “arm’s-length” prices). Under the Internal Revenue Code, a foreign corporation reports only income derived from a United States source or otherwise effectively connected with the corporation’s conduct of a United States trade or business. 26 U. S. C. §§881, 882, 884, 864(c). Domestic corporations must report all income, whether the source is domestic or foreign, § 11, though they receive a tax credit for qualifying taxes paid to foreign sovereigns, 26 U. S. C. §§ 901-908 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). The figures used by the Tax Board were: Worldwide California Taxable Formula Business Franchise Taxpayer _Income_Percentage_Income_Tax Barcal $401,566,973 .0139032% $5,583,066 $693,696 BBI 401,566,973 .0003232% 129,786 16,126 App. in No. 92-1384, pp. A-13 to A-14 (Joint Stipulation of Facts ¶ 22). The petitioner in No. 92-1384, Barclays Bank PLC, is the successor in interest to the tax refund claims of both Barcal and BBI. For convenience, this opinion uses “Barclays” to refer collectively to the taxpayers and the petitioner in No. 92-1384. Colgate offered the following figures, using a water’s edge approach: Water’s edge California Income Taxable Formula Business Franchise Year Income Percentage Income Tax 1970 $25,652,055 9.31920% $2,390,566 $167,340 1971 27,520,141 9.01730% 2,481,574 173,710 1972 32,440,358 9.21640% 2,989,833 227,227 1973 36,554,060 8.88730% 3,248,669 269,640 No. 319715 (Super. Ct. Sacramento Cty., Apr. 19, 1989) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 92-1839, p. 85a). Under California’s worldwide combined reporting method, the computations were: Worldwide California Income Taxable Formula Business Franchise Year Income_Percentage_Income_Tax 1970 $ 91,566,729 4.42075% $4,047,936 $283,356 1971 108,177,612 4.12017% 4,457,101 311,997 1972 123,779,352 4.03444% 4,993,803 379,529 1973 151,585,860 3.71812% 5,636,144 467,800 Id., at 84a. Our jurisprudence refers to the self-executing aspect of the Commerce Clause as the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause. Amicus curiae the Government of the United Kingdom points to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992), which held that the Commerce Clause demands more of a connection than the “minimum contacts” that suffice to satisfy the due process nexus requirement for assertion of judicial jurisdiction. Brief for Government of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae in No. 92-1384, pp. 24-25. Noting the absence of “any meaningful contact” between California and the activities of Barclays Group members operating exclusively outside the United States, id., at 25, the United Kingdom asserts that the trial court erred if it concluded that “California had the requisite nexus with every member of the Bar-clays group,” id., at 27 (emphasis added). The trial court, however, did not reach the conclusion the United Kingdom suggests it did, nor was there cause for it so to do. As the United Kingdom recognizes, the theory underlying unitary taxation is that “certain intangible ‘flows of value’ within the unitary group serve to link the various members together as if they were essentially a single entity.” Id., at 26. Formulary apportionment of the income of a multijurisdictional (but unitary) business enterprise, if fairly done, taxes only the “income generated within a State.” Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U. S., at 783 (upholding “unitary business principle” as “an appropriate means for distinguishing between income generated within a State and income generated without”). Quill held that the Commerce Clause requires a taxpayer’s “physical presence” in the taxing jurisdiction before that jurisdiction can constitutionally impose a use tax. 504 U. S., at 317. The California presence of the taxpayers before us is undisputed, and we find nothing in Quill to suggest that California may riot reference the income of corporations worldwide with whom those taxpayers are closely intertwined in order to approximate the taxpayers’ California income. Barclays estimates, and the trial court found, that an accounting system capable of conveying the information Barclays thought California’s worldwide reporting scheme required for all of the enterprise’s foreign affiliates would cost more than $5 million to set up, and more than $2 million annually to maintain. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, p. 44, n. 13; Nos. 325059 and 325061 (Super. Ct. Sacramento Cty., Aug. 20,1987) (reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 92-1384, pp. A-27 to A-28). Under the regulations to which Barclays refers, a “unitary business with operations in foreign countries” may determine its worldwide income based upon either (1) “[a] profit and loss statement ... for each foreign branch or corporation,” Cal. Code of Regs., Title 18, § 25137 — 6(b)(1) (1985); (2) the “consolidated profit and loss statement prepared for the related corporations of which the unitary business is a member which is prepared for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission,” § 25137-6(b)(2); or (3) “the consolidated profit and loss statement prepared for reporting to shareholders and subject to review by an independent auditor,” ibid. The California Court of Appeal additionally found that Barclays’ actual compliance costs were “relatively modest” during the years just prior to those here at issue, ranging from $900 to $1,250 per annum, for BBI. Sée 10 Cal. App. 4th, at 1760, n. 9,14 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 548, n. 9. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, even the federal separate accounting scheme preferred by Barclays entails recourse to a standard “akin to reasonable approximation.” 10 Cal. App. 4th 1742, 1763, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 550 (1993). The Internal Revenue Code allows the Secretary of Treasury to “distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances” among a controlled group of businesses “if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income” of such businesses. 26 U. S. C. §482; see App. in No. 92-1384, p. A-829 (testimony of Barclays’ expert witness that §482 requires “reasonable approximation[s]” of arm’s-length prices); Peck v. Commissioner, 752 F. 2d 469, 472 (CA9 1985) (under §482, Internal Revenue Service determination of arm’s-length prices will be sustained unless unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious). We reserved judgment on whether an altered analysis would be required where the taxpayer was part of a foreign-based enterprise. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 189, n. 26; id., at 195, n. 32. To illustrate, Barclays points to its own operations: only 3 of the more than 220 entities in the Barclays Group did any business in the United States. Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, at 33. The Court stated: “[T]he double taxation in this case, although real, is not the ‘inevitable]’ result of the California taxing scheme____[W]e are faced with two distinct methods of allocating the income of a multinational enterprise. The ‘arm’s-length’ approach divides the pie on the basis of formal accounting principles. The formula apportionment method divides the same pie on the basis of a mathematical generalization. Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual case.” Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 188 (citation omitted). The Court’s decision in Container Corp. effectively modified, for purposes of income taxation, the Commerce Clause multiple taxation inquiry described in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979) (holding unconstitutional application of California’s ad valorem property tax to cargo containers based in Japan and used exclusively in foreign commerce). In Japan Line, confronting a property tax on containers used as “instrumentalities of [foreign] commerce,” not an income tax on companies, we said that a state tax is incompatible with the Commerce Clause if it “creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation.” Id., at 451. Container Corp. noted: “We recognize that the fact that legal incidence of a tax falls on a corporation whose formal corporate domicile is domestic might be less significant in the case of a domestic corporation that was owned by foreign interests. We need not decide here whether such a case would require us to alter our analysis.” 463 U. S., at 195, n. 32. Container Corp. observed that “the tax here does not create an automatic ‘asymmetry’... in international taxation,” id., at 194-195, quoting Japan Line, 441 U. S., at 453 — i. e., it does not inevitably lead to double taxation. See supra, at 319-320, and n. 17. Furthermore, Colgate, Bar-cal, and BBI are “without a doubt amenable to be taxed in California in one way or another,” and “the amount of tax [they] pa[y] is much more the function of California’s tax rate than of its allocation method.” 463 U. S., at 195. See also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U. S. 60, 75 (1993) (upholding Tennessee’s tax on lease of cargo containers used exclusively in international shipping; because tax in question was not among those proscribed by “various conventions, statutes, and regulations^] . . . the most rational inference to be drawn is that th[e] tax, one quite distinct from the general class of import duties, is permitted”). The governments of many of our trading partners have expressed their strong disapproval of California’s method of taxation, as demonstrated by the amici briefs in support of Barclays from the Government of the United Kingdom, and from the Member States of the European Communities (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and the governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Barclays has also directed our attention to a series of diplomatic notes similarly protesting the tax. See, e. g., App. in No. 92-1384, at A-92 to A-123, A-127 to A-128, A-131 to A-138; see also p. A-603 (letter from Secretary of State George Schultz to California Governor Deukmejian (Jan. 30, 1986)) (“The Department of State has received diplomatic notes complaining about state use of the worldwide unitary method of taxation from virtually every developed country in the world.”). The British Parliament has gone farther, enacting retaliatory legislation that would, if implemented, tax United States corporations on dividends they receive from their United Kingdom subsidiaries. See Finance Act 1985, pt. 2, ch. 1, §54, and sch. 13, ¶5 (Eng.), reenacted in Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, pt. 18, ch. 3, §812 and sch. 30, ¶¶ 20, 21 (Eng;). Pursuant to §201 of Pub. L. 86-272, 73 Stat. 556, in which Congress undertook to “make full and complete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation ... of interstate commerce ... by the States,” the House Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings on the (primarily domestic) implications of alternative tax apportionment schemes. See State Income Taxation of Mercantile and Manufacturing Corporations: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Subcommittee’s comprehensive final Report recommended, inter alia, that “formula apportionment be used as the sole method of dividing income among the States for tax purposes,” State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Report of the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. Rep. No. 952,89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1144 (1965), and that States be required to refrain from taxing any foreign income exempt from federal taxation. Id., at 1135. Congress, however, enacted no legislation embodying these recommendations. Congress continued to study and debate this matter over the next two decades. See Interstate Taxation Act, H. R. 11798 and Companion Bills: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Senate Committee on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Interstate Taxation, S. 1273: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1977-1978); Recommendations of the Task Force on Foreign Source Income, House Committee on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977); State Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1980: Hearings on H. R. 5076 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income, Hearings on S. 983 and S. 1688 before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Unitary Taxation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). “See, e. g., S. 1245, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); H. R. 6146,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H. R. 4940, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 3061, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 1974, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 3980, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986); S. 1139, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1775,102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). “See, e.g., H. R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H. R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 8277, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H. R. 1983, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H. R. 2918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1113, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Article 9(4) would have provided: “Except as specifically provided in this Article, in determining the tax liability of an enterprise doing business in a Contracting State, or in a political subdivision or local authority of a Contracting State, such Contracting State, political subdivision, or local authority shall not take into account the income, deductions, receipts, or outgoings of a related enterprise of the other Contracting State or of an enterprise of any third State related to any enterprise of the other Contracting State.” (Emphasis added.) Article 2(4) provides: “For the purpose of Article 24 (Nondiscrimination), this Convention shall also apply to taxes of every kind and description imposed by each Contracting State, or by its political subdivisions or local authorities.” That “federal law has long embodied a preference for the arm’s length method, in the sense that this method is used in computing the federal income tax liability of multinational corporations,” does not render a State’s use of a different method unconstitutional, as the Solicitor General points out. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17-18 (emphasis in original), citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes ofVt., 445 U. S. 425, 448 (1980) (“Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a well-established norm. Absent some explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States.”). See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1384, at 25-28; Brief for Government of United Kingdom as Amicus Curiae in No. 92-1384, at 19-24; Brief for Member States of European Communities et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 92-1384, pp. 16-17. Colgate cites, for example, President Reagan’s decision to introduce legislation confining States to a water’s edge method, State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 21 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 1368 (Nov. 8, 1985) (statement of President Reagan); letters sent by members of the Reagan and Bush administrations to the Governor of California and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, expressing the Federal Government’s opposition to worldwide combined reporting, App. in No. 92-1839, pp. 9 — 27; and Department of Justice amicus briefs filed in this Court, arguing that the worldwide combined reporting method violates the dormant Commerce Clause, e. g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., O. T. 1982, No. 81-349, cert. dism’d, 463 U. S. 1220 (1983); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., O. T. 1992, No. 92-212, cert. denied, 506 U. S. 870 (1992). See United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 331-332 (1937). The Solicitor General suggests that when a court analyzes “whether a state tax impairs the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice ... the statements of executive branch officials are entitled to substantial evidentiary weight,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, but he argues that the constitutionality of a State’s taxing practice must be assessed according to the federal policy, if any, in effect at the time the challenged taxes were assessed. He asserts that federal officials had not articulated a policy opposing use by the States of worldwide combined reporting prior to the mid-1980’s, and urges the Court to affirm the judgments below on the ground that California’s use of worldwide combined reporting was not unconstitutional during the years here at issue, even if it became unconstitutional in later years (a question on which he takes no position, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-41). Colgate, on the other hand, suggests that the relevant time frame is “when the tax is definitively enforced by the state taxing authority, through judicial proceedings if necessary, not when the tax technically accrues under state law,” Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 92-1839, p. 7, and argues in the alternative that a federal policy opposing combined worldwide reporting had been established as of 1970-1973, id., at 9. We need not resolve this dispute, because we have concluded that the Executive statements criticizing States’ use of worldwide combined reporting do not, in light of Congress’ acquiescence in the States’ actions, authorize judicial intervention here.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Tony HENDERSON, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES. No. 13-1487. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 24, 2015. Decided May 18, 2015. Daniel R. Ortiz, Charlottesville, VA, for Petitioner. Ann O'Connell, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. John P. Elwood, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Washington, DC, Daniel R. Ortiz, Counsel of Record, Toby J. Heytens, University of Virginia School of Law Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, VA, Mark T. Stancil, Robins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP, Washington, DC, David T. Goldberg, Donahue & Goldberg LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Vijay Shanker, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Opinion Justice KAGANdelivered the opinion of the Court. Government agencies sometimes come into possession of firearms lawfully owned by individuals facing serious criminal charges. If convicted, such a person cannot recover his guns because a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), prohibits any felon from possessing firearms. In this case, we consider what § 922(g)allows a court to do when a felon instead seeks the transfer of his guns to either a firearms dealer (for future sale on the open market) or some other third party. We hold that § 922(g)does not bar such a transfer unless it would allow the felon to later control the guns, so that he could either use them or direct their use. I The Federal Government charged petitioner Tony Henderson, then a U.S. Border Patrol agent, with the felony offense of distributing marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D). A Magistrate Judge required that Henderson surrender all his firearms as a condition of his release on bail. Henderson complied, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) took custody of the guns. Soon afterward, Henderson pleaded guilty to the distribution charge; as a result of that conviction, § 922(g)prevents him from legally repossessing his firearms. Following his release from prison, Henderson asked the FBI to transfer the guns to Robert Rosier, a friend who had agreed to purchase them for an unspecified price. The FBI denied the request. In a letter to Henderson, it explained that "the release of the firearms to [Rosier] would place you in violation of [§ 922(g)], as it would amount to constructive possession" of the guns. App. 121. Henderson then returned to the court that had handled his criminal case to seek release of his firearms. Invoking the court's equitable powers, Henderson asked for an order directing the FBI to transfer the guns either to his wife or to Rosier. The District Court denied the motion, concluding (as the FBI had) that Henderson could not "transfer the firearms or receive money from their sale" without "constructive[ly] possessi[ng]" them in violation of § 922(g). No. 3:06-cr-211 (MD Fla., Aug. 8, 2012), App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-6a, 12a. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground, reasoning that granting Henderson's motion would amount to giving a felon "constructive possession" of his firearms. 555 Fed.Appx. 851, 853 (2014)(per curiam). We granted certiorari, 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 402, 190 L.Ed.2d 289 (2014), to resolve a circuit split over whether, as the courts below held, § 922(g)categorically prohibits a court from approving a convicted felon's request to transfer his firearms to another person.We now vacate the decision below. II A federal court has equitable authority, even after a criminal proceeding has ended, to order a law enforcement agency to turn over property it has obtained during the case to the rightful owner or his designee. See, e.g.,United States v. Martinez,241 F.3d 1329, 1330-1331 (C.A.11 2001)(citing numerous appellate decisions to that effect); Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 (Solicitor General agreeing). Congress, however, may cabin that power in various ways. As relevant here, § 922(g)makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to "possess in or affecting commerce[ ] any firearm or ammunition." That provision prevents a court from instructing an agency to return guns in its custody to a felon-owner like Henderson, because that would place him in violation of the law. The question here is how § 922(g)affects a court's authority to instead direct the transfer of such firearms to a third party. Section 922(g)proscribes possession alone, but covers possession in every form. By its terms, § 922(g)does not prohibit a felon from owningfirearms. Rather, it interferes with a single incident of ownership-one of the proverbial sticks in the bundle of property rights-by preventing the felon from knowingly possessinghis (or another person's) guns. But that stick is a thick one, encompassing what the criminal law recognizes as "actual" and "constructive" possession alike. 2A K. O'Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Criminal § 39.12, p. 55 (6th ed. 2009) (hereinafter O'Malley); see National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead,232 U.S. 58, 67, 34 S.Ct. 209, 58 L.Ed. 504 (1914)(noting that in "legal terminology" the word "possession" is "interchangeably used to describe" both the actual and the constructive kinds). Actual possession exists when a person has direct physical control over a thing. See Black's Law Dictionary 1047 (5th ed. 1979) (hereinafter Black's); 2A O'Malley § 39.12, at 55. Constructive possession is established when a person, though lacking such physical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise control over the object. See Black's 1047; 2A O'Malley § 39.12, at 55. Section 922(g)thus prevents a felon not only from holding his firearms himself but also from maintaining control over those guns in the hands of others. That means, as all parties agree, that § 922(g)prevents a court from ordering the sale or other transfer of a felon's guns to someone willing to give the felon access to them or to accede to the felon's instructions about their future use. See Brief for United States 23; Reply Brief 12. In such a case, the felon would have control over the guns, even while another person kept physical custody. The idea of constructive possession is designed to preclude just that result, "allow[ing] the law to reach beyond puppets to puppeteers." United States v. Al-Rekabi,454 F.3d 1113, 1118 (C.A.10 2006). A felon cannot evade the strictures of § 922(g)by arranging a sham transfer that leaves him in effective control of his guns. And because that is so, a court may no more approve such a transfer than order the return of the firearms to the felon himself. The Government argues that § 922(g)prohibits still more-that it bars a felon, except in one circumstance, from transferring his firearms to another person, no matter how independent of the felon's influence. According to the Government, a felon "exercises his right to control" his firearms, and thus violates § 922(g)'s broad ban on possession, merely by "select[ing] the [ir] first recipient," because that choice "determine[s] who [will] (and who [will] not) next have access to the firearms." Brief for United States 24. And that remains so even if a felon never retakes physical custody of the guns and needs a court order to approve and effectuate the proposed transfer. The felon (so says the Government) still exerts enough sway over the guns' disposition to "have constructive possession" of them. Id.,at 25. The only time that is not true, the Government claims, is when a felon asks the court to transfer the guns to a licensed dealer or other party who will sell the guns for him on the open market. See id.,at 20-22; Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-21. Because the felon then does not control the firearms' final destination, the Government avers, he does not constructively possess them and a court may approve the transfer. See ibid. But the Government's theory wrongly conflates the right to possess a gun with another incident of ownership, which § 922(g)does not affect: the right merely to sell or otherwise dispose of that item. Cf. Andrus v. Allard,444 U.S. 51, 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)(distinguishing between entitlements to possess and sell property). Consider the scenario that the Government claims would violate § 922(g). The felon has nothing to do with his guns before, during, or after the transaction in question, except to nominate their recipient. Prior to the transfer, the guns sit in an evidence vault, under the sole custody of law enforcement officers. Assuming the court approves the proposed recipient, FBI agents handle the firearms' physical conveyance, without the felon's participation. Afterward, the purchaser or other custodian denies the felon any access to or influence over the guns; the recipient alone decides where to store them, when to loan them out, how to use them, and so on. In short, the arrangement serves only to divest the felon of his firearms-and even that much depends on a court's approving the designee's fitness and ordering the transfer to go forward. Such a felon exercises not a possessory interest (whether directly or through another), but instead a naked right of alienation-the capacity to sell or transfer his guns, unaccompanied by any control over them. The Government's view of what counts as "possession" would also extend § 922(g)'s scope far beyond its purpose. Congress enacted that ban to keep firearms away from felons like Henderson, for fear that they would use those guns irresponsibly. See Small v. United States,544 U.S. 385, 393, 125 S.Ct. 1752, 161 L.Ed.2d 651 (2005). Yet on the Government's construction, § 922(g)would prevent Henderson from disposing of his firearms even in ways that guarantee he never uses them again, solely because he played a part in selecting their transferee. He could not, for example, place those guns in a secure trust for distribution to his children after his death. He could not sell them to someone halfway around the world. He could not even donate them to a law enforcement agency. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. Results of that kind would do nothing to advance § 922(g)'s purpose. Finally, the Government's expansive idea of constructive possession fits poorly with its concession that a felon in Henderson's position may select a firearms dealer or other third party to sell his guns and give him the proceeds. After all, the felon chooses the guns' "first recipient" in that case too, deciding who "next ha[s] access to the firearms." Brief for United States 24; see supra,at 1785. If (as the Government argues) that is all it takes to exercise control over and thus constructively possess an item, then (contrary to the Government's view) the felon would violate § 922(g)merely by selecting a dealer to sell his guns. To be sure, that person will predictably convey the firearms to someone whom the felon does not know and cannot control: That is why the Government, as a practical matter, has no worries about the transfer. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-21. But that fact merely demonstrates how the Government's view of § 922(g)errs in its focus in a case like this one. What matters here is notwhether a felon plays a role in deciding where his firearms should go next: That test would logically prohibit a transfer even when the chosen recipient will later sell the guns to someone else. What matters instead is whether the felon will have the ability to use or direct the use of his firearms after the transfer. That is what gives the felon constructive possession. Accordingly, a court facing a motion like Henderson's may approve the transfer of guns consistently with § 922(g)if, but only if, that disposition prevents the felon from later exercising control over those weapons, so that he could either use them or tell someone else how to do so. One way to ensure that result, as the Government notes, is to order that the guns be turned over to a firearms dealer, himself independent of the felon's control, for subsequent sale on the open market. See, e.g.,United States v. Zaleski,686 F.3d 90, 92-94 (C.A.2 2012). Indeed, we can see no reason, absent exceptional circumstances, to disapprove a felon's motion for such a sale, whether or not he has picked the vendor. That option, however, is not the only one available under § 922(g). A court may also grant a felon's request to transfer his guns to a person who expects to maintain custody of them, so long as the recipient will not allow the felon to exert any influence over their use. In considering such a motion, the court may properly seek certain assurances: for example, it may ask the proposed transferee to promise to keep the guns away from the felon, and to acknowledge that allowing him to use them would aid and abet a § 922(g)violation. See id.,at 94; United States v. Miller,588 F.3d 418, 420 (C.A.7 2009). Even such a pledge, of course, might fail to provide an adequate safeguard, and a court should then disapprove the transfer. See, e.g., State v. Fadness,363 Mont. 322, 341-342, 268 P.3d 17, 30 (2012)(upholding a trial court's finding that the assurances given by a felon's parents were not credible). But when a court is satisfied that a felon will not retain control over his guns, § 922(g)does not apply, and the court has equitable power to accommodate the felon's request. Neither of the courts below assessed Henderson's motion for a transfer of his firearms in accord with these principles. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Court of Appeals added that Henderson's "equitable argument rings hollow" because a convicted felon has "unclean hands to demand return [or transfer] of his firearms." 555 Fed.Appx., at 854. That view is wrong, as all parties now agree. See Brief for Petitioner 35-39; Brief for United States 31, n. 8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 42. The unclean hands doctrine proscribes equitable relief when, but only when, an individual's misconduct has "immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks." Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,290 U.S. 240, 245, 54 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed. 293 (1933). The doctrine might apply, for example, if a felon requests the return or transfer of property used in furtherance of his offense. See, e.g.,United States v. Kaczynski,551 F.3d 1120, 1129-1130 (C.A.9 2009)(holding that the Unabomber had unclean hands to request the return of bomb-making materials). But Henderson's felony conviction had nothing to do with his firearms, so the unclean hands rule has no role to play here. Compare 555 Fed.Appx. 851, 853-854 (C.A.11 2014)(per curiam) (case below) (holding that § 922(g)bars any transfer); United States v. Felici,208 F.3d 667, 670 (C.A.8 2000)(same), with United States v. Zaleski,686 F.3d 90, 92-94 (C.A.2 2012)(holding that § 922(g)permits some transfers); United States v. Miller,588 F.3d 418, 419-420 (C.A.7 2009)(same). The Government calls our attention to several cases in which courts have found constructive possession of firearms based on evidence that a felon negotiated and arranged a sale of guns while using a third party to make the physical handoff to the buyer. See, e.g.,United States v. Nungaray,697 F.3d 1114, 1116-1119 (C.A.9 2012); United States v. Virciglio,441 F.2d 1295, 1297-1298 (C.A.5 1971). But the facts in the cited cases bear no similarity to those here. In each, the defendant-felon controlled the guns' movement both before and during the transaction at issue (and even was present at the delivery site). As the Government explains, the felon could "make a gun appear" at the time and place of his choosing and decide what would happen to it once it got there. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. Indeed, he could have chosen to take the firearms for himself or direct them to someone under his influence. The felon's management of the sale thus exemplified, and served as evidence of, his broader command over the guns' location and use-the very hallmark of possession. But as just explained, that kind of control is absent when a felon can do no more than nominate an independent recipient for firearms in a federal agency's custody. The decisions the Government invokes thus have no bearing on this case; nor does our decision here, which addresses only § 922(g)'s application to court-supervised transfers of guns, prevent the Government from bringing charges under § 922(g)in cases resembling those cited.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS et al. v. SHAW No. 85-54. Argued February 24, 1986 Decided July 1, 1986 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’ConnoR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 323. Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, and Deputy Solicitor General Geller. Charles Stephen Ralston argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Julius LeVonne Chambers. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The no-interest rule is to the effect that interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the Government in the absence of an express waiver of sovereign immunity from an award of interest. In this case, attorney’s fees as well as interest on those fees were awarded to a plaintiff who prevailed against petitioner Library of Congress in a suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. We therefore must decide whether Congress, in enacting Title VII, expressly waived the Government’s immunity from interest. H Respondent Tommy Shaw is an employee of the Library of Congress. He is black. During 1976 and 1977, he filed three complaints with the Library’s Equal Employment Office alleging job-related racial discrimination. Following an investigation, Library officials rejected his complaints. Thereafter, respondent’s counsel pursued administrative relief and settlement negotiations, and eventually reached a settlement with the Library. The latter agreed to promote Shaw retroactively with backpay provided that the Comptroller General first determined that the Library had authority to do so in the absence of a specific finding of racial discrimination. The Comptroller General ruled that the Library, under the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. §§5595, 5596, lacked that power; he did not address whether such relief was authorized under Title VII. Respondent then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, contending that Title VII authorized the Library to accord the relief specified in the settlement agreement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court agreed with respondent that the Library had the power under Title VII to settle his claim by awarding him a retroactive promotion with backpay without a formal finding of discrimination. 479 F. Supp. 945 (1979). The Library therefore was authorized to promote Shaw with backpay, and to pay a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs pursuant to §706(k) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k). 479 F. Supp., at 949-950. In a separate opinion calculating the attorney’s fee, the District Court began with a lodestar of $8,435, based on 99 hours of work at $85 per hour. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 62a-66a. The court then reduced the lodestar by 20 percent to reflect the quality of counsel’s representation. Id., at 66a-67a. Finally, and significantly for present purposes, the court increased the adjusted lodestar by 30 percent to compensate counsel for the delay in receiving payment for the legal services rendered. Id., at 68a. The District Court, relying on Copeland v. Marshall, 206 U. S. App. D. C. 390, 403, 641 F. 2d 880, 893 (1980) (en banc), indicated that increasing an attorney’s fee award for delay is appropriate because the hourly rates used for the lodestar represent the prevailing rate for clients who typically pay their legal bills promptly, whereas court-awarded fees are normally received long after the legal services are rendered. An increase for delay is designed to compensate the attorney for the money he could have earned had he been paid earlier and invested the funds. The District Court concluded that the period of delay ran from the time the case should have ended, which it viewed as the latter part of 1978, until just after judgment. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 241 U. S. App. D. C. 355, 747 F. 2d 1469 (1984). The court determined that, even though the adjustment was termed compensation for delay rather than interest, the no-interest rule applied because the two adjustments were functionally equivalent. The court went on to examine whether the Government expressly had waived its immunity from interest in Title VII. Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k), provides in relevant part: “In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [EEOC] or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the [EEOC] and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals noted that in a Title VII suit against a private employer, interest on attorney’s fees may be recovered. 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 361, 747 F. 2d, at 1475. See, e. g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F. 2d 760 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 956 (1983). Therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned, in making the United States liable “the same as a private person,” Congress waived the United States’ immunity from interest. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals held that even if the “same as a private person” provision was not an express waiver, the District Court’s adjustment was proper; when a statute measures the liability of the United States by that of a private person, the “traditional rigor of the sovereign-immunity doctrine” is relaxed. 241 U. S. App. D. C., at 365, 747 F. 2d, at 1479. Judge Ginsburg dissented. Id., at 371, 747 F. 2d, at 1485. She found no express waiver of immunity from interest, and declined to join what she considered to be a judicial termination of the no-interest rule. She viewed the increase for delay in this case as an award of interest, based on the manner and timing of its computation. She indicated, however, that use of current rather than historical hourly rates in order to compensate for delay, or use of historical rates that were based on expected delay, see Murray v. Weinberger, 239 U. S. App. D. C. 264, 741 F. 2d 1423 (1984), would not run afoul of the no-interest rule. We granted certiorari to address the question whether the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s repeated holdings that interest may not be awarded against the Government in the absence of express statutory or contractual consent. 474 U. S. 815 (1985). rH hH In the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest award. This requirement of a separate waiver reflects the historical view that interest is an element of damages separate from damages on the substantive claim. C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 50, p. 205 (1935). Because interest was generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties, common-law courts in England allowed interest by way of damages only when founded upon agreement of the parties. See De Havilland v. Bowerbank, 1 Camp. 50, 51, 170 Eng. Rep. 872, 873 (N. P. 1807); Calton v. Bragg, 15 East. 223, 226-227, 104 Eng. Rep. 828, 830 (K. B. 1812); H. McGregor, Mayne and McGregor On Damages 281 (1961). In turn, the agreement-basis of interest was adopted by American courts. See Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 3 Cow. 393 (N. Y. 1824) (reviewing treatment of interest in state courts); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 51, p. 208 (1935). Gradually, in suits between private parties, the necessity of an agreement faded. See id., at 210. The agreement requirement assumed special force when applied to claims for interest against the United States. As sovereign, the United States, in the absence of its consent, is immune from suit. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941). This basic rule of sovereign immunity, in conjunction with the requirement of an agreement to pay interest, gave rise to the rule that interest cannot be recovered unless the award of interest was affirmatively and separately contemplated by Congress. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 260 (1888) (“The case, therefore, falls within the well-settled principle, that the United States are not liable to pay interest on claims against them, in the absence of express statutory provision to that effect”)- The purpose of the rule is to permit the Government to “occupy an apparently favored position,” United States v. Verdier, 164 U. S. 213, 219 (1896), by protecting it from claims for interest that would prevail against private parties. See 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 136, 137 (1842). For well over a century, this Court, executive agencies, and Congress itself consistently have recognized that federal statutes cannot be read to permit interest to run on a recovery against the United States unless Congress affirmatively mandates that result. The no-interest rule is expressly described as early as 1819, in an opinion letter from Attorney General William Wirt to the Secretary of the Treasury. Congress had enacted a private Act to reimburse a citizen for unspecified injuries. When the citizen sought interest, in addition to the damages authorized by Congress, Attorney General Wirt stated that there is “no reason ... to depart from the usual practice of the Treasury Department” of denying interest, and directed the citizen to seek relief from Congress. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 268. In creating the Court of Claims, Congress retained the Government’s immunity from awards of interest, permitting it only where expressly agreed to under contract or statute. Court of Claims Act, § 7, 12 Stat. 766 (current version at 28 U. S. C. § 2516(a)). Although the Act, by its terms, addresses only those cases brought in the Court of Claims, this Court repeatedly has made clear that the Act merely codifies the traditional legal rule regarding the immunity of the United States from interest. See, e. g., Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S. 43, 47 (1879); United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S. 654, 658 (1947); United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S. 48, 49 (1951). In cases not in the Court of Claims, this Court has reaffirmed the notion: “Apart from constitutional requirements, in the absence of specific provision by contract or statute, or ‘express consent ... by Congress,’ interest does not run on a claim against the United States.” United States v. Louisiana, 446 U. S. 253, 264-265 (1980), quoting Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S. 329, 353 (1937). See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 387, n. 17 (1980). I — I HH }-H Respondent acknowledges the longstanding no-interest rule, but argues that Congress, by § 706(k), waived the Government’s immunity from interest in making the United States liable “the same as a private person” for “costs,” including “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” In analyzing whether Congress has waived the immunity of the United States, we must construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign, see McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25, 27 (1951), and not enlarge the waiver “‘beyond what the language requires,”’ Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983), quoting Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). The no-interest rule provides an added gloss of strictness upon these usual rules. “[T]here can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can an intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed.” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S., at 659. A When Congress has intended to waive the United States’ immunity with respect to interest, it has done so expressly; thus, waivers of sovereign immunity to suit must be read against the backdrop of the no-interest rule. Yet respondent contends that by equating the United States’ liability to that of a private party, Congress waived the Government’s immunity from interest. We do not agree. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41 (1928). Title VII’s provision making the United States liable “the same as a private person” waives the Government’s immunity from attorney’s fees, but not interest. The statute, as well as its legislative history, contains no reference to interest. This congressional silence does not permit us to read the provision as the requisite waiver of the Government’s immunity with respect to interest. When Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, and provided in §706(k), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(k), that the Government should be liable for attorney’s fees “the same as a private person,” it rendered the United States subject to liability only as a plaintiff for the fees of certain prevailing defendants. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978). At its inception, thus, the provision was at most a very limited waiver of sovereign immunity, establishing that the United States is liable for the fees of prevailing defendants in the same circumstances as are private plaintiffs. It was not until 1972 that Congress waived the Government’s immunity under Title VII as a defendant, affording federal employees a right of action against the Government for its discriminatory acts as an employer. See §717, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(d). That § 706(k) already contained language equating the liability of the United States for attorney’s fees to that of a private person does not represent the requisite affirmative congressional choice to waive the no-interest rule; see also n. 5, supra. Other statutes placing the United States in the same position as a private party also have been read narrowly to preserve certain immunities that the United States has enjoyed historically. In Laird v. Nelms, 406 U. S. 797 (1972), for example, the Court held that, although the Federal Tort Claims Act made the United States liable for the “negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government ... , if a private person, would be liable to the claimant,” 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), the United States nonetheless was not liable for the entire range of conduct classified as tortious under state law. Cf. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981) (jury trials are available to private, but not to Government, employees under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). B Nor do we find the requisite waiver of immunity from interest in the statutory requirement of awarding “reasonable” attorney’s fees. There is no basis for reading the term “reasonable” as the embodiment of a specific congressional choice to include interest as a component of attorney’s fees, particularly where the legislative history is silent. The Court consistently has refused to impute an intent to waive immunity from interest into the ambiguous use of a particular word or phrase in a statute. For example, interest has been ruled unavailable under statutes or.contracts directing the United States to pay the “amount equitably due.” See Tillson v. United States, 100 U. S., at 46. And the United States is not liable for interest under statutes and contracts requiring the payment of “just compensation,” United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U. S., at 49; United States v. Goltra, 312 U. S. 203 (1941), even though it long has been understood that the United States is required to pay interest where the Constitution mandates payment under the Just Compensation Clause. See Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299 (1923). Respondent argues, however, that the policy reasons that motivated Congress to permit recovery of a reasonable attorney’s fee require reading the statute as a waiver of immunity from interest. But policy, no matter how compelling, is insufficient, standing alone, to waive this immunity: “[T]he immunity of the United States from liability for interest is not to be waived by policy arguments of this nature. Courts lack the power to award interest against the United States on the basis of what they think is or is not sound policy.” United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S., at 663. C Finally, we note that the provision makes the United States liable for “costs,” and includes as an element of “costs” a reasonable attorney’s fee. Prejudgment interest, however, is considered as damages, not a component of “costs.” See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2664, pp. 159-160 (2d ed. 1983); 2 A. Sedgwick & G. Van Nest, Sedgwick on Damages 157-158 (7th ed. 1880). Indeed, the term “costs” has never been understood to include any interest component. See 28 U. S. C. §1920; see also Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra, §§2666 and 2670. A statute allowing costs, and within that category, attorney’s fees, does not provide the clear affirmative intent of Congress to waive the sovereign’s immunity. > In the alternative, respondent argues that the no-mterest rule does not prohibit the award of compensation for delay. But the force of the no-interest rule cannot be avoided simply by devising a new name for an old institution: “[T]he character or nature of ‘interest’ cannot be changed by calling it ‘damages,’ ‘loss,’ ‘earned increment,’ ‘just compensation,’ ‘discount,’ ‘offset,’ or ‘penalty,’ or any other term, because it is still interest and the no-interest rule applies to it.” United States v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 207 Ct. Cl. 369, 389, 518 F. 2d 1309, 1322 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 911 (1976). Respondent claims, however, that interest and delay represent more than mere semantic variations. Interest and a delay factor, according to respondent, have distinct purposes: the former compensates for loss in the use of money, while the latter compensates for loss in the value of money. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. We are not persuaded. Interest and a delay factor share an identical function. They are designed to compensate for the belated receipt of money. The no-interest rule has been applied to prevent parties from holding the United States liable on claims grounded on the belated receipt of funds, even when characterized as compensation for delay. See United States v. Sherman, 98 U. S. 565, 568 (1879). Thus, whether the loss to be compensated by an increase in a fee award stems from an opportunity cost or from the effects of inflation, the increase is prohibited by the no-interest rule. See Saunders v. Clayton, 629 F. 2d 596, 598 (CA9 1980) (“In essence, the inflation factor adjustment is a disguised interest award”), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 980 (1981); Blake v. Califano, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 27, 31, and n. 9, 626 F. 2d 891, 895, and n. 9 (1980) (as a matter of economic theory, there may be a distinction between interest and a delay factor, but both are nonetheless prohibited by the no-interest rule); D. Dobbs, Remedies §3.5, p. 174 (1973) (prejudgment interest represents delay damages). That interest and compensation for delay are functionally equivalent also is supported by Title VII decisions concerning private employers. Private-sector decisions, when they adjust for the time of payment, grant interest or a delay factor, but not both. See, e. g., Brown v. Gillette Co., 536 F. Supp. 113 (Mass. 1982); Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 272 (Colo. 1981); Kennelly v. Lemoi, 529 F. Supp. 140 (RI 1981). V In making the Government liable as a defendant under Title VII, Congress effected a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit, and from costs including reasonable attorney’s fees. Congress did not waive the Government’s traditional immunity from interest. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The lodestar component of an attorney’s fee is the product of “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983). The institution of interest originated under Roman law as a penalty due from a debtor who delayed or defaulted in repayment of a loan. See Leadam, Interest and Usury, in 2 Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy 432 (H. Higgs ed. 1925). The measure of the penalty due for the default or delay was id quod interest — that which is between — the difference between the creditor’s current position and what it would have been if the loan had been timely and fully repaid. See also W. Ashley, An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory 196 (1966); C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 51, pp. 207-208 (1935). Because interest was conceived of as a penalty, it was generally presumed not to be within the contemplation of the parties. Prior to the creation of the Court of Claims, a citizen’s only means of obtaining recompense from the Government was by requesting individually tailored waivers of sovereign immunity, through private Acts of Congress. The administrative responsibility of hearing many of the claims was assigned to the Treasury Department. See W. Cowen, P. Nichols, & M. Bennett, The United States Court of Claims, Part II, p. 4 (1978). Accordingly, the earliest statements of the no-interest rule appear in opinion letters of Attorneys General in response to questions posed by the Comptroller of the Treasury concerning payment of interest where a private Act of Congress authorized the Treasury Department to pay damages, with no mention of interest on the damages. See generally Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 Admin. L. Rev. 387 (1967). Subsequent Attorneys General consistently reiterated the no-interest rule. See, e. g., 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 390, 392 (1830) (“[C]laims against the government. . . are not payable until demanded — and then without interest”); 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 635, 639 (1841) (“It is confidently believed, that in all the numerous acts of Congress for the liquidation and settlement of claims against the government, there is no instance in which interest has ever been allowed, except only where those acts have expressly directed or authorized its allowance”); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 14, 15-16 (1842) (“I have no objection to admit, that as between individuals, the claim for interest in such a case would be an equitable and reasonable one. . . . But nothing is better established as a general rule than that the government is not to pay damages [in the form of interest] in such cases: a stern but necessary rule, adopted everywhere in the practice of government”); 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 286, 294 (1843) (“[U]nder the established usage of the Treasury Department, over and over again sanctioned by the opinions of the law officers of the government, the Secretary has no authority to allow [interest]”). The “constitutional requirement” arises in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. To satisfy the constitutional mandate, “just compensation” includes a payment for interest. See, e. g., Smyth v. United States, 302 U. S., at 353-354; Albrecht v. United States, 329 U. S. 599, 605 (1947). The no-interest rule is similarly inapplicable where the Government has cast off the cloak of sovereignty and assumed the status of a private commercial enterprise. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76, 79 (1925). See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. §2411 (expressly authorizing prejudgment and postjudgment interest payable by the United States in tax-refund cases); 31 U. S. C. § 1304 (appropriating funds for interest on certain district court judgments); 26 U. S. C. § 7426(g) (providing for interest in cases of wrongful levy by Internal Revenue Service). In other statutes, Congress has reiterated the general rule that interest cannot be allowed against the United States absent express waiver. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2516(a) (interest available in the Claims Court only under contract or by statute expressly providing for payment thereof). Title 28 U. S. C. § 2674 provides that the United States is not liable for prejudgment interest on claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This unusual statutory exclusion was necessitated by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s specific reference to state law for the rules of decision, in order to make clear that the United States’ immunity from interest does not turn on state law. When interest is awarded, as it was in this case, it is computed by multiplying a particular rate of interest by the amount of the award. An interest rate reflects not only the real opportunity cost of capital, but also the inflation rate. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 180 (3d ed. 1986). Thus, loss of value due to delay is an element of an interest adjustment.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN v. EWING No. 84-1273. Argued October 8, 1985 Decided December 12, 1985 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 228. Roderick K. Daane argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Peter A. Davis. Michael M. Conway argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Mary K. Butler Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Leonard Schaitman, and Freddi Lipstein; for the American Council on Education et al. by Eugene D. Gul-land, Catherine W. Brown, Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, and Joseph Anthony Keyes, Jr.; for the Curators of the University of Missouri et al. by Marvin E. Wright and William F. Amet; and for Duke University et al. by Robert B. Donin, Daniel Steiner, Eugene J. McDonald, Estelle A. Fishbein, Michael C. Weston, and Peter H. Ruger. Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, Joy L. Koletsky, Laurence Gold, and David M. Silberman filed a brief for the National Education Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Anne H. Franke and Jacqueline W. Mintz filed a brief for the American Association of University Professors as amicus curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Scott Ewing was dismissed from the University of Michigan after failing an important written examination. The question presented is whether the University’s action deprived Ewing of property without due process of law because its refusal to allow him to retake the examination was an arbitrary departure from the University’s past practice. The Court of Appeals held that his constitutional rights were violated. We disagree. I — I In the fall of 1975 Ewing enrolled m a special 6-year program of study, known as “Inteflex,” offered jointly by the undergraduate college and the Medical School. An undergraduate degree and a medical degree are awarded upon successful completion of the program. In order to qualify for the final two years of the Inteflex program, which consist of clinical training at hospitals affiliated with the University, the student must successfully complete four years of study including both premedical courses and courses in the basic medical sciences. The student must also pass the “NBME Part I” — a 2-day written test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners. In the spring of 1981, after overcoming certain academic and personal difficulties, Ewing successfully completed the courses prescribed for the first four years of the Inteflex program and thereby qualified to take the NBME Part I. Ewing failed five of the seven subjects on that examination, receiving a total score of 235 when the passing score was 345. (A score of 380 is required for state licensure and the national mean is 500.) Ewing received the lowest score recorded by an Inteflex student in the brief history of that program. On July 24,1981, the Promotion and Review Board individually reviewed the status of several students in the Inteflex program. After considering Ewing’s record in some detail, the nine members of the Board in attendance voted unanimously to drop him from registration in the program. In response to a written request from Ewing, the Board reconvened a week later to reconsider its decision. Ewing appeared personally and explained why he believed that his score on the test did not fairly reflect his academic progress or potential. After reconsidering the matter, the nine voting members present unanimously reaffirmed the prior action to drop Ewing from registration in the program. In August, Ewing appealed the Board’s decision to the Executive Committee of the Medical School. After giving Ewing an opportunity to be heard in person, the Executive Committee unanimously approved a motion to deny his appeal for a leave of absence status that would enable him to retake Part I of the NBME examination. In the following year, Ewing reappeared before the Executive Committee on two separate occasions, each time unsuccessfully seeking readmission to the Medical School. On August 19, 1982, he commenced this litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. II Ewing’s complaint against the Regents of the University of Michigan asserted a right to retake the NBME Part I test on three separate theories, two predicated on state law and one based on federal law. As a matter of state law, he alleged that the University’s action constituted a breach of contract and was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. As a matter of federal law, Ewing alleged that he had a property interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program and that his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, violating his “substantive due process rights” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and entitling him to relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court held a 4-day bench trial at which it took evidence on the University’s claim that Ewing’s dismissal was justified as well as on Ewing’s allegation that other University of Michigan medical students who had failed the NBME Part I had routinely been given a second opportunity to take the test. The District Court described Ewing’s unfortunate academic history in some detail. Its findings, set forth in the margin, reveal that Ewing “encountered immediate difficulty in handling the work,” Ewing v. Board of Regents, 559 F. Supp. 791, 793 (1983), and that his difficulties — in the form of marginally passing grades and a number of incompletes and makeup examinations, many experienced while Ewing was on a reduced course load — persisted throughout the 6-year period in which he was enrolled in the Inteflex program. Ewing discounted the importance of his own academic record by offering evidence that other students with even more academic deficiencies were uniformly allowed to retake the NBME Part I. See App. 107-111. The statistical evidence indicated that of the 32 standard students in the Medical School who failed Part I of the NBME since its inception, all 32 were permitted to retake the test, 10 were allowed to take the test a third time, and 1 a fourth time. Seven students in the Inteflex program were allowed to retake the test, and one student was allowed to retake it twice. Ewing is the only student who, having failed the test, was not permitted to retake it. Dr. Robert Reed, a former Director of the Inteflex program and a member of the Promotion and Review Board, stated that students were “routinely” given a second chance. 559 F. Supp., at 794. Accord, App. 8, 30, 39-40, 68, 73, 163. Ewing argued that a promotional pamphlet released by the Medical School approximately a week before the examination had codified this practice. The pamphlet, entitled “On Becoming a Doctor,” stated: “According to Dr. Gibson, everything possible is done to keep qualified medical students in the Medical School. This even extends to taking and passing National Board Exams. Should a student fail either part of the National Boards, an opportunity is provided to make up the failure in a second exam.” Id., at 113. The District Court concluded that the evidence did not support either Ewing’s contract claim or his promissory es-toppel claim under governing Michigan law. There was “no sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants bound themselves either expressly or by a course of conduct to give Ewing a second chance to take Part I of the NBME examination.” 559 F. Supp., at 800. With reference to the pamphlet “On Becoming A Doctor,” the District Court held that “even if [Ewing] had learned of the pamphlet’s contents before he took the examination, and I find that he did not, I would not conclude that this amounted either to an unqualified promise to him or gave him a contract right to retake the examination.” Ibid. With regard to Ewing’s federal claim, the District Court determined that Ewing had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program and that a state university’s academic decisions concerning the qualifications of a medical student are “subject to substantive due process review” in federal court. Id., at 798. The District Court, however, found no violation of Ewing’s due process rights. The trial record, it emphasized, was devoid of any indication that the University’s decision was “based on bad faith, ill will or other impermissible ulterior motives”; to the contrary, the “evidence demonstrate^] that the decision to dismiss plaintiff was reached in a fair and impartial manner, and only after careful and deliberate consideration.” Id., at 799. To “leave no conjecture” as to his decision, the District Judge expressly found that “the evidence demonstrate^] no arbitrary or capricious action since [the Regents] had good reason to dismiss Ewing from the program.” Id., at 800. Without reaching the state-law breach-of-contract and promissory-estoppel claims, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Ewing’s federal constitutional claim. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Ewing’s implied contract right to continued enrollment free from arbitrary interference qualified as a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, but it concluded that the University had arbitrarily deprived him of that property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because (1) “Ewing was a ‘qualified’ student, as the University defined that term, at the time he sat for NBME Part I”; (2) “it was the consistent practice of the University of Michigan to allow a qualified medical student who initially failed the NBME Part I an opportunity for a retest”; and (3) “Ewing was the only University of Michigan medical student who initially failed the NBME Part I between 1975 and 1982, and was not allowed an opportunity for a retest.” Ewing v. Board of Regents, 742 F. 2d 913, 916 (CA6 1984). The Court of Appeals therefore directed the University to allow Ewing to retake the NBME Part I, and if he should pass, to reinstate him in the Inteflex program. We granted the University’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals had misapplied the doctrine of “substantive due process.” 470 U. S. 1083 (1985). We now reverse. HH HH HH In Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 91-92 (1978), we assumed, without deciding, that federal courts can review an academic decision of a public educational institution under a substantive due process standard. In this case Ewing contends that such review is appropriate because he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program. But remembering Justice Brandéis’ admonition not to “ ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,”’ Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion), we again conclude, as we did in Horowitz, that the precise facts disclosed by the record afford the most appropriate basis for decision. We therefore accept the University’s invitation to “assume the existence of a constitutionally protectible property right in [Ewing’s] continued enrollment,” and hold that even if Ewing’s assumed property interest gave rise to a substantive right under the Due Process Clause to continued enrollment free from arbitrary state action, the facts of record disclose no such action. As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that any substantive constitutional protection against arbitrary dismissal would not necessarily give Ewing a right to retake the NBME Part I. The constitutionally protected interest alleged by Ewing in his complaint, App. 15, and found by the courts below, derives from Ewing’s implied contract right to continued enrollment free from arbitrary dismissal. The District Court did not find that Ewing had any separate right to retake the exam and, what is more, explicitly “reject[ed] the contract and promissory estoppel claims, finding no sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants bound themselves either expressly or by a course of conduct to give Ewing a second chance to take Part I of the NBME examination.” 559 F. Supp., at 800. The Court of Appeals did not overturn the District Court’s determination that Ewing lacked a tenable contract or estoppel claim under Michigan law, see supra, at 220, and n. 5, and we accept its reasonable rendering of state law, particularly when no party has challenged it. The University’s refusal to allow Ewing to retake the NBME Part I is thus not actionable in itself. It is, however, an important element of Ewing’s claim that his dismissal was the product of arbitrary state action, for under proper analysis the refusal may constitute evidence of arbitrariness even if it is not the actual legal wrong alleged. The question, then, is whether the record compels the conclusion that the University acted arbitrarily in dropping Ewing from the Inteflex program without permitting a reexamination. It is important to remember that this is not a case in which the procedures used by the University were unfair in any respect; quite the contrary is true. Nor can the Regents be accused of concealing nonacademic or constitutionally impermissible reasons for expelling Ewing; the District Court found that the Regents acted in good faith. Ewing’s claim, therefore, must be that the University misjudged his fitness to remain a student in the Inteflex program. The record unmistakably demonstrates, however, that the faculty’s decision was made conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety of Ewing’s academic career. When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment. Cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 323 (1982). Considerations of profound importance counsel restrained judicial review of the substance of academic decisions. As Justice White has explained: “Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the Due Process Clause has more than a procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that the substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This is . . . only to underline Mr. Justice Black’s constant reminder to his colleagues that the Court has no license to invalidate legislation which it thinks merely arbitrary or unreasonable.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 543-544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). See id., at 502 (opinion of Powell, J.). Added to our concern for lack of standards is a reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, “a special concern of the First Amendment.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967). If a “federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies,” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 349 (1976), far less is it suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions — decisions that require “an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision-making.” Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S., at 89-90. This narrow avenue for judicial review precludes any conclusion that the decision to dismiss Ewing from the Inteflex program was such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment. Certainly his expulsion cannot be considered aberrant when viewed in isolation. The District Court found as a fact that the Regents “had good reason to dismiss Ewing from the program.” 559 F. Supp., at 800. Before failing the NBME Part I, Ewing accumulated an unenviable academic record characterized by low grades, seven incompletes, and several terms during which he was on an irregular or reduced course load. Ewing’s failure of his medical boards, in the words of one of his professors, “merely culminate[d] a series of deficiencies. . . . In many ways, it’s the straw that broke the camel’s back.” App. 79. Accord, id., at 7, 54-55, 72-73. Moreover, the fact that Ewing was “qualified” in the sense that he was eligible to take the examination the first time does not weaken this conclusion, for after Ewing took the NBME Part I it was entirely reasonable for the faculty to reexamine his entire record in the light of the unfortunate results of that examination. Admittedly, it may well have been unwise to deny Ewing a second chance. Permission to retake the test might have saved the University the expense of this litigation and conceivably might have demonstrated that the members of the Promotion and Review Board misjudged Ewing’s fitness for the medical profession. But it nevertheless remains true that his dismissal from the Inteflex program rested on an academic judgment that is not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking when viewed against the background of his entire career at the University of Michigan, including his singularly low score on the NBME Part I examination. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Inteflex program has since been lengthened to seven years. At this and later meetings Ewing excused his NBME Part I failure because his mother had suffered a heart attack 18 months before the examination; his girlfriend broke up with him about six months before the examination; his work on an essay for a contest had taken too much time; his makeup examination in pharmacology was administered just before the NBME Part I; and his inadequate preparation caused him to panic during the examination. A fourth count of Ewing’s complaint advanced a claim for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court held that the Board of Regents is a state instrumentality immunized from liability for damages under the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed this count of the complaint. Ewing v. Board of Regents, 552 F. Supp. 881 (ED Mich. 1982). “In the fall of 1975, when Ewing enrolled in the program, he encountered immediate difficulty in handling the work and he did not take the final examination in Biology. It was not until the following semester that he completed this course and received a C. His performance in his other first semester courses was as follows: a C in Chemistry 120, a C in his writing course, and an incomplete in the Freshman Seminar. In the next semester he took Chemistry 220, a Freshman Seminar, and Psychology 504. He received a B in the Freshman Seminar, a C in Chemistry 220, but he withdrew from Psychology 504. He was advised at that time that he could not take the Patient Care Course, usually given during the fall of an Inteflex student’s second year, and he was placed on an irregular program. Because of these difficulties, at the July 14, 1976 meeting of the Promotion and Review Board he requested a leave of absence, and when this was approved, he left the program. “During the summer of 1976 while on leave, he took two Physics courses at Point Loma College in California. He reentered the Inteflex program at the University of Michigan in the winter 1977 term. In that term he repeated Chemistry 220 in which he received an A-. In the spring of 1977, he passed the Introduction to the Patient Care course. “In the 1977-78 year, he completed the regular Year II program. But then he encountered new difficulty. In the fall of 1978 he received an incomplete in Clinical Studies 400, which was converted to a Pass; a B in Microbiology 420; and an incomplete in Gross Anatomy 507. The Gross Anatomy incomplete was converted to a C — by a make-up examination. During the winter of 1979 he received a C — in Genetics 505, a C in Microbiology 520, an E in Microanatomy and General Pathology 506, a B in Creative Writing, and a Pass in Clinical Studies 410. He appealed the Micro-anatomy and General Pathology grade, requesting a change from an E to a D, and a make-up exam to receive a Pass. His appeal was denied by the Grade Appeal Committee, and he was again placed on an irregular program; he took only the Clinical Studies 420 course in the spring 1979 semester. “In July 1979, Ewing submitted a request to the Promotion and Review Board for an irregular program consisting of a course in Pharmacology in the fall and winter 1979-80 and a course in Human Illness and Neuroscience in 1980-81, thus splitting the fourth year into two years. The Board denied this request and directed him to take the fourth year curriculum in one academic year. He undertook to do so. He removed his deficiency in Microanatomy and General Pathology 506 by repeating the course during the winter 1980 semester and received a C +. In the spring term of 1980 he passed Developmental Anatomy with a B - grade, and he received a C grade in Neuroscience I 509 after a reexamination. In the fall of 1980, he received a passing grade in Neuroscience 609 and Pharmacology 626, and in the winter term of 1981, he received a passing grade in Clinical Studies 510 and a deficiency in Pharmacology 627. He was given a makeup examination in this course, and he received a 67.7 grade. “He then took Part I of the NBME . . . .” Ewing v. Board of Regents, 559 P. Supp., at 793-794. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because we believe this case can be disposed of on the Section 1983 claim, this Court does not expressly reach the breach of contract or promissory estoppel claims.” Ewing v. Board of Regents, 742 F. 2d 913, 914, n. 2 (CA6 1984). The University’s petition for certiorari also presented the question whether the Eleventh Amendment constituted a complete bar to the action because it was brought against the “Board of Regents of the University of Michigan,” App. 13, a body corporate. Cf. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). After the petition was granted, however, respondent Ewing filed a motion to amend the complaint by joining the individual members of the Board of Regents as named defendants in their official capacities. The University did not oppose that motion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13. Granting the motion merely conforms the pleadings to the “course of proceedings” in the District Court. Cf. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 167, n. 14 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464, 469 (1985). The record reveals that the Regents frequently referred to themselves in the plural, as “defendants,” indicating that they understood the suit to be against them individually, in their official capacities, rather than against the Board as a corporate entity. App. 11. Likewise, the District Court held that “defendants did not act in violation of Ewing’s due process rights,” 559 F. Supp., at 799, and accordingly found “in favor of the defendants,” id., at 800. We consequently grant the motion, thereby allowing Ewing to name as defendants the individual members of the Board of Regents in their official capacities. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 516, n. 19 (1982). Given our resolution of the case, we need not consider the question whether the relief sought by Ewing would be available under Eleventh Amendment principles. Ewing and the courts below reasoned as follows: In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972), this Court held that property interests protected by due process are “defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 572-573 (1975). In a companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601-602 (1972), we held that “agreements implied from ‘the promisor’s words and conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances’ ” could be independent sources of property interests. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 344 (1976) (implied contracts). According to an antiquated race discrimination decision of the Michigan Supreme Court (whose principal holding has since been overtaken by events), “when one is admitted to a college, there is an implied understanding that he shall not be arbitrarily dismissed therefrom.” Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 99-100, 120 N. W. 589, 591 (1909). From the foregoing, Ewing would have us conclude that he had a protectible property interest in continued enrollment in the Inteflex program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3. Consistent with this suggestion, petitioner’s answer to Ewing’s complaint “admitted] that, under Michigan law, [Ewing] may have enjoyed a property right and interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex Program.” App. 21. Although there is some ambiguity in its opinion, we understand the Court of Appeals to have found “clearly erroneous” the District Court’s rejection of Ewing’s federal substantive due process claim solely because of the “undisputed evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct” — namely, the “substantial and uncontroverted evidence in the trial record that at the time Ewing took the NBME Part I, medical students were routinely given a second opportunity to pass it.” 742 F. 2d, at 915. The Court of Appeals found no “rule” to the effect that medical students are entitled to retake failed examinations. Indeed, it relied on the University’s “promotional pamphlet entitled ‘On Becoming a Doctor’ ” only to the extent that it “memorialized the consistent practice of the medical school with respect to students who initially fail that examination.” Id., at 916 (emphasis added). A property interest in a second examination, however, cannot be inferred from a consistent practice without some basis in state law. Yet in this case the Court of Appeals did not reverse the District Court’s finding that Ewing was not even aware of the contents of the pamphlet and left standing its holding that the statements in this promotional tract did not “amoun[t] either to an unqualified promise to him or ... a contract right to retake the examination” under state law. 559 F. Supp., at 800. We recognize, of course, that “mutually explicit understandings” may operate to create property interests. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S., at 601. But such understandings or tacit agreements must support “a legitimate claim of entitlement” under ‘“an independent source such as state law . . . .’” Id., at 602, n. 7 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577). The District Court, it bears emphasis, held that the University’s liberal retesting custom gave rise to no state-law entitlement to retake the NBME Part I. We rejected an argument similar to Ewing’s in Board of Regents v. Roth. In that case Dr. Roth asserted a property interest in continued employment by virtue of the fact that “of four hundred forty-two non-tenured professors, four were not renewed during [a particular] academic year.” Brief for Respondent in Board of Regents v. Roth, O. T. 1971, No. 71-162, p. 28 (footnote and citation omitted). Absent a state statute or university rule or “anything approaching a ‘common law’ of reemployment,” however, we held that Dr. Roth had no property interest in the renewal of his teaching contract. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 578, n. 16. “In dealing with issues of state law that enter into judgments of federal courts, we are hesitant to overrule decisions by federal courts skilled in the law of particular states unless their conclusions are shown to be unreasonable.” Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487 (1949). Accord, Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306, 314, n. 8 (1983); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 181, n. 11 (1979); Butner v. United States, 440 U. S. 48, 58 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S., at 345-347. “University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation.” Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 96, n. 6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See id., at 90-92 (opinion of the Court). Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S., at 603; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957) (opinion of Warren, C. J.), but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself, see University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S., at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). Discretion to determine, on academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of “the four essential freedoms” of a university. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 312 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, supra, at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)) (internal quotations omitted). Even viewing the ease from Ewing’s perspective, we cannot say that the explanations and extenuating circumstances he offered were so compelling that their rejection can fairly be described as irrational. For example, the University might well have concluded that Ewing’s sensitivity to difficulties in his personal life suggested an inability to handle the stress inherent in a career in medicine. The inordinate amount of time Ewing devoted to his extracurricular essay writing may reasonably have revealed to the University a lack of judgment and an inability to set priorities. Nor does the University’s termination of Ewing substantially deviate from accepted academic norms when compared with its treatment of other students. To be sure, the University routinely gave others an opportunity to retake the NBME Part I. But despite tables recording that some students with more incompletes or low grades were permitted to retake the examination after failing it the first time, App. 105-111, and charts indicating that these students lacked the outside research and honor grade in clinical work that Ewing received, id., at 119-120, we are not in a position to say that these students were “similarly situated” with Ewing. The Promotion and Review Board presumably considered not only the raw statistical data but also the nature and seriousness of the individual deficiencies and their concentration in particular disciplines — in Ewing’s case, the hard sciences. The Board was able to take into account the numerous incom-pletes and makeup examinations Ewing required to secure even marginally passing grades, and it could view them in connection with his reduced course loads. Finally, it was uniquely positioned to observe Ewing’s judgment, self-discipline, and ability to handle stress, and was thus especially well situated to make the necessarily subjective judgment of Ewing’s prospects for success in the medical profession. The insusceptibility of promotion decisions such as this one to rigorous judicial review is borne out by the fact that 19 other Inteflex students, some with records that a judge might find “better” than Ewing’s, were dismissed by the faculty without even being allowed to take the NBME Part I a first time. Id., at 165-166. Cf. id., at 66 (nine Inteflex students terminated after suffering one deficiency and failing one course after warning).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KUCANA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL No. 08-911. Argued November 10, 2009 — Decided January 20, 2010 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scaua, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Soto-mayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 253. Rick M. Schoenfield argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael R. Lang, Elaine J. Goldenberg, and Lindsay C. Harrison. Nicole A. Saharsky argued the cause for respondent in support of petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Kagan, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Osuna, Donald E. Keener, Jennifer P. Levings, and Melissa Neiman-Kelting. Amanda C. Leiter, by invitation of the Court, 557 U. S. 951, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With her on the brief was RonNell Andersen Jones. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Lee Gelernt, Steven R. Shapiro, and Lucas Guttentag; for Law Professors by Anne Harkavy, Catherine M. A Carroll, and Stephen I. Vladeck, pro se; and for the National Immigrant Justice Center et al. by Jeffrey T. Green, Quin M. Sorenson, and Charles Roth. Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Agron Kucana moved to reopen his removal proceedings, asserting new evidence in support of his plea for asylum. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the motion, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) sustained the IJ’s ruling, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the administrative determination. For that conclusion, the court relied on a provision added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act), 66 Stat. 166, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546. The provision found dispositive by the Seventh Circuit, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), states that no court shall have jurisdiction to review any action of the Attorney General “the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). We granted certiorari to decide whether the proscription of judicial review stated in § 1252(a)(2)(B) applies not only to Attorney General determinations made discretionary by statute, but also to determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself through regulation. We hold that the key words “specified under this subchapter” refer to statutory, but not to regulatory, specifications. We so rule based on the longstanding exercise of judicial review of administrative rulings on reopening motions, the text and context of § 1252(a)(2)(B), and the history of the relevant statutory provisions. We take account, as well, of the “presumption favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action.” Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 63-64 (1993) (quoting McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496 (1991)). Separation-of-powers concerns, moreover, caution us against reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place in executive hands authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain. I A In HR IRA, Congress for the first time codified certain rules, earlier prescribed by the Attorney General, governing the reopening process. The amended Act instructs that reopening motions “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” § 1229a(c)(7)(B). Congress also prescribed that “the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Among matters excepted from the 90-day limitation are motions to reopen asylum applications because of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Section 1252(a)(2), captioned “Matters not subject to judicial review,” contains the provision on which this case turns. Subparagraph (B) of that paragraph, headed “Denials of discretionary relief,” states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory),... except as provided in subparagraph (D),[] and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review— “(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title,[] or “(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this subchapter[] to be in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . , other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.” A regulation, amended in 1996, just months before Congress enacted IIRIRA, 61 Fed. Reg. 18904, Pt. 3, § 3.2(a), states that “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is within the discretion of the Board.” 8 CFR § 1003.2(a) (2009). As adjudicator in immigration cases, the Board exercises authority delegated by the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2); 8 CFR §1003.1. See also 8 CFR § 1003.23(b)(3) (governing motions to reopen filed with an IJ). B Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States on a business visa in 1995 and remained after the visa expired. Alleging that he would be persecuted based on his political beliefs if returned to Albania, Kucana applied for asylum and withholding of removal in 1996. An IJ determined that Kucana was removable and scheduled a hearing to evaluate his eligibility for asylum. When Kucana failed to appear for the hearing, the IJ immediately ordered his removal in absentia. Kucana filed a motion to reopen, explaining that he had missed his hearing because he had overslept. The IJ denied the motion, and the BIA affirmed in 2002. Kucana did not seek judicial review, nor did he leave the United States. Kucana filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings in 2006, contending that conditions in Albania had worsened. The BIA denied relief; it concluded that conditions in Albania had actually improved since 1997. Arguing that the BIA had abused its discretion in denying his motion, Kucana filed a petition for review in the Seventh Circuit. In a fractured decision, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F. 3d 534, 539 (2008). The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review not only of administrative decisions made discretionary by statute, but also “when the agency’s discretion is specified by a regulation rather than a statute.” 533 F. 3d, at 536. In so ruling, the Seventh Circuit created a split between itself and other Courts of Appeals, all of them holding that denials of reopening motions are reviewable in court. Judge Ripple concurred dubitante. He acknowledged that the court was following an earlier decision, Ali v. Gonzales, 502 F. 3d 659 (CA7 2007), but “suggested] that, had Congress intended to deprive th[e] court of jurisdiction ..., it would have done so explicitly, as it did in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).” 533 F. 3d, at 540. The court, he concluded, should revisit both All and Kucana and “chart a course ... more closely adher[ing] to the statutory language chosen and enacted by Congress.” 533 F. 3d, at 540. Judge Cudahy dissented. Given the absence of “specific [statutory] language entrusting the decision on a motion to reopen to the discretion of the Attorney General,” ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted), he saw no impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction over Kucana’s petition. In support of his position, Judge Cudahy invoked the “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.” Id., at 541 (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U. S. 535, 542 (1988)). With four judges dissenting, the Seventh Circuit denied Kucana’s petition for rehearing en banc. See 533 F. 3d, at 541-542 (dissenting statement of Ripple, J., joined by Rovner, Wood, and Williams, JJ.). We granted certiorari, 556 U. S. 1207 (2009), to resolve the Circuit conflict. As it did before the Seventh Circuit, the Government agrees with Kucana that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not remove federal-court jurisdiction to review the denial of a reopening motion. We appointed Amanda C. Leiter to brief and argue the case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment. 557 U. S. 951 (2009). Ms. Leiter has ably discharged her assigned responsibilities. II The motion to reopen is an “important safeguard” intended “to ensure a proper and lawful disposition” of immigration proceedings. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, 18 (2008); cf. Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 401 (1995) (analogizing motions to reconsider immigration decisions to motions for relief from a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)). Federal-court review of administrative decisions denying motions to reopen removal proceedings dates back to at least 1916. See Dada, 554 U. S., at 12-13 (citing cases). This Court has ultimately reviewed reopening decisions on numerous occasions. See, e. g., INS v. Doherty, 502 U. S. 314, 322-324 (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 104-111 (1988); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U. S. 444, 449-452 (1985); INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139, 141-146. (1981) (per curiam). Mindful of the Board’s “broad discretion” in such matters, however, courts have employed a deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Doherty, 502 U. S., at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Seventh Circuit held that Congress removed the authority long exercised by federal courts to review denials of an alien’s reopening request. Congress did so, the Court of Appeals said, in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which removes jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General “the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” All agree that the Attorney General’s regulation, 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), places “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen ... within the discretion of the Board.” But the statute does not codify that prescription, and does not otherwise “specif [y]” that reopening decisions are “in the discretion of the Attorney General.” III A 1 The Board’s discretionary authority to act on a motion to reopen, we have thus far explained, is “specified” not in a statute, but only in the Attorney General’s regulation, which instructs: “The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen ... is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 CFR § 1008.2(a). Nevertheless, in defense of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, amicus urges that regulations suffice to trigger 8 . U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s proscription of judicial review. The jurisdiction-stripping provision, amicus reminds, refers to “authority . . . specified under this subchapter.” As she reads that formulation, the word “under” is key. She comprehends “under” to mean “pursuant to,” “subordinate to,” “below or lower than,” “inferior ... in rank or importance,” “by reason of the authority of.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 15,17 (citing, inter alia, Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 39 (2008); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991)). Administrative regulations count for § 1252(a)(2)(B) purposes, she urges, because they are issued “pursuant to,” and are measures “subordinate to,” the legislation they serve to implement. The parties, on the other hand, read “specified under this subchapter” to mean “specified in,” or “specified by,” the subchapter. On the reading amicus advances, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would bar judicial review" of any decision that an executive regulation places within the BIA’s discretion, including the decision to deny a motion to reopen. On the parties’ reading, however, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review only when the statute itself specifies the discretionary character of the Attorney General’s authority. 2 As the parties and amicus recognize, their diverse renderings of “under,” standing alone, do not equip us to resolve this case. The word “under” is chameleon; it “has many dictionary definitions and must draw its meaning from its context.” Ardestani, 502 U. S., at 135. Examining, in statutory context, the provision in which the word “under” is embedded, we conclude that the parties’ position stands on firmer ground. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the provision at issue here, is far from the only jurisdictional limitation in IIRIRA. See Dada, 554 U. S., at 16 (“In reading a statute we must not look merely to a particular clause, but consider in connection with it the whole statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) (“[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”). Section 1252(a)(2), titled “Matters not subject to judicial review,” lists a variety of agency determinations the federal courts lack jurisdiction to review. Those determinations divide into three categories. The first, § 1252(a)(2)(A), concerns immigration officers’ determinations whether aliens applying for admission are admissible. Next in statutory order is the provision before us, § 1252(a)(2)(B), which involves denials of discretionary relief. The last category, § 1252(a)(2)(C), concerns final orders of removal entered against criminal aliens. Both § 1252(a)(2)(A) and § 1252(a)(2)(C) depend on statutory provisions, not on any regulation, to define their scope. The latter provision, the criminal alien bar, precludes judicial review of “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in” § 1182(a)(2), § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or certain offenses covered in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). All the defining references are statutory; none invokes a regulation. The same holds for the admissibility bar in § 1252(a)(2)(A). Given § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s statutory placement, sandwiched between subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(C), one would expect that it, too, would cover statutory provisions alone. 3 Focusing on § 1252(a)(2)(B), we note the lead line serving to introduce both of the subparagraph’s two clauses: “[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review....” Clause (i) then places within the no-judicial-review category “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255.” Each of the statutory provisions referenced in clause (i) addresses a different form of discretionary relief from removal, see supra, at 239, n. 2, and each contains language indicating that the decision is entrusted to the Attorney General’s discretion. See, e.g., § 1182(h) (“The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive [inadmissibility based on certain criminal offenses].”). Clause (i) does not refer to any regulatory provision. To the clause (i) enumeration of administrative judgments that are insulated from judicial review, Congress added in clause (ii) a catchall provision covering “any other decision . . . the authority for which is specified under this subchapter.” The proximity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them — “any other decision” — suggests that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i. e., those made discretionary by legislation. The clause (i) enumeration, we find, is instructive in determining the meaning of the clause (ii) catchall. Read harmoniously, both clauses convey that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General’s discretionary authority in the statute. See Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576, 586 (2008) (“[W]hen a statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifies it follows.”). 4 We also find significant the character of the decisions Congress enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), thereby insulating them from judicial review. As the Government explained at oral argument, the determinations there listed are “substantive decisions . .. made by the Executive in the immigration context as a matter of grace, things that involve whether aliens can stay in the country or not.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. They include waivers of inadmissibility based on certain criminal offenses, § 1182(h), or based on fraud or misrepresentation, § 1182(i); cancellation of removal, § 1229b; permission for voluntary departure, § 1229c; and adjustment of status, § 1255. Other decisions specified by statute “to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,” and therefore shielded from court oversight by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), are of a like kind. See, e. g., § 1157(c)(1) (discretion to admit refugees “determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States”); § 1181(b) (discretion to waive requirement of documentation for readmission); § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iii) (discretion to waive, in certain cases, inadmissibility of aliens who have affiliated with a totalitarian party). Decisions on reopening motions made discretionary by regulation, in contrast, are adjunct rulings: The motion to reopen is a procedural device serving to ensure “that aliens [a]re getting a fair chance to have their claims heard.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. A court decision reversing the denial of a motion to reopen does not direct the Executive to afford the alien substantive relief; ordinarily, it touches and concerns only the question whether the alien's claims have been accorded a reasonable hearing. If Congress wanted the jurisdictional bar to encompass decisions specified as discretionary by regulation along with those made discretionary by statute, moreover, Congress could easily have said so. In other provisions enacted simultaneously with § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), Congress expressed precisely that meaning. See IIRIRA §213, 110 Stat. 3009-572 (“immigration benefits pursuant to this Act, or the regulations promulgated thereunder”), codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1324c(e)(2); IIRIRA §372, 110 Stat. 3009-646 (“any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this Act or regulations issued thereunder”), codified at 8 U. S. C. §1103(a)(10). “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 430 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). B The history of the relevant statutory provisions corroborates our determination that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not proscribe judicial review of denials of motions to reopen. Attorney General regulations have long addressed reopening requests. See 6 Fed. Reg. 71-72 (1941). The current regulations, adopted in 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 18904-18906, derive from rules published in 1958, see 23 Fed. Reg. 9118-9119; Dada, 554 U. S., at 13. Enacting IIRIRA in 1996, Congress “transformad] the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien.” Id., at 14. IIRIRA largely codified the Attorney GeneraFs directions on filing reopening motions. See § 1229a(c)(7) (guaranteeing right to file one motion, prescribing contents, and setting deadlines). In the same legislation, Congress amended the INA aggressively to expedite removal of aliens lacking a legal basis to remain in the United States. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 475 (1999). Among IIRIRAs several proscriptions of judicial review is the one here at issue, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), barring review of administrative decisions Congress placed within the Attorney GeneraFs discretion. Congress thus simultaneously codified the process for filing motions to reopen and acted to bar judicial review of a number of executive decisions regarding removal. But Congress did not codify the regulation delegating to the BIA discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(a) (reopening may be entertained not only on application; Board “may at any time reopen ... on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision”). Had Congress elected to insulate denials of motions to reopen from judicial review, it could have so specified together with its codification of directions on filing reopening motions. From the Legislature’s silence on the discretion of the Attorney General (or his delegate, the Board) over reopening motions, see supra, at 243, n. 10, we take it that Congress left the matter where it was pre-IIRIRA: The BIA has broad discretion, conferred by the Attorney General, “to grant or deny a motion to reopen,” 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), but courts retain jurisdiction to review, with due respect, the Board’s decision. It is unsurprising that Congress would leave in place judicial oversight of this “important [procedural] safeguard” designed “to ensure a proper and lawful disposition” of immigration proceedings, Dada, 554 U. S., at 18, where, as here, the alien’s underlying claim (for asylum) would itself be reviewable. In the REAL ID Act, Congress further amended the INA. By 2005, two Courts of Appeals had already ruled that 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not preclude them from reviewing denials of motions to reopen, see Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 1359, 1361-1362 (CA10 2004); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 520, 528-529 (CA9 2004), and no court had reached a contrary result. Although adding or reformulating provisions on asylum, § 101(a), (b), 119 Stat. 302-303, protection from removal, § 101(c), (d), id., at 303-305, even judicial review, § 106, id., at 310-311, the REAL ID Act did not disturb the unbroken line of decisions upholding court review of administrative denials of motions to reopen. See supra, at 242; supra, at 238-239, n. I. IV Any lingering doubt about the proper interpretation of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would be dispelled by a familiar principle of statutory construction: the presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action. When a statute is “reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial review.” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U. S. 417, 434 (1995). We have consistently applied that interpretive guide to legislation regarding immigration, and particularly to questions concerning the preservation of federal-court jurisdiction. See, e. g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 298 (2001); Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S., at 63-64; McNary, 498 U. S., at 496. Because the “presumption favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative action” is “well-settled,” Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S., at 63-64 (quoting McNary, 498 U. S., at 496), the Court assumes that “Congress legislates with knowledge of” the presumption, id., at 496. It therefore takes “clear and convincing evidence” to dislodge the presumption. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S., at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no such evidence here. Finally, we stress a paramount factor in the decision we render today. By defining the various jurisdictional bars by reference to other provisions in the INA itself, Congress ensured that it, and only it, would limit the federal courts’ jurisdiction. To read § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to apply to matters where discretion is conferred on the Board by regulation, rather than on the Attorney General by statute, would ignore that congressional design. If the Seventh Circuit’s construction of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) were to prevail, the Executive would have a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-of-discretion appellate court review simply by issuing a regulation declaring those decisions “discretionary.” Such an extraordinary delegation of authority cannot be extracted from the statute Congress enacted. V A statute affecting federal jurisdiction “must be construed both with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes.” Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 212 (1968). As we have noted, see supra, at 249, and as amicus emphasizes, “many provisions of IIRIRA [we]re aimed at protecting [from court review exercises of] the Executive’s discretion.” American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S., at 486 (emphasis deleted). But “no law pursues its purpose at all costs, and ... the textual limitations upon a law’s scope are no less a part of its ‘purpose’ than its substantive authorizations.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715, 752 (2006) (plurality opinion). While Congress pared back judicial review in IIRIRA, it did not delegate to the Executive authority to do so. Action on motions to reopen, made discretionary by the Attorney General only, therefore remain subject to judicial review. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the ease is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Subparagraph (D) of § 1252(a)(2), enacted in 2005, REAL ID Act of 2005 (REAL ID Act), § 106(a), 119 Stat. 310, adds: “Nothing in subparagraph (B)... or in any other provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” The addition of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) in 2005 did not change the operative language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) as enacted in 1996. The REAL ID Act amendments also inserted into this introductory clause, inter alia, the words “(statutory or nonstatutory).” § 106(a)(1)(A)(ii), 119 Stat. 310. The introductory clause, however, does not define the scope of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar. It simply informs that once the scope of the bar is determined, jurisdiction is precluded regardless of what any other provision or source of law might say. Sections 1182(h) and 1182(i) address waivers of inadmissibility based on certain criminal offenses, and fraud or misrepresentation, respectively; § 1229b addresses cancellation of removal; § 1229c, voluntary departure; and § 1255, adjustment of status. “[T]his subchapter” refers to Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, of the United States Code, codified at 8 U. S. C. §§ 1151-1381 and titled “Immigration.” The exception for relief under § 1158(a) refers to administrative decisions whether to grant asylum. Kucana’s petition for judicial review is limited to the denial of his motion to reopen; he does not challenge in this proceeding the decision denying his application for asylum. The statute “guarantees to each alien the right to file ‘one motion to reopen proceedings.’” Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, 15 (2008) (quoting § 1229a(c)(7)(A)). Attorney General regulations permit further motions to reopen to seek asylum or withholding of removal based on changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal. See 8 CFR §1003.2(e)(3)(ii) (2009). While recognizing that a regulation, rather than the INA itself, confers on the Board discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen, the Court of Appeals said that the regulation, § 1003.2(a), “draw[s]... force from provisions in the Act allowing immigration officials to govern their own proceedings.” 533 F. 3d, at 536. The “force,” according to the Seventh Circuit, comes from 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7), which it described as providing “authority for reopening by [the] Board.” 533 F. 3d, at 536. Section 1229a(c)(7), however, is not directed to the agency’s discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen. In the main, “it simply lays out the requirements an alien must fulfill when filing a motion to reopen.” Id., at 541 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also infra, at 243, n. 9. See Singh v. Mukasey, 536 F. 3d 149, 153-154 (CA2 2008); Jahjaga v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 512 F. 3d 80, 82 (CA3 2008); Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F. 3d 295, 303 (CA5 2005); Miah v. Mukasey, 519 F. 3d 784, 789, n. 1 (CA8 2008); Medina-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 520, 528-529 (CA9 2004); Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F. 3d 1359, 1361-1362 (CA10 2004). Ali involved a decision, made discretionary by regulation, denying an alien’s request for a continuance. As earlier noted, see supra, at 240-241, n. 6, the Seventh Circuit stated that the regulation specifying the Board’s discretion over motions to reopen, 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), “drawls] [its] force from provisions in the Act.” 533 F. 3d, at 536 (citing 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)). It is hard to see how the regulation could draw force from § 1229a(c)(7), for the regulation was already in force when that statutory provision was enacted. The regulation, 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), was published April 29, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 18900, 18904; 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7) was enacted September 30, 1996, §304, 110 Stat. 3009-593. The only statutory reference to discretion respecting motions to reopen appears in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), which gives the Attorney General “discretion” to waive one of the statute’s time limitations in extraordinary circumstances. Amicus urges that “the statutory language governing motions to reopen anticipates an exercise of Attorney General discretion when it states, ‘[t]he motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted’ ” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 19, n. 8 (quoting § 1229a(c)(7)(B)). One can demur to the argument that Congress anticipated that decisions on reopening motions would be discretionary. Even so, the statutory proscription Congress enacted, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), speaks of authority “specified” — not merely assumed or contemplated — to be in the Attorney General’s discretion. “Specified” is not synonymous with “implied” or “anticipated.” See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1116 (1974) (“specify” means “to name or state explicitly or in detail”). See also Soltane v. U. S. Dept. of Justice, 381 F. 3d 143, 147 (CA3 2004) (Alito, J.) (“[W]e do not think . . . that the use of marginally ambiguous statutory language, without more, is adequate to ‘speciffy]’ that a particular action is within the Attorney General’s discretion for the purposes of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”). Defining “under,” as used in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), to mean “pursuant to,” or “subordinate to,” and not “in” or “by,” the Attorney General observes, would give rise to “a fatal anomaly”: “Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would apply only to regulations promulgated “under the authority of’ the relevant sub-chapter, and not to specifications of discretion in the subchapter itself.” Reply Brief for Respondent 6. In an appendix to her brief, amicus lists hundreds of statutory provisions in which regulations are described as being issued “under” a statute. See App. A to Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below. In every one of those examples, Congress expressly used the word “regulations.” At oral argument, amicus called our attention to three instances in which Congress used the words “specified under” in Title 8, without any reference to “regulations,” to encompass agency matters. Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48, 54-55 (citing §§ 1227(a)(1)(H), 1375a(a)(6), and 1537(b)(1)). These three provisions point to other parts of the Act, which in turn rely on administrative determinations. Amicus’ research underscores the point that context defines “under.” Congress excepted from § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “the granting of relief under [§] 1158(a).” Section 1158 concerns applications for asylum. Absent the exception, asylum applicants might fall within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar because a statutory provision, § 1158(b)(1)(A), specifies that “the Attorney General may grant asylum.” (Emphasis added.) See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 697 (2001) (“ ‘may’ suggests discretion”). Amicus suggests that the word “any” in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) should be read expansively to draw in decisions made discretionary by regulation. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 21-23. But § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not say “any decision”; it says “any other decision.” And as we have just explained, other decisions falling within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s compass are most sensibly understood to include only decisions made discretionary by Congress. See Brief for Respondent 19-20, and n. 11 (noting that “over thirty provisions in the relevant sub-chapter of the INA ... explicitly grant the Attorney General... ‘discretion’ to make a certain decision”). Counsel offered this explanation in response to the question: “Why would Congress want to exclude review for discretionary judgments by the Attorney General that are recited explicitly to be discretionary in the statute, but provide judicial review for judgments that are just as lawfully discretionary because the Attorney General is given the authority to make them discretionary and has done so?” Tr. of Oral Arg. 9; see id., at 13-14. A statement in the House Conference Report on IIRIRA, amicus suggests, supports her argument that Congress intended broadly to foreclose judicial review of reopening denials. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 32-84. The Report states that § 1252(a)(2)(B) “bars judicial review ... of any decision or action of the Attorney General which is specified to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, p. 219 (1996). That statement, as we read it, simply summarizes the statutory text at a general level. It does not home in on the question whether decisions made discretionary only by regulation are judicially reviewable. We do not reach the question whether review of a reopening denial would be precluded if the court would lack jurisdiction over the alien’s underlying claim for relief. Some courts confronting that question have refused to consider petitions for review of a reopening denial that seeks to revisit the denial of the underlying claim; they have reasoned that hearing the petition would end-run the bar to review of the petitioner’s core claim. See, e. g., Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F. 3d 471, 473-475 (CA5 2004) (per curiam). We express no opinion on whether federal courts may review the Board’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte. Courts of Appeals have held that such decisions are unreviewable because sua sponte reopening is committed to agency discretion by law, see 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)(2). See, e. g., Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F. 3d 1000, 1003-1004 (CA8 2008) (en banc) (per curiam) (agreeing with ten other Courts of Appeals).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BURNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES, INC., et al. No. 71-123. Argued January 13, 1972 Decided May 15, 1972 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court in No. 71-123, and for the Court in No. 71-198, in which Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed an opinion concurring in No. 71-123 and dissenting in No. 71-198, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan and Powell, JJ., joined, post, p. 296. Norton J. Come argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board, petitioner in No. 71-123 and respondent in No. 71-198. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Harry R. Sachse, Peter G. Nash, and Nancy M. Sherman. Charles G. Bakaly, Jr., argued the cause for Burns International Security Services, Inc., respondent in No. 71-123 and petitioner in No. 71-198. With him on the brief was Seymour Swerdlow. Gordon A. Gregory argued the cause and filed a brief for International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America, et al., respondents in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by /. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and by Milton A. Smith and Jay S. Siegel for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Together with No. 71-198, Burns International Security Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Burns International Security Services, Inc. (Burns), replaced another employer, the Wackenhut Corp. (Wackenhut), which had previously provided plant protection services for the Lockheed Aircraft Service Co. (Lockheed) located at the Ontario International Airport in California. When Burns began providing security service, it employed 42 guards; 27 of them had been employed by Wackenhut. Burns refused, however, to bargain with the United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPG) which had been certified after a National Labor Relations Board (Board) election as the exclusive bargaining representative of Wackenhut’s employees less than four months earlier. The issues presented in this case are whether Burns refused to bargain with a union representing a majority of employees in an appropriate unit and whether the National Labor Relations Board could order Burns to- observe the terms of a collective-bargaining contract signed by the union and Wackenhut that Burns had not voluntarily assumed. Resolution turns to a great extent on the precise facts involved here. I The Wackenhut Corp. provided protection services at the Lockheed plant for five years before Burns took over this task. On February 28, 1967, a few months before the changeover of guard employers, a majority of the Wackenhut guards selected the union as their exclusive bargaining representative in a Board election after Waekenhut and the union had agreed that the Lockheed plant was the appropriate bargaining unit. On March 8, the Regional Director certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative for these employees, and, on April 29, Wackenhut and the union entered into a three-year collective-bargaining contract. Meanwhile, since Wackenhut’s one-year service agreement to provide security protection was due to expire on June 30, Lockheed had called for bids from various companies supplying these services, and both Burns and Wackenhut submitted estimates. At a pre-bid conference attended by Burns on May 15, a representative of Lockheed informed the bidders that Wackenhut’s guards were represented by the union, that the union had recently won a Board election and been certified, and that there was in existence a collective-bargaining contract between Wackenhut and the union. App. 4-5, 126. Lockheed then accepted Burns’ bid, and on May 31 Wackenhut was notified that Burns would assume responsibility for protection services on July 1. Burns chose to retain 27 of the Wackenhut guards, and it brought in 15 of its own guards from other Burns locations. During June, when Burns hired the 27 Wackenhut guards, it supplied them with membership cards of the American Federation of Guards (AFG), another union with which Burns had collective-bargaining contracts at other locations, and informed them that they had to become AFG members to work for Burns, that they would not receive uniforms otherwise, and that Burns “could not live with” the existing contract between Wackenhut and the union. On June 29, Burns recognized the AFG on the theory that it had obtained a card majority. On July 12, however, the UPG demanded that Burns recognize it as the bargaining representative of Burns’ employees at Lockheed and that Burns honor the collective-bargaining agreement between it and Wackenhut. When Burns refused, the UPG filed unfair labor practice charges, and Burns responded by challenging the appropriateness of the unit and by denying its obligation to bargain. The Board, adopting the trial examiner’s findings and conclusions, found the Lockheed plant an appropriate unit and held that Burns had violated §§ 8 (a)(2) and 8 (a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(2), 158 (a)(1), by unlawfully recognizing and assisting the AFG, a rival of the UPG; and that it had violated §§ 8 (a) (5) and 8(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a)(5), 158 (a)(1), by failing to recognize and bargain with the UPG and by refusing to honor the collective-bargaining agreement that had been negotiated between Wackenhut and UPG. Burns did not challenge the § 8 (a) (2) unlawful assistance finding in the Court of Appeals but sought review of the unit determination and the order to bargain and observe the pre-existing collective-bargaining contract. The Court of Appeals accepted the Board’s unit determination and enforced the Board’s order insofar as it related to the finding of unlawful assistance of a rival union and the refusal to bargain, but it held that the Board had exceeded its powers in ordering Burns to honor the contract executed by Wackenhut. Both Burns and the Board petitioned for certiorari, Burns challenging the unit determination and the bargaining order and the Board maintaining its position that Burns was bound by the Wackenhut contract, and we granted both petitions, though we declined to review the propriety of the bargaining unit, a question which was presented in No. 71-198. 404 U. S. 822 (1971). II We address first Burns’ alleged duty to bargain with the union, and in doing so it is well to return to the specific provisions of the Act, which courts and the Board alike are bound to observe. Section 8 (a)(5), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (5), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this title.” Section 159 (a) provides that “ [representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . .” Because the Act itself imposes a duty to bargain with the representative of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, the initial issue before the Board was whether the charging union was such a bargaining representative. The trial examiner first found that the unit designated by the regional director was an appropriate unit for bargaining. The unit found appropriate was defined as “[a] 11 full-time and regular part-time employees of [Burns] performing plant protection duties as determined in Section 9 (b) (3) of the [National Labor Relations] Act at Lockheed, Ontario International Airport; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, supervisors, and all other employees as defined in the Act.” This determination was affirmed by the Board, accepted by the Court of Appeals, and is not at issue here because pretermitted by our limited grant of certiorari. The trial examiner then found, inter alia, that Burns “had in its employ a majority of Wackenhut’s former employees,” and that these employees had already expressed their choice of a bargaining representative in an election held a short time before. Burns was therefore held to have a duty to bargain, which arose when it selected as its work force the employees of the previous employer to perform the same tasks at the same place they had worked in the past. The Board, without revision, accepted the trial examiner’s findings and conclusions with respect to the duty to bargain, and we see no basis for setting them aside. In an election held but a few months before, the union had been designated bargaining agent for the employees in the unit and a majority of these employees had been hired by Burns for work in the identical unit. It is undisputed that Burns knew all the relevant facts in this regard and was aware of the certification and of the existence of a collective-bargaining contract. In these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Board to conclude that the union certified to represent all employees in the unit still represented a majority of the employees and that Burns could not reasonably have entertained a good-faith doubt about that fact. Burns’ obligation to bargain with the union over terms and conditions of employment stemmed from its hiring of Wackenhut’s employees and from the recent election and Board certification. It has been consistently held that a mere change of employers or of ownership in the employing industry is not such an “unusual circumstance” as to affect the force of the Board's certification within the normal operative period if a majority of employees after the change of ownership or management were employed by the preceding employer. NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F. 2d 921, 925 (CA6 1964); NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F. 2d 219, 221 (CA10 1962); NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F. 2d 303, 307 (CA5 1960) ; NLRB v. Lander Shoe Corp., 211 F. 2d 284, 286 (CA1 1954); NLRB v. Armato, 199 F. 2d 800, 803 (CA7 1952) ; South Carolina Granite Co., 58 N. L. R. B. 1448, 1463-1464 (1944), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F. 2d 25 (CA4 1945); Northwest Glove Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 1697, 1700 (1947); Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N. L. R. B. 437, 442 (1963). It goes without saying, of course, that Burns was not entitled to upset what it should have accepted as an established union majority by soliciting representation cards for another union and thereby committing the unfair labor practice of which it was found guilty by the Board. That holding was not challenged here and makes it imperative that the situation be viewed as it was when Burns hired its employees for the guard unit, a majority of whom were represented by a Board-certified union. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 609, 610-616 (1969). It would be a wholly different case if the Board had determined that because Burns’ operational structure and practices differed from those of Wackenhut, the Lockheed bargaining unit was no longer an appropriate one. Likewise, it would be different if Burns had not hired employees already represented by a union certified as a bargaining agent, and the Board recognized as much at oral argument. But where the bargaining' unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent there is little basis for faulting the Board’s implementation of the express mandates of § 8 (a) (5) and § 9 (a) by ordering the employer to bargain with the incumbent union. This is the view of several courts of appeals and we agree with those courts. NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA5 1970) ; Tom-A-Hawk Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F. 2d 1025, 1026-1027 (CA7 1969); S. S. Kresge Co. v. NLRB, 416 F. 2d 1225, 1234 (CA6 1969); NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F. 2d, at 220. Ill It does not follow, however, from Burns’ duty to bargain that it was bound to observe the substantive terms of the collective-bargaining contract the union had negotiated with Wackenhut and to which Burns had in no way agreed. Section 8 (d) of the Act expressly provides that the existence of such bargaining obligation “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Congress has consistently declined to interfere with free collective bargaining and has preferred that device, or voluntary arbitration, to the imposition of compulsory terms as a means of avoiding or terminating labor disputes. In its report accompanying the 1935 Act, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor stated: “The committee wishes to dispel any possible false impression that this bill is designed to compel the making of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their terms. It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are satisfactory.” S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1935). This Court immediately noted this fundamental theme of the legislation: “[The Act] does not compel any agreement whatever. . . . The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937). See also NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U. S. 395, 401-02 (1952); Teamsters Local 857 v. NLRB, 365 U. S. 667, 676-677 (1961). Section 8 (d), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d), made this policy an express statutory mandate, and was enacted in 1947 because Congress feared that “the present Board has gone very far, in the guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not make. . . . [UJnless Congress writes into the law guides for the Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still further and seek to control more and more the terms of collective bargaining agreements.” H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1947). This history was reviewed in detail and given controlling effect in H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99 (1970). There this Court, while agreeing that the employer violated §8 (a)(5) by adamantly refusing to agree to a dues checkoff, intending thereby to frustrate the consummation of any bargaining agreement, held that the Board had erred in ordering the employer to agree to such a provision: “[W]hile the Board does have power ... to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is without power to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective-bargaining agreement. “It would be anomalous indeed to hold that while § 8 (d) prohibits the Board from relying on a refusal to agree as the sole evidence of bad-faith bargaining, the Act permits the Board to compel agreement in that same dispute. The Board’s remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract.” 397 U. S., at 102, 108 (citations omitted). These considerations, evident from the explicit language and legislative history of the labor laws, underlay the Board’s prior decisions, which until now have consistently held that, although successor employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with the union, they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a collective-bargaining contract negotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them. Rohlik, Inc., 145 N. L. R. B. 1236, 1242 n. 15 (1964); General Extrusion Co., 121 N. L. R. B. 1165, 1168 (1958); Jolly Giant Dumber Co., 114 N. L. R. B. 413, 414 (1955); Slater System Maryland, Inc., 134 N. L. R. B. 865, 866 (1961); Matter of ILWU (Juneau Spruce), 82 N. L. R. B. 650, 658-659 (1949), enforced, 189 F. 2d 177 (CA9 1951), aff’d on other grounds, 342 U. S. 237 (1952). As the Court of Appeals said in this case, “In none of the previous successorship cases has the Board ever reached that result. The successor has always been held merely to have the duty of bargaining with his predecessor’s union.” 441 F. 2d, at 915. The Board, however, has now departed from this view and argues that the same policies that mandate a continuity of bargaining obligation also require that successor employers be bound to the terms of a predecessor’s collective-bargaining contract. It asserts that the stability of labor relations will be jeopardized and that employees will face uncertainty and a gap in the bargained-for terms and conditions of employment, as well as the possible loss of advantages gained by prior negotiations, unless the new employer is held to have assumed, as a matter of federal labor law, the obligations under the contract entered into by the former employer. Recognizing that under normal contract principles a party would not be bound to a contract in the absence of consent, the Board notes that in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 550 (1964), the Court declared that “a collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract” but is, rather, an outline of the common law of a particular plant or industry. The Court held in Wiley that although the predecessor employer which had signed a collective-bargaining contract with the union had disappeared by merger with the successor, the union could compel the successor to arbitrate the extent to which the successor was obligated under the collective-bargaining agreement. The Board contends that the same factors that the Court emphasized in Wiley, the peaceful settlement of industrial conflicts and “protection [of] the employees [against] a sudden change in the employment relationship,” id., at 549, require that Burns be treated under the collective-bargaining contract exactly as Wackenhut would have been if it had continued protecting the Lockheed plant. We do not find Wiley controlling in the circumstances here. Wiley arose in the context of a § 301 suit to compel arbitration, not in the context of an unfair labor practice proceeding where the Board is expressly limited by the provisions of §8(d). That decision emphasized “[t]he preference of national labor policy for arbitration as a substitute for tests of strength before contending forces” and held only that the agreement to arbitrate, “construed in the context of a national labor policy,” survived the merger and left to the arbitrator, subject to judicial review, the ultimate question of the extent to which, if any, the surviving company was bound by other provisions of the contract. Id., at 549, 551. Wiley’s limited accommodation between the legislative endorsement of freedom of contract and the judicial preference for peaceful arbitral settlement of labor disputes does not warrant the Board’s holding that the employer commits an unfair labor practice unless he honors the substantive terms of the pre-existing contract. The present case does not involve a § 301 suit; nor does it involve the duty to arbitrate. Rather, the claim is that Burns must be held bound by the contract executed by Wackenhut, whether Burns has agreed to it or not and even though Burns made it perfectly clear that it had no intention of assuming that contract. Wiley suggests no such open-ended obligation. Its narrower holding dealt with a merger occurring against a background of state law that embodied the general rule that in merger situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corporation. See N. Y. Stock Corp. Law §90 (1951); 15 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations § 7121 (1961 rev. ed.). Here there was no merger or sale of assets, and there were no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut and Burns. On the contrary, they were competitors for the same work, each bidding for the service contract at Lockheed. Burns purchased nothing from Wackenhut and became liable for none of its financial obligations. Burns merely hired enough of Wackenhut’s employees to require it to bargain with the union as commanded by § 8 (a)(5) and § 9 (a). But this consideration is a wholly insufficient basis for implying either in fact or in law that Burns had agreed or must be held to have agreed to honor Wackenhut’s collective-bargaining contract. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Board failed to heed the admonitions of the H. K. Porter case. Preventing industrial strife is an important aim of federal labor legislation, but Congress has not chosen to make the bargaining freedom of employers and unions totally subordinate to this goal. When a bargaining impasse is reached, strikes and lockouts may occur. This bargaining freedom means both that parties need not make any concessions as a result of Government compulsion and that they are free from having contract provisions imposed upon them against their will. Here, Burns had notice of the existence of the Wackenhut collective-bargaining contract, but it did not consent to be bound by it. The source of its duty to bargain with the union is not the collective-bargaining contract but the fact that it voluntarily took over a bargaining unit that was largely intact and that had been certified within the past year. Nothing in its actions, however, indicated that Burns was assuming the obligations of the contract, and “allowing the Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based — private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.” H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S., at 108. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that holding either the union or the new employer bound to the substantive terms of an old collective-bargaining contract may result in serious inequities. A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital. On the other hand, a union may have made concessions to a small or failing employer that it would be unwilling to make to a large or economically successful firm. The congressional policy manifest in the Act is to enable the parties to negotiate for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow the balance of bargaining advantage to be set by economic power realities. Strife is bound to occur if the concessions that must be honored do not correspond to the relative economic strength of the parties. The Board’s position would also raise new problems, for the successor employer would be circumscribed in exactly the same way as the predecessor under the collective-bargaining contract. It would seemingly follow that employees of the predecessor would be deemed employees of the successor, dischargeable only in accordance with provisions of the contract and subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions thereof. Burns would not have been free to replace Wackenhut’s guards with its own except as the contract permitted. Given the continuity of employment relationship, the pre-existing contract’s provisions with respect to wages, seniority-rights, vacation privileges, pension and retirement fund benefits, job security provisions, work assignments and the like would devolve on the successor. Nor would the union commit a § 8 (b) (3) unfair labor practice if it refused to bargain for a modification of the agreement effective prior to the expiration date of the agreement. A successor employer might also be deemed to have inherited its predecessor’s pre-existing contractual obligations to the union that had accrued under past contracts and that had not been discharged when the business was transferred. “[A] successor may well acquire more liabilities as a result of Burns than appear on the face of a contract.” Finally, a successor will be bound to observe the contract despite good-faith doubts about the union’s majority during the time that the contract is a bar to another representation election, Ranch-Way, Inc, 183 N. L. R. B. No. 116 (1970). For the above reasons, the Board itself has expressed doubts as to the general applicability of its Burns rule. In many cases, of course, successor employers will find it advantageous not only to recognize and bargain with the union but also to observe the pre-existing contract rather than to face uncertainty and turmoil. Also, in a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock acquisition, reorganization, or assets purchase, the Board might properly find as a matter of fact that the successor had assumed the obligations under the old contract. Cf. Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N. L. R. B. 1384 (1963). Such a duty does not, however, ensue as a matter of law from the mere fact than an employer is doing the same work in the same place with the same employees as his predecessor, as the Board had recognized until its decision in the instant case. See cases cited supra, at 284. We accordingly set aside the Board’s finding of a § 8 (a)(5) unfair labor practice insofar as it rested on a conclusion that Burns was required to but did not honor the collective-bargaining contract executed by Wackenhut. IV It therefore follows that the Board’s order requiring Burns to “give retroactive effect to all the clauses of said [Wackenhut] contract and, with interest of 6 percent, make whole its employees for any losses suffered by reason of Respondent’s [Burns’] refusal to honor, adopt and enforce said contract” must be set aside. We note that the regional director’s charge instituting this case asserted that “[o]n or about July 1, 1967, Respondent [Burns] unilaterally changed existing wage rates, hours of employment, overtime wage rates, differentials for swing shift and graveyard shift, and other terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the appropriate unit . . . ,” App. 113, and that the Board’s opinion stated that “[t]he obligation to bargain imposed on a successor-employer includes the negative injunction to refrain from unilaterally changing wages and other benefits established by a prior collective-bargaining agreement even though that agreement had expired. In this respect, the successor-employer’s obligations are the same as those imposed upon employers generally during the period between collective-bargaining agreements.” App. 8-9. This statement by the Board is consistent with its prior and subsequent cases that hold that whether or not a successor employer is bound by its predecessor’s contract, it must not institute terms and conditions of employment different from those provided in its predecessor’s contract, at least without first bargaining with the employees’ representative. Overnite Transportation Co., 157 N. L. R. B. 1185 (1966), enforced sub nom. Overnite Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 372 F. 2d 765 (CA4), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 838 (1967); Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N. L. R. B. 1486 (1967), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Vaileydale Packers, Inc., 402 F. 2d 768 (CA5 1968); Michaud Bus Lines, Inc., 171 N. L. R. B. 193 (1968); Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N. L. R. B. No. 139 (1971). Thus, if Burns, without bargaining to impasse with the union, had paid its employees on and after July 1 at a rate lower than Wackenhut had paid under its contract, or otherwise provided terms and conditions of employment different from those provided in the Wackenhut collective-bargaining agreement, under the Board’s view, Burns would have committed a § 8 (a) (5) unfair labor practice and would have been subject to an order to restore to employees what they had lost by this so-called unilateral change. See Overnite Transportation Co., supra; Emerald Maintenance, Inc., supra. Although Burns had an obligation to bargain with the union concerning wages and other conditions of employment when the union requested it to do so, this case is not like a §8 (a)(5) violation where an employer unilaterally changes a condition of employment without consulting a bargaining representative. It is difficult to understand how Burns could be said to have changed unilaterally any pre-existing term or condition of employment without bargaining when it had no previous relationship whatsover to the bargaining unit and, prior to July 1, no outstanding terms and conditions of employment from which a change could be inferred. The terms on which Burns hired employees for service after July 1 may have differed from the terms extended by Wackenhut and required by the collective-bargaining contract; but it does not follow that Burns changed its terms and conditions of employment when it specified the initial basis on which employees were hired on July 1. Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a predecessor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employees’ bargaining representative before he fixes terms. In other situations, however, it may not be clear until the successor employer has hired his full complement of employees that he has a duty to bargain with a union, since it will not be evident until then that the bargaining representative represents a majority of the employees in the unit as required by § 9 (a) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). Here, for example, Burns’ obligation to bargain with the union did not mature until it had selected its force of guards late in June. The Board quite properly found that Burns refused to bargain on July 12 when it rejected the overtures of the union. It is true that the wages it paid when it began protecting the Lockheed plant on July 1 differed from those specified in the Wackenhut collective-bargaining agreement, but there is no evidence that Burns ever unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment it had offered to potential employees in June after its obligation to bargain with the union became apparent. If the union had made a request to bargain after Burns had completed its hiring and if Burns had negotiated in good faith and had made offers to the union which the union rejected, Burns could have unilaterally initiated such proposals as the opening terms and conditions of employment on July 1 without committing an unfair labor practice. Cf. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736, 745 n. 12 (1962); NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F. 2d 260, 272-273 (CA2) cert. denied, 375 U. S. 834 (1963); NLRB v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 336 F. 2d 214, 217 (CA5 1964). The Board’s order requiring Burns to make whole its employees for any losses suffered by reason of Burns’ refusal to honor and enforce the contract, cannot therefore be sustained on the ground that Burns unilaterally changed existing terms and conditions of employment, thereby committing an unfair labor practice which required monetary restitution in these circumstances. Affirmed. A Burns executive later admitted in the unfair-labor-practice proceeding that Burns was aware of the union’s status, the unit certification, and the collective-bargaining contract after the May 15 meeting. App. 105. In regard to this latter finding, the Board stated: “The question before us thus narrows to whether the national labor policy embodied in the Act requires the successor-employer to take over and honor a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of the employing enterprise by the predecessor. We hold that, absent unusual circumstances, the Act imposes such an obligation. “We find, therefore, that Burns is bound to that contract as if it were a signatory thereto, and that its failure to maintain the contract in effect is violative of Sections 8 (d) and 8 (a) (5) of the Act.” Cf. § 9 (c) (3) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (c) (3), which provides that “[n]o election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held.” See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 599 n. 14 (1969). Where an employer remains the same, a Board certification carries with it an almost conclusive presumption that the majority representative status of the union continues for a reasonable time, usually a year. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96, 98-99 (1954). After this period, there is a rebuttable presumption of majority representation. Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N. L. R. B. 664, 672 (1951). If there is a change of employers, however, and an almost complete turnover of employees, the certification may not bar a challenge if the successor employer is not bound by the collective-bargaining contract, particularly if the new employees are represented by another union or if the old unit is ruled an accretion to another unit. Cf. McGuire v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 355 F. 2d 352 (CA2), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 988 (1966). See n. 5, infra. The Court of Appeals was unimpressed with the asserted differences between Burns’ and Wackenhut’s operations: “All of the important factors which the Board has used and the courts have approved are present in the instant case: ‘continuation of the same types of product lines, departmental organization, employee identity and job functions.’. . . Both Burns and Wackenhut are nationwide organizations; both performed the identical services at the same facility; although Burns used its own supervisors, their functions and responsibilities were similar to those performed by their predecessors; and finally, and perhaps most significantly, Burns commenced performance of the contract with 27 former Wackenhut employees out of its total complement of 42.” 441 F. 2d 911, 915 (1971) (citation omitted). Although the labor policies of the two companies differed somewhat, the Board’s determination that the bargaining unit remained appropriate after the changeover meant that Burns would face essentially the same labor relations environment as Wackenhut: it would confront the same union representing most of the same employees in the same unit. The Board has never held that the National Labor Relations Act itself requires that an employer who submits the winning bid for a service contract or who purchases the assets of a business be obligated to hire all of the employees of the predecessor though it is possible that such an obligation might be assumed by the employer. But cf. Chemrock Corp., 151 N. L. R. B. 1074 (1965). However, an employer who declines to hire employees solely because they are members of a union commits a § 8 (a) (3) unfair labor practice. See K. B. & J. Young’s Super Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F. 2d 463 (CA9), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 841 (1967); NLRB v. New England Tank Industries, Inc., 302 F. 2d 273 (CA1), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 875 (1962); Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 280 F. 2d 575 (CA3 1960), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 933 (1961); Tri State Maintenance Corp., 167 N. L. R. B. 933 (1967), enforced with mod. sub nom. Tri State Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 368, 408 F. 2d 171 (1968). Further restrictions on the successor employer’s choice of employees would seem to follow from the Board’s instant decision that the employer must honor the preexisting collective-bargaining contract. See infra, at 288-290. “Q. But [counsel for the Union], when he argued, said that even if [Burns] hadn’t taken over any [employees of Wackenhut], even if they hadn’t taken over a single employee, the legal situation would be the same. “Mr. Come [for the NLRB]. We do not go that far. We don’t think that you have to go that far in- “Q.’Do you think it has to be a majority? “Mr. Come. I wouldn’t say that it has to be a majority, I think it has to be a substantial number. It has to be enough to give you a continuity of employment conditions in the bargaining unit.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 64^65. Two exceptions to this general reluctance to interfere with free collective bargaining are the imposition of compulsory arbitration during wartime, Exec. Order No. 9017 (1942), and, on occasion, in the railroad industry, 77 Stat. 132, 81 Stat. 122. Congress has consistently rejected compulsory arbitration even as a remedy for “national emergency” disputes, however. See Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735, 742-743 (1969). When the union that has signed a collective-bargaining contract is decertified, the succeeding union certified by the Board is not bound by the prior contract, need not administer it, and may demand negotiations for a new contract, even if the terms of the old contract have not yet expired. American Seating Co., 106 N. L. R. B. 250 (1953); Farmbest, Inc., 154 N. L. R. B. 1421, 1453-1454 (1965),, enf. with mod. sub nom. Farmbest, Inc. v. NLRB, 370 F. 2d 1015 (CA8 1967); see also Modine Mfg. Co. v. International Association of Machinists, 216 F. 2d 326 (CA6 1954). The Board has declined to overturn its “long standing” American Seating rule after Burns. General Dynamics Corp., 184 N. L. R. B. No. 71 (1970). The vast majority of collective-bargaining agreements specify the procedures to be used in choosing employees for available jobs, and approximately 92% of all such contracts place some limitations on the right to discharge. Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts §§40.T, 60:11 (BNA 1971). Under the Board’s theory, if a successor refused to hire or fired any of the predecessor’s employees without going through applicable grievance procedures, it might be guilty of a § 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain. See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U. S. 357, 359 (1969); NLRB v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 377 F. 2d 964, 968-969 (CA8 1967). Section 8 (d) of the Act provides, in part: “[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification— “(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; “(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; “(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and “(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later: “The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2)-(4) of this subsection . . . shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract.” 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). Doppelt, Successor Companies: The NLRB Limits the Options— and Raises Some Problems, 20 DePaul L. Rev. 176, 191 (1971). The Board imposes this contract-bar rule for the term of a collective bargaining of “reasonable duration,” a period the Board now defines as three years. General Cable Corp., 139 N. L. R. B. 1123 (1962). Also during this time, an employer cannot use doubt about a union’s majority as a defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge. Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N. L. R. B. 1384, 1387 (1963); Hexton Furniture Co., 111 N. L. R. B. 342 (1955). Prior to Burns, the Board had held that a successor was barred by the contract of the predecessor from requesting a representation election during the term of the contract only if it had assumed the contract. Jolly Giant Lumber Co., 114 N. L. R. B. 413 (1955); General Extrusion Co., 121 N. L. R. B. 1165 (1958); MV Dominator, 162 N. L. R. B. 1514 (1967). Moreover, such assumption had to be by an express written agreement. American Concrete Pipe of Hawaii, Inc., 128 N. L. R. B. 720 (1960). The Board had also permitted a non-assuming successor to raise a good-faith doubt as to the union’s majority as a defense to a refusal-to-bargain charge during the term of the old contract. Randolph Rubber Co., 152 N. L. R. B. 496 (1965); Mitchell Standard Corp., 140 N. L. R. B. 496 (1963). Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N. L. R. B. No. 139 (1971). Emerald involved a civilian contractor who undertook to provide certain maintenance services at an Air Force base. During the preceding year, the same services had been performed by two other companies whose employees were represented by a union that had negotiated collective-bargaining agreements that had not yet expired. The employer performed the work with substantially the same employee complement as had its predecessors. The Board held that the employer had a duty to recognize and bargain with the union but could not agree with the trial examiner that the employer was bound by the provisions of the contract, emphasizing in this respect the impact of the Service Contract Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 1034. The case was considered as presenting unusual circumstances justifying an exception to the Burns rule; the Board noted that “[t]his case suggests the hazards of enforcing the contracts of one employer against a successor where annual rebidding normally produces annual changes in contractor identity. These circumstances might encourage less arm’s-length collective bargaining whenever the employer had reason to expect that it would not be awarded the next succeeding annual service contract.” An amicus strongly contends that the Emerald rule is inconsistent with Burns and is based on a misreading of the legislative history of the Service Contract Act of 1965. Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae 23 n. 2. In its entirety, the Board’s order required Burns to: “1. Cease and desist from: “(a) Refusing to bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the above-described unit. “(b) Refusing to adopt, honor and enforce its contract with the Union, as successor of Wackenhut. “(c) Assisting or recognizing AFG as the representative of its employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, unless and until said labor organization shall have been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of said employees in an appropriate unit. “(d) Interfering with representation of its employees through labor organizations of their own choosing. “(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to join or assist the Union or otherwise engage in activities protected by the Act. “2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: “(a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from AFG until or unless it is certified as bargaining representative of Respondent’s employees in an appropriate unit. “(b) Bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union and, if any understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. “(c) Honor, adopt and enforce the contract between.Respondent, as successor to Wackenhut, and the Union and give retroactive effect to all the clauses of said contract and, with interest of 6 percent, make whole its employees for any losses suffered by reason of Respondent’s refusal to honor, adopt and enforce said contract. “(d) Post at its Lockheed, Ontario, California, operations copies of the notice attached hereto as ‘Appendix.’ Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 31, shall after being signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. “(e) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Recommended Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.” “While a broader unit might have been appropriate, I find a unit of guards limited to a single facility as an appropriate unit. Here, the certification was pursuant to a consent election agreement.” Trial Examiner’s decision, App. 22.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JONES, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, v. LIBERTY GLASS CO. No. 71. Argued November 17-18, 1947. Decided December 22, 1947. Lee A. Jackson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Arnold Raum and Helen R. Carloss. Earl Foster argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Reginald S. Laughlin filed a brief as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. Our concern here is with the period of limitations applicable to the filing of claims for refund of federal income taxes. Must such claims be filed within two years after payment of the tax, as provided by § 322 (b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, or within four years after payment of the tax, as provided by § 3313 of the Code? The corporate taxpayer, respondent herein, filed its income and excess-profits tax return for 1938, a return which indicated a tax liability of $1,193.25. This sum, plus a small additional assessment, was paid in 1939. A revenue agent later investigated the taxpayer’s liability again, resulting in an additional assessment of $6,640.81. Payment of this amount was made on March 8, 1941. Over three years later, on March 30, 1944, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund of $1,053.49. It was stated that the revenue agent erroneously had failed to allow certain credits for sums used by the taxpayer in 1938 to reduce its indebtedness. Reliance was placed by the taxpayer on the four-year limitation period specified in § 3313. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected this claim, pointing out that § 3313 specifically exempts from its application income, war-profits, excess-profits, estate and gift taxes. This suit was then brought by the taxpayer in the District Court to recover the amount alleged by the refund claim to be due. That court held that § 3313 was applicable and gave judgment for the taxpayer. 66 F. Supp. 254. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed the judgment. 159 F. 2d 316. The problem being one of importance in the administration of the revenue laws, we granted certiorari. Section 322 (b) (1) is to be found in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, a subtitle dealing with those taxes over which the Tax Court has jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction includes income, excess-profits, estate and gift taxes. More specifically, § 322 (b) (1) appears under Chapter 1 of the Code, pertaining to income taxes. It is concerned with overpayments of income taxes and provides quite simply that no refund shall be allowed unless a claim for refund “is filed by the taxpayer within three years from the time the return was filed by the taxpayer or within two years from the time the tax was paid . ...” Section 3313, on the other hand, is located under Subtitle B of the Code, a subtitle devoted to miscellaneous taxes. It is in Chapter 28, which contains various provisions common to such taxes. And it is among those provisions dealing with the assessment, collection and refund of the taxes. It reads as follows: “All claims for the refunding or crediting of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty alleged to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected must, except as otherwise provided by law in the case of income, war-profits, excess-profits, estate, and gift taxes, be presented to the Commissioner within four years next after the payment of such tax, penalty, or sum. The amount of the refund (in the case of taxes other than income, war-profits, excess-profits, estate, and gift taxes) shall not exceed the portion of the tax, penalty, or sum paid during the four years immediately preceding the filing of the claim, or if no claim was filed, then during the four years immediately preceding the allowance of the refund.” The substance of § 3313 of the Code has long been a part of federal statutory law. Its ancestry can be traced back to 1872, when § 3228 of the Revised Statutes was enacted. Section 3228 established a procedure for filing claims for refund of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been “erroneously or illegally assessed or collected” and created a limitation period of two years from the time the cause of action accrued, later extended in 1921 to four years from the date of payment of the tax. But soon after the entry of the income tax into the federal scene in 1913, separate provision was made for the filing of claims for refund of income taxes “paid in excess of those properly due.” Section 14 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1916 was the first such provision and it made clear that § 3228 was inapplicable to claims of this nature. Section 252 of the Revenue Act of 1918, followed by § 252 of the 1921 Act, continued this scheme of separate treatment. These later provisions were written so as to include refund claims relating to war-profits and excess-profits taxes as well as those involving income taxes; and a limitation of five years from the date the return was due was placed on the filing of such claims. It was further specified that the procedure therein detailed was to be followed “notwithstanding the provisions” of § 3228. Section 252, as it appeared in the 1921 Act, was then changed in 1923 so as to permit claims for refund of income and profits taxes “paid in excess of that properly due” to be filed within two years after the tax was paid, in addition to the five-year period after the due date of the return. This change was made “so that the taxpayer who has, by agreement with the Treasury, permitted the time for the final assessment of the taxes due from him to be made after the expiration of the five-year period, will not be barred from making a claim for a refund when such assessment is made and the taxpayer alleges that the assessment is illegal.” Amending § 252 rather than § 3228 of the Revised Statutes to accomplish this purpose was significant. It was an unequivocal indication that § 252, in speaking of claims for refund of “excess” payments of income and profits taxes, was designed by its framers to include not only those payments growing out of errors in the preparation of returns but also those payments resulting from illegal or erroneous assessments. See Graham v. duPont, 262 U. S. 234, 258. The Revenue Act of 1924 transferred the substance of the former § 252 to a new § 281. A four-year period of limitations from the date of the payment of the tax was established, a period coinciding in length with that prescribed by § 3228. The reference to the type of payments involved was recast; in place of speaking of payments “in excess of that properly due,” § 281 used the simple term “overpayment.” And instead of stating in § 281 that its provisions should apply “notwithstanding the provisions” of § 3228 of the Revised Statutes, § 3228 itself was amended to make it applicable to all claims for the refunding or crediting of any internal revenue tax “except as provided in section 281 of the Revenue Act of 1924.” This placing of an exceptive clause in § 3228 was done “to remove the doubt which now exists as to whether or not the provisions of section 3228, Revised Statutes, apply in any event to income taxes.” In other words, the statutory drafters intended to make certain that § 3228 was in no event to apply to income tax refund claims. Such claims were to be governed exclusively by § 281. The essence of § 281 of the 1924 Act has been carried through to the present § 322 of the Internal Revenue Code. The only significant change in the interval, for our purposes, was a reduction in the period of limitations, as measured from the payment of the tax, from four years to three years and finally to two years. And § 3228 of the Revised Statutes, as amended to state that it applies “except as otherwise provided by law in the case of income, war-profits, excess-profits, estate, and gift taxes,” has become the current § 3313 of the Code. With this background in mind, we find the pattern of limitation periods for tax refund claims to be clear. Section 3313 of the Code establishes a four-year period for all internal revenue taxes, except as otherwise provided by law in the case of specified taxes. Among the latter is the income tax, as to which § 322 (b) (1) makes provision “otherwise” by requiring that refund claims be presented within two years of payment or within three years from the filing of the return. Provisions are also made “otherwise” in the case of the estate tax (§ 910 of the Code) and the gift tax (§ 1027 of the Code). The argument is made, however, that § 322 (b) (1) deals only with income tax “overpayments” and not with income taxes “erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” Overpayments are said to refer solely to excess payments resulting from errors by taxpayers in the preparation of their returns or in related activities, while erroneous or illegal assessments and collections are claimed to relate to various kinds of errors on the part of revenue agents. Since there is no provision “otherwise” for income tax refund claims involving the latter type of errors, the conclusion is reached that the four-year limitation period of § 3313 remains applicable. We cannot agree. In the absence of some contrary indication, we must assume that the framers of these statutory provisions intended to convey the ordinary meaning which is attached to the language they used. See Rosenman v. United States, 323 U. S. 658, 661. Hence we read the word “overpayment” in its usual sense, as meaning any payment in excess of that which is properly due. Such an excess payment may be traced to an error in mathematics or in judgment or in interpretation of facts or law. And the error may be committed by the taxpayer or by the revenue agents. Whatever the reason, the payment of more than is rightfully due is what characterizes an overpayment. That this ordinary meaning is the one intended by the authors of § 322 (b) (1) is quite evident from the legislative history which we have detailed. The word “overpayment” first appeared in § 281 of the 1924 Revenue Act, one of the direct ancestors of § 322 (b) (1). The word was there used as a substitute for the previous reference to payments “in excess of that properly due,” a phrase that is a perfect definition of an overpayment and that is not necessarily confined to overpayments occasioned by errors made by taxpayers. The immediate predecessor of § 281 had employed that phrase and had been enacted in 1923 with the expressed intention of including claims growing out of illegal assessments. There was not the slightest indication that the substitution of the word “overpayment” was designed to narrow the scope of § 281. It apparently was a mere simplification in phraseology. But it does make clear the sense in which the word was first used in this context. The generic character of the word was emphasized from the start. And we see no basis for making it over into a word of art at this late date. The legislative history further reveals a consistent intention to make a separate and complete limitation provision for income tax refund claims, whatever might be the underlying basis of the claims. Section 322 and its predecessors were devised in order to provide such an exclusive scheme. Claims relating to the income tax have at all times been explicitly excluded from § 3313. This arrangement is but part of the general plan evident in the Internal Revenue Code of providing separate treatment for the income, profits, estate and gift taxes, as distinct from the miscellaneous taxes and the excise, import and temporary taxes. We would be doing unwarranted violence to this clear demarcation were we to read the word “overpayment” so as to place certain types of income tax refund claims within the scope of § 3313, a section that has always been divorced from the income tax portion of the revenue laws. It is pointed out, however, that various lower federal courts, beginning in 1939, have reached a contrary result. They have held that § 3313 rather than § 322 (b) (1) governs refund claims for income taxes alleged to have been “erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” Since Congress has subsequently convened from time to time and has amended § 322 in other respects without expressly disapproving this interpretation, the contention is advanced that legislative acquiescence in the interpretation must be assumed. But the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is at best only an auxiliary tool for use in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions. See Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U. S. 428, 432. Here the language and the purpose of Congress seem clear to us. The arrangement whereby all income tax refund claims are to be governed by what is now § 322 (b) (1) was established in an unmistakable manner nearly a quarter of a century ago, an arrangement that has been continued through various reenactments and changes in the revenue laws. And that arrangement has been consistently recognized and followed by the Treasury Department. Under those circumstances, it would take more than legislative silence in the face of rather recent contrary decisions by lower federal courts to overcome the factors upon which we have placed reliance. Cf. Electric Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U. S. 5, 14; Missouri v. Ross, 299 U. S. 72, 75; United States v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 298 U. S. 492, 500. We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation. In short, the original legislative language speaks louder than such judicial action. We accordingly conclude that all income tax refund claims, whatever the reasons giving rise to the claims, must be filed within three years from the time the return was filed or within two years from the time the tax was paid, as provided in § 322 (b) (1). The four-year period prescribed by § 3313 is inapplicable to such claims. Since respondent filed its income tax refund claim more than three years after filing the return and more than two years after payment of the tax, its claim was out of time. That is true even though the claim arose out of an income tax alleged to have been “erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.” Reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. The return in this case was filed in June, 1939. Since the claim was filed on March 30, 1944, no contention could be made that it was within the three-year period from the date the return was filed. Section 3228 was in the nature of a revision of § 44 of the Act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. 230, 257. Revenue Act of 1921, § 1316, 42 Stat. 227, 314. 39 Stat. 756, 772. This provided that the claim for refund might be presented “notwithstanding the provisions of section thirty-two hundred and twenty-eight of the Revised Statutes.” 40 Stat. 1057,1085. 42 Stat. 227,268. Act of March 4, 1923, 42 Stat. 1504, 1505. In amending § 252, the Act of March 4, 1923, made mention of refunds of income taxes to withholding agents which might be made under the provisions of “section 3228 of the Revised Statutes.” This was an obvious reference to the practice of the Treasury Department, admitted to be of “very doubtful legality,” H. R. Rep. No. 1424, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., p. 2, of allowing a taxpayer who had permitted an additional assessment after the five-year period from the due date of the return (specified by § 252 of the 1921 Act) to file a claim for refund within four years after payment of the tax (pursuant to § 3228), even though the five-year period had elapsed. The Treasury had instituted this practice to prevent inequities which might otherwise ensue to such taxpayers, but it was without legislative sanction. It was to take care of the taxpayers who had taken advantage of the Treasury practice that the reference in question in the Act of March 4, 1923, was made. As to claims pending on March 4, 1923, which were timely filed under § 3228, but not timely under § 252, refunds to withholding agents were necessarily to be made under § 3228. This provision was not repeated in subsequent legislation and it was not indicative of a legislative intent to permit income tax refund claims to be governed by § 3228 in the future. Emphasis added. H. R. Rep. No. 1424, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., p. 2; S. Rep. No. 1137, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., p. 2. 43 Stat. 253, 301. The Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 296, also created a new § 272, dealing with “overpayments” of income tax installments. This spoke of overpayments in the sense of payments of “more than the amount determined to be the correct amount of such installment.” This provision now exists as § 321 of the Internal Revenue Code. 43 Stat. 253,342. H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 71; S. Rep. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 44. This quotation was taken verbatim by the congressional committees from the statement of A. W. Gregg of the Treasury Department, Statement of the Changes Made in the Revenue Act of 1921 by H. R. 6715 and the Reasons Therefor, Senate Committee Print, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., March 6, 1924, p. 37. See Revenue Act of 1926, § 284, 44 Stat. 9, 66; Revenue Act of 1928, §322, 45 Stat. 791, 861; Revenue Act of 1932, §322, 47 Stat. 169, 242; Revenue Act of 1934, § 322, 48 Stat. 680, 750. Section 272 of the 1924 Act (now § 321 of the Code) referred to “overpayments” of income tax installments as payments of “more than the amount determined to be the correct amount of such installment.” See note 10, supra. Such a definition admits of no distinction between errors by the taxpayer and errors by the revenue agents. Reference should also be made to the second sentence of § 3313, providing that the amount of refund may not exceed the amount of tax paid during the four-year period. There is a parenthetical phrase in this sentence which specifically excludes income, war-profits, excess-profits, estate and gift taxes. If the first sentence of § 3313, establishing the four-year limitation period, applied to income tax refund claims arising out of illegal assessments, there would be no limit on the amount of refund by reason of this second sentence. Such a result is without support in the purpose or history of the provisions dealing with these refund claims. Huntley v. Southern Oregon Sales, 102 F. 2d 538, was the first case so holding. Subsequent decisions of the same tenor have relied in large part upon the Huntley case. Olsen v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 276; United States v. Lederer Terminal W. Co., 139 F. 2d 679; In re Tindle’s Estate, 59 F. Supp. 667, affirmed per curiam sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives v. United States, 152 F. 2d 757; Godfrey v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 240; Noble v. Kavanagh, 66 F. Supp. 258, affirmed per curiam, 160 F. 2d 104; Sbarbaro v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 213. See also Fawcett v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 742. Compare Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 920. In many cases, however, the applicability of § 322 (b) (1) to claims of the type here involved was assumed without question and without an explicit holding on the point. See, for example, United States v. Garbutt Oil Co., 302 U. S. 528. See I. T. 1447, I-2 Cum. Bull. 220 (1922); T. D. 3457, II-1 Cum. Bull. 177 (1923) and T. D. 3462, amending Regulations 62, II—1 Cum. Bull. 180 (1923); S. M. 1712, III-1 Cum. Bull. 345 (1924); S. M. 2293, III—2 Cum. Bull. 310 (1924); G. C. M. 3152, VII-1 Cum. Bull. 153 (1928); G. C. M. 13759, XIII-2 Cum. Bull. 102 (1934); Mim. 4814, 1938-2 Cum. Bull. 96; I. T. 3483, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 397. The present Treasury viewpoint is codified in Treasury Regulations 111, promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code, §29.322-3 and § 29.322-7. See also Treasury Regulations 103, promulgated under the Code, § 19.322-3 and § 19.322-7, as amended by T. D. 5256, 1943 Cum.-Bull. 550; and Treasury Regulations 101, promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1938, Articles 322-3 and 322-7.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BROCK, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. PIERCE COUNTY No. 85-385. Argued April 1, 1986 Decided May 19, 1986 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Allen H. Feldman, Mary-Helen Mautner, and Steven J. Mandel. Joseph F. Quinn argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William H. Griffies. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe by Jeanne S. Whiteing; for the county of Oakland by Charles G. Preston; for the city of Detroit by David H. Fink and Martin A. Scott; for the city of Chicago by James D. Montgomery, Mary K. Rochford, and Maureen Jeannette Kelly; and for the National Association of Counties et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and James L. Feldesman. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 106(b) of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 92 Stat. 1926, 29 U. S. C. § 816(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V), provides that the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) “shall” issue a final determination as to the misuse of CETA funds by a grant recipient within 120 days after receiving a complaint alleging such misuse. The question presented in this case is whether the Secretary loses the power to recover misused CETA funds after that 120-day period has expired. I Before its repeal in 1982, CETA provided for grants of federal funds to certain qualified entities known as “prime sponsors,” principally state and local governments, for programs “providing] job training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed, or underemployed persons,” 29 U. S. C. §801 (1976 ed., Supp. V). The statute contains detailed requirements concerning the operation of a CETA program and the training, pay, and terms of employment of participants in a program, see § § 823-827. A prime sponsor must submit to the Secretary a plan detailing the operation of the proposed program and containing assurances that the program will comply with the statute and with the Secretary’s regulations, § 813. CETA grants the Secretary broad authority to ensure that CETA funds are used in accordance with the statute and regulations. The Secretary may audit a grant recipient, and in connection with such an audit may inspect records, question employees, and enter any premises upon which the program is conducted. § 835(a)(2). Any interested person, such as a participating employee, may file a complaint with the Secretary alleging that a grant recipient is failing to comply with the applicable standards. § 816. Section 106(b), 29 U. S. C. § 816(b), which is the provision at issue in this lawsuit, requires that whenever the Secretary has reason to believe, through a complaint, an audit, or otherwise, that any grant recipient is misusing CETA funds or violating any statutory or regulatory standards, the Secretary “shall investigate the matter.” The same section goes on to require that the Secretary “shall” determine “the truth of the allegation or belief involved, not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint.” II Respondent is a county in the State of Washington that received CETA funds from 1974 through 1977 pursuant to two separate grants. On September 19, 1978, the Labor Department’s Office of Special Investigations filed an audit report concerning respondent’s first grant. That Department’s Grant Officer issued a final determination on February 13, 1981, disallowing approximately $110,000 in costs incurred by respondent on the grounds that those costs related to employees who were not eligible to participate in a CETA program. On December 11, 1978, the Department’s Office of the Inspector General filed an audit report with respect to the second grant, again raising questions concerning ineligible participants. On April 22, 1981, the Grant Officer issued a final determination which he corrected on May 22, 1981, finally disallowing $373,000 in costs arising out of the second grant. Respondent sought review of both final determinations before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Labor Department. The ALJ disallowed the smaller sums of $108,000 and $265,000, respectively, in the two cases. In both cases, respondent argued that the Secretary could not order respondent to repay these sums because the Grant Officer’s final determination had been issued considerably more than 120 days after submission of the initial audit report. While conceding that the Secretary did not lose jurisdiction to make a determination after 120 days had passed, respondent argued that it had suffered prejudice because of the lengthy delay. The ALJ rejected this claim in both cases, finding no specific instances of prejudice. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Pierce County v. United States, By and Through Dept. of Labor, 759 F. 2d 1398 (1985). That court had previously decided, in City of Edmonds v. United States Dept. of Labor, 749 F. 2d 1419 (1985), that Congress, in enacting § 106(b), had intended to prevent the Secretary from acting on a complaint unless the Secretary’s final determination was issued within 120 days from his receipt of the complaint. In the present case, the Court of Appeals decided that the statutory command to the Secretary to issue a final determination “not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint” also required the Secretary to make a determination within 120 days when the allegation or belief is a result of the Secretary’s own audit rather than a third-party complaint. This decision conflicts with decisions of the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474 U. S. 944 (1985), and we now reverse. Ill As Judge Friendly noted in a case raising the identical issue, the proposition that Congress intended the Secretary to lose the authority to recover misspent funds 120 days after learning of the misuse “is not, to say the least, of the sort that commands instant assent.” St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York v. Brock, 769 F. 2d 37, 41 (CA2 1985) (footnote omitted), cert, pending, No. 85-949. We must therefore examine carefully the statutory language and legislative history to determine whether Congress did indeed desire this somewhat incongruous result. A The Ninth Circuit held that the plain meaning of the statutory command that the Secretary “shall” take action within 120 days was sufficient to demonstrate that Congress meant to bar further action after that period had expired. City of Edmonds, 749 F. 2d, at 1421. Noting that “[statutory language is generally construed according to the plain meaning of the words used by Congress ‘absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary/” ibid, (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980)), and finding no such contrary legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit held that the 120-day limit was jurisdictional. The Secretary, however, notes that while § 106(b) speaks in mandatory language, it nowhere specifies the consequences of a failure to make a final determination within 120 days. The Secretary relies on a line of precedent in the Courts of Appeals to the effect that Government agencies do not lose jurisdiction for failure to comply with statutory time limits unless the statute “‘both expressly requires an agency or public official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provision.’” St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, supra, at 41 (quoting Fort Worth National Corp. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F. 2d 47, 58 (CA5 1972)). Having specified no consequences for the failure to make the determination required by § 106(b) within 120 days, the Secretary argues, the courts should not impute to Congress the desire to remedy such a failure by preventing the Secretary from protecting both the public fisc and the integrity of a Government program. This Court has never expressly adopted the Circuit precedent upon which the Secretary relies. However, our decisions supply at least the underpinnings of those precedents. This Court has frequently articulated the “great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided.” United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 118 U. S. 120, 125 (1886). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126 (1938); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 515 (1893). We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake. When, as here, there are less drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its power to act. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Fort Worth National line of precedent as being inconsistent with this Court’s decision in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807 (1980). In Mohasco, we held that an action filed by a private plaintiff after the expiration of the 300-day time period provided in § 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(e), was jurisdictionally barred. In so holding, we gave controlling weight to the literal meaning of the statutory provisions, which stated that “a charge under this section shall be filed” within the specified time limits. See 447 U. S., at 815-817. However, there are two clear differences between the present case and Mohasco. First, legislatures routinely create statutes of limitations for the. filing of complaints, and Congress’ intention to create a statute of limitations in § 706(e) was certainly unexceptional. Indeed, the plaintiff in Mohasco nowhere alleged that § 706(e) was not a statute of limitations, but rather contended that the word “filed” should be defined in a way that would render his action timely. 447 U. S., at 818. Section 106(b), by contrast, does not merely command the Secretary to file a complaint within a specified time, but requires him to resolve the entire dispute within that time. This is a more substantial task than filing a complaint, and the Secretary’s ability to complete it within 120 days is subject to factors beyond his control. There is less reason, therefore, to believe that Congress intended such drastic consequences to follow from the Secretary’s failure to meet the 120-day deadline. Second, Mohasco involved a private right of action, and the plaintiff’s failure to file a complaint prejudiced only that plaintiff. In the present case, by contrast, public rights are at stake, and the Secretary’s delay, under respondent’s theory, would prejudice the rights of the taxpaying public. Respondent suggests that statutes setting deadlines for agency action should be interpreted to permit the agency to proceed after the deadline has expired only when agency inaction would prejudice a private citizen seeking some sort of redress. When, as in this case, agency inaction will injure only the Federal Treasury, courts should read a command like that of § 106(b) as a statute of limitations or jurisdictional bar. We disagree with this argument for two reasons. First, the protection of the public fisc is a matter that is of interest to every citizen, and we have no evidence that Congress wanted to permit the Secretary’s inaction to harm that interest any more than it would permit such inaction to injure an individual claimant. Second, the 120-day deadline clearly applies to investigations triggered by private complaints alleging that the individual complainant, perhaps a program participant or subcontractor, has been injured by a grant recipient’s failure to comply with CETA’s requirements. Indeed, the federal courts have uniformly held that the statutory complaint mechanism is the sole means of redress for a private party injured by a grant recipient’s violation of CETA. Thus, even under respondent’s theory, § 106(b) cannot be jurisdictional, because it would then permit the Secretary’s inaction to prejudice individual complainants seeking to enforce their rights under CETA. We hold, therefore, that the mere use of the word “shall” in § 106(b), standing alone, is not enough to remove the Secretary’s power to act after 120 days. B Looking to other sources of congressional intent, we have found nothing in the history of the 1978 amendments to CETA, which added the 120-day deadline, to suggest that Congress intended to impose a jurisdictional limitation on agency action. The only explicit discussion of the jurisdictional effect of the 120-day provision was a brief colloquy on the House floor between Representative Hawkins, one of the bill’s sponsors, and Representative Obey, who offered the amendment that added the 120-day deadline: “Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Chairman, we have seen the amendment. We accept the amendment. “If the gentleman would further yield, do I understand . . . that if the determination is not made in a specified time it shall not affect the Secretary’s jurisdiction in the matter? “Mr. OBEY. That is correct. “Mr. HAWKINS. With that understanding we do accept the amendment.” 124 Cong. Rec. 25230-25231 (1978). Such statements by individual legislators should not be given controlling effect, but when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history, they provide evidence of Congress’ intent. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555, 567 (1984). In this case, the legislative history fully supports Representative Hawkins’ interpretation of § 106(b). One of the principal concerns underlying the 1978 amendments was the growing incidence of fraud and misuse of CETA funds by state and local governments. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1124, pp. 3, 5, 13 (1978) (noting “widespread concern that there has been substantial fraud and abuse in the CETA program and insufficient staff devoted to monitoring and supervising the program”); S. Rep. No. 95-891, pp. 42-44 (1978). A primary purpose of the amendments was to strengthen the Secretary’s hand in dealing with illegal practices. Thus the amendments contained numerous anti-fraud measures, including a provision for criminal sanctions, 18 U. S. C. § 665(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V), bonding requirements for grant recipients, 29 U. S. C. § 836, and authorization for the Secretary to terminate or suspend funding or to take other corrective measures, §816. In a separate bill, Congress created an Office of the Inspector General in the Labor Department. See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (now codified as amended at 5 U. S. C. App. §§ 1-12. The Conference Report for the 1978 CETA amendments made it clear that Congress expected the Secretary “to provide, within the new Office of Inspector General, for a unit whose sole responsibility will be that of monitoring the CETA program.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1765, p. 123 (1978). Congress was particularly concerned about the ability of program participants such as contractors, subgrantees, and employees to voice grievances and receive a prompt resolution. See St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York v. Brock, 769 F. 2d, at 43 (citing House and Senate hearings on 1978 amendments). The Senate noted that “[i]n some cases grievances have been either ignored, or there has been interminable delay in their resolution.” S. Rep. No. 95-891, supra, at 42. In response to this problem, Congress required, in § 106(a), that each prime sponsor establish a grievance procedure that would provide for hearings and require a decision within 60 days after the filing of the grievance. After exhausting the prime sponsor’s grievance machinery, an interested party could, pursuant to § 106(b), file a complaint with the Secretary. The legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended the 120-day deadline of § 106(b) to assure program participants the opportunity for a prompt resolution of grievances. Senate Report No. 95-891, supra, at 16, for example, states: “A party who wishes to appeal to the Secretary either the formal or the informal decision of the prime sponsor has the right to a due process hearing and a determination on the merits of the case within 120 days.” Conspicuously absent is any reference to the possibility that the 120-day provision might convey rights upon the prime sponsor. There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress was concerned that the Secretary was treating prime sponsors too harshly; to the contrary, the House and Senate Reports consistently voice Congress’ belief that the Secretary had not been aggressive enough in discovering and rectifying abuses. The 120-day provision was clearly intended to spur the Secretary to action, not to limit the scope of his authority. Congress intended that “the Secretary should have maximum authority to protect the integrity of the program.” S. Rep. No. 95-891, supra, at 21. It would be very odd if Congress had implemented that intent by cutting off the Secretary’s authority to correct abuses just 120 days after learning of them. C Respondent provides additional arguments, which we find unpersuasive, in support of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Respondent contends that even if the statute does not establish a jurisdictional bar to the Secretary’s recovery of funds, the Secretary’s own regulations do so. The Secretary’s regulations, however, merely provide a timetable for the resolution of complaints and audits. See n. 3, supra. While they arguably go beyond the statute in applying the 120-day limit to investigations triggered by audits as well as those triggered by complaints, they do not specify any consequences of a failure to meet that deadline in the event of either an audit or a complaint. Thus, even if it were possible for the Secretary to create a jurisdictional limitation not contained in the statute, the language of the regulations cannot support respondent’s contention that the 120-day provision is jurisdictional with respect to audits. Respondent urges, if we do not find § 106(b) to affect the Secretary’s jurisdiction, that we treat it like a statute of limitations that can vary depending on the complexity of the dispute or the culpability of the grant recipient. There is simply no authority in the statute or legislative history for the courts to create such a remedy. The balancing of interests that respondent proposes is a task for Congress. IV We hold that CETA’s requirement that the Secretary “shall” take action within 120 days does not, standing alone, divest the Secretary of jurisdiction to act after that time. There is simply no indication in the statute or its legislative history that Congress intended to remove the Secretary’s enforcement powers if he fails to issue a final determination on a complaint or audit within 120 days. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Effective October 13, 1982, CETA was replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1324 (now codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1501 et seq. (1982 ed., and Supp. II)). Hereafter all citations to Title 29 of the United States Code will be to Supplement V of the 1976 edition, unless otherwise specified. The Secretary has promulgated regulations implementing § 106(b). See 20 CFR §§ 676.86, 676.88 (1982). Those regulations provide that a Labor Department Grant Officer shall receive the complaint or audit report and conduct the investigation. §§ 676.86(c), (d), (e). The Grant Officer then makes an initial determination of the truth of the allegation or belief, § 676.88(a). The Grant Officer must provide the recipient with an opportunity to resolve informally the matters contained in the initial determination, § 676.88(d), and if such informal resolution fails, the Grant Officer issues a final determination, § 676.88(e). The regulations provide that the Grant Officer’s final determination shall be the “final determination” required of the Secretary by § 106(b), even though that determination is subject to further review by an administrative law judge and the Secretary. § 676.86(a). Respondent does not contest the Secretary’s interpretation of § 106(b)’s “final determination” requirement. In the present case both the Grant Officer’s final determination and the Secretary’s final action took place after the 120-day deadline had expired. Because § 106(b) states that the deadline for the Secretary’s final determination is “120 days after receiving the complaint,” the Secretary argued before the Ninth Circuit that the deadline applies only to investigations triggered by third-party complaints, and not those triggered by the Secretary’s own audit. This reading, in the Secretary’s view, also comports with the statutory purpose of protecting program participants and other interested parties who may be injured by a prime sponsor’s misuse of funds. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, in part because the Secretary’s own regulations establish a 120-day deadline for issuing determinations after an internal audit, see 20 CFR § 676.88(e) (1982). While the Secretary contends that those regulations simply constitute a self-imposed deadline, he does not challenge this aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. We therefore assume without deciding that the 120-day deadline was intended to apply to audit investigations. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, New York v. Brock, 769 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-949; Milwaukee County v. Donovan, 771 F. 2d 983 (CA7 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1109; City of St. Louis v. United States Dept. of Labor, 787 F. 2d 342 (CA8 1986); but see Lehigh Valley Manpower Program v. Donovan, 718 F. 2d 99 (CA3 1983) (failure to comply with 120-day provision bars recovery of misspent funds). See also National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 233 U. S. App. D. C. 44, 57, n. 23, 724 F. 2d 176, 189, n. 23 (1983) (requirement in 17 U. S. C. § 804(e) that tribunal “shall” render decision within one year does not make later decision void); Marshall v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 618 F. 2d 1220, 1224-1225 (CA7 1980) (failure to meet requirement in 29 U. S. C. § 660(e)(3) that Secretary of Labor “shall” make determination on employee’s complaint within 90 days does not bar subsequent enforcement action); Marshall v. Local Union 1374, Int’l Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 558 F. 2d 1354 (CA9 1977) (requirement of 29 U. S. C. § 482(b) that Secretary of Labor “shall” bring suit within 60 days of receiving complaint does not bar later suit). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§701-706, entitles any person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action” to judicial review, § 702, unless the relevant statute precludes judicial review or “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,” § 701(a)(2). Clearly the statutory command that the Secretary “shall” act within 120 days does not commit such action to the Secretary’s discretion. Moreover, nothing in CETA appears to bar an action to enforce the 120-day deadline. Cf. CETA Workers Organizing Comm. v. City of New York, 617 F. 2d 926, 934-936 (CA2 1980) (APA may not be used to circumvent § 106(b) complaint mechanism). Thus, it would appear that a complainant adversely affected by the Secretary’s failure to act on a complaint could bring an action in the district court. The court would have the authority to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” § 706(1). If respondent is correct in arguing that Congress, in enacting § 106(b), intended to protect grant recipients from lengthy delays in audits, grant recipients such as respondent would be within the zone of interests protected by § 106(b), and would therefore have standing to bring an action under the APA to the same extent as a complainant. Cf. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970). On the other hand, were § 106(b) intended only to protect complainants, there would be no need to provide grant recipients with any remedy at all — much less the drastic remedy respondent seeks in this case — for the Secretary’s failure to meet the 120-day deadline. See Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 94, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. City of New York, 676 F. 2d 20 (CA2 1982); Kolman v. Milwaukee Area Technical College, 548 F. Supp. 684 (ED Wis. 1982). We need not, and do not, hold that a statutory deadline for agency action can never bar later action unless that consequence is stated explicitly in the statute. In this case, we need not go beyond the normal indicia of congressional intent to conclude that §. 106(b) permits the Secretary to recover misspent funds after the 120-day deadline has expired.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ORVIS et al. v. BROWNELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUCCESSOR TO THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN. No. 404. Argued February 4, 1953. Decided March 16, 1953. Donald Marks argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. James L. Morrisson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, Assistant Attorney General Kirks, James D. Hill and George B. Searls. Briefs of amici curiae supporting petitioners were filed by Joseph M. Cohen for Zittman; and Henry I. Fillman for McCarthy. Me. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit, under § 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, asks a decree that petitioners have an interest in vested property of Japanese nationals in the hands of the Alien Property Custodian, that he holds the property subject to petitioners’ attachment lien and must satisfy their judgment. The controlling facts are not in controversy. The Japanese nationals involved were indebted to petitioners, while a third party, Anderson, Clayton & Co., was indebted to those Japanese. On June 14, 1941, Executive Order No. 8389 became effective as to Japan, and it blocked all transfers of evidences of debt or interests in property of Japanese citizens. Thereafter, petitioners commenced suit against the Japanese debtors in a New York state court and, without obtaining a license therefor, attached the Anderson, Clayton & Co. credit on June 25, 1943. Judgment was obtained, whereupon petitioners applied for a federal license to permit Anderson, Clayton & Co. to pay it. The application was refused. Meanwhile, on June 27,1947, the Custodian vested the Anderson, Clayton & Co. credit by a res vesting order and it was paid over to the Custodian. Petitioners filed notice of their present claim under § 9 (a) of the Act for return of an interest in vested property, which was treated as another application for a retroactive license. The claim was dismissed insofar as it was a claim under § 9 (a), based on interest in property, but was left and still is pending as a claim for payment of a debt under § 34 of the Act. The difference between what was denied and what was left pending is important, for if the attachment and judgment create an interest in the property which can be retrieved from the Custodian under § 9 (a), the judgment will be paid in full. On the other hand, if it is only an allowable debt under § 34, unless granted a priority it apparently will be paid only in part, since it appears that claims against the Japanese nationals considerably exceed the funds in the Custodian’s hands. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court granted petitioners’ motion and denied that of the respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted certiorari. The petitioning judgment creditors here are in the same position as were those in the declaratory judgment action of Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 446, in that they have judgments and attachment liens valid under New York law as against their enemy national debtors and as against those whose credits were attached. In the first Zittman case, we held that the executive freezing order did not prevent such an attachment from creating rights between the judgment creditor and the enemy debtor whom the Custodian had elected to succeed. In the second Zittman case, however, we held that where the Custodian elected to vest the res for administration purposes he was entitled to possession, even as against such an attaching creditor whose lien would have been valid under New York law. We are now called upon to decide a question not presented by these earlier cases: whether the freezing order prevented a creditor from thereafter acquiring by attachment an “interest, right, or title” in property such as will support a claim against the Custodian under § 9 (a) of the Act. We hold that the freezing order did have such an effect and that, while it recognized attachment liens insofar as they determined relationships between creditor and enemy debtor, it did not permit the transfer of a property interest in the blocked funds which could be asserted against the Custodian. The order forbids “transfers of credit” and “transfers of any evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property,” and General Ruling No. 12 specifies that this prohibition extends to the creation of a lien. Admittedly, if the Japanese had made a voluntary unlicensed assignment, it could have created no property interest. Admittedly also, if Anderson, Clayton & Co., with or without the consent of its Japanese creditors but without federal license, had paid over the fund to these petitioners, they would obtain no such interest. We cannot doubt that these administrative interpretations apply to the present transaction and that the general assent by the Government to state attachment procedures which we recited in the Zittman opinion did not extend so far as to recognize them as effecting a transfer. To so interpret it would ignore the express conditions on which the consent was extended. Realistically, these reservations deprive the assent of much substance; but that should have been apparent on its face to those who chose to litigate. The opportunity to settle their accounts with the enemy debtor was all that the permission to attach granted. Petitioners challenge the statutory authorization for such an order. It is argued that the sole purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act was to prevent transfers under duress of funds credited to residents of occupied countries. Though this was one of the aims of the Act, its language extends the authorization much farther. The validity of the freezing order as an implementation of the Trading with the Enemy Act was sustained in Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, and we adhere to that holding. Petitioners also contend that the Custodian was not given power, similar to that of a bankruptcy court, to “annul” liens and attachments. But the question is not whether a lien, concededly valid because obtained prior to the freezing order, may be “annulled” by the Custodian, but rather whether the freezing order prevented the subsequent acquisition, by attachment, of such a property interest as the Custodian would have to recognize under § 9 of the Act. Because of the supremacy of the Federal Government on matters within its competence, the freezing order, while permitting an attachment for jurisdictional and other state law purposes, prevented the subsequent acquisition of a lien which would bind the Custodian under § 9. Section 34 of the Act provides liquidation procedures by which debt claims may be allowed and priorities established. The petitioners’ claim is pending for that purpose. Judicial review is provided. It would be premature to decide how the Custodian must treat this claim in a general accounting and settlement of his trust, since this proceeding seeks only to forestall such settlement of this claim. The parties are in disagreement as to the course pursued by the Custodian in allowing payment of attachment creditors. In view of the statutory mandate that the assets shall be “equitably applied by the Custodian in accordance with the provisions of this section,” each case, to some extent, may rest on its own facts. We do not find it either necessary or possible to inquire whether other similar claims have been allowed on the grounds mentioned in § 9, and, if so, whether they were properly allowed by the Custodian. Petitioners by their unlicensed attachment could obtain no “interest, right, or title” in this fund recoverable against the Custodian. He may proceed to administer the vested assets according to § 34 of the Act and to consider petitioners’ claim and its status thereunder, subject to the review therein provided. The suit under § 9 (a), however, must fail. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 50 U. S. C. App. § 9 (a): “Any person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right, or title in any money or other property which may have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian or seized by him hereunder and held by him or by the Treasurer of the United States . . . may file with the said custodian a notice of his claim under oath and in such form and containing such particulars as the said custodian shall require; and the President, if application is made therefor by the claimant, may order the payment ... or delivery to said claimant of the money or other property so held by the Alien Property Custodian ... or of the interest therein to which the President shall determine said claimant is entitled .... If the President shall not so order within sixty days after the filing of such application or if the claimant shall have filed the notice as above required and shall have made no application to the President, said claimant may institute a suit in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States for the district in which such claimant resides ... to establish the interest, right, title, or debt so claimed, and if so established the court shall order the payment ... or delivery to said claimant of the money or other property so held by the Alien Property Custodian . . . .” 198 F. 2d 708. 344 U. S. 902. Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400, as amended by Executive Order No. 8785, June 14, 1941, 6 Fed. Reg. 2897: “. . . All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of . . . licenses, . . . if . . . such transactions involve property in which any foreign country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since the effective date of this Order had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect: . . . E. All transfers, withdrawals or exportations of, or dealings in, any evidences of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property by any person within the United States . . . .” General Ruling No. 12, April 21, 1942, § 131.12 (e) (1), 7 Fed. Reg. 2991: “The term ‘transfer’ shall mean any actual or purported act or transaction, . . . and without limitation upon the foregoing shall include . . . the creation or transfer of any lien . . . .” 50 U. S. C. App. § 5 (b) (B): “. . . [T]he President may ... investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest . . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WARREN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al. No. 76-489. Decided February 22, 1977 Per Curiam. The motion of Eddie Thomas et al. for leave to file a brief, as amici curiae, is granted. In November 1970, the Board of Supervisors of Warren County, Miss., submitted a county redistricting plan to the Attorney General for his approval under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The new plan was to replace a plan in effect since 1929. After requesting and receiving additional information, the Attorney General entered an objection to the plan. Despite this objection, the Board held elections in 1971 pursuant to the 1970 plan. After the elections, the Board sought reconsideration of the objection. The Attorney General refused to withdraw the objection and in 1973 .filed a complaint, pursuant to § 5, in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint alleged that the Attorney General’s objection to the 1970 redistricting plan rendered that plan unenforceable under § 5, and that the election districts in effect prior to the 1970 redistricting were malapportioned under the Fourteenth Amendment. Three forms of relief were requested: (1) a declaration that implementation of the 1970 plan violated § 5; (2) an injunction against implementing the 1970 plan or any other new plan until there had been compliance with one of the two procedures required by § 5; and (3) an order that a new redistricting plan be developed and implemented after being found acceptable under § 5. A properly convened three-judge court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. In its later order implementing that judgment, the court found that because the upcoming 1975 County elections could not be held as scheduled “without abridging rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution,” the elections had to be stayed subject to compliance with the procedure set out in the court’s order. The order provided that the County submit a redistricting plan to the Attorney General for § 5 review and, if no objection were interposed, that elections then be held in accordance with a stipulated schedule. In the event that the County submitted no plan by a stated deadline, or that the Attorney General objected to a submitted plan, or that a submitted plan contained infirmities with respect to the one-person-one-vote requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court would consider plans prepared by both parties and adopt an appropriate redistricting plan to be used in elections held according to the ordered schedule. The County then informally submitted two plans to the Attorney General for comment and the Attorney General indicated his reservations concerning the validity of the plans. This impasse continued until the deadline in the court’s order, after which time the court directed the parties to file their proposed plans for its consideration. After a hearing, the court adopted one of the plans prepared by the County despite the fact that the plan had not been approved pursuant to § 5 procedures. The court found that the adopted plan “neither ■ dilutes black voting strength nor is deficient in one-man, one-vote considerations.” It ordered that the county’s districts be reorganized according to the plan and that elections be held. The United States appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U. S. C. § 1973c and 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Section 5 provides for two alternative methods by which a State or political subdivision covered by the Act may satisfy the requirement of federal scrutiny of changes in voting procedures. First, the State or political subdivision may institute an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the proposed change does not have the purpose or effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race; second, it may submit the proposed change to the Attorney General. No new voting practice or procedure may.be enforced unless the State or political subdivision has succeeded in its declaratory judgment action or the Attorney General has declined to object to a proposal submitted to him. See n. 1, supra. Attempts to enforce changes that have not been subjected to § 5 scrutiny may be enjoined by any three-judge district court in a suit brought by a voter, Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 554-563 (1969), or by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States, Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§12 (d), (f), 42 U. S. C. §§ 1973j (d), (f). In Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), this Court held that the separate procedures of § 5 imposed a limitation on the determinations that may be made by district courts entertaining actions brought to enjoin § 5 violations: “What is foreclosed to such district court is what Congress expressly reserved for consideration by the District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General — the determination whether a covered change does or does not have the purpose or effect 'of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color/ ” 400 U. S., at 385. Adhering to Allen, the Court held that the inquiry of a local district court in a § 5 action against a State or political subdivision is “limited to the determination whether 'a [voting] requirement is covered by § 5, but has not been subjected to the required federal scrutiny.’ ” 400 U. S., at 383, quoting Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 561. This holding was subsequently reaffirmed in Connor v. Waller, 421 U. S. 656 (1975). ■ Allen, Perkins, and Connor involved private suits by voters claiming noncompliance with § 5 procedures; we now hold that the same limitations on the inquiry of local district courts apply in § 5 actions brought by the Attorney General. The limitation inheres in Congress’ determination that only the District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether a proposed change actually discriminates on account of race and that other district courts may consider § 5 “coverage” questions. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, at 558-559. The District Court in this case twice exceeded the permissible scope of its § 5 inquiry. In the order implementing its summary judgment for the United States, the court apparently decided that the 1970 redistricting plan did not comply with the Fifteenth Amendment. In its later Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law approving a plan submitted to the court by Warren County, the court “proceeded on the premise that if . . . Fifteenth Amendment protections had not been accorded by any plan proposed, the court could have instituted its own plan,” and then determined that the County plan “will not lessen the opportunity of black citizens of Warren County to participate in the political process and elect officials of their choice.” In both instances the court below erred in deciding the questions of constitutional law; it should have determined only whether Warren County could be enjoined from holding elections under a new redistricting plan because such plan had not been cleared under § 5. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Section 5 requires, in relevant part, that whenever a State or political subdivision covered by the Act seeks to administer “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964,” it may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that “such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.” Until the District of Columbia court enters a declaratory judgment to that effect, no person may be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with the new practice or procedure. As an alternative to the requirement of a declaratory judgment, § 5 permits the State or political subdivision to enforce a new voting procedure if the procedure has been first submitted to the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorney General has not, within 60 days, interposed an objection to the proposed change. All actions under § 5 are required to be heard by a three-judge court. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c. There is no dispute in this case that Warren County is a political subdivision covered by the Act, that realignment of election districts is a voting practice or procedure, and that Warren County has not instituted a declaratory judgment action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The court’s order enjoined the holding of the 1975 elections because they could not be held without abridging Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. The court did not elaborate, but it appears to have held that Fourteenth Amendment, one-person-one-vote rights would be abridged if the election were conducted under the old districting plan and the Fifteenth Amendment rights of black voters would be violated if the 1970 redistricting plan were used. Although the record is not clear, the source of the confusion concerning the power of the District Court in this case seems to have arisen from the fact that the Attorney General did not seek merely to enjoin implementation of the 1970 redistricting plan, but also asked the court to enjoin any election until the County had been redistricted in a manner that both met the requirements of the Voting Rights Act and eliminated the malapportionment of the old districts. The malapportionment of the old plan could not, however, be made the subject of a Government suit brought under § 5. The section is addressed only to voting procedures that were not in effect on November 1, 1964. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 138-139 (1976). The ahegedly malapportioned districts had existed long before 1964 and were,- therefore, not properly before the court in the § 5 action.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PAPISH v. BOARD OF CURATORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI et al. No. 72-794. Decided March 19, 1973 Per Curiam. Petitioner, a graduate student in the University of Missouri School of Journalism, was expelled for distributing on campus a newspaper “containing forms of indecent speech” in violation of a bylaw of the Board of Curators. The newspaper, the Free Press Underground, had been sold on this state university campus for more than four years pursuant to an authorization obtained from the University Business Office. The particular newspaper issue in question was found to be unacceptable for two reasons. First, on the front cover the publishers had reproduced a political cartoon previously printed in another newspaper depicting policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The caption under the cartoon read; . . With Liberty and Justice for All.” Secondly, the issue contained an article entitled “M f Acquitted,” which discussed the trial and acquittal on an assault charge of a New York City youth who was a member of an organization known as “Up Against the Wall, M- — f-—.” Following a hearing, the Student Conduct Committee found that petitioner had violated Par. B of Art. Y of the General Standards of Student Conduct which requires students “to observe generally accepted standards of conduct” and specifically prohibits “indecent conduct or speech.” Her expulsion, after affirmance first by the Chancellor of the University and then by its Board of Curators, was made effective in the middle of the spring semester. Although she was then permitted to remain on campus until the end of the semester, she was not given credit for the one course in which she made a passing grade. After exhausting her administrative review alternatives within the University, petitioner brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. She claimed that her expulsion was improperly premised on activities protected ' by the First Amendment. The District Court denied relief, 331 F. Supp. 1321, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 464 F. 2d 136. Rehearing en banc was denied by an equally divided vote of all the judges in the Eighth Circuit. The District Court's opinion rests, in part, on the conclusion that the banned issue of the newspaper was obscene. The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to decide that question. Instead, assuming that the newspaper was not obscene and that its distribution in the community at large would be protected by the First Amendment, the court held that on a university campus “freedom of expression” could properly be “subordinated to other interests such as, for example, the conventions of decency in the use and display of language and pictures.” Id., at 145. The court concluded that “[t]he Constitution does not compel the University ... [to allow] such publications as the one in litigation to be publicly sold or distributed on its open campus.” Ibid. This case was decided several days before we handed down Heady v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972), in which, while recognizing a state university’s undoubted prerogative to enforce reasonable rules governing student conduct, we reaffirmed that “state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.” Id., at 180. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). We think Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of ideas — no matter how offensive to good taste — on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of “conventions of decency.” Other recent precedents of this Court make it equally clear that neither the political cartoon nor the headline story involved in this case can be labeled as constitutionally obscene or otherwise unprotected. E. g., Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). There is language in the opinions below which suggests that the University’s action here could be viewed as an exercise of its legitimate authority to enforce reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and manner of speech and its dissemination. While we have repeatedly approved such regulatory authority, e. g., Healy v. James, 408 U. S., at 192-193, the facts set forth in the opinions below show clearly that petitioner was expelled because of the disapproved content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distribution. Since the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech, and because the state University’s-action here cannot be justified as a nondiscriminatory application of reasonable rules governing conduct, the judgments of the courts below must be reversed. Accordingly the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the case is remanded to the District Court, and that court is instructed to order the University to restore to petitioner any course credits she earned for the semester in question and, unless she is barred from reinstatement for valid academic reasons, to reinstate her as a student in the graduate program. Reversed and remanded. This charge was contained in a letter from the University’s Dean of Students, which is reprinted in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 464 F. 2d 136, 139 (CA8 1972). In pertinent part, the bylaw states: ''Students enrolling in the University assume an obligation and are expected by the University to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the University's functions and missions as an educational institution. For that purpose students are required to observe generally accepted standards of conduct. . . . [I]ndecent conduct or speech . . . are examples of conduct which would contravene this standard. . . .” 464 F. 2d, at 138. Miss Papish, a 32-year-old graduate student, was admitted to the graduate school of the University in September 1963. Five and one-half years later, when the episode under consideration occurred, she was still pursuing her graduate degree. She was on "academic probation” because of “prolonged submarginal academic progress,” and since November 1, 1967, she also had been on disciplinary probation for disseminating Students for a Democratic Society literature found at a university hearing to have contained “pornographic, indecent and obscene words.” This dissemination had occurred at a time when the University was host to high school seniors and their parents. 464 F. 2d, at 139 nn. 3 and 4. But disenchantment with Miss Papish's performance, understandable as it may have been, is no justification for denial of constitutional rights. Prefatorily, the District Court held that petitioner, who was a nonresident of Missouri, was powerless to complain of her dismissal because she enjoyed no “federally protected or other right to attend a state university of a state of which she is not a domiciled resident.” 331 F. Supp. 1321, 1326. The Court of Appeals, because it affirmed on a different ground, deemed it “unnecessary to comment” upon this rationale. 464 F. 2d, at 141 n. 9. The District Court’s reasoning is directly inconsistent with a long line of controlling decisions of this Court. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 596-598 (1972), and the cases cited therein. Under the authority of Gooding and Cohen, we have reversed or vacated and remanded a number of cases involving the same expletive used in this newspaper headline. Cason v. City of Columbus, 409 U. S. 1053 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U. S. 901 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U. S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U. S. 914 (1972). Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F. 2d 359, 361 and n. 7 (CA1 1969). It is true, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent indicates, that the District Court emphasized that the newspaper was distributed near the University’s memorial tower and concluded that petitioner was engaged in “pandering.” The opinion makes clear, however, that the reference to "pandering” was addressed to the content of the newspaper and to the organization on the front page of the cartoon and the headline, rather than to the manner in which the newspaper was disseminated. 331 F. Supp., at 1325, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1332. As the Court of Appeals opinion states, “[t]he facts are not in dispute.” 464 F. 2d, at 138. The charge against petitioner was quite unrelated to either the place or manner of distribution. The Dean’s charge stated that the “forms of speech” contained in the newspaper were “improper on the University campus.” Id., at 139. Moreover, the majority below quoted without disapproval petitioner’s verified affidavit stating that “no disruption of the University’s functions occurred in connection with the distribution.” Id., at 139-140. Likewise, both the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals and the District Court opinion refer to this same uncontroverted fact. Id., at 145; 331 F. Supp., at 1328. Thus, in the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. DELTA MINING, INC., et al. No. 74-521. Argued October 6, 1975 Decided January 26, 1976 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stevens, J., who took no part in .the consideration or decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Harriet S. Shapiro, Leonard Schaitman, and Michael Kimmel. Fred Blackwell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. John L. Kilcullen filed a reply brief for respondent Mears et al. Jospeh A. Yablonski, Daniel B. Edelman, and Paul R. Hoeber filed a brief for the United Mine Workers of America as amicus curiae urging reversal. Guy Farmer and William A. Gershuny filed a brief for the Bituminous Coal Operators’ Assn., Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case and consolidated it for argument with No. 73-2066, National Independent Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Kleppe, ante, p. 388, decided today, to resolve an apparent conflict between the two Circuits. In 1971 and January 1972 inspectors from the Bureau of Mines entered and inspected the coal mines owned respectively by Delta Mining, Inc., G. M. W. Coal Co., Inc., and a partnership of Edward Mears and others known as the M. Y. Coal Co. The inspectors detected a number of violations of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seg., or regulations and served each mine operator with notices of the infractions. Each notice stated that the violations were to be abated by a specified date. The inspectors returned on that date and furnished the mine operators with a notice that the violations had been abated. The local office of the Bureau of Mines sent copies of the notice of violation and abatement to the Bureau’s central office. There an assessment officer reviewed the notices and sent proposed penalty assessment orders to the mine operators. The orders contained a list of the violations, the dates of their occurrence, the regulations violated, and the amounts of the proposed penalties. The proposed order of assessment to Delta was issued on April 11, 1972. It referred to six violations with civil penalties for each ranging from $30 to $90 for a total of $375. In December 1971, and January and May 1972, G. M. W. was issued proposed assessment orders for violations occurring from May to December 1971. Ten of the violations were assessed civil penalties from $25 to $100, totaling $525. G. M. W. also received an imminent-danger withdrawal order on November 24, 1971, identified as a fire hazard from loose coal in excess of three feet deep and was assessed a fine of $5,000. For violations occurring in 1971 and 1972 Mears received assessments with fines for 16 violations ranging from $25 to $100 and a 17th at $200 for a total of $1,000. It also received a withdrawal order for failure to abate a violation of the respirable-dust-concentration standard with a fine of $1,000. Each of the operators protested the proposed assessments. Delta argued, among other things, that it was a newly opened, small mine and the fines would affect its ability to stay in business. G. M. W. protested that the loose coal was wet and therefore not a fire hazard. Without explanation as to how, if at all, the information in the protest letters was considered, the assessment officer reissued the proposed orders. One of G. M. W.’s penalties was reduced from $100 to $50. The operators were again informed that they had 15 working days from the receipt of the reissued proposed order “to accept the amended or reissued order, whereupon it shall become the final assessment order of the Secretary, or to request formal adjudication with opportunity for hearing.” None of the operators requested formal adjudication. The mine operators did not pay the assessments. The Secretary filed complaints against each of them in October and November 1972, seeking enforcement of the assessments. Attached to the complaints were the proposed orders of assessment and preprinted forms reciting that the assessment officer found in fact that the violations had occurred. These forms were dated several months after the proposed assessment orders. The mine operators each answered, denying liability. While the cases were awaiting trial, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined the Secretary from utilizing or enforcing the assessment procedures of 30 CFR pt. 100 (1972), concluding that § 109 (a)(3) of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U. S. C. § 819 (a) (3), requires the Secretary to prepare a decision incorporating findings of fact in all penalty assessment determinations, whether or not a hearing is requested. National Independent Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Morton, 357 F. Supp. 509 (1973). On the basis of that decision G. M. W. moved for summary judgment, contending that the Secretary’s assessment orders were unenforceable since there had been no “decision incorporating . . . findings of fact.” The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, relying on the National Independent decision, decided that the penalty assessments sought to be enforced by the Secretary did not meet the requirements of § 109 (a) (3) of the Act because they were not supported by adequate findings of fact. The court entered judgment in favor of the respondent mine operators in all three cases. While the cases were pending on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the decisions on which the trial court here relied. National Independent Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Morton, 161 U. S. App. D. C. 68, 494 F. 2d 987 (1974). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, declined to follow the District of Columbia Circuit decision, and held that § 109 (a) (3) compels the Secretary to support each assessment order with express findings of fact concerning the violation and the amount of the penalty, without regard to whether or not the operator requests a hearing. 495 F. 2d 38 (1974). We have today affirmed National Independent, which holding governs this case. Two remaining issues raised by the Third Circuit holding require discussion. The Court of Appeals first distinguished the District of Columbia Circuit holding on the ground that the “operators’ failure to request a hearing in no way suggests that the appropriateness of the penalty amount went undisputed. In each instance, the operators lodged protests. . . .” 495 F. 2d, at 44. This overlooks the fact that while a protest does not necessarily trigger administrative review, a request for a hearing does. Here the party against whom a penalty is assessed has deliberately forgone the opportunity for a full, public, administrative hearing from which findings of fact can be made. Here, too, the amount of the penalty is subject to de novo review in the district court whether or not a hearing was held. The Court of Appeals next distinguished the holding of the District of Columbia Circuit on the ground that the proposed assessment orders at issue “contained no 'information’ other than pro forma recitations that the six criteria [of § 109 (a)(1) of the Act] had been considered.” (Emphasis in original.) Ibid. The court was concerned that the proposed assessment orders were on “preprinted forms which recited, in some instances, that the six factors set out in the statute had been considered” and that the final orders of the Secretary did not mention the six criteria but “merely set forth the Secretary’s finding that a violation 'did, in fact, occur.’ ” Id., at 40. The court then held that “each final decision of the Secretary must be accompanied by findings of fact, concerning both the fact of violation and the magnitude of the penalty.” Id., at 44. The court noted the general proposition that judicial “review of a final administrative determination ... is rendered practically impossible, or at least vastly more difficult, where the agency's decision is not accompanied by express findings.” Id., at 42. We agree with the general proposition when judicial review is based on a substantial-evidence test. Here, however, if an operator wishes to contest the amount of the penalty without a hearing, that can be done by refusing to pay the penalty, thus invoking the right to a de novo trial in the district court, with a jury if desired. When a violation is noticed the operator- is informed as to the details of the nature and location of that violation; the administrative procedures of § 105 of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 815, with provision for a public hearing on request, come into play and appellate review is available. In light of our holding in National Independent Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Kleppe, ante, p. 388, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The operators protest that these notices are not part of the record below. Since the issue before this Court is the validity of the regulations, not whether the regulations were properly complied with, for purposes of. this ease we will assume the notices were properly served. We note, however, that the mine operators do not contend that they were not given ample notice of the violations charged by the mine inspectors. The Third Circuit found support for its concern in a Comptroller General’s report which stated that the Comptroller was “ ‘unable to' determine the adequacy of the consideration given to the six factors [of §109 (a)(1)] and the basis for the penalties assessed in [400] sample cases.’ ” 495 F. 2d, at 43. However, the Secretary’s method of assessing penalties has been changed in a way that largely meets this objection. The regulations now in force contain formulas to be used by the assessment officers in considering the six § 109 (a) (1) criteria. 30 CFR § 100.3 (1975). The Secretary represented to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the assessment formula is to be retained. National Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Morton, 161 U. S. App. D. C. 68, 70 n. 12, 494 F. 2d 987, 989 n. 12 (1974). These regulations were not in effect when the penalties at issue here were levied. Use of the current regulations is preferable to the apparent ad hoc consideration given the criteria in this case. But a trial de novo is available to the mine operators on the amount of the penalty, so the Secretary’s failure to promulgate the best regulations in the first instance does not render all penalties assessed under the prior regulations unenforceable. Although explication by the assessment officer and an examiner might be of some aid to the district judge who is called upon to consider the penalty, the provision for a de novo trial on the amount of the penalty places squarely on the court the task of evaluating the penalty. The six criteria of §109 (a)(1) can be argued to the district court. The Third Circuit is undoubtedly correct that the more information a mine operator has, the better the operator will be able to determine whether to challenge the penalty. The issue, however, was whether the new procedures were mandated by the statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. DARUSMONT et ux. No. 80-243. Decided January 12, 1981 Per Curiam. Appellees instituted this federal income tax refund suit, claiming that the 1976 amendments of the minimum tax provisions contained in § § 56 and 57 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §§ 56 and 57, could not be applied to a transaction that had taken place in 1976, prior to the enactment of the amendments, without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Appellees prevailed in the District Court. The United States has taken an appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, which authorizes a direct appeal from the final judgment of a court of the United States holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action to which the United States is a party. And a direct appeal may be taken when, as here, a federal statute has been held unconstitutional as applied to a particular circumstance. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U. S. 100 (1947). See United States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 U. S. 561, 563 (1972). I The appellees, E. M. Darusmont and B. L. Darusmont, are husband and wife. Mrs. Darusmont is a party to this action solely because she and her husband filed a joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1976. We hereinafter sometimes refer to the appellees in the singular, either as “ap-pellee” or as “taxpayer.” In April 1976, Mr. Darusmont was notified by his employer that he was to be transferred from Houston, Tex., to Bakersfield, Cal. Appellee, accordingly, undertook to dispose of his Houston home. That home was a triplex. One of the three units was occupied by the Darusmonts; taxpayer rented the other two. Appellee retained a real estate firm to list the property and to give him advice as to the most advantageous way to sell it. The firm suggested various alternatives (sale as separate condominium units, or as a whole, and either for cash or on the installment basis). The firm and appellee discussed the income tax consequences of each alternative, including the tax on capital gain, the installment method of reporting, and the possibility of deferring a portion of any capital gain by the timely purchase of a replacement home in California. After considering the several possible methods of structuring the sale, and after computing the projected income tax consequences of each method, appellee decided on an outright sale. That sale was effected on July 15, 1976, for cash. This resulted in a long-term capital gain to the taxpayer. Because, however, appellee purchased a replacement residence in California, he was able, under § 1034 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1034, to defer recognition of that portion of the gain attributable to the unit of the Texas house that the Darusmonts had occupied. Appellee’s recognized gain on the sale of the other two units was $51,332. After taking into account the deduction of 50% of net capital gain then permitted by § 1202 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1202, appellee included the remainder of the gain in his reported taxable income. The Darusmonts timely filed their joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1976. That return showed a tax of $25,384, which was paid. The present controversy concerns $2,280, the portion of appellee’s 1976 income tax liability attributable to the minimum tax imposed by § 56 of the Code on items of tax preference as defined in § 57. These minimum tax provisions, which impose a tax in addition to the regular income tax, first appeared with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 580. Originally, the minimum tax equaled 10% of the amount by which the aggregate of enumerated items of tax preference exceeded the sum of a $30,000 exemption plus the taxpayer’s regular income tax liability. For an individual, one of the items of tax preference was the deduction under § 1202 for net capital gain. See §57(a)(9)(A). Thus, appellee’s § 1202 deduction for 1976 for 50% of the capital gain recognized on the sale of the two units of the Texas triplex was an item of tax preference. If the statute’s original formulation, with its base of $30,000 plus the regular income tax liability, had been retained in the statute for 1976, appellee would not have owed any minimum tax as a result of the sale of the Houston house. Oh October 4, 1976, however, the President signed the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94 — 455, 90 Stat. 1520. Section 301 of that Act, 90 Stat. 1549, amended § 56 (a) of the Code so as to increase the rate of the minimum tax and to reduce the amount of the exemption to $10,000 or one-half of the taxpayer’s regular income tax liability (with certain adjustments), whichever was the greater. Section 301 (g)(1), 90 Stat. 1553, with exceptions not pertinent here, then provided that “the amendments made by this section shall apply to items of tax preference for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1975.” It is this stated effective date that creates the issue now in controversy for, in a certain sense, the October 4, 1976, amendment of § 56 operated “retroactively” to cover the portion of 1976 prior to that date. A result of the statutory change of October 4 was that appellee was subjected to the now contested minimum tax of $2,280 on the sale of the Texas house the preceding July 15. A proper claim for refund of the minimum tax so paid was duly filed with the Internal Revenue Service. Upon the denial of that claim, the Darusmonts instituted this refund suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Taxpayer argued that the 1976 amendments could not be applied constitutionally to a transaction fully consummated prior to their enactment. He further argued that had he known that the sale of the house would have resulted in liability for the minimum tax, he could have structured the sale so as to avoid the tax. He has conceded, however, that when he was considering the various ways in which he could dispose of the Texas property, he was not aware of the existence of the minimum tax. The District Court entered judgment in favor of appellee. It held that the application of the 1976 amendments to a transaction consummated in 1976 prior to October 4 subjected appellee “to a new, separate and distinct tax,” and was “so arbitrary and oppressive as to be a denial of due process” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. App. to Juris. Statement 3a; 80-2 USTC ¶ 9671, p. 85,208, 47 AFTR 2d ¶ 81-366, p. 81-519. We note that the District Court’s ruling is in conflict with the later decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Buttke v. Commissioner, 625 P. 2d 202 (1980), aff’g 72 T. C. 677 (1979). II In enacting general revenue statutes, Congress almost without exception has given each such statute an effective date prior to the date of actual enactment. This was true with respect to the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, and the successive Revenue Acts of 1916 through 1938. It was also true with respect to the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954. Usually the “retroactive” feature has application only to that portion of the current calendar year preceding the date of enactment, but each of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1926 was applicable to an entire calendar year that had expired preceding enactment. This “retroactive” application apparently has been confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation. We may safely say that it is a customary congressional practice. The Court consistently has held that the application of an income tax statute to the entire calendar year in which enactment took place does not per se violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. 323, 331, 332 (1874); id., at 341 (dissenting opinion); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 20 (1916); Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409, 411 (1930); Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 21 (1931); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 175 (1933); United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 498, 500-501 (1937); Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 146, 148-150 (1938); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340, 355 (1945). See also Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 592 (1935); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 706-711 (1960). Justice Miller succinctly stated the principle a century ago in writing for the Court in Stockdale, supra: “The right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new statute, although the measure of it was governed by the income of the past year, cannot be doubted; much less can it be doubted that it could impose such a tax on the income of the current year, though part of that year had elapsed when the statute was passed.” 20 Wall., at 331. Justice Van Devanter in writing for the Court in Hudson, supra, similarly approved the congressional practice: “As respects income tax statutes it long has been the practice of Congress to make them retroactive for relatively short periods so as to include profits from transactions consummated while the statute was in process of enactment, or within so much of the calendar year as preceded the enactment; and repeated decisions of this Court have recognized this practice and sustained it as consistent with the due process clause of the Constitution” 299 U. S., at 500. The Court has stated the underlying rationale for allowing this “retroactivity”: “Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process, and to challenge the present tax it is not enough to point out that the taxable event, the receipt of income, antedated the statute.” Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S., at 146-147. Judge Learned Hand also commented upon the point and set forth the answer to the constitutional argument: “Nobody has a vested right in the rate of taxation, which may be retroactively changed at the will of Congress at least for periods of less than twelve months; Congress has done so from the outset. . . . The injustice is no greater than if a man chance to make a profitable sale in the months before the general rates are retroactively changed. Such a one may indeed complain that, could he have foreseen the increase, he would have kept the transaction unliquidated, but it will not avail him; he must be prepared for such possibilities, the system being already in operation. His is a different case from that of one who, when he takes action, has no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.” Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F. 2d 540, 545 (CA2 1930). Appellee concedes that the Court “has held that a retroactive income tax statute does not violate the 'due process’ clause of the Constitution per se.” Motion to Affirm 6. Appellee asserts, however, that three tests have been developed for determining whether a particular tax is so harsh and oppressive as to be a denial of due process, namely, whether the taxpayer could have altered his behavior to avoid the tax if it could have been anticipated by him at the time the transaction was effected; whether the taxpayer had notice of the tax when he engaged in the transaction; and whether the tax is a new tax and not merely an increase in the rate of an existing income tax. Appellee argues that the altered minimum tax fits within these three tests. In support of the first proposition, appellee cites Blodgett v. Holden 275 U. S. 142 (1927), modified, 276 U. S. 594 (1928), and Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928). These, however, are gift tax cases, and the gifts in question were made and completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute. We do not regard them as controlling authority with respect to any retroactive feature of a federal income tax. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S., at 147-148. Regarding his second test, appellee states that he had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the forthcoming October changes in the minimum tax when he sold the triplex in July and that, as a consequence, the retroactive imposition of the tax after the sale was arbitrary, harsh, and oppressive. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that personal notice is relevant, appellee is hardly in a position to claim surprise at the 1976 amendments to the minimum tax. The proposed increase in rate had been under public discussion for almost a year before its enactment. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-658, pp. 130-132 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-938, pp. 108-114 (1976). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 reflected a compromise between the House and Senate proposals. Both bills, however, provided that the changes in the minimum tax were to be effective for taxable years beginning after 1975. Appellee, therefore, had ample advance notice of the increase in the- effective minimum rate. Appellee’s “new tax” argument is answered completely by the fact that the 1976 amendments to the minimum tax did not create a new tax. To be sure, the minimum tax is described in the statute, § 56 (a), as one “[i]n addition to” the regular income tax. But the minimum tax provision was imposed in 1969, and one of the original items of tax preference subjected to the minimum tax was the untaxed portion of any net long-term capital gain. 83 Stat. 582. Appellee’s position is far different, from that of the individual who, as Judge Hand stated in the language quoted above, “has no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.” The 1976 changes affected appellee only by decreasing the allowable exemption and increasing the percentage rate of tax. “Congress intended these changes to raise the effective tax rate on tax preference items . . . .” Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 105 (Comm. Print 1976). Congress possessed ample authority to make this kind of change effective as of the beginning of the year of enactment. We are not persuaded by appel-lee’s proffered distinction between his case and Buttke v. Commissioner, 625 F. 2d 202 (CA8 1980), that the taxpayer in Buttke, unlike appellee, would have incurred a tax anyway under the prior form of the statute. See Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 78, ¶ 80,106 P-H Memo TC (1980) (appeal pending CA5). We think Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409 (1930), is particularly close to this case. There the taxpayer, on November 7, 1921, sold stock acquired by gift from her husband a week earlier. On November 23, however, the Revenue Act of 1921 was approved and became law. The new Act provided that the income tax basis of property received by gift after December 31, 1920, was the same as the donor’s basis, instead of being the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift, the rule which had theretofore prevailed. The taxpayer sought to avoid the lower carryover basis in computing her gain on the sale, and argued that the new provision should not be applied “to transactions fully completed before enactment of the statute.” Id., at 411. This Court, however, rejected that contention, saying, ibid.: “That the questioned provision can not be declared in conflict with the Federal Constitution merely because it requires gains from prior but recent transactions to be treated as part of the taxpayer’s gross income has not been open to serious doubt since Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, and Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339.” The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with directions to enter judgment for the United States. It is so ordered. The Tax Court consistently has adhered to this position. See Estate of Kearns v. Commissioner, 73 T. C. 1223 (1980); Westwick v. Commissioner, 38 TCM 1269, ¶ 79,329 P-H Memo TC (1979) (appeal pending CA10); Estate of Lewis v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 78, ¶ 80,106 P-H Memo TC (1980) (appeal pending CA5); Schopp v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 276, ¶ 80,148 P-H Memo TC (1980); Witte v. Commissioner, 40 TCM 1259, ¶ 80,393 P-H Memo TC (1980). Other rulings adverse to the taxpayer on this issue are Appendrodt v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 490 (WD Pa. 1980); Metzger v. United States, No. 78-0346-S (SD Cal. Feb. 16, 1979) (appeal pending CA9). Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, §11, D, 38 Stat. 168; Revenue Act of 1916, §§ 8 (a) and (b), 13 (a) and (b), 39 Stat. 761,770, 771; War Revenue Act of 1917, §§ 1, 2, 4, 40 Stat. 300-302; Revenue Act of 1918, §200, 40 Stat. 1058; Revenue Act of 1921, §200(1), 42 Stat. 227; Revenue Act of 1924, § 200 (a), 43 Stat. 254; Revenue Act of 1926, § 200 (a), 44 Stat. (part 2) 10; Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 1, 48 (a), 45 Stat. 795, 807; Revenue Act of 1932, §§ 1, 48 (a), 47 Stat. 173, 187; Revenue Act of 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 683; Revenue Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 1014; Revenue Act of 1936, § 1, 49 Stat. 1652; Revenue Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 813; Revenue Act of 1938, § 1, 52 Stat. 452. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 1, 53 Stat. 4; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §7851 (a)(1)(A), 68A Stat. 919.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McDONALD v. CITY OF WEST BRANCH, MICHIGAN, et al. No. 83-219. Argued February 27, 1984 Decided April 18, 1984 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. David Achtenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Irving Achtenberg. Richard G. Smith argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs was Mona C. Doyle Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Robert M. Weinberg, Michael H. Gottesman, Laurence Gold, J. Albert Woll, Bernard Kleiman, and Carl B. Frankel; and for the Edwin F. Man-del Legal Aid Clinic by Gary H. Palm. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this § 1983 action is whether a federal court may accord preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration award in a case brought under that statute. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such awards have preclusive effect. We granted certiorari, 464 U. S. 813 (1983), and now reverse. H-H On November 26, 1976, petitioner Gary McDonald, then a West Branch, Mich., police officer, was discharged. McDon-aid filed a grievance pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement then in force between West Branch and the United Steelworkers of America (the Union), contending that there was “no proper cause” for his discharge, and that, as a result, the discharge violated the collective-bargaining agreement. After the preliminary steps in the contractual grievance procedure had been exhausted, the grievance was taken to arbitration. The arbitrator ruled against McDonald, however, finding that there was just cause for his discharge. McDonald did not appeal the arbitrator’s decision. Subsequently, however, he filed this § 1983 action against the city of West Branch and certain of its officials, including its Chief of Police, Paul Longstreet. In his complaint, McDonald alleged that he was discharged for exercising his First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict against Longstreet, but in favor of the remaining defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment against Longstreet. 709 F. 2d 1505 (1983). The court reasoned that the parties had agreed to settle their disputes through the arbitration process and that the arbitrator had considered the reasons for McDonald’s discharge. Finding that the arbitration process had not been abused, the Court of Appeals concluded that McDonald’s First Amendment claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. II A At the outset, we must consider whether federal courts are obligated by statute to accord res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to the arbitrator’s decision. Respondents contend that the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, requires that we give preclusive effect to the arbitration award. Our cases establish that §1738 obliges federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as would the courts of the State rendering the judgment. See, e. g., Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U. S. 75, 81 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 466 (1982). As we explained in Kremer, however, “[arbitration decisions . . . are not subject to the mandate of § 1738.” Id., at 477. This conclusion follows from the plain language of § 1738 which provides in pertinent part that the “judicial proceedings [of any court of any State] shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken.” (Emphasis added.) Arbitration is not a “judicial proceeding” and, therefore, § 1738 does not apply to arbitration awards. B Because federal courts are not required by statute to give res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an unappealed arbitration award, any rule of preclusion would necessarily be judicially fashioned. We therefore consider the question whether it was appropriate for the Court of Appeals to fashion such a rule. On two previous occasions this Court has considered the contention that an award in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement should preclude a subsequent suit in federal court. In both instances we rejected the claim. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), was an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 brought by an employee who had unsuccessfully claimed in an arbitration proceeding that his discharge was racially motivated. Although Alexander protested the same discharge in the Title VII action, we held that his Title VII claim was not foreclosed by the arbitral decision against him. In addition, we declined to adopt a rule that would have required federal courts to defer to an arbitrator’s decision on a discrimination claim when “(i) the claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim and to fashion a remedy.” Id., at 55-56. Similarly, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728 (1981), Barrentine and a fellow employee had unsuccessfully submitted wage claims to arbitration. Nevertheless, we rejected the contention that the arbitration award precluded a subsequent suit based on the same underlying facts alleging a violation of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id., at 745-746. Our rejection of a rule of preclusion in Barrentine and our rejection of a rule of deferral in Gardner-Denver were based in large part on our conclusion that Congress intended the statutes at issue in those cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under those statutes. 450 U. S., at 740-746; 415 U. S., at 56-60. These considerations similarly require that we find the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel inapplicable in this § 1983 action. Because § 1983 creates a cause of action, there is, of course, no question that Congress intended it to be judicially enforceable. Indeed, as we explained in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 242 (1972), “[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights — to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law.” See also Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 503 (1982). And, although arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes, our decisions in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver compel the conclusion that it cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard. As a result, according preclusive effect to an arbitration award in a subsequent § 1983 action would undermine that statute’s efficacy in protecting federal rights. We need only briefly reiterate the considerations that support this conclusion. First, an arbitrator’s expertise “pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.” Gardner-Denver, supra, at 57. An arbitrator may not, therefore, have the expertise required to resolve the complex legal questions that arise in § 1983 actions. Second, because an arbitrator’s authority derives solely from the contract, Barrentine, supra, at 744, an arbitrator may not have the authority to enforce § 1983. As we explained in Gardner-Denver: “The arbitrator . . . has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties .... If an arbitral decision is based ‘solely upon the arbitrator’s view of the requirements of enacted legislation,’ rather than on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has ‘exceeded the scope of the submission,’ and the award will not be enforced.” 415 U. S., at 53, quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 597 (1960). Indeed, when the rights guaranteed by § 1983 conflict with provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator must enforce the agreement. Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S., at 43. Third, when, as is usually the case, the union has exclusive control over the “manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented,” Gardner-Denver, supra, at 58, n. 19, there is an additional reason why arbitration is an inadequate substitute for judicial proceedings. The union’s interests and those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a result, the union may present the employee’s grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic choices, than would the employee. See Gardner-Denver, supra, at 58, n. 19; Barrentine, supra, at 742. Thus, were an arbitration award accorded preclusive effect, an employee’s opportunity to be compensated for a constitutional deprivation might be lost merely because it was not in the union’s interest to press his claim vigorously. Finally, arbitral factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding. As we explained in Gardner-Denver, “[t]he record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.” 415 U. S., at 57-58. It is apparent, therefore, that in a § 1983 action, an arbitration proceeding cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial trial. Consequently, according preclusive effect to arbitration awards in § 1983 actions would severely undermine the protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to provide. We therefore hold that in a §1983 action, a federal court should not afford res judicata or collateral-estoppel effect to an award in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Section 3.0 of Article III of the collective-bargaining agreement between the city of West Branch and the Union provided in pertinent part: “Among the powers, rights, authority, duties and responsibilities which shall continue to be vested in the City of West Branch, but not intended as a wholly inclusive list of them, shall be: The right to . . . suspend or discharge employees for proper cause.” In addition to Longstreet, the complaint named the following city officials as defendants: Acting City Manager Bernard Olson, City Attorney Charles Jennings, and City Attorney Demetre Ellias. McDonald also named the Union as a defendant, claiming that it had breached its state-law duty to represent him fairly. The District Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over this claim. In addition, McDonald alleged that his discharge deprived him of property without due process of law. The jury, however, rejected this claim. Earlier this Term, we noted that various phrases have been used to describe the preclusive effects of former judgments. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U. S. 75 (1984). Because the Court of Appeals used the terms “res judicata” and “collateral estoppel,” we find it convenient to use these terms in this opinion. Thus, in this case, we utilize the term “res judicata” to refer to the effect of a judgment on the merits in barring a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies that is based on the same claim. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326, n. 5 (1979). By contrast, “[ujnder collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94 (1980). The complete text of § 1738 provides: “The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto. “The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form. “Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” The statute also applies to Acts of state legislatures and records of state courts. See n. 6, supra. Arbitration obviously falls into neither of these categories. The Court of Appeals in Gardner-Denver had concluded that the Title VII suit was barred by the doctrines of election of remedies and waiver, and by “the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.” 415 U. S., at 46. In addition to holding that none of these doctrines justified a rule of preclusion, we noted that “[t]he policy reasons for rejecting the doctrines of election of remedies and waiver in the context of Title VII are equally applicable to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” Id., at 49. n. 10. Indeed, many arbitrators are not lawyers. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 450 U. S. 728, 743 (1981); Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S., at 57, n. 18. In addition, amici AFL-CIO and the United Steelworkers of America note that “[t]he union's case in a labor arbitration is commonly prepared and presented by non-lawyers.” Brief as Amici Curiae 10. Amici AFL-CIO and the United Steelworkers of America inform us that under most collective-bargaining agreements the union “controls access to the arbitrator, the strategy and tactics of how to present the case, the nature of the relief sought, and the actual presentation of the case.” Id.. at 7. In addition to diminishing the protection of federal rights, a rule of preclusion might have a detrimental effect on the arbitral process. Were such a rule adopted, employees who were aware of this rule and who believed that arbitration would not protect their § 1983 rights as effectively as an action in a court might bypass arbitration. See Gardner-Denver, supra, at 59. The Court of Appeals justified its application of res judicata and collateral estoppel in part by stating that “[t]he parties have agreed to settle this dispute through the private means of arbitration.” In both Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, however, we rejected similar contentions. See Gardner-Denver, supra, at 51-52; Barrentine, supra, at 736-746. For example, in Gardner-Denver we considered the argument that the arbitration provision of the collective-bargaining agreement waived the employee’s right to bring a Title VII action. We found this contention unpersuasive, however, concluding that “[t]he rights conferred [by Title VII] can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.” Gardner-Denver, supra, at 51. Similarly, because preclusion of a judicial action would gravely undermine the effectiveness of § 1983, we must reject the Court of Appeals’ reliance on and deference to the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. Consistent with our decisions in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver, an arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence in a § 1983 action. As in those cases: ‘We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with [the statute or constitution], the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue [in the judicial proceeding], and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee’s [statutory or constitutional] rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress . . . thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of [these] claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.” Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S., at 60, n. 21. See also Barrentine, 450 U. S., at 743-744, n. 22.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KONIGSBERG v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA et al. No. 5. Argued January 14, 1957. Decided May 6, 1957. Edward Mosk argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Samuel Rosenwein. Frank B. Belcher argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Ralph E. Lewis. Briefs of amici curiae in support of petitioner were filed by A. L. Wirin for the American Civil Liberties Union, Southern California Branch, and Osmond K. Fraenkel for the National Lawyers Guild. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner, Raphael Konigsberg, graduated from the Law School of the University of Southern California in 1953 and four months later satisfactorily passed the California bar examination. Nevertheless, the State Committee of Bar Examiners, after several hearings, refused to certify him to practice law on the grounds he had failed to prove (1) that he was of good moral character and (2) that he did not advocate overthrow of the Government of the United States or California by unconstitutional means. As permitted by state law, Konigs-berg asked the California Supreme Court to review the Committee’s refusal to give him its certification. He contended that he had satisfactorily proved that he met all the requirements for admission to the bar, and that the Committee’s action deprived him of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State Supreme Court, without opinion, and with three of its seven justices dissenting, denied his petition for review. We granted certiorari because the constitutional questions presented were substantial. 351 Before reaching the merits, we must first consider the State’s contention that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the case. The State argues (1) that petitioner did not present his constitutional claims to the California Supreme Court in the manner prescribed by that court’s rules, and (2) that the state court’s decision not to grant him relief can be attributed to his failure to conform to its procedural rules rather than to a rejection of his constitutional claims. In considering actions of the Committee of Bar Examiners the California Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction and is not restricted to the limited review made by an appellate court. For example, that court declared in In re Lacey, 11 Cal. 2d 699, at 701, 81 P. 2d 935, at 936: “That, this court has the inherent power and authority to admit an applicant to practice law in this state or to reinstate an applicant previously disbarred despite an unfavorable report upon' such application by the Board of Bar Governors of the State Bar, we think is now well settled in this state. . . . The recommendation of the Board of Bar Governors is advisory only .... [T]he final determination in all these matters rests with this court, and its powers in that regard are plenary and its judgment conclusive.” The California Supreme Court has a special rule, Rule 59 (b), which governs review of actions of the Bar Examiners. Rule 59 (b) requires that a petition for review “shall specify the grounds relied on and shall be accompanied by petitioner’s brief.” Konigsberg complied with this rule. In his petition for review he specifically charged that the findings of the Committee were not supported by any lawful evidence. The petition then went on to assert that the Committee’s action, which was based on findings that the petition had previously alleged were not supported by evidence, was an attempt by the State of California in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to deprive him “of liberty or property without due process of law” and to deny him “the equal protection of the laws.” Throughout the hearings before the Bar Examiners Konigsberg repeatedly objected to questions about his beliefs and associations asserting that such inquiries infringed rights guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. He urged that the Committee would abridge freedom of speech, press and assembly, violate due process, and deny equal protection of the laws if it denied his application because of his political opinions, writings, and affiliations. He asserted that he had affirmatively proved his good moral character and that there was no legal basis for finding that he was morally unfit to practice law. He insisted that in determining whether he was qualified the Committee had to comply with due process of law and cited as supporting his position Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, and Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, where this Court condemned arbitrary findings as offensive to due process. Since Konigsberg challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in his petition for review, it seems clear that the State Supreme Court examined the entire record of the hearings before the Bar Examiners and must have been aware of the constitutional arguments made by Konigsberg during the hearings and the authorities relied on to support these arguments. The State contends, however, that it was not enough for Konigsberg to raise his constitutional objections in his petition, in the manner prescribed by Rule 59 (b), and at the hearings. It claims that under California practice the State Supreme Court will not consider a contention unless it is supported by an argument and citation of authorities in a brief submitted by the person seeking review. Because Konigsberg’s brief did not repeat, precisely and in detail, the constitutional objections set forth in his petition, the argument continues, this Court is compelled to hold that the State Supreme Court could have refused relief to petitioner on a narrow procedural ground. But the California cases cited by the State do not require such a conclusion. It is true that the State Supreme Court has insisted that on appeal in ordinary civil cases alleged errors should be pointed out clearly and concisely, with reasons why they are erroneous, and with reference to supporting authorities. However this case was not reviewed under the rules of appeal which apply to the ordinary civil case but rather under a special rule applying to original proceedings. We are pointed to nothing which indicates that the State Supreme Court has adopted any rule in this type of case which requires that contentions raised in the petition for review must also be set out in the brief. The one case cited, Johnson v. State Bar of California, 4 Cal. 2d 744, 52 P. 2d 928, indicates the contrary. In challenging the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the State Bar that he be suspended from the practice of law, Johnson alleged, apparently in an offhand way, that the entire State Bar Act was “unconstitutional.” He made no argument and cited no authority to support this bare, sweeping assertion. While the court said that this was an insufficient presentation of the issue it nevertheless went ahead to consider and reject Johnson's argument and to hold the Act constitutional. Counsel for California concedes that the state courts in criminal cases often pass on issues ineptly argued in a defendant’s brief or sometimes not raised there at all. As counsel states, the reasons for relaxing this standard in criminal cases are obvious — such cases may involve forfeiture of the accused’s property, liberty, or life. While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary run of civil cases. The Committee’s action prevents him from earning a living by practicing law. This deprivation has grave consequences for a man who has spent years of study and a great deal of money in preparing to be a lawyer. In view of the grounds relied on in Konigsberg’s petition for review, his repeated assertions throughout the hearings of various federal constitutional rights, and the practices of the California Supreme Court, we cannot conclude that that court, with three of its seven justices dissenting, intended to uphold petitioner’s exclusion from the practice of law because his lawyer failed to elaborate in his brief the constitutional claims set forth in his petition for review and in the record of the hearings. Our conclusion is that the constitutional issues are before us and we must consider them. II. We now turn to the merits. In passing on Konigsberg’s application, the Committee of Bar Examiners conducted a series of hearings. At these hearings Konigsberg was questioned at great length about his political affiliations and beliefs. Practically all of these questions were directed at finding out whether he was or ever had been a member of the Communist Party. Konigsberg declined to respond to this line of questioning, insisting that it was an intrusion into areas protected by the Federal Constitution. He also objected on the ground that California law did not require him to divulge his political associations or opinions in order to qualify for the Bar and that questions about these matters were not relevant. The Committee of Bar Examiners rejected Konigs-berg’s application on the ground that the evidence in the record raised substantial doubts about his character and his loyalty which he had failed to dispel. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Committee sent a formal written notice — which later served as the basis for his petition to the California Supreme Court — stating that his application was denied because: 1. He failed to demonstrate that he was a person of good moral character and 2. He failed to show that he did not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State by force, violence or other unconstitutional means. He was not denied admission to the California Bar simply because he refused to answer questions. In Konigsberg’s petition for review to the State Supreme Court there is no suggestion that the Committee had excluded him merely for failing to respond to its inquiries. Nor did the Committee in its answer indicate that this was the basis for its action. After responding to Konigs-berg’s allegations, the Bar Committee set forth a defense of its action which in substance repeated the reasons it had given Konigsberg in the formal notice of denial for rejecting his application. There is nothing in the California statutes, the California decisions, or even in the Rules of the Bar Committee, which has been called to our attention, that suggests that failure to answer a Bar Examiner’s inquiry is, ipso jacto, a basis for excluding an applicant from the Bar, irrespective of how overwhelming is his showing of good character or loyalty or how flimsy are the suspicions of the Bar Examiners. Serious questions of elemental fairness would be raised if the Committee had excluded Konigsberg simply because he failed to answer questions without first explicitly warning him that he could be barred for this reason alone, even though his moral character and loyalty were unimpeachable, and then giving him a chance to comply. In our opinion, there is nothing in the record which indicates that the Committee, in a matter of such grave importance to Konigsberg, applied a brand new exclusionary rule to his application— all without telling him that it was doing so. If it were possible for us to say that the Board had barred Konigsberg solely because of his refusal to respond to its inquiries into his political associations and his opinions about matters of public interest, then we would be compelled to decide far-reaching and complex questions relating to freedom of speech, press and assembly. There is no justification for our straining to reach these difficult problems when the Board itself has not seen fit, at any time, to base its exclusion of Konigsberg on his failure to answer. If and when a State makes failure to answer a question an independent ground for exclusion from the Bar, then this Court, as the cases arise, will have to determine whether the exclusion is constitutionally permissible. We do not mean to intimate any view on that problem here nor do we mean to approve or disapprove Konigsberg’s refusal to answer the particular questions asked him. We now pass to the issue which we believe is presented in this case: Does the evidence in the record support any reasonable doubts about Konigsberg’s good character or his loyalty to the Governments of State and Nation? In considering this issue, we must, of course, take into account the Committee’s contention that Konigsberg’s failure to respond to questions was evidence from which some inference of doubtful character and loyalty can be drawn. Konigsberg claims that he established his good moral character by overwhelming evidence and carried the burden of proving that he does not advocate overthrow of the Government. He contends here, as he did in the California court, that there is no evidence in the record which rationally supports a finding of doubt about his character or loyalty. If this contention is correct, he has been denied the right to practice law although there was no basis for the finding that he failed to meet the qualifications which the State demands of a person seeking to become a lawyer. If this is true, California’s refusal to admit him is a denial of due process and of equal protection of the laws because both arbitrary and discriminatory. After examination of the record, we are compelled to agree with Konigsberg that the evidence does not rationally support the only two grounds upon which the Committee relied in rejecting his application for admission to the California Bar. A. Good Moral Character. — The term “good moral character” has long been used as a qualification for membership in the Bar and has served a useful purpose in this respect. However the term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law. While we do not have the benefit of a definition of “good moral character” by the California Supreme Court in this case, counsel for the State tells us that the definition of that term adopted in California “stresses elements of honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.” The decisions of California courts cited here do not support so broad a definition as claimed by counsel. These cases instead appear to define “good moral character” in terms of an absence of proven conduct or acts which have been historically considered as manifestations of “moral turpitude.” To illustrate, California has held that an applicant did not have good character who had been convicted of forgery and had practiced law without a license, or who had obtained money by false representations and had committed fraud upon a court, or who had submitted false affidavits to the Committee along with his application for admission. It should be emphasized that neither the definition proposed by counsel nor those appearing in the California cases equates unorthodox political beliefs or membership in lawful political parties with bad moral character. Assuming for purposes of this case that counsel’s broad definition of “good moral character” is the one adopted in California, the question is whether on the whole record a reasonable man could fairly find that there were substantial doubts about Konigsberg’s “honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation.” A person called on to prove his character is compelled to turn to the people who know him. Here, forty-two individuals who had known Konigsberg at different times during the past twenty years attested to his excellent character. These testimonials came from persons in every walk of life. Included among them were a Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, lawyers, doctors, professors, businessmen and social workers. The following are typical of the statements made about Konigsberg: An instructor at the University of Southern California Law School: “He seems to hold the Constitution in high esteem and is a vigorous supporter of civil rights. . . . He indicated to me an open-mindedness seemingly inconsistent with any calculated disregard of his duty as a loyal and conscientious citizen.” A rabbi: “I unreservedly recommend Mr. Konigsberg as a person who is morally and ethically qualified to serve as a member of [the bar].” A lawyer: “I recommend Mr. Konigsberg unreservedly as a person of high moral principle and character. . . . He is a much more profound person than the average bar applicant and exhibits a social consciousness which, in my opinion, is unfortunately too rare among applicants.” A Catholic Monsignor: “I do not hesitate to recommend him to you. I am satisfied that he will measure up to the high requirements established for members of the legal profession.” Other witnesses testified to Konigsberg’s belief in democracy and devotion to democratic ideas, his principled convictions, his honesty and integrity, his conscientiousness and competence in his work, his concern and affection for his wife and children and his loyalty to the country. These, of course, have traditionally been the kind of qualities that make up good moral character. The significance of the statements made by these witnesses about Konigsberg is enhanced by the fact that they had known him as an adult while he was employed in responsible professional positions. Even more significant, not a single person has testified that Konigsberg’s moral character was bad or questionable in any way. Konigsberg’s background, which was also before the Committee, furnished strong proof that his life had always been honest and upright. Born in Austria in 1911, he was brought to this country when eight years old. After graduating from Ohio State University in 1931, he taught American history and literature for a time in a Cleveland high school. In 1934 he was given a scholarship to Ohio State University and there received his Master of Arts degree in Social Administration. He was then employed by the District of Columbia as a supervisor in its Department of Health. In 1936 he went to California where he worked as an executive for several social agencies and at one time served as District Supervisor for the California State Relief Administration. With our entry into the Second World War, he volunteered for the Army and was commissioned a second lieutenant. He was selected for training as an orientation officer in the Army’s information and education program and in that capacity served in North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. He was promoted to captain and while in Germany was made orientation officer for the entire Seventh Army. As an orientation officer one of his principal functions was to explain to soldiers the advantages of democracy as compared with totalitarianism. After his honorable discharge in 1946 he resumed his career in social work. In 1950, at the age of thirty-nine, Konigsberg entered the Law School of the University of Southern California and was graduated in 1953. There is no criticism in the record of his professional work, his military service, or his performance at the law school. Despite Konigsberg’s forceful showing of good moral character and the fact that there is no evidence that he has ever been convicted of any crime or has ever done anything base or depraved, the State nevertheless argues that substantial doubts were raised about his character by: (1) the testimony of an ex-Communist that Konigsberg had attended meetings of a Communist Party unit in 1941; (2) his criticism of certain public officials and their policies; and (3) his refusal to answer certain questions about his political associations and beliefs. When these items are analyzed, we believe that it cannot rationally be said that they support substantial doubts about Konigsberg’s moral fitness to practice law. (1) Testimony of the Ex-Communist. — The suspicion that Konigsberg was or had been a Communist was based chiefly on the testimony of a single ex-Communist that Konigsberg had attended meetings of a Communist Party unit in 1941. From the witness’ testimony it appears that this unit was some kind of discussion group. On cross-examination she conceded that her sole basis for believing that Konigsberg was a member of that party was his attendance at these meetings. Her testimony concerned events that occurred many years before and her identification of Konigsberg was not very convincing. She admitted that she had not known him personally and never had any contact with him except at these meetings in 1941. Konigsberg denied that he had ever seen her or known her. And in response to a Bar Examiner’s question as to whether he was a communist, in the philosophical sense, as distinguished from a member of the Communist Party, Konigsberg replied: “If you want a categorical answer to 'Are you a communist?’ the answer is no.” Even if it be assumed that Konigsberg was a member of the Communist Party in 1941, the mere fact of membership would not support an inference that he did not have good moral character. There was no evidence that he ever engaged in or abetted any unlawful or immoral activities — or even that he knew of or supported any actions of this nature. It may be, although there is no evidence in the record before us to that effect, that some members of that party were involved in illegal or disloyal activities, but petitioner cannot be swept into this group solely on the basis of his alleged membership in that party. In 1941 the Communist Party was a recognized political party in the State of California. Citizens of that State were free to belong to that party if they wanted to do so. The State had not attempted to attach penalties of any kind to membership in the Communist Party. Its candidates' names were on the ballots California submitted to its voters. Those who accepted the State at its word and joined that party had a right to expect that the State would not penalize them, directly or indirectly, for doing so thereafter. (2) Criticism of Certain Public Officials and Their Policies. — In 1950 Konigsberg wrote a series of editorials for a local newspaper. In these editorials he severely criticized, among other things, this country's participation in the Korean War, the actions and policies of the leaders of the major political parties, the influence of “big business” in American life, racial discrimination, and this Court’s decisions in Dennis and other cases. When read in the light of the ordinary give-and-take of political controversy the editorials Konigsberg wrote are not unusually extreme and fairly interpreted only say that certain officials were performing their duties in a manner that, in the opinion of the writer, was injurious to the public. We do not believe that an inference of bad moral character can rationally be drawn from these editorials. Because of the very nature of our democracy such expressions of political views must be permitted. Citizens have a° right under our constitutional system to criticize government officials and agencies. Courts are not, and should not be, immune to such criticism. Government censorship can no more be reconciled with our national constitutional standard of freedom of speech and press when done in the guise of determining “moral character,” than if it should be attempted directly. (3) Refusal to Answer Questions. — During the prolonged hearings before the Committee of Bar Examiners, Konigsberg was not asked directly about his honesty, trustworthiness, or other traits which are generally thought of as related to good character. Almost all of the Bar Examiners’ questions concerned his political affiliations, editorials and beliefs. Konigsberg repeatedly declined to answer such questions, explaining that his refusal was based on his understanding that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution a State could not inquire into a person’s political opinions or associations and that he had a duty not to answer. Essentially, this is the same stand he had taken several years before when called upon to answer similar questions before the Tenney Committee. The State argues that Konigsberg’s refusal to tell the Examiners whether he was a member of the Communist Party or whether he had associated with persons who were members of that party or groups which were allegedly Communist dominated tends to support an inference that he is a member of the Communist Party and therefore a person of bad moral character. We find it unnecessary to decide if Konigsberg’s constitutional objections to the Committee’s questions were well founded. Prior decisions by this Court indicate that his claim that the questions were improper was not frivolous and we find nothing in the record which indicates that his position was not taken in good faith. Obviously the State could not draw unfavorable inferences as to his truthfulness, candor or his moral character in general if his refusal to answer was based on a belief that the United States Constitution prohibited the type of inquiries which the Committee was making. On the record before us, it is our judgment that the inferences of bad moral character which the Committee attempted to draw from Konigsberg’s refusal to answer questions about his political affiliations and opinions are unwarranted. B. Advocating the Overthrow of Government by Force. — The Committee also found that Konigsberg had failed to prove that he did not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States or California by force and violence. Konigsberg repeatedly testified under oath before the Committee that he did not believe in nor advocate the overthrow of any government in this country by any unconstitutional means. For example, in response to one question as to whether he advocated overthrowing the Government, he emphatically declared: “I answer specifically I do not, I never did or never will.” No witness testified to the contrary. As a matter of fact, many of the witnesses gave testimony which was utterly inconsistent with the premise that he was •disloyal. And Konigsberg told the Committee that he was ready at any time to take an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of California. Even if it be assumed that Konigsberg belonged to the Communist Party in 1941, this does not provide a reasonable basis for a belief that he presently advocates overthrowing the Government by force. The ex-Communist, who testified that Konigsberg attended meetings of a Communist unit in 1941, could not remember any statements by him or anyone else at those meetings advocating the violent overthrow of the Government. And certainly there is nothing in the newspaper editorials that Konigsberg wrote that tends to support a finding that he champions violent overthrow. Instead, the editorials expressed hostility to such a doctrine. For example, Konigsberg wrote: “It is vehemently asserted that advocacy of force and violence is a danger to the American government and that its proponents should be punished. With this I agree. Such advocacy is un-Ameri-can and does undermine our democratic processes. Those who preach it must be punished.” Counsel for California offers the following editorial as evidence that Konigsberg advocates overthrow of the Government by force and violence: “Loyalty to America, in my opinion, has always meant adherence to the basic principles of our Constitution and Declaration of Independence — not loyalty to any man or group of men. Loyalty to America means belief in and militant support of her noble ideals and the faith of her people. Loyalty to America today, therefore, must mean opposition to those who are betraying our country’s traditions, who are squandering her manpower, her honor and her riches.” On its surface this editorial does not appear to be a call for armed revolution. To the contrary, it manifests a strongly held conviction for our constitutional system of government. However, the State attempts to draw an inference adverse to Konigsberg from his use of the word “militant” which it points out in one sense means “warlike.” To us it seems far-fetched to say that exhortation to “militant” support of America’s “noble ideals” demonstrates a willingness to overthrow our democratic institutions. We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or association. A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order to obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintim-idated — free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar. In this case we are compelled to conclude that there is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish his good moral character or failed to show that he did not advocate forceful overthrow of the Government. Without some authentic reliable evidence of unlawful or immoral actions reflecting adversely upon him, it is difficult to comprehend why the State Bar Committee rejected a man of Konigsberg’s background and character as morally unfit to practice law. As we said before, the mere fact of Konigsberg’s past membership in the Communist Party, if true, without anything more, is not an adequate basis for concluding that he is disloyal or a person of bad character. A lifetime of good citizenship is worth very little if it is so frail that it cannot withstand the suspicions which apparently were the basis for the Committee’s action. The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Under California procedure the State Supreme Court may admit a person to the bar upon certification by the Committee of Bar Examiners that he meets the necessary requirements. California Business and Professions Code, 1937, § 6064. Section 6060 (c) requires that an applicant must have “good moral character” before he can be certified. Section 6064.1 provides that no person “who advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of this State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means, shall be certified to the Supreme Court for admission and a license to practice law.” See also Preston v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 2d 643, 171 P. 2d 435; Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018. Rule 59 (b) is set out at 36 Cal. 2d 43. Generally, the California Supreme Court divides its rules into two main parts: (1) “Rules on Appeal,” which govern appeals in civil and criminal cases; and (2) “Rules on Original Proceedings in Reviewing Courts.” The petition asserted: “1. That the petitioner sustained his burden of proof of establishing his good moral character and all other requirements established by law in the State of California for applicants for admission to the bar. “2. That the committee erred in asserting that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof of establishing his good moral character. “3. That no lawful evidence was received or exists supporting the denial of the application of the petitioner.” He also referred to Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, and Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U. S. 583. Cf. In re Admission to Practice Law, 1 Cal. 2d 61, 33 P. 2d 829. The brief did refer to pages of the record where constitutional arguments were made and cases cited to support them. People v. McLean, 135 Cal. 306, 67 P. 770; Title G. & T. Co. v. Fraternal Finance Co., 220 Cal. 362, 30 P. 2d 515. See, e. g., People v. Hadley, 175 Cal. 118, 119, 165 P. 442, 443; People v. Yaroslawsky, 110 Cal. App. 175, 176, 293 P. 815, 816; People v. Buck, 72 Cal. App. 322, 237 P. 63. Cf. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116. The record, when read as a whole, shows that Konigsberg took the position that he would answer all questions about his character or loyalty except those directed to his political views and beliefs and to questions about membership in the Communist Party. The record also shows that the Committee made no effort to pursue any other course of interrogation. Neither the Committee as a whole nor any of its members ever intimated that Konigsberg would be barred just because he refused to answer relevant inquiries or because he was obstructing the Committee. Some members informed him that they did not necessarily accept his position that they were not entitled to inquire into his political associations and opinions and said that his failure to answer would have some bearing on their determination of whether he was qualified. But they never suggested that his failure to answer their questions was, by itself, a sufficient independent ground for denial of his application. The answer, in pertinent part, read as follows : “ [P] etitioner was invited to appear at a hearing before the Southern Subcommittee of the Committee of Bar Examiners on the 25th day of September, 1953, at which time he was informed of evidence raising doubts as to his fitness to practice law, and was questioned concerning such evidence and other matters relevant to his qualifications to become a member of the State Bar of California. “On or before the 8th day of February, 1954 the Southern Subcommittee of the Committee of Bar Examiners considered all oj the evidence which had been presented, and determined that petitioner had jailed to show his good moral character so that his application must be denied. On or about the 8th day of February, 1954 said Subcommittee informed the petitioner in writing of the denial of his application and the reasons therefor. “On or prior to the 17th day of May, 1954 [the Full Committee] considered all oj the evidence which had been introduced and determined that petitioner had not sustained the burden oj proof that he was possessor of the good moral character required by California Business and Professions Code, Section 6060 (c) and that he had not complied with Section 6064.1 of said Code, so that his application must be denied. Petitioner was notified of this decision and the reasons therefor by letter dated May 17, 1954. “Petitioner has not complied with the requirements of California Business and Professions Code, Sections 6060 (c) and 6064.1 and so is not entitled to be and should not be admitted to practice law in the State of California.” (Emphasis supplied.) As pointed out in note 1, supra, § 6064.1 excludes applicants who advocate the overthrow of the Government of California or the United States by “unconstitutional means,” while § 6060 (c) requires that an applicant must have good moral character. Cf. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196, 201. In presenting its version of the questions before this Court, the Bar Committee did not suggest that the denial of Konigsberg’s application could be upheld merely because he had failed to answer questions. Nor was such a position taken on oral argument. Counsel, instead, reiterated what the Bar Committee had contended throughout, namely, that Konigsberg was rejected because he failed to dispel substantial doubts raised by the evidence in the record about his character and loyalty. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, ante, p. 232; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. Cf. Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U. S. 192, 197. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 232 (dissenting opinion); United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F. 2d 920, 921; Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Col. L. Rev. 838. In re Garland, 219 Cal. 661, 28 P. 2d 354. In re Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 163 P. 657. Spears v. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697. This testimony was in the form of written statements. Konigs-berg offered to produce witnesses to testify in person but the Board preferred to have their statements in writing. Counsel for the Bar Committee acknowledged this in oral argument. He stated: “Now Mrs. Bennett’s testimony left much to be desired, that I concede. Her identification of this man is not all that you might wish.” Konigsberg gave this answer during the first hearing held by the Committee. He was not represented by counsel at the time. At a subsequent hearing he stated that his earlier willingness to answer this question was inconsistent with his general position that the Committee had no right to inquire into his political associations and beliefs. He said he would not answer if the same question were then presented to him. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, ante, p. 232; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118, 136. Cf. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, where this Court struck down an attempt to exclude from the practice of law individuals who had taken up arms against the United States in the War Between the States. See also Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; Brown and Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 480 (1953). For example, petitioner wrote: "When the Supreme Court of these benighted states can refuse to review the case of the Hollywood Ten thus making that high tribunal an integral part of the cold war machine directed against the American people — then the enemies of democracy have indeed won a major victory. When the commanders of the last legal bulwark of our liberties sell out to the enemy, then the fascists have gone far, much farther than most people think. He who cannot see the dangerous damnable parallel to what happened in Germany is willfully blind.” In 1948 Konigsberg appeared before the Un-American Activities Committee of the California Senate, commonly known as the Tenney Committee. At that time he sharply criticized this committee, accusing it of subverting the liberties of Americans, and declared: “I pledge my word to use every democratic means to defeat you.” The State points to petitioner’s criticism of this committee as casting doubt on his moral character. What is said in the text disposes of this contention. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252. See, e. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 48 (concurring opinion); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 531; West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 365-366. A dissenting opinion in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584, 611, 618, which was adopted on rehearing, 319 U. S. 103, declared: “Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind.” Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, 557; Sheiner v. Florida, 82 So. 2d 657; Ex parte Marshall, 165 Miss. 523, 147 So. 791. And see Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 426-428; Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 763, 767-768, 126 N. E. 2d 100, 102-103; In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N. E. 2d 543; Matter of Grae, 282 N. Y. 428, 26 N. E. 2d 963. See, for example, text at pp. 264-265. California Business and Professions Code, 1937, § 6067, requires: “Every person on his admission shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California, and faithfully to discharge the duties of any attorney at law to the best of his knowledge and ability.” Compare the discussion in the text at footnote 25, supra, and see cases cited in that footnote. Petitioner also contends that it violates due process to make advocacy of overthrow of the Government of the United States or of a State by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means an automatic ground for denying the right to practice law regardless of the reasons for or the nature of such advocacy. Because of our disposition of the case, it is unnecessary to consider this argument. See Cammer v. United States, 350 U. S. 399, 406-407. Compare Chafee, the Harvard Law School Record, Nov. 1, 1950, and Nov. 8, 1950.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, et al. v. BENTEX PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., et al. No. 72-555. Argued April 17, 1973 Decided June 18, 1973 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except Brennan, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case, and Stewart, J., who took no part in the decision of the case. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Andrew L. Frey, Howard E. Shapiro, George Edelstein, and Peter Barton Hutt. George F. Townes argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Sol E. Abrams and C. Ben Bowen. Bruce J. Terris, Joseph Onek, and Peter H. Schuck filed a brief for American Public Health Assn, et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lloyd N. Cutler, Daniel Marcus, and William T. Lake for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Assn., and by Thomas D. Finney, Jr., Thomas Richard Spradlin, and Daniel F. O’Keefe, Jr., for the Proprietary Assn. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case Bentex and some 20 other firms that market drugs containing pentylenetetrazol filed this suit for a declaratory judgment that their drugs containing pentylenetetrazol are generally recognized as safe and effective, and thus not “new drugs” within the meaning of §201 (p) (1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, as amended, 76 Stat. 781, 21 U. S. C. § 321 (p) (1). They also sought exemption from the new effectiveness requirements by reason of § 107 (c) (4) of the 1962 amendments to the Act, known as the “grandfather” clause. As part of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program, three separate National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) panels reviewed the evidence concerning these drugs, and each concluded that the drug was “ineffective” for the indicated use. The Commissioner concluded there was a lack of substantial evidence that these drugs were effective for their intended uses and gave notice of his intention to initiate proceedings to withdraw approval of the new drug applications (NDA’s). FDA had taken the position that withdrawal of approval of an NDA would operate to remove marketing approval for all drugs of similar composition, known as “me-too” drugs, whether or not they were expressly covered by an effective NDA. Aecord-ingly, the notice invited the holders of the NDA’s for drugs containing pentylenetetrazol, “and any interested person who might be adversely affected by their removal from the market/’ to submit “adequate and well-controlled studies” to establish the effectiveness of the drugs. See § 505 (d), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (d). Only one NDA holder submitted further evidence, which the Commissioner held did not satisfy the statutory standard. He thereupon gave notice of intent to issue an order withdrawing approval of the NDA’s under § 505 (e), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (e). Again, all those who might be adversely affected by withdrawal of the NDA’s were given the opportunity to participate. Only one NDA holder requested a hearing but filed no data to support it. The Commissioner issued orders withdrawing approval of the three NDA’s (35 Fed. Reg. 14412); no appeal was taken. This suit in the District Court followed. It appears that all of the parties to this suit market “me-too” drugs, none of which was expressly covered by an effective NDA. The District Court held that although it could determine whether the drugs were “new” or “grandfathered” drugs, its jurisdiction was concurrent with that of FDA and that FDA should resolve the “new drug” issue in an administrative proceeding. It entered an injunction to preserve the status quo and ruled that if FDA should decline to hold a hearing it would determine the issue. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions that the District Court determine whether the challenged drugs may lawfully be marketed without approved NDA’s. 463 F. 2d 363. It held that FDA has no jurisdiction, either primary or concurrent, to decide in an administrative proceeding what is a “new drug” for which an NDA is required. In its view the 1962 Act established two forums for the regulation of drugs: an administrative one for premarketing clear-anees for “new drugs” or withdrawal of previously approved NDA’s, with the right of appeal; and, second, a judicial one for enforcement of the requirement that “new drugs” be cleared as safe and effective before marketing by providing the Government with judicial remedies of seizure, injunction, and criminal prosecution available solely in the District Court. Id., at 371-372. We reverse the Court of Appeals. FDA, as a result of an NAS-NRC study and after due notice, faced up to the problem of proposing withdrawal of drugs found to be lacking in substantial evidence of effectiveness. One method would be to have 1,000 withdrawal hearings — perhaps as many as 3,500, each one lasting probably for weeks. The cost in time and budget would be enormous. Accordingly, FDA issued regulations, already discussed in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., ante, p. 609, defining the “scientific principles which characterize an adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation,” which elaborates on the statutory “substantial evidence” test. And, as we held in Hynson, no basis for a hearing under these regulations would be laid unless a party seeking a hearing proffered at least some evidence of that nature and quality. By May 1972, 102 final orders effecting withdrawal of approval for 452 NDA's had been issued; and they resulted in the removal from the market of an additional 1,473 “me-too” drugs. FDA was still troubled because under the 1962 Act no census of the marketplace was authorized. That is why Congress enacted the Drug Listing Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 559, 21 U. S. C. §§ 331 (p), 335 (e), 360 (e), (f), (c), (d) (1970 ed., Supp. II). That Act requires manufacturers to submit to FDA a list of all drugs they market, including data showing their composition, labeling, and advertising. The Senate Report stated: “The effective enforcement of the drug provisions of the Act requires the ready availability of a current inventory of all marketed drugs. The Secretary is just completing a thorough review of the effectiveness of drugs marketed pursuant to new drug applications during the period 1938-1962, as required by the Drug Amendments of 1962. Application of the results of this important review to related drugs would be frustrated if a list of all marketed drugs were not easily obtained.” FDA also realized that it is impossible to apply the 1962 amendments to over-the-counter (OTC) drugs on a case-by-case basis. There are between 100,000 and 500,000 of these products, few of which were previously approved by FDA. In May 1972 FDA adopted a procedure for determining whether particular OTC products, not covered by NDA’s are safe products, not ineffective, and not misbranded. 37 Fed. Reg. 9464. The procedure involves the establishment of independent expert panels for different categories of OTC drugs (e. g., antacids, laxatives, analgesics) which would review all available data and prepare monographs prescribing drug composition, labeling, and manufacturing controls. OTC’s conforming to the monograph will not be considered either misbranded or a “new drug” requiring an NDA. The regulation provides for a hearing before the expert panel, comments and rebuttal comments on the monograph, and finally a hearing before the Commissioner and judicial review. Id., at 9475. This case, like the cross-petition in the Hynson case (No. 72-414) raises the question whether FDA has authority to decide in an administrative hearing whether a drug satisfies the new effectiveness requirements of the Act. As noted, the Commissioner ordered that three NDA’s for the drugs in question be withdrawn. Review of the order was not sought in the Court of Appeals as provided in § 505 (h), 21 U. S. C. § 355 (h). Rather, the aggrieved manufacturers of “me-too” drugs filed suit in the District Court, with the results we have already detailed. The narrow question is whether the FDA may decide whether a drug is a “new drug” on referral from a district court. As already noted, an order denying an NDA or withdrawing one is reviewable by the Court of Appeals, § 505 (h); and we see no reason why Congress could not make one method of review the exclusive one. Certainly an order that does not deny or withdraw an NDA is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, if it declares a “new drug” status. See Hynson, supra, at 627. In bolstering that conclusion we should note in passing that Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 144, said that the provisions stated in this Act for judicial review do not manifest “a congressional purpose to eliminate judicial review of other kinds of agency action.” While § 505 (h) would appear to be the exclusive method of obtaining judicial review of FDA’s order withdrawing an NDA covering the instant drugs, the Government apparently did not oppose the District Court’s taking jurisdiction, or appeal from its action, and presents no objection to the exercise by the courts of jurisdiction in this case. It does, however, strenuously oppose the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals. That court, in holding that FDA has no jurisdiction to determine the “new drug” status of a drug, stated that the question of “new drug” status is never presented when an application of a manufacturer for approval is filed. Parties, of course, cannot confer jurisdiction; only Congress can do so. The line sought to be drawn by the Court of Appeals is FDA action on NDA’s pursuant to § 505 (d) and § 505 (e), on the one hand, and the question of “new drug” determination on the other. We can discern no such jurisdictional line under the Act. The FDA, as already stated, may deny an NDA where there is a lack of “substantial evidence” of the drug’s effectiveness, based, as we have outlined, on clinical investigation by experts. But the “new drug” definition under § 201 (p) encompasses a drug “not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use.” Whether a particular drug is a “new drug,” depends in part on the expert knowledge and experience of scientists based on controlled clinical experimentation and backed by substantial support in scientific literature. One function is not peculiar to judicial expertise, the other to administrative expertise. The two types of cases overlap and strongly suggest that Congress desired that the administrative agency make both kinds of determination. Even where no such administrative determination has been made and the issue arises in a district court in enforcement proceedings, it would be commonplace for the court to await an appropriate administrative declaration before it acted. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51; FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621, 647. It may, of course, be true that in some cases general recognition that a drug is efficacious might be made without the kind of scientific support necessary to obtain approval of an NDA. But, as we indicate in Hynson, supra, at 631, the reach of scientific inquiry under both § 505 (d) and § 201 (p) is precisely the same. We think that it is implicit in the regulatory scheme, not spelled out in haec verba, that FDA has jurisdiction to decide with administrative finality, subject to the types of judicial review provided, the “new drug” status of individual drugs or classes of drugs. The deluge of litigation that would follow if “me-too” drugs and OTC drugs had to receive de novo hearings in the courts would inure to the interests of manufacturers and merchants in drugs, but not to the interests of the public that Congress was anxious to protect by the 1962 amendments, as well as OTC drugs and drugs covered by the 1972 Act. We are told that FDA is incapable of handling a caseload of more than perhaps 10 or 15 de novo judicial proceedings in a year. Clearly, if FDA were required to litigate, on a case-by-case basis, the “new drug” status of each drug now marketed, the regulatory scheme of the Act would be severely undermined, if not totally destroyed. Moreover, a case-by-case approach is inherently unfair because it requires compliance by one manufacturer while his competitors marketing similar drugs remain free to violate the Act. In a case much more clouded with doubts than this one, we held that we would not “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention . . . prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency’s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 780. And see Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U. S. 289, 304-306. We conclude that the District Court’s referral of the “new drug” and the “grandfather” issues to FDA was appropriate, as these are the kinds of issues peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA. As the District Court said: “Evaluation of conflicting reports as to the reputation of drugs among experts in the field is not a matter well left to a court without chemical or medical background.” The determination whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective within the meaning of §201(p)(l) necessarily implicates complex chemical and pharmacological considerations. Threshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative agency are appropriately routed to the agency, while the court stays its hand. As we stated in Far Eastern Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574-575: “[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.” And see Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 68; Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, supra, at 304-306. Reversed. MR. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of this case. Volume 37 Fed. Reg. 23187, adding § 130.40 to 21 CFR, defines “identical, related, or similar drug” as used in this Act to include “other brands, potencies, dosage forms, salts, and esters of the same drug moiety as well as of any drug moiety related in chemical structure or known pharmacological properties.” It also provides all persons with an interest in such drugs an opportunity for hearing on any proposed withdrawal of NDA approval for the basic drug. A district court order directing FDA to apply the NAS-NRC evaluation to all “me-too” drugs is reproduced in 37 Fed. Reg. 26623-26624. 35 Fed. Reg. 3073 and 7250. See the Appendix in Hynson, ante, p. 634. Hearings on the Present Status of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 22, p. 8525. Filings are due in June 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 26432. S. Rep. No. 92-924, p. 2.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SIMS v. UNITED STATES. No. 88. Argued February 26, 1959. Decided March 23, 1959. Fred H. Capian, Assistant Attorney General of West Virginia, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was W. W. Barron, Attorney General of West Virginia. Melva M. Graney argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Joseph Kovner. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed an income tax deficiency against each of three residents of West Virginia and forwarded the assessment lists to the Director of Internal Revenue at Parkersburg for collection. The deficiencies remaining unpaid for more than 10 days- after demand for payment and the taxpayers being then employed by the State of West Virginia, the Director issued notices of levy directed to the State of West Virginia and served them on petitioner, as the State Auditor, seizing the accrued salaries of the taxpayers pursuant to § 6331 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 6331. Petitioner refused to honor the levies and instead issued and delivered payroll warrants to the taxpayers for their then accrued net salaries aggregating $519.71. Thereafter the .Government brought this suit in the Federal District Court against petitioner under § 6332 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 6332, to recover from him personally the $519.71 that he had so paid to the taxpayers in disobedience to and defeat of the Government’s levies. The District Court rendered judgment for the Government and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 252 F. 2d 434. Certiorari was sought on the grounds that § 6331 does not authorize a levy on the accrued salaries of employees of a State, and that, if it be held that it does, petitioner was not a person “obligated with respect to” the accrued and seized salaries, within the meaning of § 6332, and, therefore, is not personally liable for refusing to surrender them to the Government.' We granted the writ to determine those questions. 358 U. S. 809. Nothing in the Constitution requires that the salaries of state employees be treated any differently, for federal tax purposes, than the salaries of others, Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405; Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, and it is quite clear, generally, that accrued salaries are property and rights to prop-' erty subject to levy. In plain terms, § 6331 proyides for the collection of assessed and unpaid taxes “by levy upon all property and rights to property” belonging to a delinquent taxpayer. Pursuant to that statute a regulation was promulgated expressly interpreting and declaring § 6331 to authorize levy on the accrued salaries of employees of a State to enforce collection of any federal tax. Although not disputing these principles, petitioner advances two arguments in support of his claim' that the statutes do not authorize a levy on the accrued salaries of employees of a State. First, he contends that a State is not a “person” within the meaning of § 6332, and, second,. he argues that Congress, by specifically authorizing in § 6331 a levy “upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected 'Official, of the United States, 'the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality” thereof, but not similarly specifically authorizing levy upon the accrued salaries or wages of employees of a State, evinced its intention to exclude the latter from such levies. Though the definition of “person” in § 6332 does not mention States or any sovereign or political entity or their officers among those it “includes” (Note 3), it is equally clear that it does not exclude them. This is made certain by the provisions of § 7701 (b) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code that “The terms ‘includes’ and ‘including’ when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise .within the meaning of the term defined.” 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 7701 (b). Whether the term “person” when used in a federal statute includes a State cannot be abstractly declared, but depends upon its legislative ewironment, Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161. It is clear that § 6332 is stated in all-inclusive terms of general application. “In interpreting federal revenue measures expressed in terms of general application, this Court has ordinarily found them operative in the case of state activities even though States were not expressly indicated as subjects of tax.” Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U. S. 411, 416, and cases cited. We think that the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation, i. e., the legislative environment, of § 6332 make it plain that Congress intended to and did include States within the.term “person” as used'in § 6332. Nor is there merit in petitioner’s contention that Congress, by specifically providing in § 6331 for levy upon the accrued salaries of federal employees, but not mentioning state employees, evinced an intention to exclude the latter from levy. The explanation of that action by Congress appears quite clearly to be that this Court had held in Smith v. Jackson, 246 U. S. 388, that a federal disbursing officer might not, in the absence of express congressional authorization, set off an indebtedness of a federal employee to tbe Government against the employee’s salary, and, pursuant to that opinion, the Comptroller General ruled that an “administrative official served with [notices of levy] would be without authority to withhold any portion of the current salary of such employee in satisfaction of the notices of levy and distraint.” 26 Comp. Gen. 907, 912 (1947). It is evident that § 6331 was enacted to overcome that difficulty and to subject the salaries of federal employees to the same collection procedures as are available against all other taxpayers, including employees of a State. Accordingly we hold that §§ 6331 and 6332 authorize levy upon the accrued salaries of state employees for the collection of any federal tax. • : This brings us to petitioner’s contention that even if the salaries of state employees are subject to levy, he is not personally liable to the Government for refusing to honor its levies because, contrary to the holding of the courts below, he was not a person “obligated with respect to” the salaries covered thereby. Congress did not define the questioned phrase, nor do we feel called upon here to delimit its scope, for we think it includes, at least, a person who has the sole power to control disposition of the fund, and we also think that, under the West Virginia law, petitioner both had and exercised that power. By a West Virginia statute, 1 W. Va. Code, 1955, § 1031 (1)-, he was empowered and obligated to deduct and withhold from the salaries of state employees sums “to pay taxes as may be required by an act or acts of the congress of the United States of America”; and, similarly, another West Virginia statute, 2 W. Va. Code, 1955, §3834.(18), authorizes garnishments to be served upon him to sequester the salaries of state employees. He alone has the obligation and power to issue warrants for the payment of salaries,. and state employees entitled to payment for services may enforce their rights by mandamus against him. State ex rel. Board of Governors of West Virginia University v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 239, 55 S. E. 2d 505; State ex rel. Board of Governors of West Virginia University v. Sims, 136 W. Va. 789, 68 S. E. 2d 489; State ex rel. Board of Governors of West Virginia University v. Sims, 140 W. Va. 64, 82 S. E. 2d 321. By and to the extent of these West Virginia laws petitioner was obligated and empowered in respect to the sequestered salaries. These laws empowered him completely to control the disposition of that fund. He exercised that power by refusing to honor the Government’s valid levies, and to surrender the fund to the Government. Instead he surrendered the fund to the taxpayers. That action by petitioner resulted in defeat of the Government’s valid levies. Upon these principles four judges who are constantly required to pass upon West Virginia laws have held that, under the law of that State, petitioner is a person who was obligated with respect to the salaries covered by the Government’s levies. Their conclusion appears to be founded on reason and authority, and under familiar principles will be accepted here. Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487. Being a person who, under the law of West Virginia, was obligated with respect to the salaries covered by the Government’s levies, petitioner is, by § 6332 (b), made personally liable to the Government in a sum equal to the amount, not exceeding the delinquent taxes, which he refused to surrender to the Government but surrendered instead to the taxpayers in defeat of the Government’s levies. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was therefore correct and must be Affirmed. 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 6331, in pertinent part) provides: “(a) Authority of secretary or delegate. — If any. person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay' the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary or his delegate to collect such tax ... by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer .... “(b) Seizure and sale of property. — The term ‘levy’ as used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means. In any case in .which the Secretary or his delegate may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible).” The assessment against each of the taxpayers substantially exceeded in amount the accrued salary owing to each at the time of the levies. 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §6332 provides: “(a) Requirement. — Any person-in possession of (or obligated with respect to)- property or rights to property subject to levy -upon -which a levy has been made shall, upon demand of the Secretary or his delegate, surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the Secretary or his delegate, except such p^rt of the property or'rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject to an attachment1 or execution under any judicial process. “(b)- Penalty for violation. — Any person who fails or refuses to surrender as required by subsection (a) any property or rights to property, subject to levy, upon demand by the Secretary or his delegate, shall be liable in his own person and.estate to the United States in a sum equal to the value of the property or rights not so surrendered, but not exceeding the amount of the taxes for the collection of which such levy has been made, together with costs and interest on such sum at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of such levy. “(c) Person defined. — The term ‘person,’ as used in subsection (a), includes an officer or employee of. a corporation or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to surrender the property or rights to property, or to discharge the obligation.” Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265, 268; United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F. 2d 983, 986 (C. A. 2d Cir.); 9 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (Rev.), §49.205. The only property exempt from levy is that listed in § 6334 (a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 6334 (a), consisting of certain personal articles, and provisions. It does not exempt salaries or wages. Section 301.6331-1 (a) (4) (ii) of Treasury Regulations relating to Seizure of Property for Collection of Taxes (1954), 26 CFR (revised as of January 1, 1958) §301.6331-1 (a)(4)(h), in pertinent part, provides: “State and municipal employees. Accrued salaries, wages, or other compensation of any officer, employee, or elected or appointed official of a State or Territory, or of any agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof, are also subject to levy to enforce collection of any Federal tax.” This Regulation became effective on January 1, 1955, 1955-1 Cum. Bull., p. 195, § 7851, and therefore prior to the service on petitioner of the Government’s notices of levy in October 1955.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MEAD CORP. No. 99-1434. Argued November 8, 2000 Decided June 18, 2001 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 239. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, William Kanter, Bruce G. Forrest, and Neal S. Wolin. J. Peter Coll, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Kristen Bancroft and Sidney H. Kuflik Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of Exporters and Importers by Peter Buck Feller, Daniel G. Jarcho, and Michael J. Haungs; for Cargill, Inc., et al. by John M. Peterson, Michael K. Tomenga, George W. Thompson, and Curtis W. Knauss; for the Customs and International Trade Bar Association by Sidney N. Weiss and David Serko; for Filofax Inc. by Charles H. Bayar; for the Joint Industry Group et al. by William D. Outman II and Bruce N. Shulman; and for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Timothy J. McCormally and Mary L. Fahey. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel et al. by Walter E. Dellinger and Ronald W Gerdes; and for Professor Thomas W. Merrill, pro se. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service deserves judicial deference. The Federal Circuit rejected Customs’s invocation of Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), in support of such a ruling, to which it gave no deference. We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 (1944), the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness. I A Imports are taxed under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U. S. C. § 1202. Title 19 U. S. C. § 1500(b) provides that Customs “shall, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury,] ... fix the final classification and rate of duty applicable to... merchandise” under the HTSUS. Section 1502(a) provides that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall establish and promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law (including regulations establishing procedures for the issuance of binding rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise concerned), and may disseminate such information as may be necessary to secure a just, impartial, and uniform appraisement of imported merchandise and the classification and assessment of duties thereon at the various ports of entry.” See also §1624 (general delegation to Secretary to issue rules and regulations for the admission of goods). The Secretary provides for tariff rulings before the entry of goods by regulations authorizing “ruling letters” setting tariff classifications for particular imports. 19 CFR § 177.8 (2000). A ruling letter “represents the official position of the Customs Service with respect to the particular transaction or issue described therein and is binding on all Customs Service personnel in accordance with the provisions of this section until modified or revoked. In the absence of a change of practice or other modification or revocation which affects the principle of the ruling set forth in the ruling letter, that principle may be cited as authority in the disposition of transactions involving the same circumstances.” § 177.9(a). After the transaction that gives it birth, a ruling letter is to “be applied only with respect to transactions involving articles identical to the sample submitted with the ruling request or to articles whose description is identical to the description set forth in the ruling letter.” § 177.9(b)(2). As a general matter, such a letter is “subject to modification or revocation without notice to any person, except the person to whom the letter wás addressed,” § 177.9(c), and the regulations consequently provide that “no other person should rely on the ruling letter or assume that the principles of that ruling will be applied in connection with any transaction other than the one described in the letter,” ibid. Since ruling letters respond t'o transactions of the moment, they are not subject to notice and comment before being issued, may be published but need only be made “available for public inspection,” 19 U. S. C. § 1625(a), and, at the time this action arose, could be modified without notice and comment under most circumstances, 19 CFR § 177.10(c) (2000). A broader notice-and-comment requirement for modification of prior rulings was added by statute in 1993, Pub. L. 103-182, § 623, 107 Stat. 2186, codified at 19 U. S. C. § 1625(c), and took effect after this case arose. Any of the 46 port-of-entry Customs offices may issue ruling letters, and so may the Customs Headquarters Office, in providing “[a]dvice or guidance as to the interpretation or proper application of the Customs and related laws with respect to a specific Customs transaction [which] may be requested by Customs Service field offices ... at any time, whether the transaction is prospective, current, or completed,” 19 CFR § 177.11(a) (2000). Most ruling letters contain little or no reasoning, but simply describe goods and state the appropriate category and tariff. A few letters, like the Headquarters ruling at issue here, set out a rationale in some detail. B Respondent, the Mead Corporation, imports “day planners,” three-ring binders with pages having room for notes of daily schedules and phone numbers and addresses, together with a calendar and suchlike. The tariff schedule on point falls under the HTSUS heading for “[registers, account books, notebooks, order books, receipt books, letter pads, memorandum pads, diaries and similar articles,” HTSUS subheading 4820.10, which comprises two subcategories. Items in the first, “[d]iaries, notebooks and address books, bound; memorandum pads, letter pads and similar articles,” were subject to a tariff of 4.0% at the time in controversy. 185 F. 3d 1304, 1305 (CA Fed. 1999) (citing subheading 4820.10.20); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. Objects in the second, covering “[o]ther” items, were free of duty. HTSUS subheading 4820.10.40; see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a. Between 1989 and 1993, Customs repeatedly treated day planners under the “other” HTSUS subheading. In January 1993, however, Customs changed its position, and issued a Headquarters ruling letter classifying Mead’s day planners as “Diaries . . . , bound” subject to tariff under subheading 4820.10.20. That letter was short on explanation, App. to Brief in Opposition 4a-6a, but after Mead’s protest, Customs Headquarters issued a new letter, carefully reasoned but never published, reaching the same conclusion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-47a. This letter considered two definitions of “diary” from the Oxford English Dictionary, the first covering a daily journal of the past day’s events, the second a book including “ ‘printed dates for daily memoranda and jottings; also . . . calendars . . . .’” Id., at 33a-34a (quoting Oxford English Dictionary 321 (Compact ed. 1982)). Customs concluded that “diary” was not confined to the first, in part because the broader definition reflects commercial usage and hence the “commercial identity of these items in the marketplace.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. As for the definition of “bound,” Customs concluded that HTSUS was not referring to “bookbinding,” but to a less exact sort of fastening described in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes to Heading 4820, which spoke of binding by “‘reinforcements or fittings of metal, plastics, etc.’ ” Id., at 45a. Customs rejected Mead’s further protest of the second Headquarters ruling letter, and Mead filed suit in the Court of International Trade (CIT). The CIT granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, adopting Customs’s reasoning without saying anything about deference. 17 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (1998). Mead then went to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. While the case was pending there this Court decided United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U. S. 380 (1999), holding that Customs regulations receive the deference described in Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). The appeals court requested briefing on the impact of Haggar, and the Government argued that classification rulings, like Customs regulations, deserve Chevron deference. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the CIT and held that Customs classification rulings should not get Chevron deference, owing to differences from the regulations at issue in Haggar. Rulings are not preceded by notice and comment as under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 553, they “do not carry the force of law and are not, like regulations, intended to clarify the rights and obligations of importers beyond the specific case under review.” 185 F. 3d, at 1307. The appeals court thought classification rulings had a weaker Chevron claim even than Internal Revenue Service interpretive rulings, to which that court gives no deference; unlike rulings by the IRS, Customs rulings issue from many locations and need not be published. 185 F. 3d, at 1307-1308. The Court of Appeals accordingly gave no deference at all to the ruling classifying the Mead day planners and rejected the agency’s reasoning as to both “diary” and “bound.” It thought that planners were not diaries because they had no space for “relatively extensive notations about events, observations, feelings, or thoughts” in the past. Id., at 1310. And it concluded that diaries “bound” in subheading 4810.10.20 presupposed “unbound” diaries, such that treating ring-fastened diaries as “bound” would leave the “unbound diary” an empty category. Id., at 1311. We granted certiorari, 530 U. S. 1202 (2000), in order to consider the limits of Chevron deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute. We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent. The Customs ruling at issue here fails to qualify, although the possibility that it deserves some deference under Skidmore leads us to vacate and remand. II A When Congresshas “explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843-844, and any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute. See id., at 844; United States v. Morton, 467 U. S. 822, 834 (1984); APA, 5 U. S. C. §§706(2)(A), (D). But whether or not they enjoy any express delegation of authority on a particular question, agencies charged with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices, and while not all of those choices bind judges to follow them, they certainly may influence courts facing questions the agencies have already answered. “[T]he well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,’ ” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624,642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 139-140), and “[w]e have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . Chevron, supra, at 844 (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U. S. 555, 565 (1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position, see Skidmore, supra, at 139-140. The approach has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end, see, e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dish, 467 U. S. 380, 389-390 (1984) (“ 'substantial deference’ ” to administrative construction), to near indifference at the other, see, e. g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212-213 (1988) (interpretation advanced for the first time in a litigation brief). Justice Jackson summed things up in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.: “The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 323 U. S., at 140. Since 1984, we have identified a category of interpretive choices distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference. This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only engages in express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that “[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit.” 467 U. S., at 844. Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provision or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which “Congress did not actually have an intent” as to a particular result. Id,., at 845. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems unwise, see id., at 845-846, but is obliged to accept the agency’s position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, see id., at 842-845; cf. 5 U. S. C. §706(2) (a reviewing court shall set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed. See, e. g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257 (1991) (no Chevron deference to agency guideline where congressional delegation did not include the power to “ ‘promulgate rules or regulations’ ” (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 141 (1976))); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 596-597 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (where it is in doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate particular interpretive authority to an agency, Chevron is “inapplicable”). It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. Cf. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 741 (1996) (APA notice and comment “designed to assure due deliberation”). Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded, see, e. g., NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 256-257, 263 (1995). The fact that the tariff classification here was not a product of such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of Chevron. There are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron deference here. The authorization for classification rulings, and Customs’s practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here. B No matter which angle we choose for viewing the Customs ruling letter in this case, it fails to qualify under Chevron. On the face of the statute, to begin with, the terms of the congressional delegation give no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law. We are not, of course, here making any global statement about Customs’s authority, for it is true that the general rulemaking power conferred on Customs, see 19 U. S. C. § 1624, authorizes some regulation with the force of law, or “legal norms,” as we put it in Haggar, 526 U. S., at 391. It is true as well that Congress had classification rulings in mind when it explicitly authorized, in a parenthetical, the issuance of “regulations establishing procedures for the issuance of binding rulings prior to the entry of the merchandise concerned,” 19 U. S. C. § 1502(a). The reference to binding classifications does not, however, bespeak the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling, once the goods classified are admitted into this country. And though the statute’s direction to disseminate “information” necessary to “secure” uniformity, ibid., seems to assume that a ruling may be precedent in later transactions, precedential value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement; interpretive rules may sometimes function as precedents, see Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L. J. 1463, 1472-1473 (1992), and they enjoy no Chevron status as a class. In any event, any precedential claim of a classification ruling is counterbalanced by the provision for independent review of Customs classifications by the CIT, see 28 U. S. C. §§2638-2640; the scheme for CIT review includes a provision that treats classification rulings on par with the Secretary’s rulings on “valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters,” § 1581(h); see § 2639(b). It is hard to imagine a congressional understanding more at odds with the Chevron regime. It is difficult, in fact, to see in the agency practice itself any indication that Customs ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications like these. Customs does not generally engage in notice- and-comment practice when issuing them, and their treatment by the agency makes it clear that a letter’s binding character as a ruling stops short of third parties; Customs has regarded a classification as conclusive only as between itself and the importer to whom it was issued, 19 CFR § 177.9(c) (2000), and even then only until Customs has given advance notice of intended change, §§ 177.9(a), (c). Other importers are in fact warned against assuming any right of detrimental reliance. § 177.9(c). Indeed, to claim that classifications have legal force is to ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of them each year, see Brief for Respondent 5; CITBA Brief 6 (citing Treasury Advisory Committee on the Commercial Operations of the United States Customs Service, Report of the COAC Subcommittee on OR&R, Exhs. 1, 3 (Jan. 26, 2000) (reprinted in App. to CITBA Brief 20a-21a)). Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply self-refuting. Although the circumstances are less startling here, with a Headquarters letter in issue, none of the relevant statutes recognizes this category of rulings as separate or different from others; there is thus no indication that a more potent delegation might have been understood as going to Headquarters even when Headquarters provides developed reasoning, as it did in this instance. Nor do the amendments to the statute made effective after this case arose disturb our conclusion. The new law requires Customs to provide notice-and-comment procedures only when modifying or revoking a prior classification ruling or modifying the treatment accorded to substantially identical transactions, 19 U. S. C. § 1625(c); and under its regulations, Customs sees itself obliged to provide notice-and-comment procedures only when “changing a practice” so as to produce a tariff increase, or in the imposition of a restriction or prohibition, or when Customs Headquarters determines that “the matter is of sufficient importance to involve the interests of domestic industry,” 19 CFR §§ 177.10(c)(1), (2) (2000). The statutory changes reveal no new congressional objective of treating classification decisions generally as rulemaking with force of law, nor do they suggest any intent to create a Chevron patchwork of classification rulings, some with force of law, some without. In sum, classification rulings are best treated like “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.” Christensen, 529 U. S., at 587. They are beyond the Chevron pale. C To agree with the Court of Appeals that Customs ruling letters do not fall within Chevron is not, however, to place them outside the pale of any deference whatever. Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the “specialized experience and broader investigations and information” available to the agency, 328 U. S., at 139, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires, id., at 140. See generally Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U. S. 121, 136 (1997) (reasonable agency interpretations carry “at least some added persuasive force” where Chevron is inapplicable); Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (according “some deference” to an interpretive rule that “do[es] not require notice and comment”); Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991) (“some weight” is due to informal interpretations though not “the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of... delegated lawmaking powers”). There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case: whether the daily planner with room for brief daily entries falls under “diaries,” when diaries are grouped with “notebooks and address books, bound; memorandum pads, letter pads and similar articles,” HTSUS subheading 4820.10.20; and whether a planner with a ring binding should qualify as “bound,” when a binding may be typified by a book, but also may have “reinforcements or fittings of metal, plastics, etc.,” Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes to Heading 4820, p. 687 (cited in Customs Headquarters letter, App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a. A classification ruling in this situation may therefore at least seek a respect proportional to its “power to persuade,” Skidmore, supra, at 140; see also Christensen, 529 U. S., at 587; id., at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id., at 596-597 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight. D Underlying the position we take here, like the position expressed by Justice Scalia in dissent, is a choice about the best way to deal with an inescapable feature of the body of congressional legislation authorizing administrative action. That feature is the great variety of ways in which the laws invest the Government’s administrative arms with discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts of Congress. Implementation of a statute may occur in formal adjudication or the choice to defend against judicial challenge; it may occur in a central board or office or in dozens of enforcement agencies dotted across the country; its institutional lawmaking may be confined to the resolution of minute detail or extend to legislative rulemaking on matters intentionally left by Congress to be worked out at the agency level. Although we all accept the position that the Judiciary should defer to at least some of this multifarious administrative action, we have to decide how to take account of the great range of its variety. If the primary objective is to simplify the judicial process of giving or withholding deference, then the diversity of statutes authorizing discretionary administrative action must be declared irrelevant or minimized. If, on the other hand, it is simply implausible that Congress intended such a broad range of statutory authority to produce only two varieties of administrative action, demanding either Chevron deference or none at all, then the breadth of the spectrum of possible agency action must be taken into account. Justice Scalia’^ first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s choice has been to tailor deference to variety. This accept-anee of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to recognize more than one variety of judicial deference, just as the Court has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference. Our respective choices are repeated today. Justice Scalia would pose the question of deference as an either- or choice. On his view that Chevron rendered Skidmore anachronistic, when courts owe any deference it is Chevron deference that they owe, post, at 250. Whether courts do owe deference in a given case turns, for him, on whether the agency action (if reasonable) is “authoritative,” post, at 257. The character of the authoritative derives, in turn, not from breadth of delegation or the agency’s procedure in implementing it, but is defined as the “official” position of an agency, ibid., and may ultimately be a function of administrative persistence alone, ante, at 258. The Court, on the other hand, said nothing in Chevron to eliminate Skidmore’s recognition of various justifications for deference depending on statutory circumstances and agency action; Chevron was simply a case recognizing that even without express authority to fill a specific statutory gap, circumstances pointing to implicit congressional delegation present a particularly insistent call for deference. Indeed, in holding here that Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority was not invoked, we hold nothing more than we said last Term in response to the particular statutory circumstances in Christensen, to which Justice Scalia then took exception, see 529 U. S., at 589, just as he does again today. We think, in sum, that Justice Scalia’s efforts to simplify ultimately run afoul of Congress’s indications that different statutes present different reasons for considering respect for the exercise of administrative authority or deference to it. Without being at odds with congressional intent much of the time, we believe that judicial responses to administrative action must continue to differentiate between Chevron and Skidmore, and that continued recognition of Skidmore is necessary for just the reasons Justice Jackson gave when that ease was decided. * * * Since the Skidmore assessment called for here ought to be made in the first instance by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or the CIT, we go no further than to vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The statutory term “ruling” is defined by regulation as “a written statement. . . that interprets and applies the provisions of the Customs and related laws to a specific set of facts.” 19 CFR § 177.1(d)(1) (2000). The opinion of the Federal Circuit in this case noted that § 177.10(c) provides some notice-and-comment procedures for rulings that have the ‘“effect of changing a practice.’” 185 F. 3d 1304, 1307, n. 1 (1999). The appeals court noted that this ease does not involve such a ruling, and specifically excluded such rulings from the reach of its holding. Ibid. As amended by legislation effective after Customs modified its classification ruling in this case, 19 U. S. C. § 1625(c) provides that a ruling or decision that would “modify ... or revoke a prior interpretive ruling or decision which has been in effect for at least 60 days” or would “have the effect of modifying the treatment previously accorded by the Customs Service to substantially identical transactions” shall be “published in the Customs Bulletin. The Secretary shall give interested parties an opportunity to submit, during not less than the 30-day period after the date of such publication, comments on the correctness of the proposed ruling or decision. After consideration of any comments received, the Secretary shall publish a final ruling or decision in the Customs Bulletin within 30 days after the closing of the comment period. The final ruling or decision shall become effective 60 days after the date of its publication.” Brief for Customs and International Trade Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 5 (CITBA Brief). I. e., “a Customs location having a full range of cargo processing functions, including inspections, entry, collections, and verification.” 19 CFR §101.1 (2000). Assuming in each case, of course, that the agency’s exercise of authority is constitutional, see 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(B), and does not exceed its jurisdiction, see §706(2)(C). See, e. g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 142 (1976) (courts consider the “‘thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration’” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944))). See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 417 (1993) (“[T]he consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due”). See, e. g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal agency guideline that is not “subject to the rigors of the [APA], including public notice and comment,” is entitled only to “some deference” (internal quotation marks omitted)). See, e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Disk, 467 U. S. 380, 390 (1984). See Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833,872 (2001) (“[I]f Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent, then Chevron should apply only where Congress would want Chevron to apply. In delineating the types of delegations of agency authority that trigger Chevron deference, it is therefore important to determine whether a plausible case can be made that Congress would want such a delegation to mean that agencies enjoy primary interpretational authority”). For rulemaking cases, see, e. g., Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U. S. 1, 20-21 (2000); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U. S. 380 (1999); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382 (1998); Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U. S. 448 (1998); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U. S. 642 (1997); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735 (1996); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687 (1995); ICC v. Transcon Lines, 513 U. S. 138 (1995); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U. S. 700 (1994); Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, supra; American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U. S. 606 (1991); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83 (1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U. S. 521 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107 (1989); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281 (1988); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 154 (1986); United States v. Fulton, 475 U. S. 657 (1986); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U. S. 121 (1985). For adjudication cases, see, e. g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 423-425 (1999); Federal Employees v. Department of Interior, 526 U. S. 86, 98-99 (1999); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U. S. 392 (1996); ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U. S. 317, 824-325 (1994); National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U. S. 407, 417-418 (1992); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 128 (1991); Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 644-645 (1990); Department of Treasury, IRS v. FLRA, 494 U. S. 922 (1990). In NationsBank of N. C., N. A v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S., at 256-257 (internal quotation marks omitted), we quoted longstanding precedent concluding that “[t)he Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of [the rule of deference] with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.” See also 1 M. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation § 1.3.1, p. 1.41 (1996) (stating that the Comptroller is given “personal authority” under the National Bank Act). Cf. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U. S. 638, 649-650 (1990) (although Congress required the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards implementing certain provisions of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, and “agency determinations within the scope of delegated authority are entitled to deference,” the Secretary’s interpretation of the Act’s enforcement provisions is not entitled to Chevron deference because “[n]o such delegation regarding [those] provisions is evident in the statute”). The ruling in question here, however, does not fall within that category. Although Customs’s decision “is presumed to be correct” on review, 28 U. S. C. § 2639(a)(1), the CIT “may consider any new ground” even if not raised below, § 2638, and “shall make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before the court,” rather than that developed by Customs, § 2640(a); see generally Haggar Apparel, 526 U. S., at 391. Compare Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those in opinion letters — like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law — do not warrant Chevron-style deference”), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 257-258 (1991) (applying Skidmore analysis where Congress did not confer upon the agency authority to promulgate rules or regulations), with Christensen, supra, at 589-591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (urging Chevron treatment); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., supra, at 259-260 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (urging Chevron treatment); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 453-455 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (urging broader application of Chevron). It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hard-edged rule. But Chevron itself is a good example showing when Chevron deference is warranted, while this is a good case showing when it is not. Judges in other, perhaps harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two examples, the way courts have always done. Surely Justice Jackson’s practical criteria, along with Chevron’s concern with congressional understanding, provide more reliable guideposts than conclusory references to the “authoritative” or “official.” Even if those terms provided a true criterion, there would have to be something wrong with a standard that accorded the status of substantive law to every one of 10,000 “official” customs classifications rulings turned out each year from over 46 offices placed around the country at the Nation’s entryways. Justice Scalia tries to avoid that result by limiting what is “authoritative” or “official” to a pronouncement that expresses the “judgment of central agency management, approved at the highest levels,” as distinct from the pronouncements of “underlings,” post, at 259, n. 6. But that analysis would not entitle a Headquarters ruling to Chevron deference; the “highest level” at Customs is the source of the regulation at issue in Haggar, the Commissioner of Customs with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. 526 U. S., at 386. The Commissioner did not issue the Headquarters ruling. What Justice Scalia has in mind here is that because the Secretary approved the Government’s position in its brief to this Court, Chevron deference is due. But if that is so, Chevron deference was not called for until sometime after the litigation began, when central management at the highest level decided to defend the ruling, and the deference is not to the classification ruling as such but to the brief. This explains why the Court has not accepted Justice Scalia’s position.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. No. 404. Argued April 18, 1963. Decided June 3, 1963. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Stuart Rothman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come. Harry S. Benjamin, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Aloysius F. Power. J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine, Thomas E. Harris, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard and Harold A. Cranefield filed a brief for the American Federation 'of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et ah, as amici curiae, urging reversal. Oioen J. Neighbours filed a brief for Raymond E. Lewis et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue here is whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice, National Labor Relations Act §8 (a)(5), when it refuses to bargain with a certified union over the union’s proposal for the adoption of the “agency shop.” More narrowly, since the employer is not obliged to bargain over a proposal that he commit an unfair labor practice, the question is whether the agency shop is an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) (3) of the Act or else is exempted from the prohibitions of that section by the proviso thereto. We ha^e concluded that this type of arrangement does not constitute an unfair labor practice and that it is not prohibited by § 8. Respondent’s employees'are represented by the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, in a single, multiplant, company-wide unit. The 1958 agreement • between union’ and company provides for maintenance of membership and the union shop. These provisions were not operative, however, in such States as Indiana where state law prohibited making union membership a condition of employment. In June 1959, the Indiana intermediate appellate court held that an agency shop arrangement would not violate the state right-to-work law. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N. E. 2d 408. As defined in that opinion, the term “agency shop” applies to an arrangement under which all employees are required as a condition of employment to pay dues to the union and pay the union’s initiation fee, but they need not actually become union members. The union thereafter sent respondent a letter proposing the negotiation of a contractual provision covering Indiana plants “generally similar to that set forth” in the Meade case. Continued employment in the Indiana plants would be conditioned upon the payment of sums equal to the initiation fee and regular monthly dues paid by the union members. The intent of the proposal, the National Labor Relations Board concluded, was not to require membership but to make membership available at the employees’ option and on nondiscriminatory terms. Employees choosing not to join would make the required payments and, in accordance with union custom, would share in union expenditures for strike benefits, educational and retired member benefits, and union publications and promotional activities, but they would not be entitled to attend union meetings, vote upon ratification of agreements negotiated by. the union, or have a voice in the internal affairs of the union. The respondent made no counterproposal, but replied to the union’s letter that the proposed agreement would violate the National Labor Relations Act and that respondent must therefore “respectfully décline to comply with your request for a meeting” to bargain over the proposal. The union thereupon filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board against respondent for its alleged refusal to bargain in good faith. In the Board’s view of the record, “the Union was not seeking to bargain over a clause requiring nonmember employees to pay sums equal to dues and fees as a condition of employment while at the same time maintaining a closed-union policy with respect to applicants for membership,” since the proposal contemplated an arrangement in which “all employees are given the option of becoming, or refraining from becoming, members of the Union.” Proceeding on this basis and putting aside the consequences of a closed-union policy upon the legality of the agency shop, the Board assessed the union’s proposal as comporting fully with the congressional declaration of policy in favor of union-security contracts and therefore a mandatory subject as to which the Act obliged respondent to bargain in good faith. At- the same time, it stated that it had “no doubt that an agency-shop agreement is a permissible form of union-security within the meaning of Sections 7 and 8 (a) (3) of the Act.” Accordingly, the Board ruled that respondent had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain in good faith with the certified bargaining representative of its employees, and it ordered respondent to bargain with the union over the proposed arrangement; no back-pay award is involved in this case. 133 N. L. R. B. 451, 456, 457. Respondent petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals, and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. The Court of Appeals set the order aside on the grounds that the Act tolerates only “an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment” when such agreements do not violate state right-to-work laws, and that the Act does not authorize agreements requiring payment of membership dues to a union, in lieu of membership, as a condition of employment. It held that the proposed agency shop agreement would violate §§ 7, 8 (a)(1), and 8 (a)(3) of the Act and that the employer was therefore not obliged to bargain over it. 303 F. 2d 428 (C. A. 6th Cir.). We granted certiorari, 371 U. S. 908, and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 8 (3) under the Wagner Act was the predecessor to § 8 (a)(3) of the present law. Like § 8 (a)(3), § 8 (3) forbade employers to discriminate against employees to compel them to join a union. Because it was feared that § 8 (3) and § 7, if nothing were added to qualify them, might be held to outlaw union-security arrangements such as the closed shop, see 79 Cong. Rec. 7570 (statement of Senator Wagner), 7674 (statement of Senator Walsh); H. R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17; H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, the proviso to § 8 (3) was added expressly declaring: “Provided, That nothing in this Act ... or in any other statute-of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a) . . . The prevailing administrative and judicial view under the Wagner Act was or came to be that the proviso to § 8 (3) covered both the closed and union shop, as well as less onerous union-security arrangements, if they were otherwise legal. The National Labor Relations Board construed the proviso as shielding from an unfair labor practice charge less severe forms of union-security arrangements than the closed or the union shop, including an arrangement in Public Service Co. of Colorado, 89 N. L. R. B. 418, requiring nonunion members to pay to the union $2 a month “for the support of the bargaining unit.” And in Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 301, 307, which involved a maintenance of membership agreement, the Court, in commenting on petitioner’s contention that the proviso of § 8 (3) affirmatively protected arrangements within its scope, cf. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, said of its purpose: “The short answer is that § 8 (3) merely disclaims a national policy hostile to the closed shop or other forms of union-security agreement.” (Emphasis added.) When Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, it added the following to the. language of the original proviso to §8(3):. “on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment- or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later . . . Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions. generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues 'and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(3). These additions were intended to accomplish twin purposes. On the one hand, the most serious abuses of compulsory unionism were eliminated by abolishing the closed shop. On the other hand, Congress recognized that in the absence of a union-security provision “many employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish by collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of the cost.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6, 1 Leg. Hist. L. M. R. A. 412. Consequently, under the new law “employers would still be permitted to enter into agreements requiring all the employees in a givén bargaining unit to become members 30 days after being hired,” but “expulsion from a union cannot be a ground of compulsory discharge if the worker is not delinquent in paying his initiation fee or dues.” S. Rep. No. 105, p. 7, 1 Leg. Hist. L. M. R. A. 413. The amendments were intended only to “remedy the most serious abuses of compulsory union membership and yet give employers and unions who feel that such agreements promoted stability by eliminating ‘free riders’ the right to continue such arrangements.” Ibid. As far as the federal law was concerned, all employees could be required to pay their way. The bill “abolishes the closed shop but permits voluntary agreements for requiring such forms of compulsory membership as the union shop or maintenance of membership . . . .” S. Rep. No. 105, p. 3, 1 Leg. Hist. L. M. R. A. 409. We find nothing in the legislative history of the Act indicating that Congress intended the amended proviso to §8(a)(3) to validate only the union shop and simultaneously to abolish, in addition to the closed shop, all other union-security arrangements permissible under state law. There is much to be said for the Board’s view that, if Congress desired in the Wagner Act to permit a closed or union shop and in the Taft-Hartley Act the union shop, then it also intended to preserve the status of less vigorous, less compulsory contracts which demanded less adherence to the union. • Respondent, however, relies upon the express words of the proviso which allow employment to be conditioned upon “membership”: since the union’s proposal here does not require actual membership but demands only initiation fees and monthly dues, it is not saved by the proviso. This position, of course, would reject administrative decisions concerning the scope of § 8 (3) of the Wagner Act, e. g., Public Service Co. of Colorado, supra, reaffirmed by the Board-under the Taft-Hartley amendments, American Seating Co., 98 N. L. R. B. 800. Moreover, the 1947 amendments not only abolished the closed shop but also made significant alterations in the meaning of “membership” for the purposes of union-security contracts. Under the second proviso to § 8 (a)(3), the burdens of membership upon which employment may be conditioned are expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. “Membership” as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core. This Court has said as much before in Radio Officers’ Union v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17, 41: “This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees. Thus Congress recognized the validity of unions’ concern about ‘free riders,’ i. e., employees who receive the benefits of union representation but are unwilling to contribute their fair share of financial support to such union, and gave unions the power to contract to meet that problem while withholding from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees for any other reason. . . .” We are therefore confident that the proposal made by the union here conditioned employment upon the practical equivalent of union “membership,” as Congress used that term in the proviso to 18(a)(3). The proposal for requiring the payment of dues and fees imposes no burdens not imposed by a permissible, union shop contract and compels the performance of only those duties of membership which are enforceable by discharge under a union shop arrangement. If an employee in a union shop unit refuses to respect any union-imposed obligations other than the duty to pay dues and fees, and membership in the union is therefore denied or terminated, the condition of “membership” for § 8 (a)(3) purposes is nevertheless satisfied and the employee may not be discharged for nonmembership even though he is not a formal member. Of course, if the union chooses to extend membership even though the employee will meet only the minimum financial burden, and refuses to support or “join” the union in any other .affirmative way, the employee may have to become a “member” under a union shop contract, in the sense that the union may be able to place him on its rolls. The agency shop arrangement proposed here removes that choice from the union and places the option of membership in the employee while still requiring the same monetary support as does the union shop. Such a difference between the union and agency shop may be of great importance in some contexts, but for present purposes it is more formal than real. To the extent that it has any significance at all it serves, rather than violates, the desire of Congress to reduce the evils of compulsory unionism while allowing financial support for the bargaining agent. In short, the employer categorically refused to bargain with the union over a proposal for an agreement within the proviso to § 8 (a) (3) and as such lawful for the purposes of this case. By the same token, § 7, and derivatively §8 (a)(1), cannot be deemed to forbid the employer to enter such agreements, since it too is expressly limited by the § 8 (a) (3) proviso. We hold that the employer was not excused from his duty to bargain over the proposal on the theory that his acceding to it would necessarily involve him in an unfair labor practice. Whether a different result obtains in States which have declared such arrangements unlawful is an issue still to be resolved in Retail Clerks Assn. v. Schermerhorn, post, p. 746, and one which is of no relevance here because Indiana law does not forbid the present contract proposal. In the context of this case, then, the employer cannot justify his refusal to bargain. He violated § 8 (a)(5), and the Board properly ordered him to return to the bargaining table. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a).” “Sec.- 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later “Union Security and Check-Off of Union Membership Dues “(4) An employe who is a member of the-Union at the time this Agreement becomes effective shall continue membership in the Union for the duration of this Agreement to the extent of paying an initiation fee and the membership dues uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the Union. “(4a) An employe who is not a member of the Union at the time this Agreement becomes effective shall become a member of the Union within. 60 days after the thirtieth (30th) day following the effective date of this Agreement or within 60 days after the thirtieth (30th) day following employment, whichever is later, and shall remain a member of Union, to the extent of paying an initiation fee and the membership dues uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the Union, whenever employed under, and for the duration of, this Agreement. “(4b) Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, an employe shall not be required to become a member of, or continue membership in, the Union, as a condition of employment, if employed in any state which prohibits, or otherwise makes unlawful, membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. “(4c) The Union shall accept into membership each employe covered by this Agreement who tenders to the Union the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the Union. “(4f) ‘MemDer of the Union’ as used in paragraphs (4) and (4a) above means any employe who is a member of the Union and is not more than sixty (60) days in arrears in the payment of membership dues.” The union’s vice-president so explained the union proposal, and. the Board seems to have accepted this view. 133 N. L. R. B. 451, at 456, n. 12. The Board also held that respondent’s refusal to bargain interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of , their National Labor Relations Act § 7 rights, contrary to National Labor Relations Act §8 (a)(1). See, e. g., M. & J. Tracy, Inc., 12 N. L. R. B. 916, 931-934; J. E. Pearce Contracting & Stevedoring Co., Inc., 20 N. L. R. B. 1061, 1070-1073. And see the memorandum printed by the Senate committee, commenting upon the final bill, which indicated that the exemption of the proviso was not limited to the closed or union shop: “Unless this change is made as provided in S, 1958, most strikes for a closed shop or even for a preferential shop would by this act be declared to be for an illegal purpose .... “As the legislative history of [N. I. R. A. §] 7 (a) demonstrates, nothing in that section was intended to deprive labor of its existing rights in many States to contract or strike for a closed or preferential shop .... No.reason appears for a contrary view here.” 1 Leg. Hist. N. L. R. A. 1354-1355. This case was decided in 1950, but it was governed by the Wagner Act because the agreement was covered by the saving clause in the Labor Management Relations Act, § 102, 89 N. L. R. B., at 419-420. In that case, the Board stated: “As to the requirement in paragraph 4 that religious objectors who do not become members pay to the Intervenor sums equivalent to dues, the Board has ruled that closed-shop agreements providing for ‘support money’ payments did not violate the proviso to Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act. As the precise language of the 8 (3) proviso in the Wagner Act was continued in the amended Act with certain added qualifications not pertinent-here, and because the legislative history of the amended Act indicates that.Congress intended not to illegalize the practice of obtaining support payments from nonunion members who would otherwise be ‘free riders,’ we find that the provision for support payments in the instant contract does not exceed the union-security' agreements authorized by the Act.” 98 N. L. R. B., at 802. Referring to the Canadian practice, Senator Taft stated that the rule adopted by the Conference Committee “is substantially the rule now in effect in Canada” which is that “the employee must, nevertheless, pay dues, even though he does not join the union” and that if he pays the dues without joining he has the right to be employed. 93 Cong. Rec. 4887, 2 Leg. Hist. L. R. M. A. 1422. Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. Labor Board, 186 F. 2d 1008 (C. A. 7th Cir.). See also Labor Board v. Food Fair Stores, 307 F. 2d 3 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Labor Board v. Local 815, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 290 F. 2d 99 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. Local 450, International Union of Operating Engineers, 281 F. 2d 313, 316-317 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Labor Board v. National Automotive Fibres, Inc., 277 F. 2d 779 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Labor Board v. Die & Tool Makers Lodge, 231 F. 2d 298 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Labor Board v. Mechanics Educational Society of America, 222 F. 2d 429 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Labor Board v. Pape Broadcasting Co., 217 F. 2d 197 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Labor Board v. Philadelphia Iron Works, 211 F. 2d 937 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Labor Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F. 2d 684 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Utley Company, 108 N. L. R. B. 295, enforced, 217 F. 2d 885 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Washington Waterfront Employers, 98 N. L. R. B. 284, enforced, 211 F. 2d 946 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Electric Auto-Lite Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 1073, enforced, 196 F. 2d 500 (C. A. 6th Cir.). Cf. American Seating Co., 98 N. L. R. B. 800, 802, quoted supra. note 8, approving a provision protecting those who object on conscientious grounds from being required to become “members” in the conventional sense of that term. Also wide of the mark is respondent’s further suggestion that Congress contemplated the obligation to pay fees and dues to be imposed only in connection with actual - membership in the union, so as to insure the enjoyment of all union benefits, and rights by those from whom money is extracted. Congress, it is said, had no desire to open the door to compulsory contracts which extract money but exclude the contributing employees from union membership. But, as analyzed by the Board and as the case comes to us, there is no closed-union aspect to the present proposal by the union. Membership remains optional with the employee and the significance of desired, but unavailable, union membership, or the benefits of membership, in terms of permissible § 8 (a) (3) security contracts, we leave for another case. In view of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley amendments to § 8' (a) (3) and of their purposes, we cannot say that optional membership, which is neither compulsory nor unavailable membership, vitiates an otherwise valid union-security arrangement.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SNEPP v. UNITED STATES No. 78-1871. Decided February 19, 1980 Together with No. 79-265, United States v. Snepp, also on petition for certiorari to the same court. Per Curiam. In No. 78-1871, Prank W. Snepp III seeks review of a judgment enforcing an agreement that he signed when he accepted employment with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He also contends that punitive damages are an inappropriate remedy for the breach of his promise to submit all writings about the Agency for prepublication review. In No. 79-265, the United States conditionally cross petitions from a judgment refusing to find that profits attributable to Snepp’s breach .are impressed with a constructive trust. We grant the petitions for certiorari in order to correct the judgment from which both parties seek relief. I Based on his experiences as a CIA agent, Snepp published a book about certain CIA activities in South Vietnam. Snepp published the account without submitting it to the Agency for prepublication review. As an express condition of his employment with the CIA in 1968, however, Snepp had executed an agreement promising that he would “not . . . publish . . . any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval by the Agency.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 78-1871, p. 59a. The promise was an integral part of Snepp’s concurrent undertaking “not to disclose any classified information relating to the Agency without proper authorization.” Id., at 58a. Thus, Snepp had pledged not to divulge classified information and not to publish any information without prepublication clearance. The Government brought this suit to enforce Snepp’s agreement. It sought a declaration that Snepp had breached the contract, an injunction requiring Snepp to submit future writings for prepublication review, and an order imposing a constructive trust for the Government’s benefit on all profits that Snepp might earn from publishing the book in violation of his fiduciary obligations to the Agency. The District Court found that Snepp had “willfully, deliberately and surreptitiously breached his position of trust with the CIA and the [1968] secrecy agreement” by publishing his book without submitting it for prepublication review. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Ya. 1978). The court also found that Snepp deliberately misled CIA officials into believing that he would submit the book for prepublication clearance. Finally, the court determined as a fact that publication of the book had “caused the United States irreparable harm and loss.” Id., at 180. The District Court therefore enjoined future breaches of Snepp’s agreement and imposed a constructive trust on Snepp’s profits. The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the District Court and agreed that Snepp had breached a valid contract. It specifically affirmed the finding that Snepp’s failure to submit his manuscript for prepublication review had inflicted “irreparable harm” on intelligence activities vital to our national security. 595 F. 2d 926, 935 (CA4 1979). Thus, the court upheld the injunction against future violations of Snepp’s prepublication obligation. The court, however, concluded that the record did not support imposition of a constructive trust. The conclusion rested on the court’s perception that Snepp had a First Amendment right to publish unclassified information and the Government’s concession— for the purposes of this litigation — that Snepp’s book divulged no classified intelligence. Id., at 935-936. In other words, the court thought that Snepp’s fiduciary obligation extended only to preserving the confidentiality of classified material. It therefore limited recovery to nominal damages and to the possibility of punitive damages if the Government — in a jury trial — could prove tortious conduct. Judge Hoffman, sitting by designation, dissented from the refusal to find a constructive trust. The 1968 agreement, he wrote, “was no ordinary contract; it gave life to a fiduciary relationship and invested in Snepp the trust of the CIA.” Id., at 938. Prepublication clearance was part of Snepp’s undertaking to protect confidences associated with his trust. Punitive damages, Judge Hoffman argued, were both a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp’s breach. We agree with Judge Hoffman that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust. II Snepp’s employment with the CIA involved an extremely high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust relationship. The trust agreement specifically imposed the obligation not to publish any information relating to the Agency without submitting the information for clearance. Snepp stipulated at trial that — after undertaking this obligation — he had been “assigned to various positions of trust” and that he had been granted “frequent access to classified information, including information regarding intelligence sources and methods.” 456 F. Supp., at 178. Snepp published his book about CIA activities on the basis of this background and exposure. He deliberately and surreptitiously violated his obligation to submit all material for prepublication review. Thus, he exposed the classified information with which he had been entrusted to the risk of disclosure. Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon whether his book actually contained classified information. The Government does not deny — as a general principle— Snepp’s right to publish unclassified information. Nor does it contend — at this stage of the litigation — that Snepp’s book contains classified material. The Government simply claims that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to publish would compromise classified information or sources. Neither of the Government’s concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp’s failure to submit to prepublication review was a breach of his trust. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that a former intelligence agent’s publication of unreviewed material relating to intelligence activities can be detrimental to vital national interests even if the published information is unclassified. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what information is detrimental, he may reveal information that the CIA — with its broader understanding of what may expose classified information and confidential sources — could have identified as harmful. In addition to receiving intelligence from domestically based or controlled sources, the CIA obtains information from the intelligence services of friendly nations and from agents operating in foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the CIA’s ability to guarantee the security of information that might compromise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign agents. Undisputed evidence in this case shows that a CIA agent’s violation of his obligation to submit writings about the Agency for prepublication review impairs the CIA’s ability to perform its statutory duties. Admiral Turner, Director of the CIA, testified without contradiction that Snepp’s book and others like it have seriously impaired the effectiveness of American intelligence operations. He said: “Over the last six to nine months, we have had a number of sources discontinue work with us. We have had more sources tell us that they are very nervous about continuing work with us. We have had very strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison, who have questioned whether they should continue exchanging information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I cannot estimate to you how many potential sources or liaison arrangements have never germinated because people were unwilling to enter into business with us.” 456 F. Supp., at 179-180. In view of this and other evidence in the record, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that Snepp’s breach of his explicit obligation to submit his material— classified or not — for prepublication clearance has irreparably harmed the United States Government. 595 F. 2d, at 935; 456 F. Supp., at 180. Ill The decision of the Court of Appeals denies the Government the most appropriate remedy for Snepp’s acknowledged wrong. Indeed, as a practical matter, the decision may well leave the Government with no reliable deterrent against similar breaches of security. No one disputes that the actual damages attributable to a publication such as Snepp’s generally are unquantifiable. Nominal damages are a hollow alternative, certain to deter no one. The punitive damages recoverable after a jury trial are speculative and unusual. Even if recovered, they may bear no relation to either the Government’s irreparable loss or Snepp’s unjust gain. The Government could not pursue the only remedy that the Court of Appeals left it without losing the benefit of the bargain it seeks to enforce. Proof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages might force the Government to disclose some of the very confidences that Snepp promised to protect. The trial of such a suit, before a jury if the defendant so elects, would subject the CIA and its officials to probing discovery into the Agency’s highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this risk. In a letter introduced at Snepp’s trial, former CIA Director Colby noted the analogous problem in criminal cases. Existing law, he stated, “requires the revelation in open court of confirming or additional information of such a nature that the potential damage to the national security precludes prosecution.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 78-1871, p. 68a. When the Government cannot secure its remedy without unacceptable risks, it has no remedy at all. A constructive trust, on the other hand, protects both the Government and the former agent from unwarranted risks. This remedy is the natural and customary consequence of a breach of trust. It deals fairly with both parties by conforming relief to the dimensions of the wrong. If the agent secures prepublication clearance, he can publish with no fear of liability. If the agent publishes unreviewed material in violation of his fiduciary and contractual obligation, the trust remedy simply requires him to disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness. Since the remedy is swift and sure, it is tailored to deter those who would place sensitive information at risk. And since the remedy reaches only funds attributable to the breach, it cannot saddle the former agent with exemplary damages out of all proportion to his gain. The decision of the Court of Appeals would deprive the Government of this equitable and effective means of protecting intelligence that may contribute to national security. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it refused to impose a constructive trust on Snepp’s profits, and we remand the cases to the Court of Appeals for reinstatement of the full judgment of the District Court. So ordered. Upon the eve of his departure from the Agency in 1976, Snepp also executed a “termination secrecy agreement.” That document reaffirmed his obligation “never” to reveal “any classified information, or any information concerning intelligence or CIA that has not been made public by CIA . . . without the express written consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his representative.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 78-1871, p. 61a. At the time of suit, Snepp already had received about $60,000 in advance payments. His contract with his publisher provides for royalties and other potential profits. 456 F. Supp. 176, 179 (ED Va. 1978). The Court of Appeals and the District Court rejected each of Snepp’s defenses to the enforcement of his contract. 595 F. 2d 926, 931-934 (CA4 1979); 456 F. Supp., at 180-181. In his petition for certiorari, Snepp relies primarily on the claim that his agreement is unenforceable as a prior restraint on protected speech. When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he voluntarily signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily reaffirmed his obligation when he left the Agency. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Snepp’s agreement is an “entirely appropriate” exercise of the CIA Director’s statutory mandate to "protec [t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,” 50 U. S. C. §403 (d)(3). 595 F. 2d, at 932. Moreover, this Court’s cases make clear that — even in the absence of an express agreement — the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment. CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); see Brown v. Glines, ante, p. 348; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-28 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976); id., at 844-848 (Fowell, J., concurring); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972). The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service. See infra, at 511— 512. The agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest. The Government's concession distinguished this litigation from United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972). There, the Government claimed that a former CIA employee intended to violate his agreement not to publish any classified information. 466 F. 2d, at 1313. Marchetti therefore did not consider the appropriate remedy for the breach of an agreement to submit all material for prepub-lication review. By relying on Marchetti in this litigation, the Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between Snepp’s breach and the violation at issue in -Marchetti. The first sentence of the 1968 agreement read: “I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand that upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the Government. . . .” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 78-1871, p. 58a. Quite apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of Snepp’s duties and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish a trust relationship. See 595 F. 2d, at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Few types of governmental employment involve a higher degree of trust than that reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp’s duties. Every major nation in the world has an intelligence service. Whatever fairly may be said about some of its past activities, the CIA (or its predecessor the Office of Strategic Services) is an agency thought by every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt to be essential to the security of the United States and — in a sense — the free world. It is impossible for a government wisely to make critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of dependable foreign intelligence. See generally T. Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1979). In questioning the force of Admiral Turner’s testimony, Mr. Justice SteveNs’ dissenting opinion suggests that the concern of foreign intelligence services may not be occasioned by the hazards of allowing an agent like Snepp to publish whatever he pleases, but by the release of classified information or simply the disagreement of foreign agencies with our Government’s classification policy. Post, at 522-523. Mr. Justice Stevens’ views in this respect not only find no support in the record, but they also reflect a misapprehension of the concern reflected by Admiral Turner’s testimony. If in fact information is unclassified or in the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be concerned. The problem is to ensure in advance, and by proper procedures, that information detrimental to national interest is not published. Without a dependable prepublication review procedure, no intelligence agency or responsible Government official could be assured that an employee privy to sensitive information might not conclude on his own — innocently or otherwise — that it should be disclosed to the world. The dissent argues that the Court is allowing the CIA to “censor” its employees’ publications. Post, at 522. Snepp’s contract, however, requires no more than a clearance procedure subject to judicial review. If Snepp, in compliance with his contract, had submitted his manuscript for review and the Agency had found it to contain" sensitive material, presumably— if one accepts Snepp’s present assertion of good intentions — an effort would have been made to eliminate harmful disclosures. Absent agreement in this respect, the Agency would have borne the burden of seeking an injunction against publication. See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F. 2d 1362 (CA4), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972). Although both the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly found otherwise, Mr. Justice Stevens says that “the interest in confidentiality that Snepp’s contract was designed to protect has not been compromised.” Post, at 516-517. Thus, on the basis of a premise wholly at odds with the record, the dissent bifurcates Snepp’s 1968 agreement and treats its interdependent provisions as if they imposed unrelated obligaT tions. Mr. Justice SteveNS then analogizes Snepp’s prepublication review agreement with the Government to a private employee’s covenant not to compete with his employer. Post, at 518-520. A body of private law intended to preserve competition, however, simply has no bearing on a contract made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation to “protec [t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U. S. C. §403 (d)(3). Judge Hoffman’s dissent suggests that even this remedy may be unavailable if the Government must bring suit in a State that allows punitive damages only upon proof of compensatory damages. 595 F. 2d., at 940. The Court of Appeals majority, however, held as a matter of federal law that the nominal damages recoverable for any breach of a trust agreement will support an exemplary award. See id., at 936, and n. 10, 937-938. See id., at 939 (Hoffman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Mr. Justice Stevens concedes that, even in the absence of a written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential information obtained during the course of his employment. Post, at 518. He also concedes that all personal profits gained from the exploitation of such information are impressed with a constructive trust in favor of the employer. Post, at 521. In this case, he seems to think that the common law would not treat information as “confidential” unless it were “classified.” See, e. g., post, at 518. We have thought that the common-law obligation was considerably more expansive. See, e. g., Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 396 (c), 400 and Comment c, 404 and Comments b, d (1958); 5 A. Scott, Trusts § 505 (3d ed. 1967). But since this case involves the breach of a trust agreement that specifically required the prepublication review of all information about the employer, we need not look to the common law to determine the scope of Snepp’s fiduciary obligation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GREENE v. UNITED STATES. No. 84. Argued November 21, 1963. Decided February 17, 1964. Eugene Gressman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was George Kaufmann. J. William Doolittle argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Douglas, Louis F. Claiborne, Alan S. Rosenthal and Kathryn H. Baldwin. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, the prevailing party in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, comes to this Court for a second time. Prior to April 23, 1953, petitioner was employed by a private corporation producing mechanical and electrical parts for military agencies of the United States. On that date the corporation discharged him because of the revocation of his security clearance by the Department of the Navy. Following his challenge of this revocation, this Court held in 1959 in Greene v. McElroy, supra, that “in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.” Id., at 508. On remand the District Court, declaring that revocation of petitioner’s security clearance was “not validly authorized,” ordered that all rulings denying petitioner’s security clearance be “expunged from all records of the Government of the United States.” In the interim between the security revocation and the District Court order, petitioner had found it necessary to take less remunerative nonsecurity employment. When, after the prolonged litigation, he obtained judicial relief in 1959, his current employment did not require and he did not seek access authorization. He then sought only to recover compensation for the unauthorized governmental action, and to that end, shortly after entry of the court order, formally requested the Department of Defense to provide monetary restitution for his loss of earnings. Petitioner based his claim on a 1955 Department of Defense regulation providing that where there has been “a final determination . . . favorable to a contractor employee,” the employee will be reimbursed “in an equitable amount for any loss of earnings during the interim resulting directly from a suspension of clearance.” The Department of Defense refused to grant restitution under this 1955 regulation but offered to consider petitioner’s claim under a 1960 regulation issued after the claim had arisen and had been formally asserted. Pursuant to the terms of the new regulation, the Department indicated that, as a condition of monetary restitution, it would be necessary to have an administrative determination that he “would be” currently entitled to a security clearance. Petitioner thereupon instituted the present action in the Court of Claims to obtain restitution under the terms of the 1955 regulation and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Court of Claims refused to pass on the merits of petitioner’s claim and, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, ordered proceedings “suspended pending pursuit of administrative remedies [made available] by the Department of Defense.” For the reasons stated below, we hold that petitioner is entitled to restitution under the 1955 regulation and that, under the circumstances, it was error to remit petitioner to further administrative proceedings under the 1960 regulation. I. The facts comprising the background of the present action are fully set forth in Greene v. McElroy, supra, at 476-491, and need only brief restatement here. Petitioner, an aeronautical engineer, was serving as vice president and general manager of Engineering and Research Corporation (ERCO), a private firm producing mechanical and electrical parts for various agencies of the United States Armed Services. Petitioner had been employed by ERCO in 1937 and, except for a brief leave of absence, had continued with the firm. In connection with this employment, which involved classified work for the Armed Forces, he had obtained security clearances. Indeed, before the revocation of his security clearance, the Industrial Employment Review Board, on January 29, 1952, had reversed the action of an inferior board and granted petitioner clearance for secret governmental contract work. On April 17, 1953, however, the Secretary of the Navy notified ERCO that petitioner’s “continued access to Navy classified security information [was] inconsistent with the best interests of National Security.” No hearing preceded this notification. The Secretary further requested ERCO to exclude petitioner “from any part of your plants, factories or sites at which classified Navy projects are being carried out and to bar him access to all Navy classified information.” ERCO had no choice but to comply with this request and so, a week later, on April 23, 1953, petitioner was discharged. Petitioner promptly asked the Navy for reconsideration. A year later he was given a “hearing” in which he was denied an opportunity to confront or cross-examine the allegedly adverse witnesses. On the basis of this proceeding the appropriate administrative boards approved the Secretary’s revocation of security clearance. Petitioner thereupon filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia asking for appropriate injunctive relief and a declaration that the revocation was unlawful and void. The District Court denied relief, 150 F. Supp. 958, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 87, 254 F. 2d 944. Then, as noted above, on June 29, 1959, this Court, reversing the decisions below, held that “in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.” Greene v. McElroy, supra, at 508. On remand, the District Court on December 14, 1959, with the consent of the Government, entered a final order declaring: (1) “that the action of the Secretary of Defense and his subordinates in finally revoking plaintiff’s security clearance was . . . not validly authorized,” and (2) “that any or all rulings, orders, or determinations wherein or whereby plaintiff’s security clearance was revoked are hereby annulled and expunged from all records of the Government of the United States.” Following issuance of this order, petitioner initiated the administrative and legal steps immediately leading to the present action. His current employment did not require and he did not seek an opportunity to obtain current access authorization for classified information; indeed, he plainly says that he does not now “need or want” such authorization. His sole objective is to obtain compensation for the governmental action held by this Court not to have been validly authorized. On December 28, 1959, he made a formal demand of the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy “for monetary restitution from the Department of the Navy and/or the Department of Defense pursuant to Section 26 of the Industrial Personnel Security Review Regulation, 20 Fed. Reg. 1553.” This regulation, issued in 1955, provides as follows: “In cases where a final determination is favorable to a contractor employee, the department whose activity originally forwarded the case to the Director will reimburse the contractor employee in an equitable amount for any loss of earnings during the interim resulting directly from a suspension of clearance.” The General Counsel of the Department of the Navy acknowledged the demand and requested that certain dates and financial data be supplied. A statement of petitioner’s legal position respecting the applicability of the regulation was also requested. On April 20, 1960, he supplied the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy with the requested information and statement of legal position. While petitioner’s claim was thus being processed, the Secretary of Defense on July 28,1960, issued a new Industrial Personnel Access Authorization Review Regulation, a regulation superseding in pertinent part the 1955 regulation under which petitioner had claimed compensation. The language of the new “monetary restitution” provision clearly indicates that the 1955 regulation had been significantly and substantially altered. Thus, instead of simply providing, as the earlier regulation did, that upon “a final determination . . . favorable to a contractor employee” the Government shall provide compensation for the loss of earnings, the 1960 regulation, inter alia, (1) subjects the claimant’s recovery to administrative discretion; (2) requires that “at a later time” the claimant qualify to receive a security clearance equivalent to that originally held or sought; (3) requires that the “favorable determination” be a favorable “administrative” determination; and (4) requires that the contrary determination had been “unjustified.” On January 4, 1961, petitioner was advised that his claim had been forwarded to the Director of the Office of Security Policy of the Department of Defense for final determination. Petitioner then, in a letter addressed to the Director, reiterated his claim and stated that he was entitled to restitution under the 1955 regulation. After further communication, the Director advised petitioner that the Department of Defense was prepared to consider his case under the newly issued 1960 regulation and “to take such action as may be necessary to reach a final determination as to whether it is in the national interest to grant him an authorization for access to classified information.” On March 2, 1961, petitioner again submitted a statement of his legal position concerning the applicability of the 1955 regulation and again pointed out that he had no occasion to require and, therefore, was not seeking current security clearance. He expressly declined to request consideration of his case under the 1960 regulation. The Director responded by reemphasizing the Department’s “willingness to process the question of Mr. Greene’s current eligibility for access authorization under the provisions of the 1960 Review Regulation.” Finally, on June 1, 1961, nearly a year and a half after this Court’s decision and petitioner’s request for compensation, the Deputy General Counsel of the Department of Navy advised petitioner that “[i]n accordance with Department of Defense policy, it has been determined by the Department of Defense that Mr. Greene does not qualify for monetary restitution under the provisions” of the 1955 regulation. This conclusion was coupled with another expression of the Defense Department’s willingness “to undertake the processing of his case under the July 28, 1960 Review Regulation . . . .” Petitioner then commenced the present action in the Court of Claims, alleging that he was entitled to monetary restitution “in an amount equal to the salary or pay which he would have earned at the rate he was receiving on the date of his suspension from employment by ERCO less his earnings from other employment.” Petitioner based his claim on the 1955 regulation and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Government moved “to suspend proceedings in this case pending plaintiff’s pursuit and completion of the administrative remedy available to him in the Department of Defense.” Petitioner responded reasserting that the “July 28, 1960 Review Regulation has no application to. [this] claim for monetary restitution . . that his current employment did not require and that he did not seek or desire access authorization; and, therefore, that he was “not bound to exhaust any remedies under the July 28, 1960 Review Regulation before making such claim or bringing this suit.” The Commissioner of the Court of Claims sustained the Government’s position by ordering “further proceedings . . . suspended pending pursuit of administrative remedies [made available] by the Department of Defense.” The Court of Claims subsequently denied petitioner’s request for review, and this Court granted certiorari, 372 U. S. 974. II. Petitioner contends that his right to monetary restitution must be determined under the 1955 regulation. This regulation provides that governmental liability follows from “a final determination . . . favorable to a contractor employee.” Petitioner concludes that this Court’s decision in Greene v. McElroy, supra, and the District Court order constitute the only final and favorable determination required by the 1955 regulation. He maintains that the judicial order expunging adverse determinations reinstated in effect the security clearance of January 1952 — “at least for the period between petitioner’s discharge on April 23, 1953, and the expungement order of December 14, 1959.” Furthermore, petitioner argues, when in Greene v. McElroy this Court held unauthorized the revocation of security clearance, an act that deprived petitioner of his job, he became entitled as a matter of right to recover damages resulting from the loss of that employment. The Government responds that the 1960, rather than the 1955, regulation applies and that, pursuant to the 1960 regulation, petitioner must establish as a condition of recovery that he now “would be” currently entitled to a security clearance. Alternatively, assuming the 1955 regulation governs, the Government contends that before restitution is allowed there must be “a further showing, at the administrative level, that the challenged revocation of access authorization was not only procedurally incorrect, but substantively wrong.” Specifically, the Government states, to meet the requirements of the 1955 regulation, petitioner “must at least show that he was entitled to clearance during the period for which he claims damages by reason of the denial of clearance.” Finally, the Government argues, even if the 1955 regulation is applicable, petitioner must exhaust the possibility of recovery in administrative proceedings under the 1960 regulation. Whatever petitioner’s rights are, there can be no doubt they matured and were asserted under the 1955 directive. Not until six months after petitioner formally presented his claim to the Department of Defense did the Secretary of Defense issue a new, and substantially revised, regulation concerning “monetary restitution.” Thus the Government’s argument necessarily requires that the 1960 regulation be given retroactive application. As the Court said in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190, 199, “the first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed to the future, not to the past . . . [and] a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless such be ‘the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature.’ ” Since regulations of the type involved in this case are to be viewed as if they were statutes, this “first rule” of statutory construction appropriately applies and under the circumstances, it would be unjustifiable to give the 1960 regulation retroactive effect. Our interpretation of the 1955 regulation makes it clear that petitioner has obtained the requisite final, favorable determination. In Greene v. McElroy, supra, this Court held that the Government had acted without authority in denying petitioner security clearance without providing the traditional safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. On remand, and with the consent of the Government, the District Court entered the order voiding and expunging all determinations adverse to petitioner. As a result of the judicial action and in the absence of intervening administrative proceedings, the only legally cognizable administrative determination — for the period between petitioner’s 1953 discharge and the 1959 ex-pungement order — was the January 1952 ruling granting petitioner security clearance. Thus the final judicial order effectively reinstated the last valid administrative determination, a determination which had been substantively favorable to petitioner. By virtue of the District Court order, therefore, petitioner must be regarded as having obtained, for the period between the discharge and the judicial mandate, a “final” and “favorable” determination. Furthermore, we read the applicable regulation as equitably designed to compensate employees whose security clearance has been improperly or wrongly denied. The directive’s language does not reasonably warrant the implication that a claimant, who has sustained the burden of demonstrating that the Government acted without authority in revoking his clearance without fair procedures, must take on the additional burden of showing at a later time that if he had been afforded fair procedures in the first instance he would have been able to demonstrate successfully that he was entitled to access authorization. On the contrary, the regulation should be interpreted to mean that where a claimant establishes that the Government has improperly denied clearance by its failure to provide fair procedures, the Government is liable and petitioner is entitled to recover “in an equitable amount for any loss of earnings during the interim resulting directly from a suspension of clearance.” In a case such as the present, where the Government has acted without authority in causing the discharge of an employee without providing adequate procedural safeguards, we should be reluctant to conclude that a regulation, not explicitly so requiring, conditions restitution on a retrospective determination of the validity of the substantive reasons for the Government action — reasons which the employee was not afforded an adequate opportunity to meet or rebut at the time of his discharge. This principle is analogous to that reflected in state court decisions recognizing that “a private association’s failure to afford procedural safeguards may result in the imposition of damage liability without inquiry into whether the association’s action lacked substantive basis . . . .” See authorities cited in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 365, n. 18. Having determined that petitioner was entitled to compensation under the 1955 regulation, we must consider whether it was proper, as the Government contends here and the Court of Claims held, to remit petitioner to further administrative proceedings under the 1960 regulation. The Department of Defense, after considering petitioner’s claim for nearly a year and a half following this Court’s decision in Greene v. McElroy, supra, specifically determined that “Mr. Greene does not qualify for monetary restitution under the provisions” of the 1955 regulation. Petitioner’s legitimate claim thus having been presented and rejected, there can be no doubt that he had exhausted the reasonable possibility of administrative proceedings under the applicable regulation. The Government argues in effect, however, that the claim could be administratively processed, and petitioner possibly could recover, under the 1960 regulation and that, by failing to resort to proceedings under the newly issued regulation, petitioner thereby failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. The Department of Defense had clearly declared that in the course of applying the 1960 regulation, it would necessarily “process the question of Mr. Greene’s current eligibility for access authorization . . . .” As we have indicated, however, petitioner, who had to find non-security employment as a result of the 1953 clearance revocation,’ does not now require and is not seeking current access authorization. Therefore, an administrative review of his present eligibility is wholly irrelevant to a determination of his damages under the 1955 regulation. In view of the substantial differences between the two regulations and in view of the additional factual determinations that would be relevant under the 1960 regulation but irrelevant under the 1955 regulation, we conclude the 1960 regulation does not provide a reasonable basis for reviewing petitioner’s rights under the 1955 regulation. We do not suggest that a claimant, seeking damages under a former regulation, need not resort to administrative proceedings under a new regulation where the new regulation contains essentially the same substantive requirements as its predecessor. Since in this case the only available administrative procedure entailed the burden of presenting the claim under an inapplicable and substantially revised regulation, that procedure must be regarded as inappropriate and inadequate and therefore need not be pursued. It follows that petitioner, having exhausted administrative proceedings under the applicable 1955 regulation, properly resorted to the Court of Claims which Congress has invested with jurisdiction to entertain claims asserted against the United States and founded upon “any regulation of an executive department.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491. In summary, then, we hold that petitioner was entitled as a matter of right to compensation under the 1955 regulation and that, when the Department of Defense rejected his claim under that regulation, he was not required to proceed administratively under the newly issued 1960 regulation. In so holding, we do not suggest that if petitioner were now seeking access to security-classified information, he would be entitled to have his clearance qualifications judged by other than current regulations. But all he seeks are damages for the Government’s unauthorized action and to this much, we hold, he is certainly entitled. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the case remanded to that court for a determination of the amount of restitution due petitioner. Reversed and remanded. The text of the District Court order, dated December 14, 1959, is as follows: “Upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in this case (Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474) and the copy of the judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court heretofore filed with the clerk of this Court; and “It appearing that counsel for the respective parties have consented hereto, it is hereby “ORDERED that the action of the Secretary of Defense and his subordinates in finally revoking plaintiff’s security clearance was and the same is hereby declared to be not validly authorized; and it is further “ORDERED that any or all rulings, orders, or determinations wherein or whereby plaintiff’s security clearance was revoked are hereby annulled and expunged from all records of the Government of the United States.” In the prior litigation this Court noted that the Court of Appeals had concluded: “We have no doubt that Greene has in fact been injured. He was forced out of a job that paid him $18,000 per year. He has since been reduced, so far as this record shows, to working as an architectural draftsman at a salary of some $4,400 per year. Further, as an aeronautical engineer of considerable experience he says (without real contradiction) that he is effectively barred from pursuit of many aspects of his profession, given the current dependence of most phases of the aircraft industry on Defense Department contracts not only for production but for research and development work as well. ... Nor do we doubt that, following the Government’s action, some stigma, in greater or less degree, has attached to Greene.” 360 U. S. 474, 491, n. 21, quoting 103 U. S. App. D. C. 87, 95-96, 254 F. 2d 944, 952-953. The pertinent regulation is Paragraph 26, Department of Defense Directive 6220.6, 20 Fed. Reg. 1653, dated February 2, 1955: “Monetary Restitution. In cases where a final determination is favorable to a contractor employee, the department whose activity originally forwarded the case to the Director will reimburse the contractor employee in an equitable amount for any loss of earnings during the interim resulting directly from a suspension of clearance. Such amount shall not exceed the difference between the amount the contractor employee would have earned at the rate he was receiving on the date of suspension and the amount of his interim net earnings. No contractor employee shall be compensated for any increase in his loss of earnings caused by his voluntary action in unduly delaying the processing of his case under this part.” The July 28, 1960, regulation (Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, 25 Fed. Reg. 7523), issued pursuant to an Executive Order of February 20, 1960 (Exec. Order No. 10865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583), contains the following provision for “monetary restitution”: “If an applicant suffers a loss of earnings resulting directly from a suspension, revocation, or denial of his access authorization, and at a later time a final administrative determination is made that the granting to him of an access authorization at least equivalent to that which was suspended, revoked or denied, would be clearly consistent with the national interest and it is determined by the board making a final favorable determination that the administrative determination which resulted in the loss of earnings was unjustified, reimbursement of such loss of earnings may be allowed in an amount which shall not exceed the difference between the amount the applicant would have earned at the rate he was receiving on the date of suspension, revocation, or denial of his access authorization and the amount of his interim net earnings.” The order declared that: “In view of the action this day by the court in Stephen L. Kreznar v. The United States, No. 47-60, and Novera Herbert Spector v. The United States, No. 48-60, further proceedings herein are hereby suspended pending pursuit of administrative remedies [made available] by the Department of Defense.” The cases cited are now pending in this Court on petition for a writ of certiorari, No. 85, this Term. See Greene v. McElroy, supra, at 476, n. 1: “Petitioner was given a Confidential clearance by the Army on August 9,1949, a Top Secret clearance by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Military District of Washington on November 9, 1949, and a Top Secret clearance by the Air Materiel Command on February 3, 1950.” At the time the Secretary acted, the administrative boards that had reviewed petitioner’s earlier clearance had been abolished. See Greene v. McElroy, supra, at 480-483. The full text of the order is set forth in note 1, supra. See note 3, supra. Petitioner stated that he had incurred a $49,960.41 loss of earnings from April 23, 1953, the date of his dismissal, to December 31, 1959. The text of the new provision is set forth in note 4, supra. The text of the order is set forth in note 5, supra. Although petitioner asserts that the Government in this Court in effect concedes that the 1955 regulation must govern, we understand the Government to have framed alternative arguments rather than to have made such a concession. See, e. g., Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 141, 164; Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 776-781 (1936). The purpose of insuring “equity and justice” is reflected by the testimony in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 774r-781. The “interim resulting” would, we believe, in this case extend from petitioner’s discharge in 1953 to issuance of the District Court order expunging the revocation of security clearance. See supra, pp. 156-157. See, e. g., Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 562-563; Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U. S. 587, 591; Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 625-626; 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958), §20.07; Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 Buff. L. Rev. 327, 329-331 (1963). Since we remand the cause to the Court of Claims to fix the amount of compensation, we need not and do not pass on petitioner’s claim under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

McLAUGHLIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR v. RICHLAND SHOE CO. No. 86-1520. Argued February 24, 1988 Decided May 16, 1988 Stevens J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’ConnoR, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 135. Deputy Solicitor General Ayer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Richard G. Taranto, George R. Salem, Allen H. Feldman, and Mary-Helen Mautner. Leon Ehrlich argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Garen E. Dodge filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented concerns the meaning of the word “willful” as used in the statute of limitations applicable to civil actions to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The statute provides that such actions must be commenced within two years “except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” 61 Stat. 88, 29 U. S. C. § 255(a). I Respondent, a manufacturer of shoes and boots, employed seven mechanics to maintain and repair its equipment. In 1984, the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) filed a complaint alleging that “in many work weeks” respondent had failed to pay those employees the overtime compensation required by the FLSA. As an affirmative defense, respondent pleaded the 2-year statute of limitations. The District Court found, however, that the 3-year exception applied because respondent’s violations were willful, and entered judgment requiring respondent to pay a total of $11,084.26, plus interest, to the seven employees. Donovan v. Richland Shoe Co., 623 F. Supp. 667 (ED Pa. 1985). In resolving the question of willfulness, the District Court followed Fifth Circuit decisions that had developed the so-called Jiffy June standard. The District Court explained: “The Fifth Circuit has held that an action is willful when ‘there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that the employer knew or suspected that his actions might violate the FLSA. Stated most simply, we think the test should be: Did the employer know the FLSA was in the picture?’ Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F. 2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir.)[, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 948 (1972)]. “This standard requires nothing more than that the employer has an awareness of the possible application of the FLSA. Id.; Castillo v. Givens, 704 F. 2d 181, 193 (5th Cir.)[, cert. denied, 464 U. S. 850 (1983)]. ‘An employer acts willfully and subjects himself to the three year liability if he knows, or has reason to know, that his conduct is governed by the FLSA.’ Brennan v. Heard, 491 F. 2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original). See also Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., Inc., 695 F. 2d 190, 196 (5th Cir.)[, cert. denied, 463 U. S. 1207 (1983)].” 623 F. Supp., at 670-671. On appeal respondent persuaded the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit “that the Jiffy June standard is wrong because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the FLSA.” Brock v. Richland Shoe Co., 799 F. 2d 80, 82 (1986). Adopting the same test that we employed in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111, 125-130 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that respondent had not committed a willful violation unless “it knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA.” 799 F. 2d, at 83 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, it vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration under the proper standard. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari asking us to resolve the post -Thurston conflict among the Circuits concerning the meaning of the word “willful” in this statute. The petition noted that the statute applies not only to actions to enforce the overtime and recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA, but also to the Equal Pay Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Somewhat surprisingly, the petition did not endorse the Jiffy June standard that the Secretary had relied on in the District Court and the Court of Appeals, but instead invited us to adopt an intermediate standard. We granted certiorari, 484 U. S. 813 (1987), and now affirm. II Because no limitations period was provided in the original 1938 enactment of the FLSA, civil actions brought thereunder were governed by state statutes of limitations. In the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 84, 29 U. S. C. §§216, 251-262, however, as part of its response to this Court’s expansive reading of the FLSA, Congress enacted the 2-year statute to place a limit on employers’ exposure to unanticipated contingent liabilities. As originally enacted, the 2-year limitations period drew no distinction between willful and nonwillful violations. In 1965, the Secretary proposed a number of amendments to expand the coverage of the FLSA, including a proposal to replace the 2-year statute of limitations with a 3-year statute. The proposal was not adopted, but in 1966, for reasons that are not explained in the legislative history, Congress enacted the 3-year exception for willful violations. The fact that Congress did not simply extend the limitations period to three years, but instead adopted a two-tiered statute of limitations, makes it obvious that Congress intended to draw a significant distinction between ordinary violations and willful violations. It is equally obvious to us that the Jiffy June standard of willfulness — a standard that merely requires that an employer knew that the FLSA “was in the picture” — virtually obliterates any distinction between willful and nonwillful violations. As we said in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S., at 128, “it would be virtually impossible for an employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its potential applicability.” Under the Jiffy June standard, the normal 2-year statute of limitations would seem to apply only to ignorant employers, surely not a state of affairs intended by Congress. In common usage the word “willful” is considered synonymous with such words as “voluntary,” “deliberate,” and “intentional.” See Roget’s International Thesaurus §622.7, p. 479; §653.9, p. 501 (4th ed. 1977). The word “willful” is widely used in the law, and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly consistent interpretation, it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely negligent. The standard of willfulness that was adopted in Thurston — that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute — is surely a fair reading of the plain language of the Act. The strongest argument supporting the Jiffy June standard is that it was widely used for a number of years. The standard was not, however, consistently followed in all Circuits. In view of the fact that even the Secretary now shares our opinion that it is not supported by the plain language of the statute, we readily reject it. We also reject the intermediate alternative espoused by the Secretary for the first time in this Court. Relying on the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 185 U. S. App. D. C. 322, 352-354, 567 F. 2d 429, 461-462 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978), she argues that we should announce a two-step standard that would deem an FLSA violation willful “if the employer, recognizing it might be covered by the FLSA, acted without a reasonable basis for believing that it was complying with the statute. ” Brief for Petitioner 41. This proposal differs from Jiffy June because it would apparently make the issue in most cases turn on whether the employer sought legal advice concerning its pay practices. It would, however, permit a finding of willfulness to be based on nothing more than negligence, or, perhaps, on a completely good-faith but incorrect assumption that a pay plan complied with the FLSA in all respects. We believe the Secretary’s new proposal, like the discredited Jiffy June standard, fails to give effect to the plain language of the statute of limitations. Ordinary violations of the FLSA are subject to the general 2-year statute of limitations. To obtain the benefit of the 3-year exception, the Secretary must prove that the employer’s conduct was willful as that term is defined in both Thurston and this opinion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Compare Russo v. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc., 837 F. 2d 40, 45 (CA2 1988) (applying Thurston standard); Peters v. Shreveport, 818 F. 2d 1148, 1167-1168 (CA5 1987) (overruling Jiffy June, applying Thurston), cert. dism’d, 485 U. S. 930 (1988); and Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F. 2d 303, 308-311 (CA7 1986) (applying Thurston), with Brock v. Shirk, 833 F. 2d 1326, 1329 (CA9 1987) (adhering to Jiffy June); Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling Corp., 798 F. 2d 1345, 1349-1350 (CA10 1986) (adhering to Jiffy June); Donovan v. Bel-Loc Diner, Inc., 780 F. 2d 1113, 1117 (CA4 1985) (adhering to Jiffy June); Secretary of Labor v. Daylight Dairy Products, Inc., 779 F. 2d 784, 789 (CA1 1985) (adhering to Jiffy June); and Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F. 2d 1026, 1038-1039 (CA11 1985) (adhering to Jiffy June; no mention of Thurston). See 52 Stat. 1062, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 206(d)(3). 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 40 U. S. C. § 276(a) et seq. 49 Stat. 2036, as amended, 41 U. S. C. §35 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). See 81 Stat. 604, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 626(e)(1). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581, n. 8 (1978). The Portal-to-Portal Act also made the award of liquidated damages discretionary rather than mandatory and authorized exemptions for certain types of wage plans. In this case, respondent contended that one of those exemptions — the exemption for “Belo” plans, see 29 U. S. C. § 207(f) — was applicable. Petitioner directs us to a memorandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Taft during a 1974 debate over amendments to the FLSA that did not alter the language at issue here. See Brief for Petitioner 32. The memorandum described the Jiffy June standard as the then-prevailing interpretation of § 255(a). See 120 Cong. Rec. 4710 (1974). Petitioner concludes that “[notwithstanding that explicit focus on the judicial construction of willfulness, Congress amended Section 255 without addressing the ‘willful violation’ standard of Section 255(a).” Brief for Petitioner 33. This passing reference to the then-prevailing standard is too slender a reed, we think, to support the inference petitioner would have us draw, namely, that Congress approved the Jiffy June standard in enacting the 1974 amendments by mentioning it as the current interpretation and failing to amend that reading. The ease with which the Jiffy June standard can be met is exemplified in this case. As the District Court wrote: “[T]he vice president and general manager of the defendant was aware that the FLSA existed and that it governed overtime systems such as that used for the Richland mechanics. . .« Thus, although Isenberg did not state that he thought that the system used was contrary to the provisions of the FLSA, he did state that he knew that the FLSA applied. I believe that this admission is sufficient to satisfy the liberal willfulness requirement of the FLSA.” Donovan v. Richland Shoe Co., 623 F. Supp. 667, 671 (ED Pa. 1985). See, e. g., Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F. 2d 1139, 1142 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 948 (1972); Brennan v. Heard, 491 F. 2d 1, 3 (CA5 1974); Marshall v. Union Pacific Motor Freight Co., 650 F. 2d 1085, 1091-1093 (CA9 1981); Marshall v. Erin Food Services, Inc., 672 F. 2d 229, 231 (CA1 1982); Donovan v. Carls Drug Co., Inc., 703 F. 2d 650, 652-653 (CA2 1983); EEOC v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 705 F. 2d 1270, 1274-1275 (CA10 1983). See, e. g., Hodgson v. Cactus Craft of Arizona, 481 F. 2d 464, 467 (CA9 1973) (willful violation after two prior warnings and unkept promises of compliance); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 186 U. S. App. D. C. 322, 352-355, 567 F. 2d 429, 459-462 (1976) (intermediate standard; see text following this footnote), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1086 (1978); Donovan v. KFC National Management Co., 682 F. 2d 603, 605 (CA6 1982) (voluntary conduct that employer knows might violate Act is willful). The Secretary’s present opinion of the Jiffy June standard is expressed in her brief: “As this Court found in Thurston (469 U. S. at 128), the ‘in the picture’ standard seems to give too little effect to Congress’s express intent to create two tiers of liability in the FLSA limitations provision. Among employers eventually found to have violated the FLSA, it would seem that there are not many who did not know that the Act was ‘in the picture.’ It may be ‘virtually impossible for an employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its potential applicability’ (ibid.). In addition, the Jiffy June standard would impose a third year of liability even on those employers who firmly and reasonably (albeit wrongly) believe that their pay practices are lawful, a result that seems counter to the concerns expressed in the legislative process during the 89th Congress.” Brief for Petitioner 39-40 (footnote omitted). We recognize that there is some language in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111 (1985), not necessary to our holding, that would seem to permit a finding of unreasonableness to suffice as proof of knowing or reckless disregard, and thus that would render petitioner’s standard an appropriate statement of the law. See id., at 126. Our decision today should clarify this point: If an employer acts reasonably in determining its legal obligation, its action cannot be deemed willful under either petitioner’s test or under the standard we set forth. If an employer acts unreasonably, but not recklessly, in determining its legal obligation, then, although its action would be considered willful under petitioner’s test, it should not be so considered under Thurston or the identical standard we approve today. Of course, we express no view as to whether, under the proper standard, respondent’s violation was “willful.” That determination is for the District Court to make on remand from the Court of Appeals.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. LAS VEGAS SAND & GRAVEL CORP. No. 38. Decided January 15, 1962. Solicitor General Rankin, Stuart Rothman, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come for petitioner. Per Curiam. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The respondent consented to the entry by the National Labor Relations Board of an order directing it to cease and desist from interfering with activities of its employees on behalf of a named labor organization “or of any other labor organization.” The respondent further waived all defenses to the entry by the Court of Appeals of a decree enforcing said order. The Court of Appeals, sua sponte, struck the references to “any other labor organization” wherever they appeared in the Board’s order. 283 F. 2d 26. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with directions that a judgment be entered which affirms and enforces the Board order. Labor Board v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., ante, p. 318. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTH DAKOTA v. YANKTON SIOUX TRIBE et al. No. 96-1581. Argued December 8, 1997 Decided January 26, 1998 O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John Patrick Guhin, Deputy Attorney General. Kenneth W. Cotton filed a brief for the Southern Missouri Waste Management District, respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.4, in support of petitioner. James G. Abourezk argued the cause for respondent Yank-ton Sioux Tribe et al. With him on the brief were Bobbie JRasmusson, Michael H. Scarmon, and Paul Bender. Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Edward J. Shawaker. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed for Charles Mix County, South Dakota, by Tom D. Tobin and Matthew F. Gaffey; for the City of Dante et al. by Timothy B. Whalen; for Duchesne County, Utah, by Herbert Wm. Gillespie; and for Lewis County, Idaho, by Kimron R. Torgerson. Reid Peyton Chambers, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., and William R. Perry filed a brief for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Limgren, Attorney General of California, and Thomas F. Gede, Special Assistant Attorney General, Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of Idaho, and Steven W. Strack, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jan Graham of Utah, and William U. Hill of Wyoming. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This ease presents the question whether, in an 1894 statute that ratified an agreement for the sale of surplus tribal lands, Congress diminished the boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota. The reservation was established pursuant to an 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe. Subsequently, under the Indian General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U. S. C. §381 (Dawes Act), individual members of the Tribe received allotments of reservation land, and the Government then negotiated with the Tribe for the cession of the remaining, unallotted lands. The issue we confront illustrates the jurisdictional quandaries wrought by the allotment policy: We must decide whether a landfill constructed on non-Indian fee land that falls within the boundaries of the original Yankton Reservation remains subject to federal environmental regulations. If the divestiture of Indian property in 1894 effected a diminishment of Indian territory, then the ceded lands no longer constitute “Indian country” as defined by 18 U. S. C. § 1151(a), and the State now has primary jurisdiction over them. In light of the operative language of the 1894 Act, and the circumstances surrounding its passage, we hold that Congress intended to diminish the Yankton Reservation and consequently that the waste site is not in Indian country. I A' At the outset of the 19th century, the Yankton Sioux Tribe held exclusive dominion over 13 million acres of land between the Des Moines and Missouri Rivers, near the boundary that currently divides North and South Dakota. H. Hoover, The Yankton Sioux 25 (1988). In 1858, the Yanktons entered into a treaty with the United States renouncing their claim to more than 11 million acres of their aboriginal lands in the north-central plains. Treaty of Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743. Pursuant to the agreement, the Tribe ceded “all the lands now owned, possessed, or claimed by them, wherever situated, except four hundred thousand acres thereof, situated and described as follows, to wit — Beginning at the mouth of the Naw-izi-wa-koo-pah or Chouteau River and extending up the Missouri River thirty miles; thence due north to a point; thence easterly to a point on the said Chouteau River; thence down said river to the place of beginning, so as to include the said quantity of four hundred thousand acres.” Art. I, id., at 744. The retained portion of the Tribe’s lands, located in what is now the southeastern part of Charles Mix County, South Dakota, was later surveyed and determined to encompass 430,405 acres. See Letter from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 9, 1893), reprinted in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1894) (hereinafter Letter). In consideration for the cession of lands and release of claims, the United States pledged to protect the Yankton Tribe in their “quiet and peaceable possession” of this reservation and agreed that “[n]o white person,” with narrow exceptions, would “be permitted to reside or make any settlement upon any part of the [reservation].” Arts. IV, X, 11 Stat. 744, 747. The Federal Government further promised to pay the Tribe, or expend for the benefit of members of the Tribe, $1.6 million over a 50-year period, and appropriated an additional $50,000 to aid the Tribe in its transition to the reservation through the purchase of livestock and agricultural implements, and the construction of houses, schools, and other buildings. Not all of this assistance was forthcoming, and the Tribe experienced severe financial difficulties in the years that followed, compounded by weather cycles of drought and devastating floods. When war broke out between the United States and the Sioux Nation in 1862, the Yankton Tribe alone sided with the Federal Government, a decision that isolated it from the rest of the Sioux Federation and caused severe inner turmoil as well. The Tribe’s difficulties coincided with a period of rapid growth in the United States’ population, increasing westward migration, and ensuing demands from non-Indians to open Indian holdings throughout the Western States to settlement. In response to these “familiar forces,” DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U. S. 425, 431 (1975), Congress retreated from the reservation concept and began to dismantle the territories that it had previously set aside as permanent and exclusive homes for Indian tribes. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 468, 466 (1984). The pressure from westward-bound homesteaders, and the belief that the Indians would benefit from private property ownership, prompted passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, 24 Stat. 388. The Dawes Act permitted the Federal Government to allot traets of tribal land to individual Indians and, with tribal consent, to open the remaining holdings to non-Indian settlement. Within a generation or two, it was thought, the tribes would dissolve, their reservations would disappear, and individual Indians would be absorbed into the larger community of white settlers. See Hearings on H. R. 7902 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 428 (1934) (statement of D. S. Otis on the histoiy of the allotment policy). With respect to the Yankton Reservation in particular, some Members of Congress speculated that “close contact with the frugal, moral, and industrious people who will settle [on the reservation] [would] stimulate individual effort and make [the Tribe’s] progress much more rapid than heretofore.” Report of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Rep. No. 196, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1894). In accordance with the Dawes Act, each member of the Yankton Tribe received a 160-acre tract from the existing reservation, held in trust by the United States for 25 years. Members of the Tribe acquired parcels of land throughout the 1858 reservation, although many of the allotments were clustered in the southern part, near the Missouri River. By 1890, the allotting agent had apportioned 167,325 acres of reservation land, 95,000 additional acres were subsequently allotted under the Act of February 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, and a small amount of acreage was reserved for government and religious purposes. The surplus amounted to approximately 168,000 acres of unallotted lands. See Letter, at 5. In 1892, the Secretary of the Interior dispatched a three-member Yankton Indian Commission to Greenwood, South Dakota, to negotiate for the acquisition of these surplus lands. See Act of July 13, 1892, 27 Stat. 137 (appropriating fends to enable the Secretary to “negotiate with any Indians for the surrender of portions of their respective reservations”). When the Commissioners arrived on the reservation in October 1892, they informed the Tribe that they had been sent by the “Great Father” to discuss the cession of “this land that [members of the Tribe] hold in common,” Council of the Yankton Indians (Oct. 8, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doe. No. 27, at 48, and they abruptly encountered opposition to the sale from traditionalist tribal leaders. See Report of the Yankton Indian Commission (Mar. 31, 1893), reprinted in S. Exec. Doe. No. 27, at 9-11 (hereinafter Report). In the lengthy negotiations that followed, members of the Tribe raised concerns about the suggested price per acre, the preservation of their annuities under the 1858 Treaty, and other outstanding claims against the United States, but they did not discuss the future boundaries of the reservation. Once the Commissioners garnered a measure of support for the sale of the unallotted lands, they submitted a proposed agreement to the Tribe. Article I of the agreement provided that the Tribe would “cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States” all of the unallotted lands on the reservation. Pursuant to Article II, the United States agreed to compensate the Tribe in a single payment of $600,000, which amounted to $3.60 per acre. Much of the agreement focused on the payment and disposition of that sum. Article YII further provided that all the signatories and adult male members of the Tribe would receive a $20 gold piece to commemorate the agreement. Some members of the Tribe also sought unpaid wages from their service as scouts in the Sioux War, and in Article XV, the United States recognized their claim. The saving clause in Article XVIII, the core of the current disagreement between the parties to this case, stated that nothing in the agreement’s terms “shall be construed to abrogate the treaty [of 1858]” and that “all provisions of the said treaty... shall be in full force and effect, the same as though this agreement had not been made.” By March 1893, the Commissioners had collected signatures from 255 of the 458 male members of the Tribe eligible to vote, and thus obtained the requisite majority endorsement. The Yankton Indian Commission filed its report in May 1893, but congressional consideration was delayed by an investigation into allegations of fraud in the procurement of signatures. On August 15, 1894, Congress finally ratified the 1892 agreement, together with similar surplus land sale agreements between the United States and the Siletz and Nez Perce Tribes. Act of Aug. 15,1894, 28 Stat. 286. The 1894 Act incorporated the 1892 agreement in its entirety and appropriated the necessary funds to compensate the Tribe for the ceded lands, to satisfy the claims for scout pay, and to award the commemorative $20 gold pieces. Congress also prescribed the punishment for violating a liquor prohibition included in the agreement and reserved certain sections in each township for common-school purposes. Ibid. President Cleveland issued a proclamation opening the ceded lands to settlement as of May 21, 1895, and non-Indians rapidly acquired them. By the turn of the century, 90 percent of the unallotted tracts had been settled. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 623 P. 2d 159, 171 (Ct. Cl. 1980). A majority of the individual allotments granted to members of the Tribe also were subsequently conveyed in fee by the members to non-Indians. Today, the total Indian holdings in the region consist of approximately 30,000 acres of allotted land and 6,000 acres of tribal land. Indian Reservations: A State and Federal Handbook 260 (1986). Although formally repudiated with the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461, the policy favoring assimilation of Indian tribes through the allotment of reservation land left behind a lasting legacy. The conflict between the modern-day approach to tribal self-determination and the assimilation impetus of the allotment era has engendered “a spate of jurisdictional disputes between, state and federal officials as to which sovereign has authority over lands that were opened by the [surplus land] Acts and have since passed out of Indian ownership.” Solem, 465 U. S., at 467. B We confront such a dispute in the instant ease, in which tribal, federal, and state officials disagree as to the environmental regulations applicable to a proposed waste site. In February 1992, several South Dakota counties formed the Southern Missouri Recycling and Waste Management District (hereinafter Waste District) for the purpose of constructing a municipal solid waste disposal facility. The Waste District acquired the site for the landfill, which falls within the 1858 boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation, in fee from a non-Indian. The predicate for the parties’ claims in this case is that the waste site lies on land ceded in the 1894 Act, and the record supports that assumption. In the Tribe’s complaint, the proposed landfill is described as “the south one-half north one-quarter (S1/2 N1/4), Section 6, Township 96 North, Range 65 West (S6, T96N, R65W) of the Fifth Principal Meridan [sic], Charles Mix County, South Dakota.” App. 24. That description corresponds to the account of a tract of land deeded to Lars K. Langeland under the Homestead Act in 1904. See App. to Brief for Respondent Southern Missouri Waste Management District la-2a. Because all of the land allotted to individual Indians on the Yankton Reservation was inalienable, pursuant to the Dawes Act, during a 25-year trust period, the tract acquired by a homesteader in 1904 and currently owned by the Waste District must consist of unallotted land ceded in the 1894 Act. (The Dawes Act was amended in 1906 by the Burke Act, 34 Stat. 182, 25 U. S. C. § 349, which permitted the issuance of some fee-simple patents before the expiration of the 25-year trust period, but the restrictions on alienation remained in place as of 1904.) When the Waste District sought a state permit for the landfill, the Yankton Tribe intervened and objected on environmental grounds, arguing that the proposed compacted clay liner was inadequate to prevent leakage. After an administrative hearing in December 1993, the State Board of Minerals and the Environment granted the solid waste permit, finding that South Dakota regulations did not require the installation of the synthetic composite liner the Tribe had requested. The Sixth Judicial Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, and no appeal was taken to the State Supreme Court. In September 1994, the Tribe filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of South Dakota to enjoin construction of the landfill, and the Waste District joined South Dakota as a third party so that the State could defend its jurisdiction to grant the permit. The Tribe also sought a declaratory judgment that the permit did not comport with Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations mandating the installation of a composite liner in the landfill. See 40 CFR § 258.40(b) (1997). The District Court held, in accordance with our decision in South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679, 692 (1993), that the Tribe itself could not assert regulatory jurisdiction over the non-Indian activity on fee lands. Furthermore, because the Tribe did not establish that the landfill would compromise the “political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” the court concluded that the Tribe could not invoke its inherent sovereignty under the exceptions in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 566 (1981). Accordingly, the court declined to enjoin the landfill project, a decision the Tribe does not appeal. The District Court also determined, however, that the 1894 Act did not diminish the exterior boundaries of the reservation as delineated in the 1858 Treaty between the United States and the Tribe, and consequently that the waste site lies within an Indian reservation where federal environmental regulations apply. On appeal by the State, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed that “Congress intended by its 1894 Act that the Yankton Sioux sell their surplus land to the government, but not their governmental authority over it.” 99 F. 3d 1439, 1457 (1996). The court relied primarily on the saving clause in Article XVIII, reasoning that, given its “unusually expansive language,” other sections of the 1894 Act “should be read narrowly to minimize any conflict with the 1858 treaty.” Id., at 1447. The court further concluded that neither the historical evidence nor the demographic development of the area could sustain a finding of diminishment. Id., at 1457. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and a number of decisions of the South Dakota Supreme Court declaring that the reservation has been diminished. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997). We now reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision and hold that the unal-lotted lands ceded as a result of the 1894 Act did not retain reservation status. H-t H-l ' States acquired primary jurisdiction over unallotted opened lands where “the applicable surplus land Act freed that land of its reservation status and thereby diminished the reservation boundaries.” Solem, 465 U. S., at 467. In contrast, if a surplus land Act “simply offered non-Indians the opportunity to purchase land within established reservation boundaries,” id., at 470, then the entire opened area remained Indian country. Our touchstone to determine whether a given statute diminished or retained reservation boundaries is congressional purpose. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 615 (1977). Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights. See, e. g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978). Accordingly, only Congress can alter the terms of an Indian treaty by diminishing a reservation, United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909), and its intent to do so must be “clear and plain,” United States v. Dion, 476 U. S. 734, 738-739 (1986). Here, we must determine whether Congress intended by the 1894 Act to modify the reservation set aside for the Yankton Tribe in the 1858 Treaty. Our inquiry is informed by the understanding that, at the turn of this century, Congress did not view the distinction between acquiring Indian property and assuming jurisdiction over Indian territory as a critical one, in part because “[t]he notion that reservation status of Indian lands might not be coextensive with tribal ownership was unfamiliar,” Solem, 465 U. S., at 468, and in part because Congress then assumed that the reservation system would fade over time. “Given this expectation, Congress naturally failed to be meticulous in clarifying whether a particular piece of legislation formally sliced a certain parcel of land off one reservation.” Ibid.; see also Hagen v. Utah, 510 U. S. 399, 426 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“As a result of the patina history has placed on the allotment Acts, the Court is presented with questions that their architects could not have foreseen”). Thus, although “[t]he most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course, the statutory language used to open the Indian lands,” we have held that we will also consider “the historical context surrounding the passage of the surplus land Acts,” and, to a lesser extent, the subsequent treatment of the area in question and the pattern of settlement there. Id., at 411. Throughout this inquiry, “we resolve any ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we will not lightly find diminishment.” Ibid. A . Article I of the 1894 Act provides that the Tribe will “cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation”; pursuant to Article II, the United States pledges a fixed payment of $600,000 in return. This “cession” and “sum certain” language is “precisely suited” to terminating reservation status. See DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 445. Indeed, we have held that when a surplus land Act contains both explicit language of cession, evidencing “the present and total surrender of all tribal interests,” and a provision for a fixed-sum payment, representing “an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land,” a “nearly conclusive,” or “almost insurmountable,” presumption of diminishment arises. Solem, supra, at 470; see also Hagen, supra, at 411. The terms of the 1894 Act parallel the language that this Court found terminated the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in DeCoteau, supra, at 445, and, as in DeCoteau, the 1894 Act ratified a negotiated agreement supported by a majority of the Tribe. Moreover, the Act we construe here more clearly indicates diminishment than did the surplus land Act at issue in Hagen, which we concluded diminished reservation lands even though it provided only that “all the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain.” See 510 U. S., at 412. The 1894 Act is also readily distinguishable from surplus land Acts that the Court has interpreted as maintaining reservation boundaries. In both Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U. S. 351, 355 (1962), and Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 481, 501-502 (1973), we held that Acts declaring surplus land “subject to settlement, entry, and purchase,” without more, did not evince congressional intent to diminish the reservations. Likewise, in Solem, we did not read a phrase authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to “sell and dispose” of surplus lands belonging to the Cheyenne River Sioux as language of cession. See 465 U. S., at 472. In contrast, the 1894 Act at issue here — a negotiated agreement providing for the total surrender of tribal claims in exchange for a fixed payment — bears the hallmarks of congressional intent to diminish a reservation. B The Yankton Tribe and the United States, appearing as amicus for the Tribe, rest their argument against diminishment primarily on the saving clause in Article XVIII of the 1894 Act. The Tribe asserts that because that clause purported to conserve the provisions of the 1858 Treaty, the existing reservation boundaries were maintained. The United States urges a similarly “holistic” construction of the agreement, which would presume that the parties intended to modify the 1858 Treaty only insofar as necessary to open the surplus lands for settlement, without fundamentally altering the treaty’s terms. Such a literal construction of the saving elause, as the South Dakota Supreme Court noted in State v. Greger, 559 N. W. 2d 854, 863 (1997), would “impugn the entire sale.” The unconditional relinquishment of the Tribe’s territory for settlement by non-Indian homesteaders can by no means be reconciled with the central provisions of the 1858 Treaty, which recognized the reservation as the Tribe’s “permanent” home and prohibited white settlement there. See Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U. S. 753, 770 (1985) (discounting a saving clause on the basis of a “glaring inconsistency” between the original treaty and the subsequent agreement). Moreover, the Government’s contention that the Tribe intended to cede some property but maintain the entire reservation as its territory contradicts the common understanding of the time: that tribal ownership was a critical component of reservation status. See Solem, supra, at 468. We “cannot ignore plain language that, viewed in historical context and given a fair appraisal, clearly runs counter to a tribe’s later claims.” Klamath, supra, at 774 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather than read the saving clause in a manner that eviscerates the agreement in which it appears, we give it a “sensible construction” that avoids this “absurd conclusion.” See United States v. Granderson, 511 U. S. 39, 56 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The most plausible interpretation of Article XVIII revolves around the annuities in the form of cash, guns, ammunition, food, and clothing that the Tribe was to receive in exchange for its aboriginal claims for 50 years after the 1858 Treaty. Along with the proposed sale price, these annuities and other unrealized Yankton claims dominated the 1892 negotiations between the Commissioners and the Tribe. The tribal historian testified, before the District Court, that the loss of their rations would have been “disastrous” to the Tribe, App. 589, and members of the Tribe clearly perceived a threat to the annuities. At a particularly tense point in the negotiations, when the tide seemed to turn in favor of forces opposing the sale, Commissioner John J. Cole warned: “I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the Great Father to-day for a living. Let the Government send out instructions to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let the Government instruct your agent to cease to issue your clothes. . . . Let the Government instruct him to cease to issue your supplies, let him take away the money to run your schools with, and I want to know what you would do. Everything you are wearing and eating is gratuity. Take all this away and throw this people wholly upon their own responsibility to take care of themselves, and what would be the result? Not one-fourth of your people could live through the winter, and when the grass grows again it would be nourished by the dust of all the balance of your noble tribe.” Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 10, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 74. Given the Tribe’s evident concern with reaffirmance of the Government’s obligations under the 1858 Treaty, and the Commissioners’ tendency to wield the payments as an inducement to sign the agreement, we conclude that the saving clause pertains to the continuance of annuities, not the 1858 borders. The language in Article XVIII specifically ensuring that the ‘Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their annuities under the [1858 Treaty]” underscores the limited purpose and scope of the saving clause. It is true that the Court avoids interpreting statutes in a way that “renders some words altogether redundant.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 574 (1995). But in light of the fact that the record of the negotiations between the Commissioners and the Yankton Tribe contains no discussion of the preservation of the 1858 boundaries but many references to the Government’s failure to fulfill earlier promises, see, e. g., Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 3, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 54-55, it seems most likely that the parties inserted and understood Article XVIII, including both the general statement regarding the force of the 1858 Treaty and the particular provision that payments would continue as specified therein, to assuage the Tribes’ concerns about their past claims and future entitlements. Indeed, apart from the pledge to pay annuities, it is hard to identify any provision in the 1858 Treaty that the Tribe might have sought to preserve, other than those plainly inconsistent with or expressly included in the 1894 Act. The Government points to Article XI of the treaty, in which the Tribe agreed to submit for federal resolution “all matters of dispute and difficulty-between themselves and other Indians," 11 Stat. 747, and urges us to extrapolate from this provision that the Tribe implicitly retained jurisdiction over internal matters, and from there to apply the standard canon of Indian law that “[o]nce powers of tribal self-government or other Indian rights are shown to exist, by treaty or otherwise, later federal action which might arguably abridge thdm is construed narrowly in favor of retaining Indian rights.” F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 224 (1982) (hereinafter Cohen). But the treaty’s reference to tribal authority is indirect, at best, and it does not persuade us to view the saving clause as an agreement to maintain exclusive tribal governance within the original reservation boundaries. The Tribe further contends that because Article XVIII affirms that the 1858 Treaty will govern “the same as though [the 1892 agreement] had not been made,” without reference to consistency between those agreements, it has more force than the standard saving clause. While the language of the saving clause is indeed unusual, we do not think it is meaningfully distinct from the saving clauses that have failed to move this Court to find that.pre-existing treaties remain in effect under comparable circumstances. See, e. g., Klamath, 473 U. S., at 769-770; Montana, 450 U. S., at 548, 558-559; Rosebud, 430 U. S., at 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, “it is a commonplace of statutoiy construction that the specific” cession and sum certain language in Articles I and II “governs the general” terms of the saving clause. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384 (1992). Finally, the Tribe argues that, at a minimum, the saving clause renders the statute equivocal, and that confronted with that ambiguity we must adopt the reading that favors the Tribe. See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 (1930). The principle according to which ambiguities are resolved to the benefit of Indian tribes is not, however, “a license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent.” DeCoteau, 420 U. S., at 447; see also South Carolina v. Catawba Tribe, Inc., 476 U. S. 498, 506 (1986). In previous decisions, this Court has recognized that the precise cession and sum certain language contained in the 1894 Act plainly indicates diminishment, and a reasonable interpretation of the saving clause does not conflict with a like conclusion in this case. C Both the State and the Tribe seek support for their respective positions in two other provisions of the 1894 Act: a clause reserving sections of each township for schools and a prohibition on liquor within the ceded lands. Upon ratification, Congress added that “the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections in each Congressional township... shall be reserved for common-school purposes and be subject to the laws of the State of South Dakota.” 28 Stat. 319. This “school sections clause” parallels the enabling Act admitting South Dakota to the Union, which grants the State sections 16 and 36 in every township for the support of common schools, but expressly exempts reservation land “until the reservation shall have been extinguished and such lands restored to ... the public domain.” Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 679. When considering a similar provision included in the Act ceding the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, the Court discerned congressional intent to diminish the reservation, “thereby making the sections available for disposition to the State of South Dakota for ‘school sections.’ ” Rosebud, supra, at 601. The Tribe argues that the clause in the 1894 Act specifying the application of state law would be superfluous if Congress intended to diminish the reservation. As the Court stated in DeCoteau, however, “the natural inference would be that state law is to govern the manner in which the 16th and 36th sections are to be employed ‘for common school purposes,’ ” which “implies nothing about the presence or absence of state civil and criminal jurisdiction over the remainder of the ceded lands.” 420 U. S., at 446, n. 33. Although we agree with the State that the school sections clause reinforces the view that Congress intended to extinguish the reservation status of the unallotted land, a somewhat contradictory provision counsels against finding the reservation terminated. Article VIII of the 1894 Act reserved from sale those surplus lands “as may now be occupied by the United States for agency, schools, and other purposes.” In Solem, the Court noted with respect to virtually identical language that “[i]t is difficult to imagine why Congress would have reserved lands for such purposes if it did not anticipate that the opened area would remain part of the reservation.” 465 U. S., at 474. The State’s position is more persuasively supported by the liquor prohibition included in Article XVII of the agreement. The provision prohibits the sale or offering of “intoxicating liquors” on “any of the lands by this agreement ceded and sold to the United States” or “any other lands within or comprising the reservations of the Yankton Sioux or Dakota Indians as described in the [1858] treaty,” 28 Stat. 318, thus signaling a jurisdictional distinction between reservation and ceded land. The Commissioners’ report recommends that Congress “fix a penalty for the violation of this provision which will make it most effective in preventing the introduction of intoxicants within the limits of the reservation,” Report, at 21, which could be read to suggest that ceded lands remained part of the reservation. We conclude, however, that “the most reasonable inference from the inclusion of this provision is that Congress was aware that the opened, unallotted areas would henceforth not be ‘Indian country.’ ” Rosebud, supra, at 613. By 1892, Congress already had enacted laws prohibiting alcohol on Indian reservations, see Cohen 306-307, and “[w]e assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation,” Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32 (1990). Furthermore, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the provision as prohibiting “the sale or disposition of intoxicants upon any of the lands now within the Yankton Reservation,” Letter, at 6-7 (emphasis added), indicating that the lands would be severed from the reservation upon ratification of the agreement. In Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478 (1914), we implied that the lands conveyed by the 1894 Act lost their reservation status when we construed Article XVII as applying to “ceded lands formerly included in the Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation.” Id., at 480. We now reaffirm that the terms of the 1894 Act, including both the explicit language of cession and the surrounding provisions, attest to Congress’ intent to diminish the Yankton Reservation. Ill Although we perceive congressional intent to diminish the reservation in the plain statutory language, we also take note of the contemporary historical context, subsequent congressional and administrative references to the reservation, and demographic trends. Even in the absence of a clear expression of congressional purpose in the text of a surplus land Act, unequivocal evidence derived from the surrounding circumstances may support the conclusion that a reservation has been diminished. See Solem, 465 U. S., at 471. In this case, although the context of the Act is not so compelling that, standing alone, it would indicate diminishment, neither does it rebut the “almost insurmountable presumption” that arises from the statute’s plain terms. Id., at 470. A The “manner in which the transaction was negotiated” with the Yankton Tribe and “the tenor of legislative Reports presented to Congress” reveal a contemporaneous understanding that the proposed legislation modified the reservation. Id., at 471. In 1892, when the Commissioner of Indian Affairs appointed the Yankton Commission, he charged its members to “negotiate with the [Tribe] for the cession of their surplus lands” and noted that the funds exchanged for the “relinquishment” of those lands would provide a future income for the Tribe. Instructions to the Yankton Indian Commission (July 27, 1892), reprinted in App. 98-99. The negotiations themselves confirm the understanding that by surrendering its interest in the unallotted lands, the Tribe would alter the reservation’s character. Commissioner J. C. Adams informed members of the Tribe that once surplus lands were sold to the “Great Father,” the Tribe would “assist in making the laws which will govern [members of the Tribe] as eitizens of the State and nation.” Council of the Yankton Indians (Oct. 8, 1892), transcribed in S. Exec. Doc. No. 27, at 48. In terms that strongly suggest a reconception of the reservation, Commissioner Cole admonished the Tribe: “This reservation alone proclaims the old time and the old conditions .... The tide of civilization is as resistless as the tide of the ocean, and you have no choice but to accept it and live according to its methods or be destroyed by it. To accept it requires the sale of these surplus lands and the opening of this reservation to white settlement. “You were a great and powerful people when your abilities and energies were directed in harmony with the. conditions which surrounded you, but the wave of civilization which swept over you found you unprepared for the new conditions and you became weak.... [Y]ou must accept the new life wholly. You must break down the barriers and invite the white man with all the elements of civilization, that your young men may have the same opportunities under the new conditions that your fathers had under the old.” Council of the Yankton Indians (Dec. 17, 1892), transcribed id., at 81. Cole’s vivid language and entreaty to “break down the barriers” are reminiscent of the “picturesque” statement that Congress would “pull up the nails” holding down the outside boundary of the Uintah Reservation, which we viewed as evidence of diminishment in Hagen, 510 U. S., at 417. Moreover, the Commissioners’ report of the negotiations signaled their understanding that the cession of the surplus lands dissolved tribal governance of the 1858 reservation. They observed that “now that [members of the Tribe] have been allotted their lands in severalty and have sold their surplus land — the last property bond which assisted to hold them together in their tribal interest and estate — their tribal interests may be considered a thing of the past.” Report, at 19. And, in a March 1894 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, several Yankton chiefs and members of the Tribe indicated that they concurred in such an interpretation of the agreement’s impact. The letter urged congressional ratification of the agreement, explaining that the signatories “want[ed] the laws of the United States and the State that we live in to be recognized and observed,” and that they did not view it as desirable to “keep up the tribal relation ... as the tribal relation on this reservation is an obstacle and hindrance to the advancement of civilization.” S. Misc. Doc. No. 134, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1894). The legislative history itself adds little because Congress considered the Siletz, Nez Perce, and Yankton surplus land sale agreements at the same time, but the few relevant references from the floor debates support a finding of diminishment. Some members noted that the cessions would restore the surplus lands to the “public domain,” see 53 Cong. Rec. 6425 (1894) (remarks of Rep. McCrae); id., at 6426 (remarks of Rep. Hermann), language that indicates congressional intent to diminish a reservation, see Hagen, supra, at 418; Solem, 465 U. S., at 475. That same phrase appears in the annual report of the Commissioner on Indian Affairs that was released in September 1894, just after congressional ratification of the agreement. See Annual Report of the Commissioner on Indian Affairs 26 (Sept. 14, 1894), excerpted in App. 450-452 (noting that under the Siletz, Nez Perce, and Yankton agreements, "some 880,000 acres of land will be restored to the public domain”). Finally, the Presidential Proclamation opening the lands to settlement declared that the Tribe had “ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed to the United States, all [its] claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation set apart to said tribe by the first article [of the 1858 Treaty].” Presidential Proclamation (May 16, 1895), reprinted in App. 453. This Court has described substantially similar language as “an unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement by the Nation’s Chief Executive, of a perceived disestablishment.” Rosebud, 430 U. S., at 602-603. B Despite the apparent contemporaneous understanding that the 1894 Act diminished the reservation, in the years since, both Congress and the Executive Branch have described the reservation in contradictory terms and treated the region in an inconsistent manner. An 1896 statute, for example, refers to “homestead settlers upon the Yankton Indian Reservation,” 29 Stat. 16, while in a Report included in the legislative history for that statute, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs discusses the “former” reservation, H. R. Rep. No. 100, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1896). From the 1896 statutory reference to hearings on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act - nearly a century later, Congress has occasionally, though not invariably, referred to the “Yankton Sioux Reservation.” We have often observed, however, that “the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348-349 (1963). Likewise, the sqores of administrative documents and maps marshaled by the parties to support or contradict diminishment have limited interpretive value. We need not linger over whether the many references to the Yankton Reservation in legislative and administrative materials utilized a convenient geographical description or reflected a considered jurisdictional statement. The mixed record we are presented with “reveals no consistent, or even dominant, approach to the territory in question,” and it “carries but little force” in light of the strong textual and contemporaneous evidence of diminishment. Rosebud, supra, at 605, n. 27; see also Solem, 465 U. S., at 478 (finding subsequent treatment that was “rife with contradictions and inconsistencies” to be “of no help to either side”). C “Where non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we have acknowledged that defacto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred.” Id., at 471. This final consideration is the least compelling for a simple reason: Every surplus land Act necessarily resulted in a surge of non-Indian settlement and degraded the “Indian character” of the reservation, yet we have repeatedly stated that not every surplus land Act diminished the affected reservation. See id., at 468-469. The fact that the Yankton population in the region promptly and drastically declined after the 1894 Act does, however, provide “one additional clue as to what Congress expected,” id., at 472. Today, fewer than 10 percent of the 1858 reservation lands are in Indian hands, non-Indians constitute over two-thirds of the population within the 1858 boundaries, and several municipalities inside those boundaries have been incorporated under South Dakota law. The opening of the tribal casino in 1991 apparently reversed the population trend; the tribal presence in the area has steadily increased in recent years, and the advent of gaming has stimulated the local economy. In addition, some acreage within the 1858 boundaries has reverted to tribal or trust land. See H. Hoover, Yankton Sioux Tribal Land History (1995), reprinted in App. 545-546. Nonetheless, the area remains “predominantly populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments,” and those demographies signify a diminished reservation. Solem, supra, at 471, n. 12. The 'State’s assumption of jurisdiction over the territory, almost immediately after the 1894 Act and continuing virtually unchallenged to the present day, further reinforces our holding. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, South Dakota “has quite consistently exercised various forms of governmental authority over the opened lands,” 99 F. 3d, at 1455, and the “tribe presented no evidence that it has attempted until recently to exercise civil, regulatory, or criminal jurisdiction over nontrust lands.” Id., at 1456. Finally, the Yankton Constitution, drafted in 1932 and amended in 1962, defines the Tribe’s territory to include only those tribal lands within the 1858 boundaries “now owned” by the Tribe. Constitution and Bylaws of the Yankton Sioux Tribal Business and Claims Committee, Art. VI, § 1. IV The allotment era has long since ended, and its guiding philosophy has been repudiated. Tribal communities struggled but endured, preserved their cultural roots, and remained, for the most part, near their historie lands. But despite the present-day understanding of a “government-to-government relationship between the United States and each Indian tribe,” see, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 3601, we must give effect to Congress’ intent in passing the 1894 Act. Here, as in DeCoteau, we believe that Congress spoke clearly, and although “[s]ome might wish [it] had spoken differently,. . . we cannot remake history.” 420 U. S., at 449. The 1894 Act contains the most certain statutory language, evincing Congress’ intent to diminish the Yankton Sioux Reservation by providing for total cession and fixed compensation. Contemporaneous historical evidence supports that conclusion, and nothing in the ambiguous subsequent treatment of the region substantially controverts our reasoning. The conflicting understandings about the status of the reservation, together with the fact that the Tribe continues to own land in common, caution us, however, to limit our holding to the narrow question presented: whether unal-lotted, ceded lands were severed from the reservation. We need not determine whether Congress disestablished the reservation altogether in order to resolve this case, and accordingly decline to do so. Our holding in Hagen was similarly limited, as was the State Supreme Court’s description of the Yankton reservation in Greger. See 510 U. S., at 421; State v. Greger, 559 N. W. 2d, at 867. In sum, we hold that Congress diminished the Yankton Sioux Reservation in the 1894 Act, that the unallotted tracts no longer constitute Indian country, and thus that the State has primary jurisdiction over the waste site and other lands ceded under the Act. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The text of the agreement provides in relevant part: “Article I. “The Yankton tribe of Dakota or Sioux Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation set apart to said Indians as aforesaid. “Article II. “In consideration for the lands ceded, sold, relinquished, and conveyed to the United States as aforesaid, the United States stipulates and agrees to pay to the said Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians the sum of six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000), as hereinbefore provided for. “Article VII. “In addition to the stipulations in the preceding articles, upon the ratification of this agreement by Congress, the United States shall pay to the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians as follows: To each person whose name is signed to this agreement and to each other male member of the tribe who is eighteen years old or older at the date of this agreement, twenty dollars ($20) in one double eagle, struck in the year 1892 as a memorial of this agreement.... “Article VIII. “Such part of the surplus lands hereby ceded and sold to the United States as may now be occupied by the United States for agency, schools, and other purposes, shall be reserved from sale to settlers until they are no longer required for such purposes. But all other lands included in this sale shall, immediately after the ratification of this agreement by Congress, be offered for sale through the proper land office, to be disposed of under the existing land laws of the United States, to actual bona fide settlers only. “Article XV. “The claim of fifty-one Yankton Sioux Indians, who were employed as scouts by General Alf. Sully in 1864, for additional compensation at the rate of two hundred and twenty-five dollars ($225) each, aggregating the sum of eleven thousand four hundred and seventy-five dollars ($11,475) is hereby recognized as just, and within ninety days (90) after the ratification of this agreement by Congress the same shall be paid in lawful money of the United States to the said scouts or to their heirs. “Article XVII. “No intoxicating liquors nor other intoxicants shall ever be sold or given away upon any of the lands by this agreement ceded and sold to the United States, nor upon any other lands within or comprising the reservations of the Yankton Sioux or Dakota Indians as described in the treaty between the said Indians and the United States, dated April 19th, 1858, and as afterwards surveyed and set off to the said Indians. The penalty for the violation of this provision shall be such as Congress may prescribe in the act ratifying this agreement. “Article XVIII. “Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of April 19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux- Indians and the United States. And after the signing of this agreement, and its ratification by Congress, all provisions of the said treaty of April 19th, 1858, shall be in fall force and effect, the same as though this agreement had not been made, and the said Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their annuities under the said treaty of April 19th, 1858.” 28 Stat. 314-318. In 1980, the Court of Claims concluded that the land ceded by the Tribe had a fair market value of $6.65 per acre, or $1,337,381.50, that the $600,000 paid pursuant to the 1892 agreement was “unconscionable and grossly inadequate,” and that the Tribe was entitled to recover the difference. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 623 F. 2d 159, 178. The Waste District explains that it did not appeal because the District Court’s decision allowed it to go forward with construction of the proposed landfill, but it filed a brief as a respondent supporting the petitioner State in this Court because “of the likelihood that the assertion of tribal jurisdiction will continue to affect the District in this or similar contexts.” Brief for Respondent Southern Missouri Waste Management District 6, n. 6. With respect to the particular issue of the landfill’s liner, the Waste District’s concerns appear academic. The EPA has waived the requirement of a composite liner and has permitted construction to go forward with the compacted day liner. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Environmental Protection Agency, 950 F. Supp. 1471, 1482 (SD 1996). See State v. Greger, 559 N. W. 2d 854 (S. D. 1997); see also State v. Thompson, 355 N. W. 2d 349, 350 (S. D. 1984); State v. Williamson, 87 S. D. 512, 515, 211 N. W. 2d 182, 184 (1973); Wood v. Jameson, 81 S. D. 12, 18-19, 130 N. W. 2d 95, 99 (1964). Hearings on Pub. L. .100-497, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, before the Subcommittee on Native American Affairs of the House Committee on Natural Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1994) (held, according to the record, at the Fort Randall Casino Hotel on the “Yankton Sioux Reservation”); see, e. g., 143 Cong. Rec. S9616 (Sept. 18, 1997) (discussion of the Marty Indian School “located on the Yankton Sioux Reservation”); 135 Cong. Rec. 1656 (1989) (description of the Lake Andes-Wagner project, which irrigates “Indian-owned land located on the Yankton Sioux Reservation”). But see 35 Stat. 808 (referring to land “on the former Yankton Reservation”). See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 5173 (Aug. 9, 1929) (extending the trust period on the allotted lands “on the Yankton Sioux Reservation”); Exec. Order No. 2363 (Apr. 30, 1916) (same); Letter to Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs, from Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 1, 1921), reprinted in App. 480 (stating that “Lake Andes is within the former Yankton-Sioux Indian Reservation”); Letter to Yankton Agency from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Aug. 20, 1930), reprinted in App. 481 (discussing lands “heretofore constituting a part of the reservation”); Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Pub. No. 1990 CPH-1-43, p. 175 (1991), reprinted in App. 527 (listing population figures for the Yankton Reservation). The Tribe also highlights a 1941 opinion letter issued by Felix Cohen, then-acting Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, in which he concluded that the Yankton Reservation had not been altered by the 1894 Act because allotments were “scattered over all the reservation,” and the Act was thus distinguishable from statutes that “ceded a definite part of the reservation and treated the remaining areas as a diminished reservation.” See Letter of Aug. 7,1941, reprinted in 1U. S. Dept, of Interior, Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1063,1064 (1979). The letter has not been disavowed but was apparently ignored in subsequent determinations by the agency. A1969 memorandum on tribal courts, for example, plainly stated that the 1894 Act “diminishCed] the area over which the [Yankton] tribe might exercise its authority.” Memorandum M-36783 from Associate Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1 (Sept. 10, 1969), reprinted in App. 518.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DICKMAN et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 82-1041. Argued November 1, 1983 Decided February 22, 1984 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 345. Frank P. Riggs argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Guy S. Emerich, Vester T. Hughes, Jr., M. David Bryant, Jr., and Kathryn G. Henkel. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Harriet S. Shapiro, Michael L. Paup, Jonathan S. Cohen, and Farley P. Katz Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for D’Ancona & Pflaum by Byron S. Miller and Alan L. Reinstein; and for Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue by Erwin N. Griswold. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits as to whether intrafamily, interest-free demand loans result in taxable gifts of the value of the use of the money lent. I A Paul and Esther Dickman were husband and wife; Lyle Dickman was their son. Paul, Esther, Lyle, and Lyle’s wife and children were the owners of Artesian Farm, Inc. (Arte-sian), a closely held Florida corporation. Between 1971 and 1976, Paul and Esther loaned substantial sums to Lyle and Artesian. Over this 5-year interval, the outstanding balances for the loans from Paul to Lyle varied from $144,715 to $342,915; with regard to Paul’s loans to Artesian, the outstanding balances ranged from $207,875 to $669,733. During the same period, Esther loaned $226,130 to Lyle and $68,651 to Artesian. With two exceptions, all the loans were evidenced by demand notes bearing no interest. Paul Dickman died in 1976, leaving a gross estate for federal estate tax purposes of $3,464,011. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue audited Paul Dickman’s estate and determined that the loans to Lyle and Artesian resulted in taxable gifts to the extent of the value of the use of the loaned funds. The Commissioner then issued statutory notices of gift tax deficiency both to Paul Dickman’s estate and to Esther Dickman. Esther Dickman and the estate, petitioners here, sought redetermination of the deficiencies in the Tax Court. Reaffirming its earlier decision in Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T. C. 1060 (1977), aff’d, 685 F. 2d 234 (CA7 1978), the Tax Court concluded that intrafamily, interest-free demand loans do not result in taxable gifts. 41 TCM 620, 623 (1980), ¶80,575 P-H Memo TC, at 2428. Because the Tax Court determined that all the loans to Lyle and Artesian were made payable on demand, it held that the loans were not subject to the federal gift tax. Id., at 624, ¶80,575 P-H Memo TC, at 2428. B The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that gratuitous interest-free demand loans give rise to gift tax liability. 690 F. 2d 812, 819 (1982). Reviewing the language and history of the gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U. S, C. §2501 et seq., the Court of Appeals concluded that Congress intended the gift tax to have the broadest and most comprehensive coverage possible. The court reasoned that the making of an interest-free demand loan constitutes a “transfer of property by gift” within the meaning of 26 U. S. C. § 2501(a)(1), and accordingly is subject to the gift tax provisions of the Code. In so holding, the Court of Appeals squarely rejected the contrary position adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F. 2d 234 (1978). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 459 U. S. 1199 (1983); we affirm. II A The statutory language of the federal gift tax provisions purports to reach any gratuitous transfer of any interest in property. Section 2501(a)(1) of the Code imposes a tax upon “the transfer of property by gif t. ” Section 2511 (a) highlights the broad sweep of the tax imposed by §2501, providing in pertinent part: “Subject to the limitations contained in this chapter, the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible . . . The language of these statutes is clear and admits of but one reasonable interpretation: transfers of property by gift, by whatever means effected, are subject to the federal gift tax. The Committee Reports accompanying the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169, which established the present scheme of federal gift taxation, make plain that Congress intended the gift tax statute to reach all gratuitous transfers of any valuable interest in property. Among other things, these Reports state: “The terms ‘property,’ ‘transfer,’ ‘gift,’ and ‘indirectly’ are used in the broadest and most comprehensive sense; the term ‘property’ reaching every species of right or interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value. “The words ‘transfer ... by gift’ and ‘whether . . . direct or indirect’ are designed to cover and comprehend all transactions . . . whereby, and to the extent. . . that, property or a property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or the device employed in its accomplishment.” H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 27-28 (1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1932). The plain language of the statute reflects this legislative history; the gift tax was designed to encompass all transfers of property and property rights having significant value. On several prior occasions, this Court has acknowledged the expansive sweep of the gift tax provisions. In Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 306 (1945), the Court explained that “Congress intended to use the term ‘gifts’ in its broadest and most comprehensive sense ... [in order] to hit all the protean arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions within the meaning of ordinary speech.” The Court has also noted that the language of the gift tax statute “is broad enough to include property, however conceptual or contingent,” Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 180 (1943), so as “to reach every kind and type of transfer by gift,” Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184, 187 (1943). Thus, the decisions of this Court reinforce the view that the gift tax should be applied broadly to effectuate the clear intent of Congress. B In asserting that interest-free demand loans give rise to taxable gifts, the Commissioner does not seek to impose the gift tax upon the principal amount of the loan, but only upon the reasonable value of the use of the money lent. The taxable gift that assertedly results from an interest-free demand loan is the value of receiving and using the money without incurring a corresponding obligation to pay interest along with the loan’s repayment. Is such a gratuitous transfer of the right to use money a “transfer of property” within the intendment of § 2501(a)(1)? We have little difficulty accepting the theory that the use of valuable property — in this case money — is itself a legally protectible property interest. Of the aggregate rights associated with any property interest, the right of use of property is perhaps of the highest order. One court put it succinctly: “ ‘Property’ is more than just the physical thing — the land, the bricks, the mortar — it is also the sum of all the rights and powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is the tangible and the intangible. Property is composed of constituent elements and of these elements the right to use the physical thing to the exclusion of others is the most essential and beneficial. Without this right all other elements would be of little value . . . .” Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (MD Ga. 1963) (emphasis in original). What was transferred here was the use of a substantial amount of cash for an indefinite period of time. An analogous interest in real property, the use under a tenancy at will, has long been recognized as a property right. E. g., Restatement (Second) of Property § 1.6 (1977); 3 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modem Law of Real Property §1020 (J. Grimes ed. 1980). For example, a parent who grants to a child the rent-free, indefinite use of commercial property having a reasonable rental value of $8,000 a month has clearly transferred a valuable property right. The transfer of $100,000 in cash, interest-free and repayable on demand, is similarly a grant of the use of valuable property. Its uncertain tenure may reduce its value, but it does not undermine its status as property. In either instance, when the property owner transfers to another the right to use the object, an identifiable property interest has clearly changed hands. The right to the use of $100,000 without charge is a valuable interest in the money lent, as much so as the rent-free use of property consisting of land and buildings. In either case, there is a measurable economic value associated with the use of the property transferred. The value of the use of money is found in what it can produce; the measure of that value is interest — “rent” for the use of the funds. We can assume that an interest-free loan for a fixed period, especially for a prolonged period, may have greater value than such a loan made payable on demand, but it would defy common human experience to say that an intrafamily loan payable on demand is not subject to accommodation; its value may be reduced by virtue of its demand status, but that value is surely not eliminated. This Court has noted in another context that the making of an interest-free loan results in the transfer of a valuable economic right: “It is virtually self-evident that extending interest-free credit for a period of time is equivalent to giving a discount equal to the value of the use of the purchase price for that period of time.” Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643, 648 (1980) (per curiam). Against this background, the gift tax statutes clearly encompass within their broad sweep the gratuitous transfer of the use of money. Just as a tenancy at will in real property is an estate or interest in land, so also is the right to use money a cognizable interest in personal property. The right to use money is plainly a valuable right, readily measurable by reference to current interest rates; the vast banking industry is positive evidence of this reality. Accordingly, we conclude that the interest-free loan of funds is a “transfer of property by gift” within the contemplation of the federal gift tax statutes. C Our holding that an interest-free demand loan results in a taxable gift of the use of the transferred funds is fully consistent with one of the major purposes of the federal gift tax statute: protection of the estate tax and the income tax. The legislative history of the gift tax provisions reflects that Congress enacted a tax on gifts to supplement existing estate and income tax laws. H. R. Rep. No. 708, at 28; S. Rep. No. 665, at 40; see also 65 Cong. Rec. 3119-3120, 8095-8096 (1924); Harriss, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 Taxes 531, 536 (1940). Failure to impose the gift tax on interest-free loans would seriously undermine this estate and income tax protection goal. A substantial no-interest loan from parent to child creates significant tax benefits for the lender quite apart from the economic advantages to the borrower. This is especially so when an individual in a high income tax bracket transfers income-producing property to an individual in a lower income tax bracket, thereby reducing the taxable income of the high-bracket taxpayer at the expense, ultimately, of all other taxpayers and the Government. Subjecting interest-free loans to gift taxation minimizes the potential loss to the federal fisc generated by the use of such loans as an income tax avoidance mechanism for the transferor. Gift taxation of interest-free loans also effectuates Congress’ desire to supplement the estate tax provisions. A gratuitous transfer of income-producing property may enable the transferor to avoid the future estate tax liability that would result if the earnings generated by the property — rent, interest, or dividends — became a part of the transferor’s estate. Imposing the gift tax upon interest-free loans bolsters the estate tax by preventing the diminution of the transferor’s estate in this fashion. Ill Petitioners contend that administrative and equitable considerations require a holding that no gift tax consequences result from the making of interest-free demand loans. In support of this position, petitioners advance several policy arguments; none withstands studied analysis. A Petitioners first advance an argument accepted by the Tax Court in Crown v. Commissioner: “[O]ur income tax system does not recognize unrealized earnings or accumulations of wealth and no taxpayer is under any obligation to continuously invest his money for a profit. The opportunity cost of either letting one’s money remain idle or suffering a loss from an unwise investment is not taxable merely because a profit could have been made from a wise investment.” 67 T. C., at 1063-1064. Thus, petitioners argue, an interest-free loan should not be made subject to the gift tax simply because of the possibility that the money lent might have enhanced the transferor’s taxable income or gross estate had the loan never been made. This contention misses the mark. It is certainly true that no law requires an individual to invest his property in an income-producing fashion, just as no law demands that a transferor charge interest or rent for the use of money or other property. An individual may, without incurring the gift tax, squander money, conceal it under a mattress, or otherwise waste its use value by failing to invest it. Such acts of consumption have nothing to do with lending money at no interest. The gift tax is an excise tax on transfers of property; allowing dollars to lie idle involves no transfer. If the taxpayer chooses not to waste the use value of money, however, but instead transfers the use to someone else, a taxable event has occurred. That the transferor himself could have consumed or wasted the use value of the money without incurring the gift tax does not change this result. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, a holding in favor of the taxability of interest-free loans does not impose upon the transferor a duty profitably to invest; rather, it merely recognizes that certain tax consequences inevitably flow from a decision to make a “transfer of property by gift.” 26 U. S. C. § 2501(a)(1). B Petitioners next attack the breadth of the Commissioner’s view that interest-free demand loans give rise to taxable gifts. Carried to its logical extreme, petitioners argue, the Commissioner’s rationale would elevate to the status of taxable gifts such commonplace transactions as a loan of the proverbial cup of sugar to a neighbor or a loan of lunch money to a colleague. Petitioners urge that such a result is an untenable intrusion by the Government into cherished zones of privacy, particularly where intrafamily transactions are involved. Our laws require parents to provide their minor offspring with the necessities and conveniences of life; questions under the tax law often arise, however, when parents provide more than the necessities, and in quantities significant enough to attract the attention of the taxing authorities. Generally, the legal obligation of support terminates when the offspring reach majority. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for parents to provide their adult children with such things as the use of cars or vacation cottages, simply on the basis of the family relationship. We assume that the focus of the Internal Revenue Service is not on such traditional familial matters. When the Government levies a gift tax on routine neighborly or familial gifts, there will be time enough to deal with such a case. Moreover, the tax law provides liberally for gifts to both family members and others; within the limits of the prescribed statutory exemptions, even substantial gifts may be entirely tax free. First, under § 2503(e) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 2503(e) (1982 ed.), amounts paid on behalf of an individual for tuition at a qualified educational institution or for medical care are not considered “transfer^] of property by gift” for purposes of the gift tax statutes. More significantly, § 2503(b) of the Code provides an annual exclusion from the computation of taxable gifts of $10,000 per year, per donee; this provision allows a taxpayer to give up to $10,000 annually to each of any number of persons, without incurring any gift tax liability. The “split gift” provision of Code § 2513(a), which effectively enables a husband and wife to give each object of their bounty $20,000 per year without liability for gift tax, further enhances the ability to transfer significant amounts of money and property free of gift tax consequences. Finally, should a taxpayer make gifts during one year that exceed the § 2503(b) annual gift tax exclusion, no gift tax liability will result until the unified credit of Code §2505 has been exhausted. These generous exclusions, exceptions, and credits clearly absorb the sorts of de minimis gifts petitioners envision and render illusory the administrative problems that petitioners perceive in their “parade of horribles.” C Finally, petitioners urge that the Commissioner should not be allowed to assert the gift taxability of interest-free demand loans because such a position represents a departure from prior Internal Revenue Service practice. This contention rests on the fact that, prior to 1966, the Commissioner had not construed the gift tax statutes and regulations to authorize the levying of a gift tax on the value of the use of money or property. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F. 2d, at 241; Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (ND Tex. 1966). From this they argue that it is manifestly unfair to permit the Commissioner to impose the gift tax on the transactions challenged here. Even accepting the notion that the Commissioner’s present position represents a departure from prior administrative practice, which is by no means certain, it is well established that the Commissioner may change an earlier interpretation of the law, even if such a change is made retroactive in effect. E. g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 72-75 (1965); Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180, 183-184 (1957). This rule applies even though a taxpayer may have relied to his detriment upon the Commissioner’s prior position. Dixon v. United States, supra, at 73. The Commissioner is under no duty to assert a particular position as soon as the statute authorizes such an interpretation. See also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983). Accordingly, petitioners’ “taxpayer reliance” argument is unavailing. I — < <J As we have noted, supra, at 341-342, Congress has provided generous exclusions and credits designed to reduce the gift tax liability of the great majority of taxpayers. Congress clearly has the power to provide a similar exclusion for the gifts that result from interest-free demand loans. Any change in the gift tax consequences of such loans, however, is a legislative responsibility, not a judicial one. Until such a change occurs, we are bound to effectuate Congress’ intent to protect the estate and income tax systems with a broad and comprehensive tax upon all “transferís] of property by gift.” Cf. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U. S. 191, 199 (1982). We hold, therefore, that the interest-free demand loans shown by this record resulted in taxable gifts of the reasonable value of the use of the money lent. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is Affirmed. One exception was a loan made to Lyle on “open account” and payable on demand; the parties have agreed that the gift tax consequences of this “open account” loan are identical to those of the loans evidenced by the demand notes. 41 TCM 620, 623, n. 4 (1980), ¶80,575 P-H Memo TC, at 2427, n. 4. The other exception was a loan made to Artesian and memorialized by a no-interest note having a term of 10 years, the characterization of which has been a matter of dispute. Although the Tax Court held that this loan to Artesian was in substance a demand loan, id., at 624, ¶80,575 P-H Memo TC, at 2428, the Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue, suggesting that the Tax Court consider the valuation consequences of the loan’s characterization on remand. 690 F. 2d 812, 814, n. 3 (CA11 1982). For present purposes, we shall refer to all the loans from Paul and Esther Dickman to Lyle and Artesian as demand loans. In valuing the gifts, the Commissioner multiplied the loan balances outstanding at the end of each taxable quarter by interest rates ranging from six percent to nine percent per annum. These interest rates were taken from § 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 6621, made applicable by Code § 6601 to underpayments of tax. The Commissioner asserted a $42,212.91 deficiency against Paul Dick-man’s estate and a $41,109.78 deficiency against Esther Dickman. The comprehensive scope of the gift tax, reflected by its statutory language and legislative history, is analogous to that of § 61 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 61, which defines gross income as “all income from whatever source derived.” Section 61 has long been interpreted to include all forms of income except those specifically excluded from its reach. See, e. g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426 (1955). Similarly, the gift tax applies to any “transfer of property by gift,” Code § 2501(a)(1), “[s]ubjeet to the limitations contained in this chapter,” Code § 2511(a). Accordingly, absent an express exclusion from its provisions, any transfer meeting the statutory requirements must be held subject to the gift tax. The Commissioner’s tax treatment of interest-free demand loans may perhaps be best understood as a two-step approach to such transactions. Under this theory, such a loan has two basic economic components: an arm’s-length loan from the lender to the borrower, on which the borrower pays the lender a fair rate of interest, followed by a gift from the lender to the borrower in the amount of that interest. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F. 2d 234, 240 (CA7 1978). See also Barker v. Publishers’ Paper Co., 78 N. H. 571, 573, 103 A. 757, 758 (1918) (“In its final analysis, the property in any thing consists in the use”); 1 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 5, p. 31 (J. Grimes ed. 1980) (“The use of a given object is the most essential and beneficial quality or attribute of property”). Petitioners argue that no gift tax consequences should attach to interest-free demand loans because no “transfer” of property occurs at the time the loan is made. Petitioners urge that the term “transfer” “connotes a discrete, affirmative act whereby a person conveys something to another person, not a continuous series of minute failures to require return of something loaned.” Brief for Petitioners 22. We decline to adopt that construction of the statute. In order to make a taxable gift, a transferor must relinquish dominion and control over the transferred property. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511 — 2(b), 26 CFR § 25.2511-2(b) (1983). At the moment an interest-free demand loan is made, the transferor has not given up all dominion and control; he could terminate the transferee’s use of the funds by calling the loan. As time passes without a demand for repayment, however, the transferor allows the use of the principal to pass to the transferee, and the gift becomes complete. See ibid.; Rev. Rul. 69-347, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 227; Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 227. As the Court of Appeals realized, 690 F. 2d, at 819, the fact that the transferor’s dominion and control over the use of the principal are relinquished over time will become especially relevant in connection with the valuation of the gifts that result from such loans; it does not, however, alter the fact that the lender has made a gratuitous transfer of property subject to the federal gift tax. During the taxable periods involved in this case, Code § 2503(b) provided an annual exclusion of $3,000 per year, per donee. Section 441(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 319, amended § 2503(b) by raising the annual exclusion to $10,000 for transfers made after December 31, 1981. Under Code § 2513(a), 26 U. S. C. § 2513(a), a husband and wife may elect to treat a gift in fact made by one spouse as having been made one-half by each spouse. Simply put, the net effect of this “gift-splitting” provision is to double the gift tax exclusions and exemptions applicable to each gift by the donor. In some states, of course, community property laws achieve the same “gift-splitting” result. See generally C. Lowndes, R. Kramer, & J. McCord, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes §35.1 (3d ed. 1974). Under the gift tax system in effect during the taxable periods involved in this case, former Code § 2521 provided a lifetime gift tax exemption of $30,000 for each taxpayer. Section 2001(b)(3) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1849, replaced the lifetime exemption with a unified credit. As modified by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, supra, the unified credit provided by Code § 2505 is scheduled to increase each year until 1987; at that time, the credit will total $192,800, the equivalent of a lifetime exemption of $600,000 per taxpayer. See Code § 2505(b), 26 U. S. C. § 2505(b) (1982 ed.). The Treasury Regulations implementing the gift tax provisions have always reflected the broad scope of the statutory language. See Treas. Regs. 79, Art. 2 (1933); Treas. Regs. 79, Art. 2 (1936); Treas. Regs. 108, § 86.2(a) (1943). The regulation presently in force is virtually identical to those in effect during the preceding five decades; it provides: “The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax.” Treas. Reg. § 25.2511 — 1(c), 26 CFR § 25.2511-l(c) (1983). The longstanding interpretation of the statute embodied in these regulations indicates that the Commissioner’s allegedly novel assertion in 1966 regarding the gift taxability of interest-free demand loans was not without a reasonable and well-established foundation. Indeed, the explanation for the dearth of pre-1966 cases presenting this precise issue is probably economic; the low interest rates that prevailed until recent years diminished the attractiveness of the interest-free demand loan as a tax-planning device and reduced the likelihood that the value of such loans would exceed the annual gift tax exclusion. Petitioners’ detrimental reliance argument must fail for an additional reason. The interest-free demand loans challenged by the Commissioner in this case were made between 1971 and 1976. The Commissioner first litigated the question of the gift taxability of such loans in Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (ND Tex. 1966). Six years later, in Rev. Rui. 78-61, 1973-1 Cum. Bull. 408, the Commissioner formally announced the position that interest-free demand loans give rise to taxable gifts. Because approximately half the loans in this case were made after the Commissioner had issued Rev. Rui. 73-61, petitioners are hardly in a position to argue that they relied to their detriment on a different interpretation of the gift tax statute. In determining the value of the gifts made by Paul and Esther Dickman to Lyle Dickman and Artesian, the Commissioner applied to the loan balances outstanding during each taxable quarter certain interest rates derived from § 6621 of the Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6621. See n. 2, supra. The Court of Appeals declined to address the question, but remanded to the Tax Court for consideration of the method by which the gifts associated with interest-free demand loans should be valued. 690 F. 2d, at 820, and n. 11. The valuation issue is therefore not presented on the record before us. We note, however, that to support a gift tax on the transfer of the use of $100,000 for one year, the Commissioner need not establish that the funds lent did in fact produce a particular amount of revenue; it is sufficient for the Commissioner to establish that a certain yield could readily be secured and that the reasonable value of the use of the funds can be reliably ascertained.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LUJAN, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION et al. No. 89-640. Argued April 16, 1990 Decided June 27, 1990 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’ConnoR, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 900. Acting Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Lawrence S. Robbins, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Anne S. Almy, Fred R. Disheroon, and Vicki L. Plant. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John C. Keeney, Jr., Kathleen C. Zimmerman, and Norman L. Dean, Jr. William Perry Pendley filed a brief for respondents Mountain States Legal Foundation et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Kathryn A. Oberly and John J. Rade-macher; for the American Mining Congress by Jerry L. Haggard and Gerrie Apker Kurtz; for the National Cattlemen’s Association et al. by Constance E. Brooks; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Ronald A. Zum-brun, Robin L. Rivett, and James S. Burling; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Terence P. Ross, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Craig C. Thompson, Susan L. Durbin, Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, and Nilda M. Mesa, Deputy Attorney Generals, and for the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; and for the Wilderness Society et al. by Bmce J. Ennis, Jr. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we must decide whether respondent, the National Wildlife Federation (hereinafter respondent), is a proper party to challenge actions of the Federal Government relating to certain public lands. H — ( Respondent filed this action in 1985 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners the United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an agency within the Department. In its amended complaint, respondent alleged that petitioners had violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. (1982 ed.), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq., and § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §706, in the course of administering what the complaint called the “land withdrawal review program” of the BLM. Some background information concerning that program is necessary to an understanding of this dispute. In various enactments, Congress empowered United States citizens to acquire title to, and rights in, vast portions of federally owned land. See, e. g., Rev. Stat. §2319, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq. (Mining Law of 1872); 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U. S. C. § 181 et seq. (Mineral Leasing Act of 1920). Congress also provided means, however, for the Executive to remove public lands from the operation of these statutes. The Pickett Act, 36 Stat. 847, 43 U. S. C. § 141 (1970 ed.), repealed, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976), authorized the President “at any time in his discretion, temporarily [to] withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States . . . and reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes . . . Acting under this and under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended, 43 U. S. C. §315f, which gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to “classify” public lands as suitable for either disposal or federal retention and management, President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew all unreserved public land from disposal until such time as they were classified. Exec. Order No. 6910, Nov. 26, 1934; Exec. Order No. 6964, Feb. 5, 1935. In 1936, Congress amended § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior “to examine and classify any lands” withdrawn by these orders and by other authority as “more valuable or suitable” for other uses “and to open such lands to entry, selection, or location for disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable public-land laws.” 49 Stat. 1976, 43 U. S. C. §315f (1982 ed.). The amendment also directed that “[s]uch lands shall not be subject to disposition, settlement, or occupation until after the same have been classified and opened to entry.” Ibid. The 1964 classification and multiple use Act, 78 Stat. 986, 43 U. S. C. §§1411-1418 (1970 ed.) (expired 1970), gave the Secretary further authority to classify lands for the purpose of either disposal or retention by the Federal Government. Management of the public lands under these various laws became chaotic. The Public Land Law Review Commission,. established by Congress in 1964 to study the matter, 78 Stat. 982, determined in 1970 that “virtually all” of the country’s public domain, see Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation’s Land 52 (1970) — about one-third of the land within the United States, see id., at 19 — had been withdrawn or classified for retention; that it was difficult to determine “the extent of existing Executive withdrawals and the degree to which withdrawals overlap each other,” id., at 52; and that there were inadequate records to show the purposes of withdrawals and the permissible public uses. Ibid. Accordingly, it recommended that “Congress should provide for a careful review of (1) all Executive withdrawals and reservations, and (2) BLM retention and disposal classifications under the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964.” Ibid. In 1976, Congress passed the FLPMA, which repealed many of the miscellaneous laws governing disposal of public land, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. (1982 ed.), and established a policy in favor of retaining public lands for multiple use management. It directed the Secretary to “prepare and maintain on a continuing basis an inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values,” § 1711(a), required land use planning for public lands, and established criteria to be used for that purpose, § 1712. It provided that existing classifications of public lands were subject to review in the land use planning process, and that the Secretary could “modify or terminate any such classification consistent with such land use plans.” § 1712(d). It also authorized the Secretary to “make, modify, extend or revoke” withdrawals. § 1714(a). Finally it directed the Secretary, within 15 years, to review withdrawals in existence in 1976 in 11 Western States, § 1714 (0( 1), and to “determine whether, and for how long, the continuation of the existing withdrawal of the lands would be, in his judgment, consistent with the statutory objectives of the programs for which the lands were dedicated and of the other relevant programs,” § 1714(0(2). The activities undertaken by the BLM to comply with these various provisions constitute what respondent’s amended complaint styles the BLM’s “land withdrawal review program,” which is the subject of the current litigation. Pursuant to the directives of the FLPMA, petitioners engage in a number of different types of administrative action with respect to the various tracts of public land within the United States. First, the BLM conducts the review and recommends the determinations required by § 1714(0 with respect to withdrawals in 11 Western States. The law requires the Secretary to “report his recommendations to the President, together with statements of concurrence or non-concurrence submitted by the heads of the departments or agencies which administer the lands”; the President must in turn submit this report to the Congress, together with his recommendation “for action by the Secretary, or for legislation.” § 1714(0(2). The Secretary has submitted a number of reports to the President in accordance with this provision. Second, the Secretary revokes some withdrawals under § 204(a) of the Act, which the Office of the Solicitor has interpreted to give the Secretary the power to process proposals for revocation of withdrawals made during the “ordinary course of business.” U. S. Dept, of the Interior, Memorandum from the Office of the Solicitor, Oct. 30, 1980. These revocations are initiated in one of three manners: An agency or department holding a portion of withdrawn land that it no longer needs may file a notice of intention to relinquish the lands with the BLM. Any member of the public may file a petition requesting revocation. And in the case of lands held by the BLM, the BLM itself may initiate the revocation proposal. App. 56-57. Withdrawal revocations may be made for several reasons. Some are effected in order to permit sale of the land; some for record-clearing purposes, where the withdrawal designation has been superseded by congressional action or overlaps with another withdrawal designation; some in order to restore the land to multiple use management pursuant to § 102(a)(7) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1701(a)(7) (1982 ed.). App. 142-145. Third, the Secretary engages in the ongoing process of classifying public lands, either for multiple use management, 43 CFR pt. 2420 (1988), for disposal, pt. 2430, or for other uses. Classification decisions may be initiated by petition, pt. 2450, or by the BLM itself, pt. 2460. Regulations promulgated by the Secretary prescribe the procedures to be followed in the case of each type of classification determination. HH I — I In its complaint, respondent averred generally that the reclassification of some withdrawn lands and the return of others to the public domain would open the lands up to mining activities, thereby destroying their natural beauty. Respondent alleged that petitioners, in the course of administering the Nation’s public lands, had violated the FLPMA by failing to “develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands,” 43 U. S. C. § 1712(a) (1982 ed.); failing to submit recommendations as to withdrawals in the 11 Western States to the President, § 1714(Z); failing to consider multiple uses for the disputed lands, § 1732(a), focusing inordinately on such uses as mineral exploitation and development; and failing to provide public notice of decisions, §§ 1701(a)(5), 1712(c)(9), 1712(f), and 1739(e). Respondent also claimed that petitioners had violated NEPA, which requires federal agencies to “include in every recommendation or report on . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . the environmental impact of the proposed action.” 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C) (1982 ed.). Finally, respondent alleged that all of the above actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” and should therefore be set aside pursuant to § 10(e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §706. Appended to the amended complaint was a schedule of specific land-status determinations, which the complaint stated had been “taken by defendants since January 1, 1981”; each was identified by a listing in the Federal Register. In December 1985, the District Court granted respondent’s motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting petitioners from “[m]odifying, terminating or altering any withdrawal, classification, or other designation governing the protection of lands in the public domain that was in effect on January 1, 1981,” and from “[tjaking any action inconsistent” with any such withdrawal, classification, or designation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 185a. In a subsequent order, the court denied petitioners’ motion under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint for failure to demonstrate standing to challenge petitioners’ actions under the APA, 5 U. S. C. §702. App. to Pet. for Cert. 183a. The Court of Appeals affirmed both orders. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 266 U. S. App. D. C. 241, 835 F. 2d 305 (1987). As to the motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals found sufficient to survive the motion the general allegation in the amended complaint that respondent’s members used environmental resources that would be damaged by petitioners’ actions. See id., at 248, 835 F. 2d, at 312. It held that this allegation, fairly read along with the balance of the complaint, both identified particular land-status actions that respondent sought to challenge — since at least some of the actions complained of were listed in the complaint’s appendix of Federal Register references — and asserted harm to respondent’s members attributable to those particular actions. Id., at 249, 835 F. 2d, at 313. To support the latter point, the Court of Appeals pointed to the affidavits of two of respondent’s members, Peggy Kay Peterson and Richard Erman, which claimed use of land “in the vicinity” of the land covered by two of the listed actions. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, there was “concrete indication that [respondent’s] members use specific lands covered by the agency’s Program and will be adversely affected by the agency’s actions,” and the complaint was “sufficiently specific for purposes of a motion to dismiss.” Ibid. On petitions for rehearing, the Court of Appeals stood by its denial of the motion to dismiss and directed the parties and the District Court “to proceed with this litigation with dispatch.” National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 269 U. S. App. D. C. 271, 272, 844 F. 2d 889, 890 (1988). Back before the District Court, petitioners again claimed, this time by means of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which motion had been outstanding during the proceedings before the Court of Appeals), that respondent had no standing to seek judicial review of petitioners’ actions under the APA. After argument on this motion, and in purported response to the court’s postargument request for additional briefing, respondent submitted four additional member affidavits pertaining to the issue of standing. The District Court rejected them as untimely, vacated the injunction, and granted the Rule 56 motion to dismiss. It noted that neither its earlier decision nor the Court of Appeals’ affirmance controlled the question, since both pertained to a motion under Rule 12(b). It found the Peterson and Erman affidavits insufficient to withstand the Rule 56 motion, even as to judicial review of the particular classification decisions to which they pertained. And even if they had been adequate for that limited purpose, the court said, they could not support respondent’s attempted APA challenge to “each of the 1250 or so individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations” effected under the land withdrawal review program. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (DC 1988). This time the Court of Appeals reversed. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 278 U. S. App. D. C. 320, 878 F. 2d 422 (1989). It both found the Peterson and Erman affidavits sufficient in themselves and held that it was an abuse of discretion not to consider the four additional affidavits as well. The Court of Appeals also concluded that standing to challenge individual classification and withdrawal decisions conferred standing to challenge all such decisions under the land withdrawal review program. We granted certiorari. 493 U. S. 1042 (1990). hH A We first address respondent’s claim that the Peterson and Erman affidavits alone suffice to establish respondent’s right to judicial review of petitioners’ actions. Respondent does not contend that either the FLPMA or NEPA provides a private right of action for violations of its provisions. Rather, respondent claims a right to judicial review under § 10(a) of the APA, which provides: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U. S. C. §702. This provision contains two separate requirements. First, the person claiming a right to sue must identify some “agency action” that affects him in the specified fashion; it is judicial review “thereof” to which he is entitled. The meaning of “agency action” for purposes of § 702 is set forth in 5 U. S. C. §551(13), see 5 U. S. C. § 701(b)(2) (“For the purpose of this chapter . . . ‘agency action’ ha[s] the meanin[g] given ... by section 551 of this title”), which defines the term as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,” 5 U. S. C. § 551(13). When, as here, review is sought not pursuant to specific authorization in the substantive statute, but only under the general review provisions of the APA, the “agency action” in question must be “final agency action.” See 5 U. S. C. §704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review” (emphasis added). Second, the party seeking review under § 702 must show that he has “suffered] legal wrong” because of the challenged agency action, or is “adversely affected or aggrieved” by that action “within the meaning of a relevant statute.” Respondent does not assert that it has suffered “legal wrong,” so we need only discuss the meaning of “adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute.” As an original matter, it might be thought that one cannot be “adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning” of a statute unless the statute in question uses those terms (or terms like them) — as some pre-APA statutes in fact did when conferring rights of judicial review. See, e. g., Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1093, as amended, 47 U. S. C. §402(b)(6) (1982 ed.). We have long since rejected that interpretation, however, which would have made the judicial review provision of the APA no more than a restatement of pre-existing law. Rather, we have said that to be “adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning” of a statute, the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388, 396-397 (1987). Thus, for example, the failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring “on the record” hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency’s proceedings; but since the provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that company would not be “adversely affected within the meaning” of the statute. B Because this case comes to us on petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, we must assess the record under the standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule- 56(c) states that a party is entitled to summary judgment in his favor “if the pleadings/depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(e) further provides: “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” As we stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 (1986), “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id., at 322. Where no such showing is made, “[t]he moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id., at 323. These standards are fully applicable when a defendant moves for summary judgment, in a suit brought under § 702, on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to show that he is “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” The burden is on the party seeking review under § 702 to set forth specific facts (even though they may be controverted by the Government) showing that he has satisfied its terms. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972). Celotex made clear that Rule 56 does not require the moving party to negate the elements of the nonmoving party’s case; to the contrary, “regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” 477 U. S., at 323. C We turn, then, to whether the specific facts alleged in the two affidavits considered by the District Court raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether an “agency action” taken by petitioners caused respondent to be “adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute.” We assume, since it has been uncontested, that the allegedly affected interests set forth in the affidavits — “recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment” — are sufficiently related to the purposes of respondent association that respondent meets the requirements of § 702 if any of its members do. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333 (1977). As for the “agency action” requirement, we think that each of the affidavits can be read, as the Court of Appeals believed, to complain of a particular “agency action” as that term is defined in § 551. The parties agree that the Peterson affidavit, judging from the geographic area it describes, must refer to that one of the BLM orders listed in the appendix to the complaint that appears at 49 Fed. Reg. 19904-19905 (1984), an order captioned W-6228 and dated April 30, 1984, terminating the withdrawal classification of some 4,500 acres of land in that area. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioners 8-10. The parties also appear to agree, on the basis of similar deduction, that the Erman affidavit refers to the BLM order listed in the appendix that appears at 47 Fed. Reg. 7232-7233 (1982), an order captioned Public Land Order 6156 and dated February 18, 1982. We also think that whatever “adverse effect” or “aggrievement” is established by the affidavits was “within the meaning of the relevant statute” — ?:, e., met the “zone of interests” test. The relevant statute, of course, is the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint — both the FLPMA and NEPA. We have no doubt that “recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment” are among the sorts of interests those statutes were specifically designed to protect. The only issue, then, is whether the facts alleged in the affidavits showed that those interests of Peterson and Erman were actually affected. The Peterson affidavit averred: “My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department. In particular, the South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming has been opened to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 191a. Erman’s affidavit was substantially the same as Peterson’s, with respect to all except the area involved; he claimed use of land “in the vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park, the Arizona Strip (Kanab Plateau), and the Kaibab National Forest.” Id., at 187a. The District Court found the Peterson affidavit inadequate for the following reasons: “Peterson . . . claims that she uses federal lands in the vicinity of the South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming for recreational purposes and for aesthetic enjoyment and that her recreational and aesthetic enjoyment has been and continues to be adversely affected as the result of the decision of BLM to open it to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing. . . . This decision [W-6228] opened up to mining approximately 4500 acres within a two million acre area, the balance of which, with the exception of 2000 acres, has always been open to mineral leasing and mining. . . . There is no showing that Peterson’s recreational use and enjoyment extends to the particular 4500 acres covered by the decision to terminate classification to the remainder of the two million acres affected by the termination. All she claims is that she uses lands ‘in the vicinity.’ The affidavit on its face contains only a bare allegation of injury, and fails to show specific facts supporting the affiant’s allegation.” 699 F. Supp., at 331 (emphasis in original). The District Court found the Erman affidavit “similarly flawed.” “The magnitude of Erman’s claimed injury stretches the imagination. . . . [T]he Arizona Strip consists of all lands in Arizona north and west of the Colorado River on approximately 5.5 million acres, an area one-eighth the size oif the State of Arizona. Furthermore, virtually the entire Strip is and for many years has been open to uranium and other metalliferous mining. The revocation of withdrawal [in Public Land Order 6156] concerned only non-metalliferous mining in the western one-third of the Arizona Strip, an area possessing no potential for non-metalliferous mining.” Id,., at 332. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court’s assessment as to the Peterson affidavit (and thus found it unnecessary to consider the Erman affidavit) for the following reason: “If Peterson was not referring to lands in this 4500-acre affected area, her allegation of impairment to her use and enjoyment would be meaningless, or perjurious. . . . [T]he trial court overlooks the fact that unless Peterson’s language is read to refer to the lands affected by the Program, the affidavit is, at best, a meaningless document. “At a minimum, Peterson’s affidavit is ambiguous regarding whether the adversely affected lands are the ones she uses. When presented with ambiguity on a motion for summary judgment, a District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the non-moving party .... This means that the District Court was obliged to resolve any factual ambiguity in favor of NWF, and would have had to assume, for the purposes of summary judgment, that Peterson used the 4500 affected acres.” 278 U. S. App. D. C., at 329, 878 F. 2d, at 431. That is not the law. In ruling upon a Rule 56 motion, “a District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the non-moving party” only in the sense that, where the facts specifically averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be denied. That is a world apart from “assuming” that general averments embrace the “specific facts” needed to sustain the complaint. As set forth above, Rule 56(e) provides that judgment “shall be entered” against the nonmoving party unless affidavits or other evidence “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” The object of this provision is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[T]he plaintiff could not rest on his allegations of a conspiracy to get to a jury without ‘any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint’”), quoting First National Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253, 290 (1968). Rather, the purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact essential to the other side’s case to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues. At the margins there is some room for debate as to how “specific” must be the “specific facts” that Rule 56(e) requires in a particular case. But where the fact in question is the one put in issue by the §702 challenge here — whether one of respondent’s members has been, or is threatened to be, “adversely affected or aggrieved” by Government action — Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments which state only that one of respondent’s members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action. It will not do to “presume” the missing facts because without them the affidavits would not establish the injury that they generally allege. That converts the operation of Rule 56 to a circular promenade: plaintiff’s complaint makes general allegation of injury; defendant contests through Rule 56 existence of specific facts to support injury; plaintiff responds with affidavit containing general allegation of injury, which must be deemed to constitute averment of requisite specific facts since otherwise allegation of injury would be unsupported (which is precisely what defendant claims it is). Respondent places great reliance, as did the Court of Appeals, upon our decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U. S. 669 (1973). The SCRAP opinion, whose expansive expression of what would suffice for § 702 review under its particular facts has never since been emulated by this Court, is of no relevance here, since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings. The latter, unlike the former, presumes that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). IV We turn next to the Court of Appeals’ alternative holding that the four additional member affidavits proffered by respondent in response to the District Court’s briefing order established its right to § 702 review of agency action. A It is impossible that the affidavits would suffice, as the Court of Appeals held, to enable respondent to challenge the entirety of petitioners’ so-called “land withdrawal review program.” That is not an “agency action” within the meaning of §702, much less a “final agency action” within the meaning of §704. The term “land withdrawal review program” (which as far as we know is not derived from any authoritative text) does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and regulations. It is simply the name by which petitioners have occasionally referred to the continuing (and thus constantly changing) operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and the classifications of public lands and developing land use plans as required by the FLPMA. It is no more an identifiable “agency action” — much less a “final agency action” — than a “weapons procurement program” of the Department of Defense or a “drug interdiction program” of the Drug Enforcement Administration. As the District Court explained, the “land withdrawal review program” extends to, currently at least, “1250 or so individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations.” 699 F. Supp., at 332. Respondent alleges that violation of the law is rampant within this program — failure to revise land use plans in proper fashion, failure to submit certain recommendations to Congress, failure to consider multiple use, inordinate focus upon mineral exploitation, failure to provide required public notice, failure to provide adequate environmental impact statements. Perhaps so. But respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made. Under the terms of the APA, respondent must direct its attack against some particular “agency action” that causes it harm. Some statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the “agency action,” and thus to be the object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt. Absent such a provision, however, a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action “ripe” for judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is “ripe” for review at once, whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the APA is provided. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 152-154 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U. S. 167, 171-173 (1967). Cf. Toi let Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158, 164-166 (1967).) In the present case, the individual actions of the BLM identified in the six affidavits can be regarded as rules of general applicability (a “rule” is defined in the APA as agency action of “general or particular applicability and future effect,” 5 U. S. C. §551(4) (emphasis added)) announcing, with respect to vast expanses of territory that they cover, the agency’s intent to grant requisite permission for certain activities, to decline to interfere with other activities, and to take other particular action if requested. It may well be, then, that even those individual actions will not be ripe for challenge until some further agency action or inaction more immediately harming the plaintiff occurs. But it is at least entirely certain that the flaws in the entire “program” — consisting principally of the many individual actions referenced in the complaint, and presumably actions yet to be taken as well— cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the APA, simply because one of them that is ripe for review adversely affects one of respondent’s members. The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frustrating to an organization such as respondent, which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our Nation’s wildlife and the streams and forests that support it. But this is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts. Except where Congress explicitly provides for our correction of the administrative process at a higher level of generality, we intervene in the administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific “final agency action” has an actual or immediately threatened effect. Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U. S., at 164-166. Such an intervention may ultimately have the effect of requiring a regulation, a series of regulations, or even a whole “program” to be revised by the agency in order to avoid the unlawful result that the court discerns. But it is assuredly not as swift or as immediately far-reaching a corrective process as those interested in systemic improvement would desire. Until confided to us, however, more sweeping actions are for the other branches. B The Court of Appeals’ reliance upon the supplemental affidavits was wrong for a second reason: The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit them. Petitioners filed their motion for summary judgment in September 1986; respondent filed an opposition but did not submit any new evidentiary materials at that time. On June 27, 1988, after the case had made its way for the first time through the Court of Appeals, the District Court announced that it would hold a hearing on July 22 on “the outstanding motions for summary judgment,” which included petitioners’ motion challenging respondent’s § 702 standing. The hearing was held and, as noted earlier, the District Court issued an order directing respondent to file “a supplemental memorandum regarding the issue of its standing to proceed.” Record, Doc. No. 274. Although that plainly did not call for the submission of new evidentiary materials, it was in purported response to this order, on August 22, 1988, that respondent submitted (along with the requested legal memorandum) the additional affidavits. The only explanation for the submission (if it can be called an explanation) was contained in a footnote to the memorandum, which simply stated that “NWF now has submitted declarations on behalf of other members of NWF who have been injured by the challenged actions of federal defendants.” Record, Doc. No. 278, p. 18, n. 21. In its November 4, 1988, ruling granting petitioners’ motion, the District Court rejected the additional affidavits as “untimely and in violation of [the court’s briefing] Order.” 699 F. Supp., at 328, n. 3. Respondent’s evidentiary submission was indeed untimely, both under Rule 56, which requires affidavits in opposition to a summary judgment motion to be served “prior to the day of the hearing,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c), and under Rule 6(d), which states more generally that “[w]hen a motion is supported by affidavit, . . . opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time.” Rule 6(b) sets out the proper approach in the case of late filings: “When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect . . . .” This provision not only specifically confers the “discretion” relevant to the present issue, but also provides the mechanism by which that discretion is to be invoked and exercised. First, any extension of a time limitation must be “for cause shown.” Second, although extensions before expiration of the time period may be “with or without motion or notice,” any posideadline extension must be “upon motion made,” and is permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline “was the result of excusable neglect.” Thus, in order to receive the affidavits here, the District Court would have had to regard the very filing of the late document as the “motion made” to file it; it would have had to interpret “cause shown” to mean merely “cause,” since respondent made no “showing” of cause at all; and finally, it would have had to find as a substantive matter that there was indeed “cause” for the late filing, and that the failure to file on time “was the result of excusable neglect.” This last substantive obstacle is the greatest of all. The Court of Appeals presumably thought it was overcome because “the papers on which the trial court relied were two years old by the time it requested supplemental memoranda” and because “there was no indication prior to the trial court’s request that [respondent] should have doubted the adequacy of the affidavits it had already submitted.” 278 U. S. App. D. C., at 331, 878 F. 2d, at 433. We do not understand the relevance of the first point; the passage of so long a time as two years suggests, if anything, that respondent had more than the usual amount of time to prepare its response to the motion, and was more than moderately remiss in waiting until after the last moment. As to the suggestion of unfair surprise: A litigant is never justified in assuming that the court has made up its mind until the court expresses itself to that effect, and a litigant’s failure to buttress its position because of confidence in the strength of that position is always indulged in at the litigant’s own risk. In any case, whatever erroneous expectations respondent may have had were surely dispelled by the District Court’s order in June 1988 announcing that the hearing on petitioners’ motion would be held one month later. At least when that order issued, respondent was on notice that its right to sue was at issue, and that (absent proper motion) the time for filing any additional evidentiary materials was, at the latest, the day before the hearing. Perhaps it is true that the District Court could have overcome all the obstacles we have described — apparent lack of a motion, of a showing, and of excusable neglect — to admit the affidavits at issue here. But the proposition that it was compelled to receive them — that it was an abuse of discretion to reject them — cannot be accepted. V Respondent’s final argument is that we should remand this case for the Court of Appeals to decide whether respondent may seek § 702 review of petitioners’ actions in its own right, rather than derivatively through its members. Specifically, it points to allegations in the amended complaint that petitioners unlawfully failed to publish regulations, to invite public participation, and to prepare an environmental impact statement with respect to the “land withdrawal review program” as a whole. In order to show that it is a “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved” by these failures, it submitted to the District Court a brief affidavit (two pages in the record) by one of its vice presidents, Lynn A. Greenwalt, who stated that respondent’s mission is to “inform its members and the general public about conservation issues” and to advocate improvements in laws and administrative practices “pertaining to the protection and enhancement of federal lands,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 193a-194a; and that its ability to perform this mission has been impaired by petitioners’ failure “to provide adequate information and opportunities for public participation with respect to the Land Withdrawal Review Program.” Id., at 194a. The District Court found this affidavit insufficient to establish respondent’s right to seek judicial review, since it was “conclusory and completely devoid of specific facts.” 699 F. Supp., at 330. The Court of Appeals, having reversed the District Court on the grounds discussed above, did not address the issue. We agree with the District Court’s disposition. Even assuming that the affidavit set forth “specific facts,” Fed. R. Civ. Proe. 56(e), adequate to show injury to respondent through the deprivation of information; and even assuming that providing information to organizations such as respondent was one of the objectives of the statutes allegedly violated, so that respondent is “aggrieved within the meaning” of those statutes; nonetheless, the Greenwalt affidavit fails to identify any particular “agency action” that was the source of these injuries. The only sentences addressed to that point are as follows: “NWF’s ability to meet these obligations to its members has been significantly impaired by the failure of the Bureau of Land Management and the Department of the Interior to provide adequate information and opportunities for public participation with respect to the Land Withdrawal Review Program. These interests of NWF have been injured by the actions of the Bureau and the Department and would be irreparably harmed by the continued failure to provide meaningful opportunities for public input and access to information regarding the Land Withdrawal Review Program.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 194a. As is evident, this is even more deficient than the Peterson and Erman affidavits, which contained geographical descriptions whereby at least an action as general as a particular classification decision could be identified as the source of the grievance. As we discussed earlier, the “land withdrawal review program” is not an identifiable action or event. With regard to alleged deficiencies in providing information and permitting public participation, as with regard to the other illegalities alleged in the complaint, respondent cannot demand a general judicial review of the BLM’s day-to-day operations. The Greenwalt affidavit, like the others, does not set forth the specific facts necessary to survive a Rule 56 motion. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. As an additional basis for its conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the earlier panel’s finding that the Peterson and Erman affidavits were sufficient to establish respondent’s right to sue was the “law of the case.” We do not address this conclusion, as the earlier panel’s ruling does not, of course, bind this Court. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444 (1912). Contrary to the apparent understanding of the dissent, we do not contend that no “land withdrawal review program” exists, any more than we would contend that no weapons procurement program exists. We merely assert that it is not an identifiable “final agency action” for purposes of the APA. If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across the board to all individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final, and has become ripe for review in the manner we discuss subsequently in text, it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected — and the entire “land withdrawal review program,” insofar as the content of that particular action is concerned, would thereby be affected. But that is quite different from permitting a generic challenge to all aspects of the “land withdrawal review program,” as though that itself constituted a final agency action. Under the Secretary’s regulations, any person seeking to conduct mining operations that will “cause a cumulative surface disturbance” of five acres or more must first obtain approval of a plan of operations. 43 CFR §3809.1-4 (1988). Mining operations that cause surface disturbance of less than five acres do not require prior approval, but prior notice must be given to the district office of the BLM. § 3809.1-3. Neither approval nor notification is required only with respect to “casual use operations,” § 3809.1-2, defined as “activities ordinarily resulting in only negligible disturbance of the Federal lands and resources,” § 3809.0-5. (Activities are considered “casual” if “they do not involve the use of mechanized earth moving equipment or explosives or do not involve the use of motorized vehicles in areas designated as closed to off-road vehicles . . . .” Ibid.) Thus, before any mining use ordinarily involving more than “negligible disturbance” can take place, there must occur either agency action in response to a submitted plan or agency inaction in response to a submitted notice. In one of the four new affidavits, Peggy Peterson, one of the original affi-ants, states that a corporation has filed a mine permit application with the BLM covering a portion of the land to which her original affidavit pertained. App. to Brief in Opposition for Respondent National Wildlife Federation 16. If that permit is granted, there is no doubt that agency action ripe for review will have occurred; nor any doubt that, in the course of an otherwise proper court challenge, affiant Peterson, and through her respondent, would be able to call into question the validity of the classification order authorizing the permit. However, before the grant of such a permit, or (when it will suffice) the filing of a notice to engage in mining activities, or (when only “negligible disturbance” will occur) actual mining of the land, it is impossible to tell where or whether mining activities will occur. Indeed, it is often impossible to tell from a classification order alone whether mining activities will even be permissible. As explained in the uncontested affidavit of the BLM’s Assistant Director of Land Resources: “The lands may be subject to another withdrawal of comparable scope or they may be subject to classification segregations tantamount to such a withdrawal. In that case, the lands would not be opened to the operation of the public land laws so that the removal of one of the withdrawals has no practical effect. Another reason why there may not be any change is that before the revocation occurred, the lands may have been transferred into private ownership. Consequently, the withdrawal revocation amounts to nothing more than a paper transaction .... In the alternative, a revoked withdrawal may open the lands to the operation of the public land and mineral laws. . . . Some withdrawal revocations are made without prior knowledge as to what subsequent disposition may be made of the lands. After the lands are opened, they might be transferred out of federal ownership by sale, exchange, or some other discretionary mode of disposal, not anticipated when the withdrawal was revoked. These subsequent discretionary actions require separate and independent decisionmaking that, obviously, are divorced from the prior revocation decision. Environmental and other management concerns and public participation are taken into account in relation to the post-revocation decisionmaking.” Affidavit of Frank Edwards, Aug. 18, 1985, App. 61-62. Nothing in this is contrary to our opinion in Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274 (1986), cited by the Court of Appeals. That opinion did not discuss, and the respondent Secretary of Labor did not rely upon, the requirements of 5 U. S. C. §702 and our ripeness jurisprudence in cases such as Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U. S. 167 (1967); and Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158 (1967). The only challenge made and decided, with respect to the individuals’ right to sue, relied upon 19 U. S. C. § 2311(d) (1982 ed.), which according to the Secretary of Labor made entertainment of that suit “ ‘contrary to Congress’s incorporation of the state system into the administration of the Trade Act, and an affront to the integrity and authority of the state courts. ’ ” 477 U. S., at 283, quoting Brief for Respondent in Automobile Workers, O. T. 1985, No. 84-1777, p. 16. The dissent asserts that a footnote in respondent’s reply memorandum to the District Court was a “motion” within the meaning of Rule 6(b)(2), and was so obviously so that the District Court committed reversible error in failing to construe it that way. Post, at 909-910, n. 10. We cannot agree. Rule 6(b) establishes a clear distinction between “requests” and “motions,” and the one cannot be converted into the other without violating its provisions — or at least cannot be converted on the basis of such lax criteria that conversion would be not only marginally permissible but positively mandatory in the present case. Rule 6(b)(1) allows a court (“for cause shown” and “in its discretion”) to grant a “request” for an extension of time, whether the request is made “with or without motion or notice,” 'provided the request is made before the time for filing expires. After the time for filing has expired, however, the court (again “for cause shown” and “in its discretion”) may extend the time only “upon motion.” To treat all postdeadline “requests” as “motions” (if indeed any of them can be treated that way) would eliminate the distinction between predeadline and postdeadline filings that the Rule painstakingly draws. Surely the post-deadline “request,” to be even permissibly treated as a “motion,” must contain a high degree of formality and precision, putting the opposing party on notice that a motion is at issue and that he therefore ought to respond. The request here had not much of either characteristic. As for formality, it was not even made in a separate filing or in a separate appearance before the court, but was contained in a single sentence at the end of the first paragraph of one of the 18 single-spaced footnotes in a 20-page memorandum of law. Our district judges must read footnotes with new care if they are to be reversed for failing to recognize motions buried in this fashion. And as for precision, the request not only did not ask for any particular extension of time (7 days, 30 days), it did not specifically ask for an extension of time at all, but merely said that respondent “should be given adequate opportunity to supplement the record.” Even this, moreover, was not requested (much less moved for) unconditionally, but only “[i]f the court intends to reverse its prior ruling [regarding NWF standing].” Record, Doc. No. 294, p. 17, n. 16. We think it quite impossible to agree with the dissent that the District Judge not only might treat this request as a motion, but that he was compelled to do so.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALICE CORPORATION PTY. LTD., Petitioner v. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL et al. No. 13-298. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 31, 2014. Decided June 19, 2014. Syllabus* Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several patents that disclose a scheme for mitigating "settlement risk," i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. In particular, the patent claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary. The patents in suit claim (1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations, and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations. Respondents (together, CLS Bank), who operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions, filed suit against petitioner, arguing that the patent claims at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging infringement. After Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792, was decided, the District Court held that all of the claims were ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they are directed to an abstract idea. The en banc Federal Circuit affirmed. Held : Because the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, they are not patent eligible under § 101. Pp. 2354 - 2360. (a) The Court has long held that § 101, which defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection, contains an implicit exception for " '[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.' " Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116, 186 L.Ed.2d 124. In applying the § 101 exception, this Court must distinguish patents that claim the " 'buildin[g] block[s]' " of human ingenuity, which are ineligible for patent protection, from those that integrate the building blocks into something more, see Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1303, 182 L.Ed.2d 321, thereby "transform[ing]" them into a patent-eligible invention, id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. Pp. 2354 - 2355. (b) Using this framework, the Court must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at ----. If so, the Court then asks whether the claim's elements, considered both individually and "as an ordered combination," "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. Pp. 2355 - 2360. (1) The claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. Under "the longstanding rule that '[a]n idea of itself is not patentable,' " Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273, this Court has found ineligible patent claims involving an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form, id., at 71-72, 93 S.Ct. 253; a mathematical formula for computing "alarm limits" in a catalytic conversion process, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-595, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451; and, most recently, a method for hedging against the financial risk of price fluctuations, Bilski, 561 U.S., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218. It follows from these cases, and Bilski in particular, that the claims at issue are directed to an abstract idea. On their face, they are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is " 'a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce,' " ibid., and the use of a third-party intermediary (or "clearing house") is a building block of the modern economy. Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is an "abstract idea" beyond § 101's scope. Pp. 2355 - 2357. (2) Turning to the second step of Mayo 's framework: The method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Pp. 2357 - 2360. (i) "Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality," to a method already "well known in the art" is not " enough " to supply the " 'inventive concept' " needed to make this transformation. Mayo, supra, at ----, ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1300, 1297, 1294. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis. Neither stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it,' " Mayo,supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294, nor limiting the use of an abstract idea " 'to a particular technological environment,' " Bilski, supra, at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218, is enough for patent eligibility. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of "additional featur[e]" that provides any "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself." Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. Pp. 2357 - 2359. (ii) Here, the representative method claim does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step-creating and maintaining "shadow" accounts, obtaining data, adjusting account balances, and issuing automated instructions-is "[p]urely 'conventional.' " Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. Considered "as an ordered combination," these computer components "ad[d] nothing ... that is not already present when the steps are considered separately." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. Viewed as a whole, these method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. They do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. An instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer is not " enough " to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. Pp. 2359 - 2360. (3) Because petitioner's system and media claims add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea, they too are patent ineligible under § 101. Petitioner conceded below that its media claims rise or fall with its method claims. And the system claims are no different in substance from the method claims. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long "warn[ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art.' " Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. Holding that the system claims are patent eligible would have exactly that result. P. 2360. 717 F.3d 1269, affirmed. THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined. Carter G. Phillips, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Mark Perry, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the respondents. Adam L. Perlman, Williams & Connolly LLP, Robert E. Sokohl, Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox PLLC, Carter G. Phillips, Counsel of Record, Jeffrey P. Kushan, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Tacy F. Flint, Timothy R. Hargadon, Benjamin M. Flowers, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner. Mark A. Perry, Counsel of Record, Helgi C. Walker, Brian M. Buroker, Alexander N. Harris, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The patents at issue in this case disclose a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating "settlement risk" ( i.e., the risk that only one party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary. The question presented is whether these claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, or are instead drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. We hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. We therefore affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I A Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several patents that disclose schemes to manage certain forms of financial risk.1 According to the specification largely shared by the patents, the invention "enabl[es] the management of risk relating to specified, yet unknown, future events." App. 248. The specification further explains that the "invention relates to methods and apparatus, including electrical computers and data processing systems applied to financial matters and risk management." Id., at 243. The claims at issue relate to a computerized scheme for mitigating "settlement risk"- i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. In particular, the claims are designed to facilitate the exchange of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-party intermediary. Id., at 383-384.2 The intermediary creates "shadow" credit and debit records ( i.e., account ledgers) that mirror the balances in the parties' real-world accounts at "exchange institutions" ( e.g., banks). The intermediary updates the shadow records in real time as transactions are entered, allowing "only those transactions for which the parties' updated shadow records indicate sufficient resources to satisfy their mutual obligations." 717 F.3d 1269, 1285 (C.A.Fed.2013) (Lourie, J., concurring). At the end of the day, the intermediary instructs the relevant financial institutions to carry out the "permitted" transactions in accordance with the updated shadow records, ibid., thus mitigating the risk that only one party will perform the agreed-upon exchange. In sum, the patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method for exchanging obligations (the method claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of exchanging obligations (the media claims). All of the claims are implemented using a computer; the system and media claims expressly recite a computer, and the parties have stipulated that the method claims require a computer as well. B Respondents CLS Bank International and CLS Services Ltd. (together, CLS Bank) operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions. In 2007, CLS Bank filed suit against petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment that the claims at issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging infringement. Following this Court's decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010), the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the asserted claims are eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The District Court held that all of the claims are patent ineligible because they are directed to the abstract idea of "employing a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk." 768 F.Supp.2d 221, 252 (D.C.2011). A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that it was not "manifestly evident" that petitioner's claims are directed to an abstract idea. 685 F.3d 1341, 1352, 1356 (2012). The Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. 717 F.3d, at 1273. Seven of the ten participating judges agreed that petitioner's method and media claims are patent ineligible. See id., at 1274 (Lourie, J., concurring); id., at 1312-1313 (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). With respect to petitioner's system claims, the en banc Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment by an equally divided vote. Id., at 1273. Writing for a five-member plurality, Judge Lourie concluded that all of the claims at issue are patent ineligible. In the plurality's view, under this Court's decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), a court must first "identif[y] the abstract idea represented in the claim," and then determine "whether the balance of the claim adds 'significantly more.' " 717 F.3d, at 1286. The plurality concluded that petitioner's claims "draw on the abstract idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party intermediary," and that the use of a computer to maintain, adjust, and reconcile shadow accounts added nothing of substance to that abstract idea. Ibid. Chief Judge Rader concurred in part and dissented in part. In a part of the opinion joined only by Judge Moore, Chief Judge Rader agreed with the plurality that petitioner's method and media claims are drawn to an abstract idea. Id., at 1312-1313. In a part of the opinion joined by Judges Linn, Moore, and O'Malley, Chief Judge Rader would have held that the system claims are patent eligible because they involve computer "hardware" that is "specifically programmed to solve a complex problem." Id., at 1307. Judge Moore wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part, arguing that the system claims are patent eligible. Id., at 1313-1314. Judge Newman filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that all of petitioner's claims are patent eligible. Id., at 1327. Judges Linn and O'Malley filed a separate dissenting opinion reaching that same conclusion. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 571 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 734, 187 L.Ed.2d 590 (2013), and now affirm. II Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection. It provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. "We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116, 186 L.Ed.2d 124 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for more than 150 years. Bilski,supra, at 601-602, 130 S.Ct. 3218; see also O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-120, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174-175, 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853). We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption. See, e.g., Bilski, supra, at 611-612, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (upholding the patent "would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea"). Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are " ' "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." ' " Myriad, supra, at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2116. "[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it," thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws. Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1923; see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress "shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"). We have "repeatedly emphasized this ... concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of" these building blocks of human ingenuity. Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301 (citing Morse, supra, at 113). At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1293-1294. At some level, "all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1293. Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981). "[A]pplication[s]" of such concepts " 'to a new and useful end,' " we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972). Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the " 'buildin[g] block[s]' " of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1303, thereby "transform[ing]" them into a patent-eligible invention, id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. The former "would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying" ideas, id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294, and are therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of pre-emption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent laws. III In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 182 L.Ed.2d 321 (2012), we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1296-1297. If so, we then ask, "[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?" Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298, 1297. We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an " 'inventive concept' "- i.e., an element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294.3 A We must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. We conclude that they are: These claims are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. The "abstract ideas" category embodies "the longstanding rule that '[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.' " Benson, supra, at 67, 93 S.Ct. 253 (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507, 22 L.Ed. 410 (1874)); see also Le Roy,supra, at 175 ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right"). In Benson, for example, this Court rejected as ineligible patent claims involving an algorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form, holding that the claimed patent was "in practical effect ... a patent on the algorithm itself." 409 U.S., at 71-72, 93 S.Ct. 253. And in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-595, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978), we held that a mathematical formula for computing "alarm limits" in a catalytic conversion process was also a patent-ineligible abstract idea. We most recently addressed the category of abstract ideas in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). The claims at issue in Bilski described a method for hedging against the financial risk of price fluctuations. Claim 1 recited a series of steps for hedging risk, including: (1) initiating a series of financial transactions between providers and consumers of a commodity; (2) identifying market participants that have a counterrisk for the same commodity; and (3) initiating a series of transactions between those market participants and the commodity provider to balance the risk position of the first series of consumer transactions. Id., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Claim 4 "pu[t] the concept articulated in claim 1 into a simple mathematical formula." Ibid. The remaining claims were drawn to examples of hedging in commodities and energy markets. "[A]ll members of the Court agree[d]" that the patent at issue in Bilski claimed an "abstract idea." Id., at 609, 130 S.Ct. 3218; see also id., at 619, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Specifically, the claims described "the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk." Id., at 611, 130 S.Ct. 3218. The Court explained that " '[h]edging is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory finance class.' " Ibid. "The concept of hedging" as recited by the claims in suit was therefore a patent-ineligible "abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook." Ibid. It follows from our prior cases, and Bilski in particular, that the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. Petitioner's claims involve a method of exchanging financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate settlement risk. The intermediary creates and updates "shadow" records to reflect the value of each party's actual accounts held at "exchange institutions," thereby permitting only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources. At the end of each day, the intermediary issues irrevocable instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions. On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is " 'a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.' " Ibid.; see, e.g., Emery, Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, in 7 Studies in History, Economics and Public Law 283, 346-356 (1896) (discussing the use of a "clearing-house" as an intermediary to reduce settlement risk). The use of a third-party intermediary (or "clearing house") is also a building block of the modern economy. See, e.g., Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 Geo. L.J. 387, 406-412 (2013); J. Hull, Risk Management and Financial Institutions 103-104 (3d ed. 2012). Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of § 101. Petitioner acknowledges that its claims describe intermediated settlement, see Brief for Petitioner 4, but rejects the conclusion that its claims recite an "abstract idea." Drawing on the presence of mathematical formulas in some of our abstract-ideas precedents, petitioner contends that the abstract-ideas category is confined to "preexisting, fundamental truth[s]" that " 'exis[t] in principle apart from any human action.' " Id., at 23, 26 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297). Bilski belies petitioner's assertion. The concept of risk hedging we identified as an abstract idea in that case cannot be described as a "preexisting, fundamental truth." The patent in Bilski simply involved a "series of steps instructing how to hedge risk." 561 U.S., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Although hedging is a longstanding commercial practice, id., at 599, 130 S.Ct. 3218, it is a method of organizing human activity, not a "truth" about the natural world " 'that has always existed,' " Brief for Petitioner 22 (quoting Flook,supra, at 593, n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 2522). One of the claims in Bilski reduced hedging to a mathematical formula, but the Court did not assign any special significance to that fact, much less the sort of talismanic significance petitioner claims. Instead, the Court grounded its conclusion that all of the claims at issue were abstract ideas in the understanding that risk hedging was a " 'fundamental economic practice.' " 561 U.S., at 611, 130 S.Ct. 3218. In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas" as we have used that term. B Because the claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, we turn to the second step in Mayo 's framework. We conclude that the method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. 1 At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an " 'inventive concept' " sufficient to "transform" the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. 566 U.S., at ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294, 1298. A claim that recites an abstract idea must include "additional features" to ensure "that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297.Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application requires "more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words 'apply it.' " Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. Mayo itself is instructive. The patents at issue in Mayo claimed a method for measuring metabolites in the bloodstream in order to calibrate the appropriate dosage of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune diseases. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294-1296. The respondent in that case contended that the claimed method was a patent-eligible application of natural laws that describe the relationship between the concentration of certain metabolites and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be harmful or ineffective. But methods for determining metabolite levels were already "well known in the art," and the process at issue amounted to "nothing significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. "Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality," was not " enough " to supply an " 'inventive concept.' " Id., at ----, ----, ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1300, 1297, 1294. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis at Mayo step two. In Benson, for example, we considered a patent that claimed an algorithm implemented on "a general-purpose digital computer." 409 U.S., at 64, 93 S.Ct. 253. Because the algorithm was an abstract idea, see supra, at 2355, the claim had to supply a " 'new and useful' " application of the idea in order to be patent eligible. 409 U.S., at 67, 93 S.Ct. 253. But the computer implementation did not supply the necessary inventive concept; the process could be "carried out in existing computers long in use." Ibid. We accordingly "held that simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, [i]s not a patentable application of that principle." Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301 (citing Benson,supra, at 64, 93 S.Ct. 253). Flook is to the same effect. There, we examined a computerized method for using a mathematical formula to adjust alarm limits for certain operating conditions ( e.g., temperature and pressure) that could signal inefficiency or danger in a catalytic conversion process. 437 U.S., at 585-586, 98 S.Ct. 2522. Once again, the formula itself was an abstract idea, see supra, at 2355, and the computer implementation was purely conventional. 437 U.S., at 594, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (noting that the "use of computers for 'automatic monitoring-alarming' " was "well known"). In holding that the process was patent ineligible, we rejected the argument that "implement[ing] a principle in some specific fashion" will "automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of § 101." Id., at 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522. Thus, " Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the idea] to a particular technological environment." Bilski, 561 U.S., at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155, by contrast, we held that a computer-implemented process for curing rubber was patent eligible, but not because it involved a computer. The claim employed a "well-known" mathematical equation, but it used that equation in a process designed to solve a technological problem in "conventional industry practice." Id., at 177, 178, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The invention in Diehr used a "thermocouple" to record constant temperature measurements inside the rubber mold-something "the industry ha[d] not been able to obtain." Id., at 178, and n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1048. The temperature measurements were then fed into a computer, which repeatedly recalculated the remaining cure time by using the mathematical equation. Id., at 178-179, 101 S.Ct. 1048. These additional steps, we recently explained, "transformed the process into an inventive application of the formula." Mayo,supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1299. In other words, the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented on a computer. These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it' " is not enough for patent eligibility. Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea " 'to a particular technological environment.' " Bilski, supra, at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to "implemen [t]" an abstract idea "on ... a computer," Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1301, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the pre-emption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, see 717 F.3d, at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring), wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of "additional featur[e]" that provides any "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself." Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. The fact that a computer "necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm," Brief for Petitioner 39, is beside the point. There is no dispute that a computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a "machine"), or that many computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject matter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any principle of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to implement the relevant concept. Such a result would make the determination of patent eligibility "depend simply on the draftsman's art," Flook, supra, at 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522, thereby eviscerating the rule that " '[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable,' " Myriad, 569 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2116. 2 The representative method claim in this case recites the following steps: (1) "creating" shadow records for each counterparty to a transaction; (2) "obtaining" start-of-day balances based on the parties' real-world accounts at exchange institutions; (3) "adjusting" the shadow records as transactions are entered, allowing only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources; and (4) issuing irrevocable end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions. See n. 2, supra. Petitioner principally contends that the claims are patent eligible because these steps "require a substantial and meaningful role for the computer." Brief for Petitioner 48. As stipulated, the claimed method requires the use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions; in other words, "[t]he computer is itself the intermediary." Ibid. (emphasis deleted). In light of the foregoing, see supra, at 2357 - 2359, the relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is "[p]urely conventional." Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298 (internal quotation marks omitted). Using a computer to create and maintain "shadow" accounts amounts to electronic recordkeeping-one of the most basic functions of a computer. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S., at 65, 93 S.Ct. 253 (noting that a computer "operates ... upon both new and previously stored data"). The same is true with respect to the use of a computer to obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions are "well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]" previously known to the industry. Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. Considered "as an ordered combination," the computer components of petitioner's method "ad[d] nothing ... that is not already present when the steps are considered separately." Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. Viewed as a whole, petitioner's method claims simply recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. See 717 F.3d, at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring) (noting that the representative method claim "lacks any express language to define the computer's participation"). The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. See ibid. ("There is no specific or limiting recitation of ... improved computer technology ..."); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28-30. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S., at 177-178, 101 S.Ct. 1048. Instead, the claims at issue amount to "nothing significantly more" than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer. Mayo, 566 U.S., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1298. Under our precedents, that is not " enough " to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id., at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1297. C Petitioner's claims to a computer system and a computer-readable medium fail for substantially the same reasons. Petitioner conceded below that its media claims rise or fall with its method claims. En Banc Response Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 11-1301 (CA Fed.) p. 50, n. 3. As to its system claims, petitioner emphasizes that those claims recite "specific hardware" configured to perform "specific computerized functions." Brief for Petitioner 53. But what petitioner characterizes as specific hardware-a "data processing system" with a "communications controller" and "data storage unit," for example, see App. 954, 958, 1257-is purely functional and generic. Nearly every computer will include a "communications controller" and "data storage unit" capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims. See 717 F.3d, at 1290 (Lourie, J., concurring). As a result, none of the hardware recited by the system claims "offers a meaningful limitation beyond generally linking 'the use of the [method] to a particular technological environment,' that is, implementation via computers." Id., at 1291 (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S., at 610-611, 130 S.Ct. 3218). Put another way, the system claims are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long "warn[ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art.' " Mayo, supra, at ----, 132 S.Ct., at 1294 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S., at 593, 98 S.Ct. 2522); see id., at 590, 98 S.Ct. 2522 ("The concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not 'like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction ...' "). Holding that the system claims are patent eligible would have exactly that result. Because petitioner's system and media claims add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea, we hold that they too are patent ineligible under § 101. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER join, concurring. I adhere to the view that any "claim that merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a 'process' under § 101." Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 614, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 972 (C.A.Fed.2008) (Dyk, J., concurring) ("There is no suggestion in any of th[e] early [English] consideration of process patents that processes for organizing human activity were or ever had been patentable"). As in Bilski, however, I further believe that the method claims at issue are drawn to an abstract idea. Cf. 561 U.S., at 619, 130 S.Ct. 3218 (opinion of Stevens, J.). I therefore join the opinion of the Court. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. The patents at issue are United States Patent Nos. 5,970,479 (the '479 patent), 6,912,510, 7,149,720, and 7,725,375. The parties agree that claim 33 of the '479 patent is representative of the method claims. Claim 33 recites: "A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the method comprising the steps of: "(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution from the exchange institutions; "(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; "(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the supervisory institution adjusting each respective party's shadow credit record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in chronological order, and "(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions." App. 383-384. Because the approach we made explicit in Mayo considers all claim elements, both individually and in combination, it is consistent with the general rule that patent claims "must be considered as a whole." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1048, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981); see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978) ("Our approach ... is ... not at all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be considered as a whole").

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO., INC. NO. 117. Argued February 1, 1954. Decided April 5, 1954. J. Roger Wollenberg argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Daniel R. Ohlbaum. Alfred McCormack argued the cause for appellee in No. 117. With him on the brief was George B. Turner. Paul W. Williams argued the cause for appellee in No. 118. With him on the brief were Thomas E. Ervin and Dudley B. Tenney. Max Freund argued the cause for appellee in No. 119. With him on the brief was Ralph F. Colin. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases are before us on direct appeal from the decision of a three-judge District Court in the Southern District of New York, enjoining the Federal Communications Commission from enforcing certain provisions in its rules relating to the broadcasting of so-called “giveaway” programs. The question presented is whether the enjoined provisions correctly interpret § 1304 of the United States Criminal Code, formerly § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934. This statute prohibits the broadcasting of “. . . any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance . ...” The appellees are national radio and television broadcasting companies. They are, in addition, the operators of radio and television stations licensed by the Commission. Each of the appellees broadcasts, over its own and affiliated stations, certain programs popularly known as “give-away” programs. Generally characteristic of this type of program is the distribution of prizes to home listeners, selected wholly or in part on the basis of chance, as an award for correctly solving a given problem or answering a question. The rules challenged in this proceeding, §§ 3.192, 3.292, and 3.656 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, were designed to prevent the broadcast of such programs. The rules are identically worded and apply, respectively, to standard radio broadcasting (AM), FM radio broadcasting, and television broadcasting. Paragraph (a) of each rule provides that “An application for construction permit, license, renewal of license, or any other authorization for the operation of a broadcast station, will not be granted where the applicant proposes to follow or continue to follow a policy or practice of broadcasting . . . ,” programs of a sort forbidden by § 1304. Paragraph (b) provides that a program will fall within the ban “. . . if in connection with such program a prize consisting of money or thing of value is awarded to any person whose selection is dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, if as a condition of winning or competing for such prize: “(1) Such winner or winners are required to furnish any money or thing of value or are required to have in their possession any product sold, manufactured, furnished or distributed by a sponsor of a program broadcast on the station in question; or “(2) Such winner or winners are required to be listening to or viewing the program in question on a radio or television receiver; or “(3) Such winner or winners are required to answer correctly a question, the answer to which is given on a program broadcast over the station in question or where aid to answering the question correctly is given on a program broadcast over the station in question. Eor the purposes of this provision the broadcasting of the question to be answered over the radio station on a previous program will be considered as an aid in answering the question correctly; or “(4) Such winner or winners are required to answer the phone in a prescribed manner or with a prescribed phrase, or are required to write a letter in a prescribed manner or containing a prescribed phrase, if the prescribed manner of answering the phone or writing the letter or the prescribed phrase to be used over the phone or in the letter (or an aid in ascertaining the prescribed phrase or the prescribed manner of answering the phone or writing the letter) is, or has been, broadcast over the station in question.” After promulgation of the rules, the present actions were brought by the appellees. The District Court sustained the Commission’s general authority to adopt such rules, and sustained subdivision (1) of paragraph (b) as a correct interpretation of § 1304. But, with one dissent, the court held that subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) were beyond the scope of § 1304 and hence invalid. The court was of the view that § 1304 applied only to contest programs requiring contestants to contribute a “price” or “thing of value.” We noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases for argument. Like the court below, we have no doubt that the Commission, concurrently with the Department of Justice, has power to enforce § 1304. Indeed, the Commission would be remiss in its duties if it failed, in the exercise of its licensing authority, to aid in implementing the statute, either by general rule or by individual decisions. But the Commission’s power in this respect is limited by the scope of the statute. Unless the “give-away” programs involved here are illegal under § 1304, the Commission cannot employ the statute to make them so by agency action. Thus, reduced to its simplest terms, the issue before us is whether this type of program constitutes a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme” proscribed by § 1304. All the parties agree that there are three essential elements of a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme”: (1) the distribution of prizes; (2) according to chance; (3) for a consideration. They also agree that prizes on the programs under review are distributed according to chance, but they fall out on the question of whether the home contestant furnishes the necessary consideration. The Commission contends that there is such consideration; in its brief, it urges that these programs . . are nothing but age old lotteries in a slightly new form. The new form results from the fact that the schemes here are illicit appendages to legitimate advertising. The classic lottery looked to advance cash payments by the participants as the source of profit; the radio give-away looks to the equally material benefits to stations and advertisers from an increased radio audience to be exposed to advertising.” It contends that consideration in the form of money or a thing of value is not essential, and that a commercial benefit to the promoter satisfies the consideration requirement: . . Where a scheme of chance is successfully designed to reap profits for its promoter, there will ultimately be consideration flowing from the participants, and it is of no consequence whether such consideration be direct or indirect. In either event, the gambling spirit — the lure of obtaining something for nothing or almost nothing — is exploited for the benefit of the promoter of the scheme.” As against this claim the appellees insist that something more is required than just a benefit to the promoter; that the participation of the home audience by merely listening to a broadcast does not constitute the necessary consideration. Section 1304 itself does not define the type of consideration needed for a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.” Nor do the postal lottery statutes from which this language was taken. The legislative history of § 1304 and the postal statutes is similarly unilluminating. For guidance, therefore, we must look primarily to American decisions, both judicial and administrative, construing comparable antilottery legislation. Enforcing such legislation has long been a difficult task. Law enforcement officers, federal and state, have been plagued with as many types of lotteries as the seemingly inexhaustible ingenuity of their promoters could devise in their efforts to circumvent the law. When their schemes reached the courts, the decision, of necessity, usually turned on whether the scheme, on its own peculiar facts, constituted a lottery. So varied have been the techniques used by promoters to conceal the joint factors of prize, chance, and consideration, and so clever have they been in applying these techniques to feigned as well as legitimate business activities, that it has often been difficult to apply the decision of one case to the facts of another. And so it is here. We find no decisions precisely in point on the facts of the cases before us. The courts have defined consideration in various ways, but so far as we are aware none has ever held that a contestant’s listening at home to a radio or television program satisfies the consideration requirement. Some courts — with vigorous protest from others — have held that the requirement is satisfied by a “raffle” scheme giving free chances to persons who go to a store to register in order to participate in the drawing of a prize, and similarly by a “bank night” scheme giving free chances to persons who gather in front of a motion picture theatre in order to participate in a drawing held for the primary benefit of the paid patrons of the theatre. But such cases differ substantially from the cases before us. To be eligible for a prize on the “give-away” programs involved here, not a single home contestant is required to purchase anything or pay an admission price or leave his home to visit the promoter’s place of business; the only effort required for participation is listening. We believe that it would be stretching the statute to the breaking point to give it an interpretation that would make such programs a crime. Particularly is this true when through the years the Post Office Department and the Department of Justice have consistently given the words “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme” a contrary administrative interpretation. Thus the Solicitor of the Post Office Department has repeatedly ruled that the postal lottery laws do not preclude the mailing of circulars advertising the type of “give-away” program here under attack. Similarly, the Attorney General— charged directly with the enforcement of federal criminal laws — has refused to bring criminal action against broadcasters of such programs. And in this very action, it is noteworthy that the Department of Justice has not joined the Commission in appealing the decision below. It is true, as contended by the Commission, that these are not criminal cases, but it is a criminal statute that we must interpret. There cannot be one construction for the Federal Communications Commission and another for the Department of Justice. If we should give § 1304 the broad construction urged by the Commission, the same construction would likewise apply in criminal cases. We do not believe this construction can be sustained. Not only does it lack support in the decided cases, judicial and administrative, but also it would do violence to the well-established principle that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. It is apparent that these so-called “give-away” programs have long been a matter of concern to the Federal Communications Commission; that it believes these programs to be the old lottery 'evil under a new guise, and that they should be struck down as illegal devices appealing to cupidity and the gambling spirit. It unsuccessfully sought to have the Department of Justice take criminal action against them. Likewise, without success, it urged Congress to amend the law to specifically prohibit them. The Commission now seeks to accomplish the same result through agency regulations. In doing so, the Commission has overstepped the boundaries of interpretation and hence has exceeded its rule-making power. Regardless of the doubts held by the Commission and others as to the social value of the programs here under consideration, such administrative expansion of § 1304 does not provide the remedy. The judgments are Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision of these cases. 18 U. S. C. § 1304 (derived from former § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088-1089, repealed by 62 Stat. 862, 866): “Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of. any advertisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. “Each day’s broadcasting shall constitute a separate offense.” Examples of the “give-away” programs involved here are “Stop the Music” (American Broadcasting Company), “What’s My Name” (National Broadcasting Company), and “Sing It Again” (Columbia Broadcasting System). “Stop the Music” is described in American’s complaint in No. 117 as follows: The home contestants are called on the telephone during the program. On the radio version, home contestants are selected at random from telephone directories. On the television version, home contestants are selected by lot from among those listeners who express in advance, through postcards sent to the network, their desire to participate. On both the radio and television versions, however, the home contestant is not required to be listening to the broadcast at the time he is called in order to participate. When called, the home contestant is asked to give the title of a musical selection that has just been played. In the event he was not listening, or for some other reason desires to have the tune repeated, the master of ceremonies hums or sings it to him over the telephone. If he answers correctly, he receives a merchandise prize; if not, he gets a less valuable “consolation” prize and a member of the studio audience is then given an opportunity to win the merchandise prize by identifying the same tune. If the home contestant answers correctly, he receives, in addition to the merchandise prize, an opportunity to identify another tune, called the “Mystery Melody.” If he identifies this tune, he wins the “jackpot” prize, usually valued at several thousand dollars. Should he fail to identify the “Mystery Melody," another home contestant is called and the process is repeated. Additions to the “jackpot” prize are made each week so long as the “Mystery Melody” remains unidentified. “What’s My Name” is described in National’s complaint in No. 118 as follows: Prizes are awarded to contestants for correctly identifying famous persons on the basis of clues given by the master of ceremonies and in a short skit performed by professional actors. All but one of the contestants on the program are chosen from members of the studio audience. The remaining contestant is chosen at random from postcards sent in by listeners, and is called on the telephone during the program. For answering the telephone, he is awarded a watchband manufactured by the sponsor of the program and is also given the opportunity to win a valuable “jackpot” prize in Government bonds by identifying the famous person described in the “jackpot” clues. If the home contestant fails to make a correct identification, the amount of the “jackpot” is added to the “jackpot” for the following week’s program. The subject of the “jackpot” clues, however, is changed every week. “Sing It Again” is described in Columbia’s complaint in No. 119 as follows: Performers sing a popular song and then repeat it but this time with parody lyrics describing some person, place, or event. Contestants, selected at random from telephone directories, are called by long distance telephone during the program. If the contestant correctly identifies the subject described by the parody lyrics, he wins a merchandise prize and an opportunity to win a “jackpot” prize by identifying the “Phantom Voice,” the voice of a famous but unrevealed person. Clues as to the identity of the “Phantom Voice” are given on the program and on other programs broadcast over the same network. The “jackpot” is increased week by week until the correct identification is made. If the home contestant fails to identify the subject of the parody lyrics, he receives a “consolation prize,” and a member of the studio audience is given the opportunity to answer and win the merchandise prize. 47 CFR, 1952 Cum. Supp., §§ 3.192, 3.292, 3.656. The language of the rules is broad enough to cover contest programs drawing contestants solely from members of the studio audience. In the court below, however, the Commission took the position that such coverage was not intended, and the controversy was delimited to programs involving the distribution of prizes to contestants participating from their homes. 110 F. Supp. 374, 381. The actions were brought under § 402 (a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1093, 47 U. S. C. § 402 (a); 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 1398, 2284, 2321-2325; and § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243, 5 U. S. C. § 1009. Pub. L. No. 901, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 64 Stat. 1129, 5 U. S. C. § 1031, has since changed the procedure under § 402 (a), but is inapplicable to actions commenced prior to its enactment. 110 F. Supp. 374. 346 U. S. 808. The Commission is authorized by § 4 (i) of the Communications Act to “make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions”; by § 303 (r) to “Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter”; by § 307 (a) and § 309 (a) to grant station licenses and license renewals “if public convenience, interest, or necessity” would thereby be served; by § 312 (a) to revoke a license for a violation of any regulation authorized by the Act. 48 Stat. 1068, 47 U. S. C. § 154 (i); 50 Stat. 191, 47 U. S. C. § 303 (r); 48 Stat. 1083, 47 U. S. C. § 307 (a); 48 Stat. 1085, 47 U. S. C. § 309 (a); 48 Stat. 1086-1087, 47 U. S. C. § 312 (a). The “public interest, convenience, or necessity” standard for the issuance of licenses would seem to imply a requirement that the applicant be law-abiding. In any event, the standard is sufficiently broad to permit the Commission to consider the applicant’s past or proposed violation of a federal criminal statute especially designed to bar certain conduct by operators of radio and television stations. And if this consideration is a proper one in individual eases, there is no reason why it may not be stated in advance by the Commission in interpretative regulations defining the prohibited conduct with greater clarity. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 222-224; cf. Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 316 U. S. 31, 46-47. A typical “lottery” is a scheme in which tickets are sold and prizes are awarded among the ticket holders by lot. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814. A typical “gift enterprise” differs from this in that it involves the purchase of merchandise or other property; the purchaser receives, in addition to the merchandise or other property, a “free” chance in a drawing. See Horner v. United States, 147 U. S. 449. But whatever may be the factual differences between a “lottery,” a “gift enterprise,” and a “similar scheme,” the traditional tests of chance, prize, and consideration are applicable to each. We are aware of no decision, federal or state, which has distinguished among them on the basis of their legal elements. Section 1304 is one of five sections — § 1301 through § 1305 — which constitute “Chapter 61 — Lotteries” of Title 18. Section 1305, added in 1950, exempts certain "fishing contests” from the operation of the other four sections. Section 1301 prohibits the importing or transporting of lottery tickets; § 1302, the mailing of lottery tickets and related matter; § 1303, the participation in lottery schemes by postmasters and postal employees; and § 1304, the broadcasting of lottery information. These four sections use the same terminology— “any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance.” This language first appeared in the 1909 amendments to the federal lottery laws. 35 Stat. 1129, 1130, 1136. It was adopted verbatim in § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, which was the first federal statute to ban the broadcasting of lotteries. With only slight modifications not material here, § 316 became § 1304 of the Criminal Code in the 1948 revision of Title 18. For the early history of lotteries in this country, see Spofford, Lotteries in American History, at p. 171 of 1892 Report of American Historical Association, S. Misc. Doc. No. 57, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. See S. Rep. No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A99 (1947); S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 8 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 49 (1934) ; S. Rep. No. 564, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10 (1932); H. R. Rep. No. 221, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 8 (1932); S. Rep. No. 10, Part 1, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23 (1908); H. R. Rep. No. 2, Part 1, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 22 (1908). In the only previous decision on the legality of a “give-away” program of the type involved here, a state trial court held that the program did not constitute a lottery because the consideration element was lacking. Clef, Inc. v. Peoria Broadcasting Co., Equity No. 21368, Circuit Court of Peoria County, Illinois (1939). Similarly, cases under the postal lottery laws (see note 9, supra) appear to be uniform in requiring a “valuable” consideration for a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.” See Garden City Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Wagner, 100 F. Supp. 769 (E. D. N. Y.), stay denied, 192 F. 2d 240 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Post Publishing Co. v. Murray, 230 F. 773 (C. A. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 241 U. S. 675. But cf. dictum in Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, 181 F. 579, 581-582 (C. C. E. D. N. Y.). A leading case is Maughs v. Porter, 157 Va. 415, 161 S. E. 242; see also State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N. W. 491. Contra, Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 P. 821; cf. Garden City Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Wagner, 100 F. Supp. 769 (E. D. N. Y.), stay denied, 192 F. 2d 240 (C. A. 2d Cir.). For critical commentary on the Maughs decision, supra, see Notes, 18 Va. L. Rev. 465 and 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 744; Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1196, 1206. E. g., Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller, 40 Del. 28, 5 A. 2d 257; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F. 2d 597 (C. A. 10th Cir.). Contra, e. g., Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S. C. 282, 2 S. E. 2d 782; Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3 (N. D. Ill.). Some of the programs involved here (e. g., “Stop the Music,” described in note 2, supra) do not even make this requirement. As a practical matter, however, few home contestants on a “give-away” program would be in a position to answer correctly the questions asked of them unless they listened to the program. In 1949 the Solicitor ruled that material relating to “Stop the Music” (described in note 2, supra) would be mailable. In 1950 he ruled that material relating to a comparable contest conducted on the program “Truth or Consequences” would be mailable. While earlier rulings on a “give-away” program called “Mu$ico” had been to the contrary, the Solicitor in 1949 informally advised that the material relating to the program would be mailable. These unreported rulings were made part of the record below. In accord with these rulings, the Solicitor in 1947 had instructed local postmasters that at least “an expenditure of substantial effort or time” was required in order to find an enterprise to be a “lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.” The instructions provided: “In order for a prize scheme to be held in violation of this section, it is necessary to show (in addition to the fact that the prizes are awarded by means of lot or chance) that the ‘consideration’ involves, for example, the payment of money for the purchase of merchandise, chance or admission ticket, or as payment on an account, or requires an expenditure of substantial effort or time. On the other hand, if it is required merely that one’s name be registered at a store in order to be eligible for the -prize, consideration is not deemed to be present.” (Italics added.) Postal Bulletin, Feb. 13, 1947. The italicized language, supra, was judicially confirmed in Garden City Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Wagner, 100 F. Supp. 769 (E. D. N. Y.), stay denied, 192 F. 2d 240 (C. A. 2d Cir.). In 1953, on the basis of the Garden City case and the District Court decision in this case, the Solicitor issued new instructions further narrowing the meaning of “an expenditure of substantial effort or time.” Postal Bulletin, June 4, 1953. Apparently no prosecutions have ever been instituted under either the former § 316 of the Communications Act or the present § 1304 of the Criminal Code. In a series of letters made part of the record below, the Chairman of the Commission in 1940 urged the Attorney General to institute criminal proceedings against a number of stations because of their broadcasting of “give-away” programs similar to those involved here. In response to each letter, the Attorney General advised that “careful consideration has been given to this matter and it has been concluded that no action is warranted by this Department.” See note 16, supra. In a letter made part of the record below, the Chairman of the Commission in 1943 urged the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee to approve a proposed amendment to § 316 of the Communications Act, later to become § 1304 of the Criminal Code. The proposed amendment would have retained the existing language as to “any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme,” but would have extended the prohibition to “any program which offers money, prizes, or other gifts to members of the radio audience (as distinguished from the studio audience) selected in whole or in part by lot or chance.” No action was ever taken on the proposal. Cf. United States v. Halseth, 342 U. S. 277, 280-281.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WILSON et al. v. OMAHA INDIAN TRIBE et al. No. 78-160. Argued March 21, 1979 — Decided June 20, 1979 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Powell, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. BlackmuN, J., filed a concurring opinon, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 679. Edson Smith argued the cause for petitioners in No. 78-160. With him on the briefs were Robert H. Berkshire, Thomas R. Burke, Lyman L. Larsen, Francis M. Gregory, Jr., and Maurice B. Nieland. Bennett Cullison, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in No. 78-161. With him on the brief were Richard C. Turner, Attorney General of Iowa, and' James C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General. William H. Veeder argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Omaha Indian Tribe in both cases. Sara Sun Beale argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With her on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Deputy Solicitor General Barnett, Robert L. Klarquist, and Edward J. Shawaker. Together with No. 78-161, Iowa et al. v. Omaha Indian Tribe et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Edgar B. Washburn filed a brief for Title Insurance and Trust Co. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in both cases. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 78-161 was filed for their respective States by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana, Jane Gootee, Deputy Attorney General, and Donald Bogará; William J. Baxley, Attorney General of Alabama; Avrum Gross, Attorney General of Alaska; John A.t LaSota, Jr., Acting Attorney General of Arizona; William J. Clinton, Attorney General of Arkansas; Carl B. Afelio, Attorney General of Connecticut; Richard B. Wier, Jr., Attorney General of Delaware; Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida; Ronald Y. Amemiya, Attorney General of Hawaii; Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General of Idaho; William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Curt T. Schneider, Attorney General of Kansas; Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General of Kentucky; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana; Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General of Maine; Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland; Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan; A. F. Summer, Attorney General of Mississippi; John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska; Robert List, Attorney General of Nevada; Thomas D. Rath, Attorney General of New Hampshire; Toney Anaya, Attorney General of New Mexico; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina; Allen I. Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota; William J. Brown, Attorney General of Ohio; James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon; Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina; William Janklow, Attorney General of South Dakota; William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General of Tennessee; Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah; M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General of Vermont; J. Marshall Coleman, Attorney General of Virginia; Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia; Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin; John J. Rooney, Acting Attorney General of Wyoming, and Jack D. Palma II, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Robert S. Pelcyger, Richard B. Collins, and Arthur Lazarus, Jr., filed a brief for the Native American Rights Fund et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. John C. Christie, Jr., Charles T. Martin, and Stephen J. Landes filed a brief for the American Land Title Assn, as amicus curiae in both cases. A brief of amici curiae was filed in No. 78-161 for their respective States by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, N. Gregory Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, and John Briscoe and Bruce S. Flushman, Deputy Attorneys General; John L. Hill, Attorney General of Texas; Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana; Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota; Gerald Gornish, Attorney General of Pennsylvania; and J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, and David W. Bobbins, Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue here is the ownership of a tract of land on the east bank of the Missouri River in Iowa. Respondent Omaha Indian Tribe, supported by the United States as trustee of the Tribe’s reservation lands, claims the tract as part of reservation lands created for it under an 1854 treaty. Petitioners, including the State of Iowa and several individuals, argue that past movements of the Missouri River washed away part of the reservation and the soil accreted to the Iowa side of the river, vesting title in them as riparian landowners. Two principal issues are presented. First, we are faced with novel questions regarding the interpretation and scope of Rev. Stat. § 2126, as set forth in 25 U. S. C. § 194, a 145-year-old, but seldom used, statute that provides: “In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party on one side, and a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of previous possession or ownership.” Second, we must decide whether federal or state law determines whether the critical changes in the course of the Missouri River in this case were accretive or avulsive. I In 1854, the Omaha Indian Tribe ceded most of its aboriginal lands by treaty to the United States in exchange for money and assistance to enable the Tribe to cultivate its retained lands. Treaty of Mar. 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043; see United States v. Omaha Indians, 253 U. S. 275, 277-278 (1920). The retained lands proved unsatisfactory to the Tribe, and it exercised its option under the treaty to exchange those lands for a tract of 300,000 acres to be designated by the President and acceptable to the Tribe. The Blackbird Hills area, on the west bank of the Missouri, all of which was then part of the Territory of Nebraska, was selected. The eastern boundary of the reservation was fixed as the center of the main channel of the Missouri River, the thalweg. That land, as modified by a subsequent treaty and statutes, has remained the home of the Omaha Indian Tribe. In 1867, a survey by T. H. Barrett of the General Land Office established that the reservation included a large peninsula jutting east toward the opposite, Iowa, side of the river, around which the river flowed in an oxbow curve known as Blackbird Bend. Over the next few decades, the river changed course several times, sometimes moving east, sometimes west. Since 1927, the river has been west of its 1867 position, leaving most of the Barrett survey area on the Iowa side of the river, separated from the rest of the reservation. As the area, now on the Iowa side, dried out, Iowa residents settled on, improved, and farmed it. These non-Indian owners and their successors in title occupied the land for many years prior to April 2, 1975, when they were dispossessed by the Tribe, with the assistance of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Four lawsuits followed the seizure, three in federal court and one in state court. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa consolidated the three federal actions, severed claims to damages and lands outside the Barrett survey area, and issued a temporary injunction that permitted the Tribe to continue possession. The court then tried the case without a jury. At trial, the Government and the Tribe argued that the river’s movement had been avul-sive, and therefore the change in location of the river had not affected the boundary of the reservation. Petitioners argued that the river had gradually eroded the reservation lands on the west bank of the river, and that the disputed land on the east bank, in Iowa, had been formed by gradual accretion and belonged to the east-bank riparian owners. Both sides sought to quiet title in their names. The District Court concluded that state rather than federal law should be the basis of decision. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 57 (1977). The court interpreted the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652, as not requiring the application of federal law in land disputes, even though the United States and an Indian tribe were claimants, unless the Constitution, a treaty, or an Act of Congress specifically supplanted state law. The court found no indication in those sources that federal law was to govern. It then went on to conclude that 25 U. S. C. § 194 was not applicable to the case because it was impossible for the Tribe to make out a prima facie case that it possessed the disputed lands in the past without proving its case on the merits. Thus, § 194 had no significance because it was “inextricably entwined with the merits.” 433 F. Supp., at 66. Applying Nebraska law, which places the burden of proof on the party seeking to quiet title, the court concluded that the key changes in the river had been accretive, and that the east-bank riparians, the petitioners, were thus the owners of the disputed area. 433 F. Supp. 67 (1977). The Court of Appeals reversed. 575 F. 2d 620 (CA8 1978). It began by ruling that the District Court should have applied federal rather than state law for two distinct reasons. First, the boundary of the reservation was coincidental with an interstate boundary at the time the river moved. Therefore, under Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363, 375 (1977), and other cases of this Court, the governing law is federal because “[t]he rendering of a decision in a private dispute which would ‘press back’ an interstate boundary sufficiently implicates the interests of the states to require the application of federal common law.” 575 F. 2d, at 628. Second, the Court of Appeals construed our decision in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 677 (1974), as requiring the application of federal law because the Tribe asserted a right to reservation land based directly on the 1854 treaty and therefore arising under and protected by federal law. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Court had erred by refusing to apply 25 U. S. C. § 194. Because the Tribe had proved that the 1854 treaty included the land area within the Barrett survey, it had made a sufficient showing of “previous possession or ownership” to invoke the statute and place the burden of proof on petitioners. Adopting the District Court’s construction “would negate the application of the § 194 statutory burden upon a pleading that simply recites Indian land had been destroyed by the erosive action of a river.” 575 F. 2d, at 631. Reviewing what it perceived to be the federal common law of accretion and avulsion and with no more than passing reference to Nebraska law on the issue, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had based its ruling on a too narrow definition of avulsion. The court then applied the law to the evidence and found that the evidence was in equipoise. Because § 194 placed the burden of proof on the non-Indians, however, the court ruled that judgment must be entered for the Tribe. We granted separate petitions for certiorari filed by the State of Iowa and its Conservation Commission in No. 78-161 and by the individual petitioners in No. 78-160, but limited to the questions whether 25 U. S. C. § 194 is applicable in the circumstances of this litigation, in particular with respect to the State of Iowa, and whether federal or state law governs the substantive aspects of these cases. 439 U. S. 963 (1978). We are in partial, but serious, disagreement with the Court of Appeals, and vacate its judgment. II Petitioners challenge on several grounds the Court of Appeals’ construction and application of § 194 to these cases. First, they argue that by its plain language the section does not apply when an Indian tribe, rather than one or more individual Indians, is the litigant. We think the argument is untenable. The provision first appeared in slightly different form in 1822, Act of May 6, 1822, 3 Stat. 683, as part of an Act amending the 1802 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of Mar. 30, 1802, 2 Stat. 139, which was one of a series of Acts originating in 1790 and designed to regulate trade and other forms of intercourse between the North American Indian tribes and non-Indians. Because of recurring trespass upon and illegal occupancy of Indian territory, a major purpose of these Acts as they developed was to protect the rights of Indians to their properties. Among other things, non-Indians were prohibited from settling on tribal properties, and the use of force was authorized to remove persons who violated these restrictions. The 1822 provision was part of this design ; and with only slight change in wording, it was incorporated in the 1834 consolidation of the various statutes dealing with Indian affairs. Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729. Section 22 of that Act is now 25 U. S. C. § 194, already set out in this opinion. Although the word “Indian” in the second line of § 22 of the 1834 Act replaced the word “Indians” in the 1822 provision, there is no indication that any change in meaning was intended; and none should be implied at this late date, particularly in light of 1 U. S. C. § 1, which provides that unless the context indicates otherwise, “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” Even construed as including the plural, however, it is urged that the word “Indians” does not literally include an Indian tribe, and that it is plain from other provisions of the Act that Congress intended to distinguish between Indian tribes and individual Indians. But as we see it, this proves too much. At the time of the enactment of the predecessors of § 194, Indian land ownership was primarily tribal ownership; aboriginal title, a possessory right, was recognized and was extinguishable only by agreement with the tribes with the consent of the United States. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S., at 669-670. Typically, this was accomplished by treaty between the United States and the tribe, and typically the land reserved or otherwise set aside was held in trust by the United States for the tribe itself. “ 'Whatever title the Indians have is in the tribe, and not in the individuals, although held by the tribe for the common use and equal benefit of all the members.’ ” United States v. Jim, 409 U. S. 80, 82 (1972), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 307 (1902). It is clear enough that, when enacted, Congress intended the 1822 and 1834 provisions to protect Indians from claims made by non-Indian squatters on their lands. To limit the force of these provisions to lands held by individual Indians would be to drain them of all significance, given the historical fact that at the time of the enactment virtually all Indian land was tribally held. Legislation dealing with Indian affairs “cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted [it].” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 206 (1978). Furthermore, “ 'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.' ” Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976), quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918). The second argument, presented in its most acute form by the State of Iowa, is that § 194 applies only where the Indians' antagonist is an individual white person and has no force at all where the adverse claimant is an artificial entity. We cannot accept this broad submission. The word “person” for purposes of statutory construction, unless the context indicates to the contrary, is normally construed to include “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 1 U. S. C. § 1. And in terms of the protective purposes of the Acts of which § 194 and its predecessors were a part, it would make little sense to construe the provision so that individuals, otherwise subject to its burdens, could escape its reach merely by incorporating and carrying on business as usual. As we said in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 687 (1978), “by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis.” It stands to reason that in re-enacting this provision in the Revised Statutes, now codified in the United States Code, Congress was fully aware that it would be interpreted to cover artificial entities as well as individuals. It nevertheless does not follow that the “white persons” to whom will be shifted the burden of proof in title litigation with Indians also include the sovereign States of the Union. “[I]n common usage, the term 'person’ does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941); accord, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947). Particularly is this true where the statute imposes a burden or limitation, as distinguished from conferring a benefit or advantage. United States v. Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (1840). There is nevertheless “no hard and fast rule of exclusion,” United States v. Cooper Corp., supra, at 604-605; and much depends on the context, the subject matter, legislative history, and executive interpretation. The legislative history here is uninformative, and executive interpretation is unhelpful with respect to this dormant statute. But in terms of the purpose of the provision — that of preventing and providing remedies against non-Indian squatters on Indian lands — it is doubtful that Congress anticipated such threats from the States themselves or intended to handicap the States so as to offset the likelihood of unfair advantage. Indeed, the 1834 Act, which included § 22, the provision identical to the present § 194, was “intended to apply to the whole Indian country, as defined in the first section.” H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1834). Section 1 defined Indian country as being “all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished . . . 4 Stat. 729. Although this definition was discarded in the Revised Statutes, see Rev. Stat. § 5596, it is apparent that in adopting § 22 Congress had in mind only disputes arising in Indian country, disputes that would not arise in or involve any of the States. Nor have we discovered anything since its passage or in connection with the definition of Indian country now contained in the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 1151, indicating that Congress intended the words “white person” in § 194 to include any of the original or any of the newly admitted States of the Union. We hesitate, therefore, to hold that the State of Iowa must necessarily be disadvantaged by § 194 when litigating title to the property to which it claims ownership, particularly where its opposition is an organized Indian tribe litigating with the help of the United States of America. It may well be that a State, like other litigants and like the State of Iowa did in this case, will often bear the burden of proof on various issues in litigating the title to real estate. But § 194 operates regardless of the circumstances once the Tribe or its champion, the United States, has demonstrated that the Tribe was once in possession of or had title to the area under dispute. Petitioners also defend the refusal of the District Court to apply § 194 on the grounds that a precondition to applying it is proof of prior possession or title in the Indians and that this involves the merits of the issue on which this case turns— whether the changes in the river were avulsive or accretive. We think the Court of Appeals had the better view of the statute in this regard. Section 194 is triggered once the Tribe makes out a prima facie case of prior possession or title to the particular area under dispute. The usual way of describing real property is by identifying an area on the surface of the earth through the use of natural or artificial monuments. There seems to be no question here that the area within the Barrett survey was once riparian land lying on the west bank of the Missouri River and was long occupied by the Tribe as part of the reservation set apart for it in consequence of the treaty of 1854. This was enough, it seems to us, to bring § 194 into play. Of course, that would not foreclose the State of Iowa from offering sufficient evidence to prove its own title or from prevailing on any affirmative defenses it may have. Petitioners also assert that even if § 194 is operative and even if the Tribe has made out its prima facie case, only the burden of going forward with the evidence, and not the burden of persuasion, is shifted to the State. Therefore they, the petitioners, should prevail if the evidence is in equipoise. The term “burden of proof” may well be an ambiguous term connoting either the burden of going forward with the evidence, the burden of persuasion, or both. But in view of the evident purpose of the statute and its use of the term “presumption” which the “white man” must overcome, we are in agreement with the two courts below that § 194 contemplates the non-Indian’s shouldering the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of producing evidence once the tribe has made out its prima facie case of prior title or possession. Ill A In Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363 (1977), this Court held that, absent an overriding federal interest, the laws of the several States determine the ownership of the banks and shores of waterways. This was expressive of the general rule with respect to the incidents of federal land grants: “ 'We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever, according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested according to the laws of the United States.' ” Id., at 377, quoting Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 517 (1839) (emphasis added by the Corvallis Court). The Court’s conclusion in the particular dispute before it in Corvallis was that state law governed the rights of the riparian owner because there was no claim of an applicable federal right other than the equal-footing origin of the State’s title. As the Court of Appeals held, however, the general rule recognized by Corvallis does not oust federal law in this case. Here, we are not dealing with land titles merely derived from a federal grant, but with land with respect to which the United States has never yielded title or terminated its interest. The area within the survey was part of land to which the Omahas had held aboriginal title and which was reserved by the Tribe and designated by the United States as a reservation and the Tribe’s permanent home. The United States continues to hold the reservation lands in trust for the Tribe and to recognize the Tribe pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et se.q. In these circumstances, where the Government has never parted with title and its interest in the property continues, the Indians’ right to the property depends on federal law, “wholly apart from the application of state law principles which normally and separately protect a valid right of possession.” Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S., at 677. It is rudimentary that “Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal consent” and that the termination of the protection that federal law, treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is “exclusively the province of federal law.” Id,., at 670. Insofar as the applicable law is concerned, therefore, the claims of the Omahas are “clearly distinguishable from the claims of land grantees for whom the Federal Government has taken no such responsibility.” Id., at 684 (RehNQUIst, J., concurring). This is not a case where the United States has patented or otherwise granted lands to private owners in a manner that terminates its interest and subjects the grantees’ incidents of ownership to determination by the applicable state law. The issue here is whether the Tribe is no longer entitled to possession of an area that in the past was con-cededly part of the reservation as originally established. That question, under Oneida, is a matter for the federal law to decide. B Although we have determined that federal law ultimately controls the issue in this case, it is still true that “[c]ontro-versies . . . governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules. . . . Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law.' ” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 727-728 (1979), quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 310 (1947). The Court of Appeals, noting the existence of a body of federal law necessarily developed by this Court in the course of adjudicating boundary disputes between States having their common border on a navigable stream, purported to find in those doctrines the legal standards to apply in deciding whether the changes in the course of the Missouri River involved in this case had been avulsive or ac-cretive in nature. The federal law applied in boundary cases, however, does not necessarily furnish the appropriate rules to govern this case. No dispute between Iowa and Nebraska as to their common border on or near the Missouri River is involved here. The location of that border on the ground was settled by Compact in 1943 and by further litigation in this Court, Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U. S. 117 (1972). The federal interest in this respect has thus been satisfied, except to the extent that the Compact itself may bear upon a dispute such as this. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra, advises that at this juncture we should consider whether there is need for a nationally uniform body of law to apply in situations comparable to this, whether application of state law would frustrate federal policy or functions, and the impact a federal rule might have on existing relationships under state law. An application of these factors suggests to us that state law should be borrowed as the federal rule of decision here. First, we perceive no need for a uniform national rule to determine whether changes in the course of a river affecting riparian land owned or possessed by the United States or by an Indian tribe have been avulsive or accretive. For this purpose, we see little reason why federal interests should not be treated under the same rules of property that apply to private persons holding property in the same area by virtue of state, rather than federal, law. It is true that States may differ among themselves with respect to the rules that will identify and distinguish between avulsions and accretions, but as long as the applicable standard is applied evenhandedly to particular disputes, we discern no imperative need to develop a general body of federal common law to decide cases such as this, where an interstate boundary is not in dispute. We should not accept “generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect [federal interests].” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., supra, at 730. Furthermore, given equitable application of state law, there is little likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities or to tribal possessory interests. On some occasions, Indian tribes may lose some land because of the application of a particular state rule of accretion and avulsion, but it is as likely on other occasions that the tribe will stand to gain. The same would be the case under a federal rule, including the rule that the Court of Appeals announced in this case. The United States fears a hostile and unfavorable treatment at the hands of state law, but, as we have said, the legal issues are federal and the federal courts will have jurisdiction to hear them. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661 (1974). Adequate means are thus available to insure fair treatment of tribal and federal interests. This is also an area in which the States have substantial interest in having their own law resolve controversies such as these. Private landowners rely on state real property law when purchasing real property, whether riparian land or not. There is considerable merit in not having the reasonable expectations of these private landowners upset by the vagaries of being located adjacent to or across from Indian reservations or other property in which the United States has a substantial interest. Borrowing state law will also avoid arriving at one answer to the avulsive-accretion riddle in disputes involving Indians on one side and possibly quite different answers with respect to neighboring land where non-Indians are the disputants. Indeed, in this case several hundred acres of land within the Barrett survey are held in fee, and concededly are not Indian property. These tracts would not be governed by the federal rule announced by the Court of Appeals. We have borrowed state law in Indian cases before. In Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939), the question was what law, federal or state, would apply in a claim to recover taxes improperly levied by a political subdivision of a State upon Indians’ trust lands. The Court observed that “[s]ince the origin of the right to be enforced is the Treaty, plainly whatever rule we fashion is ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States, and does not owe its authority to the law-making agencies of Kansas.” Id., at 349-350. The Court, nevertheless, elected to adopt state law as the federal rule of decision. There was no reason in the circumstances of the case for the beneficiaries of federal rights to have a privileged position over other aggrieved taxpayers, and “[t]o respect the law of interest prevailing in Kansas in no wise impinges upon the exemption which the Treaty of 1861 has commanded Kansas to respect and the federal courts to vindicate.” The importance of attending to state law, once an interstate boundary has been determined, is underlined by Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158 (1918). In that case, because the disputed boundary between Arkansas and Tennessee had been determined, the question of title to riparian land and to the river bottom was a matter to be determined by local law: “How the land that emerges on either side of an interstate boundary stream shall be disposed of as between public and private ownership is a matter to be determined according to the law of each State, under the familiar doctrine that it is for the States to establish for themselves such rules of property as they deem expedient with respect to the navigable waters within their borders and the riparian lands adajacent to them. . . . But these dispositions are in each case limited by the interstate boundary, and cannot be permitted to press back the boundary line from where otherwise it should be located.” Id., at 175-176. Likewise, in the present case, the Compact of 1943 settled the location of the interstate boundary, within and without the river; and the question of land ownership within or adjacent to the river is best settled by reference to local law even where Indian trust land, a creature of the federal law, is involved. C The passage quoted above from Arkansas v. Tennessee was quoted with approval in Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U. S., at 126-127, where the central question was the interpretation of the Interstate Compact determining the location of the entire border between Nebraska and Iowa. Our opinion in Nebraska v. Iowa is also instructive with respect to which state law, Iowa or Nebraska, the federal court should refer to in determining the federal standard applicable to this case. Under § 2 of the Compact, each State ceded to the other and relinquished jurisdiction over all lands within the Compact boundary of the other State. Under § 3, “Titles, mortgages, and other liens” affecting such lands that are “good in” the ceding State “shall be good in” the other State. Thus, ceded lands east of the Compact line came under Iowa jurisdiction; but Iowa was obligated to respect title to any-ceded land east of the new boundary if that title was “good in” Nebraska. Accepting the Special Master’s recommendations in this respect, the Court ruled that one claiming a Nebraska title to land east of the Compact line need show only “good title” under Nebraska law and need not also prove either the location of the original boundary between the two States or that the land at issue was on the Nebraska side of that original boundary. The Court further ruled, in agreement with the Special Master, that in litigating with private claimants seeking to prove good Nebraska title to land east of the Compact line, the State of Iowa was disentitled to rely on certain doctrines of Iowa common law bearing on riparian land ownership. In this case, the District Court ruled that even though the United States and an Indian tribe rather than private parties were plaintiffs, title to the Barrett survey land, which was once in Nebraska but is now unquestionably in Iowa, should be governed by Nebraska law in accordance with the terms of the Compact. Proceeding to adjudicate the case in accordance with Nebraska law, the District Judge found that the Tribe and the Government, respondents here, had failed to prove that the Blackbird Bend area had been separated from the rest of the reservation by avulsive changes in the Missouri River and that the defendants, petitioners here, without the aid of any presumption of accretion available under Iowa law if applicable, had instead proved that the river changes had been by accretion. In the course of arriving at this conclusion, the District Court, relying on Nebraska cases, rejected the Government’s definition of avulsion, later embraced by the Court of Appeals, as contrary to the common law of Nebraska. The defendants, petitioners here, having carried the burden of proving their good title to the land at issue, were entitled to a decree quieting title in them. Although we have already held that the District Court erred in concluding that determination of titles to reservations lands is not a matter for the federal law, we have also indicated that the federal law should incorporate the applicable state property'law to resolve the dispute. Therefore, it seems to us that the District Court reached the correct result in ruling that under the construction of the Compact in Nebraska v. Iowa, Nebraska law should be applied in determining whether the changes in the river that moved the Blackbird Bend area from Nebraska to Iowa had been avulsive or accretive. It should also be noted that the District Court, although wrong in wholly rejecting the applicability of § 194, concluded as a matter of fact and law that the defendants, petitioners here, had carried the burden of persuasion normally incumbent upon a plaintiff in a quiet-title action, and had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the reservation lands had eroded and had accreted to the Iowa shoreline. Apparently for this reason, the trial judge observed at the end of his memorandum opinion that were he wrong in refusing to apply § 194, his findings and conclusions “would not be altered by any different allocation of the burden of persuasion.” 433 F. Supp., at 67. IV In sum, the Court of Appeals was partially correct in ruling that § 194 was applicable in this case. By its terms, § 194 applies to the private petitioners but not to petitioner State of Iowa. We also agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that federal law governed the substantive aspects of the dispute, but find it in error for arriving at a federal standard, independent of state law, to determine whether there had been an avulsion or an accretion. Instead, the court should have incorporated the law of the State that otherwise would have been applicable which, as we have said, is the law of Nebraska. Of course, because of its view of the controlling law, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether'the District Court had correctly interpreted Nebraska law and had properly applied it to the facts of this case. These tasks are still to be performed, and we vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. In Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), the Court explained the source and nature of this trust relationship. In the exercise of its plenary authority over Indian affairs, Congress has the power to place restrictions on the alienation of Indian lands. Where it does so, it continues guardianship over Indian lands and “[d]uring the continuance of this guardianship, the right and duty of the Nation to enforce by all appropriate means the restrictions designed for the security of the Indians cannot be gainsaid. ... A transfer of the [Indian land] is not simply a violation of the proprietary rights of the Indian. It violates the governmental rights of the United States.” Id., at 437-438. Accordingly, the United States is entitled to go into court as trustee to enforce Indian land rights. “It [is] not essential that it should have a pecuniary interest in the controversy.” Id., at 439. See also Morrison v. Work, 266 U. S. 481, 485 (1925); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 678 (1912); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 94-96 (1942). The State of Iowa claims title to certain lands deeded to it by quitclaim and to the bed of the Missouri between the thalweg (see n. 3, infra) and the ordinary high-water mark, any islands formed in that portion of the river, and any abandoned channels. The latter claims are based upon the equal-footing doctrine, see Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), and the 1943 Boundary Compact between Iowa and Nebraska, see n. 6, infra. The term is commonplace in boundary disputes between riparian States. See, e. g., Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U. S. 273, 282 (1920) : “The doctrine of Thalweg, a modification of the more ancient principle which required equal division of territory, was adopted in order to preserve to each State equality of right in the beneficial use of the stream as a means of communication. Accordingly, the middle of the principal channel of navigation is commonly accepted as the boundary. Equality in the beneficial use often would be defeated, rather than promoted, by fixing the boundary on a given line merely because it connects points of greatest depth. Deepest water and the principal navigable channel are not necessarily the same. The rule has direct reference to actual or probable use in the ordinary course, and common experience shows that vessels do not follow a narrow crooked channel close to shore, however deep, when they can proceed on a safer and more direct one with sufficient water.” Treaty of Mar. 6, 1865, 14 Stat. 667; Act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 146, 170; Act of Aug. 7, 1882, 22 Stat. 341; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 362, 370, as amended by Act of Jan. 7, 1925, ch. 34, 43 Stat. 726. There is some dispute over whether the Barrett survey actually marked the reservation boundary because several years had passed since the Tribe began occupying the reservation and the Missouri may have changed its course during that period. See United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 67, 69, 74 (ND Iowa 1977). This does not appear to be of significance in this litigation. Id., at 75. In Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359 (1892), the Court decided a boundary dispute between the States of Nebraska and Iowa caused by the wanderings of the Missouri. “[T]he fickle Missouri River,” however, “refused to be bound by the . . . decree,” Eriksson, The Boundaries of Iowa, 25 Iowa J. of Hist, and Pol. 163, 234 (1927); and in 1943 Nebraska and Iowa entered into a Compact fixing the boundary between the States independent of the river’s location. Congress ratified the Compact in the Act of July 12, 1943, ch. 220, 57 Stat. 494. Since the time of the Compact, the Army Corps of Engineers has been largely successful in taming the river. See Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U. S. 117, 119 (1972). The District Court stated the common-law rule, 433 F. Supp. 57, 62 (1977): “Simply stated, when a river which forms a boundary between two parcels of land moves by processes of erosion and accretion, the boundary follows the movements of the river. Independent Stock Farm v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 259 N. W. 647 (1935). On the other hand, when a river which forms a boundary between two parcels of land abruptly moves from its old channel to a new channel through an event known as avulsion, the boundary remains defined by the old river channel. Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Coulthard, 96 Neb. 607, 148 N. W. 328 (1914). The jurisdiction of Nebraska applies these principles to the movements of the Missouri River. DeLong v. Olsen, 63 Neb. 327, 88 N. W. 512 (1901).” This Court has followed the same principles resolving boundary disputes between States bordering on navigable streams. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 173 (1918); Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U. S. 23, 34-36 (1904); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S., at 360-361, 370. The District Court relied on Mason v. United States, 260 U. S. 545 (1923); Francis v. Francis, 203 U. S. 233 (1906); and Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe of Nebraska, 298 F. Supp. 855 (Neb. 1969), aff’d, 430 F. 2d 143 (CA8 1970). Tbo District Court also suggested that the possessory interest of the Tribe was not of sufficient quality to trigger the burden shifting contemplated by 25 U. S. C. § 194. The District Court construed the Court’s decision in Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U. S. 117 (1972), as requiring the application of Nebraska law with respect to changes in the river that occurred before 1943, the date of the Iowa-Nebraska Compact that permanently fixed the boundary between the States, because the land at issue here was indisputably part of Nebraska before the river changed its course. 433 F. Supp., at 60, and n. 2. Although tho District Court hewed closely to Nebraska caso law, it also observed that insofar as the relevant definitions of avulsion and accretion were concerned, there was no significant difference between Iowa and Nebraska law, except that under Iowa law accretion was presumed, which was not the case under Nebraska law. Because Nebraska law would not aid tho defendants by a presumption of accretion, the Tribe was favored by tho application of Nebraska law. The District Court was also of the view that tho federal accretion-avulsion law was not substantially different. As we shall see, the Court of Appeals differed with the District Court in this respect. The Court of Appeals relied on two cases, Veatch v. White, 23 F. 2d 69 (CA9 1927), and Uhlhorn v. United States Gypsum Co., 366 F. 2d 211 (CA8 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1026 (1967), in concluding that, under federal law, “the sudden, perceptible change of the channel, whether within or without the river’s original bed, is a critical factor in defining an avulsion.” 575 F. 2d 620, 637 (CA8 1978). This definition was broader than the Nebraska rule as understood and applied by the District Court, which the Court of Appeals described as follows: “an avulsion occurs only where a sudden shift in a channel cuts off land 'so that after the shift it remains identifiable as land which existed before the change of the channel and which never became a part of the river bed.’ ” Id., at 634, quoting 433 F. Supp., at 73. As is evident, the definition employed by the Court of Appeals permits a finding of avulsion even where the river is still largely within its original bed. In No. 78-161, filed by the State of Iowa and its Conservation Commission, the questions on which certiorari was granted were stated as follows: “Whether the State of Iowa is 'a white person’, and the Omaha Indian Tribe is 'an Indian’ within the meaning of 25 U. S. C. § 194. “Whether federal law requires divestiture of Iowa’s apparent good title to real property located within its boundaries.” In No. 78-160, we granted certiorari on the following questions: “Whether the Eighth Circuit erroneously construed Title 25 U. S. Code § 194 to make it applicable in this case. “Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that Federal and not state common law with regard to accretion and avulsion is applicable in this case.” Of these various arguments, only the single ground relied on by the District Court in refusing to apply § 194 was discussed and rejected by the Court of Appeals. The other grounds for holding § 194 inapplicable to this case were presented by petitioners either in their briefs on the merits before the Court of Appeals or their petition for rehearing before that court after it reversed the District Court. The background, history, and development of these laws and Acts are explored exhaustively in F. Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 (1962). See also Cohen, supra n. 1, at 68-75. Petitioners cite United States v. Perryman, 100 U. S. 235 (1880), as support for their position that § 194 must be construed literally to apply only to a “white person,” or individual Caucasian. But that ease dealt with another provision of the 1834 Nonintercourse Act, § 16, and there were distinct grounds in the legislative history indicating that the term “white person” as used in § 16 did not include a Negro. Whether Perryman would be followed today is a question we need not decide. Thero wero two corporate defendants among the parties in the District Court. They filed a separate petition for certiorari, No. 78-162, RGP, Inc. v. Omaha Indian Tribe, but no action has yet been taken on it. Under our Rules, however, the two corporations are party-respondents in the cases in which we havo granted certiorari. Rule 21 (4). Petitioners claim that Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574 (1922), mandates the applicability of state rather than federal law in this case. But there the United States issued patents granting former reservation lands. The Court merely held that, absent contrary evidence, when the United States conveyed and completely parted with its territory, even though Indian land, it intended the incidents of the resulting ownership to be determined by state law. This is no more than the general rule that Oneida recognized. In the present case, of course, the area at issue was never conveyed away by the United States or by the Tribe and is claimed by the United States and the Tribe to remain as part of the reservation established as the result of the treaty of 1854. Neither do we find that United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 318 U. S. 206 (1943), presents a contrary holding. There, the Court refused to construe a federal statute permitting the Secretary of the Interior to grant permission for the opening of highways over Indian land “in accordance with the laws of the state” as prohibiting the establishment of a power line in the highway right-of-way without further federal consent. Id., at 208. As we understand that case, the Court held only that the consent authorized by the federal statute included the uses which such consent would authorize under state law. Compare P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 768 (2d ed. 1973): “The federal 'command’ to incorporate state law may be a judicial rather than a legislative command; that is, it may be determined as a matter of choice of law, even in the absence of statutory command or implication, that, although federal law should 'govern’ a given question, state law furnishes an appropriate and convenient measure of the content of this federal law.” See Board of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U. S., at 351-352: “Having left the matter at large for judicial determination within the framework of familiar remedies equitable in their nature, see Stone v. White, 301 U. S. 532, 534, Congress has left us free to take into account appropriate considerations of ‘public convenience.’ Cf. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 552. Nothing seems to us more appropriate than due regard for local institutions and local interests. We are concerned with the interplay between the rights of Indians under federal guardianship and the local repercussion of those rights. Congress has not been heedless of the interests of the states in which Indian lands were situated, as reflected by their local laws. See, e. g., § 5 of the General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, 389. With reference, to other federal rights, the state law has been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent with federal policy. See Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299. In the absence of explicit legislative policy cutting across state interests, we draw upon a general principle that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to have a privileged position over other aggrieved tax-payers in their relation with the states or their political subdivisions. To respect the law of interest prevailing in Kansas in no wise impinges upon the exemption which the Treaty of 1861 has commanded Kansas to respect and the federal courts to vindicate.” The Special Master in that ease observed that, although it would be difficult, the location of the agreed-upon boundary in the Compact could be determined with reasonable accuracy. Report of Special Master in Nebraska v. Iowa, O. T. 1964, No. 17 Orig., p. 50. See 1943 Iowa Acts, ch. 306, as ratified by Act of July 12, 1943, ch. 220, 57 Stat. 494: “Sec. 2. The State of Iowa hereby cedes to the State of Nebraska and relinquishes jurisdiction over all lands now in Iowa but lying westerly of said boundary line and contiguous to lands in Nebraska. “Sec. 3. Titles, mortgages, and other hens good in Nebraska shall be good in Iowa as to any lands Nebraska may cede to Iowa and any pending suits or actions concerning said lands may be prosecuted to final judgment in Nebraska and such judgments shall be accorded full force and effect in Iowa.” Under this ruling, Iowa was disentitled, either as plaintiff or defendant, from invoking its presumption that changes in the Missouri had been accretive rather than avulsive, and could not rely on its rule that no person can claim adversely against the sovereign State of Iowa. Thus, a title based on adverse possession good under Nebraska law would be good in Iowa. Report of Special Master, supra, at 17A-175.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HUGHES TOOL CO. et al. v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC. No. 71-827. Argued October 10, 1972 Decided January 10, 1973 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 389. Marshall, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Charles Alan Wright argued the cause for petitioners in No. 71-827 and respondents in No. 71-830. With him on the briefs were Clark M. Clifford, Thomas D. Finney, Jr., E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Chester C. Davis, and Maxwell E. Cox. Dudley B. Tenney argued the cause for respondent in No. 71-827 and petitioner in No. 71-830. With him on the briefs were James Wm. Moore, Paul W. Williams, Marshall H. Cox., Jr., Raymond L. Falls, Jr., and William T. Lifiand. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, George Edelstein, O. D. Ozment, Warren L. Sharjman, and Robert L. Toomey filed a memorandum for the Civil Aeronautics Board as amicus curiae. Together with No. 71-830, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. et al., on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The complaint in this litigation alleged antitrust violations and damages suffered by Trans World Airlines (TWA) while under control of Hughes Tool Co. (Toolco). A default judgment was entered for over $145 million with interest at the rate of 7The District Court’s opinions confirming the damages award are reported at 308 F. Supp. 679, 312 F. Supp. 478. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 449 F. 2d 51. The cases are here on a petition for certiorari and on a cross petition. 405 U. S. 915. The crux of TWA’s complaint was the use by Toolco of its control over TWA to control and dictate the manner and method by which TWA acquired aircraft and the necessary financing thereof. Whether or not that complaint states a cause of action under the antitrust laws is a question we do not reach. Another defense of Toolco was that those transactions were under the control and surveillance of the Civil Aeronautics Board and by virtue of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 those transactions have immunity from the antitrust laws. It is our view that the Court of Appeals erroneously rejected that defense. This result, we think, is required by §§ 408 and 414 of the Federal Aviation Act and by our prior decision in Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 (1963). Section 408 of the Act makes illegal certain mergers, consolidations, and other transactions without the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Specifically, § 408 (a)(5) requires the approval of the Board when “any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics” seeks to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever. Section 408 (b) authorizes and directs the Board to approve such transactions, including acquisitions of control, that are in the “public interest” and prohibits approval of any transaction “which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier” not a party to the transaction. Section 102 of the Act requires that in assessing the public interest and the public convenience and necessity, the Board should consider, among other things, “[cjompetition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States . Section 408 (e) empowers the Board, upon complaint or its own initiative, to investigate and determine whether any person is violating any provision of subsection (a) and, if such violation is found, to “require such person to take such action, consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as may be necessary, in the opinion of the Board, to prevent further violation of such provision.” Under § 408 (d), the Board has broad control over the accounts, records, and reports of anyone controlling an air carrier, and their inspection. The Board is further granted power to control the designation of any officer or director of an air carrier who is an officer, director, member, or the controlling stockholder of any person who is engaged “in any phase of aeronautics.” § 409 (a), 49 U. S. C. § 1379 (a). Section 414 relieves from the operation of the antitrust laws any person affected by any order under § 408 “insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.” It was against this statutory backdrop that the Civil Aeronautics Board issued a series of decisions and orders with respect to the control of TWA by Toolco, the major decisions being issued in 1944, 1948, 1950, and 1960. The first decision, 6 C. A. B. 153 (1944), authorized control of approximately 45.6% of the outstanding stock of TWA. From the Board’s opinion issued at that time, it appears that Howard Hughes first became interested in TWA at the invitation of his friend, Jack Frye, the president of TWA. Hughes began acquiring TWA stock through Toolco, which he solely owned. By 1942, Toolco had acquired 42.1% of TWA’s outstanding stock and for all practical purposes was in position to control the day-to-day affairs of the carrier. Meanwhile, Hughes and Frye had jointly designed a four-engine transport, later known as the Constellation, which Lockheed agreed to manufacture under contract with Toolco. The contract was assigned by Toolco to TWA in 1942, Toolco reserving the right to purchase a sizable number of such aircraft through TWA. It was this arrangement by which Toolco might actually acquire for resale a number of commercial aircraft that, together with its experimental work in aviation and its manufacture of aircraft parts for the military, characterized Toolco as an organization engaged in any phase of aeronautics and therefore forbidden to acquire control of an air carrier such as TWA without the consent of the Board. Toolco’s control of TWA, by virtue of its stock ownership which had by 1944 increased to 45.6%, was approved by the Board as being in the public interest and consistent with the provisions of § 408, including the prohibition against monopoly. In order to insure that Toolco would not abuse its power over TWA, “to its own profit and to the detriment of the public interest,” 6 C. A. B., at 156, the approval was to continue only so long as intercompany purchases did not exceed $200 per item and did not amount to more than $10,000 in any one calendar year. Annual reports were required in this respect. 6 C. A. B., at 158. The 1948 and 1950 decisions of the Board originated in a letter agreement presented by Toolco to TWA on January 8, 1947, and accepted by TWA the following day. By this agreement, Toolco agreed to loan $10 million to TWA in return for the latter’s interest-bearing notes which were convertible into common stock of the company. On its own initiative, the Board opened an investigation into the matter. At the threshold was the question of Board jurisdiction, which was hotly contested. The Board’s June 1948 opinion sustained its jurisdiction, 9 C. A. B. 381. The opinion took a dual approach to the jurisdictional question. It first inquired whether “any change in the activities of Toolco in the field of aeronautics since October 17, 1944, has affected or altered the character of the control approved in Docket No. 1182. It is clear that a substantial change in the activities of Toolco in the field of aeronautics would result in a transaction subject to the Board’s jurisdiction under section 408 by reason of the fact that the character and propriety of control originally approved might be altered or changed as a result thereof.” 9 C. A. B., at 382. After reviewing the aeronautical activities of Toolco, it was concluded that the aircraft division of the company was chiefly a large-scale experimental plant for the military and had not substantially changed its status with respect to its participation in any phase of aeronautics. The Board’s second approach to the jurisdictional question was to inquire whether the letter agreement, which would permit Toolco to increase its shareholdings up to 80% of the outstanding shares of TWA, represented such a change in extent or effectiveness of control as to give the Board jurisdiction and require its consent. Its conclusion was that, although Toolco’s 45.6% was obviously enough to dominate the Board and control the day-today affairs of the company, the 1947 letter agreement would permit Toolco to translate its de facto control into full legal control of the company, which would “obviously impl[y] power to dictate the complete corporate activities of the corporation.” 9 C. A. B., at 387. This was sufficient to require an order of the Board in addition to the 1944 order. With its jurisdiction established, the Board proceeded with hearings and inquiry into whether the additional control was consistent with the public interest. This matter was also contested. Toolco thought that only a narrowly focused inquiry was appropriate, but the Board’s public counsel not only insisted that the hearings be far-ranging but urged, as a possible solution, that the additional control be disapproved and that the original 1944 proceedings, Docket No. 1182, be reopened to determine whether all control of TWA by Toolco should be terminated. The Board opted for an investigation sufficiently broad to inquire “into the actions and policies of the controlling company with respect to TWA for the period during which the prior-approved control existed . . . [f] or inevitably the controlling company, by virtue of its investment in the acquired carrier, will endeavor to make itself accountable — as indeed the acquirer here under scrutiny had — for the managerial efficiency, the operating economy, and the financial integrity of the controlled carrier.” 12 C. A. B. 192, 196 (1950). Before approving the additional acquisition, which would make certain “[cjomplete actual and legal control,” id., at 197, the Board determined not only to examine the future plans of Toolco but also its past conduct with respect to TWA. Accordingly, the Toolco-Hughes-TWA relationship from 1939 to the date of the decision was examined in detail, including the events occurring since the letter agreement of January 1947. The major focus of the inquiry was the differences between TWA management and Toolco with respect to the acquisition of new flight equipment — the quantity, the type, the timing, and the financing thereof. Unquestionably, TWA had been and was in need of additional financing to make possible the purchase of new equipment, particularly that needed to operate its expanded routes. TWA proposed and preferred equity financing in large measure, but Toolco most often insisted on financing new equipment through credit arrangements. Disagreement caused delay, and this, in combination with other factors, brought TWA to the verge of bankruptcy or reorganization in late 1946. It was at this juncture that the January 1947 letter agreement eventuated. Financial failure was averted; but urgent needs for new equipment continued, and substantial additions were made in the years from 1947 to 1950, most of it with the aid of Toolco and some of it by purchase from Toolco itself. By the time the hearings concluded and the case was under submission, TWA’s financial condition had considerably improved, measurably aided by better operating results, better expense control, and a stock offering to stockholders with the unsubscribed amount being underwritten by investment bankers. 12 C. A. B., at 208-209. In considering whether the additional control by Toolco would be in the public interest, the Board observed that there was no conflict of interest between Toolco’s present or contemplated aeronautical activities and its control of an air carrier and that enhanced control presented no problems under the antimonopoly provisions of § 408 (b). Id., at 216. The Board then noted that Toolco’s contributions to the science of aeronautics by way of aircraft design and instrumental aids to aviation for both the armed services and civil aviation have been substantial and found that “of specific importance to TWA, have been the contributions of Toolco and Mr. Hughes in the way of financial support to the carrier, in the selection and purchase of its equipment, and their advice and guidance to the engineering and operations departments of the carrier.” Ibid. Most important, however, in the Board’s opinion, were the efforts of Toolco to improve the financial position of TWA during the last few years. Although criticizing Toolco, along with others in the aircraft transportation industry, for relying too heavily on debt financing which, in the case of TWA had resulted in a very difficult, lopsided capital structure, the Board concluded that the record would not support a finding that the additional control would be inconsistent with the public interest. Indeed, the Board concluded that “[t]he continued interest of Toolco in TWA appears essential to the best interests of the carrier and the public.” Id., at 224. The Board’s approval in 1950 of the complete control of TWA by Toolco was made “subject to the terms and conditions” imposed by the 1944 order with respect to intercompany purchases and annual reporting. See supra, at 370. As a result, from 1944 through 1960, every acquisition or lease of aircraft by TWA from Toolco and each financing of TWA by Toolco required Board approval. Applications by Toolco were made to the Board in each instance, with the terms and conditions of the transactions being described. Each was approved by the Board and each was regarded as a modification or interpretation of its antecedent control orders under § 408. Each of these transactional orders recited a finding of the Board that the transaction was “just and reasonable and in the public interest.” Then, in December 1960, the Board issued an order approving a major proposal by TWA for the acquisition of jet equipment, which among other things involved fundamental changes in relationship between TWA and Toolco in that the stock of the former, at the insistence of the financial institutions involved in the program, was to be placed in a voting trust and the company’s Board of Directors reconstituted. 32 C. A. B. 1363. The dominant position of Toolco thus ended for the period of the trusteeship. In the course of its opinion accompanying the order, the Board stated that although it had not been officially informed of the reasons for the banks’ insistence on the voting trust, it was not “unaware of TWA’s problems.” Id., at 1364. The Board knew, because it was a matter of public record, that TWA had been delayed in financing its jet fleet and the Board’s opinion was that TWA had probably suffered because more attractive financing terms were no longer available and because the unavailability of equipment may have contributed to the company’s failure to maintain its normal share of the transportation market. “Under these circumstances” the Board said, “we think it clear that Board action to facilitate TWA’s acquisition of jet equipment is in the public interest. At the same time, however, it is evident that Toolco’s control of TWA, as exercised through Hughes, has presented substantial problems requiring the Board’s attention.” Id., at 1365. The Board went on to make clear that its approval would be required before Toolco would be permitted to reassume control over TWA and that any such approval would be forthcoming only after a most “searching inquiry” into the public interest factors involved. Ibid. It was six months later that TWA, now no longer under control of Toolco, filed suit against the latter alleging violations of the antitrust laws to the injury of TWA’s business. As analyzed by the Court of Appeals in its opinions filed in this case, the complaint rested principally on Toolco’s conduct as controlling stockholder during the years 1955-1960. The assertions were that in 1955 the commercial air industry was converting to jet aircraft, and that TWA’s competitors began in that year “to aid in the development of and to purchase jet planes.” 332 F. 2d 602, 605. Toolco and General Dynamics Corp. (Convair) had entered into an arrangement for the joint development of a suitable aircraft but the plan proved abortive, whereupon Toolco considered but ultimately abandoned a plan for itself to enter aircraft production. Meanwhile, Toolco had arranged for the purchase of jet aircraft from Convair and Boeing, the arrangements providing that Toolco could assign its rights to such aircraft to TWA. As respects its defense that CAB control and surveillance gave it immunity from the antitrust suit, Toolco relies on Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U. S. 296. The Court of Appeals distinguished that case, saying that there the unlawful division of territories and allocation of routes were directly “within the ambit of powers explicitly granted the Board by the Congress,” 332 F. 2d, at 608. The Court of Appeals said that the present ease was different because, in its view, the continuing supervision of the Board over the Toolco-TWA relationship was general and not related to specific conduct that gave rise to violations of the antitrust laws. The transactions on the basis of which damages were awarded were based primarily on profits lost as a result of five transactions relating to orders placed by Toolco for a fleet of 63 jet aircraft destined for use by TWA. 449 F. 2d, at 65-66: (1) The diversion of six Convairs by Toolco to Northeast Airlines; (2) The temporary retention by Toolco of four other Convairs and their ultimate lease to Northeast Airlines; (3) The diversion of six Boeing jets out of 33 ordered to Pan American Airways; (4) The lease, instead of outright sales, of jets in 1959-1960; and (5) The late delivery of 47 of the 63 jets. One difficulty with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that these transactions, unlike those involved in the Pan American case, were transactions on which the Board might take action but did not do so, is that it misconstrues the record. As noted, from 1944 through 1960 every acquisition or lease of aircraft by TWA from Toolco and each financing of TWA by Toolco required Board approval. Each transaction was approved by the Board and each approval was an order under § 408, for the Board regarded its transactional orders as modifications or interpretations of its antecedent control order. Each of the modification orders recited a finding of the Board that the transactions were “just and reasonable and in the public interest.” It is said, however, that while the Board modified its original “control” order under § 408 so as to permit sale or lease of the aircraft out of which the alleged antitrust violations occurred, the approval of the Board did not sanction the precise way in which Toolco allegedly used the power to the disadvantage of TWA. But that is not an answer to the problem of exemption. The Federal Aviation Act as construed and applied by this Court and the Civil Aeronautics Board dictates a contrary result. In Pan American World Airways v. United States, supra, the United States brought a civil antitrust action under §§ 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act challenging the joint control of Panagra, an air carrier, by Pan American Airways and W. R. Grace & Co. The allegations were that Pan American, Grace, and Panagra had divided territories, that Pan American and Grace had conspired to monopolize air transportation on the west coast of South America, and that Pan American had used its power to prevent Panagra from extending its routes from the Canal Zone to the United States. The District Court found no division of territories and no conspiracy between Grace and Pan American but concluded that Pan American had violated the Sherman Act in interfering with Panagra’s possible route extension. On cross appeals by Pan American and the United States, this Court held that the complaint should have been dismissed because § 411 of the Act gave the CAB broad power to investigate and bring to a halt unfair practices and unfair methods of competition, including those alleged in the complaint, and because if the courts were to intrude independently with their own construction of the antitrust laws the two regimes might collide. Hence, relief against the alleged division of territories, allocation of routes, and conspiracy to monopolize was a matter exclusively for the Board. The Court also pointed out that under § 414 of the Act, Board orders carried antitrust immunity for any conduct authorized, approved, or required by the order and that it would be odd to hold that an affiliation between an air carrier and others that would pass muster under § 408 could nevertheless run afoul of the antitrust laws: “Whether or not transactions of that character meet the standards of competition and monopoly provided by the Act is peculiarly a question for the Board, subject of course to judicial review as provided in 49 U. S. C. § 1486.” 371 U. S., at 309. As previously indicated, the Court of Appeals did not consider Pan American to be relevant or controlling because, different from the situation there, the conduct challenged in TWA's complaint against Toolco was “unrelated to any specific function of the CAB” and hence was not within the exclusive competence of that body. 332 F. 2d, at 608. This view is difficult to square with the statute and the several opinions and orders issued by the Board with respect to the relationship between Toolco and TWA. The Act expressly forbade Toolco to acquire control of TWA without approval of the Board. Section 408, however, directed the Board to approve the acquisition if consistent with the public interest and empowered it to remedy any acquisition of control by Toolco obtained otherwise than in accordance with the Act. It is also perfectly clear that in 1944 the Board approved the acquisition of control of TWA by Toolco by virtue of a 45.6% stock ownership and that in 1948 and 1950 the Board approved a transaction that could have increased Toolco’s holdings to 80% and transformed its de facto control into full legal, as well as practical, control. In reaching this conclusion, the Board inquired broadly into all phases of the exercise of Toolco’s control over TWA during the years 1944H947. It was not only proper but necessary in determining whether further acquisition of control was consistent with the public interest to examine “into the actions and policies of the controlling company . . . [f]or inevitably the controlling company, by virtue of its investment in the acquired carrier, will endeavor to make itself accountable ... for the managerial efficiency, the operating economy, and the financial integrity of the controlled carrier.” 12 C. A. B., at 196. Hence, of major interest to the Board were the decisions of Toolco with respect to the type, quantity, timing, and financing of new equipment acquisitions by TWA. It examined and dealt with in great detail the assertions that Toolco had improperly delayed the arrival of new equipment, had insisted on debt rather than equity financing, and itself had sold or leased aircraft to TWA. All of these matters, the Board concluded, were central to proper determination of the issue of the additional control and, indeed, to the additional question before the Board as to whether the existing relationship should have been completely terminated. The point is that the conduct of Toolco with which the Board so extensively dealt in 1950 is the same kind of conduct charged to Toolco in the 1950’s and alleged by TWA in its complaint to violate the antitrust laws. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how the Court of Appeals could conclude that the acts of Toolco in controlling, allegedly to the injury of TWA, the timing, the financing, and the flow of new equipment to TWA were unrelated to any function of the Board under the Act. Clearly, such considerations were in the mainstream of the Board's § 408 responsibilities to insure that only those acquisitions of control that are in the public interest are approved. Nor is it tenable to argue that, however relevant Tool-co’s new equipment decisions might have been to the public-interest standard mandated for Board approval of the additional control obtained in 1947, the Board’s authority nevertheless terminated with that approval and that the Board, having issued its approval, was powerless to control or oversee its exercise in the years to come. Section 408 permits only those acquisitions of control that are not inconsistent with the public interest and that will not result in a monopoly. It also authorizes the Board to approve acquisitions subject to such conditions as it may deem desirable. Section 408 (e) empowers the Board to investigate and remedy violations of §408 (a). If a carrier has acquired control “in any manner whatsoever” other than that approved by the Board, the Board is authorized either on complaint or its own initiative to investigate and if a violation is discovered it is ordered to remedy that situation. Section 204 (a), 49 U. S. C. § 1324 (a), authorizes the Board to issue and amend such orders as it shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of and to exercise and perform its powers and duties under the statute. It seems sufficiently apparent, therefore, that the Board did not exhaust its powers with respect to Toolco’s control of TWA when it issued its order of approval in Docket No. 1182 in 1944. Obviously, the Board remained competent to enforce or to waive the conditions attached to that order. It did so many times. See n. 10, supra. It also is clear from the 1948 and 1950 proceedings, where the Board’s jurisdiction was challenged, that its jurisdiction was triggered not only by substantial additional acquisitions of stock but by any change in the extent or effectiveness of Toolco’s control or in Toolco’s position in the aeronautics industry. The Board also implied that had Toolco’s exercise of control over TWA from 1942 to 1947 been sufficiently unacceptable to foreclose the additional acquisition of control, reopening of Docket No. 1182 and re-examination of the initial approval would have been justified. We have little doubt that the authority of the Board, either on complaint or its own initiative, extended to forbidding any exercise of control by Toolco which was not authorized or contemplated by the initial or subsequent approval. This seems the clear import of the Act and of the Board’s 1948-1950 proceedings. Also instructive is the Board’s response when asked in 1956 to modify its original order so as to permit TWA’s purchase of up to 25 jet-powered aircraft from Toolco. Reciting that its prior approvals of Toolco’s control of TWA had been premised upon the assumption that Toolco was not engaged in the manufacture or sale of aircraft for commercial use, the Board forthwith opened an investigation to determine whether Toolco’s position in the aeronautics industry had so changed as to result in a transaction subject to the Board’s jurisdiction under § 408. The motion for waiver of the 1944 condition was consolidated with this new proceeding. The proceeding was later canceled when the motion to waive the 1944 condition was withdrawn, but clearly the Board thought, and rightly so, that it had continuing power to audit the ongoing relationship between TWA and Toolco. It is also difficult to read in any other manner the recital by the CAB, in the course of approval of the 1960 voting trust arrangement, of Toolco’s alleged conduct in delaying the delivery of new equipment and dictating the financing of same, all to TWA’s alleged injury, followed by its assertion that such conduct “presented substantial problems requiring the Board’s attention.” 32 C. A. B., at 1365. It is therefore no answer to say that our Pan American decision does not cover the alleged antitrust violations involved in the Toolco-TWA transactions for which treble damages were sought. As noted, § 408 (b) states that the Board shall not approve any “acquisition of control” which would result “in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier.” Moreover, the Board in granting permission to “control” an air carrier must consider the standards of the public interest as defined in § 102 of the Act. Among such standards is that set forth in § 102 (c), which, as indicated, ante, at 368 n. 4, provides: “The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices.” Competition and monopoly — two ingredients of the antitrust laws — are thus standards governing the CAB’s exercise of authority in granting, allowing, or expanding or contracting the control which Toolco had over TWA by reason of the various orders issued by the CAB under § 408. In this context, the authority of the Board to grant the power to “control” and to investigate and alter the manner in which that “control” is exercised leads us to conclude that this phase of CAB jurisdiction, like the one in the Pan American case, pre-empts the antitrust field. It should be noted in that connection that in the Pan American case, Pan American, which owned 50% of the stock of the air carrier Panagra, was charged with using its control to prevent Panagra from receiving the authority of the CAB to extend its route from the Canal Zone to the United States. That restraint was held beyond the reach of the antitrust laws even though the CAB had taken no action to investigate, let alone act on, the alleged misfeasance as the Board has done here for over 16 years. We think the Court of Appeals erred also in construing § 414, which immunizes from antitrust liability any conduct approved, authorized, or required by any Board order issued under § 408. As we read this record, the Board not only approved Toolco’s ownership of TWA stock but it also contemplated actual and legal control of TWA by Toolco. The Board made it as plain as possible that Toolco’s stock ownership would inevitably result in Toolco’s exercising authority over the day-to-day affairs of TWA, including the acquisition and financing of equipment. It was precisely this kind of control the Board approved. Toolco’s power of decision with respect to these matters was central to the public-interest issue. What is more, the Board not only concluded that Toolco’s stewardship, although faulty in some respects, had been a great benefit to TWA and to the public in years gone by, but also determined that the additional control sought by Toolco and continuation of TWA-Toolco relationships were essential to the public interest. It is too clear for argument that in entering the 1950 order the Board fully realized that Toolco had determined and would determine when and how much new equipment would be purchased, from whom it would be acquired, and how it would be financed. It was precisely this type of association that it contemplated when it approved the additional control obtained by Toolco in 1947. And it was precisely this same conclusion that the Board was implementing each time during the 1950’s that it approved a sale or a lease of an airplane from Toolco to TWA which, without its approval, would have violated the Board’s ongoing limitation on the size of intercompany transactions. We repeat, however, what we said in the Pan American case that the Federal Aviation Act does not completely displace the antitrust laws. “While the Board is empowered to deal with numerous aspects of what are normally thought of as antitrust problems, those expressly entrusted to it encompass only a fraction of the total.” 371 U. S., at 305. One of the most conspicuous exceptions would be the combination or agreement between two air carriers involving trade restraints. See Timken Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593, 598. There may be other exceptions. But where, as here, the CAB authorizes control of an air carrier to be acquired by another person or corporation, and where it specifically authorizes as in the public interest specific transactions between the parent and the subsidiary, the way in which that control is exercised in those precise situations is under the surveillance of the CAB, not in the hands of those who can invoke the sanctions of the antitrust laws. As noted, the parent company which controls an air carrier is subject to pervasive control by the CAB. The control which the CAB is authorized to grant or to deny under § 408 involves an appraisal of the impact of that control in terms of monopoly and competition; and the ongoing supervision entrusted to the CAB by § 415 is broad enough to put all transactions between parent and subsidiary — -as originally conceived or subsequently exercised — under CAB supervision. We cannot believe that if the day after the Board's order of 1950, a minority stockholder had instituted a derivative antitrust suit against Toolco, alleging that Toolco had monopolized the TWA market from 1944 to 1950, delayed deliveries of aircraft, and insisted on improvident financing arrangements, such a suit could have survived a motion to dismiss based on § 414. Such an action would have sought to negate what the Board, after full investigation, had found consistent with § 408’s anti-monopoly provision, consistent with § 102’s competition standard, and consistent with the public interest. TWA’s suit in 1961 carries no better credentials, for it sought to terminate a relationship the continuation of which the Board had found essential to both TWA and the public interest and to penalize the type of conduct which the Board expressly contemplated and preferred would continue unless and until a different order from the Board was forthcoming. It adds nothing to the analysis to characterize Toolco’s exercise of power over TWA as monopolization of the TWA market, for it was precisely such control that the Board opted for in 1944 and 1950. Moreover, a condition of the order was that Toolco’s sales to TWA could not assume more than negligible proportions without in every instance the Board’s approving the transaction as being consistent with the public interest. Nor does it add to the argument to describe Toolco’s conduct as furthering a tying or exclusive-dealing arrangement or as a conspiracy to restrain trade in that market represented by TWA. The short of it is that in our view §§ 408 and 414 of the Act, as construed in Pan American, require reversal of the Court of Appeals and dismissal of this action. What TWA charged in its complaint was no more than the kind of conduct the CAB in 1950 had approved and authorized for the future; and, in any event, such conduct was within the power of the Board to control and was central to the mandate of § 408 to permit control of TWA by Toolco only if consistent with the public interest. We by no means hold that the Federal Aviation Act completely displaces the antitrust laws. Pan American, 371 U. S., at 305. But where, as here, the CAB authorizes control of an air carrier to be acquired by another person or corporation, and where the CAB specifically authorizes as in the public interest specific transactions between the parent and the subsidiary, the way in which that control is exercised in those precise situations is under the surveillance of the CAB, not in the hands of those who can invoke the sanctions of the antitrust laws. The control which the CAB is authorized to grant or to deny under § 408 involves an appraisal of the impact of that control in terms of monopoly and competition; and the ongoing supervision entrusted to the CAB by § 415 is broad enough to put all transactions between parent and subsidiary — as originally conceived or subsequently exercised — under CAB supervision. This conclusion necessitates a dismissal of the cross-petition, a reversal of the judgment below, and a remand with directions to dismiss the complaint, as the numerous other points briefed and argued become irrelevant in that posture of the litigation. Reversed. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. The District Court's judgment on entry of a default and certifying a controlling question of law is reported at 32 F. R. D. 604. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 332 F. 2d 602. We granted certiorari, 379 U. S. 912, but after argument dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 380 U. S. 248. Moreover, our dismissal as improvidently granted was in 1965 and involved the 1964 judgment of the Court of Appeals. In 1971 a diiferent panel of the Court of Appeals ruled that its 1964 decision was not binding. It noted that prior to its 1971 decision there had been no “final judgment” with respect to the merits of TWA’s cause of action against Toolco and therefore res judicata did not apply. 449 F. 2d 51, 58. It went on to say that collateral estoppel likewise did not apply, since the only relevant issue that was actually litigated and determined in the 1964 appeal was that the District Court “properly entered the default on Toolco’s counterclaims.” Ibid. That issue, it said, was “a sharply distinguishable issue from the propriety of a different default judgment in favor of Toolco’s adversary.” Ibid. No party has suggested that our prior dismissal forecloses us from reaching the issue now presented. The prior dismissal did not establish the law of the case or amount to res judicata on the points raised. Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314 U. S. 63 (1941), was a diversity action in which the District Court, after realigning the parties, dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed and this Court denied certiorari. Two years later, after the Court of Appeals sustained plaintiff’s claims on the merits, certiorari was granted and this Court reversed, holding that proper realignment “precludes assumption of jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship.” 314 U. S., at 74. Similarly, in Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U. S. 152 (1964), a diversity action for wrongful death, certiorari was initially denied after the Court of Appeals had set aside a jury verdict on the grounds of various trial errors and insufficiency of the evidence. On remand, the District Court denied a motion for a new trial and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We then granted certiorari and reversed because the trial errors did not affect substantial rights and the evidence at the trial was sufficient to sustain a verdict in petitioner’s favor. See also Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 488 n. 6 (1968). For the well-settled view that denial of certiorari imparts no implication or inference concerning the Court’s view of the merits, see Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U. S. 912, 919 (Frankfurter, J.). See 449 F. 2d, at 71. Section 408, 72 Stat. 767, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 1378, reads in pertinent part as follows: “(a) Prohibited acts. “It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Board as provided in this section— “(2) For any air carrier, any person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any substantial part thereof, of any air carrier; “(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier, any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, or any other person to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever: Provided, That the Board may by order exempt any such acquisition of a noncertificated air carrier from this requirement to the extent and for such periods as may be in the public interest; “(b) Application to Board; hearing; approval; disposal without hearing. “Any person seeking approval of a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, specified in subsection (a) of this section, shall present an application to the Board, and thereupon the Board shall notify the persons involved in the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, and other persons known to have a substantial interest in the proceeding, of the time and place of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the Board finds that the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control will not be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe: Provided, That the Board shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control . . . .” In 1969, § 408 (a) (5) was amended to include “any other person” acquiring control of an air carrier. Section 102, 49 U. S. C. § 1302, reads: “In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity: “(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; “(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; “(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; “(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense; “(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and “(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.” Section 414, 49 U. S. C. § 1384, reads: “Any person affected by any order made under sections 1378,1379, or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the ‘antitrust laws,’ as designated in section 12 of Title 15, and of all other restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.” See also §§ 1002 (b), (c), of the Act, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1482 (b), (c). The Board’s public counsel had opposed such a condition on approval as “imposing far too great a burden upon the Board to ask it to pass upon the wisdom and propriety, in both a technical and business way, of every bargain made by a carrier for the purchase of equipment from a particular manufacturer.” Brief for Examiner 25 (filed Apr. 22, 1944). Public counsel’s alternative proposed condition required Toolco to forfeit control in the event Toolco should manufacture or sell certain commercial aircraft or Hughes “should attempt to influence TWA with regard to the purchase, acceptance, or use by it of any aircraft or aircraft parts in the development or design of which he himself may have participated to a substantial degree.” 6 C. A. B., at 157. The Board rejected this proposal, reasoning as follows: “The conditions proposed by public counsel are complicated and seem to be somewhat indefinite and difficult of enforcement. The object of any condition . . . should be to protect the public interest from any improper coercion of the air carrier by a controlling company on account of any interest which that controlling company may have in some other phase of aeronautics. This can be accomplished by a reasonable limit upon commercial transactions between the acquirer and the acquired which may be had without further consideration in this proceeding by the Board.” Ibid. References to the Board’s 1950 opinion are actually to the opinion of the Trial Examiner. But the Board adopted as its own “the findings, conclusions, and recommended decision of the examiner” without modification. 12 C. A. B. 192, 193. The Examiner found that it was “necessary" for Toolco to acquire aircraft initially and then resell them to TWA on a conditional sales basis because TWA “could not have purchased [the aircraft] directly without the specific consent of its principal creditors.” 12 C. A. B., at 218. For example, the Examiner found that: “Even before TWA’s financial crisis of late 1946, the financial resources of Toolco were used to provide credit for the carrier. For example, the credit arrangements provided by Toolco made possible the placing of the original order for the Constellation airplane with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. There is little doubt that the Constellation would not have been developed as early as it had without the aid of Mr. Hughes and his company. In addition to the technical assistance from Mr. Hughes and his engineers in Toolco, the financial commitment which was necessary to undertake and continue the project could never have been made and met by TWA.” 12 C. A. B., at 216. For example: On May 15, 1959, the Board authorized Toolco to lease 11 Boeing jets and 30 spare jet engines to TWA. The Board required that a separate lease be executed for each aircraft and modified the previous order under § 408 to permit aircraft lease transactions between TWA and Toolco and to authorize an agreement covering |3% million worth of spare parts. On July 1, 1959, Toolco asked that 10 leases of Boeing aircraft to TWA be modified so as to permit the extension of the 10 leases under the same rental until no later than September 30, 1959, and to permit the lease under identical terms of four additional Boeing jets and to permit the purchase from Toolco at actual cost of additional spare parts necessary for the operation of the leased jet airliners. This order of the Board also constituted a modification of the original order of control granted under § 408. On September 30, 1959, Toolco asked permission to extend the leases of 10 Boeing jets. The extension was to be under the identical terms of the original leases, the new leases to be terminated by either party within 24 hours on written notice. Here again the Board modified the original transaction under § 408. On January 29, 1959, Toolco asked permission to lease to TWA on a day-to-day basis up to eight Boeing aircraft and up to eight Convairs, and for TWA to purchase from Toolco at actual cost such spare parts as were necessary and such other equipment as might be required. Here again the Board entered an order that qualified its original “control” order under § 408. In a footnote, the Board amplified what it meant by public-interest factors through reference to the following excerpt from its 1950 decision (12 C. A. B., at 196): “Aside from any undesirable influence on an air carrier which might' arise because of the acquirer’s interest in a given phase of aeronautics, an acquirer of an air carrier is not without responsibility in other respects for an air carrier’s general capacity to perform its public responsibilities. For inevitably the controlling company, by virtue of its investment in the acquired carrier, will endeavor to make itself accountable ... for the managerial efficiency, the operating economy, and the financial integrity of the controlled carrier. Accordingly, in determining whether or not a particular acquisition should be approved, it is necessary to consider the over-all impact of the acquirer’s plans and policies with respect to the controlled carrier.” See also § 415 of the Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1385, which provides that: “For the purpose of exercising and performing its powers and duties under this chapter, the Board is empowered to inquire into the management of the business of any air carrier and, to the extent reasonably necessary for any such inquiry, to obtain from such carrier, and from any -person controlling . . . such air carrier, full and complete reports and other information.” (Emphasis added.) The Board in an early decision refused to approve a joint agreement among carriers because of its antitrust aspects: “Agreements of this nature, whereby a carrier operating in a particular territory obtains from a prospective competitor an undertaking, express or implied, not to attempt competitive operations, are likely to tend to impede the development of competition to the extent required by the present and future needs of the nation. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that such agreements thwart the purposes of the Act, and that their formation should in general be discouraged.” Pan American Airways, 3 C. A. B. 540, 546-547. The Pan American case is consistent with the view expressed in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 360-361, that a statutory scheme that does not create a total exception from antitrust laws may, nonetheless, in particular and discrete instances by implication grant immunity from an antitrust claim. To the same effect is United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 200, where the Court said: “That the field covered by the Agricultural Act is not coterminous with that., covered by the Sherman Act is manifest from the fact that the former is thus delimited by the prescribed action participated in and directed by an officer of government proceeding under the authority specifically conferred by Congress. As to agreements and arrangements not thus agreed upon or directed by the Secretary, the Agricultural Act in no way impinges upon the prohibitions and penalties of the Sherman Act, and its condemnation of private action in entering into combinations and conspiracies which impose the prohibited restraint upon interstate commerce remains untouched.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CASTLE, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. HAYES FREIGHT LINES, INC. No. 44. Argued November 17, 1954. Decided December 6, 1954. John L. Davidson, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Latham Castle, Attorney General, Mark O. Roberts, Special Assistant Attorney General, and William C. Wines and Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorneys General. David Axelrod argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jack Goodman and Carl L. Steiner. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and J. D. Wright and Arthur H. Gemmer, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of Indiana; and Charles C. Collins and Ode L. Rankin for the American Automobile Association, Inc. Peter T. Beardsley filed a brief for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises important questions concerning the power of states to bar interstate motor carriers from use of state roads as punishment for repeated violations of state highway regulations. The respondent Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. is such a carrier transporting goods to and from many points in Illinois and seven other states. This extensive interstate business is done under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under authority of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Hayes also does an intrastate carrier business in Illinois under a certificate issued by state authorities. Illinois has a statute which limits the weight of freight that can be carried in commercial trucks over Illinois highways; the same statute also provides for a balanced distribution of freight loads in relation to the truck's axles. Repeated violations of these provisions by trucks of a carrier are made punishable by total suspension of the carrier’s right to use Illinois state highways for periods of ninety days and one year. This action was brought in a state court to restrain Illinois officials from prosecuting Hayes as a repeated violator. The State Supreme Court held that the punishment of suspension provided by the state statute could not be imposed on the interstate operations of the respondent Hayes. Such a state suspension- of interstate transportation, it was decided, would conflict with the Federal Motor Carrier Act which is the supreme law of the iand. We granted the State’s petition for certiorari. 347 U. S. 1009. Congress in the Motor Carrier Act adopted a comprehensive plan for regulating the carriage of goods by motor truck in interstate commerce. The federal plan of control was so all-embracing that former power of states over interstate motor carriers was greatly reduced. No power at all was left in states to determine what carriers could or could not operate in interstate commerce. Exclusive power of the Federal Government to make this determination is shown by § 306 of 49 U. S. C. which describes the conditions under which the Interstate Commerce Commission can issue certificates of convenience and necessity. And § 312 of the same title provides that all certificates, permits or licenses issued by the Commission “shall remain in effect until suspended or terminated as herein provided.” But in order to provide stability for operating rights of carriers, Congress placed within very narrow limits the Commission’s power to suspend or revoke an outstanding certificate. No certificate is to be revoked, suspended or changed until after a hearing and a finding that a carrier has willfully failed to comply with the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act or with regulations properly promulgated under it. Under these circumstances, it would be odd if a state could take action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate carrier’s commission-granted right to operate. Cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538. It cannot be doubted that suspension of this common carrier’s right to use Illinois highways is the equivalent of a partial suspension of its federally granted certificate. The highways of Illinois are not only used by Hayes to transport interstate goods to and from that State but are also used as connecting links to points in other states which the Commission has authorized Hayes to serve. Consequently if the ninety-day or the one-year suspension should become effective, the carriage of interstate goods into Illinois and other states would be seriously disrupted. That Illinois seeks to punish Hayes for violations of its road regulations does not justify this disruption of federally authorized activities. A state’s regulation of weight and distribution of loads carried in interstate trucks does not itself conflict with the Federal Act. The reason for this as pointed out in Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, is that the Federal Act has a provision designed to leave states free to regulate the sizes and weights of motor vehicles. But it would stretch this statutory provision too much to say that it also allowed states to revoke or suspend the right of interstate motor carriers for violation of state highway regulations. It is urged that without power to impose punishment by suspension states will be without appropriate remedies to enforce their laws against recalcitrant motor carriers. We are not persuaded, however, that the conventional forms of punishment are inadequate to protect states from overweighted or improperly loaded motor trucks. Moreover, a Commission regulation requires motor carriers to abide by valid state highway regulations. And as previously pointed out, the Commission can revoke in whole or in part certificates of motor carriers which willfully refuse to comply with any lawful regulation of the Commission. If, therefore, motor carriers persistently and repeatedly violate the laws of a state, we know of no reason why the Commission may not protect the state’s interest, either on the Commission’s own initiative or on complaint of the state. We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the right of this carrier to use Illinois highways for interstate transportation of goods cannot be suspended by Illinois. Affirmed. Indiana, Missouri, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 49 Stat. 543. Now Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 919, 49 U. S. C. § 301 et seq. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, c. 9514, § 228. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1953, c. 95½, § 229b. This section provides for a 90-day suspension upon a finding of 10 or more violations. If thereafter the same carrier is found to have been guilty of 10 or more later violations the suspension is for one year. 2 Ill. 2d 58, 117 N. E. 2d 106. But the State Supreme Court held that Hayes’ intrastate operations could be suspended. Hayes appealed to this Court. We dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. 347 U. S. 994. Smith Bros., Revocation of Certificate, 33 M. C. C. 465, 472. See United States v. Seatrain Lines, 329 U. S. 424. 49 CFR, 1954 Cum. Supp., § 192.3. “Every motor vehicle shall be driven in accordance with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is being operated, unless such laws, ordinances and regulations are at variance with specific regulations of this Commission which impose a greater affirmative obligation or restraint.” 49 Stat. 555, 49 U. S. C. § 312. 49 Stat. 555, 49 U. S. C. § 312. For eases in which the Commission has considered violations of state law in passing on the fitness and ability of applicants to operate as carriers in interstate commerce see Southwest Freight Lines, Inc., Extension — Glass Products, 54 M. C. C. 205, 219; Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., Extension — Alternate Routes, 54 M. C. C. 643, 659.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. No. 798. Argued April 28, 1969. Decided June 2, 1969. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States in No. 798. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Leonard and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Lewin. Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioners in No. 997. With him on the brief were Fred D. Gray, James M. Nabrit III, Melvyn Zarr, Franklin E. White, and Elizabeth B. DuBois. Joseph D. Phelps argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents in both cases. Together with No. 997, Carr et al. v. Montgomery County Board of Education et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. In this action the United States District Court at Montgomery, Alabama, ordered the local Montgomery County Board of Education to bring about a racial desegregation of the faculty and the staff of the local county school system. 289 F. Supp. 647 (1968). Dissatisfied with the District Court’s order, the board appealed. A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order but, by a two-to-one vote, modified it in part, 400 F. 2d 1 (1968). A petition for rehearing en banc was denied by an evenly divided court, six to six, thereby leaving standing the modifications in the District Court’s order made by the panel. On petitions of the United States as intervenor below in No. 798, and the individual plaintiffs in No. 997, we granted certiorari. 393 U. S. 1116 (1969). Fifteen years ago, on May 17, 1954, we decided that segregation of the races in the public schools is unconstitutional. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (Brown I). In that case we left undecided the manner in which the transition from segregated to unitary school systems would be achieved, and set the case down for another hearing, inviting the Attorney General of the United States and the Attorneys General of the States providing for racial segregation in the public schools to present their views on the best ways to implement and enforce our judgment. We devoted four days to the argument on this single problem, and all the affected parties were given the opportunity to present their views at length. After careful consideration of the many viewpoints so fully aired by the parties, we announced our decision in Brown II, 349 U. S. 294 (1955). We held that the primary responsibility for abolishing the system of segregated schools would rest with the local school authorities. In some of the States that argued before us, the laws permitted but did not require racial segregation, and we noted that in some of these States “substantial steps to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools have already been taken ... Id., at 299. Many other States had for many years maintained a completely separate system of schools for whites and nonwhites, and the laws of these States, both civil and criminal, had been written to keep this segregated system of schools inviolate. The practices, habits, and customs had for generations made this segregated school system a fixed part of the daily life and expectations of the people. Recognizing these indisputable facts, we neither expected nor ordered that a complete abandonment of the old and adoption of a new system be accomplished overnight. The changes were to be made “at the earliest practicable date” and with “all deliberate speed.” Id., at 300, 301. We were not content, however, to leave this task in the unsupervised hands of local school authorities, trained as most would be under the old laws and practices, with loyalties to the system of separate white and Negro schools. As we stressed then, “[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.” Id., at 300. The problem of delays by local school authorities during the transition period was therefore to be the responsibility of courts, local courts so far as practicable, those courts to be guided by traditional equitable flexibility to shape remedies in order to adjust and reconcile public and private needs. These courts were charged in our Brown II opinion, id., at 300, with a duty to: “require that the defendants [local school authorities] make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.” The record shows that neither Montgomery County nor any other area in Alabama voluntarily took any effective steps to integrate the public schools for about 10 years after our Brown I opinion. In fact the record makes clear that the state government and its school officials attempted in every way possible to continue the dual system of racially segregated schools in defiance of our repeated unanimous holdings that such a system violated the United States Constitution. There the matter stood in Alabama in May 1964 when the present action was brought by Negro children and their parents, with participation by the United States as amicus curiae. Apparently up to that time Montgomery County, and indeed all other schools in the State, had operated, so far as actual racial integration was concerned, as though our Brown cases had never been decided. Obviously voluntary integration by the local school officials in Montgomery had not proved to be even partially successful. Consequently, if Negro children of school age were to receive their constitutional rights as we had declared them to exist, the coercive assistance of courts was imperatively called for. So, after preliminary procedural matters were disposed of, answers filed, and issues joined, a trial took place. On July 31, 1964, District Judge Johnson handed down an opinion and entered an order. 232 F. Supp. 705. The judge found that at the time: “There is only one school district for Montgomery County, Alabama, with the County Board of Education and the Superintendent of Education of Montgomery County, Alabama, exercising complete control over the entire system. In this school system for the school year 1963-64, there were in attendance approximately 15,000 Negro children and approximately 25,000 white children. In this system the Montgomery County Board of Education owns and operates approximately 77 schools. “From the evidence in this case, this Court further specifically finds that, through policy, custom and practice, the Montgomery County Board of Education, functioning at the present time through the named individual defendants, operates a dual school system based upon race and color; that is to say, that, through this policy, practice and custom, these officials operate one set of schools to be attended exclusively by Negro students and one set of schools to be attended exclusively by white students. The evidence further reflects that the teachers are assigned according to race; Negro teachers are assigned only to schools attended by Negro students and white teachers are assigned only to schools attended by white students.” 232 F. Supp., at 707. Based on his findings, Judge Johnson ordered that integration of certain grades begin in September 1964, but in this first order did not require efforts to desegregate the faculty. The school board, acting under- the State’s school placement law, finally admitted eight Negro students out of the 29 who had sought transfers to white schools under the judge’s July 31 order. The judge refused to order admission of the 21 Negro students whose transfer applications had been rejected by the school officials. The 1964 initial order of Judge Johnson was followed by yearly proceedings, opinions, and orders by him. Hearings, preceding these additional orders, followed the filing each year under the judge’s direction of a report of the school board’s plans for proceeding with desegregation. These annual reports and orders, together with transcripts of the discussions at the hearings, seem to reveal a growing recognition on the part of the school board of its responsibility to achieve integration as rapidly as practicable. The record, however, also reveals that in some areas the board was not moving as rapidly as it could to fulfill this duty, and the record shows a constant effort by the judge to expedite the process of moving as rapidly as practical toward the goal of a wholly unitary system of schools, not divided by race as to either students or faculty. During these years of what turned out to be an exchange of ideas between judge and school board officials, the judge, from time to time, found it possible to compliment the board on its cooperation with him in trying to bring about a fully integrated school system. Some of these complimentary remarks are set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals modifying the judge’s decree. 400 F. 2d, at 3, n. 3. On the other hand the board did not see eye to eye with Judge Johnson on the speed with which segregation should be wiped out “root and branch” as we have held it must be done. Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 438 (1968). The school board, having to face the “complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination,” Brown II, 349 U. S., at 299, was constantly sparring for time; the judge, upon whom was thrust the difficult task of insuring the achievement of complete integration at the earliest practicable date, was constantly urging that no unnecessary delay could be allowed in reaching complete compliance with our mandate that racially segregated public schools be made nothing but a matter of past history. In this context of clashing objectives it is not surprising that the judge’s most recent 1968 order should have failed fully to satisfy either side. It is gratifying, however, that the differences are so minor as they appear to us to be. In his 1968 order Judge Johnson provided for safeguards to assure that construction of new schools or additions to existing schools would not follow a pattern tending to perpetuate segregation. The order also provided for the adoption of nondiscriminatory bus routes and for other safeguards to insure that the board’s transportation policy would not tend to perpetuate segregation. The order provided for detailed steps to eliminate the impression existing in the school district that the new Jefferson Davis High School and two new elementary schools were to be used primarily by white students. The order also included a requirement that the board file in the near future further specific reports detailing the steps taken to comply with each point of the order. Nearly all of these aspects of the order were accepted by the school board and not challenged in its appeal to the Court of Appeals. Of the provisions so far mentioned, only one aspect of the provision relating to Jefferson Davis High School was challenged in the Court of Appeals, and after the Court of Appeals upheld Judge Johnson’s order on this point, the school board accepted its decision and did not seek review on the question here. The dispute in this action thus centers only on that part of the 1968 order which deals with faculty and staff desegregation, a goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a public school system wholly free from racial discrimination. See, e. g., Bradley v. School Board, 382 U. S. 103 (1965); Rogers v. Paul, 382 U. S. 198 (1965). Judge Johnson noted that in 1966 he had ordered the board to begin the process of faculty desegregation in the 1966-1967 school year but that the board had not made adequate progress toward this goal. He also found: “The evidence does not reflect any real administrative problems involved in immediately desegregating the substitute teachers, the student teachers, the night school faculties, and in the evolvement of a really legally adequate program for the substantial desegregation of the faculties of all schools in the system commencing with the school year of 1968-69.” 289 F. Supp., at 650. He therefore concluded that a more specific order would be appropriate under all the circumstances to establish the minimum amount of progress that would be required for the future. To this end his order provided that the board must move toward a goal under which “in each school the ratio of white to Negro faculty members is substantially the same as it is throughout the system.” Id., at 654. In addition, the order set forth a specific schedule. The ratio of Negro to white teachers in the assignment of substitute, student, and night school teachers in each school was to be almost immediately made substantially the same as the ratio of Negro to white teachers in each of these groups for the system as a whole. With respect to full-time teachers, a more gradual schedule was set forth. At the time the ratio of white to Negro full-time teachers in the system as a whole was three to two. For the 1968-1969 school year, each school with fewer than 12 teachers was required to have at least two full-time teachers whose race was different from the race of the majority of the faculty at that school, and in schools with 12 or more teachers, the race of at least one out of every six faculty and staff members was required to be different from the race of the majority of the faculty and staff members at that school. The goals to be required for future years were not specified but were reserved for later decision. About a week later Judge Johnson amended part of the original order by providing that in the 1968-1969 term schools with less than 12 teachers would be required to have only one full-time teacher of the minority race rather than two, as he had originally required. It was the part of the District Court’s order containing this ratio pattern that prompted the modification of the order by the Court of Appeals. Agreeing that the District Court had properly found from “extensive hearings .. . that desegregation of faculties in the Montgomery County school system was lagging and that appellants [the school board] had failed to comply with earlier orders of the court requiring full faculty desegregation,” and noting that the testimony of school officials themselves indicated the need for more specific guidelines, the Court of Appeals nevertheless struck down parts of the order which it viewed as requiring “fixed mathematical” ratios. It held that the part of the order setting a specific goal for the 1968-1969 school year should be modified to require only “substantially or approximately” the 5-1 ratio required by Judge Johnson’s order. With respect to the ultimate objective for the future, it held that the numerical ratio should be eliminated and that compliance should not be tested solely by the achievement of specified ratios. In so holding, the Court of Appeals made many arguments against rigid or inflexible orders in this kind of case. These arguments might possibly be more troublesome if we read the District Court’s order as being absolutely rigid and inflexible, as did the Court of Appeals. But after a careful consideration of the whole record we cannot believe that Judge Johnson had any such intention. During the four or five years that he held hearings and considered the problem before him, new orders, as previously shown, were issued annually and sometimes more often. On at least one occasion Judge Johnson, on his own motion, amended his outstanding order because a less stringent order for another district had been approved by the Court of Appeals. This was done in order not to inflict any possible injustice on the Montgomery County school system. Indeed the record is filled with statements by Judge Johnson showing his full understanding of the fact that, as this Court also has recognized, in this field the way must always be left open for experimentation. Judge Johnson’s order now before us was adopted in the spirit of this Court’s opinion in Green v. County School Board, supra, at 439, in that his plan “promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.” The modifications ordered by the panel of the Court of Appeals, while of course not intended to do so, would, we think, take from the order some of its capacity to expedite, by means of specific commands, the day when a completely unified, unitary, nondiscriminatory school system becomes a reality instead of a hope. We believe it best to leave Judge Johnson’s order as written rather than as modified by the 2-1 panel, particularly in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals as a whole was evenly divided on this subject. We also believe that under all the circumstances of this case we follow the original plan outlined in Brown II, as brought up to date by this Court’s opinions in Green v. County School Board, supra, and Griffin v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218, 233-234 (1964), by accepting the more specific and expeditious order of Judge Johnson, whose patience and wisdom are written for all to see and read on the pages of the five-year record before us. It is good to be able to decide a case with the feelings we have about this one. The differences between the parties are exceedingly narrow. Respondents, members of the Montgomery County school board, state clearly in their brief, “These respondents recognize their affirmative responsibility to provide a desegregated, unitary and nonracial school system. These respondents recognize their responsibility to assign teachers without regard to race so that schools throughout the system are not racially identifiable by their faculties . . . .” Brief for Respondents 11-12. Petitioners, on the other hand, do not argue for precisely equal ratios in every single school under all circumstances. As the United States, petitioner in No. 798, recognizes in its brief, the District Court’s order “is designed as a remedy for past racial assignment .... We do not, in other words, argue here that racially balanced faculties are constitutionally or legally required.” Brief for the United States 13. In short, the Montgomery County school board, and its counsel, assert their purpose to bring about a racially integrated school system as early as practicable in good-faith obedience to this Court’s decisions. Both the District Judge and the Court of Appeals have accorded to the parties and their counsel courteous and patient consideration; there is no sign of lack of interest in the cause of either justice or education in the views maintained by any of the parties or in the orders entered by either of the courts below. Despite the fact that the individual petitioners in this litigation have with some reason argued that Judge Johnson should have gone farther to protect their rights than he did, we approve his order as he wrote it. This, we believe, is the best course we can take in the interest of the petitioners and the public school system of Alabama. We hope and believe that this order and the approval that we now give it will carry Alabama a long distance on its way toward obedience to the law of the land as we have declared it in the two Brown cases and those that have followed them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the District Court. It is so ordered. The dissent from the original panel opinion is reported at 402 F. 2d 782. The dissents from the denial en banc of the petition for rehearing are reported at 402 F. 2d, at 784, 787. A substantial part of the history of the continued support by Alabama’s governor and other state officials for its dual system of schools, completely separating white and nonwhite students, faculty, and staff, can be found in the opinion of the three-judge court for the Middle District of Alabama in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (1967), affirmed by this Court under the title of Wallace v. United States, 389 U. S. 215 (1967). These orders were reported as follows: May 18, 1965, 10 Race Rel. L. Rep. 582; March 22, 1966, 253 F. Supp. 306; August 18, 1966, 11 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1716; June 1, 1967, 12 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1200. The Court of Appeals quoted the following excerpt from the testimony of Associate Superintendent W. S. Garrett: “Q. Well, under your plan, when do you estimate that faculty desegregation will be finally accomplished in terms of the objective of the court order removing— “A. Well, now, that is something I don’t know, because I don’t know w'hat the objectives of the court order are. That has never been laid down in any percentage fashion that I know of. It says that you will have reasonable desegregation of faculty and that you will strive toward having each faculty not recognizable as being staffed for a particular race. That is what I get out of it. “Q. Well, let— “A. So I— I can’t— this court order is in fairly general terms; I can’t answer that question. “Q. Well, you made the statement about having schools staffed so that they will not be recognizable as for a particular race; when do you expect that that will be accomplished ? “A. Well, that would depend on what the Board’s definition of that is, the court’s definition of that. “Q. Do you have a definition of that? “A. Not at this point; we have discussed that many times, and I do not have a definition of— of what that would mean. “Q. No one has told you, given you a definition in terms of mechanics, in terms of numbers, none of your superiors? “A. No, as far as I know, no other school personnel man in America has. I have talked to many of them. What we are striving to do is to make progress and keep going and hope that somewhere along the line we will have achieved the— what the court has in mind. But if you will look at that court order, you will see it doesn’t lay down the precise terms exactly what that means; it is a broad definition.” As we stated in Green v. County School Board, supra, at 439: “There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance. It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the district court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. BURNUP & SIMS, INC. No. 15. Argued October 15, 1964. Decided November 9, 1964. Arnold Ordman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Dominick L. Manóli and Norton J. Come. Erie Phillips argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Two employees in respondent’s plant, Davis and Harmon, undertook to organize the employees who worked there. The Superintendent was advised by another employee, one Pate, that Davis and Harmon, while soliciting him for membership in the union, had told him the union would use dynamite to get in if the union did not acquire the authorizations. Respondent thereafter discharged Davis and Harmon because of these alleged statements. An unfair labor practice proceeding was brought. The Board held that the discharges violated §§' 8 (a)(1) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act,61 Stat. 136,140-141,29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1) and (a)(3). It found that Pate’s charges against Davis and Harmon were untrue and that they had actually made no threats against the company’s property; and it concluded that respondent’s honest belief in the truth of the statement was not a defense. 137 N. L. R. B. 766, 772-773. The Court of Appeals refused reinstatement of Davis and Harmon, holding that since the employer acted in good faith, the discharges-were not unlawful. 322 F. 2d 57. We granted the petition for certiorari because of a conflict among the. Circuits. Cf. with the opinion below Labor Board v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F. 2d 87; Labor Board v. Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F. 2d 48; Cusano v. Labor Board, 190 F. 2d 898. We find it unnecessary to reach the questions raised under § 8 (a)(3) for we are of the view that in thé context of this record § 8 (a)(1) was plainly violated, whatever the employer’s motive. Section 7 grants employees, inter alia, “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” Defeat of those rights by employer action does not necessarily depend on the existence of an anti-union bias. Over and again the Board has ruled that §8 (a)(1) is violated if an employee is discharged for misconduct arising out of a protected activity, despite the employer’s good faith, when it is shown that the misconduct never occurred. See, e. g., Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N. L. R. B. 912, 932-934; Standard Oil Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 783, 790-791; Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., 99 N. L. R. B. 610, 611. In sum, § 8 (a) (1). is violated if it is shown that the discharged employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such, that the basis of the discharge was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity, and that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct. That rule seems to us to be in conformity with the policy behind §8 (a)(1). Otherwise the protected activity would lose some of its immunity, since the example of employees who are discharged on false charges would or might have a deterrent effect on other employees. Union activity often engenders strong emotions and gives rise to active rumors. A protected activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can be discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in good faith. It is the tendency of those discharges to weaken or destroy the § 8 (a)(1) right that is controlling. We are not in the realm of managerial prerogatives. Rather we are concerned with the manner of soliciting union membership over which the Board has been entrusted with powers of surveillance. See Garment Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 731, 738-739; Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 228-229. Had the alleged dynamiting threats been wholly disassociated from § 7 activities quite different considerations might apply. Reversed. Sections 8 (a)(1) and (3) .read as follows: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .” As an alternative ground for its finding that the Act had been violated) the Board held that Pate’s allegation was merely “seized up [on]” by the respondent as an “excuse” for the discharges of Davis and Harmon. 137 N. L. R. B. 766, 772-773. The Court of Appeals, however, rejected without discussion this suggestion of the existence of anti-union bias. 322 F. 2d 57, 59, 61. In its petition for writ of certiorari the Board expressly stated that “The propriety of this action [by the Court of Appeals] is not questioned here.” In fight of this concession it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the Board’s alternative finding of a discriminatory motivation is supported by substantial evidence. The Rubin Bros, case made a qualification as to burden of proof. Prior thereto the burden was on the employer to prove that the discharged employee was in fact guilty of the misconduct. Rubin Bros, said that “once such an honest belief is established', the General Counsel must go forward with evidence to prove that the employees did not, in fact, engage in such misconduct.” 99 N. L. R. B., at 611.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROUDEBUSH v. HARTKE et al. No. 70-66. Argued December 13, 1971 Decided February 23, 1972 StewaRT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, and Blackmuh, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which BreN-NAN, J., joined, post, p. 26. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Donald A. Schabel argued the cause for appellant in No. 70-66. With him on the briefs was L. Keith Bulen. Richard C. Johnson, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for appellant in No. 70-67. On the briefs were Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, pro se, William F. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, and Mark Peden, Deputy Attorney General. John J. Dillon argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief for appellee Hartke were David W. Mernitz and James L. Tuohy. Together with No. 70-67, Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana v. Hartke et al., also on appeal from the same court. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The 1970 election for the office of United States Senator was the closest in Indiana history. The incumbent, Senator R. Vance Hartke (Hartke), was declared the winner by a plurality of 4,383 votes — a margin of approximately one vote per state precinct. On November 16, 1970, 13 days after the election, the Indiana Secretary of State certified to the Governor that Hartke had been re-elected. On the following day, candidate Richard L. Roudebush (Roudebush) filed in the Superior Court of Marion County a timely petition for a recount. Hartke moved in that court to dismiss the petition, arguing that the state recount procedure conflicted with the Indiana and Federal Constitutions. On December 1, the state court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the petition for a recount. It appointed a three-man recount commission and directed it to begin its task on December 8. Hartke then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana asking for an injunction against the recount. He invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) and claimed that the recount was prohibited by Art. I, § 5, of the Constitution of the United States, which delegates to the Senate the power to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members. A single district judge issued an order temporarily restraining the recount pending decision by a three-judge district court. The Attorney General of Indiana then moved successfully to intervene as a defendant, and a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284. After taking testimony and hearing argument, the court ruled in Hartke’s favor and issued an interlocutory injunction, 321 F. Supp. 1370, one judge dissenting. Roudebush and the Attorney General both brought direct appeals to this Court. On January 21, 1971, shortly after the jurisdictional statements were filed, the Senate administered the oath of office to Hartke, who had been issued a certificate of election by the Governor. Hartke was seated, however, “without prejudice to the outcome of an appeal pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, and without prejudice to the outcome of any recount that the Supreme Court might order . ...” Following the Senate’s decision to seat him, Hartke moved to dismiss the appeals as moot. We consolidated both appeals and postponed further consideration of questions of jurisdiction to the hearing of the cause on the merits. 401 U. S. 972. I We consider first the claim that these appeals are moot. This claim is based upon the proposition, as stated in appellee Hartke’s brief, that the “basic issue” before the Court is “whether appellee Hartke or appellant Roude-bush is entitled to the office of United States Senator from Indiana.” Since the Senate has now seated Hartke, and since this Court is without power to alter the Senate’s judgment, it follows, the argument goes, that the cause is moot. The difficulty with this argument is that it is based on an erroneous statement of the “basic issue.” Which candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate is, to be sure, a non justiciable political question — a question that would not have been the business of this Court even before the Senate acted. The actual question before us, however, is a different one. It is whether an Indiana recount of the votes in the 1970 election is a valid exercise of the State’s power, under Art. I, § 4, to prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections, or is a forbidden infringement upon the Senate’s power under Art. I, § 5. That question is not moot, because the Senate has postponed making a final determination of who is entitled to the office of Senator, pending the outcome of this lawsuit. Once this case is resolved and the Senate is assured that it has received the final Indiana tally, the Senate will be free to make an unconditional and final judgment under Art. I, § 5. Until that judgment is made, this controversy remains alive, and we are obliged to consider it. II It is the position of the appellants that, quite apart from the merits of the controversy, the three-judge District Court was barred from issuing an injunction by reason of 28 U. S. C. § 2283, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court proceedings except in a few specific instances. This argument has weight, of course, only if the Indiana statutory recount procedure is a “proceeding in a State court” within the meaning of § 2283. This Court has said of a predecessor to § 2283, “The provision expresses on its face the duty of ‘hands off’ by the federal courts in the use of the injunction to stay litigation in a state court.” More recently, we characterized the statute as designed to assure “the maintenance of state judicial systems for the decision of legal controversies.” We have in the past recognized that not every state court function involves “litigation” or “legal controversies.” In the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210, the Court reviewed a federal injunction preventing a state commission from fixing passenger rail rates. The Court assumed that the commission had the powers of a state court and that the predecessor of § 2283 governed any attempt by a federal court to enjoin the exercise of the commission’s judicial powers. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that rate-making could be enjoined because it was legislative in nature. Hence, the Court held that § 2283 does not restrict a federal court from enjoining a state court when it is involved in a nonjudicial function. To determine whether an Indiana court engages in a judicial function in connection with an election recount, we turn to the law of that State. In Indiana every candidate has a right to a recount and can obtain one by merely filing a timely petition in the circuit or superior court of the appropriate county. If the petition is correct as to form, the state court “shall . . . grant such petition . . . and order the recount . . . .” When it grants a petition, the court is required to appoint three commissioners to carry out the recount. Once these appointments are made, the Indiana court has no other responsibilities or powers. The exercise of these limited responsibilities does not constitute a court proceeding under § 2283 within the test of Prentis: “A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end.” 211 U. S., at 226. The state courts’ duties in connection with a recount may be characterized as ministerial, or perhaps administrative, but they clearly do not fall within this definition of a “judicial inquiry.” The process of determining that the recount petition is correct as to form — that it contains the proper information, such as the names and addresses of all candidates, and is timely filed — is clearly not a judicial proceeding. Nonjudicial functionaries continually make similar determinations in the processing of all kinds of applications. And finally, Hartke’s complaint in this cause did not ask the three-judge federal court to restrain the action of the Indiana court as such. It did not seek to enjoin the state court from ruling on the formal correctness of the petition; it did not even seek to enjoin the state court’s appointive function. It sought, rather, to enjoin the recount commission from proceeding after the court had appointed the members of the commission. We conclude that the three-judge District Court was not prohibited by § 2283 from issuing and had power under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 to issue, an injunction in this cause. Ill We turn, therefore, to the merits of the District Court’s decision. The Indiana Election Code calls for the vote to be initially counted, in each precinct, by an election board. After recording the voting machine totals, the board seals the machines. Paper ballots, including absentee ballots, are then counted and tallied. Counted ballots are placed in a bag and sealed. Ballots that bear distinguishing marks or are mutilated or do not clearly reveal the voter’s choice are not counted. These rejected ballots are sealed in a separate bag. Both bags are preserved for six months and may not be opened except in the case of a recount. If a recount is conducted in any county, the voting machine tallies are checked and the sealed bags containing the paper ballots are opened. The recount commission may make new and independent determinations as to which ballots shall be counted. In other words, it may reject ballots initially counted and count ballots initially rejected. Disputes within the commission are settled by a majority vote. When the commission finishes its task it seals the ballots it counted in one bag, and the ballots it rejected in another. Once the recount is completed, all previous returns are superseded. The District Court held these procedures to be contrary to the Constitution in two ways. First, the court found that in making judgments as to which ballots to count, the recount commission would be judging the qualifications of a member of the Senate. It held this would be a usurpation of a power that only the Senate could exercise. Second, it found that the Indiana ballots and other election paraphernalia would be essential evidence that the Senate might need to consider in judging Hartke’s qualifications. The court feared that the recount might endanger the integrity of those materials and increase the hazard of their accidental destruction. Thus, the court held that, even if the commission would not be usurping the Senate’s exclusive power, it would be hindering the Senate’s exercise of that power. We cannot agree with the District Court on either ground. Unless Congress acts, Art. I, § 4, empowers the States to regulate the conduct of senatorial elections. This Court has recognized the breadth of those powers: “It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 366. Indiana has found, along with many other States, that one procedure necessary to guard against irregularity and error in the tabulation of votes is the availability of a recount. Despite the fact that a certificate of election may be issued to the leading candidate within 30 days after the election, the results are not final if a candidate’s option to compel a recount is exercised. A recount is an integral part of the Indiana electoral process and is within the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I, § 4. It is true that a State’s verification of the accuracy of election results pursuant to its Art. I, § 4, powers is not totally separable from the Senate’s power to judge elections and returns. But a recount can be said to “usurp” the Senate’s function only if it frustrates the Senate’s ability to make an independent final judgment. A recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the election any more than the initial count does. The Senate is free to accept or reject the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount. It would be no more than speculation to assume that the Indiana recount procedure would impair such an independent evaluation by the Senate. The District Court’s holding was based on a finding that a recount would increase the probability of election fraud and accidental destruction of ballots. But there is no reason to suppose that a court-appointed recount commission would be less honest or conscientious in the performance of its duties than the precinct election boards that initially counted the ballots. For the reasons expressed, we conclude that Art. I, § 5, of the Constitution, does not prohibit Indiana from conducting a recount of the 1970 election ballots for United States Senator. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Roudebush filed similar petitions in 10 other counties. Recounts in all 11 counties have been postponed, pending the outcome of this cause. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343 provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: “(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” The District Court apparently viewed the suit as substantively based upon 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which authorizes a civil action on the part of a person deprived, under color of state law, “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . U. S. Const., Art. I, § 5, provides in pertinent part: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .” Direct appeals from such interlocutory orders are authorized by 28 U. S. C. § 1253. 117 Cong. Rec. 6. See Reed v. County Comm’rs, 277 U. S. 376, 388: “[The Senate] is the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. Art. I, § 5. It is fully empowered, and may determine such matters without the aid of the House of Representatives or the Executive or Judicial Department.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486. U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, provides in pertinent part: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” See Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 496. Title 28 U. S. C. §2283 provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The statute dates from 1793. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 334. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 132. (Emphasis supplied.) Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 285. (Emphasis supplied.) See Hill v. Martin, 296 U. S. 393, 398. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 29-5401 through 29-5417. The election recount provisions of some other States appear to give the state courts a broader function. See, e. g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 9-323 ; Va. Code Ann. §24-277.1 (1969). The role of the Indiana courts in this connection is not unlike that of the state court in the case of Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153. A state statute there authorized property owners to petition a state court to establish a drainage district and to construct a drainage ditch. To assist in the planning of a ditch, the state court was empowered to appoint a drainage commissioner. The commissioner served on a commission that submitted plans for construction. The state court could either accept or reject these submissions. If it approved plans, the court allocated funds and supervised construction. Applying Prentis, this Court held that these activities were not judicial, and that enjoining the construction of a drainage ditch was not enjoining a state court “proceeding.” See also Central Electric & Gas Co. v. City of Stromsburg, 192 F. Supp. 280, aff’d, 289 F. 2d 217 (federal court could enjoin a state court’s appointment of an appraiser pursuant to a state statute); Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Martin, 19 F. Supp. 82, aff’d sub nom. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Martin, 100 F. 2d 139 (federal court could enjoin ministerial act of state judge, pursuant to state statute, converting a state tax into a lien against the taxpayer) ; Weil v. Calhoun, 25 F. 865 (federal court could enjoin a state ordinary, having the powers of a probate judge, from declaring the results of a county election). The only injunctive relief sought in Hartke’s amended complaint was “that the court permanently restrain and enjoin the defendants and restraining and enjoining the defendants Samuel Walker, John R. Hammond and Duge Butler [the recount commissioners) from convening and commencing a recount, and the defendant Richard L. Roudebush and all persons acting in his behalf or in concert with him [from] taking any further action to use said machinery and procedures to carry forward a recount of the vote for the office of United States Senator in the general election of November 3, 1970.” An interlocutory injunction against- the same defendants was also sought. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 29-5201 through 29-5220. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 29-5401 through 29-5417. The District Court cited three cases decided by the Indiana Supreme Court as authority for its rulings. State ex rel. Batchelet v. Dekalb Circuit Court, 248 Ind. 481, 229 N. E. 2d 798; State ex rel. Beaman v. Circuit Court of Pike County, 229 Ind. 190, 96 N. E. 2d 671; State ex rel. Acker v. Reeves, 229 Ind. 126, 95 N. E. 2d 838. These cases held that the Indiana Constitution prohibited recounts in certain state elections. They do not address the federal constitutional question at issue in this cause. See n. 8, supra. The Secretary of State is required by statute to certify to the Governor the leading candidate as duly elected “as soon as he shall receive” certified statements from the counties. The statutory period for receiving those statements is 26 days. The Governor is required to give a certificate of election to each certified candidate. Ind. Ann. Stat. §§29-5306 through 29-5309. A petition for a recount may be filed 15 days after the election is held. §29-5403. The petition cannot be granted nor the recount commission appointed by the court for another 25 days. § 29-5409. The recount may not commence until at least five days after the commission is appointed. §29-5411. Additional time elapses before the results are made final and the appropriate persons are notified. Thus, the recount is unlikely to be completed before the Governor becomes obligated by statute to issue a certificate of election based on the initial count. Nevertheless, the recount supersedes the initial count even though a certificate of election may have been issued. § 29-5415. The Senate’s power to judge the qualifications of its members is limited to the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486. One of those qualifications is that a Senator be elected by the people of his State. U. S. Const., Amend. XVII. The Senate itself has recounted the votes in close elections in States where there was no recount procedure. E. g., O’Conor v. Markey, Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases from 1789 to 1960, S. Doe. No. 71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 144 (1962).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. v. MISSISSIPPI ex rel. MOORE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI, et al. No. 86-1970. Argued February 22, 1988 Decided June 24, 1988 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 377. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 383. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were George L. Saunders, Jr., David W. Carpenter, Robert R. Nordhaus, Howard E. Shapiro, and James K. Child, Jr. Deputy Solicitor General Cohen argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Richard J. Lazarus, Catherine C. Cook, and Jerome M. Feit. John L. Maxey II argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellee State of Mississippi were Mike Moore, Attorney General, Frank Spencer, Assistant Attorney General, and W. Glenn Watts, Special Assistant Attorney General. Jesse C. Pennington and Lewis Burke filed a brief for appellee Mississippi Legal Services Coalition. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Consumer Federation of America et al. by Scott Hempling and Roger Colton; for the National Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates by Raymon E. Lark, Jr., Elizabeth Elliot, and Steven W. Hamm; and for the National Governors’ Association et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Robert H. Loeffler. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Council of the city of New Orleans by Clinton A. Vince; for the Arkansas Public Service Commission et al. by Steve Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, and Mary B. Stallcup, Deputy Attorney General, Wallace L. Duncan, James D. Pembroke, and J. Cathy Fogel; and for the Edison Electric Institute by James B. Liber-man, and Robert L. Baum. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. On July 1, 1985, Grand Gulf Unit 1, a major nuclear power-plant located in Port Gibson, Mississippi, began commercial operations. An order entered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) required Mississippi Power and Light Company (MP&L) to purchase 33% of the plant’s output at rates determined by FERC to be just and reasonable. The Mississippi Public Service Commission (MPSC) subsequently granted MP&L an increase in its retail rates to enable it to recover the cost of its purchases of Grand Gulf power. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that it was error to grant an increase in retail rates without first examining the prudence of the management decisions that led to the construction and completion of Grand Gulf 1. The question presented to us is whether the FERC proceedings have pre-empted such a prudence inquiry by the State Commission. For reasons similar to those set forth in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U. S. 953 (1986), we conclude that the state proceedings are pre-empted and therefore reverse. I MP&L is one of four operating companies whose voting stock is wholly owned by Middle South Utilities (MSU), a public utility holding company. The four companies are engaged both in the wholesale sale of electricity to each other and to companies outside the MSU system and in the retail sale of electricity in separate service areas in Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, and Mississippi. Through MSU the four companies operate as an integrated power pool, with all energy in the entire system being distributed by a single dispatch center located in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Wholesale transactions among the four operating companies historically have been governed by a succession of three “System Agreements,” which were filed with FERC in 1951, 1973, and 1982. The System Agreements have provided the basis for planning and operating the companies’ generating units on a single-system basis and for equalizing cost imbalances among the four companies. The retail sales of each of the operating companies are regulated by one or more local regulatory agencies. For example, Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L) sells in both Arkansas and Missouri and therefore is regulated by both the Arkansas Public Service Commission and the Missouri Public Service Commission. MP&L’s retail rates are subject to the jurisdiction of the MPSC. Through the 1950’s and into the 1960’s, most of the MSU system’s generating plants were fueled with oil or gas. In the late 1960’s, the MSU system sought to meet projected increases in demand and to diversify its fuel base by adding coal and nuclear generating units. It was originally contemplated that each of the four operating companies would finance and construct a nuclear power facility. Consistent with this scheme, MP&L was assigned to construct two nuclear power facilities at Port Gibson, Mississippi, Grand Gulf 1 and 2. The Grand Gulf project, however, proved too large for one operating company to finance. MSU therefore formed a new subsidiary, Middle South Energy, Inc. (MSE), to finance, own, and operate Grand Gulf. MSE acquired full title to Grand Gulf, but hired MP&L to design, construct, and operate the facilities. In April 1974, MSE and MP&L applied to MPSC for a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of the plant. The State Commission granted the certificate, noting that MP&L was part of “an integrated electric system” and that “the Grand Gulf Project [would] serve as a major source of baseload capacity for the company and the entire Middle South System pooling arrangement.” App. to Motion to Dismiss 36-37. By the late 1970’s it became apparent that systemwide demand in the ensuing years would be lower than had been forecast, making Grand Gulf’s capacity unnecessary. Moreover, regulatory delays, additional construction requirements, and severe inflation frustrated the project. Management decided to halt construction of Grand Gulf 2, but to complete Grand Gulf 1, largely on the assumption that the relatively low cost of nuclear fuel would make the overall cost of Grand Gulf power per kilowatt hour lower than that of alternative energy sources. As it turned out, however, the cost of completing Grand Gulf construction was about six times greater than had been projected. Consequently, the wholesale cost of Grand Gulf’s power greatly exceeds that of power produced in other system facilities. The four operating companies considered various methods of allocating the cost of Grand Gulf’s power. In 1982 MSU filed two agreements with FERC. The first was a new System Agreement, which set forth the terms and conditions for coordinated operations and wholesale transactions among the four companies, including a scheme of “capacity equalization payments,” which were designed to ensure that each company contribute proportionately to the total costs of generating power on the system. Transactions related to the purchase of power from Grand Gulf 1, however, were not included in the 1982 System Agreement. The second agreement filed with FERC was the Unit Power Sales Agreement (UPSA), which provided wholesale rates for MSE’s sale of Grand Gulf 1 capacity and energy. Under the UPSA, AP&L was not obligated to purchase any of Grand Gulf’s capacity; LP&L was obligated to purchase 38.57%, NOPSI 29.8%, and MP&L 31.63%. The FERC Proceedings FERC assigned the agreements to two different Administrative Law Judges, who were charged with the task of determining whether the agreements were “just and reasonable” within the meaning of the Federal Power Act. Extensive hearings were held by each ALJ, in which numerous parties representing consumer interests and the various state regulatory agencies participated. Both judges concluded that because Grand Gulf was designed to serve the needs of the entire MSU system, the failure to distribute the costs associated with Grand Gulf among all members of the system rendered the agreements unduly discriminatory and that costs should be allocated in proportion to each company’s relative system demand. Middle South Services, Inc., 30 FERC ¶ 63,030, pp. 65,170-66,173 (1985) (1982 System Agreement); Middle South Energy, Inc., 26 FERC ¶63,044, pp. 65,105-65,108 (1984) (UPSA). FERC consolidated the decisions of the Administrative Law Judges for review and issued its decision in June 1985. Middle South Energy, Inc., 31 FERC ¶61,305. The Commission acknowledged that it had before it difficult cost allocation issues and that there were “no easy answers.” After extensive review, FERC concluded that the most equitable result would be to adopt ALJ Liebman’s formula for allocating Grand Gulf costs. The Commission affirmed and adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judges that MSU is a highly integrated and coordinated power pool. It concluded that the result of this integration and coordination was “planning, construction, and operations which [were] conducted primarily for the system as a whole.” Id., at 61,645. Because it found that nuclear units on the System had been “planned to meet overall System needs and objectives,” it concluded “that some form of equalization of nuclear plant costs [was] necessary to achieve just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory rates among the MSU operating companies.” Id., at 61,655. The Commission agreed with the judges that the 1982 System Agreement and the UPSA as filed would not together produce proper cost allocation, but concluded that the 1982 System Agreement in conjunction with ALJ Liebman’s allocation of capacity costs associated with Grand Gulf would “achieve just and reasonable results.” Ibid. Thus FERC affirmed the allocation of 33% of Grand Gulf’s capacity costs to MP&L as just and reasonable. Although it did not expressly discuss the “prudence” of constructing Grand Gulf and bringing it on line, FERC implicitly accepted the uncontroverted testimony of the MSU executives who explained why they believed the decisions to construct and to complete Grand Gulf 1 were sound, and approved the finding that “continuing construction of Grand Gulf Unit No. 1 was prudent because Middle South’s executives believed Grand Gulf would enable the Middle South system to diversify its base load fuel mix and, it was projected, at the same time, produce power for a total cost (capacity and energy) which would be less than existing alternatives on the system.” 26 FERC, at 65,112-65,113; see 31 FERC, at 61,666 (affirming ALJ Liebman’s decision to the extent not modified). The Commission later clarified certain aspects of its previous order in the course of considering several petitions for rehearing. It rejected contentions that its exercise of jurisdiction would destroy effective state regulation of retail rates. Specifically, FERC rejected claims that it could not exercise jurisdiction because such action would result in States being “precluded from judging the prudence of Grand Gulf costs and denied any say in the rate of return imposed as part of these costs” and “imping[e] on the State’s paramount authority in certification decisions regarding need, type, and costs of construction of new generating facilities.” Middle South Energy, Inc., 32 FERC ¶61,425, p. 61,951 (1985). FERC asserted that its opinion was “the result of a careful balancing of the state and Federal interests involved” and that it had paid “careful heed to the impact [its] decision would have on the states.” Id., at 61,951-61,952. FERC went on to reject the argument that allocation of Grand Gulf costs should be based on whether individual companies needed Grand Gulf capacity. Since Grand Gulf had been constructed to meet the needs and serve the goals of the entire system, FERC reasoned that “the allocation of Grand Gulf power must rest not on the ‘needs’ of an individual company, but rather on the principles of just, reasonable, non-discriminatory, and non-preferential rates.” Id., at 61,958. FERC emphasized that the parties had entered the pooling agreement voluntarily and that its decision did no more than “alter in as limited a means as possible the agreed-upon cost scheme, in order to achieve just, reasonable, non-discriminatory and non-preferential rates.” Id., at 61,961. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed FERC’s order that the four operating companies share the cost of the system’s investment in nuclear energy in proportion to their relative demand for energy generated by the system as a whole. The court first rejected various challenges to FERC’s authority to restructure the parties’ agreed-upon allocations, holding that the Federal Power Act (FPA) gave FERC the necessary authority. The court then affirmed FERC’s allocation of-Grand Gulf capacity and costs as both rational and within the Commission’s range of discretion to remedy unduly discriminatory rates. Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 257 U. S. App. D. C. 244, 285, 808 F. 2d 1525, 1566 (1987). The State Proceedings On November 16, 1984, before the FERC proceedings were completed, MP&L filed an application for a substantial increase in its retail rates. The major portion of the requested increase was based on the assumption that MP&L would be required to purchase 31.63% of the high-cost Grand Gulf power when the unit began operating on July 1, 1985, in accordance with the terms of the UPSA. After public hearings, on June 14, 1985, the Mississippi Commission entered an order allowing MP&L certain additional revenues, but denying MP&L any retail rate relief associated with Grand Gulf Unit 1. App. to Juris. Statement 33a. On June 27, 1985, MP&L applied for rehearing of the order insofar as it denied any rate relief associated with Grand Gulf. As expected, Grand Gulf went on line on July 1, 1985, and MP&L became obligated consistent with FERC’s allocation to make net payments of about $27 million per month for Grand Gulf capacity. After public hearings on the rehearing petition, the MPSC found that MP&L would become insolvent if relief were not granted and allowed a rate increase to go into effect to recover a projected annual revenue deficiency of about $327 million. The increase was predicated entirely on the company’s need for revenues to cover the purchased power expenses associated with Grand Gulf 1. See id., at 39a. In its order the MPSC noted that petitions for rehearing were pending before FERC, in which the MPSC was continuing to challenge the allocation of 33% of Grand Gulf’s power to MP&L. Id., at 28a. It stated that it intended “to vigorously pursue every available legal remedy challenging the validity and fairness of the FERC allocation to MP&L,” id., at 51a, and that appropriate rate adjustments would be made if that allocation was changed. The order made no reference to the prudence of the investment in Grand Gulf. The Attorney General of Mississippi and certain other parties representing Mississippi consumers appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Under Mississippi law, the MPSC has authority to establish just and reasonable rates which will lead to a fair rate of return for the utility. Miss. Code Ann. §77-3-39 (Supp. 1987). “A fair return is one which, under prudent and economical management, is just and reasonable to both the public and the utility.” Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm’n, 237 Miss. 157, 241, 113 So. 2d 622, 656 (1959); Mississippi Public Service Comm’n v. Mississippi Power Co., 429 So. 2d 883 (Miss. 1983). The appealing parties charged, inter alia, that the MPSC had exceeded the scope of its authority by adopting “retail rates to pay Grand Gulf expenses without first determining that the expenses were prudently incurred.” Mississippi ex rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Public Service Comm’n, 506 So. 2d 978, 979 (Miss. 1987). The State Supreme Court agreed, rejecting the argument that requiring the MPSC to review the prudence of incurring costs associated with Grand Gulf would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The court concluded that MP&L and its sister and parent companies were “using the jurisdictional relationship between state and federal regulatory agencies to completely evade a prudency review of Grand Gulf costs” by either state or federal agencies and remanded the case to the MPSC for further proceedings.. The court held that FERC’s determination that MP&L’s assumption of a 33% share of the costs associated with Grand Gulf would be fair to its sister operating companies did not obligate the State to approve a pass-through of those costs to state consumers without a prudence review. The court rejected MP&L’s argument that the decision of this Court in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U. S. 953 (1986), which barred the State of North Carolina from setting retail rates that did not take into account FERC’s allocation of power between two related utility companies, foreclosed a state prudence review. Nantahala, the state court concluded, simply did not force the “MPSC to set rates based on the construction and operation of a plant (nuclear or otherwise) that generates power that is not needed at a price that is not prudent.” 506 So. 2d, at 985. The court assumed that only the fact that Grand Gulf was owned by an out-of-state corporation as opposed to MP&L created a question whether a state prudence determination was preempted and concluded that that fact was not enough to rob it of authority. The court distinguished Nantahala because that case concerned an agreement allocating low-cost power, and the prudence of purchasing the available low-cost hydroelectric power was never at issue. The state court adopted the view that in determining whether a particular aspect of state regulation was preempted by FERC action, the state court should “‘examine those matters actually determined, whether expressly or impliedly, by the FERC.’” 506 So. 2d, at 986 (quoting Appeal of Sinclair Machine Products, Inc., 126 N. H. 822, 833, 498 A. 2d 696, 704 (1985)). It concluded that “ ‘[a]s to those matters not resolved by the FERC, State regulation is not preempted provided that regulation would not contradict or undermine FERC determinations and federal interests, or impose inconsistent obligations on the utility companies involved.’” 506 So. 2d, at 986. The court then noted that FERC “was never presented with the question of whether the completion of Grand Gulf, or its continued operation, was prudent” ibid., and that the Court of Appeals in affirming FERC’s allocation had “made no finding with regard to prudency because the issue was not presented.” Id., at 987 (emphasis in original). Consistent with this analysis, the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded the case to the MPSC “for a review of the prudency of the Grand Gulf investment.” The court specified that this review should “determine whether MP&L, [MSE] and MSU acted reasonably when they constructed Grand Gulf 1, in light of the change in demand for electric power in this state and the sudden escalation of costs.” Ibid. Thus the MPSC was directed to examine the prudence of the investment of both domestic and foreign corporations in Grand Gulf “in light of local conditions.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). Appellant MP&L contends that our decision in Nantahala, the FPA, and the Commerce Clause require the MPSC in setting retail electric rates to recognize that expenses incurred under FERC wholesale rate decisions that allocate interstate wholesale costs are reasonably incurred operating expenses. In essence appellant asserts that FERC’s allocation of Grand Gulf power pre-empts the jurisdiction of state regulatory agencies to set retail rates that do not recognize the costs associated with that allocation as reasonable. Ap-pellees contend that the Supremacy Clause does not preclude review of MP&L’s managerial prudence and that the effect of pre-emption would be to create a regulatory gap not contemplated by Congress, the Constitution, or this Court. II We hold that our decision in Nantahala rests on a foundation that is broad enough to support the order entered by FERC in this case and to require the MPSC to treat MP&L’s FERC-mandated payments for Grand Gulf costs as reasonably incurred operating expenses for the purpose of setting MP&L’s retail rates. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s judgment ordering the MPSC to conduct proceedings to determine whether some or all of the costs were not prudently incurred is pre-empted by federal law and must be reversed. In Nantahala we considered the pre-emptive' effect of a FERC order that reallocated the respective shares of two affiliated companies’ entitlement to low-cost power. Under an agreement between the two affiliated companies, Nan-tahala, a public utility selling to both retail and wholesale customers in North Carolina, had been allocated 20% of the low-cost power purchased from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), while 80% was reserved for the affiliate whose only customer was their common parent. FERC found that the agreement was unfair to Nantahala and ordered it to file a new wholesale rate schedule based on an entitlement to 22.5% of the low-cost power purchased from TVA. Subsequently, in a retail rate proceeding, the North Carolina Regulatory Commission reexamined the issue and determined that any share less than 24.5% was unfair and therefore ordered Nantahala to calculate its costs for retail ratemaking purposes as though it had received 24.5% of the low-cost power. The effect of the State Commission’s order was to force Nantahala to calculate its retail rates as though FERC had allocated it a greater share of the low-cost power and to deny Nantahala the right to recover a portion of the costs it had incurred in paying rates that FERC had determined to be just and reasonable. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates, it held that the State Commission’s de facto reallocation of low-cost power was “‘well within the field of exclusive state rate making authority engendered by the “bright line” between state and federal regulatory jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act.’” Nantahala, 476 U. S., at 961 (quoting State ex rel. Utilities Comm’n v. Nantahala Power & Light Co., 313 N. C. 614, 687-688, 332 S. E. 2d 397, 440-441 (1985)). The state court emphasized that its order did not require Nantahala to violate the FERC order and that it was not expressly contradicting a FERC finding. We rejected these arguments. The reasoning that led to our decision in Nantahala applies with equal force here and compels the same conclusion — States may not alter FERC-ordered allocations of power by substituting their own determinations of what would be just and fair. FERC-mandated allocations of power are binding on the States, and States must treat those allocations as fair and reasonable when determining retail rates. Our decision in Nantahala relied on fundamental principles concerning the pre-emptive impact of federal jurisdiction over wholesale rates on state regulation. First, FERC has exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of wholesale rates. It is now settled that “ ‘the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes, and, . . . except for review of the Commission’s orders, [a] court can assume no right to a different one on the ground that, in its opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable one.’” Nantahala, 476 U. S., at 963-964 (quoting Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251-252 (1951)). This principle binds both state and federal courts and is in the former respect mandated by the Supremacy Clause. 476 U. S., at 963. Second, FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction applies not only to rates but also to power allocations that affect wholesale rates. Id., at 966. Third, States may not bar regulated utilities from passing through to retail consumers FERC-mandated wholesale rates. “The filed rate doctrine ensures that sellers of wholesale power governed by FERC can recover the costs incurred by their payment of just and reasonable FERC-set rates. When FERC sets a rate between a seller of power and a wholesaler-as-buyer, a State may not exercise its undoubted jurisdiction over retail sales to prevent the wholesaler-as-seller from recovering the costs of paying the FERC-approved rate. . . . Such a ‘trapping’ of costs is prohibited.” Id., at 970. These principles led us to hold in Nantahala that the North Carolina Utilities Commission’s order “trapping” federally mandated costs was pre-empted. Today they compel us to hold that the MPSC may not enter an order “trapping” the costs MP&L is mandated to pay under the FERC order allocating Grand Gulf power or undertake a “prudence” review for the purpose of deciding whether to enter such an order. The facts of this case and Nantahala are not distinguishable in any way that has relevance to the operation of the principles stated above. Both cases concern FERC orders adjusting in the interest of fairness voluntary allocations of power among related entities. Nantahala involved a FERC order fixing the utility’s right to acquire low-cost power; this case involves a FERC order fixing MP&L’s obligation to acquire high-cost power. In Nantahala FERC had “determined that Nantahala’s average cost of power obtained from TVA should be based on a. particular allocation of entitlements power, and no other,” id., at 971 (emphasis added); in this case FERC has determined that MP&L’s cost of power obtained from Grand Gulf should be based on a particular allocation, and no other. In Nantahala the state court attempted to approve retail rates based on the assumption that Nantahala was entitled to more low-cost power than FERC had allocated to it. Here the state court seeks to permit the State to set rates based on an assumption that MP&L is obligated to purchase less Grand Gulf power than FERC has ordered it to purchase. In this case as in Nantahala we hold that “a state utility commission setting retail prices must allow, as reasonable operating expenses, costs incurred as a result of paying a FERC-determined wholesale price. . . . Once FERC sets such a rate, a State may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale rates are unreasonable. A State must rather give effect to Congress’ desire to give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority.” Nantahala, 476 U. S., at 965, 966. Thus we conclude that the Supremacy Clause compels the MPSC to permit MP&L to recover as a reasonable operating expense costs incurred as the result of paying a FERC-determined wholesale rate for a FERC-mandated allocation of power. Appellees seek to characterize this case as falling within facts distinguished in Nantahala. Without purporting to determine the issue, we stated in Nantahala: “[W]e may assume that a particular quantity of power procured by a utility from a particular source could be deemed unreasonably excessive if lower-cost power is available elsewhere, even though the higher-cost power actually purchased is obtained at a FERC-approved, and therefore reasonable, price.” Id., at 972 (emphasis in original). As we assumed, it might well be unreasonable for a utility to purchase unnecessary quantities of high-cost power, even at FERC-approved rate's, if it had the legal right to refuse to buy that power. But if the integrity of FERC regulation is to be preserved, it obviously cannot be unreasonable for MP&L to procure the particular quantity of high-priced Grand Gulf power that FERC has ordered it to pay for. Just as Nantahala had no legal right to obtain any more low-cost TVA power than the amount allocated by FERC, it is equally clear that MP&L may not pay for less Grand Gulf power than the amount allocated by FERC. The Mississippi Supreme Court erred in adopting the view that the pre-emptive effect of FERC jurisdiction turned on whether a particular matter was actually determined in the FERC proceedings. See 506 So. 2d, at 986. We have long rejected this sort of “‘case-by-case analysis of the impact of state regulation upon the national interest’ ” in power regulation cases. Nantahala, 476 U. S., at 966 (quoting FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U. S. 205, 215-216 (1964)). Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal authority in the setting of wholesale rates and in the regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates. States may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly exercised its jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable wholesale rates or to insure that agreements affecting wholesale rates are reasonable. FERC’s jurisdiction to adjust the allocations of Grand Gulf power in the UPSA has been established. Mississippi, therefore, may not consistent with the Supremacy Clause conduct any proceedings that, challenge the reasonableness of FERC’s allocation. The reasonableness of rates and agreements regulated by FERC may not be collaterally attacked in state or federal courts. The only appropriate forum for such a challenge is before the Commission or a court reviewing the Commission’s order. The Mississippi Supreme Court attached considerable significance to the fact that the prudence of investing in Grand Gulf and bringing it on line was not discussed either in the proceedings before FERC or on review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The question of prudence was not discussed, however, because no party raised the issue, not because it was a matter beyond the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction. The Mississippi Supreme Court characterized the conduct of MP&L and its sister companies as an effort to “us[e] the jurisdictional relationship between state and federal regulatory agencies to completely evade a prudency review of Grand Gulf costs by either agency.” 506 So. 2d, at 979. The facts of this case, however, offer no evidence of such subterfuge. The very parties who are appellees here and who urged the Mississippi Supreme Court to order the MPSC to conduct a prudence review were also participants in the proceedings before FERC. The parties to the FERC proceedings recognized the impact that FERC's order would have on the jurisdiction of the state regulatory agencies. See Middle South Energy, Inc., 32 FERC, at 61,951-61,952. Despite that recognition, appellees failed to raise the matter of the prudence of the investment in Grand Gulf before FERC though it was a matter FERC easily could have considered in determining whether to permit MSE to recoup 100% of the costs of Grand Gulf in the wholesale rates it charged to the four operating companies and in allocating Grand Gulf power. See New England Power Co., 31 FERC ¶ 61,047, pp. 61,081-61,084 (1985), enf’d, 800 F. 2d 280 (CA1 1986). In fact, FERC did consider and reject some aspects of the prudence review the Mississippi Supreme Court directed the MPSC to conduct. The state court emphasized that the MPSC was to determine whether “MSU and its subsidiaries made reasonable decisions in light of local conditions.” 506 So. 2d, at 987. FERC rejected, however, the argument that decisions about the allocation of Grand Gulf costs should be made in light of the needs of any one of the operating companies. It emphasized that “the Middle South companies appropriately approach power planning on a systemwide basis, whereby the individual companies’ needs are the component parts of the System power plan [and that] [implementation of the System plan . . . require[d] that the individual companies’ needs be subsumed by the greater interests of the entire System.” 32 FERC, at 61,958. Thus FERC’s order specifically bars a state regulatory agency from evaluating the prudence of Grand Gulf “in light of local conditions” alone. The state court also directed a “complete review of the transactions between MP&L, [MSE], and MSU, and their effect on Grand Gulf expense.” These transactions, however, comprise the very System Agreements between MSU and the operating companies and UPS A evaluated by FERC in the exercise of its jurisdiction over wholesale rates. The MPSC lacks jurisdiction to reevaluate the reasonableness of those transactions. The MPSC cannot evaluate either the prudence of MSU’s decision to invest in Grand Gulf and bring it on line or the prudence of MP&L’s decision to be a party to agreements to construct and operate Grand Gulf without traversing matters squarely within FERC’s jurisdiction. There “can be no divided authority over interstate commerce . . . the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive.” Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925). Consequently, a state agency’s “efforts to regulate commerce must fall when they conflict with or interfere with federal authority over the same activity.” Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311, 318-319 (1981). Mississippi’s effort to invade the province of federal authority must be rejected. The judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is reversed. It is so ordered. The other operating companies owned by MSU are Louisiana Power and Light (LP&L), New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (NOPSI), and Arkansas Power and Light Company (AP&L). Prior to the events that gave rise to the instant controversy, each generating unit on the system was owned, financed, constructed, and operated by a single operating company despite the fact that new generating units were planned and constructed in accordance with the needs of the system as a whole, not merely the needs of the particular operating company. Middle South Energy, Inc., 31 FERC ¶61,305, p. 61,653 (1985). Originally, AP&L was assigned to build and operate two nuclear facilities in Arkansas, ANO 1 and ANO 2; LP&L undertook the construction of Waterford 3 and 4; MP&L was assigned to build and operate Grand Gulf 1; and NOPSI was to construct a unit near New Orleans. Although the two ANO units were completed without incident, regulatory delays, additional construction requirements, and severe inflation led to serious problems in the construction of the remaining units. Plans to construct Waterford 4 quickly failed and severe costs overruns marred the completion of Waterford 3. The site for the NOPSI facility proved unsuitable and responsibility for construction of that unit, Grand Gulf 2, was transferred to MP&L. The MPSC’s Order Granting Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity reflected the MPSC’s appreciation of the interstate dimensions of the MSU system. It stated, in part: “Middle South Utilities, Inc. (‘Middle South’) is a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. It owns all of the outstanding common stock of each of its principal operating subsidiaries: Arkansas Power & Light Company (Arkansas), Arkansas-Missouri Power Company (Ark-Mo), Louisiana Power & Light Company (Louisiana), [MP&L], and New Orleans Public Service Inc. (NOPSI). . . . Middle South and all of its subsidiaries constitute the Middle South Utilities System (Middle South System). The electric properties of the System operating companies constitute an integrated public utility system. “The generating facilities of the Middle South System have been strategically located with a reference to the availability of fuel, protection of local loads and other controlling economic factors. The size of these units has been determined basically by the projected load growth of the Middle South System. [MP&L’s] present rate and capital structure obviously cannot support construction of this magnitude. “In order to finance this construction on a basis that will be in the best interests of both its investors and the investors in its subsidiaries, and to insure adequate and dependable electric service to the customers and service areas of its subsidiaries, including Company, and without unnecessarily complicating its financial structure, Middle South [Middle South Energy, Inc.] has been organized.” App. to Motion to Dismiss 27-28, 30-31. It was originally estimated that the cost per kilowatt of capacity would be about $500; by the time commercial operations began, that cost amounted to $2,933. The original estimate for the cost of two nuclear units at Port Gibson was approximately $1.2 billion. Regulatory delays, additional construction requirements imposed after the Three Mile Island disaster, and severe inflation, however, ran up Grand Gulf costs to more than $3 billion for the single unit. ' See Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 257 U. S. App. D. C. 244, 250, 808 F. 2d 1525, 1531 (1987). Section 205 of the Federal Power Act declares unlawful any rate charged in any transaction within FERC’s jurisdiction that is not just and reasonable. 49 Stat. 851, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §824d(a). Section 206 of the Act provides that when FERC determines after a hearing that “any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” 16 U. S. C. § 824e(a). Because FERC determined that the UPSA allocating Grand Gulf power among the four operating companies was a contract affecting the wholesale rates of those operating companies, § 206 of the FPA imposed on FERC an obligation to fix terms that would render the contract “just and reasonable.” See Mississippi Industries, 257 U. S. App. D. C., at 259-260, 808 F. 2d, at 1540-1541. Administrative Law Judge Liebman, who reviewed the UPSA, “concluded that the evidence was overwhelming that the Middle South system is a single integrated and coordinated electric system operating in Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Missouri. He found that the Grand Gulf project was initiated in the 1970’s to meet the then projected load demand of the system and not just the load of any Middle South operating company or companies, and further that every unit on the Middle South system had been constructed to meet system load. Therefore, he concluded that the costs of Grand Gulf capacity and energy should be shared equitably by all four operating companies and their customers” and that the allocations in the UPSA were “unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory.” Middle South Energy, Inc., 31 FERC, at 61, 632-61,633 (emphasis in original); Middle South Energy, Inc., 26 FERC ¶63,044, pp. 65,106-65,108 (1984). He concluded that the allocation proposal submitted by the Louisiana Public Service Commission was the most equitable. Under that proposal each operating company would be allocated a share of the cost of nuclear capacity on the MSU system roughly in proportion to each company’s relative share of system demand, as fixed in 1982. Id., at 65,109. This approach allocated 33% of Grand Gulf’s capacity costs to MP&L, a percentage slightly higher than that contained in the UPSA, which had distributed costs among only three of the operating companies. Administrative Law Judge Head, who presided in the proceedings involving the 1982 System Agreement, advocated equalizing production costs on the basis of annual demand. Although he characterized Grand Gulf as an “anomaly,” he reached conclusions similar to ALJ Liebman’s about the relationship of Grand Gulf to the system: “[Grand Gulf] was planned, licensed, and constructed as a system plant, intended to supply power not only in Mississippi but throughout the entire MSU system.. . . [T]he financial responsibility and production cost responsibility for Grand Gulf should be borne by all the operating companies. . . . “. . . Grand Gulf [should be integrated] into the 1982 System Agreement by having each of the four operating companies pay for the production costs of the Grand Gulf facility based on the ratio that the individual operating company’s total annual demand bears to the total annual system demand.” Middle South Services, Inc., 30 FERC ¶ 63,030, p. 65,172 (1985) (emphasis added). Both judges considered and rejected MP&L’s proposition that costs should be allocated in accordance with the 1973 System Agreement. Under the 1973 Agreement, the cost to be borne by each operating company would depend on the percentage of Grand Gulf capacity that company needed to meet the demands of its customers. Thus companies owning capacity sufficient to meet their needs, “long” companies, would not bear any of the cost while “short” companies, companies that have to purchase additional capacity to meet their needs, would bear the total cost. Responsibility would shift as particular operating companies became “shorter” or “longer.” Since MP&L is predicted to be a long company until sometime in the 1990’s, under the 1973 System Agreement, it would not have had to bear any costs associated with Grand Gulf until depreciation had substantially reduced the cost of Grand Gulf power. Judge Bork agreed with most of the majority’s decision but dissented from the panel’s affirmance of FERC’s specific allocation of Grand Gulf costs on the ground that FERC had failed adequately to explain its criteria fer determining undue discrimination and why the allocation it adopted was not unduly discriminatory. The panel voted to deny rehearing, but the court granted rehearing en banc to consider the issues raised by the dissent and vacated the portions of the panel opinion concerning the specific allocation of costs. Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 259 U. S. App. D. C. 244, 814 F. 2d 773 (1987). Later, the en bane court vacated its order granting rehearing. 262 U. S. App. D. C. 41, 822 F. 2d 1103 (1987). At the same time, the panel vacated its order denying rehearing, granted rehearing, reversed FERC’s order, vacated the part of its opinion concerning specific cost allocations, and remanded to FERC for reconsideration of the decision to equalize capacity costs and for an explanation of what constitutes undue discrimination and why FERC’s order was not unduly discriminatory. Mississippi Industries v. FERC, 262 U. S. App. D. C. 42, 822 F. 2d 1104 (1987). On remand, FERC has issued an opinion reaffirming and further explaining the basis for its previous allocation. See System Energy Resources, Inc., 41 FERC ¶61,238 (1987). The court pointed out that approval to build Grand Gulf in the State of Mississippi had been secured on the strength of certain assumptions: “the first unit was to be operational in 1980, the two units were to cost $1,227 billion, and Mississippi ratepayers were not to pay for any more of its capacity than they needed.” 506 So. 2d, at 984. Reliance on these assumptions proved unjustified: “Unit 1 began operation in July, 1985; the cost of Unit 1 alone, was over $3.5 billion; and the MSU-controlled operating companies agreed, among themselves that Mississippians should pay for 1/3 of its cost.” Ibid, (emphasis omitted). Of course, the failure of the assumptions made by both MP&L and the State at the time construction of Grand Gulf was approved has little to do with the pre-emption question before us. We note, however, that the failure was not the result of any deception on the part of MP&L, MSU, or MSE. At the time construction of Grand Gulf was initiated, no one anticipated the enormous cost overruns that would be associated not only with that plant but also with virtually every nuclear power facility being constructed in the United States. See nn. 2 and 5, supra. Appellant asserted in its jurisdictional statement that the Mississippi Supreme Court had rejected its challenge to the constitutionality of Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-39 (Supp. 1987) and that this Court had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). Relying on this assertion and on the substantial federal question presented, we postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits. 484 U. S. 813 (1987). On further review of the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court and of the briefs submitted by appellant to that court, however, we are of the view that appellant never challenged the constitutionality of § 77-3-39; rather it merely argued that the MPSC’s exercise of jurisdiction to determine prudence would violate the Supremacy Clause. Although appellant’s argument implicitly called into question the scope of any state statutes that speak to the MPSC’s jurisdiction, it was not the type of express challenge to the constitutionality of the state statute required for this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under § 1257(2). See Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U. S. 80, 84, n. 4 (1988). Consequently, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. However, because the papers do present a substantial federal question, “construing the papers filed as a petition for a writ of certiorari, we now grant the petition.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 422-423 (1979); see 28 U. S. C. § 2103. As we have in previous cases in which we have construed a jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari, for convenience we continue to refer to the parties as appellant and appellees. See Peralta, 485 U. S., at 84, n.4; Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978). Appellees contend that the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is not “final” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257 because further proceedings will be held on remand. The critical federal question — whether federal law pre-empts such proceedings while the FERC order remains in effect — has, however, already been answered by the State Supreme Court and its judgment is therefore ripe for review. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477 (1975). See also R. Stern, E. Gress-man, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 129 (6th ed., 1986). It is clear that the only purpose of the prudence review ordered by the Mississippi Supreme Court was to determine whether the costs FERC had directed MP&L to pay for its allocation of Grand Gulf power should be “trapped” or passed on to MP&L’s retail customers. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s judgment ordering the review itself had the effect of “trapping” some Grand Gulf costs since the MPSC responded to the judgment by rescinding the previously approved rate increase and ordering MP&L to submit a plan for refunding to its customers all of its prior recovery of Grand Gulf expenses. To prevent this “trapping,” we granted a. stay of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s judgment. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Pittman, 483 U. S. 1013 (1987). Appellant and other parties unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of FERC over the UPSA in the FERC proceedings and on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. After thorough consideration at every level of administrative and judicial review, this challenge was rejected. See 26 FERC, at 65,113-65,117; 31 FERC, at 61,643-61,644; 32 FERC, at 61,943-61,951; 257 U. S. App. D. C., at 258-262. 808 F. 2d. 1539-1543. In addition to arguing that the Supremacy Clause does not bar an MPSC prudence inquiry, appellees argue that MP&L should be equitably estopped from arguing that the prudence review ordered by the Mississippi Supreme Court is pre-empted by federal law. In acquiring a license from the State of Mississippi to construct Grand Gulf, MSU and MP&L made certain representations to the MPSC as to how Grand Gulf costs and power would be allocated. Appellees do not claim that these representations were false when made, Brief for Appellee State of Mississippi 39, or that FERC was bound by the representations made in the state proceedings, id., at 42; rather, they argue that MSU should have been “denied standing ... to file an application with FERC, or enforce any allocation against the Mississippi service area other than originally represented to secure the necessary construction certificate,” id., at 43. This argument has no relevance to the pre-emption question before us. Representations in state proceedings, even ones that were false when made, cannot subvert the operation of the Supremacy Clause. The appropriate place to contend that MSU and or MP&L lacked standing before the FERC was in the Commission proceedings, and the argument was in fact raised and rejected in those proceedings. See 257 U. S. App. D. C., at 268-269, 808 F. 2d, at 1549-1550.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LINEHAN et al. v. WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR et al. NO. 557. Decided April 12, 1954. George A. Brenner for appellants. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General of New York, Lawrence E. Walsh and Wendell P. Brown for appellees. Whitman Knapp was also for appellees in No. 558. Per Curiam. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgments are affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v. TARKANIAN No. 87-1061. Argued October 5, 1988 Decided December 12, 1988 Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were George H. Gangwere, James H. McLarney, and Daniel L. .Sailler. Samuel S. Lionel argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were David N. Frederick and Mark A. Solomon. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. When he became head basketball coach at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), in 1973, Jerry Tarkanian inherited a team with a mediocre 14-14 record. App. 188, 205. Four years later the team won 29 out of 32 games and placed third in the championship tournament sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), to which UNLV belongs. Id., at 188. Yet in September 1977 UNLV informed Tarkanian that it was going to suspend him. No dissatisfaction with Tarkanian, once described as “the ‘winningest’ active basketball soach,” id., at 19, motivated his suspension. Rather, the impetus was a report by the NCAA detailing 38 violations of NCAA rules by UNLV personnel, including 10 involving Tarkanian. The NCAA had placed the university’s basketball team on probation for two years and ordered UNLV to show cause why the NCAA should not impose further penalties unless UNLV severed all ties during the probation between its intercollegiate athletic program and Tarkanian. Facing demotion and a drastic cut in pay, Tarkanian brought suit in Nevada state court, alleging that he had been deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Ultimately Tarkanian obtained injunctive relief and an award of attorney’s fees against both UNLV and the NCAA. 103 Nev. 331, 741 P. 2d 1345 (1987) (per curiam). NCAA’s liability may be upheld only if its participation in the events that led to Tarkanian’s suspension constituted “state action” prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment and was performed “under color of” state law within the meaning of § 1983. We granted certiorari to review the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding that the NCAA engaged in state action when it conducted its investigation and recommended that Tarkanian be disciplined. 484 U. S. 1058 (1988). We now reverse. I In order to understand the four separate proceedings that gave rise to the question we must decide, it is useful to begin with a description of the relationship among the three parties — Tarkanian, UNLV, and the NCAA. Tarkanian initially was employed on a year-to-year basis but became a tenured professor in 1977. He receives an annual salary with valuable fringe benefits, and his status as a highly successful coach enables him to earn substantial additional income from sports-related activities such as broadcasting and the sponsorship of products. UNLY is a branch of the University of Nevada, a state-funded institution. The university is organized and operated pursuant to provisions of Nevada’s State Constitution, statutes, and regulations. In performing their official functions, the executives of UNLV unquestionably act under color of state law. The NCAA is an unincorporated association of approximately 960 members, including virtually all public and private universities and 4-year colleges conducting major athletic programs in the United States. Basic policies of the NCAA are determined by the members at annual conventions. Between conventions, the Association is governed by its Council, which appoints various committees to implement specific programs. One of the NCAA’s fundamental policies “is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body, and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.” App. 80. It has therefore adopted rules, which it calls “legislation,” ibid., governing the conduct of the intercollegiate athletic programs of its members. This NCAA legislation applies to a variety of issues, such as academic standards for eligibility, admissions, financial aid, and the recruiting of student athletes. By joining the NCAA, each member agrees to abide by and to enforce such rules. The NCAA’s bylaws provide that its enforcement program shall be administered by a Committee on Infractions. The Committee supervises an investigative staff, makes factual determinations concerning alleged rule violations, and is expressly authorized to “impose appropriate penalties on a member found to be in violation, or recommend to the Council suspension or termination of membership.” In particular, the Committee may order a member institution to show cause why that member should not suffer further penalties unless it imposes a prescribed discipline on an employee; it is not authorized, however, to sanction a member institution’s employees directly. The bylaws also provide that representatives of member institutions “are expected to cooperate fully” with the administration of the enforcement program. Id., at 97. The bylaws do not purport to confer any subpoena power on the Committee or its investigators. They state: “The enforcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic program of each member institution and require full and complete disclosure by all institutional representatives of any relevant information requested by the NCAA investigative staff, Committee on Infractions or Council during the course of an inquiry.” Ibid. During its investigation of UNLV, the Committee on Infractions included three law professors, a mathematics professor, and the dean of a graduate school. Four of them were on the faculties of state institutions; one represented a private university. The NCAA Investigation of UNLV On November 28, 1972, the Committee on Infractions notified UNLV’s president that it was initiating a preliminary inquiry into alleged violations of NCAA requirements by UNLV. As a result of that preliminary inquiry, some three years later the Committee decided that an “Official Inquiry” was warranted and so advised the UNLV president on February 25, 1976. That advice included a series of detailed allegations concerning the recruitment of student athletes during the period between 1971 and 1975. Many of the allegations implicated Tarkanian. It requested UNLV to investigate and provide detailed information concerning each alleged incident. With the assistance of the Attorney General of Nevada and private counsel, UNLV conducted a thorough investigation of the charges. On October 27, 1976, it filed a comprehensive response containing voluminous exhibits and sworn affidavits. The response denied all of the allegations and specifically concluded that Tarkanian was completely innocent of wrongdoing. Thereafter, the Committee conducted four days of hearings at which counsel for UNLV and Tarkanian presented their views of the facts and challenged the credibility of the NCAA investigators and their informants. Ultimately the Committee decided that many of the charges could not be supported, but it did find 38 violations of NCAA rules, including 10 committed by Tarkanian. Most serious was the finding that Tarkanian had violated the University’s obligation to provide full cooperation with the NCAA investigation. The Committee’s findings and proposed discipline were summarized in great detail in its so-called “Confidential Report No. 123(47).” App. 122-204. The Committee proposed a series of sanctions against UNLV, including a 2-year period of probation during which its basketball team could not participate in postseason games or appear on television. The Committee also requested UNLV to show cause why additional penalties should not be imposed against UNLV if it failed to discipline Tarkanian by removing him completely from the University’s intercollegiate athletic program during the probation period. UNLV appealed most of the Committee’s findings and proposed sanctions to the NCAA Council. After hearing arguments from attorneys representing UNLV and Tarkanian, the Council on August 25, 1977, unanimously approved the Committee’s investigation and hearing process and adopted all its recommendations. UNLV’s Discipline of Tarkanian Promptly after receiving the NCAA report, the president of UNLV directed the University’s vice president to schedule a hearing to determine whether the Committee’s recommended sanctions should be applied. Tarkanian and UNLV were represented at that hearing; the NCAA was not. Although the vice president expressed doubt concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Committee’s findings, he concluded that “given the terms of our adherence to the NCAA we cannot substitute — biased as we must be — our own judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that of the infractions committee and the Council.” Id., at 75. With respect to the proposed sanctions, he advised the president that he had three options: “1. Reject the sanction requiring us to disassociate Coach Tarkanian from the athletic program and take the risk of still heavier sanctions, e. g., possible extra years of probation. “2. Recognize the University’s delegation to the NCAA of the power to act as ultimate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian from his present position — though tenured and without adequate notice— even while believing that the NCAA was wrong. “3. Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that you will not execute what you hold to be their unjust judgments.” Id., at 76. Pursuant to the vice president’s recommendation, the president accepted the second option and notified Tarkanian that he was to “be completely severed of any and all relations, formal or informal, with the University’s Intercollegiate athletic program during the period of the University’s NCAA probation.” Id., at 70. Tarkanian’s Lawsuit Against UNLV The day before his suspension was to become effective, Tarkanian filed an action in Nevada state court for declaratory and injunctive relief against UNLV and a number of its officers. He alleged that these defendants had, in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, deprived him of property and liberty without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Based on a stipulation of facts and the testimony offered by Tarkanian, the trial court enjoined UNLV from suspending Tarkanian on the ground that he had been denied procedural and substantive due process of law. UNLV appealed. The NCAA, which had not been joined as a party, filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that there was no actual controversy between Tarkanian and UNLV; thus, the suit should be dismissed. Alternatively, the NCAA contended that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively invalidating the enforcement proceedings of the NCAA, even though the Association was not a party to the suit. Should a controversy exist, the NCAA argued, it was a necessary party to litigate the scope of any relief. Finally, it contested the trial court’s conclusion that Tarkanian had been denied due process. The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that there was an actual controversy but agreed that the NCAA was a necessary party and therefore reversed and remanded to permit joinder of the NCAA. University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P. 2d 1159 (1979). The Lawsuit Against NCAA Tarkanian consequently filed a second amended complaint adding the NCAA. The defendants promptly removed the suit to Federal District Court on the ground that joinder of the NCAA substantially had altered the nature of the litigation. The District Court held, however, that the original defendants had waived their right to remove the suit when it was first filed, and therefore granted Tarkanian’s motion to remand the case to the state court. After a 4-year delay, the trial judge conducted a 2-week bench trial and resolved the issues in Tarkanian’s favor. The court concluded that NCAA’s conduct constituted state action for jurisdictional and constitutional purposes, and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious. It reaffirmed its earlier injunction barring UNLV from disciplining Tarkanian or otherwise enforcing the Confidential Report. Additionally, it enjoined the NCAA from conducting “any further proceedings against the University,” from enforcing its show-cause order, and from taking any other action against the University that had been recommended in the Confidential Report. App. 34. Two weeks after the trial court’s opinion was entered, Tarkanian filed a petition for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Asserting that this was the first time Tarkanian had claimed relief under § 1988, the NCAA again sought removal to Federal District Court on the ground that the litigation had changed substantially. When the university defendants declined to join the removal petition, the NCAA contended that they should be realigned as plaintiffs because they actually wanted Tarkanian to prevail. The District Court, however, again ordered the litigation remanded, and the Ninth Circuit agreed. App. to Pet. for Cert. A120. Even before the Ninth Circuit ruled, the Nevada trial court had awarded Tarkanian attorney’s fees of almost $196,000, 90% of which was to be paid by the NCAA. App. 41-42. The NCAA appealed both the injunction and the fee order. Not surprisingly, UNLV, which had scored a total victory except for its obligation to pay a fraction of Tarkanian’s fees, did not appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed that Tarkanian had been deprived of both property and liberty protected by the Constitution and that he was not afforded due process before suspension. It thus affirmed the trial court’s injunction insofar as it pertained to Tarkanian, but narrowed its scope “only to prohibit enforcement of the penalties imposed upon Tarkanian in Confidential Report No. 123(47) and UNLV’s adoption of those penalties.” 103 Nev., at 343, 741 P. 2d, at 1353. The court also reduced the award of attorney’s fees. As a predicate for its disposition, the State Supreme Cour held that the NCAA had engaged in state action. Severa strands of argument supported this holding. First, the cour assumed that it was reviewing “UNLV’s and the NCAA’s im position of penalties against Tarkanian,” id., at 335, 741 P 2d, at 1347, rather than the NCAA’s proposed sanction.1 against UNLV if it failed to discipline Tarkanian appropri ately. Second, it regarded the NCAA’s regulatory activities as state action because “many NCAA member institutions were either public or government supported.” Ibid. Third, it stated that the right to discipline a public employee “is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state” and that UNLV could not escape its responsibility for such disciplinary action by delegating that duty to a private entity. Id., at 336, 741 P. 2d, at 1348. The court next pointed to our opinion in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 937 (1982), in which we held that .the deprivation of a federal right may be attributed to the State if it resulted from a state-created rule and the party charged with the deprivation can fairly be said to a state actor. Summing up its holding that the NCAA’s activities constituted state action, the Nevada Supreme Court stated: “The first prong [of Lugar] is met because no third party could impose disciplinary sanctions upon a state university employee unless the third party received the right or privilege from the university. Thus, the deprivation which Tarkanian alleges is caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by the state. Also, in the instant case, both UNLV and the NCAA must be considered state actors. By delegating authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by imposing the NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the NCAA.” 103 Nev., at 337, 741 P. 2d, at 1349. II Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948); see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 349 (1974). As a general matter the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to “private conduct abridging individual rights.” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 722 (1961). “Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law” and avoids the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control. Lugar, 457 U. S., at 936-937. When Congress enacted §1983 as the statutory remedy for violations of the Constitution, it specified that the conduct at issue must have occurred “under color of” state law; thus, liability attaches only to those wrongdoers “who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961). As we stated in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941): “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.” In this case Tarkanian argues that the NCAA was a state actor because it misused power that it possessed by virtue of state law. He claims specifically that UNLV delegated its own functions to the NCAA, clothing the Association with authority both to adopt rules governing UNLV’s athletic programs and to enforce those rules on behalf of UNLV. Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court held that UNLV had delegated its authority over personnel decisions to the NCAA. Therefore, the court reasoned, the two entities acted jointly to deprive Tarkanian of liberty and property interests, making the NCAA as well as UNLV a state actor. These contentions fundamentally misconstrue the facts of this case. In the typical case raising a state-action issue, a private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct as state action. This may occur if the State creates the legal framework governing the conduct, e. g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975); if it delegates its authority to the private actor, e. g., West v. Atkins, 487 U. S. 42 (1988); or sometimes if it knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior, e. g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra. Thus, in the usual case we ask whether the State provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor. This case uniquely mirrors the traditional state-action case. Here the final act challenged by Tarkanian — his suspension — was committed by UNLV. A state university without question is a state actor. When it decides to impose a serious disciplinary sanction upon one of its tenured employees, it must comply with the terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Accord, Cleveland Board of Education v. Louder- mill, 470 U. S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972). Thus when UNLV notified Tarkanian that he was being separated from all relations with the university’s basketball program, it acted under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The mirror image presented in this case requires us to step through an analytical looking glass to resolve the case. Clearly UNLV’s conduct was influenced by the rules and recommendations of the NCAA, the private party. But it was UNLV, the state entity, that actually suspended Tarkanian. Thus the question is not whether UNLV participated to a critical extent in the NCAA’s activities, but whether UNLV’s actions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations turned the NCAA’s conduct into state action. We examine first the relationship between UNLV and the NCAA regarding the NCAA’s rulemaking. UNLV is among the NCAA’s members and participated in promulgating the Association’s rules; it must be assumed, therefore, that Nevada had some impact on the NCAA’s policy determinations. Yet the NCAA’s several hundred other public and private member institutions each similarly affected those policies. Those institutions, the vast majority of which were located in States other than Nevada, did not act under color of Nevada law. It necessarily follows that the source of the legislation adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada but the collective membership, speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular State. Cf. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U. S. 492, 501 (1988) (“Whatever de facto authority the [private standard-setting] Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any government...”). State action nonetheless might lie if UNLV, by embracing the NCAA’s rules, transformed them into state rules and the NCAA into a state actor. See Lugar, 457 U. S., at 937. UNLV engaged in state action when it adopted the NCAA’s rules to govern its own behavior, but that would be true even if UNLV had taken no part in the promulgation of those rules. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), we established that the State Supreme Court’s enforcement of disciplinary rules transgressed by members of its own bar was state action. Those rules had been adopted in toto from the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. Id., at 360,, n. 12. It does not follow, however, that the ABA’s formulation of those disciplinary rules was state action. The State Supreme Court retained plenary power to reexamine those standards and, if necessary, to reject them and promulgate its own. See id., at 362. So here, UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own standards. The university alternatively could have stayed in the Association and worked through the Association’s legislative process to amend rules or standards it deemed harsh, unfair, or unwieldy. Neither UNLV’s decision to adopt the NCAA’s standards nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance. Tarkanian further asserts that the NCAA’s investigation, enforcement proceedings, and consequent recommendations constituted state action because they resulted from a delegation of power by UNLV. UNLV, as an NCAA member, subscribed to the statement in the Association’s bylaws that NCAA “enforcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic program of each member institution.” App. 97. It is, of course, true that a State may delegate authority to a private party and thereby make that party a state actor. Thus, we recently held that a private physician who had contracted with a state prison to attend to the inmates’ medical needs was a state actor. West v. Atkins, 487 U. S. 42 (1988). But UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take specific action against any university employee. The commitment by UNLV to adhere to NCAA enforcement procedures was enforceable only by sanctions that the NCAA might impose on UNLV itself. Indeed, the notion that UNLV’s promise to cooperate in the NCAA enforcement proceedings was tantamount to a partnership agreement or the transfer of certain university powers to the NCAA is belied by the history of this case. It is quite obvious that UNLV used its best efforts to retain its winning coach — a goal diametrically opposed to the NCAA’s interest in ascertaining the truth of its investigators’ reports. During the several years that the NCAA investigated the alleged violations, the NCAA and UNLV acted much more like adversaries than like partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth. The NCAA cannot be regarded as an agent of UNLV for purposes of that proceeding. It is more correctly characterized as an agent of its remaining members which, as competitors of UNLV, had an interest in the effective and evenhanded enforcement of the NCAA’s recruitment standards. Just as a state-compensated public defender acts in a private capacity when he or she represents a private client in a conflict against the State, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 320 (1981), the NCAA is properly viewed as a private actor at odds with the State when it represents the interests of its entire membership in an investigation of one public university. The NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers to facilitate its investigation. It had no power to subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert sovereign authority over any individual. Its greatest authority was to threaten sanctions against UNLV, with the ultimate sanction being expulsion of the university from membership. Contrary to the premise of the Nevada Supreme Court’s opinion, the NCAA did not — indeed, could not — directly discipline Tarkanian or any other state university employee. The express terms of the Confidential Report did not demand the suspension unconditionally; rather, it requested “the University ... to show cause” why the NCAA should not impose additional penalties if UNLV declines to suspend Tarkanian. App. 180. Even the university’s vice president acknowledged that the Report gave the university options other than suspension: UNLV could have retained Tarkanian and risked additional sanctions, perhaps even expulsion from the NCAA, or it could have withdrawn voluntarily from the Association. Finally, Tarkanian argues that the power of the NCAA is so great that the UNLV had no practical alternative to compliance with its demands. We are not at all sure this is true, but even if we assume, that a private monopolist can impose its will on a state agency by a threatened refusal to deal with it, it does not follow that such a private party is therefore acting under color of state law. Cf. Jackson, 419 U. S., at 351-352 (State’s conferral of monopoly status does not convert private party into state actor). In final analysis the question is whether “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [can] be fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U. S., at 937. It would be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA’s imposition of sanctions against UNLV — sanctions that UNLV and its counsel, including the Attorney General of Nevada, steadfastly opposed during protracted adversary proceedings — is fairly attributable to the State of Nevada. It would be more appropriate to conclude that UNLV has conducted its athletic program under color of the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that those policies were developed and enforced under color of Nevada law. The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The trial court found that Tarkanian, as head basketball coach, “is annually paid (in lieu of his salary as a professor) $125,000, plus 10% of the net proceeds received by UNLV for participation in NCAA-authorized championship games, plus fees from basketball camps and clinics, product endorsements, and income realized from writing a newspaper column, speaking on a radio program entitled ‘THE JERRY TARKANIAN SHOW,’ and appearing on a television program bearing the same name.” App. 18. That compensation was “entirely contingent on [Tarkanian’s] continued status as the Head Basketball Coach at UNLV.” As a tenured professor alone, he would have earned about $53,000 a year, the court found. Ibid. That section provides, in part: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The fees were awarded pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which authorizes a court in its discretion to award the prevailing party in an action brought under § 1983 a reasonable attorney’s fee as a part of the costs. In this case the under-color-of-law requirement of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are equivalent. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 838 (1982); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 928-935 (1982). Although the NCAA’s status as a state or private actor is a novel issue in this Court, lower federal courts have entertained the question for a number of years. Initially, Federal Courts of Appeals held that the NCAA was a state actor for §1983 purposes. E. g., Regents of University of Minnesota v. NCAA, 560 F. 2d 352 (CA8), cert. dism’d, 434 U. S. 978 (1977); Howard University v. NCAA, 166 U. S. App. D. C. 260, 510 F. 2d 213 (1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F. 2d 1028 (CA5 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F. 2d 1251 (CA9 1974) (per curiam). Since our decisions in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., supra, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, supra, and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991 (1982), all issued on the same day, lower courts have held to the contrary. E. g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F. 2d 1338 (CA5 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F. 2d 258 (CA6 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F. 2d 953 (CA6 1986); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F. 2d 1019 (CA4 1984). See Spath v. NCAA, 728 F. 2d 25, 28 (CA1 1984) (dictum). App. 98. Among the sanctions that the Committee may impose “against an institution” are; “(1) Reprimand and censure; “(2) Probation for one year; “(3) Probation for more than one year; “(4) Ineligibility for one or more National Collegiate Championship events; “(5) Ineligibility for invitational and postseason meets and tournaments; “(6) Ineligibility for any television programs subject to the Association’s control or administration; “(7) Ineligibility of the member to vote or its personnel to serve on committees of the Association, or both; “(8) Prohibition against an intercollegiate sports team or teams participating against outside competition for a specified period; “(9) Prohibition against the recruitment of prospective student-athletes for a sport or sports for a specified period . . . .” Id,., at 103-104. Upon finding that misconduct by an employee of a member institution caused NCAA rules to be violated, the Committee may require the member to “show cause why: “(i) a penalty or an additional penalty should not be imposed if, in the opinion of the Committee (or Council), it does not take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against athletic department personnel involved in the infractions case, any other institutional employee if the circumstances warrant, or representatives of the institution’s athletic interests; or “(ii) a recommendation should not be made to the membership that the institution’s membership in the Association be suspended or terminated if, in the opinion of the Committee (or Council), it does not take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against the head coach of the sport involved, any other institutional employee if the circumstances warrant, or representatives of the institution’s athletic interests.” Id., at 104. See id., at 141-150, 190, 196. “Most serious is the charge that Coach Tarkanian attempted to frustrate the NCAA’s application of the rules by getting people to ‘change their story’ or to fabricate bodies of countervailing evidence. I am not convinced that the NCAA investigation adequately supports this charge and yet we must remember that the NCAA infractions committee and the NCAA Council, both composed of distinguished scholars, administrators, and lawyers, believed otherwise.” Id., at 72. The court held the NCAA was not liable for fees Tarkanian incurred during the first trial and first appeal to the State Supreme Court. Not only,did those events occur before the NCAA was a party to the litigation, the court explained, but since the trial court’s judgment was reversed, Tarkanian had not prevailed, and thus was not eligible for fees pursuant to § 1988. In a later opinion, the Supreme Court ordered that Tarkanian be allowed additional fees for services performed on his second appeal before that court. “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14. § 1. E. g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 (1974) (“[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State itself”). The situation would, of course, be different if the membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State, many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Association, 695 F. 2d 1126 (CA9 1982), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 818 (1983); Louisiana High School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F. 2d 224 (CA5 1968). The dissent apparently agrees that the NCAA was not acting under color of state law in its relationships with private universities, which constitute the bulk of its membership. See post, at 202, n. 2. Petitioners in Bates, contended that enforcement of disciplinary rules circumscribing attorney advertising violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, and the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 433 U. S., at 353. The Court unanimously concluded that state action existed in deciding that by the doctrine enunciated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943), respondent was immune from Sherman Act liability. The Court reached the merits of petitioners’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims without discussing whether state action existed for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 433 U. S., at 363-384. Although by no means identical, analysis of the existence of state action justifying immunity from antitrust liability is somewhat similar to the state-action inquiry conducted pursuant to § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. In both contexts, for example, courts examine whether the rule in question is a rule of the State. Compare Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U. S. 558, 569 (1984) (“[T]he Court has required a showing that the conduct is pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy’ to replace competition with regulation”) (citation omitted), with Lugar, 457 U. S., at 937 (“[T]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible”). The degree to which the activities of the state entity and the arguably private entity are intertwined also is pertinent. Compare Hoover, 466 U. S., at 569-570, with Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 721-726 (1961). Furthermore, the NCAA’s bylaws permit review of penalties, even after they are imposed, “upon a showing of newly discovered evidence which is- directly related to the findings in the case, or that there was a prejudicial error in the procedure which was followed in the processing of the case by the Committee.” App. 107. UNLV could have sought such a review, perhaps on the theory that the NCAA’s investigator was biased against Tarkanian, as the Nevada trial court found in 1984. Id., at 20. The NCAA Committee on Infractions was authorized to “reduce or eliminate any penalty” if the university had prevailed. Id., at 108. Tarkanian argues that UNLV and the NCAA were “joint participants” in state action. Brief for Respondent 42. He would draw support from Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961), in which a lease relationship between a private restaurant and a publicly owned parking structure entailed “an incidental variety of mutual benefits,” id., at 724: tax exemptions for the restaurant, rent payments for the parking authority, and increased business for both. Because of this interdependence, we held, the restaurant and parking authority jointly violated the Fourteenth Amendment when the restaurant discriminated on account of race. Id., at 725. In the case before us the state and private parties’ relevant interests do not coincide, as they did in Burton; rather, they have clashed throughout the investigation, the attempt to discipline Tarkanian, and this litigation. UNLV and the NCAA were antagonists, not joint participants, and the NCAA may not be deemed a state actor on this ground. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24 (1980), on which the dissent relies, the parties had entered into a corrupt agreement to perform a judicial act. As we explained: “[Hjere the allegations were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the judge’s action or that of his co-conspirators. Indeed, his immunity is dependent on the challenged conduct being an official judicial act within his statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed. Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of law . . . .” Id., at 28-29 (footnote and citations omitted). In this case there is no suggestion of any impropriety respecting the agreement between the NCAA and UNLV. Indeed the dissent seems to assume that the NCAA’s liability as a state actor depended not on its initial agreement with UNLV, but on whether UNLV ultimately accepted the NCAA’s recommended discipline of Tarkanian. See post, at 203. In contrast, the conspirators in Dennis became state actors when they formed the corrupt bargain with the judge, and remained so through completion of the conspiracy’s objectives. Cf. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 149-150, and n. 5 (1970) (private restaurant that denied plaintiff service in violation of federal law would be liable as state actor upon proof that it conspired with police officer to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights). Tarkanian urges us to hold, as did the Nevada Supreme Court, that the NCAA by its rules and enforcement procedures has usurped a traditional, essential state function. Quite properly, he does not point to the NCAA’s overriding function of fostering amateur athletics at the college level. For while we have described that function as “critical,” NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 120 (1984), by no means is it a traditional, let alone an exclusive, state function. Cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U. S. 522, 545 (1987) (“Neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has been a traditional government function”). Tarkanian argues instead that the NCAA has assumed the State’s traditional and exclusive power to discipline its employees. “[A]s to state employees connected with intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA requires that its standards, procedures and determinations become the State’s standards, procedures and determinations for disciplining state employees,” he contends. “The State is obligated to impose NCAA standards, procedures and determinations making the NCAA a joint participant in the State’s suspension of Tarkanian.” Brief for Respondent 34-35 (emphases in original). This argument overlooks the fact that the NCAA’s own legislation prohibits it from taking any direct action against Tarkanian. Moreover, suspension of Tarkanian is one of many recommendations in the Confidential Report. Those recommendations as a whole were intended to bring UNLV’s basketball program into compliance with NCAA rules. Suspension of Tarkanian was but one means toward achieving that goal. The university’s desire to remain a powerhouse among the Nation’s college basketball teams is understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously would thwart that goal. But that UNLV’s options were unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND et al. No. 99-2047. Argued February 26, 2001 Decided June 28, 2001 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connoe, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Part II-A. O’Connor, J., post, p. 632, and Scalia, J., post, p. 636, filed concurring opinions. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 637. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 645. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 654. James S. Burling argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Eric Grant. Sheldon Whitekouse, Attorney General of Rhode Island, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael Rubin, Assistant Attorney General, Brian A. Goldman and Richard J. Lazarus. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneed-ler, William B. Lazarus, and R. Justin Smith Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Timothy S. Bishop, Jeffrey W. Sarles, Steffen N. Johnson, John J. Rademacher, and John J. Kupa; for the California Coastal Property Owners Association by Carter G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad, and Catherine Valerio Barrad; for Defenders of Property Rights by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellar, Clint Bolick, Scott G. Bullock, and Richard A. Epstein; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson; and for W. Frederick Williams III et al. by Michael E. Malamut. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, J. Matthew Rodriquez, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Attorney General, Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike McGrath of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Phillip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmond-son of Oklahoma, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Iver A. Stridiron of the Virgin Islands, and Christine O. Gre-goire of Washington; for the County of Santa Barbara by Stephen Shane Stark and Alan L. Seltzer; for the American Planning Association et al. by Timothy J. Dowling and James E. Ryan; for the Board of County Commissioners of the County of La Plata, Colorado, by Michael A. Goldman and Jeffery P. Robbins; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by Vicki L. Been and Glenn P. Sugameli; for Save the Bay-People for Narragansett Bay by Deming E. Sherman and Kendra Beaver; and for Daniel W. Bromley et al. by John D. Echeverría. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Association of Home Builders by Christopher G. Senior; and for Dr. John M. Teal et al. by Patrick A. Parenteau and Tim Eichenberg. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Anthony Palazzolo owns a waterfront parcel of land in the town of Westerly, Rhode Island. Almost all of the property is designated as coastal wetlands under Rhode Island law. After petitioner’s development proposals were rejected by respondent Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (Council), he sued in state court, asserting the Council’s application of its wetlands regulations took the property without compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, binding upon the State through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner sought review in this Court, contending the Supreme Court of Rhode Island erred in rejecting his takings claim. We granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 923 (2000). I The town of Westerly is on an edge of the Rhode Island coastline. The town’s western border is the Pawcatuck River, which at that point is the boundary between Rhode Island and Connecticut. Situated on land purchased from the Narragansett Indian Tribe, the town was incorporated in 1669 and had a precarious, though colorful, early history. Both Connecticut and Massachusetts contested the boundaries — and indeed the validity — of Rhode Island’s royal charter; and Westerly’s proximity to Connecticut invited encroachments during these jurisdictional squabbles. See M. Best, The Town that Saved a State — Westerly 60-83 (1943); see also W. McLoughlin, Rhode Island: A Bicentennial History 39-57 (1978). When the borders of the Rhode Island Colony were settled by compact in 1728, the town’s development was more orderly, and with some historical distinction. For instance, Watch Hill Point, the peninsula at the southwestern tip of the town, was of strategic importance in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. See Best, supra, at 190; F. Denison, Westerly and its Witnesses 118-119 (1878). In later times Westerly’s coastal location had a new significance: It became a popular vacation and seaside destination. One of the town’s historians gave this happy account: “After the Civil War the rapid growth of manufacture and expansion of trade had created a spending class on pleasure bent, and Westerly had superior attractions to offer, surf bathing on ocean beaches, quieter bathing in salt and fresh water ponds, fishing, annual sail and later motor boat races. The broad beaches of clean white sand dip gently toward the sea; there are no odorous marshes at low tide, no railroad belches smoke, and the climate is unrivalled on the coast, that of Newport only excepted. In the phenomenal'heat wave of 1881 ocean resorts from northern New England to southern New Jersey sweltered as the thermometer climbed to 95 and 104 degrees, while Watch Hill enjoyed a comfortable 80. When Providence to the north runs a temperature of 90, the mercury in this favored spot remains at 77.” Best, supra, at 192. Westerly today has about 20,000 year-round residents, and thousands of summer visitors come to enjoy its beaches and coastal advantages. One of the more popular attractions is Misquamicut State Beach, a lengthy expanse of coastline facing Block Island Sound and beyond to the Atlantic Ocean. The primary point of access to the beach is Atlantic Avenue, a well-traveled 3-mile stretch of road running along the coastline within the town’s limits. At its western end, Atlantic Avenue is something of a commercial strip, with restaurants, hotels, arcades, and other typical seashore businesses. The pattern of development becomes more residential as the road winds eastward onto a narrow spine of land bordered to the south by the beach and the ocean, and to the north by Winnapaug Pond, an intertidal inlet often used by residents for boating, fishing, and shellfishing. In 1959 petitioner, a lifelong Westerly resident, decided to invest in three undeveloped, adjoining parcels along this eastern stretch of Atlantic Avenue. To the north, the property faces, and borders upon, Winnapaug Pond; the south of the property faces Atlantic Avenue and the beachfront homes abutting it on the other side, and beyond that the dunes and the beach. To purchase and hold the property, petitioner and associates formed Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI). After SGI purchased the property petitioner bought out his associates and became the sole shareholder. In the first decade of SGI’s ownership of the property the corporation submitted a plat to the town subdividing the property into 80 lots; and it engaged in various transactions that left it with 74 lots, which together encompassed about 20 acres. During the same period SGI also made initial attempts to develop the property and submitted intermittent applications to state agencies to fill substantial portions of the parcel. Most of the property was then, as it is now, salt marsh subject to tidal flooding. The wet ground and permeable soil would require considerable fill — as much as six feet in some places — before significant structures could be built. SGPs proposal, submitted in 1962 to the Rhode Island Division of Harbors and Rivers (DHR), sought to dredge from Winna-paug Pond and fill the entire property. The application was denied for lack of essential information. A second, similar proposal followed a year later. A third application, submitted in 1966 while the second application was pending, proposed more limited filling of the land for use as a private beach club. These latter two applications were referred to the Rhode Island Department of Natural Resources, which indicated initial assent. The agency later withdrew approval, however, citing adverse environmental impacts. SGI did not contest the ruling. No further attempts to develop the property were made for over a decade. Two intervening events, however, become important to the issues presented. First, in 1971, Rhode Island enacted legislation creating the Council, an agency charged with the duty of protecting the State’s coastal properties. 1971 R. I. Pub. Laws, ch. 279, § 1 et seq. Regulations promulgated by the Council designated salt marshes like those on SGPs property as protected “coastal wetlands,” Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP) §210.3 (as amended, June 28,1983) (lodged with the Clerk of this Court), on which development is limited to a great extent. Second, in 1978, SGPs corporate charter was revoked for failure to pay corporate income taxes; and title to the property passed, by operation of state law, to petitioner as the corporation’s sole shareholder. In 1983, petitioner, now the owner, renewed the efforts to develop the property. An application to the Council, resembling the 1962 submission, requested permission to construct a wooden bulkhead along the shore of Winnapaug Pond and to fill the entire marshland area. The Council rejected the application, noting it was “vague and inadequate for a project of this size and nature.” App. 16. The agency also found that “the proposed activities will have significant impacts upon the waters and wetlands of Winnapaug Pond,” and concluded that “the proposed alteration ... will conflict with the Coastal Resources Management Plan presently in effect.” Id., at 17. Petitioner did not appeal the agency’s determination. Petitioner went back to the drawing board, this time hiring counsel and preparing a more specific and limited proposal for use of the property. The new application, submitted to the Council in 1985, echoed the 1966 request to build a private beach club. The details do not tend to inspire the reader with an idyllic coastal image, for the proposal was to fill 11 acres of the property with gravel to accommodate “50 cars with boat trailers^ a dumpster, port-a-johns, picnic tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other trash receptacles.” Id., at 25. The application fared no better with the Council than previous ones. Under the agency’s regulations, a landowner wishing to fill salt marsh on Winnapaug Pond needed a “special exception” from the Council. CRMP § 180. In a short opinion the Council said the beach club proposal conflicted with the regulatory standard for a special exception. See App. 27. To secure a special exception the proposed activity must serve “a compelling public purpose which provides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed to individual or private interests.” CRMP § 130A(l). This time petitioner appealed the decision to the Rhode Island courts, challenging the Council’s conclusion as contrary to principles of state administrative law. The Council’s decision was affirmed. See App. 31-42. Petitioner filed an inverse condemnation action in Rhode Island Superior Court, asserting that the State’s wetlands regulations, as applied by the Council to his parcel, had taken the property without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id., at 45. The suit alleged the Council’s action deprived him of “economically, beneficial use” of his property, ibid., resulting in a total taking requiring compensation under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992). He sought damages in the amount of $3,150,000, a figure derived from an appraiser’s estimate as to the value of a 74-lot residential subdivision. The State countered with a host of defenses. After a bench trial, a justice of the Superior Court ruled against petitioner, accepting some of the State’s theories. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-l to B-13. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. 746 A. 2d 707 (2000). Like the Superior Court, the State Supreme Court recited multiple grounds for rejecting petitioner’s suit. The court held, first, that petitioner’s takings claim was not ripe, id., at 712-715; second, that petitioner had no right to challenge regulations predating 1978, when he succeeded to legal ownership of the property from SGI, id., at 716; and third, that the claim of deprivation of all economically beneficial use was contradicted by undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property, id., at 715. In addition to holding petitioner could not assert a takings claim based on the denial of all economic use, the court concluded he could not recover under the more general test of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). On this claim, too, the date of acquisition of the parcel was found determinative, and the court held he could have had “no reasonable investment-backed expectations that were affected by this regulation” because it predated his ownership, 746 A. 2d, at 717; see also Penn Central, supra, at 124. We disagree with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island as to the first two of these conclusions; and,, we hold, the court was correct to conclude that the owner is not deprived of all economic use of his property because the value of upland portions is substantial. We remand for further consideration of the claim under the principles set forth in Penn Central. II The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897), prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without just compensation. The clearest sort of taking occurs when the government encroaches upon or occupies private land for its own proposed use. Our cases establish that even a minimal “permanent physical occupation of real property” requires compensation under the Clause. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 427 (1982). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), the Court recognized that there will be instances when government actions do not encroach upon or occupy the property yet still affect and limit its use to such an extent that a taking occurs. In Justice Holmes’ well-known, if less than self-defining, formulation, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id., at 415. Since Mahon, we have given some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory taking. First, we have observed, with certain qualifications, see infra, at 629-630, that a regulation which “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land” will require compensation under the Takings Clause. Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1015; see also id., at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 261 (1980). Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. Penn Central, supra, at 124. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). Petitioner seeks compensation under these principles. At the outset, however, we face the two threshold considerations invoked by the state court to bar the claim: ripeness, and acquisition which postdates the regulation. A In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), the Court explained the requirement that a takings claim must be ripe. The Court held that a takings claim challenging the application of land-use regulations is not ripe unless “the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Id., at 186. A final decision by the responsible state agency informs the constitutional determination whether a regulation has deprived a landowner of “all economically beneficial use” of the property, see Lucas, supra, at 1015, or defeated the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the landowner to the extent that a taking has occurred, see Penn Central, supra, at 124. These matters cannot be resolved , in definitive terms until a court knows “the extent of permitted development” on the land in question. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 340, 351 (1986). Drawing on these principles, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that petitioner had not taken the necessary steps to ripen his takings claim. The central question in resolving the ripeness issue, under Williamson County and other relevant decisions, is whether petitioner obtained a final decision from the Council determining the permitted use for the land. As we have noted, SGI’s early applications to fill had been granted at one point, though that assent was later revoked. Petitioner then submitted two proposals: the 1988 proposal to fill the entire parcel, and the 1985 proposal to fill 11 of the property’s 18 wetland acres for construction of the beach club. The court reasoned that, notwithstanding the Council’s denials of the applications, doubt remained as to the extent of development the Council would allow on petitioner’s parcel. We cannot agree. The court based its holding in part upon petitioner’s failure to explore “any other use for the property that would involve filling substantially less wetlands.” 746 A. 2d, at 714. It relied upon this Court’s observations that the final decision requirement is not satisfied when a developer submits, and a land-use authority denies, a grandiose development proposal, leaving open the possibility that lesser uses of the property might be permitted. See MacDonald, supra, at 353, n. 9. The suggestion is that while the Council rejected petitioner’s effort to fill all of the wetlands, and then rejected his proposal to fill 11 of the wetland acres, perhaps an application to fill (for instance) 5 acres would have been approved. Thus, the reasoning goes, we cannot know for sure the extent of permitted development on petitioner’s wetlands. This is belied by the unequivocal nature of the wetland regulations at issue and by the Council’s application of the regulations to the subject property. Winnapaug Pond is classified under the CRMP as a Type 2 body of water. See CRMP § 200.2. A landowner, as a general rule, is prohibited from filling or building residential structures on wetlands adjacent to Type 2 waters, see id., Table 1, p. 22, and § 210.3(C)(4), but may seek a special exception from the Council to engage in a prohibited use, see id., § 130. The Council is permitted to allow the exception, however, only where a “compelling public purpose” is served. Id., § 130A(2). The proposal to fill the entire property was not accepted under Council regulations and did not qualify for the special exception. The Council determined the use proposed in the second application (the beach club) did not satisfy the “compelling public purpose” standard. There is no indication the Council would have accepted the application had petitioner’s proposed beach club occupied a smaller surface area. To the contrary, it ruled that the proposed activity was not a “compelling public purpose.” App. 27; cf. id., at 17 (1983 application to fill wetlands proposed an “activity” conflicting with the CEMP). Williamson County’s final decision requirement “responds to the high degree of discretion characteristically possessed by land-use boards in softening the strictures of the general regulations they administer.” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725, 738 (1997). While a landowner must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened. The case is quite unlike those upon which respondents place principal reliance, which arose when an owner challenged a land-use authority’s denial of a substantial project, leaving doubt whether a more modest submission or an application for a variance would be accepted. See MacDonald, supra, at 342 (denial of 159-home residential subdivision); Williamson County, supra, at 182 (476-unit subdivision); cf. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980) (case not ripe because no plan to develop was submitted). These cases stand for the important principle that a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation. Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in considering development plans for the property, including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law. As a general rule, until these ordinary processes have been followed the extent of the restriction on property is not known and a regulatory taking has not yet been established. See Suitum, supra, at 736, and n. 10 (noting difficulty of demonstrating that “mere enactment” of regulations restricting land use effects a taking). Government authorities, of course, may not burden property by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid a final decision. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 698 (1999). With respect to the wetlands on petitioner’s property, the Council’s decisions make plain that the agency interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from engaging in any filling or development activity on the wetlands, a fact reinforced by the Attorney General’s forthright responses to our questioning during oral argument in this case. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 31. The rulings of the Council interpreting the regulations at issue, and the briefs, arguments, and candid statements by counsel for both sides, leave no doubt on this point: On the wetlands there can be no fill for any ordinary land use. There can be no fill for its own sake; no fill for a beach club, either rustic or upscale; no fill for a subdivision; no fill for any likely or foreseeable use. And with no fill there can be no structures and no development on the wetlands. Further permit applications were not necessary to establish this point. As noted above, however, not all of petitioner’s parcel constitutes protected wetlands. The trial court accepted uncontested testimony that an upland site located at the eastern end of the property would have an estimated value of $200,000 if developed. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-5. While Council approval is required to develop upland property which lies within 200 feet of protected waters, see CRMP § 100.1(A), the strict “compelling public purpose” test does not govern proposed land uses on property in this classification, see id., § 110, Table 1A, § 120. Council officials testified at trial, moreover, that they would have allowed petitioner to build a residence on the upland parcel. App. to Pet. for Cert. B-5. The State Supreme Court found petitioner’s claim unripe for the further reason that he “has not sought permission for any . . . use of the property that would involve . . . development only of the upland portion of the parcel.” 746 A. 2d, at 714. In assessing the significance of petitioner’s failure to submit applications to develop the upland area it is important to bear in mind the purpose that the final decision requirement serves. Our ripeness jurisprudence imposes obligations on landowners because “[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation goes ‘too far’ unless it knows how far the regulation goes.” MacDonald, All U. S., at 348. Ripeness doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for their own sake. Petitioner is required to explore development opportunities on his upland parcel only if there is uncertainty as to the land’s permitted use. The State asserts the value of the uplands is in doubt. It relies in part on a comment in the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court that “it would be possible to build at least one single-family home on the upland portion of the parcel.” 746 A. 2d, at 714. It argues that the qualification “at least” indicates that additional development beyond the single dwelling was possible. The attempt to interject ambiguity as to the value or use of the uplands, however, comes too late in the day for purposes of litigation before this Court. It was stated in the petition for certiorari that the uplands on petitioner’s property had an estimated worth of $200,000. See Pet. for Cert. 21. The figure not only was uncontested but also was cited as fact in the State’s brief in opposition. See Brief in Opposition 4, 19. In this circumstance ripeness cannot be contested by saying that the value of the nonwetland parcels is unknown. See Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1020, and n. 9. The State’s prior willingness to accept the $200,000 figure, furthermore, is well founded. The only reference to upland property in the trial court’s opinion is to a single parcel worth an estimated $200,000. See App. to Pet. for Cert. B-5. There was, it must be acknowledged, testimony at trial suggesting the existence of an additional upland parcel elsewhere on the property. See Tr. 190-191, 199-120 (testimony of Dr. Grover Fugate, Council Executive Director); see also id., at 610 (testimony of Steven Clarke). The testimony indicated, however, that the potential, second upland parcel was on an “island” which required construction of a road across wetlands, id., at 610, 623-624 (testimony of Mr. Clarke) — and, as discussed above, the filling of wetlands for such a purpose would not justify a special exception under Council regulations. See supra, at 619-621; see also Brief for Respondents 10 (“Residential construction is not the basis of such a ‘special exception’”). Perhaps for this reason, the State did not maintain in the trial court that additional uplands could have been developed. To the contrary, its post-trial memorandum identified only the single parcel that petitioner concedes retains a development value of $200,000. See State’s Post-Trial Memorandum in No. 88-0297 (Super. Ct. R. I.), pp. 25, 81. The trial court accepted the figure. So there is no genuine ambiguity in the record as to the extent of permitted development on petitioner’s property, either on the wetlands or the uplands. Nonetheless, there is some suggestion that the use permitted on the uplands is not known, because the State accepted the $200,000 value for the upland parcel on the premise that only a Lucas claim was raised in the pleadings in the state trial court. See Brief for Respondents 29-30. Since a. Penn Central argument was not pressed at trial, it is argued, the State had no reason to assert with vigor that more than a single-family residence might be placed on the uplands. We disagree; the State was aware of the applicability of Penn Central. The issue whether the Council’s decisions amounted to a taking under Penn Central was discussed in the trial court, App. to Pet. for Cert. B-7, the State Supreme Court, 746 A. 2d, at 717, and the State’s own post-trial submissions, see State’s Post-Trial Supplemental Memorandum 7-10. The state-court opinions cannot be read as indicating that a Penn Central claim was not properly presented from the outset of this litigation. A final ripeness issue remains. In concluding that Williamson County’s final decision requirement was not satisfied, the State Supreme Court placed emphasis on petitioner’s failure to “appl[y] for permission to develop [the] seventy-four-lot subdivision” that was the basis for the damages sought in his inverse condemnation suit. 746 A. 2d, at 714. The court did not explain why it thought this fact significant, but respondents and amici defend the ruling. The Council’s practice, they assert, is to consider a proposal only if the applicant has satisfied all other regulatory preconditions for the use envisioned in the application. The subdivision proposal that was the basis for petitioner’s takings claim, they add, could not have proceeded before the Council without, at minimum, zoning approval from the town of Westerly and a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management allowing the installation of individual sewage disposal systems on the property. Petitioner is accused of employing a hide the ball strategy of submitting applications for moré modest uses to the Council, only to assert later a takings action predicated on the purported inability to build a much larger project. Brief for the National Wildlife Federation et al. as Amici Curiae 9. It is difficult to see how this concern is relevant to the inquiry at issue here. Petitioner was informed by the Council that he could not fill the wetlands; it follows of necessity that he could not fill and then build 74 single-family dwellings upon it. Petitioner’s submission of this proposal would not have clarified the extent of development permitted by the wetlands regulations, which is the inquiry required under our ripeness decisions. The State’s concern may be that landowners could demand damages for a taking based on a project that could not have been constructed under other, valid zoning restrictions quite apart from the regulation being challenged. This, of course, is a valid concern in inverse condemnation cases alleging injury from wrongful refusal to permit development. The instant case does not require us to pass upon the authority of a State to insist in such cases that landowners follow normal planning procedures or to enact rules to control damages awards based on hypothetical uses that should have been reviewed in the normal course, and we do not intend to cast doubt upon such rules here. The mere allegation of entitlement to the value of an intensive use will not avail the landowner if the project would not have been allowed under other existing, legitimate land-use limitations. When a taking has occurred, under accepted condemnation principles the owner’s damages will be based upon the property’s fair market value, see, e. g., Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246,255 (1934); 4 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.01 (rev. 3d ed. 2000) — an inquiry which will turn, in part, on restrictions on use imposed by legitimate zoning or other regulatory limitations, see id., § 12C.03[1]. The state court, however, did not rely upon state-law ripeness or exhaustion principles in holding that petitioner’s takings claim was barred by virtue of his failure to apply for a 74-lot subdivision; it relied on Williamson County. As we have explained, Williamson County and our other ripeness decisions do not impose further obligations on petitioner, for the limitations the wetland regulations imposed were clear from the Council’s denial of his applications, and there is no indication that any use involving any substantial structures or improvements would have been allowed. Where the state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land-use regulation entertains an application from an owner and its denial of the application makes clear the extent of development permitted, and neither the agency nor a reviewing state court has cited noncompliance with reasonable state-law exhaustion or pre-permit processes, see Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 150-151 (1988), federal ripeness rules do not require the submission of further and futile applications with other agencies. B We turn to the second asserted basis for declining to address petitioner’s takings claim on the merits; When the Council promulgated its wetlands regulations, the disputed parcel was owned not by petitioner but by the corporation of which he was sole shareholder. When title was transferred to petitioner by operation of law, the wetlands regulations were in force. The state court held the postregulation acquisition of title was fatal to the claim for deprivation of all economic use, 746 A. 2d, at 716, and to the Penn Central claim, 746 A. 2d, at 717. While the first holding was couched in terms of background principles of state property law, see Lucas, 505 U. S., at 1015, and the second in terms of petitioner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, see Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124, the two holdings together amount to a single, sweeping, rule: A purchaser qr a successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking. The theory underlying the argument that postenactment purchasers cannot challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these lines: Property rights are created by the State. See, e. g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 163 (1998). So, the argument goes, by prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with notice of the limitation. The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle. The right to improve property, of course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-use restrictions. See Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U. S., at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”). The Takings Clause, however, in certain circumstances allows a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the State’s regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation. Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or title. Were we to accept the State’s rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land. Nor does the justification of notice take into account the effect on owners at the time of enactment, who are prejudiced as well. Should an owner attempt to challenge a new regulation, but not survive the process of ripening his or her claim (which, as this case demonstrates, will often take years), under the proposed rule the right to compensation may not be asserted by an heir or successor, and so may not be asserted at all. The State’s rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation. The State may not by this means secure a windfall for itself. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 164 (1980) (“[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation”); cf. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L. J. 1315, 1368-1369 (1993) (right to transfer interest in land is a defining characteristic of the fee simple estate). The proposed rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect. The young owner contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the resources to hold contrasted with the owner with the need to sell, would be in different positions. The Takings Clause is not so quixotic. A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is taken. Direct condemnation, by invocation of the State’s power of eminent domain, presents different considerations from cases alleging a taking based on a burdensome regulation. In a direct condemnation action, or when a State has physically invaded the property without filing suit, the fact and extent of the taking are known. In such an instance, it is a general rule of the law of eminent domain that any award goes to the owner at the time of the taking, and that the right to compensation is not passed to a subsequent purchaser. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 284 (1939); 2 Sack-man, Eminent Domain, at § 5.01[5][d][i] (“It is well settled that when there is a taking of property by eminent domain in compliance with the law, it is the owner of the property at the time of the taking who is entitled to compensation”). A challenge to the application of a land-use regulation, by contrast, does not mature until ripeness requirements have been satisfied, under principles we have discussed; until this point an inverse condemnation claim alleging a regulatory taking cannot be maintained. It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to make the claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner. There is controlling precedent for our conclusion. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 488 U. S. 825 (1987), presented the question whether it was consistent with the Takings Clause for a state regulatory agency to require oceanfront landowners to provide lateral beach access to the public as the condition for a development permit. The principal dissenting opinion observed it was a policy of the California Coastal Commission to require the condition, and that the Nollans, who purchased their home after the policy went into effect, were “on notice that new developments would be approved only if provisions were made for lateral beach access.” Id., at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court rejected the proposition. “So long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them,” the Court reasoned, “the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot.” Id., at 834, n. 2. It is argued that Nolían’s holding was limited by the later decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas the Court observed that a landowner’s ability to recover for a government deprivation of all economically beneficial use of property is not absolute but instead is confined by limitations on the use of land which “inhere in the title itself.” Id., at 1029. This is so, the Court reasoned, because the landowner is constrained by those “restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.” Ibid. It is asserted here that Lucas stands for the proposition that any new regulation, once enacted, becomes a background principle of property law which cannot be challenged by those who acquire title after the enactment. We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law or whether those circumstances are present here. It suffices to say that a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title. This relative standard would be incompatible with our description of the concept in Lucas, which is explained in terms of those common, shared understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State’s legal tradition, see id., at 1029-1030. A regulation or common-law rule cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for others. The determination whether an existing, general law can limit all economic use of property must turn on objective factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed. See id., at 1030 (“The Total taking’ inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail . . . analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s proposed activities”). A law does not become a background principle for subsequent owners by enactment itself. Lucas did not overrule our holding in Nollan, which, as we have noted, is based on essential Takings Clause principles. For reasons we discuss next, the state court will not find it necessary to explore these matters on remand in connection with the claim that all economic use was deprived; it must address, however, the merits of petitioner’s claim under Penn Central. That claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restriction. Ill As the case is ripe, and as the date of transfer of title does not bar petitioner’s takings claim, we have before us the alternative ground relied upon by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in ruling upon the merits of the takings claims. It held that all economically beneficial use was not deprived because the uplands portion of the property can still be improved. On this point, we agree with the court’s decision. Petitioner accepts the Council’s contention and the state trial court’s finding that his parcel retains $200,000 in development value under the State’s wetlands regulations. He asserts, nonetheless, that he has suffered a total taking and contends the Council cannot sidestep the holding in Lucas “by the simple expedient of leaving a landowner a few crumbs of value.” Brief for Petitioner 37. Assuming a taking is otherwise established, a. State may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest. This is not the situation of the landowner in this case, however. A regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property “economically idle.” Lucas, supra, at 1019. In his brief submitted to us petitioner attempts to revive this part of his claim by reframing it. He argues, for the first time, that the upland parcel is distinct from the wetlands portions, so he should be permitted to assert a deprivation limited to the latter. This contention asks us to examine the difficult, persisting question of what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation Law,” 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1192 (1967). Some of our cases indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured against the value of the parcel as a whole, see, e. g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 497 (1987); but we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule, see Lucas, supra, at 1016-1017, n. 7, a sentiment echoed by some commentators, see, e. g., Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 16-17 (1987); Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1535 (1994). Whatever the merits of these criticisms, we will not explore the point here. Petitioner did not press the argument in the state courts, and the issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari. The ease comes to us on the premise that petitioner’s entire parcel serves as the basis for his takings claim, and, so framed, the total deprivation argument fails. * * * For the reasons we have discussed, the State Supreme Court erred in finding petitioner’s claims were unripe and in ruling that acquisition of title after the effective date of the regulations barred the takings claims. The court did not err in finding that petitioner failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value, for it is undisputed that the parcel retains significant worth for construction of a residence. The claims under the Penn Central analysis were not examined, and for this purpose the case should be remanded. The judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. DIXIE HIGHWAY EXPRESS, INC., et al. No. 694. Decided December 18, 1967. Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane and Betty Jo Christian for the United States et al. in No. 694. T. S. Christopher for appellant in No. 707. Robert E. Short for Dixie Highway Express, Inc., et al., and Bates Block, Wentworth Griffin, Ed White,W. D. Benson, Jr., John S. Fessenden, Robert E. Joyner, R. J. Reynolds III and William 0. Turney for Baggett Transportation Co. et al., appellees in both cases. Together with No. 707, Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Dixie Highway Express, Inc., et al., also on appeal from the same court. Per Curiam. Pursuant to § 207 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 551, 49 U. S. C. § 307 (a), the Interstate Commerce Commission concluded that a certificate of public convenience and necessity should issue to Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., authorizing Braswell to extend its motor carrier services to stated points. This conclusion was based upon the Commission’s finding that existing service to those points was inadequate to serve public needs. Upon suit by several competing motor carriers serving the area, the District Court enjoined the Commission from proceeding with the grant to Braswell on the ground that the Commission had failed to make adequate findings and that it had failed to afford existing carriers an opportunity to rectify deficiencies in their service. Upon remand, the Commission did not take further evidence, but it made additional findings in considerable detail. It again concluded that shippers and receivers were hampered by the inadequacy of existing service, and it held that, despite numerous complaints, existing carriers had not demonstrated that they could be depended upon to furnish adequate service. The competing carriers then filed in the District Court a motion under the All-Writs .Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651, contending that the Commission had disregarded the prior opinion and order of the court and asking that the court enforce its prior judgment. The District Court agreed. It stated that it was the Commission’s “invariable rule” that no certificate would issue to add a carrier to those serving an area without first furnishing existing carriers an opportunity to improve the service. It referred to this as a “rule of property” operating in favor of existing carriers. Accordingly, it permanently enjoined the Commission from issuing a certificate of convenience and necessity to Braswell “unless and until the [appellees — the existing motor carriers] are first afforded a reasonable opportunity to furnish such service . . . .” The United States and the Commission, and Braswell, appealed the judgment to this Court under the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §§ 1253 and 2101 (b) The District Court erred in holding that it is the “invariable rule” of the Commission to grant existing carriers an opportunity to remedy deficiencies in service, and in holding that carriers have a property right to such opportunity before a new certificate may be issued upon a lawful finding of public convenience and necessity pursuant to the statute. The Commission's power is not so circumscribed. No such limitation has been established by the Commission's own decisions or by judicial determinations. It is, of course, true that the Commission should consider the public interest in maintaining the health and stability of existing carriers, see United States v. Drum, 368 U. S. 370, 374 (1962); but it is also true that, upon the basis of appropriate findings, “the Commission may authorize the certificate even though the existing carriers might arrange to furnish successfully the projected service.” ICC v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, 70 (1945); see Schaffer Transportation Co. v. United States, 355 U. S. 83, 90-91 (1957). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Me. Justice Makshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Appellees urge that the appeals are untimely because they were filed more than 60 days after the District Court’s initial judgment. This is palpably untenable because, without passing upon the appropriateness of the All-Writs procedure which appellees utilized, it is clear that the appeals were properly taken from the District Court’s second order entered after the Commission decision upon remand.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1431. Argued February 20, 2008 Decided May 27, 2008 Michael W. Hawkins argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael J. Newman and Michael Zylstra. Cynthia H. Hyndman argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Aleeza M. Strubel and Eric Schnapper. Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Becker, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, Curtis E. Gannon, and Dennis J. Dimsey Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Catherine E. Stetson, Robin S. Conrad, and Shane Brennan; and for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Rae T. Vann, Karen R. Harned, and Elizabeth Milito. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New York et al. by Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, and Benjamin N. Gutman, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas Miller of Iowa, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Martha Coakley of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada, Anne Milgram of New Jersey, Marc Dann of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for Historian Mary Frances Berry et al. by Melissa Hart and Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.; for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights et al. by Paul R. Q. Wolf-son, Anne Harkavy, and Michael Foreman; for Members of Congress by Aaron M. Panner and Priya R. Aiyar; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Douglas B. Huron, Stephen Z. Chertkof and Tammany M. Kramer. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. A longstanding civil rights law, first enacted just after the Civil War, provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a). The basic question before us is whether the provision encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another person’s contract-related “right.” We conclude that it does. I The case before us arises out of a claim by respondent, Hedrick G. Humphries, a former assistant manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant, that CBOCS West, Inc. (Cracker Barrel’s owner), dismissed him (1) because of racial bias (Humphries is a black man) and (2) because he had complained to managers that a fellow assistant manager had dismissed another black employee, Venus Green, for race-based reasons. Humphries timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5, and received a “right to sue” letter. He then filed a complaint in Federal District Court charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and the older “equal contract rights” provision here at issue, §1981. The District Court dismissed Humphries’ Title VII claims for failure to pay necessary filing fees on a timely basis. It then granted CBOCS’ motion for summary judgment on Humphries’ two § 1981 claims. Humphries appealed. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled against Humphries and upheld the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in respect to his direct discrimination claim. But it ruled in Humphries’ favor and remanded for a trial in respect to his § 1981 retaliation claim. In doing so, the Court of Appeals rejected CBOCS’ argument that § 1981 did not encompass a claim of retaliation. 474 F. 3d 387 (2007). CBOCS sought certiorari, asking us to consider this last-mentioned legal question. And we agreed to do so. See 551 U. S. 1189 (2007). II The question before us is whether § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. We conclude that it does. And because our conclusion rests in significant part upon principles of stare decisis, we begin by examining the pertinent interpretive history. A The Court first considered a comparable question in 1969, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229. The case arose under Rev. Stat. § 1978,42 U. S. C. § 1982, a statutory provision that Congress enacted just after the Civil War, along with § 1981, to protect the rights of black citizens. The provision was similar to § 1981 except that it focused, not upon rights to make and to enforce contracts, but rights related to the ownership of property. The statute provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” § 1982. Paul E. Sullivan, a white man, had rented his house to T. R. Freeman, Jr., a black man. He had also assigned Freeman a membership share in a corporation, which permitted the owner to use a private park that the corporation controlled. Because of Freeman’s race, the corporation, Little Hunting Park, Inc., refused to approve the share assignment. And, when Sullivan protested, the association expelled Sullivan and took away his membership shares. Sullivan sued Little Hunting Park, claiming that its actions violated §1982. The Court upheld Sullivan’s claim. It found that the corporation’s refusal “to approve the assignment of the membership share ... was clearly an interference with Freeman’s [the black lessee’s] right to ‘lease.’” 396 U. S., at 237. It added that Sullivan, the white lessor, “has standing to maintain this action,” ibid., because, as the Court had previously said, “the white owner is at times ‘the only effective adversary’ of the unlawful restrictive covenant.” Ibid, (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). The Court noted that to permit the corporation to punish Sullivan “for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982” would give “impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property.” 396 U. S., at 237. And this Court has made clear that Sullivan stands for the proposition that § 1982 encompasses retaliation claims. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167,176 (2005) (“[I]n Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination [in §1982] to cover retaliation against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition”). While the Sullivan decision interpreted § 1982, our precedents have long construed §§1981 and 1982 similarly. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160,173 (1976), the Court considered whether § 1981 prohibits private acts of discrimination. Citing Sullivan, along with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968), and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 410 U. S. 431 (1973), the Court reasoned that this case law “necessarily requires the conclusion that § 1981, like § 1982, reaches private conduct.” 427 U. S., at 173. See also id., at 187 (Powell, J., concurring) (“Although [Sullivan and Jones] involved §1982, rather than § 1981,1 agree that their considered holdings with respect to the purpose and meaning of § 1982 necessarily apply to both statutes in view of their common derivation”); id., at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t would be most incongruous to give those two sections [1981 and 1982] a fundamentally different construction”). See also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U. S. 615, 617-618 (1987) (applying to § 1982 the discussion and holding of Saint Francis College v. AlKhazraji, 481 U. S. 604, 609-613 (1987), a case interpreting §1981). As indicated in Runyon, the Court has construed §§ 1981 and 1982 alike because it has recognized the sister statutes’ common language, origin, and purposes. Like § 1981, § 1982 traces its origin to §1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U. S. 375, 383-384 (1982) (noting shared historical roots of the two provisions); Tillman, supra, at 439-440 (same). Like § 1981, § 1982 represents an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy. See General Building Contractors Assn., supra, at 388 (noting strong purposive connection between the two provisions). Like §1981, §1982 uses broad language that says “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” Compare § 1981’s language set forth above, supra, at 445. See Jones, supra, at 441, n. 78 (noting the close parallel language of the two provisions). Indeed, § 1982 differs from § 1981 only in that it refers, not to the “right ... to make and enforce contracts,” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a), but to the “right... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,” § 1982. In light of these precedents, it is not surprising that following Sullivan, federal appeals courts concluded, on the basis of Sullivan or its reasoning, that § 1981 encompassed retaliation claims. See, e. g., Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst, of N. Y, 735 F. 2d 38, 42-43 (CA2 1984); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 598-599 (CA5 1982), overruled, Carter v. South Central Bell, 912 F. 2d 832 (1990); Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1266, 1270 (CA6 1977). In 1989, 20 years after Sullivan, this Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, significantly limited the scope of § 1981. The Court focused upon § 1981’s words “to make and enforce contracts” and interpreted the phrase narrowly. It wrote that the statutory phrase did not apply to “conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions.” Id., at 177 (emphasis added). The Court added that the word “enforce” does not apply to post-contract-formation conduct unless the discrimination at issue “infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Thus §1981 did not encompass the claim of a black employee who charged that her employer had violated her employment contract by harassing her and failing to promote her, all because of her race. Ibid. Since victims of an employer’s retaliation will often have opposed discriminatory conduct taking place after the formation of the employment contract, Patterson’s holding, for a brief time, seems in practice to have foreclosed retaliation claims. With one exception, we have found no federal court of appeals decision between the time we decided Patterson and 1991 that permitted a § 1981 retaliation claim to proceed. See, e. g., Walker v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 904 F. 2d 275, 276 (CA5 1990) (per curiam); Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F. 2d 470, 473 (CA9 1989); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F. 2d 1527, 1534-1535 (CA11 1990) (per curiam). See also Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F. 2d 1305, 1312-1314 (CA7 1989) (questioning without deciding the viability of retaliation claims under §1981 after Patterson). But see Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F. 2d 630, 635-638 (CA8 1990) (allowing a claim for discriminatory discharge to proceed under § 1981), vacated and remanded, 499 U. S. 914 (1991) (ordering reconsideration in light of what became the Eighth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Taggart v. Jefferson Cty. Child Support Enforcement Unit, 935 F. 2d 947 (1991), which held that racially discriminatory discharge claims under § 1981 are barred). In 1991, however, Congress weighed in on the matter. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,105 Stat. 1071, with the design to supersede Patterson. Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369, 383 (2004). Insofar as is relevant here, the new law changed 42 U. S. C. § 1981 by reenacting the former provision, designating it as § 1981(a), and adding a new subsection, (b), which, says: “ ‘Make and enforce contracts’ defined “For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” An accompanying Senate Report pointed out that the amendment superseded Patterson by adding a new subsection (b) that would “reaffirm that the right ‘to make and enforce contracts’ includes the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.” S. Rep. No. 101-315, p. 6 (1990). Among other things, it would “ensure that Americans may not be harassed, fired or otherwise discriminated against in contracts because of their race.” Ibid, (emphasis added). An accompanying House Report said that in “cutting back the scope of the rights to ‘make’ and ‘enforce’ contracts[,] Patterson . .. has been interpreted to eliminate retaliation claims that the courts had previously recognized under section 1981.” H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, pp. 92-93, n. 92 (1991). It added that the protections that subsection (b) provided, in “the context of employment discrimination ... would include, but not be limited to, claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retaliation, and hiring.” Id., at 92 (emphasis added). It also said that the new law “would restore rights to sue for such retaliatory conduct.” Id., at 93, n. 92. After enactment of the new law, the Federal Courts of Appeals again reached a broad consensus that §1981, as amended, encompasses retaliation claims. See, e.g., Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F. 3d 684, 693 (CA2 1998); Aleman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F. 3d 206, 213-214 (CA4 2007); Foley v. University of Houston System, 355 F. 3d 333, 338-339 (CA5 2003); Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F. 3d 561, 575-576 (CA6 2000); 474 F. 3d, at 403 (case below); Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F. 3d 792, 800-801, and n. 11 (CA9 2003); Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital, 140 F. 3d 1405, 1411-1413 (CA11 1998). The upshot is this: (1) In 1969, Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, recognized that § 1982 encompasses a retaliation action; (2) this Court has long interpreted §§ 1981 and 1982 alike; (3) in 1989, Patterson, without mention of retaliation, narrowed § 1981 by excluding from its scope conduct, namely, post-contract-formation conduct, where retaliation would most likely be found; but in 1991, Congress enacted legislation that superseded Patterson and explicitly defined the scope of §1981 to include post-contract-formation conduct; and (4) since 1991, the lower courts have uniformly interpreted § 1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. C Sullivan, as interpreted and relied upon by Jackson, as well as the long line of related cases where we construe §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly, lead us to conclude that the view that § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims is indeed well embedded in the law. That being so, considerations of stare decisis strongly support our adherence to that view. And those considerations impose a considerable burden upon those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. See, e. g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468, 494-495 (1987) (plurality opinion) (describing importance of stare decisis)-, Patterson, 491 U. S., at 172 (considerations of stare decisis “have special force in the area of statutory interpretation”); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 139 (2008) (same). Ill In our view, CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from what we have just described as the well-embedded interpretation of § 1981. First, CBOCS points to the plain text of § 1981 — a text that says that “[a]ll persons ... shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(a) (emphasis added). CBOCS adds that, insofar as Humphries complains of retaliation, he is complaining of a retaliatory action that the employer would have taken against him whether he was black or white, and there is no way to construe this text to cover that kind of deprivation. Thus the text’s language, CBOCS concludes, simply “does not provide for a cause of action based on retaliation.” Brief for Petitioner 8. We agree with CBOCS that the statute’s language does not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different individual, suffering direct racial discrimination, secure his § 1981 rights. But that fact alone is not sufficient to carry the day. After all, this Court has long held that the statutory text of § 1981’s sister statute, § 1982, provides protection from retaliation for reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory right. See supra, at 447. Moreover, the Court has recently read another broadly worded civil rights statute, namely, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1681 et seq., as including an antiretaliation remedy. In 2005 in Jackson, the Court considered whether statutory language prohibiting “discrimination [on the basis of sex] under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” § 1681(a), encompassed claims of retaliation for complaints about sex discrimination. 544 U. S., at 173-174. Despite the fact that Title IX does not use the word “retaliation,” the Court held in Jackson that the statute’s language encompassed such a claim, in part because: (1) “Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan was decided”; (2) it is “ ‘realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar’ ” with Sullivan; and (3) Congress consequently “ ‘expected its enactment’ ” of Title IX “ ‘to be interpreted in conformity with’ ” Sullivan. 544 U. S., at 176. The Court in Jackson explicitly rejected the arguments the dissent advances here — that Sullivan was merely a standing case, see post, at 464-467 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Compare Jackson, 544 U. S., at 176, n. 1 (“Sullivan’s holding was not so limited. It plainly held that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under § 1982 if he could show that he was ‘punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities’” (emphasis in original)), with id., at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Regardless, the linguistic argument that CBOCS makes was apparent at the time the Court decided Sullivan. See 396 U. S., at 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the construction of § 1982 in Jones, 392 U. S. 409, was “in no way required by [the statute’s] language” — one of the bases of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Jones — and further contending that the Court in Sullivan had gone “yet beyond” Jones). And we believe it is too late in the day in effect to overturn the holding in that case (nor does CBOCS ask us to do so) on the basis of a linguistic argument that was apparent, and which the Court did not embrace at that time. Second, CBOCS argues that Congress, in 1991 when it reenacted §1981 with amendments, intended the reenacted statute not to cover retaliation. CBOCS rests this conclusion primarily upon the fact that Congress did not include an explicit antiretaliation provision or the word “retaliation” in the new statutory language — although Congress has included explicit antiretaliation language in other civil rights statutes. See, e. g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(4); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. § 215(a)(3); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-3(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 623(d); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U. S. C. §§ 12203(a)-(b); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U. S. C. §2615. We believe, however, that the circumstances to which CBOCS points find a far more plausible explanation in the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need for Congress to include explicit language about retaliation. After all, the 1991 amendments themselves make clear that Congress intended to supersede the result in Patterson and embrace pre-Patterson law. And pre-Patterson law included Sullivan. See Part II, supra. Nothing in the statute’s text or in the surrounding circumstances suggests any congressional effort to supersede Sullivan or the interpretation that courts have subsequently given that case. To the contrary, the amendments’ history indicates that Congress intended to restore that interpretation. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, at 92 (noting that § 1981(b) in the “context of employment discrimination ... would include ... claims of... retaliation”). Third, CBOCS points out that §1981, if applied to employment-related retaliation actions, would overlap with Title VII. It adds that Title VII requires that those who invoke its remedial powers satisfy certain procedural and administrative requirements that §1981 does not contain. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (charge of discrimination must be brought before EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory act); §2000e-5(f)(l) (suit must be filed within 90 days of obtaining an EEOC right-to-sue letter). And CBOCS says that permitting a §1981 retaliation action would allow a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s “specific administrative and procedural mechanisms,” thereby undermining their effectiveness. Brief for Petitioner 25. This argument, however, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§ 1981 “overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination. Yet Congress explicitly created the overlap in respect to direct employment discrimination. Nor is it obvious how we can interpret §1981 to avoid employment-related overlap without eviscerating §1981 in respect to %o%-employment contracts where no such overlap exists. Regardless, we have previously acknowledged a “necessary overlap” between Title VII and § 1981. Patterson, 491 U. S., at 181. We have added that the “remedies available under Title VII and under §1981, although related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent.” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454,461 (1975). We have pointed out that Title VII provides important administrative remedies and other benefits that § 1981 lacks. See id., at 457-458 (detailing the benefits of Title VII to those aggrieved by race-based employment discrimination). And we have concluded that “Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48-49 (1974). In a word, we have previously held that the “overlap” reflects congressional design. See ibid. We have no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case. Fourth, CBOCS says it finds support for its position in two of our recent cases, Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 (2006), and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470 (2006). In Burlington, a Title VII case, we distinguished between discrimination that harms individuals because of “who they are, i. e., their status,” for example, as women or as black persons, and discrimination that harms “individuals based on what they do, i. e., their conduct,” for example, whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation. 548 U. S., at 63. CBOCS says that we should draw a similar distinction here and conclude that § 1981 only encompasses status-based discrimination. In Burlington, however, we used the status/conduct distinction to help explain why Congress might have wanted its explicit Title VII antiretaliation provision to sweep more broadly (i. e., to include conduct outside the workplace) than its substantive Title VII (status-based) antidiscrimination provision. Burlington did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all events. The dissent argues that the distinction made in Burlington is meaningful here because it purportedly “underscores the fact that status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation are distinct harms that call for tailored legislative treatment. ” Post, at 462. The Court’s construction of a general ban on discrimination such as that contained in § 1981 to cover retaliation claims, the dissent continues, would somehow render the separate antiretaliation provisions in other statutes “superfluous.” Ibid. But the Court in Burlington did not find that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision was redundant; it found that the provision had a broader reach than the statute’s substantive provision. And in any case, we have held that “legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination.” Alexander, supra, at 47. See Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366, 377 (1979) (“[S]ubstantive rights conferred in the 19th century [civil rights Acts] were not withdrawn, sub silentio, by the subsequent passage of the modern statutes”). Accordingly, the Court has accepted overlap between a number of civil rights statutes. See ibid, (discussing interrelation of fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and § 1982; between § 1981 and Title VII). See also supra, at 455 (any overlap in reach between § 1981 and Title VII, the statute at issue in Burlington, is by congressional design). CBOCS highlights the second case, Domino’s Pizza, along with Patterson, and cites Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), and Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522 (1987) (per curiam), to show that this Court now follows an approach to statutory interpretation that emphasizes text. And that newer approach, CBOCS claims, should lead us to revisit the holding in Sullivan, an older case, where the Court placed less weight upon the textual language itself. But even were we to posit for argument’s sake that changes in interpretive approach take place from time to time, we could not agree that the existence of such a change would justify reexamination of well-established prior law. Principles of stare decisis, after all, demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so, those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon which the rule of law depends. See, e. g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U. S., at 139. IV We conclude that considerations of stare decisis strongly support our adherence to Sullivan and the long line of related cases where we interpret §§1981 and 1982 similarly. CBOCS’ arguments do not convince us to the contrary. We consequently hold that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 encompasses claims of retaliation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting. The Court holds that the private right of action it has implied under Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, encompasses claims of retaliation. Because the Court’s holding has no basis in the text of § 1981 and is not justified by principles of stare decisis, I respectfully dissent. I It is unexceptional in our case law that “ ‘[statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.’” Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 252 (2004) (quoting Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194 (1985)). Today, that rule is honored in the breach: The Court’s analysis of the statutory text does not appear until Part III of its opinion, and then only as a potential reason to depart from the interpretation the Court has already concluded, on other grounds, must “carry the day.” Ante, at 452. Unlike the Court, I think it best to begin, as we usually do, with the text of the statute. Section 1981(a) provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” Section 1981(a) thus guarantees “[a]ll persons ... the same right... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” It is difficult to see where one finds a cause of action for retaliation in this language. On its face, § 1981(a) is a straightforward ban on racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. Not surprisingly, that is how the Court has always construed it. See, e. g., Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470, 476 (2006) (“Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship”); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 171 (1989) (“[Section] 1981 'prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts’” (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168 (1976))); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454,459 (1975) (Section 1981 “on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts”). Respondent nonetheless contends that “[t]he terms of section 1981 are significantly different, and broader, than a simple prohibition against discrimination.” Brief for Respondent 15. It is true that § 1981(a), which was enacted shortly after the Civil War, does not use the modern statutory formulation prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of race.” But that is the clear import of its terms. Contrary to respondent’s contention, nothing in § 1981 evinces a “concer[n] with protecting individuals 'based on what they do,’ ” as opposed to “ ‘preventing] injury to individuals based on who they are.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53, 63 (2006)). Nor does § 1981 “affirmatively guarante[e]” freestanding “rights to engage in particular conduct.” Brief for Respondent 16. Rather, § 1981 is an equal-rights provision. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, 791 (1966) (“Congress intended to protect a limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality”). The statute assumes that “white citizens” enjoy certain rights and requires that those rights be extended equally to “[a]ll persons,” regardless of their race. That is to say, it prohibits discrimination based on race. Retaliation is not discrimination based on race. When an individual is subjected to reprisal because he has complained about racial discrimination, the injury he suffers is not on account of his race; rather, it is the result of his conduct. The Court recognized this commonsense distinction just two years ago in Burlington when it explained that Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision “seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i. e., their status,” whereas its “antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i. e., their conduct.” 548 U. S., at 63. This distinction is sound, and it reflects the fact that a claim of retaliation is both logically and factually distinct from a claim of discrimination — logically because retaliation based on conduct and discrimination based on status are mutually exclusive categories, and factually because a claim of retaliation does not depend on proof that any status-based discrimination actually occurred. Consider, for example, an employer who fires any employee who complains of race discrimination, regardless of the employee’s race. Such an employer is undoubtedly guilty of retaliation, but he has not discriminated on the basis of anyone’s race. Because the employer treats all employees — black and white — the same, he does not deny any employee “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The Court apparently believes that the status/conduct distinction is not relevant here because this case, unlike Burlington, does not require us to determine whether § 1981’s supposed prohibition on retaliation “sweep[s] more broadly” than its antidiscrimination prohibition. Ante, at 456. That is nonsense. Although, as the Court notes, we used the status/conduct distinction in Burlington to explain why Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must sweep more broadly than its antidiscrimination provision in order to achieve its purpose, 548 U. S., at 63-64, it does not follow that the distinction between status and conduct is irrelevant here. To the contrary, Burlington underscores the fact that status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation are distinct harms that call for tailored legislative treatment. That is why Congress, in Title VII and a host of other statutes, has enacted separate provisions prohibiting discrimination and retaliation. See Brief for Petitioner 17-18 (citing statutes); see also ante, at 453-454 (same). Construing a general ban on discrimination such as that contained in § 1981 to cover retaliation would render these separate antiretaliation provisions superfluous, contrary to the normal rules of statutory interpretation. Of course, this is not the first time I have made these points. Three Terms ago in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005), the Court held that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., which prohibits recipients of federal education funding from discriminating “on the basis of sex,” § 1681(a), affords an implied cause of action for retaliation against those who complain of sex discrimination. In so doing, the Court disregarded the fundamental distinction between status-based discrimination and conduct-based retaliation, asserting that retaliation against those who complain of sex discrimination “is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.” 544 U. S., at 174. But as I explained in my dissenting opinion in Jackson, “the sex-based topic of the complaint cannot overcome the fact that the retaliation is not based on anyone’s sex, much less the complainer’s sex.” Id., at 188. Likewise here, the race-based topic of the complaint cannot overcome the fact that the retaliation is not based on anyone’s race. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the fact that “protection from retaliation is separate from direct protection of the primary right [against discrimination] and serves as a prophylactic measure to guard the primary right.” Id., at 189; see also Burlington, swpra, at 63 (explaining that Title VII’s “antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status,” whereas its “antiretaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees”). In other words, “[t]o describe retaliation as discrimination on the basis of [race] is to conflate the enforcement mechanism with the right itself, something for which the statute’s text provides no warrant.” Jackson, supra, at 189 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Notably, the Court does not repeat Jackson’s textual analysis in this case, perhaps because no amount of repetition could make it any more plausible today than it was three years ago. Instead, the Court acknowledges that “the statute’s language does not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation.” Ante, at 452. The Court concludes, however, that the statute’s failure expressly to provide a cause of action for retaliation “is not sufficient to carry the day,” ibid., despite our usual rule that “affirmative evidence of congressional intent must be provided for an implied remedy,... for without such intent the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist,” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 293, n. 8 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted); see also id., at 286-287 (emphasizing that, absent evidence of Congress’ intent to create a cause of action, the “cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute”). Section 1981’s silence regarding retaliation is not dispositive, the Court says, because “it is too late in the day” to resort to “a linguistic argument” that was supposedly rejected in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 (1969). Ante, at 453. As I explain below, the Court’s reliance on Sullivan is entirely misplaced. But it also bears emphasis that the Court does not even purport to identify any basis in the statutory text for the “well-embedded interpretation of § 1981,” ante, at 452, it adopts for the first time today. Unlike the Court, I find the statute’s text dispositive. Because §1981 by its terms prohibits only discrimination based on race, and because retaliation is not discrimination based on race, § 1981 does not provide an implied cause of action for retaliation. II Unable to justify its holding as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court today retreats behind the figleaf of ersatz stare decisis. The Court’s invocation of stare decisis appears to rest on three considerations: (1) Sullivan’s purported recognition of a cause of action for retaliation under § 1982; (2) Jackson’s (re)interpretation of Sullivan; and (3) the Courts of Appeals’ view that § 1981 provides a cause of action for retaliation. None of these considerations, separately or together, justifies implying a cause of action that Congress did not include in the statute. And none can conceal the irony in the Court’s novel use of stare decisis to decide a question of first impression. I turn first to Sullivan, as it bears most of the weight in the Court’s analysis. As I explained in my dissent in Jackson, Sullivan did not “hol[d] that a general prohibition against discrimination permitted a claim of retaliation,” but rather “that a white lessor had standing to assert the right of a black lessee to be free from racial discrimination.” 544 U. S., at 194.. Thus, “[t]o make out his third-party claim on behalf of the black lessee, the white lessor would necessarily be required to demonstrate that the defendant had discriminated against the black lessee on the basis of race.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, respondent “need not show that the [race] discrimination forming the basis of his complaints actually occurred.” Ibid. Accordingly, as it did in Jackson, the Court “creates an entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights holder, beyond the claim of the original rights holder, and well beyond Sullivan.” Id., at 194-195. Having reexamined Sullivan, I remain convinced that it was a third-party standing case. Sullivan did not argue that his expulsion from the corporation — as opposed to the corporation’s refusal to approve the assignment — violated § 1982. Instead, he argued that his expulsion was “contrary to public policy” because it was the “direct result of his having dealt with Freeman, as the statute requires, on a nondiscriminatory basis.” Brief for Petitioners in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., O. T. 1969, No. 33, p. 32. Sullivan further contended not that his own rights under § 1982 had been violated, but that he “ha[d] standing to rely on the rights of the Negro, Freeman,” since he was best situated to vindicate those rights. Id., at 33; see also Pet. for Cert. in Sullivan, p. 17, n. 13 (“Although the statute declares the rights of Negroes not to be discriminated against, Sullivan, a Caucasian, has standing to rely on the invasion of the rights of others, since he is the only effective adversary capable of vindicating them in litigation arising from his expulsion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, the United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support of Sullivan, argued that because “the private action involved in refusing to honor the assignment was itself illegal,” “relief should be available to all persons injured by it, or as a consequence of their efforts to resist it.” Brief for United States in Sullivan, p. 34. Thus, both Sullivan and the United States argued that Sullivan had standing to seek relief for injuries he suffered as a result of the corporation’s violation of Freeman’s rights — not that Sullivan’s own rights under § 1982 were violated. And that is the best interpretation of what the Court subsequently held. Tracking the parties’ arguments, the Court first concluded that the corporation’s “refus[al] to approve the assignment of the membership share . . . was clearly an interference with Freeman’s right to ‘lease’ ” under § 1982. 396 U. S., at 237. Only then did it conclude — based on Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953), a third-party standing case in which another white litigant was permitted to “rely on the invasion of the rights of others,” id., at 255 — that Sullivan “ha[d] standing to maintain this action.” Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 237. The word “retaliation” does not appear in the Court’s opinion. Nor is there any suggestion that Sullivan would have had “standing” absent the violation of Freeman’s rights. Of course, Sullivan is not a model of clarity, and Justice Harlan, writing in dissent, was correct to criticize the “undiscriminating manner” in which the Court dealt with Sullivan’s claims. Id., at 251. Sullivan had sought relief both for the corporation’s refusal to approve the assignment and for his expulsion. Id., at 253. But in stating that Sullivan had standing to maintain “this action,” id., at 237 (majority opinion), the Court did not specify what relief Sullivan was entitled to pursue on remand. Lamenting the Court’s “failure to provide any guidance as to the legal standards that should govern Sullivan’s right to recovery on remand,” id., at 252 (dissenting opinion), Justice Harlan provided an instructive summary of the ambiguities in the Court’s opinion: “One can imagine a variety of standards, each based on different legal conclusions as to the ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ created by § 1982, and each having very different remedial consequences. For example, does § 1982 give Sullivan a right to relief only for injuries resulting from Little Hunting Park’s interference with his statutory duty to Freeman under § 1982? If so, what is Sullivan’s duty to Freeman under § 1982? Unless § 1982 is read to impose a duty on Sullivan to protest Freeman’s exclusion, he would be entitled to reinstatement under this standard only if the Board had expelled him for the simple act of assigning his share to Freeman. “As an alternative, Sullivan might be thought to be entitled to relief from those injuries that flowed from the Board’s violation of its ‘duty’ to Freeman under § 1982. Such a standard might suggest that Sullivan is entitled to damages that resulted from Little Hunting Park’s initial refusal to accept the assignment to Freeman but again not to reinstatement. Or does the Court think that § 1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his ‘legitimate’ protest aimed at convincing the Board to accept Freeman?” Id., at 254-255. It is noteworthy that of the three possible standards Justice Harlan outlined, the first two clearly depend on a showing that Freeman’s §1982 rights were violated. Only the third — “Or does the Court think that § 1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his ‘legitimate’ protest” — resembles a traditional retaliation claim and, in context, even it is probably best read to presuppose that Sullivan was protesting an actual violation of Freeman’s rights. Id., at 255. Which, if any, of these standards the Court had in mind is anybody’s guess. It did not say. I thus adhere to my view that Sullivan is best read as a third-party standing case. That is how the parties argued the case, and that is the most natural reading of the Court’s opinion. But even if Sullivan could fairly be read as having inferred a freestanding cause of action for retaliation — which I doubt it can, at least not without superimposing an anachronistic outlook on a Court that was not as familiar with retaliation claims as we are today — the Court’s one-paragraph discussion of the issue was, at best, both cursory and ambiguous. This is hardly the stuff of which stare decisis is made. Steadfastly refusing to acknowledge any ambiguity, the Court asserts that it is “not surprising that following Sullivan, federal appeals courts concluded, on the basis of Sullivan or its reasoning, that §1981 encompassed retaliation claims.” Ante, at 448. But given Sullivan’s use of the word “standing” and its reliance on a third-party standing case, what is unsurprising is that each of the cases the Court cites either characterized the issue as one of standing, Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1266, 1270 (CA6 1977) (characterizing the issue as “whether or not the white plaintiff in this action has standing to sue his former employer under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 for discharging him in alleged retaliation for plaintiff’s protesting the alleged discriminatory firing of a black co-worker”), or recognized that it was taking a step beyond Sullivan in inferring a cause of action for retaliation, Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst, of N. Y., 735 F. 2d 38, 42 (CA2 1984) (stating that the Second Circuit “ha[d] never decided whether § 1981 creates a cause of action for retaliation,” even though it had previously held, based on Sullivan, “that a white person who claimed to have suffered reprisals as a result of his efforts to vindicate the rights of non-whites had standing to sue under § 1981”); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F. 2d 593, 598, n. 7 (CA5 1982) (recognizing that Sullivan and a previous Fifth Circuit decision relying on Sullivan were “essentially standing cases holding that white people can assert civil rights claims when they are harmed by someone’s discrimination against blacks,” which is distinct from holding that “a particular type of conduct— retaliation for the filing of a § 1981 law suit — is actionable in the first place”). Moreover, even if Sullivan had squarely and unambiguously'held that § 1982 provides an implied cause of action for retaliation, it would have been wrong to do so because § 1982, like § 1981, prohibits only discrimination based on race, and retaliation is not discrimination based on race. The question, then, would be whether to extend Sullivan’s erroneous interpretation of § 1982 to § 1981. The Court treats this as a foregone conclusion because “our precedents have long construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.” Ante, at 447. But erroneous precedents need not be extended to their logical end, even when dealing with related provisions that normally would be interpreted in lockstep. Otherwise, stare decisis, designed to be a principle of stability and repose, would become a vehicle of change whereby an error in one area metastasizes into others, thereby distorting the law. Two wrongs do not make a right, and an aesthetic preference for symmetry should not prevent us from recognizing the true meaning of an Act of Congress. The Court’s remaining reasons for invoking stare decisis require little discussion. First, the Court relies on the fact that Jackson interpreted Sullivan as having recognized a cause of action for retaliation under § 1982. See ante, at 447, 452-453. That is true but irrelevant. It was only through loose language and creative use of brackets that Jackson was able to assert that Sullivan “upheld Sullivan’s cause of action under 42 U. S. C. § 1982 for '[retaliation] for the advocacy of [the black person’s] cause.’” 544 U. S., at 176 (quoting Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 237; brackets in original). Of course, Sullivan did not use the word “retaliation,” did not say anything about a “cause of action,” and did not state that Sullivan had rights under § 1982. It most certainly did not “interpret] a general prohibition on racial discrimination to cover retaliation against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.” Jackson, 544 U. S., at 176. Jackson’s assertion that Sullivan “plainly held that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under § 1982,” 544 U. S., at 176, n. 1, misses the point entirely. While Sullivan held that “the white owner” had standing to maintain his own suit, it said nothing to suggest that he could sue to vindicate his own right to be free from retaliation under § 1982. Rather, as I have explained, Sullivan’s “standing” was derivative of the violation of Freeman’s rights. In short, Jackson’s characterization of Sullivan was erroneous, and I am aware of no principle of stare decisis that requires us to give decisive weight to a precedent’s erroneous characterization of another precedent — particularly where, as here, the cases involved different statutes, neither of which was the statute at issue in the case at bar. Second, the Court appears to give weight to the fact that, since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,105 Stat. 1071, “the lower courts have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions.” Ante, at 451. This rationale fares no better than the others. The Court has never suggested that rejection of a view uniformly held by the courts of appeals violates some principle of stare decisis. To the contrary, we have not hesitated to take a different view if convinced the lower courts were wrong. Indeed, it has become something of a dissenter’s tactic to point out that the Court has decided a question differently than every court of appeals to have considered it. See, e. g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 278, n. 11 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 643 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227,254 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court does not explain what makes this particular line of lower court authority any more sacrosanct than those we have rejected in the past. Of course, lower court decisions may be persuasive, and when the Court rejects the unanimous position of the courts of appeals, it is fair to point out that fact. But the point has traction only to the extent it tends to show that the Court’s reasoning is flawed on the merits, as demonstrated by the number of judges who have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e. g., Buckhannon, supra, at 643-644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When this Court rejects the considered judgment prevailing in the Circuits, respect for our colleagues demands a cogent explanation”). Unlike decisions of this Court, decisions of the courts of appeals, even when unanimous, do not carry stare decisis weight, nor do they relieve us of our obligation independently to decide the merits of the question presented. That is why, when we have affirmed a view unanimously held by the courts of appeals, we have done so (at least until today) not because we gave precedential weight to the lower courts’ decisions, but because we agreed with their resolution of the question on the merits. See, e. g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 531 (2005) (“Virtually every Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that such a pleading ... is in substance a successive habeas petition .... We think those holdings are correct”); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S. 350, 362 (1991) (“Thus, we agree with every Court of Appeals that has been called upon to apply a federal statute of limitations to a § 10(b) claim”). Ill As in Jackson, “[t]he question before us is only whether [§1981] prohibits retaliation, not whether prohibiting it is good policy.” 544 U. S., at 195 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “By crafting its own additional enforcement mechanism, the majority returns this Court to the days in which it created remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congressional purpose.” Ibid. That the Court does so under the guise of stare decisis does not make its decision any more justifiable. Because the text of § 1981 provides no basis for implying a private right of action for retaliation, and because no decision of this Court holds to the contrary, I would reverse the judgment below. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support of respondent, contends that § 1981 prohibits not only racial discrimination, but also any other kind of “discrimination” that “impair[s]” the rights guaranteed by § 1981(a). Brief for United States 17. In support of this argument, the United States points to § 1981(c), which provides that “[t]he rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.” Thus, the argument goes, retaliation is prohibited because it is discrimination (differential treatment for those who complain) and it impairs the right granted in § 1981(a) to be free from racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts (by penalizing assertion of that right). Although I commend the United States for at least attempting to ground its position in the statutory text, its argument is unconvincing. Section 1981(c) simply codifies the Court’s holding in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), that § 1981 applies to private, as well as governmental, discrimination. Nothing in § 1981(c) indicates that Congress otherwise intended to expand the scope of § 1981. To the contrary, § 1981(c) refers to “[t]he rights protected by this section,” i. e., the rights enumerated in § 1981(a) to make and enforce contracts on the same terms as white citizens. Moreover, the word “discrimination” in § 1981(c) does not refer to “all discrimination,” as the United States would have it. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 4. Rather, it refers back to the type of discrimination prohibited by § 1981(a), i. e., discrimination based on race. Thus, § 1981 is violated only when racial discrimination impairs the right to make and enforce contracts. Of course, if an employer had a different retaliation policy for blacks and whites — firing black employees who complain of race discrimination but not firing similarly situated white employees — a black employee who was fired for complaining of race discrimination would have a promising §1981 claim. But his claim would not sound in retaliation; rather, it would be a straightforward claim of racial discrimination. In his briefs before this Court, respondent attempts to shoehorn his claim into this category, asserting that petitioner “retaliated against [him] because he was a black worker who exercised his right” to lodge a grievance under petitioner’s open-door policy. Brief for Respondent 27; see also id., at 33 (“[S]eetion 1981 forbids an employer from having one dismissal policy for blacks who complain about race discrimination, and another for whites who complain about such discrimination”). But respondent cites no record evidence to support his assertion that petitioner treated him differently than it would have treated a similarly situated white complainant. And while the Court of Appeals found that respondent had established a prima facie case of retaliation, 474 F. 3d 387, 406-407 (CA7 2007), it did not identify any evidence that would permit a jury to conclude that the alleged retaliation was race based. Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that respondent had “waived ... his discrimination claim by devoting only a skeletal argument [to it] in response to [petitioner’s] motion for summary judgment.” Id., at 407. In contrast to his argument based on § 1982, which he consistently tied to the violation of Freeman's rights, Sullivan also argued that his own First Amendment rights were violated: “Since Sullivan’s expulsion was in retaliation for his having obeyed the dictate of the law the expulsion was against public policy, and he should be reinstated. For the law to sanction punishment of a person such as Sullivan for refusing to discriminate against Negroes would be to render nugatory the rights guaranteed to Negroes by 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981,1982----Furthermore, by giving sanction to Sullivan’s expulsion, the state court deprived Sullivan of his rights, guaranteed by the First Amendment to criticize the conduct of the association’s directors.” Brief for Petitioners in Sullivan, p. 14 (emphasis added). The majority claims that Sullivan “did not embrace” this “linguistic argument.” Ante, at 453. That is because the argument was not before the Court. The corporation did not argue that § 1982’s text could not reasonably be construed to create a cause of action for retaliation; nor did Justice Harlan in dissent. No one made this argument because that was not how the issue was framed, either by Sullivan or by the Court. The majority suggests that the argument was “apparent at the time the Court decided Sullivan.” Ibid. But the only evidence it cites is Justice Harlan’s observation that the Court’s holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968), that § 1982 prohibits private as well as governmental discrimination was “in no way required by [§ 1982’s] language.” Sullivan, 396 U. S., at 241 (dissenting opinion). I fail to see how that observation— or Justice Harlan’s further observation that the Court in Sullivan had gone “yet beyond Jones,” ibid. — shows that the Court considered and rejected the entirely different argument that § 1982’s text does not provide a cause of action for retaliation. For example, we have refused to extend the holding of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964), which inferred a private right of action for violations of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to other sections of the Act. Borak applied the understanding — later abandoned in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975) — that “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose” expressed by a statute. 377 U. S., at 433. As Chief Judge Easterbrook explained in dissent below, the analogy to the present case is obvious: “The argument goes that, because Sullivan ignored the language of § 1982 and drafted an ‘improved’ version of the statute, we are free to do the same today for § 1981, its neighbor. The Supreme Court requires us to proceed otherwise. Borak dealt with § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U. S. C. § 78n(a). It was as freewheeling in ‘interpreting’ that law as Sullivan was with § 1982. Yet the Court has held that the change of interpretive method announced in Cort applies to all other sections of the Securities Exchange Act. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977) (§ 14(e)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979) (§ 17(a)). Borak and similar decisions from the 1960s have not been overruled, but we have been told in no uncertain terms that they must not be extended. Indeed, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U. S. 1083 (1991), the Court declined to apply Borak to a portion of § 14(a) that had not been involved in Borak. So that case has been limited to a single sentence of one subsection. Why, then, may the method of Sullivan be applied to other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 despite intervening precedent?” 474 F. 3d, at 410-411 (some citations omitted).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. v. CARPET, LINOLEUM, SOFT TILE & RESILIENT FLOOR COVERING LAYERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 419, AFL-CIO, et al. No. 476. Argued March 3, 1970 Decided April 27, 1970 Gerard C. Smetana argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Alan Rayvñd. David S. Barr argued the cause for respondent union. With him on the brief was Philip Hornbein, Jr. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondent the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Joseph J. Connolly, Arnold Ordman, and Norton J. Come. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Brice I. Bishop and Phil B. Hammond for the American Retail Federation, and by Jerry Kronenberg and Charles C. Kieffer for the Terminal Freight Handling Co. et al. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E, Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Per Curiam. The petitioner, Sears, Roebuck and Company (Sears), filed a charge with the NLRB Regional Director, alleging that the respondent union was engaged in unlawful secondary picketing of the petitioner’s premises in violation of § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. The Regional Director investigated the charge and, finding there was reasonable cause to believe it was true, issued an unfair labor practice complaint with the Board. He also petitioned a Federal District Court for injunctive relief pursuant to § 10 (l) of the Act, which directs him to apply for such temporary relief “pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter.” Counsel for Sears appeared at the hearing before the District Court, but Sears did not seek to intervene formally. After hearing testimony the court declined to issue an injunction, believing that Sears was not likely to prevail before the Board on its unfair labor practice charge. The Regional Director did not appeal the court’s decision, but Sears sought to do so. 410 F. 2d 1148. The Court of Appeals dismissed Sears’ appeal on the ground that under the Act only the Regional Director could appeal from the denial of a § 10 (l) injunction. Thereafter the Board issued its decision and order in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding, finding that the respondent union had violated § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the Act, and ordering it to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct. 176 N. L. R. B. No. 120, 71 L. R. R. M. 1372 (1969). Under these circumstances the question whether Sears could appeal the District Court’s denial of an injunction has now become moot. For even if the Court of Appeals was wrong in dismissing Sears’ appeal, any relief that that court might have given would now have terminated. “ 'To adjudicate a cause which no longer exists is a proceeding which this Court uniformly has declined to entertain.’ ” Oil Workers Union v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363, 371, quoting from Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U. S. 216, 217-218. See also Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45; Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S. 41; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103. Sears concedes that an injunction, had one issued, would terminate upon “final” Board resolution of the underlying unfair labor practice charge. But it argues that the Board’s action cannot be considered final where, as here, one of the parties, in this case the respondent union, has sought review of the Board’s order. In this situation, Sears maintains, the injunctive relief, if granted, would remain in effect until the Board’s order with respect to the underlying unfair labor practice were either enforced or denied enforcement by the Court of Appeals. It is argued that because the Court of Appeals has not yet acted on the Board’s order here, Sears may still be entitled to injunctive relief, and thus the question of whether it was entitled to appeal the denial of a § 10 (i) injunction remains a viable one. But neither the language, the legislative history, nor the policies of the Act support this construction. For by its terms § 10 (l) merely authorizes the issuance of an injunction “pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to [the] matter.” (Emphasis added.) Once the Board has acted, it can itself seek injunctive relief from the Court of Appeals, pursuant to § 10 (e) of the Act, which empowers that court to grant “such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.” See McLeod v. Business Machine Mechanics Conference Board, 300 F. 2d 237, 241. The legislative history makes clear that the purpose of enacting §10 (l) in 1947 was simply to supplement the pre-existing § 10 (e) power of the Board by authorizing injunctive relief prior to Board action. It was thus relief prior to Board action that Congress was concerned with providing when it enacted § 10 (i), and any injunction issued pursuant to that section terminates when the Board resolves the underlying dispute. Where the Board ultimately finds no unfair labor practice, it would clearly be contrary to the policies of the Act to permit a district court injunction to remain in effect pending Court of Appeals review of the District Court’s action. And where the Board does find an unfair labor practice, § 10 (e) provides an adequate remedy should its order be disobeyed. Yet on the petitioner’s reading of the Act, the District Court injunction would remain in effect until Court of Appeals review, whatever the Board did. This is not what was intended by § 10 (l), and the courts that have confronted the issue have consistently so held. Carpenters’ District Council v. Boire, 288 F. 2d 454, 455; Monique, Inc. v. Boire, 344 F. 2d 1017, 1018; NLRB v. Nashville Bldg. Trades Council, 383 F. 2d 562, 564. See also this Court’s disposition in Los Angeles Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v. LeBaron, 342 U. S. 802. But see Houston Insulation Contractors Assn. v. NLRB, 339 F. 2d 868. Because any injunctive relief to which Sears might have been entitled under § 10 (l) would now have terminated in any event, the question of whether Sears was entitled to challenge the denial of such relief has become moot. Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint as moot. It is so ordered. Sec. 8 (b). “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(4) (i) to engage, in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is— . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9 . . . .” (61 Stat. 141, 73 Stat. 542, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b).) 29 U. S. C. §160 (l). The District Court decision is unreported. 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e). “Under the present act the Board is empowered to seek interim relief only after it has filed in the appropriate circuit court of appeals its order and the record on which it is based. . . . “In subsections (j) and (1) . . . the Board is given additional authority to seek injunctive relief. . . . Thus the Board need not wait, if the circumstances call for such relief, until it has held a hearing, issued its order, and petitioned for enforcement of its order.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1947).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TERK v. GORDON, DIRECTOR, NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, et al. No. 77-1042. Decided June 12, 1978 Per Curiam. This case originated as a challenge, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and under the Fourteenth Amendment, to New Mexico’s statutes requiring licenses to hunt game in that State. A three-judge United States District Court upheld the State’s statutory provisions insofar as they imposed higher license fees for nonresidents than for residents, but the court also ruled that the statutes governing the allocation of licenses to hunt, certain rare species of game were unconstitutional. Plaintiff-appellant Terk, a Texas resident, appeals from that portion of the District Court’s judgment that upheld the New Mexico fee discrimination. The defendant-appellees, who are the Director of the State’s Department of Game and Fish and the members of the State Game Commission, did not seek review of that portion of the judgment that held the allocation of licenses to be unconstitutional. The issue as to the fee discrimination between residents and nonresidents is controlled by this Court’s recent decision in Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm’n, ante, p. 371. On appellant Terk’s appeal, therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court is affirmed. We express no view, however, on the allocation issue as to which no review was sought. Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 90-97. Argued February 25, 1991 Decided April 23, 1991 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. James D. Holzhauer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kenneth S. Geller, Arthur R. Miller, and Rhonda A. Rhodes. Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent National Labor Relations Board were Solicitor General Starr, Stephen L. Nightingale, Robert E. Allen, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Woody N. Peterson, David Silberman, Laurence Gold, Helen Morgan, Richard Griffin, Michael Fanning, Miriam Gafni, James Grady, Jonathan Hiatt, Richard Kirschner, Bruce Miller, Patrick Scanlon, and George Murphy filed a brief for respondents American Nurses Association et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Fairfax Hospital System, the Maryland Hospital Association, Inc., and the Virginia Hospital Association by John G. Kruchko and Paul M. Lusky; for the California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems et al. by Robert M. Stone and Dana D. Howells; for the Greater Cincinnati Hospital Council by Laivrence J. Barty and Frank H. Stewait; for the Hospital Association of Pennsylvania et al. by John E. Lyncheski and Michael J. Reilly; for the Society for Human Resource Management by Glen D. Nager; for the Missouri Hospital Association by E. J. Holland, Jr.; for St. Francis Hospital, Inc., of Memphis by Jeff Weintraub; and for William Beaumont Hospital et al. by Theodore R. Oppenvall. Laivrence Rosenziveig filed a brief for the Union of American Physicians and Dentists as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. For the first time since the National Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB) was established in 1935, the Board has promulgated a substantive rule defining the employee units appropriate for collective bargaining in a particular line of commerce. The rule is applicable to acute care hospitals and provides, with three exceptions, that eight, and only eight, units shall be appropriate in any such hospital. The three exceptions are for cases that present extraordinary circumstances, cases in which nonconforming units already exist, and cases in which labor organizations seek to combine two or more of the eight specified units. The extraordinary circumstances exception applies automatically to hospitals in which the eight-unit rule will produce a unit of five or fewer employees. See 29 CFR § 103.30 (1990). Petitioner, American Hospital Association, brought this action challenging the facial validity of the rule on three grounds: First, petitioner argues that § 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) requires the Board to make a separate bargaining unit determination “in each case” and therefore prohibits the Board from using general rules to define bargaining units; second, petitioner contends that the rule that the Board has formulated violates a congressional admonition to the Board to avoid the undue proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry; and, finally, petitioner maintains that the rule is arbitrary and capricious. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with petitioner’s second argument and enjoined enforcement of the rule. 718 F. Supp. 704 (1989). The Court of Appeals found no merit in any of the three arguments and reversed. 899 F. 2d 651 (CA7 1990). Because of the importance of the case, we granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 894 (1990). We now affirm. I Petitioner’s first argument is a general challenge to the Board’s rulemaking authority in connection with bargaining unit determinations based on the terms of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq., as originally enacted in 1935. In § 1 of the NLRA Congress made the legislative finding that the “inequality of bargaining power” between unorganized employees and corporate employers had adversely affected commerce and declared it to be the policy of the United States to mitigate or eliminate those adverse effects “by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U. S. C. § 151. The central purpose of the Act was to protect and facilitate employees’ opportunity to organize unions to represent them in collective-bargaining negotiations. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Act created the Board and generally described its powers. §§ 153-155. Section 6 granted the Board the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions” of the Act. § 156. This grant was unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at issue in this case unless limited by some other provision in the Act. Petitioner argues that § 9(b) provides such a limitation because this section requires the Board to determine the appropriate bargaining unit “in each case.” § 159(b). We are not persuaded. Petitioner would have us put more weight on these three words than they can reasonably carry. Section 9(a) of the Act provides that the representative “designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes” shall be the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees in that unit. § 159(a). This section, read in light of the policy of the Act, implies that the initiative in selecting an appropriate unit resides with the employees. Moreover, the language suggests that employees may seek to organize “a unit” that is “appropriate” — not necessarily the single most appropriate unit. See, e. g., Trustees of Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F. 2d 626, 634 (CA2 1983); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 411 F. 2d 356, 358 (CA7) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 832 (1969); Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F. 2d 570, 574 (CA1 1983); Local 627, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 37, 41, 595 F. 2d 844, 848 (1979); NLRB v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 F. 2d 119, 123 (CA3), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 978 (1968). Thus, one union might seek to represent all of the employees in a particular plant, those in a particular craft, or perhaps just a portion thereof. Given the obvious potential for disagreement concerning the appropriateness of the unit selected by the union seeking recognition by the employer — disagreements that might involve rival unions claiming jurisdiction over contested segments of the work force as well as disagreements between management and labor — § 9(b) authorizes the Board to decide whether the designated unit is appropriate. See Hearings on S. 1958 before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, p. 82 (1935) (hereinafter Hearings), 1 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 1935, p. 1458 (hereinafter Legislative History) (testimony of Francis Biddle, Chairman of Board); H. R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1935), 2 Legislative History 2976. Section 9(b) provides: “The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner reads the emphasized phrase as a limitation on the Board’s rulemaking powers. Although the contours of the restriction that petitioner ascribes to the phrase are murky, petitioner’s reading of the language would prevent the Board from imposing any industry-wide rule delineating the appropriate bargaining units. We believe petitioner’s reading is inconsistent with the natural meaning of the language read in the context of the statute as a whole. The more natural reading of these three words is simply to indicate that whenever there is a disagreement about the appropriateness of a unit, the Board shall resolve the dispute. Under this reading, the words “in each case” are synonymous with “whenever necessary” or “in any case in which there is a dispute.” Congress chose not to enact a general rule that would require plant unions, craft unions, or industry-wide unions for every employer in every line of commerce, but also chose not to leave the decision up to employees or employers alone. Instead, the decision “in each case” in which a dispute arises is to be made by the Board. In resolving such a dispute, the Board’s decision is presumably to be guided not simply by the basic policy of the Act but also by the rules that the Board develops to circumscribe and to guide its discretion either in the process of case-by-case adjudication or by the exercise of its rulemaking authority. The requirement that the Board exercise its discretion in every disputed case cannot fairly or logically be read to command the Board to exercise standardless discretion in each case. As a noted scholar on administrative law has observed: “[T]he mandate to decide ‘in each case’ does not prevent the Board from supplanting the original discretionary chaos with some degree of order, and the principal instruments for regularizing the system of deciding ‘in each case’ are classifications, rules, principles, and precedents. Sensible men could not refuse to use such instruments and a sensible Congress would not expect them to.” K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 6.04, p. 145 (3d ed. 1972). This reading of the “in each case” requirement comports with our past interpretations of similar provisions in other regulatory statutes. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 467 (1983). These decisions confirm that, even if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decision-maker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority. Even petitioner acknowledges that “the Board could adopt rules establishing general principles to guide the required case-by-case bargaining unit determinations.” Brief for Petitioner 19. Petitioner further acknowledges that the Board has created many such rules in the half-century during which it has adjudicated bargaining unit disputes. Reply Brief for Petitioner 8-11. Petitioner contends, however, that a rule delineating the appropriate bargaining unit for an entire industry is qualitatively different from these prior rules, which at most established rebuttable presumptions that certain units would be considered appropriate in certain circumstances. We simply cannot find in the three words “in each case” any basis for the fine distinction that petitioner would have us draw. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Board’s rule is not an irrebuttable presumption; instead, it contains an exception for “extraordinary circumstances.” Even if the rule did establish an irrebuttable presumption, it would not differ significantly from the prior rules adopted by the Board. As with its prior rules, the Board must still apply the rule “in each case.” For example, the Board must decide in each case, among a host of other issues, whether a given facility is properly classified as an acute care hospital and whether particular employees are properly placed in particular units. Our understanding that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language cannot support petitioner’s construction is reinforced by the structure and the policy of the NLRA. As a matter of statutory drafting, if Congress had intended to curtail in a particular area the broad rulemaking authority granted in § 6, we would have expected it to do so in language expressly describing an exception from that section or at least referring specifically to the section. And, in regard to the Act’s underlying policy, the goal of facilitating the organization and recognition of unions is certainly served by rules that define in advance the portions of the work force in which organizing efforts may properly be conducted. The sparse legislative history of the provision affords petitioner no assistance. That, history reveals that the phrase was one of a group of “small amendments” suggested by the Secretary of Labor “for the sake of clarity.” See Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Memorandum Comparing S. 2926 and S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (Comm. Print 1935), 1 Legislative History 1332, Hearings, 1442,1445; Hearings on H. R. 6288 before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 283-284 (1935), 2 Legislative History 2757-2758. If this amendment had been intended to place the important limitation on the scope of the Board’s rulemaking powers that petitioner suggests, we would expect to find some expression of that intent in the legislative history. Cf. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 600-601 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The only other relevant legislative history adds nothing to the meaning conveyed by the text that was enacted. Petitioner relies on a comment in the House Committee on Labor Report that the matter of the appropriate unit “is obviously one for determination in each individual case, and the only possible workable arrangement is to authorize the impartial government agency, the Board, to make that determination.” H. R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1935), 2 Legislative History 2976. This comment, however, simply restates our reading of the statute as requiring that the Board decide the appropriate unit in every case in which there is a dispute. The Report nowhere suggests that the Board cannot adopt generally applicable rules to guide its “determination in each individual case.” In sum, we believe that the meaning of §9(b)’s mandate that the Board decide the appropriate bargaining unit “in each case” is clear and contrary to the meaning advanced by petitioner. Even if we could find any ambiguity in § 9(b) after employing the traditional tools of statutory construction, we would still defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory text. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984). We thus conclude that § 9(b) does not limit the Board’s rulemaking authority under § 6. I — I I — I Consideration of petitioner’s second argument requires a brief historical review of the application of federal labor law to acute care hospitals. Hospitals were “employers” under the terms of the NLRA as enacted in 1935, but in 1947 Congress excepted not-for-profit hospitals from the coverage of the Act. See 29 U. S. C. § 152(2) (1970 ed.) (repealed, 1974). In 1960, the Board decided that proprietary hospitals should also be excepted, see Flatbush General Hospital, 126 N. L. R. B. 144, 145, but this position was reversed in 1967, see Butte Medical Properties, 168 N. L. R. B. 266, 268. In 1973, Congress addressed the issue and considered bills that would have extended the Act’s coverage to all private health care institutions, including not-for-profit hospitals. The proposed legislation was highly controversial, largely because of the concern that labor unrest in the health care industry might be especially harmful to the public. Moreover, the fact that so many specialists are employed in the industry created the potential for a large number of bargaining units, in each of which separate union representation might multiply management’s burden in negotiation and might also increase the risk of strikes. Motivated by these concerns, Senator Taft introduced a bill that would have repealed the exemption for hospitals, but also would have placed a limit of five on the number of bargaining units in nonprofit health care institutions. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Senator Taft’s bill did not pass. In the second session of the same Congress, however, the National Labor Relations Act Amendments of 1974 were enacted. See 88 Stat. 395. These amendments subjected all acute care hospitals to the coverage of the Act but made no change in the Board’s authority to determine the appropriate bargaining unit in each case. See ibid. Both the House and the Senate Committee Reports on the legislation contained this statement: “EFFECT ON EXISTING LAW “Bargaining Units “Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board decisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 NLRB No. 50, 85 LRRM 1093 (1974), and Woodland Park Hospital, 205 NLRB No. 144, 84 LRRM 1075 (1973), as well as the trend toward broader units enunciated in Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 NLRB No. 170, 83 LRRM 1242 (1973). See S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 5 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1051, pp. 6-7 (1974). Petitioner does not — and obviously could not — contend that this statement in the Committee Reports has the force of law, for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in legislating. Nor, in view of the fact that Congress refused to enact the Taft bill that would have placed a limit of five on the number of hospital bargaining units, does petitioner argue that eight units necessarily constitute proliferation. Rather, petitioner’s primary argument is that the admonition, when coupled with the rejection of a general rule imposing a five-unit limit, evinces Congress’ intent to emphasize the importance of the “in each case” requirement in § 9(b). We find this argument no more persuasive than petitioner’s reliance on § 9(b) itself. Assuming that the admonition was designed to emphasize the requirement that the Board determine the appropriate bargaining unit in each case, we have already explained that the Board’s rule does not contravene this mandate. See Part I, supra. Petitioner also suggests that the admonition “is an authoritative statement of what Congress intended when it extended the Act’s coverage to include nonproprietary hospitals.” Brief for Petitioner 30. Even if we accepted this suggestion, we read the admonition as an expression by the Committees of their desire that the Board give “due consideration” to the special problems that “proliferation” might create in acute care hospitals. Examining the record of the Board’s rulemaking proceeding, we find that it gave extensive consideration to this very issue. See App. 20, 78-84, 114, 122, 131, 140, 158-159, 191-194, 246-254. In any event, we think that the admonition in the Committee Reports is best understood as a form of notice to the Board that if it did not give appropriate consideration to the problem of proliferation in this industry, Congress might respond with a legislative remedy. So read, the remedy for noncompliance with the admonition is in the hands of the body that issued it. Cf. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158, 168 (1989) (legislative history that cannot be tied to the enactment of specific statutory language ordinarily carries little weight injudicial interpretation of the statute). If Congress believes that the Board has not given “due consideration” to the issue, Congress may fashion an appropriate response. III Petitioners final argument is that the rule is arbitrary and capricious because “it ignores critical differences among the more than 4,000 acute-care hospitals in the United States, including differences in size, location, operations, and workforce organization.” Brief for Petitioner 39. Petitioner supports this argument by noting that in at least one earlier unit determination, the Board had commented that the diverse character of the health care industry precluded generalizations about the appropriateness of any particular bargaining unit. See St. Francis Hospital, 271 N. L. R. B. 948, 953, n. 39 (1984), remanded sub nom. Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 259 U. S. App. D. C. 168, 814 F. 2d 697 (1987). The Board responds to this argument by relying on the extensive record developed during the rulemaking proceedings, as well as its experience in the adjudication of health care cases during the 13-year period between the enactment of the health care amendments and its notice of proposed rule-making. Based on that experience, the Board formed the “considered judgment” that “acute care hospitals do not differ in substantial, significant ways relating to the appropriateness of units.” App. 188-189. Moreover, the Board argues, the exception for “extraordinary circumstances” is adequate to take care of the unusual case in which a particular application of the rule might be arbitrary. We do not believe that the challenged rule is inconsistent with the Board’s earlier comment on diversity in the health care industry. The comment related to the entire industry whereas the rule does not apply to many facilities, such as nursing homes, blood banks, and outpatient clinics. See St. Francis, 271 N. L. R. B., at 953, n. 39. Moreover, the Board’s earlier discussion “anticipate^] that after records have been developed and a number of cases decided from these records, certain recurring factual patterns will emerge and illustrate which units are typically appropriate.” See ibid. Given the extensive notice and comment rulemaking conducted by the Board, its careful analysis of the comments that it received, and its well-reasoned justification for the new rule, we would not be troubled even if there were inconsistencies between the current rule and prior NLRB pronouncements. The statutory authorization “from time to time to make, amend, and rescind” rules and regulations expressly contemplates the possibility that the Board will reshape its policies on the basis of more information and experience in the administration of the Act. See 29 U. S. C. § 156. The question whether the Board has changed its view about certain issues or certain industries does not undermine the validity of a rule that is based on substantial evidence and supported by a “reasoned analysis.” See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 42, 67 (1983). The Board’s conclusion that, absent extraordinary circumstances, “acute care hospitals do not differ in substantial, significant ways relating to the appropriateness of units,” App. 189, was based on a “reasoned analysis” of an extensive record. See 463 U. S., at 57. The Board explained that diversity among hospitals had not previously affected the results of bargaining unit determinations and that diversification did not make rulemaking inappropriate. See App. 55-59. The Board justified its selection of the individual bargaining units by detailing the factors that supported generalizations as to the appropriateness of those units. See, e. g., id., at 93-94, 97, 98, 101, 118-120, 123-129, 133-140. The fact that petitioner can point to a hypothetical case in which the rule might lead to an arbitrary result does not render the rule “arbitrary or capricious.” This case is a challenge to the validity of the entire rule in all its applications. We consider it likely that presented with the case of an acute care hospital to which its application would be arbitrary, the Board would conclude that “extraordinary circumstances” justified a departure from the rule. See 29 CFR §§ 103.30(a), (b) (1990). Even assuming, however, that the Board might decline to do so, we cannot conclude the the entire rule is invalid on its face. See Illinois Commerce Commission v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 249 U. S. App. D. C. 389, 393-394, 776 F. 2d 355, 359-360 (1985) (Scalia, J.); Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. United States, 682 F. 2d 1092, 1105 (CA5 1982); cf. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U. S. 230, 247 (1988) (“A statute such as this is not to be held unconstitutional simply because it may be applied in an arbitrary or unfair way in some hypothetical case not before the Court”). In this opinion, we have deliberately avoided any extended comment on the wisdom of the rule, the propriety of the specific unit determinations, or the importance of avoiding work stoppages in acute care hospitals. We have pretermitted such discussion not because these matters are unimportant but because they primarily concern the Board’s exercise of its authority rather than the limited scope of our review of the legal arguments presented by petitioner. Because we find no merit in any of these legal arguments, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. “*By our reference to Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve all of the holdings of that decision.” We further note that the Board’s rule is fully consistent with the two NLRB case holdings expressly approved by the admonition. In one of those cases, the Board refused to approve a bargaining unit composed of only x-ray technicians and instead ruled that all technical workers should be grouped together. See Woodland Park Hospital, Inc., 205 N. L. R. B. 888-889 (1973). In the other case, the Board refused to permit a unit of only two employees. See Four Seasons Nursing Center of Joliet, 208 N. L. R. B. 403 (1974). The current rule authorizes a single unit for all technical workers and prohibits units of fewer than five employees. See 29 CFR § 103.30(a) (1990).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?