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ANDREW G. NELSON, INC., v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 16. Argued December 11, 1957. Decided March 3, 1958. Paul E. Blanchard argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Victor L. Lewis and Edward W. Rothe. Roger Fisher argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Robert W. Ginnane and Isaac K. Hay for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees. Me. Justice Clakk delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns the scope of a contract carrier permit granted appellant by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the “grandfather clause” of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The Commission interpreted “stock in trade of drug stores,” a commodity description in appellant’s permit, to authorize carriage of only those goods which at time of movement are, or are intended to become, part of the stock in trade of a drugstore. On the basis of that interpretation, an appropriate cease and desist order prohibiting carriage of unauthorized goods was entered. 63 M. C. C. 407. After a three-judge District Court refused to enjoin enforcement of the order, 150 F. Supp. 181, direct appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 352 U. S. 905 (1956). For reasons hereinafter stated we affirm the judgment of the District Court. Appellant’s predecessor, Andrew G. Nelson, having operated as a contract carrier before enactment of the Motor Carrier Act, applied for a permit to continue his operation subsequent to passage of the Act, as contemplated by § 209 (a) thereof. The application described Nelson’s complete operation as "transportation ... of store fixtures and miscellaneous merchandise, and household goods of employes, for Walgreen Co., in connection with the opening, closing and remodeling of stores.” In a supporting affidavit Nelson stated that he was “an interstate contract carrier of property for the Walgreen Company and for it alone ... to and from Walgreen Retail Stores . . . the commodities so transported [being] usually store fixtures and equipment and merchandise for the opening stock.” Filed with the affidavit were 17 delivery receipts showing contract carriage for Walgreen in 1934-1935. On March 13, 1942, the Commission issued the permit in controversy without a hearing, relying on the application and supporting papers filed by Nelson. The permit authorized contract carriage of “[n]ew and used store fixtures, new and used household goods, and stock in trade of drug stores” over irregular routes in 10 States. Upon Nelson’s incorporation in 1951, the Commission issued an identical permit to the corporation, the appellant here. In 1954, an investigation by the Commission to determine if appellant was operating beyond the bounds of its permit authority revealed that appellant was carrying a wide range of commodities for many kinds of shippers, including groceries for grocery stores, beer and wine to liquor distributors, dry glue to manufacturers of gummed products, and automobile batteries to department stores. The Commission held that such carriage, all of which appellant attempted to justify under the description “stock in trade of drug stores,” violated § 209 of the Act, which prohibits contract carriage without a permit authorizing the business in question. Appellant contends that the critical language of the permit, “stock in trade of drug stores,” is a generic description of commodities by reference to place of sale, entitling it to transport goods like those stocked by present-day drugstores to any consignee within the authorized operating territory. The Commission, however, regards these words as a description of commodities by reference to intended use, authorizing a more limited carriage: goods moving to a drugstore for sale therein, or if moving elsewhere, then with the intention at the time of movement that they ultimately will become part of the goods stocked by a drugstore. Appellant argues that the intended use of the goods is of no consequence here because (1) intended use restrictions are never applied to commodity descriptions by reference to place of sale, and (2) intended use restrictions were developed by the Commission long after issuance of Nelson’s permit and cannot now be applied retroactively. Finally, having offered evidence of a much more extensive grandfather operation than was set out in Nelson’s application and affidavits, appellant contends that the Commission erred in excluding such evidence. Before considering these contentions, we first note that the plain meaning of words in a commodity description is controlling in the absence of ambiguity or specialized usage in the trade. Neither of the parties believes the description here patently ambiguous, nor do we consider it to be such. Moreover, appellant is unwilling to say that the instant description is a term of art, while the Commission specifically asserts that it is not. Consequently, the ordinary meaning of the words used in the permit is determinative. In ascertaining that meaning, we are not given carte blanche; just as “[t]he precise delineation of an enterprise which seeks the protection of the ‘grandfather’ clause has been reserved for the Commission,” Noble v. United States, 319 U. S. 88, 93 (1943), subsequent construction of the grandfather permit by the Commission is controlling on the courts unless clearly erroneous. Dart Transit Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 110 F. Supp. 876, aff’d, 345 U. S, 980 (1953). In construing “stock in trade of drug stores,” the Commission found the controverted words to be a commodity description" by reference to intended use; it held them equivalent to “drug stores’ stock” and analogized the latter to such descriptions as “contractors’ equipment” or “packing house supplies.” On that basis it required that the goods transported be intended for use by a drugstore as part of its stock in trade. The Commission rejected appellant’s contention that the words of this permit are a description by reference to place of sale. In making that contention appellant equates the permit’s language with “goods such as are sold in drug stores.” It is obvious to us that such a reading enlarges the ordinary meaning of the words. As pointed out by the examiner, 63 M. C. C., at 414, the description used in the permit connotes possession, and therefore lends itself more readily to “drug stores’ stock” than it does to “goods such as are sold in drug stores.” Moreover, an examination of the Commission’s decisions indicates use of a definite and distinctive linguistic pattern whenever descriptions are made by reference to place of sale: if the Commission’s purpose has been to authorize transportation of goods like those named in the permit, that purpose consistently has been revealed by use of the phrase “such as,” or a close variation thereof. Yet there is no such phrase in the present permit. These considerations are bulwarked by the record Nelson put before the Commission in 1942, clearly showing that he was hauling Walgreen’s drugstore stock, and not goods such as might be stocked for sale by Walgreen. On balance, therefore, we are compelled to think the Commission right; certainly it is not clearly wrong. Appellant contends that the permit language cannot embody an intended use restriction because such restrictions were not formulated by the Commission until after issuance of Nelson’s permit and cannot be retroactively applied as a limitation on the same. The Commission challenges the assertion that the intended use restriction was never applied prior to issuance of the permit. It is unnecessary for us to resolve that question, however. Assuming that the intended use test first appeared as a commodity description technique after appellant’s predecessor obtained his permit, we think the Commission still free to interpret the permit as it has done. Its determination accords with the common, ordinary meaning of the words used, and in no way strains or artificializes that meaning. If the controverted words fairly lend themselves now to the construction made here, they always have done so. Consequently, any retroactive application of the intended use test could work no prejudice to appellant; once it is determined that the ordinary meaning of the description is neither more nor less than the Commission’s interpretation, the manner in which the Commission arrived at its conclusion is not controlling. Finally, appellant contends that the Commission’s interpretation limits the actual- — though previously unas-serted — scope of grandfather operations carried on by appellant’s predecessor, thus subverting the substantial parity which a grandfather permit should establish between pre-Act and post-Act operations. Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15 (1942). If this be so, the remedy lies elsewhere: in the event the grandfather permit does not correctly reflect the scope of the grandfather operation, the carrier’s recourse is to petition the Commission to reopen the grandfather proceedings for consideration of the evidence not previously brought to the Commission’s attention. Such a contention is no answer to the present charge of permit violation, since the permit cannot be collaterally attacked. Callarían Road Improvement Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 507 (1953); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Consolidated Freight-ways, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 651. To hold otherwise would render meaningless the congressional requirement of a permit to continue grandfather operations subsequent to the Act. Appellant’s arguments based on noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1011, have no merit. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Douglas dissents. This Act became Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. Section 209 (a), 49 Stat. 552, as amended, 52 Stat. 1238, 64 Stat. 575, 49 U. S. C. §309 (a)(1), makes it unlawful to engage in interstate contract carriage by motor vehicle without a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission; however, the first proviso thereto provides that the Commission shall issue a permit as a matter of course upon application by a carrier for authority to operate a route over which the carrier or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation on July 1, 1935. That proviso is commonly called the “grandfather clause.” Since neither party attaches any significance to certain underscoring of language in the permit, we do not italicize that language. Appellant does argue alternatively that if the Commission’s interpretation is adopted, the description necessarily would be ambiguous. This is a considerable twisting of appellant’s earlier position, consistently maintained throughout these proceedings, that the permit’s phraseology exhibits no ambiguity or indefiniteness. In this regard, the Commission held, “We agree with the contention of the parties and the examiner’s conclusion that there is no such patent ambiguity in the permit as to warrant our going back of it and giving consideration to events prior to its issuance.” 63 M. C. C., at 409. Absent patent ambiguity, it is well established that the Commission will not' refer to the underlying grandfather operation. P. Saldutti & Son, Inc. — Interpretation of Permit, 63 M. C. C. 593. Even if such reference is made here, however, the Nelson application and all the documents filed with it describe an operation solely for the Walgreen Drug Company; appellant admits that all the record evidence before the Commission gives “the impression that Nelson was hauling only for Walgreen.” That background in nowise supports appellant’s position here, since it shows Nelson to have been carrying goods actually destined to become part of the stock of a drugstore, and not merely goods like those stocked by such a store. Although appellant offers evidence now of a grandfather operation more extensive than carriage merely for Walgreen, it seems obvious that the Commission’s intent in issuing the present permit is not to be ascertained from evidence unknown to the Commission at the time of issuance. It is true, of course, that limitations on Commission power to modify motor carrier permits, established in § 212 (a) of the Act, cannot be by-passed under a guise of interpretative action. Commission interpretation of the meaning of a permit, being simply a definitive declaration of what rights existed from the very beginning under the permit, cannot be equated with modification, however, unless found to be clearly erroneous. See C. & H. Transportation Co. — Interpretation of Certificate, 62 M. C. C. 586, holding that “contractors’ equipment and supplies” authorized transportation of such goods only when intended for use by a contractor; transportation of similar goods for use by a branch of the armed services was held unauthorized. See Dart Transit Co. — Modification of Permit, 49 M. C. C. 607, holding that “packing house supplies” means supplies that in fact are intended to be used in a packing house, and not supplies like those used in packing houses. In contending, then, that the Commission erred in applying the intended use test to a commodity description by reference to place of sale, appellant clearly begs the question at issue. Appellant argues that McAteer Contract Carrier Application, 42 M. C. C. 35, equates the phrases “goods such as are sold in” and “stock in trade of.” The opinion’s single use of the latter phrase, however, gives no support to such a contention. See, e. g., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Ratner, 6 CCH Fed. Carriers Cases ¶ 80,415 (“such merchandise as is dealt in by wholesale food business houses”); Anton Vidas Contract Carrier Application, 62 M. C. C. 106 (“such commodities as are sold by retail mail-order houses”); National Trucking Co. Extension — Electrical Appliances, 51 M. C. C. 638 (“such commodities as are dealt in by wholesale and retail hardware stores”); Sanders Extension of Operations, 47 M. C. C. 210 (“such general merchandise as is dealt in by wholesale and retail grocery stores”); McAteer Contract Carrier Application, 42 M. C. C. 35 (“such merchandise as is dealt in by wholesale, retail, and chain grocery and food business houses”); Onondaga Freight Corp. Common Carrier Application, 28 M. C. C. 53 (“such merchandise as is dealt in by retail food stores”); Keystone Transportation Co. Contract Carrier Application, 19 M. C. C. 475 (“such merchandise as is dealt in by wholesale, retail, and chain grocery and food business houses”). Contrast the Commission’s interpretation here with those in Bird Trucking Co. — Modification of Certificate, 61 M. C. C. 311, rev’d, 11 CCH Fed. Carriers Cases ¶ 81,028; Johnson Truck Service v. Salvino, 61 M. C. C. 329, rev’d, 119 F. Supp. 277, on which appellant relies. The intended use test, as applied by the Commission here, is descriptive rather than determinative: it describes the result obtained by taking the language of the permit at face value, and in no sense is a factor in arriving at that result.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T. A. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 08-305. Argued April 28, 2009 Decided June 22, 2009 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 249. Gary Feinerman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard Cohn-Lee, Andrea L. Hungerford, and Eamon P. Joyce. David B. Salmons argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jason R. Scherr, Goutam Patnaik, and Mary E. Broadhursk Eric D. Miller argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Acting Assistant Attorney General King, Deputy Solicitor General Katyal, Mark L. Gross, Karl N. Gellert, and Philip H. Rosenfelk Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of New York by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, Michael Best, Edward F. X. Hart, and Drake A. Colley; for the Council of the Great City Schools by Julie Wright Halbert, Pamela A. Harris, and Shannon M. Pazur; for the National Education Association by John M. West, Robert H. Chanin, and Michael D. Simpson; for the National School Boards Association et al. by Maree F. Sneed, John W Borkowski, Audrey J. Anderson, Francisco M. Negron, Jr., and Naomi Gittins; for the New York State School Boards Association by Jay Worona and Pilar Sokol; and for the U. S. Conference of Mayors et al. by Richard Ruda and Donald B. Ayer. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Autism Speaks by Robert H. Pees and Gary S. Mayerson; for the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates by Ankur J. Goel and Tamu K. Floyd; for the Disability Rights Legal Center et al. by Terri D. Keville and Deborah A. Dorfman; and for the National Disability Rights Network et al. by Brian R. Matsui, Seth M. Galanter, and Linda A. Arnsbarger. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., requires States receiving federal funding to make a “free appropriate public education” (EAPE) available to all children with disabilities residing in the State, § 1412(a)(1)(A). We have previously held that when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the school district’s consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education. See School Comm, of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 370 (1985). The question presented in this ease is whether the IDEA Amendments of 1997 (Amendments), 111 Stat. 37, categorically prohibit reimbursement for private-education costs if a child has not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). We hold that the Amendments impose no such categorical bar. I Respondent T. A. attended public schools in the Forest Grove School District (School District or District) from the time he was in kindergarten through the winter of his junior year of high school. From kindergarten through eighth grade, respondent’s teachers observed that he had trouble paying attention in class and completing his assignments. When respondent entered high school, his difficulties increased. In December 2000, during respondent’s freshman year, his mother contacted the school counselor to discuss respondent’s problems with his schoolwork. At the end of the school year, respondent was evaluated by a school psychologist. After interviewing him, examining his school records, and administering cognitive ability tests, the psychologist concluded that respondent did not need further testing for any learning disabilities or other health impairments, including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The psychologist and two other school officials discussed the evaluation results with respondent’s mother in June 2001, and all agreed that respondent did not qualify for special-education services. Respondent’s parents did not seek review of that decision, although the hearing examiner later found that the School District’s evaluation was legally inadequate because it failed to address all areas of suspected disability, including ADHD. With extensive help from his family, respondent completed his sophomore year at Forest Grove High School, but his problems worsened during his junior year. In February 2003, respondent’s parents discussed with the School District the possibility of respondent completing high school through a partnership program with the local community college. They also sought private professional advice, and in March 2003 respondent was diagnosed with ADHD and a number of disabilities related to learning and memory. Advised by the private specialist that respondent would do best in a structured, residential learning environment, respondent’s parents enrolled him at a private academy that focuses on educating children with special needs. Four days after enrolling him in private school, respondent’s parents hired a lawyer to ascertain their rights and to give the School District written notice of respondent’s private placement. A few weeks later, in April 2003, respondent’s parents requested an administrative due process hearing regarding respondent’s eligibility for special-education services. In June 2003, the District engaged a school psychologist to assist in determining whether respondent had a disability that significantly interfered with his educational performance. Respondent’s parents cooperated with the District during the evaluation process. In July 2003, a multidisciplinary team met to discuss whether respondent satisfied IDEA’S disability criteria and concluded that he did not because his ADHD did not have a sufficiently significant adverse impact on his educational performance. Because the School District maintained that respondent was not eligible for special-education services and therefore declined to provide an individualized education program (IEP), respondent’s parents left him enrolled at the private academy for his senior year. The administrative review process resumed in September 2003. After considering the parties’ evidence, including the testimony of numerous experts, the hearing officer issued a decision in January 2004 finding that respondent’s ADHD adversely affected his educational performance and that the School District failed to meet its obligations under IDEA in not identifying respondent as a student eligible for special-education services. Because the District did not offer respondent a FAPE and his private-school placement was appropriate under IDEA, the hearing officer ordered the District to reimburse respondent’s parents for the cost of the private-school tuition. The School District sought judicial review pursuant to § 1415(i)(2), arguing that the hearing officer erred in granting reimbursement. The District Court accepted the hearing officer’s findings of fact but set aside the reimbursement award after finding that the 1997 Amendments categorically bar reimbursement of private-school tuition for students who have not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.” §612(a)(10)(C)(ii), 111 Stat. 63, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The District Court further held that, “[e]ven assuming that tuition reimbursement may be ordered in an extreme case for a student not receiving special education services, under general principles of equity where the need for special education was obvious to school authorities,” the facts of this case do not support equitable relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court first noted that, prior to the 1997 Amendments, “IDEA was silent on the subject of private school reimbursement, but courts had granted such reimbursement as ‘appropriate’ relief under principles of equity pursuant to 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).” 523 F. 3d 1078, 1085 (2008) (citing Burlington, 471 U. S., at 370). It then held that the Amendments do not impose a categorical bar to reimbursement when a parent unilaterally places in private school a child who has not previously received special-education services through the public school. Rather, such students “are eligible for reimbursement, to the same extent as before the 1997 amendments, as ‘appropriate’ relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).” 523 F. 3d, at 1087-1088. The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court’s analysis of the equities as resting on two legal errors. First, because it found that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) generally bars relief in these circumstances, the District Court wrongly stated that relief was appropriate only if the equities were sufficient to “ ‘override’ ” that statutory limitation. The District Court also erred in asserting that reimbursement is limited to “ ‘extreme’ ” cases. Id., at 1088 (emphasis deleted). The Court of Appeals therefore remanded with instructions to reexamine the equities, including the failure of respondent’s parents to notify the School District before removing respondent from public school. In dissent, Judge Rymer stated her view that reimbursement is not available as an equitable remedy in this case because respondent’s parents did not request an IEP before removing him from public school, and respondent’s right to a FAPE was therefore not at issue. Because the Courts of Appeals that have considered this question have reached inconsistent results, we granted certiorari to determine whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) establishes a categorical bar to tuition reimbursement for students who have not previously received special-education services under the authority of a public education agency. 555 U. S. 1130 (2009). II Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for a unanimous Court in Burlington provides the pertinent background for our analysis of the question presented. In that case, respondent challenged the appropriateness of the IEP developed for his child by public-school officials. The child had previously received special-education services through the public school. While administrative review was pending, private specialists advised respondent that the child would do best in a specialized private educational setting, and respondent enrolled the child in private school without the school district’s consent. The hearing officer concluded that the IEP was not adequate to meet the child’s educational needs and that the school district therefore failed to provide the child a FAPE. Finding also that the private-school placement was appropriate under IDEA, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse respondent for the cost of the private-school tuition. We granted certiorari in Burlington to determine whether IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private education when a parent or guardian unilaterally enrolls a child in private school because the public school has proposed an inadequate IEP and thus failed to provide a FAPE. The Act at that time made no express reference to the possibility of reimbursement, but it authorized a court to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). In determining the scope of the relief authorized, we noted that “the ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the court” and that, absent any indication to the contrary, what relief is “appropriate” must be determined in light of the Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through publicly funded private-school placements when necessary. 471 U. S., at 369. Accordingly, we held that the provision’s grant of authority includes “the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.” Ibid. Our decision rested in part on the fact that administrative and judicial review of a parent’s complaint often takes years. We concluded that, having mandated that participating States provide a FAPE for every student, Congress could not have intended to require parents to either accept an inadequate public-school education pending adjudication of their claim or bear the cost of a private education if the court ultimately determined that the private placement was proper under the Act. Id., at 370. Eight years later, we unanimously reaffirmed the availability of reimbursement in Florence County School Dish Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7 (1993) (holding that reimbursement may be appropriate even when a child is placed in a private school that has not been approved by the State). The dispute giving rise to the present litigation differs from those in Burlington and Carter in that it concerns not the adequacy of a proposed IEP but the School District’s failure to provide an IEP at all. And, unlike respondent, the children in those cases had previously received public special-education services. These differences are insignificant, however, because our analysis in the earlier cases depended on the language and purpose of the Act and not the particular facts involved. Moreover, when a child requires special-education services, a school district’s failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP. It is thus clear that the reasoning of Burlington and Carter applies equally to this case. The only question is whether the 1997 Amendments require a different result. Ill Congress enacted IDEA in 1970 to ensure that all children with disabilities are provided “ ‘a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of [such] children and their parents or guardians are protected.’” Burlington, 471 U. S., at 367 (quoting 20 U. S. C. § 1400(c) (1982 ed.), now codified as amended at §§ 1400(d)(1)(A), (B)). After examining the States’ progress under IDEA, Congress found in 1997 that substantial gains had been made in the area of special education but that more needed to be done to guarantee children with disabilities adequate access to appropriate services. See S. Rep. No. 105-17, p. 5 (1997). The 1997 Amendments were intended “to place greater emphasis on improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality public education.” Id., at 3. Consistent with that goal, the Amendments preserved the Act’s purpose of providing a FAPE to all children with disabilities. And they did not change the text of the provision we considered in Burlington, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which gives courts broad authority to grant “appropriate” relief, including reimbursement for the cost of private special education when a school district fails to provide a FAPE. “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978). Accordingly, absent a clear expression elsewhere in the Amendments of Congress’ intent to repeal some portion of that provision or to abrogate our decisions in Burlington and Carter, we will continue to read § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize the relief respondent seeks. The School District and the dissent argue that one of the provisions enacted by the Amendments, § 1412(a)(10)(C), effects such a repeal. Section 1412(a)(10)(C) is entitled “Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency,” and it sets forth a number of principles applicable to public reimbursement for the costs of unilateral private-school placements. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) states that IDEA “does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education ... of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child” and his parents nevertheless elected to place him in a private school. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) then provides that a “court or hearing officer may require [a public] agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of [private-school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available” and the child has “previously received special education and related services under the authority of [the] agency.” Finally, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) discusses circumstances under which the “cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii) may be reduced or denied,” as when a parent fails to give 10 days’ notice before removing a child from public school or refuses to make a child available for evaluation, and § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) lists circumstances in which a parent’s failure to give notice may or must be excused. Looking primarily to clauses (i) and (ii), the School District argues that Congress intended § 1412(a)(10)(C) to provide the exclusive source of authority for courts to order reimbursement when parents unilaterally enroll a child in private school. According to the District, clause (i) provides a safe harbor for school districts that provide a FAPE by foreclosing reimbursement in those circumstances. Clause (ii) then sets forth the circumstance in which reimbursement is appropriate — namely, when a school district fails to provide a FAPE to a child who has previously received special-education services through the public school. The District contends that because § 1412(a)(10)(C) only discusses reimbursement for children who have previously received special-education services through the public school, IDEA only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance. The dissent agrees. For several reasons, we find this argument unpersuasive. First, the School District’s reading of the Act is not supported by its text and context, as the 1997 Amendments do not expressly prohibit reimbursement under the circumstances of this case, and the District offers no evidence that Congress intended to supersede our decisions in Burlington and Carter. Clause (i)’s safe harbor explicitly bars reimbursement only when a school district makes a FAPE available by correctly identifying a child as having a disability and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs. The clause says nothing about the availability of reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE. Indeed, its statement that reimbursement is not authorized when a school district provides a FAPE could be read to indicate that reimbursement is authorized when a school district does not fulfill that obligation. Clause (ii) likewise does not support the District’s position. Because that clause is phrased permissively, stating only that courts “may require” reimbursement in those circumstances, it does not foreclose reimbursement awards in other circumstances. Together with clauses (iii) and (iv), clause (ii) is best read as elaborating on the general rule that courts may order reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that may affect a reimbursement award in the common situation in which a school district has provided a child with some special-education services and the child’s parents believe those services are inadequate. Referring as they do to students who have previously received special-education services through a public school, clauses (ii) through (iv) are premised on a history of cooperation and together encourage school districts and parents to continue to cooperate in developing and implementing an appropriate IEP before resorting to a unilateral private placement. The clauses of § 1412(a)(10)(C) are thus best read as elucidative rather than exhaustive. Cf. United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U. S. 128, 137 (2007) (noting that statutory language may “perfor[m] a significant function simply by clarifying” a provision’s meaning). This reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C) is necessary to avoid the conclusion that Congress abrogated sub silentio our decisions in Burlington and Carter. In those cases, we construed § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s private-school placement is appropriate, without regard to the child’s prior receipt of services. It would take more than Congress’ failure to comment on the category of cases in which a child has not previously received special-education services for us to conclude that the Amendments substantially superseded our decisions and in large part repealed § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). See Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“[A]bsent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We accordingly adopt the reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C) that is consistent with those decisions. The School District’s reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C) is also at odds with the general remedial purpose underlying IDEA and the 1997 Amendments. The express purpose of the Act is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs,” § 1400(d)(1)(A) — a factor we took into account in construing the scope of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), see Burlington, 471 U. S., at 369. Without the remedy respondent seeks, a “child’s right to a free appropriate education . . . would be less than complete.” Id., at 370. The District’s position similarly conflicts with IDEA’S “child find” requirement, pursuant to which States are obligated to “identif[y], locat[e], and evaluat[e]” “[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the State” to ensure that they receive needed special-education services. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii). A reading of the Act that left parents without an adequate remedy when a school district unreasonably failed to identify a child with disabilities would not comport with Congress’ acknowledgment of the paramount importance of properly identifying each child eligible for services. Indeed, by immunizing a school district’s refusal to find a child eligible for special-education services no matter how compelling the child’s need, the School District’s interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C) would produce a rule bordering on the irrational. It would be particularly strange for the Act to provide a remedy, as all agree it does, when a school district offers a child inadequate special-education services but to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situation in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such services altogether. That IDEA affords parents substantial procedural safeguards, including the right to challenge a school district’s eligibility determination and obtain prospective relief, see post, at 258-259, is no answer. We roundly rejected that argument in Burlington, observing that the “review process is ponderous” and therefore inadequate to ensure that a school’s failure to provide a FAPE is remedied with the speed necessary to avoid detriment to the child’s education. 471 U. S., at 370. Like Burlington, see ibid., this case vividly demonstrates the problem of delay, as respondent’s parents first sought a due process hearing in April 2003, and the District Court issued its decision in May 2005 — almost a year after respondent graduated from high school. The dissent all but ignores these shortcomings of IDEA’S procedural safeguards. IV The School District advances two additional arguments for reading the Act to foreclose reimbursement in this case. First, the District contends that because IDEA was an exercise of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 1, any conditions attached to a State’s acceptance of funds must be stated unambiguously. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Applying that principle, we held in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 304 (2006), that IDEA’S fee-shifting provision, § 1415(i)(3)(B), does not authorize courts to award expert-services fees to prevailing parents in IDEA actions because the Act does not put States on notice of the possibility of such awards. But Arlington is readily distinguishable from this case. In accepting IDEA funding, States expressly agree to provide a FAPE to all children with disabilities. See § 1412(a)(1)(A). An order awarding reimbursement of private-education costs when a school district fails to provide a FAPE merely requires the district “to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along.” Burlington, 471 U. S., at 370-371. And States have in any event been on notice at least since our decision in Burlington that IDEA authorizes courts to order reimbursement of the costs of private special-education services in appropriate circumstances. Pennhurst’s notice requirement is thus clearly satisfied. Finally, the District urges that respondent’s reading of the Act will impose a substantial financial burden on public-school districts and encourage parents to immediately enroll their children in private school without first endeavoring to cooperate with the school district. The dissent echoes this concern. See post, at 258. For several reasons, those fears are unfounded. Parents “are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the Act.” Carter, 510 U. S., at 15. And even then courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant — for instance, if the parents failed to give the school district adequate notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school. In considering the equities, courts should generally presume that public-school officials are properly performing their obligations under IDEA. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 62-63 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring). As a result of these criteria and the fact that parents who “ ‘unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk,’ ” Carter, 510 U. S., at 15 (quoting Burlington, 471 U. S., at 373-374), the incidence of private-school placement at public expense is quite small, see Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae 13-14. V The IDEA Amendments of 1997 did not modify the text of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and we do not read § 1412(a)(10)(C) to alter that provision’s meaning. Consistent with our decisions in Burlington and Carter, we conclude that IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education or related services through the public school. When a court or hearing officer concludes that a school district failed to provide a PAPE and the private placement was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors, including the notice provided by the parents and the school district’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s private education is warranted. As the Court of Appeals noted, the District Court did not properly consider the equities in this case and will need to undertake that analysis on remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX Title 20 U. S. C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) provides: “(C) Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency “(i) In general “Subject to subparagraph (A), this subchapter does not require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility. “(ii) Reimbursement for private school placement “If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. “(iii) Limitation on reimbursement “The cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii) may be reduced or denied— “(I) if- “(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended prior to removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not inform the IEP Team that they were rejecting the placement proposed by the public agency to provide a free appropriate public education to their child, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense; or “(bb) 10 business days (including any holidays that occur on a business day) prior to the removal of the child from the public school, the parents did not give written notice to the public agency of the information described in item (aa); “(II) if, prior to the parents’ removal of the child from the public school, the public agency informed the parents, through the notice requirements described in section 1415(b)(3) of this title, of its intent to evaluate the child (including a statement of the purpose of the evaluation that was appropriate and reasonable), but the parents did not make the child available for such evaluation; or “(III) upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by the parents.” An IEP is an education plan tailored to a child’s unique needs that is designed by the school district in consultation with the child’s parents after the child is identified as eligible for special-education services. See 20 U. S. C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). Although it was respondent’s parents who initially sought reimbursement, when respondent reached the age of majority in 2003 his parents’ rights under IDEA transferred to him pursuant to Ore. Admin. Rule 581-015-2325(1) (2008). Compare Frank G. v. Board of Ed. of Hyde Park, 459 F. 3d 356, 376 (CA2 2006) (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not bar reimbursement for students who have not previously received public special-education services), and M. M. v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade-Cty., Fla., 437 F. 3d 1085, 1099 (CA11 2006) (per curiam) (same), with Greenland School Dish v. Amy N., 358 F. 3d 150, 159-160 (CA1 2004) (finding reimbursement barred in those circumstances). We previously granted certiorari to address this question in Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of New York v. Tom F., 552 U. S. 1 (2007), in which we affirmed without opinion the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by an equally divided vote. At the time we decided Burlington, that provision was codified at § 1415(e)(2). The 1997 Amendments renumbered the provision but did not alter its text. For ease of reference, we refer to the provision by its current section number, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). The legislation was enacted as the Education of the Handicapped Act, Title VI of Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175, and was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990, see § 901(a)(3), Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142. The full text of § 1412(a)(10)(C) is set forth in the Appendix, infra, at 248. The dissent asserts that, under this reading of the Act, “Congress has called for reducing reimbursement only for the most deserving . . . but provided no mechanism to reduce reimbursement to the least deserving.” Post, at 254 (opinion of Souter, J.). In addition to making unsubstantiated generalizations about the desert of parents whose children have been denied public special-education services, the dissent grossly mischaracterizes our view of § 1412(a)(10)(C). The fact that clause (iii) permits a court to reduce a reimbursement award when a parent whose child has previously received special-education services fails to give the school adequate notice of an intended private placement does not mean that it prohibits courts from similarly reducing the amount of reimbursement when a parent whose child has not previously received services fails to give such notice. Like clause (ii), clause (iii) provides guidance regarding the appropriateness of relief in a common factual scenario, and its instructions should not be understood to preclude courts and hearing officers from considering similar factors in other scenarios. In arguing that § 1412(a)(10)(C) is the exclusive source of authority for granting reimbursement awards to parents who unilaterally place a child in private school, the dissent neglects to explain that provision’s failure to limit the type of private-school placements for which parents may be reimbursed. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359 (1985), held that courts may grant reimbursement under § 1415(i) (2) (C) (iii) only when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate. See id., at 369; see Florence County School Dish Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, 12-13 (1993). The latter requirement is essential to ensuring that reimbursement awards are granted only when such relief furthers the purposes of the Act. See Burlington, 471 U. S., at 369. That § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not codify that requirement further indicates that Congress did not intend that provision to supplant § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) as the sole authority on reimbursement awards but rather meant to augment the latter provision and our decisions construing it. As discussed above, although the children in Burlington and Carter had previously received special-education services in public school, our decisions in no way depended on their prior receipt of services. Those holdings rested instead on the breadth of the authority conferred by § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), the interest in providing relief consistent with the Act’s purpose, and the injustice that a contrary reading would produce, see Burlington, 471 U. S., at 369-370; see also Carter, 510 U. S., at 12-14 — considerations that were not altered by the 1997 Amendments. For the same reason, we reject the District’s argument that because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) authorizes “a court or a hearing officer” to award reimbursement for private-school tuition, whereas § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) only provides a general grant of remedial authority to “court[s],” the latter section cannot be read to authorize hearing officers to award reimbursement. That argument ignores our decision in Burlington, 471 U. S., at 363, 370, which interpreted § 1415(i) (2) (C) (iii) to authorize hearing officers as well as courts to award reimbursement notwithstanding the provision’s silence with regard to hearing officers. When Congress amended IDEA without altering the text of § 1415 (i) (2) (C)(iii), it implicitly adopted that construction of the statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). Looking to the Amendments’ legislative history for support, the School District cites two House and Senate Reports that essentially restate the text of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), H. R. Rep. No. 105-95, pp. 92-93 (1997); S. Rep. No. 105-17, p. 13 (1997), and a floor statement by Representative Mike Castle, 143 Cong. Rec. 8013 (1997) (stating that the “bill makes it harder for parents to unilaterally place a child in elite private schools at public taxpayer expense, lowering costs to local school districts”). Those ambiguous references do not undermine the meaning that we discern from the statute’s language and context. Notably, the agency charged with implementing IDEA has adopted respondent’s reading of the statute. In commentary to regulations implementing the 1997 Amendments, the Department of Education stated that “hearing officers and courts retain their authority, recognized in Burlington ... to award ‘appropriate’ relief if a public agency has failed to provide FAPE, including reimbursement ... in instances in which the child has not yet received special education and related services.” 64 Fed. Reg. 12602 (1999); see 71 Fed. Reg. 46599 (2006).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WEST, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS v. GIBSON No. 98-238. Argued April 26, 1999 — Decided June 14, 1999 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scaiia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 224. Barbara McDowell argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Marleigh D. Dover, and Steven I. Frank. Timothy M. Kelly argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mark D. Roth and Joseph F. Henderson filed a brief for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-GIO, as amicus curiae urging reversal. Edward H. Passman and Paula A. Brantmr filed a brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this ease is whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) possesses the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Stat. 121, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. We conclude that the EEOC does have that authority. I A Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination. In 1972 Congress extended Title VII so that it applies not only to employment in the private sector, but to employment in the Federal Government as well. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. Ill, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16. This 1972 Title VII extension, found in §717 of Title VII, has three relevant subsections. The first subsection, § 717(a), sets forth the basic Federal Government employment antidiscrimination standard. It says that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment [of specified Government agencies and departments] shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(a). The second subsection, § 717(b), provides the EEOC with the power to enforce the standard. It says (among other things) that “the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) .. . through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section ....” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(b) (emphasis added). The third subsection, § 717(c), concerns a court’s authority to enforce the standard. It says that, after an agency or the EEOC takes final action on a complaint (or fails to take action within a certain time), “an employee or applicant [who is still] aggrieved . . . may file a civil action as provided in section [706, dealing with discrimination by private employers], in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(e). In 1991 Congress again amended Title VIL The amendment relevant here permits victims of intentional employment discrimination (whether within the private sector or the Federal Government) to recover compensatory damages. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(1). The relevant portion of that amendment, which we shall call the Compensatory Damages Amendment (CDA), says: “In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 [dealing with discrimination by private employers] or 717 [dealing with discrimination by the Federal Government] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination ... , the complaining party may recover compensatory... damages-” 42 U.S. C. § 1981a(a)(1). The CDA also sets forth certain conditions and exceptions. It imposes, for example, a cap on compensatory damages (of up to $300,000 for large employers, § 1981a(b)(3)(D)). And it adds: “If a complaining party seeks compensatory .. . damages under this section ... any party may demand a trial by jury . . . §1981a(c). Once the CDA became law, the EEOC began to grant compensatory damages awards in Federal Government employment discrimination cases. Compare 29 CFR pt. 1613, App. A (1990) (no reference to compensatory damages in preamendment list of EEOC remedies), with, e. g., Jackson v. Runyon, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399, p. 3 (Nov. 12, 1992) (“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1991... makes compensatory damages available to federal sector complainants in the administrative process”). B Respondent, Michael Gibson, filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs charging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. The EEOC, however, subsequently found in Gibson’s favor and awarded the promotion plus backpay. Three months later Gibson filed a complaint in Federal District Court, asking the court to order the Department to comply immediately with the EEOC’s order and also to pay compensatory damages. Complaint ¶ 17 (App. 28). The Department then voluntarily complied with the EEOC’s order, but it continued to oppose Gibson’s claim for compensatory damages. Eventually, the District Court dismissed Gibson’s compensatory damages claim. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court’s dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; hence, he could not bring that claim in court. Gibson v. Brown, 137 F. 3d 992, 994 (CA7 1998). The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the District Court’s dismissal. It rejected the Department’s argument because, in its view, the EEOC lacked the legal power to award compensatory damages; consequently there was no administrative remedy to exhaust. Id., at 995-998. Because the Circuits have disagreed about whether the EEOC has the power to award compensatory damages, compare Fitzgerald v. Secretary, Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 121 F. 3d 203, 207 (CA5 1997) (EEOC may award compensatory damages), with Crawford v. Babbitt, 148 F. 3d 1318, 1326 (CA11 1998) (EEOC cannot award compensatory damages), and 137 F. 3d, at 996-998 (same), we granted certiorari in order to decide that question. II The language, purposes, and history of the 1972 Title VII extension and the 1991 CDA convince us that Congress has authorized the EEOC to award compensatory damages in Federal Government employment discrimination cases. Read literally, the language of the statutes is consistent with a grant of that authority. The relevant portion of the Title VII extension, namely, § 717(b), says that the EEOC “shall have authority” to enforce § 717(a) “through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(b). After enactment of the 1991 CDA, an award of compensatory damages is a “remedy” that is “appropriate.” We recognize that § 717(b) explicitly mentions certain equitable remedies, namely, reinstatement, hiring, and back-pay, and it does not explicitly refer to compensatory damages. But the preceding word “including” makes clear that the authorization is not limited to the specified remedies there mentioned; and the 1972 Title VII extension’s choice of examples is not surprising, for in 1972 (and until 1991) Title VII itself authorized only equitable remedies. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(g) (private sector discrimination); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16 (federal sector discrimination). Section 717’s language, however, does not freeze the scope of the word “appropriate” as of 1972. Words in statutes can enlarge or contract their scope as other changes, in law or in the world, require their application to new instances or make old applications anachronistic. See, e. g., Browder v. United States, 312 U. S. 335, 339-340 (1941) (new, unforeseen “use” of passport); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157, 172-173 (1968) (cable television as “communications”); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U. S. 390, 395-396 (1968) (old statutory language read to reflect technological change). The meaning of the word “appropriate” permits its scope to expand to include Title VII remedies that were not appropriate before 1991, but in light of legal change are appropriate now. The word “including” makes clear that “appropriate remedies” are not limited to the examples that follow that word. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 189 (1941). And in context the word “appropriate” most naturally refers to forms of relief that Title VII itself authorizes — at least where that relief is of a kind that agencies typically can provide. Thus, Congress’ decision in the 1991 CDA to permit a “complaining party” to “recover compensatory damages” in “an action brought under section ... 717,” by adding compensatory damages to Title VII’s arsenal of remedies, could make that form of relief “appropriate” under § 717(b) as well. An examination of the purposes of the 1972 Title VII extension shows that this permissible reading of the language is also the correct reading. Section 717’s general purpose is to remedy discrimination in federal employment. It does so in part by creating a dispute resolution system that requires a complaining party to pursue administrative relief prior to court action, thereby encouraging quicker, less formal, and less expensive resolution of disputes within the Federal Government and outside of court. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16(c) (court action permitted only where complainant disagrees with final agency disposition or, if complainant pursued discretionary appeal to EEOC, with EEOC disposition; or if either agency or EEOC disposition is delayed); Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 833 (1976) (discussing § 717’s “rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements”); see also 29 CFR § 1614.105(a) (1998) (requiring complainant initially to notify agency and make effort to resolve matter informally); § 1614.106(d)(2) (requiring agency investigation prior to EEOC consideration). To deny that an EEOC compensatory damages award is, statutorily speaking, “appropriate” would undermine this remedial scheme. It would force into court matters that the EEOC might otherwise have resolved. And by preventing earlier resolution of a dispute, it would increase the burdens of both time and expense that accompany efforts to resolve hundreds, if not thousands, of such disputes each year. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Federal Sector Report on EEC Complaints Processing and Appeals by Federal Agencies for Fiscal Year 1997, pp. 19, 61 (1998) (28,947 Federal Government employment discrimination claims filed in 1997; 7,112 claims appealed to EEOC); Reply Brief for Petitioner 12-13, n. 9 (estimating “hundreds” of cases each year that involve claims for compensatory damages). The history of the CDA reinforces this point. The CDA’s sponsors and supporters spoke frequently of the need to create a new remedy in order, for example, to “help make victims whole.” H. R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, pp. 64-65 (1991); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, §2, 105 Stat. 1071, 42 U. S. C. §1981 note (congressional finding that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter . . . intentional discrimination in the workplace”); id., §3 (one purpose of Act is “to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination ... in the workplace”); 137 Cong. Rec. 28636-28638, 28663-28667, 28676-28680 (1991) (introduction and discussion of Danforth/Kennedy Amendment No. 1274, in relevant part permitting recovery of compensatory damages); id., at 28880-28881 (statements of Sen. Warner and Sen. Kennedy) (clarifying that Danforth/Kennedy amendment covers federal employees and suggesting amendment to this effect). But the CDA’s sponsors and supporters said nothing about limiting the EEOC’s ability to use the new Title VII remedy or suggesting that it would be desirable to distinguish the new Title VII remedy from old Title VII remedies in that respect. This total silence is not surprising. What reason could there be for Congress, anxious to have the EEOC consider as a preliminary matter every other possible remedy, not to want the EEOC similarly to consider compensatory damages as well? Respondent makes three important arguments in favor of a more limited interpretation of the statutes — an interpretation that would deprive the EEOC of the power to award compensatory damages. First, respondent points out that the CDA says nothing about the EEOC, or EEOC proceedings, but rather states only that a complaining party may recover compensatory damages “in an action brought under section ... 717.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(1) (emphasis added). And the word “action” often refers to judicial cases, not to administrative “proceedings.” See New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54,60-62 (1980) (distinguishing civil “actions” from administrative “proceedings”). Had Congress thought it important so to limit the scope of the CDA, however, it could easily have cross-referenced § 717(c), the civil action subsection itself, rather than cross-referencing the whole of § 717, which includes authorization for the EEOC to enforce the section through “appropriate remedies.” Regardless, the question, as we see it, is whether, by using the word “action,” Congress intended to deny that compensatory damages is “appropriate” administrative relief within the terms of § 717(b). In light of the previous discussion, see supra, at 217-220, we do not believe the simple use of the word “action” in the context of a cross-reference to the whole of §717 indicates an intent to deprive the EEOC of that authority. Second, in an effort to explain why Congress might have wanted to impose a special EEOC-related limitation in respect to compensatory damages, respondent points to the language in the CDA that says: “If a complaining party seeks compensatory ... damages under this section ... any party may demand a trial by jury.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(c) (emphasis added). Respondent notes that an EEOC compensatory damages award would not involve a jury. And an agency cannot proceed to court under § 717(c) because that subsection makes a court action available only to an aggrieved complaining party, not to the agency. §2000e-16(e). Thus, respondent concludes that the CDA must implicitly forbid any such EEOC award, for that award would take place without the jury trial that § 1981a(c) guarantees. This argument, however, draws too much from too little. One easily can read the jury trial provision in § 1981a(c) as simply guaranteeing either party a jury trial in respect to compensatory damages if a complaining party proceeds to court under § 717(c). The words “under this section” in § 1981a(c) support that interpretation, for “this section,” § 1981a, refers primarily to court proceedings. And there is no reason to believe Congress intended more. The history of the jury trial provision suggests that Congress saw the provision primarily as a benefit to complaining parties, not to the Government. See, e. g., 137 Cong. Rec., at 29051-29052 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (for “the first time, women and the disabled could recover damages and have jury trials for claims of intentional discrimination”); id., at 30668 (statement of Rep. Ford) (provision will “provid[e] all victims of intentional discrimination a right to trial by jury”); see also, e. g., id., at 29053-29054 (statement of Sen. Wallop) (discussing “economically devastating lawsuits”); id., at 29041 (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (relating fears about “runaway juries]”). The fact that Congress permits an employee to file a complaint in court, but forbids the agency to challenge an adverse EEOC decision in court, also suggests that Congress was not inordinately and unusually concerned -with invoking special judicial safeguards to protect the Government. Finally, respondent argues that insofar as the law permits the EEOC to award compensatory damages, it waives the Government’s sovereign immunity, and we must construe any such waiver narrowly. See Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996); Lehman v. Nakshian, 458 U. S. 156, 160-161 (1981). There is no dispute, however, that the CDA waives sovereign immunity in respect to an award of compensatory damages. Whether, in light of that waiver, the CDA permits the EEOC to consider the same matter at an earlier phase of the employment discrimination claim is a distinct question concerning how the waived damages remedy is to be administered. Because the relationship of this kind of administrative question to the goals and purposes of the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be unclear, ordinary sovereign immunity presumptions may not apply. In the Secretary’s view here, for example, the EEOC’s preliminary consideration, by lowering the costs of resolving disputes, does not threaten, but helps to protect, the public fisc. Regardless, if we must apply a specially strict standard in such a case, which question we need not decide, that standard is met here. We believe that the statutory language, taken together with statutory purposes, history, and the absence of any convincing reason for denying the EEOC the relevant power, produce evidence of a waiver that satisfies the stricter standard. For these reasons, we conclude that the EEOC possesses the legal authority to enforce § 717 through an award of compensatory damages. III Respondent asks us to affirm on alternative grounds the Seventh Circuit’s judgment permitting his case to proceed in the District Court. The Seventh Circuit considered whether Gibson had “asked the EEOC for compensatory damages.” 137 F. 3d, at 994. It added that if “he did, then the government’s failure-to-exhaust argument obviously is a non-starter.” Ibid. But the Court of Appeals concluded that Gibson did not “put the EEOC on notice that he was seeking compensatory damages.” Ibid. Respondent claims that he can proceed in District Court because he did satisfy the law’s exhaustion requirements, even if the EEOC has the legal power to award compensatory damages and even if he did not give notice to the EEOC that he sought compensatory damages. He argues that is so because (1) the requirement of notice for exhaustion purposes is unusually weak in respect to compensatory damages, (2) he did request a “monetary cash award,” and (3) special circumstances estop the Government from asserting a “no exhaustion” claim in this case. These matters fall outside the scope of the question presented in the Government’s petition for certiorari. See Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 525 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1999) (per curiam). We remand the case so that the Court of Appeals can determine whether these questions have been properly raised and, if so, decide them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOOSTER LODGE NO. 405, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. No. 71-1417. Argued March 26, 1973 Decided May 21, 1973 Bernard Dunau argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Plato E. Papps, Louis P. Poulton, and C. Paul Barker. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Harriet S. Shapiro, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, and Patrick Hardin. Samuel Lang argued the cause for respondent Boeing Co. With him on the brief were C. Dale Stout and Frederick A. Kullman. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. Milton Smith, Gerard C. Smetana, and Jerry Kronenberg filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Per Curiam. In this companion case to NLRB v. Boeing Go., ante, p. 67, we must decide whether our decision in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213, authorizes the Board to find that a union commits an unfair labor practice in seeking court enforcement of fines imposed for strikebreaking activities by employees who have resigned from the union, even though the union constitution expressly prohibits members from strikebreaking. We hold that it does. On September 16, 1965, the day after the expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement between Booster Lodge No. 405, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union), and the Boeing Co. (the Company), the Union called a lawful strike and picketed the Company’s Michoud, Louisiana, plant to further its demands for a new contract. The strike continued for 18 days, during which time 143 of the 1,900 production and maintenance employees represented by the Union crossed the picket line to work. All of these employees had been members of the Union before the strike, but 61 resigned their membership prior to returning to work and another 58 resigned after they returned to work. These resignations were tendered in registered or certified letters to the Union. Neither its constitution nor its bylaws contained any provision expressly permitting or forbidding such resignations. The strike ended on October 4, 1965, after ratification of a new collective-bargaining agreement by the Union membership. During late October and early November, the Union notified all employees who had crossed the picket line to work during the strike that charges had been preferred against them under the Union constitution for “Improper Conduct of a Member” because of their having “accept[ed] employment ... in an establishment where a strike or lockout exist [ed].” They were advised of the dates of their Union trials, which were to be held even in their absence, and of their right to be represented by any counsel who was a member of the International Union. Fines were imposed on all employees who had worked during the strike without regard to whether or not such employees had resigned or had remained members. None of the disciplined employees processed intra-union appeals. To the extent that fines were not paid, the Union sent written notices to the offending employees stating that the matter had been referred to an attorney for collection. Suits were initiated in state court against nine employees for the purpose of collecting the fines plus attorneys’ fees and interest. None of these suits has been resolved. The Company filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the Union had violated §8 (b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1)(A). The General Counsel issued a complaint, and the Board held that the Union violated § 8(b)(1) (A), by fining those employees who had resigned from the Union before returning to work during the strike, and by fining those who had resigned after returning to work to the extent that such fines were based on post-resignation work. No violation was found in the Union’s fining members for crossing the picket line to work during the strike or in its fining those employees who resigned after they returned to work for work performed prior to resignation. The Board ordered the Union to cease and desist from fining employees who had resigned from the Union for their post-resignation work during the strike and from seeking court enforcement of such fines. It further ordered reimbursement to employees who had already paid fines for any amount imposed because of post-resignation work. The Court of Appeals sustained these holdings, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 459 F. 2d 1143 (1972), and, on the Union’s petition for review, we granted certiorari. 409 U. S. 1074. In NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S., at 217, we held that “[w]here a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct.” Since in that case there was no provision in the Union’s constitution or bylaws limiting the circumstances in which a member could resign, we concluded that the members were free to resign at will and that § 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, protected that right to return to work during a strike which had been commenced while they were union members. The Union’s imposition of court-collectible fines against the former members for such work was, therefore, held to violate § 8 (b)(1)(A). Here, as in Textile Workers, the Union’s constitution and bylaws are silent on the subject of voluntary resignation from the Union. And here, as there, we leave open the question of the extent to which contractual restriction on a member’s right to resign may be limited by the Act. Since there is no evidence that the employees here either knew of or had consented to any limitation on their right to resign, we need “only to apply the law which normally is reflected in our free institutions — the right of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit ‘subject of course to any financial obligations due and owing’ the group with which he was associated.” Textile Workers, supra, at 216. The Union contends, however, that a result different from Textile Workers is warranted in this case because, even though its constitution does not expressly restrict the right to resign during a strike, it does impose on members an obligation to refrain from strikebreaking. The Union asserts that this provision has been consistently interpreted to bind a member, notwithstanding his resignation, to abstain from strikebreaking for the duration of an existing strike. It urges that this provision may be enforced as a matter of contract law against one whose membership has ceased, because it was an obligation he undertook while a member. The provision in the Union’s constitution which proscribes strikebreaking by its terms purports only to define “misconduct of a member.” Nothing in the record indicates that Union members were informed, prior to the bringing of the charges that were the basis of this action, that the provision was interpreted as imposing any obligation on a resignee. Thus, in order to sustain the Union’s position, we would first have to find, contrary to the determination of the Board and of the Court of Appeals, that the Union constitution by implication extended its sanctions to nonmembers, and then further conclude that such sanctions were consistent with the Act. But we are no more disposed to find an implied post-resignation commitment from the strikebreaking proscription in the Union’s constitution here than we were to find it from the employees’ participation in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in Textile Workers. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Board’s finding of an unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner Union is Affirmed. The expired collective agreement contained a maintenance-of-membership provision that required new employees, as a condition of continued employment, to become members of the Union unless they notified both the Union and the Company within 40 days of accepting employment that they did not wish to join. Further, Union members were required to maintain their membership during the life of the contract. The remaining employees who returned to work during the strike did not resign from the Union. A standard fine of $450 was imposed on each of the disciplined employees. The amount was reduced, however, for those few members who appeared at their hearings, apologized for their actions, and pledged loyalty to the Union. None of the $450 fines has been paid, but reduced fines have been paid in a few instances. Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act provides, in relevant part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .” Section 7 of the Act provides, in relevant part: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . It was stipulated in that case that all 31 of the employees who resigned from the Union during the strike and returned to work participated in the strike vote, and voted in favor of the strike. NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U. S. 213, 219 n. 2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Since the collective-bargaining agreement expired prior to the times of the resignations, the maintenance-of-membership clause therein was no impediment to resigning. The Union points out in its brief that at the 1972 International Union convention its interpretation of the strikebreaking proscription was made explicit. This constitutional amendment, made seven years after the strike here, is persuasive evidence that it was not there before, or at a minimum, that the proscription then existing did not apprise the employees of their asserted obligations to the Union. In its reply brief, the Union argues that in Textile Workers there was no limiting rule on post-resignation return to work during the course of the strike, but that in this case, the Union constitution proscribed such conduct. In Textile Workers, however, there was a duly enacted rule prohibiting any member from aiding and abetting the employer during the strike and subjecting violators to a $2,000 fine. On its face, the constitutional proscription here advanced is no broader than that rule.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. FIRST CITY NATIONAL BANK OF HOUSTON et al. No. 914. Argued February 20-21, 1967. Decided March 27, 1967. Assistant Attorney General Turner argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall and Richard A. Posner. David T. Searls argued the cause for appellees First City National Bank of Houston et al. in No. 914. With him on the brief were Harry M. Reasoner, Leon M. Payne and William R. Lummis. Frederic L. Ballard argued the cause for appellees Provident National Bank et al. in No. 972. With him on the brief were Charles I. Thompson, Jr., Tyson W. Coughlin and Richard C. Bull. Eugene J. Metzger in No. 914 and Joseph J. O’Malley in No. 972 argued the- cause for appellee Comptroller of the Currency. With them on the brief were Robert Bloorh, Charles H. McEnerney, Jr., and Philip L. Roache, Jr. Together with No. 972, United States v. Provident National Bank et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District- of Pennsylvania, argued February 21, 1967. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. These civil suits were filed by the United States under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 18, to prevent two bank mergers — one in Texas between the First City National Bank of Houston and the Southern National Bank of Houston, and one in Pennsylvania between the Provident National Bank and the Central Penn National Bank, both in Philadelphia. The Comptroller of the Currency approved the mergers under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 7,12 U. S. C. § 1828 (e) (1964 ed., Supp. II). The United States thereupon brought these suits in the respective District Courts and the Comptroller intervened in them. The District Courts dismissed the complaints. No. 914 (unreported) ; No. 972, 262 F. Supp. 397. The United States appealed, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 385 U. S. 1023, 1024. I. ■ It is suggested that the complaints are defective in that they fail to state that the actions are brought under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, do not even mention the Act, and that, therefore, these cases should be remanded to allow the Government to amend the complaints. The Bank Merger Act of 1966 provides that “[a]ny action brought under the antitrust laws” shall be brought within a specified time (12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(7)(A)); it also specifies the standards to be applied by a court in a judicial proceeding challenging a bank merger “on the ground that the merger . . . constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 of [the Sherman Act]” (12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(7)(B)); and it provides immunity from such an attack if those standards are met. Section 1828 (c)(8) provides that, “[f]or the purposes of [§ 1828 (c) ], the term ‘antitrust laws’ means . . . [the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act], and any other Acts in pari materia.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, an action challenging a bank merger on the ground of its anticompeti-tive effects is brought under the antitrust laws. Once an action - is brought under the antitrust laws, the Bank Merger Act provides a new defense or justification to the merger’s proponents — “that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5)(B). There is no indication that an action challenging a merger on the ground of its anticompetitive effects is bottomed on the Bank Merger. Act rather than on the antitrust, laws. What is apparent is that Congress intended that a defense or justification be available once it had been determined that a transaction would have anticompetitive effects, as judged by the standards normally applied in antitrust actions. Thus, the Government’s failure to base the actions on the Bank Merger Act of 1966 does not constitute a defect in its pleadings. Nor is the Government’s failure to mention the Bank Merger Act fatal, for, as we shall see, the offsetting community “convenience and needs,” as, specified in 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5)(B), must be pleaded and proved by the defenders of the merger. . - n. An application for approval of- the Texas merger was made to the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(5)(B), which provides that he shall not approve the merger “whose effect in any section of*the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be-in restraint of trade, unless [he] finds that the - anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” Requests were made of the Attorney General and the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c) (4) for their views- and both submitted reports to the Comptroller that the merger would have serious anticompetitive effects. The Comptroller nonetheless approved it. The same procedure was followed in the Pennsylvania case, and the Attorney General and Federal Reserve, submitted adverse reports. Nonetheless the Comptroller approved this merger also. And, as we have said, these civil suits were instituted to enjoin the mergers under § 7 of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Clayton^ Act condemns mergers where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition.” The Bank Merger Act of 1966 did not change that standard or the machinery for obtaining the prior approval of the Comptroller and a preliminary expression of views by the Attorney General and the Federal Reserve, but it added an additional standard for the Comptroller. Section 1828 (c)(5)(B) says, as already noted, that no merger shall be approved where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition” unless the responsible agency, in this case the Comptroller, “finds that the anti-competitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” And that subsection goes on to say: “In every case, the responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community! to be served.” Section 1828 (c) (7) (B) provides that in a judicial proceeding attacking a merger on the ground that it violates the antitrust laws “the standards applied by the court shall be identical with” those the banking agencies must apply. Arid 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(7)(A) states that “In any such action, the court shall review de novo the issues presented.” (Emphasis added.) Section 1828 (c)(7)(A) also provides that the commencement of an antitrust action in the courts “shall stay the effectiveness of the agency’s approval unless the court shall otherwise specifically order.” It is around these new provisions of the 1966 Aet and their interplay with §.7 of the Clayton Act that the present controversy turns. First is the question whether the burden of proof is on the defendant banks to establish that an anticom-petitive merger is within the exception of 12 U, 8. C. § 1828 (c) (5) (B) or whether it is on the Government. We think it plain that the banks carry , the burden.' That is the general rule where one claims the benefits of an exception to the prohibition of a statute, Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 44-45. The House Report (No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.) makes clear that antitrust standards were the norm and anticompetitive bank mergers, the exception: “. . . the bill acknowledges that the general principle of the antitrust- laws — that substantially anticompetitive mergers are prohibited — applies to banks, but permits an exception in cases where it is clearly shown that a given merger is so beneficial to the convenience and needs of the community to be served . . . that it would be in the public interest to permit it ” (Emphasis added.) Id., at 3-4. The sponsor of the bill that was finally enacted, Congressman Patman, flatly stated: “It should be clearly noted that the burden of establishing such 'convenience and needs' is on the banks seeking to merge; and when we say clearly outweighed we mean outweighed' by the preponderance of the evidence.” 112 Cong. Rec.' 2333-2334 (Feb. 8, 1966). We therefore disagree with the views ■ of the lower courts to the contrary. * This problem is, of course, subtly merged with the question whether judicial review of the Comptroller’s decision is in the category of other administrative rulings which are sustained unless a court is persuaded that the agency’s action is clearly unsupported or not supported by substantial evidence. The 1966 Act was the product of powerful contending forces, each of which in the aftermath claimed more of a victory than it deserved, leaving the controversy that finally abated in Congress to be finally resolved in the courts. So far as review of administrative agency action is concerned, we have only this to say. Prior to the 1966 Act administrative approval of bank mergers was necessary. Yet in an antitrust action later brought to enjoin them we never stopped to consider what weight, if any, the agency’s determination should have in the antitrust case. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321; United States v. First Nat. Bank, 376 U. S. 665. Traditionally in antitrust actions involving regulated industries, the courts have never given presumptive weight to a prior agency decision, for the simple reason that Congress put such suits on a different axis than was familiar in administrative procedure. United States v. Radio Corporation of America, 358 U. S. 334; United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651; United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra; United States v. First Nat. Bank, supra. We have found no indication that Congress designed judicial review differently under the 1966 Act than had earlier obtained. In fact, as already noted, “the standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply.” 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c) (7)(B). This language does not express the conventional standard, i. e., whether the agency’s action is supported by substantial evidence. In the latter instance it is the agency’s function to determine whether the law has been violated, while it is the court’s function to ascertain whether, absent error in statutory construction, the agency’s action has substantial support in the evidence. There is no indication that Congress took that course here. Indeed the 1966 Act provides that the court in an antitrust action “shall review de novo the issues presented.” (Emphasis added.) 12 U. S. C. § Í828 (c)(7)(A). It is argued that the use of the word “review” rather than “trial” indicates a more limited scope to judicial action. The words “review” and “trial” might conceivably be used interchangeably. The critical words seem to us to be “de novo” and “issues presented.” They mean to us that the court should make an independent determination of the issues. Congressman Patman, the Chairman of the House Committee that drafted the Act, in speaking of this de novo review, said that the court would “completely and On its own make a determination as to whether the challenged bank merger should .be approved under the standard set forth in paragraph 5 (B) of the bill.” He added that the “court is not to give any special weight to the determination of the bank supervisory agency on this, issue.” 112 Cong.' Rec. 2335 (Feb. 8, 1966). Indeed the momentum of judicial precedents is in .that direction. For immunity from antitrust laws “is not lightly implied.” California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U. S. 482, 485. And .the grant of administrative power to give immunity unless the agency's decision is arbitrary; 'capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence, would be a long step in that direction. • Moreover, the Comptrollér’s action is informal, no hearings in the customary sense having been held prior to the 1966 Act (United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra, at 351) and none being required by Congress in the 1966 Act. We would therefore have to assume that Congress made a revolutionary innovation by making administrative action well nigh conclusive, even though no hearing had been held and no record in the customary sense created. The courts may find the Comptroller’s reasons persuasive or well nigh conclusive. But it is the court’s judgment, not the Comptroller’s, that finally determines whether the merger is legal. That was the practice prior to the 1966 Act; and we cannot find a purpose on the part of Congress to change the rule. This conclusion does not raise serious constitutional questions by making the courts perform non judicial tasks. The “rule of reason,” long prevalent in the antitrust field (see, e. g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231), has been administered by the courts. A determination of tiie effect on competition within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act is a familiar judicial task. The area of “the convenience and needs of the community to be served,” now in focus as part of the defense under the 1966 Act, is related, though perhaps remotely, to the failing-company, doctrine, long known to the courts in antitrust merger cases. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U. S. 654. The appraisal of competitive factors is grist for the antitrust mill. See, e. g., United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra, 357-367. The courts are not left at-large as planning agencies. The effect on competition is the standard; and it is a familiar one. If the anticompeti-tive effect is adverse, then it is to be excused only if “the convenience and needs of the community to be served” clearly outweigh it. We see no problems in bringing these standards into the area of judicial competence. There are no constitutional problems here not present in the “rule of reason” cases. There is left only the stay issue; As we have seen, the 1966 Act provides that a timely antitrust action “shall stay the effectiveness of the agency’s approval unless the court shall otherwise specifically order.” 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(7)(A). The lower courts dissolved the statutory stays on dismissing the antitrust suits. Our remand will direct that the stays continue until the hearings below are completed and any appeal is had. A stay of course is not mandatory under any and all circumstances. But absent a frivolous complaint by the United States, which we presume will be infrequent, a stay is essential until the judicial remedies have been exhausted. The caption of the 1966 Act states that it is designed “[t]o establish a procedure for the review of proposed bank mergers so as to eliminate the necessity for the dissolution of merged banks.” Moreover, bank mergers may not, absent emergency conditions, be consummated until 30 days after approval by the Comptroller in order to enable the Attorney General to commence an antitrust action, 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(6), which, apart from emergency situations, must be started within 30 days of the agency’s approval, 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c)(7)(A). The legislative history is replete with references to the difficulty of unscrambling two or more banks after their merger. The normal procedure therefore should be maintenance of the status quo until the antitrust litigation has run its course, lest consummation take place and the unscrambling process that Congress abhorred in the case of banks be necessary. Reversed. Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 12 U. S. C. §1828 (e)(5)(B) provides, as we have seen, that a merger shall not be approved “whose effect.in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition.” It is pointed out that that standard omits the phrase “in-any line of commerce” which is present in § 7 of the Clayton Act. It is argued that Con-' gress meant that commercial banking is no longer to be considered as an area of effective competition and that the Act establishes in banking “a market test measürable only by larger commercial realities.” We do not reach this question and we intimate no opinion on it nor any views on the merits of these mergers or on the justifications that are urged in their support. All questions except the procedural ones treated in the opinion are reserved. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve System testified in the hearings that preceded enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 1966 that “a Federal court order cannot recreate the two banks that formerly existed .... [N]o matter how one may feel about whether the merger should have taken place in the first instance, there is no turning back. To unscramble the resulting bank clearly'poses serious problems not only for the bank but for its customers and the community.” Hearings on S. 1698 and related bills before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Hous§. Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 11. The president of the American Bankers Association declared that “ ‘[u]nmerging’ a bank after the two banks have operated as a single unit is nightmarish even in the abstract.” Hearings on S. 1698 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 63.. Senator Robertson stated, “you are dealing with a physical impossibility,” and “the community gets hurt,” when divestiture is attempted in a bank merger case. Id., at 4. Senator Proxmire spoke of “the agony and the inequity and the financial loss, disruption of the economy in the community, of being required . . . to unscramble.” Id., at 202.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

John STURGEON, Petitioner v. Bert FROST, in his official capacity as Alaska Regional Director of the National Park Service, et al. No. 14-1209. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Jan. 20, 2016. Decided March 22, 2016. Matthew T. Findley, Anchorage, AK, for Petitioner. Ruth Botstein, Anchorage, AK, for the State of Alaska as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner. Rachel P. Kovner, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. William S. Consovoy, J. Michael Connolly, Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC, Arlington, VA, Michael H. Park, Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC, New York, NY, Matthew T. Findley, Eva R. Gardner, Ashburn & Mason, P.C., Douglas Pope, Pope & Katcher, Anchorage, AK, for Petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Andrew C. Mergen, Dean K. Dunsmore, Elizabeth Ann Peterson, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. For almost 40 years, John Sturgeon has hunted moose along the Nation River in Alaska. Because parts of the river are shallow and difficult to navigate, Sturgeon travels by hovercraft, an amphibious vehicle capable of gliding over land and water. To reach his preferred hunting grounds, Sturgeon must pilot his hovercraft over a stretch of the Nation River that flows through the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, a 1.7 million acre federal preservation area managed by the National Park Service. 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(10). Alaska law permits the use of hovercraft. National Park Service regulations do not. See 36 CFR § 2.17(e) (2015). After Park Service rangers informed Sturgeon that he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the boundaries of the preserve, Sturgeon filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He argues that the Nation River is owned by the State, and that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) prohibits the Park Service from enforcing its regulations on state-owned land in Alaska. The Park Service disagrees, contending that it has authority to regulate waters flowing through federally managed preservation areas. The District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Park Service. We granted certiorari. I In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward, serving under President Andrew Johnson, negotiated a treaty to purchase Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539. In a single stroke, the United States gained 365 million acres of land-an area more than twice the size of Texas. Despite the bargain price of two cents an acre, however, the purchase was mocked by contemporaries as "Seward's Folly" and President Johnson's "Polar Bear Garden." See C. Naske & H. Slotnick, Alaska: A History 92-94 (2011) (Naske & Slotnick); S.Rep. No. 1163, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1957). The monikers didn't stick. In 1898, the "Three Lucky Swedes"-Jafet Lindeberg, Eric Lindblom, and Jon Brynteson-struck gold in Nome, Alaska. As word of their discovery spread, thousands traveled to Alaska to try their hand at mining. Once the gold rush subsided, settlers turned to other types of mining, fishing, and trapping, fueling an emerging export economy. See Naske & Slotnick 128-129, 155, 249-251; D. Wharton, The Alaska Gold Rush 186-187 (1972). Despite newfound recognition of Alaska's economic potential, however, it was not until the 1950's that Congress seriously considered admitting Alaska as a State. By that time, it was clear that Alaska was strategically important both in the Pacific and Arctic, and that the Territory was rich in natural resources, including oil. Moreover, the people of Alaska favored statehood. See Naske & Slotnick 201, 224-235. But there was a problem: Out of the 365 million acres of land in Alaska, 98 percent were owned by the Federal Government. As a result, absent a land grant from the Federal Government to the State, there would be little land available to drive private economic activity and contribute to the state tax base. See S.Rep. No. 1163, at 2, 12 ("The expenses of the State of Alaska will be comparatively high, partially due to the vast land areas within the State; but the State would be able to realize revenues from only 2 percent of this vast area unless some provision were made to modify the present land-ownership conditions"). A solution was struck. The 1958 Alaska Statehood Act permitted Alaska to select 103 million acres of "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved" federal land-just over a quarter of all land in Alaska-for state ownership. §§ 6(a)-(b), 72 Stat. 340. That land grant included "mineral deposits," which were "subject to lease by the State as the State legislature may direct." § 6(i), id., at 342. Upon statehood, Alaska also gained "title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters" within the State, in addition to "the natural resources within such lands and waters," including "the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources." § 3(a), 67 Stat. 30, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) ; § 6(m), 72 Stat. 343. With over 100 million acres of land now available to the new State, Alaska could begin to fulfill its state policy "to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with the public interest." Alaska Const., Art. VIII, § 1 (2014). The Statehood Act did not, however, determine the rights of the Alaska Natives, who asserted aboriginal title to much of the same land now claimed by the State. Naske & Slotnick 287-289. To resolve the dispute, Congress in 1971 passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which extinguished aboriginal land claims in Alaska. 85 Stat. 688, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. In exchange, Congress provided for a $960 million settlement and permitted corporations organized by groups of Alaska Natives to select 40 million acres of federal land to manage within the State. §§ 1605, 1610-1615; Naske & Slotnick 296-297. Congress sought to implement the settlement "rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs" of Alaska Natives. § 1601(b). In addition to settling the claims of the Alaska Natives, ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior to select up to 80 million acres of unreserved federal land in Alaska for addition to the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, and Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, subject to congressional approval. § 1616(d)(2). When Congress failed to approve the Secretary's selections, however, President Carter unilaterally designated 56 million acres of federal land in Alaska as national monuments. See Presidential Proclamation Nos. 4611-4627, 3 CFR 69-104 (1978 Comp.). President Carter's actions were unpopular among many Alaskans, who were concerned that the new monuments would be subject to restrictive federal regulations. Protesters demonstrated in Fairbanks, and more than 2,500 Alaskans participated in the "Great Denali-McKinley Trespass." The goal of the trespass was to break over 25 Park Service rules in a two-day period-including by camping, hunting, snowmobiling, setting campfires, shooting guns, and unleashing dogs. During the event, a "rider on horseback, acting the part of Paul Revere, galloped through the crowd yelling, 'The Feds are coming! The Feds are coming!' " N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1979, p. A8; Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 1-2. Congress once again stepped in to settle the controversy, passing the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. 94 Stat. 2371, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. ANILCA had two stated goals: First, to provide "sufficient protection for the national interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values on the public lands in Alaska." § 3101(d). And second, to provide "adequate opportunity for satisfaction of the economic and social needs of the State of Alaska and its people." Ibid. ANILCA set aside 104 million acres of land in Alaska for preservation purposes, in the process creating ten new national parks, preserves, and monuments-including the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve-and tripling the number of acres set aside in the United States for federal wilderness preservation. See § 410hh ; Naske & Slotnick 315-316. At the same time, ANILCA specified that the Park Service could not prohibit on those lands certain activities of particular importance to Alaskans. See, e.g., § 3170(a) (Secretary must permit reasonable use of vehicles "for travel to and from villages and homesites"); § 3201 (Secretary must permit "the taking of fish and wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses" within National Preserves in Alaska, subject to regulation and certain exceptions). President Carter's earlier land designations were rescinded. See § 3209(a). Under ANILCA, federal preservation lands in Alaska were placed into "conservation system units," which were defined to include "any unit in Alaska of the National Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems, National Trails System, National Wilderness Preservation System, or a National Forest Monument." § 3102(4). Congress drew the boundaries of those units to "follow hydrographic divides or embrace other topographic or natural features," however, rather than to map the Federal Government's landholdings. § 3103(b). As a consequence, in addition to federal land, over 18 million acres of state, Native Corporation, and private land ended up inside the boundaries of conservation system units. See Brief for Petitioner 6. This brings us back to Sturgeon and his hovercraft. II A One fall day in 2007, Sturgeon was piloting his hovercraft on the Nation River, which rises in the Ogilvie Mountains in Canada and joins the Yukon River within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve conservation system unit (Yukon-Charley). Sturgeon was headed to a hunting ground upstream from the preserve, just shy of the Canadian border. To reach that hunting ground, dubbed "moose meadows," Sturgeon had to travel on a portion of the river that flows through the preserve. About two miles into his trip on the Nation River, Sturgeon stopped on a gravel bar to repair the steering cable of his hovercraft. As he was performing the repairs, Sturgeon was approached by three Park Service rangers. The rangers informed him that hovercraft were prohibited under Park Service regulations, and that he was committing a crime by operating his hovercraft within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Despite Sturgeon's protests that Park Service regulations did not apply because the river was owned by the State of Alaska, the rangers ordered Sturgeon to remove his hovercraft from the preserve. Sturgeon complied, heading home without a moose. Sturgeon now fears that he will be criminally prosecuted if he returns to hunt along the Nation River in his hovercraft. To avoid prosecution, Sturgeon sued the Park Service and several federal officials in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief permitting him to operate his hovercraft within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Alaska intervened in support of Sturgeon, and the Park Service opposed the suit. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Park Service. Sturgeon v. Masica, 2013 WL 5888230 (Oct. 30, 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in pertinent part. Sturgeon v. Masica, 768 F.3d 1066 (2014). We granted certiorari. 576 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 27, 192 L.Ed.2d 997 (2015). B The Secretary of the Interior has authority to "prescribe regulations" concerning "boating and other activities on or relating to water located within System units, including water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 54 U.S.C. § 100751(b) (2012 ed., Supp. II). "System units" are in turn defined as "any area of land and water administered by the Secretary, acting through the Director [of the Park Service], for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." §§ 100102, 100501. The Park Service's hovercraft regulation was adopted pursuant to Section 100751(b). The hovercraft ban applies not only within "[t]he boundaries of federally owned lands and waters administered by the National Park Service," but also to "[w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States located within the boundaries of the National Park System, including navigable waters ... without regard to the ownership of submerged lands." 36 CFR § 1.2(a). The hovercraft ban is not limited to Alaska, but instead has effect in federally managed preservation areas across the country. Section 103(c) of ANILCA, in contrast, addresses the scope of the Park Service's authority over lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. The first sentence of Section 103(c) specifies the property included as a portion of those units. It states: "Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit." 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). ANILCA defines the word "land" to include "lands, waters, and interests therein," and the term "public lands" to include "lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2, 1980," with certain exceptions. § 3102. In sum, only "lands, waters, and interests therein" to which the United States has "title" are considered "public" land "included as a portion" of the conservation system units in Alaska. The second sentence of Section 103(c) concerns the Park Service's authority to regulate "non-public" lands in Alaska, which include state, Native Corporation, and private property. It provides: "No lands which, before, on, or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units." § 3103(c). The third sentence of Section 103(c) explains how new lands become part of conservation system units: "If the State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to convey any such lands, the Secretary may acquire such lands in accordance with applicable law (including this Act), and any such lands shall become part of the unit, and be administered accordingly." Ibid. C The parties dispute whether Section 103(c) of ANILCA created an Alaska-specific exception to the Park Service's general authority over boating and related activities in federally managed preservation areas. Sturgeon, the Park Service, and the Ninth Circuit each adopt a different reading of Section 103(c), reaching different conclusions about the scope of the Park Service's powers. Sturgeon, joined by the State, understands Section 103(c) to stand for a simple proposition: The Park Service is prohibited from regulating "non-public" land in Alaska as if that land were owned by the Federal Government. He contends that his reading is consistent with the history of federal land management in Alaska, beginning with the Alaska Statehood Act and culminating in ANILCA. Sturgeon's argument proceeds in two steps. First, he asserts that the Nation River is not "public land" for purposes of ANILCA and is therefore not part of the Yukon-Charley. As discussed, ANILCA defines "public lands" as lands to which the United States has "title." 16 U.S.C. § 3102. And Section 103(c) provides that "[o]nly those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands (as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit." § 3103(c). Sturgeon argues that the Nation River is not "public land" because it is owned by the State and not by the Federal Government. To support his argument, Sturgeon relies on the Alaska Statehood Act, which granted ownership of the submerged lands beneath the navigable waters in Alaska, and the resources within those waters, to the State. See § 6(m), 72 Stat. 343; 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). He also cites this Court's decision in United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1662, 56 L.Ed.2d 94 (1978), which stated that "the Submerged Lands Act transferred title to and ownership of the submerged lands and waters" to the States. Id., at 40, 98 S.Ct. 1662 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the State and not the Federal Government owns the Nation River, Sturgeon urges, it is not "public" land under ANILCA and is therefore not part of the Yukon-Charley. Second, Sturgeon asserts that because the Nation River is not part of the Yukon-Charley, the Park Service lacks authority to regulate it. His argument rests on the second sentence of Section 103(c), which states that "[n]o lands which, before, on, or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units." 16 U.S.C. § 3103(c). Sturgeon argues that the phrase "regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units" refers to those regulations that apply "solely" by virtue of the Park Service's "authority to manage national parks." Brief for Petitioner 18, 26-27. The word "solely," Sturgeon contends, simply ensures that "non-public" lands within the boundaries of those units remain subject to laws generally "applicable to both public and private lands (such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act)." Id., at 19. Because the hovercraft regulation was adopted pursuant to the Park Service's authority over federally managed preservation areas, and is not a law of general applicability like the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, Sturgeon concludes that Section 103(c) bars enforcement of the regulation. The Park Service, in contrast, reads Section 103(c) more narrowly. In its brief in this Court, the Park Service, while defending the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, relies primarily on very different arguments. The agency stresses that it has longstanding authority to regulate waters within federally managed preservation areas, and that Section 103(c) does not take any of that authority away. In reaching its conclusion, the Park Service disagrees with Sturgeon at each step. First, the Park Service contends that the Nation River is part of the Yukon-Charley. To support that contention, the agency cites ANILCA's definition of "public lands," which-as noted-includes "lands, waters, and interests therein" to which the United States has "title." 16 U.S.C. § 3102. The Park Service argues that the United States has "title" to an "interest" in the water within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley under the reserved water rights doctrine. The reserved water rights doctrine specifies that "when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation." Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976). By creating the Yukon-Charley, the Park Service urges, the Federal Government reserved the water within the boundaries of the conservation system unit to achieve the Government's conservation goals. As a result, the Federal Government has "title" to an "interest" in the Nation River, making it "public" land subject to Park Service regulations. Second, the Park Service contends that even if the Nation River is not "public" land, the agency still has authority to regulate it. According to the Park Service, the second sentence of Section 103(c) imposes only a limited restriction on the agency's power, prohibiting it from enforcing on "non-public" lands only those regulations that explicitly apply "solely to public lands." The hovercraft regulation applies both within "[t]he boundaries of federally owned lands and waters administered by the National Park Service" and to "[w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States located within the boundaries of the National Park System, including navigable waters ... without regard to the ownership of submerged lands." 36 CFR § 1.2(a). Accordingly, the Park Service asserts, the hovercraft regulation does not apply "solely to public lands," and Section 103(c) therefore does not prevent enforcement of the regulation. See Brief for Respondents 56-58. The Ninth Circuit, for its part, adopted a reading of Section 103(c) different from the primary argument advanced by the Park Service in this Court. The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether the Nation River counts as "public" land for purposes of ANILCA. Instead, it held that the phrase "regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units" distinguishes between Park Service regulations that apply solely to "public" lands in Alaska, and Park Service regulations that apply to federally managed preservation areas across the country. In the Ninth Circuit's view, the Park Service may enforce nationally applicable regulations on both "public" and "non-public" property within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, because such regulations do not apply "solely to public lands within such units." The Park Service may not, however, apply Alaska-specific regulations to "non-public" lands within the boundaries of those units. According to the Ninth Circuit, because the hovercraft regulation "applies to all federal-owned lands and waters administered by [the Park Service] nationwide, as well as all navigable waters lying within national parks," the hovercraft ban does not apply "solely" within conservation system units in Alaska. 768 F.3d, at 1077. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Park Service therefore has authority to enforce its hovercraft regulation on the Nation River. Id., at 1078. The Ninth Circuit's holding is subject to some interpretation, but Sturgeon, the State, the Alaska Native Corporations, and the Park Service (at least at times) concur in our understanding of the decision below. See Brief for Petitioner 25; Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae 23; Brief for Arctic Slope Regional Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae 12-13; Brief for Doyon, Ltd., et al. as Amici Curiae 31-32; Brief for Respondents 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 61; 80 Fed.Reg. 65573 (2015). III We reject the interpretation of Section 103(c) adopted by the Ninth Circuit. The court's reading of the phrase "regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units" may be plausible in the abstract, but it is ultimately inconsistent with both the text and context of the statute as a whole. Statutory language "cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1350, 1357, 182 L.Ed.2d 341 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the reading of the statute adopted below, the Park Service may apply nationally applicable regulations to "non-public" lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, but it may not apply Alaska-specific regulations to those lands. That is a surprising conclusion. ANILCA repeatedly recognizes that Alaska is different-from its "unrivaled scenic and geological values," to the "unique" situation of its "rural residents dependent on subsistence uses," to "the need for development and use of Arctic resources with appropriate recognition and consideration given to the unique nature of the Arctic environment." 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101(b), 3111(2), 3147(b)(5). ANILCA itself accordingly carves out numerous Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service's general authority over federally managed preservation areas. For example, ANILCA requires the Secretary of the Interior to permit "the exercise of valid commercial fishing rights or privileges" within the National Wildlife Refuge System in Alaska, including the use of "campsites, cabins, motorized vehicles, and aircraft landings directly incident to the exercise of such rights or privileges," with certain exceptions. 94 Stat. 2393. ANILCA also requires the Secretary to "permit on the public lands appropriate use for subsistence purposes of snowmobiles, motorboats, and other means of surface transportation traditionally employed for such purposes by local residents, subject to reasonable regulation." 16 U.S.C. § 3121(b). And it provides that National Preserves "in Alaska shall be administered and managed as a unit of the National Park System in the same manner as a national park except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the taking of fish and wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses, and trapping shall be allowed" pursuant to applicable law. § 3201 (emphasis added). Many similar examples are woven throughout ANILCA. See, e.g., 94 Stat. 2393 (Secretary must administer wildlife refuge "so as to not impede the passage of navigation and access by boat on the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers," subject to reasonable regulation); id., at 2388 (Secretary must allow reindeer grazing uses in certain areas, including construction of necessary facilities); 16 U.S.C. § 3203(a) (Alaska-specific rules for wilderness management apply "in recognition of the unique conditions in Alaska"); § 3170(a) (Secretary must permit reasonable use of snowmachines, motorboats, and airplanes within conservation system units "for travel to and from villages and homesites"). All those Alaska-specific provisions reflect the simple truth that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule. Yet the reading below would prevent the Park Service from recognizing Alaska's unique conditions. Under that reading, the Park Service could regulate "non-public" lands in Alaska only through rules applicable outside Alaska as well. Thus, for example, if the Park Service elected to allow hovercraft during hunting season in Alaska-in a departure from its nationwide rule-the more relaxed regulation would apply only to the "public" land within the boundaries of the unit. Hovercraft would still be banned from the "non-public" land, even during hunting season. Whatever the reach of the Park Service's authority under ANILCA, we cannot conclude that Section 103(c) adopted such a topsy-turvy approach. Moreover, it is clear that Section 103(c) draws a distinction between "public" and "non-public" lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. See § 3103(c) ("Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands ... shall be deemed to be included as a portion of such unit"); ibid. (No lands "conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units"). And yet, according to the court below, if the Park Service wanted to differentiate between that "public" and "non-public" land in an Alaska-specific way, it would have to regulate the "non-public" land pursuant to rules applicable outside Alaska, and the "public" land pursuant to Alaska-specific provisions. Assuming the Park Service has authority over "non-public" land in Alaska (an issue we do not decide), that strikes us as an implausible reading of the statute. Looking at ANILCA both as a whole and with respect to Section 103(c), the Act contemplates the possibility that all the land within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska may be treated differently from federally managed preservation areas across the country, and that "non-public" lands within the boundaries of those units may be treated differently from "public" lands within the unit. Under the Ninth Circuit's reading of Section 103(c), however, the former is not an option, and the latter would require contorted and counterintuitive measures. We therefore reject the interpretation of Section 103(c) adopted by the court below. That reading of the statute was the sole basis for the disposition of this case by the Court of Appeals. We accordingly vacate the judgment of that court and remand for further proceedings. We do not reach the remainder of the parties' arguments. In particular, we do not decide whether the Nation River qualifies as "public land" for purposes of ANILCA. Sturgeon claims that it does not; the Park Service that it does. The parties' arguments in this respect touch on vital issues of state sovereignty, on the one hand, and federal authority, on the other. We find that in this case those issues should be addressed by the lower courts in the first instance. Given this determination, we also do not decide whether the Park Service has authority under Section 100751(b) to regulate Sturgeon's activities on the Nation River, even if the river is not "public" land, or whether-as Sturgeon argues-any such authority is limited by ANILCA. Finally, we do not consider the Park Service's alternative argument that it has authority under ANILCA over both "public" and "non-public" lands within the boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, to the extent a regulation is written to apply specifically to both types of land. We leave those arguments to the lower courts for consideration as necessary. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE No. 86-472. Argued October 5, 1987 Decided November 10, 1987 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Brennan and Scalia, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Michael Lee Hertzberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Eric M. Lieberman and Ellen J. Winner. Deputy Solicitor General Lauber argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mann, and Alan I. Horowitz David C. Vladeck and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Professor John L. Neufeld et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. John A. Powell, Stephen K. Strong, and David F. Stobaugh filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 6103, lays down a general rule that “returns” and “return information” as defined therein shall be confidential. “Return information” is elaborately defined in § 6103(b)(2); immediately after that definition appears the following proviso, known as the Haskell Amendment: “[B]ut such term does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.” Petitioner Church of Scientology of California, seeking disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, contends that the Haskell Amendment excepts from the definition of “return information” all material in the files of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which can be redacted to delete those parts which would identify a particular taxpayer. Respondent IRS in opposition argues that the mere redaction of identifying data will not, by virtue of the Haskell Amendment, take the material out of the definition of “return information.” We agree with the IRS. Petitioner filed a request with respondent under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. §552, for the production of numerous documents. Among the materials sought by petitioner were “[c]opies of all information relating to or containing the names of, Scientology, Church of Scientology, any specific Scientology church or entity identified by containing the words Scientology, Hubbard and/or Dianetics in their names, L. Ron Hubbard or Mary Sue Hubbard in the form of written record, correspondence, document, memorandum, form, computor [sic] tape, computor [sic] program or microfilm, which is contained in” an extensive list of respondent’s case files and data systems. FOIA Request Dated May 16, 1980, App. 20a-27a. Petitioner also requested similar information from the offices and personal areas of a number of respondent’s officials. Dissatisfied by the slow response to its request, petitioner filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to compel release of the materials. In the District Court the parties agreed — as they continue to agree here — that § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code is the sort of statute referred to by the FOIA in 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3) relating to matters that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . . ”; thus, if §6103 forbids the disclosure of material, it may not be produced in response to a request under the FOIA. Respondent argued that many of the records were protected as “returns” or “return information” under § 6103. Section 6103(a) provides that “[r]eturns and return information shall be confidential” and shall not be disclosed “except as authorized by this title.” A “return” is defined in § 6103(b)(1) as “any tax or information return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund” including supporting schedules, attachments, and lists. Section 6103(b)(2) then supplies a more extensive definition of “return information,” which includes: “[A] taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, over-assessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense . . . .” After providing this detailed explanation of confidential “return information,” § 6103(b)(2), as previously noted, continues: “but such term does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.” This last clause — the Haskell Amendment — was proposed as a floor amendment by Senator Haskell of Colorado and was adopted by a voice vote during the debate on the 1976 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. The District Court, after an in camera review of representative documents, held that respondent had correctly limited its search for and disclosure of materials requested by petitioner. 569 F. Supp. 1165 (DC 1983). Petitioner appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Following briefing and argument before a three-judge panel, the Court of Appeals sua sponte undertook en banc review of the meaning of the Haskell Amendment and the modification it works upon § 6103(b)(2). The Court of Appeals concluded that, by using the words “in a form,” Congress contemplated “not merely the deletion of an identifying name or symbol on a document that contains return information, but agency reformulation of the return information into a statistical study or some other composite product. . . .” 253 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 92, 792 F. 2d 153, 160 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, the court held, before respondent may produce documents otherwise protected, the Haskell Amendment requires that some modification have occurred in the form of the data contained in the documents. “[M]ere deletion of the taxpayer’s name or other identifying data is not enough, since that would render the reformulation requirement entirely duplicative of the nonidentification requirement.” Id., at 95, 792 F. 2d, at 163. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1063 (1987), to consider the scope of the Haskell Amendment and its relation to the confidentiality provisions of §§ 6103(a) and (b). Petitioner believes that the Haskell Amendment makes significantly greater inroads on the definition of “return information” than did the Court of Appeals. It makes two interrelated contentions: first, that the Haskell Amendment removes from the classification of “return information” all data which do not identify a particular taxpayer, and, second, that 5 U. S. C. § 552(b) — requiring that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion” of a record be provided to a requester after deletion of the portions which are exempt — compels respondent to redact “return information” in its files where possible so as to bring that material within the terms of the Haskell Amendment. We reject both of these arguments. We are told by the IRS that, as a practical matter, “return information” might include the report of an audit examination, internal IRS correspondence concerning a taxpayer’s claim, or a notice of deficiency issued by the IRS proposing an increase in the taxpayer’s assessment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25. Petitioner asserts that the segregation requirement of the FOIA, § 552(b), directs respondent to remove the identifiers from such documents as these and that, once the materials are purged of such identifiers, they must be disclosed because they no longer constitute return information described in § 6103(b)(2). We find no support for petitioner’s arguments in either the language of § 6103 or in its legislative history. In addition to the returns themselves, which are protected from disclosure by § 6103(b)(1), § 6103(b)(2) contains an elaborate description of the sorts of information related to returns that respondent is compelled to keep confidential. If the mere removal of identifying details from return information sufficed to put the information “in a form” envisioned by the Haskell Amendment, the remainder of the categories included in § 6103(b)(2) would often be irrelevant. The entire section could have been prefaced by the simple instruction to respondent that the elimination of identifiers would shift related tax data outside the realm of protected return information. Respondent would then first determine whether the information could be redacted so as not to identify a taxpayer; only if it could not would the extensive list of materials that constitute “return information” become pertinent. And if petitioner correctly interprets the intent of the Haskell Amendment, Congress’ drafting was awkward in the extreme. The Amendment exempts “data in a form” (emphasis added) that cannot be associated with or otherwise identify a particular taxpayer. A much more natural phrasing would omit the confusing and unnecessary words “in a form” and refer simply to data. Other provisions of § 6103 likewise belie petitioner’s construction of the Haskell Amendment. Subsections (c) through (o) of § 6103 set forth various exceptions to the general rule that returns and return information are confidential and not to be disclosed. These subsections provide that in some circumstances, and with special safeguards, returns and return information can be made available to congressional committees, the President, state tax officials, and other federal agencies. The subsections also recognize that “return information” remains such even when it does not identify a particular taxpayer. Subsections 6103 (f)(1), (2), and (4), for example, allow the release of returns and return information to congressional committees, but distinguish between return information that identifies a taxpayer and return information that does not. Subsection (f) is thus inconsistent with petitioner’s theory that nonidentifying data cease to be return information at all. The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, of which the amendments to § 6103 are a part, also indicates that Congress did not intend the statute to allow the disclosure of otherwise confidential return information merely by the redaction of identifying details. One of the major purposes in revising § 6103 was to tighten the restrictions on the use of return information by entities other than respondent. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 318 (1976) (“[Rjeturns and return information should generally be treated as confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended section 6103”). Petitioner’s suggestion that the Haskell Amendment was intended to modify the restrictions of §6103 by making all nonidentifying return information eligible for disclosure would mean that the Amendment was designed to undercut the legislation’s primary purpose of limiting access to tax filings. The circumstances under which the Haskell Amendment was adopted make us reluctant to credit it with this expansive purpose. During debate on the Senate floor, Senator Haskell proposed that § 6103(b)(2) be amended to make clear that return information “does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.” He then added this explanation of his proposal: “[T]he purpose of this amendment is to insure that statistical studies and other compilations of data now prepared by the Internal Revenue Service and disclosed by it to outside parties will continue to be subject to disclosure to the extent allowed under present law. Thus the Internal Revenue Service can continue to release for research purposes statistical studies and compilations of data, such as the tax model, which do not identify individual taxpayers. “The definition of ‘return information’ was intended to neither enhance nor diminish access now obtainable under the Freedom of Information Act to statistical studies and compilations of data by the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, the addition by the Internal Revenue Service of easily deletable identifying information to the type of statistical study or compilation of data which, under its current practice, has [sic] been subject to disclosure, will not prevent disclosure of such study or compilation under the newly amended § 6103. In such an instance, the identifying information would be deleted and disclosure of the statistical study or compilation of data be made.” 122 Cong. Rec. 24012 (1976). After these remarks, the floor manager of the legislation, Senator Long, added that he would “be happy to take this amendment to conference. It might not be entirely necessary, but it might serve a good purpose.” The Haskell Amendment was then passed by voice vote in the Senate and became part of the conference bill. We find it difficult to believe that Congress in this manner adopted an amendment which would work such an alteration to the basic thrust of the draft bill amending § 6103. The Senate’s purpose in revising § 6103 was, as we have noted, to impose greater restrictions on the disclosure of tax data; a change in the proposed draft permitting disclosure of all return information after deletion of material identifying a particular taxpayer would have, it seems to us, at a minimum engendered some debate in the Senate and resulted in a rollcall vote. More importantly, Senator Haskell’s remarks clearly indicate that he did not mean to revise § 6103(b)(2) in this fashion. He refers only to statistical studies and compilations, and gives no intimation that his amendment would require respondent to remove identifying details from material as it exists in its files in order to comply with its requirement. All in all, we think this is a case where common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s “dog that didn’t bark,” that an amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill. We thus hold that, as with a return itself, removal of identification from return information would not deprive it of protection under § 6103(b). Since such deletion would not make other-wise protected return information disclose-able, respondent has no duty under the FOIA to undertake such redaction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. Justices Brennan and Sc alia took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit was thus in substantial agreement with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in King v. IRS, 688 F. 2d 488 (1982), and the Eleventh Circuit’s determination in Currie v. IRS, 704 F. 2d 523 (1983). The Seventh Circuit concluded in King that § 6103 “protects from disclosure all nonamalgamated items listed in subsection (b) (2)(A), and that the Haskell Amendment provides only for the disclosure of statistical tabulations which are not associated with or do not identify particular taxpayers.” 688 F. 2d, at 493. Similarly, in Currie the Eleventh Circuit held that the Haskell Amendment does not obligate the IRS, in a suit under the FOIA, to delete identifying material from documents and release what would otherwise be return information. 704 F. 2d, at 531-532. The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a different result in Long v. IRS, 596 F. 2d 362 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 917 (1980). In Long, the court found that the Haskell Amendment removes from the category of protected return information any documents that do not identify a particular taxpayer once names, addresses, and similar details are deleted. See 596 F. 2d, at 367-369. The original panel applied the en bane decision to the search and disclosure undertaken by respondent. See 253 U. S. App. D. C. 78, 792 F. 2d 146 (1986). Although many of the requested documents were protected as “return information,” the panel found that the District Court had erred in accepting respondént’s blanket assertion that all information responsive to petitioner’s request in files unrelated to petitioner’s California branch was exempt from disclosure. The panel remanded the case to District Court with instructions that respondent conduct a new search for information about the third parties identified by petitioner and justify any withholding of the information under the FOIA or § 6103. See id., at 84-85, 792 F. 2d, at 152-153.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ATLAS ROOFING CO., INC. v. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION et al. No. 75-746. Argued November 29, 1976 Decided March 23, 1977 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined, except Blackmun, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. McNeill Stokes argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were Ira J. Smotherman, Jr., Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Nathan Lewin, Martin D. Minsker, and Oliver N. Hormell. Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Lee, Louis F. Claiborne, William J. Kilberg, and Michael H. Levin. Together with No. 75-748, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Gerard C. Smetana, Jerry Kronenberg, Howard L. Mocerf, Lawrence B. Kraus, and Richard O’Brecht filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Warren L. Johns, Philip B. Kurland, and Alan L. Unikel filed a brief for the Seventh-Day Adventist Church as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 75-748. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in these cases is whether, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, Congress may create a new cause of action in the Government for civil penalties enforceable in an administrative agency where there is no jury trial. I After extensive investigation, Congress concluded, in 1970, that work-related deaths and injuries had become a “drastic” national problem. Finding the existing state statutory remedies as well as state common-law actions for negligence and wrongful death to be inadequate to protect the employee population from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or Act), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq. The Act created a new statutory duty to avoid maintaining unsafe or unhealthy working conditions, and empowers the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and safety standards. Two new remedies were provided—permitting the Federal Government, proceeding before an administrative agency, (1) to obtain abatement orders requiring employers to correct unsafe working conditions and (2) to impose civil penalties on any employer maintaining any unsafe working condition. Each remedy exists whether or not an employee is actually injured or killed as a result of the condition, and existing state statutory and common-law remedies for actual injury and death remain unaffected. Under the Act, inspectors, representing the Secretary of Labor, are authorized to conduct reasonable safety and health inspections. 29 U. S. C. § 657 (a). If a violation is discovered, the inspector, on behalf of the Secretary, issues a citation to the employer fixing a reasonable time for its abatement and, in his discretion, proposing a civil penalty. §§ 658, 659. Such proposed penalties may range from nothing for de minimis and nonserious violations, to not more than $1,000 for serious violations, to a maximum of $10,000 for willful or repeated violations, §§ 658 (a), 659 (a), 666 (a)-(c) and (j). If the employer wishes to contest the penalty or the abatement order, he may do so by notifying the Secretary of Labor within 15 days, in which event the abatement order is automatically stayed. §§ 659 (a), (b), 666 (d). An evidentiary hearing is then held before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission consists of three members, appointed for six-year terms, each of whom is qualified “by reason of training, education or experience” to adjudicate contested citations and assess penalties. §§ 651 (3), 659 (c), 661, 666 (i). At this hearing the burden is on the Secretary to establish the elements of the alleged violation and the propriety of his proposed abatement order and proposed penalty; and the judge is empowered to affirm, modify, or vacate any or all of these items, giving due consideration in his penalty assessment to “the size of the business of the employer . . . , the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations.” § 666 (i). The judge’s decision becomes the Commission’s final and appealable order unless within 30 days a Commissioner directs that it be reviewed by the full Commission. §§ 659 (c), 661 (i); see 29 CFR §§ 2200.90, 2200.91 (1976). If review is granted, the Commission’s subsequent order directing abatement and the payment of any assessed penalty becomes final unless the employer timely petitions for judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals. 29 U. S. C. § 660 (a). The Secretary similarly may seek review of Commission orders, § 660 (b), but, in either case, “[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.” § 660 (a). If the employer fails to pay the assessed penalty, the Secretary may commence a collection action in a federal district court in which neither the fact of the violation nor the propriety of the penalty assessed may be retried. § 666 (k). Thus, the penalty may be collected without the employer’s ever being entitled to a jury determination of the facts constituting the violation. II Petitioners were separately cited by the Secretary and ordered immediately to abate pertinent hazards after inspections of their respective worksites conducted in 1972 revealed conditions that assertedly violated a mandatory occupational safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under § 5 (a) (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 654 (a) (2). In each case an employee’s death had resulted. Petitioner Irey was cited for a willful violation of 29 CFR § 1926.652 (b) and Table P-1 (1976)—a safety standard promulgated by the Secretary under the Act requiring the sides of trenches in “unstable or soft material” to be “shored, . . . sloped, or otherwise supported by means of sufficient strength to protect the employees working within them.” The Secretary proposed a penalty of $7,500 for this violation and ordered the hazard abated immediately. Petitioner Atlas was cited for a serious violation of 29 CFR §§ 1926.500 (b) (1) and (f) (5) (ii) (1976), which require that roof opening covers, be “so installed as to prevent accidental displacement.” The Secretary proposed a penalty of $600 for this violation and ordered the hazard abated immediately. Petitioners timely contested these citations and were afforded hearings before Administrative Law Judges of the Commission. The judges, and later the Commission, affirmed the findings of violations and accompanying abatement requirements and assessed petitioner Irey a reduced civil penalty of $5,000 and petitioner Atlas the civil penalty of $600 which the Secretary had proposed. Petitioners respectively thereupon sought judicial review in the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, challenging both the Commission’s factual findings that violations had occurred and the constitutionality of the Act’s enforcement procedures. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Commission’s orders in the Irey case over petitioner’s and a dissenter’s contention that the failure to afford the employer a jury trial on the question whether he had violated OSHA was in violation of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides for jury trial in most civil suits at common law. 519 F. 2d 1200. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, over four dissents, adhered to the original panel’s decision. Id., at 1215. It concluded that this Court’s rulings to date “leave no doubt that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable, at least in the context of a case such as this one, and that Congress is free to provide an administrative enforcement scheme without the intervention of a jury at any stage.” Id., at 1218. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also affirmed the Commission’s order in the Atlas case over a similar claim that the enforcement scheme violated the Seventh Amendment. 518 F. 2d 990. It stated: “Where adjudicative responsibility rests only in the administering agency, 'jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication and would substantially interfere with the [agency’s] role in the statutory scheme.’” Id., at 1011. We granted the petitions for writs of certiorari limited to the important question whether the Seventh Amendment prevents Congress from assigning to an administrative agency, under these circumstances, the task of adjudicating violations of OSHA. 424 U. S. 964. Ill The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” The phrase “Suits at common law” has been construed to refer to cases tried prior to the adoption of the Seventh Amendment in courts of law in which jury trial was customary as distinguished from courts of equity or admiralty in which jury trial was not. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830). Petitioners claim that a suit in a federal court by the Government for civil penalties for violation of a statute is a suit for a money judgment which is classically a suit at common law, Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146, 151 (1891); and that the defendant therefore has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury determination of all issues of fact in such a case, see Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103, 115 (1909) (dictum) ; United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37, 47 (1914) (dictum). Petitioners then claim that to permit Congress to assign the function of adjudicating the Government’s rights to civil penalties for violation of the statute to a different forum—an administrative agency in which no jury is available—would be to permit Congress to deprive a defendant of his Seventh Amendment jury right. We disagree. At least in cases in which “public rights” are being litigated—e. g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enact—the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible. Congress has often created new statutory obligations, provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively to an administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fact occurred. These statutory schemes have been sustained by this Court, albeit often without express reference to the Seventh Amendment. Thus taxes may constitutionally be assessed and collected together with penalties, with the relevant facts in some instances being adjudicated only by an administrative agency. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 599-600 (1931); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272, 284 (1856). Neither of these cases expressly discussed the question whether the taxation scheme violated the Seventh Amendment. However, in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938), the Court said, in rejecting a claim under the Sixth Amendment that the assessment and adjudication of tax penalties could not be made without a jury, that “the determination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury,” id., at 402. Similarly, Congress has entrusted to an administrative agency the task of adjudicating violations of the customs and immigration laws and assessing penalties based thereon. Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 335 (1932) (“[D]ue process of law does not require that the courts, rather than administrative officers, be charged . . . with determining the facts upon which the imposition of [fines] depends”); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909). See also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451, 458 (1929). In Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921), the Court sustained Congress’ power to pass a statute, applicable to the District of Columbia, temporarily suspending landlords’ legal remedy of ejectment and relegating them to an administrative factfinding forum charged with determining fair rents at which tenants could hold over despite the expiration of their leases. In that case the Court squarely rejected a challenge to the statute based on the Seventh Amendment, stating: “The statute is objected to on the further ground that landlords and tenants are deprived by it of a trial by jury on the right to possession of the land. If the power of the Commission established by the statute to regulate the relation is established, as we think it is, by what we have said, this objection amounts to little. To regulate the relation and to decide the facts affecting it are hardly separable.” Id., at 158. (Emphasis added.) In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932), apparently referring to the above-cited line of authority, the Court stated: “[T]he distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. . . . [T]he Congress, in exercising the powers confided to it may establish ‘legislative’ courts ... to serve as special tribunals ‘to examine and determine various matters, arising between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it.’ But ‘the mode of determining matters of this class is completely within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals.’ . . . Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans.” Id., at 50-51. (Emphasis added.) In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937), the Court squarely addressed the Seventh Amendment issue involved when Congress commits the factfinding function under a new statute to an administrative tribunal. Under the National Labor Relations Act, Congress had committed to the National Labor Relations Board, in a proceeding brought by its litigating arm, the task of deciding whether an unfair labor practice had been committed and of ordering backpay where appropriate. The Court stated: “The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are requirements [administratively] imposed for violation of the statute and are remedies appropriate to its enforcement. The contention under the Seventh Amendment is without merit.” Id., at 48-49. (Emphasis added.) This passage from Jones & Laughlin has recently been explained in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189 (1974), in which the Court held the Seventh Amendment applicable to private damages suits in federal courts brought under the housing discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Court rejected the argument that Jones & Laughlin held the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to any action based on a statutorily created right even if the action was brought before a tribunal which customarily utilizes a jury as its factfinding arm. Instead, we concluded that Jones & Laughlin upheld “congressional power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized court of equity [] free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment.” 415 U. S., at 194-195. (Emphasis added.) Finally, in Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363 (1974), in discussing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921), and Jones & Laughlin, we stated: “Block v. Hirsh merely stands for the principle that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication. . . . We may assume that the Seventh Amendment would not be a bar to a congressional effort to entrust landlord-tenant disputes, including those over the right to possession, to an administrative agency. Congress has not seen fit to do so, however, but rather has provided that actions under § 16-1501 be brought as ordinary civil actions in the District of Columbia’s court of general jurisdiction. Where it has done so, and where the action involves rights and remedies recognized at common law, it must preserve to parties their right to a jury trial.” 416 U. S., at 383. (Emphasis added.) In sum, the cases discussed above stand clearly for the proposition that when Congress creates new statutory “public rights,” it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment’s injunction that jury trial is to be “preserved” in “suits at common law.” Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the relevant field. This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law instead of an administrative agency. Petitioners would nevertheless have us disregard the interpretation of Jones & Laughlin which we recently espoused in Curtis v. Loether and Pernell v. Southall Realty, reading it instead as a holding solely that the entire proceeding before the NLRB was really equitable in nature; and they would have us entirely disregard Block v. Hirsh, supra. They would have us disregard the dictum in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932), that the adjudication of congressionally created public rights may be assigned to administrative agencies, as well as the similar holdings in Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329 (1932); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 (1909); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (1856); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931); and Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938). None of the grounds tendered for so reinterpreting the Seventh Amendment is convincing. It is suggested that in some of the cases, Elting, Oceanic, Murray’s Lessee, Phillips, and Helvering, the Seventh Amendment was not expressly put in issue. But these cases are clear enough that in the context involved, there was no requirement that the courts be involved at all in the factfinding process in the first instance. It is difficult to believe that these holdings or dicta did not subsume the proposition that a jury trial was not required. Furthermore, there are the remaining cases where the Court expressly held or observed that the Seventh Amendment did not bar administrative factfindings. Jones & Laughlin, Block, Pernell, and Curtis. Second, it is argued with some force that cases such as Murray’s Lessee, Elting, Oceanic, Phillips, and Helvering all deal with the exercise of sovereign powers that are inherently in the exclusive domain of the Federal Government and critical to its very existence—the power over immigration, the importation of goods, and taxation—and that the theory of those cases is inapplicable where the Government exercises other powers that petitioners apparently regard as less fundamental, less exclusive, and less vital to the existence of the Nation, such as the power to regulate commerce among the several States, the latter being the power Congress sought to exercise in enacting the statute at issue here. The difficulty with this argument is that the Court in these cases, and in others, did not appear to confine its holdings in this manner. In Murray’s Lessee the Court referred to “matters, involving public rights [that] congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.” 18 How., at 284. In Oceanic, which sustained the administrative imposition of a fine for the wrongful importation of aliens, the Court said that its ruling was in accordance with “settled judicial construction” that “not only as to tariff but as to internal revenue, taxation and other subjects” Congress could “impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.” 214 U. S., at 339. (Emphasis added.) Crowell spoke broadly of the distinction between cases of private right and those which arise between the Government and persons subject to its authority “in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments,” see supra, at 452, and gave “familiar illustrations” of the permissible use of administrative agencies in connection with the exercise of such congressional powers as “interstate and foreign commerce.” 285 U. S., at 51. Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, at 402-403, relying on Oceanic and similar cases, stated simply that “the determination of the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administrative agency instead of a jury.” It is also apparent that Jones & Laughlin, Pernell, and Curtis are not amenable to the limitations suggested by petitioners. Third is the assertion that the right to jury trial was never intended to depend on the identity of the forum to which Congress has chosen to submit a dispute; otherwise, it is said, Congress could utterly destroy the right to a jury trial by always providing for administrative rather than judicial resolution of the vast range of cases that now arise in the courts. The argument is well put, but it overstates the holdings of our prior cases and is in any event unpersuasive. Our prior cases support administrative factfinding in only those situations involving “public rights,” e. g., where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated. More to the point, it is apparent from the history of jury trial in civil matters that factfinding, which is the essential function of the jury in civil cases, Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S. 149, 157 (1973), was never the exclusive province of the jury under either the English or American legal systems at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment; and the question whether a fact would be found by a jury turned to a considerable degree on the nature of the forum in which a litigant found himself. Critical factfinding was performed without juries in suits in equity, and there were no juries in admiralty, Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433 (1830); nor were there juries in the military justice system. The jury was the factfinding mode in most suits in the common-law courts, but it was not exclusively so: Condemnation was a suit at common law but constitutionally could be tried without a jury, Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 375-376 (1876); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 593 (1897); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 18 (1970). “[M]any civil as well as criminal proceedings at common law were without a jury.” Kohl v. United States, supra, at 376. The question whether a particular case was to be tried in a court of equity—without a jury—or a court of law—with a jury—did not depend on whether the suit involved factfinding or on the nature of the facts to be found. Factfinding could be a critical matter either at law or in equity. Rather, as a general rule, the decision turned on whether courts of law supplied a cause of action and an adequate remedy to the litigant. If it did, then the case would be tried in a court of law before a jury. Otherwise the case would be tried to a court of equity sitting without a jury. Thus, suits for damages for breach of contract, for example, were suits at common law with the issues of the making of the contract and its breach to be decided by a jury; but specific performance was a remedy unavailable in a court of law and where such relief was sought the case would be tried in a court of equity with the facts as to making and breach to be ascertained by the court. The Seventh Amendment was declaratory of the existing law, for it required only that jury trial in suits at common law was to be “preserved.” It thus did not purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. Moreover, it did not seek to change the factfinding mode in equity or admiralty or to freeze equity jurisdiction as it existed in 1789, preventing it from developing new remedies where those available in courts of law were inadequate. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U. S. 531 (1970), is instructive in this respect. We there held that a jury trial is required in stockholder derivative suits where, if the corporation itself had sued, a jury trial would have been available to the corporation. It is apparent, however, that prior to the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merging the law and equity functions of the federal courts, the very suit involved in Bernhard would have been in a court of equity sitting without a jury, not because the underlying issue was any different at all from the issue the corporation would have presented had it sued, but because the stockholder plaintiff who was denied standing in a court of law to sue on the issue was enabled in proper circumstances, starting in the early part of the 19th century, to sue in equity on behalf of the company. The point is that the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases. It took the existing legal order as it found it, and there is little or no basis for concluding that the Amendment should now be interpreted to provide an impenetrable barrier to administrative factfinding under otherwise valid federal regulatory statutes. We cannot conclude that the Amendment rendered Congress powerless—when it concluded that remedies available in courts of law were inadequate to cope with a problem within Congress’ power to regulate—to create new public rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court of law—such as an administrative agency—in which facts are not found by juries. Indeed, as the Oceanic opinion said, the “settled judicial construction” was to the contrary “from the beginning.” 214 U. S., at 339. That case indicated, as had Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103 (1909), that the Government could commit the enforcement of statutes and the imposition and collection of fines to the judiciary, in which event jury trial would be required, see also United States v. Regan, 232 U. S. 37 (1914), but that the United States could also validly opt for administrative enforcement, without judicial trials. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S., at 402-403, and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 50-51. Thus, history and our cases support the proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved. Congress found the common-law and other existing remedies for work injuries resulting from unsafe working conditions to be inadequate to protect the Nation’s working men and women. It created a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law, and placed their enforcement in a tribunal supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved. The Seventh Amendment is no bar to the creation of new rights or to their enforcement outside the regular courts of law. The judgments below are affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of these cases. The Senate Report stated: “The problem of assuring safe and healthful workplaces for our working men and women ranks in importance with any that engages the national attention today. . . . 14,500 persons are killed annually as a result of industrial accidents; accordingly, during the past four years more Americans have been killed where they work than in the Vietnam war. By the lowest count, 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each year, resulting in the loss of 250 million man days of work-many times more than are lost through strikes. “In addition to the individual human tragedies involved, the economic impact of industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay workmen’s compensation benefits and medical expenses. “This ‘grim current scene’ . . . represents a worsening trend, for the fact is that the number of disabling injuries per million man hours worked is today 20% higher than in 1958.” S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 2 (1970), Leg. Hist. 142. See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, pp. 14-15 (1970); Leg. Hist. 844-845 (“The issue of the health and safety of the American, working man and woman is the most crucial one in the whole environmental question . . . the worst problem confronting American workers”). House and Senate debates are reprinted, along with the House, Senate, and Conference Reports, in a one-volume Committee Print entitled Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 1971) (cited supra and hereafter as Leg. Hist.). The statute provides in § 5 (a), 29 U. S. C. § 654 (a), that each employer: “(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; “(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act.” Petitioners make no challenge to the absence of mandatory review by the Commission of the administrative law judge’s findings of fact. The other Courts of Appeals which have passed on this issue have uniformly (and without a dissent) agreed with these results. Mohawk Excavating, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 549 F. 2d 859 (CA2 1977); Beall Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 507 F. 2d 1041 (CA8 1974); Brennan v. Winters Battery Mfg. Co., 531 F. 2d 317 (CA6 1975); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 531 F. 2d 451 (CA10 1976). See also Underhill Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 526 F. 2d 53, 57 n. 10 (CA2 1975). Each petitioner also argued below that the enforcement scheme violates the constitutional requirements that juries decide fact issues in criminal cases—arguing that the fines involved are “penal” in nature. Each petitioner asked this Court in its petition for a writ of certiorari to review the unfavorable rulings of the courts below on this issue. In light of our disposition of these cases we decline the respondents’ invitation to decide whether the dictum in these cases correctly divines the intent of the Seventh Amendment or whether, as the respondents argue, the Seventh Amendment has no application to Government litigation and leaves solely to the Sixth Amendment the function of interposing a jury between the Federal Government and an individual from whom it wishes to exact a fine. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454 (1975). These cases do not involve purely “private rights.” In cases which do involve only “private rights,” this Court has accepted factfinding by an administrative agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Art. III court, analogizing the agency to a jury or a special master and permitting it in admiralty cases to perform the function of the special master. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 51-65 (1932). The Court there said: “On the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself.” Id., at 51. In Murray’s Lessee, the Court stated: “[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper." 18 How., at 284. (Emphasis added.) In Oceanic, the Court stated: “In accord with this settled judicial construction the legislation of Congress from the beginning, not only as to tariff, but as to internal revenue, taxation, and other subjects, has proceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.” 214 U. S., at 339. (Emphasis added.) The Court also rejected the Seventh Amendment claim in Jones & Laughlin on the separate ground that that Amendment is inapplicable where “recovery of money damages is an incident to [nonlegal] relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law,” 301 U. S., at 48-49, since in such cases courts of equity would historically have granted monetary relief. In Jones & Laughlin, the NLRB ordered reinstatement of a dismissed employee, an order analogous to injunctive relief historically obtainable only in a court of equity, and consequently this alternative ground was an adequate one to decide Jones & Laughlin. However, this alternative ground would have been insufficient to decide the more general question of the NLRB’s power to order backpay where, for one reason or another, no such equitable order was sought. See Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 54 (1954); NLRB v. National Garment Co., 166 F. 2d 233 (CA8 1948); NLRB v. Brookside Industries, Inc., 308 F. 2d 224 (CA4 1962); Bon Hennings Logging Co. v. NLRB, 308 F. 2d 548 (CA9 1962); NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., Inc., 205 F. 2d 902 (CA9 1953); Reliance Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 125 F. 2d 311 (CA7 1941); NLRB v. Carpenters, 238 F. 2d 832 (CA5 1956); Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 122 F. 2d 757 (CA7 1941). The Court had reference to Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323 (1966), in which this Court sustained the power of a bankruptcy court, exercising summary jurisdiction without a jury, to adjudicate the otherwise legal issues of voidable preferences. The Court did so on the ground that a bankruptcy court, exercising its summary jurisdiction, was a specialized court of equity and constituted a forum before which a jury would be out of place and would go far to dismantle the statutory scheme. The holding in Pernell was that the Seventh Amendment applies to resolution of disputes of a “legal” nature—those regarding right to possession of real property when the resolution is entrusted to a forum which customarily employs a jury. We note that the decision of the administrative tribunal in these cases on the law is subject to review in the federal courts of appeals, and on the facts is subject to review by such courts of appeals under a substantial-evidence test. Thus, these cases do not present the question whether Congress may commit the adjudication of public rights and the imposition of fines for their violation to an administrative agency without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 82, which was in this respect declaratory of existing law, provided: “Sec. 16. And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.” Finally, it should be noted that, if the fines involved in these cases were made criminal fines instead of civil fines, the Seventh Amendment would be inapplicable by its terms. The Sixth Amendment would then govern the employer’s right to a jury and under our prior cases no jury trial would be required. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454 (1975). It would be odd to hold that Congress could avoid the jury-trial requirement by labeling the civil penalties criminal fines but not by assigning their adjudication to an administrative agency. Petitioners claim that permitting Congress to control the jury-right question by picking the forum is to delegate to it, rather than this Court, the final power to decide Seventh Amendment issues. The claim is incorrect. The Seventh Amendment prevents Congress from depriving a litigant of a jury trial in a “legal” action before a tribunal customarily utilizing a jury as its factfinding arm, Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363 (1974), and this Court has the final decision on the question whether a jury is required.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO. No. 75-1771. Argued March 30, 1977 Decided June 23, 1977 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 163. Stewart, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Bork, Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Baum, Stephen M. Gelber, and Jeanne L. Dobres. Vester T. Hughes, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Gene A. Castleberry and W. John Glaney. Matthew J. Zinn argued the cause for the American Council of Life Insurance as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were William B. Harman, Jr., Kenneth L. Kimble, and Francis A. Goodhue, Jr. Edward, J. Schmuck and Carolyn P. Chiechi filed a brief for the Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, for the second time this Term, we are required to construe the complex portion of the Internal Revenue Code concerning life insurance companies. The issue in this case is the extent to which deferred and uncollected life insurance premiums are includable in “reserves,” “assets,” and “gross premium income,” as those concepts are used in the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959. I Premiums on respondent’s policies are often payable in installments. If an installment is not paid when due, the policy will lapse, generally after a grace period. However, there is no legally enforceable duty to pay the premiums. An installment falling due between the end of the tax year and the policy’s anniversary date is called a “deferred premium.” In 1961, the most recent year in issue, respondent had $1,572,763 of deferred premiums. Pet. for Cert. 4a. An installment which is overdue at the end of the tax year is called an “uncollected premium” if the policy has not yet lapsed. In 1961, respondent had $231,969 of uncollected premiums. Ibid. For convenience, we shall refer to both deferred and uncollected premiums simply as “unpaid premiums.” The amount charged a policyholder — the “gross premium”^ — includes two components. Under state law, the company must add part of the premium to its reserves to ensure that it will have sufficient funds to pay death benefits. This amount, the “net valuation premium,” is determined under mortality and interest assumptions. The rest of the gross premium is called “loading,” and covers profits and expenses such as salesmen’s commissions, state taxes, and overhead. Under normal accounting rules, unpaid premiums would simply be ignored. They would not be properly accruable since the company has no legal right to collect them. Nevertheless, for the past century, insurance companies have added an amount equal to the net valuation portion of unpaid premiums to their reserves, with an offsetting addition to assets. State law uniformly requires this treatment of unpaid premiums, as does the accounting form issued by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). This national organization of state regulatory officials, which acts on behalf of the various state insurance departments, performs audits on insurance companies like respondent which do business in many States. The NAIC accounting form, known in the industry as the “Annual Statement,” is used by respondent for its financial reporting. In effect, in calculating its reserves, the company must treat these premiums to some extent as if they had been paid. This case involves the tax treatment of respondent’s unpaid premiums for the years 1958, 1959, and 1961. In its returns for each of those years, it included the net unpaid premiums in reserves, just as it did in its annual NAIC statement. In 1959 and 1961, it also followed the NAIC statement by including the net premiums in assets and premium income. In 1958, however, it excluded the entire unpaid premium from assets. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency because respondent did not, in any of these years, include the entire unpaid premium — loading as well as net premium — in calculating assets and income. In his view, if reserves are calculated on the fictional assumption that these premiums have been paid, the same assumption should apply to the calculation of assets and gross premium income. The Tax Court upheld the deficiency; but the Court of Appeals reversed. It held that respondent’s reserve calculation was correct because it was required by state law. The court further held that in accord with normal accounting practices, the premiums could not be considered as either assets or income before they were actually collected. The Courts of Appeals have taken varying approaches to this problem. The position taken by the Tenth Circuit in this case conflicts with decisions of four other Circuits. For this reason, and because the question is important to the revenue, we granted certiorari. 429 U. S. 814. Although the problem is a perplexing one, as indicated by the diversity of opinion among the Circuits, we find guidance in 26 U. S. C. § 818 (a), which governs the method of accounting by life insurance companies. In our view, § 818 (a) requires deference in this case to the established accounting procedures of the NAIC. In accordance with the NAIC procedures, we therefore hold that the net valuation portion of unpaid premiums, but not the loading, must be included in assets and gross premium income, as well as in reserves. Resolution of the problem before us requires some understanding of how reserves, assets, and premium income enter into the calculation of a life insurance company's taxable income. We therefore begin with a summary of past legislation and of the method by which the tax is now calculated. We then turn to a discussion of § 818 (a) and its application to-this case. II Throughout the history of the federal income tax, Congress has taken the view that life insurance companies should not be taxed on the amounts collected for the purpose of paying death benefits. This basic theme has been implemented in different ways. A From 1913 to 1920, life insurance companies, like other companies, were taxed on their entire income, but were allowed a deduction for “the net addition . . . required by law to be made within the year to reserve funds . ..." In that period the Government first challenged, but then accepted, the industry practice of deducting additions to reserves based on unpaid premiums without taking those premiums into income. Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress taxed only the investment income of life insurance companies; premium income was not included in their gross income. The companies were allowed to deduct a fixed percentage of their total reserves from their total investment income. The computation of this deduction was based on the company’s entire policy reserves, including the portion attributed to unpaid premiums. This use of this portion of the reserves apparently was not questioned during that period. There was no occasion to consider whether unpaid premiums should be treated as “income” since all premium income was exempt from tax in this period. The 1959 statute applies to all tax years after 1957. It preserves the basic concept of taxing only that portion of the life insurance company’s income which is not required to meet policyholder obligations. It makes two important changes, however, in the method of computing that amount. First, whereas the preceding statutes assumed an industrywide rate of return for the purpose of calculating the reserve deduction, the 1959 Act requires a calculation based on each company’s own earnings record. Second, in addition to imposing a tax on investment income, the new Act also taxes a portion of the company’s premium income. Although the computations are more complex, the basic approach of the 1959 Act is therefore somewhat comparable to the,pre-1921 “total income” concept. B In order to understand the implications of the Commissioner’s argument that unpaid premiums should be consistently treated in calculating “assets” and “gross premium income,” as well as “reserves,” it is necessary to explain how these concepts are employed in the present statute. The 1959 Act adds §§801 through 820 to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U. S. C.). Section 802 (b) defines three components of “life insurance company taxable income,” of which only the first two are relevant to this case. Generally, the taxable income is the sum of (1) the company's “taxable investment income” and (2) 50% of its other income (defined as the difference between its total “gain from operations” and its taxable investment income) , A company’s total investment income is regarded as including a share for the company, which is taxable, and a “policyholders’ share,” which is not. The policyholders’ share is a percentage which is essentially determined by the ratio of the company’s reserves to its assets. An increase in reserves will therefore reduce the company’s taxable investment income, whereas an increase in its assets will increase its tax. The company’s “gain from operations” includes, in addition to its share of investment income, the “gross amount of premiums,” § 809 (c) (1). Obviously, if unpaid premiums are regarded as part of this gross amount, the company’s gain from operations will be increased to that extent. Moreover, since a deduction is allowed for the net increase in reserves, §809 (d)(2), the contribution of unpaid premiums to the reserves diminishes the company’s gain. h — I hH I — I In a sense the case presents a question of timing. Respondent claims the right to treat unpaid premiums as creating reserves, and therefore a tax deduction, in one year, but wishes not to recognize the unfavorable tax consequences of increased “assets” and “premium income” until the year in which the premiums are actually paid. As the Commissioner forcefully argues, the respondent’s position lacks symmetry and the lack thereof redounds entirely to its benefit. A We start from the premise that unpaid premiums must be reflected in a life insurance company’s reserves. This has been the consistent and unbroken practice since the inception of the federal income tax on life insurance companies in 1913. Moreover, the uniform practice of the States since before 1913 has been to require that reserves reflect unpaid premiums. State law is relevant to the statutory definition of reserves, since life insurance reserves generally must be required by state law in order to be recognized for tax purposes. § 801 (b) (2). As a matter of state law, a genuine contingent liability exists and must be reflected on the company’s financial records. This liability has effects on the company’s business which transcend its income tax consequences. In view of the critical importance of the definition of reserves in the entire statutory scheme, as well as in the conduct of the company’s business, the practice of including net unpaid premiums in reserves cannot have been unknown to Congress. It is clear, we think, that no radical departure from past law was intended. Having decided that unpaid premiums must be treated to some extent as though they had actually been paid, the more difficult question is how far to apply this fictional assumption. Since this is essentially an accounting problem, our inquiry is governed by § 818. As its title indicates, § 818 contains the “Accounting provisions” relating to this portion of the Code. Section 818 (a) provides: “(a) Method of accounting. “All computations entering into the determination of the taxes imposed by this part shall be made— “(1) under an accrual method of accounting, or “(2) to the extent permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, under a combination of an accrual method of accounting with any other method permitted by this chapter (other than the cash receipts and disbursements method). “Except as provided in the preceding sentence, all such computations shall be made in a manner consistent with the manner required for purposes of the annual statement approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.” The legislative history makes it clear that the accounting procedures established by the NAIC apply if they are “not inconsistent” with accrual accounting rules. In other words, except when the rules of accrual accounting dictate a contrary-result, NAIC procedures “shall” apply. With the statutory test in mind, we consider the various proposed solutions to this accounting problem. B Essentially, the problem in this case is to decide the scope to be given a fictional assumption. Four solutions have been proposed. First, as the company argues, the assumption of prepayment could be applied in calculating the reserves, but ignored when calculating assets and income. This was the position taken by the Court of Appeals in this case. That position significantly distorts the tax equation in favor of the taxpayer and against the Government. Although we do not accept the notion that there must be perfect symmetry in the tax laws, there should be a measure of consistency in the accounting treatment of an item affecting interrelated elements in a formula such as that used to calculate the policyholders’ share of investment income. We think the Commissioner, and the other Courts of Appeals, see n. 4, supra, properly rejected the entirely one-sided use of the fictional assumption proposed by the taxpayer in this case. Second, we could assume that the entire premium has been paid, but that none of the associated expenses have been incurred. Thus, the fictional assumption would be applied when determining reserves, assets, and gross premium income, but not when determining expenses. This is the position taken by the Commissioner. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.805,1.809-4, 26 CFR §§ 1.805-5, 1.809-4 (1976). It is obvious that requiring the companies to treat the premium (including loading) as an asset and as income would improperly accelerate their tax payments; for a major share of loading is applied, when it is received, to deductible items such as sales commissions. Thus, to tax the entire loading portion of an unpaid premium is doubly objectionable: It imposes a tax on income the company has not received; and it treats the entire loading as income even though most of it will be disbursed for deductible expenses. The result of accepting the Commissioner’s position would be that the insurance company would have a greater tax liability on unpaid premiums than if the premiums had actually been paid. This result is also unacceptable. Third, some Courts of Appeals have extended the fiction somewhat further to include an assumption that certain expenses associated with the unpaid premiums have been incurred. These courts allow a deduction for some expenses such as salesmen’s commissions, which are payable upon receipt of the premium. It is not clear, however, precisely what expenses would receive this treatment. The approach adopted by these courts eliminates much of the unfairness of the Commissioner’s position. But their approach would take us far from the statute. Since there is nothing in the statute directing that any portion of unpaid loading be treated as an asset or as income, the statute obviously cannot provide guidance in fashioning a set of deductions to be credited against the fictional assumption that such loading is income. The fourth approach, in contrast, does have support in the statute. This approach has been adopted by the NAIC for the purpose of preparing the Annual Statement, and therefore is firmly anchored in the text of § 818 (a) which establishes a preference for NAIC accounting methods. Under this view, the net valuation portion of the unpaid premiums is included in reserves, assets, and gross premium income, while the loading portion is entirely excluded. This approach might be described as adopting the fictional assumption that the net valuation portion of the premium has been paid, but that the loading portion has not. This accounting treatment has been consistently applied throughout the industry for decades, and was regarded as the correct approach by the Tax Court when it first confronted this problem area. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Commissioner, 51 T. C. 824 (1969), modifying 50 T. C. 285 (1968), rev’d, 432 F. 2d 298 (CA5 1970). By including the net valuation portion of the unpaid premium — and only that portion — on both sides of the relevant equations, it satisfies in large measure the Commissioner’s quest for symmetry. It also avoids the uncertainty and confusion that would attend any attempt to segregate unpaid loading into deductible and nondeductible parts. Finally, it provides a practical rule which should minimize the likelihood of future disputes. Under § 818 (a), rejection of the NAIC approach would be justified only if it were found inconsistent with the dictates of accrual accounting. But the general rules of accrual accounting simply do not speak to the question of the scope to be given the entirely fictional assumption required by this statute. Any one of the four approaches has an equally good — or equally bad — claim to being “an accrual method.” Since general accounting rules are not controlling, the statute requires use of the NAIC approach to fill the gap. Accordingly, we conclude that unpaid premiums must be reflected in the computation of respondent’s tax liabilities “in a manner consistent with the manner required for purposes of the annual statement approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.” To the extent that the Secretary’s regulations require different treatment of unpaid premiums, we hold that they are inconsistent with § 818 (a) and therefore invalid. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. See United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U. S. 725. 26 U. S. C. §§801-820. 525 F. 2d 786 (CA10 1975). See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 408 F. 2d 842 (CA4 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 828; Western Nat. Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Commissioner, 432 F. 2d 298 (CA5 1970); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 460 F. 2d 8 (CA6 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 399 F. 2d 757 (CA7 1968), cert denied, 393 U. S. 1118. We are informed that substantially more than $100 million is in dispute. Pet. for Cert, 8. See, e. g., Tariff Act of 1913, § II (G)(b), 38 Stat. 173; Revenue Act of 1916, § 12 (a) Second, 39 Stat. 768; Revenue Act of 1918, § 234 (a) (10), 40 Stat. 1079. In Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Herold, 247 F. 681 (NJ 1918), the Government argued that the taxpayer was not entitled to credit for the full value of its reserves because the deferred and uncollected premiums had not been included in its taxable income. The court examined and rejected the argument: “The question to be decided, therefore, is whether the plaintiff, in figuring its net addition to the reserve funds which it was required by law to make, was justified in including the value of such policies. The argument upon which the defendant’s contention in this respect is based seems to be that as part of the assets making up the plaintiff’s 'reserve’ consisted of these uncollected and deferred premiums, and as they are not included in the plaintiff’s gross income (as, clearly, they should not be so included, Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold [198 F. 199 (NJ 1912)]; Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Eaton [218 F. 188 (Conn. 1914)]), that the value of such policies should not be included, for purposes of taxation, in its net addition to reserve funds. But this argument, I think, begs the question, which is, as clearly defined by the Supreme Court in McCoach v. Insurance Co. of North America, 244 U. S. 585, . . . what sum or sums in the aggregate did the state laws require the plaintiff to maintain as a reserve fund, not the character of the assets making up the actual 'reserve funds’. No matter what their character, they were as effectively withdrawn from the plaintiff’s use as if they had been expended. If therefore the law of New Jersey, or any other state in which it did business, made it obligatory on the part of the plaintiff to maintain a ‘reserve’ on account of the policies of the character in question, it is of no materiality what the ‘reserve funds’ actually consisted of, whether cash, securities, real estate, or due and uncollected premiums.” Id., at 685-686. Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue acquiesced. In a bulletin issued to its employees the Bureau said: “The legal reserves . . . can not be reduced by the net uncollected and deferred premiums.” Treas. Dept., Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bulletin H, Income Tax Rulings Peculiar to Insurance Companies (1921), Ruling 14, p. 9. See also Ruling 8, p. 7. See, e. g., Revenue Act of 1921, §244 (a), 42 Stat. 261. The tax was levied only on net investment income, that is, the excess over the amount deemed necessary to pay death claims. If, for example, the amount of the net valuation premium had been calculated on the assumption that the company would receive a 4% return on its investment of premiums between the time of its payment and the death of the policyholder, and it actually realized 5%, the tax applied to the net of 1%. This deduction reflects the assumption that interest on net premiums, as well as the premiums themselves, would be needed to satisfy death claims, and that only investment income greater than the amount projected in the determination of net premiums should be taxed. Revenue Act of 1921, §245 (a)(2), 42 Stat. 261; Revenue Act of 1924, §245 (a) (2), 43 Stat. 289; Revenue Act of 1926, § 245 (a) (2), 44 Stat. (pt. 2) 47; Revenue Act of 1928, § 203 (a) (2), 45 Stat. 843; Revenue Act of 1932, §203 (a)(2), 47 Stat. 224; Revenue Act of 1934, §203 (a)(2), 48 Stat. 732; Revenue Act of 1936, §203 (a)(2), 49 Stat. 1711; Revenue Act of 1938, § 203 (a) (2), 52 Stat. 523; Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 203 (a), 26 Ü. S. G §203 (a) (1952 ed.). Like the parties, we will emphasize the role of these concepts in the relevant calculations. Other factors involved in the calculations, such as pension plan reserves and real estate transactions, have little significance for the purpose of decision of this case. Section 802 (b) provides:- “Life insurance company taxable income defined. “For purposes of this part, the term ‘life insurance company taxable income’ means the sum of— “(1) the taxable investment income (as defined in section 804) or, if smaller, the gain from operations (as defined in section 809), “(2) if the gain from operations exceeds the taxable investment income, an amount equal to 50 percent of such excess, plus “(3) the amount subtracted from the policyholders surplus account for the taxable year, as determined under section 815.” For the purpose of this discussion, we assume that the gain from operations is greater than investment income. As the statute makes clear, §802 (b)(1), only the gain from operations is taxed if that figure is less than the taxable investment income, a situation which would probably arise only if the company lost money on its noninvestment operations. “The 1959 Act defines life insurance company reserves, provides a rather intricate method for establishing the amount which for tax purposes is deemed to be added each year to these reserves and in § 804 prescribes a division of the investment income of an insurance company into two parts, the policyholders’ share and the company’s share. More specifically, the total amount to be added to the reserve — the policy and other contract liability requirements — is divided by the total investment yield and the resulting percentage is used to allocate each item of investment income, including tax-exempt interest, partly to the policyholders and partly to the company. In this case, approximately 85% of each item of income was assigned to the policyholders and was, as the Act provides, excluded from the company’s taxable income.” United States v. Atlas Ins. Co., 381 U. S. 233, 236-237 (footnotes omitted). Actually, the computation is made in two steps. An earnings rate is determined by dividing the company’s investment yield by its assets (§ 805 (b) (2)). This earnings rate must be derived from a four-year average of earnings if such an average is lower than the current earnings rate (§805 (b)(1) and (3)). The adjusted life insurance reserves are determined by comparing the company’s actual earnings rate with the rate which was assumed when the reserves were calculated; for each one point of additional earnings rate there is a 10% decrease in the value of the reserve account, and vice versa (§805 (c)(1)). The earnings rate is multiplied by the adjusted life insurance reserve (§805 (a)(1)), and added with some other factors not germane here to yield the “policy and other contract liability requirements” (§ 805 (a)). In the second step of the computation, the “policy and other contract liability requirements” are divided by the investment yield to determine the percentage which is the policyholders’ share (§ 804 (a) (1)). The investment yield is the gross investment income less deductible expenses, depreciation and depletion (§ 804 (e)). For purposes of determining gain from operations, the company’s share is determined under §§ 809 (a) and (b) (3). Section 809 (a) defines the policyholder's share as the percentage obtained by dividing the required interest (the rate of interest used to calculate the reserves, multiplied by the amount of the reserves) by the investment yield. This formula is somewhat simpler than that used in §§ 804 and 805 for purposes of caculating taxable investment income. In this case, although the Commissioner recomputed respondent’s tax for the entire period from 1958 through 1961, the adjustments resulted in no deficiency for 1960. We therefore reject the Commissioner’s alternative position, that unpaid premiums should be ignored in calculating reserves, assets, and gross premium income. The Commissioner does not contend otherwise. Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. For example, the definition is also controlling on the question whether a company qualifies as a “life insurance company” within the meaning of the statute. See United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U. S. 725. The Senate Report describes the provision as follows: “(a) Method of accounting. — Subsection (a) of section 818, which is identical with the House bill, provides the general rule that all computations entering into the determination of taxes imposed by the new part I of subchapter L shall be made under an accrual method of accounting. This subsection further provides that, to the extent permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, a life insurance company may determine its taxes under a combination of an accrual method of accounting with any other method permitted by chapter 1 (other than the cash receipts and disbursements method). For example, the Secretary or his delegate may determine that the use of the installment method for reporting sales of realty and casual sales of personalty (see sec. 453 (b)) may, in combination with an accrual method of accounting, properly reflect life insurance company taxable income. To the extent not inconsistent with the provision of the 1954 Code and an accrual method of accounting, all computations entering into the determination of taxes imposed by the new part I shall be made in a manner consistent with the manner required for purposes of the annual statement approved by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.” S. Rep. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 72-73 (1959). The same language is used in the House Report. H. R. Rep. No. 34, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1959). The mandatory language contained in the provision requiring consistency with the NAIC statement is to be contrasted with the permissive language used to describe accounting methods covered by the Secretary’s regulations. Section 818 (a) (2) merely allows the Secretary to permit deviations from accrual accounting. Since this case does not concern any optional method allowed by the Secretary, this provision does not concern us here. These Regulations cite unpaid premiums as examples of assets (§ 1.805-5, Example (1)) and include these premiums as part of the “gross premiums” used in calculating gain from operations (§ 1.809-4 (a)(1)). In addition, § 1.801-4 (f) provides that "[i]n the event it is determined on the basis of the facts of a particular case that [unpaid premiums] are not properly accruable for the taxable year . . . and, accordingly, are not properly includible under assets . . . appropriate reduction shall be made in the life insurance reserves.” Based on the latter Regulation, the Commissioner makes an alternative argument that unpaid premiums should be disregarded for all purposes, including computations of reserves. We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Part III-A. Great Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 491 F. 2d 109 (CA5 1974); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 527 F. 2d 1096 (CA7 1975); North American Life & Cas. Co. v. Commissioner, 533 F. 2d 1046 (CA8 1976). Evidence of congressional respect for NAIC accounting methods is not limited to the portion of the Code concerning life insurance companies. In defining “gross income” and “expenses incurred” for purposes of taxing certain other insurance companies, Congress expressly requires computations to follow “the annual statement approved by the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners.” 26 U. S. C. §§832 (b)(1)(A), (b)(6). The American Council of Life Insurance has filed a brief as amicus curiae and made oral argument urging adoption of this position. The first Court of Appeals to consider this argument rejected it on the ground that Congress would not have intended “to relegate the substantive matter of offsetting or excluding loading on deferred and uncollected premiums, with its concomitant impact on the resulting tax, to the NAIC.” Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 399 F. 2d, at 760. We think that § 818 (a) gives the NAIC precisely this role of filling the gaps in the statutory treatment of accounting problems like this one.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTHEAST MARINE TERMINAL CO., INC., et al. v. CAPUTO et al. No. 76-444. Argued April 18, 1977 Decided June 17, 1977 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. William M. Kimball argued the cause for petitioners in No. 76-444. With him on the brief was Peter M. Pryor. E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner in No; 76-454. With him on the briefs was Robert J. Kenney, Jr. Angelo C. Gucciardo argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Caputo and Blundo in both cases. Frank H. Easterbrook argued the cause for respondent Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, in both cases pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Laurie M. Streeter, and Joshua T. Gillelan II. Together with No. 76-454, International Terminal Operating Co., Inc. v. Blundo et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by E. D. Vickery and W. Robins Brice for the West Gulf Maritime Assn.; and by Thomas D. Wilcox for the National Association of Stevedores. Thomas W. Gleason and Herzl S. Eisenstadt filed a brief for the International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1972 Congress amended the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., in substantial part to “extend [the Act’s] coverage to protect additional workers.” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 1 (1972) (hereinafter S. Rep.). In these consolidated cases we must determine whether respondents Caputo and Blundo, injured while working on the New York City waterfront, are entitled to compensation. To answer that question we must determine the reach of the 1972 Amendments. The sections of the Act relevant to these cases are the ones providing “coverage” and defining “employee.” They provide, with italics to indicate the material added in 1972: “Compensation shall be payable ... in respect of disability or death of an employee but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 903 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. V). “The term 'employee’ means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.” 33 U. S. C. § 902 (3) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Specifically at issue here is whether respondents Caputo and Blundo were “employees” within the meaning of the Act and whether the injuries they sustained occurred on the “navigable waters of the United States.” I At the time of his injury respondent Carmelo Blundo had been employed for five years as a “checker” by petitioner International Terminal Operating Co. (ITO) at its facility in Brooklyn, N. Y., known as the 21st Street Pier. As a checker he was responsible for checking and recording cargo as it was loaded onto or unloaded from vessels, barges, or containers. Blundo was assigned his tasks at the beginning of each day and until he arrived at the terminal he did not know whether he would be working on a ship or on shore. He was reassigned during the day if he completed the task to which he was assigned initially. App. 63-69, 112. On January 8, 1974, ITO assigned Blundo to check cargo being “stripped” or removed from a container on the 19th Street side of the pier. The container Blundo was checking had been taken off a vessel at another pier facility outside of Brooklyn and brought overland unopened by an independent trucking company to the 21st Street Pier. It was Blundo’s job to break the seal that had been placed on the container in a foreign port and show it to United States Customs Agents. After the seal was broken, Blundo was to check the contents of the container against a manifest sheet describing the cargo, the consignees, and the ship on, and port from which, the cargo had been transported. He was to mark each item of cargo with an identifying number. After the checking, the cargo was to be placed on pallets, sorted according to consignees, and put in a bonded warehouse pending customs inspection. Blundo was injured as he was marking the cargo stripped from the container, when he slipped on some ice on the pier. Id., at 69-74, 86-90. Blundo sought compensation under the LHWCA. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Blundo satisfied the coverage requirements of the Act and the Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed. Respondent Ralph Caputo was a member of a regular longshoring “gang” that worked for Pittston Stevedoring Co. When his gang was not needed, Caputo went to the waterfront hiring hall, where he was hired by the day by other stevedoring companies or terminal operators with work available. He had been hired on some occasions by Northeast Stevedoring Co. to work as a member of a stevedore gang on ships at the 39th Street Pier in Brooklyn; on other occasions he had been hired by petitioner Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. (Northeast), for work in its terminal operations at the same location. App. 8-10,14-16. On April 16, 1973, Caputo was hired by Northeast to work as a “terminal labor [er].” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-444, p. 48a; App. 8, 14. A terminal laborer may be assigned to load and unload containers, lighters, barges, and trucks. Id., at 8; Brief for Petitioners in No. 76-444, p. 4. When he arrived at the terminal, Caputo was assigned, along with a checker and forklift driver, to help consignees’ truckmen load their trucks with cargo that had been discharged from ships at Northeast’s terminal. Caputo was injured while rolling a dolly loaded with cheese into a consignee’s truck. App. 27-40. The Administrative Law Judge found that Caputo satisfied the requirements of the Act and awarded him compensation. The BRB affirmed. The employers in both cases filed petitions to review the decisions and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit consolidated the cases. After thorough consideration of the language, history, and purposes of the 1972 Amendments, the court held, one judge dissenting, that the injuries of both respondents were compensable under the LHWCA. In view of the conflict over the coverage afforded by the 1972 Amendments, we granted certiorari to consider both cases. 429 U.S. 998 (1976). We affirm. II Congress enacted the LHWCA in 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, after this Court had thwarted the efforts of the States and of Congress to provide compensation for maritime workers injured on navigable waters through state compensation programs. In 1917, the Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, held that the States were without power to extend a workmen's compensation remedy to longshoremen injured on the gangplank between a ship and a pier. The decision left longshoremen injured on the seaward side of a pier without a compensation remedy while longshoremen injured on the pier were protected by state compensation Acts. State Industrial Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922). Dissatisfied with the gap in coverage thus created, and recognizing that the amphibious nature of longshoremen’s work made it desirable to have “one law to cover their whole employment, whether directly part of the process of loading or unloading a ship or not,’’ Congress sought to authorize States to apply their compensation statutes to injuries seaward of the Jensen line. Its attempts to allow such uniform state systems, however, were struck down as unlawful delegations of congressional power. Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920). Finally, convinced that the only way to provide workmen’s compensation for longshoremen and harborworkers injured on navigable waters was to enact a federal system, Congress, in 1927, passed the LHWCA. The Act was, in a sense, a typical workmen’s compensation system, compensating an employee for injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” But it was designed simply to be a gapfiller — to fill the void created by the inability of the States to remedy injuries on navigable waters. Thus, it provided coverage only for injuries occurring “upon the navigable waters of the United States” and permitted compensation awards only “if recovery . . . through workmen’s compensation proceedings [could] not validly be provided by state law.” Congress’ initial apprehension of the difficulties inherent in the existence of two compensation systems for injuries sustained by amphibious workers proved to be well founded. The courts spent the next 45 years trying to ascertain the respective spheres of coverage of the state and federal systems. As two commentators described it, “the relationship between [LHWCA] and the otherwise applicable State Compensation Act [was] shrouded in impenetrable confusion.” G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty 409 (2d ed. 1975) (Gilmore). It is unnecessary to examine in detail the Court’s efforts to dispel the confusion. Suffice it to say that while the Court permitted recovery under state remedies in particular situations seaward of the Jensen line, see, e. g., Davis v. Washington Labor Dept., 317 U. S. 249 (1942), the Court made it clear that federal coverage stopped at the water’s edge. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212 (1969). In Nacirema Operating Co., supra, the Court held that the Act did not cover longshoremen killed or injured on a pier while attaching cargo to ships’ cranes for loading onto the ships, even though coverage might have existed had the men been hurled into the water by the accident, Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (ED Va. 1965), aff’d, 398 F. 2d 900 (CA4 1968) (en banc), or been injured on the deck of the ship while performing part of the same operation, Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U. S. 114 (1962). The dissent protested the incongruity and unfairness of having coverage determined by “where the body falls” and argued that the Act was “status oriented, reaching all injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employment.” 396 U. S. at 224 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thb majority, however, did not agree. “There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen injured while loading or unloading a ship. But even construing the [Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948, 46 U. S. C. § 740,] to amend the Longshoremen’s Act would not effect this result, since longshoremen injured on a pier by pier-based equipment would still remain outside the Act. And construing the Longshoremen’s Act to coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction — whatever they may be and however they may change — simply replaces one line with another whose uncertain contours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line, the same confusion that previously existed on the seaward side. While we have no doubt that Congress had the power to choose either of these paths in defining the coverage of its compensation remedy, the plain fact is that it chose instead the line in Jensen separating water from land at the edge of the pier. The invitation to move that line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court.” Id., at 223-224.” In 1972, Congress moved the line. The 1972 Amendments were the first significant effort to reform the 1927 Act and the judicial gloss that had been attached to it. The main concern, of the 1972 Amendments was not with the scope of coverage but with accommodating the desires of three interested groups: (1) shipowners who were discontented with the decisions allowing many maritime workers to use the doctrine of “seaworthiness” to recover full damages from shipowners regardless of fault; (2) employers of the longshoremen who, under another judicially created doctrine, could be required to indemnify shipowners and thereby lose the benefit of the intended exclusivity of the compensation remedy; and (3) workers who wanted to improve the benefit schedule deemed inadequate by all parties. Congress sought to meet these desires by “specifically eliminating suits against vessels brought for injuries to longshoremen under the doctrine of seaworthiness and outlawing indemnification actions and ‘hold harmless’ or indemnity agreements [; continuing] to allow suits against vessels or other third parties for negligence [; and raising] benefits to a level commensurate with present day salaries and with the needs of injured workers whose sole support will be payments under the Act.” S. Rep. 5. In increasing the benefits, however, Congress recognized that the disparity between the federal compensation rates and the significantly lower state rates would exacerbate the harshness of the already unpopular Jensen line. It also realized that modem technology had moved much of the longshoreman’s work onto the land so that if coverage were not extended, there would be many workers who would be relegated to what Congress deemed clearly inadequate state compensation systems. As both the Senate and House Reports stated: “[C]overage of the present Act stops at the water’s edge; injuries occurring on land are covered by State Workmen's Compensation laws. The result is a disparity in benefits payable for death or disability for the same type of injury depending on which side of the water’s edge and in which State the accident occurs. “To make matters worse, most State Workmen’s Compensation laws provide benefits which are inadequate “It is apparent that if the Federal benefit structure embodied in [the] Committee bill is enacted, there would be a substantial disparity in benefits payable to a permanently disabled longshoreman, depending on which side of the water’s edge the accident occurred, if State laws are permitted to continue to apply to injuries occurring on land. It is also to be noted that with the advent of modern cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and the use of LASH-type vessels, more of the longshoreman’s work is performed on land than heretofore.” To remedy these problems, Congress extended the coverage shoreward. It broadened the definition of “navigable waters of the United States” to include “any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel.” At the same time, Congress amended the definition of the persons covered by the Act. Previously, so long as a work-related injury occurred on navigable waters and the injured worker was not a member of a narrowly defined class, the worker would be eligible for federal compensation provided that his or her employer had at least one employee engaged in maritime employment. It was not necessary that the injured employee be so employed. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O’Rourke, 344 U. S. 334, 340-342 (1953). But with the definition of “navigable waters” expanded by the 1972 Amendments to include such a large geographical area, it became necessary to describe affirmatively the class of workers Congress desired to compensate. It therefore added the requirement that the injured worker be “engaged in maritime employment,” which it defined to include “any longshoreman or other person engaged in long-shoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but . . . not ... a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.” 33 U. S. C. § 902 (3) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The 1972 Amendments thus changed what had been essentially only a “situs” test of eligibility for compensation to one looking to both the “situs” of the injury and the “status” of the injured. We must now determine whether respondents Caputo and Blundo satisfied these requirements. Ill We turn first to the question whether Caputo and Blundo satisfied the “status” test — that is, whether they were “engaged in maritime employment” and therefore “employees” at the time of their injuries. The question is made difficult by the failure of Congress to define the relevant terms— “maritime employment,” “longshoremen,” “longshoring operations” — in either the text of the Act or its legislative history. The closest Congress came to defining the key terms is the “typical example” of shoreward coverage provided in the Committee Reports. The example clearly indicates an intent to cover those workers involved in the essential elements of unloading a vessel — taking cargo out of the hold, moving it away from the ship’s side, and carrying it immediately to a storage or holding area. The example also makes it clear that persons who are on the situs but are not engaged in the overall process of loading and unloading vessels are not covered. Thus, employees such as truckdrivers, whose responsibility on the waterfront is essentially to pick up or deliver cargo unloaded from or destined for maritime transportation are not covered. Also excluded are employees who perform purely clerical tasks and are not engaged in the handling of cargo. But while the example is useful for identifying the outer bounds of who is clearly excluded and who is clearly included, it does not speak to all situations. In particular, it is silent on the question of coverage for those people, such as Caputo and Blundo, who are injured while on the situs, see Part IV, infra, and engaged in the handling of cargo as it moves between sea and land transportation after its immediate unloading. Nevertheless, we are not without guidance in resolving that question. The language of the 1972 Amendments is broad and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended coverage. Indeed, such a construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation. The Act “must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results.” Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S. 328, 333 (1953). Consideration of the purposes behind the broadened coverage reveals a clear intent to reach persons such as Blundo and Caputo. One of the primary motivations for Congress’ decision to extend the coverage shoreward was the recognition that “the advent of modern cargo-handling techniques” had moved much of the longshoreman’s work off the vessel and onto land. S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 10. Noted specifically was the impact of containerization. Unlike traditional break-bulk cargo handling, in which each item of cargo must be handled separately and stored individually in the hold of the ship as it waits in port, containerization permits the time-consuming work of stowage and unstowage to be performed on land in the absence of the vessel. The use of containerized ships has reduced the costly time the vessel must be in port and the amount of manpower required to get the cargo onto the vessel. In effect, the operation of loading and unloading has been moved shoreward; the container is a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel. As Judge Friendly observed below, “[s] tripping a container ... is the functional equivalent of sorting cargo discharged from a ship; stuffing a container is part of the loading of the ship even though it is performed on shore and not in the ship’s cargo holds.” Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d 35, 53 (CA2 1976). Congress’ intent to adapt the LHWCA to modern cargo-handling techniques clearly indicates that these tasks, heretofore done on board ship, are included in the category of “longshoring operations.” It is therefore apparent that respondent Blundo was a statutory “employee” when he slipped on the ice. His job was to check and mark items of cargo as they were unloaded from a container. This task is clearly an integral part of the unloading process as altered by the advent of containerization and was intended to be reached by the Amendments. Indeed, the Committee Reports explicitly state: “[C]heckers, for example, who are directly involved in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new amendment.” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 11. We thus have no doubt that Blundo satisfied the status test. The congressional desire to accommodate the Act to modern technological changes is not relevant to Caputo’s case, since he was injured in the old-fashioned process of putting goods already unloaded from a ship or container into a delivery truck. Another dominant theme underlying the 1972 Amendments, however, assists us in analyzing Caputo’s status. Congress wanted a “uniform compensation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity.” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 10-11. It wanted a system that did not depend on the “fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury [to the longshoreman] occurred on land or over water.” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 10. It therefore extended the situs to encompass the waterfront areas where the overall loading and unloading process occurs. It is the view of the respondent Director of the OWCP that a uniform system must reach “all physical cargo handling activity anywhere within an area meeting the situs [test].” Brief for Federal Respondent 20. “[M]aritime employment,” in his view, “include [s] all physical tasks performed on the waterfront, and particularly those tasks necessary to transfer cargo between land and water transportation.” Id.,, at 25. Under this theory, it is clear that the Act would cover someone who, like Caputo, was engaged in the final steps of moving cargo.from maritime to land transportation: putting it in the consignee’s truck. We need not decide, however, whether the congressional desire for uniformity supports the Director’s view and entities everyone performing a task such as Caputo’s to benefits under the Act. It is clear, at a minimum, that when someone like Caputo performs such a task, he is to be covered. The Act focuses primarily on occupations — longshoreman, harbor worker, ship repairman, shipbuilder, shipbreaker. Both the text and the history demonstrate a desire to provide continuous coverage throughout their employment to these amphibious workers who, without the 1972 Amendments, would be covered only for part of their activity. It seems clear, therefore, that when Congress said it wanted to cover “longshoremen,” it had in mind persons whose employment is such that they spend at least some of their time in indisputably long-shoring operations and who, without the 1972 Amendments, would be covered for only part of their activity. That Caputo is such a person is readily apparent. As a member of a regular stevedoring gang, he participated on either the pier or the ship in the stowage and unloading of cargo. On the day of his injury he had been hired by petitioner Northeast as a terminal laborer. In that capacity, he could have been assigned to any one of a number of tasks necessary to the transfer of cargo between land and maritime transportation, including stuffing and stripping containers, loading and discharging lighters and barges, and loading and unloading trucks. App. 8. Not only did he have no idea when he set out in the morning which of these tasks he might be assigned, but in fact his assignment could have changed during the day. Thus, had Caputo avoided injury and completed loading the consignee’s truck on the day of the accident, he then could have been assigned to unload a lighter. Id., at 24. Since it is clear that he would have been covered while unloading such a vessel, to exclude him from the Act’s coverage in the morning but include him in the afternoon would be to revitalize the shifting and fortuitous coverage that Congress intended to eliminate. Petitioners and the NAS seek to avoid these results by proposing a so-called "point of rest” theory. The term “point of rest” is claimed to be a term of art in the industry that denotes the point where the stevedoring operation ends (or, in the case of loading, begins) and the terminal operation function begins (or ends, in the case of loading). Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-454, p. 9. See n. 4, supra. Petitioners contend that the “maritime employment of longshoremen” includes only “the stevedoring activity of the longshore gang (and those directly involved with the gang) which, in the case of unloading, takes cargo out of the hold of the vessel, moves it away from the ship’s side, and carries it to its point of rest on the pier or in a terminal shed.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 74-454, p. 9. Since Caputo and Blundo were handling cargo that had already reached its first point of rest, petitioners argue they are not to be covered. This contention that Congress intended to use the point of rest as the decisive factor in the “status” determination has several fatal weaknesses. First, the term “point of rest” nowhere appears in the Act or in the legislative history. It is difficult to understand why, if Congress intended to stop coverage at this point, it never used the term. The absence of a term that is claimed to be so well known in the industry is both conspicuous and telling. But it is not simply the term’s unexplained absence that undermines petitioners’ theory. More fundamentally, the theory is simply too restrictive, failing to accommodate either the language or the intent of the 1972 Amendments. The operations petitioners would cover clearly are "longshoring operations” and are appropriately covered by the Act. But petitioners fail to give effect to the obvious desire to cover longshoremen whether or not their particular task at the moment of injury is clearly a “longshoring operation.” The theory does not comport with the Act’s focus on occupations and its desire for uniformity. As the First Circuit noted: “The evil of the old Act was that it bifurcated coverage for essentially the same employment. The point-of-rest approach would seem to result in the same sort of bifurcation, since the same employee engaged in an activity beyond the point of rest would cease to be covered.” Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F. 2d 264, 275 (1976). In addition, the theory fails to accommodate the intent to cover those long-shoring operations that modern technology had moved onto the land. Coverage that stops at the point of rest excludes those engaged in loading and unloading the modern functional equivalents of the hold of the ship. As we have indicated, Congress clearly intended to cover such operations. The only support petitioners can find for their theory is the fact that it is consistent with the “typical example” given in the Committee Reports. See n. 27, supra. But as we have already indicated, supra, at 266-267, the example is equally consistent with a broader view of coverage. Consistency with an illustrative example is clearly not enough to overcome the overwhelming evidence against the theory. In view of all this, it is not surprising that the “point of rest” limitation has been rejected by all but one of the Circuits that have considered it and by virtually all the commentators. We too reject it. A theory that nowhere appears in the Act, that was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative process, that does not comport with Congress’ intent, and that restricts the coverage of a remedial Act designed to extend coverage is incapable of defeating our conclusion that Blundo and Caputo are “employees.” IV Having established that respondents Blundo and Caputo satisfied the “status” test for coverage under the Act, we consider now whether their injuries occurred on a covered “situs” — “the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel).” There is no dispute with respect to Caputo. The truck he was helping to load was parked inside the terminal area. As petitioner Northeast correctly concedes, this situs “unquestionably met the requirements of § 3 (a) of the Act, . . . because the terminal adjoins navigable waters of the United States and parts of the terminal are used in loading and unloading ships.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 76-444, p. 3 n. 1. Blundo’s injury was sustained while he was checking a container being stripped on a pier located within a facility known as the 21st Street Pier. The fenced-in facility was located on the water and ran between 19th and 21st Streets. It included two “finger-piers.” The pier on the 21st Street end was used to berth ships for purposes of loading and unloading them. The one on the 19th Street end was used only for stripping and stuffing containers and storage. See the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-454, pp. 52a-53a. Blundo was working on this latter pier. Petitioner ITO argues that Blundo was not on a covered situs because the 19th Street Pier was not “customarily used by an employer for loading [or] unloading ... a vessel.” The Court of Appeals labeled this argument “halfhearted” and dismissed it in a footnote. 544 F. 2d, at 51 n. 19. We agree that the argument does not merit extended discussion. First, we agree with the court below that it is not at all clear that the phrase “customarily used” was intended to modify more than the immediately preceding phrase “other areas.” We note that the sponsor of the bill in the House, Representative Daniels, described this section as “expand [ing] the coverage which was limited to the ship in the present law, to the piers, wharves, and terminals.” 118 Cong. Rec. 36381 (1972). There was little concern with respect to how these facilities were used. Second, even if we assume that the phrase should be read to modify the preceding terms, we agree with the BRB and the Court of Appeals that Blundo satisfied the situs test in the same way that Caputo did — by working in an “adjoining . . . terminal... customarily used ... in loading [and] unloading.” The entire terminal facility adjoined the water and one of its two finger-piers clearly was used for loading and unloading vessels. Accordingly, we conclude that when Congress sought to expand the situs to avoid anomalies inherent in a system that drew lines at the water’s edge, it intended to include an area such as the one at issue here. Accord, Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F. 2d, at 271-272; I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore v. BRB, 529 F. 2d 1080, 1083-1084 (CA4 1975), modified en banc, 542 F. 2d 903 (1976). Since we find that both Caputo and Blundo satisfied the status and the situs tests, we affirm. It is so ordered. 86 Stat. 1251, Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter 1972 Amendments). A container is a large metal box resembling a truck trailer without wheels. It can carry large amounts of cargo destined for one or more consignees. If the goods are for a single consignee, the container may be removed from the pier intact and delivered directly to him, but if it carries goods destined for several consignees, it must be unloaded or “stripped” and the goods sorted according to consignee. This operation may be done at the waterfront or inland. The analogous process during the loading phase is called “stuffing.” App. 86-89, 96-98, 101-103, 105-107; Brief for Federal Respondent 7 n. 4; Brief for National Association of Stevedores as Amicus Curiae 30. Under the 1972 Amendments, contested compensation claims are heard by an administrative law judge. 33 U. S. C. § 919 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Review is then available from the BRB, a three-member board appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The BRB, created by the 1972 Amendments, is empowered “to hear and determine appeals raising a substantial question of law or fact taken by any party in interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees under [the LHWCA].” 33 U. S. C. §§ 921 (b) (1), (3) (1970 ed., Supp. V); see generally 20 CFR §§ 801-802 (1976). The decisions of the BRB are subject to review in the courts of appeals. 33 U. S. C. § 921 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Prior to the 1972 Amendments, cases were heard in the first instance by deputy commissioners and review was then available in the district courts. 33 U. S. C. § 921. There was no administrative review procedure for LHWCA claims. The Benefits Review Board Service (BRBS) is the unofficial reporter of the Board’s decisions. The BRB’s decision in Blundo’s case may be found at 2 BRBS 376 (1975) as well as in App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-454, p. 45a. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision is reproduced id., at 49a. A synopsis of it may be found at 1 BRBS 71 (ALJ) (1975). It is necessary, at this point, to introduce some terminology. “A stevedore or stevedore contractor is responsible for loading or unloading a ship in port by contract with a shipowner, agent, or charter operator.” U. S. Dept, of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs Task Force Report, Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Program 103 (1976). “[A] marine terminal operator, who may own or lease the terminal property, is responsible for the safe handling of the ship, the delivery and receipt of the ship’s cargo, and all movement and handling of that cargo between the point-of-rest and any place on the marine terminal property except to shipside.” Ibid. Typically, the work of getting the cargo on and off the ship is done by a “gang” of longshoremen “distributed between the ship and the pier so they can move cargo in an uninterrupted flow.” Id., at 104. A member of the gang may be designated by the equipment he operates, e. g., a winchman or hustler operator, or by the area in which he works, e. g., holdman. A typical longshore gang ranges from 12 to 20 workers. Because ship arrivals are irregular, the demand for a gang varies from day to day. Ibid. A lighter is a closed barge. App. 8. See discussion n. 35, infra. It is not clear from the record whether loading vessels with "ships’ stores” and laundry for the crew may be assigned to a terminal laborer or whether there is a separate classification called "ship laborer” for this. Compare App. 8, 24-25 with Brief for Federal Respondent 5 n. 3. It was stipulated that all the cargo handled at this terminal either was going on board a vessel or had come from one. App. 6. The BRB decision is reported at 3 BRBS 13 (1975). A synopsis of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision appears at 2 BRBS 4 (ALJ) (1975). Both opinions may also be found in Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-444, pp. 47a, 51a. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d 35 (CA2 1976). See ibid.; Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 540 F. 2d 629 (CA3 1976); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F. 2d 533 (CA5 1976), cert. pending sub nom. P. C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, No. 76-641, Halter Marine Fabricators, Inc. v. Nulty, No. 76-880, and Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., No. 76-1166; Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F. 2d 264 (CA1 1976), cert. pending, No. 76-571; I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore v. BRB, 542 F. 2d 903 (CA4 1976) (en banc), cert. pending sub nom. Maritime Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, No. 76-706, and Adkins v. I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore, No. 76-730. For discussion of these cases, see n. 40, infra. The Court of Appeals questioned whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP), the federal respondent here, was a proper party in the Court of Appeals. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, supra, at 42 n. 5. (The OWCP was established by the Secretary of Labor and given the responsibility to administer several benefits programs, including the LHWCA. 20 CFR §701.201 (1976).) It concluded that some federal participation was proper and did not reach the question whether the BRB should have been substituted for the Director. Petitioners named the Director rather than the BRB as a respondent in the Court of Appeals and neither party has raised any question in this Court concerning the identity of the federal respondent. This question is therefore not before us. The Department of Labor has recently promulgated a regulation making it clear that the Director of OWCP is the proper federal party in a case of this nature. 42 Fed. Reg. 16133 (Mar. 1977). H. R. Rep. No. 639, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1922). More fully, the Report noted: “It is easy to understand the reason why the representatives of the workmen ask for compensation under State laws. The longshoremen are no more peripatetic workmen than are the repair men. They do not leave the port in which they work; they do not go into different jurisdictions. They are part of the local labor force and are permanently subject to the same conditions as are other local workmen. The work of longshoremen is not all on ship. Much of it is on the wharves. They may be at one moment unloading a dray or a railroad car or moving articles from one point on the dock to another, the next actually engaged in the process of loading or unloading cargo. Their need for uniformity is one law to cover their whole employment, whether directly part of the process of loading or unloading a ship or not.” See also S. Rep. No. 139, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1917). “Injury,” “employee,” and “employer” were defined in 33 U. S. C. §§902 (2), (3), (4): “(2) The term ‘injury’ means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury .... “(3) The term ‘employee’ does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net. “(4) The term ‘employer’ means an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).” Title 33 U. S. C. § 903 defined the coverage provided by the Act: “(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation, proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of— “(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or “(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof. “(b) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the Intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.” For discussion of the history, see Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202, 204-209 (1971); Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U. S. 212, 216-224 (1969); Gilmore 417-423; 4 A. Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 89 (1976); Note, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 La. L. Rev. 683 (1973). Nacirema Operating Co., supra, reversed the en banc decision of the Fourth Circuit in Marine Stevedoring Corp. That decision involved four separate cases in which longshoremen had been injured in different incidents while engaged in loading cargo vessels. The Deputy Commissioner awarded compensation to the man hurled into the water by his accident; the others were found to be outside the Act’s coverage. The Court of Appeals found that all four should be compensated. No petition for certiorari was sought in the case involving the worker who fell in the water and thus this Court did not have that question before it. The Court reiterated its suggestion to Congress in Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, supra, which held that a longshoreman injured on the pier by a pier-based forklift could not recover from the shipowner under a warranty of seaworthiness. The Court noted the sturdiness of the Jensen line in the absence of statutory modification. It observed, however, that “if denying federal remedies to longshoremen injured on land is intolerable Congress has ample power under Arts. I and III of the Constitution to enact a suitable solution.” 404 U. S., at 216. The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare described the need for the bill: “The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was last amended in 1961, at which time the maximum benefit under the Act was set at $70 per week. . . . Clearly, in order to provide adequate income replacement for disabled workers covered under this law a substantial increase in benefits is urgently required. “While every one has agreed since at least the mid-1960’s that the benefits under this Act should be raised, there has been some dispute over the years as to whether such benefits should be raised so long as this compensation law was not the exclusive remedy for an injured worker. It has been the feeling of most employers that while they were willing to guarantee payment to an injured worker regardless of fault, they would only do so if the right to such payment was the exclusive remedy and they would not be subject to additional law suits because of that injury. “Since 1946, due to a number of decisions by the U. S. Supreme Court [starting with Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U. S. 85 (1946)], it has been possible for an injured longshoreman to avail himself of the benefits of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and to sue the owner of the ship on which he was working for damages as a result of this injury. The Supreme Court has ruled that such ship owner, under the doctrine of seaworthiness, was liable for damages caused by any injury regardless of fault. In addition, [under the ruling of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U. S. 124 (1956),] shipping companies generally have succeeded in recovering the damages for which they are held liable to injured longshoremen from the stevedore on theories of express or implied warranty, thereby transferring their liability to the stevedore company, the actual employer of the longshoremen.” S. Rep. 4. “The end result is that, despite the provision in the Act which limits an employer’s liability to the compensation and medical benefits provided in the Act, a stevedore-employer is indirectly liable for damages to an injured longshoreman who utilizes the technique of suing the vessel under the unseaworthiness doctrine.” Id., at 9. “The social costs of these law suits, the delays, crowding of court calendars and the need to pay for lawyers’ services have seldom resulted in a real increase in actual benefits for injured workers.” Id., at 4. See Pub. L. 92-576, §§ 5-11,18, 86 Stat. 1253. S. Rep. 12-13. This appears in the section of the report called Extension of Coverage to Shoreside Areas. The House Report, H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441, pp. 10-11 (1972) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) contains the identical section. 33 U. S. C. §903 (1970 ed., Supp. Y). Congress also removed the provision that precluded federal recovery if a state workmen's compensation remedy were available. It retained the exclusions contained in 33 U. S. C. §§ 903 (a) (1), (a) (2), and (b). See n. 14, supra. The definition of “employee” excluded "a master or member of a crew of any vessel, [and] any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.” 33 U. S. C. § 902 (3). In addition, the coverage section, § 903, provided that no compensation was payable in respect of the disability or death of an employee of the United States. See n. 14, supra. These exclusions have been retained by the 1972 Amendments, see n. 21, supra. The definition of “employer” was changed so as to correspond with the broadened definition of navigable waters. Title 33 U. S. C. § 902 (4) (1970 ed., Supp. V) reads: “The term 'employer’ means an emploj'er any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel).” There is no question in these cases that the injuries “arose out of and in the course of employment” and that the employers are statutory employers. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-454, pp. 53a-54a; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-444, pp. 52a-53a; Brief for Petitioners in No. 76-444, p. 3. As the definition of “employee” makes clear, the category of persons engaged in maritime employment includes more than longshoremen and persons engaged in longshoring operations. It is, however, unnecessary in this case to look beyond these two sub categories. This case also does not involve the question whether Congress excluded people who would have been covered before the 1972 Amendments; that is, workers who are injured on navigable waters as previously defined. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F. 2d 957 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 868 (1976). The Reports and discussions used only the terms of the statute without elaboration. Thus, for example, the Section-by-Section Analysis in the Senate Report states: “Section 2(a) amends section 2(3) of the Act to define an 'employee’ as any person engaged in maritime employment. The definition specifically includes any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoreing [sic] operations, and any harborworker, including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and shipbreaker. It does not exclude other employees traditionally covered but retains that part of 2(3) which excludes from the definition of ‘employee’ masters, crew members or persons engaged by the master to unload, load or repair vessels of less than eighteen tons net.” S. Rep. 16. See also H. R. Rep. 14. And in the section describing the shoreward extension, the Committee Reports state: “The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder should not depend on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land or over water. Accordingly, the bill would amend the Act to provide coverage of longshoremen, harbor workers, ship repairmen, ship builders, shipbreakers, and other employees engaged in maritime employment (excluding masters and members of the crew of a vessel) if the injury occurred either upon the navigable waters of the United States or any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other area adjoining such navigable waters customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 10. “The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity. To take a typical example, cargo, whether in break bulk or containerized form, is typically unloaded from the ship and immediately transported to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters. The employees who perform this work would be covered under the bill for injuries sustained by them over the navigable waters or on the adjoining land area. The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of cargo. However, checkers, for example, who are directly involved in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new amendment. Likewise the Committee has no intention of extending coverage under the Act to individuals who are not employed by a person who is an employer, i. e., a person at least some of whose employees are engaged, in whole or in part in some form of maritime employment. Thus, an individual employed by a person none of whose employees work, in whole or in part, on navigable waters, is not covered even if injured on a pier adjoining navigable waters.” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 10-11. That the example is not exhaustive is clear. Some types of cargo, for example, are never brought to a “holding or storage area” but are placed directly on a truck or railroad car for immediate inland movement. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-454, p. 38 n. 46; Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. And, while all would agree that persons bringing such cargo directly from a ship to a truck are engaged in maritime employment, see infra, at 274-275, the example does not mention such activity. In addition, while it is incontrovertible that workers engaged in the process of loading a ship and performing steps analogous to those mentioned in the example — that is, moving cargo from storage and placing it immediately on the ship — are covered, the fact is that the example also does not mention these steps. See also discussion, n. 38, infra. Accord, Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d, at 54; Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F. 2d, at 540. The First Circuit in fact accused Congress of “seemingly [going] out of its way to avoid taking any express stance on the status of those engaged in stuffing and stripping containers as part of the loading and unloading process just as it is silent on the status of other terminal employees engaged in moving, storing and culling cargo on the pier.” Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc., 539 F. 2d, at 274. We find consideration of the purposes more enlightening than looking simply at whether respondents belong to the International Longshoremen’s Association. See Brief for ILA as Amicus Curiae 15. We cannot assume that Congress intended to make union membership the decisive factor. The vagaries of union jurisdiction are unrelated to the purposes of the Act. Pittston Stevedoring Corp., supra, at 52; Stockman, supra, at 272; Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., supra, at 543-544; but cf. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F. 2d, at 962. The private respondents suggest, Brief for Respondents Caputo et al. 19-21, that Congress intended to use the definitions found in the Bi-State Compact between New York and New Jersey that created the Bi-State Waterfront Commission, and was approved by Congress, 67 Stat. 541. The definitions may be found in N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 9806, 9905 (McKinney 1974). Section 9806 provides, in relevant part: “ ‘Pier’ shall include any wharf, pier, dock or quay. “ 'Other waterfront terminal’ shall include any warehouse, depot or other terminal (other than a pier) which is located within one thousand yards of any pier in the port of New York district and which is used for waterborne freight in whole or substantial part. “ 'Longshoreman' shall mean a natural person, other than a hiring agent, who is employed for work at a pier or other waterfront terminal, either by a carrier of freight by water or by a stevedore “(a) physically to move waterborne freight on vessels berthed at piers, on piers or at other waterfront terminals, or “(b) to engage in direct and immediate checking of any such freight or of the custodial accounting therefor or in the recording or tabulation of the hours worked at piers or other waterfront terminals by natural persons employed by carriers of freight by water or stevedores, or “(c) to supervise directly and immediately others who are employed as in subdivision (a) of this definition.” Section 9905 provides supplementary definitions: “(6) 'Longshoreman’ shall also include a natural person, other than a hiring agent, who is employed for work at a pier or other waterfront terminal “(a) either by a carrier of freight by water or by a stevedore physically to perform labor or services incidental to the movement of waterborne freight on vessels berthed at piers, on piers or at other waterfront terminals, including, but not limited to, cargo repairmen, coopers, general maintenance men, mechanical and miscellaneous workers, horse and cattle fitters, grain ceilers and marine carpenters, or “(b) by any person physically to move waterborne freight to or from a barge, lighter or railroad car for transfer to or from a vessel of a carrier of freight by water which is, shall be, or shall have been berthed at the same pier or other waterfront terminal, or “(c) by any person to perform labor or services involving, or incidental to, the movement of freight at a waterfront terminal as defined in subdivision (10) of this section. “(10) ‘Other waterfront terminal’ shall also include any warehouse, depot or other terminal (other than a pier), whether enclosed or open, which is located in a marine terminal in the port of New York district and any part of which is used by any person to perform labor or services involving, or incidental to, the movement of waterborne freight or freight. “As used in this section, ‘marine terminal’ means an area which includes piers, which is used primarily for the moving, warehousing, distributing or packing of waterborne freight or freight to or from such piers, and which, inclusive of such piers, is under common ownership or control.” While we find these definitions useful indicators of the terminology used by the industry, we agree with the court below that to assume, absent any indication in the legislative history, that Congress in 1972 had in mind this action of the 1953 Congress is “to attribute a degree of acumen few Congressmen would claim.” 544 F. 2d, at 50. “[T]he greatest economies promised by containerization are found in the efficiency of using a specially fitted all-container ship. A most important part of the costs of running a vessel is the dead time in port while loading and unloading. A ship in port earns no income and its heavy fixed costs continue. Moreover, the fast turnaround time of container ships — a container ship can unload and reload in 36-48 hours compared to the seven or eight days required for conventional ships — substantially cuts the number of ships needed to handle any given volume of cargo. . . . ■ “Labor productivity is astonishingly increased by containerization. One major shipping company reported that each of its work gangs on a conventional ship produced an average of 15 tons per hour compared with 300 tons an hour worked by one gang at a container ship hatch. More generally, the industry considers that 'it would take 126 men 84 hours each, or a total of 10,584 man-hours, to discharge and load about 11,000 tons of cargo aboard a conventional ship. The same amount of cargo on a container vessel can be handled by 42 men working 13 hours each or a total of 546 man hours.' ” Ross, Waterfront Labor Response to Technological Change: A Tale of Two Unions, 21 Labor L. J. 397, 399-400 (1970). See Goldberg, Containerization as a Force for Change on the Waterfront, 91 Monthly Labor Rev. 8, 9 (1968). Accord, Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 544 F. 2d, at 53; I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore, 542 F. 2d, at 905; Stockman, 539 F. 2d, at 275-277. As one commentator observed: “The work of the longshoreman, the loading and unloading of cargo, remains the same; only the procedure and the place of performance [have] changed. It seems unlikely that Congress would acknowledge that long-shoring today involves more shore-based activity than formerly and then extend coverage only to those longshoremen working closest to the ship." Comment, Maritime Law — LHWCA Recovery Denied Longshoremen Injured Landward of the “Point of Rest,” 10 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1179, 1188 (1976). We find no significance in the fact that the container Blundo was stripping had been taken off a vessel at another pier and then moved to the site of the injury. Until the container was stripped, the unloading process was clearly incomplete. The only geographical concern Congress exhibited was that the operation take place at a covered situs. See Part IV, infra. It was precisely Congress’ intent to accommodate the mobility of containers and the ability to transport and strip them at locations removed from the ship. While the Director identifies this as the BRB’s position as well as his own, Brief for Federal Respondent 20, it appears to us that the BRB has gone further than this position suggests. For example, the BRB found that a clerk, who worked in an office processing the paperwork for the delivery of cargo to truckmen for removal from the terminal, was a covered “employee.” It reasoned that this function, although clerical in nature, was “essential to the removal of cargo from the terminal and was an integral part of longshoring operations.” Farrell v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 3 BRBS 42, 45 (1975). Contrary to the view expressed by the Director, the BRB showed no concern with the fact that the employee did not handle cargo. Citing the Committee Reports, see n. 27, supra, the Third Circuit has rejected this conclusion and granted a petition for review. Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Farrell, 548 F. 2d 476, 478 (1977). Regardless of whether the view advanced by the Director is the position of the BRB, we agree with Judge Friendly that it would be useful for the BRB to engage in an extensive study of the structure of work on the various piers of the country. While the record before us contains sufficient information to enable us to decide the present cases, such a study will be helpful for future eases. Lighters and barges are part of the modern technological advancements to which Congress referred when it mentioned “LASH-type vessels.” The term LASH is an acronym for “lighter aboard ship.” The National Association of Stevedores (NAS) describes the system as follows: “[C]argo is placed in special uniform size 'lighters,’ or barges, which are called LASH barges to differentiate them from river barges. The LASH barges are towed from the loading port to the location of the LASH vessel, which is sometimes called the mother ship. The barges are mechanically loaded by a crane on the mother ship and are stacked in specially constructed holds in the mother ship. The actual stowage or unstowage of the barges with their contents in the mother ship requires substantially fewer longshoremen than does the loading of cargo into a breakbulk type ship. A very similar type of operation called SEABEE differs from the LASH operation described only in the size of the barge and the mechanical means for loading or unloading the barge onto or from the mother SEABEE ship. “The actual loading of the barges is performed by longshoremen in precisely the same manner traditionally employed in the loading or unloading of a breakbulk ship. However, in most instances the size of the longshore gang involved in LASH and SEABEE operations is smaller than the regular ship’s gang primarily because of the smaller size of the barge. The barges are in fact vessels and ply the navigable waters of the United States and may be loaded or unloaded at any inland or coastal waterfront facility.” Brief for NAS as Amicus Curiae 27-28. The NAS specifically agrees: “Workers who actually load or unload the barges are engaged in traditional longshore operations and if injured while so engaged would obviously be entitled to the benefits of the LHWCA unless their employer were a state, municipal or other public political entity.” Id., at 28. Petitioner Northeast also argues that the particular cargo Caputo was handling at the moment of injury was no longer in “maritime commerce” because it had been at least five days since it had been taken off a ship. See the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 76-444, p. 52a. But the consignee’s delay in picking up the cargo has no effect on the character of the work required to effectuate the transfer of the cargo to the consignee. The work performed by the longshoreman is the same whether performed the day the cargo arrives in port or weeks later. In addition, we reiterate that Caputo did not fall within the excluded category of employees “whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment.” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 11. As we indicated, supra, at 266-267, that exclusion pertains to workers, such as the consignees’ truckdrivers Caputo was helping, whose presence at the pier or terminal is for the purpose of picking up cargo for further shipment by land transportation. Moreover, we are not convinced that the point-of-rest theory provides the workable definition that petitioners claim for it. The “point” varies from port to port and with different types of cargo. See the Stevedore and Marine Terminal Industry of the United States (unpublished survey by the NAS) (1974-1975); n. 28, supra. The point can be moved seaward or landward at the whim of the employer. Such characteristics make it inconsistent with the uniform system Congress sought to design. As Judge Craven observed, when a panel of the Fourth Circuit adopted the point-of-rest theory and refused to cover persons holding jobs similar to Caputo’s and Blundo’s: “[Respondents] will, I think, be surprised to learn that they are not longshoremen, and astonished to discover that they are not engaged in maritime employment of any kind. If they are not, as my brothers hold, then the Congress has labored prodigiously only to have accomplished nothing at all in its effort to simplify the problems of maritime workers’ compensation. . . . Henceforth, injured employees and their counsel must comb the waterfronts of this circuit, probing hopelessly, like Diogenes with his lantern, for that elusive ‘point 0f rest’ upon which coverage depends.” I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore v. BRB, 529 F. 2d 1080, 1089 (1975) (dissenting opinion), modified en banc, 542 F. 2d 903 (1976). Petitioners also contend that it is too expensive to extend coverage beyond the point of rest and that Congress did not intend to impose such expenses on the employers. Brief for Petitioner in No. 76-454, pp. 68-73. However, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate what Congress anticipated the expanded coverage would cost. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the case below, rejected the point-of-rest theory and awarded compensation to Blundo and Caputo for reasons similar to those upon which we rely. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d 35 (1976). The First Circuit, as noted in n. 29, supra, has also found the point-of-rest theory incompatible with Congress’ desire for uniformity. Also relying on factors similar to those we consider, the court concluded that the operations of stuffing and stripping containers were clearly longshoring operations and affirmed a compensation award to one so engaged. Stockman, 539 F. 2d, at 272-277. The Third Circuit has extended coverage well beyond the point of rest. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation, 540 F. 2d 629 (1976). Its analysis has differed from the other Circuits. It concluded that Congress meant to exercise its full constitutional authority and to “afford federal coverage to all those employees engaged in handling cargo after it has been delivered from another mode of transportation for the purpose of loading it aboard a vessel, and to all those employees engaged in discharging cargo from a vessel up to the time it has been delivered to a place where the next mode of transportation will pick it up.” Id., at 638. The Circuit appears to have essentially discarded the situs test, holding that only "[an] employment nexus (status) with maritime activity is [necessary] ” and that the situs of the maritime employee at the time of injury is irrelevant. Ibid. See also Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 552 F. 2d 985 (CA3 1977); Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Farrell, 548 F. 2d 476 (CA3 1977). The Fifth Circuit also has rejected the point-of-rest theory, calling it a "hypertechnical construction.” Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F. 2d, at 540. It affirmed compensation awards to a worker securing a vehicle to a railway car in preparation for its transportation inland and to a worker unloading bales of cotton from a wagon and stacldng them in the warehouse to await future placement on a ship. The awards were affirmed because both people were involved in “an integral part of the ongoing process of moving cargo between land transportation and a ship.” Id., at 543-544. The Fourth Circuit is the one Circuit that has considered the theory and not rejected it. I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore v. BRB, 542 F. 2d 903 (1976) (en banc). But it has also not accepted it. While three of six judges sitting en banc accepted the theory, the fourth held that the Act covered certain cargo handling within the terminal shoreside of the point of rest. He found coverage for two workers situated similarly to Blundo, characterizing their activities as part of the overall loading and unloading function. Id., at 905. He denied coverage to a worker in the same situation as Caputo. The other two judges of the en banc court would have covered all three workers since they were engaged in “handl[ing] ships’ cargo.” I. T. O. Corp. of Baltimore v. BRB, 529 F. 2d, at 1097 (Craven, J., dissenting). Only one of the commentators discussing the Act prior to the early cases even thought of the point of rest as a line of demarcation, but he makes no effort to explain why the term was never mentioned in the Act or history. Vickery, Some Impacts of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 41 Ins. Counsel J. 63 (1974). Gilmore §§ 6-51, p. 427; Gorman, The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act — After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, 9-10 (1974); Note, The 1972 Amendments to Section 903 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act, 4 Rutgers Camden L. J. 404 (1973); Note, Maritime Jurisdiction and Longshoremen’s Remedies, 1973 Wash. U. L. Q. 649; Note, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 La. L. Rev. 683 (1973). Those writing after the theory had been advanced in the courts have universally found it inadequate. 4 A. Larson, supra, n. 15, §89.42; Note, Shoreside Coverage Under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 18 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 135 (1976); Comment, Maritime Law — LHWCA Recovery Denied Longshoremen Injured Landward of “Point of Rest,” 10 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1179 (1976); Note, Admiralty Law/Workmen’s Compensation — On the Waterfront, 54 N. C. L. Rev. 925 (1976); Comment, The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act: Coverage After the 1972 Amendments, 55 Texas L. Rev. 99, 116-120 (1976). Petitioner ITO contends that statements in the Committee Reports indicate that the “customarily used” requirement is to apply to ail the specified areas. It points to the Reports’ intent to exclude persons not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel “just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity,” S. Rep. 13; H. R. Rep. 11, and the Senate Report’s description of the bill as “expand [ing] the coverage of this Act to cover injuries occurring in the contiguous dock area related to longshore and ship repair work.” S. Rep. 2. These statements, however, serve to undermine rather than to help ITO’s attempt to read the situs requirement to exclude the pier on which Blundo was working. Even assuming they suggest a usage requirement for all such adjoining piers, it is clear that the usage is broad enough to encompass stripping and stuffing containers, integral parts of the overall loading and unloading process.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. HILL et ux. No. 91-1421. Argued November 2, 1992 Decided January 25, 1993 Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bruton, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Ann Belanger Durney, and Charles Bricken. Richard B. Robinson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert A. Wherry, Jr Timothy B. Dyk filed a brief for the National Coal Association et al. as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. Under §§56 and 57(a)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. §§56, 57(a)(8) (1976 ed.), a taxpayer must pay a “minimum tax” on the excess of the allowable depletion deduction for an interest in a mineral deposit over the taxpayer’s adjusted basis for that interest. The question presented here is whether the term “adjusted basis,” as used in § 57(a)(8), includes certain depreciable drilling and development costs identified in § 1.612-4(c)(l) of the Treasury Department regulations. We hold that the term does not cover such costs. I In 1981 and 1982, respondents William F. and Lola E. Hill were in the oil and gas exploration and production business, and, on their federal income tax returns for those respective years, they deducted $439,884 and $371,636 for depletion with respect to their interests in oil and gas deposits. Under 26 U. S. C. § 57(a)(8) (1976 ed.), the excess of the allowable depletion deduction for each of the deposit interests over the interest’s “adjusted basis” is an “ite[m] of tax preference” on which a taxpayer must pay a “minimum tax” for the tax year in question. See § 56(a). In determining the adjusted bases of their deposit interests, the Hills included not only the unrecovered portions of the amounts they originally paid to purchase the interests, but also the unrecovered costs of depreciable tangible items (machinery, tools, pipes, and so forth) used to exploit the deposits. Having thus reduced the amount of each item of tax preference under § 57(a)(8), they calculated and paid minimum taxes on those items of $29,812 for 1981 and $26,736 for 1982. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disputed the inclusion of the tangible costs in the deposits’ adjusted bases, and assessed a larger minimum tax based on their exclusion. The Hills paid the resulting respective deficiencies of $30,963 and $18,733, and filed a refund claim, which the Commissioner denied. The taxpayers then sued the United States, petitioner here, for a refund in the Claims Court, which granted summary judgment in their favor. 21 Cl. Ct. 713 (1990). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 945 F. 2d 1529 (1991). Because of the importance of the issue to the federal fisc, we granted certiorari. 503 U. S. 1004 (1992). We now reverse. 1 — 1 An oil and gas producer cannot ordinarily depreciate or otherwise recover (before disposition) his investment in land ' on which he drills wells because the process of producing his taxable income does not wear out or use up the land. See, e. g., Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-2 (disallowing a depreciation deduction for “land apart from the improvements or physical development added to it”). Part of the purchase price of a fee simple interest in the land, however, represents investment in the right to extract any oil and gas from subsurface deposits, which (unlike the land) are “wasting assets,” gradually depleted as the minerals are removed. An owner of such wasting assets, according to basic income tax theory, should accordingly be allowed a “reasonable allowance for depletion,” 26 U. S. C. § 611(a) (1976 ed.), “to compensate [him] for the part exhausted in production, so that when the minerals are gone, the owner’s capital and his capital assets remain unimpaired.” Paragon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U. S. 624, 631 (1965). To a degree, however, practice and theory have drifted apart. The Code and associated Treasury Department regulations require taxpayers to calculate depletion allowances by whichever of two methods produces the larger deduction for the current taxable year. Treas. Reg. §-1.611 — 1(a)(1); see also 26 U. S. C. § 613(a) (1976 ed.) (“In no case shall the allowance for depletion under section 611 be less than it would be if computed without reference to this section [concerning' percentage depletion]”). The first method, “cost depletion,” remains firmly moored to the rationale articulated in Paragon Jewel. Under that method, the taxpayer estimates the number of recoverable units in his mineral deposit, and deducts an appropriate portion of the deposit’s adjusted basis for each unit extracted and sold. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.611-2, 1.612-1. When the sum of prior deductions equals the cost or other basis of the deposit, plus allowable capital additions, “[n]o further deductions for cost depletion shall be allowed.” Treas. Reg. § 1.611 — 2(b)(2). The second method, “percentage depletion,” has no such ties. It generously allows the taxpayer extracting minerals from a deposit to deduct a specified percentage of his gross income, even when his prior depletion deductions have exceeded his investment in the deposit. See 26 U. S. C. § 613 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); Treas. Reg. § 1.613-1. For the tax years at issue, percentage depletion produced the larger deduction for the Hills, and they accordingly calculated their depletion allowance according to that method. For those tax years, however, percentage depletion’s gleam is dimmed by the minimum tax. Section 57(a)(8) of the Code requires a taxpayer to calculate as a “tax preference” “[w]ith respect to each [interest in a mineral deposit], the excess of the deduction for depletion allowable under section 611 for the taxable year over the adjusted basis of the [mineral deposit interest] at the end of the taxable year (determined without regard to the depletion deduction for the taxable year).” In turn, §56 of the Code requires a taxpayer to pay an extra minimum tax of 15% on the amount by which the sum of the enumerated tax-preference items in § 57(a) exceeds the specific deductions permitted by §56. Because the amount subject to the extra tax is reduced dollar for dollar by every outlay that can be added to the adjusted basis of the mineral deposit interest, a taxpayer would like as long a list of eligible outlays as possible. In this case the dispute is about the inclusion in the adjusted basis of certain tangible drilling and development costs, as defined by the Treasury Regulations implementing §§ 263(c) and 612 of the Code. Section 263(c) grants taxpayers an option to deduct against current income certain “intangible drilling and development costs.” The regulations limit the costs recoverable under that option by distinguishing “intangible costs” from costs for “capital items,” which the parties refer to as “tangible costs”: “The option with respect to intangible drilling and development costs does not apply to expenditures by which the taxpayer acquires tangible property ordinarily considered as having a salvage value. Examples of such items are the costs of the actual materials in those structures which are constructed in the wells and on the property, and the cost of drilling tools, pipe, casing, tubing, tanks, engines, boilers, machines, etc. . . . These are capital items and are returnable through depreciation.” Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(l). It is the cost of such capital items as these, to the extent that they have not already been recovered through depreciation, that the Hills would like to add to the bases of their mineral deposit interests for purposes of calculating the amount of their percentage depletion deductions subject to the minimum tax. Ill The taxpayers enter the race with a handicap. As we have noted, see n. 4, supra, § 57(a)(8) defines the “property” with which it is concerned by reference to §614, which speaks in terms of the adjusted basis of “each separate interest owned by the taxpayer in each mineral deposit.” 26 U. S. C. § 614(a) (1976 ed). A regulation defines “mineral deposit” as “minerals in place,” Treas. Reg. § 1.611-l(d)(4), while a neighboring regulation defines another term, “mineral enterprise,” to include “the mineral deposit or deposits and improvements, if any, used in mining or in the production of oil and gas,” Treas. Reg. § 1.611-l(d)(3) (emphasis added). Because these regulatory definitions were well established at the time Congress passed § 57(a)(8), see 25 Fed. Reg. 11796 (1960); Pub. L. 91-172, §301, 83 Stat. 580, 582, we think it reasonable to assume that Congress relied on the accepted distinction between them in its reference to “mineral deposit” as contained in §614. Thus the definitional scheme suggests strongly that the “property” we are concerned with in § 67(a)(8) excludes just those improvements that the Hills wish to treat as part of the property’s adjusted basis. They assert, however, (and the Government does not dispute) that the term “mineral enterprise” occurs in only that one operative provision in the regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.611-l(d)(4), which concerns the allocation of a portion of the cost of a mineral enterprise to a mineral deposit or deposits. On that basis, the Hills argue that the term has the limited function of “assisting] in identifying depletable and depreciable costs when an operating mineral property is acquired as a unit.” Brief for Respondents 18, n. 21. Consistently with that view, they note, a regulation implementing § 57(a)(8) directs us to “see section 1016 and the regulations thereunder . . . [f]or the determination of the adjusted basis of the property.” Treas. Reg. § 1.57-l(h)(3). The computation of adjusted basis under 26 U. S. C. § 1016 (1976 ed. and Supp. V), they argue, is independent of the definition and function of “mineral enterprise” in the §611 regulations; thus, the implications of this term’s definition do not extend to the calculation at issue in this case. We agree that § 1016 is the proper place to look for the rules concerning adjustment of basis; but we conclude that the computation of adjusted basis under §1016 is wholly predicated on, rather than independent of, an understanding of “mineral deposit” as distinct from “improvements” within the meaning of the regulations under §611. Section 1016 is one of a number of general provisions that together determine the amount of gain or loss a taxpayer must recognize when he sells or otherwise disposes of any type of property. Section 1001(a) provides the basic rule: gain or loss is determined by subtracting “adjusted basis” from “amount realized.” Section 1011(a) defines “adjusted basis” as “basis (determined under section 1012 [or other parts of the Code]), adjusted as provided in section 1016.” Section 1016 provides the rules for making “[adjustments to basis.” The taxpayers, acknowledging the centrality of §1016, seize on the last phrase of a regulation addressing that section: “The cost or other basis shall be properly adjusted for any expenditure ... or other item, properly chargeable to capital account, including the cost of improvements and betterments made to the property.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a). The ordinary meanings of the terms “improvements” and “betterments,” the Hills say, include all valuable additions to property that are more than mere repairs; the tangible costs that they have incurred to exploit their mineral deposits increase the value of those deposits, and in any case are specifically referred to in the regulations implementing §611 as “improvements,” see Treas. Reg. § 1.611-5; therefore, those costs should be included in the adjusted basis of the mineral deposit for purposes of § 1016. The Hills’ chosen passage, however, cannot carry the weight they ask it to bear. The purpose of the phrase “including the cost of improvements and betterments made to the property” in Treas. Reg. § 1.1016 — 2(a) is not to provide guidance in particular cases as to whether, for tax accounting purposes, an expense should be added to the basis of an existing “property,” or treated as a separate “property” of its own. Rather, it is to ensure coordination of §1016 with § 263, the Code section from which the term “improvements and betterments” (which should probably be read as a unit) is borrowed. Section 263(a)(1) provides that an expenditure may not currently be deducted from income if it is “paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or better-ments made to increase the value of any property or estate.” 26 U. S. C. § 263(a)(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). We have said that “[t]he purpose of § 263 is to reflect the basic principle that a capital expenditure may not be deducted from current income. It serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly attributable, through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income producing.” Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U. S. 1, 16 (1974). In turn, inclusion of the term “improvements and betterments” in Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) ensures the fulfillment of §263’s implicit promise: If a taxpayer cannot deduct an expenditure from current income because it has been deemed an “improvement or betterment” to property, he will be able to recover it later, either through a form of cost recovery such as depreciation or depletion, or upon sale as a deduction from the amount realized. Thus it is not by deciphering particular terms in the regulations accompanying § 1016 that the question in this case is answered, but by relying on the basic principles embodied in §1016’s directives. For our purposes, the most important mandate is found in § 1016(a)(2), which requires a taxpayer to subtract from his original basis in the property sold or exchanged “not less than the amount allowable [for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion] under this subtitle or prior income tax laws.” In other words, whether or not the taxpayer ever took a depreciation, amortization, or depletion deduction with respect to the item he is selling, he must, for purposes of §1016, determine whether such deductions were allowable with respect to that item, and reduce his basis by at least that allowable amount. To follow this directive, the taxpayer must determine whether parts of the item sold are subject to different tax treatments, and must treat those parts as different properties for purposes of § 1016. Thus, a taxpayer who bought an apartment building and the land it sits on for a single price must determine how much of that price went to pay for each, and must treat each cost as a separate asset for purposes of § 1016. This is so because the depreciation deduction allowable for the building (if the building is used to produce income) must, upon the sale or exchange of the property, be subtracted from the taxpayer’s basis in the building whether the deduction was taken or not; but there is no subtraction from the land’s basis since no such deduction is allowable for the land. See, e. g., Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-5 (requiring an apportionment of basis when a taxpayer has acquired “a combination of depreciable and nondepreciable property for a lump sum, as for example, buildings and land”). Although the Code and regulations allow some flexibility within such major categories of tax treatment, the boundaries between the major categories are almost completely impassable. When a taxpayer is dealing with associated items falling into two different major categories, he cannot, as a general matter, choose to treat those items as a single property falling into one category or the other; a taxpayer may not, for example, decide to treat some or all of his apartment building as more land. Nor may a taxpayer choose to add “improvement” costs to the basis of whichever item he pleases: some costs, say of a new roof, must be treated as adding to the value of the depreciable building (or as separate depreciable assets), whereas other costs, like that of grading a building site, must be treated as additions to the value of the nondepreciable land. See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 74-265, 1974-1 Cum. Bull. 56 (distinguishing between deprecia-ble and nondepreciable improvements to land). Depletion and depreciation are two of these major categories of tax treatment. As this Court said almost a half-century ago, “[t]h[e] distinction between depletion and depreciation runs through the basis provisions of the [Internal Revenue Code].” Choate v. Commissioner, 324 U. S. 1, 3 (1945). Thus, the Code’s depreciation allowance “does not apply to natural resources which are subject to the allowance for depletion provided in section 611.” Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-2. Accordingly, §611 itself carefully appends, to its provision for “a reasonable allowance for depletion” in the case of natural deposits and timber, the qualification “and for depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case.” 26 U. S. C. § 611(a) (1976 ed.); see Treas.. Reg. §1.611-5(a). To implement this distinction, the regulations under §611, mentioned above, separately define “mineral deposit” as “minerals in place,” Treas. Reg. § 1.611— 1(d)(4), and “mineral enterprise” as including “the mineral deposit or deposits and improvements,” § 1.611-1 (d)(3). The section defining “mineral deposit” then further provides that “[w]hen a mineral enterprise is acquired as a unit, the cost of any interest in the mineral deposit or deposits is that proportion of the total cost of the mineral enterprise which the value of the interest in the deposit or deposits bears to the value of the entire enterprise at the time of its acquisition.” Treas. Reg. § 1.611 — 1(d)(4); see also § 1.611 — 2(g)(2)(vii) (requiring a statement to be attached to the taxpayer’s return showing “[a]n allocation of the cost or value among the mineral property, improvements and the surface of the land for purposes other than mineral production”). These provisions are designed to isolate those portions of the cost of a “mineral enterprise” that are subject to recovery through depletion. Thus, just as one generally cannot calculate an adjusted basis under §1016 by treating an apartment building as “more land,” one generally cannot treat tangible tools and equipment as “more mineral deposit.” If a mineral deposit and associated equipment are sold together, § 1016 requires the seller to separate them for the purpose of determining his gain or loss on the sale, just as §§ 167 and 611 required him to keep them separate for the purpose of calculating his depreciation and depletion deductions. Since, as the Hills point out, a regulation incorporates the §1016 rule into § 57(a)(8), and since the Hills have identified no exception to this rule, we infer that the Hills’ tangible costs may not be included in the basis of depletable mineral deposits for purposes of calculating the amount of percentage depletion subject to the minimum tax. IV Our conclusion is confirmed by the astonishing, circuitously achieved results of reading § 57(a)(8) as the taxpayers urge. A regulation that the Hills do not challenge provides that “[i]n no event shall percentage depletion in excess of cost or other basis of the property be credited to the improvements account or the depreciation reserve account.” Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(b)(2). The tangible costs at issue here are recorded in these accounts. Thus, under this regulation, a tangible cost is not itself adjusted for the amount of percentage depletion that on the Hills’ theory it would shelter from the minimum tax each year. As a result, the tangible cost would shelter, • over the years the taxpayer owned the capital item it represented, an amount of percentage depletion many times that of the cost itself. For example, a $21,000 capital item, subject to straight-line depreciation over 20 years with a salvage value of $1,000, would add $20,000 to the basis of the mineral deposit the first year, $19,000 the second year, and so on for 20 years. At the end • of the 20th year, the item would be fully depreciated, and the taxpayer’s basis in the item would then remain at $1,000, the salvage value, for as many more years as he continued to own it. Thus, over the first 20 years, the capital item would shelter $210,000, or 10 times its cost, from the minimum tax; beginning in the 21st year, it would shelter $1,000 per year for as long as it remained in the taxpayer’s hands. At a minimum tax rate of 15%, a taxpayer would realize a tax benefit, from his $21,000 investment, of $31,500 over the first 20 years from § 57(a)(8) alone, without regard to the additional tax benefit from ordinary depreciation of the item. It is hard to believe that Congress would enact a minimum tax to limit the benefit that taxpayers could realize from “items of tax preference,” only to define one of those items in a way that would create an even greater proportional tax benefit from investing in tangible items, and to do so in an oblique fashion that, as far as we know, has no precedent in the history of the federal income tax. V The Hills contend that two Treasury Department regulations we have not yet discussed foreclose our conclusion. They point first to one of the cost depletion regulations under §612, which, but for its title and one adjective, would independently reinforce our conclusion: “The basis for cost depletion of mineral or timber property does not include: “(i) Amounts recoverable through depreciation deductions, through deferred expenses, and through deductions other than depletion, and “(ii) The residual value of land and improvements at the end of operations.” Treas. Reg. § 1.612 — 1 (b)(1). This, of course, is exactly the conclusion in the case of percentage depletion that we have reached after a long detour through § 1016. Section 1.612 — 1(b)(1) applies by its terms, however, only to the determination of mineral deposit basis for the purpose of calculating cost depletion; and the title of § 1.612 — 1(b) is “Special rules.” Therefore, reason the Hills, the “general rule” for determining mineral deposit basis under § 1016 must include the items, such as “[ajmounts recoverable through depreciation deductions,” excluded in the “special rule.” But this argument proves too much. If the Hills stuck to their logic, they would have to claim that they could also add “[t]he residual value of land and improvements at the end of operations” to their bases in their mineral deposit interests, an absurdity that they cannot, and do not try to, support. The simple answer is that when an arguable suggestion of the title of one subsection of a regulation is pitted against the entire Code framework for determining basis, the Code wins, and the title is at most an infelicity. The infelicity is understandable here. The calculation of percentage depletion is unconnected to the concept of basis; the annual percentage depletion deduction is not measured in relation to basis, nor are the cumulative deductions limited by basis. See 26 U. S. C. §613 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The concepts of basis and percentage depletion meet only in the minimum tax provisions, for the purpose of calculating the item of tax preference in § 57(a)(8). Since § l'.612-l(b)(l) was issued long before the minimum tax was enacted, see 25 Fed. Reg. 11801 (1960); Pub. L. 91-172, §301, 83 Stat. 580, that regulation’s reference to a “special rule” for “cost” depletion cannot have been intended to indicate that some other rule applied to the calculation of basis for percentage depletion. After the minimum tax was enacted, the Treasury Department inserted a regulation about basis for percentage depletion where one would expect it: among the regulations implementing the minimum tax. That regulation, § 1.57-l(h)(3), directs us to § 1016, but unfortunately contains no correlative reference to the regulations under § 612. Second, the Hills argue that excluding tangible costs from the adjusted basis of their mineral deposit interests would run counter to regulations specifying the inclusion of certain intangible costs. As we have already noted, 26 U. S. C. § 263(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V) grants taxpayers an option to deduct as expenses certain “intangible drilling and development costs.” If a taxpayer chooses instead to capitalize those costs, the regulations require the taxpayer to sort the costs into two bins. Costs “represented by physical property” are recoverable through depreciation, either through adjustments to the bases of pre-existing items to which the costs relate, or through an initial entry in a new .depreciation account. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(2). Costs “not represented by physical property” are recoverable through depletion, as adjustments to the bases of the mineral deposit interests to which they relate. § 1.612 — 4(b)(1); see § 1.612-4(d) (if a taxpayer fails to elect to expense intangible costs correctly, “he shall be deemed to have elected to recover such costs through depletion to the extent that they are not represented by physical property, and through depreciation to the extent that they are represented by physical property”). Since these latter costs are added to depletable basis, the taxpayers argue, so should the tangible costs that are excluded altogether from the § 263(c) option. We fail to see the logic of this argument. To the extent that the. regulation allowing intangible costs “not represented by physical property” to be added to a mineral deposit’s basis deviates from general principles of basis allocation, we see no reason why one deviation should force the Government, or this Court, to create another. Nor have the Hills explained why this regulation in fact represents a deviation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. A11 references to the Internal Revenue Code and related Treasury Regulations are to those that applied during the tax years at issue. The Treasury Regulations are cited as codified in the 1981 and 1982 editions of Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In the course of enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Congress redesignated § 57(a)(8) as § 57(a)(1) for taxable years beginning after 1986. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 701(a) and 701(f)(1), 100 Stat. 2333,2343. In October 1992, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776. Section 1915(a) of that Act amends § 57(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code and provides that, for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1992, the depletion allowance permitted under §613A(c) of the Code will not be treated as an item of tax preference subject to taxation as alternative minimum taxable income. See n. 3, infra. Allowable capital additions include intangible drilling and development costs that are “not represented by physical property,” such as expenditures for clearing ground, draining, road making, surveying, geological work, grading, and the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells, to the extent that the taxpayer opts to capitalize these costs rather than deducting them as expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.612 — 4(b)(1). For further discussion of these costs, see infra, at 563-564. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, § 201, 96 Stat. 411, repealed the “minimum tax” for noncorporate taxpayers for tax years beginning after December 31, 1982. See §§ 201(c)(1), 201(e)(1). At the same time, however, the Act also included items of tax preference, such as excess percentage depletion under § 67(a)(8), in the calculation of a taxpayer’s “alternative minimum taxable income.” § 201(a). While the “minimum tax” was simply added to the amount of income tax due under the normal provisions, the “alternative minimum tax” provision, 26 U. S. C. § 55 (1982 ed.), requires the recalculation of a taxpayer’s income under a different set of rules. A tax is then imposed at a graduated rate on the taxpayer’s “alternative minimum taxable income”; if the amount of alternative minimum tax so calculated is greater than the income tax calculated under the ordinary provisions, the taxpayer must pay both the normal tax and the amount by which his alternative minimum tax liability exceeds his ordinary tax liability. Because items of tax preference were added to “alternative minimum taxable income,” the issue in this case continued to be relevant for tax years beginning after December 31, 1982. For the subsequent history of § 57(a)(8), see n. 1, swpra. Section 67(a)(8) applies to “each property (as defined in section 614).” Section 614(a) defines “property,” “[f]or the purpose of computing the depletion allowance in the case of mines, wells, and other natural deposits,” as “each separate interest owned by the taxpayer in each mineral deposit in each separate tract or parcel of land.” (The remainder of § 614 provides detailed rules about when a taxpayer may, and sometimes must, combine separate interests and treat them as one “property.”) Section 1.614-l(a) of the Treasury Department regulations makes the definition in §614 applicable “[f]or purposes of subtitle A of the [Internal Revenue] Code.” The regulations also foreclose the option with respect to the cost of “labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., in connection with the operation of the wells and of other facilities on the property for the production of oil or gas.” Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(c)(2). These costs must be “charged off as expense.” Ibid. Section 263(a)(1) has one of the longest lineages of any provision in the Internal Revenue Code. The Revenue Act of 1864 included a provision specifying that “no deduction shall be made for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements, or betterments, made to increase the value of any property or estate.” § 117, 13 Stat. 282. The wording of this provision remained the same in § 28 of the Revenue Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 553, and in § 2(B) of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 167. The current wording of the provision was adopted in the Revenue Act of 1918. See § 215(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1069. The language of Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) apparently originated in a passage in a House Committee Report on the Revenue Act of 1924, discussing the progenitor of 26 U. S. C. § 1016. See H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 50 (1924) (“Under this provision capital charges, such as improvements and betterments . .. are to be added to the cost of the property in determining the gain or loss from its subsequent sale”). The forerunner to Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) was issued that same year. See Treas. Regs. 65, Art. 581 (1924). After tracing the word “improvement” from the regulations implementing § 611 through the regulations implementing § 1016 to the text of §263, one might hope that §263 itself would provide some insight into whether tangible development costs should be treated as an “improvement” to the mineral deposit, or as a separate property. Two circumstances dash this hope. First, as we said above, the phrase “improvements and betterments,” as used in the § 1016 regulations and in § 263, should probably be read as a single term unrelated to the term “improvements” in §611 and the regulations thereunder. Second, §263 is concerned only with identifying those payments that “serv[e] to create or enhance . . . what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset.” Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Assn., 403 U. S. 345, 354 (1971). So long as one can say that a payment must either be “creating” a separate asset or “enhancing” one that already exists, one need not, for purposes of § 263, identify which of these is the case. Here, we are presented with precisely that question. The directive is phrased “not less than the amount allowable” to account for the case in which a taxpayer has erroneously deducted more than that amount in a prior year. In that case, the taxpayer must reduce the basis by the greater amount actually deducted, to the extent that it resulted “(by reason of the deductions so allowed) in a reduction for any taxable year of [his] taxes.” 26 U. S. C. § 1016(a)(2)(B) (1976 ed.); see § 1016(a)(2)(A). For example, a taxpayer may set up a depreciation account for a new furnace separate from that of the account of the building in which it is installed; he may also, under some circumstances, set up a “composite” account which combines the cost of the building with the cost of “improvements,” such as the furnace. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-7 (describing “group,” “classified,” “composite,” and component accounts for depreciable property). As we have noted, see n. 7, supra, the word “improvements” carries a different meaning here than it does within the term “improvements or betterments” as used in § 263(a). Under § 57(a)(8), percentage depletion is offset by “the adjusted basis of the [mineral deposit interest] at the end of the taxable year." (Emphasis added.) Assuming that the capital item was placed in service at the beginning of a taxable year, by the end of the year the taxpayer’s basis in it would be reduced by the first year’s depreciation. Thus, in our example, the $21,000 capital item would add $20,000 to the taxpayer’s basis in the mineral deposit, for purposes of § 57(a)(8), the first year it was placed in service. The taxpayers also cite Internal Revenue Service Technical Advice Memorandum 8314011 (Dec. 22, 1982), which holds that unamortized deferred development expenditures under § 616 of the Code are included in the basis of a mineral deposit for purposes of § 57(a)(8). As respondents acknowledge, the Code specifically provides that such memoranda “may not be used or 'cited as precedent.” 26 U. S. C. §6110(j)(3) (1976 ed.). In any case, § 616 sets up a system for the treatment of development expenditures entirely different from the system at issue here; in particular, § 616(c) specifically mandates that expenses deferred under § 616(b) “shall be taken into account in computing the adjusted basis of the mine or deposit.” Thus, Technical Advice Memorandum 8314011 simply is not relevant to the question presented in this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC., et al. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al. No. 95-1081. Argued November 12, 1996 Decided February 18, 1997 Rickard P. Salloum argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Paul B. Howell, William J. Powers, Jr., and George M. Simmerman, Jr. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the federal respondent. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, J. Davitt McAteer, Allen H. Feldman, and Edward D. Sieger. Wynn E. Clark argued the cause for respondent Yates. With him on the brief was Ransom P. Jones III Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Bethlehem Steel Corp. by Robert E. Babcock; and for the National Association of Waterfront Employers et al. by Charles T. Carroll, Jr., Thomas D. Wilcox, and Franklin W. Losey. Victoria Edises and Anne Michelle Burr filed a brief for the Asbestos Victims of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 33 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 933, gives the “person entitled to compensation” two avenues of recovery: Such a person may seek to recover damages from the third parties ultimately at fault for any injuries and still recover compensation under the Act from the covered worker’s employer as long as the worker’s employer gives its approval before the person settles with any of the third party tortfeasors. The question we decide today is whether an injured worker’s spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under the Act after the worker dies, is a “person entitled to compensation” when the spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker’s death. We also consider whether the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) is a proper respondent in proceedings before the courts of appeals. I Jefferson Yates worked for Ingalls as a shipfitter at its Pascagoula shipyards in Mississippi between 1953 and 1967 and was exposed to asbestos in his workplace during this time. In March 1981, Mr. Yates was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis, chronic bronchitis, and possible malignancy in his lungs. Less than a month later, he filed a claim for disability benefits under § 8 of the LHWCA, 33 U. S. C. § 908, asserting that his present condition resulted from his exposure to asbestos while employed by Ingalls. Ingalls admitted the compensability of this claim and eventually entered into a formal settlement with Mr. Yates in satisfaction of its liability under the Act. Dis- Mr. Yates, in the trict Court against the 23 manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos whose products were allegedly present at the Pas-cagoula shipyards during the period in which Mr. Yates contracted asbestosis. Before his death in 1986, Mr. Yates entered into settlement agreements with 8 of the 23 defendants (predeath settlements). Each defendant required Maggie Yates, Mr. Yates’ wife, to join in the settlement and to release her present right to sue for loss of consortium, even though she was not a party to the litigation. Six of the eight defendants also required Mrs. Yates to release any cause of action for wrongful death that might accrue to her after her husband died. None of the third party settlements was approved by Ingalls. After her husband’s lated resulted from asbestos exposure that occurred “in the course and scope of [his] employment,” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-59, Mrs. Yates filed a claim for death benefits as Mr. Yates’ widow under § 9 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 909. Ingalls contested the claim on the ground that Mrs. Yates had been a “person entitled to compensation” under the Act when she entered into the predeath settlements. Ingalls argued that by failing to obtain its approval of those settlements she forfeited, under § 33(g)(1), her eligibility for death benefits. In response, Mrs. Yates argued that she was not a “person entitled to compensation” when she entered into those settlement agreements because her husband was still alive at that time. The deputy commissioner referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ ruled in favor of Mrs. Yates. Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 26 BRBS 174 (1992). The ALJ recognized that Mrs. Yates was no more than a “potential widow” when she entered into the settlement agreements. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-67. Reasoning that the prerequisites for the recovery of death benefits could not be established prior to the worker’s death, he found that the “spouse of an injured employee has no cause of action [under the Act] until the injured employee dies from his work-related injury.” Id., at A-68. Because Mrs. Yates had no cause of action for death benefits prior to her husband’s death, the ALJ concluded that she was not a “person entitled to compensation” obligated to seek the employer’s approval of any settlements signed at that time. Ingalls appealed to the Benefits Review Board. Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 28 BRBS 137 (1994). The Director, OWCP, appeared as a respondent in support of Mrs. Yates. The Board affirmed, largely in reliance upon our decision in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469 (1992), in which we held that an injured worker was a “person entitled to compensation” for the purpose of disability benefits under § 8 of the Act at “the moment his right to recovery vested,” id., at 477, which in that case was when the worker suffered his permanent injury. The Board reasoned that Cowart’s “vesting” rationale applied to death as well as disability benefits, and observed that Mrs. Yates’ “right to death benefits under the Act could not have vested before she became a widow.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35 (emphasis in original). Although it might appear at the time of settlement that Mrs. Yates would likely become a “person entitled to compensation” under the Act, before her husband’s death any one of several events might occur that would prevent her from recovering any death benefits under the Act — she might predecease her husband, she might divorce her husband, or her husband might die from causes independent of his work-related injury. For these reasons, the Board held that Mrs. Yates was not a “person entitled to compensation” at the time she entered into the predeath settlements, but acknowledged that its ruling was at odds with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F. 3d 843 (1993), cert, denied, 512 U. S. 1219 (1994). cert, Ingalls again appealed, this time to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 65 F. 3d 460 (1995). Although Ingalls renewed its § 33(g) argument, the Court of Appeals rejected it for the reasons advanced by the Board. Ingalls also moved to strike the brief of the Director and to disallow the Director’s further participation in the appeal on the ground that the Director lacked standing. The Court of Appeals dismissed this argument in a footnote, citing its prior decision in Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Systems, Inc. v. White, 681 F. 2d 275, 280-284 (CA5 1982), overruled on other grounds, Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F. 2d 399, 406-407 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 818 (1984), in which the court held that “the Director has standing to participate as a respondent in the appeal of a [Benefits Review Board] decision [before the Court of Appeals].” 65 F. 3d, at 463, n. 2. The court distinguished our decision in Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122 (1995), as relevant- only to the question of the Director’s standing as a petitioner to the Court of Appeals, and not as a respondent. both The Courts of Appeals are in disagreement over both questions addressed. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are divided on the meaning of the phrase “person entitled to compensation.” Compare 65 F. 3d, at 464 (potential widow is not a “person entitled to compensation”), with Cretan, supra, at 847 (potential widow is a “person entitled to compensation”). The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, and for the District of Columbia, are split over whether the Director may participate in proceedings before the Courts of Appeals as a respondent. Compare Parker v. Director, OWCP, 75 F. 3d 929, 935 (CA4 1996) (Director may not appear), cert. denied, post, p. 812, with Shahady v. Atlas Tile & Marble Co., 673 F. 2d 479, 483-484 (CADC 1982) (Director is a proper respondent as a person “adversely affected or aggrieved” by the decision below); Goldsmith v. Director, OWCP, 838 F. 2d 1079, 1080 (CA9 1988) (same); White, supra, at 281-282 (Director may appear pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a)). We granted certiorari to resolve these splits, 517 U. S. 1186 (1996). II We begin our inquiry into the meaning of the phrase “person entitled to compensation” in § 33(g), as we must, with an examination of the language of the statute. Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990) (“In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Section 33(g)(1) states in pertinent part: “If the person entitled to compensation ... enters into a settlement with a third person ... for an amount less than the compensation to which the person ... would be entitled under this chapter, the employer shall be liable for compensation as determined under subsection (f) of this section only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer and the employer’s carrier, before the settlement is executed, and by the person entitled to compensation . . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 933(g)(1) (emphasis added). The plain language of this subsection reveals two salient points. First, the use of the present tense (i. e., “enters”) indicates that the “person entitled to compensation” must be so entitled at the time of settlement. Second, the ordinary meaning of the word “entitle” indicates that the “person entitled to compensation” must at the very least be qualified to receive compensation. Black’s Law Dictionary 532 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "entitle” as “To qualify for; to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or claiming”). v. We reached the same conclusion in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469 (1992). There, Cowart, an injured worker, settled with a third party without obtaining the consent of his employer or his employer’s insurance carrier. Cowart thereafter filed a claim for disability benefits under the Act, which his employer contested. The employer argued that Cowart had been a “person entitled to compensation” under the Act at the time of his settlement, and that his failure to obtain his employer’s approval of the settlement barred any further recovery of benefits under the Act. In response, Cowart asserted that he had not been a “person entitled to compensation” when he entered into the settlement because that phrase referred only “to injured workers who are either already receiving compensation payments from their employer, or in whose favor an award of compensation has been entered.” Id., at 475. The Court held that Cowart was barred by § 33(g) 5. receiving further compensation under the Act. We recognized that the relevant time for examining whether a person is “entitled to compensation” is the time of settlement. Ibid. (“The question is whether Cowart, at the time of . . . settlement, was a ‘person entitled to compensation’ under the terms of § 33(g)(1) of the LHWCA”). We then addressed the definition of the term “person entitled to compensation.” We said: “Both in legal and general usage, the normal meaning of entitlement includes a right or benefit for which a person qualifies, and it does not depend upon whether the right has been acknowledged or adjudicated. It means only that the person satisfies the prerequisites attached to the right.” Id., at 477. We concluded that Cowart had satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining the permanent disability benefits at issue in that case when he was injured, so that he was a “person entitled to compensation” and required to obtain his employer’s approval at the time he entered into the settlement agreement. Ibid. With Cowart and the plain language of § 33(g) in mind, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether Mrs. Yates satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining death benefits under the Act at the time she signed the releases contained in the predeath settlements. Section 9 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 909(b), governs the distribution of death benefits, and provides that a “widow or widower” is entitled to such benefits “[i]f the [employee’s] injury causes death.” See also §902(11) (defining “death” as a basis for a right to compensation as “death resulting from an injury”); § 902(2) (defining “injury” as “accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment”). The Act defines a “widow or widower” as “the decedent’s wife or husband living with or dependent for support upon him or her at the time of his or her death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his or her desertion at such time.” § 902(16). Taken together, these statutes indicate that a surviving spouse qualifies for death benefits only if: (i) the survivor’s deceased worker-spouse dies from a work-related injury; (ii) the survivor is married to the worker-spouse at the time of the worker-spouse’s death; and (iii) the survivor is either living with the worker-spouse, dependent upon the worker-spouse, or living apart from the worker-spouse because of desertion or other justifiable cause at the time of the worker-spouse’s death. Cf. Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U. S. 334, 336 (1954) (looking to status of spouse at time of death to determine whether spouse is a “widow” or “widower” for purposes of LHWCA). It is impossible to ascertain whether these prerequisites have been met at any time prior to the death of the injured worker. Accord, Cortner v. Chevron Int’l Oil Co., 22 BRBS 218, 220 (1989) (“It is not until death occurs that the right to benefits arises and the potential beneficiaries are identified”); 51 Fed. Reg. 4270, 4276 (1986) (“Since a claim for survivor benefits does not arise until the employee’s death, there is no claim [against the employer] that can be settled [before then]”). We therefore reject the argument that a person seeking death benefits under the Act can satisfy the prerequisites for those benefits at any earlier time — e. g., when the worker is initially injured or when the worker enters into a predeath settlement. See also 20 CFR § 702.241(g) (1996) (no one can enter a settlement agreement with the employer regarding death benefits before the worker dies). Because Mrs. Yates’ husband was alive at the time she released her potential wrongful death actions, she was not a “person entitled to compensation” at that time and was therefore not obligated to seek Ingalls’ approval to preserve her entitlement to statutory death benefits. Ingalls contends that dates a contrary conclusion. Ingalls’ analysis focuses on the presence of the phrase “would be entitled”: “If the person entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third person ... for an amount less than the compensation to which the person ... would be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable [only if approval is obtained].” 33 U. S. C. § 933(g)(1) (emphasis added). Because this subsection examines the compensation to which the person “would be entitled” under the Act, argues Ingalls, it “encompasses a broad forward looking concept” that effectively brings any “person who would be entitled to compensation” within its purview. Brief for Petitioners 15. As support, Ingalls draws upon the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F. 3d 843 (1993). On facts almost identical to those presented here, the Court of Appeals held that the injured worker’s spouse was a “person entitled to compensation” for death benefits prior to her husband's death. The court found “lit-tie sense in a distinction that turns on whether the death for which settlement is made has yet to occur.” Id., at 847. Ingalls essentially takes issue with our conclusion that the proper time to evaluate whether a person is “entitled to compensation” is the time of settlement. Ingalls’ position is at odds with our precedent, see Cowart, 505 U. S., at 475, and with the plain language of this statute, supra, at 255. The phrase “would be entitled” in subsection (g)(1) simply frames the inquiry into whether the approval requirement applies at all. If the person entitled to compensation enters into a settlement for an amount less than that to which the person “would be entitled” under the Act, then the employer’s approval must be obtained. If the settlement is for an amount greater than or equal to the amount to which the person “would be entitled,” then the employer’s approval need not be obtained. 505 U. S., at 482. Ingalls’ reading would assign an additional and unnecessary purpose to the phrase. Under Ingalls’ suggested reading, a worker’s spouse who signs a predeath settlement is considered a “person entitled to compensation” even though, in the time between the settlement and the worker’s death, the worker’s spouse might become ineligible for those death benefits (e.g., by predeceasing or divorcing the worker). In this context, the worker’s spouse would not actually be entitled to death benefits, but would nonetheless be considered the “person entitled” to such benefits. This reading cannot be supported by the statutory language. Ingalls also contends that we should depart from a plain reading of the statutory language because strict adherence to it is at odds with the policies underlying the Act. More specifically, Ingalls avers that our reading of § 33(g) will effectively abrogate the employer’s right to offset its liability for death benefits by any amounts received by the surviving spouse in predeath settlements. Section 33(f) allows an employer to reduce its compensation obligations under the Act by the net amount of damages that the “person entitled to compensation” recovers from third parties. 33 § 933(f) (“If the person entitled to compensation institutes proceedings . . . the employer shall be required to pay as compensation under this chapter a sum equal to the excess of the amount which the Secretary determines is payable on account of such injury or death over the net amount recovered against such third person”). If, as Ingalls asserts, the phrase “person entitled to compensation” means the same thing under § 33(f) as it does under § 33(g), see Cowart, supra, at 479, then our holding today means that an employer would not be permitted to reduce the spouse’s death benefits by any amounts the spouse receives from predeath settlements. Such a spouse would be able to recover once from the third party and again from the worker’s employer under the Act after the worker’s death. In effect, a spouse in this situation — unlike a spouse who entered into settlements the day after the worker dies — would receive double recovery for her injuries. This double recovery, Ingalls contends, contravenes one of the central tenets of the Act set forth in § 3(e), 33 U. S. C. § 903(e), of the Act: “[A]ny amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death for which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers’ compensation law or section 688 of title 46, Appendix (relating to recovery for injury to or death of seamen), shall be credited against any liability imposed by this chapter.” See also Cowart, supra, at 483 (noting that the Act “ensures against fraudulent double recovery by the employee”); 2A A. Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 71.21 (1996) (“[T]he policy of avoiding double recovery is a strong one ...”). In Ingalls’ view, our reading of the statute gives a “potential widow... greater benefits and protections than that afforded to covered employees who settle their third party claims.” Brief for Petitioners 22-23. This entire argument, however, presupposes definition we today give to “person entitled to compensation” under § 33(g) applies without qualification to § 33(f) as well. This is a question we have yet to decide, and is one we leave for another day. If, for the sake of argument, we assumed that Ingalls’ proposition were correct, our conclusion on the question presented in this case would not change. We agree that the Act generally reflects a policy of avoiding double recovery. See 33 U. S. C. § 903(e). But § 903(e) is of fairly recent vintage, Pub. L. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1640; E. P. Paup Co. v. Director, OWCP, 999 F. 2d 1341, 1350 (CA9 1993) (“Prior to [enactment of] section 903(e), the credit doctrine allowed offset of benefits against LHWCA awards only if prior benefits were awarded under the LHWCA”) (emphasis added), and its reach is not all inclusive. See, e. g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 848 F. 2d 125 (CA9 1998) (allowing double recovery of veterans disability benefits and LHWCA benefits); Brown v. Forest Oil Corp., 29 F. 3d 966, 971 (CA5 1994) (“Although admittedly the LHWCA has a general policy to avoid double recoveries, we have also noted that limitations on employee recovery are not favored absent statutory authority”) (footnote omitted). Because the prohibition against double recovery is not absolute, we do not find the possibility of such recovery in this context to be so absurd or glaringly unjust as to warrant a departure from the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U. S. 475, 484 (1984) (plain language controls unless it leads to results that are “ ‘absurd or glaringly unjust’ ”). Furthermore, as Ingalls acknowledges, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 13, subrogation under the Act is not an employer’s exclusive remedy against third parties responsible for employees’ injuries; an employer in Ingalls’ position would remain free to seek indemnification against a third party through a tort action in state or federal court. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U. S. 529, 538 (1983); Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U. S. 404, 412-414 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that before an injured worker’s death, the worker’s spouse is not a “person entitled to compensation” for death benefits within the meaning of LHWCA § 33(g), and does not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the Act for failure to obtain the worker’s employer’s approval of settlements entered into before the worker’s death. Ill Ingalls also challenges the “standing” of the Director, OWCP, to appear before the courts of appeals as a respondent in cases in which there are already two adverse litigants. To assess this claim, familiarity with the Act’s appeals process, as well as with the Director’s role within that process, is helpful. file A person seeking compensation under the Act must file a timely claim with the local deputy commissioner. 33 U. S. C. § 913(a) (1-year limitation period). The commissioner notifies the employer of the claim, § 919(b), at which time the employer might: (i) agree to pay the amount of benefits fixed by the Act, 20 CFR § 702.231 et seq. (1996) (procedures for payment of noncontroverted claims); (ii) enter into a formal settlement with the person seeking compensation for a (presumably) lesser amount, subject to the approval of the deputy commissioner or an ALJ, 33 U. S. C. § 908(i); 20 CFR § 702.241 et seq-. (1996); or (iii) give notice that it is denying liability for, or controverting, the claim, §702.251. If the employer controverts the claim, the deputy commissioner is empowered to attempt to resolve the parties’ dispute informally. §702.311 et seq. Should informal discussions prove unsuccessful, the commissioner refers the matter to an ALJ and a formal hearing is held. 33 U. S. C. §§919(c)-(d); 20 CFR § 702.316 (1996). “[A]ny party in interest” may appeal the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review Board. 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(3). An appeal from the Board’s decision to the courts of appeals may be initiated by “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board.” § 921(c); see also 20 CFR § 802.410(a) (1996). The Director, OWCP, plays a significant role in this process. In addition to being charged with the LHWCA’s administration, § 701.202 (transferring to the Director “all functions of the Department of Labor with respect to the administration of benefits programs under the [LHWCA]”), and enforcement, § 802.410(b) (noting that Director is “responsible for the administration and enforcement of the [LHWCA]”); see also Newport News, 514 U. S., at 134 (noting Director’s “duty of uniform administration and enforcement”), the Director has also been authorized by the Secretary of Labor to appear as a litigant before the relevant adjudicative branches of the Department of Labor, the ALJ, and the Benefits Review Board. 20 CFR § 702.333(b) (1996) (“The Solicitor of Labor or his designee may appear and participate in any formal hearing [before an ALJ] held pursuant to these regulations on behalf of the Director as an interested party”); § 802.202(a) (“Any party ... may appear before and/or submit written argument to the [Benefits Review] Board”); § 801.2(a)(10) (defining “party” to include “the Secretary or his designee”); § 802.201(a) (“The Director, OWCP, . . . shall [under certain circumstances] be considered a party adversely affected” for purposes of initiating appeal to Board). The Director may also appear before the courts of appeals, although the limits of the Director’s authority to do so are less clear. Section 21(e) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921(c), provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred ....” In Newport News, we held that “the phrase ‘person adversely affected or aggrieved’ does not refer to an agency acting in its governmental capacity,” 514 U. S., at 130, so that the Director was therefore not permitted to appeal from a decision of the Benefits Review Board when the Board’s decision did no more than “impai[r] [the Director’s] ability to achieve the Act’s purposes and to perform the administrative duties the Act prescribes,” id., at 126. We expressed no view on the question whether the Director can appear before the court of appeals, not as a petitioner seeking review, but as a respondent. Id., at 127, n. 2. Any impediment to the Director’s appearance as a respondent in this case is not of constitutional origin. As we stated in Newport News, although the Director had no statutory authorization to petition the Court of Appeals, “Congress could have conferred standing upon the Director without infringing Article III of the Constitution.” Id., at 133. In light of this observation, Article III surely poses no bar to the Director’s participation as a respondent in those courts. Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (reserving question whether persons seeking to intervene “must satisfy not only the requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III”). Whether the Director has statutory authority to appear as a respondent before the courts of appeals is not as easily resolved. The Act itself does not speak to the issue. Section 21(c) of the Act, by its very terms, defines only who “may obtain a review of [a final order of the Board],” 33 U. S. C. § 921(c); it does not purport to delineate who may appear in those proceedings once a proper party initiates them. Thus, we must reject Ingalls’ argument that § 21(c) requires the Director to demonstrate an “advers[e] [e]ffect or aggriev[ement]” in order to appear as a respondent. Section 21a of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 921a, similarly provides no authorization. While §21a states that “[attorneys appointed by the Secretary shall represent the Secretary, the deputy commissioner, or the Board in any court proceedings under section 921 of this title or other provisions of this chapter,” it says nothing about when the Secretary may be a party to those proceedings in the first place. See also 20 CFR § 802.410(b) (1996) (“The Director, OWCP,. . . shall be deemed to be the proper party on behalf of the Secretary of Labor in all review proceedings conducted pursuant to section 21(c) of the LHWCA”). Nor need we infer the Director’s right to appear as a respondent in order for §21a to have meaning. Although Newport News curtailed the Secretary’s right to appear as a petitioner before the courts of appeals in most circumstances, that decision did not foreclose an appearance as a petitioner in all situations. See, e. g., Newport News, supra, at 128, n. 3 (leaving open the possibility that the Director may be a “person adversely affected or aggrieved” when appealing a Board ruling adverse to the § 944 fund). Left with no guidance from the Act itself, we turn to the general rule that governs all appeals from administrative agencies to the courts of appeals, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a). That Rule, in pertinent part, states: “Review of an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer (hereinafter, the term ‘agency’ will include agency, board, commission, or officer) must be obtained by filing with the clerk of a court of appeals ... [the appropriate form indicated by law].... In each case the agency must be named respondent.” (Emphasis added.) We believe that it is this Rule that confers upon the Director the right to appear as a respondent before the courts of appeals. Rule 15(a) clearly applies to appeals from the Benefits Review Board: The LHWCA authorizes appellate review of the “final order of the [Benefits Review] Board,” 33 U. S. C. § 921(c), and Rule 15(a) applies to “[r]eview of an order of an administrative agency [or] board.” We decline to read Rule 15(a) more narrowly, as the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the District of Columbia have done. Those courts have held that Rule 15(a) applies only where “a single private party is contesting the action of an agency, which agency must appear and defend on the merits to insure the proper adversarial clash requisite to a ‘case or controversy.’ ” McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 514 F. 2d 198, 200 (CADC 1975). Where “there is sufficient adversity between [the employer and the claimant] to insure proper litigation,” ibid., they reason, “the Director’s presence as a party is not necessary” and would in fact run afoul of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 1(b) by “‘extending] . . . the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.’” Parker, 75 F. 3d, at 934 (citing McCord, swpra, at 200); see also Fed. Rule App. Proc. 1(b) (“These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as established by law”). re- We reject this quire us to tack the words “when necessary to preserve adversity” onto, the otherwise unqualified language in Rule 15(a) that “the agency must be named respondent.” Where there is already a case or controversy between parties properly before a court, as there is in this case between Ingalls and Mrs. Yates who properly appear pursuant to 33 U. S. C. § 921(c), that court’s jurisdiction is not extended by the inclusion of an additional party whose presence is also consistent with Article III, see supra, at 264. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F. 2d 35, 43, n. 5 (CA2 1976) (“The existence of sufficient adversity between private parties has not been thought to preclude the Government’s right to be a party in many other sorts of review of federal administrative action”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U. S. 249 (1977). Justice Scalia is concerned that Rule 1(b) might be violated in the converse situation — i. e., when the Director is the sole respondent whose presence is “necessary to preserve adversity.” See post, at 274. Although the Director’s participation in that case would not extend the courts’ jurisdiction beyond the perimeter of Article III, see Newport News, 514 U. S., at 133 (no Article III impediment to the Director’s participation), it is possible that such participation might exceed the court’s statutory authority to hear the case. While this transgression of statutory authority is not a question we decide today, it nevertheless raises a concern relevant to our interpretation of Rule 15(a). We do not find this concern controlling, however, when, as in this case, the Director is not in fact the sole respondent. Having concluded that Rule 15(a) applies, the question becomes which “agency” must be named as a respondent. When an agency has a unitary structure — i. e., where a single entity wears the hats of adjudicator and litigator/ enforcer — the application of Rule 15(a) is straightforward. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for instance, has adjudicative duties, 47 U. S. C. §§ 154(j), 155(c), as well as enforcement duties that require it to appear as a litigant, §402. It is therefore proper to name the FCC as the respondent “agency” in proceedings before the courts of appeals under Rule 15(a). Indeed, it is necessary to do so, since the FCC is the only “agency” that could be named. See also 29 U. S. C. § 160(f) (National Labor Relations Board adjudicates unfair labor practice claims and litigates before the courts of appeals); 16 U. S. C. §§ 825f, 825g (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission investigates, enforces, and adjudicates violations of the Federal Power Act). But not all agencies share this unitary structure. Some have a split-function regime in which Congress places adjudicatory authority outside the agency charged with administering and enforcing the statute. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, for example, gives general enforcement authority to the Department of Labor, but vests adjudicatory authority in an independent body, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 651(b)(3), 661; Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 147 (1991). See also 30 U. S. C. §§811, 823 (authorizing Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and safety standards under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, but establishing independent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission to exercise adjudicatory authority under the Act). Other split-function regimes involve only one agency, whose adjudicative and enforcement/litigation duties have been divided by Congress between two sub-“agencies,” both of which are under the umbrella of the same overarching agency. In this latter type of split-function regime, the only type that we address today, it is the overarching agency that is the “agency” for the purposes of Rule 15(a), since an order of the agency’s designated adjudicator is in reality an order of the agency itself. That “agency” may then be free to designate its enforcer/litigator as its voice before the courts of appeals. To require the agency’s adjudicator to appear before the courts of appeals makes little sense because that adjudicator has no more interest or stake in defending its orders in the courts of appeals than does a district court. It would also compel what we believe is a strange result — the substitution of an agency’s adjudicator for its designated litigator once the case reaches the courts of appeals. Although our interpretation of Rule 15(a), as the dissent points out, is not free from anomalies, neither is the dissent’s interpretation. In particular, we take issue with the dissent’s view that the overarching agency must have absolute veto power over the decisions of its adjudicator before the adjudicator is deemed to be “within” the agency and before the order of one can be considered the order of the other. Cf. 8 CFR § 3.1(h) (1996) (Attorney General may review and modify decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s adjudicator). Other methods of agency oversight exist, and an agency’s inability to employ the most compelling form of oversight does not mean it possesses no supervisory authority over its tribunal or that it is therefore somehow unfair to treat the adjudicator’s order as the agency’s. The Secretary of Labor’s power under the LHWCA to appoint all five members of the Benefits Review Board, 33 U. S. C. § 921(b)(1), and to establish the rules of procedure of the Board, 20 CFR § 802.101 et seq. (1996), demonstrates the Secretary’s indirect but substantial control over the Board and its decisions. Perhaps these concerns animated the Courts of Appeals actually confronted with this situation, since they have seen fit, in over 2,000 decisions, to allow the Director’s participation as a respondent. WESTLAW, CTA database (Jan. 21, 1997). Should Congress wish to alter this review scheme, it is, of course, free to do so. As it stands now, however, we conclude that the Director may be named as a respondent in the courts of appeals. By statute and by regulation, the adjudicative and enforcement/ litigation functions of the Department of Labor with respect to the LHWCA are divided between the ALJ’s and the Benefits Review Board on the one hand, 20 CFR § 702.332 (1996) (formal hearings conducted by ALJ’s); 33 U. S. C. § 921(b) (appeals from ALJ’s heard by Benefits Review Board), and the Director on the other, see supra, at 262-263. Because the Benefits Review Board is a subdivision of the Department of Labor, see H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 12 (1972) (describing Board as “providing] an internal administrative review of initial decisions in contested cases by a three-man board within the Department of Labor”) (emphasis added); 20 CFR §801 et seq. (1996) (describing “establishment and the organizational structure of the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor”) (emphasis added), the Board’s order is the Department’s order, and the Department of Labor is the “agency” for the purposes of Rule 15(a). Congress, however, has delegated to the Secretary of Labor, the Department’s chief administrator, the right to choose the Department’s legal representative, 33 U. S. C. §921a, and the Secretary has exercised that discretion by naming the Director as the Department’s designated litigant in the courts of appeals. 20 CFR § 802.410(b) (1996). This conclusion does not upset the balance of representation in the courts of appeals. Although in Newport News we held that the Director does not always have the right to appeal as a petitioner to the courts of appeals, 514 U. S., at 135-136, and we now hold that the Director may appear as a respondent before those courts, this will not result in a “lopsided” scheme whereby the Director can appear only in defense of the Benefits Review Board’s decisions. The Director, even as a respondent, is free to argue on behalf of the petitioner, see Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297, 301 (1983) (Director appeared as respondent before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit but filed a brief on behalf of the petitioner), and to challenge the decision of the Board. Indeed, the Director’s participation before the courts of appeals would be plenary but for the inability to initiate an appeal; the Director must usually wait for someone else to do so first. Although this is unusual, it does not result in a “lopsided” proceeding and is an oddity wrought by congressional “oversight,” Newport News, 514 U. S., at 128-129 (GlNSBURG, J., concurring), and not by virtue of our holding today. For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DeFUNIS et al. v. ODEGAARD et al. No. 73-235. Argued February 26, 1974 Decided April 23, 1974 Josef Diamond argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Lyle L. Iversen. Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Barnes B. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by 'Milton A. Smith, Gerard C. Smetana, and Jerry Kronenberg for,the1 Chamber of Commerce of the United States;.by J. Albert Wall, Laurence Gold, and Thomas E. Harris for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; by Theodore R. Mann for the American Jewish Congress; by David I. Caplan for' the Jewish Rights .Council; by Anthony J. Fornelli, Thaddeus L. Kowalski, and Samuel Rabinove for the Advocate Society et al.; and by Alexander M. Bickel, Philip B. Kurland, - Larry Ml Lavinsky, and Arnold Forster for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance- were filed by William J. Brown, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ruzicho, Earl M. Manz, and Stephen J. Simmons, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; by John P. Harris for the city of Seattle; by Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., and Chesterfield SrditK for the American Bar Assn.; by Archibald Cox, James N. Bier man, James A. Sharaf, and Daniel Steiner for the President and Fellows of Harvard College; by J. Harold Flannery for the Center for Law and Education, Harvard University; by Frank Askin and Norman Amaker for the Board'of Governors of Rutgers, the State University of'New Jersey, et al.; by Edgar S. Cahn and Jean Camper Cahn for the Deans of the Antioch School of Law;, by Erwin N. Griswold and Clifford C. Alloway for the Association of American Law Schools; by John Holt Myers for the Association of American Medical Colleges; by Howard A. Glickstein for a Group of Law School Deans; by Harry B. Reese and Peter Martin for the Law School Admission Council; by Sanford Jay Rosen, Herbert Teitelbaum, and Melvin L. Wulf -for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al.; by Cruz Reynoso and Robert B. McKay for the Council on Legal Education Opportunity; by Roswell B. Perkins, Kenneth C. Bass III, David S. Tatel, and R. Stephen Browning for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Jeffry A. Mintz, Louis H. Poliak, and John.Baker for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Derrick A. Bell, Jr., for the National Conference of Black Lawyers; by Brucé R: Greene and Herbert Becker for the American Indian Law .Students -Assn., Inc., et al.; by Clifford Sweet, C. Dyonel Jones, Dennis R. Yeager, E. Richard Lafsqn, Nathaniel R. Jones, Michael H. Terry, Joseph A. Matera, and C. Christopher Brown for the Legal Aid Society of Alameda County et al.; by Peter Van N. Lockwood, David Bonderman, Sylvia Roberts, and David Rubin for the National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et ah; and by Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the National Council of Jewish Women et al. Per Curiam. In 1971 the petitioner Marco DeFunis, Jr., applied for admission as a first-year student at the University of Washington Law School, a state-operated institution. The size of the incoming first-year class was to be limited to 150 persons, and the LaW School received some 1,600 applications for these 150 places. DeFunis was eventually notified that he' had been denied admission. He thereupon commenced this suit in a Washington trial court, contending that' the. procedures and criteria employed by the Law School Admissions Committee invidiously discriminated against him on account of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. DeFunis brought the suit on behalf of himself alone, and not.as the representative of any class, against the various respondents, who are officers, faculty members, and members of the Board of Regents of the University of Washington. He asked the' trial court to issue a mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to admit him as a member of the first-year class entering in- September 1971, on the ground that the Law School admissions policy had resulted in the unconstitutional denial of his application for admission. The trial court agreed with his claim and granted, the requested relief. DeFunis was, accordingly, admitted to the Law School and began his legal studies there in the fall of 1971. On appeal, the Washington Supreme. Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the Law School admissions policy did not violate the Constitution. By this time DeFunis was in his second year at the Law School. He then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, and Mr. Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court pending the “final disposition of the case by this Court.” By virtue, of this stay, DeFunis has remained in law school, and was in the first term of his third and final year when this Court first considered his certiorari petition in the fall of 1973. Because of our concern that DeFunis’ third-year standing in the Law School might have rendered this case moot, we requested the parties to brief the question of mootness before we acted on the petition. In response, both sides contended that the case was not moot. The respondents indicated that, if the decision of the Washington Supreme Court were permitted to stand, the petitioner could complete the term for which he was then enrolled but would have to apply to the faculty for permission to continue in the school before he could register for another term. We granted the petition for certiorari on November 19, 1973. 414 U. S. 1038. The case was in due course orally argued on February 26, 1974. In response to questions raised from the bench during the oral argument, counsel for the petitioner has informed the Court that DeFunis has now registered “for his final quarter in law school.” Counsel for the respondents have made clear that the Law School will not in anyway seek to abrogate this registration. In light of DeFunis’ recent registration for the last quarter of his final law school year, and the Law School’s assurance that his registration is fully effective, the insistent question again arises whether this case is not moot, and to that question we now turn. The starting point for analysis is the familiar proposition that “federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244 246 (1971). The inability of the federal judiciary “to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. Ill of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306 n. 3 (1964); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 496 n. 7 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 50 n. 8 (1968). Although as a matter of Washington state law it appears that this case would be saved from mootness by “the great public interest in the continuing issues raised by this appeal,” 82 Wash. 2d 11, 23 n. 6, 507 P. 2d 1169, 1177 n. 6 (1973), the fact remains that under Art. Ill “[e]ven in cases arising in the state-courts, the question of mootness is a federal one which a federal coürt must resolve, before it assumes jurisdiction.” North Carolina v. Rice, supra, at 246. . The resporidents have represented that, without regard toy the ultimate resolution of the issues in this case, DeFunis will remain a student in the Law School for the duration of any term in which he has already enrolled. Since he has now registered for his final term, it is evident that he will be given an opportunity to complete all academic and other requirements for graduation,' and, if he does so, will receive his diploma regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits of this case. In short, all parties agree that DeFunis is now entitled to complete his legal studies at the University of Washington and to receive his degree from that institution. A determination by this Court of the legal issues tendered by the parties is no longer necessary to compel that result, and could not serve to prevent it. DeFunis did not cast his suit as a class action, and the only remedy he requested was an injunction commanding his admission to the Law. School. He was not only accorded that remedy, but he now has also been irrevocably admitted to the final term of the final year of the Law School course. The controversy between the parties has thus clearly ceased to be “definite and concrete” and no longer “touch [es] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). It matters not that these circumstances partially stem from a policy decision on the part of the respondent Law School authorities. The respondents, through their counsel, the Attorney General of the State, have professionally represented that in no event will the status of DeFunis now be affected by any view this Court might express on the merits of this controversy. And it has been the settled practice of the Court, in contexts no less significant, fully to accept representations such as these as parameters for decision. See Gerende v. Election Board, 341 U. S. 56 (1951); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54, 57-58 (1967); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U. S. 99. 107 (1971); cf. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163 (1971). There is a line of decisions in this Court standing for the proposition that the “voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i. e., does not make the case moot.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629; 632 (1953); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290, 308-310 (1897); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37, 43 (1944); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 376 (1963); United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U. S. 199, 202-203 (1968). These decisions.and the doctrine they reflect would be quite relevant if the question of mootness here had arisen by reason of a unilateral change in the admissions procedures of the Law School. For it was the admissions procedures that-were the target of this' litigation, and a voluntary cessation of the admissions practices complained of could make this case moot only if it could be said with assurance “that 'there is no reasonable expectation-that the wrong will be repeated.’” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at 633. Otherwise, “[t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways,” id., at 632, and this fact would be enough to prevent mootness because of the “public interest in having the legality of the practices settled.” Ibid. But mootness in-the present case depends not at all upon a “voluntary cessation” of the admissions practices that were the subject of' this litigation. It depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the final quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the term for which he is now enrolled. It might also be suggested that this case presents a question that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911); Roe v. Wade, U. S. 113, 125 (1973), and is thus amenable to federal adjudication even though it might otherwise be considered moot. But DeFunis will never again be requirgd to run the gantlet of the Law School’s admission process, and so the question is certainly not “capable of repetition” so far as he is concerned. Moreover, just because this particular case did not reach the Court until the eve of the petitioner’s graduation from law school, it hardly follows that the issue he raises will in the future evade review. If the admissions procedures of the Law School remain unchanged, there is.no reason to suppose that a subsequent case attacking those procedures will not come with relative speed to this Court, now that the Supreme Court of Washington has spoken. This case, therefore, in no way presents the exceptional situation in which the Southern Pacific Terminal doctrine might permit a departure from “[t]he usual rule in federal cases . . . that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.” Roe v. Wade, supra, at 125; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any decision 'this Court might reach on the merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art. Ill of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues tendered by the parties. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is vacated, and the ;cause is remanded for such proceedings as by that court'may be deemed appropriate. It is so ordered. Also included as petitioners are DeFunis’ parents and his wife. Hereafter, the singular form “petitioner" is used. By contrast, in their response to the petition for certiorari, the respondents had stated that DeFunis “will complete his third year [of law school] and be awarded his J. D. degree at the end of the 1973-74 academic year regardless of the outcome of this appeal.” In their memorandum on the question of mootness, counsel for the respondents unequivocally stated: “If Mr. DeFunis registers for the spring quarter under the existing order of this court during •the registration period from February 20, 1974, to March 1, 1974, that registration would not be canceled unilaterally by the university” regardless of the outcome of this litigation.” In response to an inquiry from .the Court, counsel for the respondents has advised that some changes have been made in the admissions procedures “for the applicants seeking admission to the University of Washington law school for the academic year commencing September, 1974.” The respondents’ counsel states, however, that “[these] changes do not affect the policy challenged by the petitioners ... in that . . . special consideration still is given to applicants from ‘certain ethnic groups.’ ” It is suggested in dissent that "[a]ny number of unexpected events — illnéss, economic necessity, even academic failure — might prevent his graduation at the end of the term.” Post, at 348. “B.ut such speculative contingencies afford no basis for our passing on 'the substantive issues [the petitioner] would have us decide,” Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 49 (1969), in the absence of "evidence that this is á prospect. of 'immediacy and reality.’ ” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. OKLAHOMA et al. No. 73. Argued November 9-10, 1950. Decided December 11, 1950. Don Emery and R. M. Williams argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief were Rayburn L. Foster and Harry D. Turner. T. Murray Robinson argued the cause for the State of Oklahoma, Floyd Green for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, and D. A. Richardson for the Peerless Oil & Gas Co., appellees. With them on the brief were Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General, and Fred Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Oklahoma, and Thomas J. Lee and Richard H. Dunn for the Commissioners of the Land Office of Oklahoma. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a companion case to Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179, decided this date. Appellant is a producer in the Guymon-Hugoton Field, owning leases on approximately 183,000 acres, but unlike Cities Service it does not purchase from other producers in this field. It has its own gathering system through which gas is transported to a central point in Hansford County, Texas. There the gas is processed for the extraction of gasoline and other liquid hydrocarbons. These by-products are either utilized or sold, and the residue of natural gas is sold to pipe-line companies. Appellant’s first appearance before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in connection with the Peerless proceedings was on January 17, 1947, after the entry of the order setting a minimum price on all natural gas taken from the Guy-mon-Hugoton Field. Phillips moved that the Commission either vacate the order insofar as applicable to it, or clarify the application of the order to gas not actually sold at the wellhead. On February 4, 1947, the Commission issued Order No. 19702, refusing to vacate or further clarify its general minimum price order. The Commission concluded that Phillips had no standing to complain of the general order since the company was currently complying with it by realizing on the average, from sale and utilization of by-products and sale of gas, the minimum price set. On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and with respect to Phillips stated: “Our discussion of the Cities Service appeal is here applicable. We find no basis in the due process and equal protection clause of the Federal and State Constitutions for condemning the orders appealed from in their application to Phillips.” 203 Okla. 35, 48, 220 P. 2d 279, 292 (1950). It is apparent from this opinion that the court below took jurisdiction and passed upon the constitutional issues raised. We assumed therefore that the court, noting the evidence of injury contained in the record, found no technical defects in the pleadings before the Commission which would deprive Phillips of standing to appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal to this Court in order to secure a complete picture of the issues at stake. Appellant does not argue that the orders violate the Commerce Clause. In other respects, the appeal presents only minor variations of the issues raised by Cities Service. Phillips argues that it is not a purchaser but merely a producer; that unlike the situation in Cities Service, the order as applied to it lacks any connection with correlative rights, the interest of the public, monopolistic practices or discrimination. The distinction is without a difference: the connection between realized price and conservation applies to all production in the field, whether owners purchase from others or not, and whether they own pipe lines or not. In a field which constitutes a common reservoir of gas, the Commission must be able to regulate the operations of all producers or there is little point in regulating any. Phillips also relies heavily on the contention that the orders are unreasonably vague. In substance, this argument is nothing more than that the determination by an integrated company of proceeds realized from gas at the wellhead involves complicated problems in cost accounting. These problems are common to a host of valid regulations. There is nothing to indicate that Phillips will be penalized for reasonable and good faith efforts to solve them. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that the alleged federal constitutional questions are frivolous and that the appeal therefore should be dismissed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARKANSAS LOUISIANA GAS CO. v. HALL et al. No. 78-1789. Argued April 20, 1981 Decided July 2, 1981 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BrennaN, White, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 585. SteveNS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which RehNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 586. Stewart, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Reuben Goldberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert Roberts, Jr., Marlin Risinger, Jr., W. Michael Adams, and Glenn W. Letham. James Fleet Howell argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General McCree, Elliott Schulder, Jerome Nelson, Jerome M. Feit, and Joshua Z. Rokach for the United States et al.; and by Edward Kliewer, Jr., Dean W. Wallace, and Patrick J. McCarthy for Northern Natural Gas Co. James R. Coffee and Edward J. Kremer filed a brief for Atlantic Rich-field Co. as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The “filed rate doctrine” prohibits a federally regulated seller of natural gas from charging rates higher than those filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The question before us is whether that doctrine forbids a state court to calculate damages in a breach-of-contract action based on an assumption that had a higher rate been filed, the Commission would have approved it. I Respondents are producers of natural gas, and petitioner Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. (Arkla) is a customer who buys their gas. In 1952, respondents and Arkla entered into a contract under which respondents agreed to sell Arkla natural gas from the Sligo Gas Field in Louisiana. The contract contained a fixed price schedule and a “favored nations clause.” The favored nations clause provided that if Arkla purchased Sligo Field natural gas from another party at a rate higher than the one it was paying respondents, then respondents would be entitled to a higher price for their sales to Arkla. In 1954, respondents filed with the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) the contract and their rates and obtained from the Commission a certificate authorizing the sale of gas at the rates specified in the contract. In September 1961, Arkla purchased certain leases in the Sligo Field from the United States and began producing gas on its leasehold. In 1974, respondents filed this state-court action contending that Arkla’s lease payments to the United States had triggered the favored nations clause. Because Arkla had not increased its payments to respondents as required by the clause, respondents sought as damages an amount equal to the difference between the price they actually were paid in the intervening years and the price they would have been paid had the favored nations clause gone into effect. In its answer, Arkla denied that its lease payments were purchases of gas within the meaning of the favored nations clause. Arkla subsequently amended its answer to allege in addition that the Commission had primary jurisdiction over the issues in contention. Arkla also sought a Commission ruling that its lease payments had not triggered the favored nations clause. The Commission did not act immediately, and the case proceeded to trial. The state trial court found that Arkla’s payments had triggered the favored nations clause, but nonetheless held that the filed rate doctrine pre-eluded an award of damages for the period prior to 1972. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, 359 So. 2d 255 (1978), and both parties sought leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied Arkla’s petition for appeal, 362 So. 2d 1120 (1978), and Arkla sought certiorari in this Court on the question whether the interpretation of the favored nations clause should have been referred to the Commission. We denied the petition. 444 U. S. 878 (1979). While Arkla’s petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court of Louisiana granted respondents’ petition for review and reversed the intermediate court on the measure of damages. 368 So. 2d 984 (1979). The court held that respondents were entitled to damages for the period between 1961 and 1972 notwithstanding the filed rate doctrine. The court reasoned that Arkla’s failure to inform respondents of the lease payments to the United States had prevented respondents from filing rate increases with the Commission, and that had respondents filed rate increases with the Commission, the rate increases would have been approved. Id., at 991. After the decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the Commission in May 1979 finally declined to exercise primary jurisdiction over the case, holding that the interpretation of the favored nations clause raised no matters on which the Commission had particular expertise. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 7 FERC ¶ 61,175, p. 61,321. The Commission did, however, state: “It is our opinion that the Louisiana Supreme Court's award of damages for the 1961-1972 period violates the filed rate doctrine.” Id., at 61,325, n. 18. Under that doctrine, no regulated seller is legally entitled to collect a rate in excess of the one filed with the Commission for a particular period. See infra, at 576-579. We granted Arkla's subsequent petition for certiorari challenging the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court. 449 U. S. 1109 (1981). II Sections 4 (c) and 4 (d) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 822-823, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c (c) and 717c (d), require sellers of natural gas in interstate commerce to file their rates with the Commission. Under § 4 (a) of the Act, 52 Stat. 822, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (a), the rates that a regulated gas company-files with the Commission for sale and transportation of natural gas are lawful only if they are “just and reasonable.” No court may substitute its own judgment on reasonableness for the judgment of the Commission. The authority to decide whether the rates are reasonable is vested by § 4 of the Act solely in the Commission, see FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 611 (1944), and “the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes,” Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251 (1951). Except when the Commission permits a waiver, no regulated seller of natural gas may collect a rate other than the one filed with the Commission. § 4 (d), 52 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 717c (d). These straightforward principles underlie the “filed rate doctrine,” which forbids a regulated entity to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority. See, e. g., T. I. M. E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464, 473 (1959). The filed rate doctrine has its origins in this Court’s cases interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act, see, e. g., Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U. S. 516, 520-521 (1939); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184, 196-197 (1913), and has been extended across the spectrum of regulated utilities. “The considerations underlying the doctrine . . . are preservation of the agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the need to insure that regulated companies charge only those rates of which the agency has been made cognizant.” City of Cleveland v. FPC, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10, 525 F. 2d 845, 854 (1976). See City of Piqua v. FERC, 198 U. S. App. D. C. 8, 13, 610 F. 2d 950, 955 (1979). Not only do the courts lack authority to impose a different rate than the one approved by the Commission, but the Commission itself has no power to alter a rate retroactively. When the Commission finds a rate unreasonable, it “shall determine the just and reasonable rate ... to be thereafter observed and in force.” § 5 (a), 52 Stat. 823, 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a) (emphasis added). See, e. g., FPC v. Tennessee Gas Co., 371 U. S. 145, 152-153 (1962); FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 353 (1956). This rule bars “the Commission’s retroactive substitution of an unreasonably high or low rate with a just and reasonable rate.” City of Piqua v. FERC, supra, at 12, 610 F. 2d, at 954. In sum, the Act bars a regulated seller of natural gas from collecting a rate other than the one filed with the Commission and prevents the Commission itself from imposing a rate increase for gas already sold. Petitioner Arkla and the Commission as amicus curiae both argue that these rules taken in tandem are sufficient to dispose of this case. No matter how the ruling of the Louisiana Supreme Court may be characterized, they argue, it amounts to nothing less than the award of a retroactive rate increase based on speculation about what the Commission might have done had it been faced with the facts of this case. This, they contend, is precisely what the filed rate doctrine forbids. We agree. It would undermine the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to award as damages a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never found to be reasonable within the meaning of the Act. Following that course would permit state courts to grant regulated sellers greater relief than they could obtain from the Commission itself. In asserting that the filed rate doctrine has no application here, respondents contend first that the state court has done no more than determine the damages they have suffered as a result of Arkla’s breach of the contract. No federal interests, they maintain, are affected by the state court’s action. But the Commission itself has found that permitting this damages award could have an “unsettling effect ... on other gas purchase transactions” and would have a “potential for disruption of natural gas markets . . . .” Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 13 FERC ¶ 61,100, p. 61,213 (1980). Even were the Commission not on record in this case, the mere fact that respondents brought this suit under state law would not rescue it, for when Congress has established an exclusive form of regulation, “there can be no divided authority over interstate commerce.” Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925). Congress here has granted exclusive authority over rate regulation to the Commission. In so doing, Congress withheld the authority to grant retroactive rate increases or to permit collection of a rate other than the one on file. It would surely be inconsistent with this congressional purpose to permit a state court to do through a breach-of-contract action what the Commission itself may not do. We rejected an analogous claim earlier this Term in Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U. S. 311 (1981). There, a shipper of goods by rail sought to assert a state common-law tort action for damages stemming from a regulated rail carrier’s decision to cease service on a rail line. We held unanimously that because the Interstate Commerce Commission had, in approving the cessation, ruled on all issues that the shipper sought to raise in the state-court suit, the common-law action was pre-empted. In reaching our conclusion, we explained that “[a] system under which each State could, through its courts, impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable service requirements could hardly be more at odds with the uniformity contemplated by Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act.” Id., at 326. To hold otherwise, we said, would merely approve “an attempt by a disappointed shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was denied by the Commission.” Id., at 324. In the case before us, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s award of damages to respondents was necessarily supported by an assumption that the higher rate respondents might have filed with the Commission was reasonable. Otherwise, there would have been no basis for that court’s conclusion, 368 So. 2d, at 991, that the Commission would have approved the rate. But under the filed rate doctrine, the Commission alone is empowered to make that judgment, and until it has done so, no rate other than the one on file may be charged. And far from approving the rate here in issue, the Commission has expressly declined to speculate on what its predecessor might have done. The court below, like the state court in Kalo Brick, has consequently usurped a function that Congress has assigned to a federal regulatory body. This the Supremacy Clause will not permit. Respondents’ theory of the case would give inordinate importance to the role of contracts between buyers and sellers in the federal scheme for regulating the sale of natural gas. Of course, as we have held on more than one occasion, nothing in the Act forbids parties to set their rates by contract. E. g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 820-822 (1968); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 338-340 (1956). But those cases stand only for the proposition that the Commission itself lacks affirmative authority, absent extraordinary circumstances, to “abrogate existing contractual arrangements.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra, at 820. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra, at 338-339. That rule does not affect the supremacy of the Act itself, and under the filed rate doctrine, when there is a conflict between the filed rate and the contract rate, the filed rate controls. See, e. g., Louisville :& Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97 (1915); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245 (1906). “This rule is undeniably strict, and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress . . . .” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Maxwell, supra, at 97. Moreover, to permit parties to vary by private agreement the rates filed with the Commission would undercut the clear purpose of the congressional scheme: granting the Commission an opportunity in every case to judge the reasonableness of the rate. Cf. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., supra, at 338-339. Respondents also appeal to what they say are equitable considerations. The filed rate doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, we are told, should not bar recovery when the defendant’s misconduct prevented filing of a higher rate. We do not find this argument compelling. The court below did not find that Arkla intentionally failed to inform respondents of its lease payments to the United States in an effort to defraud them. Consequently, we are not faced with affirmative misconduct, and we need not consider the application of the filed rate doctrine in such a case. The courts below found that Arkla has done no more than commit a simple breach of its contract. But when a court is called upon .to decide whether state and federal laws are in conflict, the fact that the state law has been violated does not affect the analysis. Every pre-emption case involves a conflict between a claim of right under federal law and a claim of right under state law. A finding that federal law provides a shield for the challenged conduct will almost always leave the state-law violation unredressed. Thus in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), the mere fact that a group of unions violated state law through their peaceful picketing did not permit enforcement of that law when it would conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. That the state-court suit was one for damages rather than for the type of relief available from the National Labor Relations Board weighed against pre-emption, not in favor of it. “[S]ince remedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation,” Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court, “to allow the State to grant a remedy here which has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict.” Id., at 247. The same principle applies here. Permitting the state court to award what amounts to a retroactive right to collect a rate in excess of the filed rate “only accentuates the danger of conflict.” No appeal to equitable principles can justify this usurpation of federal authority. Ill We hold that the filed rate doctrine prohibits the award of damages for Arkla’s breach during the period that respondents were subject to Commission jurisdiction. In all respects other than those relating to damages, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is affirmed. With respect to its calculation of damages, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Respondents include both original parties to the contract and successors in interest to parties to the contract. The favored nations clause provided in relevant part: “If at any time during the term of this agreement Buyer should purchase from another party seller gas produced from the subject wells or any other well or wells located in the Sligo Gas Field at a higher price than is provided to be paid for gas delivered under this agreement, then in such event the price to be paid for gas thereafter delivered hereunder shall be increased by an amount equal to the difference between the price provisions hereof and the concurrently effective higher price provisions of such subsequent contract.” App. 99. On October 1, 1977, the relevant responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission were transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See 10 CFR § 1000.1 (d) (1980). The term “Commission” in this opinion refers to the Federal Power Commission when referring to action taken prior to that date and to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission when referring to action taken after that date. The May 1979 order was actually the Commission’s second decision on primary jurisdiction. The Commission initially declined to exercise primary jurisdiction in March 1976, citing a then-existing policy against assuming jurisdiction over matters pending before a court. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 55 F. P. C. 1018, 1020-1021. On rehearing, the Commission further noted that on October 19, 1972, respondents had gained “small producer” status, see n. 5, infra, and were therefore no longer required to make rate increase filings, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 56 F. P. C. 2905 (1976). Arkla challenged the Commission’s automatic deferral policy before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. While the matter was pending before that court, the Commission asked that the record be remanded to it for further consideration, and the Court of Appeals granted the motion. The May 1979 order resulted from this remand, and review of that order is pending before the Court of Appeals. The Commission limited its disagreement with the state court to the period before 1972 because of its additional finding that as of October 1972 respondents had become “small producers” and were no longer required to file their rates with the Commission. See 18 CFR § 157.40 (1980). It therefore took the position that the filed rate doctrine did not apply to respondents after that date. Arida disputes here the administrative determination that respondents met the criteria to be considered “small producers.” The Commission's finding itself is not before us, and we do not believe that the state courts erred in deferring to that finding. Subsequent to the award of damages but prior to our action on Arlda’s petition for certiorari, the Commission informed respondents that in order to collect a damages award amounting to a retroactive rate increase, they would have to ask the Commission to waive the filing requirements of the Natural Gas Act. Respondents sought a waiver, which was denied by the Commission. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 13 FERC ¶ 61, 000 (1980). In its order, the Commission explained that in order to grant a waiver, it would have to “speculat[e] as to what the Commission would or would not have done in 1961 . . . .” Id., at 61,213. The Commission added that because the request for an increase called for contract interpretation, the 1961 Commission “would almost certainly have either suspended or rejected the filing.” Ibid. The Commission added that granting a waiver in this case would present a “potential for disruption of natural gas markets.” Ibid. Review of that order is pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Montana-Dakota Utilities was a case under the Federal Power Act rather than under the Natural Gas Act, but as we have previously said, the relevant provisions of the two statutes “are in all material respects substantially identical.” FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 353 (1956). In this opinion we therefore follow our established practice of citing interchangeably decisions interpreting the pertinent sections of the two statutes. See, e. g., ibid.; Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 820-821 (1968). Although the Commission may not impose a retroactive rate alteration and, in particular, may not order reparations, see, e. g., FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U. S. 9, 24 (1968), it may “for good cause shown/’ 15 U. S. C. § 717c (d), waive the usual requirement of timely filing of an alteration in a rate. Assuming, arguendo, that waiver is available for retroactive collection of a higher rate than the one on file, we note that in this case, the Commission has expressly found that respondents have not demonstrated that good cause exists for waiving the filing requirements on their behalf. See n. 6, supra. Arkla seeks to have this Court determine, as a matter of law, whether it actually breached its contract with respondents. This we decline to do. We see no reason to disagree with the Commission’s judgment that interpretation of the favored nations clause raises only questions, of state law. The state court found that the contract had been breached. We will not overturn the construction of Louisiana law by the highest court of that State. Apparently in an effort to challenge this determination, respondents assert that the damages would be paid entirely from Arkla’s corporate assets and would not be passed on to consumers. We see no reason why this fact, even if true, would alter our analysis. In any case, the record does not support respondents’ assertion that Arkla could not pass the damages award along to its customers. In its order denying respondents’ request for a waiver of the § 4 (d) notice requirement, the Commission conceded that Arkla would have the right to do so, even though all the natural gas for which Arkla would be paying was long since sold. 13 FERC, at 61,213. Respondents assert, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana found, that the Commission has expressly approved the damages award through its repeated statements that the award is not in excess of applicable ceilings. This is simply not the case. The court below based its conclusion on the Commission’s order denying rehearing on Arkla’s request that it exercise primary jurisdiction. 368 So. 2d, at 991, citing Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 56 F. P. C. 2905 (1976). Nothing in that order approves the retroactive rate increase; it only lists, at the request of the parties, “the maximum rates . . . which, if contractually authorized and if proper filing procedures had been followed, would have been approved . . . .” Id., at 2906. The fact that the retroactive rate increase was within the rate ceiling does not mean that it would have been approved if actually submitted, and certainly does not mean that it would be approved after the fact. In rejecting Respondents’ request for a waiver of its filing requirements, the Commission set forth several reasons for disapproving a rate increase falling within the ceiling rates and expressly declined to speculate on what the earlier Commission might have done. See n. 6, supra. In addition to the order denying rehearing, respondents also rely on language in the Commission’s May 18, 1979, order declining to exercise primary jurisdiction and in a letter from the Commission’s staff counsel. Staff counsel’s letter is ambiguous at best, and in any case, it should be unnecessary to add that staff counsel may not speak for the Commission. The language relied on in the May 18 order appears to have reference only to damages for the period after 1972. The same order twice disapproves granting, damages for the period prior to respondents’ assumption of small-producer status. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 7 FERC ¶ 61,175, p. 61,325, n. 18 (1979) (“It is our opinion that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s award of damages for the 1961-1972 period violates the filed rate doctrine”); id., at 61,325, n. 20 (“As we stated above, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in effect, waived one of this Commission’s filing requirements when it determined that [respondents’] group was entitled to damages back to 1961. This holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court conflicts with the filed rate doctrine”). The unconnected and ambiguous references on which respondents and the court below rely to find Commission “approval” of the retroactive rate increase cannot override these express statements of disapproval. None of the other cases relied on by respondents commands a contrary result. Shelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U. S. 667 (1950), held only that federal courts are not granted jurisdiction over state-law declaratory judgment actions merely because a federal question might potentially be raised in defense of the suit. The only issue in Shelly Oil was whether certain contracts had properly been terminated, so there was no occasion to consider whether the filed rate doctrine barred a damages remedy. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division, 358 U. S. 103 (1958), like the cases mentioned in text, held only that the Act does not automatically abrogate all private contracts. And Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U. S. 656 (1961), stated only that a state rather than a federal court was the proper forum in which a buyer should bring a breach-of-coniiract action to obtain a refund of charges in excess of the filed rate. Permitting that action in no way contravened the filed rate doctrine; in fact, it furthered the doctrine’s purpose. We note that a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit stated in City of Cleveland v. FPC, 174 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10-11, 525 F. 2d 845, 854-855 (1976), that "the proposition that a filed rate variant from an agreed rate is nonetheless the legal rate wages war with basic premises of the . . . Act.” That case is immediately distinguishable from the one before us because it involved a claim that the rate itself had been filed in violation of a contract. We express no opinion on the merits of that case, but to the extent that the quoted dictum would lead to a contrary result in the instant case, it is expressly disapproved. We agree with the Commission’s finding that Arkla “could have reasonably assumed that the government royalty payment did not trigger the [favored nations clause].” 13 FERC, at 61,213. Because the record contains no findings of misconduct, respondents’ argument that this Court has consistently recognized the doctrine of estoppel has no relevance. We save for another day the question whether the filed rate doctrine applies in the face of fraudulent conduct. There is no bar to damages for the period after respondents gained “small producer” status. See n. 5, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JONES, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, et al. v. NORTH CAROLINA PRISONERS’ LABOR UNION, INC. No. 75-1874. Argued April 19, 1977 Decided June 23, 1977 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGer, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 136. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 138. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p._ 139. Jacob L. Safron, Special Deputy Attorney General of North Carolina, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General. Norman B. Smith argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Deborah Mailman. Kenneth S. Getter argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Assistant Attorney General Thornburgh, and Jerome M. Feit. The Prisoners’ Union, Inc., filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. MR. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correction, appellants prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join appellee, the North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc. (Union), barred all meetings of the Union, and refused to deliver packets of Union publications that had been mailed in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. The Union instituted this action, based on 42 U. S. C. § 1983, to challenge these policies. It alleged that appellants’ efforts to prevent the operation of a prisoners’ union violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of it and its members and that the refusal to grant the Union those privileges accorded several other organizations operating within the prison system deprived the Union of equal protection of the laws. A three-judge court was convened. After a hearing, the court found merit in the Union’s free speech, association, and equal protection arguments, and enjoined appellants from preventing inmates from soliciting other prisoners to join the Union and from “refus[ing] receipt of the Union’s publications on the ground that they are calculated to encourage membership in the organization or solicit joining.” The court also held that the Union “shall be accorded the privilege of holding meetings under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate organizations . . . .” 409 F. Supp. 937. We noted probable jurisdiction to consider whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments extend prisoner labor unions such protection. 429 U. S. 976. We have decided that they do not, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of the District Court. I Appellee, an organization self-denominated as a Prisoners’ Labor Union, was incorporated in late 1974, with a stated goal of “the promotion of charitable labor union purposes” and the formation of a “prisoners’ labor union at every prison and jail in North Carolina to seek through collective bargaining . . . to improve . . . working . . . conditions. ...” It also proposed to work toward the alteration or elimination of practices and policies of the Department of Correction which it did not approve of, and to serve as a vehicle for the presentation and resolution of inmate grievances. By early 1975, the Union had attracted some 2,000 inmate “members” in 40 different prison units throughout North Carolina. The State of North Carolina, unhappy with these developments, set out to prevent inmates from forming or operating a “union.” While the State tolerated individual “membership,” or belief, in the Union, it sought to prohibit inmate solicitation of other inmates, meetings between members of the Union, and bulk mailings concerning the Union from outside sources. Pursuant to a regulation promulgated by the Department of Correction on March 26, 1975, such solicitation and group activity were proscribed. Suit was filed by the Union in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on March 18, 1975, approximately a week before the date upon which the regulation was to take effect. The Union claimed that its rights, and the rights of its members, to engage in protected free speech, association, and assembly activities were being infringed by the no-solicitation and no-meeting rules. It also alleged a deprivation of equal protection of the laws in that the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous were permitted to have meetings and other organizational rights, such as the distribution of bulk mailing material, that the Union was being denied. A declaratory judgment and injunction against continuation of these restrictive policies were sought, as were substantial damages. °A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284, while dismissing the Union’s prayers for damages and attorney’s fees, granted it substantial injunctive relief. The court found that appellants “permitted” inmates to join the Union, but “oppose{d] the solicitation of other inmates to join,” either by inmate-to-inmate solicitation or by correspondence. 409 F. Supp., at 941. The court noted, id., at 942: “[Appellants] sincerely believe that the very existence of the Union will increase the burdens of administration and constitute a threat of essential discipline and control. They are apprehensive that inmates may use the Union to establish a power bloc within the inmate population which could be utilized to cause work slowdowns or stoppages or other undesirable concerted-activity.” The District Court concluded, however, that there was “no consensus” among experts on these matters, and that it was “left with no firm conviction that an association of inmates is necessarily good or bad . . . .” Id., at 942-943. The court felt that since appellants countenanced the bare fact of Union membership, it had to allow solicitation activity, whether by inmates or by outsiders: “We are unable to perceive why it is necessary or essential to security and order in the prisons to forbid solicitation of membership in a union permitted by the authorities. This is not a case of riot. There is not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions.” Id., at 944. The other questions, respecting the bulk mailing by the Union of literature into the prisons for distribution and the question of meetings of inmate members, the District Court resolved against appellants “by application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.” Ibid. Finding that such meetings and bulk mailing privileges had been permitted the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and, in one institution, the Boy Scouts, the District Court concluded that appellants “may not pick and choose depending on [their] approval or disapproval of the message or purpose of the group” unless “the activity proscribed is shown to be detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful.” Ibid. The court concluded that appellants had failed to meet this burden. Appropriate injunctive relief was thereupon ordered. II A The District Court, we believe, got off on the wrong foot in this case by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement. While litigation by prison inmates concerning conditions of confinement, challenged other than under the Eighth Amendment, is of recent vintage, this Court has long recognized that "[1] awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 285 (1948); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 822 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 555 (1974). The fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration. We noted in Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822: “[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law.” Perhaps the most obvious of the First Amendment rights that are necessarily curtailed by confinement are those associational rights that the First Amendment protects outside of prison walls. The concept of incarceration itself entails a restriction on the freedom of inmates to associate with those outside of the penal institution. Equally as obvious, the inmate’s “status as a prisoner” and the operational realities of a prison dictate restrictions on the associational rights among inmates. Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators. We noted in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 405 (1974): “[CJourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities.” (Footnote omitted.) See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972). It is in this context that the claims of the Union must be examined. B State correctional officials uniformly testified that the concept of a prisoners’ labor union was itself fraught with potential dangers, whether or not such a union intended; illegally, to press for collective-bargaining recognition. Appellant Ralph Edwards, the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, stated in his affidavit: “The creation of an inmate union will naturally result in increasing the existing friction between inmates and prison personnel. It can also create friction between union inmates and non-union inmates.” Appellant David Jones, the Secretary of the Department of Correction, stated: “The existence of a union of inmates can create a divisive element within the inmate population. In a time when the units are already seriously over-crowded, such an element could aggravate already tense conditions. The purpose of the union may well be worthwhile projects. But it is evident that the inmate organizers could, if recognized as spokesman for all inmates, make themselves to be power figures among the inmates. If the union is successful, these inmates would be in a position to misuse their influence. After the inmate union has become established, there would probably be nothing this Department could do to terminate its existence, even if its activities became overtly subversive to the functioning of the Department. Work stoppages and mutinies are easily foreseeable. Riots and chaos would almost inevitably result. Thus, even if the purposes of the union are as stated, in the complaint, the potential for a dangerous situation exists, a situation which could not be brought under control.” The District Court did not reject these beliefs as fanciful or erroneous. It, instead, noted that they were held “sincerely,” and were arguably correct. 409 F. Supp., at 942-943. Without a showing that these beliefs were unreasonable, it was error for the District Court to conclude that appellants needed to show more. In particular, the burden was not on appellants to show affirmatively that the Union would be “detrimental to proper penological objectives” or would constitute a “present danger to security and order.” Id., at 944A945. Rather, “[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 827. The necessary and correct result of our deference to the informed discretion of prison administrators permits them, and not the courts, to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations in situations such as this. The District Court, however, gave particular emphasis to what it viewed as appellants’ tolerance of membership by inmates in the Union as undermining appellants’ position. It viewed a system which permitted inmate “membership” but prohibited inmate-to-inmate solicitation (as well, it should be noted, as meetings, or other group activities) as bordering “on the irrational,” and felt that “[t]he defendants’ own hypothesis in this case is that the existence of the Union and membership in it are not dangerous, for otherwise they would surely have undertaken to forbid membership.” 409 F. Supp., at 944. This, however, considerably overstates what appellants’ concession as to pure membership entails. Appellants permitted membership because of the reasonable assumption that each individual prisoner could believe what he chose to believe, and that outside individuals should be able to communicate ideas and beliefs to individual inmates. Since a member qua member incurs no dues or obligations — a prisoner apparently may become a member simply by considering himself a member — this position simply reflects the concept that thought control, by means of prohibiting beliefs, would not only be undesirable but impossible. But appellants never acquiesced in, or permitted, group activity of the Union in the nature of a functioning organization of the inmates within the prison, nor did the District Court find that they had. It is clearly not irrational to conclude that individuals may believe what they want, but that concerted group activity, or solicitation therefor, would pose additional and unwarranted problems and frictions in the operation of the State’s penal institutions. The ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings, therefore, was rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. C The invocation of the First Amendment, whether the asserted rights are speech or associational, does not change this analysis. In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights that are "inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 822. Prisons, it is obvious, differ in numerous respects from free society. They, to begin with, are populated, involuntarily, by people who have been found to have violated one or more of the criminal laws established by society for its orderly governance. In seeking a “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives [of prisons] and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 556, this Court has repeatedly recognized the need for major restrictions on a prisoner’s rights. See, e. g., id., at 561-562; Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 143 (1962). These restrictions have applied as well where First Amendment values were implicated. See, e. g., Pell v. Procunier, supra; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976). An examination of the potential restrictions on speech or association that have been imposed by the regulations under challenge, demonstrates that the restrictions imposed are reasonable, and are consistent with the inmates' status as prisoners and with the legitimate operational considerations of the institution. To begin with, First Amendment speech rights are barely implicated in this case. Mail rights are not themselves implicated; the only question respecting the mail is that of bulk mailings. The advantages of bulk mailings to inmates by the Union are those of cheaper rates and convenience. While the District Court relied on the cheaper bulk mailing rates in finding an equal protection violation, infra, at 133, it is clear that losing these cost advantages does not fundamentally implicate free speech values. Since other avenues of outside informational flow by the Union remain available, the prohibition on bulk mailing, reasonable in the absence of First Amendment considerations, remains reasonable. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, supra; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843 (1974). Nor does the prohibition on inmate-to-inmate solicitation of membership trench untowardly on the inmates’ First Amendment speech rights. Solicitation of membership itself involves a good deal more than the simple expression of individual views as to the advantages or disadvantages of a union or its views; it is an invitation to collectively engage in a legitimately prohibited activity. If the prison officials are otherwise entitled to control organized union activity within the prison walls, the prohibition on solicitation for such activity is not then made impermissible on account of First Amendment considerations, for such a prohibition is then not only reasonable but necessary. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 822. First Amendment associational rights, while perhaps more directly implicated by the regulatory prohibitions, likewise must give way to the reasonable considerations of penal management. As already noted, numerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the realities of confinement. They may be curtailed whenever the institution’s officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations, whether through group meetings or otherwise, possess the likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment. As we noted in Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 823, “central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.” Appellant prison officials concluded that the presence, perhaps even the objectives, of a prisoners’ labor union would be detrimental to order and security in the prisons, supra, at 127. It is enough to say that they have not been conclusively shown to be wrong in this view. The interest in preserving order and authority in the prisons is self-evident. Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S., at 561-562. Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to forestall such a threat, and they must be permitted to act before the time when they can compile a dossier on the eve of a riot. The case of a prisoners’ union, where the focus is on the presentation of grievances to, and encouragement of adversary relations with, institution officials surely would rank high on anyone’s list of potential trouble spots. If the appellants’ views as to the possible detrimental effects of the organizational activities of the Union are reasonable, as we conclude they are, then the regulations are drafted no more broadly than they need be to meet the perceived threat — which stems directly from group meetings and group organizational activities of the Union. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S., at 412-416. When weighed against the First Amendment rights asserted, these institutional reasons are sufficiently weighty to prevail. D The District Court rested on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down appellants’ prohibition against the receipt and distribution of bulk mail from the Union as well as the prohibition of Union meetings among the inmates. It felt that this was a denial of equal protection because bulk mailing and meeting rights had been extended to the Jaycees, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the Boy Scouts. The court felt that just as outside the prison, a “government may not pick and choose depending upon its approval or disapproval of the message or purpose of the group,” 409 F. Supp., at 944, so, too, appellants could not choose among groups without first demonstrating that the activity proscribed is “detrimental to proper penological objectives, subversive to good discipline, or otherwise harmful.” Ibid. This analysis is faulty for two reasons. The District Court erroneously treated this case as if the prison environment were essentially a “public forum.” We observed last Term in upholding a ban on political meetings at Fort Dix that a Government enclave such as a military base was not a public forum. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976). We stated, id., at 838 n. 10: “The fact that other civilian speakers and entertainers had sometimes been invited to appear at Fort Dix did not of itself serve to convert Fort Dix into a public forum or to confer upon political candidates a First or Fifth Amendment right to conduct their campaigns there. The decision of the military authorities that a civilian lecture on drug abuse, a religious service by a visiting preacher at the base chapel, or a rock musical concert would be supportive of the military mission of Fort Dix surely did not leave the authorities powerless thereafter to prevent any civilian from entering Fort Dix to speak on any subject whatever.” A prison may be no more easily converted into a public forum than a military base. Thus appellants need only demonstrate a rational basis for their distinctions between organizational groups. Cf. City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, 426 U. S. 283 (1976). Here, appellants’ affidavits indicate exactly why Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jaycees have been allowed to operate within the prison. Both were seen as serving a rehabilitative purpose, working in harmony with the goals and desires of the prison administrators, and both had been determined not to pose any threat to the order or security of the institution. The affidavits indicate that the administrators’ view of the Union differed critically in both these respects. Those conclusions are not unreasonable. Prison administrators may surely conclude that the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous differ in fundamental respects from appellee Union, a group with no past to speak of, and with the avowed intent to pursue an adversary relationship with the prison officials. Indeed, it would be enough to distinguish the Union from Alcoholics Anonymous to note that the chartered purpose of the Union, apparently pursued in the prison, was illegal under North Carolina law. Since a prison is most emphatically not a “public forum,” these reasonable beliefs of appellants are sufficient, cf. Greer v. Spock, supra; City of Charlotte v. Firefighters, supra. The District Court’s further requirement of a demonstrable showing that the Union was in fact harmful is inconsistent with the deference federal courts should pay to the informed discretion of prison officials. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S., at 405. It is precisely in matters such as this, the decision as to which of many groups should be allowed to operate within the prison walls, where, confronted with claims based on the Equal Protection Clause, the courts should allow the prison administrators the full latitude of discretion, unless it can be firmly stated that the two groups are sp similar that discretion has been abused. That is surely not the case here. There is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups alike where differentiation is necessary to avoid an imminent threat of institutional disruption or violence. The regulations of appellants challenged in the District Court offended neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment of that court holding to the contrary is Reversed. These are the corporation purposes listed in the Articles of Incorporation issued by the Secretary of State of North Carolina. Collective bargaining for inmates with respect to pay, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of incarceration is illegal under N. C. Gen. Stat. §95-98 (1975). Other allegations were contained in the complaint, respecting the opening of outgoing prison mail and the interference with visitation rights of certain paralegals. These specific allegations are not before us, and we will not deal with them further. Appellants were enjoined as follows: “(1) Inmates and all other persons shall be permitted to solicit and invite other inmates to join the plaintiff Union orally or by written or printed communication; provided, however, that access to inmates by outsiders solely for the purpose of soliciting membership may be denied except that inmate members of the Union may become entitled to be visited by free persons who are engaged with them in legitimate Union projects to the same extent that other members of free society are admitted for like purposes. “(2) Free persons otherwise entitled to visitation with inmates, be they attorneys, paralegals, friends, relatives, etc. shall not be denied access to such visitation by reason of their association or affiliation with the Union. “(3) The Union shall be accorded the privilege of bulk mailing to the extent that such a privilege is accorded other organizations. “(4) The Union and its inmate members shall be accorded the privilege of holding meetings under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate organizations, and to the extent that other meetings of prisoners are permitted.” The District Court observed that “it is clear beyond argument that no association of prisoners may operate as a true labor union . . . .” It concluded that “it [is] of no legal significance that the charter purports, to authorize more than can lawfully be accomplished.” 409 F. Supp. 937, 940 n. 1. But, whether or not illegal activity was actually actively pursued by the Union, it is clear that its announced purpose to engage in collective bargaining is a factor which prison officials may legitimately consider in determining whether the Union is likely to be a disruptive influence, or otherwise detrimental to the effective administration of the North Carolina prison system. The District Court did hold that there was “not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions.” Id., at 944. This historical finding, however, does not state that appellants’ fears as to future disruptions are groundless; there, the court indicated the opposite: “On conflicting expert opinion evidence we are left with no firm conviction that an association of inmates is necessarily good or bad .. . .” Id., at 943. The State has not hampered the ability of prison inmates to communicate their grievances to correctional officials. In banning Union solicitation or organization, appellants have merely affected one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials. There exists an inmate grievance procedure through which correctional officials are informed about complaints concerning prison conditions, and through which remedial action may be secured. See Affidavit of Director Edwards, App. 127. With this presumably effective path available for the transmission of grievances, the fact that the Union’s grievance procedures might be more “desirable” does not convert the prohibitory regulations into unconstitutional acts. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 847 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The complaint alleged only that the bulk mail prohibition denied the Union equal protection of the laws: “The refusal by Defendants to allow the Prisoners’ Union Newsletter to arrive in bundles for distribution, while allowing the Jaycee Newsletter to arrive in the same manner violates Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.” The District Court, likewise, dealt with the bulk mail question only in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 409 F. Supp., at 944. The ban on bulk mailing by the Union does not extend to individual mailings to individual inmates. In his affidavit, Director Edwards stated: “They are permitted to receive publications sent to them directly, but they are prohibited from receiving packets of material from unions or any other source for redistribution. This is in accordance with the Department’s policy requiring publication [s] mailed to inmates to be sent directly from the publisher. A serious security problem would result if inmates could receive packets of material and then redistribute them as they see fit. It would be impossible for the Department to inspect every magazine, every book, etc., to insure that no contraband had been placed inside the publication. The exception in regard to Jaycees is based on the recognized fact that the Jaycees are substantial citizens from the free community who are most unlikely to attempt to smuggle contraband into the union or disseminate propaganda subversive of the legitimate purposes of the prison system.” App. 129. See also N. C. Department of Correction Guidebook, Commissioner’s Administrative Directives — Publications Received by Inmates, App. 138-139. As the State has disavowed any intention of interfering with correspondence between outsiders and individual inmates in which Union matters are discussed, we do not have to discuss questions of the First Amendment right of inmates, or outsiders, see Procunier v. Martinez, supra, at 408-409, in the context of a total prohibition on the communication of information about the Union. The District Court apparently thought that solicitation by means of correspondence is prohibited, even if the general discussion of Union affairs is not, 409 F. Supp., at 941. The Union does not press this point here, and it is not alleged in its complaint, but, clearly, if the appellants are permitted to prohibit solicitation activities, they may prohibit solicitation activities by means which use the mails. The informed discretion of prison officials that there is potential danger may be sufficient for limiting rights even though this showing might be “unimpressive if . . . submitted as justification for governmental restriction of personal communication among members of the general public.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 825 (1974). Director Edwards listed the objectives for which the Jaycees had been allowed within the North Carolina prison system, namely the “productive association [of inmates] with stable community representatives and the accomplishment of service projects to the community . . . .” When these objectives cease, “the functions of the organization and its opportunities to assemble as an organization would also cease.” Affidavit of Director Edwards, App. 125. With respect to Alcoholics Anonymous, he stated, id., at 126: “The objectives of the Alcoholics Anonymous Program are to provide therapeutic support, insight, and an opportunity for productive sharing of experiences among those who have encountered the deteriorative effects of alcoholism. Alcoholics Anonymous is structured on a peer pressure basis which begins while the individual client is confined and is intended to have carry over effects into Alcoholic Anonymous groups in the free community.” With respect to Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jaycees, Director Edwards stated, ibid.: “The goals and the objectives of [both] the Alcoholics Anonymous and the Jayeee Program were presented to correctional staff as meaningful courses of action with positive goals relative to the productive restoration of offenders to active, lawful participation in the community. The goals of both organizations [were] scrutinized, evaluated, and approved. Operational guidelines have been drawn up in each instance following approval to certify that the primary objective of the correctional system — to maintain order and security — would not be abridged by the operation of these programs within the confines of prison units.” Opposed to these articulated reasons for allowing these groups is his statement with respect to the Union, ibid.: “The Division of Prisons was unable to validate a substantive rehabilitation purpose or associative purpose in the design of the organization. To accept the organizational objectives of a prisoner’s union would be to approve an organization whose design and purpose would compromise the order and security of the correctional system.” See also supra, at 127. See n. 1, supra. It was acknowledged at oral argument that the Union newsletter has since reiterated the Union’s goal, as stated in the charter, and that the newsletter has contained authorization cards whereby the inmate could “authorize the agents or representatives of said Union to represent me and to act as a collective bargaining agent in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, hours of employment and all other terms and conditions of incarceration.” Record 25. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, 34r-35.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. TEXACO INC. et al. No. 72-1490. Argued February 19, 1974 Decided June 10, 1974 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stewart, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Mark L. Evans argued the cause for petitioner in No. 72-1490. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Leo E. Forquer, and George W. McHenry, Jr. Ben F. Vaughan III argued the cause for petitioners in No. 72-1491. With him on the briefs was William Terry Bray. Christopher T. Boland and Peter H. Schiff argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With Mr. Boland on the brief for respondent Interstate Natural Gas Association of America were Jerome J. McGrath and Robert G. Hardy. With Mr. Schiff on the brief for respondent Public Service Commission of the State of New York was Richard A. Solomon. Kirk W. Weinert and C. Fielding Early, Jr., filed a brief for respondent Texaco Inc. Kenneth Heady, John L. Williford, Charles E. McGee, John T. Ketcham, and Robert J. Haggerty filed a brief for respondent Phillips Petroleum Co. Melvin Richter and L. F. Cadenhead filed a brief for respondent Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., a Division of Tenneco Inc. Edward H. Forgotson filed a brief for respondent Forgotson. Together with No. 72-1491, Dougherty, Executor, et al. v. Texaco Inc. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed by L. Dan Jones for the Independent Petroleum Association of America, and by J. Evans Atwell and Lynn R. Coleman for the Small Producers Group. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This litigation involves the validity of Order No. 428 of the Federal Power Commission, 45 F. P. C. 454 (1971), which provides a blanket certificate‘procedure for small producers of natural gas, and relieves them of almost all filing requirements. The rates of small producers would no longer be directly regulated but would be subjected to indirect regulation through the review of purchased gas costs of the pipelines and large producers to whom these small producers sell. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, set aside the order, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 168, 474 F. 2d 416 (1972), concluding that the Commission’s order amounted to "deregulation” of small producers and was unauthorized by the Natural Gas Act (the Act), 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seg. Because the validity of the order is of obvious importance, we granted the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Commission in No. 72-1490 and by the estate of Mrs. James R. Dougherty, an intervenor in the Court of Appeals, in No. 72-1491. 414 U. S. 817 (1973). I On July 23, 1970, the Federal Power Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking “proposing] prospectively to exempt from regulation under the Natural Gas Act all existing and all future jurisdictional sales made by small producers . . . .” 35 Fed. Reg. 12,220 (1970). Following the filing of comments and informal conferences, the Commission, noting that one of its important responsibilities was "to assure maintenance of an adequate gas supply for the interstate market,” issued Order No. 428, aimed at encouraging “small producers to increase their exploratory efforts which are so important to the discovery of new sources of gas ... to facilitate the entry of the small producer into the interstate market and to stimulate competition among producers to sell gas in interstate commerce.” The small producer was to be assured that “when he enters into a new contract for the interstate sale of gas, the provisions of his contract will not be subject to change. We also want to relieve the small producer of the expenses and burdens relating to regulatory matters.” 45 F. P. C., at 455. Accordingly, the order provided for a nationwide blanket certificate for small producers and relieved them, with some exceptions, from all filing requirements under the Act. Unlike large producers, subject to Commission-fixed ceilings on rates charged, the small producers could sell gas at the price the market would bear, even though in excess of maximum rates set for producers in pertinent area rate proceedings. Furthermore, they would have “no refund obligations with respect to increased rates, if any, collected for sales regulated hereunder to pipelines . . . .” Id., at 457. The order nevertheless asserted that the “action taken here in our view does not constitute deregulation of sales by small producers,” id., at 455, and that the Commission would continue to regulate such sales in the course of regulating the rates of pipelines and large producers to whom the small producers sell their gas. Pipelines purchasing from small producers at prices in excess of existing ceilings were to be permitted to file “tracking increases” in their rates, but those rates would be subject to refund “with respect to new small producer sales, but only as to that part of the rate which is unreasonably high considering appropriate comparisons with highest contract prices for sales by large producers or the prevailing market price for intrastate sales in the same producing area.” Id., at 457. The issue would be resolved either in pipeline rate cases, a proceeding limited to the tracking increase, or in certificate cases. “The Commission shall consider all relevant factors.” Id., at 458. Review of tracking increases by pipelines was not anticipated as to existing contracts with small producers; the order authorized small producers to increase their rates under these contracts, terms permitting. Large producers buying from small producers would be permitted tracking increases to the extent authorized by their contracts and without refund obligation “as long as the price differential is consistent with prevailing price differentials in the area and as long as the small producer prices for new gas are not unreasonably high, considering appropriate comparisons with highest contract prices by large producers or the prevailing market price for intrastate sales in the same producing area.” Id., at 456. To the extent that they reflected small-producer prices in excess of that standard, large-producer tracking increases would be subject to refund. The Commission finally asserted that “[w]e intend to review the prices established in new contracts or contract amendments relating to sales by small producers to assure the reasonableness of the rates charged by such producers pursuant to the action we are taking herein. In the event we determine that this approach is inimical to the interests of consumers, we shall take further action to protect the consumers.” Id., at 459. The Commission apparently remained free to institute separate proceedings under § 5 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a), to reduce the producer’s rates prospectively. The Commission also made clear that small producers remain subject to the requirements of § 7 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (b), with respect to the abandonment of jurisdictional sales, including those sales dealt with in the order. The order also limited the use of indefinite price escalation clauses in small-producer contracts and excluded from the reach of the order small-producer sales made from reserves transferred by large producers. The Court of Appeals set aside the Commission order, holding that under the statute all natural gas sold in interstate commerce must carry just and reasonable rates and that even if indirect regulation was permissible under the statute, Order No. 428 was infirm because nothing in it satisfied the Commission's “duty to insure that all rates are 'just and reasonable.''' 154 U. S. App. D. C., at 173, 474 F. 2d, at 421. Instead, the order was thought merely to call for rates that were not unreasonably high as compared with the highest contract prices for large-producer sales or the prevailing market price in the intrastate market — “factors which [the Commission] does not regulate or which derive solely from market forces.'' Ibid. Nor could the court accept the possible argument that market forces themselves would produce just and reasonable rates, particularly when it understood the Commission itself to take the position that the just- and-reasonable standard was in no event mandatory. The Court of Appeals accordingly set aside the Commission's order. II The Commission does not contend in this Court that the Act permits it to exempt small-producer rates from regulation or to regulate those rates by any criterion less demanding than the just-and-reasonable standard mandated by §§ 4 and 5 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c and 717d. Its major propositions are, first, that Order No. 428, when properly understood, provides for just and reasonable rates but through the means of indirect, rather than direct, regulation; and, second, that the Act does not forbid this kind of indirect regulation. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the duty imposed by the Act to provide just and reasonable rates cannot be satisfied by indirect regulation and that Order No. 428 in any event abandons the just-and-reasonable standard with respect to small-producer rates. We face first the issue as to the validity of indirect regulation of small-producer rates: on the assumption that Order No. 428 allows pipelines and large producers to reflect in their rates only just and reasonable charges for gas purchased from small producers, is the order valid? We hold that it is, for we see nothing in the Act which requires the Commission to fix the rates chargeable by small producers by orders directly addressed to them or which proscribes the kind of indirect regulation undertaken here. The Act directs that all producer rates be just and reasonable but it does not specify the means by which that regulatory prescription is to be attained. That every rate of every natural gas company must be just and reasonable does not require that the cost of each company be ascertained and its rates fixed with respect to its own costs. Although for a time following Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672 (1964), the Commission proceeded to regulate rates company by company, there was soon a shift to the technique of setting area rates based on composite cost considerations. We sustained this mode of rate regulation. In Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U. S. 294, 309 (1963), the Court affirmed the Commission's decision to abandon the individual cost-of-service method of fixing rates and to substitute area ratemaking. The Court said: “To declare that a particular method of rate regulation is so sanctified as to make it highly unlikely that any other method could be sustained would be wholly out of keeping with this Court's consistent and clearly articulated approach to the question of the Commission's power to regulate rates. It has repeatedly been stated that no single method need be followed by the Commission in considering the justness and reasonableness of rates . . . This was wholly consistent with the Court’s prior views, see FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581 (1945), and reaffirmed the principle which had been clearly stated in the Hope ease: “Under the statutory standard of 'just and reasonable’ it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling." 320 U. S., at 602. The principles of these prior cases were recognized and applied in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968), where we sustained a two-tier system of rates for natural gas producers. In the course of doing so, we recognized that encouraging the exploration for and development of new sources of natural gas was one of the aims of the Act and one of the functions of the Commission. The performance of this role obviously involved the rate structure and implied a broad discretion for the Commission. The Court summarized the principles controlling the judicial review of Commission orders in terms very pertinent here: “The Act was intended to create, through the exercise of the national power over interstate commerce, 'an agency for regulating the wholesale distribution to public service companies of natural gas moving interstate’; Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 506; it was for this purpose expected to ‘balanc[e] ... the investor and the consumer interests.’ FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. [320 U. S.], at 603. This Court has repeatedly held that the width of administrative authority must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred; see, e. g., Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. Comm’n, 286 U. S. 299; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 193-194; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190; American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311. Surely the Commission’s broad responsibilities therefore demand a generous construction of its statutory authority. [Footnote omitted.] “Such a construction is consistent with the view of administrative rate making uniformly taken by this Court. The Court has said that the 'legislative discretion implied in the rate making power necessarily extends to the entire legislative process, embracing the method used in reaching the legislative determination as well as that determination itself.’ Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 289 U. S. 287, 304. And see San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 446. It follows that rate-making agencies are not bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted, unless their statutory authority otherwise plainly indicates, 'to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.’ FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. [316 U. S.], at 586.’’ 390 U. S., at 776-777. It followed that Commission action taken in the pursuit of a legitimate statutory goal enjoyed the presumption of validity, id., at 767, and that he who would upset the rate order under the Act carries “ 'the heavy burden of making a convincing shewing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.’ ” Ibid. Accepting these views of our role as a court sitting in review, we cannot at this point say that the Commission has exceeded its powers by instituting a regime of indirect regulation of small-producer rates. Surely it is not fatal to Order No. 428 that it does not, as an initial matter, consider the costs of each company and the reasonableness of its rates. Nor is the order vulnerable because there will be one level of just and reasonable rates for small producers and another for large producers. As previously noted, the Court approved two sets of just and reasonable rates in the Permian Basin cases, the justification being the necessity to stimulate exploration for and the development of new supplies of natural gas. Id., at 796-797. Indirect regulation through the mechanism of controlling large-producer costs will not merely recreate the situation which the Court in the Phillips case found to be inconsistent with the Natural Gas Act. In the pre-Phillips era, although asserting the right to pass on the prudentiality of various items of the pipelines’ costs, the Commission did not purport to regulate the rates of producers with the aim of keeping them within just and reasonable limits, as the Commission now asserts it is doing under Order No. 428. It is argued that permitting the small producers initially to charge what the market will bear and relying on later regulation of pipeline rates to protect the consumer is contrary to Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 360 U. S. 378 (1959) (CATCO). But pipelines and large producers must file with the Commission their new contracts with the small producers, and their rates will be subject to suspension and refund within the limits set out in Order No. 428. As the Court noted in FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U. S. 9, 26 (1968), the basic assumption which must have underlain the Court’s CATCO decision was “that the purchasing pipeline, whose cost of purchase is a current operating expense which the pipeline is entitled to pass on to its customers as part of its rates, lacks sufficient incentive to bargain prices down.” Here, on the other hand, the incentive is provided — pipeline rates are subject to refund to the extent that the purchased gas cost component of their rates is excessive. This leads to the contention of the pipelines and the large producers that the scheme of indirect regulation envisioned by Order No. 428 unfairly subjects them to the risk of later determination that their gas costs are unjust and unreasonable and to the obligation to make refunds which they cannot in turn recover from the small producers whose rates have been found too high. But those whose rates are regulated characteristically bear the burden and the risk of justifying their rates and their costs. Rate regulation unavoidably limits profits as well as income. “The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 601. All that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory level. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S., at 585. In the context of the Act’s rate regulation, whether any rate is confiscatory, or for that matter “just and reasonable,” can only be judged by “the result reached, not the method employed.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S., at 769, we stated a truism of rate regulation: “Regulation may, consistently with the Constitution limit stringently the return recovered on investment, for investors’ interests provide only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness.” Here, requiring pipelines and the large producers to assume the risk in bargaining for reasonable prices from small producers is within the Commission’s discretion in working out the balance of the interests necessarily involved. The consumer would be protected from current excessive rates, but at the expense of the pipeline, rather than the producer, who is engaged in necessary exploratory activity, thus serving the public interest in getting greater gas production but at just and reasonable rates. Under such circumstances, it is surely not an abuse of the discretion the Commission retains under § 4 (e) of the Act, see Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra, at 826-827, to refrain from imposing a refund obligation on the small producers. Any broadside assertion that indirect regulation will be confiscatory is premature. The consequences of indirect regulation can only be viewed in the entirety of the rate of return allowed on investment, and this effect will be unknown until the Commission has applied its scheme in individual cases over a period of time. Moreover, the “regulation of producer prices is avowedly still experimental,” id., at 772, and Order No. 428 asserts the Commission’s intention to keep the experiment under close review. The Commission claims and is entitled to no license to be arbitrary or capricious in disallowing purchased gas costs of large producers and pipelines. The Commission may not exceed its authority under the Act; its orders are subject to judicial review; and reviewing courts must determine whether Commission orders, issued pursuant to indirect regulation, are supported by substantial evidence and whether it is rational to expect them “to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risk they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable.” Id., at 792. If, in the course of the necessary bargaining with small producers, the large producers and the pipelines are given no guidance whatsoever as to what the standards of the Commission may be, the risk of incurring unrefundable expenses that may later be disallowed is considerably enhanced. The scope of this possible difficulty is measured by the standards, or lack of them, by which the Commission will review the purchased gas costs of the large producers and the pipelines. As Order No. 428 reveals, the Commission is surely aware of the problem, and we would expect additional attention to be given this question in the course of the remand proceedings which, as explained in Part III, we think are necessary here. Ill We turn now to whether Order No. 428 is invalid for failure to comply with the Act's requirement that the sale price for gas sold in interstate commerce be just and reasonable. The Court of Appeals rejected what it apparently understood was “the Commission’s basic contention all along . . . that the 'just and reasonable’ standard was not mandatory and that the FPC can simply choose not to regulate rates.” 154 U. S. App. D. C., at 175, 474 F. 2d, at 422. Whatever the position of the Commission heretofore has been, it wisely does not challenge that aspect of the Court of Appeals judgment. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act require that all gas rates be just and reasonable; and the Court held in Phillips that this very prescription applies to the rates of all gas producers. The Commission may have great discretion as to how to insure just and reasonable rates, but it is plain enough to us that the Act does not empower it to exempt small-producer rates from compliance with that standard. Section 16, 15 U. S. C. § 717o, upon which the Commission relies, is not to the contrary. It authorizes the Commission to perform any and all acts and to issue any and all rules and regulations “as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act”; and “[f]or the purposes of its rules and regulations, the Commission may classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or matters.” But § 16 obviously does not vest authority in the Commission to set unjust and unreasonable rates, even for small producers. It does not authorize the Commission to set at naught an explicit provision of the Act. No producer is exempt from §§ 4 and 5. Neither the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases nor FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621 (1972), on which the Government relies, suggests or holds that § 16 permits the Commission to ignore the specific mandates of those sections. The Court of Appeals also read Order No. 428 as failing to provide a mechanism for insuring that small-producer rates will be just and reasonable. In its view, the order provided a pure market standard for the approval of the purchased gas costs of large producers and pipelines, a standard which fell short of the requirements of the Act. Accordingly, it set aside the order. The Commission does not assert here that it is free under the Act to equate just and reasonable rates with the prices for gas prevailing in the market place. Its major remaining contention is that the Court of Appeals misread Order No. 428 and that the order, properly understood, contemplates a scheme of indirect regulation that would assure just and reasonable small-producer rates for natural gas and that would judge small-producer rates not only by market factors but by all the relevant considerations necessary to arrive at the considered judgment contemplated by the Act. For present purposes, then, the Commission accepts the Court of Appeals’ construction of the Act; but insists that the order is consistent with the statute as so construed. In this posture of the case, we think it clear that Order No. 428 cannot stand in its present form and that the cases should be remanded for further proceedings before the Commission. We have studied the order with care, and we cannot accept the construction of it that the Commission now presses upon us. At the very least, the order is so ambiguous that it falls short of that standard of clarity that administrative orders must exhibit. The Commission was bound to exercise its discretion within the limits of the standards expressed by the Act; and “for the courts to determine whether the agency has done so, it must ‘disclose the basis of its order' and ‘give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.’ ” Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 167-168 (1962), quoting in part from Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 197 (1941). We shall indicate briefly our basis for this conclusion. In the first place, Order No. 428 does not expressly mention the just-and-reasonable standard. It comes no closer than to subject pipeline rates to reduction and refund “only as to that part of the rate which is unreasonably high considering appropriate comparisons with highest contract prices for sales by large producers or the prevailing market price for intrastate sales . . . .” 45 F. P. C., at 457. (Emphasis added.) The order took a very similar approach to the tracking increases by large producers. Moreover, under the order, contractually authorized increases in rates for flowing gas under existing contracts could be automatically passed through by the pipelines and would not be subject to examination under the standard proposed by the order with respect to new sales by small producers. There was no finding that these contemplated increased rates for flowing gas would be just and reasonable. The Commission merely asserts in its brief here that it was familiar with the existing contracts and must have considered the rates reserved to be acceptable under the Act. It is true that pipeline and large-producer costs for new small-producer gas were not to be “unreasonable” but the implication appears to be that reasonableness would be judged by the standard of the marketplace. It is also true that the Commission asserted that it was not deregulating small-producer rates, that the Commission “shall consider all relevant factors” in determining whether proposed rates were consistent with the “public convenience and necessity,” and that the Commission intended to review new contract prices charged by small producers “to assure . . . the reasonableness of the rates charged by such producers pursuant to the action we are taking herein.” But these generalities do not supply the requisite clarity to the order or convince us that it should be sustained. Had the order unambiguously provided what the Commission now asserts it was intended to provide, we would have a far different case to decide. But as it is, we cannot “accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action”; for an agency's order must be upheld, if at all, “on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.” Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U. S., at 168-169; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). IV For the purposes of the proceedings that may occur on remand, we should also stress that in our view the prevailing price in the marketplace cannot be the final measure of “just and reasonable” rates mandatéd by the Act. It is abundantly clear from the history of the Act and from the events that prompted its adoption that Congress considered that the natural gas industry was heavily concentrated and that monopolistic forces were distorting the market price for natural gas. Hence, the necessity for regulation and hence the statement in Sunray DX, 391 U. S., at 25, that if contract prices for gas were set at the market price, this “would necessarily be based on a belief that the current contract prices in an area approximate closely the ‘true’ market price — the just and reasonable rate. Although there is doubtless some relationship, and some economists have urged' that it is intimate, such a belief would contradict the basic assumption that has caused natural gas production to be subjected to regulation . . . (Footnote omitted.) In subjecting producers to regulation because of anti-competitive conditions in the industry, Congress could not have assumed that "just and reasonable” rates could conclusively be determined by reference to market price. Our holding in Phillips implies just the opposite. This does not mean that the market price of gas would never, in an individual case, coincide with just and reasonable rates or not be a relevant consideration in the setting of area rates, see Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S., at 793-795; it may certainly be taken into account along with other factors, Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F. 2d 407, 441 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Associated Gas Distributors v. Austral Oil Co., 400 U. S. 950 (1970). It does require, however, the conclusion that Congress rejected the identity between the “true” and the “actual” market price. The Court is not unresponsive to the special needs of small producers who play a critical role in exploratory efforts in the natural gas industry and ameliorating the supply shortage. The requirements of the Act, however, do not distinguish between small and large producers with respect to just and reasonable rates. Even if the effect of increased small-producer prices would make a small dent in the consumer’s pocket, when compared with the rates charged by the large producers, the Act makes unlawful all rates which are not just and reasonable, and does not say a little unlawfulness is permitted. Moreover, there is no finding in the Commission’s order as to the actual impact the projected market price increases would have on consumer expenditures for gas, and the Commission is previously on record in its Permian decision, as stating: “[T]he impact of small producer prices on consumers is by no means de minimis on an area basis, and is of great impact in some situations.” 34 F. P. C. 159, 235 (1965). V In concluding that the Commission lacks the authority to place exclusive reliance on market prices, we bow to our perception of legislative intent. It may be, as some economists have persuasively argued, that the assumptions of the 1930’s about the competitive structure of the natural gas industry, if true then, are no longer true today. It may also be that control of prices in this industry, in a time of shortage, if such there be, is counterproductive to the interests of the consumer in increasing the production of natural gas. It is not the Court’s role, however, to overturn congressional assumptions embedded into the framework of regulation established by the Act. This is a proper task for the Legislature where the public interest may be considered from the multifaceted points of view of the representational process. Attempts haye been made in the past to exempt producers from the coverage of the Act, but these attempts have been unsuccessful. The Court realized as much in the Phillips case. 347 U. S., at 685, and n. 14. In 1950, Congress had passed a bill, H. R. 1758, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., to exempt gas producers from the Act, but President Truman vetoed the bill stating that “there is a clear possibility that competition will not be effective, at least in some cases, in holding prices to reasonable levels. Accordingly, to remove the authority to regulate, as this bill would do, does not seem to me to be wise public policy.” The President made this judgment despite the arguments that imposition of price control would discourage exploration and development of new wells. Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 257 (1965). For the Court to step outside its role in construing this statute, and insert itself into the debate on economics and the public interest, would be an unwarranted intrusion into the legislative forum where the debate again rages on the question of deregulation of natural gas producers. We do, however, make clear that under the present Act the Commission is free to engage in indirect regulation of small producers by reviewing pipeline costs of purchased gas, providing that it insures that the rates paid by pipelines, and ultimately borne by the consumer, are just and reasonable. It may be, as some of the respondents suggest, that ensuring just and reasonable rates by means of indirect regulation will not be administratively feasible, but this is a matter for the Commission to consider. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the order of the Commission must be set aside; but for reasons previously stated, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases to that court with instructions to remand the cases to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Vacated and remanded. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. A “small producer” was defined as an independent producer, not affiliated with a natural gas pipeline company, whose total jurisdictional sales on a nationwide basis, together with sales of affiliated producers, did not exceed 10,000,000 Mcf at 14.65 psia during any calendar year. New small-producer sales included any sale made pursuant to a contract dated after March 18,1971. The Commission found that small producers produce about 10% of the gas purchased by pipelines, excluding all pipeline-to-pipeline sales. It appears, however, that they also account for 80% of the natural gas exploration in this country. Subsequently, the Commission issued two supplemental orders, Order No. 428-A, 45 F. P. C. 548, revising the annual statement requirements for small producers and Order No. 428-B, 46 F. P. C. 47, which denied applications for rehearing and modified Order No. 428 in respects that need not be mentioned here. The large producers also contend that they are put at a disadvantage by the Commission’s order because their contracts may not permit them to pass on the increased costs of gas purchased from small producers, whereas the pipelines will be in a position to do so. This is, however, a function of the producers’ contracts, and the Commission has no authority, absent a finding that the existing contract rate “is so low as to have an adverse effect on the public interest,” to permit large producers or pipelines to raise their rates in excess of the maximum authorized in their contracts, FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 355 (1956); United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 U. S. 332 (1956). We think other claims of the large producers, as to unfair treatment or discrimination, are equally ill-founded. The New York Public Service Commission also questions whether it is administratively feasible for the FPC, on review of individual pipelines’ costs, to make sure rates are just and reasonable, claiming that this would be a return with a vengeance to the administrative morass which led to the adoption of area rates for producers in the first instance. This claim is also premature in light of possible regulatory approaches the FPC may take on remand. The Commission’s position is not advanced by FPC v. Hunt, 376 U. S. 515, 527 (1964). The Court in that case merely questioned whether exemption might prove, after study, to be an available alternative. The Commission, in its brief, has indicated that the standard will not be limited to comparisons with appropriate market prices, but will include (1) producer’s costs, (2) the pipeline’s need for gas, (3) the availability of other gas supplies, (4) the amount of gas dedicated under the contract, and (5) the rates of other recent small-producer sales previously approved for flowthrough. fAs appears from § 1 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §717 (a), the legislation stemmed from the 1935 Report of the Federal Trade Commission. S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 84r-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (published 1936). That report concluded that there was heavy concentration both in the production and distribution of natural gas. “The 4 largest producer groups account for about 72 percent of the output of natural gas produced by 32 holding company groups in 1930.” Id., at 589. The heavy concentration of pipeline ownership “accentuates whatever control the pipeline interests have of the available gas supply.” Id., at 590. The Commission concluded, on the basis of its detailed investigation of the industry, that “[t]he prime characteristic of the situation described is that of a steadily developing concert of interests dominating the producing, transporting, and distributing branches of the industry.” Id., at 600. The heart of the problem was at the pipeline end, since the concentration of ownership there allowed the concert of interests “to determine the amount of natural gas which may be marketed by fixing the amount which may be transported. That in turn gives it power to say how much shall be produced.” Ibid. Based upon these findings, the Commission singled out as “Specific Evils Existing in the Natural-Gas Industry” both the “ [u] nregulated monopolistic control of certain natural-gas production areas” and the "[u] nregulated control of pipeline transmission and of wholesale distribution.” Id., at 615. It concluded that regulation, at least of pipelines, see id., at 616, was required. See C. Hawkins, Structure of the Natural Gas Producing Industry, and P. MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, in Regulation of the Natural Gas Producing Industry 137-191 (K. Brown ed. 1972). See also Statement of John N. Nassikas, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, Hearing on the Natural Gas Industry before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 43-72 (1973).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FIDELITY-PHILADELPHIA TRUST CO. et al., EXECUTORS, v. SMITH, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 130. Argued January 30, 1958. Decided April 28, 1958. Robert T. McCracken argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was John B. Leake. Myron C. Baum argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice and Harry Baum. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before the Court is whether the proceeds of certain insurance policies on the life of the decedent, payable to named beneficiaries and irrevocably assigned by the insured, should be included in the estate of the decedent for the purposes of the federal estate tax. The facts are not in dispute. In 1934 decedent, then aged 76, purchased a series of annuity-life insurance policy combinations. Three single-premium life insurance policies, at face values of $200,000, $100,000, and $50,000, respectively, were obtained without the requirement of a medical examination. As a condition to selling decedent each life insurance policy, the companies involved required decedent also to purchase a separate, single-premium, nonrefundable life annuity policy. The premiums for each life insurance policy and for each annuity policy were fixed at regular rates. The size of each annuity, however, was calculated so that in the event the annuitant-insured died prematurely the annuity premium, less the amount allocated to annuity payments already made, would combine with the companion life insurance premium, plus interest, to equal the amount of insurance proceeds to be paid. Each annuity policy could have been purchased without the insurance policy for the same premium charged for it under the annuity-life insurance combination. The decedent’s children were primary beneficiaries of the insurance policies; the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company, as trustee of a trust established by decedent, was named beneficiary of the interests of any of decedent’s children who predeceased her. In the year of purchase, decedent assigned all rights and benefits under two of the life insurance policies to her children and under the other to the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company as trustee. These rights and benefits included the rights to receive dividends, to change the beneficiaries, to surrender the policies, and to assign them. Dividends were received, but, as far as the record discloses, none of the other rights was exercised. A gift tax on these transfers was paid by the decedent in 1935. In 1938 decedent amended the above-mentioned trust so that it became irrevocable. As the Government concedes, the decedent retained no beneficial or reversionary interest in the trust. The insured died in 1946. The proceeds of the three insurance policies were not included in her estate in the estate tax return. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that these proceeds should have been included and assessed a deficiency accordingly. The adjusted tax was paid by the executors, and when claim for refund was denied, this action for refund followed. The District Court entered judgment for the taxpayers, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 241 F. 2d 690. We granted certiorari. 354 U. S. 921. It is conceded by the parties that the question of whether the proceeds should be included in the estate is not determinable by the federal estate tax provision dealing with life insurance proceeds. Cf. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U. S. 531. To support the decision below, the Government argues that the proceeds are includible in the estate under Section 811 (c) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which includes, in the estate of the decedent, property, to the extent of the decedent’s interest therein, which the decedent had transferred without adequate and full consideration, under which transfer the decedent “has retained for his life ... (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the property . . . .” The Government contends that the annuity payments, which were retained until death, were income from property transferred by the decedent to her children through the use of the life insurance policies. On the other hand, petitioners, executors of the estate, assert that the annuity payments were income from the annuity policies, which were separate property from the insurance policies, and that since decedent had assigned away the life insurance policies before death, she retained no interest in them at death. The Government relies on Helvering v. Le Gierse, supra, where this Court also had before it the issue of the taxability of proceeds from a life insurance policy in an annuity-life insurance combination. After holding that the taxability of these proceeds was not to be determined for estate tax purposes according to the statutory provisions dealing with life insurance, the Court held that the proceeds were includible in the estate under Section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 because they devolved on the beneficiaries in a transfer which took “effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . . death.” 312 U. S., at 542. However, in reaching this conclusion the decision did not consider the problem in the case at bar, for in Le Oierse the insured had retained the rights and benefits of the insurance policy until death. The facts in the instant case on this point are fundamentally different. Prior to death, the decedent had divested herself of all interests in the insurance policies, including the possibility that the funds would return to her or her estate if the beneficiaries predeceased her. The assignees became the “owners” of the policies before her death; they had received the right to the immediate and unlimited use of the policies to the full extent of their worth. The immediate value of the policies was always substantial. In the year of assignment their total cash surrender value was over $289,000; in the year of death it was over $326,000. Under the assignment, the decedent had not become a life tenant who postpones the possession and enjoyment of the property by the remaindermen until her death. Cf. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297; Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632. On the contrary, the assignees held the bundle of rights, the incidents of ownership, over property from which the decedent had totally divorced herself. Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327; Goldstone v. United States, 325 U. S. 687. Illustrative of the distinction between Helvering v. Le Gierse and the case at bar is the fact that the Government has not endeavored here to sustain the tax under the statutory provision applied in that case. Instead of the provision taxing transfers “intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after” the transferor’s death, the provision applied in Le Gierse, the Government relies on the provision taxing transfers in which the transferor has retained until death “the right to income from” the transferred property. However, the Government’s position that the annuities were income from property which the insured transferred to her children under the life insurance policies is not well taken. To establish its contention, the Government must aggregate the premiums of the annuity policies with those of the life insurance policies and establish that the annuity payments were derived as income from the entire investment. This proposition cannot be established. Admittedly, when the policies were purchased, each life insurance-annuity combination was the product of a single, integrated transaction. However, the parties neither intended that, nor acted as if, any of the transactions would have a quality of indivisibility. Regardless of the considerations prompting the insurance companies to hedge their life insurance contracts with annuities, each time an annuity-life insurance combination was written, two items of property, an annuity policy and an insurance policy, were transferred to the purchaser. The annuity policy could have been acquired separately, and the life insurance policy could have been, and was, conveyed separately. The annuities arose from personal obligations of the insurance companies which were in no way conditioned on the continued existence of the life insurance contracts. These periodic payments would have continued unimpaired and without diminution in size throughout the life of the insured even if the life insurance policies had been extinguished. Quite clearly the annuity payments arose solely from the annuity policies. The use and enjoyment of the annuity policies were entirely independent of the life insurance policies. Because of this independence, the Commissioner may not, by aggregating the two types of policies into one investment, conclude that by receiving the annuities, the decedent had retained income from the life insurance contracts. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Of course, an additional amount is added to the premiums to compensate the insurance companies for expenses. In agreement with the decision below are Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F. 2d 871 (C. A. 2d Cir.), and Conway v. Glenn, 193 F. 2d 965 (C. A. 6th Cir.). To the contrary is Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F. 2d 492 (C. A. 7th Cir.), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 345 U. S. 946. Section 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 71, exempted from the estate proceeds up to $40,000 “receivable ... as insurance” by persons other than the executor. The proceeds in Helvering v. Le Gierse were not considered to have arisen from “insurance” as Congress meant the word to be used because the ordinary “insurance risk” was not present. The insurance company had not undertaken to shift the risk of premature death from the insured and to distribute the risk among its other policyholders. On the contrary, by requiring a concurrent purchase of a nonrefundable annuity contract, the company had neutralized the risk at the expense of the “insured.” The remaining risk, whether the annuitant would live beyond the actuarial prediction and after the insurance policy had been surrendered, was considered not an insurance risk but a risk of ordinary investment. Cf. Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Estate and Inheritance Taxes, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 856, 883. The principle that the proceeds are not considered “receivable ... as insurance” applies whether at death the rights and benefits of the policies are in the hands of the insured or of another person. Goldstone v. United States, 325 U. S. 687, 690. Cf. Goldstone v. United States, supra. Nor are the assignees like second annuitants in survivorship annuities or joint annuitants in joint and survivor annuities. The donor’s and donee’s annuities have a common fund as the source so that if the source of the donor’s annuity is extinguished, the donee’s annuity is destroyed. The entire economic enjoyment of the second annuitant must, realistically speaking, await the death of the first annuitant, and a substantial portion of the surviving joint annuitant’s enjoyment is similarly postponed. Cf., e. g., Commissioner v. Wilder’s Estate, 118 F. 2d 281; Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F. 2d 998; Mearkle’s Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 386. Section 811 (c)(1)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended by Section 7 (a) of the Act of October 25, 1949, c. 720, 63 Stat. 891, 895. Section 811 (c) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended by Section 7 (a) of the Act of October 25, 1949, c. 720, 63 Stat. 894. This provision was also a part of Section 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 at the time applicable in Helvering v. Le Gierse. Where a decedent, not in contemplation of death, has transferred property to another in return for a promise to make periodic payments to the transferor for his lifetime, it has been held that these payments are not income from the transferred property so as to include the property in the estate of the decedent. E. g., Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T. C. 543, Acq., 1943 Cum. Bull. 2; Security Trust & Savings Bank, Trustee, 11 B. T. A. 833; Seymour Johnson, 10 B. T. A. 411; Hirsh v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 508, 35 F. 2d 982 (Ct. Cl. 1929); cf. Welch v. Hall, 134 F. 2d 366. In these eases the promise is a personal obligation of the transferee, the obligation is usually not chargeable to the transferred property, and the size of the payments is not determined by the size of the actual income from the transferred property at the time the payments are made. For the treatment by lower courts of the life insurance-annuity combination in a similar situation in the field of federal income taxation, cf. Commissioner v. Meyer, 139 F. 2d 256; Edna E. Meredith, 1 T. C. M. 847, affirmed, Helvering v. Meredith, 140 F. 2d 973; John Koehrer, 4 T. C. M. 219.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BECK, LIQUIDATING TRUSTEE OF ESTATES OF CROWN VANTAGE, INC., et al. v. PACE INTERNATIONAL UNION ET AL. No. 05-1448. Argued April 24, 2007 Decided June 11, 2007 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. M. Miller Baker argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David E. Rogers, Wilber H. Boies, and Michael T Graham. Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Jonathan L. Snare, Edward D. Sieger, Israel Goldowitz, and Karen L. Morris. Julia Penny Clark argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Laurence Gold, Douglas L. Greenfield, Leon Dayan, and Christian L. Raisner. A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by W. Stephen Cannon, Raymond C. Fay, Laura C. Fentonmiller, James J. Keightley, Harold J. Ashner, and Shane Brennan. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We decide in this case whether an employer that sponsors and administers a single-employer defined-benefit pension plan has a fiduciary obligation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., to consider a merger with a multiemployer plan as a method of terminating the plan. I Crown Paper and its parent entity, Crown Vantage (the two hereinafter referred to in the singular as Crown), employed 2,600 persons in seven paper mills. PACE International Union, a respondent here, represented employees covered by 17 of Crown’s defined-benefit pension plans. A defined-benefit plan, “as its name implies, is one where the employee, upon retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic payment.” Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 152, 154 (1993). In such a plan, the employer generally shoulders the investment risk. It is the employer who must make up for any deficits, but also the employer who enjoys the fruits (whether in the form of lower plan contributions or sometimes a reversion of assets) if plan investments perform beyond expectations. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U. S. 432, 439-440 (1999). In this case, Crown served as both plan sponsor and plan administrator. In March 2000, Crown filed for bankruptcy and proceeded to liquidate its assets. ERISA allows employers to terminate their pension plans voluntarily, see Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 638 (1990), and in the summer of 2001, Crown began to consider a “standard termination,” a condition of which is that the terminated plans have sufficient assets to cover benefit liabilities. § 1341(b)(1)(D); id., at 638-639. Crown focused in particular on the possibility of a standard termination through purchase of annuities, one statutorily specified method of plan termination. See § 1341(b)(3)(A)(i). PACE, however, had ideas of its own. It interjected itself into Crown’s termination discussions and proposed that, rather than buy annuities, Crown instead merge the plans covering PACE union members with the PACE Industrial Union Management Pension Fund (PIUMPF), a multiemployer or “Taft-Hartley” plan. See § 1002(37). Under the terms of the PACE-proposed agreement, Crown would be required to convey all plan assets to PIUMPF; PIUMPF would assume all plan liabilities. Crown took PACE’s merger offer under advisement. As it reviewed annuitization bids, however, it discovered that it had overfunded certain of its pension plans, so that purchasing annuities would allow it to retain a projected $5 million reversion for its creditors after satisfying its obligations to plan participants and beneficiaries. See § 1344(d)(1) (providing for reversion upon plan termination where certain conditions are met). Under PACE’s merger proposal, by contrast, the $5 million would go to PIUMPF. What is more, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which administers an insurance program to protect plan benefits,' agreed to withdraw the proofs of claim it had filed against Crown in the bankruptcy proceedings if Crown went ahead with an annuity purchase. Crown had evidently heard enough. It consolidated 12 of its pension plans into a single plan, and terminated that plan through the purchase of an $84 million annuity. That annuity fully satisfied Crown’s obligations to plan participants and beneficiaries and allowed Crown to reap the $5 million reversion in surplus funds. PACE and two plan participants, also respondents here (we will refer to all respondents collectively as PACE), thereafter filed an adversary action against Crown in the Bankruptcy Court, alleging that Crown’s directors had breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by neglecting to give diligent consideration to PACE’s merger proposal. The Bankruptcy Court sided with PACE. It found that the decision whether to purchase annuities or merge with PIUMPF was a fiduciary decision, and that Crown had breached its fiduciary obligations by giving insufficient study to the PIUMPF proposal. Rather than ordering Crown to cancel its annuity (which would have resulted in a substantial penalty payable to Crown’s annuity provider), the Bankruptcy Court instead issued a preliminary injunction preventing Crown from obtaining the $5 million reversion. It subsequently approved a distribution of that reversion for the benefit of plan participants and beneficiaries, which distribution was stayed pending appeal. Petitioner, the trustee of the Crown bankruptcy estates, appealed the Bankruptcy-Court decision to the District Court, which affirmed in relevant part, as did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “the decision to terminate a pension plan is a business decision not subject to ERISA’s fiduciary obligations,” but reasoned that “the implementation of a decision to terminate” is fiduciary in nature. 427 F. 3d 668, 673 (2005). It then determined that merger was a permissible means of plan termination and that Crown therefore had a fiduciary obligation to consider PACE’s merger proposal seriously, which it had failed to do. Petitioner thereafter sought rehearing in the Court of Appeals, this time with the support of the PBGC and the Department of Labor, who agreed with petitioner that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment was in error. The Ninth Circuit held to its original decision, and we granted certiorari. 549 U. S. 1177 (2007). II Crown’s operation of its defined-benefit pension plans placed it in dual roles as plan sponsor and plan administrator; an employer’s fiduciary duties under ERISA are implicated only when it acts in the latter capacity. Which hat the employer is proverbially wearing depends upon the nature of the function performed, see Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, at 444, and is an inquiry that is aided by the common law of trusts which serves as ERISA’s backdrop, see Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U. S. 211, 224 (2000); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U. S. 882, 890 (1996). It is well established in this Court’s eases that an employer’s decision whether to terminate an ERISA plan is a settlor function immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations. See, e. g., ibid.; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U. S. 73, 78 (1995). And because “decision[s] regarding the form or structure” of a plan are generally settlor functions, Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U. S., at 444, PACE acknowledges that the decision to merge plans is “normally [a] plan sponsor decisio[n]” as well. Brief for Respondents 13-14, n. 5,20-21; see also Malia v. General Electric Co., 23 F. 3d 828, 833 (CA3 1994) (holding that employer’s decision to merge plans “d[id] not invoke the fiduciary duty provisions of ERISA”). But PACE says that its proposed merger was different, because the PIUMPF merger represented a method of terminating the Crown plans. And just as ERISA imposed on Crown a fiduciary obligation in its selection of an appropriate annuity provider when terminating through annuities, see 29 CFR §§2509.95-1, 4041.28(c)(3) (2006), so too, PACE argues, did it require Crown to consider merger. The idea that the decision whether to merge could switch from a settlor to a fiduciary function depending upon the context in which the merger proposal is raised is an odd one. But once it is realized that a merger is simply a transfer of assets and liabilities, PACE’s argument becomes somewhat more plausible: The purchase of an annuity is akin to a transfer of assets and liabilities (to an insurance company), and if Crown was subject to fiduciary duties in selecting an annuity provider, why could it automatically disregard PIUMPF simply because PIUMPF happened to be a multiemployer plan rather than an insurer? There is, however, an antecedent question. In order to affirm, the judgment below, we would have to conclude (as the Ninth Circuit did) that merger is, in the first place, a permissible form of plan termination under ERISA. That requires us to delve into the statute’s provisions for plan termination. ERISA sets forth the exclusive procedures for the standard termination of single-employer pension plans. § 1341(a)(1); Hughes Aircraft Co., supra, at 446. Those procedures are exhaustive, setting detailed rules for, inter alia, notice by the plan to affected parties, § 1341(a)(2), review by the PBGC, § 1341(b)(2)(A), (C), and final distribution of plan funds, § 1341(b)(2)(D), §1344. See generally E. Veal & E. Mackiewicz, Pension Plan Terminations 43-61 (2d ed. 1998) (hereinafter Veal & Mackiewicz). At issue in this case is § 1341(b)(3)(A), the provision of ERISA setting forth the permissible Tnethods of terminating a single-employer plan and distributing plan assets to participants and beneficiaries. Section 1341(b)(3)(A) provides as follows: “In connection with any final distribution of assets pursuant to the standard termination of the plan under this subsection, the plan administrator shall distribute the assets in accordance with section 1344 of this title. In distributing such assets, the plan administrator shall— “(i) purchase irrevocable commitments from an insurer to provide all benefit liabilities under the plan, or “(ii) in accordance with the provisions of the plan and any applicable regulations, otherwise fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan....” The PBGC’s regulations impose in substance the same requirements. See 29 CFR § 4041.28(c)(1). Title 29 U. S. C. §1344, which is referred to in § 1341(b)(3)(A), sets forth a specific order of priority for asset distribution, including (under certain circumstances) reversions of excess funds to the plan sponsor, see § 1344(d)(1). The parties to this case all agree that § 1341(b)(3)(A)(i) refers to the purchase of annuities, see 29 CFR §4001.2 (defining “irrevocable commitment”), and that § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii) allows for lump-sum distributions at present discounted value (including rollovers into individual retirement accounts). As PACE concedes, purchase of annuity contracts and lump-sum payments are “by far the most common distribution methods.” Brief for Respondents 45; see also Veal & Mackiewicz 72-73 (“The basic alternatives are the purchase of annuity contracts or some form of lump-sum cashout”). To affirm the Ninth Circuit, we would have to decide that merger is a permissible method as well. *3 And we would have to do that over the objection of the PBGC, which (joined by the Department of Labor) disagrees with the Ninth Circuit, taking the position that § 1341(b)(3)(A) does not permit merger as a method of termination because (in its view) merger is an alternative to (rather than an example of) plan termination. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8, 17-30. We have traditionally deferred to the PBGC when interpreting ERISA, for “to attempt to answer these questions without the views of the agencies responsible for enforcing ERISA, would be to embar[k] upon a voyage without a compass.” Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U. S. 714, 722, 725-726 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LTV Corp., 496 U. S., at 648, 651. In reviewing the judgment below, we thus must examine “whether the PBGC’s policy is based upon a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 648. We believe it is. PACE has “failed to persuade us that the PBGC’s views are unreasonable,” Mead Corp., supra, at 725. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that the statute, with its general residual clause in § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii), is potentially more embracing of alternative methods of plan termination (whatever they may be) than longstanding ERISA practice, which appears to have employed almost exclusively annuities and lump-sum payments. But we think that the statutory text need not be read to include mergers, and indeed that the PBGC offers the better reading in excluding them. Most obviously, Congress nowhere expressly provided for merger as a permissible means of termination. Merger is not mentioned in § 1341(b)(3)(A), much less in any of § 1341’s many subsections. Indeed, merger is expressly provided for in an entirely separate set of statutory sections (of which more in a moment, see infra, at 108-110). PACE nevertheless maintains that merger is clearly covered under § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii)’s residual clause, which refers to a distribution of assets that “otherwise fully provide^] all benefit liabilities under the plan.” By PACE’s reasoning, annuities are covered under § 1341(b)(3)(A)(i); annuities are — by virtue of the word “otherwise” — an example of a means by which a plan may “fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan,” § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii); and therefore, “at the least,” any method of termination that is the “legal equivalent” of annuitization is permitted, Brief for Respondents 23. Merger, PACE argues, is such a legal equivalent. We do not find the statute so clear. Even assuming that PACE is right about “otherwise” — that the word indicates that annuities are one example of satisfying the residual clause in § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii) — we still do not find mergers covered with the clarity necessary to disregard the PBGC’s considered views. Surely the phrase “otherwise fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan” is not without some teeth. And we think it would be reasonable for the PBGC to determine both that merger is not like the purchase of annuities in its ability to “fully provide all benefit liabilities under the plan,” and that the statute’s distinct treatment of merger and termination provides clear evidence that one is not an example of the other. Three points strike us as especially persuasive in these regards. First, terminating a plan through purchase of annuities (like terminating through distribution of lump-sum payments) formally severs the applicability of ERISA to plan assets and employer obligations. Upon purchasing annuities, the employer is no longer subject to ERISA’s multitudinous requirements, such as (to name just one) payment of insurance premiums to the PBGC, § 1307(a). And the PBGC is likewise no longer liable for the deficiency in the event that the plan becomes insolvent; there are no more benefits for it to guarantee. The assets of the plan are wholly removed from the ERISA system, and plan participants and beneficiaries must rely primarily (if not exclusively) on state contract remedies if they do not receive proper payments or are otherwise denied access to their funds. Further, from the standpoint of the participants and beneficiaries, the risk associated with an annuity relates solely to the solvency of an insurance company, and not the performance of the merged plan’s investments. Merger is fundamentally different: It represents a continuation rather than a cessation of the ERISA regime. If Crown were to have merged its pension plans into PIUMPF, the plan assets would have been combined with the assets of the multiemployer plan, where they could then be used to satisfy the benefit liabilities of participants and beneficiaries other than those from the original Crown plans. Those assets would remain within ERISA’s purview, the PBGC would maintain responsibility for them, and if Crown continued to employ the plan participants it too would remain subject to ERISA. Finally, plan participants and beneficiaries would have their recourse not through state contract law, but through the ERISA system, just as they had prior to merger. Second, in a standard termination ERISA allows the employer to (under certain circumstances) recoup surplus funds, § 1344(d)(1), (3), as Crown sought to do here. But ERISA forbids employers to obtain a reversion in the absence of a termination: “A valid plan termination is a prerequisite to a reversion of surplus plan assets to an employer.” App. to Brief in Opposition 15a (PBGC Opinion Letter 85-25 (Oct. 11, 1985)); see also Veal & Mackiewicz 164-165. Crown could not simply extract the $5 million surplus from its plans, nor could it have done so once those assets had transferred to PIUMPF. This would have run up against ERISA’s anti-inurement provision, which prohibits employers from misappropriating plan assets for their own benefit. See § 1103(c). Consequently, we think the PBGC was entirely reasonable in declining to recognize as a form of termination a mechanism that would preclude the receipt of surplus funds, which is specifically authorized upon termination. Third, the structure of ERISA amply (if not conclusively) supports the conclusion that § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii) does not cover merger. As noted above, merger is nowhere mentioned in § 1341, and is instead dealt with in an entirely different set of statutory sections setting forth entirely different rules and procedures. Compare §1058 (general merger provision), §1411 (mergers between multiemployer plans), and §1412 (mergers between multiemployer and single-employer plans) with §1341 (termination of single-employer plans), § 1341a (termination of multiemployer plans); see generally Veal & Mackiewicz 31-40 (describing merger as an alternative to plan termination). Section 1058, the general merger provision, in fact quite clearly contemplates that merger and termination are not one and the same, forbidding merger “unless each participant in the plan would (if the plan then terminated) receive a benefit immediately after the merger ... which is equal to or greater than the benefit he would have been entitled to receive immediately before the merger ... (if the plan had then terminated).” (Emphasis added.) As for the different rules and procedures governing termination and merger: Most critically, plans seeking to terminate must provide advance notice to the PBGC, as well as extensive actuarial information. § 1341(b)(2)(A). The PBGC has the authority to halt the termination if it determines that plan assets are insufficient to cover plan liabilities. § 1341(b)(2)(C). Merger, by contrast, involves considerably less PBGC oversight, and the PBGC has no similar ability to cancel, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. And the rules governing notice to the PBGC are either different or nonexistent. Section 1412, the provision governing merger between a single and multiemployer plan (the form of merger contemplated by PACE’s proposal) makes no mention of early notice to the PBGC. And while mergers between multiemployer plans do require, 120-days advance notice, § 1411(b)(1), this still differs from the general notice provision for termination of single-employer plans, which requires notice to the PBGC “[a]s soon as practicable” after notice is given to affected parties, § 1341(b)(2)(A). Belatedly, § 1341(a)(2) also requires that, in a standard termination, written notice to plan participants and beneficiaries include “any related additional information required in regulations of the [PBGC].” Those regulations require, among other things, that the plan inform participants and beneficiaries that upon distribution, “the PBGC no longer guarantees . . . plan benefits.” 29 CFR § 4041.23(b)(9). (This requirement of eourse has no relevance to a merger, because after a merger the PBGC continues to guarantee plan benefits.) PACE believes that these procedural differences can be ironed over rather easily. It insists: “Many plan mergers take place without intent to terminate a plan; in those cases, the requirements for plan merger can be followed without consulting the requirements for plan termination. Conversely, many plan terminations take place without an associated merger; in those cases there is no need to consult the requirements for mergers. But if a plan sponsor intends to use merger as a method of implementing a plan termination, it simply must follow the rules for both merger and termination.” Brief for Respondents 36. PACE similarly explains that while the PBGC does not approve “ordinary merger[s],” PBGC approval would be necessary when a merger is designed to terminate a plan. Id:, at 37. The confusion invited by PACE’s proposed framework is alone enough to condemn it. How could a plan be sure that it was in one box rather than the other? To avoid the risk of liability, should it simply follow both sets of rules all of the time? PACE’s proposal is flawed for another reason as well: It has no apparent basis in the statute. The separate provisions governing termination and merger quite clearly treat the two as wholly different transactions, with no exception for the case where merger is used for termination. For all of the foregoing reasons, we believe that the PBGC’s construction of the statute is a permissible one, and indeed the more plausible. Crown did not breach its fiduciary obligations in failing to consider PACE’s merger proposal because merger is not a permissible form of termination. Even from a policy standpoint, the PBGC’s choice is an eminently reasonable one, since termination by merger could have detrimental consequences for plan beneficiaries and plan sponsors alike. When a single-employer plan is merged into a multiemployer plan, the original participants and beneficiaries become dependent upon the financial well-being of the multiemployer plan and its contributing members. Assets of the single-employer plan (which in this case were capable of fully funding plan liabilities) may be used to satisfy commitments owed to other participants and beneficiaries of the (possibly underfunded) multiemployer plan. The PBGC believes that this arrangement creates added risk for participants and beneficiaries of the original plan, particularly in view of the lesser guarantees that the PBGC provides to multiemployer plans, compare § 1322 with § 1322a. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29, and n. 11. For employers, the ill effects are demonstrated by the facts of this very case: By diligently funding its pension plans, Crown became the bait for a union bent on obtaining a surplus that was rightfully Crown’s. All this after Crown purchased an annuity that none dispute was sufficient to satisfy its commitments to plan participants and beneficiaries. * * * We hold that merger is not a permissible method of terminating a single-employer defined-benefit pension plan. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Crown's various other pension plans are not at issue in this case. PACE now suggests that it would have been willing to agree to a merger in which Crown kept its surplus funds. Brief for Respondents 17, n. 7. But this is belied not only by the terms of the proposed merger agreement, but by the fact that PACE actively sought and obtained a preliminary injunction freezing Crown’s $5 million reversion. The Bankruptcy Court having rejected PACE’s request to undo the annuity contract, PACE has provided no reason for pursuing this litigation other than to obtain the $5 million that remained after Crown satisfied its benefit commitments. Moreover, as PACE concedes, whether the parties would have agreed to a merger arrangement that did not include the $5 million is “speculation.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 42. We would not have to decide that question of statutory interpretation if Crown's pension plans disallowed merger. Any method of termination permitted by § 1341(b)(3)(A)(ii) must also be one that is “in accordance with the provisions of the plan.” Crown thus could have drafted its plan documents to limit the available methods of termination, so that merger was not permitted. Petitioner argued below that Crown had done just that. Though the District Court concluded that the plan terms allowed for merger, App. to Pet. for Cert. 47, the Ninth Circuit declined to consider the plan language because it held that petitioner had failed to preserve the argument in the Bankruptcy Court. Petitioner did not seek certiorari on the factbound issues of waiver and plan interpretation, and we accordingly do not address them here. PACE argues that the PBGC took an inconsistent approach in several opinion letters from the 1980’s concerning the applicability of certain joint guidelines for asset reversions during complex termination transactions. See App. to Brief in Opposition 6a-9a (Opinion Letter 85-11 (May 14, 1985)); id,., at 10a-13a (Opinion Letter 85-21 (Aug. 26, 1985)); id., at 14a-16a (Opinion Letter 85-25 (Oct. 11, 1985)). But insofar as the PBGC’s consistency is even relevant to whether we should accord deference to its presently held views, none of those letters so much aé hints that the PBGC treated merger as a permissible form of plan termination. In fact, to the extent they even speak to the question, they clearly show the opposite. In Opinion Letter 85-25, for example, the PBGC explained that the joint guidelines for asset reversions did not apply to “a transfer [of assets and liabilities] from a single-employer plan to an ongoing multiemployer plan followed by the termination of the single-employer plan.” Id., at 15a (emphasis added). By characterizing the proposed transaction as one that took place in two separate steps (merger and then termination), this letter fully contemplated that merger was not an example of plan termination. This inability to recover surplus funds through a merger could not be remedied, as PACE now suggests, by structuring the transaction so that Crown provided to PIUMPF only assets sufficient to cover plan liabilities (effectively creating a spinoff from Crown’s plans and merging that spinoff plan with PIUMPF). Under that arrangement, Crown could indeed obtain the $5 million reversion — not, however, by reason of the merger-called-termination, but only by subsequent termination of the residual plan. See, e.g., id., at 14a-16a (PBGC Opinion Letter 85-25 (Oct. 11, 1985)) (describing such a sequence of transactions). This falls short of rendering the merger a termination permitting recovery of surplus funds. That a transfer of assets can occur in anticipation of a future termination does not render that transfer itself a termination.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CARLUCCI, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al. v. DOE No. 87-751. Argued October 11, 1988 Decided December 6, 1988 Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Barbara L. Herwig, and Freddi Lipstein. John G. Gill, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. David I. Shapiro, George Kaufmann, Peter W. Morgan, John A. Powell, and Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the National Security Agency (NSA) invoked the proper statutory authority when it terminated respondent John Doe, an NSA employee. The Court of Appeals held that NSA did not — a decision with which we disagree. We first describe the statutes relevant to this case. Section 7532 of Title 5 of the United States Code, on which the Court of Appeals relied, was passed in 1950 and reenacted and codified in 1966, as part of Chapter 75 of Title 5, the Chapter that deals with adverse actions against employees of the United States. See 5 U. S. C. §7532. The section provides that the head of an agency “may suspend without pay” an employee when he considers such action “necessary in the interests of national security,” see § 7532(a), and “may remove” the suspended employee if such action is “necessary or advisable in the interests of national security.” § 7532(b). Subsection (c) of §7532 specifies the procedural protections to which a suspended employee is entitled prior to removal. The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (1959 NSA Act) empowers the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, to establish NSA positions and appoint employees thereto “as may be necessary to carry out the functions of such agency.” Note following 50 U. S. C. § 402. By virtue of the 1959 NSA Act, NSA employees who are not preferred eligible veterans are in the “excepted” service, hence not covered by the removal provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 5 U. S. C. §§7511-7513. Pursuant to the Defense Department Directive No. 5100.23 (May 17, 1967), as printed in App. in No. 86-5395 (CADC), p. 60, the Secretary delegated his 1959 NSA Act appointment authority to the NSA Director, who promulgated internal personnel regulations. See National Security Agency Central Security Service Personnel Management Manual 30-2 (PMM), Ch. 370 (Aug. 12, 1980), App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. Chapter 370 of these regulations describes procedures for removing employees, and states generally that removal is permissible for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” §3-4, App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. Dismissals proposed under Chapter 370 guarantee employees various procedural protections, such as 30-day advance notice, an opportunity to respond and to have legal representation, and a written final decision. Although Chapter 370 assigns to some employees the further right to appeal an adverse action to the Merit Systems Protection Board, nonveterans like Doe at NSA do not have this right; nor does Chapter 370 provide for a hearing or review by the Secretary of Defense. In 1964, Congress amended the Internal Security Act of 1950 by passing an Act relating to “Personnel Security Procedures in the National Security Agency.” 78 Stat. 168, 50 U. S. C. §§831-833 (NSA Personnel Security Procedures Act). Section 831 requires the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations assuring that no person will be employed or continue to be employed by NSA or have access to classified information unless such employment or access is “clearly consistent with the national security.” The Secretary’s determination is final. The Secretary’s authority under §831 has been delegated to the NSA Director and implemented through regulations, including a regulation requiring security clearance for employment at NSA. See PMM, Ch. 371, §§1-1, 1-3. Section 832(a) proscribes NSA employment to any person not subjected to a full field investigation and “cleared for access to classified information.” In addition, Congress directs that boards of appraisal are to assist in appraising the loyalty and suitability of persons for access to classified information in those cases where the NSA Director doubts such suitability. § 832(b). Section 833(a) gives the Secretary authority to terminate the employment of any NSA officer or employee whenever he considers that action “to be in the interest of the United States” and determines that the procedures stated in other provisions of the law “cannot be invoked consistently with national security.” This case began in 1982 when John Doe, a cryptographic material control technician at NSA for 16 years, disclosed to NSA officials that he had engaged in homosexual relationships with foreign nationals. Doe was notified of his proposed removal pursuant to Chapter 370 of the PMM, which governs NSA’s procedures for removal for cause. The notification letter of Virginia C. Jenkins, Director of Civilian Personnel, was dated November 23, 1982, and explained that Doe’s “indiscriminate personal conduct with unidentified foreign nationals” makes impossible his continued — and essential to NSA employment — access to classified information. See App. in No. 86-5395 (CADC), p. 83. The notice also advised Doe of his adjudicatory rights to contest the decision, which rights he exercised through counsel, including in his answer the results of a psychiatric evaluation as to his security threat. Pursuant to 50 U. S. C. § 832(b), the NSA Director convened a board of appraisal, which ultimately con-eluded that Doe’s access to classified material was “clearly inconsistent with the national security.” See App. in No. 5395 (CADC), p. 108. After a hearing before the Director, Doe was notified that his security clearance was being revoked. Because this clearance is a condition of NSA employment, the Director, pursuant to the authority delegated to him under the 1959 NSA Act, removed Doe. Relying on 5 U. S. C. § 7532, Doe then requested a hearing before the Secretary of Defense, claiming that the 1959 NSA Act does not authorize removals and that he could only be discharged by the Secretary after a hearing before that official or his designee. Both the Secretary and the Director replied that Doe’s removal was “for cause” under Chapter 370 of the PMM and was not pursuant to the Secretary’s §7532 summary authority. Doe brought suit in the District Court challenging his removal on constitutional and statutory grounds. He charged, inter alia, that the 1959 NSA Act’s appointment authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the NSA Director does not include the authority to remove employees; hence NSA is required to apply 5 U. S. C. § 7532’s termination procedures that guarantee NSA employees a preremoval hearing before the Secretary or his designee, the NSA Director. The District Court denied this argument and granted summary judgment for petitioners. Acknowledging that the NSA Director could have elected to proceed under either § 833 or § 7532 summary authority, the court held that the Director could also proceed under the authority provided by the 1959 NSA Act. Doe v. Weinberger, Civ. Action No. 85-1996 (DC, Apr. 25, 1986). The Court of Appeals reversed as to the optional applicability of §7532 and vacated the remainder of the District Court’s decision. Doe v. Weinberger, 820 F. 2d 1275 (1987). The Court of Appeals was of the view that the chronology of congressional action indicates that § 7532, which predates the establishment of NSA, must control NSA employee dismissals on national security grounds. The court acknowledged § 833’s parallel summary removal scheme, but held that because the NSA Director disclaimed reliance on that section, remand to NSA for compliance with §7532 was obligatory. We granted the Secretary’s and Director’s petition for certiorari. 485 U. S. 904 (1988). The 1959 NSA Act authorizes the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, “to establish such positions, and to appoint thereto, without regard to the civil service laws, such officers and employees, in the National Security Agency, as may be necessary to carry out the functions of such agency.” Note following 50 U. S. C. §402. The Secretary, in turn, issued Defense Department Directive No. 5100.23 to delegate this appointment authority to the NSA Director, which authority was implemented by regulations covering both the hiring and removal of NSA employees. Although the 1959 NSA Act does not refer to termination, the Court has held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that, absent a “specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal from office is incident to the power of appointment.” Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293 (1900); see also Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99, 108 (1890); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961). Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondent questions this general proposition, nor have they shown that Congress expressly or impliedly indicated a contrary purpose in the 1959 NSA Act or its subsequent amendments. The Court of Appeals, however, held that removals for national security reasons must occur under either 5 U. S. C. §7532 or 50 U. S. C. §833 and that because NSA disclaimed reliance on § 833, resort to § 7532 rather than NSA’s for-cause removal regulations was mandatory. In our view, however, §833 and §7532 are not the exclusive means to remove NSA employees for national security reasons, but instead contemplate alternative recourse to NSA’s ordinary removal mechanisms pursuant to the 1959 NSA Act. This discretionary aspect of §§833 and 7532 is manifest in both the express statutory language and also the legislative history of these provisions. Section 833(a) states: “[Notwithstanding sections 7512 and 7532 of title 5, or any other provision of law,” the Secretary of Defense “may” remove an employee provided that he finds that “the procedures prescribed in other provisions of law that authorize the termination . . . cannot be invoked consistently with the national security.” Petitioners correctly argue that where the for-cause procedures for removal under §7512 or under the regulations adopted under the 1959 NSA Act do not jeopardize national security, recourse may, even must, be had to those other procedures. Section 7532 also is not mandatory. It provides that “[notwithstanding other statutes,” the head of an agency “may” suspend and remove employees “in the interests of national security.” This language declares that even though other statutes might not permit it, the Secretary may authorize removals pursuant to § 7532 procedures, rather than those governing terminations under those other laws. The Court of Appeals did not expressly address the permissive character of the section and construed the statute to require the Secretary, in all cases of removal based on national security, to resort to the removal procedures of § 833 or § 7532, notwithstanding other available statutory removal regimes. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by relying on two sentences from the House Report on the bill that ultimately became the predecessor to § 7532. These sentences state that the bill guarantees employees in various agencies, including the Department of Defense, the right to appeal to the head of the department in removal cases covered by §7532. This passage, however, does not indicate that §7532 procedures are the exclusive means for removals on national security grounds or that § 7532 displaces the otherwise applicable removal provisions of the agencies covered by the section. Read as the Court of Appeals understood them, the two sentences confound the permissive language of the statute and are inconsistent with other evidence from the legislative history. Congress enacted the §7532 and §833 summary removal measures to supplement, not narrow, ordinary agency removal procedures. Section 7532, like § 833, applies to a special class of national security cases, and authorizes summary suspension and unreviewable removal at the Secretary’s personal initiative after a hearing of unspecified scope. The removal provisions apply only to an employee who has been suspended. An employee so removed is ineligible for employment elsewhere in the Government without approval by the Office of Personnel Management. See 5 U. S. C. § 7312. The Court has held that in light of its summary nature, Congress intended § 7532 to be invoked only where there is “an immediate threat of harm to the ‘national security’ ” in the sense that the delay from invoking “normal dismissal procedures” could “cause serious damage to the national security.” Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 546 (1956). Were §7532 the exclusive procedure in this case and like cases, no national security termination would be permissible without an initial suspension and adherence to the Cole v. Young standard. We are unconvinced that Congress intended any such result when it enacted § 7532. Indeed, when Congress passed the NSA Personnel Security Procedures Act in 1964, 50 U. S. C. §§831-833, Congress must have intended that § 7532 did not impose this restriction on the various affected agencies. The stringency would conflict with the provisions of that Act that require the Secretary to apply general security considerations in selecting NSA employees. Just as the Secretary need only find “inconsistency” with national security to reject an applicant seeking the necessary NSA clearance for classified information, see §831, so too the boards of appraisal that assist in this determination are authorized to recommend denial or cancellation of such clearance if the NSA Director “doubt[s]” that clearance is consistent with national security. See § 832(b). The Secretary, in turn, must adhere to a board’s recommendation unless he makes the affirmative finding that clearance is in the national interest. See ibid. Under the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, however, the revocation of a security clearance ordered by NS A pursuant to a board’s recommendation will not suffice for the dismissal mandated by § 832(a), but rather would require further review by the Secretary under the more stringent standard imposed by § 7532. The Court of Appeals was of the view that its construction of §7532 is necessary to provide employees sought to be removed on national security grounds with procedures equivalent to those provided by that section. This approach assumes that NSA’s ordinary clearance revocation and for cause dismissal procedures are less protective than those guaranteed by § 7532. This is a doubtful proposition, to say the least. The section, as we have said, provides for summary suspension without pay, affords a hearing of undefined scope before the agency head, and attaches to a removal order the sanction that the employee is ineligible for other governmental employment. NSA’s for-cause removals neither are preceded by suspension nor entail a collateral bar from federal employment. In this case, Doe was on the payroll until removed, and the record does not indicate that the hearing Doe received, or the other procedural protections accorded to him, were inferior to those that would have been available under § 7532. Indeed, in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 533 (1988), we rejected the argument that § 7532 would have provided more protections than the Navy’s ordinary for-cause removal procedures. More significantly, the Court of Appeals’ view that Congress enacted §7532 to extend new protections to all employees sought to be dismissed on national security grounds runs counter to explicit congressional statements that the legislation was proposed “to increase the authority of the heads of Government departments engaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend employees considered to be bad security risks, and to terminate their services if subsequent investigation develops facts which support such action.” S. Rep. No. 2158, at 2; see also H. R. Rep. No. 2330, at 2. We thus agree with the conclusion of the Merit Systems Protection Board in a similar case that “section 7532 is not the exclusive basis for removals based upon security clearance revocations,” Egan v. Department of the Navy, 28 M. S. P. R. 509, 521 (1985), and with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that “[t]here is nothing in the text of section 7532 or in its legislative history to suggest that its procedures were intended to preempt section 7513 procedures whenever the removal could be taken under section 7532. The language of section 7532 is permissive.” Egan v. Department of the Navy, 802 F. 2d 1563, 1568 (1986). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7532(c) accords the suspended employee the following procedural rights before removal: “(A) a written statement of the charges against him within 30 days after suspension, which may be amended within 30 days thereafter and which shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit; (B) an opportunity within 30 days thereafter, plus an additional 30 days if the charges are amended, to answer the charges and submit affidavits; (C) a hearing, at the request of the employee, by an agency authority duly constituted for this purpose; (D) a review of his case by the head of the agency or his designee, before a decision adverse to the employee is made final; and (E) a written statement of the decision of the head of the agency.” See Defense Department Directive No. 5210.45, p. 3 (May 9, 1964), as printed in App. in No. 86-5395 (CADC), p. 75 (emphasis added), which reads: “When the two conditions [in §833 — i. e., (1) other statutory removal provisions, which (2) will safeguard the national security — ] do not exist, the Director, NSA shall, when appropriate, take action pursuant to other provisions of law, as applicable, to terminate the employment of a civilian officer or employee. The Director shall recommend to the Secretary of Defense the exercise of the authority of [§ 833] only when the termination of the employment of a civilian officer or employee cannot, because of paramount national security interests, be carried out under any other provision of law.” The relevant sentences in the House Report state: “Under the present law, with respect to [the Departments of State and Defense,] the officer or employee who is suspended or terminated as a security risk is not entitled as a matter of right to an appeal to the head of the agency concerned. This legislation extends this appeal right to employees [of these agencies].” H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1950). The Court of Appeals also noted that 5 U. S. C. §7533 provides that § 7532 does not “impair the powers vested in the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] — or the requirement — that adequate provision be made for administrative review” of a termination by that Agency, yet does omit any similar exception for the pre-existing powers of any other agency. The Court of Appeals extrapolated that except in the case of the AEC, § 7532 supplants the removal authority of all agencies covered by the section in all cases involving national security. This conjecture extracts far more meaning than is warranted from the special mention by Congress that it intended to preserve the unique, expansive removal powers of the AEC, particularly in light of § 7532’s language indicating that its applicability is permissive. Numerous congressional reports and statements indicate that §7532 and its legislative antecedents were proposed as extraordinary, supplementary measures to enable the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads responsible for United States security, to respond to rare, urgent threats to national security. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 6 (1950); H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 6 (1950); S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1948); Hearing on S. 1561 and S. 1570 before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, 4 (1948). Respondent defends the result reached by the Court of Appeals on the alternative ground that NSA violated its own regulations in removing him. That claim, as well as others argued to the Court of Appeals, was not passed on by that court, and we prefer to leave the matter to the Court of Appeals in the first instance.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION et al. v. AKTIEBOLAGET SVENSKA AMERIKA LINIEN (SWEDISH AMERICAN LINE) et al. No. 257. Argued January 25, 1968. Decided March 6, 1968. Irwin A. Seibel argued the cause for petitioners in No. 257. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Louis F. Claiborne, Robert N. Katz and Gordon M. Shaw. Robert J. Sisk argued the cause for petitioner in No. 258. With him on the briefs were Harold S. Barron and Glen A. Wilkinson. Edward R. Neaher argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Carl S. Rowe and Gertrude S. Rosenthal. Together with No. 258, American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish American Line) et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in these cases is whether the Federal Maritime Commission properly disapproved two provisions of several shipping conference agreements. One of the provisions under attack, the so-called tying rule, prohibits travel agents who book passage on ships participating in the conferences from selling passage on competing, nonconference lines. The second provision, known as the unanimity rule, requires unanimous action by conference members before the maximum rate of commissions payable to travel agents may be changed. The Commission’s authority in this area stems from the Shipping Act, 1916. Section 15 of this Act, as amended, requires common carriers by water to submit most of their cooperative agreements to the Commission and directs it to: “disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this chapter . . . .” In 1959 proceedings were initiated before the Federal Maritime Board, predecessor agency to the present Federal Maritime Commission, on the complaint of the American Society of Travel Agents, petitioner in No. 258. The Society challenged a number of the practices of two conferences composed of steamship lines that furnish passenger service across the Atlantic. After extensive investigation and hearings before a Commission Examiner, the Commission disapproved both the tying and unanimity rules and ordered them eliminated. 7 F. M. C. 737 (1964). The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the order and remanded the case to the Commission for more detailed findings and explanations. 122 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 351 F. 2d 756 (1965). On remand the Commission again disapproved both rules. The tying rule was found detrimental to the commerce of the United States, unjustly discriminatory as between carriers, and contrary to the public interest. The unanimity rule was found detrimental to the commerce of the United States and contrary to the public interest. -F. M. C. - (1966). On appeal, the Court of Appeals again set aside the order, holding that the Commission’s new opinion had not remedied the defects noted in the prior decision on appeal, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 359, 372 F. 2d 932 (1967), and we granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 816 (1967). We hold that the Commission’s order was supported in all respects by adequate findings and analysis. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and approve the order of the Commission. I. An understanding of the issues in these cases will be facilitated by a very brief discussion of the purposes of these shipping conferences and the federal statutes enacted to regulate them. Major American and foreign steamship lines which compete for trafile along the same routes have long joined together in conferences to fix rates and other charges, allocate traffic, and in other ways moderate the rigors of competition. Despite traditional hostility to anticompetitive arrangements of this kind, however, Congress found after extensive investigation that the cooperative activity of these conferences was to some extent in the public interest. The House Committee that conducted the primary inquiry reported that the conferences promoted: “regularity and frequency of service, stability and uniformity of rates, economy in the cost of service, better distribution of sailings, maintenance of American and European rates to foreign markets on a parity, and equal treatment of shippers through the elimination of secret arrangements and underhanded methods of discrimination.” H. R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 416. These advantages, the Committee concluded, could probably not be preserved in the face of unrestricted competition, and accordingly it recommended that the industry be granted some exemption from the antitrust laws. On the other hand, the Committee stressed that an unqualified exemption would be undesirable. The conferences had abused their power in the past and might do so in the future unless they were subjected to some form of effective governmental supervision. In response to these findings Congress enacted the Shipping Act, 1916. The statute not only outlawed a number of specific abuses but set up the United States Shipping Board, a predecessor of the present Federal Maritime Commission, with permanent authority under § 15 of the Act to modify or disapprove conference agreements. The antitrust immunity conferred was, as the House Committee had recommended, a limited one — only agreements receiving the approval of the Board were exempted. Originally the Board could disapprove an agreement on only three grounds: unjust discrimination, detriment to commerce, or illegality under one of the specific provisions of the Act. In 1959, however, Congress began an extensive review of regulation under the Shipping Act, and amendments passed in 1961 in response to these studies included a provision granting considerably broader authority by permitting disapproval under § 15 of any agreement found to be “contrary to the public interest.” The scheme of regulation adopted thus permits the conferences to continue operation but insures that their immunity from the antitrust laws will be subject to careful control. II. A crucial issue in these cases is respondents’ challenge to the Commission’s reliance on antitrust policy as a basis for disapproving these rules. Since the contention is equally relevant to analysis of the tying and unanimity rules, we consider it at the outset. The Commission has formulated a principle that conference restraints which interfere with the policies of antitrust laws will be approved only if the conferences can “bring forth such facts as would demonstrate that the . . . rule was required by a serious transportation need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act.” See - F. M. C., at -. In the present cases, but for the partial immunity granted by the Act, both the tying and unanimity rules undoubtedly would be held illegal under the antitrust laws, and respondents failed to satisfy the Commission that the rules were necessary to further some legitimate interest. The Commission found this sufficient reason to disapprove the rules, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. Emphasizing that “[t]he statutory language authorizes disapproval only when the Commission finds as a fact that the agreement operates in one of the four ways set out in the section by Congress,” the court held, “We do not read the statute as authorizing disapproval of an agreement on the ground that it runs counter to antitrust principles . . . .” 122 TJ. S. App. D. C., at 64; 351 F. 2d, at 761 (opinion on first appeal). Insofar as this holding rests on the absence of an explicit antitrust test among the “four ways set out in the section,” we think the Court of Appeals was excessively formalistic in its approach to the Commission’s findings. By its very nature an illegal restraint of trade is in some ways “contrary to the public interest,” and the Commission’s antitrust standard, involving an assessment of the necessity for this restraint in terms of legitimate commercial objectives, simply gives understandable content to the broad statutory concept of “the public interest.” Certainly any reservations the Court of Appeals may have had on this point should have been dispelled by the Commission’s careful explanation on remand of the connection between its antitrust standard and the public interest requirement. See-F. M. C., at-. As long as the Commission indicates which of the statutory standards is the ultimate authority for its disapproval, we can see no objection to the Commission’s casting its primary analysis in terms of the requirements of its antitrust test. Respondents argue more broadly, however, that the antitrust test is not a permissible elaboration of the statutory standards. They contend that the whole purpose of the statutory scheme would be defeated if incompatibility with the antitrust laws can be a sufficient reason for denying immunity from these laws. Congress, it is argued, has already decided that there is a justification for intrusions on our antitrust policy by the conference system, and accordingly the Commission cannot require further justifications from the shipping lines but must itself demonstrate the way in which the statutory requirements are violated. Respondents’ arguments, however, are not even superficially persuasive. Congress has, it is true, decided to confer antitrust immunity unless the agreement is found to violate certain statutory standards, but as already indicated, antitrust concepts are intimately involved in the standards Congress chose. The Commission’s approach does not make the promise of antitrust immunity meaningless because a restraint that would violate the antitrust laws will still be approved whenever a sufficient justification for it exists. Nor does the Commission’s test, by requiring the conference to come forward with a justification for the restraint, improperly shift the burden of proof. The Commission must of course adduce substantial evidence to support a finding under one of the four standards of § 15, but once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is “contrary to the public interest,” unless other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the weight of this factor. It is not unreasonable to require that a conference adopting a particular rule to govern its own affairs, for reasons best known to the conference itself, must come forward and explain to the Commission what those reasons are. We therefore hold that the antitrust test formulated by the Commission is an appropriate refinement of the statutory “public interest” standard. III. We turn then to the Commission’s analysis of the specific impact of the unanimity rule. The rule is embodied in the basic agreement of the carriers in the Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, an association of the major lines serving passenger traffic between Europe and the United States and Canada. Article 6 (a) of this agreement provides that the rate of commission which member lines may pay to their agents must be established by unanimous agreement of the member lines. In addition, Article 3 (d) of the agreement permits the subcommittee with primary responsibility for suggesting commission rates to make recommendations to the full conference only when subcommittee members are in unanimous accord. The Commission noted that at the time of its hearings, the commission paid by conference members to travel agents was substantially lower than that paid by the airlines. By the time the Commission wrote its opinion on remand, the conference had raised its commission to the level offered by the airlines, but the effective commission earned by travel agents remained lower on ocean travel because booking passage by sea requires three to four times as much of a travel agent’s time as is required to book air travel. The Commission found that the unanimity rule was responsible for the existing disparity between effective commissions on air and sea travel and for the delays in conference action to rectify the situation. On three specific occasions, lack of unanimity prevented the conference subcommittee from recommending an increase, even though a majority was recorded as being in favor of the proposals. The Commission also referred to several other occasions on which the conference and its subcommittee failed to take action. Because minutes apparently were not taken for these meetings, the Commission was unable to determine with certainty whether the unanimity rule had frustrated the will of a majority on these occasions. The Commission then found that as a result of the relatively advantageous commission on sales of air travel, there was a definite tendency for travel agents to encourage their customers to travel by air rather than by sea. This situation in turn not only injured the majority of the shipping lines by diverting business to the airlines, but also injured the undecided traveler, who lost the opportunity to deal with an agent whose recommendations would not be influenced by his own economic interest. The Commission also found that respondents had failed to establish any important public interest served by the unanimity rule. Under these circumstances the Commission concluded that the rule was detrimental to commerce by fostering a decline in travel by sea, and contrary to the public interest in the maintenance of a sound and independent merchant marine. The Commission also found the rule contrary to the public interest in that it invaded the principles of the antitrust laws more than was necessary to further any valid regulatory purpose. We find the Commission’s analysis sound and the evidence in support of its conclusions more than ample. Respondents attack the initial finding that the unanimity-rule has blocked the desires of the majority to raise the commission rate, but the argument reduces to an insistence that the Commission establish this point by conclusive proof. It is true that there is no specific evidence in the record revealing that at any of the conference meetings where no action was taken, a majority favored an immediate increase. But the Maritime Commission faces no such rigorous standard of proof. The issue to be decided was a purely factual one, and the Commission was entitled to draw inferences as to the wishes of the majority from the record as a whole. The record showed beyond doubt that in several instances a majority of the subcommittee favored an increase, and faced with the lack of proof one way or the other as to the wishes of the majority of the full conference, the Commission acted reasonably in assuming that the views of the subcommittee were not diametrically opposed to that of the entire membership. In addition, it is undisputed that the rule on several occasions operated to prevent a majority of the subcommittee from presenting its recommendations to the full conference, and the Commission could reasonably conclude that this impact on the subcommittee served in itself to delay or prevent action by the full conference. Although any conclusion as to the commission rate that would have prevailed under a different voting procedure must to some extent rest on “conjecture,” the court below misconceived its reviewing function when it found this a sufficient basis for setting the Commission’s finding aside. Having correctly noted that positive proof on various aspects of the case was simply not available one way or the other, the Commission was fully entitled to draw inferences on these points from the incomplete evidence that was available. “Conjecture” of this kind, when based on inferences that are reasonable in light of human experience generally or when based on the Commission’s special familiarity with the shipping industry, is fully within the competence of this administrative agency and should be respected by the reviewing courts. Respondents’ attack on the finding that the commission disparity affected the recommendations of travel agents suffers from this same misconception of the Commission’s task. It is true that no agent testified that he had ever persuaded a customer to travel by air over the customer’s preference to travel by sea. Agents heavily dependent on conference business could hardly be expected to make such an admission, but one agent did go so far as to concede that under some circumstances, there was a “definite tendency” to encourage a customer to choose air travel because “it is easier to sell” and “you make more money.” This amply supports the Commission’s conclusion. The final problem is respondents’ claim that the rule is justified because none of the member lines, the American-flag minority in particular, wishes to surrender control over basic financial decisions to a majority of its competitors. This is a bewildering contention, to say the least. The rule may enable a single line to protect itself from a majority decision, but the rule in no way guarantees that line control over its own financial decisions. Lack of unanimity under this particular rule does not leave the lines free to make independent decisions, but simply freezes the existing situation. In this way control over the basic financial decisions of all lines is “surrendered” not to the majority but to any single line that happens to oppose change. We therefore find that the Commission’s conclusions with respect to the unanimity rule were supported by substantial evidence and should have been upheld by the Court of Appeals. IV. The tying rule is imposed by the second conference involved in these cases, the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference. This conference is composed of the major lines providing passenger service between America and Europe, and it has substantially the same membership as the conference which is formally responsible for the unanimity rule already considered. The tying rule prohibits all travel agents authorized to book passage for the member lines “from selling passage tickets for any steamer not connected with the fleets of the member Lines.” The rule does not prohibit these agents from arranging air travel. As the Commission correctly noted, this rule seriously interferes with the purposes of the antitrust laws. Under the Sherman Act, any agreement by a group of competitors to boycott a particular buyer or group of buyers is illegal per se. United States v. General Motors, 384 U. S. 127, 146-147 (1966); Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U. S. 207 (1959). And the conference’s tying rule specifically injures three distinct sets of interests. It denies passengers the advantages of being able to deal with a travel agent who can sell any means of travel. It denies agents the ability to serve passengers who wish to travel on nonconference lines. Most important, it denies nonconference lines the opportunity to reach effectively the 80% of all transatlantic steamship passengers who book their travel through conference-appointed agents. Given these effects of the rule, which are not seriously disputed, it was incumbent upon the conference to establish a justification for the rule in terms of some legitimate objective. One of the possible purposes of the rule is to eliminate the competition of the noncon-ference lines, but this is not a permissible objective under the Shipping Act, see Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 491-493 (1958), and respondents quite properly do not press it. Respondents do contend, however, that the rule is justified as a means of preserving the stability of the conference. By choosing and supervising responsible agents who will book steamship passage only for its members, the conference creates an incentive for members to remain in the conference and for other lines to join. The Commission found no indication, however, that elimination of the rule would in fact jeopardize the stability of the conference. Although no evidence in the record actually tends to refute respondents’ theory, it is also clear that respondents failed to come forward with any evidence to support their claim. The theory was therefore insufficient to justify the undeniable injury to interests ordinarily protected by the antitrust laws. Equally insubstantial is the second justification presented by respondents, that the conference members bear the expense of selecting and supervising qualified agents and that other lines who wish to take advantage of these efforts should pay their fair share by joining the conference. The Commission found that most of the expenses incurred by the conference were in fact reimbursed by the agents themselves through annual fees. Many of the promotional activities were paid for by individual lines, and in addition these arrangements often required matching contributions by the agents. In light of these factors the Commission properly concluded that although the conference’s efforts might entitle it to exercise some control over the agents’ activities, there was no justification for completely prohibiting the agents from dealing with nonconference lines. These circumstances taken together provide substantial support for all three of the Commission’s findings — that the rule is detrimental to the commerce of the United States by injuring passengers, agents, and nonconference lines, that the rule is unjustly discriminatory as between conference and nonconference carriers, and that the rule is contrary to the public interest by unnecessarily invading the policies of the antitrust laws. Y. For the reasons indicated the Commission properly disapproved the tying and unanimity rules involved in these cases. These proceedings were commenced more than eight years ago, and this is the second time the controversy has been appealed to the reviewing courts. On the second appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court took the extraordinary course of simply reversing, without remanding to the Commission for further action. Since we have found that the Commission’s findings and order are supported by substantial evidence, and since there are no other meritorious contentions raised by the respondents, we think it is time for a final disposition of the proceedings. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded with directions to affirm the order of the Commission. It is so ordered. Me. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. 39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. See Hearings before Antitrust Subcommittee of House Committee on the Judiciary, on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries: Ocean. Freight Industry, 86th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., ser. 14, Pt. 1, Vols. I-V, and Pt. 2, Vols. I-II (1959-1960), 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, Pt. 3, Vols: I-II (1961); Hearings before Special Subcommittee on Steamship Conferences of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Steamship Conference Study, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. 1-3 (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 1419, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 75 Stat. 762. For this reason the Commission’s antitrust standard is entirely consistent with respondents’ evidence of a congressional recognition at the time the “contrary to the public interest” test was added in 1961, that “our traditional antitrust concepts cannot be fully applied to this aspect of international commerce.” S. Rep. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1961) (emphasis added). And for the same reason respondents’ reliance on Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 382 U. S. 154 (1965), and Minneapolis St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173 (1959), is misplaced. The antitrust standard formulated here is in full accord with the kind of accommodation between antitrust and regulatory objectives approved by this Court in those cases. Indeed we have stressed that such an accommodation does not authorize the agency in question to ignore the antitrust laws. E. g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 67, 79-80 (1944). Respondents correctly point out that there is no support for the Commission’s finding that the majority of the members were unable to act at the meeting of February-March 1956 because of a veto exercised by one line. It does appear that at the meeting of May 3, 1960, a majority favored an increase, but the memorandum disclosing this does not indicate clearly whether the majority preferred to put the increase into effect immediately, or favored the actual decision to defer consideration. Compare IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C. A. B. 639, 645 (1946). These airline conferences leave the individual members free to initiate their own rates when unanimous agreement cannot be reached. The Commission's reference to the fact that the Caribbean cruise trade operates without a tying rule does not seem to meet respondents’ contention. Since the Caribbean cruise trade operates without a conference at all, the lack of a tying rule would in no way indicate the extent to which such a rule tends to strengthen membership in conferences.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA No. 85-1940. Argued February 23, 1987 Decided March 31, 1987 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., and Jacques B. Gelin. James G. Wilcoxen argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Paul M. Niebell. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620 (1970), the Court determined that certain treaties between the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Tribes and the United States granted to the Tribes fee simple title to the riverbed underlying specified portions of the Arkansas River in Oklahoma. The Court found the circumstances sufficient to overcome the “strong presumption against conveyance by the United States” of title to the bed of a navigable water. Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 552 (1981). See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49 (1926). The question presented in this case is whether the United States must pay the Cherokee Nation compensation for damage to these riverbed interests caused by navigational improvements which it has made on the Arkansas River. The damage to sand and gravel deposits resulted from the McClellan-Kerr Project, approved by Congress in 1946, Act of July 24, 1946, ch. 595, 60 Stat. 634, 635-636, and designed to improve navigation by construction of a channel in the Arkansas River from its mouth at the Mississippi to Catoosa, Oklahoma. The project was completed in 1971. After our decision in Choctaw Nation, the Cherokee Nation sought compensation from the Government. Congress refused to fund the claim after the Department of the Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers concluded that the United States’ navigational servitude rendered it meritless. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, pp. 379-892 (1979). Congress did, however, provide respondent with the opportunity to seek judicial relief, conferring jurisdiction on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma to determine “any claim which the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma may have against the United States for any and all damages to Cherokee tribal assets related to and arising from the construction of the [McClellan-Kerr Project].” H. R. 2329, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The Cherokee Nation filed a complaint contending that the construction of the McClellan-Kerr Project resulted in a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the Tribe’s riverbed interests without just compensation. The United States in response claimed that its navigational servitude precluded liability for the alleged taking. The District Court granted the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the decision in Choctaw Nation created a “unique situation by which a portion of the navigable Arkansas River is, essentially, a private waterway belonging exclusively to the Cherokee Nation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a. Because the United States did not reserve its navigational servitude in the relevant treaties, the court held, it owed the Tribe just compensation, id., at 27a. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, adopting a different analysis. 782 F. 2d 871 (1986). The court rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the United States’ failure to reserve its navigational servitude defeated that interest. It found it “certain [that] the United States retained a navigational servitude in the Arkansas River.” Id., at 876. Nevertheless, the court held that the servitude was insufficient to protect the United States from liability. Finding that “the assertion of a navigational servitude on particular waters acknowledges only that the property owner’s right to use these waters is shared with the public at large,” id., at 877, the court believed that the effect of the navigational servitude varied with the owner’s intended use: “When the exercise of that public power affects private ownership rights not connected to a navigational use, the court must balance the public and private interests to decide whether just compensation is due.” Ibid. Applying this test, the court concluded that though the Cherokee Nation could not interfere with the United States’ exercise of the navigational servitude, it had a right to compensation for any consequent loss of property or diminution in value. We think the Court of Appeals erred in formulating a balancing test to evaluate this assertion of the navigational servitude. No such “balancing” is required where, as here, the interference with in-stream interests results from an exercise of the Government’s power to regulate navigational uses of “the deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195 (1824). Though “this Court has never held that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority to promote navigation,” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, 172 (1979), there can be no doubt that “[t]he Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters.” United States v. Rands, 389 U. S. 121, 122 (1967). It gives to the Federal Government “a ‘dominant servitude/ FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U. S. 239, 249 (1954), which extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below ordinary high-water mark. The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been subject.” Rands, supra, at 123. See also United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799, 808 (1950); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900). The application of these principles to interference with streambed interests has not depended on balancing this valid public purpose in light of the intended use of those interests by the owner. Thus, in Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U. S. 82 (1913), the Court held that no taking occurred where dredging carried out under the direction of the United States destroyed oysters that had been cultivated on privately held lands under the waters of the Great South Bay in New York. The decision rested on the view that the dominant right of navigation “must include the right to use the bed of the water for every purpose which is in aid of navigation.” Id., at 87. The Court did not rely on the particular use to which the private owners put the bed, but rather observed that their very title to the submerged lands “is acquired and held subject to the power of Congress to deepen the water over such lands or to use them for any structure which the interest of navigation, in its judgment, may require.” Id., at 88. See also United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U. S. 386, 390 (1945); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592, 596-597 (1941). These well-established principles concerning the exercise of the United States’ dominant servitude would, in the usual case, dictate that we reject respondent’s “takings” claim. We do not understand respondent to argue otherwise. See e. g., Brief in Opposition 11 — 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 16, 28-29. Instead, the Cherokee Nation asserts that its title to the Arkansas River bed is unique in scope and that interference with that interest requires just compensation. Respondent does not rely explicitly on any language of the relevant treaties, but rather on its reading of Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620 (1970). We have noted that Choctaw Nation involved “very peculiar circumstances,” Montana v. United States, 450 U. S., at 555, n. 5, in that “the Indians were promised virtually complete sovereignty over their new lands.” Choctaw Nation, swpra, at 635. These circumstances allowed the claimants to overcome the strong presumption against conveyance of riverbed interests by the United States, designed to protect the interests of the States under the equal-footing doctrine. See Montana v. United States, supra, at 551-553; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 48-50 (1894). Respondent urges that these circumstances further indicate that the United States abandoned its navigational servitude in the area. Thus, in respondent’s view, the treaties by which it gained fee simple title to the bed of the Arkansas River were such as to make the Arkansas River a “private stream,” Brief for Respondent 28, “not intended as a public highway or artery of commerce.” Id., at 23. We think that the decision in Choctaw Nation was quite generous to respondent, and we refuse to give a still more expansive and novel reading of respondent’s property interests. There is certainly nothing in Choctaw Nation itself that suggests such a broad reading of the conveyance. To the contrary, the Court expressly noted that the United States had no interest in retaining title to the submerged lands because “it had all it was concerned with in its navigational easement via the constitutional power over commerce.” Choctaw Nation, supra, at 635 (emphasis added). The parties, including respondent here, clearly understood that the navigational servitude was dominant no matter how the question of riverbed ownership was resolved. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner in Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, O. T. 1969, No. 59, p. 19 (“[T]here is nothing in the conveyance of title to the land beneath the navigable waters which conflicts with the power of the Government to hold such lands for navigation”). Any other conclusion would be wholly extraordinary, for we have repeatedly held that the navigational servitude applies to all holders of riparian and riverbed interests. See Montana v. United States, supra, at 555; United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U. S. 229, 233 (1960); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 63 (1913), citing Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 271 (1897). Indeed, even when the sovereign States gain “the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use” by operation of the equal-footing doctrine, Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842), this “absolute right” is unquestionably subject to “the paramount power of the United States to ensure that such waters remain free to interstate and foreign commerce.” Montana v. United States, supra, at 551. If the States themselves are subject to this servitude, we cannot conclude that respondent — though granted a degree of sovereignty over tribal lands — gained an exemption from the servitude simply because it received title to the riverbed interests. Such a waiver of sovereign authority will not be implied, but instead must be “‘surrendered in unmistakable terms.’” Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. 41, 52 (1986), quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U. S. 130, 148 (1982). Respondent can point to no such terms. We also reject respondent’s suggestion that the fiduciary obligations of the United States elevate the Government’s actions into a taking. It is, of course, well established that the Government in its dealings with Indian tribal property acts in a fiduciary capacity. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). When it holds lands in trust on behalf of the tribes, the United States may not “give the tribal lands to others, or . . . appropriate them to its own purposes, without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compensation for them.” United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103, 110 (1935). These principles, however, do little to aid respondent’s cause, for they do not create property rights where none would otherwise exist but rather presuppose that the United States has interfered with existing tribal property interests. As we have explained, the tribal interests at issue here simply do not include the right to be free from the navigational servitude, for exercise of the servitude is “not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it. ...” United States v. Rands, 389 U. S., at 123. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Cherokee Nation also claimed that, whether or not the United States’ actions resulted in a taking, the failure to pay compensation violated the Government’s duty to engage in fair and honorable dealings with the Tribe. The District Court did not address this claim, and certified the takings claim for interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). The Court of Appeals accordingly did not consider the issue, and it is not before us here. The dissenting judge found no support for the balancing of public and private interests, noting that “instead the issue is whether the segment or interest is within the definition and scope of the [navigational servitude] doctrine geographically . . . .” 782 F. 2d, at 882. Relying on United States v. Rands, 389 U. S. 121 (1967), the dissent observed that privately owned riverbed interests are subject to the navigational servitude, and found “no authority and no basis for an exception to the public nature of the navigable river to create a ‘private river’ as plaintiff urges nor to create an exception to the application of the navigational servitude because plaintiff is an Indian tribe.” 782 F. 2d, at 883. Though Rands spoke in terms of riparian owners, rather than those holding fee simple title to riverbed interests, our eases make clear that the navigational servitude is dominant to riverbed interests no matter how acquired. See, e. g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592, 596 (1941) (“Whether, under local law, the title to the bed of the stream is retained by the State or the title of the riparian owner extends to the thread of the stream, or ... to low-water mark, the rights of the title holder are subject to the dominant power of the federal Government in respect of navigation”) (footnotes omitted). See also Reply Brief for Petitioner in Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, O. T. 1969, No. 59, pp. 13-14 (“Throughout their brief respondents imply that if title to the river were vested in the petitioner and not in the state (under the equal footing-implied trust doctrine) the authority and power of the United States would somehow be compromised. Such an inference is absurd; no matter who holds title to the riverbed, the petitioner or the state, the rights and power of the United States are precisely the same”). Respondent now argues that these statements merely admitted the power of the United States to exercise the servitude, but did not waive its right to compensation when this exercise damaged its interests. See Brief for Respondent 34. We find no support for the existence of such a “hybrid” navigational servitude in these circumstances.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK & TRUST CO. et al. No. 96-843. Argued October 6, 1997 Decided February 25, 1998 Thomas, J., delivered an opinion, which was for the Court except as to footnote 6. Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Scalia, J., joined except as to footnote 6. O’Con-nor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 503. Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the federal petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, David C. Frederick, Douglas N. Letter, Jacob M. Lewis, Michael E. Robinson, and John K. Ianno. John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner AT&T Family Federal Credit Union et al. With him on the briefs were Paul J. Lambert, Jonathan S. Franklin, and Brenda S. Furlow. Michael S. Heifer argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs were Louis R. Cohen, Christopher R. Lipsett, John J. Gill III, and Michael F. Crotty. Together with No. 96-847, AT&T Family Federal Credit Union et al. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Ad Hoc Small Employers Group et al. by Paul G. Gaston, Richard J. Dines, and Christiane Gigi Hyland; for the California Credit Union League by Thomas H. Ott, Craig A Horowitz, Wayne D. Clayton, and Joseph A McDonald; for the Consumer Federation of America, Inc., et al. by Joseph C. Zengerle; for the National Association of Federal Credit Unions by John F. Cooney, Ronald R. Glancz, Melissa Landau Steinman, William J. Donovan, and Fred M. Haden; and for the National Association of State Credit Union Supervisors by Stanley M. Gorinson, John Longstreth, and C. Stephen Trimmier. Leonard J. Rubin filed a brief for the Independent Bankers Association of America et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 6. Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 48 Stat. 1219, 12 U. S. C. § 1759, provides that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” Since 1982, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the agency charged with administering the FCUA, has interpreted § 109 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple unrelated employer groups, each having its own common bond of occupation. In this action, respondents, five banks and the American Bankers Association, have challenged this interpretation on the ground that § 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite every member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. We granted certiorari to answer two questions. First, do respondents have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal-court review of the NCUA’s interpretation? Second, under the analysis set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), is the NCUA’s interpretation permissible? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. We therefore affirm. I A In 1934, during the Great Depression, Congress enacted the FCUA, which authorizes the chartering of credit unions at the national level and provides that federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to their members. Section 109 of the FCUA, which has remained virtually unaltered since the FCUA’s enactment, expressly restricts membership in federal credit unions. In relevant part, it provides: “Federal credit union, membership shall consist of the incorporators and such other persons and incorporated and unincorporated organizations, to the extent permitted by rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, as may be elected to membership and as such shall each, subscribe to at least one share of its stock and pay the initial installment thereon and a uniform entrance fee if required by the board of directors; except that Federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759 (emphasis added). Until 1982, the NCUA and its predecessors consistently interpreted § 109 to require that the same common bond of occupation unite every member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. In 1982, however, the NCUA reversed its longstanding policy in order to permit credit unions to be composed of multiple unrelated employer groups. See IRPS 82-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 16775 (1982). It thus interpreted § 109’s common bond requirement to apply only to each employer group in a multiple-group credit union, rather than to every member of that credit union. See IRPS 82-3,47 Fed. Reg. 26808 (1982). Under the NCUA’s new interpretation, all of the employer groups in a multiple-group credit union had to be located “within a well-defined area,” ibid., but the NCUA later revised this requirement to provide that each employer group could be located within “an area surrounding the [credit union’s] home or a branch office that can be reasonably served by the [credit union] as determined by NCUA.” IRPS 89-1, 54 Fed. Reg. 31170 (1989). Since 1982, therefore, the NCUA has permitted federal credit unions to be composed of wholly unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond. B After the NCUA revised its interpretation of § 109, petitioner AT&T Family Federal Credit Union (ATTF) expanded its operations considerably by adding unrelated employer groups to its membership. As a result, ATTF now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide, only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 9. The remaining members are employees of such diverse companies as the Lee Apparel Company, the Coca-Cola Bottling Company, the Ciba-Geigy Corporation, the Duke Power Company, and the American Tobacco Company. See App. 54-79. In 1990, after the NCUA approved a series of amendments to ATTP’s charter that added several such unrelated employer groups to ATTP’s membership, respondents brought this action. Invoking the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §702, respondents claimed that the NCUA’s approval of the charter amendments was contrary to law because the members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with ATTP’s existing members, as respondents alleged § 109 required. ATTP and petitioner Credit Union National Association were permitted to intervene in the action as defendants. The District Court dismissed the complaint. It held that respondents lacked prudential standing to challenge the NCUA’s chartering decision because their interests were not within the “zone of interests” to be protected by § 109, as required by this Court’s cases interpreting the APA. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 772 F. Supp. 609 (DC 1991). The District Court rejected as irrelevant respondents’ claims that the NCUA’s interpretation had caused them competitive injury, stating that the legislative history of the FCUA demonstrated that it was passed “to establish a place for credit unions within the country’s financial market, and specifically not to protect the competitive interest of banks.” Id., at 612. The District Court also determined that respondents were not “suitable challengers” to the NCUA’s interpretation, as that term had been used in prior prudential standing cases from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 988 F. 2d 1272, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 907 (1993). The Court of Appeals agreed that “Congress did not, in 1934, intend to shield banks from competition from credit unions,” 988 F. 2d, at 1275, and hence respondents could not be said to be “intended beneficiaries” of § 109. Relying on two of our prudential standing cases involving the financial services industry, Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971), and Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987), the Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that respondents’ interests were sufficiently congruent with the interests of §109’s intended beneficiaries that respondents were “suitable challengers” to the NCUA’s chartering decision; therefore, their suit could proceed. See 988 F. 2d, at 1276-1278. On remand, the District sis that we announced in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), and held that the NCUA had permissibly interpreted § 109. 863 F. Supp. 9 (DC 1994). It first asked whether, in enacting § 109, Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue — whether the same common bond of occupation must unite members of a federal credit union composed of multiple employer groups. See id., at 12. It determined that because § 109 could plausibly be understood to permit an occupationally defined federal credit union to consist of several employer “groups,” each having its own distinct common bond of occupation, Congress had not unambiguously addressed this question. See ibid. The District Court then stated that it was unnecessary to decide, under the second step of Chevron, whether the NCUA’s interpretation was reasonable, because respondents had not “seriously argued” that the interpretation was unreasonable. See 863 F. Supp., at 13-14. Accordingly, the District Court entered summary judgment against respondents. See ibid. The Court of Appeals again reversed. 90 F. 3d 525 (CADC 1996). It held that the District Court had incorrectly applied the first step of Chevron: Congress had indeed spoken directly to the precise question at issue and had unambiguously indicated that the same common bond of occupation must unite members of a federal credit union composed of multiple employer groups. See 90 F. 3d, at 527. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the concept of a “common bond” is implicit in the term “group,” the term “common bond” would be surplusage if it applied only to the members of each constituent “group” in a multiple-group federal credit union. See id., at 528. It further noted that the NCUA had not interpreted §109’s geographical limitation to allow federal credit unions to comprise groups from multiple unrelated “neighborhood^], communities], or rural dis-triet[s]” and stated that the occupational limitation should not be interpreted differently. See id., at 528-529. The NCUA’s revised interpretation of § 109 was therefore impermissible. See id., at 529. Because of the importance of the issues presented, we granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 1148 (1997). Respondents claim a right to judicial review of the NCUA’s chartering decision under § 10(a) of the APA, which provides: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U. S. C. § 702. We have interpreted § 10(a) of the APA to impose a prudential standing requirement in addition to the requirement, imposed by Article III of the Constitution, that a plaintiff have suffered a sufficient injury in fact. See, e. g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 152 (1970) (Data Processing). For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.” Id., at 153. Based on four of our prior cases finding that competitors of financial institutions have standing to challenge agency action relaxing statutory restrictions on the activities of those institutions, we hold that respondents’ interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by § 109. Therefore, respondents have prudential standing under the APA to challenge the NCUA’s interpretation. A Although our prior cases have not stated a clear rule for determining when a plaintiff’s interest is “arguably within the zone of interests” to be protected by a statute, they nonetheless establish that we should not inquire whether there has been a congressional intent to benefit the would-be plaintiff. In Data Processing, supra, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) had interpreted the National Bank Act’s incidental powers clause, Rev. Stat. § 5136, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh, to permit national banks to perform data processing services for other banks and bank customers. See Data Processing, supra, at 151. The plaintiffs, a data processing corporation and its trade association, alleged that this interpretation was impermissible because providing data processing services was not, as was required by the statute, “[an] incidental powe[r]... necessary to carry on the business of banking.” See 397 U. S., at 157, n. 2. In holding that the plaintiffs had standing, we stated that § 10(a) of the APA required only that “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.” Id., at 153. In determining that the plaintiffs’ interest met this requirement, we noted that although the relevant federal statutes—the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh, and the Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1864—did not “in terms protect a specified group[,] . . . their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable.” Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 157. “[A]s competitors of national banks which are engaging in data processing services,” the plaintiffs were within that class of “aggrieved persons” entitled to judicial review of the Comptroller’s interpretation. Ibid. Less than a year later, we applied the “zone of interests” test in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U. S. 45 (1970) (per curiam) (Arnold Tours). There, certain travel agencies challenged a ruling by the Comptroller, similar to the one contested in Data Processing, that permitted national banks to operate travel agencies. See 400 U. S., at 45. In holding that the plaintiffs had prudential standing under the APA, we noted that it was incorrect to view our decision in Data Processing as resting on the peculiar legislative history of §4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, which had been passed in part at the behest of the data processing industry. See 400 U. S., at 46. We stated explicitly that “we did not rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to protect data processors alone from competition.” Ibid. We further explained: “In Data Processing . . . [w]e held that §4 arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it. Nothing in the opinion limited §4 to protecting only competitors in the data-proeessing field. When national banks begin to provide travel services for their customers, they compete with travel agents no less than they compete with data processors when they provide data-processing services to their customers.” Ibid, (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A year later, we decided Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971) (ICI). In that ease, an investment company trade association and several individual investment companies alleged that the Comptroller had violated, inter alia, §21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 1932, by permitting national banks to establish and operate what in essence were early versions of mutual funds. We held that the plaintiffs, who alleged that they would be injured by the competition resulting from the Comptroller’s action, had standing under the APA and stated that the case was controlled by Data Processing. See 401 U. S., at 621. Significantly, we fonnd unpersuasive Justice Harlan’s argument in dissent that the suit should be dismissed because “neither the language of the pertinent provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act nor the legislative history evineefd] any congressional concern for the interests of petitioners and others like them in freedom from competition.” Id., at 640. Our fourth case in this vein was Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987) (Clarke). There, a securities dealers trade association sued the Comptroller, this time for authorizing two national banks to offer discount brokerage services both at their branch offices and at other locations inside and outside their home States. See id., at 391. The plaintiff contended that the Comptroller’s action violated the McFadden Act, which permits national banks to carry on the business of banking only at authorized branches, and to open new branches only in their home States and only to the extent that state-chartered banks in that State can do so under state law. See id., at 891-392. We again held that the plaintiff had standing under the APA. Summarizing our prior holdings, we stated that although the “zone of interests” test “denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are . . . marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute,” id., at 399, “there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff,” id., at 399-400 (citing ICI). We then determined that by limiting the ability of national banks to do business outside their home States, “Congress ha[d] shown a concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money.” 479 U. S., at 403. The interest of the securities dealers in preventing national banks from expanding into the securities markets directly implicated this concern because offering discount brokerage services would allow national banks “access to more money, in the form of credit balances, and enhanced opportunities to lend money, viz., for margin purchases.” Ibid. The case was thus analogous to Data Processing and ICI: “In those cases the question was what activities hanks could engage in at all; here, the question is what activities banks can engage in without regard to the limitations imposed by state branching law.” 479 U. S., at 403. B Our prior eases, therefore, have consistently held that for a plaintiff’s interests to be arguably within the “zone of interests” to be protected by a statute, there does not have to be an “indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Id., at 399-400 (citing ICI); see also Arnold Tours, 400 U. S., at 46 (citing Data Processing). The proper inquiry is simply “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected... by the statute.” Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added). Hence in applying the “zone of interests” test, we do not ask whether, in enacting the statutory provision at issue, Congress specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff. Instead, we first discern the interests “arguably ... to be protected” by the statutory provision at issue; we then inquire whether the plaintiff’s interests affected by the agency action in question are among them. Section 109 provides that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759. By its express terms, §109 limits membership in every federal credit union to members of definable “groups.” Because federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to members, see, e. g., 12 U. S. C. §§ 1757(5)-(6), § 109 also restricts the markets that every federal credit union can serve. Although these markets need not be small, they unquestionably are limited. The link between § 109’s regulation of federal credit union membership and its limitation on the markets that federal credit unions can serve is unmistakable. Thus, even if it cannot be said that Congress had the specific purpose of benefiting commercial banks, one of the interests “arguably... to be protected” by § 109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. This interest is precisely the interest of respondents affected by the NCUA’s interpretation of § 109. As competitors of federal credit unions, respondents certainly have an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve, and the NCUA’s interpretation has affected that interest by allowing federal credit unions to increase their customer base. Section 109 cannot be distinguished from the statutory provisions at issue in Clarke, ICI, Arnold Tours, and Data Processing. Although in Clarke the McFadden Act appeared to be designed to protect only the interest of state banks in parity of treatment with national banks, we nonetheless determined that the statute also limited “the extent to which [national] banks [could] engage in the discount brokerage business and hence Iimit[ed] the competitive impact on nonbank discount brokerage houses.” Clarke, 479 U. S., at 408. Accordingly, although Congress did not intend specifically to protect securities dealers, one of the interests “arguably ... to be protected” by the statute was an interest in restricting national bank market power. The plaintiff securities dealers, as competitors of national banks, had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the interpretation of the McFadden Act they sought to challenge, because that interpretation had allowed national banks to expand their activities and serve new customers. See ibid. Similarly, in ICI, even though in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress did not intend specifically to benefit investment companies and may have sought only to protect national banks and their depositors, one of the interests “arguably ... to be protected” by the statute was an interest in restricting the ability of national banks to enter the securities business. The investment company plaintiffs, as competitors of national banks, had that interest^ and that interest had been affected by the Comptroller’s interpretation allowing national banks to establish mutual funds. So too, in Arnold Tours and Data Processing, although in enacting the National Bank Act and the Bank Service Corporation Act, Congress did not intend specifically to benefit travel agents and data processors and may have been concerned only with the safety and soundness of national banks, one of the interests “arguably ... to be protected” by the statutes was an interest in preventing national banks from entering other businesses’ product markets. As competitors of national banks, travel agents and data processors had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the Comptroller’s interpretations opening their markets to national banks. See also NationsBank of N C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251 (1995) (deciding that the Comptroller had permissibly interpreted 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh to allow national banks to act as agents in the sale of annuities; insurance agents’ standing to challenge .the interpretation not questioned). C Petitioners attempt to distinguish this action principally on the ground that there is no evidence that Congress, when it enacted the FCUA, was at all concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks, or indeed at all concerned with competition. See Brief for Petitioner ATTF 21-22. Indeed, petitioners contend that the very reason Congress passed the FCUA was that “[blanks were simply not in the picture” as far as small borrowers were concerned, and thus Congress believed it necessary to create a new source of credit for people of modest means. See id., at 25. The difficulty with this argument is that similar arguments were made unsuccessfully in each of Data Processing, Arnold Tours, ICI, and Clarke. In Data Processing, the Comptroller argued against standing for the following reasons: “[P]etitioners do not contend that Section 24 Seventh had any purpose ... to protect the interest of potential competitors of national banks. The reason is clear: the legislative history of the Section dispels all possible doubt that its enactment in 1864 (18 Stat. 101) was for the express and sole purpose of creating a strong national banking system .... To the extent that the protection of a competitive interest was at the bottom of the enactment of Section 24 Seventh, it was the interest of national banks and not of their competitors.” Brief for Comptroller of the Currency in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, O. T. 1969, No. 85, pp. 19-20. Similarly, in Arnold Tours, the Comptroller contended that the position of the travel agents was “markedly different from that of the data processors,” who could find in the legislative history “some manifestation of legislative concern for their competitive position.” Memorandum for Comptroller of the Currency in Opposition in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, O. T. 1970, No. 602, pp. 8-4. And in ICI, the Comptroller again urged us not to find standing, because— “[t]he thrust of the legislation, and the concern of the drafters, was to protect the banking public through the maintenance of a sound national banking system .... “There was no Congressional objective to protect mutual funds or their investment advisers or underwriters.” Brief for Comptroller of Currency in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, O. T. 1970, No. 61, pp. 27-29 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Indeed, the. Congressional attitude toward the investment bankers can only be characterized as one of distaste. For example, in discussing the private investment bankers, Senator Glass pointed out that many of them had ‘unloaded millions of dollars of worthless investment securities upon the banks of this country.’” Id., at 30, n. 22 (citation omitted). Finally, in Clarke, the Comptroller contended that “[tjhere is no doubt that Congress had only one type of competitive injury in mind when it passed the [McFadden] Act — the type that national and state banks might inflict upon each other.” Brief for Federal Petitioner in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., O. T. 1985, No. 85-971, p. 24. In each case, we declined to accept the Comptroller’s argument. In Data Processing, we considered it irrelevant that the statutes in question “d[id] not in terms protect a specified group,” because “their general policy [was] apparent[,] and those whose interests [were] directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of [the statutes] [were] easily identifiable.” 397 U. S., at 157. In Arnold Tours, we similarly believed it irrelevant that Congress had shown no concern for the competitive position of travel agents in enacting the statutes in question. See 400 U. S., at 46. In ICI, we were unmoved by Justice Harlan’s comment in dissent that the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in spite of its positive effects on the competitive position of investment banks. See 401 U. S., at 640. And in Clarke, we did not debate whether the Congress that enacted the McFadden Act was concerned about the competitive position of securities dealers. See 479 U. S., at 403. The provisions at issue in each of these cases, moreover, could be said merely to be safety-and-soundness provisions, enacted only to protect national banks and their depositors and without a concern for competitive effects. We nonetheless did not hesitate to find standing. We therefore cannot accept petitioners’ argument that respondents do not have standing because there is no evidence that the Congress that enacted § 109 was concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks. To accept that argument, we would have to reformulate the “zone of interests” test to require that Congress have specifically intended to benefit a particular class of plaintiffs before a plaintiff from that class could have standing under the APA to sue. We have refused to do this in our prior eases, and we refuse to do so today. Petitioners also mistakenly rely on our decision in Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U. S. 517 (1991). In Air Courier, we held that the interest of Postal Service employees in maximizing employment opportunities was not within the “zone of interests” to be protected by the postal monopoly statutes, and hence those employees did not have standing under the APA to challenge a Postal Service regulation suspending its monopoly over certain international operations. See id., at 519. We stated that the purposes of the statute were solely to increase the revenues of the Post Office and to ensure that postal services were provided in a manner consistent with the public interest, see id., at 526-527. Only those interests, therefore, and not the interests of Postal Service employees in their employment, were “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected” by the statute. Cf. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883 (1990) (stating that an agency reporting company would not have prudential standing to challenge the agency’s failure to comply with a statutory mandate to eon-duet hearings on the record). We further noted that although the statute in question regulated competition, the interests of the plaintiff employees had nothing to do with competition. See Air Courier, supra, at 528, n. 5 (stating that “[ejmployees have generally been denied standing to enforce competition laws because they lack competitive and direct injury”)- In this action, not only do respondents have “competitive and direct injury,” but, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, they possess an interest that is “arguably ... to be protected” by § 109. Respondents’ interest in limiting the markets that credit unions can serve is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected” by § 109. Under our precedents, it is irrelevant that in enacting the FCUA, Congress did not specifically intend to protect commercial banks. Although it is clear that respondents’ objectives in this action are not eleemosynary in nature, under our prior cases that, too, is beside the point. Ill Turning to the merits, we must judge the permissibility of the NCUA’s current interpretation of § 109 by employing the analysis set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Under that analysis, we first ask whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id., at 842-848. If we determine that Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, we then inquire whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See id., at 843-844. Because we conclude that Congress has made it clear that the same common bond of occupation must unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union, we hold that the NCUA’s contrary interpretation is impermissible under the first step of Chevron. As noted, § 109 requires that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” Respondents contend that because § 109 uses the article “a” — “i. e., one”— in conjunction with the noun “common bond,” the “natural reading” of §109 is that all members in an occupationally defined federal credit union must be united by one common bond. See Brief for Respondents 33. Petitioners reply that because § 109 uses the plural noun “groups,” it permits multiple groups, each with its own common bond, to constitute a federal credit union. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 29-30. Like the Court of Appeals, we do not think that either of these contentions, standing alone, is conclusive. The article “a” could be thought to convey merely that one bond must unite only the members of each group in a multiple-group credit unión, and not all of the members in the credit union taken together. See 90 F. 3d, at 528. Similarly, the plural word “groups” could be thought to refer not merely to multiple groups in a particular credit union, but rather to every single “group” that forms a distinct credit union under the FCUA. See ibid. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, additional considerations compel the conclusion that the same common bond of occupation must unite all of the members of an occupationally defined federal credit union. First, the NCUA’s current interpretation makes the phrase "common bond” surplusage when applied to a federal credit union made up of multiple unrelated employer groups, because each "group” in such a credit union already has its own "common bond.” See ibid. To use the facts of this action, the employees of AT&T and the employees of the American Tobacco Company each already had a “common bond” before being joined together as members of ATTF. The former were bonded because they worked for AT&T, and the latter were bonded because they worked for the American Tobacco Company. If the phrase “common bond” is to be given any meaning when these employees are joined together, a different "common bond” — one extending to each and every employee considered together — must be found to unite them. Such a "common bond” exists when employees of different subsidiaries of the same company are joined together in a federal credit union; it does not exist, however, when employees of unrelated companies are so joined. See ibid. Put another way, in the multiple employer group context, the NCUA has read the statute as though it merely stated that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to occupational groups,” but that is simply not what the statute provides. Second, the NCUA’s interpretation violates the established canon of construction that similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be accorded a consistent meaning. See Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 225 (1992). Section 109 consists of two parallel clauses: Federal credit union membership is limited “to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759 (emphasis added). The NCUA concedes that even though the second limitation permits geographically defined credit unions to have as members more than one "group,” all of the groups must come from the same “neighborhood, community, or rural district.” See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 37. The reason that the NCUA has never interpreted, and does not contend that it could interpret, the geographical limitation to allow a credit union to be composed of members from an unlimited number of unrelated geographic units, is that to do so would render the geographical limitation meaningless. Under established principles of statutory interpretation, we must interpret the occupational limitation in the same way. Petitioners have advanced one reason why we should interpret the occupational limitation differently. They contend that whereas the geographical limitation uses the word "within” and is thus "prepositional,” the occupational limitation uses the word “having” and is thus “participial” (and therefore less limiting). See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 31. There is, however, no reason why a participial phrase is inherently more open-ended than a prepositional one; indeed, certain participial phrases can narrow the relevant universe in an exceedingly effective manner — for example, “persons having February 29th as a wedding anniversary.” Reading the two parallel clauses in the same way, we must conclude that, just as all members of a geographically defined federal credit union must be drawn from the same “neighborhood, community, or rural district,” members of an occupationally defined federal credit union must be united by the same “common bond of occupation.” Finally, by its terms, § 109 requires that membership in federal credit unions “shall be limited.” The NCUA’s interpretation — under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group— has the potential to read these words out of the statute entirely. The NCUA has not contested that, under its current interpretation, it would be permissible to grant a charter to a conglomerate credit union whose members would include the employees of every company in the United States. Nor can it: Each company’s employees would be a “group,” and each such “group” would have its own “common bond of occupation.” Section 109, however, cannot be considered a limitation on credit union membership if at the same time it permits such a limitless result. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the NCUA’s current interpretation of § 109 is contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and is thus impermissible under the first step of Chevron. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice Scalia joins this opinion, except as to footnote 6. The Court of Appeals’ holding that respondents had prudential standing conflicted with a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached prior to this Court’s decision in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987). See Branch Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Administration Bd., 786 F. 2d 621 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 1063 (1987). A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit later reached a similar conclusion, with one judge dissenting. See First City Bank v. National Credit Union Administration Bd., 111 F. 3d 433 (1997). According to the NCUA, since 1982, thousands of federal credit unions have relied on the NCUA’s revised interpretation of § 109. See Pet. for Cert. in No. 96-843, p. 14. Moreover, following the Court of Appeals’ decision on the merits, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a nationwide injunction prohibiting the NCUA from approving the addition of unrelated employer groups to any federal credit union. See Brief for Petitioner ATTF 14, n. 5. In this action, it is not disputed that respondents have suffered an injury in fact because the NCUA’s interpretation allows persons who might otherwise be their customers to be members, and therefore customers, of ATTF. Under § 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, it is unlawful “[f]or any person, firm, [or] corporation ... engaged in the business of issuing... securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits.” § 21 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 189, 12 U. S. G. § 378(a). The legislative history of § 109, upon which petitioners so heavily rely, supports this conclusion. Credit unions originated in xnid-19th-century Europe as cooperative associations that were intended to provide credit to persons of small means; they were usually organized around some common theme, either geographic or associational. See General Accounting Office, Credit Unions: Reforms for Ensuring Future Soundness 24 (July 1991). Following the European example, in the 1920’s many States passed statutes authorizing the chartering of credit unions, and a number of those statutes contained provisions similar to § 109’s common bond requirement. See A. Burger & T. Dadn, Field of Membership: An Evolving Concept 6 (2d ed. 1992). During the Great Depression, in contrast to widespread bank failures at both the state and national level, there were no involuntary liquidations of state-chartered credit unions. See S. Rep. No. 555,73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). The cooperative nature of the institutions, which state-law common bond provisions reinforced, was believed to have contributed to this result. See Credit Unions: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20, 26 (1933). A common bond provision was thus included in the District of Columbia Credit Union Act, which Congress passed in 1932; it was identical to the FCUA’s common bond provision enacted two years later. When Congress enacted the FCUA, sponsors of the legislation emphasized that the cooperative nature of credit unions allowed them to make credit available to persons who otherwise would not qualify for loans. See S. Rep. No. 555, supra, at 1,3. The legislative history thus confirms that § 109 was thought to reinforce the cooperative nature of credit unions, which in turn was believed to promote their safety and soundness and allow access to credit to persons otherwise unable to borrow. Because, by its very nature, a cooperative institution must serve a limited market, the legislative history of § 109 demonstrates that one of the interests “arguably ... to be protected” • by § 109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. Contrary to the dissent’s contentions, see post, at 503,509, our formulation does not “eviscerat[e]” or “abolis[h]” the zone of interests requirement. Nor can it be read to imply that, in order to have standing under the APA, a plaintiff must merely have an interest in enforcing the statute in question. The test we have articulated — discerning the interests “arguably ... to be protected” by the statutory provision at issue and inquiring whether the plaintiff’s interests affected by the agency action in question are among them — differs only as a matter of semantics from the formulation that the dissent has accused us of “eviscerating” or “abolishing,” see post, at 504 (stating that the plaintiff must establish that “the injury he complains of... falls 'within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Our only disagreement with the dissent lies in the application of the “zone of interests” test. Because of the unmistakable link between § 109’s express restriction on credit union membership and the limitation on the markets that federal credit unions can serve, there is objectively “some indication in the statute,” post, at 517 (emphasis deleted), that respondents’ interest is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected” by § 109. Hence respondents are more than merely incidental beneficiaries of § 109’s effects on competition. The data processing companies, travel agents, investment companies, and securities dealers that challenged the Comptroller’s rulings in our prior cases certainly did not bring suit to advance the noble goal of maintaining the safely and soundness of national banks, or to promote the interests of national bank depositors. Unlike some of our prudential standing cases, no suggestion is made in this action that Congress has sought to preclude judicial review of agency action. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340 (1984). We have no need to consider §109’s legislative history, which, as both courts below found, is extremely “murky” and a “slender reed on which to place reliance.” 90 F. 3d, at 530 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. TESTAN et al. No. 74-753. Argued November 12, 1975 Decided March 2, 1976 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stevens, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. John P. Rupp argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, and Ronald R. Glancz. Edwin J. McDermott argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Robert N. Sayler, filed a brief for Melvin Allison et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit for reclassification of federal civil service positions and for backpay. It presents a substantial issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the relief available in that tribunal. I The plaintiff-respondents, Herman R. Testan and Francis L. Zarrilli, are trial attorneys employed in the Office of Counsel, Defense Personnel Support Center, Defense Supply Agency, in Philadelphia. They represent the Government in certain matters that come before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals of the Department of Defense. Their positions are subject to the Classification Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5101 et seq., and they are presently classified at civil service grade GS-13. In December 1969 respondents, through their Chief Attorney, requested their employing agency to reclassify their positions to grade GS-14. The asserted ground was that their duties and responsibilities met the requirements for the higher grade under standards promulgated by the Civil Service Commission in General Attorney Series GS-905-0. In addition, they contended that their duties were identical to those of other trial attorneys in positions classified as GS-14 in the Contract Appeals Division, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and that under the principle of “equal pay for substantially equal work,” prescribed in § 5101 (1)(A), they were entitled to the higher classification. The agency, after an audit by a position classification specialist, concluded that the respondents’ assigned duties were properly classified at the GS-13 level under the Commission’s classification standards. On appeal, the Commission reached the same conclusion and denied reclassification. The Commission also ruled that comparison of the positions held by the respondents with those of attorneys employed by the referenced Logistics Command was not a proper method of classification. The two respondents then instituted this suit in the Court of Claims. Each sought an order directing reclassification of his position as of the date (May 8, 1970) of the first administrative denial of his request, and back-pay, computed at the difference between his salary and grade GS-14 (and the claimed appropriate within-grade step), from that date. The trial judge, in a long opinion, App. 43-117, concluded that the respondents were not entitled to backpay due to their allegedly wrongful'classi-fieation. Id., at 57. But he also concluded that the Commission’s refusal to reclassify respondents to GS-14 was arbitrary, discriminatory, and not supported by substantial evidence, ibid., and that as a matter of law the respondents were entitled to an order remanding the case to the Commission with directions so to. reclassify the respondents. Id., at 58, 117. The Court of Claims considered the case en banc and divided 4-3. The majority disapproved the trial judge’s recommendation that the court was empowered to direct the reclassification of respondents to GS-14, for the Court of .Claims is not authorized to create an entitlement to a governmental position. “If entitlement depends on the exercise of discretion by someone else we cannot substitute our own discretion.” 205 Ct. Cl. 330, 332, 499 F. 2d 690, 691 (1974). The majority felt, however, that if the Commission were to determine that it had made an erroneous classification, that determination “could create a legal right which we could then enforce by a money judgment.” Id., at 333, 499 F. 2d, at 691. The majority agreed with the trial judge that the Commission’s failure to compare respondents’ positions with those of the Logistics Command attorneys was arbitrary and capricious. Id., at 331, 499 F. 2d, at 691. The court observed: “Ordinarily ... it is not arbitrary and capricious to refuse to consider the grade of employees other than the ones complaining.” But it went on to say: “This case is peculiar in its facts,” for the employees “all belong to a small readily manageable cadre, their jobs have a large nexus of duties shared in common, and the other employees are specifically pointed out by the complaining employees.” Id., at 332, 499 F. 2d, at 691. The court ruled that it had the power under the remand statute, 86 Stat. 652, now codified as part of 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), to order the Commission to reconsider its classification decision “under proper directions.” Accordingly, and pursuant to its Rule 149 (b), the court remanded the case to the Commission to make the comparison and to report the result to the court. The dissent argued that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is limited to money judgments and, since none had been or could be ordered in this case, the court was without jurisdiction even to remand the case to the Civil Service Commission. In addition, the respondents had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, for they were asking for positions, and pay, to which they had never been appointed. The dissent further argued that there is no constitutional right to a governmental position to which one has not been appointed; that the salary of a Government job is payable only to the person appointed to that position; and that the court has no authority to take over the appointing power that the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, has placed in the Executive Department. It asserted that the decision of the majority was but a declaratory judgment, a legal function not within the court’s jurisdiction. Finally, the dissent argued that the classification decision of the Commission was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. 205 Ct. Cl., at 334-338, 499 F. 2d, at 692-694. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue in the measure of the Court of Claims' statutory jurisdiction, and because of the significance of the court's decision upon the Commission's administration of the civil service classification system. 420 U. S. 923 (1975). II We turn to the respective statutes that are advanced as support for the action taken by the Court of Claims. A. The Tucker Act. The central provision establishing the jurisdiction of the court is that part of the Tucker Act now codified as 28 U. S. C. § 1491: "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or un-liquidated damages in cases not soui~ding in tort." This Court recently had occasion to examine the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under this statutory formulation. In United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1 (1969), the Court reviewed a decision (182 Ct. Cl. 631, 390 F. 2d 894) in which the Court of Claims had concluded that it was empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2201. This Court observed that the Court of Claims was established by Congress in 1855; that "[t]hroughout its entire history," until the King case was filed, "its jurisdiction has been limited to money claims against the United States Government”; that decided cases in this Court had “reaffirmed this view of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Claims,” and “the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887 had not expanded that jurisdiction to equitable matters”; that “neither the Act creating the Court of Claims nor any amendment to it” granted that court jurisdiction of the case before it because King’s claim was “not limited to actual, presently due money damages from the United States”; and that what King was requesting was “essentially equitable relief of a kind that the Court of Claims has held throughout its history ... it does not have the power to grant.” 395 U. S., at 2-3. The Court then went on to hold that the Declaratory Judgment Act did not grant the Court of Claims authority to issue declaratory judgments. Cited in support of all this were Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 557 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion); United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 (1889); and United States v. Alire, 6 Wall. 573, 575 (1868). See Lee v. Thornton, 420 U. S. 139 (1975); Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464 (1973); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 589-591 (1941). The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages. The Court of Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction upon it whenever the substantive right exists. Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1009 (1967). We therefore must determine whether the two other federal statutes that are invoked by the respondents confer a substantive right to recover money damages from the United States for the period of their allegedly wrongful civil service classifications. B. The Classification Act. Inasmuch as the trial judge proposed, App. 57, that the respondents were not entitled to backpay under the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5596, and the Court of Claims held that there was no need for it to reach and construe that Act, 205 Ct. Cl., at 333, 499 F. 2d, at 691, it is implicit in the court’s decision in favor of respondents that a violation of the Classification Act gives rise to a claim for money damages for pay lost by reason of the allegedly wrongful classifications. It long has been established, of course, that the United States, as sovereign, “is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S., at 586. And it has been said, in a Court of Claims context, that a waiver of the traditional sovereign immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. King, 395 U. S., at 4; Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 (1957). Thus, except as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the United States, “there is no jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United States.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S., at 587-588. We find no provision in the Classification Act that expressly makes the United States liable for pay lost through allegedly improper classifications. To be sure, in the “purpose” section of the Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5101 (1)(A), Congress stated that it was “to provide a plan for classification of positions whereby . . . the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed.” And in subsequent sections, there are set forth substantive standards for grading particular positions, and provisions for procedures to ensure that those standards are met. But none of these several sections contains an express provision for an award of backpay to a person who has been erroneously classified. In answer to this fact, the respondents and the amid make two observations. They first argue that the Tucker Act fundamentally waives sovereign immunity with respect to any claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or regulation, and makes available any and all generally accepted and important forms of redress, including money damages. It is said that the Government has confused two very different issues, namely, whether there has been a waiver of sovereignty, and whether a substantive right has been created, and it is claimed that where there has been a violation of a substantive right, the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity as to all measures necessary to redress that violation. The argument does not persuade us. As stated above, the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional, and grant of a right of action must be made with specificity. The respondents do not rest their claims upon a contract; neither do they seek the return of money paid by them to the Government. It follows' that the asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl., at 607, 372 F. 2d, at 1009; Mosca v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 283, 290, 417 F. 2d 1382, 1386 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U. S. 911 (1970). We are not ready to tamper with these established principles because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy. See Brief for Amici Curiae 9-11. In a suit against the United States, there cannot be a right to money damages without a waiver of sovereign immunity, and we regard as unsound the argument of amici that all substantive rights of necessity create a waiver of sovereign immunity such that money damages are available to redress their violation. We perceive nothing in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 (1974), cited by the amici with other cases centering in the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”), that lends support to the respondents. These Fifth Amendment cases are tied to the language, purpose, and self-executing aspects of that constitutional provision, Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933), and are not authority to the effect that the Tucker Act eliminates from consideration the sovereign immunity of the United States. The respondents and the amici next argue that the violation of any statute or regulation relating to federal employment automatically creates a cause of action against the United States for money damages because, if this were not so, the employee would then have a right without a remedy, inasmuch as he is denied access to the one forum where he may seek redress. Here again we are not persuaded. Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim — whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation — does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court of Claims has stated, that basis “in itself... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl., at 607, 372 F. 2d, at 1008, 1009. We see nothing akin to this in the Classification Act or in the context of a suit seeking reclassification. The present action, of course, is not one concerning a wrongful discharge or a wrongful suspension. In that situation, at least since the Civil Service Act of 1883, the employee is entitled to the emoluments of his position until he has been legally disqualified. United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390 (1906). There is no claim here that either respondent has been denied the benefit of the position to which he was appointed. The claim, instead, is that each has been denied the benefit of a position to which he should have been, but was not, appointed. The established rule is that one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has been duly appointed to it. United States v. McLean, 95 U. S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F. 2d 900, 902 (1967). The Classification Act does not purport by its terms to change that rule, and we see no suggestion in it or in its legislative history that Congress intended to alter it. The case of Selman v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 675, 498 F. 2d 1354 (1974), pressed upon us by the respondents, if correct, is clearly distinguishable. The pay claims there rested flatly upon the mandatory provision contained in 37 U. S. C. § 202 (l) to the effect that an officer “serving as Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy is entitled to the basic pay of a rear admiral (lower half) or brigadier general, as appropriate.” Neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act contains any mandatory provision of this kind. The situation, as we see it, is not that Congress has left the respondents remediless, as they assert, for their allegedly wrongful civil service classification, but that Congress has not made available to a party wrongfully classified the remedy of money damages through retroactive classification. There is a difference between prospective reclassification, on the one hand, and retroactive reclassification resulting in money damages, on the. other. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Respondents, of course, have an administrative avenue of prospective relief available to them under the elaborate and structured provisions of the Classification Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 5101-5115. The amici so recognize. Brief for Amici Curiae 13-15. Among the Act’s provisions along this line are those requiring the Civil Service Commission to engage in supervisory review of an agency’s classifications, and, where necessary, to review and reclassify individual positions, 5 U. S. C. §5110; allowing the Commission to reclassify, § 5112; and allowing the Commission even to revoke or suspend the agency’s authority to classify its own positions, § 5111. Indeed, as the amid describe it: “[T]he Act is not merely a hortatory catalogue of high principles.” Brief for Amici Curiae 15. The built-in avenue of administrative relief is one response to these statutory requirements. Review and reclassification may be brought into play at the request of an employee. 5 U. S. C. § 5112 (b). And respondents, as has been- noted, did just that. A second possible ave-, nue of relief — and it, too, seemingly, is only prospective— is by way of mandamus, under 28 U. S. C. § 1361, in a proper federal district court. In this way, also, the respondents have asserted their claims. See n. 5, supra. The respondents, thus, are not entirely without remedy. They are without the remedies in the Court of Claims of retroactive classification and money damages to which they assert they are entitled. Additional remedies of this kind are for the Congress to provide and not for the courts to construct. Finally, we note that if the respondents were correct in their claims to retroactive classification and money damages, many of the federal statutes — such as the Back Pay Act — that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous. The Court of Claims, in the present case, sought to avoid all this by its remand to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. If, then, the Commission were to find that the respondents were entitled to a higher grade, the Court of Claims announced that it would be prepared on appropriate motion to enter ah award of money damages for the respondents for whatever backpay they lost during the period of their wrongful classifications. See Chambers v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 186, 451 F. 2d 1045 (1971). The remand statute, Pub. L. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652, now codified as part of 28 U. S. C. § 1491 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Court of Claims to “issue orders directing restoration to . . . position, placement in appropriate duty . . . status, and correction of applicable records” in order to complement the relief afforded by a money judgment, and also to “remand appropriate matters to any administrative . . . body” in a case “within its jurisdiction.” The remand statute, thus, applies only to cases already within the court’s jurisdiction. The present litigation is not such a case. Respondents cite Allison v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 263, 451 F. 2d 1035 (1971), and Pettit v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 207, 488 F. 2d 1026 (1973), as precedent for the remand order in this case. Those cases found the employees’ “entitlement” to money damages in an Executive Order, and to that extent might be distinguishable from the instant case. But cf. Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F. 2d 93 (CA6 1971); Onotta v. United States, 415 F. 2d 1271 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 934 (1970); Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 350 F. 2d 451 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 978 (1966). To the extent, however, that AUison and Pettit rely on the concept that an admission of misclassification by an agency automatically gives rise to a cause of action for money damages against the United States, their reasoning is identical to the Court of Claims’ reasoning in the instant case; and to the extent that analysis is now rejected, the analysis of Allison and Pettit is necessarily rejected. See also Chambers v. United States, supra. C. The Back Pay Act. This statute, which the Court of Claims found unnecessary to evaluate in arriving at its decision, does not apply, in our view, to wrongful-classification claims. The Act does authorize retroactive recovery of wages whenever a federal employee has “undergone an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action that has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or a part of” the compensation to which the employee is otherwise entitled. 5 U. S. C. § 5596 (b). The statute’s language was intended to provide a monetary remedy for wrongful reductions in grade, removals, suspensions, and “other unwarranted or unjustified actions affecting pay or allowances [that] could occur in the course of reassignments and change from full-time to part-time work.” S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966). The Commission consistently has so construed the Back Pay Act. See 5 CFR § 550.803 (e) (1975). So has the Court of Claims. See Desmond v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 507, 527 (1973). For many years federal personnel actions were viewed as entirely discretionary and therefore not subject to any judicial review, and in the absence of a statute eliminating that discretion, courts refused to intervene where an employee claimed that he had been wrongfully discharged. Compare Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293-296 (1900), with United States v. Wicker sham, 201 U. S. 390 (1906). See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1974). Relief was invariably denied where the claim was that the employee had been denied a promotion on improper grounds. See Keim v. United States, 177 U. S., at 296; United States v. McLean, 95 U. S., at 753. Congress, of course, now has provided specifically in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U. S. C. § 7501, for administrative review of a claim of wrongful adverse action, and in the Back Pay Act for the award of money damages for a wrongful deprivation of pay. But federal agencies continue to have discretion in determining most matters relating to the terms and conditions of federal employment. One continuing aspect of this is the rule, mentioned above, that the federal employee is entitled to receive only the salary of the position to which he was appointed, even though he may have performed the duties of another position or claims that he should have been placed in a higher grade. Congress did not override this rule, or depart from it, with its enactment of the Back Pay Act. It could easily have so provided had that been its intention. In support of their contention that the Back Pay Act authorizes a claim in the situation here presented, respondents and amici cite only two cases other than the Court of Claims cases whose reasoning is directly in question here. Neither case supports the proposition. Walker v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 749 (DC 1973). (cited by respondents), addressed the issue of the retro-activity of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Ainsworth v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 110, 399 F. 2d 176 (1968) (cited by amici), involved the rights of an employee who had been discharged and subsequently reinstated. Neither of these cases provides a reason for doubting that the Back Pay Act, as its words so clearly indicate, was intended to grant a monetary cause of action only to those who were subjected to a reduction in their duly appointed emoluments or position. III We therefore conclude that neither the Classification Act nor the Back Pay Act creates a substantive right in the respondents to backpay for the period of their claimed wrongful classifications. This makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional argument advanced by the United States that the Classification Act does not require that positions held by employees of one agency be compared with those of employees in another agency. The Court of Claims was in error when it remanded the case to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. That court’s judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the respondents’ suit. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Title 5, §5101. “Purpose. “It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a plan for classification of positions whereby— • “(1) in determining the rate of basic pay which an employee will receive— “(A) the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work will be followed . , There is no suggestion that the plaintiff-respondents have not properly pursued and exhausted their administrative remedies. The decision of the Court of Claims in this case is not inconsistent, as to these issues, with other recent cases resolved by divided votes in that court. See Chambers v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 186, 451 F. 2d 1045 (1971); Allison v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 263, 451 F. 2d 1035 (1971); Small v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 11, 470 F. 2d 1020 (1972); Pettit v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 207, 488 F. 2d 1026 (1973). But see Applegate v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 999, 521 F. 2d 1406 (1975); Roseman v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 998, 521 F. 2d 1406 (1975); Kaeserman v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 983 (1975); Barnum v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 1024, 529 F. 2d 531 (1975). Title 28 U. S. C. § 1494 also grants the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine the amount due from the United States "by reason of any unsettled account of any officer . of . the United State." The amici acknowledge that it is conceivable that the respondents will be able to obtain reclassification for the future through the mandamus action they instituted in 1971. See Testan v. Hampton, Civ. No. 71-2250 (ED Pa.). That suit apparently lies dormant subject to reactivation. The Government states that if respondents proceed with the action, the United States “will not contest the district court’s jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ claim for prospective equitable relief.” Reply Brief for United States 17 n. 7. Brief for Respondents 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-28. The committee reports relating to Pub. L. 92-415 expressly confirm the understanding that the remand statute “does not extend the class of cases over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction.” S. Rep. No. 92-1066, p. 1 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1023, p. 3 (1972). In 1972, Congress made Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to federal employees. 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e (a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The nature of that explicit waiver of sovereign immunity is presently before the Court. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 507 F. 2d 1300 (CA2 1974), cert. granted, 421 U. S. 987 (1975).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WRIGHT et al. v. CITY OF ROANOKE REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY No. 85-5915. Argued October 6, 1986 Decided January 14, 1987 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Powell and ¿calía, JJ., joined, post, p. 432. Henry L. Woodward argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Renae Reed Patrick. Bayard E. Harris argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. David B. Bryson and Catherine M. Bishop filed a brief for the National Housing Law Project as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners in this case, tenants living in low-income housing projects owned by respondent, brought suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that respondent overbilled them for their utilities and thereby violated the rent ceiling imposed by the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937, and the implementing regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The District Court, 605 F. Supp. 532 (WD Va. 1984), and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 771 F. 2d 833 (1985), concluded that petitioners did not have a cause of action under § 1983. We granted certiorari and now reverse. I — I Respondent is one of many public housing authorities (PHA’s) established throughout the country under the United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 60 Stat. 888, 42 U. S. C. §1401 et seq., (1970 ed.), to provide affordable housing for low-income people. In 1969, the Housing Act was amended in a fundamental respect: the Brooke Amendment, Pub. L. 91-152, §213, 83 Stat. 389, imposed a ceiling for rents charged to low-income people living in public housing projects, and, as later amended, Pub. L. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400, provides that a low-income family “shall pay as rent” a specified percentage of its income. HUD has consistently considered “rent” to include a reasonable amount for the use of utilities, which is defined by regulation as that amount equal to or less than an amount determined by the PHA to be a reasonable part of the rent paid by low-income tenants. In their suit against respondent, petitioners alleged that respondent had overcharged them for their utilities by failing to comply with the applicable HUD regulations in establishing the amount of utility service to which petitioners were entitled. Thus, according to petitioners, respondent imposed a surcharge for “excess” utility consumption that should have been part of petitioners’ rent and deprived them of their statutory right to pay only the prescribed maximum portion of their income as rent. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondent on petitioners’ § 1983 claim, holding that a private cause of action was unavailable to enforce the Brooke Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Relying primarily on two of its earlier decisions, Perry v. Housing Authority of Charleston, 664 F. 2d 1210 (1981), and Phelps v. Housing Authority of Woodruff, 742 F. 2d 816 (1984), the Court of Appeals held that while the Brooke Amendment confers certain rights on tenants, these rights are enforceable only by HUD, not by the individual tenant: “[T]he situation is very analogous to the one in which a trustee [that is, HUD], not the cestui que trust, must bring suit.” 771 F. 2d, at 836. h-I I — ( Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), held that §1983 was available to enforce violations of federal statutes by agents of the State. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), however, recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to remedy statutory violations: where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immupities within the meaning of § 1983. In Pennhurst, a § 1983 action did not lie because the statutory provisions were thought to be only statements of “findings” indicating no more than a congressional preference — at most a “nudge in the preferred direc-tio[n],” 451 U. S., at 19, and not intended to rise to the level of an enforceable right. In Sea Clammers, an intent to foreclose resort to § 1983 was found in the comprehensive remedial scheme provided by Congress, a scheme that itself provided for private actions and left no room for additional private remedies under § 1983. Similarly, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984), held that allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the Education of the Handicapped Act’s administrative remedies would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme, which itself allowed private parties to seek remedies for violating federal law. Under these cases, if there is a state deprivation of a “right” secured by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. “We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy” for the deprivation of a federally secured right. Ibid. Here, the Court of Appeals held that the statute and the Brooke Amendment clearly manifested congressional intention to vest in HUD the exclusive power to enforce the benefits due housing project tenants and hence the intention to foreclose both a private cause of action under the Housing Act and any private enforcement under § 1983. For the Court of Appeals, the barrier was not the lack of statutory right or its quality or enforceability — “the plaintiffs under 42 U. S. C. § 1437a have certain rights,” 771 F. 2d, at 837 — but the fact that Congress had not intended tenants to have the authority themselves to sue: “HUD alone may, as quasi trustee, take legal action, for the right is explicitly tailored not to allow the beneficiaries, the low cost housing tenants, to do so.” Ibid. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ rather summary conclusion that the administrative scheme of enforcement foreclosed private enforcement. The Court of Appeals merely relied on one of its prior cases which had referred to HUD’s authority to enforce the annual contributions contracts between PHA’s and HUD, see 42 U. S. C. § 1437c, to conduct audits and to cut off funds. HUD undoubtedly has considerable authority to oversee the operation of the PHA’s. We are unconvinced, however, that respondent has overcome its burden of showing that “the remedial devices provided in [the Housing Act] are sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.” Sea Clammers, supra, at 20. They do not show that “Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Smith v. Robinson, supra, at 1004-1005, n. 9. Not only are the Brooke Amendment and its legislative history devoid of any express indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD, but there have also been both congressional and agency actions indicating that enforcement authority is not centralized and that private actions were anticipated. Neither, in our view, are the remedial mechanisms provided sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a §1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants’ rights secured by federal law. In 1981, Congress changed the maximum percentage of income' that could be paid as “rent” from 25 percent to 30 percent. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, § 322, 95 Stat. 400. In making this change, Congress gave the Secretary of HUD discretion to raise tenants’ rent incrementally over a 5-year period to ease the burden on low-income tenants during the transition. § 322(i), 95 Stat. 404. To avoid a potential multitude of litigation over the way in which the Secretary implemented the phased-in rate increase, Congress specifically made the Secretary’s decisions effectuating the phase-in immune from judicial review. § 322(i)(3). At congressional hearings in which this specific and limited exception to judicial review was discussed, HUD representatives explained that this exception had no effect on tenants’ ability to enforce their rights under the Housing Act in federal court other than the limited exception concerning the phase-in. Apparently dissatisfied with even a temporary preclusion of judicial review, Congress repealed it two years later. Pub. L. 98-181, § 206(e), 97 Stat. 1181. Also at odds with the holding that HUD has exclusive authority to enforce the Brooke Amendment is the enactment in 1985 of 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(k) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill), which directed HUD to continue its longstanding regulatory requirement that each PHA provide formal grievance, procedures for the resolution of tenant disputes with the PHA arising out of their lease or PHA regulations. These procedures, which Congress ordered continued, include informal and formal hearings and administrative appeals, conducted within each PHA by impartial decisionmakers, to consider adverse decisions taken against tenants by the PHA. Congress’ aim was to provide a “decentralized, informal, and relatively non-adversarial administrative process” for resolving tenant-management disputes. Samuels v. District of Columbia, 248 U. S. App. D. C. 128, 133, 770 F. 2d 184, 189 (1985). The procedures are open to individual grievances but not to class actions. See 24 CFR § 966.51(b) (1986). HUD itself has never provided a procedure by which tenants could complain to it about the alleged failures of PHA’s to abide by their annual contribution contracts, the Brooke Amendment, or HUD regulations; nor has it taken unto itself the task of reviewing PHA grievance procedure decisions. Moreover, § 966.57(c) of HUD’s grievance procedure regulations provides that a decision terminating a grievance proceeding shall in no way affect the rights of a tenant either to seek “trial de novo or judicial review in any judicial proceedings, which may thereafter be brought in the matter. ” HUD thus had no thought that its own supervisory powers or the grievance system that it had established foreclosed resort to the courts by tenants who claimed that a PHA was not observing the commands of the Brooke Amendment. There is other evidence clearly indicating that in HUD’s view tenants have the right to bring suit in federal court to challenge housing authorities’ calculations of utility allowances. Among HUD’s 1982 proposed regulations was § 865.476(d), 47 Fed. Reg. 35249, 35254 (1982), which would have confined tenant utility-allowance challenges to the procedures available in state court. The final regulation, however, contained no such limitation and contemplated that tenants could challenge PHA actions in federal as well as state courts. 24 CFR § 965.473(e) (1985). As the comment accompanying the final regulation explained, the proposal to limit challenges to state-court actions had been abandoned. The final “provision does not preclude Federal court review.” 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984). HUD’s opinion as to available tenant remedies under the Housing Act is entitled to some deference by this Court. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U. S. 846, 865 (1985); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984). In both Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson, the statutes at issue themselves provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy. There is nothing of that kind found in the Brooke Amendment or elsewhere in the Housing Act. Indeed, the only private remedy provided for is the local grievance procedures which the Act now requires. These procedures are not open to class grievances; and even if tenants may grieve about a PHA’s utility allowance schedule, which petitioners dispute, the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to § 1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 516 (1982). The Court of Appeals and respondents rely on HUD’s authority to audit, enforce annual contributions contracts, and cut off federal funds. But these generalized powers are insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 704-707 (1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420 (1970). HUD has the authority to audit, but it does not do so frequently and its own Handbook requires audits only every eight years. There are no other mechanisms provided to enable HUD to effectively oversee the performance of the some 3,000 local PHA’s across the country. The statute does not require and HUD has not provided any formal procedure for tenants to bring to HUD’s attention alleged PHA failures to abide by the Brooke Amendment and HUD regulations. Hence, there will be little occasion to exercise HUD’s power to sue PHA’s to enforce the provisions of the annual contributions contracts. Respondent asserts PHA’s must annually file their utility allowance schedules with HUD and that HUD must approve them, but the final regulations eliminated HUD’s duty to approve these schedules before their effective date. 24 CFR § 965.473(d) (1986). Review of the schedules would be done in the course of audits or reviews of PHA operations. Lastly, it is said that tenants may sue on their lease in state courts and enforce their Brooke Amendment rights in that litigation. Perhaps they could, but the state-court remedy is hardly a reason to bar an action under § 1983, which was adopted to provide a federal remedy for the enforcement of federal rights. In sum, we conclude that nothing in the Housing Act or the Brooke Amendment evidences that Congress intended to preclude petitioners’ § 1983 claim against respondent. HH HH I — I Although the Court of Appeals read the Brooke Amendment as extending to housing project tenants certain rights enforceable only by HUD, respondent asserts that neither the Brooke Amendment nor the interim regulations gave the tenants any specific or definable rights to utilities, that is, no enforceable rights within the meaning of § 1983. We perceive little substance in this claim. The Brooke Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended in 1981, tenants could be charged as rent no more and no less than 30 percent of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing on the individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is undeniable. Nor is there any question that HUD interim regulations, in effect when this suit began, expressly required that a “reasonable” amount for utilities be included in rent that a PHA was allowed to charge, an interpretation to which HUD has adhered both before and after the adoption of the Brooke Amendment. HUD’s view is entitled to deference as a valid interpretation of the statute, and Congress in the course of amending that provision has not disagreed with it. Respondent nevertheless asserts that the provision for a “reasonable” allowance for utilities is too vague and amorphous to confer on tenants an enforceable “right” within the meaning of § 1983 and that the whole matter of utility allowances must be left to the discretion of the PHA, subject to supervision by HUD. The regulations, however, defining the statutory concept of “rent” as including utilities, have the force of law, Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 294-295 (1979), they specifically set out guidelines that the PHAs were to follow in establishing utility allowances, and they require notice to tenants and an opportunity to comment on proposed allowances. In our view, the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under Pennhurst and § 1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed. “[42 U. S. C.] § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” The Brooke Amendment in its present form reads as follows: “§ 1437a. Rental payments “(a) Families included; amount “Dwelling units assisted under this chapter shall be rented only to families who are lower income families at the time of their initial occupancy of such units. Reviews of family income shall be made at least annually. A family shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter (other than a family assisted under section 1437f(o) of this title) the highest of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar: “(1) 30 per centum of the family’s monthly adjusted income; “(2) 10 per centum of the family’s monthly income; or “(3) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public agency and a part of such payments, adjusted in accordance with the family’s actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the family’s housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated.” 42 U. S. C. § 1437a (1982 ed. and Supp. III). The language of the original Brooke Amendment required that low-income tenant’s rent “may not exceed one-fourth of the family’s income, as defined by the Secretary.” The complaint was filed December 8, 1982. The regulations in effect at that time defined “contract rent,” that is, the amount actually charged to low-income tenants, as follows: “Contract rent means the rent charged a tenant for the use of the dwelling accommodation and equipment (such as ranges and refrigerators but not including furniture), services, and reasonable amounts of utilities determined in accordance with the PHA’s [public housing authority’s] schedule of allowances for utilities supplied by the project. Contract rent does not include charges for utility consumption in excess of the public housing agency’s schedule of allowances for utility consumption, or other miscellaneous charges . . . .” 24 CFR § 860.403 (1982). The relevant regulations were originally promulgated as an interim rule on September 9,1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 59502 (1980). As there noted, HUD had previously regulated the way in which utility charges were dealt with in HUD’s Local Housing Authority Management Handbook, pt. 2, §9, Controlling Utility Consumption and Costs (1963). Ibid. On August 13, 1982, HUD published a proposed rule to amend the interim regulations, commenting as follows with respect to the inclusion of utilities in the calculation of rent: “In administering the low-income public housing program under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, HUD historically has considered ‘rent’ to include shelter cost plus a reasonable amount for utilities. As a result, even prior to adoption of the ‘Brooke Amendment’ in 1969 (limiting the amount of ‘rent’ chargeable to public housing tenants to a stated percentage of income, then 25 percent), HUD provided for a system under which allowances were established as part of the rent schedule showing the amounts of electricity in kilowatt-hours to which tenants were entitled.” 47 Fed. Reg. 35249-35250 (1982). The regulation was finally amended on August 7, 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 31399 (1984). The Supplementary Information section of the published regulation contains a discussion which underscores the fact that HUD has traditionally treated “rent” to include a reasonable amount of utility usage. Id., at 31400. That section also provides an overview of the development of the utility regulations at issue here. The dissent may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the statute. The applicable regulations, 24 CFR §865.470 et seq. (1983), require housing authorities like respondent to, inter alia, recalculate their utility allowances on the basis of current data, to set the allowances in such a fashion that 90 percent of a particular authority’s dwelling units do not pay surcharges, and to review tenant surcharges quarterly and consider revision of the allowances if more than 26 percent of any category of units are being surcharged. The complaint also contained a claim against respondent for breach of paragraph 4 of the standard lease agreement providing: “Utilities: Management Agent agrees to furnish at no charge to the Resident the following utilities as reasonably necessary: hot and cold water, gas for cooking, and electricity for lighting and general household appliances and heat at appropriate times of the year, and also range and refrigerator. Resident will be required to pay for all excess consumption of utilities above the monthly allocated amount as developed by the Authority and determined by the individual check meter servicing the leased unit. The schedule of allocations and charges for excess consumption is posted on the bulletin board of each Housing Development office.” Record, Exh. H. The original complaint asked for both injunctive relief and recovery of whatever amount respondent allegedly overcharged petitioners. Pursuant to new HUD regulations, respondent revised its allowances for reasonable utility use. Petitioners are now seeking only recovery of alleged past improper charges. Brief for Petitioners 8. Petitioners asserted that while their right to sue on the lease derives from state law, the lease claim is controlled by federal law and hence is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. The court acknowledged that its conclusion that the Brooke Amendment created no enforceable rights in petitioners conflicted with the See-ond Circuit’s decision in Beckham v. New York City Housing Authority, 755 F. 2d 1074 (1985). The court stated, however, that this decision “must yield to the authority of Perry and Phelps, supra, from our own circuit.” 771 F. 2d, at 837, n. 8. In response to a question by Congressman Vento concerning the reason for the exception to judicial review, a representative of HUD explained that this limited exception had no effect on tenants’ ability to protect their rights other than limiting their right to challenge the Secretary’s actions in implementing the phase-in: “Mr. Vento. Well, has this been a special problem? Usually we don’t exempt people from going to the district court unless there has been some problem that has developed. Has there been that type of a problem in the past? “Mr. Hovde. I will call upon Mr. Hipps for a response. “Mr. Hipps. In direct answer to your question, yes, we have had a lot of litigation involving tenants rights over the past several years. The provision that you have raised a question about is addressed only at the 5-year phase in of the increase, and is not intended, as I understand, to eliminate any tenants rights beyond that point.” Hearings on Housing and Community Development Amendments before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 654 (1981). Petitioners assert that the grievance mechanism is not available for challenges to the general utility allowance schedules. They rely on HUD statements to this effect, the first in 1984 in connection with the issuance of formal regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 31407: “Some legal services organizations recommended that grievance procedures should apply to the utility allowance provisions. Grievance procedures under former Part 866 (now Part 966) apply to individual, not class, grievances so that challenges to the general utility allowance schedules would be precluded. The Department believes that procedures to be followed on claims for individual relief under § 965.479 should be left to PHA determination.” The second statement by HUD was in connection with proposing new grievance hearing regulations in 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 26528: “(a) Purpose of informal hearing. (1) The grievance procedure shall provide the Family an opportunity for an informal hearing to review proposed PHA adverse action. The purpose of the informal hearing shall be to review whether the proposed adverse action by the PHA is in accordance with, the lease, or with the law, HUD regulations or PHA rules. “(2) PHA action or non-action concerning general policy issues or class grievances (including determination of the PHA’s schedules of allowances for PHA-furnished utilities or of allowances for Tenant-purchased utilities) does not constitute adverse action by the PHA, and the PHA is not required to provide the opportunity for a hearing to consider such issues or grievances.” United States Dept, of Housing and Urban Development, Field Office Monitoring of Public Housing Agencies (PHAs) 6-1 (Handbook 7460.7, Rev. Sept. 9, 1985). HUD explained, 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984), as follows: “In a related issue, legal service organizations expressed concern about the absence of any HUD review of the PHA’s allowance determination. “HUD’s regulatory reform goals include the removal of unnecessary reviews and approvals of actions by responsible parties having equal or greater information at hand. This is particularly appropriate in the case of public housing in view of the ’37 Act’s injunction that ‘[I]t is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.’ 42 U. S. C. 1437. The Department believes that the definition of standards in § 965.476, combined with the record and notice provisions added to § 965.473, should adequately assure the reasonableness of PHA determinations so as to obviate the necessity or usefulness of HUD review and approval before implementation of PHA-determined allowances.” We thus reject respondent’s argument that the Brooke Amendment’s rent ceiling applies only to the charge for shelter and that the HUD definition of rent as including a reasonable charge for utilities is not authorized by the statute. The dissent misconstrues our discussion of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and the enactment of the grievance procedures as codified at 42 U. S. C. § 1437d(k) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Our conclusion that low-income tenants have a right to a reasonable amount of utilities does not come from these two congressional Acts. Rather, these Acts and their history show that Congress did not close the courthouse door to low-income tenants by establishing an alternative enforcement mechanism. The dissent is also quite wrong in concluding that HUD’s “regulations indicate that while it did not have the authority finally to resolve the question, HUD viewed utilities determinations as a matter for state rather than federal courts.” Post, at 440. It is true that the 1982 proposed regulations would have confined review of PHA utility allowances to state forums, but it was never indicated that the governing law was state rather than federal law; and in the final regulations, even the provision making PHA determinations final unless overturned in state courts was deleted. HUD thus abandoned any attempt to foreclose resort to federal courts and surely negated any conclusion that PHA determinations were not judicially re viewable. The Supplemental Information section to HUD’s final regulations contains the following revealing discussion, 49 Fed. Reg. 31403 (1984): “C. Review of PHA Decisions by State Courts “The National Housing Law Project and other legal service groups challenged, as illegal, proposed § 865.476(d) which would make PHA determinations of allowances and revisions thereof final unless found, upon review pursuant to such procedures as may be available under State or local law, to be arbitrary or capricious. “The commenters challenged HUD’s power .(1) to prescribe a standard of review for State courts, and (2) to divest Federal court of jurisdiction over cases involving questions of compliance with Federal statutes and regulations. “State procedures for review of actions by administrative bodies created under State law frequently have provided a forum for review of agency determinations that involve questions of Federal law. Such State law proceedings may be more accessible to public housing tenants in some localities than a Federal court. Moreover, the Department believes that State courts are fully competent to review determinations by authorities created under State law. “Nevertheless, the Department also recognizes that some plaintiffs may prefer to challenge PHA determinations in Federal rather than State court and that the Department’s power to preclude access to Federal court is doubtful. The Department also recognizes that not all States may have adopted procedures providing for judicial review of administrative action. Accordingly, this provision (transferred to § 965.473(e)) has been revised (i) to expand the standard of review to ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ (compare Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 706(2)), and (ii) to state that such standard of review will govern ‘except where a different standard of review is applicable in review procedures governed by applicable State law.’ This provision does not preclude Federal court review.” Petitioners also argue that the District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider their breach-of-lease claims given the federal nature of the rights contained in their leases. In light of our decision that petitioners have a § 1983 claim, the District Court can certainly exercise pendent jurisdiction over petitioners’ breach-of-lease claims. We offer no opinion as to whether the District Court has jurisdiction to consider only their breach-of-lease claims irrespective of their § 1983 claim.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RUCKELSHAUS, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. SIERRA CLUB et al. No. 82-242. Argued April 25, 1983 — Decided July 1, 1983 Kathryn A. Oberly argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Anne S. Almy, and James M. Spears. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. Bingham Kennedy and Barry J. Trilling filed a brief for respondent Environmental Defense Fund. Joseph J. Brecher filed a brief for respondent Sierra Club. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1979, following a year of study and public comment, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated standards limiting the emission of sulfur dioxide by coal-burning powerplants. Both respondents in this case — the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the Sierra Club— filed petitions for review of the agency’s action in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. EDF argued that the standards promulgated by the EPA were tainted by the agency’s ex parte contacts with representatives of private industry, while the Sierra Club contended that EPA lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to issue the type of standards that it did. In a lengthy opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected all the claims of both EDF and the Sierra Club. Sierra Club v. Costle, 211 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 657 F. 2d 298 (1981). Notwithstanding their lack of success on the merits, EDF and the Sierra Club filed a request for attorney’s fees incurred in the Sierra Club action. They relied on § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 91 Stat. 777, 42 U. S. C. § 7607(f) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which permits the award of attorney’s fees in certain proceedings “whenever [the court] determines that such award is appropriate.” Respondents argued that, despite their failure to obtain any of the relief they requested, it was “appropriate” for them to receive fees for their contributions to the goals of the Clean Air Act. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, ultimately awarding some $45,000 to the Sierra Club and some $46,000 to EDF. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 217 U. S. App. D. C. 180, 672 F. 2d 33 (1982); Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 221 U. S. App. D. C. 450, 684 F. 2d 972 (1982). We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 942 (1982), to consider the important question decided by the Court of Appeals. I The question presented by this case is whether it is “appropriate,” within the meaning of § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, to award attorney’s fees to a party that achieved no success on the merits of its claims. We conclude that the language of the section, read in the light of the historic principles of fee-shifting in this and other countries, requires the conclusion that some success on the merits be obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award under § 307(f). A Section 307(f) provides only that: “In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.” 91 Stat. 777, 42 U. S. C. §7607(f) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). It is difficult to draw any meaningful guidance from § 307 (f )’s use of the word “appropriate,” which means only “specially suitable: fit, proper.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 106 (1976). Obviously, in order to decide when fees should be awarded under § 307(f), a court first must decide what the award should be “specially suitable,” “fit,” or “proper” for. Section 307(f) alone does not begin to answer this question, and application of the provision thus requires reference to other sources, including fee-shifting rules developed in different contexts. As demonstrated below, inquiry into these sources shows that requiring a defendant, completely successful on all issues, to pay the unsuccessful plaintiff’s legal fees would be a radical departure from longstanding fee-shifting principles adhered to in a wide range of contexts. B Our basic point of reference is the “American Rule,” see Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975) (emphasis added), under which even “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.” It is clear that generations of American judges, lawyers, and legislators, with this rule as the point of departure, would regard it as quite “inappropriate” to award the “loser” an attorney’s fee from the “prevailing litigant.” Similarly, when Congress has chosen to depart from the American Rule by statute, virtually every one of the more than 150 existing federal fee-shifting provisions predicates fee awards on some success by the claimant; while these statutes contain varying standards as to the precise degree of success necessary for an award of fees — such as whether the fee claimant was the “prevailing party,” the “substantially prevailing” party, or “successful” — the consistent rule is that complete failure will not justify shifting fees from the losing party to the winning party. Also instructive is Congress’ reaction to a draft of the Equal Access to Justice Act, which permitted shifting fees from losing parties to the Government, if “in the interest of justice,” S. 2354, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This provision, criticized by the Justice Department as a “radical” departure from traditional principles, was rejected by Congress. Finally, English courts have awarded counsel fees to successful litigants for 750 years, see Alyeska, supra, at 247, n. 18, but they have never gone so far as to force a vindicated defendant to pay the plaintiff’s legal expenses. While the foregoing treatments of fee-shifting differ in many respects, they reflect one consistent, established rule: a successful party need not pay its unsuccessful adversary’s fees. The uniform acceptance of this rule reflects, at least in part, intuitive notions of fairness to litigants. Put simply, ordinary conceptions of just returns reject the idea that a party who wrongly charges someone with violations of the law should be able to force that defendant to pay the costs of the wholly unsuccessful suit against it. Before we will conclude Congress abandoned this established principle that a successful party need not pay its unsuccessful adversary’s fees — rooted as it is in intuitive notions of fairness and widely manifested in numerous different contexts — a clear showing that this result was intended is required. Also relevant in deciding whether to accept the reading of “appropriate” urged by respondents is the fact that § 307(f) affects fee awards against the United States, as well as against private individuals. Except to the extent it has waived its immunity, the Government is immune from claims for attorney’s fees, Alyeska, supra, at 267-268, and n. 42. Waivers of immunity must be “construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,” McMahon v. United States, 342 U. S. 25, 27 (1951), and not “enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires.” Eastern Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). In determining what sorts of fee awards are “appropriate,” care must be taken not to “enlarge” §307(f)’s waiver of immunity beyond what a fair reading of the language of the section requires. Given all the foregoing, we fail to find in § 307(f) the requisite indication that Congress meant to abandon historic fee-shifting principles and intuitive notions of fairness when it enacted the section. Instead, we believe that the term “appropriate” modifies but does not completely reject the traditional rule that a fee claimant must “prevail” before it may recover attorney’s fees. This result is the most reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. M HH Respondents make relatively little effort to dispute much of the foregoing, devoting their principal attention to the legislative history of § 307(f). Respondents’ arguments rest primarily on the following excerpt from the 1977 House Report on § 307(f): “The committee bill also contains express authority for the courts to award attorneys [sic] fees and expert witness fees in two situations. The judicial review proceedings under section 307 of the act when the court determines such award is appropriate [sic]. “In the case of the section 307 judicial review litigation, the purposes of the authority to award fees are not only to discourage frivolous litigation, but also to encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and administration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest. The committee did not intend that the court’s discretion to award fees under this provision should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was the ‘prevailing party.’ In fact, such an amendment was expressly rejected by the committee, largely on the grounds set forth in NRDC v. EPA, 484 F. 2d 1331, 1388 [sic] (1st Cir. 1973).” H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, p. 337 (1977) (emphasis added). In determining the meaning of the Senate Report’s rejection of the “prevailing party” standard it first is necessary to ascertain what this standard was understood to mean. When § 307(f) was enacted, the “prevailing party” standard had been interpreted in a variety of rather narrow ways. See, e. g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F. 2d 263, 273 (CA10 1975); Pearson v. Western Electric Co., 542 F. 2d 1150 (CA10 1976); Best Medium Publishing Co. v. National Insider, Inc., 385 F. 2d 384, 386 (CA7) (the “‘prevailing party’ is the one who prevails as to the substantial part of the litigation”), aff’g 259 F. Supp. 433 (ND Ill. 1967); Dobbins v. Local 212, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 292 F. Supp. 413, 450 (SD Ohio 1968); Goodall v. Mason, 419 F. Supp. 980 (ED Va. 1976); Clanton v. Allied Chemical Corp., 409 F. Supp. 282 (ED Va. 1976). Some courts — although, to be sure, a minority — denied fees to plaintiffs who lacked a formal court order granting relief, while others required showings not just of some success, but “substantial” success. Indeed, even today, courts require that, to be a “prevailing party,” one must succeed on the “central issue,” Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F. 2d 24, 26 (CA5 1981), or “essentially succee[d] in obtaining the relief he seeks in his claims on the merits,” Bagby v. Beal, 606 F. 2d 411, 415 (CA3 1979). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433, n. 8 (1983). These various interpretations of the “prevailing party” standard provide a ready, and quite sensible, explanation for the Senate Report’s discussion of § 307(f). Section 307(f) was meant to expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties— parties achieving some success, even if not major success. Put differently, by enacting § 307(f), Congress intended to eliminate both the restrictive readings of “prevailing party” adopted in some of the cases cited above and the necessity for case-by-case scrutiny by federal courts into whether plaintiffs prevailed “essentially” on “central issues.” This view of the “when appropriate” standard is confirmed by the language of a forerunner of § 307, § 36 of S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977): “(d) In any judicial proceeding under this Act in which the United States ... is a party.. . any party other than the United States which prevails in such action shall recover from the United States the reasonable costs for such party’s participation in such proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees. ... In any case in which such party prevails in part, the court shall have discretion to award such reasonable costs.” (Emphasis added.) This provision was described, in the legislative history, as follows: “This section amends section 307 of existing law. In any suit in which the United States is a party, any prevailing party . . . shall recover all reasonable costs of its participation in such proceeding. Where such party prevails in part, the court may award reasonable costs.” It is clear from the distinction drawn in these two passages that — as the case law discussed above fairly indicated — Congress understood “prevailing party” and “partially prevailing party” as two quite different things, with the former encompassing only a limited category of parties that achieved success in their lawsuits. The “prevailing party” category was thought not to extend to parties who prevailed only in part. Given this, the House Report’s statement that “the court’s discretion. .. should [not] be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was the ‘prevailing party,’” H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, p. 337 (1977) (emphasis added), provides little, if any, support for the theory that completely unsuccessful plaintiffs may receive fees. Rather, the sentence, fairly read, means only that fees may be awarded to all parties who prevail in part as w.ell as those who prevail in full: it rejects the restrictive notions of “prevailing party” adopted in Pearson, supra, and like cases, as well as difficult questions of what constitutes a “central” issue, or “essential” success. The Report, however, does not give any real support to the view that Congress meant to depart from the long-established rule that complete winners need not pay complete losers for suing them. This straightforward reading of the House Report finds support in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F. 2d 1331 (CA1 1973), cited in the Report. There, the court considered whether fees should be denied under § 304(d) “because some issues were decided adversely to petitioners.” Id., at 1338. This argument was rejected, primarily because “petitioners were successful in several major respects; they should not be penalized for having also advanced some points of lesser weight.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Needless to say, this holding does not mean that even if a party is unsuccessful in all respects, it still may recover fees from its opponent. Rather, the court’s decision provides precise support for the view, urged above, that adoption of the “when appropriate” standard was intended to permit awards of fees to all partially prevailing parties. After all, this was just what the facts were in NRDC v. EPA. The foregoing reading of § 307(f) also finds support in other aspects of the legislative history. For example, § 307(f), as enacted, was regarded as narrower than the attorney’s fee provision in S. 252, which, as mentioned above, was a forerunner of § 307(f). A section-by-section analysis of S. 252 and § 307(f) stated that the “conference report [setting out the current ‘when appropriate’ standard] contained a narrower House provision” than S. 252. Section-by-Section Analysis, swpra n. 10, at 37. Yet, as the quotation, supra, at 689, shows, S. 252 permitted fee awards only to prevailing and partially prevailing parties, and not to completely losing parties. The statement that the current language of § 307(f) is “narrower” than S. 252 strongly suggests that losing parties were not intended to recover fee awards under the section. Moreover, the view that § 307(f) was “narrow” hardly comports with the somewhat radical departure from well-settled legal principles urged by respondents. In addition, the relation between §§ 304(d) and 307(f) is instructive. Like § 307(f), § 304(d) provides that a court may award fees when “appropriate.” Importantly, however, suits may be brought under § 304 against private parties alleged to be in violation of the requirements of the Clean Air Act. It is clear, as explained below, that, whatever general standard may apply under § 307(f), a similar standard applies under § 304(d). In Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Ed., 412 U. S. 427 (1973), we held that similar attorney’s fee provisions should be interpreted pari passu, and read the “prevailing party” standard in 20 U. S. C. § 1617 as identical to that in 42 U. S. C. §2000a-3(b). In Hensley, 461 U. S., at 433, n. 7, we held that “the standards set forth . . . are generally applicable to all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’” See also BankAmerica, Corp. v. United States, 462 U. S. 122, 129 (1983). Thus, it is clear, at least as a general principle, that awards of attorney’s fees under § 304(d) will be “appropriate” in circumstances similar to those that are “appropriate” under § 307(f). Given the foregoing, respondents’ argument that fee awards are available even to unsuccessful plaintiffs encounters yet further difficulties. Section 304 suits may be brought against private businesses by any private citizen. Such suits frequently involve novel legal theories, theories that the EPA has rejected. After protracted litigation requiring payment of expensive legal fees and associated costs in both money and manpower, the private defendant may well succeed in refuting each charge against it — proving it was in complete compliance with every detail of the Clean Air Act. Yet, under respondents’ view of the Act, the defendant’s reward could be a second lawyer’s bill — this one payable to those who wrongly accused it of violating the law. We simply do not believe that Congress would have intended such a result without clearly saying so. Finally, as shown in the margin, the central purpose of § 304(d) was to check the “multiplicity of [potentially merit-less] suits,” that Congress feared would follow the authorization of suits under the Clean Air Act, which was seen as an “unprecedented” innovation. One might well imagine the surprise of the legislators who voted for this section as an instrument for deterring meritless suits upon learning that instead it could be employed to fund such suits. I — I I — I I — Í We conclude, therefore, that the language and legislative history of § 307(f) do not support respondents’ argument that the section was intended as a radical departure from established principles requiring that a fee claimant attain some success on the merits before it may receive an award of fees. Instead, we are persuaded that if Congress intended such a novel result — which would require federal courts to make sensitive, difficult, and ultimately highly subjective determinations — it would have said so in far plainer language than that employed here. Hence, we hold that, absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not “appropriate” for a federal court to award attorney’s fees under § 307(f). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Sixteen federal statutes and § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V), contain provisions for awards of attorney’s fees identical to § 307(f). See, e. g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U. S. C. § 2618(d); Endangered Species Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(4); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1270(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1427(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V); Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365(d); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1415(g)(4); Deep-water Port Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. § 300j — 8(d); Noise Control Act, 42 U. S. C. § 4911(d); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6305(d); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U. S. C. § 8435(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 U. S. C. § 9124(d) (1976 ed., Supp. V); and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U. S. C. § 1349(a)(6) (1976 ed., Supp. V). As explained below, the interpretation of “appropriate” in § 307(f) controls construction of the term in these statutes. Dissenting from an award of fees under § 307(f) by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Wilkey noted “the absence of any clue as to the meaning of ‘appropriate,’ ” and wrote that “there is no comprehensible or principled meaningfor ‘appropriate.’ ” Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 217 U. S. App. D. C. 148, 171, 179, 672 F. 2d 1, 24, 32 (1982). The Senate Report to § 307 also illustrates the lack of guidance provided by the plain language of the section. The Report observed that “[t]he purpose of the amendment to section 307 is to carry out the intent of the committee in 1970 that a court may, in its discretion, award costs of litigation to a party bringing a suit under section 307 of the Clean Air Act.” S. Rep. No. 95-127, p. 99 (1977) (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, p. 28 (1977). See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(1) (1982 ed.); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 18(f); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. § 1973Z(e); Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1976 ed., Supp. V). See, e. g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(E); Privacy Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), 552a(g)(3)(B); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552b(i). See, e. g., Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U. S. C. § 2607(d)(2); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U. S. C. § 3417(a)(4) (1982 ed.); Jewelers’ Liability Act, 15 U. S. C. § 298(c). Equal Access to Courts: Hearing on S. 2354 before the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 31, 50 (1978). Indeed, when Congress has desired such a change it has said so expressly, as in 15 U. S. C. § 2605(c)(4)(A), permitting fee awards if a party “represents an interest which would substantially contribute to a fair determination of the issues,” even if the participant’s viéws are rejected. If Congress intended the truly radical departure from American and English common law and countless federal fee-shifting statutes that the Court of Appeals attributes to it, it no doubt would have used explicit language to this effect — as it did in 15 U. S. C. §2605. Respondents also rely on a single sentence from the 1970 Senate Report: “The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances the courts should award costs of litigation to such party. This should extend to plaintiffs in actions which result in successful abatement but do not reach a verdict. For instance, if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court may award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in prosecuting such actions.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p. 38 (emphasis added). The approval of fee awards in “legitimate” actions offers respondents little comfort: “legitimate” means “being exactly as proposed: neither spurious nor false,” which does not describe respondents’ claims in this case. Respondents contend, however, that Congress intended the term “appropriate” to encompass situations beyond those mentioned in the legislative history, and, therefore, that the term reaches even totally unsuccessful actions. This is, of course, possible, but not likely. Congress found it necessary to explicitly state that the term appropriate “extended” to suits that forced defendants to abandon illegal conduct, although without a formal court order; this was no doubt viewed as a somewhat expansive innovation, since, under then-controlling law, see infra, some courts awarded fees only to parties formally prevailing in court. We are unpersuaded by the argument that this same Congress was so sure that “appropriate” also would extend to the far more novel, costly, and intuitively unsatisfying result of awarding fees to unsuccessful parties that it did not bother to mention the fact. If Congress had intended the far-reaching result urged by respondents, it plainly would have said so, as is demonstrated by Congress’ careful statement that a less sweeping innovation was adopted. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that trivial success on the merits, or purely procedural victories, would justify an award of fees under statutes setting out the “when appropriate” standard. Rather, Congress meant merely to avoid the necessity for lengthy inquiries into the question whether a particular party’s success was “substantial” or occurred on a “central issue.” Section-by-Section Analysis of S. 252 and S. 253, Prepared by the Staff of the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Serial No. 95-2, p. 36 (Comm. Print 1977) (emphasis added). Respondents observe that Congress failed to adopt the attorney’s fee provision contained in S. 252, discussed above, requiring fee awards to “prevailing parties,” and permitting awards to “partially prevailing parties.” They argue that Congress’ failure to adopt this rule indicates a desire to expand the availability of fee awards to parties not prevailing in any degree. The argument is unpersuasive. Congress almost certainly rejected the provision because it required fee awards to “prevailing parties.” This rule was specifically criticized by several groups commenting on the proposed legislation. One group wrote: “[W]e strongly oppose Section 36 of S. 252. We see no basis for automatically providing court costs and attorney’s fees for parties prevailing in litigation pursuant to the Act. If such parties represent a widespread public interest, they should be able to finance themselves.” See 5 Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 95-16, pp. 4241, 4255 (1978) (Chamber of Commerce). Indeed, the Natural Resources Defense Council told Congress that the provision requiring fee awards to “prevailing parties was “fundamentally unwise” and “wholly unprecedented in American law”: it urged that the provision be rejected. Id., at 4092. It is obvious, therefore, that S. 252 was rejected not because it was too restrictive in its awarding of fees, but because it required, rather than permitted awards of attorney’s fees. We do not mean to suggest that private parties should be treated in exactly the same manner as governmental entities. Differing abilities to bear the cost of legal fees and differing notions of responsibility for fulfilling the goals of the Clean Air Act likely would justify exercising special care regarding the award of fees against private parties. Because, as just shown, §§ 304(d) and 307(f) have similar meanings, the history of §304 is relevant to a construction of § 307(f). The 1970 Clean Air Amendments contained a new concept — the statutory authorization of “citizens suits,” allowing private citizens to sue any person violating the Clean Air Act. This provision attracted vehement opposition in Congress.- Senator Hruska, for example, read a memorandum observing that the section “is unprecedented in American history.’’ 1 Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress) Ser. No. 93-18, p. 277 (1974) (Senate debate on S. 4358, Sept. 21, 1970). The memorandum predicted that § 304 “will result in a multiplicity of suits which will interfere with the Executive’s capability of carrying out its duties” and warned that § 304’s “open invitation to the institution of Citizens Suits” would “impose an impossible burden on the already burdened judicial system.” Id., at 278. The principal response to these concerns was as follows: “The Senator from Nebraska raised the question of possible harassing suits by citizens. This the committee attempted to discourage by providing that the costs of litigation — including counsel fees — may be awarded by the courts to the defendants in such cases, so that the citizen who brings a harassing suit is subject not only to the loss of his own costs of litigation, but to the burden of bearing the costs of the parties against whom he has brought the suit in the first instance. I doubt very much that individual citizens would lightly engage this possibility.” Id., at 280. This point was repeated in the Senate Report: “Concern was expressed that some lawyers would use section 304 to bring frivolous and harassing actions. The Committee has added a key element in providing that the courts may award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, whenever the court determines that such action is in the public interest. The court could thus award costs of litigation to defendants where the litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing. This should have the effect of discouraging abuse of this provision, while at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions that will be brought.” S. Rep. No. 91-1196, p. 38 (1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS et al. v. FELDMAN et al. No. 81-1335. Argued December 8, 1982 Decided March 23, 1983 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 488. Daniel A. Rezneck argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Charles H. Cochran. Robert M. Sussman argued the cause for respondent Feldman. With him on the brief was William P. Skinner. Michael F. Healy argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Hickey. Allen R. Snyder and Elliot M. Mincberg filed a brief for the Conference of Chief Justices as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. We must decide in this case what authority the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have to review decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in bar admission matters. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reversing the United States District Court, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denials of the respondents’ requests for waivers of a bar admission rule that requires applicants to have graduated from an approved law school. We vacate the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. M We have discussed in detail in earlier opinions the changes in the structure of the District of Columbia court system effected by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. See Key v. Doyle, 434 U. S. 59 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973). For purposes of this case, three provisions of that legislation are crucial. One provision made “[f]inal judgments and decrees of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with section 1257 of title 28, United States Code.” § 111, 84 Stat. 475 (codified at D. C. Code § 11-102 (1981)). Another provision amended 28 U. S. C. § 1257 to specify that the term “highest court of a State” as used in §1257 includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. 590. These provisions make the judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the judgments of state courts, directly reviewable in this Court. Cases no longer have to proceed from the local courts to the United States Court of Appeals and then to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254. See Key v. Doyle, supra, at 64. The third provision authorized the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to “make such rules as it deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to membership in its bar, and their censure, suspension, and expulsion.” §111, 84 Stat. 521 (codified at D. C. Code § ll-2501(a) (1981)). This provision divested the United States District Court of its former authority to supervise admission to the District of Columbia Bar. Pursuant to its new rulemaking authority, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted, as part of its general rules, Rule 461 (1973), which governs admission to the bar. Rule 461(b)(3) states: “(3) Proof of Legal Education. An applicant who has graduated from a law school that at the time of graduation was approved by the American Bar Association or who shall be eligible to be graduated from an approved law school within 60 days of the date of the examination will be permitted to take the bar examination. Under no circumstances shall an applicant be admitted to the bar without having first submitted to the Secretary to the Committee [on Admissions] a certificate verifying that he has graduated from an approved law school.” Neither of the respondents graduated from an approved law school. Their efforts to avoid the operation of Rule 461(b)(3) form the foundation of this case. A Respondent Feldman did not attend law school. Instead, he pursued an alternative path to a legal career provided by the State of Virginia involving a highly structured program of study in the office of a practicing attorney. See Va. Code §54-62 (1982). In addition to his work and study at a law firm in Charlottesville, Va., Feldman formally audited classes at the University of Virginia School of Law. For the final six months of his alternative course of study, Feldman served as a law clerk to a United States District Judge. Having passed the Virginia bar examination, Feldman was admitted to that State’s Bar in April 1976. In March of that year he had begun working as a staff attorney for the Baltimore, Md., Legal Aid Bureau. He continued in that job until January 1977. Like the District of Columbia, Maryland has a rule limiting access to the bar examination to graduates of ABA-approved law schools, but the Maryland Board of Law Examiners waived the rule for Feldman. Feldman passed the Maryland examination and later was admitted to that State’s Bar. In November 1976, Feldman applied to the Committee on Admissions of the District of Columbia Bar for admission to the District Bar under a rule which, prior to its recent amendment, allowed a member of a bar in another jurisdiction to seek membership in the District Bar without examination. In January 1977, the Committee denied Feldman’s application on the ground that he had not graduated from an approved law school. Initially, the Committee stated that waivers of Rule 461(b)(3), or exceptions to it, were not authorized. Following further contact with the Committee, however, Feldman was granted an informal hearing. After the hearing, the Committee reaffirmed its denial of Feld-man’s application and stated that only the District of Columbia Court of Appeals could waive the requirement of graduation from an approved law school. In June 1977, Feldman submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for admission to the bar without examination. App. la. Alternatively, Feldman requested that he be allowed to sit for the bar examination. Id., at 5a. In his petition, Feldman described his legal training, work experience, and other qualifications. He suggested that his professional training and education were “equal to that received by those who have attended an A. B. A. approved law school.” Id., at 4a. In view of his training, experience, and success in passing the bar examinations in other jurisdictions, Feldman stated that “the objectives of the District of Columbia’s procedures and requirements for admission to the Bar will not be frustrated by granting this petition.” Ibid. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not act on Feldman’s petition for several months. In March 1978, Feldman’s counsel wrote to the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to urge favorable action on Feld-man’s petition. The letter stated that Feldman had “abundantly demonstrated his fitness to practice law” and suggested that “it would be a gross injustice to exclude him from the Bar without even considering his individual qualifications.” Id., at 6a. The letter went on to state that “[i]n the unique circumstances of his case, barring Mr. Feldman from the practice of law merely because he has not graduated from an accredited law school would raise important questions under the United States Constitution and the federal antitrust laws — questions that Mr. Feldman is prepared to pursue in the United States District Court if necessary.” Id., at 6a-7a. In support of Feldman’s position, the letter again stressed the strength of his training and the breadth of his experience. While acknowledging that a strict reading of Rule 461(b)(3) prevented Feldman from taking the bar examination, Feldman’s counsel suggested that the court was not precluded from considering “Mr. Feldman’s application on its merits.” Id., at 9a. The court has plenary power to regulate the licensing of attorneys, which, in the view of Feld-man’s counsel, includes the discretion to waive the requirements of Rule 461 in a deserving case. In view of Feldman’s “unusually high qualifications for admission” his case provided “an ideal occasion for the exercise of such discretion.” Ibid. Feldman’s counsel also pointed out that the court had granted waivers of the rule in the past and suggested that a “failure to consider Mr. Feldman’s application would be highly arbitrary and would raise serious questions about the fairness and even-handedness of the Court’s policies regarding bar admissions.” Id., at 10a. He went on to state that “serious questions under the United States Constitution are raised by any bar admissions procedure which automatically rejects applicants who have not graduated from an A. B. A. accredited law school, without any opportunity to show that their experience and education provide equivalent evidence of their fitness to practice law.” Id., at 10a-lla. Feldman’s counsel cited case authority in support of his position. Finally, Feldman’s counsel stated that “[t]he federal antitrust laws provide an alternative basis for questioning the legality of a bar admissions procedure which presumes applicants to be unqualified if they lack a law degree and denies them any opportunity to show that their individual training and experience still qualify them to practice law.” Id., at 12a. Feld-man’s counsel also cited cases in support of this position. In late March 1978, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals responded to the letter from Feldman’s counsel. Id., at 16a. The Chief Judge stated that while the Committee on Admissions had recognized Mr. Feldman’s “exceptional opportunity for training” and his fine personal qualities, the purpose of the rule at issue was “to prevent the Committee and the Court from assuming the practicably impossible task of making separate subjective evaluations of each applicant’s training and education; hence, an objective and reasonable standard as prescribed by the rule must be utilized.” Ibid. In this light, the court decided not to waive the rule and upheld the Committee’s denial of Feldman’s application. On March 30, 1978, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued a per curiam order denying Feldman’s petition. Id., at 18a. The order stated simply that “[o]n consideration of the petition of Marc Feldman to waive the provisions of Rule 46 of the General Rules of this Court, it is ORDERED that applicant’s petition is denied.” Ibid. In May 1978, Feldman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ refusal to waive Rule 461(b)(3) on his behalf. Id., at 35a. The complaint stated that the “[defendants’ refusal to consider plaintiff’s individual qualifications to practice law is unlawful in view of his demonstrated fitness and competence, as well as the prior admission to the D. C. bar of several other individuals who did not attend an accredited law school.” Id., at 36a. Feld-man sought “a declaration that defendants’ actions have violated the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and the Sherman Act, and ... an injunction requiring defendants either to grant plaintiff immediate admission to the District of Columbia bar or to permit him to sit for the bar examination as soon as possible.” Ibid' The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. Id., at 78a, 79a. The court found that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ order denying Feld-man’s petition was a judicial act “which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory issues raised.” Id., at 82a. The court stated that if it were “to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of this lawsuit, it would find itself in the unsupportable position of reviewing an order of a jurisdiction’s highest court.” Ibid. B Respondent Hickey began the study of law in March 1975 at the Potomac School of Law, Washington, D. C., after concluding a distinguished 20-year career as a pilot in the United States Navy. At the time he entered Potomac, Hickey was aware that it had not been accredited by the ABA, but he thought that he could transfer at some later date to an ABA-approved school. Shortly after Hickey started his studies, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted waivers of Rule 461(b)(3) to graduates of the International School of Law, a new and unapproved school in the area. The court granted waivers to members of the 1975, 1976, and 1977 graduating classes of International. This practice encouraged Hickey to believe that he also would be able to obtain a waiver of the rule. In November 1977, however, the Court of Appeals denied Potomac’s petition for a temporary waiver of the rule and announced that it would no longer grant waivers to future International graduates. In April 1978, Hickey submitted to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a petition for waiver of Rule 461(b)(3) so that he could sit for the bar examination. Id., at 19a. In his petition, Hickey described his career in the Navy and his law school record. He also submitted affidavits from four law professors attesting to his competence in his legal studies. Hickey went on to suggest that it would be unfair to deny him, or other students currently enrolled at Potomac, a waiver after they had pursued three years of legal education in reliance on the court’s previous policy of granting waivers to International graduates. Hickey pointed out that denying his petition for waiver would impose an especially severe burden on him in view of his age and his status as a husband and father. Hickey also suggested that it would be burdensome for him to attempt to comply with Rule 461(b)(4), which permits graduates of unapproved law schools to sit for the bar examination after completing 24 credit hours at an approved law school. Furthermore, Hickey contended that he would be unable to comply with the rule because the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement. Finally, Hickey stated that his 20 years of military service had demonstrated “far beyond that of the average bar exam candidate, that he possesses the qualities essential to a good lawyer, including: judgment, maturity, courage in the face of adversity, concern for his fellow man, commitment to our society and attention to detail.” App. 24a. He suggested that “[f ]ar more than most, [he had] earned the right to sit for the bar examination.” Ibid. On June 12, 1978, the court issued a per curiam order denying Hickey’s petition for a waiver. Id., at 49a. The order stated that the court had considered the petition and Hickey’s contention that the ABA had instructed approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to nondegree candidates for completion of the 24-credit-hour requirement. The court stated: “The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure, as amended — 1977, permit enrollment of persons in petitioner’s category under Standard 506(ii) if they can satisfy the requirement for admission set forth in Standard 502.” Ibid. In July 1978, Hickey filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of his waiver petition. Id., at 60a. Hickey alleged that the denial of his petition violated the Fifth Amendment and the federal antitrust laws. Id., at 64a-65a. The allegations and prayer for relief in Hickey’s complaint were virtually identical to the allegations and prayer for relief in Feldman’s complaint, see n. 3, supra, except that Hickey simply sought an order requiring the defendants to allow him to sit for the bar examination at the earliest possible date. App. 66a. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Hickey’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id., at 142a. In this regard, the court stated that “[i]t is well settled that the admission and exclusion of attorneys by the members of the highest court of a state is the exercise of a judicial function which may be reviewed only by the United States Supreme Court.” Id., at 143a. In the District Court’s view, Hickey was seeking review of the defendants’ denial of his petition for admission to the bar examination. The court suggested that “[t]he constitutional challenge to that denial is wholly and directly intertwined with plaintiff’s efforts to secure an exemption from Rule 46, and the allegations of the complaint and the relief requested concern essentially the application of the Rule to his own particular case.” Ibid. In this light the court concluded that “there is no basis for the extraordinary attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on a matter entrusted by the Congress to the D. C. Court of Appeals.” Ibid. c Both Hickey and Feldman appealed the dismissals of their complaints to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Hickey’s and Feldman’s antitrust claims on the ground that they were insubstantial. Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 122, 661 F. 2d 1295, 1298 (1981). The court, however, concluded that the waiver proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals “were not judicial in the federal sense, and thus did not foreclose litigation of the constitutional contentions in the District Court.” Ibid. The court therefore reversed the dismissals of the constitutional claims and remanded them for consideration on the merits. Ibid. Although the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged that “review of a final judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of the United States,” id., at 134, 661 F. 2d, at 1310 (footnote omitted), and that the United States District Court therefore is without authority to review determinations by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings, the court found that the District Court has jurisdiction over these cases because the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals “were not judicial. . . .” Ibid. The court based this conclusion on a finding that neither Feldman nor Hickey asserted in their waiver petitions “any sort of right to be admitted to the District of Columbia bar, or even to take the examination therefor.” Id., at 139, 661 F. 2d, at 1315 (emphasis in original). Feldman and Hickey simply sought an exemption from the rule. In particular, Hickey did not present any legal arguments nor did “he demand admission to the examination as a matter of legal entitlement. ” Ibid. He “merely asked the court to exercise its administrative discretion to permit him to take the test.” Ibid. This amounted to a request that the court “make a policy decision equating his personal qualities with accredited legal education, not an adjudication requiring resort to legal principles.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). The District of Columbia Circuit found Feldman’s case more difficult, id., at 140, 661 F. 2d, at 1316, but still concluded that the proceedings on his waiver petition were not judicial in nature because the “claim-of-right element” was lacking. Ibid. Feldman’s petition did not “claim that a refusal of his waiver request would deny him any right at all.” Ibid. Instead, the petition “invoked the administrative discretion of [the court], simply asking that it temper its rule in his favor, for personal and not legal reasons.” Ibid. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the argument that the letter from Feldman’s counsel, which raised certain legal arguments, changed the nature of the proceedings. Id., at 140-141, 661 F. 2d, at 1316-1317. The District of Columbia Circuit stated: “We are unable to discern in the letter any desire that the court consider Feldman’s legal criticisms of the rule on their merits, or hand down a decision dealing with them. The letter made unmistakably clear that these criticisms would be litigated, if at all, in the District Court. . . .” Ibid, (footnotes omitted). II The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings. Review of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 296 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, 415, 416 (1923). A crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature. A This Court has considered the distinction between judicial and administrative or ministerial proceedings on several occasions. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908), railroads challenged in federal court the constitutionality of rail passenger rates set by the State Corporation Commission. The question presented by the case was whether the federal court was free to enjoin implementation of the rate order. Id., at 223. In considering this question, we assumed that the State Corporation Commission was, at least for some purposes, a court. Id., at 224. We held, however, that the federal court could enjoin implementation of the rate order because the Commission had acted in a legislative as opposed to a judicial capacity in setting the rates. Id., at 226. In reaching this conclusion, we stated: “A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind . . . .” Ibid. We went on to suggest that the nature of a proceeding “depends not upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings.” Ibid. See generally Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U. S. 15, 20-22 (1972); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820, 827 (1961); Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 259 (1933); Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153, 161-162 (1919). In In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945), we considered the petitioner’s challenge to the constitutionality of a State Supreme Court’s refusal to admit him to the practice of law. At the outset, we noted that the record was not in the “customary form” because the state court had not treated the proceeding as “judicial.” Id., at 563. In fact, the state court contested our certiorari jurisdiction on the ground that the state-court proceedings had not been judicial in nature and that no case or controversy therefore existed in this Court under Art. Ill of the Federal Constitution. Id., at 564-565. In considering this contention, we conceded that the state-court proceedings might not have been judicial under state law and that the denial of the petitioner’s application for admission to the bar was treated “as a ministerial act which is performed by virtue of the judicial power, such as the appointment of a clerk or bailiff or the specification of the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar, rather than a judicial proceeding.” Id., at 566. We stated, however, that in determining the nature of the proceedings “we must for ourselves appraise the circumstances of the refusal.” Ibid. In conducting this appraisal, we first stated: “A case arises, within the meaning of the Constitution, when any question respecting the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States has assumed ‘such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it.’ ... A declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, not on rights which may arise in the future, and there must be an actual controversy over an issue, not a desire for an abstract declaration of the law. The form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling.” Id., at 566-567, quoting Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819 (1824) (citations omitted). Applying this standard, we noted that the state court had concluded that the report of the Committee on Character and Fitness, which refused to issue a favorable certificate, should be sustained. The state court, therefore, considered the petitioner’s petition “on its merits.” 325 U. S., at 567. Although “no entry was placed by the Clerk in the file, on a docket, or in a judgment roll,” ibid., we found that the state court had taken “cognizance of the petition and passed an order which [was] validated by the signature of the presiding officer.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). We stated: “Where relief is thus sought in a state court against the action of a committee, appointed to advise the court, and the court takes cognizance of the complaint without requiring the appearance of the committee or its members, we think the consideration of the petition by the Supreme Court, the body which has authority itself by its own act to give the relief sought, makes the proceeding adversary in the sense of a true case or controversy. “A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a controversy. When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right is made by judicial order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the Constitution when federal questions are raised and proper steps taken to that end, in this Court.” Id., at 567-569 (footnote omitted). B These precedents clearly establish that the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals surrounding Feldman’s and Hickey’s petitions for waiver were judicial in nature. The proceedings were not legislative, ministerial, or administrative. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did not “loo[k] to the future and chang[e] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.” Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S., at 226. Nor did it engage in rulemaking or specify “the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar . . . .” In re Summers, swpra, at 566. Nor did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals simply engage in ministerial action. Instead, the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals involved a “judicial inquiry” in which the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce “liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.” Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra, at 226. In his petition to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, discussed in detail, supra, at 466-468, Feldman contended that he possessed “the requisite fitness and good moral character necessary to practice law in this jurisdiction.” App. la. In support of his position, he described in detail his legal training and experience. He asserted that his professional education and training were “equal to that received by those who have attended an A. B. A. approved law school.” Id., at 4a. He further argued that granting his petition would not frustrate the objectives of the District of Columbia’s procedures and requirements for admission to the bar. In his later letter, see supra, at 466-467, Feldman pointed out that the court’s former practice of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools raised questions about the fairness of denying his petition. He also made explicit legal arguments against the rule based both on the Constitution and on the federal antitrust laws. All of this was done against the background of an existing rule. In essence, Feldman argued on policy grounds that the rule should not be applied to him because he had fulfilled the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 461(b)(3). Alternatively, he argued in his letter that the rule was invalid. In short, he was seeking “a declaration on rights as they [stood] . . . not on rights which [might] arise in the future . . . .” In re Summers, 325 U. S., at 567. This required the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to determine in light of existing law and in light of Feldman’s qualifications and arguments whether Feldman’s petition should be granted. The court also had before it legal arguments against the validity of the rule. When it issued a per curiam order denying Feldman’s petition, it determined as a legal matter that Feldman was not entitled to be admitted to the bar without examination or to sit for the bar examination. The court had adjudicated Feldman’s “claim of a present right to admission to the bar,” id., at 568, and rejected it. This is the essence of a judicial proceeding. The same conclusion obtains with respect to the proceedings on Hickey’s petition for waiver. In his petition, see supra, at 471-472, Hickey asserted that he was substantively qualified to sit for the bar examination. In support of his position, he submitted affidavits supporting his competence and described in detail his military service and legal education. He also argued that he had relied on the court’s former policy of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools in developing a reasonable expectation that he would be granted a waiver as well. Moreover, he suggested that ABA policy made it impossible for him to pursue the alternative route under the rules to being permitted to sit for the bar examination. Finally, he argued, based on equitable considerations such as his age, military service, and status as a father and husband, that he should be granted a waiver. He stated that “[f]ar more than most,” he had “earned the right to sit for the bar examination.” App. 24a. As in Feldman’s case, Hickey’s petition called upon the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to consider policy and equitable arguments in deciding whether to waive the rule. The fact that Hickey did not cite case authority in support of his arguments or make any explicitly legal contentions does not render the proceedings nonjudicial. The court still was required to determine if Hickey’s qualifications and background fulfilled the basic purposes of the rule sufficiently to justify a waiver and, if not, whether equitable considerations compelled a waiver. These are essentially judicial inquiries. They resulted in a per curiam order that denied Hickey’s petition and explicitly rejected his contention that ABA policy prevented him from acquiring 24 credit hours from an accredited law school. Admittedly, the proceedings in both Feldman’s case and Hickey’s case did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial proceedings. As we said in In re Summers, supra, however, “[tjhe form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling.” Id., at 567. III A A determination that the proceedings on Feldman’s and Hickey’s petitions were judicial does not finally dispose of this case. As we have noted, supra, at 476, a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court. Therefore, to the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of their petitions for waiver, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints. Hickey and Feld-man should have sought review of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ judgments in this Court. To the extent that Hickey and Feldman mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 461(b)(3), however, the District Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints. The difference between seeking review in a federal district court of a state court’s final judgment in a bar admission matter and challenging the validity of a state bar admission rule has been recognized in the lower courts and, at least implicitly, in the opinions of this Court. In Doe v. Pringle, 550 F. 2d 596 (CA10 1976), the plaintiff challenged in United States District Court the constitutionality of a state-court decision denying his application for admission to the bar. In concluding that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, the Court of Appeals stated: “We concur in the district court’s finding that it is without subject matter jurisdiction to review a final order of the [State] Supreme Court denying a particular application for admission to the [state bar]. This rule applies even though, as here, the challenge is anchored to alleged deprivations of federally protected due process and equal protection rights.” Id., at 599 (emphasis in original). During the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated: “The United States District Court, in denying [the plaintiff] relief, declared that there is a subtle but fundamental distinction between two types of claims which a frustrated bar applicant might bring to federal court: The first is a constitutional challenge to the state’s general rules and regulations governing admission; the second is a claim, based on constitutional or other grounds, that the state has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission. The Court held that while federal courts do exercise jurisdiction over many constitutional claims which attack the state’s power to license attorneys involving challenges to either the rule-making authority or the administration of the rules,. . . such is not true where review of a state court’s adjudication of a particular application is sought. The Court ruled that the latter claim may be heard, if at all, exclusively by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id., at 597 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Doe v. Pringle, supra, properly emphasized the distinction between general challenges to state bar admission rules and claims that a state court has unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission. We have recognized that state supreme courts may act in a nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules regulating the bar. See, e. g., Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U. S. 719, 731 (1980); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S., at 827 (plurality opinion); In re Summers, 325 U. S., at 566. Challenges to the constitutionality of state bar rules, therefore, do not necessarily require a United States district court to review a final state-court judgment in a judicial proceeding. Instead, the district court may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the case, the district court is not reviewing a state-court judicial decision. In this regard, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 does not act as a bar to the district court’s consideration of the case and because the proceedings giving rise to the rule are nonjudicial the policies prohibiting United States district court review of final state-court judgments are not implicated. United States district courts, therefore, have subject-matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1257. B Applying this standard to the respondents’ complaints, it is clear that their allegations that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying their petitions for waiver and that the court acted unreasonably and discriminatorily in denying their petitions in view of its former policy of granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools, see n. 3, supra, required the District Court to review a final judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular case. These allegations are inextricably intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny the respondents’ petitions. The District Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents’ complaints. The remaining allegations in the complaints, however, involve a general attack on the constitutionality of Rule 461 (b)(3). See n. 3, supra. The respondents’ claims that the rule is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that only graduates of accredited law schools are fit to practice law, discriminates against those who have obtained equivalent legal training by other means, and im-permissibly delegates the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ power to regulate the bar to the American Bar Association, do not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case. The District Court, therefore, has subject-matter jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents’ complaints. In deciding that the District Court has jurisdiction over those elements of the respondents’ complaints that involve a general challenge to the constitutionality of Rule 461(b)(3), we expressly do not reach the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints. We leave that question to the District Court on remand. IV The judgment of the District of Columbia Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Under Rule 461(b)(4), a graduate of an unaccredited law school “may be permitted admission to an examination only after receiving credit for 24 semester hours of study in a law school that at the time of study was approved by the American Bar Association and with Committee approval.” The complaint named as defendants the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in his official capacity, the Committee on Admissions, and the Chairman and Secretary of that Committee. App. 37a-38a. In his complaint, Feldman specifically alleged that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ refusal to admit him to the bar violated the Fifth Amendment in five respects. First, Feldman alleged that Rule 461(b)(3), by limiting bar membership to graduates of accredited law schools, creates an irrebuttable presumption that only graduates of such schools are fit to practice law in the District of Columbia and thereby deprives persons who have pursued alternative methods of legal training of their liberty and property without due process of law. App. 42a. Second, Feldman alleged that the rule impermissibly and irrationally discriminates against persons who have obtained equivalent legal training by other means and therefore denies such persons the equal protection of the laws. Ibid. Third, Feldman alleged that by conclusively presuming that only graduates of accredited law schools are fit to practice law in the District of Columbia, the rule impermissibly delegates to the American Bar Association the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ power to regulate the practice of law and therefore deprives persons with alternative legal training of their property and liberty without due process of law. Ibid. Fourth, Feldman alleged that by refusing to consider whether his individual qualifications and training were equivalent to graduation from an accredited law school and for that reason justified a waiver of the rule, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously and deprived him of his liberty and property without due process of law. Ibid. Finally, Feldman alleged that because the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had repeatedly waived the rule in the past to permit admission to the bar of persons who had not graduated from approved law schools, the court acted unreasonably and diseriminatorily in refusing to consider his individual qualifications and both denied him the equal protection of the laws and deprived him of his liberty and property without due process of law. Id., at 43a. The complaint also included an allegation that by limiting membership in the District of Columbia Bar to graduates of approved law schools, the defendants had entered into a combination in restraint of trade and had attempted to monopolize, and in fact had monopolized, the practice of law in the District of Columbia. Ibid. In his prayer for relief, Feldman asked for a declaration that Rule 461, “either on its face or as applied to plaintiff,” ibid., violates the Fifth Amendment; that the defendants’ refusal to consider his individual qualifications and training violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment; and that the defendants’ rejection of his application because he did not graduate from an approved law school violated the federal antitrust laws. Id., at 43a-44a. Feldman requested an order requiring the defendants to admit him to the bar without examination or to allow him to sit for the bar examination at the earliest possible date or to determine whether his training and qualifications had provided him with the same competence to practice law as graduates of approved law schools. Id., at 44a. The defendants also asserted res judicata as a ground for their motion to dismiss. Id., at 80a. Hickey also suggested that the court’s former policy of granting waivers to the members of the first three graduating classes of a new law school should be continued in view of the difficulty of meeting “the strict standards for ABA approval in the mere three years between the inception of a new law school and its first graduation.” Id., at 23a. Hickey also asserted that it was unnecessary for him to take 24 more credit hours at an approved law school in view of the breadth of the legal education he already had received. He stated that he had completed 87 credit hours covering all of the subjects included in the bar examination. To take 24 more credit hours he would have to enroll in elective courses not even tested by the bar examination. Id., at 23a-24a. At the direction of the court, the Clerk of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had written to the ABA to determine whether it had “ ‘instructed, as a matter of policy, the approved law schools in the District of Columbia to deny admission to non-degree candidates, as Potomac graduates will be, for completion of the 24 credit hour requirement.’” Id,., at 138a. The ABA responded by citing Standard 506, which permits, among other things, “the enrollment in a limited number of courses of non-degree candidates who are students enrolled in other colleges, members of the bar, graduates of other approved law schools, or other persons who have successfully completed at least three years toward a bachelor’s degree at a regionally accredited college or university.” Id., at 140a. The complaint named as defendants the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and its individual judges in their official capacities. Id., at 61a. The District Court pointed out that if the issues concerning the validity of the rule had been raised in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that “court could and would have entertained and determined them.” Id., at 143a. The court stated that if that course had been followed “this Court would have been precluded in any event from thereafter entertaining those same issues.” Id., at 144a. The court also noted that it had been advised by counsel for the defendants that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was still willing to consider those matters. The court suggested that it “would be a violation of the principles of comity and judicial economy in these circumstances for this Court to exercise jurisdiction even if such jurisdiction exists.” Ibid. Finally, the court dismissed the antitrust claims on the ground that the antitrust laws “do not apply to the kind of action being challenged.” Ibid. Although the cases were not consolidated, the District of Columbia Circuit dealt with them in a single opinion because they raised nearly identical legal issues and were argued on the same day. Feldman v. Gardner, 213 U. S. App. D. C. 119, 122, n. 3, 661 F. 2d 1296, 1298, n. 3 (1981). We denied respondents’ cross-petitions for certiorari from the disposition of the antitrust claims. Feldman v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 458 U. S. 1106 (1982); Hickey v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 458 U. S. 1106 (1982). Those claims, therefore, are not before us. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioners’ alternative argument that consideration of the legal issues Feldman sought to raise in the District Court was barred by principles of res judicata. Feldman v. Gardner, supra, at 144, 661F. 2d, at 1320. The court did so on the ground that the proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were nonjudicial in nature. Ibid. In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, id., at 145,661F. 2d, at 1321, Judge Robb expressed the view that the District Court had no jurisdiction to review the orders of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Ibid. He noted that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has the status of a state supreme court and stated: “The adverse decisions in the appellants’ cases were reviewable in the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the appellants cast their petitions to the Court of Appeals in terms of requests for waivers, the petitions in essence were demands that the court declare the petitioners qualified to sit for the bar examination. Those demands were denied by en banc orders of the Court of Appeals. The denials were judicial acts and as such were reviewable on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. They were not reviewable in the District Court.” Ibid. As the District of Columbia Circuit recognized, it is a question of federal law whether “a particular proceeding before another tribunal was truly judicial” for purposes of ascertaining the jurisdiction of a federal court. Feldman v. Gardner, supra, at 134, 661 F. 2d, at 1310. See In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 566 (1945). The fact that Feldman’s counsel stated in the letter that he was prepared to pursue constitutional and antitrust challenges to the rule in federal district court if Feldman’s petition was denied is irrelevant to a consideration of whether these issues were before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. This case is not like England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964), which arose in the abstention context, and discussed a litigant’s right to reserve his federal claims for consideration by a federal court even though he might be required to inform the state court of the nature of his federal claims so that a state statute could be construed in light of those claims. Our conclusion that the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature is consistent with our grants of certiorari to review state-court decisions on bar-related matters in such cases as Schware v. New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957), Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252 (1957), Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U. S. 36 (1961), In re Anastaplo, 366 U. S. 82 (1961), Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96 (1963), Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U. S. 1 (1971), and In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23 (1971). Last Term we again recognized the judicial nature of state bar disciplinary proceedings in Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423 (1982). It is possible that review of a state-court decision by this Court could be barred by a petitioner’s failure to raise his constitutional claims in the state courts. In Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437 (1969), we stated that “[i]t was very early established that the Court will not decide federal constitutional issues raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions.” Id., at 438. See also Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U. S. 351, 352 (1973); Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, 805 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969). Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 436-437 (1959) (“There can be no question as to the proper presentation of a federal claim when the highest state court passes on it. . . . We think this sufficient here to satisfy the statutory requirement that the federal right sought to be vindicated in this Court be one claimed below. 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3)” (footnote omitted)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 129, 133 (1964). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has relied on this limit on our certiorari jurisdiction to hold that a federal district court has jurisdiction over constitutional claims asserted by a plaintiff who has been denied admission to a state bar in a state-court judicial proceeding if he failed to raise his constitutional claims in the state court. In Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas, 658 F. 2d 1045 (1981), the Court of Appeals stated: “The record gives no indication that [the plaintiff] asserted the federal constitutional claims which are the basis of her § 1983 action — that the denial of her application for admission to the bar examination deprived her of a constitutionally protected liberty and property interest in pursuing the practice of law in Texas, constituted a violation of equal protection and infringed upon her constitutionally protected right to travel — in the Texas Supreme Court. Since 28 U. S. C. § 1257(3) authorizes the Supreme Court to review only judgments in state court cases in which a federal issue was raised and adjudicated, ... it is apparent that [the plaintiff’s] case could not have been reviewed on a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court following the Texas Supreme Court’s denial of her motion. Since [the plaintiff’s] § 1983 complaint states claims for relief grounded in federal constitutional rights, claims which were not presented to the Texas Supreme Court, her § 1983 suit does not constitute an impermissible effort to seek review of a state court judgment in a lower federal court.” Id., at 1051 (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Dasher is flawed. As we noted in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281 (1970), “lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.” Id., at 296. If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s denial in a judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff’s application for admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision. This the district court may not do. Moreover, the fact that we may not have jurisdiction to review a final state-court judgment because of a petitioner’s failure to raise his constitutional claims in state court does not mean that a United States district court should have jurisdiction over the claims. By failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court. This result is eminently defensible on policy grounds. We have noted the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal constitutional claims. See, e. g., Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 549 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 105 (1980); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 383 (1977). We also noted in Cardinale that one of the policies underlying the requirement that constitutional claims be raised in state court as a predicate to our certiorari jurisdiction is the desirability of giving the state court the first opportunity to consider a state statute or rule in light of federal constitutional arguments. A state court may give the statute a saving construction in response to those arguments. 394 U. S., at 439. Finally, it is important to note in the context of this case the strength of the state interest in regulating the state bar. As we stated in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975), “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” Id., at 792. See also Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assn., supra, at 434-435; Leis v. Flynt, 439 U. S. 438, 442 (1979). In MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F. 2d 846 (CA9 1969), the court stated: “[OJrders of a state court relating to the admission, discipline, and disbarment of members of its bar may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari to the state court, and not by means of an original action in a lower federal court. The rule serves substantial policy interests arising from the historic relationship between state judicial systems and the members of their respective bars, and between the state and federal judicial systems.” Ibid. See also Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners, 623 F. 2d 605 (CA9 1980). In reaching these conclusions regarding the District Court’s jurisdiction over particular elements of the respondents’ complaints, we necessarily refuse to accept in their entirety either the petitioners’ argument that “the sum and substance of respondents’ federal court actions were to obtain review of the prior adverse decisions of the D. C. Court of Appeals in their individual cases,” Brief for Petitioners 23, n. 9; Reply Brief for Petitioners 4-7, or the respondents’ argument that their complaints involved general challenges to the constitutionality of Rule 461(b)(3) without seeking review of particularized decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adjudicating their right to practice law. See Brief for Respondent Hickey 11; Brief for Respondent Feldman 41. As discussed above, a close reading of the complaints discloses that the respondents mounted a general challenge to the constitutionality of the rule and sought review of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions in their particular cases. The District Court did not reach the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata barred further litigation on the respondents’ claims in either Feldman’s case, App. 79a, or Hickey’s, id., at 142a.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al. v. PUBLIC CITIZEN et al. No. 03-358. Argued April 21, 2004 Decided June 7, 2004 Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clark, Austin C. Schlick, John L. Smeltzer, David C. Shilton, Jeffrey A. Rosen, and Peter J. Plocki. Jonathan Weissglass argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stephen P. Berzon, Gail Ruder-man Feuer, Julie Masters, Adrianna Quintero Somaini, Melissa Lin Perrella, David C. Vladeck, Patrick J Szymanski, David Rosenfeld, William S. Lerach, Patrick J. Coughlin, Albert H. Meyerhoff and Thomas O. McGarity. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Susan L. Durbin and Gordon B. Burns, Deputy Attorneys General, Manuel M. Medeiros, Solicitor General, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Craig C. Thompson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, and Peggy A. Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for the American Public Health Association et al. by Hope M. Babcock; for Defenders of Wildlife et al. by Pamela S. Karlan and Sanjay Narayan; for the Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund by Karen B. Tripp; and for South Coast Air Quality Management District et al. by Barbara Baird and Patricia V. Tubert. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we confront the question whether the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852 (codified, as amended, at 42 U. S. C. §§4321-4370f), and the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 7401-7671q, require the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to evaluate the environmental effects of cross-border operations of Mexican-domiciled motor carriers, where FMCSA’s promulgation of certain regulations would allow such cross-border operations to occur. Because FMCSA lacks discretion to prevent these cross-border operations, we conclude that these statutes impose no such requirement on FMCSA. I Due to the complex statutory and regulatory provisions implicated in this case, we begin with a brief overview of the relevant statutes. We then turn to the factual and procedural background. A 1 Signed into law on January 1, 1970, NEPA establishes a “national policy [to] encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment,” and was intended to reduce or eliminate environmental damage and to promote “the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to” the United States. 42 U. S. C. §4321. “NEPA itself does not mandate particular results” in order to accomplish these ends. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 350 (1989). Rather, NEPA imposes only procedural requirements on federal agencies with a particular focus on requiring agencies to undertake anal-yses of the environmental impact of their proposals and actions. See id., at 349-350. At the heart of NEPA is a requirement that federal agencies “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on— “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C). This detailed statement is called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), established by NEPA with authority to issue regulations interpreting it, has promulgated regulations to guide federal agencies in determining what actions are subject to that statutory requirement. See 40 CFR §1500.3 (2003). The CEQ regulations allow an agency to prepare a more limited document, an Environmental Assessment (EA), if the agency’s proposed action neither is categorically excluded from the requirement to produce an EIS nor would clearly require the production of an EIS. See §§ 1501.4(aMb). The EA is to be a “concise public document” that “[b]riefly provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an [EIS].” § 1508.9(a). If, pursuant to the EA, an agency determines that an EIS is not required under applicable CEQ regulations, it must issue a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI), which briefly presents the reasons why the proposed agency action will not have a significant impact on the human environment. See §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13. 2 What is known as the CAA became law in 1963, 77 Stat. 392. In 1970, Congress substantially amended the CAA into roughly its current form. 84 Stat. 1713. The 1970 amendments mandated national air quality standards and deadlines for their attainment, while leaving to the States the development of “implementation plan[s]” to comply with the federal standards. Ibid. In 1977, Congress again amended the CAA, 91 Stat. 749, to prohibit the Federal Government and its agencies from “engaging] in, supporting] in any way or providing] financial assistance for, licensing] or permitting], or approving], any activity which does not conform to [a state] implementation plan.” 42 U. S. C. § 7506(c)(1). The definition of “conformity” includes restrictions on, for instance, “increasing] the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any standard in any area,” or “delaying] timely attainment of any standard ... in any area.” § 7506(c)(1)(B). These safeguards prevent the Federal Government from interfering with the States’ abilities to comply with the CAA’s requirements. 3 FMCSA, an agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is responsible for motor carrier safety and registration. See 49 U. S. C. § 113(f). FMCSA has a variety of statutory mandates, including “ensuring]” safety, §31136, establishing minimum levels of financial responsibility for motor carriers, §31139, and prescribing federal standards for safety inspections of commercial motor vehicles, §31142. Importantly, FMCSA has only limited discretion regarding motor vehicle carrier registration: It must grant registration to all domestic or foreign motor carriers that are “willing and able to comply with” the applicable safety, fitness, and financial-responsibility requirements. § 13902(a)(1). FMCSA has no statutory authority to impose or enforce emissions controls or to establish environmental requirements unrelated to motor carrier safety. B We now turn to the factual and procedural background of this case. Before 1982, motor carriers domiciled in Canada and Mexico could obtain certification to operate within the United States from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). In 1982, Congress, concerned about discriminatory treatment of United States motor carriers in Mexico and Canada, enacted a 2-year moratorium on new grants of operating authority. Congress authorized the President to extend the moratorium beyond the 2-year period if Canada or Mexico continued to interfere with United States motor carriers, and also authorized the President to lift or modify the moratorium if he determined that doing so was in the national interest. 49 U. S. C. § 10922(0 (1982 ed.). Although the moratorium on Canadian motor carriers was quickly lifted, the moratorium on Mexican motor carriers remained, and was extended by the President. In December 1992, the leaders of Mexico, Canada, and the United States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 32 I. L. M. 605 (1993). As part of NAFTA, the United States agreed to phase out the moratorium and permit Mexican motor carriers to obtain operating authority within the United States’ interior by January 2000. On NAFTA’s effective date (January 1, 1994), the President began to lift the trade moratorium by allowing the licensing of Mexican carriers to provide some bus services in the United States. The President, however, did not continue to ease the moratorium on the timetable specified by NAFTA, as concerns about the adequacy of Mexico’s regulation of motor carrier safety remained. The Government of Mexico challenged the United States’ implementation of NAFTA’s motor carrier provisions under NAFTA’s dispute-resolution process, and in February 2001, an international arbitration panel determined that the United States’ “blanket refusal” of Mexican motor carrier applications breached the United States’ obligations under NAFTA. App. 279, ¶295. Shortly thereafter, the President made clear his intention to lift the moratorium on Mexican motor carrier certification following the preparation of new regulations governing grants of operating authority to Mexican motor carriers. In May 2001, FMCSA published for comment proposed rules concerning safety regulation of Mexican motor carriers. One rule (the Application Rule) addressed the establishment of a new application form for Mexican motor carriers that seek authorization to operate within the United States. Another rule (the Safety Monitoring Rule) addressed the establishment of a safety-inspection regime for all Mexican motor carriers that would receive operating authority under the Application Rule. In December 2001, Congress enacted the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 115 Stat. 833. Section 350 of this Act, id., at 864, provided that no funds appropriated under the Act could be obligated or expended to review or to process any application by a Mexican motor carrier for authority to operate in the interior of the United States until FMCSA implemented specific application and safety-monitoring requirements for Mexican carriers. Some of these requirements went beyond those proposed by FMCSA in the Application and Safety Monitoring Rules. Congress extended the §350 conditions to appropriations for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004. In January 2002, acting pursuant to NEPA’s mandates, FMCSA issued a programmatic EA for the proposed Application and Safety Monitoring Rules. FMCSA’s EA evaluated, the environmental impact associated with three separate scenarios: where the President did not lift the moratorium; where the President did but where (contrary to what was legally possible) FMCSA did not issue any new regulations; and the Proposed Action Alternative, where the President would modify the moratorium and where FMCSA would adopt the proposed regulations. The EA considered the environmental impact in the categories of traffic and congestion, public safety and health, air quality, noise, socioeconomic factors, and environmental justice. Vital to the EA’s analysis, however, was the assumption that there would be no change in trade volume between the United States and Mexico due to the issuance of the regulations. FMCSA did note that § 350’s restrictions made it impossible for Mexican motor carriers to operate in the interior of the United States before FMCSA’s issuance of the regulations. But, FMCSA determined that “this and any other associated effects in trade characteristics would be the result of the modification of the moratorium” by the President, not a result of FMCSA’s implementation of the proposed safety regulations. App. 60. Because FMCSA concluded that the entry of the Mexican trucks was not an “effect” of its regulations, it did not consider any environmental impact that might be caused by the increased presence of Mexican trucks within the United States. The particular environmental effects on which the EA focused, then, were those likely to arise from the increase in the number of roadside inspections of Mexican trucks and buses due to the proposed regulations. The EA concluded that these effects (such as a slight increase in emissions, noise from the trucks, and possible danger to passing motorists) were minor and could be addressed and avoided in the inspections process itself. The EA also noted that the increase of inspection-related emissions would be at least partially offset by the fact that the safety requirements would reduce the number of Mexican trucks operating in the United States. Due to these calculations, the EA concluded that the issuance of the proposed regulations would have no significant impact on the environment, and hence FMCSA, on the same day as it released the EA, issued a FONSI. On March 19, 2002, FMCSA issued the two interim rules, delaying their effective date until May 3, 2002, to allow public comment on provisions that FMCSA added to satisfy the requirements of §350. In the regulatory preambles, FMCSA relied on its EA and its FONSI to demonstrate compliance with NEPA. FMCSA also addressed the CAA in the preambles, determining that it did not need to perform a “conformity review” of the proposed regulations under 42 U. S. C. § 7506(c)(1) because the increase in emissions from these regulations would fall below the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) threshold levels needed to trigger such a review. In November 2002, the President lifted the moratorium on qualified Mexican motor carriers. Before this action, however, respondents filed petitions for judicial review of the Application and Safety Monitoring Rules, arguing that the rules were promulgated in violation of NEPA and the CAA. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, granted the petitions, and set aside the rules. 316 F. 3d 1002 (CA9 2003). The Court of Appeals concluded that the EA was deficient because it failed to give adequate consideration to the overall environmental impact of lifting the moratorium on the cross-border operation of Mexican motor carriers. According to the Court of Appeals, FMCSA was required to consider the environmental effects of the entry of Mexican trucks because “the President’s rescission of the moratorium was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ at the time the EA was prepared and the decision not to prepare an EIS was made.” Id., at 1022 (quoting 40 CFR §§1508.7, 1508.8(b) (2003)). Due to this perceived deficiency, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for preparation of a full EIS. The Court of Appeals also directed FMCSA to prepare a full CAA conformity determination for the challenged regulations. It concluded that FMCSA’s determination that emissions attributable to the challenged rules would be below the threshold levels was not reliable because the agency’s CAA determination reflected the “illusory distinction between the effects of the regulations themselves and the effects of the presidential rescission of the moratorium on Mexican truck entry.” 316 F. 3d, at 1030. We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1088 (2003), and now reverse. II An agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS can be set aside only upon a showing that it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). See also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360, 375-376 (1989); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 412 (1976). Here, FMCSA based its FONSI upon the analysis contained within its EA; respondents argue that the issuance of the FONSI was arbitrary and capricious because the EA’s analysis was flawed. In particular, respondents criticize the EA’s failure to take into account the various environmental effects caused by the increase in cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers. Under NEPA, an agency is required to provide an EIS only if it will be undertaking a “major Federal actio[n],” which “significantly affect[s] the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C). Under applicable CEQ regulations, “[mjajor Federal action” is defined to “includ[ej actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.” 40 CFR §1508.18 (2008). “Effects” is defined to “include: (a) Direct effects, which are caused by the action and occur at the same time and place,” and “(b) Indirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” §1508.8. Thus, the relevant question is whether the increase in cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers, with the correlative release of emissions by Mexican trucks, is an “effect” of FMCSA’s issuance of the Application and Safety Monitoring Rules; if not, FMCSA’s failure to address these effects in its EA did not violate NEPA, ánd so FMCSA’s issuance of a FONSI cannot be arbitrary and capricious. A To answer this question, we begin by explaining what this case does not involve. What is not properly before us, despite respondents’ argument to the contrary, see Brief for Respondents 38-41, is any challenge to the EA due to its failure properly to consider possible alternatives to the proposed action (i. e., the issuance of the challenged rules) that would mitigate the environmental impact of the authorization of cross-border operations by Mexican motor carriers. Persons challenging an agency’s compliance with -NEPA must “structure their participation so that it. . . alerts the agency to the [parties’] position and contentions,” in order to allow the agency to give the issue meaningful consideration. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 553 (1978). None of the respondents identified in their comments any rulemaking alternatives beyond those evaluated in the EA, and none urged FMCSA to consider alternatives. Because respondents did not raise these particular objections to the EA, FMCSA was not given the opportunity to examine any proposed alternatives to determine if they were reasonably available. Respondents have therefore forfeited any objeetion to the EA on the ground that it failed adequately to discuss potential alternatives to the proposed action. Admittedly, the agency bears the primary responsibility to ensure that it complies with NEPA, see ibid., and an EA’s or an EIS’ flaws might be so obvious that there is no need for a commentator to point them out specifically in order to preserve its ability to challenge a proposed action. But that situation is not before us. With respect to FMCSA’s ability to mitigate, respondents can argue only that FMCSA could regulate emissions from Mexican trucks indirectly, through making the safety-registration process more onerous or by removing older, more polluting trucks through more effective enforcement of motor carrier safety standards. But respondents fail to identify any evidence that shows that any effect from these possible actions would be significant, or even noticeable, for air-quality purposes. The connection between enforcement of motor carrier safety and the environmental harms alleged in this case is also tenuous at best. Nor is it clear that FMCSA could, consistent with its limited statutory mandates, reasonably impose on Mexican carriers standards beyond those already required in its proposed regulations. B With this point aside, respondents have only one complaint with respect to the EA: It did not take into account the environmental effects of increased cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers. Respondents’ argument that FMCSA was required to consider these effects is simple. Under § 350, FMCSA is barred from expending any funds to process or review any applications by Mexican motor carriers until FMCSA implemented a variety of specific application and safety-monitoring requirements for Mexican carriers. This expenditure bar makes it impossible for any Mexican motor carrier to receive authorization to operate within the United States until FMCSA issued the regulations challenged here. The promulgation, of the regulations, the argument goes, would “caus[e]” the entry of Mexican trucks (and hence also cause any emissions such trucks would produce), and the entry of the trucks is “reasonably foreseeable.” 40 CFR § 1508.8 (2003). Thus, the argument concludes, under the relevant CEQ regulations, FMCSA must take these emissions into account in its E A when evaluating whether to produce an EIS. Respondents’ argument, however, overlooks a critical feature of this case: FMCSA has no ability to countermand the President’s lifting of the moratorium or otherwise categorically to exclude Mexican motor carriers from operating within the United States. To be sure, §350 did restrict the ability of FMCSA to authorize cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers, but Congress did not otherwise modify FMCSA’s statutory mandates. In particular, FMCSA remains subject to the mandate of 49 U. S. C. § 13902(a)(1), that FMCSA “shall register a person to provide transportation ... as a motor carrier if [it] finds that the person is willing and able to comply with” the safety and financial responsibility requirements established by DOT. (Emphasis added.) Under FMCSA’s entirely reasonable reading of this provision, it must certify any motor carrier that can show that it is willing and able to comply with the various substantive requirements for safety and financial responsibility contained in DOT regulations; only the moratorium prevented it from doing so for Mexican motor carriers before 2001. App. 51-55. Thus, upon the lifting of the moratorium, if FMCSA refused to authorize a Mexican motor carrier for cross-border services, where the Mexican motor carrier was willing and able to comply with the various substantive safety and financial responsibilities rules, it would violate § 13902(a)(1). If it were truly impossible for FMCSA to comply with both § 350 and § 13902(a)(1), then we would be presented with an irreconcilable conflict of laws. As the later enacted provision, § 350 would quite possibly win out. See Posadas v. Na tional City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). But FMCSA ocan easily satisfy both mandates: It can issue the application and safety inspection rules required by § 350, and start processing applications by Mexican motor carriers and authorize those that satisfy § 13902(a)(l)’s conditions. Without a conflict, then, FMCSA must comply with all of its statutory mandates. Respondents must rest, then, on a particularly unyielding variation of “but for” causation, where an agency’s action is considered a cause of an environmental effect even when the agency has no authority to prevent the effect. However, a “but for” causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency responsible for a particular effect under NEPA and the relevant regulations. As this Court held in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U. S. 766, 774 (1983), NEPA requires “a reasonably close causal relationship” between the environmental effect and the alleged cause. The Court analogized this requirement to the “familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law.” Ibid. In particular, “courts must look to the underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.” Id., at 774, n. 7. See also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 264, 274-275 (5th ed. 1984) (proximate cause analysis turns on policy considerations and considerations of the “legal responsibility” of actors). Also, inherent in NEPA and its implementing regulations is a “‘rule of reason,’” which ensures that agencies determine whether and to what extent to prepare an EIS based on the usefulness of any new potential information to the decisionmaking process. See Marsh, 490 U. S., at 373-374. Where the preparation of an EIS would serve “no purpose” in light of NEPA’s regulatory scheme as a whole, no rule of reason worthy of that title would require an agency to prepare an EIS. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U. S. 289, 325 (1975); see also 40 CFR §§ 1500.1(b)-(e) (2003).- In these circumstances, the underlying policies behind NEPA and Congress’ intent, as informed by the “rule of reason,” make clear that the causal connection between FMCSA’s issuance of the proposed regulations and the entry of the Mexican trucks is insufficient to make FMCSA responsible under NEPA to consider the environmental effects of the entry. The NEPA EIS requirement serves two purposes. First, “[i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.” Robertson, 490 U. S., at 349. Second, it “guarantees that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.” Ibid. Requiring FMCSA to consider the environmental effects of the entry of Mexican trucks would fulfill neither of these statutory purposes. Since FMCSA has no ability categorically to prevent the cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers, the environmental impact of the cross-border operations would have no effect on FMCSA’s decisionmaking — FMCSA simply lacks the power to act on whatever information might be contained in the EIS. Similarly, the informational purpose is not served. The “informational role” of an EIS is to “giv[e] the public the assurance that the agency ‘has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process,’ Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. [v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87, 97 (1983)], and, perhaps more significantly, provid[e] a springboard for public comment” in the agency decisionmaking process itself, ibid. The purpose here is to ensure that the “larger audience,” ibid., can provide input as necessary to the agency making the relevant decisions. See 40 CFR § 1500.1(c) (2003) (“NEPA’s purpose is not to generate paperwork — even excellent paperwork — but to foster excellent action. The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment”); § 1502.1 (“The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government”). But here, the “larger audience” can have no impact on FMCSA’s decisionmaking, since, as just noted, FMCSA simply could not act on whatever input this “larger audience” could provide. It would not, therefore, satisfy NEPA’s “rule of reason” to require an agency to prepare a full EIS due to the environmental impact of an action it could not refuse to perform. Put another way, the legally relevant cause of the entry of the Mexican trucks is not FMCSA’s action, but instead the actions of the President in lifting the moratorium and those of Congress in granting the President this authority while simultaneously limiting FMCSA’s discretion. Consideration of the CEQ’s “cumulative impact” regulation does not change this analysis. An agency is required to evaluate the “[cjumulative impact” of its action, which is defined as “the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.” § 1508.7. The “cumulative impact” regulation required FMCSA to consider the “incremental impact” of the safety rules themselves, in the context of the President’s lifting of the moratorium and other relevant circumstances. But this is exactly what FMCSA did in its EA. FMCSA appropriately and reasonably examined the incremental impact of its safety rules assuming the President’s modification of the moratorium (and, hence, assuming the increase in cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers). The “cumulative impact” regulation does not require FMCSA to treat the lifting of the moratorium itself, of consequences from the lifting of the moratorium, as an effect of its promulgation of its Application and Safety Monitoring Rules. C We hold that where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant “cause” of the effect. Hence, under NEPA and the implementing CEQ regulations, the agency need not consider these effects in its EA when determining whether its action is a “major Federal action.” Because the President, not FMCSA, could authorize (or not authorize) cross-border operations from Mexican motor carriers, and because FMCSA has no discretion to prevent the entry of Mexican trucks, its EA did not need to consider the environmental effects arising from the entry. III Under the CAA, a federal “department, agency, or instrumentality” may not, generally, “engage in, support in any way or provide financial assistance for, license or permit, or approve, any activity” that violates an applicable state air-quality implementation plan. 42 U. S. C. § 7506(c)(1); 40 CFR § 93.150(a) (2003). Federal agencies must, in many circumstances, undertake a conformity determination with respect to a proposed action, to ensure that the action is consistent with § 7506(c)(1). See 40 CFR §§ 93.150(b), 93.153(a)-(b). However, an agency is exempt from the general conformity determination under the CAA if its action would not cause new emissions to exceed certain threshold emission rates set forth in § 93.153(b). FMCSA determined that its proposed regulations would not cause emissions to exceed the relevant threshold amounts and therefore concluded that the issuance of its regulations would comply with the CAA. App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a-66a, 155a. Critical to its calculations was its consideration of only those emissions that would occur from the increased roadside inspections of Mexican trucks; like its NEPA analysis, FMCSA’s CAA analysis did not consider any emissions attributable to the increased presence of Mexican trucks within the United States. The EPA’s rules provide that “a conformity determination is required for each pollutant where the total of direct and indirect emissions in a nonattainment or maintenance area caused by a Federal action would equal or exceed” the threshold levels established by the EPA. 40 CFR § 93.153(b) (2003). “Direct emissions” are defined as those covered emissions “that are caused or initiated by the Federal action and occur at the same time and place as the action.” §93.152. The term “[indirect emissions” means covered emissions that “(1) Are caused by the Federal action, but may occur later in time and/or may be further removed in distance from the action itself but are still reasonably foreseeable; and “(2) The Federal agency can practicably control and will maintain control over due to a continuing program responsibility of the Federal agency.” Ibid. Unlike the regulations implementing NEPA, the EPA’s CAA regulations have defined the term “[claused by.” Ibid. In particular, emissions are “[claused by” a federal action if the “emissions . .. would not... occur in the absence of the Federal action.” Ibid. Thus, the EPA has made clear that for purposes of evaluating causation in the conformity review process, some sort of “but for” causation is sufficient. Although arguably FMCSA’s proposed regulations would be “but for” causes of the entry of Mexican trucks into the United States, the emissions from these trucks are neither “direct” nor “indirect” emissions. First, the emissions from the Mexican trucks are not “direct” because they will not occur at the same time or at the same place as the promulgation of the regulations. Second, FMCSA cannot practicably control, nor will it maintain control, over these emissions. As discussed above, FMCSA does not have the ability to countermand the President’s decision to lift the moratorium, nor could it act categorically to prevent Mexican carriers from being registered or Mexican trucks from entering the United States. Once the regulations are promulgated, FMCSA would have no ability to regulate any aspect of vehicle exhaust from these Mexican trucks. FMCSA could not refuse to register Mexican motor carriers simply on the ground that their trucks would pollute excessively. FMCSA cannot determine whether registered carriers actually will bring trucks into the United States, cannot control the routes the carriers take, and cannot determine what the trucks will emit. Any reduction in emissions that would occur at the hands of FMCSA would be mere happenstance. It cannot be said that FMCSA “practicably controls]” or “will maintain control” over the vehicle emissions from the Mexican trucks, and it follows that the emissions from the Mexican trucks are not “indirect emissions.” Ibid.; see also Determining Conformity of General Federal Actions to State or Federal Implementation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 63214, 63221 (1993) (“The EPA does not believe that Congress intended to extend the prohibitions and responsibilities to eases where, although licensing or approving action is a required initial step for a subsequent, activity that causes emissions, the agency has no control over that subsequent activity”). The emissions from the Mexican trucks are neither “direct” nor “indirect” emissions caused by the issuance of FMCSA’s proposed regulations. Thus, FMCSA did not violate the CAA or the applicable regulations by failing to consider them when it evaluated whether it needed to perform a full “conformity determination.” IV FMCSA did not violate NEPA or the relevant CEQ regulations when it did not consider the environmental effect of the increase in cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers in its EA. Nor did FMCSA act improperly by not performing, pursuant to the CAA and relevant regulations, a full conformity review analysis for its proposed regulations. We therefore reject respondents’ challenge to the procedures used in promulgating these regulations. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. In 1995, Congress abolished the ICC and transferred most of its responsibilities to the Secretary of Transportation. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, § 101,109 Stat. 803. In 1999, Congress transferred responsibility for motor carrier safety within DOT to the newly created FMCSA. See Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 1748. Respondents are left with arguing that an EIS would be useful for informational purposes entirely outside FMCSA’s decisionmaking process. See Brief for Respondents 42. But such an argument overlooks NEPA’s core focus on improving agency decisionmaking. See 40 CFR §§ 1500.1, 1500.2,1502.1 (2003). The Court of Appeals and respondents contend that the EA contained numerous other errors, but their contentions are premised on the conclusion that FMCSA was required to take into account the increased cross-border operations of Mexican motor carriers. Respondents argue that Congress ratified the Court of Appeals’ decision when it, after the lower court’s opinion, reenacted §350 in two appropriations bills. The doctrine of ratification states that “Congress is presumed to be aware of [a] . . . judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978). But this case involves the interpretation of NEPA and the CAA, not §350. Indeed, the precise requirements of §350 were not below, and are not here, in dispute. Hence, congressional reenactment of § 350 tells us nothing about Congress’ view as to the requirements of NEPA and the CAA, and so, on the legal issues involved in this case, Congress has been entirely silent.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UDALL, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al. No. 463. Argued April 11, 1967. Decided June 5, 1967 Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for petitioner in No. 463. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant A ttorney General Weisl, Richard A. Posner, Roger P. Marquis, S. Billingsley Hill, Frank J. Barry, Edward Weinberg, Harry Hogan and Ernest J. London. Northcutt Ely argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 462. Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for respondent Federal Power Commission in both cases. With him on the brief were Howard E. Wahrenbrock, Peter H. Schiff and Joel Yohalem. Hugh Smith argued the cause for respondents Pacific Northwest Power Co. et al. in both cases. With him on the briefs were Francis M. Shea, William H. Dempsey, Jr., Ralph J. Moore, Jr., and John R. Kramer. Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and Richard W. Sabin, Dale T. Crabtree and Leon L. Hagen, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Oregon, Allan G. Shepard, Attorney General of Idaho, and T. J. Jones III filed a brief for the Idaho Fish and Game Commission, C. Frank Reifsnyder filed a brief for the Idaho Wildlife Federation, and Joseph T. Mijich filed a brief for the Washington State Sportsmen’s Council, Inc., et al., respondents in both cases. Together with No. 462, Washington Public Power Supply System v. Federal Power Commission et al., also on certiorari to the same court, argued April 11-12, 1967. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Power Commission has awarded Pacific Northwest Power Company (a joint venture of four private power companies) a license to construct a hydroelectric power project at High Mountain Sheep, a site on the Snake River, a mile upstream from its confluence with the Salmon. 31 F. P. C. 247, 1051. The Court of Appeals approved the action, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 209, 358 F. 2d 840; and we granted the petitions for certiorari. 385 U. S. 926, 927. The primary question in the cases involves an interpretation of § 7 (b) of the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, as amended by the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 800 (b), which provides: “Whenever, in the judgment of the Commission, the development of any water resources for public purposes should be undertaken by the United States itself, the Commission shall not approve any application for any project affecting such development, but shall cause to be made such examinations, surveys, reports, plans, and estimates of the cost of the proposed development as it may find necessary, and shall submit its findings to Congress with such recommendations as it may find appropriate concerning such development.” The question turns on whether § 7 (b) requires a showing that licensing of a private, state, or municipal agency is a satisfactory alternative to federal development. We put the question that way because the present record is largely silent on the relative merits of federal and non-federal development. What transpired is as follows: Both Pacific Northwest and Washington Public Power Supply System, allegedly a “municipality” under § 4 (e) and under § 7 (a) of the Act, filed applications for licenses on mutually exclusive sites; and they were consolidated for hearing. Before the hearing the Commission solicited the views of the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary urged postponement of the licensing of either project while means of protecting the salmon and other fisheries were studied. That was on March 15,1961. But the hearings went forward and on June 28, 1962, after the record before the Examiner was closed, but before he rendered his decision, the Secretary wrote the Commission urging it to recommend to Congress the consideration of federal construction of High Mountain Sheep. The Commission reopened the record to allow the Secretary’s letter to be incorporated and invited the parties to file supplemental briefs in response to it. On October 8, 1962, the Examiner rendered his decision, recommending that Pacific Northwest receive the license. He disposed of the issue of federal development on the ground that there “is no evidence in this record that Federal development will provide greater flood control, power benefits, fish passage, navigation or recreation; and there is substantial evidence to the contrary.” The Secretary asked for leave to intervene and to file exceptions to the Examiner’s decision. The Commission allowed intervention “limited to filing of exceptions to the Presiding Examiner’s decision and participation in such oral argument as might subsequently be ordered.” The Secretary filed exceptions and participated in oral argument. The Commission on February 5, 1964, affirmed the Examiner saying that it agreed with him “that the record supports no reason why federal development should be superior,” observing that “[w]hile we have extensive material before us on the position of the Secretary of the Interior, there is no evidence in the record presented by him to support his position.” 31 F. P. C., at 275. It went on to say that it found “nothing in this record to indicate” that the public purposes of the dam (flood control, etc.) would not be served as adequately by Pacific Northwest as they would under federal development. And it added, “We agree that the Secretary (or any single operator) normally would have a superior ability to co-ordinate the operations of HMS with the other affected projects on the river. But there is no evidence upon which we can determine the scope or the seriousness of this matter in the context of a river system which already has a number of different project operators and an existing co-ordination system, i. e., the Northwest Power Pool.” Id., at 276-277. The Secretary petitioned for a rehearing, asking that the record be opened to permit him to supply the evi-dentiary deficiencies. A rehearing, but not a reopening of the record, was granted; and the Commission shortly reaffirmed its original decision with modifications not material here. The issue of federal development has never been explored in this record. The applicants introduced no evidence addressed to that question; and the Commission denied the Secretary an opportunity to do so though his application was timely. The issue was of course briefed and argued; yet no factual inquiry was undertaken. Section 7 (b) says “Whenever, in the judgment of the Commission, the development of any water resources for public purposes should be undertaken by the United States itself,” the Commission shall not approve other applications. Yet the Commission by its rulings on the applications of the Secretary to intervene and to reopen precluded it from having the informed judgment that § 7 (b) commands. We indicate no judgment on the merits. We do know that on the Snake-Columbia waterway between High Mountain Sheep and the ocean, eight hydroelectric dams have been built and another authorized. These are federal projects; and if another dam is to be built, the question whether it should be under federal auspices looms large. Timed releases of stored water at High Mountain Sheep may affect navigability; they may affect hydroelectric production of the downstream dams when the river level is too low for the generators to be operated at maximum capacity; they may affect irrigation; and they may protect salmon runs when the water downstream is too hot or insufficiently oxygenated. Federal versus private or municipal control may conceivably make a vast difference in the functioning of the vast river complex. Beyond that is the question whether any dam should be constructed. As to this the Secretary in his letter to the Commission dated November 21, 1960, in pleading for a deferment of consideration of applications stated: “In carrying out this Department’s responsibility for the protection and conservation of the vital Northwest anadromous fishery resource and in light of the fact that the power to be available as a result of ratification of the proposed Columbia River treaty with Canada will provide needed time which can be devoted to further efforts to resolve the fishery problems presently posed by these applications, we believe that it is unnecessary at this time and for some years to come to undertake any project in this area. “You may be assured that the Fish and Wildlife Service of this Department will continue, with renewed emphasis, the engineering and research studies that must be done before we can be assured that the passage of anadromous fish can be provided for at these proposed projects.” Since the cases must be remanded to the Commission, it is appropriate to refer to that aspect of the cases. Section 10 (a) of the Act provides that “the project adopted” shall be such “as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway . . . and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes.” (Emphasis added.) The objective of protecting “recreational purposes” means more than that the reservoir created by the dam will be the best one possible or practical from a recreational viewpoint. There are already eight lower dams on this Columbia River system and a ninth one authorized; and if the Secretary is right in fearing that this additional dam would destroy the waterway as spawning grounds for anadromous fish (salmon and steelhead) or seriously impair that function, the project is put in an entirely different fight. The importance of salmon and steelhead in our outdoor fife as well as in commerce is so great that there certainly comes a time when their destruction might necessitate a halt in so-called “improvement” or “development” of waterways. The destruction of anadro-mous fish in our western waters is so notorious that we cannot believe that Congress through the present Act authorized their ultimate demise. We need not speculate as to what the 1920 purpose may have been. For the 1965 Anadromous Fish Act, 79 Stat. 1125, 16 U. S. C. §§ 757a-757f (1964 ed., Supp. II), is on this aspect of the present case in parí materia with the 1920 Act. We know from § 1 of the 1965 Act that Congress is greatly concerned with the depletion of these fish resources “from water resources developments and other causes.” See also H. R. Rep. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-5; S. Rep. No. 860, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.; Anadromous Fish, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 133; Anadromous Fish, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 11. The rapid depletion of the Nation’s anadromous fish resources led Congress to enact the Anadromous Fish Act which authorizes federal-state cooperation for the conservation, development, and enhancement of the Nation’s anadromous fish resources and to prevent their depletion from various causes including water resources development. In passing the Act, Congress was well aware that the responsibility for the destruction of the anadromous fish population partially lies with the “improvement” and “development” of water resources. It directed the Secretary of the Interior “to conduct such studies and make such recommendations as the Secretary determines to be appropriate regarding the development and management of any stream or other body of water for the conservation and enhancement of anadromous fishery resources.” § 2. Mr. Justice Holmes once wrote that “A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure.” New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 342. That dictum is relevant here for the Commission under § 10 of the 1920 Act, as amended, must take into consideration not only hydroelectric power, navigation, and flood control, but also the “recreational purposes” served by the river. And, as we have noted, the Secretary of the Interior has a mandate under the 1965 Act to study recommendations concerning water development programs for the purpose of the conservation of anadromous fish. Thus apart from § 7 (b) of the 1920 Act, as amended, the Secretary by reason of § 2 of the 1965 Act comes to the Federal Power Commission with a special mandate from Congress, a mandate that gives him special standing to appear, to intervene, to introduce evidence on the proposed river development program, and to participate fully in the administrative proceedings. Fishing is obviously one recreational use of the river and it also has vast commercial implications as the legislative history of the 1965 Act indicates. The Commission, to be sure, did not wholly neglect this phase of the problem. In its report it adverted to the anadromous fish problem, stating that it was “highly controversial” and was not “clearly resolved on record.” The reservoir is “the most important hazard” both to upstream migrants and downstream migrants. Upstream migrants can be handled quite effectively by fish ladders. But those traveling downstream must go through the turbines; and their mortality is high. Moreover, Chinook salmon are “basically river fish and do not appear to adapt to the different conditions presented by a reservoir.” 31F. P. C., •at 260. The ecology of a river is different from the ecology of a reservoir built behind a dam. What the full effect on salmon will be is not known. But we get a glimmering from the Commission’s report. As to this the Commission said: “A reservoir exhibits a peculiar thermal structure. During the winter it is homogeneous with regard to temperature, but as the season advances a horizontal stratification results with the colder water sinking lower. Since Salmon River water is colder than Snake River water, it is possible, if not probable, that in the Nez Perce reservoir the water from the two rivers would be found in separate layers and be drawn off at different times. Presumably the upstream migrants reaching fish ladders might at one time be presented with water from one river and at another time water from the other river. If water quality is important in attracting the upstream migrants to their proper streams, as many experts believe, this stratification would be a source of confusion and delay. Also a source of confusion to the upstream migrants would be the predicted tendency shown by the record for water from the Salmon River arm of the Nez Perce reservoir to flow up the Snake River arm and vice versa. Again the fish are faced with a complicated problem in finding their way. “The velocity of flow in the Nez Perce or HMS reservoir would be very low compared with the free flowing stream or even compared to the flow in the reservoir of the McNary dam on the Columbia. Since the upstream migrants follow water flow and downstream migrants are carried by current, such low velocities offer a further obstacle to the passage of anadromous fish. “The record also shows that during the summer months the oxygen content of the water in the reservoir at the lower levels will fall to amounts which are dangerously insufficient for salmon. The decrease in oxygen content appears to be due to decomposed sinking dead organisms (plankton) from the upper layers of water. The record indicates that salmon require an oxygen content of approximately five parts per million, yet the oxygen content at the 250-350 foot level would fall in August to less than three parts per million.” 31 F. P. C., at 261. The Commission further noted that some salmon remain in the reservoir due to “loss of water velocity or accumulation of dissolved salts” and are lost “as perpet-uators of the species.” But it did not have statistics showing the loss of the downstream migrants as a result of passing through the turbines. We are told from studies of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries that the greatest downstream migration occurs at night when turbine loads are lower. We are told from these studies that the effect of dams on the downstream migration of salmon and steelhead may be disastrous. It is reported that unless practical alternatives are designed, such as the collection of juvenile fish above the dams and their transportation below it, we may witness an inquest on a great industry and a great “recreational” asset of the Nation. In his letter of November 21, 1960, the Secretary of the Interior noted the adverse effects this present project would have on anadromous fish, that the facilities proposed to protect the fish were “unproved,” and that “conservation in the fullest sense calls for a deferral while full advantage is taken of the opportunity presented by Canadian storage and Libby [Dam].” The Commission admitted that “high dams and reservoirs present major obstacles to anadromous fish,” that it was not optimistic “as to the efficacy of fish passage facilities on high dams,” and concluded with the forlorn statement that, “We can hope for the best and we will continue to insist that any licensee building a high dam at a site which presumably involves major fish runs do everything possible within the limits of reasonable expense to preserve the fish runs. But as of now we understandably must assume that the best efforts will be only partly successful and that real damage may and probably will be done to any such fish runs.” 31 F. P. C., at 262. Equally relevant is the effect of the project on wildlife. In his letter of November 21, 1960, the Secretary of the Interior noted that the areas of the proposed projects were important wildlife sanctuaries, inhabited by elk, deer, partridge, a variety of small game and used by ducks, geese, and mourning doves during migration. He concluded that “adverse effects of the proposed project [HMS] on wildlife could [not] be mitigated.” Letter of November 21, 1960 (Joint App. 133), as corrected by letter of December 7, 1960 (J. A. 137). The Secretary concluded that “Several thousand acres of mule deer range would be inundated and there would be a moderate reduction in the number of deer as a result of loss of range. There would be losses of upland game, fur animals, and waterfowl. Reservoir margins would be barren and unattractive to all wildlife groups. Waterfowl use of the reservoir would be insignificant. There does not appear to be any feasible means of mitigating wildlife losses.” The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 72 Stat. 563, 16 U. S. C. § 661 et seq., establishes a national policy of “recognizing the vital contribution of our wildlife resources to the Nation, the increasing public interest and significance thereof due to expansion of our national economy and other factors, and to provide that wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration and be co-ordinated with other features of water-resource development programs . . . .” Section 2 (a), 16 U. S. C. § 662 (a), provides that an agency evaluating a license under which “the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed ... to be impounded” “first shall consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior ... with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by preventing loss of and damage to such resources . . . .” Certainly the wildlife conservation aspect of the project must be explored and evaluated. These factors of the anadromous fish and of other wildlife may indeed be all-important in light of the alternate sources of energy that are emerging. In his letter of November 21, 1960, the Secretary noted that, due to increased power resources, the projects could be safely deferred. “These projects could extend the time still further, as could also be the case in the event nuclear power materialized at Hanford in the 1960-1970 period. This possibility, as you know, has been under intensive study by your staff for the Atomic Energy Commission . . . .” The urgency of the hydroelectric power at High Mountain Sheep was somewhat discounted by the Secretary in his petition to intervene: “Power needs of the Northwest do not require immediate construction of the High Mountain Sheep Project. One of the reasons which leads the Secretary to intervene now is that the Examiner’s decision of October 10, 1962, was handed down just prior to Congressional action which substantially altered the federal power resource program of the Pacific Northwest. This Congressional action requires a complete re-examination and re-appraisement of the conclusions stated as the basis for the Examiner’s findings. “The action of Congress in the session just concluded has made provisions for new federal power producing facilities. Bruc[e]s Eddy Dam, with a peak capacity of 345,000 KW, was authorized and received an appropriation for the start of construction in Fiscal Year 1963. Asotin Dam, with a peak capacity of 331,000 KW, was also authorized. Little Goose Dam, with a peak capacity of 466,000 KW, which had previously been authorized, received an appropriation for the start of construction in 1963. Most important of all, generation at the Hanford Thermal Project, which would add approximately 905,000 kilowatts to the Northwest’s power resources was also approved. “There are other possibilities regarding new power sources which have reasonable prospects of realization. They include Canadian storage, realization of which is dependent upon consummation of the Canadian Treaty. Additional firm capacity which would accrue to the United States from such storage would be 1,300,000 kilowatts. In addition, the Treaty would allow the construction of Libby Dam which would initially have a capacity of 397,000 kilowatts. There is also the possibility of the availability in the United States of power from the Canadian entitlement under the Treaty of 1,300,000 kilowatts. Plans are also under way for construction of a 500,000 kilowatt steam plant by Kittitas PUD and Grant County PUD. A number of different agencies have proposed the construction of the Pacific Northwest-Southwest transmission intertie which, by electrical integration, would add an additional 400,000 kilowatts of firm capacity for the Pacific Northwest. “The total power resource of the area is therefore predictably in excess of all foreseeable requirements thereon for the period through 1968-1969 and sufficient to meet all requirements until at least 1972-1973 and potentially for years beyond that date. The addition of High Mountain Sheep Dam will not be needed until at least 1972-1973, and construction should be planned to bring it into production at that time or later as the developing power resource picture indicates. “New generating facilities, which are not correlated to the power resources and power demands within the area of the marketing responsibility of BPA necessarily result in surpluses of power on the federal system which is the basic wholesale supplier of power in the area and thereby result in financial deficits on the federal marketing system. In view of the role of the Federal system as the base supplier for the area, this threatens the stability of the area’s permanent resources and hence of the area’s economy. The High Mountain Sheep project at this time would have such an effect.” We are also told that hydroelectric power promises to occupy a relatively small place in the world’s supply of energy. It is estimated that when the world’s population reaches 7,000,000,000 — as it will in a few decades — the total energy requirement will be 70,000,000,000 metric tons of coal or equivalent annually and that it will be supplied as follows: „ . , ^ „ . , ^ Equivalent metric tons of Source coal (billions) Solar energy (for two-thirds of space heating). 15.6 Hydroelectricity . 4.2 Wood for lumber and paper. 2.7 Wood for conversion to liquid fuels and chemicals. 2.3 Liquid fuels and “petro” chemicals produced via nuclear energy . 10.0 Nuclear electricity. 35.2 Total 70.0 Brown, The Next Hundred Years (1957), p. 113. By 1980 nuclear energy “should represent a significant proportion of world power production.” Id., at 109. By the end of the century “nuclear energy may account for about one-third of our total energy consumption.” Ibid. “By the middle of the next century it seems likely that most of our energy needs will be satisfied by nuclear energy.” Id., at 110. Group, Under Direction of A. B. Cambel, at 22. The following table is taken from that source. Percent of total energy requirements supplied by hydro, nuclear, and fossil fuels Some of these time schedules are within the period of the 50-year licenses granted by the Commission. Nuclear energy is coming to the Columbia River basin by 1975. For plans are afoot to build a plant on the Trogan site, 14 miles north of St. Helens. This one plant will have a capacity of 1,000,000 kws. This emphasizes the relevancy of the Secretary’s reference to production and distribution of nuclear energy at the Hanford Thermal Project which he called “most important of all” and which Congress has authorized. 76 Stat. 604. Implicit in the reasoning of the Commission and the Examiner is the assumption that this project must be built and that it must be built now. In the view of the Commission, one of the factors militating against federal development was that “[t]he Department of Interior . . . frankly admitted it [had] no present intention of seeking authorization to commence construction or planning to construct an HMS project.” 31 F. P. C., at 277. The Examiner’s report stated that “[a] comprehensive plan provides for prompt and optimum multipurpose development of the water resource” and that the relative merits of the proposed projects “turn on a comparison of the costs and benefits of component developments and on which project is best adapted to attain optimum development at the earliest time with the smallest sacrifice of natural values.” J. A. 394 (emphasis added). But neither the Examiner nor the Commission specifically found that deferral of the project would not be in the public interest or that immediate development would be more in the public interest than construction at some future time or no construction at all. Section 4 (e) of the Act, the section authorizing the Commission to grant licenses, provides in part: “Whenever the contemplated improvement is, in the judgment of the Commission, desirable and justified in the public interest for the purpose of improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, a finding to that effect shall be made by the Commission and shall become a part of the records of the Commission.” 49 Stat. 840, 16 U. S. C. § 797 (e). And § 10 (a) of the Act provides that: “the project adopted . . . shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes . . . .” 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (a). The issues of whether deferral of construction would be more in the public interest than immediate construction and whether preservation of the reaches of the river affected would be more desirable and in the public interest than the proposed development are largely unexplored in this record. We cannot assume that the Act commands the immediate construction of as many projects as possible. The Commission did discuss the Secretary of Interior’s claim that, due to alternate power sources, the region will not need the power supplied by the High Mountain Sheep dam for some time. And it concluded that “[o]f more significance . . . than the regional power situation are the load and resources of the [Pacific Northwest Power Company] companies themselves,” which could use the power in the near future. 31 F. P. C., at 272. It added, “In summary as to the need for power, we conclude that the PNPC sponsoring companies will be able to use HMS power as soon as it is available.” 31 F. P. C., at 273. On rehearing, the Commission stated that “HMS power will be needed on a regional basis by 1970-1971 _” 31 F. P. C. 1051, 1052. The question whether the proponents of a project “will be able to use” the power supplied is relevant to the issue of the public interest. So too is the regional need for the additional power. But the inquiry should not stop there. A license under the Act empowers the licensee to construct, for its own use and benefit, hydroelectric projects utilizing the flow of navigable waters and thus, in effect, to appropriate water resources from the public domain. The grant of authority to the Commission to alienate federal water resources does not, of course, turn simply on whether the project will be beneficial to the licensee. .Nor is the test solely whether the region will be able to use the additional power. The test is whether the project will be in the public interest. And that determination can be made only after an exploration of all issues relevant to the “public interest,” including future power demand and supply, alternate sources of power, the public interest in preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas, the preservation of anadromous fish for commercial and recreational purposes, and the protection of wildlife. The need to destroy the river as a waterway, the desirability of its demise, the choices available to satisfy future demands for energy — these are all relevant to a decision under § 7 and § 10 but they were largely untouched by the Commission. On our remand there should be an exploration of these neglected phases of the cases, as well as the other points raised by the Secretary. We express no opinion on the merits. It is not our task to determine whether any dam at all should be built or whether if one is authorized it should be private or public. If the ultimate ruling under § 7 (b) is that the decision concerning the High Mountain Sheep site should be made by the Congress, the factors we have mentioned will be among the many considerations it doubtless will appraise. If the ultimate decision under § 7 (b) is the other way, the Commission will not have discharged its functions under the Act unless it makes an informed judgment on these phases of the cases. This leaves us with the questions presented by Washington Public Power Supply System in No. 462. The main points raised by it are that it is a “municipality” within the meaning of § 7 (a) and therefore entitled to a preference over this power site, that the Commission violated that statutory preference, and that while Pacific Northwest had a prior preliminary permit granted under § 5 of the Act, the Commission unlawfully expanded it to include this site. We express no opinion on the merits of these contentions because they may or may not survive a remand. If in time the project, if any, becomes a federal one, Washington Public Power Supply System would be excluded along with Pacific Northwest, and the points now raised by it would become moot. If in time a new license is issued to Pacific Northwest, the points now raised by Washington Public Power Supply System can be preserved. Accordingly in No. 462 we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand to the Commission. In No. 463 we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand to the Commission. Each remand is for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Section 4 of the Act provides in part: “The Commission is hereby authorized and empowered— “(a) To make investigations and to collect and record data concerning the utilization of the water resources of any region to be developed, the water-power industry and its relation to other industries and to interstate or foreign commerce, and concerning the location, capacity, development costs, and relation to markets of power sites, and whether the power from Government dams can be advantageously used by the United States for its public purposes, and what is a fair value of such power, to the extent the Commission may deem necessary or useful for the purposes of this Act. “(e) To issue licenses to citizens of the United States, or to any association of such citizens, or to any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or any State thereof, or to any State or municipality for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintaining dams, water conduits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines, or other project works necessary or convenient for the development and improvement of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of power across, along, from, or in any of the streams or other bodies of water over which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or upon any part of the public lands and reservations of the United States (including the Territories), or for the purpose of utilizing the surplus water or water power from any Government dam, except as herein provided . . . .” 49 Stat. 839, 840, 16 U. S. C. §§797 (a), (e). See n. 1, supra, for §4 (e). Section 7 (a) of the Act provides: “In issuing preliminary permits hereunder or licenses where no preliminary permit has been issued and in issuing licenses to new licensees under section 15 hereof the Commission shall give preference to applications therefor by States and municipalities, provided the plans for the same are deemed by the Commission equally well adapted, or shall within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Commission be made equally well adapted, to conserve and utilize in the public interest the water resources of the region . . . .” 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. § 800 (a). The Secretary argued that federal development of High Mountain Sheep is necessary because (1) hydraulic and electrical coordination with other Columbia River Basin projects, particularly the federal dams already or to be constructed on the downstream sites, could be more effectively achieved if High Mountain Sheep is a part of the federal system; (2) federal development will assure maximum use of the federal northwest transmission grid, thus contributing to maximum repayment of the federal investment in transmission, which will, in turn, redound to the benefit of the power consumers; (3) federal development would provide greater flexibility and protection in the management of fish resources; (4) flood control could better be effected by flexible federal operation; (5) storage releases for navigation requirements could be made under federal ownership and supervision with less effect on power supply; (6) federal development can better provide recreational facilities for an expanding population. The Secretary noted, however, that immediate construction of the project would produce an excess of power in the Pacific Northwest which would cause large losses to Bonneville Power Administration and severe harm to the region’s economy. Various federal agencies have been long engaged in the development of a comprehensive plan for the improvement of the Middle Snake. As early as 1948 the Secretary of the Interior submitted a comprehensive plan for the development of water resources of the Columbia River Basin. In 1949 the Corps of Engineers submitted a comprehensive plan for the development of the Columbia River Basin. H. R. Doc. No. 531, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1, pp. 1-3, Vol. 4, pp. 1429, 1482, Vol. 6, p. 2509. The plan recommended, in part, federal construction of nine run-of-the-river dams downstream from High Mountain Sheep and a regulating reservoir for the nine dams at Hells Canyon on the upper Snake. The nine dams were all authorized by Congress and have been or, in one case, will be constructed as federal projects in accordance with the plan. Hells Canyon was later licensed for private development, and, according to the Secretary of the Interior, without adequate regulating facilities. The Corps of Engineers and the Secretary of the Interior then recommended that the federal regulating dam be built, after further study, at High Mountain Sheep — the last suitable site. H. R. Doc. No. 403, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 1, pp. iv, viii-ix, 260. Though it is not contended that congressional authorization of the nine federal dams downstream may have pre-empted the Commission's authority to license High Mountain Sheep for private development (cf. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm’n, 345 U. S. 153), it is argued that Congress appropriated vast sums for federal development of the Columbia River Basin’s hydroelectric resources in accordance with an overall plan that contemplated that the key structure in the system would be federally operated and that the downstream dams can be efficiently operated only if High Mountain Sheep is federally operated. “All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the following conditions: “(a) That the project adopted, including the maps, plans, and specifications, shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes; and if necessary in order to secure such plan the Commission shall have authority to require the modification of any project and of the plans and specifications of the project works before approval.” 49 Stat. 842, 16 U. S. C. §803 (a). In 1966 the value of the Pacific salmon catch was over $67,000,000 and in 1965 over $65,000,000. United States Department of Interior, Fish & Wildlife Service, Fisheries of the United States, 1966, p. 2. As noted by the Commission, “the Columbia River is the greatest producer of Pacific salmon and steelhead trout in the United States.” “Columbia River salmon have been important in the development of the Pacific Northwest for almost a century.” “The commercial catch of Columbia River salmon is estimated to be worth $12,000,000 annually and the sport fishing attributable to the Salmon River alone . . . may be worth as much as $8 million a year.” 31 F. P. C., at 259. See H. R. Rep. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2-5; S. Rep. No. 860, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.; Anadromous Fish, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 11. Recently, Congress has expressed a renewed interest in preserving our Nation’s rivers in their wild, unexploited state. On January 18, 1966, the Senate passed the National Wild Rivers bill (S. 1446, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 Cong. Rec. 500 (daily ed., Jan. 18, 1966), and it was pending before the House of Representatives when the Eighty-ninth Congress adjourned. The bill has already been reintroduced in the Ninetieth Congress. S. 119, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.). If enacted, it would preserve the Salmon River, a tributary of the Snake just below High Mountain Sheep, in its natural state. The bill states: “The Congress finds that some of the free-flowing rivers of the United States possess unique water conservation, scenic, fish, wildlife, and outdoor recreation values of present and potential benefit to the American people. The Congress also finds that our established national policy of dam and other construction at appropriate sections of the rivers of the United States needs to be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers or sections thereof in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes. It is the policy of Congress to preserve, develop, reclaim, and make accessible for the benefit of all of the American people selected parts of the Nation’s diminishing resource of free-flowing rivers.” And see §§ 2 and 4 (d) of the Wilderness Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 890, 894. Long, Day-night Occurrence and Vertical Distribution of Juvenile Anadromous Fish in Turbine Intakes (U. S. .Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Fish-Passage Research Program) 12,13, 16. From the data, it would appear that successful passage of juvenile salmonoids is highly unlikely through the impoundments that will be created in the Middle Snake River Basin. This implies that if natural runs are to be passed in this area, downstream migrants must be collected in the head of a reservoir or in streams above the reservoir and transported below. “Passage of juveniles has not been successful. Escapement from the reservoir varied from year to year, ranging from approximately 10 to 55 percent of the calculated recruitment. The best passage occurred in 1964 in conjunction with a substantial drawdown, high inflows, and a slow spring fill-up that resulted in large discharges (up to 50,000 c. f. s.) during smolt migration. Progeny of spring-run chinook stocks appear to fare better than those from the fall run, and limited data on steelhead suggest that this species may be having even greater difficulty than salmon in passing through the reservoir.” Collins & Elling, Summary of Progress in Fish-Passage Research 1964, p. 2, in Vol. 1, Fish-Passage Research Program, Review of Progress (U. S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries 1964). Projections of energy sources for the coming years have been summarized in Energy R, & D and National Progress, prepared for the Interdepartmental Energy Study by the Energy Study Estimates were made in terms of conventional sources, but text indicates that 2.5 to 3.75 percent of the total might come from atomic fuels. Although this forecast goes to 1980, the values for that year are shown only in graphic form. Therefore, the 1975 values which are given in a table aie used here. Calculations based on figures after adjusting hydropower to fuel input basis. Concerning nuclear power, the report adds “* * * but there should be no surprise if nuclear power should insinuate itself into the energy economy of the country at a much faster rate.” Nuclear power included with coal. Nuclear use is for electricity generation. Note: a. Actuals for 1960 according to the U.S. Bureau of Mines: Hydropower, 3.9 percent; nuclear, 0.1 percent; and fossil fuels, 96.0 percent. b. Hydropower is on a fuel equivalent basis. c. Week’s estimates show a breakdown by fuel types but are presented in a cumulative form which makes estimation of annual values difficult.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. PRAPROTNIK No. 86-772. Argued October 7, 1987 Decided March 2, 1988 O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 132. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 147. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. James J. Wilson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Julian L. Bush. Charles R. Oldham argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Julius LeVonne Chambers and Eric Schnapper. Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, Beate Bloch, and Carter G. Phillips filed a brief for the International City Management Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Michael H. Gottesman, David M. Silberman, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Mark Stodola and Thomas M. Carpenter filed a brief for the city of Little Rock et al. as amicus curiae. Justice O’Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia join. This case calls upon us to define the proper legal standard for determining when isolated decisions by municipal officials or employees may expose the municipality itself to liability under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. I The principal facts are not in dispute. Respondent James H. Praprotnik is an architect who began working for petitioner city of St. Louis in 1968. For several years, respondent consistently received favorable evaluations of his job performance, uncommonly quick promotions, and significant increases in salary. By 1980, he was serving in a management-level city planning position at petitioner’s Community Development Agency (CDA). The Director of CDA, Donald Spaid, had instituted a requirement that the agency’s professional employees, including architects, obtain advance approval before taking on private clients. Respondent and other CDA employees objected to the requirement. In April 1980, respondent was suspended for 15 days by CDA’s Director of Urban Design, Charles Kindleberger, for having accepted outside employment without prior approval. Respondent appealed to the city’s Civil Service Commission, a body charged with reviewing employee grievances. Finding the penalty too harsh, the Commission reversed the suspension, awarded respondent backpay, and directed that he be reprimanded for having failed to secure a clear understanding of the rule. The Commission’s decision was not well received by respondent’s supervisors at CDA. Kindleberger later testified that he believed respondent had lied to the Commission, and that Spaid was angry with respondent. Respondent’s next two annual job performance evaluations were markedly less favorable than those in previous years. In discussing one of these evaluations with respondent, Kindleberger apparently mentioned his displeasure with respondent’s 1980 appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Respondent appealed both evaluations to the Department of Personnel. In each case, the Department ordered partial relief and was upheld by the city’s Director of Personnel or the Civil Service Commission. In April 1981, a new Mayor came into office, and Donald Spaid was replaced as Director of CDA by Frank Hamsher. As a result of budget cuts, a number of layoffs and transfers significantly reduced the size of CDA and of the planning section in which respondent worked. Respondent, however, was retained. In the spring of 1982, a second round of layoffs and transfers occurred at CDA. At that time, the city’s Heritage and Urban Design Commission (Heritage) was seeking approval to hire someone who was qualified in architecture and urban planning. Hamsher arranged with the Director of Heritage, Henry Jackson, for certain functions to be transferred from CDA to Heritage. This arrangement, which made it possible for Heritage to employ a relatively high-level “city planning manager,” was approved by Jackson’s supervisor, Thomas Nash. Hamsher then transferred respondent to Heritage to fill this position. Respondent objected to the transfer, and appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission declined to hear the appeal because respondent had not suffered a reduction in his pay or grade. Respondent then filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the transfer was unconstitutional. The city was named as a defendant, along with Kindleberger, Hamsher, Jackson (whom respondent deleted from the list before trial), and Deborah Patterson, who had succeeded Hamsher at CDA. At Heritage, respondent became embroiled in a series of disputes with Jackson and Jackson’s successor, Robert Killen. Respondent was dissatisfied with the work he was assigned, which consisted of unchallenging clerical functions far below the level of responsibilities that he had previously enjoyed. At least one adverse personnel decision was taken against respondent, and he obtained partial relief after appealing that decision. In December 1983, respondent was laid off from Heritage. The layoff was attributed to a lack of funds, and this apparently meant that respondent’s supervisors had concluded that they could create two lower level positions with the funds that were being used to pay respondent’s salary. Respondent then amended the complaint in his lawsuit to include a challenge to the layoff. He also appealed to the Civil Service Commission, but proceedings in that forum were postponed because of the pending lawsuit and have never been completed. Tr. Oral Arg. 31-32. The case went to trial on two theories: (1) that respondent’s First Amendment rights had been violated through retaliatory actions taken in response to his appeal of his 1980 suspension; and (2) that respondent’s layoff from Heritage was carried out for pretextual reasons in violation of due process. The jury returned special verdicts exonerating each of the three individual defendants, but finding the city liable under both theories. Judgment was entered on the verdicts, and the city appealed. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the due process claim had been submitted to the jury on an erroneous legal theory and vacated that portion of the judgment. With one judge dissenting, however, the panel affirmed the verdict holding the city liable for violating respondent’s First Amendment rights. 798 F. 2d 1168 (1986). Only the second of these holdings is challenged here. The Court of Appeals found that the jury had implicitly determined that respondent’s layoff from Heritage was brought about by an unconstitutional city policy. Id., at 1173. Applying a test under which a “policymaker” is one whose employment decisions are “final” in the sense that they are not subjected to de novo review by higher ranking officials, the Court of Appeals concluded that the city could be held liable for adverse personnel decisions taken by respondent’s supervisors. Id., at 1173-1175. In response to petitioner’s contention that the city’s personnel policies are actually set by the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals concluded that the scope of review before that body was too “highly circumscribed” to allow it fairly to be said that the Commission, rather than the officials who initiated the actions leading to respondent’s injury, were the “final authority” responsible for setting city policy. Id., at 1175. Turning to the question whether a rational jury could have concluded that respondent had been injured by an unconstitutional policy, the Court of Appeals found that respondent’s transfer from CDA to Heritage had been “orchestrated” by Hamsher, that the transfer had amounted to a “constructive discharge,” and that the injury had reached fruition when respondent was eventually laid off by Nash and Killen. Id., at 1175-1176, and n. 8. The court held that the jury’s verdict exonerating Hamsher and the other individual defendants could be reconciled with a finding of liability against the city because “the named defendants were not the supervisors directly causing the lay off, when the actual damages arose.” Id., at 1173, n. 3. Cf. Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U. S. 796 (1986). The dissenting judge relied on our decision in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469 (1986). He found that the power to set employment policy for petitioner city of St. Louis lay with the Mayor and Aldermen, who were authorized to enact ordinances, and with the Civil Service Commission, whose function was to hear appeals from city employees who believed that their rights under the city’s Charter, or under applicable rules and ordinances, had not been properly respected. 798 F. 2d, at 1180. The dissent concluded that respondent had submitted no evidence proving that the Mayor and Aldermen, or the Commission, had established a policy of retaliating against employees for appealing from adverse personnel decisions. Id., at 1179-1181. The dissenting judge also concluded that, even if there were such a policy,, the record evidence would not support a finding that respondent was in fact transferred or laid off in retaliation for the 1980 appeal from his suspension. Id., at 1181-1182. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 1029 (1987), and we now reverse. II We begin by addressing a threshold procedural issue. The second question presented in the petition for certiorari reads as follows: “Whether the failure of a local government to establish an appellate procedure for the review of officials’ decisions which does not defer in substantial part to the original decisionmaker’s decision constitutes a delegation of authority to establish final government policy such that liability may be imposed on the local government on the basis of the decisionmaker’s act alone, when the act is neither taken pursuant to a rule of general applicability nor is a decision of specific application adopted as the result of a formal process?” Pet. for Cert. i. Although this question was manifestly framed in light of the holding of the Court of Appeals, respondent argues that petitioner failed to preserve the question through a timely objection to the jury instructions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51. Arguing that both parties treated the identification of municipal “policymakers” as a question of fact at trial, respondent emphasizes that the jury was given the following instruction, which was offered by the city itself: “As a general principle, a municipality is not liable under 42 U. S. C. 1983 for the actions of its employees. However, a municipality may be held liable under 42 U. S. C. 1983 if the allegedly unconstitutional act was committed by an official high enough in the government so that his or her actions can be said to represent a government decision.” App. 113. Relying on Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808 (1985), and Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257 (1987), respondent contends that the jury instructions should be reviewed only for plain error, and that the jury’s verdict should be tested only for sufficiency of the evidence. Declining to defend the legal standard adopted by the Court of Appeals, respondent vigorously insists that the judgment should be affirmed on the basis of the jury’s verdict and petitioner’s alleged failure to comply with Rule 51. Petitioner argues that it preserved the legal issues presented by its petition for certiorari in at least two ways. First, it filed a pretrial motion for summary judgment, or alternatively for judgment on the pleadings. In support of that motion, petitioner argued that respondent had failed to allege the existence of any impermissible municipal policy or of any facts that would indicate that such a policy existed. Second, petitioner filed a motion for directed verdict at the close of respondent’s case, renewed that motion at the close of all the evidence, and eventually filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Respondent’s arguments do not bring our jurisdiction into question, and we must not lose sight of the fact, stressed in Tuttle, that the “decision to grant certiorari represents a commitment of scarce judicial resources with a view to deciding the merits of one or more of the questions presented in the petition.” 471 U. S., at 816. In Kibbe, it is true, the writ was dismissed in part because the petitioner sought to challenge a jury instruction to which it had not objected at trial. In the case before us, the focus of petitioner’s challenge is not on the jury instruction itself, but on the denial of its motions for summary judgment and a directed verdict. Although the same legal issue was raised both by those motions and by the jury instruction, “the failure to object to an instruction does not render the instruction the 'law of the case’ for purposes of appellate review of the denial of a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Kibbe, supra, at 264 (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted). Petitioner’s legal position in the District Court — that respondent had failed to establish an unconstitutional municipal policy — was consistent with the legal standard that it now advocates. It should not be surprising if petitioner’s arguments in the District Court were much less detailed than the arguments it now makes in response to the decision of the Court of Appeals. That, however, does not imply that petitioner failed to preserve the issue raised in its petition for certiorari. Cf. post, at 165-167 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we find no obstacle to reviewing the question presented in the petition for certiorari, a question that was very clearly considered, and decided, by the Court of Appeals. We note, too, that petitioner has throughout this litigation been confronted with a legal landscape whose contours are “in a state of evolving definition and uncertainty.” Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 256 (1981). We therefore do not believe that our review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, a decision raising a question that “is important and appears likely to recur in § 1983 litigation against municipalities,” id., at 257, will undermine the policy of judicial efficiency that underlies Rule 51. The definition of municipal liability manifestly needs clarification, at least in part to give lower courts and litigants a fairer chance to craft jury instructions that will not require scrutiny on appellate review. Ill A Section 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. ...” Ten years ago, this Court held that municipalities and other bodies of local government are “persons” within the meaning of this statute. Such a body may therefore be sued directly if it is alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 690 (1978). The Court pointed out that § 1983 also authorizes suit “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id., at 690-691. At the same time, the Court rejected the use of the doctrine of respondeat superior and concluded that municipalities could be held liable only when an injury was inflicted by a govern-merit’s “lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Id., at 694. MonelVs rejection of respondeat superior, and its insistence that local governments could be held liable only for the results of unconstitutional governmental “policies,” arose from the language and history of § 1983. For our purposes here, the crucial terms of the statute are those that provide for liability when a government “subjects [a person], or causes [that person] to be subjected,” to a deprivation of constitutional rights. Aware that governmental bodies can act only through natural persons, the Court concluded that these governments should be held responsible when, and only when, their official policies cause their employees to violate another person’s constitutional rights. Reading the statute’s language in the light of its legislative history, the Court found that vicarious liability would be incompatible with the causation requirement set out on the face of § 1983. See id., at 691. That conclusion, like decisions that have widened the scope of § 1983 by recognizing constitutional rights that were unheard of in 1871, has been repeatedly reaffirmed. See, e. g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 633, 655, n. 39 (1980); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 325 (1981); Tuttle, 471 U. S., at 818, and n. 5 (plurality opinion); id., at 828 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S., at 478-480, and nn. 7-8. Cf. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., supra, at 259 (“[B]ecause the 1871 Act was designed to expose state and local officials to a new form of liability, it would defeat the promise of the statute to recognize any pre-existing immunity without determining both the policies that it serves and its compatibility with the purposes of § 1983”). In Monell itself, it was undisputed that there had been an official policy requiring city employees to take actions that were unconstitutional under this Court’s decisions. Without attempting to draw the line between actions taken pursuant to official policy and. the independent actions of employees and agents, the Monell Court left the “full contours” of municipal liability under § 1983 to be developed further on “another day.” 436 U. S., at 695. In the years since Monell was decided, the Court has considered several cases involving isolated acts by government officials and employees. We have assumed that an unconstitutional governmental policy could be inferred from a single decision taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in that area of the government’s business. See, e. g., Owen v. City of Independence, supra; Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247 (1981). Cf. Pembaur, supra, at 480. At the other end of the spectrum, we have held that an unjustified shooting by a police officer cannot, without more, be thought to result from official policy. Tuttle, 471 U. S., at 821 (plurality opinion); id., at 830-831, and n. 5 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Cf. Kibbe, 480 U. S., at 260 (dissenting opinion). Two Terms ago, in Pembaur, supra, we undertook to define more precisely when a decision on a single occasion may be enough to establish an unconstitutional municipal policy. Although the Court was unable to settle on a general formulation, Justice Brennan’s opinion articulated several guiding principles. First, a majority of the Court agreed that municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts for which the municipality itself is actually responsible, “that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Id., at 480. Second, only those municipal officials who have “final policymaking authority” may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability. Id., at 483 (plurality opinion). Third, whether a particular official has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law. Ibid, (plurality opinion). Fourth, the challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city’s business. Id., at 482-483, and n. 12 (plurality opinion). The Courts of Appeals have already diverged in their interpretations of these principles. Compare, for example, Williams v. Butler, 802 F. 2d 296, 299-302 (CA8 1986) (en banc), cert. pending sub nom. Little Rock v. Williams, No. 86-1049, with Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 798 F. 2d 748, 759-760 (CA5 1986) (dictum). Today, we set out again to clarify the issue that we last addressed in Pembaur. B We begin by reiterating that the identification of policy-making officials is a question of state law. “Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority, and of course, whether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, supra, at 483 (plurality opinion). Thus the identification of policymaking officials is not a question of federal law, and it is not a question of fact in the usual sense. The States have extremely wide latitude in determining the form that local government takes, and local preferences have led to a profusion of distinct forms. Among the many kinds of municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and special districts of all sorts, one may expect to find a rich variety of ways in which the power of government is distributed among a host of different officials and official bodies. See generally C. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations §§1.3-1.7 (1980). Without attempting to canvass the numberless factual scenarios that may come to light in litigation, we can be confident that state law (which may include valid local ordinances and regulations) will always direct a court to some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policy in any given area of a local government’s business. We are not, of course, predicting that state law will always speak with perfect clarity. We have no reason to suppose, however, that federal courts will face greater difficulties here than those that they routinely address in other contexts. We are also aware that there will be cases in which policy-making responsibility is shared among more than one official or body. In the case before us, for example, it appears that the Mayor and Aldermen are authorized to adopt such ordinances relating to personnel administration as are compatible with the City Charter. See St. Louis City Charter, Art. XVIII, § 7(b), App. 62-63. The Civil Service Commission, for its part, is required to “prescribe . . . rules for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this article, and of any ordinance adopted in pursuance thereof, and not inconsistent therewith.” §7(a), App. 62. Assuming that applicable law does not make the decisions of the Commission reviewable by the Mayor and Aldermen, or vice versa, one would have to conclude that policy decisions made either by the Mayor and Aldermen or by the Commission would be attributable to the city itself. In any event, however, a federal court would not be justified in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it. And certainly there can be no justification for giving a jury the discretion to determine which officials are high enough in the government that their actions can be said to represent a decision of the government itself. As the plurality in Pembaur recognized, special difficulties can arise when it is contended that a municipal policymaker has delegated his policymaking authority to another official. 475 U. S., at 482-483, and n. 12. If the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability. If, however, a city’s lawful policymakers could insulate the government from liability simply by delegating their policymaking authority to others, § 1983 could not serve its intended purpose. It may not be possible to draw an elegant line that will resolve this conundrum, but certain principles should provide useful guidance. First, whatever analysis is used to identify municipal policymakers, egregious attempts by local governments to insulate themselves from liability for unconstitutional policies are precluded by a separate doctrine. Relying on the language of § 1983, the Court has long recognized that a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 167-168 (1970). That principle, which has not been affected by Monell or subsequent cases, ensures that most deliberate municipal evasions of the Constitution will be sharply limited. Second, as the Pembaur plurality recognized, the authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy. 475 U. S., at 481-484. When an official’s discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official’s making, those policies, rather than the subordinate’s departures from them, are the act of the municipality. Similarly, when a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies. If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. C Whatever refinements of these principles may be suggested in the future, we have little difficulty concluding that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect legal standard in this case. In reaching this conclusion, we do not decide whether the First Amendment forbade the city to retaliate against respondent for having taken advantage of the grievance mechanism in 1980. Nor do we decide whether there was evidence in this record from which a rational jury could conclude either that such retaliation actually occurred or that respondent suffered any compensable injury from whatever retaliatory action may have been taken. Finally, we do not address petitioner’s contention that the jury verdict exonerating the individual defendants cannot be reconciled with the verdict against the city. Even assuming that all these issues were properly resolved in respondent’s favor, we would not be able to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The city cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless respondent proved the existence of an unconstitutional municipal policy. Respondent does not contend that anyone in city government ever promulgated, or even articulated, such a policy. Nor did he attempt to prove that such retaliation was ever directed against anyone other than himself. Respondent contends that the record can be read to establish that his supervisors were angered by his 1980 appeal to the Civil Service Commission; that new supervisors in a new administration chose, for reasons passed on through some informal means, to retaliate against respondent two years later by transferring him to another agency; and that this transfer was part of a scheme that led, another year and a half later, to his layoff. Even if one assumes that all this was true, it says nothing about the actions of those whom the law established as the makers of municipal policy in matters of personnel administration. The Mayor and Aldermen enacted no ordinance designed to retaliate against respondent or against similarly situated employees. On the contrary, the city established an independent Civil Service Commission and empowered it to review and correct improper personnel actions. Respondent does not deny that his repeated appeals from adverse personnel decisions repeatedly brought him at least partial relief, and the Civil Service Commission never so much as hinted that retaliatory transfers or layoffs were permissible. Respondent points to no evidence indicating that the Commission delegated to anyone its final authority to interpret and enforce the following policy set out in Article XVIII of the city’s Charter, §2(a), App. 49: “Merit and fitness. All appointments and promotions to positions in the service of the city and all measures for the control and regulation of employment in such positions, and separation therefrom, shall be on the sole basis of merit and fitness . . . .” The Court of Appeals concluded that “appointing authorities,” like Hamsher and Killen, who had the authority to initiate transfers and layoffs, were municipal “policymakers.” The court based this conclusion on its findings (1) that the decisions of these employees were not individually reviewed for “substantive propriety” by higher supervisory officials; and (2) that the Civil Service Commission decided appeals from such decisions, if at all, in a circumscribed manner that gave substantial deference to the original decisionmaker. 798 F. 2d, at 1174-1175. We find these propositions insufficient to support the conclusion that Hamsher and Killen were authorized to establish employment policy for the city with respect to transfers and layoffs. To the contrary, the City Charter expressly states that the Civil Service Commission has the power and the duty: “To consider and determine any matter involved in the administration and enforcement of this [Civil Service] article and the rules and ordinances adopted in accordance therewith that may be referred to it for decision by the director [of personnel], or on appeal by any appointing authority, employe, or taxpayer of the city, from any act of the director or of any appointing authority. The decision of the commission in all such matters shall be final, subject, however, to any right of action under any law of the state or of the United States.” St. Louis City Charter, Art. XVIII, § 7(d), App. 63. This case therefore resembles the hypothetical example in Pembaur: “[I]f [city] employment policy was set by the [Mayor and Aldermen and by the Civil Service Commission], only [those] bodies’] decisions would provide a basis for [city] liability. This would be true even if the [Mayor and Aider-men and the Commission] left the [appointing authorities] discretion to hire and fire employees and [they] exercised that discretion in an unconstitutional manner . . . .” 475 U. S., at 483, n. 12. A majority of the Court of Appeals panel determined that the Civil Service Commission’s review of individual employment actions gave too much deference to the decisions of appointing authorities like Hamsher and Killen. Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one’s subordinates, however, is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. It is equally consistent with a presumption that the subordinates are faithfully attempting to comply with the policies that are supposed to guide them. It would be a different matter if a particular decision by a subordinate was cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by the supervising policymaker. It would also be a different matter if a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a “custom or usage” of which the supervisor must have been aware. See supra, at 127. In both those cases, the supervisor could realistically be deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been formulated or initiated by a lower ranking official. But the mere failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate’s discretionary decisions does not amount to a delegation of policymaking authority, especially where (as here) the wrongfulness of the subordinate’s decision arises from a retaliatory motive or other unstated rationale. In such circumstances, the purposes of § 1983 would not be served by treating a subordinate employee’s decision as if it were a reflection of municipal policy. Justice Brennan’s opinion, concurring in the judgment, finds implications in our discussion that we do not think necessary or correct. See post, at 142-147. We nowhere say or imply, for example, that “a municipal charter’s precatory admonition against discrimination or any other employment practice not based on merit and fitness effectively insulates the municipality from any liability based on acts inconsistent with that policy.” Post, at 145, n. 7. Rather, we would respect the decisions, embodied in state and local law, that allocate policymaking authority among particular individuals and bodies. Refusals to carry out stated policies could obviously help to show that a municipality’s actual policies were different from the ones that had been announced. If such a showing were made, we would be confronted with a different case than the one we decide today. Nor do we believe that we have left a “gaping hole” in § 1983 that needs to be filled with the vague concept of “de facto final policymaking authority.” Post, at 144. Except perhaps as a step towards overruling Monell and adopting the doctrine of respondeat superior, ad hoc searches for officials possessing such “defacto” authority would serve primarily to foster needless unpredictability in the application of § 1983. IV We cannot accept either the Court of Appeals’ broad definition of municipal policymakers or respondent’s suggestion that a jury should be entitled to define for itself which officials’ decisions should expose a municipality to liability. Respondent has suggested that the record will support an inference that policymaking authority was in fact delegated to individuals who took retaliatory action against him and who were not exonerated by the jury. Respondent’s arguments appear to depend on a legal standard similar to the one suggested in Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, post, at 171, which we do not accept. Our examination of the record and state law, however, suggests that further review of this case may be warranted in light of the principles we have discussed. That task is best left to the Court of Appeals, which will be free to invite additional briefing and argument if necessary. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Unlike Justice Brennan, we would not replace this standard with a new approach in which state law becomes merely an “appropriate starting point” for an “assessment of a municipality’s actual power structure.” Post, at 143,145. Municipalities cannot be expected to predict how courts or juries will assess their “actual power structures,” and this uncertainty could easily lead to results that would be hard in practice to distinguish from the results of a regime governed by the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is one thing to charge a municipality with responsibility for the decisions of officials invested by law, or by a “custom or usage” having the force of law, with policymaking authority. It would be something else, and something inevitably more capricious, to hold a municipality responsible for every decision that is perceived as “final” through the lens of a particular factfinder’s evaluation of the city’s “actual power structure.” Justice Stevens, who believes that Monell incorrectly rejected the doctrine of respondeat superior, suggests a new theory that reflects his perceptions of the congressional purposes underlying § 1983. See post, at 148, n. 1. This theory would apparently ignore state law, and distinguish between “high” officials and “low” officials on the basis of an independent evaluation of the extent to which a particular official’s actions have “the potential of controlling governmental decisionmaking,” or are “perceived as the actions of the city itself.” Post, at 171. Whether this evaluation would be conducted by judges or juries, we think the legal test is too imprecise to hold much promise of consistent adjudication or principled analysis. We can see no reason, except perhaps a desire to come as close as possible to respondeat superior without expressly adopting that doctrine, that could justify introducing such unpredictability into a body of law that is already so difficult. As Justice Stevens acknowledges, see post, at 148, n. 1, this Court has repeatedly rejected his interpretation of Congress’ intent. We have held that Congress intended to hold municipalities responsible under § 1983 only for the execution of official policies and customs, and not for injuries inflicted solely by employees or agents. See, e. g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 478-480 (1986). Like the Pembaur plurality, we think it is self-evident that official policies can only be adopted by those legally charged with doing so. See supra, at 124, and n. 1. We are aware of nothing in § 1983 or its legislative history, and Justice Stevens points to nothing, that would support the notion that unauthorized acts of subordinate employees are official policies because they may have the “potential”' to become official policies or may be “perceived as” official policies. Accordingly, we conclude that Justice Stevens’ proposal is without a basis in the law.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BRANNAN, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, v. STARK et al. NO. 6. Argued October 9, 1951. Decided March 3, 1952. Neil Brooks argued the cause for the Secretary of Agriculture. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman and W. Carroll Hunter.. Seward A. Miller, Frederic P. Lee and Maurice A. Gellis submitted on brief for the Dairymen’s League Co-operative Association, Inc. Edward B. Hanify argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briéf were Harry Polikoff and Lipman Redman. Reuben Hall and Waldo Noyes filed a brief for the New England Milk Producers’ Association et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This action by dairy farmers, nonmembers of cooperative, associations, concerns 1941 amendments to an order, of the Secretary of Agriculture dealing with the marketing of milk in the Boston area. It was previously here as Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288 (1944), where it was held that the respondents had such an interest in the Order as to give them legal standing to object to those of its provisions here under attack. Upon remand the provisions were held invalid by the District Court, 82 F. Supp. 614, and that decision, was affirmed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 87 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 185 F. 2d 871. We granted certiorari. 341 U. S. 908. The question now presented is whether those amendments to the Order which provide for certain payments to cooperative associations are within the authority granted the Secretary by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. The respondents seek to enjoin the enforcement of the provisions in question. The purpose of the Act and the nature of the Secretary’s Order No. 4 thereunder are set out in some detail in Stark v. Wickard, supra, at 291-302. It is here sufficient to note thq following aspects of Order No. 4, as amended: In the Order, issued pursuant to the Act, the Secretary divided all milk marketed in the Greater Bos: ton area into Class I, which is sold as fluid milk, and Class II, which is used for other purposes such as the manufacture of butter and cheese. The Order provides for the fixing of minimum price's to be paid, by handlers for each of these classes of milk. Each handler pays for milk in accordance with the amount of each class he has purchased. Producers, however, are paid the same price for milk delivered no matter what use is made of the particular milk by the handler. The Market Administrator computes, on the basis of prices paid by handlers, the value of all milk sold in the area each month. After making certain adjustments, he divides that value, as adjusted, by the total quantity of milk, sold in the area during the month, to determine the "blended price,” which is the price actually paid the producer. One adjustment made in determining the blended price is the deduction providing for the disputed payments to cooperatives. This deduction is thus “a burden on every area sale.” Stark v. Wickard, supra, at 303. “Apparently, [it] is the only deduction that is an unrecoverable charge agáinst the producers. The other items deducted under [the Order] are for a revolving fund or to meet differentials in price because of location, seasonal delivery, et cetera.” Id., at 301. The effect, of the deduction and. the correlative payments to cooperatives is to reduce the amount which producers, such as respondents, who are not members of cooperatives would otherwise receive for their milk, and to increase correspondingly the receipts of cooperatives. We must determine whether the Secretary was authorized by the statute to include the provisions requiring this deduction and these payments in the Order. No question is presented as to the adequacy of the evidence to support the findings of the Secretary, but rather, a question as to the power granted the Secretary by Congress. The disputed provisions were introduced into the-Boston Order in 1941, after hearings called by the Secretary. Affidavits, filed by representatives of the Secretary in support of his motion for summary judgment in the District Court; show the following: A major issue at the hearings was the amount of a uniform allowance, previously 260 per hundredweight, which was reflected in the price paid by all handlers for Class II milk. This allowance resulted in a lower price to handlers, for Class II milk than for Class I milk. It was intended to defray the cost of handling surplus milk. There was a considerable variance in milk plant costs which was thought to make continuance of a uniform rate undesirable. Cooperative plants showed higher costs than those of proprietary handlers. That difference was attributable not only to the cooperatives’ maintenance of a reserve supply to meet irregular demands of proprietary handlers for Class I milk, but also to overcapitalization and excess capacity which had existed prior to any federal regulation. To meet these higher costs cooperatives proposed a lower uniform allowance for Class II milk, coupled with a payment to cooperatives only for market services, although they had engaged in the activities claimed to constitute market services for years • without any such payment. In the amendments resulting from the hearings, the uniform allowance to handlers was reduced from 26$ to 21%$, while at the same time the provisions here contested, requiring payments to cooperatives alone, were introduced. Section 8c (5) of the Act provides that orders relating to milk and its products shall contain one or more of certain enumerated terms and conditions, “and (except as provided in subsection (7)) no others" (emphasis added). It is paragraph (D) of subsection (7) upon which the Secretary relies. That paragraph authorizes provisions “incidental to, and not inconsistent with, the terms and conditions specified in subsections (5), (6), and (7) and necessary to effectuate the other provisions of such order.” The provisions here in question are not specifically authorized by any part of the Act. Both courts below thought these provisions to be neither incidental nor necessary, and to be inconsistent with terms specified in the named subsections. The payments to the cooperative associations are said to be justified as remuneration for services performed for the market by the associations. To qualify for the payments, an association must meet eight requirements listed in the Order. But none of these shows any indication that the activity it prescribes will benefit nonmembers, with the possible exception of the seventh, which requires that the association collaborate “with similar associations „ in activities incident, to the maintenance and strengthening of collective bargaining by producers and- the operation of a plan of uniform pricing of milk to handlers.” Even if this requirement comprehends a service to nonmember producers substantial enough to be significant in determining the validity of a mandatory contribution from them to cooperatives, it does not support the exaction in issue, which concededly is based mainly upon other services, primarily performed for members. Indeed, those “services” which the Secretary principally urges as justifying the payments do not appear among the expressed prerequisites for .the payments. Chief among the activities claimed to benefit all producers are those-which tend to maintain an adequate supply of fluid milk at’ all times and to dispose of surplus supply. A principal source of the problems of milk marketing is the seasonal character of milk production. Herds sufficient to meet the demand for fluid milk during the winter months produce much more than enough to satisfy that demand during the summer months. It is contended that the cooperative associations handle a proportionately larger share of surplus milk than other handlers. It appears that they engage in the manufacture of milk products as a means of absorbing the surplus, and otherwise aid in obviating/the “dumping” of surplus and discouraging the reduction of- herds to a point below that necessary to supply the demand in the season of low production. It may be conceded that these activities are indirectly beneficial to the whole market, even though they are engaged in for the direct advantage of members only. However, proprietary handlers also carry on activities of this kind, and their plants handle two-thirds as much surplus milk as do those of the cooperatives. Prior to amendment of the Order in 1941, the cost of handling surplus milk was recognized in the uniform 26$ allowance to all handlers of Class II milk, but only cooperative associations now receive the payments in issue here. It is clear that the associations are in no way required to handle any of the surplus milk of nonmembers. More significant, there is no requirement in the Order that the associations take any action directed toward solution of the problem, even with respect to surplus milk of their members. Other “services” of the cooperatives which are claimed to be beneficial to all producers are, as they affect the issue here, relatively insignificant. These activities are, like the others, primarily désigned for the advantage of members, although they may sometimes incidentally benefit the whole market. They generally amount to no more than playing the part of an alert, intelligent, organized participant in the market. They include such functions as employing economists to study the needs of the industry, participating in hearings on orders such as that inyplved here, being attentive to changing factors in the market, and maintaining the cooperative organizations by promotional work to show farmers the benefits of cooperation and by educational work among members.- One may observe some incongruity in requiring some producers to pay others for vigorously prosecuting their own interests, especially where their interests may sometimes conflict with those of the producers burdened with the payments. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the disputed provisions fall within the authority granted by the catchall phrases of § & (7) (D) of the Act. We noté at the outset that § 8c (5) states in specific and lengthy detail the provisions which may be included in milk marketing orders. That subsection lays down comprehensive directions for classification, pricing, and the operation of the equalization pool mechanism, particularly as to adjustments and deductions employed in determining the blended price. But § 8c (5) does not authorize the provisions challenged here.. Section 8c (7) authorizes a congeries of general terms which may be included in all marketing orders, including those dealing with commoditiés other than milk and milk products. The'Secretary claims authority for the provisions in question is given by the last paragraph of this omnibus subsection, a paragraph .authorizing the inclusion of auxiliary provisions “incidental to . . . the terms and conditions specified in subsections (5), (6), and (7).” Yet it is claimed that the contested provisions are of such basic importance that their validity may be crucial to the success of the whole milk marketing program. We do not think it likely that Congress, in fashioning this intricate marketing order machinery, would thus hang one of the main gears on the tail pipe. The conclusion that these provisions are not “incidental” to the specified terms is further supported by the presence of § 8c (5) (E), expressly authorizing deductions from payments to producers for other, specified services, and indicating the likelihood of similar specific authorization for the contested deductions if Congress intended that they should be made. Finally, the provisions cannot be incidental to the enumerated terms and conditions since they are inconsistent therewith. The payments to cooperatives are inconsistent with § 8c (5) (A), which provides that all handlers shall pay uniform prices for, each class of milk, subject to certain adjustments of no concern here. The discriminatory effect of the payments becomes the more evident when they are considered in context with the reduction in the uniform allowance to all handlers on the price of Class II milk. That reduction' was simultaneous with the establishment of the system of payments to be made to cooperatives only and to be funded by deductions from prices paid all producers. The result would have been substantially similar if the allowance to proprietary handlers had been reduced while the allowance to cooperatives had been permitted to remain at its previous higher level. Such a lack of- uniformity in prices paid by handlers, would clearly have contravened § 8c (5) (A). The deduction for payments to cooperatives is inconsistent with §8c(5)(B), which requires the payment of uniform prices to all producers for all milk delivered, subject to certain adjustments not here pertinent. It has been contended that the deduction does not affect the uniform price of milk, but represepts only a reimbursement for services.' The argument seems to be that all producers receive a uniform price while the deduction merely constitutes a charge to all producers for services, a charge which happens to be paid certain associations of producers because those associations perform the services. The fact remains that the receipts of nonmembers resulting from delivery of a given quantity of milk are smaller than those of the associations and their members. This is true because nonmembers are' paid only the blended price while members receive, through their associations, the disputed payments in addition to the blended price. Although made to, members collectively, these payments necessarily redound to members individually. Thus, if they are used to pay the costs of the associations, they reduce pró ianto the contributions which are required from individual members. But we need not go further than to hold that the argument cannot negate inconsistency with the uniform price requirement where, as here, the services for which the payment is made are performed for the direct bénefit of the cooperatives’ memberships, are but incidentally helpful to other producers, and are not a required condition to receipt of the payments. Since the provisions for payments to1 cooperatives are not incidental to § 8c (5) and (7),‘but are inconsistent with the former subsection, we need not determine whether they are “necessary to effectuate the other provisions” of the Order, the third requirement of § 8c (7)(D). When the directly relevant provisions of the Act thus demonstrate lack of authority for the payments to cooperatives, no power to require them can be implied from the general instruction of § 10 (b)(1) to the Secretary, directing him to accord “recognition and encouragement” to cooperative associations. Without support in the words of the statute the challenged provisions must fall, for neither legislative history nor administrative construction offers any cogent reasons for a contrary result. Available indicia of congressional intent at the time of enactment lend weight to the contention that specific provision would have been made for this kind of payments to cooperatives if they were meant to be made. Attempted amendment later to provide authorization for the payments, and the accompanying discussion in Congress, are, as a whole, indecisive. Approval of the payments by Congress cannot be inferred from its ratification, upon passage of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act in 1937, of marketing orders previously issued under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Even if we were to accept the proposition that Congress there intended to confer statutory authority for all future provisions like any of those then existing in any marketing order, we would reach the same conclusion because neither the provisions for these particular payments nor any closely analogous provisions were at that time present in any marketing orders. Nor have provisions bearing substantial similarity to those before us since been included in other orders so frequently as to amount to a consistent administrative interpretation of import in construing the Act. Many provisions for payments to cooperatives appearing in other orders have been of a kind specifically authorized by the statute. Thus, the provision of the first Boston Milk Order for a price differential as between cooperative milk and noncooperative milk was upheld in Green Valley Creamery v. United States, as a “market differential” authorized by § 8c (5) (A)(1). We have no occasion to judge the equity or the wisdom of the payments to cooperatives involved in this case. We hold that they are not authorized by the Act. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. The Act of 1937 reenacted and amended provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31, as amended. 7 CFR §§ 904.1-904.110. Section 904.8 (b) of the Order requires the Market Administrator, in computing the blended price, to deduct, among other items, the total amount of cooperative payments required by § 904.10 (b), which provides: “(b) Cooperative payments. On or before the 25th day after the end of each month, each qualified association shall be entitled to receive a cooperative payment from the funds provided by handlers’ payments to the market administrator pursuant to §904.9. The payment shall be made under the conditions and at the rates specified in this paragraph, and shall be subject to verification of the receipts and other items upon which such payment is based. “(1) Each qualified association shall be entitled to payment at the rate of 1 cént per hundredweight on the milk which its producer members deliver to the plant of a handler other than a qualified association; except on milk delivered by a producer who is also a member of another qualified association, and on milk delivered to a handler who fails to make applicable payments pursuant to § 904.9 (b) (2) and §904.11 within 10 days after the end of the month in which he is required to do so. If the handler is required by paragraph (e) of this section to make deductions from members of the association at a rate lower than 1 cent per hundredweight, the payment pursuant to this subparagraph shall be at such lower rate. “ (2) Each qualified association shall be entitled to payment at the rate of 2 cents per hundredweight on milk received from producers at a plant operated by that association.” 7 CFR § 904.10 (b). The total, amount thus pajd cooperatives in the Boston area since 1941 is $1,521,028; in addition, more than $400,000 has been deposited in a special account to await' the final result of this litigation. However, the payments to cooperatives have in each year constituted no more than a fraction of one percent of the total value of milk marketed in the area. See, e. g., R. 60, 70-75. § 8c (5), note 1, supra: “(5) In the case of milk and its products, orders issued pursuant to this section shall contain one or more of the following terms and conditions, and (except as provided in subsection (7)) no others: “ (A) Classifying milk in accordance with the form in which or the purpose for which it is used, and fixing, or providing a method for fixing, minimum prices for each such use classification which all handlers shall pay, and the time when payments shall be made, for milk purchased from producers or associations 6f producers. Such prices shall be uniform as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers. “(B) Providing: (i) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to the same handler of uniform prices for all milk delivered by them: Provided, That, except in the case of orders covering milk products only, such provision is approved or favored by at least three-fourths of the producers who, during a representative period determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, have been engaged in the production for market of milk covered in such order or by producers who, during such representative period, have produced at least three-fourths of the volume of such milk produced for market during such period; the approval required hereunder shall be separate and apart from any other approval or disapproval provided for by this section; or (ii) for the payment to all producers and associations of producers delivering milk to. all handlers of uniform prices for all milk so delivered, irrespective of the uses made of such milk by the individual handler to whom it is delivered; subject, in either case, only to adjustments for (a) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (b) the grade or quality of the milk delivered, (c) the locations at which delivery of such milk is made, and (d) a further adjustment, equitably to apportion the total value of the milk purchased by any handler, or by all handlers, among producers and associations of producers, on the basis of their marketings of milk during a representative period of time. “(C) In order to accomplish the purposes set forth in paragraphs (A) and (B) of this subsection (5), providing a method for making' adjustments in payments, as among handlers (including producers who are also handlers), to the end that the total sums paid by each handler shall equal the value of the milk purchased by him at the prices fixed in accordance with paragraph (A) hereof. “(D) Providing that, in the case of all milk purchased by handlers from any producer who did not regularly sell milk during a period of 30 days next preceding the effective date of such order for consumption in the area covered thereby, payments to such producer, for the period beginning with the first regular delivery by such producer and continuing 'until the end of two full calendar months following the first day of the next succeeding calendar month, shall be made at the price for the lowest use classification specified in such order, subject to the adjustments specified in paragraph (B) of this subsection (5). “ (E) Providing (i) except as to producers for whom such services are being' rendered by a cooperative marketing association, qualified as provided in paragraph (F) of this subsection (5), for market information to producers and for the verification of weights, sarfipling, and testing of milk purchased from producers, and for making appropriate deductions therefor from payments to producers, and (ii) for assurance of, and security for, the payment by handlers for milk purchased. “(F) Nothing contained in this subsection (5) is intended or shall be. construed to prevent a cooperative marketing association qualified under the provisions of the Act of Congress of February 18, 1922, as amended, known as the ‘Capper-Volstead Act’, engaged in making collective sales or marketing of milk or its products for the producers thereof, from blending the net proceeds of'all of its sales in all markets in all use classifications, arid making distribution thereof to its producers in accordance with the contract between the association and its producers: Provided, That it shall not sell milk or its products to any handler for use or consumption in any market at prices less than the prices fixed pursuant to paragraph (A) of this subsection (5) for such milk. “(G) No marketing agreement or order applicable to milk and its products in any marketing area shall prohibit or in any manner limit, in the case of the products of milk, the marketing in that area of any milk or product thereof produced in any production area in the United States!” § 8c (7) (D), note 1, supra. Subsection 7 authorizes certain general terms for all marketing orders, including both those relating to milk and its products and those relating to other commodities. The terms thus authorized, aside from paragraph (D), prohibit-unfair competition, provide for filing of sales prices by handlers, and provide for selection of an agency to implement the order. 82 F. Supp. 614, 618; 87 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 397-399, 185 F. 2d 871, 880-882. 7 CFR § 904.10 (a): “(a) Application and qualification for cooperative payments. Any cooperative association of producers duly organized under the laws of any state may apply to the Secretary for a determination that it is qualified to receive cooperative payments in accordance with the provisions of this section. Upon notice of the filing of such an application, the market administrator shall set aside for each month, from the funds provided by handlers’ payments to the market administrator pursuant to § 904.9, such amount as he estimates is ample to make payment to the applicant, and hold it in reserve until the Secretary has ruled upon the application. The applicant association shall be considered to -be a qualified association entitled to receive such payments from the date fixed by the Secretary, if he determines that it meets all of the following requirements. “(1) It' conforms to the requirements relating to character of organization, voting, dividend payments, and dealing in products of nonmembers, which are set forth in the Capper-Volstead Act and in the state laws under which the association is organized. “(2) It operates as a responsible producer-controlled marketing association exercising full authority in the sale of the milk of its members. “(3) It .systematically checks the weights and tests of milk which its members deliver to plants not operated by the association. “(4) It guarantees payment to its members for milk delivered to plants not operated by the association. “(5) It maintains, either individually or together with-other qualified associations, a competent staff for dealing with marketing problems and for providing information to its members. *(6) It constantly maintains close working relationships with its members. “(7) It collaborates with similar associations in activities incident to the maintenance and strengthening of collective bargaining by producers and the operation of a plan of uniform pricing of milk to handlers. “(8) It is in compliance with all applicable provisions of this subpart.” Ibid. In' 1939 (no later statistics are available in the record), there were 21 plants in the Boston area which were equipped for manufacturing milk powder, condensed milk or butter, of which 13 were cooperative and 8 proprietary. The cooperative plants handled 60.2 percent of the surplus milk that year. R. 66 and 68. Contrast the New York Order, providing for .comparable payments, at various rates, to cooperatives. That Orcler expressly requires that an association, to qualify for any such payments, must arrange for and supply “in times of short supply, Class I milk to the marketing area,” and must secure “utilization of milk, in times of long supply, in a manner.to assure the greatest possible return to all producers.” 7 CFR, 1950 Cum. Supp., § 927.9 (f). To receive the highest rate of'payments under that Order, in certain circumstances a cooperative must “in addition to the other qualifications . . . [be] determined by the Secretary to have sufficient plant capacity to receive all the milk'of producers who are members and to be willing and able to receive milk from producers not members.” Id., at § 927.9 (f) (3). As proposed at one point in the hearings, the Boston Order would have contained requirements like those of the New York Order. R. 233. Their omission, in the Order, as finally issued, presumably was deliberate. In fact, the Secretary admits that many of the cooperatives in the Boston area were unwilling or unable to perform services such as those required by the New York Order. R. 24-25 and 70. § 8c (7) (D), note 1, supra. Subsection (6) has no application to orders dealing with milk. § 8c (7) (D), note 1, supra. § 10 (b) (1), note 1, supra. The statutory provisions setting forth the terms which might be included in marketing orders were first enacted in an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1935. 49 Stat. 753. This enactment occurred shortly after the decisions of this Court in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), placing limitations on the delegation of rule-making authority to administrative agencies. With these cases specifically in mind, Congress set forth with deliberate particularity and completeness the terms which the Secretary might include in marketing orders. H. E. Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8; S. Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8. S. 3426, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 1719, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. S. 3426 would have clearly authorized payments such as those challenged here. It passed the Senate, but went no further. As to the inconclusive nature of the Bill and its history, see the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 400, 185 F. 2d 871, 883. “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as invalidating any marketing agreement, license, or order, or any regulation relating to, or any provision of, or any act of the Secretary of Agriculture in connection with, any such agreement, license, or order which has been executed, issued, approved, or done under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, or any amendment thereof, but such marketing agreements, licenses, orders, regulations, provisions, and acts are hereby expressly ratified, legalized, and confirmed.” 50 Stat. 246. 249 Of thirty-nine currently' outstanding milk marketing orders, only four contain provisions of the general nature of those in question. One of these is the Boston Order involved here; another is the New York Order, as to which see note 12, supra. 108 F. 2d 342, 345 (G. A. 1st Cir., 1939).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. UNITED FOODS, INC. No. 00-276. Argued April 17, 2001 Decided June 25, 2001 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., post, p. 417, and Thomas, J., post, p. 418, filed concurring opinions. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, and in which O’Connor, J., joined as to Parts I and III, post, p. 419. Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schif-fer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Douglas N. Letter. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Goldstein and Bradley A. MacLean. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Edna Walz, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, and Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington; for the American Mushroom Institute et al. by John G. Roberts, Jr., David G. Leitch, and Richard T. Rossier; and for the Western Mushroom Marketing Association et al. by Kendall L. Manock, Robert D. Wilkinson, and Linda Berg Othman. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Center for Individual Freedom by Erik S. Jaffe and Renee Giachino; for the Coalition of Cotton Apparel Importers by Daniel M. Price; for the DKT Liberty Project by Julia M. Carpenter; for Gerawan Farming, Inc., et al. by Michael W. McConnell and Brian C. Leighton; for the Institute for Justice by William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, and Scott G. Bullock; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson; and for Jeanne Charter et al. by Vernon E. Woodward and Lynn A. Hayes. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. Four Terms ago, in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457 (1997), the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a series of agricultural marketing orders that, as part of a larger regulatory marketing scheme, required producers of certain California tree fruit to pay assessments for product advertising. In this case a federal statute mandates assessments on handlers of fresh mushrooms to fund advertising for the product. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined the mandated payments were not part of a more comprehensive statutory program for agricultural marketing, thus dictating a different result than in Glickman. It held the assessment requirement unconstitutional, and we granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 1009 (2000). The statute in question, enacted by Congress in 1990, is the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act, 104 Stat. 3854, 7 U. S. C. § 6101 et seq. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a Mushroom Council to pursue the statute’s goals. Mushroom producers and importers, as defined by the statute, submit nominations from among their group to the Secretary, who then designates the Council membership. 7 U. S. C. §§ 6104(b) (1)(B), 6102(6), 6102(11). To fund its programs, the Act allows the Council to impose mandatory assessments upon handlers of fresh mushrooms in an amount not to exceed one cent per pound of mushrooms produced or imported. § 6104(g)(2). The assessments can be used for “projects of mushroom promotion, research, consumer information, and industry information.” § 6104(c)(4). It is undisputed, though, that most moneys raised by the assessments are spent for generic advertising to promote mushroom sales. Respondent United Foods, Inc., is a large agricultural enterprise based in Tennessee. It grows and distributes many crops and products, including fresh mushrooms. In 1996 respondent refused to pay its mandatory assessments under the Act. The forced subsidy for generic advertising, it contended, is a violation of the First Amendment. Respondent challenged the assessments in a petition filed with the Secretary. The United States filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking an order compelling respondent to pay. Both matters were stayed pending this Court’s decision in Glickman. After Glickman was decided, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed respondent’s petition, and the Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed. Respondent sought review in District Court, and its suit was consolidated with the Government’s enforcement action. The District Court, holding Glickman dispositive of the First Amendment challenge, granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held this case is not controlled by Glickman and reversed the District Court. 197 F. 3d 221 (1999). We agree with the Court of Appeals and now affirm. A quarter of a century ago, the Court held that commercial speech, usually defined as speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction, is protected by the First Amendment. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976). “The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.” Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 767 (1993). We have used standards for determining the validity of speech regulations which accord less protection to commercial speech than to other expression. See, e. g., ibid.; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 557 (1980). That approach, in turn, has been subject to some criticism. See, e. g., Glickman, supra, at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting); UU Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484, 518 (1996) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). We need not enter into the controversy, for even viewing commercial speech as entitled to lesser protection, we find no basis under either Glickman or our other precedents to sustain the compelled assessments sought in this case. It should be noted, moreover, that the Government itself does not rely upon Central Hudson to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision, Reply Brief for Petitioners 9, n. 7, and we therefore do not consider whether the Government’s interest could be considered substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson test. The question is whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced. Just as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain views, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), or from compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of Cal, 496 U. S. 1 (1990); see also Glickman, supra, at 469, n. 13. Our precedents concerning compelled contributions to speech provide the beginning point for our analysis. The fact that the speech is in aid of a commercial purpose does not deprive respondent of all First Amendment protection, as held in the cases already cited. The subject matter of the speech may be of interest to but a small segment of the population; yet those whose business and livelihood depend in some way upon the product involved no doubt deem First Amendment protection to be just as important for them as it is for other discrete, little noticed groups in a society which values the freedom resulting from speech in all its diverse parts. First Amendment concerns apply here because of the requirement that producers subsidize speech with which they disagree. “[T]he general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented.” Edenfield, supra, at 767. There are some instances in which compelled subsidies for speech contradict that constitutional principle. Here the disagreement could be seen as minor: Respondent wants to convey the message that its brand of mushrooms is superior to those grown by other producers. It objects to being charged for a message which seems to be favored by a majority of producers. The message is that mushrooms are worth consuming whether or not they are branded. First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors; and there is no apparent principle which distinguishes out of hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than just any mushroom. As a consequence, the compelled funding for the advertising must pass First Amendment scrutiny. In the Government’s view the assessment in this case is permitted by Glickman because it is similar in important respects. It imposes no restraint on the freedom of an objecting party to communicate its own message; the program does not compel an objecting party (here a corporate entity) itself to express views it disfavors; and the mandated scheme does not compel the expression of political or ideological views. See Glickman, 521 U. S., at 469-470. These points were noted in Glickman in the context of a different type of regulatory scheme and' are not controlling of the outcome. The program sustained in Glickman differs from the one under review in a most fundamental respect. In Glickman the mandated assessments for speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy. Here, for all practical purposes, the advertising itself, far from being ancillary, is the principal object of the regulatory scheme. In Glickman we stressed from the very outset that the entire regulatory program must be considered in resolving the case. In deciding that case wé emphasized “the importance of the statutory context in which it arises.” Id., at 469. The California tree fruits were marketed “pursuant to detailed marketing orders that ha[d] displaced many aspects of independent business activity.” Id., at 469. Indeed, the marketing orders “displaced competition” to such an extent that they were “expressly exempted from the antitrust laws.” Id., at 461. The market for the tree fruit regulated by the program was characterized by “[collective action, rather than the aggregate consequences of independent competitive choices.” Ibid. The producers of tree fruit who were compelled to contribute funds for use in cooperative advertising “d[id] so as a part of a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act independently [wa]s already constrained by the regulatory scheme.” Id., at 469. The opinion and the analysis of the Court proceeded upon the premise that the producers were bound together and required by the statute to market their products according to cooperative rules. To that extent, their mandated participation in an advertising program -with a particular message was the logical concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation. The features of the marketing scheme found important in Glickman are not present in the case now before us. As respondent notes, and as the Government does not contest, cf. Brief for Petitioners 25, almost all of the funds collected under the mandatory assessments are for one purpose: generic advertising. Beyond the collection and disbursement of advertising funds, there are no marketing orders that regulate how mushrooms may be produced and sold, no exemption from the antitrust laws, and nothing preventing individual producers from making their own marketing decisions. As the Court of Appeals recognized, there is no “heavy regulation through marketing orders” in the mushroom market. 197 F. 3d, at 225. Mushroom producers are not forced to associate as a group which makes cooperative decisions. “[T]he mushroom growing business ... is unregulated, except for the enforcement of a regional mushroom advertising program,” and “the mushroom market has not been collectivized, exempted from antitrust laws, subjected to a uniform price, or otherwise subsidized through price supports or restrictions on supply.” Id., at 222, 223. It is true that the party who protests the assessment here is required simply to support speech by others, not to utter the speech itself. We conclude, however, that the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity. See, e. g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990). The Government claims that, despite the lack of cooperative marketing, the Abood rule protecting against compelled assessments for some speech is inapplicable. We did say in Glickman that Abood “recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one’s ‘freedom of belief.’ ” 521 U. S., at 471 (quoting Abood, 431 U. S., at 235). We take further instruction, however, from Abood,’s statement that speech need not be characterized as political before it receives First Amendment protection. Id., at 232. A proper application of the rule in Abood requires us to invalidate the instant statutory scheme. Before addressing whether a conflict with freedom of belief exists, a threshold inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is only the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the first place. In Abood, the infringement upon First Amendment associational rights worked by a union shop arrangement was “constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.”. Id., at 222. To attain the desired benefit of collective bargaining, union members and nonmembers were required to associate with one another, and the legitimate purposes of the group were furthered by the mandated association. A similar situation obtained in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., supra. A state-mandated, integrated bar sought to ensure that “all of the lawyers who derive benefit from the unique status of being among those admitted to practice before the courts [were] called upon to pay a fair share of the cost.” Id., at 12. Lawyers could be required to pay moneys in support of activities that were germane to the reason justifying the compelled association in the first place, for example, expenditures (including expenditures for speech) that related to “activities connected with disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession.” Id., at 16. Those who were required to pay a subsidy for the speech of the association already were required to associate for other purposes, making the compelled contribution of moneys to pay for expressive activities a necessary incident of a larger expenditure for an otherwise proper goal requiring the cooperative activity. The central holding in Keller, moreover, was that the objecting members were not required to give speech subsidies for matters not germane to the larger regulatory purpose which justified the required association. The situation was much the same in Glickman. As noted above, the market for tree fruit was cooperative. To proceed, the statutory scheme used marketing orders that to a large extent deprived producers of their ability to compete and replaced competition with a regime of cooperation. The mandated cooperation was judged by Congress to be necessary to maintain a stable market. Given that producers were bound together in the common venture, the imposition upon their First Amendment rights caused by using compelled contributions for germane advertising was, as in Abood and Keller, in furtherance of an otherwise legitimate program. Though four Justices who join this opinion disagreed, the majority of the Court in Glickman found the compelled contributions were nothing more than additional, economic regulation, which did not raise First Amendment concerns. Glickman, 521 U. S., at 474; see id., at 477 (Souter, J., dissenting). The statutory mechanism as it relates to handlers of mushrooms is concededly different from the scheme in Glickman; here the statute does not require group action, save to generate the very speech to which some handlers object. In contrast to the program upheld in Glickman, where the Government argued the compelled contributions for advertising were “part of a far broader regulatory system that does not principally concern speech,” Reply Brief for Petitioner, O. T. 1996, No. 95-1184, p. 4, there is no broader regulatory system in place here. We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself. Although greater regulation of the mushroom market might have been implemented under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, 7 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., the compelled contributions for advertising are not part of some broader regulatory scheme. The only program the Government contends the compelled contributions serve is the very advertising scheme in question. Were it sufficient to say speech is germane to itself, the limits observed in Abood and Keller would be empty of meaning and significance. The cooperative marketing structure relied upon by a majority of the Court in Glickman to sustain an ancillary assessment finds no corollary here; the expression respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself; and the rationale of Abood extends to the party who objects to the compelled support for this speech. For these and other reasons we have set forth, the assessments are not permitted under the First Amendment. Our conclusions are not inconsistent with the Court’s decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985), a case involving attempts by a State to prohibit certain voluntary advertising by licensed attorneys. The Court invalidated the restrictions in substantial part but did permit a rule requiring that attorneys who advertised by their own choice and who referred to contingent fees should disclose that clients might be liable for costs. Noting that substantial numbers of potential clients might be misled by omission of the explanation, the Court sustained the requirement as consistent with the State’s interest in “preventing deception of consumers.” Id., at 651. There is no suggestion in the case now before us that the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of private persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements non-misleading for consumers. The Government argues the advertising here is government speech, and so immune from the scrutiny we would otherwise apply. As the Government admits in a forthright manner, however, this argument was “not raised or addressed” in the Court of Appeals. Brief for Petitioners 32, n. 19. The Government, citing Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374 (1995), suggests that the question is embraced within the question set forth in the petition for certiorari. In Lebron, the theory presented by the petitioner in the brief on the merits was addressed by the court whose judgment was being reviewed. Id., at 379. Here, by contrast, it is undisputed that the Court of Appeals did not mention the government speech theory now put forward for our consideration. The Government’s failure to raise its argument in the Court of Appeals deprived respondent of the ability to address significant matters that might have been difficult points for the Government. For example, although the Government asserts that advertising is subject to approval by the Secretary of Agriculture, respondent claims the approval is pro forma. This and other difficult issues would have to be addressed were the program to be labeled, and sustained, as government speech. We need not address the question, however. Although in some instances we have allowed a respondent to defend a judgment on grounds other than those pressed or passed upon below, see, e. g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S. 517, 526, n. 11 (1998), it is quite a different matter to allow a petitioner to assert new substantive arguments attacking, rather than defending, the judgment when those arguments were not pressed in the court whose opinion we are reviewing, or at least passed upon by it. Just this Term we declined an invitation by an amicus to entertain new arguments to overturn a judgment, see Lopez v. Davis, 531 U. S. 230, 244, n. 6 (2001), and we consider it the better course to decline a party's suggestion for doing so in this case. For the reasons we have discussed, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHEA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF COLORADO, et al. v. VIALPANDO No. 72-1513. Argued February 26, 1974 Decided April 23, 1974. Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Douglas D. Doane and Charles B. Lennahan, Special Assistant Attorneys General of Colorado, argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were John P. Moore, Attorney General, John E. Bush, Deputy Attorney General, and Norman A. Palermo. Tom W. Armour argued the cause for ■ respondent. With him on the brief were James W. Kin, Steven J. Cole, and Henry A. Freedman. , Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. In administering the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended (Act), 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., state agencies are required by § 402 (a) (7) of the Act, 81 Stat. 881, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a)(7), to “take into consideration . . . any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of . . . income.” Such employment-related expenses are deducted from an AFDC applicant's- income in the process of determining eligibility for assistance. We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 999 (1973), to determine whether, in light of § 402 (a)(7), a State may adopt a standardized allowance for expenses, attributable to the earning of income which does not alloxan applicant to deduct expenses that exceed.the standard',-. We hold that, it may not. I The AFDC.program is designed to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with, and care for them. A principal purpose of the program, as indicated by 42 U. S. C. § 601, is to help such parents and relatives “to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal'independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection The program “is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism,” King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968). It is financed in large measure by the Federal Government on a matching-fund basis, and participating States, must submit AFDC plans in conformity with the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). The program is, however, administered by the States, which are given broad discretion in determining both the standard of need and the level of benefits. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 541 (1972); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 408-409 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970); King v. Smith, supra, at 318-319. Under HEW regulations -all AFDC plans .must specify a statewide standard of need, which is the amount deemed necessary by the State to maintain a hypothetical family at a subsistence level. Both eligibility for AFDC assistance and the amount of benefits to be granted an individual applicant are based on a comparison of the State’s standard of need with the income and resources available to that applicant. 45 CFR § 233.20 (a)(2)(i). The “income and resources” attributable to an applicant, defined in 45 CFR §§ 233.20 (a)/6) (iii-viii), consist generally of “only such net income as is. actually availably for current use on a regular basis-. . . and only currently .available resources.” 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii)(c). See also HEW, Simplified Methods for Consideration of Income and Resources (1965). In determining net income, any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income are deducted from gross income. 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(7). If, taking into account, these deductions and other, deductions not at issue in the instant case, the net amount of “earned income” is less than the predetermined statewide standard of need, the applicant is eligible for participation in the program anid the ^mount of the'assistance payments will be based upon that difference; 45 CFR §§ 233.20 (a) (3) (ii) (a) and (c). Prior to May 1970, Colorado’s AFDC regulations permitted the deduction from income of all expenses reasonably attributable tó employment, including but not limited to the actual cost of transportation, if “essential to retain employment.” Child care expenses and mandatory payroll deductions were also treated as employment-related expenses, and all such expenses were computed on an individualized basis. In May 1970, this policy was changed by the establishment of a maximum transportation work-expense allowance of either $30 per -month, if the use of a car was essential, or the actual expense of public transportation. Effective July 1, 1970, the Colorado work-expense allowance regulation was again amended to provide that in áddition to mandatory payroll, deductions and child care expenses: ' “For employment expenses such aá\transportation, special clothing, ■' union dues, special \¡education or training costs, telephone, additional, food or personal needs, etc., which are an obligation'due to the employment, an allowance of $30 per month is made for such costs.” Thus, while Colorado continued to allow individualized treatment of mandatory payroll deductions and child care costs, all other, wprk-related expenses were subjected to a uniform allowance.of $30, even if an applicant could prove actual expenses in excess of that figure. The Regional Commissioner of the Social and Rehabilitation Sefvice of HEW thereafter accepted the incorporation of this provision into Colorado’s AFDC plan. When this suit was commenced in July 1970, Mrs. Vialpando was' employed some eight miles from the small Colorado community in which she resided with her two-year-old daughter. Since no public transportation was available, respondent traveled to and from work each day in a used automobile she had purchased for that purpose. In making the requisite eligibility and assistance determinations under the Colorado AFDC program, Mrs. Vialpando had been permitted to deduct $47.30 in mileage costs and $63.81 'in car payments from her monthly gross income. These deductions of approximately $110 per month, coupled with child care and mandatory payroll deductions,- entitled her to an AFDC grant of $74 per month for herself and her daughter. The effect of the July 1970 amendment of the Colorado AFDC regulations was to reduce respondent’s monthly deductions for transportatipn expenses related to employment from $110 to $30. The corresponding increase in her monthly net earned income rendered her ineligible for continued AFDC assistance. Respondent thereupon brought this class action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4). She sought the convening of a three-judge District Court, and requested injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the Colorado standardized work-expense allowance violated § 402 (a)(7) of the Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Named as defendants were the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Social Services and other state officers involved in administering Colorado’s AFDC program. Upon stipulated facts and in reliance upon § 402 (a)(7) of the Act, the District Court in an unreported order grantee! respondent’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined enforcement of the challenged regulation. Finding the pendent federal statutory claim dispositive, the District Court properly did not reach the constitutional issue and properly did not convene a- three-judge court. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 475 F. 2d 731 (1973). Relying on the language and the legislative history of § 402 (a) (7) and on other provisions of the Act, the. court interpreted the words “any expenses” in § 402 (a) (7) to mean “all actuál expenses,” and held that the standardized allowance did not meet this requirement. The court reasoned that the statute could be read to permit the use of a standardized allowance for employment expenses, but only where such an allowance was adequate to cover all actual expenses. We agree. 11 The Social Security Act of 1935, as originally enacted, 49 Stat. 620, did not expressly require that States allow AFDC beneficiaries to deduct from gross income expenses incurred in connection with the earning of income. The precursor to §402 (a) (7), which appeared in the 1939 amendments to the Act, 53 Stat. 1379, provided simply that “the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child claiming aid to dependent children.” The Social Security Board, the federal entity then overseeing the categorical public assistance programs^soon recognized that under the predecessor of the AFDC'program recipient families with working members incurred certain employment-related expenses that reduced available income but were not taken into account by the States in determining eligibility for AFDC assistance. In keeping with the Act’s purpose of encouraging employment even when the income produced theréby did not eliminate entirely the need for public assistance, the Board recognized that a failure to. consider work-related expenses could result in a disincentive to seek or retain employment. Accordingly, the States were permitted but not required to allow credit for work-related expenses in determining eligibility. As part of a general amendment of the Act in 1962, Pub. L. 87-543, 76 Stat. 185, Congress made mandatory the widespread but then optional practice of deducting employment expenses from total income in détermining eligibility for assistance. Section 402 (a) (7) of the Act as thus amended provided in relevant part: “[T]he State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of-any child or relative claiming aid to families . with dependent children, as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income•. . . .” (Emphasis added.) By its terms, § 402 (a)(7) requires the consideration of “any” reasonable work expenses in determining eligibility 'for AFDC assistance. In light of the evolution of the statute and the normal meaning of the term “any,” we “read this, language as a congressional directive that no limitation, apart from that of reasonableness, may be placed upon the recognition of expenses attributable to the earning of income. Accordingly, a fixed work-expense allowance which does not permit deductions for expenses in excess of that standard, is directly contrary to the language of the statute. Petitioners, relying upon the “take into consideration” phrase of § 402 (a)(7), argue that the requirement of “consideration” is satisfied by the use of a- statistical average of the actual expenses of all AFDC participants in the State. But this argument ignores the fact that the phrase “take into consideration” modifies “income and resources ... as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income” (emphasis added). Thus, it seems inescapable that whatever treatment is accorded income must also be extended to expenses attributable to the earning of income. And, it has consistently been the practice to compute the income of an AFDC applicant on an individual basis. From the inception of the Act, Congress has sought to ensure that. AFDC assistance is provided only to needy families, and that the' amount, of assistance actually paid is based on the amount needed in the individual case after other income and resources are considered. Congress has been careful to ensure that all of the income and resources properly attributable to a particular, applicant be taken into account, and this individualized approach has been reflected in the implementing regulations. For example, HEW’s broad definition of “earned income” as “income in cash or in kind earned by a needy individual through the receipt of wages, salary, commissions, or profit from activities in which he is enagaged as a self-employed individual or as an employee,” 45 CFR § 233.20 (a)(6) (iii), and its more specific descriptions of commissioned, salaried, and self-employment derived income in 45 CFR §§ 233.20 (a)(6) (iv-viii), demonstrate its view that the determination of need in each case is to be based upon an assessment of the particular individual’s available income and resources. Moreover, individualized consideration of available income and resources is clearly contemplated by HEW regulations providing for the exclusion of such items as scholarship funds and loans, see 45 CFR §§ 233.20 (a) (3) (ii-vii), and requiring that certain items such as food stamps be. deducted, 45 CFR § 233.20 (a)(4). Thus, if income and expenses related to the production of income are to be treated alike, as the terms of § 402 (a) (7) appear to require, both must be considered on an individualized basis. The literal import of § 402 (a) (7) is confirmed by the statute's legislative history. The congressional purpose in requiring the States to take into- consideration employment expenses was clearly set forth in S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (1962), which explained: “Under present law . . . States are permitted, but not required, to take into consideration the expenses an individual has in earning any income (this practice is not uniform in the country and in a substantial number of States full consideration of such expenses is not given). The committee believes that it is only reasonable for the States to take these expenses fully into Account. Under existing law if these work expenses are not considered in determining need, they have the effect of providing a disincentive to working since that portion of the family budget spent for work expenses has the effect of reducing the amount available for food, clothing, and shelter. The bill has, therefore, added a provision in all assistance titles requiring the States to give consideration to any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income.” (Emphasis added.) Virtually identical language appears in the House Report. See H. R. Rep. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1962). Congress thus sought to encourage AFDC recipients to secure and retain employment by requiring the States to take into account fuily any expenses attributable to .the earning of income in determining eligibility for assistance. Such expenses reduce the level of actually available income, and if not deducted from gross income will not produce a corresponding increase in AFDC assistance. Failing to allow the deduction of reasonable expenses might well discourage the applicant from seeking or retaining employment whereby such expenses are incurred. Section 402 (a) (7) was aimed at removing this disincentive.. As then-Secretary- of HEW Ribicoff explained the legislation .in testimony before the Senate: “[W]e are trying to do . . . everything we can to encourage péople to get a job and work and we feel it is important to encourage the States. By having this provision, the' State will take into account these expenses so people will get jobs. I believe that the State should give them an' allowance for those items that are necessary- for them to get the job.” Hearings on the Public Assistance Act of 1962 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 152 (1962). Standardised treatment of employment-related expenses without provision for demonstrating actual and reasonable expenses in excess of that standard amount, such as Colorado has adopted, threatens to defeat the goal Congress sought to achieve in adopting the mandatory work-expense recognition provisions of § 402 (a)(7). By limiting employment expenses to $30 per month, the Colorado regulation results in a disincentive to seek or retain' employment for all recipients whose reasonable work-related expenses exceed or- would exceed that amount. Accordingly, the Colorado regulation conflicts with federal law-and is therefore invalid. It is, of course, not the adoption of a standardized work-expense allowance per se which we hold to be violative of § 402 (a)(7) of the Act, but the fact that the standard used by Colorado is in effect a maximum or absolute. limitation upon the recognition of such expenses. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, a standard allowance would be permissible, and would substantially serve petitioners’ interests in administrative efficiency, if it provided for individualized consideration of expenses in excess off the standard amount-. See 475 F. 2d. at 735. See also Anderson v. Graham, 492 F. 2d 986 (CA8 1973); Adams v. Parham, Civ. No. 16041 (ND Ga. Apr. 14, 1972) (unpublished); and Campagnuolo v. White, Civ. No. 13968 (Conn. June 22, 1972) (unpublished). Such a standard allowance would comport fully with the statutory requirement 'that any reasonable Work expenses be considered, and would allow individualized treatment where necessary. As the Court has previously observed, the AFDC program is an area in which Congress at times “has voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to the courts to discern, the theme in the cacophony of political understanding.” Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., a. 412. But as to reasonable-expenses a-ttributable to the earning of .income, Congress has spoken with firmness and. clarity. The judgment is affirmed. It is só ordered. Section 4313.13, vol. 4, Colorado Division of Public Welfare Staff Manual^effective March 1970), provided.in part: .“Employment expenses which are deducted from the gross amount received by an employed , recipient include, but are not restricted to: “Transportation expenses: “Public transportation to and from work is allowed at actual cost. When the recipient must use his own car as transportation to and from work,' 5‡ a mile is allowed, plus parking fees if required. Purchase, repair, or upkeep of a vehicle,' providing it is essential to re-, tain' employment and the plan therefore is approved by the county department." Section 4313.13, vol. 4, Colorado Division of Public Welfare Staff Manual (effective July 1970). The $30 standardized figure is an average based upon a statewide statistical survey of work expenses incurred by persons in the AFDC program.in Colorado. It was calculated by examining the work expenses of every AFDC recipient in. Colorado for the last month of each quarter of the year from March 1969 to March 1970. -The expenses included transportation, union dues, uniforms and tools, telephone, and general items, but excluded the cost of child care. The statewide average varied from a low of $30.55 in June 1969 to a high of $36.93 in March 1970. According to HEW, 20 States', including Colorado, presently employ a standard work-expense allowance in combination with actual child care expenses, and .in some cases mandatory payroll deductions, and an additional 15 States use other systems of mandatory standard allowances for .one or more major items of work expense. Brief' for United States as Amicus Curiae 5. These standard allowances have often been the subject of litigation. A number have been held invalid. See Anderson v. Graham, 492 F. 2d 986 (CA8 1973) (Nebraska $25 standard work-expense allowance); Connecticut State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 448 F. 2d 209 (CA2 1971) (Connecticut regulation limiting the types of deductible work-related expenses); Adams v. Parham, Civil Action No. 16041 . (ND Ga. Apr. 14, 1972) (unpublished) (Georgia $35 standard work-expense allowance); Campagnuolo v. White, Civil Action No. 13968 (Conn. June 22, 1972) (unpublished) (Connecticut $60 standard allowance for full-time employment expenses and $40 standard allowance for part-time employment expenses); Williford v. Laupheimer, 311 F. Supp. 720 (ED Pa. 1969) (Pennsylvania $50 maximum allowance for work expenses); County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 488 P. 2d 953 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U. S. 913 (1972) (California work-expense regulation providing for standard deductions ranging from $6 to $25 per month). In X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (N. J. 1970), modified on other grounds, sub nom. Engelman v. Amos, 404 U. S. 23 (1971), the court approved in dicta New Jersey’s $50 standard work-expense allowance. In Conover v. Hall, 104 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1972), decision vacated pending appeal in California Supreme Court, the court upheld California’s $50 standard allowance. Colorado did not make it a statewide practice to allow AFDC recipients to deduct installment payments on the purchase of a car. Consistent with the reasonableness requirement of 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(7), such determinations were, quite correctly, made on a case-by-case basis. As counsel for the State commented at oral argument: “This was an individual decision in an individual case in El Paso County, Colorado. The same facts could have been presented to an eligibility technician in another part of Colorado, who would have made a decision . . . that the car was a personal expense, that, a job was available closer to the home of the recipient or that she could use public transportation.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-34. Respondent correctly concedes the State’s responsibility for inquiring into whether claimed deductions are excessive or are truly attributable to the earning of income. Brief for Respondent 4. No doubt a State should scrutinize with particular care claimed expenses for automobiles or other items that in large measure are capital expenditures which will also be used for personal purposes unrelated to employment. Recognizing that States in administering AFDC programs must determine the reasonableness of work-related expenses does not, however, resolve the issue before us — whether States may ban. all such expenses, no matter how reasonable and necessary, above a fixed cutoff figure. Another effect of the change in the State’s AFDC regulation was to terminate respondent’s eligibility for participation in Colorado’s medical assistance program under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (10). While the case was pending in the District Court, respondent terminated her employment and again received an AEDC grant. Prior to the summary judgment hearing, she returned to work, again incurring work-related expenses substantially in excess of the $30 allowance. Although respondent continued to receive a grant despite her renewed employment, the amount was significantly lower than it would have been if she had been permitted to deduct work expenses in full. The AFDC program was originally known as “Aid to Dependent Children.” 49 Stat. 627. In 1962, the name of the program was changed to “Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children,” and the name of the assistance provided under the program changed to “Aid to Families with Dependent Children.” Pub. L. 87-543, 76 Stat. 185, §§ 104 (a) (1) and 104 (a) (2). Section 3140 of the HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, Part IV (1957), thus provided in part: “A State public assistance agency may establish a reasonable minimum money amount to represent the combined additional cost of three items — food, clothing, and personal incidentals — for all employed persons. The State plan may provide that other items of work expense will be allowed, when there is a determination that such expenses do, in fact, exist in the individual case.” See also Social Security Board, Bureau of Public Assistance, State Letter No. 4 (Apr. 30, 1942); HEW, State Letter No. 291 (Mar. 11, 1957) (indicating agency approval of such deductions). See generally 42 U. S. C. § 601; H. R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); E. Witte, The Development of the Social Security Act 163-164 (1962). Title 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (6) provides in part: “(iv) With reference to commissions, wages, or salary, the term ‘earned income’ means the total amount, irrespective of personal expenses, such as income-tax deductions, lunches, and transportation to and from work, and irrespective of expenses of employment which are not personal, such as the cost of tools, materials, special uniforms, or transportation to call on customers. “(v) With respect to self-employment,. the term ‘earned income’ means the total profit from business enterprise, farming, etc., resulting from a comparison of the gross income received with the ‘business expenses,’ i. e., total cost of the production of the income. Personal expenses, such as income-tax payments, lunches, and transportation to and from work, are not classified as business expenses. “(vi) The definition shall exclude the following from ‘earned income’: Returns from capital investment with respect to which the individual is not himself actively engaged, as in a business (for example, under most circumstances, dividends and interest would be excluded from ‘earned income’); benefits (not in the nature of wages, salary, or profit) accruing as compensation, or reward for service, or as compensation for lack of employment .... “(vii) With regard to the degree of activity, earned income is income produced as a result- of the .performance of services by a recipient; in other words, income which the individual earns by his own efforts, including managerial responsibilities, would be properly classified as earned income, such as management of capital investment in real estate. Conversely, for example, in the instance of capital investment wherein the individual carries no specific responsibility, such as where rental properties are in the hands of rental agencies and the check is forwarded to the recipient, the income would not be classified as earned income. " (viii) Reserves accumulated from earnings- are given no different treatment than reserves accumulated from any other sources.” Petitioners claim that HEW has permitted the use of standard work-expense allowances in recognition of the practical necessities of administration and that the Department’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to great weight. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1 (1965). But the sound principle of according deference to administrative practice normally applies only where the relevant statutory language is unclear or susceptible of differing interpretations. See, e. g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286 (1971). Jn view of the literal requirements of §402 (a)(7), which accord- with'the federal policy underlying its enactment, we need not look to agency practice in this case. Moreover, HEW itself has not adhered to a uniform practice. Although in recent years HEW has construed § 402 (a) (7)’ • to permit standardization of some items, in 1964 it required that “[i] terns of work expenses must be allowed when there is a determination that such expenses do, in fact, exist in the individual case.” HEW, Handbook of Public Assistance Adm nistration, Part IV, § 1340 (1964). Our interpretation of §402 (a)(7) is also supported by the disinclination of the Congress to amend the section to permit the use of various standardized allowances. See H. R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 101 (1970); H. R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 401 (1971). In explaining the latter bill, which would have replaced the present work-expense provision with an increase ill the earned income disregard of § 402 (a) (8) (A) (ii), the Committee on Ways and -Means observed that it “would eliminate the open-ended work expense exclusion . . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 92-231, p. 177 (1971), See also S. 2311, and H. R. 3153, 93d Cong, 1st Sess. (1973). The Court’s observation in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 419 (1970), that “[w]e do not, of course, hold that New York may not, consistently with the federal statutes, consolidate items on the basis of statistical averages,” was in no sense intended as a blanket approval of the principle of averaging under AEDC programs without regard to what is being averaged. In that ease, the Court found a New York statute fixing maximum AFDC allowances per family and eliminating a “special grants” program, to .be in contravention of § 402 (a) (23) of the Act. In holding that New York could not completely eliminate such items from the standard of need, the Court noted that the State could, consistently with the statute, include them through ’the use of statistical averages-.' A statewide standard of need is, however, but an estimate- by state welfare officials of the minimum financial‘requirements of-a hypothetical family, and by its very nature is susceptible'of computation through the usé of statistical averages. Moreover, the discretion granted the States by Congress in determining heed, see King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 318 n. 14. (1968), contrasts sharply with the statutory requirement of § 402 (a) (7) that any expenses reasonably attributable to the earnings of income be considered. In the face of that statutory command -and the clear statement of congressional purpose, we must álso-' reject petitioners’ claims of administrative efficiency or convenience. See Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 417. We also note that' Colorado’s use of a standard work-expense allowance is not justified by, its undisputed power to set the level of benefits under the AFDC program-. See Rosado v. Wyman, supra; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). Although Colorado may adjust the percentage of need which it has agreed to pay all recipients through its power to determine AFDC funding, see King v. Smith, supra, it may not do so in .a manner .that violates a specific requirement of the Act. See Connecticut State Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 448 F. 2d 209 (CA2 1971).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PITTSBURGH & LAKE ERIE RAILROAD CO. v. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES’ ASSOCIATION CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 87-1589. Argued March 29, 1989 Decided June 21, 1989 Richard L. Wyatt, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Ronald M. Johnson, Charles L. Warren, Eric D. Within, and G. Edward Ytircon. Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried and Deputy Solicitor General Merrill. John O’B. Clarke, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Railway Labor Executives’ Association was William G. Mahoney. Robert S. Burk, Henri F. Rush, and John J. McCarthy, Jr., filed a brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission, respondent in No. 87-1888. Together with No. 87-1888, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co. v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed for the State of South Dakota by Richard A. Allen and Julie A. Tigges; and for the National Railway Labor Conference by Richard T. Conway, Ralph J. Moore, Jr., D. Eugenia Langan, and David P. Lee. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 87-1888 were filed for the Airline Industrial Relations Conference by Harry A. Rissetto and Thomas E. Reinert, Jr.; for Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. et al. by Ral-ph J. Moore, Jr., D. Eugenia Langan, James P. Daley, Stuart F. Gassner, and Robert J. Corber; and for Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc., et al. by Ralph J. Moore, Jr., and D. Eugenia Langan. David Silberman and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 87-1589. Mark M. Levin filed a brief for the Regional Railroads of America et al. as amici curiae in both cases. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases involve the interaction of three federal statutes with respect to the proposed sale of the rail line of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Co. (P&LE). The statutes are the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U. S. C. §10101 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V); and the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA), 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 101 et seq. I Petitioner, P&LE, is a small rail carrier owning and operating 182 miles of rail line serving points in Ohio and western Pennsylvania and possessing trackage rights over other lines extending into New York. P&LE has experienced financial problems of increasing severity, having lost $60 million during the five years preceding the onset of these cases. After other efforts to improve its condition failed, notably work force reductions, concessions from its employees, and market expansion, P&LE decided that in order to recoup for its owners any part of their investments it must sell its assets. On July 8, 1987, P&LE agreed to sell its assets for approximately $70 million to a newly formed subsidiary, P&LE Rail Co., Inc. (Railco), of Chicago West Pullman Transportation Corporation (CWP). Railco intended to operate the railroad as P&LE had except that Railco would not assume P&LE’s collective-bargaining contracts with its various unions and would need only about 250 employees rather than the 750 then working for P&LE. When the unions representing P&LE’s employees were notified of the proposed sale, they asserted that the sale would have an effect on the working conditions of the carrier’s employees and therefore was subject to the requirements of the RLA, 45 U. S. C. §§ 152 Seventh and 156, which provide: “§ 152 . . . Seventh. Change in pay, rules, or working conditions contrary to agreement or to section 156 forbidden “No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.” “§ 156. Procedure in changing rates of pay, rules, and working conditions “Carriers and representatives of the employees shall give at least thirty days’ written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and place for the beginning of conference between the representatives of the parties interested in such intended changes shall be agreed upon within ten days after the receipt of said notice, and said time shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. In every case where such notice of intended change has been given, or conferences are being held with reference thereto, or the services of the Mediation Board have been requested by either party, or said Board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155 of this title, by the Mediation Board, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of the services of the Mediation Board.” The unions advised that they stood ready to negotiate all aspects of the matter, including the decision to sell the railroad assets. P&LE responded that it was willing to discuss the matter but that § 156 notice and bargaining were not required since the transaction was subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) under the ICA and since the requirements of §§ 155 and 156 would intrude on that regime as well as upon management’s prerogatives to conduct the affairs of the company with respect to the sales transaction. Most of the unions then responded by themselves filing § 156 notices proposing changes in existing agreements to ameliorate the adverse impacts of the proposed sale upon P&LE’s employees. The unions sought guarantees that the sale would not cause any employee to be deprived of employment or to be placed in any worse position with respect to pay or working conditions and that P&LE would require that the purchaser of its rail line assume P&LE’s collective-bargaining agreements. P&LE again declined to bargain, asserting that the transaction was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC. On August 19, respondent, Railway Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA), on behalf of P&LE’s unions, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to P&LE’s obligations under the RLA and an injunction against the sale pending completion of RLA bargaining obligations. On September 15, 1987, the unions went on strike. P&LE’s request for a restraining order against the strike was denied by the District Court on the ground that the NLGA forbade such an order. The proposed sale of assets could not be carried out without compliance with the terms of the ICA, 49 U. S. C. § 10901, which requires that noncarriers seeking to acquire a rail line first obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC. Section 10901(e) specifies the procedures for this purpose and provides that the ICC “may” require the acquiring company “to provide a fair and equitable arrangement for the protection of railroad employees who may be affected thereby no less protective of and beneficial to the interests of such employees than those established pursuant to section 11347 of this title.” Section 10505, however, authorizes the Commission to grant exemptions from the requirements of the Act when not necessary to carry out the national transportation policy. Based on its experience with acquisitions under § 10901, the ICC had issued what is known as the Ex Parte No. 392 Class Exemption, see Ex Parte No. 392 (Sub. No. 1), Class Exemption for the Acquisition and Operation of Rail Lines Under 4-9 U. S. C. 10901, 1 I. C. C. 2d 810 (1985) (Ex Parte 392), review denied sub nom. Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. ICC, 260 U. S. App. D. C. 38, 817 F. 2d 145 (1987)/' which provides abbreviated procedures for seeking approval for acquisitions by non-carriers such as Railco of an operating railroad or its assets. The regulatory procedure, see 49 CFR § 1150.32(b) (1987), involved the filing of an application for exemption which would become effective seven days after filing absent contrary notice from the Commission. An interested party could oppose the exemption by filing a petition to revoke at any time, after consideration of which the ICC could revoke the exemption in whole or in part or impose labor protective provisions. The ICC had indicated, however, that only in exceptional situations would such protective provisions be imposed. Accordingly, Railco on September 19, 1987, filed a notice of exemption pursuant to Ex Parte 392. After denying various requests by the unions to reject the notice of exemption and stay the sale, the Commission allowed the exemption to become effective on September 26. A petition to revoke filed by RLEA on October 2 is still pending before the Commission. At no time did RLEA request imposition of labor protective provisions pursuant to the Commission’s authority under § 10901. On October 5, 1987, P&LE reapplied to the District Court for an order restraining the strike. The District Court granted the request on October 8, ruling that the authorization of the sale by the ICC negated any duty that P&LE had to bargain over the effects of the sale on its employees, and that the NLGA did not forbid issuance of an injunction under such circumstances. On October 26, however, the Court of Appeals summarily reversed, holding that the ICA did not require accommodation of the NLGA’s restrictions on the District Court’s powers. 831 F. 2d 1231 (CA3 1987). A remand was ordered to determine whether the sale or strike violated the RLA. The unions did not resume their strike when the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s injunction, but threatened to do so if P&LE attempted to consummate the sale to Railco. The case in the District Court then went forward. Addressing the unions’ request for an injunction, the District Court held that although P&LE did not have a duty to bargain over its decision to sell, P&LE was required by the RLA to bargain over the effects of the sale on employees, and that the status quo provision of § 156 required that its bargaining obligations under the RLA must be satisfied before the sale could be consummated despite approval of the transaction by the ICC acting pursuant to the ICA. 677 F. Supp. 830 (WD Pa. 1987). A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 845 F. 2d 420 (CA3 1988). We granted P&LE’s petition in No. 87-1888, challenging the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the injunction against the sale issued by the District Court, as well as P&LE’s petition in No. 87-1589, asking for reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals setting aside the strike injunction issued by the District Court. 488 U. S. 965 (1988). II In No. 87-1888, the issue is whether the RLA, properly construed, required or authorized an injunction against closing the sale of P&LE’s assets to Railco because of an unsatisfied duty to bargain about the effects of the sale on P&LE’s employees. We first address whether the RLA required P&LE to give notice of its decision to sell and to bargain about the effects of the sale. We then consider whether the unions’ own notices and the status quo provision of § 156 justified the injunction. A P&LE submits that neither its decision to sell nor the impact that sale of the company might have had on its employees was a “change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions” (emphasis added) within the meaning of the RLA, 45 U. S. C. § 156, and that P&LE therefore had no duty to give notice or to bargain with respect to these matters. The Court of Appeals rejected this submission, focusing on the effects the sale would have on employees and concluding that the “loss of jobs by possibly two-thirds of the employees clearly would require a ‘change in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.’” 845 F. 2d, at 428. The court did not point out how the proposed sale would require changing any specific provision of any of P&LE’s collective-bargaining agreements. It did not suggest that any of those agreements dealt with the possibility of the sale of the company, sought to confer any rights on P&LE’s employees in the event of the sale, or guaranteed that jobs would continue to be available indefinitely. What P&LE proposed to do would remove it from the railroad business and terminate its position as a railroad employer; and like the Court of Appeals, RLEA does not explain how such action would violate or require changing any of the provisions of the unions’ written contracts with P&LE. Of course, not all working conditions to which parties may have agreed are to be found in written contracts. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U. S. 142, 154-155 (1969) (Shore Line). It may be that “in the context of the relationship between the principals, taken as a whole, there is a basis for implying an understanding on the particular practice involved.” Id., at 160 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the Court of Appeals did not purport to find an implied agreement that P&LE would not go out of business, would not sell its assets, or if it did, would protect its employees from the adverse consequences of such action. Neither does RLEA. We therefore see no basis for holding that P&LE should have given a § 156 notice of a proposed “change” in its express or implied agreements with the unions when it contracted to sell its assets to Railco. Nor was it, based on its own decision to sell, obligated to bargain about the impending sale or to delay its implementation. We find RLEA’s arguments to the contrary quite unconvincing. B There is more substance to the Court of Appeals’ holding, and to RLEA’s submission, that the unions’ § 156 notices proposed far-reaching changes in the existing agreements over which P&LE was required to bargain and that the status quo provision of § 156 prohibited P&LE from going forward with the sale pending completion of the “purposely long and drawn out” procedures which the Act requires to be followed in order to settle a “major” dispute. Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 384 U. S. 238, 246 (1966). Section 156 provides that when a notice of change in agreements has been given, “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered by the carrier until the controversy has been finally acted upon, as required by section 155.” Relying on Shore Line, RLEA argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that when a rail labor union files a § 156 notice to change the terms of an agreement, the “working conditions” that the carrier may not change pending conclusion of the bargaining process are not limited to those contained in express or implied agreements but include, as Shore Line held, “those actual, objective working conditions and practices, broadly conceived, which were in effect prior to the time the pending dispute arose and which are involved in or related to that dispute.” 396 U. S., at 153. RLE A submits that the relationship of employer-employee and the state of being employed are among those working conditions that may not be changed until the RLA procedures are satisfied. We are unconvinced, for several reasons, that this is the case. The facts of Shore Line, briefly stated, were these: Shore Line operated 50 miles of rail line between Lang Yard in Toledo, Ohio, and Dearoad Yard near Detroit, Michigan. For many years, all train and engine crews reported for duty and finished the day at Lang Yard. When it was necessary to perform switching and other operations at other points, crews were transported at railroad expense to those outlying points. The company proposed to establish outlying work assignments at Trenton, Michigan, some 35 miles north of Lang Yard. Crews assigned there would have to report there. The proposed change was not forbidden by, and would not have violated, the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The union filed a § 156 notice seeking to amend the agreement to forbid the railroad to make outlying assignments. The issue was not settled by the parties and the union called for mediation. While the Mediation Board proceedings were pending, the railroad posted a bulletin creating the disputed assignment at Trenton. The union threatened a strike, the company sued to restrain the strike, and the union counterclaimed for an injunction relying on the status quo provision of § 156. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held for the union, and we affirmed over a dissent by Justice Harlan, joined by Chief Justice Burger. We held that even though Shore Line did not propose to change any of its agreements, the status quo provision of §156 — “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” pending exhaustion of the required procedure — forbade any change by Shore Line in the “objective working conditions” then existing. 396 U. S., at 153. We noted that had it been the practice to make outlying work assignments, the company would have been within its rights to make the Trenton assignment; but the prior practice, the objective working condition, was to have crews report for work and come back to Lang Yard. That working condition could not be changed pending resolution of the dispute without violating the status quo provision of § 156 even though there was nothing in the agreement between the parties to prevent outlying assignments. Id., at 153-154. Shore Line, in our view, does not control these cases. In the first place, our conclusion in that case that the status quo provision required adherence not only to working conditions contained in express or implied agreements between the railroad and its union but also to conditions “objectively” in existence when the union’s notice was served, and that otherwise could be changed without violating any agreement, extended the relevant language of § 156 to its outer limits, and we should proceed with care before applying that decision to the facts of these cases. Second, reporting at Lang Yard, we thought, had been the unquestioned practice for many years, and we considered it reasonable for employees to deem it sufficiently established that it would not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the status quo provisions of the RLA. Third, and more fundamentally, the decision did not involve a proposal by the railroad to terminate its business. Here, it may be said that the working condition existing prior to the § 156 notice was that P&LE was operating a railroad through the agency of its employees, but there was no reason to expect, simply from the railroad’s long existence, that it would stay in business, especially in view of its losses, or that rail labor would have a substantial role in the decision to sell or in negotiating the terms of the sale. Whatever else Shore Line might reach, it did not involve the decision of a carrier to quit the railroad business, sell its assets, and cease to be a railroad employer at all, a decision that we think should have been accorded more legal significance than it received in the courts below. Our cases indicate as much. In Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U. S. 263 (1965), an employer closed its textile mill when a union won a representation election. The National Labor Relations Board concluded that this action was an unfair labor practice under §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the complete or partial liquidation of an employer’s business even though motivated by antiunion animus was not an unfair practice. We affirmed in part, ruling that insofar as the NLRA is concerned, an employer “has an absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases. . . .” 380 U. S., at 268. Whatever may be the limits of § 8(a)(1), we said, an employer’s decision to terminate its business is one of those decisions “so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations” of that section. Id., at 269. Neither would ceasing business and refusing to bargain about it violate § 8(a)(3) or § 8(a)(5) even if done with antiunion animus. Id., at 267, n. 5, 269-274. “A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act.” Id., at 270. We found neither. Although Darlington arose under the NLRA, we are convinced that we should be guided by the admonition in that case that the decision to close down a business entirely is so much a management prerogative that only an unmistakable expression of congressional intent will suffice to require the employer to postpone a sale of its assets pending the fulfillment of any duty it may have to bargain over the subject matter of union notices such as were served in this litigation. Absent statutory direction to the contrary, the decision of a railroad employer to go out of business and consequently to reduce to zero the number of available jobs is not a change in the conditions of employment forbidden by the status quo provision of § 156. In these cases, P&LE concluded that it must sell its assets, and its agreement to sell to Railco, if implemented, would have removed it from the railroad business; no longer would it be a railroad employer. No longer would it need the services of members of the rail unions. The RLEA concedes that had the collective-bargaining agreements expressly waived bargaining concerning sale of P&LE’s assets, the unions’ § 156 notices to change the agreements could not trump the terms of the agreements and could not delay the sale. Brief for Respondent RLEA 44. We think the same result follows where the agreement is silent on the matter and the railroad employer has proceeded in accordance with the ICA. In these circumstances, there is little or no basis for the unions to expect that a § 156 notice would be effective to delay the company’s departure from the railroad business. Congress clearly requires that sales transactions like P&LE’s proposal must satisfy the requirements of the ICA, but we find nothing in the RLA to prevent the immediate consummation of P&LE’s contract to sell. When the ICC approved the sale by permitting the Ex Parte 392 exemption to become effective, P&LE was free to close the transaction and should not have been enjoined from doing so. This construction of the RLA also responds to our obligation to avoid conflicts between two statutory regimes, namely, the RLA and ICA, that in some respects overlap. As the Court has said, we “are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). We should read federal statutes “to give effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267 (1981); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453 (1988). We act accordingly in this litigation. Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause authority to regulate rail transportation for over a century. See Act to regulate commerce of 1887 (the ICA), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. In doing so, Congress has assigned to the ICC plenary authority over rail transactions, ranging from line extensions, consolidations, and abandonments, to acquisitions. In particular, the ICA in 49 U. S. C. § 10901(a) permits non-carriers to acquire a rail line only if the ICC determines that “the present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit” the rail acquisition and operation. The ICC may approve certification on satisfaction of various conditions. Specifically, it has authority to impose labor protection provisions though it is not obligated to do so. § 10901(e). Acting pursuant to § 10505, the ICC, in its Ex Parte 392 exemption proceedings, declared all noncarrier acquisitions presumptively exempt from § 10901 regulation. Such transactions would be deemed approved seven days after a notice filed by the acquiring entities. 49 CFR § 1150.32(b) (1987). And absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, which rail labor was entitled to demonstrate, labor protection provisions would not be imposed. The Ex Parte 392 procedures, and the ICA, § 10505 exemption authority generally, like amendments to ICA in the last two decades, see, e. g., the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31; the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, aimed at reversing the rail industry’s decline through de-regulatory efforts, above all by streamlining procedures to effectuate economically efficient transactions. Here P&LE agreed to sell its assets to Railco. The transaction was presented to the ICC and an Ex Parte 392 exemption was requested. The ICC rejected the unions’ applications to stay or reject the exemption, which became effective seven days after it was requested. The unions then successfully sought an injunction delaying the closing of the transaction based on their § 156 notices. The Court of Appeals several times noted the tension between the two regimes, but concluded that the provisions of the RLA left no room for a construction easing those tensions. This was the case even though the injunction that was affirmed would likely result in cancellation of P&LE’s sale and the frustration of Congress’ intent through ICA amendments to deregulate the rail and air industries generally and more specifically to assist small rail lines with financial problems. We disagree with that conclusion, for as we have said, we are confident that the RLA is reasonably subject to a construction that would, at least to a degree, harmonize the two statutes. The injunction, which effectively prevented the sale from going forward, should not have been granted. c Our holding in these cases, which rests on our construction of the RLA and not on the pre-emptive force of the ICA, is that petitioner was not obligated to serve its own § 156 notice on the unions in connection with the proposed sale. We also conclude that the unions’ notices did not obligate P&LE to maintain the status quo and postpone the sale beyond the time the sale was approved by the Commission and was scheduled to be consummated. We do not hold, however, that P&LE had no duty at all to bargain in response to the unions’ § 156 motions. The courts below held, and RLEA agrees, that P&LE’s decision to sell, as such, was not a bargainable subject. The disputed issue is whether P&LE was required to bargain about the effects that the sale would or might have upon its employees. P&LE, in our view, was not entirely free to disregard the unions’ demand that it bargain about such effects. When the unions’ notices were served, however, the terms of P&LE’s agreement with Railco were more or less settled, and P&LE’s decision to sell on those terms had been made. To the extent that the unions’ demands could be satisfied only by the assent of the buyers, they sought to change or dictate the terms of the sale, and in effect challenged the decision to sell itself. At that time, P&LE was under no obligation to bargain about the terms it had already negotiated. To the extent that the unions’ proposals could be satisfied by P&LE itself, those matters were bargainable but only until the date for closing the sale arrived, which, of course, could not occur until the Ex Parte 392 exemption became effective. We are therefore constrained to reverse the Court of Appeals in No. 87-1888. III In No. 87-1589, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the injunction against the strike issued on October 8, 1987. At that time, the Ex Parte 392 exemption had become effective, and the District Court held that because the ICC had in effect authorized the sale and had ruled that delay would be prejudicial to the parties and the public interests, the NLGA prohibition against issuing injunctions in labor dispute cases must be accommodated to the ICC’s decision that the sale of assets should go forward. It was this decision, based on the legal significance of the ICA and its impact on the NLGA, that the Court of Appeals summarily reversed. We agree with that decision. We have held that the NLGA § 4 general limitation on district courts’ power to issue injunctions in labor disputes must be accommodated to the more specific provisions of the RLA: “[T]he District Court has jurisdiction and power to issue necessary injunctive orders” to enforce compliance with the requirements of the RLA “notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768, 774 (1952). Thus, a union may be enjoined from striking when the dispute concerns the interpretation or application of its contract and is therefore subject to compulsory arbitration. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30 (1957). “[T]he specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.” Id., at 41-42. The same accommodation of the NLGA to the specific provisions of the NLRA must be made. A union that has agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes and is subject to a no-strike clause may be enjoined from striking despite the NLGA. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). Petitioner contends that the NLGA must likewise be accommodated to the procedures mandated by Congress in 49 U. S. C. § 10901 specifically the authority of the ICC to impose labor protective provisions, the right of rail labor to seek such provisions from the ICC, and its right to judicial review if dissatisfied. It is urged that the ICA provides a comprehensive scheme for the resolution of labor protection issues arising out of ICC-regulated transactions and that rail labor must take advantage of those procedures rather than strike. We are unpersuaded that this is the case. The prohibition of the NLGA must give way when necessary to enforce a duty specifically imposed by another statute. But no applicable provision has been called to our attention that imposes any duty on rail unions to participate in ICC proceedings and to seek ICC protections with which they must be satisfied. Furthermore, labor protection provisions run against the acquiring railroad rather than the seller. Yet here it is with the seller, P&LE, that the unions wanted to bargain, seeking to ease the adverse consequences of the sale. To that end, the unions served § 156 notices, which at least to some extent obligated P&LE to bargain until its transaction was closed. We find nothing in the ICA that relieved P&LE of that duty, nor anything in that Act that empowers the ICC to intrude into the relationship between the selling carrier and its railroad unions. We are thus quite sure that the NLGA forbade an injunction against that strike unless the strike was contrary to the unions’ duties under the RLA. As to that issue, the Court of Appeals stated: “We intimate no view as to whether the provisions of the Railway Labor Act are applicable to this dispute so that the district court would be entitled to enjoin the strike while that Act’s dispute resolution mechanisms are underway. RLEA’s complaint seeking a declaration that the Railway Labor Act is applicable to this dispute is the merits issue before the district court.” 831 F. 2d, at 1237. On remand, the District Court held that the RLA was indeed applicable to the dispute and on that basis issued an injunction against P&LE. It did not, however, ever address the question whether the unions’ strike, which occurred after their suit was filed, was enjoin-able under the RLA. Neither did the Court of Appeals deal with that issue in affirming the District Court. P&LE perfunctorily asserts in its briefs in this Court that the strike injunction was proper because the unions were obligated to bargain rather than strike after their § 156 notices were served. RLEA did not respond to this assertion. With the case in this position, we shall not pursue the issue. Instead, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and leave the matter, if it is a live issue, to be dealt with on remand. IV The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 87-1888 is reversed and the judgment in No. 87-1589 is vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Attempts to interest major rail lines in the property were unavailing because of the high cost of labor protection that would have been mandatory under the section of the ICA applicable to purchases by an existing carrier. 49 U. S. C. § 11347 (1982 ed., Supp. V), which is set forth in n. 7, infra. P&LE would keep certain real estate and some 6,000 railcars. CWP anticipated inviting all P&LE employees to submit applications and intended to give preference to them in hiring. CWP also expected to bargain for new contracts with the existing unions. Disputes about proposals to change rates of pay, rules, or working conditions are known as major disputes. Minor disputes are those involving the interpretation or application of existing contracts. The latter are subject to compulsory arbitration. The former are subject to the procedures set out in §§ 156 and 155, which specify the functions of the Mediation Board. In Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369, 378 (1969), we described the procedures applicable to major disputes: “The Act provides a detailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major disputes. A party desiring to effect a change of rates, pay, rules, or working conditions must give advance written notice. § 6. The parties must confer, § 2 Second, and if conference fails to resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. § 5 First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration, which can take place, however, only if both consent. §§ 5 First, 7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens ‘substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,’ who may create an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. § 10. While the dispute is working its way through these stages, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo. §§2 Seventh, 5 First, 6, 10.” The unions’ proposals were essentially these: “1. No employee of the P&LE Railroad Company who [was actively employed or on authorized leave of absencel between August 1, 1986 and August 1,1987 . . . shall be deprived of employment or placed in a worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions for any reason except resignation, retirement, death or dismissal for justifiable cause. . . . The formulae for the protective allowances, with a separation option, shall be comparable to those established in the Neiv York Dock conditions. “2. If an employee is placed in a worse position with respect to compensation or working conditions, that employee shall receive, in addition to a make-whole-remedy, penalty pay equal to three times the lost pay, fringe benefits and consequential damages suffered by such employee. “3. P&LE agrees to obtain binding commitments from any purchaser of its rail line operating properties and assets to assume all [of P&LE’s] collective bargaining agreements ... to hire P&LE employees in seniority order without physicals, and to negotiate with the P&LE and this Organization an agreement to apply this Agreement to the sale transaction and to select the forces to perform the work over the lines being acquired.” App. 38, 42, 46, 50, 54, 58, 62, 66, 122, 126. Section 4 of the NLGA, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 104, provides in part: “§ 104. Enumeration of specific acts not subject to restraining orders or injunctions “No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: “(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment. . . .” Section 8 of that Act, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 108, is also relevant here: “§ 108. Noncompliance with obligations involved in labor disputes or failure to settle by negotiation or arbitration as preventing injunctive relief “No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.” Title 49 U. S. C. § 11347 (1982 ed., Supp. V) requires labor protective provisions when a rail carrier is involved in certain transactions such as mergers or consolidations: “§ 11347. Employee protective arrangements in transactions involving rail carriers “When a rail carrier is involved in a transaction for which approval is sought under sections 11344 and 11345 or section 11346 of this title, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement at least as protective of the interests of employees who are affected by the transaction as the terms imposed under this section before February 5, 1976, and the terms established under section 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U. S. C. 565). Notwithstanding this subtitle, the arrangement may be made by the rail carrier and the authorized representative of its employees. The arrangement and the order approving the transaction must require that the employees of the affected rail carrier will not be in a worse position related to their employment as a result of the transaction during the 4 years following the effective date of the final action of the Commission (or if an employee was employed for a lesser period of time by the carrier before the action became effective, for that lesser period).” Section 10505 provides in part: “§ 10505. Authority to exempt rail carrier transportation “(a) In a matter related to a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under this subchapter, the Commission shall exempt a person, class of persons, or a transaction or service when the Commission finds that the application of a provision of this subtitle— “(1) is not necessary to carry out the transportation policy, of section 10101a of this title; and “(2) either (A) the transaction or service is of limited scope, or (B) the application of a provision of this subtitle is not needed to protect shippers from the abuse of market power. “(g) The Commission may not exercise its authority under this section ... (2) to relieve a carrier of its obligation to protect the interests of employees as required by this subtitle.” The Commission’s brief in this Court provides this background: “In the years just after the partial deregulation of the railroad industry occasioned by the passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 194-45, numerous new short lines and regional rail lines were created, pursuant to 49 U. S. C. 10901, through the sale of marginally profitable and unprofitable rail lines to new entities eager to provide rail service. In considering and approving these sales, the Commission became convinced that the expense imposed on such sales by the imposition of labor protective conditions was hampering the development of short line railroads and, indeed, was forcing the selling carriers to abandon these marginal lines pursuant to 49 U. S. C. 10903 of the ICA. “In order to foster the development of short line railroads to preserve rail facilities, service and employment that would otherwise be lost through abandonments, the Commission began withholding labor protections in individual sales. After considering over five years many such applications, the Commission determined that the formation of new rail carriers should be encouraged. In order to aid rail formations, the Commission promulgated the procedures in Ex Parte No. 392. In Ex Parte 392 the Commission exempted rail line sales to new carriers from full compliance with Commission procedures while retaining authority, under its revocation power, to review the transaction and correct any problem arising out of the transaction.” Brief for Interstate Commerce Commission 3-4 (footnote and citations omitted). In the Ex Parte 392 proceedings, the RLEA demanded that the Commission impose labor conditions in all § 10901 sale transactions. The Commission, however, ruled that labor protective provisions would be imposed in individual cases only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. 1 I. C. C. 2d, at 815. The ICC modified the Ex Parte 392 procedure in 1988 to extend the waiting period from 7 to 35 days. See 53 Fed. Reg. 5981-5982 (1988). See n. 7, supra. The order was to remain in effect until the District Court ruled on the preliminary injunction sought by P&LE. It was this order that was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. The strike and the decisions of the Court of Appeals effectively terminated the proposed sale to Railco. Efforts to find another buyer were unsuccessful, but since P&LE is still interested in selling its assets and the issues in these cases have a bearing on those efforts, the cases, as the Court of Appeals recognized and the parties agree, ai'e not moot. Also, in late September, P&LE and its unions had informal exchanges about the effects of the sale. On October 14, one of the unions invoked the services of the Mediation Board. After the April 8, 1988, Court of Appeals decision, 845 F. 2d 420 (CA3), effects bargaining proceeded, and as these cases indicate, the parties have not resolved their differences. Indeed, the Court of Appeals stated that “P&LE’s agreements with its unions, however, do not appear to contemplate this type of transaction [i. e., sale of the rail lines], and thus neither expressly permit nor prohibit the sale.” 845 F. 2d, at 428, n. 9. RLEA asserts that P&LE had granted job security guarantees to some of its employees, see Brief for Respondent RLEA 3, but the record does not contain the collective-bargaining contracts, and if there were such guarantees, there is no claim that they would survive the sale of the rail line. Section 156 deals with bargaining and settlement procedures with respect to changes in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. There must be notice of such intended changes, as well as bargaining and mediation if requested or proffered. And in every case involving such notice, i. e., of intended changes in agreements, rates of pay, rules or working conditions shall not be changed by the carrier until the specified procedures are satisfied. Because § 156 concerns changes in agreements, it is surely arguable that it is open to a construction that would not require the status quo with respect to working conditions that have never been the subject of an agreement, expressed or implied, and that, if no notice of changes had been served by the union, could be changed by the carrier without any bargaining whatsoever. Shore Line rejected that construction, but as indicated in the text, we are not inclined to apply Shore Line to the decision of P&LE to go out of business. We thought that a partial liquidation might present a different case and remanded for further findings. See 380 U. S., at 268, 276-277. In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U. S. 666 (1981), which, like Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., arose under the NLRA, we concluded that “the harm likely to be done to an employer’s need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union’s participation in making the decision.” 452 U. S., at 686. Further, we held that the employer’s decision to close down a segment of its business “is not part of § 8 (d)’s ‘terms and conditions,’ . . . over which Congress has mandated bargaining.” Ibid. In so holding, we did not feel constrained by the Court’s decision in Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U. S. 330 (1960). Indeed, we rejected the argument that Telegraphers compelled us to find bargaining over this decision mandatory. Although we pointed in First National Maintenance to the important distinctions between the RLA and the NLRA, there are other reasons why Telegraphers does not dictate the result in these cases. In Telegraphers, the Court held that the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against a labor strike under the provisions of the NLGA. A closely divided Court reasoned that a railroad’s proposal to abandon certain single-agent stations and hence abolish some jobs was a bargainable issue. In Darlington and First National Maintenance, we concluded that the analysis in Telegraphers, which rested on an “expansive” reading of the RLA and the NLGA, did not govern a decision under the NLRA. 452 U. S., at 687, n. 23. In this case, we examine Telegraphers once again in the context of the RLA. In Telegraphers a railroad was seeking simply to eliminate or consolidate some of its little-used local stations. The railroad here, by contrast, sought to sell all its lines and go out of business. There is nothing in Telegraphers that forces us to reach the result, in this extreme case, that P&LE was prohibited from terminating its operations without first bargaining with the unions. Notwithstanding the policy considerations prompting the enlarged scope of mandatory bargaining under the RLA, in light of Darlington, which First National Maintenance reaffirmed, we are not inclined to extend Telegraphers to a case in which the railroad decides to retire from the railroad business. The dissent, post, at 518-520, seems to assert that Shore Line and Telegraphers dealt with a railroad’s freedom to leave the market. But as we point out, that is precisely what those cases did not involve. We are plainly at odds with the dissent with respect to the significance of P&LE’s decision to leave the railroad business. P&LE argues that the RLA injunction was an impermissible collateral attack on the ICC order approving the sale. But the ICA, 49 U. S. C. § 10901, and the RLA, 45 U. S. C. § 156, as we construe them, are complementary regimes. Here, the ICC simply granted an exemption from the strictures of § 10901, which permitted, but did not order, the consummation of the sale. It made no finding that would prevent enforcement of §156. The dissent, post, at 515, asserts that we ignore the principle that P&LE, a regulated utility, may not enter or leave the market without agency approval. Of course, we do not, for we set out the law that requires ICC consent to the sale, which was obtained. We address the duty to bargain about the effects of the sale only in the context of the facts existing when the unions’ notices were served. We do not deal with a railroad employer’s duty to bargain in response to a union’s § 156 notice proposing labor protection provisions in the event that a sale, not yet contemplated, should take place.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE et al. v. WASHINGTON POST CO. No. 81-535. Argued March 31, 1982 Decided May 17, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., concurred in the judgment. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Elinor Hadley Still-man, Leonard Schaitman, Bruce G. Forrest, and Margaret E. Clark. David E. Kendall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Edward Bennett Williams and Lon S. Bobby Bruce W. Sanford, W. Terry Maguire, Erwin G. Krasnow, and Arthur B. Sackler filed a brief for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In September 1979, respondent Washington Post Co. filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552, requesting certain documents from petitioner United States Department of State. The subject of the request was defined as “documents indicating whether Dr. Ali Behzadnia and Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi. . . hold valid U. S. passports.” App. 8. The request indicated that respondent would “accept any record held by the Passport Office indicating whether either of these persons is an American citizen.” Ibid. At the time of the request, both Behzadnia and Yazdi were Iranian nationals living in Iran. The State Department denied respondent’s request the following month, stating that release of the requested information “would be ‘a clearly unwarranted invasion of [the] personal privacy’ of these persons,” id., at 14 (quoting 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6)), and therefore was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the FOIA. Denial of respondent’s request was affirmed on appeal by the Department’s Council on Classification Policy, which concluded that “the privacy interests to be protected are not incidental ones, but rather are such that they clearly outweigh any public interests which might be served by release of the requested information.” Id., at 22-23. While pursuing the administrative appeal, respondent brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin petitioners from withholding the requested documents. Both sides filed affidavits and motions for summary judgment. Petitioners’ affidavit, from the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, explained that both Behzadnia and Yazdi were prominent figures in Iran’s Revolutionary Government and that compliance with respondent’s request would “cause a real threat of physical harm” to both men. The District Court nonetheless granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Petitioners appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 207 U. S. App. D. C. 372, 647 F. 2d 197 (1981). As construed by the Court of Appeals, Exemption 6 permits the withholding of information only when two requirements have been met: first, the information must be contained in personnel, medical, or “similar” files, and second, the information must be of such a nature that its disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id,., at 373, 647 F. 2d, at 198. Petitioners argued that the first requirement was satisfied because the information sought by respondent was contained in “similar files.” The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the phrase “similar files” applies only to those records which contain information “‘“of the same magnitude — as highly personal or as intimate in nature — as that at stake in personnel and medical records.”’” Id., at 373-374, 647 F. 2d, at 198-199 (quoting Simpson v. Vance, 208 U. S. App. D. C. 270, 273, 648 F. 2d 10, 13 (1980), in turn quoting Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 339, 345, 627 F. 2d 392, 398 (1980)). Because it found the citizenship status of Behzadnia and Yazdi to be less intimate than information normally contained in personnel and medical files, the Court of Appeals held that it was not contained in “similar files.” Therefore, the Court of Appeals reasoned, there was no need to consider whether disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; having failed to meet the first requirement of Exemption 6, the information had to be disclosed under the mandate of the FOIA. We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1030 (1981), to review the Court of Appeals’ construction of the “similar files” language, and we now reverse. The language of Exemption 6 sheds little light on what Congress meant by “similar files.” Fortunately, the legislative history is somewhat more illuminating. The House and Senate Reports, although not defining the phrase “similar files,” suggest that Congress’ primary purpose in enacting Exemption 6 was to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information. After referring to the “great quantities of [Federal Government] files containing intimate details about millions of citizens,” the House Report explains that the exemption is “general” in nature and seeks to protect individuals: “A general exemption for [this] category of information is much more practical than separate statutes protecting each type of personal record. The limitation of a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual’s right of privacy and the preservation of the public’s right to Government information by excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 11 (1966) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee reached a “consensus that these [personal] files should not be opened to the public, and . . . decided upon a general exemption rather than a number of specific statutory authorizations for various agencies.” S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1965) (emphasis added). The Committee concluded that the balancing of private against public interests, not the nature of the files in which the information was contained, should limit the scope of the exemption: “It is believed that the scope of the exemption is held within bounds by the use of the limitation of ‘a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” Ibid. Thus, “the primary concern of Congress in drafting Exemption 6 was to provide for the confidentiality of personal matters.” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 375, n. 14 (1976). Respondent relies upon passing references in the legislative history to argue that the phrase “similar files” does not include all files which contain information about particular individuals, but instead is limited to files containing “intimate details” and “highly personal” information. See H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 11; S. Rep. No. 813, supra, at 9. We disagree. Passing references and isolated phrases are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history. Congress’ statements that it was creating a “general exemption” for information contained in “great quantities of files,” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 11, suggest that the phrase “similar files” was to have a broad, rather than a narrow, meaning. This impression is confirmed by the frequent characterization of the “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” language as a “limitation” which holds Exemption 6 “within bounds.” S. Rep. No. 813, supra, at 9. See also, H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 11; S. Rep. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1964). Had the words “similar files” been intended to be only a narrow addition to “personnel and medical files,” there would seem to be no reason for concern about the exemption’s being “held within bounds,” and there surely would be clear suggestions in the legislative history that such a narrow meaning was intended. We have found none. A proper analysis of the exemption must also take into account the fact that “personnel and medical files,” the two benchmarks for measuring the term “similar files,” are likely to contain much information about a particular individual that is not intimate. Information such as place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment history, and comparable data is not normally regarded as highly personal, and yet respondent does not disagree that such information, if contained in a “personnel” or “medical” file, would be exempt from any disclosure that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The passport information here requested, if it exists, presumably would be found in files containing much of the same kind of information. Such files would contain at least the information that normally is required from a passport applicant. See 22 U. S. C. § 213. It strains the normal meaning of the word to say that such files are not “similar” to personnel or medical files. We agree with petitioners’ argument that adoption of respondent’s limited view of Exemption 6 would produce anomalous results. Under the plain language of the exemption, nonintimate information about a particular individual which happens to be contained in a personnel or medical file can be withheld if its release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. And yet under respondent’s view of the exemption, the very same information, being non-intimate and therefore not within the “similar files” language, would be subject to mandatory disclosure if it happened to be contained in records other than personnel or medical files. “[T]he protection of an individual’s right of privacy” which Congress sought to achieve by preventing “the disclosure of [information] which might harm the individual,” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 11, surely was not intended to turn upon the label of the file which contains the damaging information. In Department of Air Force v. Rose, supra, at 372, we recognized that the protection of Exemption 6 is not determined merely by the nature of the file in which the requested information is contained: “Congressional concern for the protection of the kind of confidential personal data usually included in a personnel file is abundantly clear. But Congress also made clear that nonconfidential matter was not to be insulated from disclosure merely because it was stored by an agency in its ‘personnel’ files.” By the same reasoning, information about an individual should not lose the protection of Exemption 6 merely because it is stored by an agency in records other than “personnel” or “medical” files. In sum, we do not think that Congress meant to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information. Rather, “[t]he exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.” H. R. Rep. No. 1497, supra, at 11. When disclosure of information which applies to a particular individual is sought from Government records, courts must determine whether release of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person’s privacy. The citizenship information sought by respondent satisfies the “similar files” requirement of Exemption 6, and petitioners’ denial of the request should have been sustained upon a showing by the Government that release of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The Court of Appeals expressly declined to consider the effect of disclosure upon the privacy interests of Behzadnia and Yazdi, and we think that such balancing should be left to the Court of Appeals or to the District Court on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice O’Connor concurs in the judgment. Exemption 6 provides that the disclosure requirements of the FOIA do not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). Petitioners’ original affidavit stated: “There is intense anti-American sentiment in Iran and several Iranian revolutionary leaders have been strongly criticized in the press for their alleged ties to the United States. Any individual in Iran who is suspected of being an American citizen or of having American connections is looked upon with mistrust. An official of the Government of Iran who is reputed to be an American citizen would, in my opinion, be in physical danger from some of the revolutionary groups that are prone to violence. “It is the position of the Department of State that any statement at this time by the United States Government which could be construed or misconstrued to indicate that any Iranian public official is currently a United States citizen is likely to cause a real threat of physical harm to that person.” Affidavit of Harold H. Saunders, Jan. 14, 1980, App. 17. The affidavit reported that Yazdi, who had previously held the position of Foreign Minister, was currently a member of the Revolutionary Council and was responsible for solving problems in various regions of Iran. It also indicated that Behzadnia had been a senior official in the Ministry of National Guidance, but that the State Department had not received any report of his activities in recent weeks. Ibid. A supplemental affidavit, executed three months after the first affidavit, stated that Yazdi had been elected to the Iranian National Assembly, but that the activities of Behzadnia were still unreported. Supplemental Affidavit of Harold H. Saunders, Apr. 22, 1980, App. 41. This view of Exemption 6 was adopted by the Attorney General shortly after enactment of the FOIA in a memorandum explaining the meaning of the Act to various federal agencies: “It is apparent that the exemption is intended to exclude from the disclosure requirements all personnel and medical files, and all -private or personal information contained in other files which, if disclosed to the public, would amount to a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of any person.” Attorney General’s Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act 36 (June 1967) (emphasis added). This construction of Exemption 6 will not render meaningless the threshold requirement that information be contained in personnel, medical, and similar files by reducing it to a test which fails to screen out any information that will not be screened out by the balancing of private against public interests. As petitioners point out, there are undoubtedly many Government files which contain information not personal to any particular individual, the disclosure of which would nonetheless cause embarrassment to certain persons. Information unrelated to any particular person presumably would not satisfy the threshold test. In holding that “similar files” are limited to those containing intimate details about individuals such as might also be contained in personnel or medical files, the Court of Appeals relied on its decision in Simpson v. Vance, 208 U. S. App. D. C. 270, 648 F. 2d 10 (1980). In Simpson, the Court of Appeals held that portions of the State Department’s Biographical Register could not be considered a “similar file” because such information was currently available to the public. Id., at 275, 648 F. 2d, at 15. At the same time, Simpson held that release of information pertaining to an individual’s marital status and the name of the individual’s spouse “would not be appropriate.” Id., at 277, 648 F. 2d, at 17. Respondent contends that information concerning the citizenship of Behzadnia and Yazdi likewise cannot be withheld as contained in “similar files” because United States citizenship is a matter of public record. Even under the Court of Appeals’ holding in Simpson, however, the fact that citizenship is a matter of public record somewhere in the Nation cannot be decisive, since it would seem almost certain that the information concerning marital status that was withheld in Simpson would likewise be contained in public records. In addition, “personnel” files, which expressly come within Exemption 6, are likely to contain much information that is equally a matter of public record. Place of birth, date of birth, marital status, past criminal convictions, and acquisition of citizenship are some examples. The public nature of information may be a reason to conclude, under all the circumstances of a given case, that the release of such information would not constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” but it does not militate against a conclusion that files are “similar” to personnel and medical files.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HORTONVILLE JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al. v. HORTONVILLE EDUCATION ASSN. et al. No. 74-1606. Argued February 23-24, 1976 Decided June 17, 1976 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which "White, Blacemun, Powell, RehNQUist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 497. Jack D. Walker argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James K. Ruhly and Joseph A. Melli. Robert H. Friebert argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Thomas W. St. John. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by James F. Clark and Karen A. Mercer for the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc.; by Leon Fieldman for the National School Boards Assn.; by Robert T. Thompson, Lawrence Kraus, and Richard B. Berman for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and by Jerome T. Foerster for the Pennsylvania School Boards Assn. Michael H. Oottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, and David Rubin filed a brief for the National Education Assn, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. John E. Murray filed a brief for the County of Broome, State of New York, as amicus curiae. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether School Board members, vested by state law with the power to employ and dismiss teachers, could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, dismiss teachers engaged in a strike prohibited by state law. I The petitioners are a Wisconsin school district, the seven members of its School Board, and three administrative employees of the district. Respondents are teachers suing on behalf of all teachers in the district and the Hortonville Education Association (HEA), the collective-bargaining agent for the district's teachers. During the 1972-1973 school year Hortonville teachers worked under a master collective-bargaining agreement; negotiations were conducted for renewal of the contract, but no agreement was reached for the 1973-1974 school year. The teachers continued to work while negotiations proceeded during the year without reaching agreement. On March 18, 1974, the members of the teachers’ union went on strike, in direct violation of Wisconsin law. On March 20, the district superintendent sent all teachers a letter inviting them to return to work; a few did so. On March 23, he sent another letter, asking the 86 teachers still on strike to return, and reminding them that strikes by public employees were illegal; none of these teachers returned to work. After conducting classes with substitute teachers on March 26 and 27, the Board decided to conduct disciplinary hearings for each of the teachers on strike. Individual notices were sent to each teacher setting hearings for April 1, 2, and 3. On April 1, most of the striking teachers appeared before the Board with counsel. Their attorney indicated that the teachers did not want individual hearings, but preferred to be treated as a group. Although counsel agreed that the teachers were on strike, he raised several procedural objections to the hearings. He also argued that the Board was not sufficiently impartial to exercise discipline over the striking teachers and that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decisionmaker. An offer of proof was tendered to demonstrate that the strike had been provoked by the Board’s failure to meet teachers’ demands, and respondents’ counsel asked to cross-examine Board members individually. The Board rejected the request, but permitted counsel to make the offer of proof, aimed at showing that the Board’s contract offers were unsatisfactory, that the Board used coercive and illegal bargaining tactics, and that teachers in the district had been locked out by the Board. On April 2, the Board voted to terminate the employment of striking teachers, and advised them by letter to that effect. However, the same letter invited all teachers on strike to reapply for teaching positions. One teacher accepted the invitation and returned to work; the Board hired replacements to fill the remaining positions. Respondents then filed suit against petitioners in state court, alleging, among other things, that the notice and hearing provided them by the Board were inadequate to comply with due process requirements. The trial court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment on the due process claim. The court found that the teachers, although on strike, were still employees of the Board under Wisconsin law and that they retained a property interest in their positions under this Court’s decisions in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972). The court concluded that the only question before the Board on April 1 and 2 was whether the teachers were on strike in violation of state law, and that no evidence in mitigation was relevant. It rejected their claim that they were denied due process, since the teachers admitted they were on strike after receiving adequate notice and a hearing, including the warning that they were in violation of Wisconsin law. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N. W. 2d 658 (1975). On the single issue now presented it held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution required that the teachers’ conduct and the Board’s response be evaluated by an impartial de-cisionmaker other than the Board. The rationale of the Wisconsin Supreme Court appears to be that although the teachers had admitted being on strike, and although the strike violated Wisconsin law, the Board had available other remedies than dismissal, including an injunction prohibiting the strike, a call for mediation, or continued bargaining. Relying on our holding in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), the Wisconsin court thén held “it would seem essential, even in cases of undisputed or stipulated facts, that an impartial decision maker be charged with the responsibility of determining what action shall be taken on the basis of those facts.” 66 Wis. 2d, at 493, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. The court held that the Board was not sufficiently impartial to make this choice: “The background giving rise to the ultimate facts in this case reveals a situation not at all conducive to detachment and impartiality on the part of the school board.” Ibid. In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged that the Board’s decision could be reviewed in other forums; but no reviewing body would give the teachers an opportunity to demonstrate that “another course of action such as mediation, injunction, continued collective bargaining or arbitration would have been a more reasonable response on the part of the decision maker.” Id., at 496, 225 N. W. 2d, at 672. Since it concluded that state law provided no adequate remedy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court fashioned one it thought necessary to comply with federal due process principles. To leave with the Board “[a]s much control as possible ... to set policy and manage the school,” the court held that the Board should after notice and hearing make the decision to fire in the first instance. A teacher dissatisfied with the Board’s decision could petition any court of record in the county for a de novo hearing on all issues; the trial court would “resolve any factual disputes and provide for a reasonable disposition.” Id., at 498, 225 N. W. 2d, at 673. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that this remedy was “not ideal because a court may be required to make public policy decisions that are better left to a legislative or administrative body.” Ibid. But it would suffice “until such time and only until such time as the legislature provides a means to establish a forum that will meet the requirements of due process.” Ibid. We granted certiorari because of the state court’s reliance on federal due process. 423 U. S. 821 (1975). We reverse. II The Hortonville School District is a common school district under Wisconsin law, financed by local property taxes and state school aid and governed by an elected seven-member School Board. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 120.01, 120.03, 120.06 (1973). The Board has broad power over “the possession, care, control and management of the property and affairs of the school district.” § 120.12 (1) ; see also §§ 120.08, 120.10, 120.15-120.17. The Board negotiates terms of employment with teachers under the Wisconsin Municipal Employment Relations Act, § 111.70 et seg. (1974), and contracts with individual teachers on behalf of the district. The Board is the only body vested by statute with the power to employ and dismiss teachers. § 118.22 (2). The sole issue in this case is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits this School Board from making the decision to dismiss teachers admittedly engaged in a strike and persistently refusing to return to their duties. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that state law prohibited the strike and that termination of the striking teachers’ employment was within the Board’s statutory authority. 66 Wis. 2d, at 479-481, 225 N. W. 2d, at 663-665. We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of Wisconsin law by the highest court of the State. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U. S. 505, 507 (1971); Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 688 (1959). The only decision remaining for the Board therefore involved the exercise of its discretion as to what should be done to carry out the duties the law placed on the Board. A Respondents argue, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held, that the choice presented for the Board’s decision is analogous to that involved in revocation of parole in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, that the decision could be made only by an impartial decisionmaker, and that the Board was not impartial. In Morrissey the Court considered a challenge to state procedures employed in revoking the parole of state prisoners. There we noted that the parole revocation decision involved two steps: First, an inquiry whether the parolee had in fact violated the conditions of his parole; second, determining whether the violations found were serious enough to justify revocation of parole and the consequent deprivation of the parolee’s conditional liberty. With respect to the second step, the Court observed: “The second question involves the application of expertise by the parole authority in making a prediction as to the ability of the individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts. This part of the decision, too, depends on facts, and therefore it is important for the board to know not only that some violation was committed but also to know accurately how many and how serious the violations were. Yet this second step, deciding what to do about the violation once it is identified, is not purely factual but also predictive and discretionary.” 408 U. S., at 480. Nothing in this case is analogous to the first step in Morrissey, since the teachers admitted to being on strike. But respondents argue that the School Board’s decision in this case is, for constitutional purposes, the same as the second aspect of the decision to revoke parole. The Board cannot make a “reasonable” decision on this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held and respondents argue, because its members are biased in some fashion that the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit. Morrissey arose in a materially different context. We recognized there that a parole violation could occur at a place distant from where the parole revocation decision would finally be made; we also recognized the risk of factual error, such as misidentification. To minimize this risk, we held: “[D]ue process requires that after the arrest [for parole violation], the determination that reasonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by someone not directly involved in the case.” Id., at 485. But this holding must be read against our earlier discussion in Morrissey of the parole officer's role as counselor for and confidant of the parolee; it is this same officer who, on the basis of preliminary information, decides to arrest the parolee. A school board is not to be equated with the parole officer as an arresting officer; the school board is more like the parole board, for it has ultimate plenary authority to make its decisions derived from the state legislature. General language about due process in a holding concerning revocation of parole is not a reliable basis for dealing with the School Board's power as an employer to dismiss teachers for cause. We must focus more clearly on, first, the nature of the bias respondents attribute to the Board, and, second, the nature of the interests at stake in this case. B Respondents’ argument rests in part on doctrines that have no application to this case. They seem to argue that the Board members had some personal or official stake in the decision whether the teachers should be dismissed, comparable to the stake the Court saw in Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927), or Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 (1973), and that the Board has manifested some personal bitterness toward the teachers, aroused by teacher criticism of the Board during the strike, see, e. g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455 (1971). Even assuming that those cases state the governing standards when the decisionmaker is a public employer dealing with employees, the teachers did not show, and the Wisconsin courts did not find, that the Board members had the kind of personal or financial stake in the decision that might create a conflict of interest, and there is nothing in the record to support charges of personal animosity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful “not to suggest . . . that the board members were anything but dedicated public servants, trying to provide the district with quality education . . . within its limited budget.” 66 Wis. 2d, at 494, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. That court’s analysis would seem to be confirmed by the Board’s repeated invitations for striking teachers to return to work, the final invitation being contained in the letter that notified them of their discharge. The only other factor suggested to support the claim of bias is that the School Board was involved in the negotiations that preceded and precipitated the striking teachers’ discharge. Participation in those negotiations was a statutory duty of the Board. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that this involvement, without more, disqualified the Board from deciding whether the teachers should be dismissed: “The board was the collective bargaining agent for the school district and thus was engaged in the collective bargaining process with the teachers' representative, the HEA. It is not difficult to imagine the frustration on the part of the board members when negotiations broke down, agreement could not be reached and the employees resorted to concerted activity. . . . They were . . . not uninvolved in the events which precipitated decisions they were required to make.” Id., at 493-494, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. Mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory role does not, however, disqualify a decisionmaker. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 700-703 (1948). Nor is a decisionmaker disqualified simply because he has taken a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that he is not “capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 421 (1941); see also FTC v. Cement Institute, supra, at 701. Respondents’ claim and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s holding reduce to the argument that the Board was biased because it negotiated with the teachers on behalf of the school district without reaching agreement and learned about the reasons for the strike in the course of negotiating. From those premises the Wisconsin court concluded that the Board lost its statutory power to determine that the strike and persistent refusal to terminate it amounted to conduct serious enough to warrant discharge of the strikers. Wisconsin statutes vest in the Board the power to discharge its employees, a power of every employer, whether it has negotiated with the employees before discharge or not. The Fourteenth Amendment permits a court to strip the Board of the otherwise unremarkable power the Wisconsin Legislature has given it only if the Board’s prior involvement in negotiating with the teachers means that it cannot act consistently with due process. C Due process, as this Court has repeatedly held, is a term that “negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). Determining what process is due in a given setting requires the Court to take into account the individual’s stake in the decision at issue as well as the State’s interest in a particular procedure for making it. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ; id., at 188 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263-266 (1970). Our assessment of the interests of the parties in this case leads to the conclusion that this is a very different case from Morrissey v. Brewer, and that the Board’s prior role as negotiator does not disqualify it to decide that the public interest in maintaining uninterrupted classroom work required that teachers striking in violation of state law be discharged. The teachers’ interest in these proceedings is, of course, self-evident. They wished to avoid termination of their employment, obviously an important interest, but one that must be examined in light of several factors. Since the teachers admitted that they were engaged in a work stoppage, there was no possibility of an erroneous factual determination on this critical threshold issue. Moreover, what the teachers claim as a property right was the expectation that the jobs they had left to go and remain on strike in violation of law would remain open to them. The Wisconsin court accepted at least the essence of that claim in defining the property right under state law, and we do not quarrel with its conclusion. But even if the property interest claimed here is to be compared with the liberty interest at stake in Morrissey, we note that both “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” and “the degree of potential deprivation” differ in a qualitative sense and in degree from those in Morrissey. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, at 341. The governmental interests at stake in this case also differ significantly from the interests at stake in Mor-rissey. The Board’s decision whether to dismiss striking teachers involves broad considerations, and does not in the main turn on the Board’s view of the “seriousness” of the teachers’ conduct or the factors they urge mitigated their violation of state law. It was not an adjudicative decision, for the Board had an obligation to make a decision based on its own answer to an important question of policy: What choice among the alternative responses to the teachers’ strike will best serve the interests of the school system, the interests of the parents and children who depend on the system, and the interests of the citizens whose taxes support it? The Board’s decision was only incidentally a disciplinary decision; it had significant governmental and public policy dimensions as well. See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 Yale L. J. 1156 (1974). State law vests the governmental, or policymaking, function exclusively in the School Board and the State has two interests in keeping it there. First, the Board is the body with overall responsibility for the governance of the school district; it must cope with the myriad day-to-day problems of a modern public school system including the severe consequences of a teachers’ strike; by virtue of electing them the constituents have declared the Board members qualified to deal with these problems, and they are accountable to the voters for the manner in which they perform. Second, the state legislature has given to the Board the power to employ and dismiss teachers, as a part of the balance it has struck in the area of municipal labor relations; altering those statutory powers as a matter of federal due process clearly changes that balance. Permitting the Board to make the decision at issue here preserves its control over school district affairs, leaves the balance of power in labor relations where the state legislature struck it, and assures that the decision whether to dismiss the teachers will be made by the body responsible for that decision under state law. Ill Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the decision to terminate their employment was infected by the sort of bias that we have held to disqualify other decisionmakers as a matter of federal due process. A showing that the Board was “involved” in the events preceding this decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the Board the power given by the state legislature, is not enough to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with decisionmak-ing power. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S., at 47. Accordingly, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee respondents^ that the decision to terminate their employment would be made or reviewed by a body other than the School Board. The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. The National School Boards Association informs us that 45 States lodge the power to dismiss teachers in local school boards. Brief as Amicus Curiae 9 n. 4. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the discharge of the teachers during their 1973-1974 individual contracts, and the revocation of the Board’s individual offers of employment for the 1974W975 school year, deprived them of property. 66 Wis. 2d 469, 489, 225 N. W. 2d 658, 669 (1975). “Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. . . .” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972). We do not challenge the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that state law gave these teachers a “legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 602 (1972). We are not required to determine whether the notice and hearing afforded by the Board, as matters separate from the Board’s ability fairly to decide the issue before it, were adequate to afford respondents due process. Respondents do not suggest here that the notice they received was constitutionally inadequate, and they refused to treat the dismissals on a case-by-case basis. Respondents argue that the requirement that the Board’s decision be “reasonable” is in fact a requirement of state law. From that premise and from the premise that the “reasonableness” determination requires an evaluation of the Board’s negotiating stance, they argue that nothing but decision and review de novo by an “uninvolved” party will secure their right to a “reasonable” decision. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 58-59, n. 25 (1975). It is clear, however, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Board’s decision must be “reasonable,” not by virtue of state law, but because of its reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Wisconsin court relied largely upon cases interpreting the Federal Constitution in this aspect of its holding. See 66 Wis. 2d, at 493, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. Second, the only state case the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited for more than a general statement of federal requirements was Durkin v. Board of Police & Fire Comm’rs, 48 Wis. 2d 112, 180 N. W. 2d 1 (1970). There the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted a state statute that gave firemen and policemen the right to appeal a decision of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners to a state court; the statute expressly provided that the court was to determine whether “upon the evidence the order of the Board was reasonable.” Id., at 117, 180 N. W. 2d, at 3. See Wis. Stat. Ann. §62.13 (5) (h) (1957). There is no comparable statutory provision giving teachers the right to review this standard. Finally, to impose a “reasonableness” requirement, or any other test that looks to evaluation by another entity, makes semantic sense only where review is contemplated by the statute. Review, and the standard for review, are concepts that go hand in hand. The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded both that review of the Board’s decision was necessary and that a “reasonableness” standard was appropriate as a result of its reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents alleged before the Board, and argue here, that the Board’s decision to dismiss them was motivated by antiunion animus in addition to personal vindictiveness, and that their illegal strike should be excused because the Board provoked it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that the Board’s “decision to discharge was possibly a convenient alternative which would eliminate their labor problems in one fell swoop.” 66 Wis. 2d, at 494, 225 N. W. 2d, at 671. Given that Wisconsin statutes permitted the Board to dismiss striking teachers, and assuming, as did the Wisconsin court, that the Board’s decision was in other respects proper under state labor law, we do not agree that federal due process prevented the Board from pursuing a course of action that was within its explicit statutory authority and which, in its judgment, would serve the best interests of the school system. That the' result may also have been desirable for other reasons is irrelevant to the due process issue on which the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision turned, and if the other reasons are invalid under state law, respondents can resort to whatever forum the State provides. Respondents argue that the School Board is free to defend its action in the de novo hearing authorized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court by attempting to demonstrate that policy considerations dictated its decision to dismiss the striking teachers. Policymaking is a process of prudential judgment, and we are not prepared to say that a judge can generally make a better policy judgment or, in this case, as good a judgment as the School Board, which is intimately familiar with all the needs of the school district, or that a school board must, at the risk of suspending school operations, wend its way through judicial processes not mandated by the legislature. More important, no matter what arguments the Board may make to the de novo trial judge, as we noted earlier it will be the School Board that will have to cope with the consequences of the decision and be responsible to the electorate for it. The privilege of oral argument to a judge is no substitute for the power to employ and dismiss vested by statute exclusively in the Board.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JIMENEZ et al. v. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE No. 72-6609. Argued March 18, 1974 Decided June 19, 1974 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, BlacicmuN, and Powell, JJ., joined. RehNQUIst, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 638. Jane G. Stevens argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. Danny J. Boggs argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting A&-sistant Attorney General Jaffe, and William Kanter. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. A three-judge District Court in the Northern District of Illinois upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act which provides that certain illegitimate children, who cannot qualify for benefits under any other provision of the Act, may obtain benefits if, but only if, the disabled wage-earner parent is shown to have contributed to the child’s support or to have lived with him prior to the parent’s disability. The District Court held that the statute’s classification is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest of avoiding spurious claims. Jimenez v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp. 1356, 1361 (1973). We noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U.S. 1061. The relevant facts are not in dispute. Ramon Jimenez, a wage earner covered under the Social Security Act, became disabled in April 1963, and became entitled to disability benefits in October 1963. Some years prior to that time, the claimant separated from his wife and began living with Elizabeth Herñandez, whom he never married. Three children were born to them, Magdalena, born August 13, 1963, Eugenio, born January 18, 1965, and Alicia, born February 24, 1968. These children have lived in Illinois with claimant all their lives; he has formally acknowledged them to be his children, has supported and cared for them since their birth, and has been their sole caretaker since their mother left the household late in 1968. Since the parents never married, these children are classified as illegitimate under Illinois law and are unable to inherit from their father because they are nonlegitimated illegitimate children. Ill. Ann. Stat., c. 3, § 12 (Supp. 1974). On August 21,1968, Ramon Jimenez, as the father, filed an application for child’s insurance benefits on behalf of these three children. Magdalena was found to be entitled to child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, and no issue is presented with respect to her claim. The claims of appellants, Eugenio and Alicia, were denied, however, on the ground that they did not meet the requirements of 42 U. S. C. § 416 (h) (3), since neither child’s paternity had been acknowledged or affirmed through evidence of domicile and support before the onset of their father’s disability. In all other respects Eugenio and Alicia are eligible to receive child’s insurance benefits, and their applications were denied solely because they are proscribed illegitimate children who were not dependent on Jimenez at the time of the onset of his disability. Appellants urge that the contested Social Security provision is based upon the so-called “suspect classification” of illegitimacy. Like race and national origin, they argue, illegitimacy is a characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth; it is a condition beyond the control of the children, and it is a status that subjects the children to a stigma of inferiority and a badge of opprobrium. We need not reach appellants’ argument, however, because in the context of this case it is enough that we note, as we did in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972): “The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual — as well as an unjust — way of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth where . . . the classification is justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.” Id., at 175-176. Conversely, the Secretary urges us to uphold this statutory scheme on the ground that the case is controlled by the Court’s recent ruling in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), where we noted: “In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. 'A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426.” Id., at 485. However, Dandridge involved an equal protection attack upon Maryland’s Aid to Families with Dependent Children program which provided aid in accordance with the family’s standard of need, but limited the maximum grant to $250 per family, regardless of size, thereby reducing the per capita allowance for children of large families. We noted that the AFDC welfare program is a “ ‘scheme of cooperative federalism’ ” and that the “starting point of the statutory analysis must be a recognition that the federal law gives each State great latitude in dispensing its available funds.” Id., at 478. This special deference to Maryland’s statutory approach was necessary because, “[g]iven Maryland’s finite resources, its choice is either to support some families adequately and others less adequately, or not to give sufficient support to any family.” Id., at 479. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence supporting the contention that to allow illegit-imates in the classification of appellants to receive benefits would significantly impair the federal Social Security trust fund and necessitate a reduction in the scope of persons benefited by the Act. On the contrary, the Secretary has persistently maintained that the purpose of the contested statutory scheme is to provide support for dependents of a wage earner who has lost his earning power, and that the provisions excluding some afterborn illegitimates from recovery are designed only to prevent spurious claims and ensure that only those actually entitled to benefit receive payments. Accepting this view of the relevant provisions of the Act, we cannot conclude that the purpose of the statutory exclusion of some afterborn illegitimates is to achieve a necessary allocation of finite resources and, to that extent, Dandridge is distinguishable and not controlling. As we have noted, the primary purpose of the contested Social Security scheme is to provide support for dependents of a disabled wage earner. The Secretary maintains that the Act denies benefits to afterborn illegit-imates who cannot inherit or whose illegitimacy is not solely because of a formal, non obvious defect in their parents’ wedding ceremony, or who are not legitimated, because it is “likely” that these illegitimates, as a class, will not possess the requisite economic dependency on the wage earner which would entitle them to recovery under the Act and because eligibility for such benefits to those illegitimates would open the door to spurious claims. Under this view the Act’s purpose would be to replace only that support enjoyed prior to the onset of disability; no child would be eligible to receive benefits unless the child had experienced actual support from the wage earner prior to the disability, and no child born after the onset of the wage earner’s disability would be allowed to recover. We do not read the statute as supporting that view of its purpose. Under the statute it is clear that illegitimate children born after the wage earner becomes disabled qualify for benefits if state law permits them to inherit from the wage earner, § 416 (h) (2) (A); or if their illegitimacy results solely from formal, nonobvious defects in their parents’ ceremonial marriage, § 416 (h) (2) (B); or if they are legitimated in accordance with state law, § 402 (d)(3)(A). Similarly, legitimate children born after their wage-earning parent has become disabled and legitimate children born before the onset of disability are entitled to benefits regardless of whether they were living with or being supported by the disabled parent at the onset of the disability, §§ 402 (d) (1) and (3). In each of the examples just mentioned, the child is by statute “deemed dependent” upon the parent by virtue of his status and no dependency or paternity need be shown for the child to qualify for benefits. However, nonlegitimated illegitimates in appellants’ position, who cannot inherit under state law and whose illegitimacy does not derive solely from a defect in their parents’ wedding ceremony, are denied a parallel right to the dependency presumption under the Act. Their dilemma is compounded by the fact that the statute denies them any opportunity to prove dependency in order to establish their “claim” to support and, hence, their right to eligibility. § 416 (h) (3) (B). The Secretary maintains that this absolute bar to disability benefits is necessary to prevent spurious claims because “[t]o the unscrupulous person, all that prevents him from realizing . . . gain is the mere formality of a spurious acknowledgment of paternity or a collusive paternity suit with the mother of an illegitimate child who is herself desirous or in need of the additional cash.” Jimenez v. Richardson, 353 F. Supp., at 1361. From what has been outlined it emerges that afterborn illegitimate children are divided into two subclassifica-tions under this statute. One subclass is made up of those (a) who can inherit under state intestacy laws, or (b) who are legitimated under state law, or (c) who are illegitimate only because of some formal defect in their parents’ ceremonial marriage. These children are deemed entitled to receive benefits under the Act without any showing that they are in fact dependent upon their disabled parent. The second subclassification of afterborn illegitimate children includes those who are conclusively denied benefits because they do not fall within one of the foregoing categories and are not entitled to receive insurance benefits under any other provision of the Act. We recognize that the prevention of spurious claims is a legitimate governmental interest and that dependency of illegitimates in appellants’ subclass, as defined under the federal statute, has not been legally established even though, as here, paternity has been acknowledged. As we have noted, the Secretary maintains that the possibility that evidence of parentage or support may be fabricated is greater when the child is not born until after the wage earner has become entitled to benefits. It does not follow, however, that the blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants’ subclass of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of spurious claims. Assuming that the appellants are in fact dependent on the claimant, it would not serve the purposes of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits, and it would discriminate between the two subclasses of afterborn illegit-imates without any basis for the distinction since the potential for spurious claims is exactly the same as to both subclasses. The Secretary does not contend that it is necessarily or universally true that all illegitimates in appellants’ subclass would be unable to establish their dependency and eligibility under the Act if the statute gave them an opportunity to do so. Nor does he suggest a basis for the assumption that all illegitimates who are statutorily deemed entitled to benefits under the Act are in fact dependent upon their disabled parent. Indeed, as we have noted, those illegitimates statutorily deemed dependent are entitled to benefits regardless of whether they were living in, or had ever lived in, a dependent family setting with their disabled parent. Even if children might rationally be classified on the basis of whether they are dependent upon their disabled parent, the Act’s definition of these two subclasses of illegitimates is “over-inclusive” in that it benefits some children who are legitimated, or entitled to inherit, or illegitimate solely because of a defect in the marriage of their parents, but who are not dependent on their disabled parent. Conversely, the Act is “underinclusive” in that it conclusively excludes some illegitimates in appellants’ subclass who are, in fact, dependent upon their disabled parent. Thus, for all that is shown in this record, the two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). In the District Court the Secretary, relying on the validity of the statutory exclusion, did not undertake to challenge the assertion that appellants are the children of the claimant, that they lived with the claimant all their lives, that he has formally acknowledged them to be his children, and that he has supported and cared for them since their birth. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to provide appellants an opportunity, consistent with this opinion, to establish their claim to eligibility as “children” of the claimant under the Social Security Act. Vacated and remanded. 42 U. S. C. §416 (h)(3). The contested Social Security scheme provides, in essence, that legitimate or legitimated children (42 U. S. C. § 402 (d) (3)), illegitimate children who can inherit their parent’s personal property under the intestacy laws of the State of the insured’s domicile (42 U. S. C. § 416 (h) (2) (A)), and those children who cannot inherit only because their parents’ ceremonial marriage was invalid for nonobvious defects (42 U. S. C. § 416 (h) (2) (B)), are entitled to receive benefits without any further showing of parental support. However, illegitimate children such as Eugenio and Alicia who were not living with or being supported by the applicant at the time the claimant’s period of disabilhy began, and who do not fall into one of the foregoing categories, are not entitled to receive any benefits. 42 U. S. C. § 416 (b)(3). See House-Senate Conference Committee Report on 1965 Amendments to Social Security Act, 111 Cong. Rec. 18387 (1965); Report of the U. S. Advisory Council on Social Security, the Status of the Social Security Program and Recommendations for its Improvement 67 (1965).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MacDOUGALL et al. v. GREEN, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, et al. No. 348. Argued October 18, 1948. Decided October 21, 1948. John J. Abt and Richard F. Watt argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief were Earl B. Dickerson and Edmund Hatfield. William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for Green, Governor, et al., appel-lees. With him on the brief were George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Raymond S. Sarnow, Assistant Attorney General. Melvin F. Winger sky argued the cause for Flynn, County Clerk, et al., appellees. With him on the brief was Gordon B. Nash. PeR Curiam. This action was brought before a three-judge court convened in the Northern District of Illinois under 28 U. S. C. § 2281 and § 2284. The object of the action is an injunction against the enforcement of a provision which, in 1935, was added to a statute of Illinois and which requires that a petition to form and to nominate candidates for a new political party be signed by at least 25,000 qualified voters, “Provided, that included in the aggregate total of twenty-five thousand (25,000) signatures are the signatures of two hundred (200) qualified voters from each of at least fifty (50) counties within the State.” Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 46, § 10 — 2 (1947). Appellants are the “Progressive Party,” its nominees for United States Senator, Presidential Electors, and State offices, and several Illinois voters. Appellees are the Governor, the Auditor of Public Accounts, and the Secretary of State of Illinois, members of the Boards of Election Commissioners of various cities, and the County Clerks of various counties. The District Court found want of jurisdiction and denied the injunction. 80 F. Supp. 725. Appellants invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. The action arises from the finding of the State Officers Electoral Board that appellants had not obtained the requisite number of signatures from the requisite number of counties and its consequent ruling that their nominating petition was “not sufficient in law to entitle the said candidates’ names to appear on the ballot.” The appellants’ claim to equitable relief against this ruling is based upon the peculiar distribution of population among Illinois’ 102 counties. They allege that 52% of the State’s registered voters are residents of Cook County alone, 87 % are residents of the 49 most populous counties, and only 13% reside in the 53 least populous counties. Under these circumstances, they say, the Illinois statute is so discriminatory in its application as to amount to a violation of the due-process, equal-protection, and privileges- and-immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Article I, §§ 2 and 4, Article II, § 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. It is clear that the requirement of two hundred signatures from at least fifty counties gives to the voters of the less populous counties of Illinois the power completely to block the nomination of candidates whose support is confined to geographically limited areas. But the State is entitled to deem this power not disproportionate: of 25,000 signatures required, only 9,800, or 39%, need be distributed; the remaining 61% may be obtained from a single county. And Cook County, the largest, contains not more than 52% of the State’s voters. It is allowable State policy to require that candidates for state-wide office should have support not limited to a concentrated locality. This is not a unique policy. See New York Laws 1896, c. 909, § 57, now N. Y. Elec. Law § 137 (4); 113 Laws of Ohio 349, Gen. Code § 4785-91 (1929), now Ohio Code Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1947) §4785-91; Mass. Acts, 1943, c. 334, § 2, now Mass. Ann. Laws c. 53, § 6 (1945). To assume that political power is a function exclusively of numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government. Thus, the Constitution protects the interests of the smaller against the greater by giving in the Senate entirely unequal representation to populations. It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former. The Constitution — a practical instrument of government— makes no such demands on the States. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, and Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U. S. 804. On the record before us, we need not pass upon purely local questions, also urged by appellants, having no federal constitutional aspect. Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Rutledge. In its facts and legal issues this case is closely analogous to Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549. It presents serious constitutional questions crucial to the validity of Illinois election procedures and their application to the imminently impending general election. That a bare majority of this Court resolve them one way and three others hold opposing views only emphasizes their substantial character and supreme importance. These qualities are not diminished by the fact that the Attorney General of Illinois, appearing for the three members of the so-called “State Certifying Board,” has conceded in his brief the validity of appellants' position and at the bar of this Court has confessed error in the decision of the District Court. Nor is it insignificant or irrelevant that the application of the statutory procedures made by the state officials in practical effect denies to a substantial body of qualified voters the right to exercise their suffrage in behalf of candidates of their choice. Forced by the exigencies of their situation, appellants have invoked federal equity jurisdiction in vindication of their rights. They seek injunctive relief, in effect, to compel placing the names of their candidates upon the ballot for the general election to be held on November 2. For present purposes we may assume that appellants have acted with all possible dispatch. Even so, we find ourselves confronted on the eve of the election with the alternatives of denying the relief sought or of directing the issuance of an injunction. This choice, in my opinion, presents the crucial question and the only one necessarily or properly now to be decided. Beyond the constitutional questions it poses delicate problems concerning the propriety of granting the relief in the prevailing circumstances. Even if we assume that appellants’ constitutional rights have been violated, the questions arise whether, in those circumstances, the equity arm of the. federal courts can now be extended to give effective relief; and whether the relief, if given, might not do more harm than good, might not indeed either disrupt the Illinois election altogether or disfranchise more persons than have been disfranchised by the application of the questioned Illinois procedures. Every reason existing in Colegrove v. Green, supra, which seemed to me compelling to require this Court to decline to exercise its equity jurisdiction and to decide the constitutional questions is present here. See the opinion concurring in the result, 328 U. S. at 564. Indeed the circumstances are more exigent and therefore more compelling to that conclusion. We are on the eve of the national election. But twelve days remain. Necessarily some of these would be consumed in remanding the cause to the District Court and in its consideration, formulation and issuance of an injunction in essentially specific terms. The ballots, as certified by the state officials, are in process of printing and distribution. Absentee ballots have been distributed. Illinois is one of the more populous states. Millions of ballots will be required, not only in the state but in Cook County alone. It is true that, on the short record before us and in the necessarily brief time available for preparing both the record and the briefs, appellees who oppose granting the relief have not made an absolutely conclusive factual showing that new ballots, containing the names of appellants’ candidates, could not possibly be printed and distributed for use at the election. But they suggest with good reason that this could not be done. The task would be gigantic. Even with the mobilization of every possible resource, it is gravely doubtful that it could be accomplished. The risk would be very large that it could not be done. Even if it could for all except absentee voters, they would be disfranchised. Issuance of the injunction sought would invalidate the ballots already prepared, including the absentee ballots, and those now in course of preparation. The sum of these considerations, without regard to others not now necessary to state, forces me to conclude that the relief sought could be had at this late stage in the electoral process only at the gravest risk of disrupting that process completely in Illinois or of disfranchising Illinois voters in perhaps much greater numbers than those whose interests appellants represent. That is a risk which, in my judgment, federal courts of equity should not undertake and indeed are not free to undertake within the historic limits of their equity jurisdiction. Accordingly, I express no opinion concerning the constitutional and other questions presented. As in Colegrove v. Green, supra, I think the case is one in which, for the reasons stated, this Court may properly, and should, decline to exercise its jurisdiction in equity. Accordingly, but solely for this reason, I agree that the judgment refusing injunctive relief should be affirmed. The State Certifying Board is composed of the Governor, the Auditor of Public Accounts and the Secretary of State, and petitions for the formation of new state-wide political parties are filed with this board. (Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 46 [1947] §§ 10 — 2, 10 — 4.) On the filing of timely objection to such petitions, the certifying board transmits the petitions and the objections to the State Officers Electoral Board, which is not a party to this action. After passing on the objection, the State Officers Electoral Board informs the State Certifying Board of its ruling, and the certifying board is required to “abide by and comply with the ruling so made to all intents and purposes.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 46 [1947] § 10 — 10.) Where objection is not made, or where it is made and overruled, the new party and the names of its candidates are certified by the State Certifying Board to the several county clerks; the clerks or the local boards of election commissioners, both groups being parties to this action, thereupon are required to print ballots containing the names of the candidates thus certified. (Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 46 [1947] § 10 — 14.)

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COSTLE, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION et al. No. 78-1472. Argued December 5, 1979 Decided March 18, 1980 Blackmtjn, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. William Alsup argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attor ney General Moorman, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Angus Macbeth, and Raymond W. Mushal. Robert K. Best argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Pacific Legal Foundation et al. were Ronald A. Zumbrun and Thomas E. Hookano. Burt Pines and Frederick N. Merkin filed a brief for respondent City of Los Angeles. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case, in a sense, is a tale of a great city’s — and the Nation’s — basic problems in disposing of human waste. “How” and “where” are the ultimate questions, and they are intertwined. The issues presently before the Court, however, center in the administrative processes by which the city and the Nation seek to resolve those basic problems. I Respondent city of Los Angeles owns and operates the Hyperion Wastewater Treatment Plant located in Playa Del Rey, Cal. Since 1960, the Hyperion plant has processed most of the city’s sewage, and has discharged the wastes through three “outfalls” extending into the Pacific Ocean. The shortest outfall terminates about one mile from the coastline in 50 feet of water. It is operative only during emergencies caused by increased sewage flow during wet weather or by power failures at the pumping plant. The second outfall terminates about five miles out. Approximately 340 million gallons of treated wastewater are discharged every day into the ocean, at a depth of 187 feet, through that outfall. This wastewater receives at least “primary treatment,” but about one-third of the flow also receives “secondary treatment” by an activated sludge process. The third outfall terminates about seven miles from the coast. It is through this third outfall that the solids that have been removed during treatment are discharged into the ocean, at a depth of 300 feet. Prior to discharge the solid materials, commonly referred to as sludge, have been digested, screened, and diluted with secondary effluent. App. 3-4. The Hyperion plant is operated under permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (CRWQCB). Such permits are issued pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), established by § 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as added by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 880, and as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). The FWPCA was enacted with a stated and obviously worthy objective, that is, “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” § 101 (a), 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (a). In order to achieve that objective, Congress declared that “it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.” § 101 (a)(1). As one means of reaching that goal, Congress in § 301 (a) of the FWPCA provided: “Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404 of this Act [33 U. S. C. §§ 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” 86 Stat. 844, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (a). Section 402 (a) (1) authorizes the Administrator of the EPA, “after opportunity for public hearing,” to issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, notwithstanding § 301 (a), upon condition that such discharge will meet all applicable requirements established in other sections of the Act, or such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the Act’s goals and objectives. 86 Stat. 880, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (a)(1). One of the requirements applicable to an NPDES permit for a publicly owned treatment works, such as the Hyperion plant, is specified in § 301 (b)(1)(B). That provision requires such works in existence on July 1, 1977, to achieve “effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment as defined by the Administrator.” 86 Stat. 845, 33 U. S. C. §1311 (b)(1)(B). II The EPA has promulgated regulations providing for notice and public participation in any permit proceeding under the NPDES. Those regulations, implementing the statutory requirement that any NPDES permit be issued “after opportunity for public hearing,” are the focus of this case. The regulations state: “Public notice of the proposed issuance, denial or modification of every permit or denial shall be circulated in a manner designed to inform interested and. potentially interested persons of the discharge and of the proposed determination to issue, deny, or modify a permit for the discharge.” 40 CFR § 125.32 (a) (1978). That public notice “shall include at least”: (1) circulation of the notice within the affected geographical area by posting in the post office and “public places” nearest the applicant’s premises; or posting “near the entrance to the applicant’s premises and in nearby places,” or publication in local newspapers; (2) the mailing of notice to the permit applicant and “appropriate” federal and state authorities; and (3) the mailing of notice to any person or group who has requested placement on the NPDES permit mailing list for actions affecting the geographical area. Ibid. Following the issuance of public notice the EPA Regional Administrator is directed to provide at least a 30-day period during which interested persons may submit written views concerning the proposed action or may request that a hearing be held. § 125.32 (b)(1). If the Regional Administrator “finds a significant degree of public interest in a proposed permit,” he is directed to hold a public hearing on the proposed action at which interested parties may submit oral or written statements and data. § 125.34. Following a determination by the Regional Administrator to take a proposed permit action, he is directed to forward a copy of that determination to any person who has submitted written comments. If the determination is substantially changed from the initial proposed action, he must give public notice of that determination. In either event, his determination constitutes the final action of the EPA unless a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing is granted. § 125.35. Any interested person, within 10 days following the date of the determination, may request an “adjudicatory hearing” or a “legal decision” with respect to the determination. § 125.36 (b). A request for an adjudicatory hearing is to be granted by the Regional Administrator if the request “[s]ets forth material issues of fact relevant to the questions of whether a permit should be issued, denied or modified.” § 125.36 (c) (1) (ii). Issues of law, on the other hand, are not to be considered at an adjudicatory hearing. If a request for an adjudicatory hearing raises a legal issue, that issue is to be referred by the hearing officer to the EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and the General Counsel for resolution. If a request for an adjudicatory hearing raises only legal issues, a hearing will not be granted and the Regional Administrator will refer those issues to the aforementioned officers. § 125.36 (m). Ill The EPA and the CRWQCB first issued a joint permit to the city of Los Angeles for discharges of. treated sewage from the Hyperion plant in November 1974. See App. 4. That permit, covering only the 1- and 5-mile outfalls, was issued following EPA publication of notice of its intent to issue a permit, an opportunity for the submission of written comments, and a public hearing. On August 18, 1975, the 1974 permit was rescinded by the federal and state authorities, and replaced with a permit covering all three outfalls. Id., at 3. The 1975 permit conditioned continued discharges from the Hyperion plant on compliance by the city with a schedule designed to achieve full secondary treatment of wastewater by October 1, 1979, and the gradual elimination of the discharge of sludge into the ocean over a 30-month period following “concept approval” of a plan for alternative disposal of the sludge. Id., at 17-19. In July 1976, the EPA notified Los Angeles that its 1975 NPDES permit would expire on February 1, 1977, and that a new permit would be needed if discharges were to continue beyond that date. Record 44. The city filed an application for a new permit on July 30. Id., at 45-80. Thereafter, in September 1976, the CRWQCB suggested to the EPA that the city’s current permit might be extended for six months to take into account any effect of pending federal legislation that would modify the FWPCA’s mandatory compliance dates for achievement of effluent limitations based upon secondary-treatment. Id., at 119. See n. 4, supra. On January 24, 1977, after a public hearing, the EPA and the CRWQCB did extend the expiration date of the 1975 permit from February 1 to June 30, 1977, citing inadequate time to review the city’s application for a new permit. App. 93. On April 26, 1977, the EPA advised the city that it again proposed to extend the expiration date of its NPDES permit for the Hyperion plant, this time from June 30, 1977, to December 17, 1979. All other terms and conditions of the permit were to remain unchanged. App. 115-120. Notice of the proposed action was published in the Los Angeles Times the following day. See L. A. Times, Apr. 27, 1977, part V, p. 2, cols. 6-7. That notice described the permit and its proposed modification, and advised persons wishing to comment upon objections or to appear at a public hearing to submit their comments or requests for a hearing to the regional office of the EPA within 30 days. Neither the city nor the respondent PLF, nor any other party, requested a hearing or filed comments on the proposed extension, and the EPA’s Regional Administrator determined that public interest in the modification proposal was insufficient to warrant convening a public hearing. On May 23, at a public hearing, the CRWQCB officially extended the expiration date of the state permit for the Hyperion plant until December 17, 1979. App. 154. On June 2, 1977, the Regional Administrator of the EPA transmitted to the city his final determination to extend the time of expiration of the federal permit to the same 1979 date. Id., at 149. On June 10, 1977, the PLF filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the regional enforcement division of the EPA, seeking information concerning the proposed extension of the expiration date of the Hyperion permit and, specifically, whether that extension had been approved. Id., at 157. When informed by telephone on June 13 that the EPA’s final determination had been made on June 2, and that a request for an adjudicatory hearing*could be accepted only if filed that day, see 40 CFR § 125.36 (b)(1), respondent Kilroy, represented by PLF attorneys, filed such a request. Under EPA regulations, Kilroy’s request for a hearing, if granted, would automatically stay the effectiveness of the permit modification pending disposition of the request. § 125.35 (d)(2). Respondent Kilroy’s request for an adjudicatory hearing presented two issues that he wished to raise: “1. Whether the requirements of the permit should be modified in that the project that is the subject of the compliance schedule set forth in NPDES permit CA010991 ■ [the Hyperion permit] is being evaluated in an EIS by the EPA pursuant to the requirements of NEPA, the compliance schedule should not be mandated in an NPDES permit until the NEPA study is completed; and “2. Whether the procedures used and the record developed were adequate [for the] issuance of an NPDES permit.” App. 160. Within 10 days of receiving Kilroy’s request, the Regional Administrator responded by certified mail, stating his determination that the request did not set forth material issues of fact relevant to the question whether the permit should be extended. Thus, he concluded that Kilroy’s request had not met the requirements of 40 CFR § 125.36 (c)(1) (ii). The Regional Administrator did construe the request, however, as one raising issues of law relating to the appropriate interpretation to be given regulations that had been promulgated under the FWPCA. He therefore certified to the EPA’s General Counsel three issues of law raised by the request. App. 166. Before the General Counsel’s ruling on the certified issues of law was announced, respondents PLF and Kilroy, joined now by the city of Torrance, theretofore a stranger to the formal proceedings, filed a timely petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the Regional Administrator’s action extending the expiration date of the Hyperion permit. A similar petition was filed by respondent city of Los Angeles. The petitions were consolidated for review. The Court of Appeals stayed the effect of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 permit, pending final disposition of the consolidated cases. Even though the city’s NPDES permit for the Hyperion plant, as modified by the EPA on June 2, 1977, stated that it expired December 17, 1979, the terms of the permit, other than those aspects of the compliance schedules requiring completion after January 1, 1977, have remained in effect, both through the Court of Appeals’ stay and by operation of law. The case, therefore, clearly has not become moot. IV The Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the Administrator for the holding of a “proper hearing.” 586 F. 2d 650, 660-661 (CA9 1978). After first determining that it had jurisdiction to hear respondents' petitions, and rejecting Los Angeles’ argument that only the State of California had the authority to extend the Hyperion NPDES permit, id., at 654-657, the court held that the EPA had failed to provide the “opportunity for public hearing” required by § 402 (a)(1) when it extended that permit. All parties agreed that the EPA had not in fact conducted a hearing prior to its extension of the permit on June 2, 1977. The EPA contended, however, that an opportunity for a hearing had been provided; it claimed that notice of the proposed extension had been published and that, when no one requested a hearing, it was proper under agency regulations for the Regional Administrator to conclude that there was insufficient public interest in the permit extension to necessitate a hearing. See 40 CFR § 125.34 (a). The Court of Appeals rejected the EPA’s contention, holding: The court also relied on language in Independent Bankers Assn. v. Board of Governors, 170 U. S. App. D. C. 278, 516 F. 2d 1206 (1975), to the effect that certain “opportunity for hearing” requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, 84 Stat. 1765, 12 U. S. C. § 1843 (c)(8), required the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to hold an evidentiary hearing unless it could “show that the parties could gain nothing thereby, because they disputed none of the material facts upon which the agency’s decision could rest.” 170 U. S. App. D. C., at 292, 516 F. 2d, at 1220. “The fact that no one requested a hearing prior to the decision is appropriately considered in this analysis, but it is not decisive. It must be shown that the material facts supporting the decision are not subject to dispute.” 586 F. 2d, at 658-659 (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals distinguished decisions of this Court in which it was held that a failure to request a hearing constituted a waiver of any right thereto under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U. S. C. § 801 et seq., and that an agency may place the burden of demonstrating that a case presents disputed issues of material fact on the party challenging the agency’s action. 586 F. 2d, at 658-659, nn. 3 and 4 (discussing National Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U. S. 388, 397-398 (1976); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S. 609, 620 (1973); and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956)). On the record before it, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the reasonableness of the EPA’s compliance schedule [incorporated within the Hyperion NPDES permit] depends upon facts that may be disputed and with respect to which the record in this case is silent.” 586 F. 2d, at 659. With respect to such factors as the adequacy of the Palos Verdes or other landfill site, the ability of the city to acquire the capacity to transport sludge to that site within designated time limits, and the possible effect on navigable waters of land disposal of the sludge, the court stated: “[W]e can conclude unequivocally neither that the parties have no dispute about these matters nor that they do.” Ibid. Thus, the court found itself unable to deny respondents an adjudicatory hearing on the ground that there was no dispute concerning the material facts upon which the EPA’s decision to extend the permit had been based. The Administrator of the EPA petitioned .this Court for review of the question whether § 402 (a)(1) requires the EPA to conduct an adjudicatory hearing before taking action on an NPDES permit issuance or modification where, after notice of the proposed action, no one requested a hearing before the action was taken and the only request filed subsequently raised no material issue of fact. We granted certiorari to review this important issue in a rapidly developing area of the law. 442 U. S. 928 (1979). y A Petitioner’s basic contentions are that the EPA was entitled to condition the availability of a public hearing on the extension of the Hyperion permit on the filing of a proper request, and that it similarly was entitled to condition an adjudicatory hearing following its extension decision on the identification of a disputed issue of material fact by an interested party. We agree with both contentions. Initially, we must state our disagreement with respondents’ characterization of the holding of the Court of Appeals. They argue that the court’s decision was based on a finding that the EPA in this case did not comply with its own regulations governing public participation in the NPDES permit issuance process, rather than on a legal conclusion that the regulations are invalid. We conclude, on the contrary, that, although the court did not explicitly hold the regulations to be invalid, its decision renders them essentially meaningless. Rather than permitting the Regional Administrator to decide, in the first instance, whether there is sufficient public interest in a proposed issuance or modification of a permit to justify a public hearing, 40 CFR § 125.34 (a), and to limit any adjudicatory hearing to the situation where an interested party raises a material issue of fact, § 125.36 (c)(1)(ii), the Court of Appeals would require the agency to justify every failure to hold a hearing by proof that the material facts supporting its action “are not subject to dispute.” 586 F. 2d, at 659. This holding is contrary to this Court’s approval in past decisions of agency rules, similar to those at issue here, that have required an applicant who seeks a hearing to meet a threshold burden of tendering evidence suggesting the need for a hearing. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott tfe Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S., at 620-621, and cases cited therein. Moreover, it is important to note that the regulations described in Part II of this opinion, supra, were designed to implement the statutory command that permits be issued “after opportunity for public hearing.” § 402 (a)(1), 86 Stat. 880, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (a)(1) (emphasis supplied). In the past, this Court has held that a similar statutory requirement that an “opportunity” for a hearing be provided may be keyed to a request for a hearing. See National Coal Operators’ Assn. v. Kleppe, 423 U. S., at 398-399. And only recently the Court re-emphasized the fundamental administrative law principle that “the formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judgments.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U. S. 519, 524 (1978). Neither can we ignore the fact that under the standard applied by the Court of Appeals, the EPA would be required to hold hearings on most of the actions it takes with respect to NPDES permit issuances and modifications. Hearings would be required even in cases, such as this, in which the proposed action only extends a permit’s expiration date without at all affecting the substantive conditions that had been considered during earlier hearings. The Administrator advises us that each year the EPA grants about 100 requests for adjudicatory hearings under the NPDES program, issues about 2,200 permits, and takes thousands of actions with respect to permits. Brief for Petitioner 34-35; see United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F. 2d 822, 834, n. 14 (CA7 1977). Affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ rationale obviously would raise serious questions about the EPA’s ability to administer the NPDES program. See Weinberger, 412 U. S., at 621; E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112, 132-133 (1977). We recognize the validity of respondents’ contention that the. legislative history of the FWPCA indicates a strong congressional desire that the public have input in decisions concerning the elimination of water pollution. The FWPCA itself recites: “Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the Administrator .. . under this Act shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator.” § 101 (e), 86 Stat. 817, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (e). Passages in the FWPCA’s legislative history indicate that this general policy of encouraging public participation is applicable to the administration of the NPDES permit program. See, e. g., 118 Cong. Rec. 37060 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Dingell during debate on override of the President’s veto of the FWPCA). The Report of the Committee on Public Works accompanying the Senate bill emphasized that an essential element of the NPDES program is public participation, and that “[t]he public must have a genuine opportunity to speak on the issue of protection of its waters.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 72 (1971). Nonetheless, we conclude that the regulations the EPA has promulgated to implement this congressional policy are fully consistent with the legislative purpose, and are valid. Respondents, in fact, do not contest seriously the proposition that the EPA’s regulations are valid on their face; the thrust of their arguments before this Court has been that the EPA, in this instance, failed to apply its regulations consistently with their purpose. B Having rejected the Court of Appeals’ invalidation of the EPA’s public participation regulations, we turn to the issues framed by respondents. First, PLF and Kilroy contend that the EPA’s regulations required the Regional Administrator to hold a public hearing in this case because there was a “significant degree of public interest” in the extension of the Hyperion permit. See 40 CFR § 125.34 (a). They also place substantial reliance upon those agency regulations that set general guidelines for public participation in water pollution control. During the period at issue here, one such regulation provided: “Where the opportunity for public hearing is called for in the Act, and in other appropriate instances, a public hearing shall be held if the hearing official finds significant public interest (including the filing of requests or petitions for such hearing) or pertinent information to be gained. Instances of doubt should be resolved in favor of holding the hearing, or if necessary, of providing alternative opportunity for public participation.” 40 CFR § 105.7 (c). Notwithstanding the orientation of these regulations toward the encouragement of public participation in the NPDES permit issuance process, our examination of the record leads us to reject respondents’ contention that the EPA failed to comply with .its regulations in this case. It is undisputed that the most controversial aspects of the Hyperion permit — the compliance schedule for secondary treatment, the “sludge-out” requirement, and the resultant requirement that the city develop an alternative method of sludge disposal — were all included within the 1975 permit. That permit was issued following EPA publication of advance notice of its tentative determination to revise the initial 1974 permit, and a hearing on the proposed revisions. None of the respondents objected to the issuance of the 1975 permit or requested an adjudicatory hearing. We agree with the position advanced by petitioner that respondents may not reopen consideration of substantive conditions contained within the 1975 permit through hearing requests relating to a proposed permit modification that did not even purport to affect those conditions. The EPA’s determination to modify the 1975 permit by extending its expiration date to December 17, 1979, was made following newspaper publication of the proposed action, including notice of an opportunity for submission of comments and hearing requests. Respondent Los Angeles received an individual notice of the EPA’s tentative determination to extend the permit, and raised no objection. Respondents PLF and Kilroy, whq argue that the EPA was aware of their interest in the Hyperion permit and their opposition to the Interim Sludge Disposal Project, could have received such individual notice if they had asked to be placed on the EPA’s mailing list for notices of proposed agency actions within the pertinent geographical area. 40 CFR § 125.32 (a)(3). They made no such request. Under the circumstances, we think it reasonable that the Regional Administrator decided to extend the expiration date of the permit without another public hearing, on the grounds that the public had not exhibited a significant degree of interest in the action under consideration, and that information pertinent to such a decision would not have been adduced if a hearing had been held. This simply is not a case in which doubt existed concerning the need for a hearing. Second, respondents suggest that the EPA’s provision of notice to the general public concerning the proposed permit extension was inadequate. The PLF and Kilroy argue that notice by newspaper publication was not adequate to apprise interested parties of the EPA’s tentative determination, and was inconsistent with the policy of encouraging public participation that underlies the statute and regulations. Based on our conclusion that the EPA’s regulations implementing the rather amorphous “opportunity for public hearing” requirement of § 402 are valid, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the form of notice provided in this case, fully consistent with the regulations, was not inadequate. Los Angeles argues that it was not given adequate notice of the proposed extension of its permit because it was never informed that the EPA regarded the federal “sludge-out” compliance schedule contained in the 1975 permit not to have been modified by subsequent orders of the CRWQCB. See n. 6, supra. This argument was not addressed directly by the Court of Appeals. It would be appropriate, therefore, for this Court not to attempt to resolve it here, even if we had an adequate record to do so. More fundamentally, however, an additional reason dictates that the city’s argument not be resolved in the context of this lawsuit at all. Los Angeles claims that the more lenient sludge-out schedule adopted by the CRWQCB in its order of May 24, 1976 (incorporating within the Hyperion permit a four-phase alternative sludge disposal plan to be completed by April 1, 1980) has been approved by the EPA with respect to the federal permit. The EPA presently takes the position that state modifications of the sludge-out plan, adopted pursuant to California law, did not alter the initial compliance schedule incorporated in the 1975 federal permit. The agency’s position will be tested in United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 77 3047 R (CD Cal., filed Aug. 12, 1977), an enforcement action brought by the Government under § 309 of the FWPCA, 86 Stat. 859, 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). The enforcement action seeks to enjoin the city from violating the conditions of its permit and to impose civil penalties against the city for past failures to comply with the permit’s schedules. App. 181. It has been stayed by the Court of Appeals pending the outcome of this case. Brief for Petitioner 17, n. 13. The argument that the city raises here concerning its understanding of the compliance schedules will be resolved far more effectively in the Government’s enforcement action than in the adjudicatory hearing the Court of Appeals would have awarded respondents in this case. Furthermore, even if the city had raised its argument in a public hearing on the proposed permit extension, that argument would have had little relevance to the EPA’s final determination because the EPA’s proposed action did not purport to change the substantive conditions that are the focus of the city’s complaint. Finally, respondents suggest that the EPA erred in not holding an adjudicatory hearing on the issues raised in respondent Kilroy’s request. We agree with petitioner, however, who contends that Kilroy’s request raised legal, rather than factual, issues, and who notes that respondents treated the request in that fashion in arguing the issues Kilroy presented before the EPA’s General Counsel. See n. 9, supra. Even in their arguments before this Court, respondents have continued to raise factual issues that are relevant only to their contention that greater adverse effects on both the marine and land environment will result from the Interim Sludge Disposal Project than from the continued discharge of sludge into the ocean. If such issues had been raised in a timely request for an adjudicatory hearing, we agree with petitioner that the EPA could have taken the position that such issues, regardless of their merits, were not pertinent to a determination to extend the Hyperion permit’s expiration date. That determination had no impact on the compliance schedule for “sludge-out” that already had long been in effect. C In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the EPA is required to hold a public hearing on every NPDES permit action it takes unless it can show that the material facts supporting its action “are not subject to dispute.” We hold, rather, that the agency’s regulations implementing the statutory requirement of “an opportunity for public hearing” under § 402 of the FWPCA are valid. Respondents have failed to demonstrate that those regulations were not applied properly in the context of this case. The Court of Appeals’ judgment remanding the case to the agency for an adjudicatory hearing on the EPA’s extension of the expiration date of Los Angeles’ NPDES permit for its Hyperion Wastewater Treatment Plant is reversed. It is so ordered. Under applicable regulations, the Environmental Protection Agency defines “primary treatment” as “the first stage in wastewater treatment where substantially all floating or settleable solids, are removed by floatation and/or sedimentation.” 40 CFR § 125.58 (m) (1979). The agency by its regulations describes “secondary treatment” as that treatment which will attain “the minimum level of effluent quality . . . in terms of . . . parameters [sic].” These so-called “parameters” (but compare any dictionary’s definition of this term) are specified levels of biochemical oxygen demand, suspended solids, and pH values. 40 CFR §§ 125.58 (r) and 133.102 (1979). In March 1973, the EPA and the California State Water Resources Control Board entered into an understanding that gave the State primary responsibility for administering the NPDES program in California, with the.EPA retaining jurisdiction over discharges beyond the limits of the territorial sea, that is, more than three miles out from the coastline. EPA permits are thus required for the Hyperion plant’s discharges through the 5- and 7-mile outfalls. The CRWQCB, acting pursuant to California's Porter-Cologne Act, Cal. Water Code Ann. § 13260 et seq. (West 1971), also requires a state permit for these outfalls. A general description of the original Federal-Water Pollution Control Act passed in 1948, 62 Stat. 1155, the events that led to the 1972 Amendment, and the operation of the NPDES program, with particular emphasis on its implementation in California, is set forth in EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 202-209 (1976), and need not be repeated here. Although the EPA has taken the position in this litigation that § 301 (b)(1)(B) required the city to end the Hyperion plant’s discharge of sludge into the ocean by July 1, 1977, the compliance schedule incorporated in the 1975 NPDES permit required the city to achieve total “sludge-out” by April 1978. The EPA asserts that this less stringent compliance schedule was necessitated by the practical inability of Los Angeles to meet the FWPCA’s requirements. Reply Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 5. Congress subsequently has acted to permit the operator of a publicly owned treatment works, in certain circumstances, to request the EPA Administrator to extend the time allowed for achieving the limitations of § 301 (b)(1)(B). Compliance must be attained, however, by July 1, 1983. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, § 45, 91 Stat. 1584, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (i) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). The city has applied for an extension of the July 1, 1977, secondary-treatment deadline established by §301 (b)(1)(B), but that application has not yet been acted upon by the EPA. Brief for Respondent City of Los Angeles 6, n. 5. The EPA’s public participation regulations were modified after the events central to this case took place. 44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (1979). Many features of the regulations that are at issue here, however, have been retained. See 40 CFR §§ 124.41-45, 124.61-64, 124.71-101, 124.111-127, and 124.131-135 (1979). All references in this opinion to the EPA’s public participation regulations, unless otherwise designated, are to the 1978 compilation. On December 1, 1975, the CRWQCB issued an order modifying the city’s compliance schedule for alternative sludge disposal. That order announced that “concept approval” had been given on October 1, 1975, and fixed definite dates for achieving the elimination of sludge discharge into the ocean. Total "sludge-out” was to be achieved by April 1, 1978. App. 51. In subsequent orders, the CRWQCB found that the city had failed to meet several deadlines for the submission of plans and specifications for various phases of the sludge discharge elimination project. The CRWQCB then modified the relevant compliance dates, and extended the deadline for total “sludge-out” to April 1, 1980. Id., at 57. The city has taken the position in this litigation that the CRWQCB’s extension of the deadline for total “sludge-out” has been incorporated within the compliance schedule of the Hyperion plant’s federal permit as well. See injra, at 218-219. In the meantime, a significant public controversy had developed concerning the EPA’s approval of the city’s alternative sludge disposal project. That project, to be funded by construction grants awarded under Title II of the FWPCA, 86 Stat. 833, 33 U. S. C. § 1281 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II), has been referred to as the Hyperion Treatment Plant Interim Sludge Disposal Project. (The parties, commendably, have refrained from referring to this project as the HTPISDP, and so shall we.) The project called for the implementation of a process at the plant by which the digested sludge would be dewatered, formed into cakes, and hauled by truck to a sanitary landfill in Palos Verdes. An environmental impact appraisal developed by the EPA has estimated that when the trucking project is fully operational it will require 255 round trips per week over a distance of 42 miles. The city of Los Angeles and its Chamber of Commerce opposed the project, and objected when the EPA decided to fund it without preparing and evaluating an environmental impact statement (EIS), which they alleged to be required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq. App. 63. Respondent Pacific -Legal Foundation (PLF) also objected. It requested the EPA to suspend those conditions on the city’s NPDES permit that required it to cease ocean discharge of sewage sludge from the Hyperion plant. This request was based on PLF’s interpretation of the requirements of the FWPCA with respect to the discharge of pollutants into the oceans. The PLF argued that § 403 of the FWPCA, 86 Stat. 883, 33 U. S. C. § 1343, required the EPA to perform a full environmental analysis of the effects on the ocean of the cessation of sludge discharge from the Hyperion plant, as well as the economic and social costs that would be involved in replacing ocean discharge with the landfill project. App. 84. The Regional Administrator of the EPA denied the PLF’s request on January 31, 1977, taking the view that the FWPCA required all publicly owned treatment works to achieve effluent limitations based upon secondary treatment by July 1, 1977, and that this requirement mandated that the Hyperion plant cease the discharge of sewage sludge into the ocean. The Regional Administrator also noted that the conditions placed upon the 1975 permit had not been challenged during the public hearings that preceded its issuance, and that no interested party had requested an adjudicatory hearing concerning those conditions. He therefore refused to reopen consideration of the 1975 permit. Id., at 89. By the time of the Regional Administrator’s response to the PLF, the city’s permit already had been extended to June 30, 1977. The PLF then attempted, unsuccessfully, to prevent the EPA from funding the Interim Sludge Disposal Project without preparing an EIS on its decision to do so. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316 (CD Cal. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-3844 (CA9). Subsequent to the District Court’s decision in Quarles, however, the EPA voluntarily agreed to prepare an EIS on the project’s funding. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 12. Still another PLF lawsuit relating to the Hyperion permit and its “sludge-out” schedule is pending. In that action the PLF has sued officials of the EPA and the Department of the Interior claiming that those agencies have failed to carry out their statutory obligations under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., in approving the alternative sludge disposal project.- The PLF contends that the elimination of sludge discharge into the ocean will adversely affect the food chain that supports the. existence of gray whales and brown pelicans, and that trucks going to and from the landfill site will kill the El Segundo butterfly. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 12. The District Court granted the PLF’s motion for partial summary judgment on its contention that the agencies had not fulfilled their statutory obligation, and' has required the EPA to consider, during the course of the hearing ordered by the Court of Appeals in thjs case, the effects of the permit’s “sludge-out” schedule oh endangered species.' Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, Civ. No. C-78-3464-AAH(SX) (CD Cal. May 8, 1979), appeals docketed, Nos. 79-3472,79-3566,79-3661 (CA9). We, of course, express no view on the merits of these related PLF challenges to the Hyperion permit’s compliance schédules. The Administrator of the EPA has the authority to issue NPDES permits “for fixed terms not exceeding five years.” §§ 402 (a)(3), (b)(1)(B), 86 Stat. 880, 881, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (a)(3), (b)(1)(B) (1976 ed. and Supp. II). The respondents have not challenged the substantive authority of the Administrator to extend the expiration of a permit to a date within five years of its initial issuance, so long as such permit modification is implemented in accordance with applicable procedural requirements. The following were the issues of law certified by the Regional Administrator to the General Counsel: “1. Must EPA conduct an informal public hearing prior to taking action to extend the expiration date of an NPDES permit where public notice of the proposed action was published more than 30 days in advance of the action? “2. Must a detailed factual record be developed prior to modification of an NPDES permit where the only modification made to the permit is the extension of the permit’s expiration date? “3. May the expiration date of an NPDES permit be extended where a project covered by the compliance schedule is being evaluated by EPA in an Environmental Impact Statement for the purpose of determining whether a grant should be made to assist in the construction of the project?” App. 168. Following the parties’ presentation of written briefs on these and related issues, the General Counsel ruled against respondent Kilroy. She concluded that the EPA has the authority to extend the expiration date of an NPDES permit through modification, and that an opportunity for a public hearing on such a modification must be provided. A hearing is to be held, however, only if the Regional Administrator finds a significant degree of public interest in the proposed modification. The General Counsel refrained from addressing the second certified issue because Kilroy’s brief did not challenge specifically the adequacy of the record supporting the permit modification. Finally, she ruled that the EPA has the authority to extend the expiration date of a permit requiring the implementation of a project, even though funding for that project is undergoing evaluation in an EIS. The General Counsel relied on the District Court’s decision in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Quarles, see n. 7, supra, as support for the latter ruling. App. 194. The Court of Appeals in December 1977 stayed the compliance schedules incorporated within the Hyperion plant’s NPDES permit pending proceedings on remand to the EPA. The effluent limitations that were in effect on January 1, 1977, however, as well as the permit’s monitoring and reporting requirements, have remained operative pending final resolution of this dispute. 586 F. 2d 650, 660-661 (CA9 1978). Because the EPA has not yet acted upon the city’s application, filed July 30, 1976, for a new NPDES permit, the terms and conditions of the 1975 permit have remained in effect by operation of law, even though the permit expiration date has now passed. See 5 U. S. C. § 558 (c) (a federal license with reference to an activity of a continuing nature does not expire until a timely application for renewal thereof has been finally determined by the pertinent agency); Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Respondents PLF and Kilroy suggest that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as having been improvidently granted because petitioner has inserted issues in his brief on the merits that were not included within the question presented in his petition for certiorari. We decline the invitation to dismiss the writ. We note, however, that a decision in this case does not require us to resolve petitioner’s contention, challenged by respondents as a “new issue,” that Congress did not intend adjudicatory hearings under § 402 of the FWPCA to be governed by the formal requirements of an adjudication “on the record” set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §554 (1976 ed. and Supp. II). To the extent the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary relied upon the decision in Independent Bankers Asm. v. Board of Governors, 170 U. S. App. D. C. 278, 516 F. 2d 1206 (1975), such reliance was misplaced. The passage from that opinion relied upon by the Court of Appeals itself demonstrates that the decision stands for the proposition that a party waives its right to an adjudicatory hearing where it fails to dispute the material facts upon which the agency’s decision rests. See supra, at 212. The Court of Appeals’ stay of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 permit did not remove the basis for the Government’s enforcement action. That action challenges several alleged violations of the Hyperion NPDES permit that predated January 1, 1977. App. 183-187. See n. 10, supra. Respondents’ litigation strategy throughout the proceedings culminating in this opinion seems to have been based, at least in part, on a fear that the EPA may evade further public scrutiny of the compliance schedules incorporated within the 1975 NPDES permit by issuing continued extensions of that permit rather than acting upon the city’s application for a new permit. See supra, at 205-206. If that potential for evasion ever did exist, it was a limited one. Under § 402 (b) (1) (B) of the FWPCA, the EPA could have set the expiration date for the initial 1975 permit as late as August 1980, and the agency actions that culminated in this lawsuit would have been unnecessary. Now that the outside date for extensions of the 1975 permit is approaching, any additional extension for purposes of avoiding further hearings on the permit’s compliance schedules would have little practical impact. We note, as well, that Los Angeles, under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (1) (a reviewing court shall “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”) may obtain judicial review of prolonged agency inaction with respect to its application for a new permit.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WOODBY v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 40. Argued November 17, 1966. Decided December 12, 1966. Jacob A. Myers argued the cause for petitioner in No. 40. With him on the briefs was Sidney G. Kusworm, Sr. Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., argued the cause for respondent in No. 40, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Robert S. Rifkind, L. Paul Winings and Charles Gordon. Joseph Forer argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 80. Charles Gordon argued the cause for respondent in No. 80. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Richard A. Posner and Maurice A. Roberts. Frank C. Newman, pro se, filed a brief for Newman et al., as amici curiae, in No. 80. Together with No. 80, Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, argued on November 16-17, 1966. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by these cases is what burden of proof the Government must sustain in deportation proceedings. We have concluded that it is incumbent upon the Government in such proceedings to establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. In Sherman (No. 80), the petitioner is a resident alien who entered this country from Poland in 1920 as a 14-year-old boy. In 1963 the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted proceedings to deport him upon the ground that he had re-entered the United States in 1938, following a trip abroad, without inspection as an alien. After a hearing before a special inquiry officer, the petitioner was ordered to be deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Government’s evidence showed that the petitioner had obtained a passport in 1937 under the name of Samuel Levine, representing himself as a United States citizen. Someone using this passport sailed to France in June 1937, proceeded to Spain, returned to the United States in December 1938, aboard the S. S. Amonia, and was admitted without being examined as an alien. To establish that it was the petitioner who had traveled under this passport, the Government introduced the testimony of Edward Morrow, an American citizen who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. Morrow was at first unable to remember the name Samuel Levine or identify the petitioner, but eventually stated that he thought he had known the petitioner as “Sam Levine,” had seen him while fighting for the Loyalists in Spain during 1937 and 1938, and had returned with him to the United States aboard the S. S. Ausonia in December 1938. Morrow conceded that his recollection of events occurring 27 years earlier was imperfect, and admitted that his identification of the petitioner might be mistaken. It is not clear what standard of proof the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals on de novo review applied in determining that it was the petitioner who had traveled to Spain and re-entered the United States under the Samuel Levine passport. At the outset of his opinion, the special inquiry officer stated that the Government must establish deportability “by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence,” without discussing what the burden of proof was. Later he concluded that the Government had established its contentions “with a solidarity far greater than required,” but did not further elucidate what was “required.” The Board of Immigration Appeals stated that it was “established beyond any reasonable doubt” that the petitioner had obtained the Samuel Levine passport, and added that this established a “presumption” that the petitioner had used it to travel abroad. The Board further stated that it was a “most unlikely hypothesis” that someone other than the petitioner had obtained and used the passport, and asserted that “the Service has borne its burden of establishing” that the petitioner was deport-able, without indicating what it considered the weight of that burden to be. Upon petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit originally set aside the deportation order, upon the ground that the Government has the burden of proving the facts supporting deportability beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reversed itself, however, upon a rehearing en banc, holding that the Government need only prove its case with “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” We granted certiorari, 384 U.S. 904. In Woodby (No. 40), the petitioner is a resident alien who was born in Hungary and entered the United States from Germany in 1956 as the wife of an American soldier. Deportation proceedings were instituted against her on the ground that she had engaged in prostitution after entry. A special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that she was deportable upon the ground charged. At the administrative hearing the petitioner admitted that she had engaged in prostitution for a brief period in 1957, some months after her husband had deserted her, but claimed that her conduct was the product of circumstances amounting to duress. Without reaching the validity of the duress defense, the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that the petitioner had continued to engage in prostitution after the alleged duress had terminated. The hearing officer and the Board did not discuss what burden of proof the Government was required to bear in establishing deportability, nor did either of them indicate the degree of certainty with which their factual conclusions were reached. The special inquiry officer merely asserted that the evidence demonstrated that the petitioner was deportable. The Board stated that the evidence made it “apparent” that the petitioner had engaged in prostitution after the alleged duress had ended, and announced that “it is concluded that the evidence establishes deportability . . . .” In denying a petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly deal with the issue of what burden of persuasion was imposed upon the Government at the administrative level, finding only that “the Board’s underlying order is 'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole ....’” We granted certiorari, 384 U. S. 904. In the prevailing opinion in the Sherman case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “[i]f the slate were clean,” it “might well agree that the standard of persuasion for deportation should be similar to that in denaturalization, where the Supreme Court has insisted that the evidence must be 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ and that the Government needs ‘more than a bare preponderance of the evidence’ to prevail. . . . But here,” the court thought, “Congress has spoken . . . .” 350 F. 2d, at 900. This view was based upon two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act which use the language “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” in connection with deportation orders. The provisions in question are § 106 (a) (4) of the Act which states that a deportation order, “if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive,” and § 242 (b) (4) of the Act which provides inter alia that “no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” It seems clear, however, that these two statutory provisions are addressed not to the degree of proof required at the administrative level in deportation proceedings, but to quite a different subject — the scope of judicial review. The elementary but crucial difference between burden of proof and scope of review is, of course, a commonplace in the law. The difference is most graphically illustrated in a criminal case. There the prosecution is generally required to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. But if the correct burden of proof was imposed at the trial, judicial review is generally limited to ascertaining whether the evidence relied upon by the trier of fact was of sufficient quality and substantiality to support the rationality of the judgment. In other words, an appellate court in a criminal case ordinarily does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. That § 106 (a) (4) relates exclusively to judicial review is made abundantly clear by its language, its context, and its legislative history. Section 106 was added to the Act in 1961 in order “to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States.” The section is entitled “Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation and Exclusion,” and by its terms provides “the sole and exclusive procedure for” the “judicial review of all final orders of deportation.” Subsection 106 (a)(4) is a specific directive to the courts in which petitions for review are filed. It is hardly less clear that the other provision upon which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied, §242 (b)(4) of the Act, is also addressed to reviewing courts, and, insofar as it represents a yardstick for the administrative factfinder, goes, not to the burden of proof, but rather to the quality and nature of the evidence upon which a deportation order must be based. The provision declares that “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” shall be the measure of whether a deportability decision is “valid” — a word that implies scrutiny by a reviewing tribunal of a decision already reached by the trier of the facts. The location of this provision in a section containing provisions dealing with procedures before the special inquiry officer has little significance when it is remembered that the original 1952 Act did not itself contain a framework for judicial review — although such review was, of course, available by habeas corpus or otherwise. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302. And whatever ambiguity might be thought to lie in the location of this section is resolved by its legislative history. The Senate Report explained § 242 (b)(4) as follows: “The requirement that the decision of the special inquiry officer shall be based on reasonable, substantial and probative evidence means that, where the decision rests upon evidence of such a nature that it cannot be said that a reasonable person might not have reached the conclusion which was reached, the case may not be reversed because the judgment of the appellate body differs from that of the administrative body.” We conclude, therefore, that Congress has not addressed itself to the question of what degree of proof is required in deportation proceedings. It is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve, and its resolution is necessary in the interest of the evenhanded administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The petitioners urge that the appropriate burden of proof in deportation proceedings should be that which the law imposes in criminal cases — the duty of proving the essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government, on the other hand, points out that a deportation proceeding is not a criminal case, and that the appropriate burden of proof should consequently be the one generally imposed in civil cases and administrative proceedings — the duty of prevailing by a mere preponderance of the evidence. To be sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580. But it does not syllogistically follow that a person may be banished from this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case. This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification. In words apposite to the question before us, we have spoken of “the solidity of proof that is required for a judgment entailing the consequences of deportation, particularly in the case of an old man who has lived in this country for forty years . . . .” Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U. S. 115, 120. In denaturalization cases the Court has required the Government to establish its allegations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. The same burden has been imposed in expatriation cases. That standard of proof is no stranger to the civil law. No less a burden of proof is appropriate in deportation proceedings. The immediate hardship of deportation is often greater than that inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in expulsion from our shores. And many resident aliens have lived in this country longer and established stronger family, social, and economic ties here than some who have become naturalized citizens. We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true. Accordingly, in each of the cases before us, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is set aside, and the case is remanded with directions to remand to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for such further proceedings as, consistent with this opinion, may be deemed appropriate. It is so ordered. Section 241 (a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(2), provides for deportation of any alien who “entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General ...” Prior to 1952, the Government was required to bring deportation proceedings within five years of an alleged illegal entry, 39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 155 (a) (1946 ed.). Thus, under the prior law, the petitioner would not have been subject to deportation proceedings commenced after 1943. However, this time limit was retroactively eliminated by the 1952 Act, §241 (d), 66 Stat. 208, 8 U. S. C. §1251 (d). See Developments in the Law, Immigration and Nationality, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 683-684. In conformity with its usual practice, the Board made its own independent determination of the factual issues after de novo examination of the record. See Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure 46-47 (1959). 350 F. 2d 894. 350 F. 2d, at 901. The. court adopted the reasoning of the opinion which Judge Friendly had filed as a dissent to the original decision. Judges Waterman and Smith, who had formed the original majority, dissented. Section 241 (a) (12) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 207, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (12), provides for the deportation of any alien who “by reason of any conduct, behavior or activity at any time after entry became a member of any of the classes specified in paragraph (12) of section 212 (a) . . . .” Among the classes specified in §212 (a) (12) of the Act, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (12), are “Aliens who are prostitutes or who have engaged in prostitution. . . .” 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a (a)(4). 66 Stat. 210 (1952), 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b) (4). See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 914 (1966); Comment, 41 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 622 (1966); Standard of Proof in Deportation Proceedings, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1237 (1966). See McCormick, Evidence 681-685 (1954); 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2497 (3d ed. 1940). E. g., Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130, 135. For discussion of variations of and alternatives to the usual rule, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L. J. 1149, 1157-1163 (1960). H. R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 22. “Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation and Exclusion “Sec. 106. (a) The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of the Act of December 29, 1950, as amended (64 Stat. 1129; 68 Stat. 961; 5 U. S. C. 1031 et seq.), shall apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . except that— “(4) . . . the petition shall be determined solely upon the administrative record upon which the deportation order is based and the Attorney General’s findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive . . . .” 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a (a). This has been recognized by the Board of Immigration Appeals itself: “Finally, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the burden of proof and the quality of the evidence which is required to establish that burden successfully. It is to be noted that subsection (b)(4) of section 242 of the act does not speak of the burden of proof but of the quality of the evidence which the Service must produce before deportability can validly be found. . . .” Matter of V—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 460, 463. S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 30. The House Report contains substantially identical language. H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 57. See McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 242 (1944). See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2488-2493, 2497-2498 (3d ed. 1940). Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665; Nowak v. United States, 356 U. S. 660; Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350. Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U. S. 920; Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 129. But see § 349 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 75 Stat. 656 (1961), 8 U. S. C. § 1481 (c). This standard, or an even higher one, has traditionally been imposed in cases involving allegations of civil fraud, and in a variety of other kinds of civil cases involving such issues as adultery, illegitimacy of a child bom in wedlock, lost wills, oral contracts to make bequests, and the like. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940). This standard of proof applies to all deportation cases, regardless of the length of time the alien has resided in this country. It is perhaps worth pointing out, however, that, as a practical matter, the more recent the alleged events supporting deportability, the more readily the Government will generally be able to prove its allegations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Section 106 (a)(1) of the Act, 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a (a)(1), provides that a petition for judicial review must be filed with the Court of Appeals not later than six months after a final order of deportation. In No. 40, Woodby, the petitioner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was dismissed on March 8, 1963, and a motion for reconsideration was denied on May 27, 1963. Petition for review by the Court of Appeals was filed more than six months after the Board upheld the deportation order, but within six months after the denial of the motion to reconsider. The Court of Appeals did not pass on the question whether, in such circumstances, its power of review was limited to consideration whether the denial of the motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion, or whether it might also assess in full the validity of the deportation order. Following the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, in similar circumstances, that it had authority to undertake full review of the deportation order, as well as the denial of the motion to reconsider. Bregman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 351 F. 2d 401. In light of the Bregman decision, the Government before this Court expressly abandoned its contention that in this case the courts are limited to reviewing the denial of the motion to reconsider. See the Government’s brief in No. 40, Woodby, p. 8, n. 3.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LITTLE v. STREATER No. 79-6779. Argued January 13, 1981 Decided June 1, 1981 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Jon C. Blue, by appointment of the Court, 449 U. S. 948, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Stephen J. McGovern, Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Carl B. Ajello, Attorney General. Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents the question whether a Connecticut statute, which provides that in paternity actions the cost of blood grouping tests is to be borne by the party requesting them, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to deny such tests to indigent defendants. I On May 21, 1975, appellee Gloria Streater, while unmarried, gave birth to a female child, Kenyatta Chantel Streater. As a requirement stemming from her child’s receipt of public assistance, appellee identified appellant Walter Little as the child’s father to the Connecticut Department of Social Services. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-169 (1981). The Department then provided an attorney for appellee to bring a paternity suit against appellant in the Court of Common Pleas at New Haven to establish his liability for the child’s support. At the time the paternity action was commenced, appellant was incarcerated in the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Enfield. Through his counsel, who was provided by a legal aid organization, appellant moved the trial court to order blood grouping tests on appellee and her child pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-184 (1977), which later became Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) and includes the provision that “[t]he costs of making such tests shall be chargeable against the party making the motion.” Appellant asserted th^t he was indigent and asked that the State be ordered to pay for the tests. The trial court granted the motion insofar as it sought blood grouping tests but denied the request that they be furnished at the State’s expense. App. 8. For “financial reasons,” no blood grouping tests were performed even though they had been authorized. Id., at 12. The paternity action was tried to the court on September 28, 1978. Both appellee and appellant, who was still a state prisoner, testified at trial. Id., at 14-19. After listening to the testimony, the court found that appellant was the child’s father. Id., at 2, 20. Following a subsequent hearing on damages, the court entered judgment against appellant in the amount of $6,974.48, which included the “lying-in” expenses of appellee and the child, “accrued maintenance” through October 31, 1978, and the “costs of suit plus reasonable attorney’s fees.” Ibid. In addition, appellant was ordered to pay child support at the rate of $2 per month — $1 toward the arrearage amount of $6,974.48 and $1 toward a current monthly award of $163.58 — directly to Connecticut’s Department of Finance and Control. Id., at 20-21. The Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a per curiam opinion that is not officially reported. Relying on its prior decision in Ferro v. Morgan, 35 Conn. Supp. 679, 406 A. 2d 873, cert. denied, 177 Conn. 753, 399 A. 2d 526 (1979), the Appellate Session held that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-168 (1981) does not violate the due process and equal protection rights of an indigent defendant in a paternity proceeding. The Appellate Session thus found no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion that the cost of blood grouping tests be paid by the State. App. 25-26. Thereafter, appellant’s petition for certification was denied by the Connecticut Supreme Court, 180 Conn. 756, 414 A. 2d 199 (1980); and we noted probable jurisdiction, 449 U. S. 817 (1980). The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part: “No State shall .. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .. .” Appellant argues that his right to due process was abridged by the refusal, under Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-168 (1981), to grant his request based on in-digency for state-subsidized blood grouping tests. Due process, “unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162 (1951) (concurring opinion). Rather, it is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 377 (1971), the Court held that “due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Accord, Armstrong v. Manso, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). And in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), we explained: “ [Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” These standards govern appellant’s due process claim, which is premised on the unique quality of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evidence, the State’s prominent role in the litigation, and the character of paternity actions under Connecticut law. A The discovery of human blood groups by Dr. Karl Landsteiner in Vienna at the beginning of this century, and subsequent understanding of their hereditary aspects, made possible the eventual use of blood tests to scientifically evaluate allegations of paternity. P. Speiser & F. Smekal, Karl Landsteiner 89-93 (1975). Like their European counterparts, American courts gradually recognized the evidentiary value of blood grouping tests in paternity cases, and the modern status of such tests has been described by one commentator as follows: “As far as the accuracy, reliability, dependability— even infallibility — of the test are concerned, there is no longer any controversy. The result of the test is universally accepted by distinguished scientific and medical authority. There is, in fact, no living authority of repute, medical or legal, who may be cited adversely. . . . [T]here is now . . . practically universal and unanimous judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of paternity.” S. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings §9.13 (1975). The application of blood tests to the issue of paternity results from certain properties of the human blood groups and types: (a) the blood group and type of any individual can be determined at birth or shortly thereafter; (b) the blood group and type of every individual remain constant throughout life; and (c) the blood groups and types are inherited in accordance with Mendel’s laws. Id., § 5.03. If the blood groups and types of the mother and child are known, the possible and impossible blood groups and types of the true father can be determined under the rules of inheritance. For example, a group AB child cannot have a group O parent, but can have a group A, B, or AB parent. Similarly, a child cannot be type M unless one or both parents are type M, and the factor rh' cannot appear in the blood of a child unless present in the blood of one or both parents. Id., §§ 5.03 and 6.02. Since millions of men belong to the possible groups and types, a blood grouping test cannot conclusively establish paternity. However, it can demonstrate nonpaternity, such as where the alleged father belongs to group 0 and the child is group AB. It is a negative rather than an affirmative test with the potential to scientifically exclude the paternity of a falsely accused putative father. The ability of blood grouping tests to exonerate innocent putative fathers was confirmed by a 1976 report developed jointly by the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association. Miale, Jennings, Rettberg, Sell, & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Family L. Q. 247 (Fall 1976). The joint report recommended the use of seven blood test “systems” — ABO, Rh, MNSs, Kell, Duffy, Kidd, and HLA — when investigating questions of paternity. Id., at 257-258. These systems were found to be “reasonable” in cost and to provide a 91% cumulative probability of negating paternity for erroneously accused Negro men and 93% for white men. Id., at 254, 257-258. The effectiveness of the seven systems attests the probative value of blood test evidence in paternity cases. The importance of that scientific evidence is heightened because “[tjhere are seldom accurate or reliable eyewitnesses since the sexual activities usually take place in intimate and private surroundings, and the self-serving testimony of a party is of questionable reliability.” Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond, 13 J. Fam. L. 713 (1973-1974). As Justice Brennan wrote while a member of the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court: “[I]n the field of contested paternity . . . the truth is so often obscured because social pressures create a conspiracy of silence or, worse, induce deliberate falsity. “The value of blood tests as a wholesome aid in the quest for truth in the administration of justice in these matters cannot be gainsaid in this day. Their reliability as an indicator of the truth has been fully established. The substantial weight of medical and legal authority attests their accuracy, not to prove paternity, and not always to disprove it, but ‘they can disprove it conclusively in a great many cases provided they are administered by specially qualified experts’ . . . .” Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 156, 76 A. 2d 717, 719 (1950). B Appellant emphasizes that, unlike a common dispute between private parties, the State’s involvement in this paternity proceeding was considerable and manifest, giving rise to a constitutional duty. Because appellee’s child was a recipient of public assistance, Connecticut law compelled her, upon penalty of fine and imprisonment for contempt, “to disclose the name of the putative father under oath and to institute an action to establish the paternity of said child.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-169 (1981). See Maher v. Doe, 432 U. S. 526 (1977); Roe v. Norton, 422 U. S. 391 (1975). The State’s Attorney General automatically became a party to the action, and any settlement agreement required his approval or that of the Commissioner of Human Resources or Commissioner of Income Maintenance. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46b-160 and 46b-170 (1981). The State referred this mandatory paternity suit to appellee’s lawyer “for prosecution” and paid his fee as well as all costs of the litigation. App. 10, 20; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 34, 40. In addition, the State will be the recipient of the monthly support payments to be made by appellant pursuant to the trial court’s judgment. App. 21. “State action” has undeniably pervaded this case. Accordingly, appellant need not, and does not, contend that Connecticut has a constitutional obligation to fund blood tests for an indigent’s defense in ordinary civil litigation between private parties. The nature of paternity proceedings in Connecticut also bears heavily on appellant’s due process claim. Although the State characterizes such proceedings as “civil,” see Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367, 372-373, 365 A. 2d 824, 827-828, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 852 (1976), they have “quasi-criminal” overtones. Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 46b-171 (1981) provides that if a putative father “is found guilty, the court shall order him to stand charged with the support and maintenance of such child” (emphasis added); and his subsequent failure to comply with the court’s support order is punishable by imprisonment under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-171, 46b-215, and 53-304 (1981). Cf. Walker v. Stokes, 45 Ohio App. 2d 275, 278, 344 N. E. 2d 159, 161 (1975); People v. Doherty, 261 App. Div. 86, 87, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 821, 823 (1941). Moreover, the defendant in a Connecticut paternity action faces an unusual evidentiary obstacle. Connecticut’s original “bastardy” statute was enacted in 1672, see The Book of the General Laws for the People Within the Jurisdiction of Connecticut 6 (1673), and from 1702 until 1902 it stated in pertinent part: “And if such woman shall continue constant in her accusation, being put to the discovery in the time of her travail, and also examined on the trial of the cause, it shall be prima facie evidence that such accused person is the father of such child.” Mosher v. Bennett, 108 Conn. 671, 672, 144 A. 297 (1929). In Booth v. Hart, 43 Conn. 480 (1876), the Connecticut Supreme Court construed this statutory language as follows: “[For 146 years], parties to suits with but one exception could not testify in their own behalf. But in cases of illegitimate children, ... an exception was made of suits brought by [a mother] for the maintenance of [her] child, and she was allowed to testify who was its father under certain safeguards provided by the statute. And the statute went on to provide that if she should continue constant in her accusation, being examined on oath and put to the discovery in the time of her travail, the person whom she declared to be the father of her child should be adjudged to be so, unless from the evidence introduced by him the triers should be of the opinion that he was innocent of the charge. The existence of these few facts were all that was necessary to maintain the suit in the first instance, and the burden of proof then changed to the defendant, and he was required to prove himself innocent of the accusation by other evidence than his own.” Id., at 485. In 1848, the Connecticut Legislature enacted a statute providing that “[n]o person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise.” Id., at 486. Since the defendant in a paternity action was no longer precluded from testifying in his own behalf, the 1848 statute removed the need for the safeguard of putting the complainant “to the discovery in the time of her travail.” Ibid. In its modern form, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-160 (1981) simply states that “if such mother or expectant mother continues constant in her accusation, it shall be evidence that the respondent is the father of such child.” Nevertheless, in Mosher v. Bennett, supra, at 674, 144 A., at 298, the Connecticut Supreme Court held: “The mother still has the right to rely upon the prima facie case made out by constancy in her accusation. She is no longer required under oath to make such discovery at the time of her travail. The prima facie case so made out places upon the reputed father the burden of showing his innocence of the charge, and under our practice he must do this by other evidence than his own.” (Emphasis added.) Accord, Kelsaw v. Green, 6 Conn. Cir. 516, 519-520, 276 A. 2d 909, 911-912 (1971). Under Connecticut law, therefore, the defendant in a paternity suit is placed at a distinct disadvantage in that his testimony valone is insufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Among the most probative additional evidence the defendant might offer are the results of blood grouping tests, but if he is indigent, the State essentially denies him that reliable scientific proof by requiring that he bear its cost. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-168 (1981). In substance, the State has created an adverse presumption regarding the defendant’s testimony by elevating the weight to be accorded the mother’s imputation of him. If the plaintiff has been “constant” in her accusation of paternity, the defendant carries the burden of proof and faces severe penalties if he does not meet that burden and fails to comply with the judgment entered against him. Yet not only is the State inextricably involved in paternity litigation such as this and responsible for an imbalance between the parties, it in effect forecloses what is potentially a conclusive means for an indigent defendant to surmount that disparity and exonerate himself. Such a practice is irreconcilable with the command of the Due Process Clause. c Our holding in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 335, set forth three elements to be evaluated in determining what process is constitutionally due: the private interests at stake; the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results and the probable value of the suggested procedural safeguard; and the governmental interests affected. Analysis of those considerations weighs in appellant’s favor. The private interests implicated here are substantial. Apart from the putative father’s pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support obligation and liberty interest threatened by the possible sanctions for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child relationship. This Court frequently has stressed the importance of familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded them constitutional protection. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972). Just as the termination of such bonds demands procedural fairness, see Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, p. 18, so too does their imposition. Through the judicial process, the State properly endeavors to identify the father of a child bom out of wedlock and to make him responsible for the child’s maintenance. Obviously, both the child and the defendant in a paternity action have a compelling interest in the accuracy of such a determination. Given the usual absence of witnesses, the self-interest coloring the testimony of the litigants, and the State’s onerous evidentiary rule and refusal to pay for blood grouping tests, the risk is not inconsiderable that an indigent defendant in a Connecticut paternity proceeding will be erroneously adjudged the father of the child in question. See generally H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy 106-108 (1971). Further, because of its recognized capacity to definitively exclude a high percentage of falsely accused putative fathers, the availability of scientific blood test evidence clearly would be a valuable procedural safeguard in such cases. See id., at 123-137; Part II-A, supra. Connecticut has acknowledged as much in § 46b-168 of its statutes by providing for the ordering of blood tests and the admissibility of negative findings. See n. 2, supra. Unlike other evidence that may be susceptible to varying interpretation or disparagement, blood test results, if obtained under proper conditions by qualified experts, are difficult to refute. Thus, access to blood grouping tests for indigent defendants such as appellant would help to insure the correctness of paternity decisions in Connecticut. The State admittedly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of a child bom out of wedlock who is receiving public assistance, as well as in securing support for the child from those legally responsible. In addition, it shares the interest of the child and the defendant in an accurate and just determination of paternity. See Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 17-82e-4 (1979). Nevertheless, the State also has financial concerns; it wishes to have the paternity actions in which it is involved proceed as economically as possible and, hence, seeks to avoid the expense of blood grouping tests. Pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 655 (a)(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), however, the states are entitled to reimbursement of 75% of the funds they expend on operation of their approved child support plans, and regulations promulgated under authority of 42 U. S. C. § 1302 make clear that such federal financial participation is available for the development of evidence regarding paternity, “including the use of . . . blood tests.” 45 CFR § 304.20 (b) (2) (i) (B) (1980). Moreover, following the example of other states, the expense of blood grouping tests for an indigent defendant in a Connecticut paternity suit could be advanced by the State and then taxed as costs to the parties. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34.705.1 (1962); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-132 (1974); La. Rev. Stat. §9:397.1 (West Supp. 1981); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §522:3 (1974); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 109.256 (1) (1979); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6135 (Purdon Supp. 1981); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 13.03 (b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). We must con-elude that the State’s monetary interest “is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, at 28. Assessment of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors indicates that appellant did not receive the process he was constitutionally due. Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a paternity case, an indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adversary when the child is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the evidentiary burden Connecticut imposes, lacks “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 377. Therefore, “the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness’ ” expressed by the Due Process Clause was not satisfied here. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, post, at 24. Ill “[A] statute . . . may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S., at 379. Thus, “a cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.” Id., at 380. We hold that, in these specific circumstances, the application of Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-168 (1981) to deny appellant blood grouping tests because of his lack of financial resources violated the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. While the case was pending, the Court of Common Pleas was merged with the Superior Court of Connecticut. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51~164s (1981). In its entirety, Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-168 (1981) states: “In any proceeding in which a question of paternity is an issue, the court, on motion of any party, may order the mother, her child and the putative father or the husband of the mother to submit to one or more blood grouping tests, to be made by a qualified physician or other qualified person, designated by the court, to determine whether or not the putative father or the husband of the mother can be excluded as being the father of the child. The results of such tests shall be admissible in evidence only in cases where such results establish definite exclusion of the putative father or such husband as such father. The costs of making such tests shall be chargeable against the party making the motion.” Appellant’s financial affidavit, which was filed with the motion, showed that he had weekly income of $5, expenses of $5, and no assets. App. 7. The trial court later specifically found that, at the time of the motion, appellant “was indigent and could not afford to pay the costs for blood grouping tests.” Id., at 23. Although appellant admitted intimacy with appellee, he expressed doubt that he was the child’s father because of appellee’s alleged relationship with another man and because she had not allowed him to see the child. Id., at 17-18. The minimal sum of $2 was ordered presumably because appellant was indigent and incarcerated. However, his payments to the State are subject to future increase pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b-171 (1981), which provides that “[a]ny order for the payment of [child] support . . . may at any time thereafter be set aside or altered by any court issuing such order.” In response to an interrogatory, appellee, through her attorney, stated that her “continuing eligibility for [public] assistance required her to disclose [the] father’s identity.” App. 10. Connecticut’s disclosure requirement is fostered by 42 U. S. C. § 654 (4), which directs that, as to any child bom out of wedlock for whom benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program are claimed, the states must undertake “to establish . . . paternity . . . unless ... it is against the best interests of the child to do so” and “to secure support for such child from his parent.” See also 45 CFR §232.12 (1980). At oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General of Connecticut acknowledged that the cost of any witnesses for the plaintiff in a proceeding such as this also would be paid by the State. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. At oral argument, the State’s Assistant Attorney General represented that “[c]urrently th[is] is the law of Connecticut,” id., at 46; and, when presented with a hypothetical situation, his response illustrated the practical operation of the evidentiary rule: “QUESTION: [D]oes that mean . . . that [if] she takes the stand [and says], he’s the father, he’s the father, he’s the father, he’s the father. She never deviates. ... He takes the stand and says, I am not, I am not, I am not, I am not. And the factfinder believes him and doesn’t believe her, you’re saying— “[COUNSEL’S ANSWER]: If that was the testimony, she would win.” Id., at 44. In its Report on the 1974 Social Services Amendments to the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 654, 655, et al., the Senate Finance Committee stated: “In taking the position that a child bom out of wedlock has a right to have its paternity ascertained in a fair and efficient manner, the [C]om-mittee acknowledges that legislation must recognize the interest primarily at stake in the paternity action to be that of the child. . . . The Committee is convinced that . . . paternity can be ascertained with reasonable assurance, particularly through the use of scientifically conducted blood typing.” S. Rep. No. 93-1356, p. 52 (1974). See n. 6, supra. Laboratories surveyed in a 1977 study sponsored by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now in part the Department of Health and Human Services) charged an average of approximately $245 for a battery of test systems that led to a minimum exclusion rate of 80%. HEW Office of Child Support Enforcement, Blood Testing to Establish Paternity 35-37 (1977 Condensed Report). According to appellant, blood grouping tests were available at the Hartford Hospital for $250 at the time this paternity action was pending trial, but the cost has since been increased to $460. Brief for Appellant 4, and n. 5. Other jurisdictions also have statutes by which blood grouping tests can be made available to indigents. See, e. g., Ala. Code § 26-12-5 (1977); D. C. Code § 16-2343 (Supp. V 1978); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 584r-16 (1976); Md. Ann. Code § 16-66G (Supp. 1980); Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716 (e) (1970); Minn. Stat. § 257.69 (2) (1980); N. D. Cent. Code § 14-17-15 (Supp. 1977); Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-23 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.48 (5) (West Supp. 1980). In addition, the highest courts of Colorado, Massachusetts, and West Virginia have held that putative fathers may not constitutionally be denied access to blood grouping tests on the basis of indigency. See Franklin v. District Court, 194 Colo. 189, 571 P. 2d 1072 (1977); Commonwealth v. Possehl, 355 Mass. 575, 246 N. E. 2d 667 (1969); State ex rel. Craves v. Daugherty, 266 S. E. 2d 142 (W. Va. 1980). Apart from Connecticut, it also appears that North Carolina requires all defendants requesting blood tests in paternity proceedings, irrespective of means, “to initially be responsible for any of the expenses thereof” or do without them. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 8-50.1 (b) (2) (Supp. 1979). In Boddie, we held that due process prohibits a state from denying an indigent access to its divorce courts because of inability to pay filing fees and costs. However, in United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973), the Court concluded that due process does not require waiver of filing fees for an indigent seeking a discharge in bankruptcy or appellate review of an agency determination resulting in reduced welfare benefits. Our decisions in Kras and Ortwein emphasized the availability' of other relief and the less “fundamental” character of the private interests at stake than those implicated in Boddie. Because appellant has no choice of an alternative forum and his interests, as well as those of the child, are constitutionally significant, this case is comparable to Boddie rather than to Kras and Ortwein. Because of our disposition of appellant’s due process claim, we need not consider whether the statute, as applied, also violated the Equal Protection Clause.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MONTANA-DAKOTA UTILITIES CO. v. NORTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE CO. No. 77. Argued November 27, 1950. Decided May 7, 1951. William D. Mitchell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John C. Benson, H. F. Fellows and Rodger L. Nordbye. Jacob M. Lashly argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Max Royhl, Fredric H. Stafford and Paul B. Rava. By special leave of Court, Howard E. Wahrenbrock argued the cause for the Federal Power Commission, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern, Bradford Ross and Reuben Goldberg. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner and respondent are public electric utilities companies engaged in interstate commerce. Petitioner’s predecessor and respondent were under the same management through interlocking directorships and joint officers. During that relationship the two interchanged electric energy, shared expenses, and made a number of intercompany contracts establishing rates and charges, which contracts were filed with and accepted by the Federal Power Commission. These contract rates and charges are at the root of this controversy. Petitioner charges that, during the period 1935-1945, its predecessor paid respondent unreasonably high prices for what respondent furnished it, and that it received unreasonably low rates for what it provided respondent. That advantage, it is alleged, was fraudulent and unlawful and was due to the interlocking directorate, which prevented protest to the Commission to have reasonable rates and charges established pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Power Act. Petitioner sued in United States District Court and asserted jurisdiction on the ground that the case “arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States” and, more particularly, under a “law regulating commerce,” specifically the Federal Power Act. Petitioner was successful in the District Court, which found the contracts void for fraud and the rates and charges established therein unreasonable. The court also determined what would have been reasonable rates and charges for the period in question and gave judgment for the difference between its conception of reasonable charges and the actual charges, amounting to over three-quarters of a million dollars. The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that the District Court was without jurisdiction. As frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question whether the complaint states a cause of action. The Judicial Code, in vesting jurisdiction in the District Courts, does not create causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions. Petitioner asserted a cause of action under the Power Act. To determine whether that claim is well founded, the District Court must take jurisdiction, whether its ultimate resolution is to be in the affirmative or the negative. If the complaint raises a federal question, the mere claim confers power to decide that it has no merit, as well as to decide that it has. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, “. . . if the plaintiff really makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress there is jurisdiction whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad.” The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25. See also Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, 240. Even a patently frivolous complaint might be sufficient to confer power to make a final decision that it is of that nature, binding as res judicata on the parties. Petitioner’s complaint, in substance, alleges existence of the interlocking directorship, contends that such relationship was used fraudulently to deprive it of its federally conferred right to reasonable rates and charges, and demands reparations. We think there was power in the District Court to decide whether the claims so grounded constitute a cause of action maintainable in federal court and, if so, whether it is sustained on the facts. We think a direction to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was error and that it should not stand as a precedent. However, it is clear that the reason underlying the Court of Appeals’ decision was that no federal cause of action was established. If this was correct, we should sustain the judgment of reversal, though on other grounds than those stated. The petitioner's problem is to avoid Scylla without being drawn into Charybdis. If its cause of action arises from fraud and deceit, it is a common-law action of which a federal court has no jurisdiction, there being no diversity in citizenship of these parties. But if it arises from being charged rates in excess of those permitted by the Power Act, it is confronted with the exclusive powers of the Commission to determine what those rates are to be. Hence, it is necessary to bring the case into court, not as a fraud action, but as one to enforce the Power Act, using the allegations of fraud to escape the limitations of the Power Commission remedies. I. Petitioner identifies as the source of its cause of action the Federal Power Act’s requirement of reasonable electric utility rates, which, it contends, creates its legal right to rates which a court may deem reasonable, even if different from those accepted by the Federal Power Commission. It is admitted, however, that a utility could not institute a suit in a federal court to recover a portion of past rates which it simply alleges were unreasonable. It would be out of court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, for, at any time in the past, it could have applied for and secured a review and, perhaps, a reduction of the rates by the Commission. Petitioner gives its case a different cast by alleging that by fraudulent abuse of the interlocking relationship its predecessor was deprived of its independence and power to resort to its administrative remedy. But the problem is whether it is open to the courts to determine what the reasonable rates during the past should have been. The petitioner, in contending that they are so empowered, and the District Court, in undertaking to exercise that power, both regard reasonableness as a justiciable legal right rather than a criterion for administrative application in determining a lawful rate. Statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint. It allows a substantial spread between what is unreasonable because too low and what is unreasonable because too high. To reduce the abstract concept of reasonableness to concrete expression in dollars and cents is the function of the Commission. It is not the disembodied “reasonableness” but that standard when embodied in a rate which the Commission accepts or determines that governs the rights of buyer and seller. A court may think a different level more reasonable. But the prescription of the statute is a standard for the Commission to apply and, independently of Commission action, creates no right which courts may enforce. Petitioner cannot separate what Congress has joined together. It cannot litigate in a judicial forum its general right to a reasonable rate, ignoring the qualification that it shall be made specific only by exercise of the Commission’s judgment, in which there is some considerable element of discretion. It can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate, whether fixed or merely accepted by the Commission, and not even a court can authorize commerce in the commodity on other terms. We hold that the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission files or fixes, and that, except for review of the Commission’s orders, the courts can assume no right to a different one on the ground that, in its opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable one. II. The petitioner here contends that its case is different by reason of its allegations of fraud. Those, the evidence that supports them, and the findings are exceedingly general, and it is not entirely clear whether, in addition to the claim that constructive fraud may be inferred from the intercorporate relationship, specific acts of deceit are found. Nor does it appear to have been thought that the difference between constructive and actual fraud mattered. If the petitioner’s grievance arises from active fraud and deceit, it gains nothing from the Federal Act. Such an action would have been maintainable if no Federal Power Act had been enacted. Before the Act, petitioner would have had no statutory right to a reasonable rate, but it did have a common-law right not to be defrauded into paying an excessive or unreasonable one. The Federal Act adds nothing to fraud as an actionable wrong, and, therefore, to find a cause of action of this character would only be to dismiss it for want of diversity. But petitioner’s case appears to have rested more heavily and perhaps entirely on constructive fraud presumed from the intercorporate relationship. The Act vests in the Commission power to authorize an interlocking directorate, which otherwise is prohibited, “upon due showing . . . that neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected thereby.” The relationship here concerned had received Commission approval. The effect of the approval is to exempt the relationship from the ban of the Act and remove from it any presumption of fraud that might be thought to arise from its mere existence. It would be a strange contradiction between judicial and administrative policies if a relationship which the Commission has declared will not adversely affect public or private interests were regarded by courts as enough to create a presumption of fraud. Perhaps, in the absence of the Commission’s approval, such relationship would be sufficient to raise the presumption under state law, but it cannot do so where the federal supervising authority has expressly approved the arrangement. We need not decide what action the Commission is empowered to take if it believes that a fraud has been committed on itself, for it has taken no action which gives rise to or affects this controversy. III. The entire Court is agreed that the judgment rendered by the District Court cannot stand and all agree that it cannot adjudicate the issues that plaintiff tendered to it. We disagree only as to the consequences of the disability. The majority believe the federal court should dismiss the complaint. A minority urges that we should direct the District Court to refer issues to the Federal Power Commission. It is true that in some cases the Court has directed lower federal courts to stay their hands pending reference to an administrative body of a subsidiary question. Smith v. Hoboken R. Co., 328 U. S. 123; Thompson v. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U. S. 134; General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U. S. 422. But in all those cases the plaintiff below concededly stated a federally cognizable cause of action, to which the referred issue was subsidiary. In no instance have we directed a court to retain a case in which it could not determine a single one of its vital issues. Here the issue of reasonableness of the charges is not one clearly severable from the issues of liability, for the acts charged do not amount to fraud unless there has been an unreasonable charge. Injury is an essential element of remediable fraud. “Deceit and injury must concur.” Adams v. Clark, 239 N. Y. 403, 410, 146 N. E. 642, 644 (1925). See also Connelly v. Bartlett, 286 Mass. 311, 315, 190 N. E. 799, 801 (1934). If the court is presented with a case it can decide but some issue is within the competence of an administrative body, in an independent proceeding, to decide, comity and avoidance of conflict as well as other considerations make it proper to refer that issue. But we know of no case where the court has ordered reference of an issue which the administrative body would not itself have jurisdiction to determine in a proceeding for that purpose. The fact that the Congress withheld from the Commission power to grant reparations does not require courts to entertain proceedings they cannot themselves decide in order indirectly to obtain Commission action which Congress did not allow to be taken directly. There is no indication in the Power Act that that was Congress’ intent. It is urged that this leaves petitioner without a remedy under the Power Act. We agree. In that respect, petitioner is no worse off after losing its lawsuit than its customers are if it wins. Unless we are to assume that this company failed to include its buying costs in its selling rates, we must assume that any unreasonable amounts it paid suppliers it collected from consumers. Indeed, this is the assumption made by the Commission in its brief as amicus curiae here. It is admitted that, if it recoups again what it has already recouped from the public, there is no machinery in or out of court by which others who have paid unreasonable charges to it can recover. Under such, circumstances, we conclude that, since- the case involves only issues which a federal court cannot decide and can only refer to a body which also would have no independent jurisdiction to decide, it must decline the case forthrightly rather than resort to such improvisation. The judgment below is affirmed upon the ground that the petitioner has not established a cause of action. It is so ordered. 41 Stat. 1063, 49 Stat. 838, 62 Stat. 275, 16 U. S. C. §§ 791a-825r. 28 U. S. C. § 1331. 28 U. S. C. § 1337. Not reported. 181 F. 2d 19. Section 205 (a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (a), states that: “All rates and charges . . . and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.” § 206 (a), 49 Stat. 852, 16 U. S. C. § 824e (a). § 305, 49 Stat. 856, 16 U. S. C. § 825d (b). S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20. Brief for the Federal Power Commission as amicus curiae, pp. 13-14. Id., pp. 14-17.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC., et al. No. 07-588. Argued December 2, 2008 Decided April 1, 2009 Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs for petitioners Entergy Corp. et al. were J. Scott Ballenger, Cassandra S. Bernstein, Elise N. Zoli, Kevin P. Martin, Abigail Hemani, Chuck D. Barlow, and John G. Valeri, Jr. Kristy A. N. Bulleit filed briefs for petitioner Utility Water Act Group. Deputy Solicitor General Joseffer argued the cause for the federal parties as respondents under this Court’s Rule 12.6 in support of petitioners. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Cynthia J. Morris, and Jessica O'Donnell. Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. were Reed W. Super, Edward Lloyd, and P. Kent Cor rell. A brief for respondents State of Rhode Island et al. was filed by Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Trida O’Hare Jedele, Special Assistant Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Kimberly Massicotte and Matthew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Andrew Goldberg, Assistant Attorney General, Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andy D. Bing, Deputy Solicitor General, Denise A. Hartman, Assistant Solicitor General, and Maureen F. Leary, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph R. Biden III, Attorney General of Delaware, and Kevin Maloney, Deputy Attorney General, Anne Mil-gram, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Ellen Barney Balint, Deputy Attorney General. Together with No. 07-589, PSEG Fossil LLC et al. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., et al., and No. 07-597, Utility Water Act Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Nebraska et al. by Jon Bruning, Attorney General of Nebraska, and David D. Cookson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective States as follows: Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General of Arkansas, John W. Suthers, Attorney General of Colorado, Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Stephen N. Six, Attorney General of Kansas, and Jared S. Maag, Deputy Solicitor General, Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General of Louisiana, Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, Gary K. King, Attorney General of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General of North Dakota, Henry McMaster, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General of Tennessee, Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, and Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, and William E. Thro, State Solicitor General; for the American Chemistry Council et al. by Russell S. Frye, Leslie A. Hulse, Richard S. Wasserstrom, Robin S. Conrad, Amar D. Sarwal, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the American Petroleum Institute by Daniel P. Albers, David T. Ballard, Harry Ng, and Michael See; for the California Council for Environmental and Economic Balance by Kevin M. Fong; for the National Association of Home Builders by Messrs. Albers and Ballard, Duane J. Desiderio, and Thomas J. Ward; for the Nuclear Energy Institute by Seth P. Waxman, Edward C. DuMont, Brian M. Boynton, and Ellen C. Ginsberg; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper and Steven Geoffrey Gieseler. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Illinois et al. by Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Michael A Scodro, Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, by Roberto J. Sánchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, by Susan Shinkman and Richard P. Mather, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Tom Miller of Iowa, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Mike McGrath of Montana, Nancy H. Rogers of Ohio, and W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma; for Commercial Fishermen of America, et al., by Elizabeth J. Hubertz and Stephanie Tai; for Environment America et al. by Christopher J. Wright and Timothy J. Simeone; for Environmental Law Professors by Jared A. Goldstein; for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by David K. Mears; for OMB Watch by Amy Sinden; and for Voices of the Wetlands et al. by Deborah A Sivas and Leah J. Russin. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the AEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies et al. by Robert E. Litan; for the Clean Air Task Force et al. by Ann Brewster Weeks; and for Frank Ackerman et al. by David M. Driesen and Douglas A. Kysar. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases concern a set of regulations adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or agency) under § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b). 69 Fed. Reg. 41576 (2004). Respondents — environmental groups and various States — challenged those regulations, and the Second Circuit set them aside. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F. 3d 83, 99-100 (2007). The issue for our decision is whether, as the Second Circuit held, the EPA is not permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in determining the content of regulations promulgated under § 1326(b). I Petitioners operate — or represent those who operate— large powerplants. In the course of generating power, those plants also generate large amounts of heat. To cool their facilities, petitioners employ “cooling water intake structures” that extract water from nearby water sources. These structures pose various threats to the environment, chief among them the squashing against intake screens (elegantly called “impingement”) or suction into the cooling system (“entrainment”) of aquatic organisms that live in the affected water sources. See 69 Fed. Reg. 41586. Accordingly, the facilities are subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., which mandates: “Any standard established pursuant to section 1311 of this title or section 1316 of this title and applicable to a point source shall require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” § 1326(b). Sections 1311 and 1316, in turn, employ a variety of “best technology” standards to regulate the discharge of effluents into the Nation’s waters. The § 1326(b) regulations at issue here were promulgated by the EPA after nearly three decades in which the determination of the “best technology available for minimizing [cooling water intake structures’] adverse environmental impact” was made by permit-issuing authorities on a case-by-case basis, without benefit of a governing regulation. The EPA’s initial attempt at such a regulation came to nought when the Fourth Circuit determined that the agency had failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F. 2d 451, 457 (1977). The EPA withdrew the regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 32956 (1979), and instead published “draft guidance” for use in implementing § 1326(b)’s requirements via site-specific permit decisions under §1342. See EPA, Office of Water Enforcement Permits Div., {Draft} Guidance for Evaluating the Adverse Impact of Cooling Water Intake Structures on the Aquatic Environment: Section 316(b) P. L. 92-500 (May 1, 1977), online at http:// www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/files/1977AEIguid.pdf (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 30, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); 69 Fed. Reg. 41584 (describing system of case-by-case permits under the draft guidance). In 1995, the EPA entered into a consent decree which, as subsequently amended, set a multiphase timetable for the EPA to promulgate regulations under § 1326(b). See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Whitman, No. 93 Civ. 0314 (AGS), 2001 WL 1505497, *1 (SDNY, Nov. 27, 2001). In the first phase the EPA adopted regulations governing certain new, large cooling water intake structures. 66 Fed. Reg. 65256 (2001) (Phase I rules); see 40 CFR §§ 125.80(a), 125.81(a) (2008). Those rules require new facilities with water-intake flow greater than 10 million gallons per day to, among other things, restrict their inflow “to a level commensurate with that which can be attained by a closed-cycle recirculating cooling water system.” § 125.84(b)(1). New facilities with water-intake flow between 2 million and 10 million gallons per day may alternatively comply by, among other things, reducing the volume and velocity of water removal to certain levels. § 125.84(c). And all facilities may alternatively comply by demonstrating, among other things, “that the technologies employed will reduce the level of adverse environmental impact... to a comparable level” to what would be achieved by using a closed-cycle cooling system. § 125.84(d). These regulations were upheld in large part by the Second Circuit in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F. 3d 174 (2004). The EPA then adopted the so-called “Phase II” rules at issue here. 69 Fed. Reg. 41576. They apply to existing facilities that are point sources, whose primary activity is the generation and transmission (or sale for transmission) of electricity, and whose water-intake flow is more than 50 million gallons of water per day, at least 25 percent of which is used for cooling purposes. Ibid. Over 500 facilities, accounting for approximately 53 percent of the Nation’s electric-power generating capacity, fall within Phase II’s ambit. See EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, p. A3-13 (Table A3-4, Feb. 2004), online at http://www. epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final/a3. pdf. Those facilities remove on average more than 214 billion gallons of water per day, causing impingement and entrainment of over 3.4 billion aquatic organisms per year. 69 Fed. Reg. 41586. To address those environmental impacts, the EPA set “national performance standards,” requiring Phase II facilities (with some exceptions) to reduce “impingement mortality for all life stages of fish and shellfish by 80 to 95 percent from the calculation baseline”; a subset of facilities must also reduce entrainment of such aquatic organisms by “60 to 90 percent from the calculation baseline.” 40 CFR § 125.94(b)(1), (2); see § 125.93 (defining “calculation baseline”). Those targets are based on the environmental improvements achievable through deployment of a mix of remedial technologies, 69 Fed. Reg. 41599, which the EPA determined were “commercially available and economically practicable,” id., at 41602. In its Phase II rules, however, the EPA expressly declined to mandate adoption of closed-cycle cooling systems or equivalent reductions in impingement and entrainment, as it had done for new facilities subject to the Phase I rules. Id., at 41601. It refused to take that step in part because of the “generally high costs” of converting existing facilities to closed-cycle operation, and because “other technologies approach the performance of this option.” Id., at 41605. Thus, while closed-cycle cooling systems could reduce impingement and entrainment mortality by up to 98 percent, id., at 41601 (compared to the Phase II targets of 80 to 95 percent impingement reduction), the cost of rendering all Phase II facilities closed-cycle-compliant would be approximately $3.5 billion per year, id., at 41605, nine times the estimated cost of compliance with the Phase II performance standards, id., at 41666. Moreover, Phase II facilities compelled to convert to closed-cycle cooling systems “would produce 2.4 percent to 4.0 percent less electricity even while burning the same amount of coal,” possibly requiring the construction of “20 additional 400-MW plants ... to replace the generating capacity lost.” Id., at 41605. The EPA thus concluded that “[although not identical, the ranges of impingement and entrainment reduction are similar under both options .... [Benefits of compliance with the Phase II rules] can approach those of closed-cycle recirculating systems at less cost with fewer implementation problems.” Id., at 41606. The regulations permit the issuance of site-specific variances from the national performance standards if a facility can demonstrate either that the costs of compliance are “significantly greater than” the costs considered by the agency in setting the standards, 40 CFR § 125.94(a)(5)(i), or that the costs of compliance “would be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the applicable performance standards,” § 125.94(a)(5)(h). Where a variance is warranted, the permit-issuing authority must impose remedial measures that yield results “as close as practicable to the applicable performance standards.” § 125.94(a)(5)(i), (ii). Respondents challenged the EPA’s Phase II regulations, and the Second Circuit granted their petition for review and remanded the regulations to the EPA. The Second Circuit identified two ways in which the EPA could permissibly consider costs under 33 U. S. C. § 1326(b): (1) in determining whether the costs of remediation “can be ‘reasonably borne’ by the industry,” and (2) in determining which remedial technologies are the most cost effective, that is, the technologies that reach a specified level of benefit at the lowest cost. 475 F. 3d, at 99-100. See also id., at 98, and n. 10. It concluded, however, that cost-benefit analysis, which “compares the costs and benefits of various ends, and chooses the end with the best net benefits,” id., at 98, is impermissible under § 1326(b), id., at 100. The Court of Appeals held the site-specific cost-benefit variance provision to be unlawful. Id., at 114. Finding it unclear whether the EPA had relied on cost-benefit analysis in setting the national performance standards, or had only used cost-effectiveness analysis, it remanded to the agency for clarification of that point. Id., at 104-105. (The remand was also based on other grounds which are not at issue here.) The EPA suspended operation of the Phase II rules pending further rulemaking. 72 Fed. Reg. 37107 (2007). We then granted certiorari limited to the following question: “Whether [§ 1326(b)] . . . authorizes the [EPA] to compare costs with benefits in determining ‘the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact’ at cooling water intake structures.” 552 U. S. 1309 (2008). II In setting the Phase II national performance standards and providing for site-specific cost-benefit variances, the EPA relied on its view that §1326(b)’s “best technology available” standard permits consideration of the technology’s costs, 69 Fed. Reg. 41626, and of the relationship between those costs and the environmental benefits produced, id., at 41603. That view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute — not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984). As we have described, § 1326(b) instructs the EPA to set standards for cooling water intake structures that reflect “the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” The Second Circuit took that language to mean the technology that achieves the greatest reduction in adverse environmental impacts at a cost that can reasonably be borne by the industry. 475 F. 3d, at 99-100. That is certainly a plausible interpretation of the statute. The “best” technology — that which is “most advantageous,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 258 (2d ed. 1953) — may well be the one that produces the most of some good, here a reduction in adverse environmental impact. But “best technology” may also describe the technology that most efficiently produces some good. In common parlance one could certainly use the phrase “best technology” to refer to that which produces a good at the lowest per-unit cost, even if it produces a lesser quantity of that good than other available technologies. Respondents contend that this latter reading is precluded by the statute’s use of the phrase “for minimizing adverse environmental impact.” Minimizing, they argue, means reducing to the smallest amount possible, and the “best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts” must be the economically feasible technology that achieves the greatest possible reduction in environmental harm. Brief for Respondent Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. 25-26. But “minimize” is a term that admits of degree and is not necessarily used to refer exclusively to the “greatest possible reduction.” For example, elsewhere in the Clean Water Act, Congress declared that the procedures implementing the Act “shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork and interagency decision procedures.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(f). If respondents’ definition of the term “minimize” is correct, the statute’s use of the modifier “drastic” is superfluous. Other provisions in the Clean Water Act also suggest the agency’s interpretation. When Congress wished to mandate the greatest feasible reduction in water pollution, it did so in plain language: The provision governing the discharge of toxic pollutants into the Nation’s waters requires the EPA to set “effluent limitations [which] shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds ... that such elimination is technologically and economically achievable,” § 1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). See also § 1316(a)(1) (mandating “where practicable, a standard [for new point sources] permitting no discharge of pollutants” (emphasis added)). Section 1326(b)’s use of the less ambitious goal of “minimizing adverse environmental impact” suggests, we think, that the agency retains some discretion to determine the extent of reduction that is warranted under the circumstances. That determination could plausibly involve a consideration of the benefits derived from reductions and the costs of achieving them. Cf. 40 CFR § 125.83 (defining “minimize” for purposes of the Phase I regulations as “reducing] to the smallest amount, extent, or degree reasonably possible”). It seems to us, therefore, that the phrase “best technology available,” even with the added specification “for minimizing adverse environmental impact,” does not unambiguously preclude cost-benefit analysis. Respondents’ alternative (and, alas, also more complex) argument rests upon the structure of the Clean Water Act. The Act provided that during its initial implementation period existing “point sources” — discrete conveyances from which pollutants are or may be discharged, 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14) — were subject to “effluent limitations . . . which shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available.” § 1311(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). (We shall call this the “BPT” test.) Following that transition period, the Act initially mandated adoption, by July 1, 1983 (later extended to March 31, 1989), of stricter effluent limitations requiring “application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class, which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants.” § 1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); see EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64, 69-70 (1980). (We shall call this the “BATEA” test.) Subsequent amendment limited application of this standard to toxic and noneonventional pollutants, and for the remainder established a (presumably laxer) test of “best conventional-pollutant control technology.” § 1311(b)(2)(E). (We shall call this “BCT.”) Finally, §1316 subjected certain categories of new point sources to “the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology. ” § 1316(a)(1) (emphasis added); § 1316(b)(1)(B). (We shall call this the “BADT” test.) The provision at issue here, applicable not to effluents but to cooling water intake structures, requires, as we have described, “the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact,” § 1326(b) (emphasis added). (We shall call this the “BTA” test.) The first four of these tests are elucidated by statutory factor lists that guide their implementation. To take the standards in (presumed) order of increasing stringency, see Crushed Stone, supra, at 69-70: In applying the BPT test the EPA is instructed to consider, among other factors, “the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved.” § 1314(b)(1)(B). In applying the BCT test it is instructed to consider “the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived.” § 1314(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). And in applying the BATEA and BADT tests the EPA is instructed to consider the “cost of achieving such effluent reduction.” §§ 1314(b)(2)(B), 1316(b)(1)(B). There is no such elucidating language applicable to the BTA test at issue here. To facilitate comparison, the texts of these five tests, the clarifying factors applicable to them, and the entities to which they apply are set forth in the Appendix, infra. The Second Circuit, in rejecting the EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis, relied in part on the propositions that (1) cost-benefit analysis is precluded under the BATEA and BADT tests; and (2) that, insofar as the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis is concerned, the BTA test (the one at issue here) is to be treated the same as those two. See 475 F. 3d, at 98. It is not obvious to us that the first of these propositions is correct, but we need not pursue that point, since we assuredly do not agree with the second. It is certainly reasonable for the agency to conclude that the BTA test need not be interpreted to permit only what those other two tests permit. Its text is not identical to theirs. It has the relatively modest goal of “minimizing adverse environmental impact” as compared with the BATE A's goal of “eliminating the discharge of all pollutants.” And it is unencumbered by specified statutory factors of the sort provided for those other two tests, which omission can reasonably be interpreted to suggest that the EPA is accorded greater discretion in determining its precise content. Respondents and the dissent argue that the mere fact that § 1326(b) does not expressly authorize cost-benefit analysis for the BTA test, though it does so for two of the other tests, displays an intent to forbid its use. This surely proves too much. For while it is true that two of the other tests authorize cost-benefit analysis, it is also true that all four of the other tests expressly authorize some consideration of costs. Thus, if respondents’ and the dissent’s conclusion regarding the import of § 1326(b)’s silence is correct, it is a fortiori true that the BTA test permits no consideration of cost whatsoever, not even the “cost-effectiveness” and “feasibility” analysis that the Second Circuit approved, see supra, at 217, that the dissent would approve, post, at 237, and that respondents acknowledge. The inference that respondents and the dissent would draw from the silence is, in any event, implausible, as § 1326(b) is silent not only with respect to cost-benefit analysis but with respect to all potentially relevant factors. If silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA could not consider any factors in implementing § 1326(b) — an obvious logical impossibility. It is eminently reasonable to conclude that §1326(b)’s silence is meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to what degree. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 238-240, our decisions in Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457 (2001), and American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490 (1981), do not undermine this conclusion. In American Trucking, we held that the text of § 109 of the Clean Air Act, “interpreted in its statutory and historical context . . . , unambiguously bars cost considerations” in setting air quality standards under that provision. 531 U. S., at 471. The relevant “statutory context” included other provisions in the Clean Air Act that expressly authorized consideration of costs, whereas §109 did not. Id., at 467-468. American Trucking thus stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that sometimes statutory silence, when viewed in context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion. For the reasons discussed earlier, § 1326(b)’s silence cannot bear that interpretation. In American Textile, the Court relied in part on a statute’s failure to mention cost-benefit analysis in holding that the relevant agency was not required to engage in cost-benefit analysis in setting certain health and safety standards. 452 U. S., at 510-512. But under Chevron, that an agency is not required to do so does not mean that an agency is not permitted to do so. This extended consideration of the text of § 1326(b), and comparison of that with the text and statutory factors applicable to four parallel provisions of the Clean Water Act, lead us to the conclusion that it was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically forbidden. Other arguments may be available to preclude such a rigorous form of cost-benefit analysis as that which was prescribed under the statute’s former BPT standard, which required weighing “the total cost of application of technology” against “the ... benefits to be achieved.” See supra, at 221. But that question is not before us. In the Phase II requirements challenged here the EPA sought only to avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits. The agency limited variances from the Phase II “national performance standards” to circumstances where the costs are “significantly greater than the benefits” of compliance. 40 CFR § 125.94(a)(5)(h). In defining the “national performance standards” themselves the EPA assumed the application of technologies whose benefits “approach those estimated” for closed-cycle cooling systems at a fraction of the cost: $889 million per year, 69 Fed. Reg. 41666, as compared with (1) at least $3.5 billion per year to operate compliant closed-cycle cooling systems, id., at 41605 (or $1 billion per year to impose similar requirements on a subset of Phase II facilities, id., at 41606), and (2) significant reduction in the energy output of the altered facilities, id., at 41605. And finally, the EPA’s assessment of the relatively meager financial benefits of the Phase II regulations that it adopted— reduced impingement and entrainment of 1.4 billion aquatic organisms, id., at 41661, Exh. XII-6, with annualized use benefits of $83 million, id., at 41662, and nonuse benefits of indeterminate value, id., at 41660-41661 — when compared to annual costs of $389 million, demonstrates quite clearly that the agency did not select the Phase II regulatory requirements because their benefits equaled their costs. While not conclusive, it surely tends to show that the EPA’s current practice is a reasonable and hence legitimate exercise of its discretion to weigh benefits against costs that the agency has been proceeding in essentially this fashion for over 30 years. See Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461, 487 (2004); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U. S. 212, 219-220 (2002). As early as 1977, the agency determined that, while § 1326(b) does not require cost-benefit analysis, it is also not reasonable to “interpret Section [1326(b)] as requiring use of technology whose cost is wholly disproportionate to the environmental benefit to be gained.” In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 1 E. A. D. 332, 340 (1977). See also In re Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., EPA General Counsel Opinions, NPDES Permits, No. 63, pp. 371, 381 (July 29, 1977) (“EPA ultimately must demonstrate that the present value of the cumulative annual cost of modifications to cooling water intake structures is not wholly out of proportion to the magnitude of the estimated environmental gains”); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F. 2d 306, 311 (CA1 1979) (rejecting challenge to an EPA permit decision that was based in part on the agency’s determination that further restrictions would be “‘wholly disproportionate to any environmental benefit’ ”). While the EPA’s prior “wholly disproportionate” standard may be somewhat different from its current “significantly greater than” standard, there is nothing in the statute that would indicate that the former is a permissible interpretation while the latter is not. Indeed, in its review of the EPA’s Phase I regulations, the Second Circuit seemed to recognize that § 1326(b) permits some form of cost-benefit analysis. In considering a challenge to the EPA’s rejection of dry cooling systems as the “best technology available” for Phase I facilities, the Second Circuit noted that “while it certainly sounds substantial that dry cooling is 95 percent more effective than closed-cycle cooling, it is undeniably relevant that that difference represents a relatively small improvement over closed-cycle cooling at a very significant cost.” Riverkeeper, 358 F. 3d, at 194, n. 22. And in the decision below rejecting the use of cost-benefit analysis in the Phase II regulations, the Second Circuit nonetheless interpreted “best technology available” as mandating only those technologies that can “be reasonably borne by the industry.” 475 F. 3d, at 99. But whether it is “reasonable” to bear a particular cost may well depend on the resulting benefits; if the only relevant factor was the feasibility of the costs, their reasonableness would be irrelevant. In the last analysis, even respondents ultimately recognize that some form of cost-benefit analysis is permissible. They acknowledge that the statute’s language is “plainly not so constricted as to require EPA to require industry petitioners to spend billions to save one more fish or plankton.” Brief for Respondent Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. 29. This concedes the principle — the permissibility of at least some cost-benefit analysis — and we see no statutory basis for limiting its use to situations where the benefits are de minimis rather than significantly disproportionate. * * * We conclude that the EPA permissibly relied on cost-benefit analysis in setting the national performance standards and in providing for cost-benefit variances from those standards as part of the Phase II regulations. The Court of Appeals’ reliance in part on the agency’s use of cost-benefit analysis in invalidating the site-specific cost-benefit variance provision, 475 F. 3d, at 114, was therefore in error, as was its remand of the national performance standards for clarification of whether cost-benefit analysis was impermissibly used, id., at 104-105. We of course express no view on the remaining bases for the Second Circuit’s remand which did not depend on the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis. See id., at 108, 110, 113, 115, 117, 120. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX The EPA and its Administrator appeared as respondents in support of petitioners. See Brief for Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Petitioners. References to “respondents” throughout the opinion refer only to those parties challenging the EPA rules at issue in these cases. Closed-cycle cooling systems recirculate the water used to cool the facility, and consequently extract less water from the adjacent waterway, proportionately reducing impingement and entrainment. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F. Bd 174, 182, n. 5 (CA2 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 41601, and n. 44 (2004). The EPA has also adopted Phase III rules for facilities not subject to the Phase I and Phase II regulations. 71 Fed. Reg. 35006 (2006). A challenge to those regulations is currently before the Fifth Circuit, where proceedings have been stayed pending disposition of these cases. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, No. 06-60662. The dissent finds it “puzzling” that we invoke this proposition (that a reasonable agency interpretation prevails) at the “outset,” omitting the supposedly prior inquiry of‘“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’” Post, at 241, n. 5 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842). But surely if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable. What is truly “puzzling” is the dissent’s accompanying charge that the Court’s failure to conduct the Chevron step-one inquiry at the outset “reflects [its] reluctance to consider the possibility ... that Congress’ silence may have meant to foreclose cost-benefit analysis.” Post, at 241, n. 5. Our discussion of that issue, infra, at 222-223, speaks for itself Respondents concede that the term “available” is ambiguous, as it could mean either technologically feasible or economically feasible. But any ambiguity in the term “available” is largely irrelevant. Regardless of the criteria that render a technology “available,” the EPA would still have to determine which available technology is the “best” one. And as discussed above, that determination may well involve consideration of the technology’s relative costs and benefits. The statute does not contain a hyphen between the words “conventional” and “pollutant.” “Conventional pollutant” is a statutory term, however, see 33 U. S. C. § 1314(a)(4), and it is clear that in § 1311(b)(2)(E) the adjective modifies “pollutant” rather than “control technology.” The hyphen makes that clear. Dry cooling systems use air drafts to remove heat, and accordingly remove little or no water from surrounding water sources. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65282 (2001). Justice Breyer would remand for the additional reason of what he regards as the agency’s inadequate explanation of the change in its criterion for variances — from a relationship of costs to benefits that is “ ‘wholly disproportionate’” to one that is “‘significantly greater.’” Post, at 236 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). That question can have no bearing upon whether the EPA can use cost-benefit analysis, which is the only question presented here. It seems to us, in any case, that the EPA’s explanation was ample. It explained that the “wholly out of proportion” standard was inappropriate for the existing facilities subject to the Phase II rules because those facilities lack “the greater flexibility available to new facilities for selecting the location of their intakes and installing technologies at lower costs relative to the costs associated with retrofitting existing facilities,” and because “economically impracticable impacts on energy prices, production costs, and energy production . . . could occur if large numbers of Phase II existing facilities incurred costs that were more than ‘significantly greater’ than but not ‘wholly out of proportion’ to the costs in the EPA’s record.” 68 Fed. Reg. 13541 (2003).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GREEN et al. v. MANSOUR, DIRECTOR, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES No. 84-6270. Argued October 7, 1985 Decided December 3, 1985 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 74. Marshall, J,, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 79. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 81. William Burnham argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Paul D. Reingold. Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Thomas L. Casey, Erica Weiss Marsden, and Robert N. Rosenberg, Assistant Attorneys General. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners brought two separate class actions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against respondent Director of the Michigan Department of Social Services, claiming that respondent’s calculations of benefits under the federal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program violated certain provisions of that federal law. Before a final determination on the merits of either case could be made, Congress amended the relevant statutory provisions. It is undisputed that respondent’s calculations thereafter have conformed to federal law. Notwithstanding this fact, petitioners claim that they were entitled to have the District Court award them both “notice relief” and a declaration that respondent’s prior conduct violated federal law. The District Court denied petitioners both forms of relief, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable principles governing the issuance of declaratory judgments forbid the award of either form of relief. The two class actions involved in this case were brought on behalf of recipients of benefits disbursed under the AFDC program. See 42 U. S. C. §§601-615. The AFDC program uses a person’s earned income in determining eligibility for, and the amount of, benefits. See §602. The complaints alleged that certain of respondent’s policies and regulations violated 42 U. S. C. § 1983 by inflating their respective class members’ earned income and thereby causing a reduction or termination of AFDC benefits contrary to the applicable federal law. One putative class challenged respondent’s policy of prohibiting the deduction of child care costs in the calculation of earned income. While the case was pending in the District Court, Congress changed the relevant provisions of the AFDC program to expressly require participating States to deduct child care expenses up to a specified amount. Respondent thereafter brought state policy into compliance with this amendment and began deducting child care expenses in the calculation of earned income. There is no claim that respondent’s current child care deduction policy violates federal law. The other putative class challenged respondent’s policy of automatically including stepparents’ income in the calculation of earned income. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing respondent from enforcing its automatic inclusion policy. But again, while the matter was pending on the merits, Congress amended the relevant section of the AFDC program to expressly require States to include stepparent income in the calculation of earned income. The parties thereafter stipulated that the District Court should terminate its preliminary injunction as of the effective date of the amendment. Here, too, there is no claim that respondent has not complied with federal law since that time. The District Court granted respondent’s motions to dismiss in each case. It held in each that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief, and that the remaining claims for declaratory and notice relief related solely to past violations of federal law. Such retrospective relief, the court determined, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F. 2d 277 (1984). It agreed that the changes in federal law rendered moot the claims for prospective relief. Id., at 281-283. It also agreed that because the sought-after notice and declaratory relief was retrospective in nature, the relief was barred by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). 742 F. 2d, at 286-288. It reasoned that when there is no prospective relief to which notice can be ancillary, even notice of the sort approved in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment bar. 742 F. 2d, at 287-288. Declaratory relief is similarly barred under such circumstances, it explained, because such relief could relate solely to past violations of federal law. Id., at 288. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits over whether federal courts may order the giving of notice of the sort approved in Quern v. Jordan, supra, or issue a declaratory judgment that state officials violated federal law in the past when there is no ongoing violation of federal law. The decision by the Court of Appeals in this case agrees with the result in Colbeth v. Wilson, 554 F. Supp. 539 (Vt. 1982), aff’d, 707 F. 2d 57 (CA2 1983) (per curiam), but it conflicts with the decisions in Appleyard v. Wallace, 754 F. 2d 955, 959-963 (CA11 1985); Randall v. Lukhard, 729 F. 2d 966 (CA4) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 872 (1984); Beltran v. Myers, 701 F. 2d 91, 94 (CA9) (per curiam), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1134 (1983); and Silva v. Vowell, 621 F. 2d 640, 650-654 (CA5 1980), which all allowed notice relief even though changes in state policy or federal law rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief stopping ongoing violations of federal law. We now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Eleventh Amendment confirms that “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 98 (1984). Because of the Eleventh Amendment, States may not be sued in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity. Id., at 99. The landmark case of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), created an exception to this general principle by asserting that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official’s action in enforcing state law is not one against the State. Id., at 159-160. The theory of Young was that an unconstitutional statute is void, id., at 159, and therefore does not “impart to [the official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” Id., at 160. Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law. Id., at 155-156, 159. We have refused to extend the reasoning of Young, however, to claims for retrospective relief. See Pennhurst, supra, at 102-103; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 337; Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 668. Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. See Pennhurst, supra, at 102. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267 (1977). But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment. Petitioners concede that any claim they might have had for the specific type of injunctive relief approved in Ex parte Young was rendered moot by the amendments to the AFDC program. They nevertheless seek “notice relief” of the type approved in Quern v. Jordan, arguing that notice is an independent form of prospective relief protected against the Eleventh Amendment bar by Ex parte Young. In taking this position, we think petitioners misconceive our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and our decision in Quern. Quern was the last chapter in the litigation that initially gave rise to Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The plaintiffs in that litigation challenged a State’s administration of the federal-state program for Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD). The District Court issued a declaratory judgment that current state regulations governing the administration of the program violated federal regulations then in effect. It therefore permanently enjoined the state officials from continuing to violate federal law. Although the language of the declaratory judgment was no broader than necessary to complement the injunction against the current violation of federal law, it implied that the defendants had violated federal law in the past. The District Court therefore issued a second injunction ordering the defendants to release and remit all AABD benefits that they had wrongfully withheld on account of their past violations of federal law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F. 2d 985 (CA7 1973), but we reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the injunction ordering retroactive benefits because it was effectively an award of money damages for past violations of federal law. Edelman v. Jordan, 451 U. S., at 666-669. On remand, the District Court ordered the defendants to send notice to the plaintiff class informing individual class members that they were wrongfully denied benefits in a particular amount, together with a returnable form for filing claims with the appropriate state agency. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court’s proposed notice violated the Eleventh Amendment because it would effectively result in a federal adjudication of state liability for past violations of federal law. Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F. 2d 873, 875 (CA7 1977) (en banc). At the same time, the Court of Appeals determined that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar an order requiring state officials to send “a mere explanatory notice to applicants advising them that there is a state administrative procedure available if they desire to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for past benefits.” Ibid. We affirmed in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), holding that although Edelman v. Jordan, supra, retained continuing vitality after Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), see 440 U. S., at 338-345, the specific notice order approved by the Court of Appeals did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 346-349. We explained that the appellate court’s particular notice order fell “on the Ex parte Young side of the Eleventh Amendment line rather than on the Edelman side.” Id., at 347. We reasoned that “unlike [the notice] ordered by the District Court, [this notice was] more properly viewed as ancillary to the prospective relief already ordered by the court,” id., at 349, and it did no more than “simply infor[m] class members that their federal suit is at an end, that the federal court can provide them with no further relief, and that there are existing state administrative procedures which they may wish to pursue.” Ibid. We also stressed that the state defendants had not objected to the expense of providing such notice, state agencies rather than federal courts would be the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be ordered, and the notice would not automatically lead to any particular action. Id., at 347-348. Our review of the long, drawn-out Jordan litigation convinces us that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court conceived of the requested notice allowed in that case to be an independent form of relief. We simply held that the specific order fell within the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment principle of sovereign immunity because it was ancillary to a valid injunction previously granted and was sufficiently narrow to retain its character as a mere case-management device. The notice in Quern v. Jordan did nothing other than inform a diverse and partially victorious class concerning the extent of the judgment in its favor, cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(d)(2), and that the federal courts could do no more for them. There was no suggestion that the notice itself would bind state officials in any way, or that such notice would be routinely available as a form of relief in other cases. Because “notice relief” is not the type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment limitation on the Art. Ill power of federal courts prevents them from ordering it as an independent form of relief. Measured by the standards of Quern, however, a request for a limited notice order will escape the Eleventh Amendment bar if the notice is ancillary to the grant of some other appropriate relief that can be “noticed.” Because there is no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin in this case, an injunction is not available. Therefore, notice cannot be justified as a mere case-management device that is ancillary to a judgment awarding valid prospective relief. Petitioners argue, however, that they are entitled to a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal law in the past. Only if petitioners are correct in this assertion can they properly nlaim a right to “notice” of a judgment under the principles of Quern. The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U. S. C. § 2201, permits a federal court to declare the rights of a party whether or not further relief is or could be sought, and we have held that under this Act declaratory relief may be available even though an injunction is not. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 462 (1974). But we have also held that the declaratory judgment statute “is an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant.” Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 237, 241 (1952). The propriety of issuing a declaratory judgment may depend upon equitable considerations, see Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66, 73 (1971), and is also “informed by the teachings and experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.” Wycoff, supra, at 243; cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 44-45 (1971). In applying these principles, we have held that a declaratory judgment is not available in a number of instances. In Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293 (1943), we held that a declaratory judgment was not available to obtain a determination of the constitutionality of a state tax even though the relevant federal statute prohibited federal courts only from issuing injunctions against the collection of such taxes. Id., at 299. We held in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, that a declaratory judgment declaring a state criminal statute unconstitutional was unavailable where it would have much the same effect as an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the statute, and the latter was barred by traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism. Id., at 69-73. In Wycoff, we held that it was inappropriate to issue a declaratory judgment deciding whether the plaintiff’s business was interstate commerce and therefore potentially immune from state regulation. 344 U. S., at 244, 247-249. We reasoned that if the federal judgment were res judicata in subsequent state proceedings, then the federal court will have lifted the case out of the state court before the state agency or court can hear it. Id., at 247. On the other hand, if the federal judgment would not have such an effect, then it would “serv[e] no useful purpose as a final determination of rights.” Ibid. We think that these cases demonstrate the impropriety of the issuance of a declaratory judgment in this case. There is no claimed continuing violation of federal law, and therefore no occasion to issue an injunction. Nor can there be any threat of state officials violating the repealed law in the future. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, supra, at 454. There is a dispute about the lawfulness of respondent’s past actions, but the Eleventh Amendment would prohibit the award of money damages or restitution if that dispute were resolved in favor of petitioners. We think that the award of a declaratory judgment in this situation would be useful in resolving the dispute over the past lawfulness of respondent’s action only if it might be offered in state-court proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liability, leaving to the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or restitution would be computed. But the issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The teachings of Huffman, Samuels, and Wycoff are that a declaratory judgment is not available when the result would be a partial “end run” around our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Justice Brennan’s dissent contends that because the injunction and declaratory judgment in Quern implied past violations of federal law, declaratory judgments expressly adjudicating the question of past violations are routinely available. We think he is mistaken. The District Court’s injunction and declaratory judgment against continuing and future violations of federal law in Quern implied that similar violations had occurred in the past because neither state nor federal policy had varied through the time of judgment. Here, by contrast, there are no present violations under the amended statute, and even if there were, an injunction against them would not imply that past practice violated the repealed federal law. Thus, a declaratory judgment that respondent violated federal law in the past would have to stand on its own feet as an appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. This it cannot do for the reasons we have previously stated. We hold that the District Court was correct in concluding that neither the “notice” proposed by petitioners nor a declaratory judgment should have issued in a case of this type. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. The declaratory judgment was embodied in paragraph 4 of the District Court’s judgment, which stated: “Illinois Categorical Assistance Manual, Section 4004, and subsections thereunder, as applied to applicants for AABD are invalid insofar as they are inconsistent with the requirements of [federal law as construed in] paragraphs 1 and 2.” Jordan v. Weaver, No. 71 C 70, p. 3 (ND Ill., Mar. 15, 1972) (emphasis added). If, of course, petitioners would make no claim that the federal declaratory judgment was res judicata in later commenced state proceedings, the declaratory judgment would serve no purpose whatever in resolving the remaining dispute between the parties, and is unavailable for that reason. Wycoff, 344 U. S., at 247.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. BOYLE, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BOYLE No. 83-1266. Argued October 10, 1984 Decided January 9, 1985 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Marshall, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 252. Albert G. Lauber, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, CarletonD. Powell, and Jo-Ann Horn. Thomas E. Davies argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether a taxpayer’s reliance on an attorney to prepare and file a tax return constitutes “reasonable cause” under § 6651(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, so as to defeat a statutory penalty incurred because of a late filing. f — ( A Respondent, Robert W. Boyle, was appointed executor of the will of his mother, Myra Boyle, who died on September 14, 1978; respondent retained Ronald Keyser to serve as attorney for the estate. Keyser informed respondent that the estate must file a federal estate tax return, but he did not mention the deadline for filing this return. Under 26 U. S. C. § 6075(a), the return was due within nine months of the decedent’s death, i. e., not later than June 14, 1979. Although a businessman, respondent was not experienced in the field of federal estate taxation, other than having been executor of his father’s will 20 years earlier. It is undisputed that he relied on Keyser for instruction and guidance. He cooperated fully with his attorney and provided Keyser with all relevant information and records. Respondent and his wife contacted Keyser a number of times during the spring and summer of 1979 to inquire about the progress of the proceedings and the preparation of the tax return; they were assured that they would be notified when the return was due and that the return would be filed “in plenty of time.” App. 39. When respondent called Keyser on September 6, 1979, he learned for the first time that the return was by then overdue. Apparently, Keyser had overlooked the matter because of a clerical oversight in omitting the filing date from Keyser’s master calendar. Respondent met with Keyser on September 11, and the return was filed on September 13, three months late. B Acting pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 6651(a)(1), the Internal Revenue Service assessed against the estate an additional tax of $17,124.45 as a penalty for the late filing, with $1,326.56 in interest. Section 6651(a)(1) reads in pertinent part: “In case of failure ... to file any return ... on the date prescribed therefor . . . , unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate . . . .” (Emphasis added.) A Treasury Regulation provides that, to demonstrate “reasonable cause,” a taxpayer filing a late return must show that he “exercised ordinary business care and prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed time.” 26 CFR §301.6651-1(c)(1) (1984). Respondent paid the penalty and filed a claim for a refund. He conceded that the assessment for interest was proper, but contended that the penalty was unjustified because his failure to file the return on time was “due to reasonable cause,” i. e., reliance on his attorney. Respondent brought suit in the United States District Court, which concluded that the claim was controlled by the Court of Appeals’ holding in Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F. 2d 211 (CA7 1979). In Rohrabaugh, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that reliance upon counsel constitutes “reasonable cause” under § 6651(a)(1) when: (1) the taxpayer is unfamiliar with the tax law; (2) the taxpayer makes full disclosure of all relevant facts to the attorney that he relies upon, and maintains contact with the attorney from time to time during the administration of the estate; and (3) the taxpayer has otherwise exercised ordinary business care and prudence. 611 F. 2d, at 215, 219. The District Court held that, under Rohrabaugh, respondent had established “reasonable cause” for the late filing of his tax return; accordingly, it granted summary judgment for respondent and ordered refund of the penalty. A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit, with three opinions, affirmed. 710 F. 2d 1251 (1983). We granted certiorari, 466 U. S. 903 (1984), and we reverse. II A Congress’ purpose in the prescribed civil penalty was to ensure timely filing of tax returns to the end that tax liability will be ascertained and paid promptly. The relevant statutory deadline provision is clear; it mandates that all federal estate tax returns be filed within nine months from the decedent’s death, 26 U. S. C. 6076(a). Failure to comply incurs a penalty of 5 percent of the ultimately determined tax for each month the return is late, with a maximum of 25 percent of the base tax. To escape the penalty, the taxpayer bears the heavy burden of proving both (1) that the failure did not result from “willful neglect,” and (2) that the failure was “due to reasonable cause.” 26 U. S. C. § 6651(a)(1). The meaning of these two standards has become clear over the near-70 years of their presence in the statutes. As used here, the term “willful neglect” may be read as meaning a conscious, intentional failure or reckless indifference. See Orient Investment & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 74, 75, 166 F. 2d 601, 602 (1948); Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 628, 634 (CA3 1947); Janice Leather Imports Ltd. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (SDNY 1974); Gemological Institute of America, Inc. v. Riddell, 149 F. Supp. 128, 131-132 (SD Cal. 1957). Like “willful neglect,” the term “reasonable cause” is not defined in the Code, but the relevant Treasury Regulation calls on the taxpayer to demonstrate that he exercised “ordinary business care and prudence” but nevertheless was “unable to file the return within the prescribed time.” 26 CFR §301.6651(c)(l)(1984); accord, e. g., Fleming v. United States, 648 F. 2d 1122, 1124 (CA7 1981); Ferrando v. United States, 245 F. 2d 582, 587 (CA9 1957); Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 769, 770 (CA2 1950); Southeastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F. 2d 205 (CA5 1946); Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F. 2d 843, 848 (CA3 1941); see also n. 1, supra. The Commissioner does not contend that respondent’s failure to file the estate tax return on time was willful or reckless. The question to be resolved is whether, under the statute, reliance on an attorney in the instant circumstances is a “reasonable cause” for failure to meet the deadline. B In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals recognized the difficulties presented by its formulation but concluded that it was bound by Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F. 2d 211 (CA7 1979). The Court of Appeals placed great importance on the fact that respondent engaged the services of an experienced attorney specializing in probate matters and that he duly inquired from time to time as to the progress of the proceedings. As in Rohrabaugh, see id., at 219, the Court of Appeals in this case emphasized that its holding was narrowly drawn and closely tailored to the facts before it. The court stressed that the question of “reasonable cause” was an issue to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See 710 F. 2d, at 1253-1254; id., at 1254 (Coffey, J., concurring). Other Courts of Appeals have dealt with the issue of “reasonable cause” for a late filing and reached contrary conclusions. In Ferrando v. United States, 245 F. 2d 582 (CA9 1957), the court held that taxpayers have a personal and nondelegable duty to file a return on time, and that reliance on an attorney to fulfill this obligation does not constitute “reasonable cause” for a tardy filing. Id., at 589. The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that the responsibility for ensuring a timely filing is the taxpayer’s alone, and that the taxpayer’s reliance on his tax advisers — accountants or attorneys — is not a “reasonable cause.” Millette & Associates v. Commissioner, 594 F. 2d 121, 124-125 (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 899 (1979); Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F. 2d 846, 854 (1966). The Eighth Circuit also has concluded' that reliance on counsel does not constitute “reasonable cause.” Smith v. United States, 702 F. 2d 741, 743 (1983) (per curiam); Boeving v. United States, 650 F. 2d 493, 495 (1981); Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F. 2d 65, 66 (1981) (per curiam). ► — I HH h-i We need not dwell on the similarities or differences in the facts presented by the conflicting holdings. The time has come for a rule with as “bright” a line as can be drawn consistent with the statute and implementing regulations. Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, however, are often essential to accomplish necessary results. The Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of self-assessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of strict filing standards. Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates. Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the Government, which should not have to assume the burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations. Congress has placed the burden of prompt filing on the executor, not on some agent or employee of the executor. The duty is fixed and clear; Congress intended to place upon the taxpayer an obligation to ascertain the statutory deadline and then to meet that deadline, except in a very narrow range of situations. Engaging an attorney to assist in the probate proceedings is plainly an exercise of the “ordinary business care and prudence” prescribed by the regulations, 26 CFR § 301.6651 — 1(c)(1) (1984), but that does not provide an answer to the question we face here. To say that it was “reasonable” for the executor to assume that the attorney would comply with the statute may resolve the matter as between them, but not with respect to the executor’s obligations under the statute. Congress has charged the executor with an unambiguous, precisely defined duty to file the return within nine months; extensions are granted fairly routinely. That the attorney, as the executor’s agent, was expected to attend to the matter does not relieve the principal of his duty to comply with the statute. This case is not one in which a taxpayer has relied on the erroneous advice of counsel concerning a question of law. Courts have frequently held that “reasonable cause” is established when a taxpayer shows that he reasonably relied on the advice of an accountant or attorney that it was unnecessary to file a return, even when such advice turned out to have been mistaken. See, e. g., United States v. Kroll, 547 F. 2d 398, 395-396 (CA7 1977); Commissioner v. American Assn. of Engineers Employment, Inc., 204 F. 2d 19, 21 (CA7 1953); Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 558, 560 (CA5 1952); Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d, at 771; Orient Investment & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 83 U. S. App. D. C., at 75, 166 F. 2d, at 603; Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d, at 633-635; Girard Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F. 2d, at 848; Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 F. 709, 712 (CA6 1922). This Court also has implied that, in such a situation, reliance on the opinion of a tax adviser may constitute reasonable cause for failure to file a return. See Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U. S. 219 (1944) (remanding for determination whether failure to file return was due to reasonable cause, when taxpayer was advised that filing was not required). When an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice. Most taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or attorney. To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a “second opinion,” or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place. See Haywood Lumber, supra, at 771. “Ordinary business care and prudence” do not demand such actions. By contrast, one does not have to be a tax expert to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when they are due. In short, tax returns imply deadlines. Reliance by a lay person on a lawyer is of course common; but that reliance cannot function as a substitute for compliance with an unambiguous statute. Among the first duties of the representative of a decedent’s estate is to identify and assemble the assets of the decedent and to ascertain tax obligations. Although it is common practice for an executor to engage a professional to prepare and file an estate tax return, a person experienced in business matters can perform that task personally. It is not unknown for an executor to prepare tax returns, take inventories, and carry out other significant steps in the probate of an estate. It is even not uncommon for an executor to conduct probate proceedings without counsel. It requires no special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met. The failure to make a timely filing of a tax return is not excused by the taxpayer’s reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not “reasonable cause” for a late filing under § 6651(a)(1). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The Internal Revenue Service has articulated eight reasons for a late filing that it considers to constitute “reasonable cause.” These reasons include unavoidable postal delays, the taxpayer’s timely filing of a return with the wrong IRS office, the taxpayer’s reliance on the erroneous advice of an IRS officer or employee, the death or serious illness of the taxpayer or a member of his immediate family, the taxpayer’s unavoidable absence, destruction by casualty of the taxpayer’s records or place of business, failure of the IRS to furnish the taxpayer with the necessary forms in a timely fashion, and the inability of an IRS representative to meet with the taxpayer when the taxpayer makes a timely visit to an IRS office in an attempt to secure information or.aid in the preparation of a return. Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) § 4350, (24) ¶ 22.2(2) (Mar. 20, 1980) (Audit Technique Manual for Estate Tax Examiners). If the cause asserted by the taxpayer does not implicate any of these eight reasons, the district director determines whether the asserted cause is reasonable. “A cause for delinquency which appears to a person of ordinary prudence and intelligence as a reasonable cause for delay in filing a return and which clearly negatives willful neglect will be accepted as reasonable.” Id., ¶ 22.2(3). Section 6081(a) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the IRS to grant “a reasonable extension of time,” generally no longer than six months, for filing any return. Congress added the relevant language to the tax statutes in 1916. For many years before that, § 3176 mandated a 50 percent penalty “in ease of a refusal or neglect, except in cases of sickness or absence, to make a list or return, or to verify the same . . . .” Rev. Stat. §3176 (emphasis added). The Revenue Act of 1916 amended this provision to require the 50 percent penalty for failure to file a return within the prescribed time, “except that, when a return is voluntarily and without notice from the collector filed after such time and it is shown that the failure to file it was due to a reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, no such addition shall be made to the tax.” Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 16,39 Stat. 756, 775 (emphasis added). No committee reports or congressional hearings or debates discuss the change in language. It would be logical to assume that Congress intended “willful neglect” to replace “refusal” — both expressions implying intentional failure — and “[absence of] reasonable cause” to replace “neglect” — both expressions implying carelessness. Respondent contends that the statute must be construed to apply a standard of willfulness only, and that the Treasury Regulation is incompatible with this construction of the statute. He argues that the Regulation converts the statute into a test of “ordinary business care,” because a taxpayer who demonstrates ordinary business care can never be guilty of “willful neglect.” By construing “reasonable cause” as the equivalent of “ordinary business care,” respondent urges, the IRS has removed from consideration any question of willfulness. We cannot accept this reasoning. Congress obviously intended to make absence of fault a prerequisite to avoidance of the late-filing penalty. See n. 3, supra. A taxpayer seeking a refund must therefore prove that his failure to file on time was the result neither of carelessness, reckless indifference, nor intentional failure. Thus, the Service’s correlation of “reasonable cause” with “ordinary business care and prudence” is consistent with Congress’ intent, and over 40 years of case law as well. That interpretation merits deference. See, e. g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844, and n. 14 (1984). Although at one point the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that reliance on counsel could constitute reasonable cause, see In re Fisk’s Estate, 203 F. 2d 358, 360 (1953), the Sixth Circuit appears now to be following those courts that have held that the taxpayer has a nondelegable duty to ascertain the deadline for a return and ensure that the return is filed by that deadline. See Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 32 TCM 424, 425 (1973), aff’d, 502 F. 2d 1148 (CA6 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 992 (1975); Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T. C. 200, 205 (1967), aff’d, 410 F. 2d 302 (CA6 1969) (per curiam). The administrative regulations and practices exempt late filings from the penalty when the tardiness results from postal delays, illness, and other factors largely beyond the taxpayer’s control. See supra, at 243, and n. 1. The principle underlying the IRS regulations and practices— that a taxpayer should not be penalized for circumstances beyond his control — already recognizes a range of exceptions which there is no reason for us to pass on today. This principle might well cover a filing default by a taxpayer who relied on an attorney or accountant because the taxpayer was, for some reason, incapable by objective standards of meeting the criteria of “ordinary business care and prudence.” In that situation, however, the disability alone could well be an acceptable excuse for a late filing. But this case does not involve the effect of a taxpayer’s disability; it involves the effect of a taxpayer’s reliance on an agent employed by the taxpayer, and our holding necessarily is limited to that issue rather than the wide range of issues that might arise in future cases under the statute and regulations. Those potential future cases are purely hypothetical at the moment and simply have no bearing on the issue now before us. The concurring opinion seems to agree in part. After four pages of discussion, it concludes: “Because the respondent here was fully capable of meeting the required standard of ordinary business care and prudence, we need not decide the issue of whether and under what circumstances a taxpayer who presents evidence that he was unable to adhere to the required standard might be entitled to relief from the penalty.” Post, at 255. This conclusion is unquestionably correct. See also, e. g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U. S. 1, 8, n. 5 (1984); Heckler v. Day, 467 U. S. 104, 119, nn. 33 and 34 (1984); Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 853, n. 8 (1984); Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U. S. 773, 779, n. 4 (1983). Many systems that do not collect taxes on a self-assessment basis have experienced difficulties in administering tax collection. See J. Wagner, France’s Soak-the-Rieh Tax, Congressional Quarterly (Editorial Research Reports), Oct. 12, 1982; Dodging Taxes in the Old World, Time, Mar. 28, 1983, p. 32. A number of courts have indicated that “reasonable cause” is a question of fact, to be determined only from the particular situation presented in each particular case. See, e. g., Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 351 F. 2d 617 (CA2 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 935 (1966); Coates v. Commissioner, 234 F. 2d 459, 462 (CA8 1956). This view is not entirely correct. Whether the elements that constitute “reasonable cause” are present in a given situation is a question of fact, but what elements must be present to constitute “reasonable cause” is a question of law. See, e. g., Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 769, 772 (CA2 1950); Daley v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 808, 811 (ND 1979). When faced with a recurring situation, such as that presented by the instant case, the courts of appeals should not be reluctant to formulate a clear rule of law to deal with that situation. Courts have differed over whether a taxpayer demonstrates “reasonable cause” when, in reliance on the advice of his accountant or attorney, the taxpayer files a return after the actual due date but within the time the adviser erroneously told him was available. Compare Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F. 2d 174, 178-179 (CA3 1978) (finding “reasonable cause” in such a situation); Estate of Rapelje v. Commissioner, 73 T. C. 82, 90, n. 9 (1979) (same); Estate of DiPalma v. Commissioner, 71 T. C. 324, 327 (1978) (same), acq., 1979-1 Cum. Bull. 1; Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 TCM 70, 72-73 (1974) (same), aff’d, 511 F. 2d 527 (CA6 1975), with Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F. 2d 454, 454-455, and n. 1 (CA8 1983) (per curiam) (no “reasonable cause”), cert. pending, No. 83-1038; Smith v. United States, 702 F. 2d 741, 742 (CA8 1983) (same); Sarto v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 476, 478 (ND Cal. 1983) (same). We need not and do not address ourselves to this issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION et al. v. BOSTON & MAINE CORP. et al. No. 90-1419. Argued January 13, 1992 Decided March 25, 1992 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connoe, Scalia, and Souter, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 424. Acting Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 90-1769 were Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Michael R. Dreeben, Robert S. Burk, Henri F. Rush, and Charles A. Stark. Robert P. vom Eigen, Charles I. Appier, Theodore A. Howard, Richard F Riley, Jr., Louis R. Cohen, Stephen C. Rogers, and Frederick C. Ohly filed briefs for petitioners in No. 90-1419. Irwin Goldbloom argued the cause for respondents in both cases and filed a brief for respondent Boston & Maine Corporation. Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, John K. Dunleavy, Assistant Attorney General, Rex E. Lee, G. Paul Moates, Ronald S. Flagg, Robert J. Baum, and Michael F. McBride filed a brief for respondents State of Vermont et al. Together with No. 90-1769, Interstate Commerce Commission et al. v. Boston & Maine Corp. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Laurence Z. Shiekman, Paul A Cunningham, Robert M. Jenkins III, and Bruce B. Wilson filed a brief for Concerned Railroads as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission) issued an order, upon the request of petitioner National Railroad Passenger Corporation, requiring conveyance of 48.8 miles of railroad track from respondent Boston and Maine Corporation (B&M) to the Corporation. In these consolidated cases we must decide whether the ICC’s decision was based on a reasonable interpretation and application of § 402(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U. S. C. § 562(d), the statute the Corporation invoked in the proceeding. We hold the ICC’s decision is authorized by the statute, and so reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which set aside the Commission’s action. I The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, is a private, for-profit corporation created by Congress in the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), Pub. L. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1328, 45 U. S. C. § 501 et seq. The purpose of Amtrak is to provide modern and efficient intercity and commuter rail passenger service. §§501, 541. Amtrak is not an agency or instrumentality of the United States Government, §541, but it has been supported over the years by congressional appropriations. Most of Amtrak’s passenger trains run over existing track systems owned and used by freight railroads. In the RPSA Congress authorized Amtrak to enter into “trackage rights” agreements which would allow Amtrak to use those tracks. When Amtrak and a freight railroad are unable to agree on the terms of such an agreement, Amtrak may request the ICC to order the track to be provided on reasonable terms. § 562(a). In 1973 Congress amended the RPSA to add subsection (d) of § 402, 45 U. S. C. § 562(d). Section 562(d) provides in pertinent part: “(1) If the Corporation [Amtrak] and a railroad are unable to agree upon terms for the sale to the Corporation of property (including interests in property) owned by the railroad and required for intercity rail passenger service, the Corporation may apply to the Commission [ICC] for an order establishing the need of the Corporation for the property at issue and requiring the conveyance thereof from the railroad to the Corporation on reasonable terms and conditions, including just compensation. Unless the Commission finds that— “(A) conveyance of the property to the Corporation would significantly impair the ability of the railroad to carry out its obligations as a common carrier; and “(B) the obligations of the Corporation to provide modern, efficient, and economical rail passenger service can adequately be met by the acquisition of alternative property (including interests in property) which is available for sale on reasonable terms to the Corporation, or available to the Corporation by the exercise of its authority under section 545(d) of this title, “the need of the Corporation for the property shall be deemed to be established and the Commission shall order the conveyance of the property to the Corporation on such reasonable terms and conditions as it may prescribe, including just compensation.” Amtrak may condemn nonrail property under a somewhat similar provision, § 545(d), a statute not at issue here. The Amtrak train the “Montrealer” began offering passenger service between Washington, D. C., and Montreal in 1972. In parts of Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire the train used the tracks of the Connecticut River Line (Conn River Line), portions of which are owned by B&M and other portions by the Central Vermont Railroad (CV). B&M and CV have operated freight trains on the Conn River Line under reciprocal “trackage rights” agreements dating back to 1930. In 1977 Amtrak entered into a “trackage rights” agreement with B&M under which B&M agreed to maintain its portions of the Conn River Line. Those portions include a 48.8-mile segment of track on the Conn River Line between Brattle-boro and Windsor, Vermont. This is the segment of track at issue here. At first the arrangement to maintain the track proceeded well, but in the early 1980’s problems developed. Guilford Transportation Industries, Inc., purchased B&M out of bankruptcy, and purchased also a railroad operating a parallel line. Amtrak’s claim is that neglect of track maintenance resulting from this purchase caused delays in Mon-trealer service. Maintenance of the Brattleboro-Windsor track was so poor that at points the train was slowed to five miles an hour. Negotiations for better maintenance were unsuccessful. In April 1987 Amtrak was forced to discontinue its Montrealer service. Congress responded to these events in July 1987 by appropriating $5 million to upgrade the Montrealer route. Act of July 11, 1987, Pub. L. 100-71, 101 Stat. 447-448. Amtrak decided not to spend the money to upgrade the Conn River Line while B&M continued to own it, because in Amtrak’s view B&M could not be relied upon to maintain the track once restored. Amtrak began negotiations with CV and, in early 1988, reached a preliminary agreement. Amtrak promised to use its statutory condemnation power to acquire the 48.8 miles of track in question, to at once reconvey the track to CV, and to provide up to $3.1 million to upgrade and rehabilitate the segment. In return, CV promised to provide the balance of the funds necessary to upgrade the track, to maintain the track for 20 years in a condition meeting Amtrak’s standards, to grant Amtrak trackage rights for 20 years, and to grant B&M trackage rights to serve its existing customers. As a prerequisite to invoking § 562(d), Amtrak made an offer to B&M to purchase the segment for $1 million, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. B&M offered to negotiate the terms under which it would be willing to upgrade the segment and stated: “[I]t appears clear that there is no need to pursue the very complex ‘offer to purchase’ set forth in your letter.” App. 60. B&M’s refusal to accept the offer seems to have been anticipated by Amtrak and CV, as indicated by an internal CV Memorandum written in January 1988. App. 94. Interpreting the B&M communication as a rejection of its offer, Amtrak instituted this proceeding before the ICC to compel conveyance of the. track. CV filed a simultaneous request for an exemption from ICC regulation for its acquisition of the segment upon reconveyance from Amtrak. B&M assessed the transaction as a significant shift in its long competition with CV for freight traffic. CV already owned large parts of the Conn River Line and after the proposed transaction it would own most of it. Though B&M would have trackage rights, CV would gain not only ownership of the segment, but also the right to obtain new customers on its route. B&M alleged this gave a new advantage to CV’s corporate parent, the Canadian National Railway Company, for each railroad links up with competing companies in Canada. CV’s lines link to Canadian National, while B&M’s lines link to the Canadian Pacific, Ltd., Canadian National’s competitor. B&M challenged the transaction as simply a device to shift ownership among railroads, not to give ownership to Amtrak, which, B&M argued, was the sole purpose of the condemnation provision. B&M filed initial objections to the § 562(d) proceeding on two grounds: that Amtrak had not shown that the parties were unable to agree on reasonable terms of sale, and that § 562(d) did not authorize condemnation of railroad lines. The ICC rejected B&M’s arguments and in a condemnation proceeding held that Amtrak had shown the inability of the parties to agree to terms. It ruled that § 562(d) covers railroad tracks because tracks are “rail property ‘required for intercity rail passenger service.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1419, pp. 130a-133a. B&M next sought to convert the proceeding into a trackage rights proceeding under § 562(a), but the ICC again rejected B&M’s position, holding that Amtrak had an “election of remedies” under § 562 and so had no obligation to seek trackage rights under subsection (a) before invoking subsection (d). Id., at 115a-116a. Meanwhile, CV and the States of Vermont and Massachusetts, as well as numerous other parties, intervened in the ICC proceeding. (CV appears as a petitioner before this Court, and Vermont and Massachusetts support petitioners.) This was the first decided case involving Amtrak’s condemnation powers under § 562(d). Id., at 39a. The ICC issued its final decision in 1988 and ordered conveyance of the segment with just compensation of $2,373,286. It reaffirmed earlier rulings and found that Amtrak “ha[d] met the statutory criteria for the institution of a proceeding” under § 562(d). Id., at 40a-42a, 81a. The ICC concluded that the presumption of Amtrak’s need for the track contained in § 562(d)(1) was applicable. In its view both statutory criteria must be met to rebut the presumption, and B&M had established neither. As to alternative property (subsection (B)), the ICC found that no reasonable alternative route existed for the Montrealer service. And as to significant impairment of B&M’s ability to carry out its common carrier obligations (subsection (A)), the ICC found that because B&M had been awarded just compensation and could continue to serve its customers under the “trackage rights” agreement which was part of the transaction, its ability had not been impaired. Id., at 45a-46a. The bulk of the ICC’s final decision deals with the question of just compensation, which is not before this Court. See infra, at 424. On petition for review, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the petition and remanded the matter to the ICC for further proceedings. 286 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 911 F. 2d 743 (1990). The majority held that § 562(d) does not permit Amtrak to condemn railroad property which it intends to reconvey to another railroad. It acknowledged that the ICC had interpreted § 562 in a different way, and that in the usual course judicial deference would be given to its interpretation under the principles enunciated in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984); but the court concluded that § 562(d) is unambiguous in light of its language and history, and so no deference was due. The panel majority reasoned that because Amtrak did not intend to retain the track to be condemned, it needed only its use, not its ownership. As Amtrak could obtain use of the property by obtaining either a “trackage rights” agreement under § 562(a), or by condemning an easement under § 562(d), the entire fee interest was not “ ‘required for intercity rail passenger service.’” 286 U. S. App. D. C., at 8, 911 F. 2d, at 750. The majority stated that its holding was confirmed by other considerations, including: (1) the potential constitutional problems, under the Takings Clause, raised by the ICC’s interpretation of § 562(d); (2) the structure of §562, which indicated an intent on the part of Congress to relegate Amtrak to trackage rights under § 562(a) when seeking only the use of track; and (3) Congress’ policy against cross-subsidization between sectors of the railroad industry, which the majority concluded would have been violated by this transaction. Judge Ruth B. Ginsburg concurred separately, rejecting the majority’s interpretation of the statute, but concluding that a remand to the ICC was necessary because the ICC had not made adequate findings to determine whether Amtrak in fact needed to shift ownership of the segment from B&M to CV to protect its interests. Id., at 11-13, 911 F. 2d, at 753-755. This factual question, whether Amtrak’s portrayal of a recalcitrant B&M is accurate, remains in dispute. Under our resolution of the case, however, the issue need not be reached. Amtrak and the ICC filed petitions for rehearing, and while the petitions were pending Congress amended § 562(d). The amendment, adopted in specific response to the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case, added the following sentence to § 562(d)(1): “The Corporation may subsequently convey title or other interest in such property to a third party, if such reconveyance is found by the Commission to further the purposes of this Act.” Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1990 § 9(a), Pub. L. 101-641, 104 Stat. 4658. The amendment was made applicable to all pending cases, §9(b), and B&M does not dispute that it applied in this case even while it was before the Court of Appeals on rehearing. Brief for Respondent B&M 33-35. The Court of Appeals considered the 1990 amendment, but denied rehearing nonetheless. 288 U. S. App. D. C. 196, 925 F. 2d 427 (1991). The panel majority held that while § 9 made it clear Amtrak was authorized to reconvey condemned property “subsequent to a condemnation that is otherwise valid under [§ 562(d)],” it did not change the statutory limitation that the property be “ ‘required for intercity rail passenger service’ ” in the first place. Id., at 197, 925 F. 2d, at 428 (emphasis in original). The majority reasoned that since its original decision was based on Amtrak’s failure to satisfy that requirement, the amendment did not affect its holding. The majority also distinguished a case from the Second Circuit, National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land, 822 F. 2d 1261, cert. denied, 484 U. S. 954 (1987), which had interpreted § 545(d)(1) (the provision authorizing Amtrak to condemn nonrail property) to permit reconveyance following condemnation. 288 U. S. App. D. C., at 196-197, 425 F. 2d, at 427-428. In a separate opinion, Judge Ginsburg wrote that the amendment confirmed her view that the ICC had not misinterpreted the statute, but that a remand remained necessary for further factual determinations. Amtrak and CV, in No. 90-1419, and the ICC, in No. 90-1769, filed separate petitions seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. We granted certiorari and consolidated the cases. 502 U. S. 807 (1991). We now reverse. II The primary question raised by these cases is a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation: whether § 562(d), as amended, authorizes the condemnation and transaction approved by the ICC but set aside by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals disallowed the transaction based on its own interpretation of the language “required for intercity rail passenger service” in § 562(d)(1). In so holding it limited Amtrak’s condemnation authority to property that was necessary, in the sense of indispensable, to Amtrak’s operations. The ICC interpreted the relevant statutory language to give Amtrak more latitude, and it is our task to determine whether the Commission had authority for its statutory interpretation. Judicial deference to reasonable interpretations by an agency of a statute that it administers is a dominant, well-settled principle of federal law. We relied upon it in Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), and have reaffirmed it often. See, e. g., K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 292-293 (1988); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 696-697 (1991). These decisions mandate that when a court is reviewing an agency decision based on a statutory interpretation, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U. S. A., supra, at 843. If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the statute, deference is due. K mart Corp., 486 U. S., at 292. In ascertaining whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the language, a court must look to the structure and language of the statute as a whole. Id., at 291; Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 89 (1990). If the text is ambiguous and so open to interpretation in some respects, a degree of deference is granted to the agency, though a reviewing court need not accept an interpretation which is unreasonable. Under these principles the ICC’s interpretation of § 562(d) was permissible, and the Court of Appeals’ decision was in error to disregard it. While the ICC’s opinion is not explicit in all of its details, the Commission’s decision is based on a reading of the statute quite different from the Court of Appeals’. The ICC agreed that property Amtrak seeks to condemn under § 562(d) must be “required for intercity rail passenger service.” It determined, however, that the word “required” need not mean, as the Court of Appeals’ opinion suggests, indispensable or necessary. Instead, the ICC gave effect to the statutory presumption of Amtrak’s need for the track, and in so doing implemented and interpreted the statute in a manner that comports with its words and structure. The analysis of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory presumption of need. The ICC’s position before the Court is that “required” can also mean “useful or appropriate,” Brief for Petitioners in No. 90-1769, p. 17, and that the order under review adopted that meaning. We agree that the manner in which the ICC has applied the statute in this case has that interpretation as its basic premise. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1419, pp. 42a-46a. In its brief the ICC cites a dictionary definition in support of its view. Brief for Petitioners in No. 90-1769, p. 17, citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1929 (1986). The existence of alternative dictionary definitions of the word “required,” each making some sense under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to interpretation. See Sullivan v. Everhart, supra. Few phrases in a complex scheme of regulation are so clear as to be beyond the need for interpretation when applied in a real context. Further, the structure of the provision reinforces our conclusion that statutory interpretation is appropriate and that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is itself open to serious question. The court defined the word “required” to establish a separate condition that the property sought to be condemned be necessary (indispensable) for Amtrak’s operations, a view which is not without support. See, e. g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1105 (2d ed. 1981). This interpretation, though, leaves little substance to the statutory presumption in favor of Amtrak’s need and so is in clear tension with that part of the statute. We decide that § 562(d) is ambiguous in some respects and conclude that the ICC’s interpretation of the word “required” is a reasonable one. We defer to its interpretation. This is not to say that the issue is beyond dispute, but these alternative interpretations are as old as the jurisprudence of this Court. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall, in a choice of interpretations with some parallels to this one, read the word “necessary” to mean “convenient, or useful,” rejecting a stricter reading of the term which would have limited congressional power under the Constitution to the “most direct and simple” means available. We think that as a matter of definition and interpretation in the context of this statute it is plausible, if not preferable, to say that Amtrak can find that an acquisition is required when it is a useful and appropriate way to accomplish its goals. The Commission’s interpretation is consistent also with the 1990 statutory addition enacted by Congress. While the amendment does not modify the specific language of § 562(d) at issue here, it confirms the ICC’s view. The interpretation given to § 562(d) by the Court of Appeals and B&M, on the other hand, would make the amendment superfluous, because if the word “required” has the strict meaning they seek to attribute to it, condemnations by Amtrak would seem to be barred whenever Amtrak’s purpose is to reconvey the property. Contrary to the position of the dissent, we are not “deferring to what we imagine an agency had in mind.” Post, at 428. Rather, we defer to an interpretation which was a necessary presupposition of the ICC’s decision. We recognize the well-established rule that an agency’s action may not be upheld on grounds other than those relied on by the agency. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943). But the fact that the ICC did not in so many words articulate its interpretation of the word “required” does not mean that we may not defer to that interpretation, since the only reasonable reading of the Commission’s opinion, and the only plausible explanation of the issues that the Commission addressed after considering the factual submissions by all of the parties, is that the ICC’s decision was based on the proffered interpretation. Chenery does not require a remand under those circumstances. It is noteworthy in this regard that neither party contends the ICC’s decision was not informed and governed by this statutory interpretation. B&M’s primary argument to the Court is that the word required must mean necessary. Brief for Respondent B&M 16, 22, 44. But this, as we have said, is quite inconsistent with the statutory presumption of need to which the ICC gave effect. There is no dispute on this record that Amtrak intends to use the condemned track for its Montrealer service. Under the ICC’s view that use is sufficient to satisfy the statutory command that the rail property be “required for intercity rail passenger service.” This is a reasonable interpretation and application of the RPSA. And it ends the judicial inquiry on this point. What we have said also answers Judge Ginsburg’s concern that the ICC must make specific findings regarding Amtrak’s actual need for the condemnation. The contention that such a finding was necessary, to implement the statutory criterion that the property be “required for intercity rail passenger service,” was the basis for Judge Ginsburg’s concurrence in the Court of Appeals. 286 U. S. App. D. C., at 12, 911 F. 2d, at 754. That position, however, appears to be based on the same interpretation of the word “required” as that adopted by the Court of Appeals’ majority, and so is inconsistent with the ICC’s interpretation. The ICC contends that the factual finding is not mandated. It argues that the structure of the statute, combined with the presumption created by the statute of Amtrak’s need for the property sought, creates a strong inference that the statute authorizes Amtrak to make a reasonable business judgment that condemnation of the property is advisable. We agree. The ICC’s oversight responsibility, exercised by enforcing the “required for intercity rail passenger service” language as interpreted by the Commission, is limited to ensuring that the condemned property will be used in Amtrak’s rail operations. The further determination of need is delegated to Amtrak, unless the statutory presumption is rebutted; and it is not rebutted here. Indeed, as our discussion above indicates, supra, at 418-419, it seems to us that any other interpretation may be inconsistent with the statutory presumption of need. In all events, the ICC’s interpretation is a reasonable one, and we may not substitute a different view. Arguing against the ICC’s interpretation, B&M cites to us cases such as United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 243, n. 13 (1946), which suggest that delegations of eminent domain power to private entities are of a limited nature. We do not believe that argument has any relevance here because Amtrak does not exercise eminent domain power under § 562(d). Rather, the statute gives that power to the ICC, a Government agency. To be sure, the statute creates a presumption in favor of conveyance to Amtrak. But the ICC must assess the impact of any condemnation and make a determination as to just compensation. Since § 562(d) is a proper exercise of regulatory authority, and the ICC’s oversight of Amtrak is intended to ensure compliance with the statute, the eminent domain power here is not private. Furthermore, this case turns on the need for deference to the ICC, not Amtrak. There is nothing in the cases B&M cites contradicting the rule of judicial deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation, even when the statute is one authorizing condemnation of private property. In short, the principle advanced by B&M does not prevail over Chevron’s rule of deference. We also reject B&M’s constitutional objections. B&M claims that § 562(d) as interpreted by the Commission violates the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, because the transaction leaves unchanged the use made by Amtrak of the condemned track. B&M’s position cannot be reconciled with our precedents. We have held that the public use requirement of the Takings Clause is coterminous with the regulatory power, and that the Court will not strike down a condemnation on the basis that it lacks a public use so long as the taking “is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 240-241 (1984); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32-34 (1954). In Midkiff we upheld land reform legislation which authorized condemnations for the specific purpose of transferring ownership to another private party, in order to eliminate a land oligopoly. In Berman we permitted land condemnations which contemplated reselling the land to redevelopers, as part of a plan to restore dilapidated sections of the District of Columbia. In both Midkiff and Berman, as in the present case, condemnation resulted in the transfer of ownership from one private party to another, with the basic use of the property by the government remaining unchanged. The Court held these exercises of the condemnation povier to be constitutional, as long as the condemning authorities were rational in their positions that some public purpose was served. Those holdings control here, for there can be no serious argument that the ICC was irrational in determining that the condemnation will, serve a public purpose by facilitating Amtrak’s rail service. That suffices to satisfy the Constitution, and we need not make a specific factual determination whether the condemnation will accomplish its objectives. Midkiff, supra, at 242-243. As a last effort, B&M argues that this matter must be remanded to the ICC because the Commission did not make adequate and accurate findings regarding several different matters. B&M claims that Amtrak failed to prove the parties were “‘unable’ to agree” on terms of sale. In B&M’s view, § 562(d) demands that Amtrak engage in “good faith ... negotiations” before it may invoke its condemnation powers. Brief for Respondent B&M 42. The ICC construed the language of § 562(d) in a more narrow fashion, to mandate nothing more than a factual determination that the parties will not be able to reach agreement through further negotiations. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1419, pp. 130a-131a (“Nothing in this record provides any indication that Amtrak and B&M will ever reach agreement on terms of sale”). This is a reasonable interpretation of the phrase “unable to agree upon terms for the sale,” and we do not substitute a different view. Thus the Commission did not err in concluding that this statutory prerequisite was satisfied. B&M argues further that the ICC made inadequate factual findings in concluding: (1) that this conveyance will not significantly impair B&M’s ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier, § 562(d)(1)(A); and (2) that Amtrak’s obligations cannot be met by the acquisition of alternative property, § 562(d)(1)(B). As to significant impairment, B&M’s argument, like the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point, 286 U. S. App. D. C., at 8-9, 911 F. 2d, at 750-751, relies on the notion that in assessing impairment the ICC may consider only the conveyance itself, not any mitigating measures adopted in response to the conveyance, such as the grant of trackage rights to B&M. We find no basis in the text or structure of § 562(d) for this position and cannot say that the statute must be interpreted to mandate such a restrictive inquiry. The ICC was not unreasonable in considering the effect of the “trackage rights” agreements and the just compensation award in assessing significant impairment; and the ICC’s conclusion, that B&M’s ability to carry out its common carrier obligations will not be impaired by the transaction in any significant way, is supported by substantial evidence. As to the availability of alternative property, the ICC interpreted that provision as referring only to whether Amtrak could provide service using an alternative route, not whether a lesser interest in property would suffice to meet Amtrak’s needs. Again, this was a reasonable reading to which we defer. Since B&M would have to prevail on both the significant impairment and alternative property issues to rebut Amtrak’s presumption of need, there can be no doubt that the ICC’s finding that Amtrak established its need for the property must be affirmed. Ill For the reasons we have stated, we hold that the ICC did not exceed its authority in ordering conveyance of the 48.8-mile segment of the Conn River Line from B&M to Amtrak. Because of its contrary holding on this point, the Court of Appeals did not address the parties’ challenges to the ICC’s just compensation finding as well as certain other issues. Id., at 11, 911 F. 2d, at 753. These questions should be resolved on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION v. MARTIN EXPLORATION MANAGEMENT CO. et al. No. 87-363. Argued March 28, 1988 Decided May 31, 1988 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except White, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for petitioner in No. 87-363. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Catherine C. Cook, Jerome M. Feit, Joel M. Cockrell, and John H. Conway. Richard A. Solomon argued the cause for petitioners in No. 87-364. With him on the briefs were Mark N. Mutterperl, Terence J. Collins, Robert Ballentine, Raymond N. Shibley, Frederick Moring, and Herbert J. Martin. John E. Holtzinger, Jr., Joseph E. Stubbs, Loren S. Meltzer, Stephen E. Williams, Georgia B. Carter, David E. Weatherwax, and Mark G. Magnuson filed a brief for CNG Transmission Corp. as respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6, in support of petitioners. Jeffrey S. Davidson argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Stephen A. Herman, Michael L. Pate, Charles H. Shoneman, John L. Williford, Charles L. Pain, Harris S. Wood, James B. Atkin, David J. Evans, C. Roger Hoffman, Douglas W. Rasch, R. Gordon Gooch, Ronald D. Hurst, Paul W. Hicks, John McDonald, Richard E. Powers, Jr., Kenneth L. Riedman, Thomas G. Johnson, and Constance D. Coleman Together with No. 87-364, Public Service Commission of the State of New York et al. v. Martin Exploration Management Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America by John H. Cheatham III; and for Williams Natural Gas Co. by Dale A. Wright, James T. McManus, Michael E. Small, Bobby Potts, and John Cary. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases involve natural gas covered by overlapping provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 — one setting a price ceiling, the other declaring prices deregulated. Petitioners contend that under § 101(b)(5) of the Act such gas should be classified as deregulated gas. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that under § 101(b)(5) such gas falls under whichever classification affords producers the highest price under their contracts and current market conditions. The Court of Appeals also held invalid a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ruling that certain “new tight formation gas” under §107 (c)(5) of the Act is automatically “new” gas qualified for deregulated treatment under § 102(c) or § 103 of the Act. We reverse on both issues. I From 1938 to 1978, the Federal Government regulated only the interstate natural gas market. By the 1970’s, however, shortages in the interstate market developed because gas producers could get higher prices in unregulated intrastate markets. Two conflicting legislative solutions were developed: the Senate passed a bill deregulating interstate gas, S. 2104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); the House passed a bill extending federal regulation to intrastate gas, H. R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Conference Committee struck a compromise. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1752 (1978). The result was the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (Act), Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351, 15 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. The Act defines various categories of gas spanning both interstate and intrastate gas, and creates a two-part system of phased deregulation. First, the Act establishes price ceilings for wellhead first sales of gas that vary with the applicable category of gas and that gradually increase over time. §§101-110, 15 U. S. C. §§3311-3320. Second, the Act establishes a three-stage elimination of price ceilings for certain categories: the price ceilings for certain “high-cost” gas were eliminated in 1979, for certain “old” intrastate gas and “new” gas in 1985, and for certain other “new” gas in 1987. See §121, 15 U. S. C. §3331. Many of these categories overlap. Recognizing the overlap, Congress provided in § 101(b)(5) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 3311(b): “If any natural gas qualifies under more than one provision of this title providing for any maximum lawful price or for any exemption from such a price with respect to any first sale of such natural gas, the provision which could result in the highest price shall be applicable.” In anticipation of the 1985 deregulation, FERC promulgated a regulation interpreting §§ 121 and 101(b)(5) to mean that any gas that was qualified for both deregulated and regulated treatment would be treated as deregulated. 18 CFR §270.208 (1987). This preference for deregulatory treatment adversely affected many gas producers who had entered into certain types of long-term contracts. Typically, these contracts had one clause setting the price if the gas were regulated and another clause setting the price if it were deregulated. The contract price for regulated gas was typically close to the price ceiling; the contract price for deregulated gas was typically based on market prices or left open to renegotiation. Because by 1984 the market price of natural gas had plunged below the regulated price ceilings, these producers stood to reap higher contractual prices if their gas was regulated than if it were deregulated. Dissatisfied with FERC’s regulation, numerous producers petitioned for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Court of Appeals rejected FERC’s interpretation of §§ 121 and 101(b)(5), adopting the producers’ position that § 101(b)(5) unambiguously requires the applicable category to be that which, at any particular moment, gamers the producer the highest contract price for its gas. 813 F. 2d 1059 (1987). In explaining this holding, the Court of Appeals also rejected FERC’s ruling that certain “new tight formation gas” subject to regulation under § 107(c)(5), 15 U. S. C. § 3317(c)(5), is automatically qualified for deregulation as new gas under § 102(c) or §103, 15 U. S. C. §§3312, 3313. See 813 F. 2d, at 1069-1070. We granted certiorari. 484 U. S. 962 (1987). II “The plain meaning of the statute decides the issue presented.” Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen, 485 U. S. 399, 403 (1988). The Act states that “the provision which could result in the highest price shall be applicable.” § 101(b)(5) (emphasis added). It does not state that the applicable provision is that which will (depending on actual contracts and daily market prices) result in the highest price for each producer. We think these words call for a simple comparison between the highest price permitted by one provision and the highest price permitted by another: the higher the price ceiling, the higher the price that “could result” under the provision. The provision with the highest price ceiling thus applies uniformly to all producers selling gas that falls within both provisions. When one of the provisions sets no price ceiling at all — i. e., it deregulates — that provision governs. The Court of Appeals rejected this straightforward interpretation on the ground that, although the price of deregulated gas “could” in theory rise without limit, “the price of regulated gas ‘could’ be higher than the price of deregulated gas.” 813 F. 2d, at 1068. The court reasoned that “[s]uch an understanding of ‘could’ — one that considers only the theoretical possibilities — renders § 101(b)(5) meaningless.” Ibid. Rather, the court concluded: “‘Could’ makes sense in § 101(b)(5) only in the context of how gas sales actually occur.” Ibid. Under this reading of § 101(b)(5), the statute requires a determination of which provision would actually result in a higher price under current market prices for that gas and the contractual arrangement each producer had for the sale of that gas. Ibid. The provision that actually results in the highest price at any particular moment establishes the applicable category for that producer’s gas. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that reading the word “could” in § 101(b)(5) with its ordinary conditional meaning makes so little sense that the word “could” must be converted to the word “will.” The conditional meaning of “could” makes perfect sense if the statute does not mean to refer to particular contracts but rather to the generic situation of parties in a precontract state: the provision that allows the parties to contract to the highest conceivable price applies. Congress must have had in mind the fact that prior to entering into a contract the parties could always contract to a higher price — i. e., a higher price could result— without a price ceiling than with one. After all, no party has any reason to contract to a higher price simply because a price ceiling has been imposed; the price ceiling can only impose a direct legal restraint if the market price would be above the price ceiling. Cf. § 101(b)(9), 15 U. S. C. § 3311(b)(9) (declaring contract prices enforceable if they do not exceed an applicable price ceiling or if a deregulatory provision applies). The Court of Appeals’ difficulty with the statutory language is caused by its focus on the postcontract situation, where many of the contracts contain clauses that have the perverse effect of increasing the price when a price ceiling is imposed. We doubt seriously that Congress enacted § 101(b)(5) with such contracts in mind or that it would have wished to make sure that the Act interacted with such contracts to mandate the maximum price possible. Certainly nothing in the legislative history suggests Congress had such a system in mind. Indeed, the Court of Appeals’ reading is contrary to the whole thrust of the Act, for it has the effect of turning a statutory scheme of price ceilings and deregulation into a system of price supports for producers. There is no evidence that Congress had any intent to create such a producer-assistance program. The Act was a compromise: those supporting deregulation were opposed only by those who thought deregulation would allow producers to charge excessive prices. Not one participant in the legislative process suggested that producers should receive higher prices than deregulation would afford them. The operating assumption of Congress was that deregulation was the most favorable regime for gas producers under consideration. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. 28633 (1978) (statement of Sen. Jackson) (describing deregulation as “the maximum economic incentive”). We are moreover reluctant to read § 101(b)(5) as making the applicable provision for a particular type of gas vary not only from producer to producer and from contract to contract, but from day to day as the actual market price of that gas changes. The statute is phrased in a general way that implies that all gas fitting the same overlapping provisions will be treated the same, and one would normally expect that a regulatory regime would apply uniformly rather than varying in such a chaotic fashion. The statute calls for a comparison of statutory provisions, not contractual ones, and nothing in the statute or legislative history suggests that Congress wanted the classification of gas to turn on contractual terms. Indeed, if the logic of the Court of Appeals’ position were pursued, then, even for gas that fell into two regulated categories, § 101(b)(5) would require a comparison of each producer’s contract prices for each category rather than a comparison of the ceiling prices for each category. We see no reason for inferring that Congress intended such a regulatory regime or the disuniformity and administrative difficulties it would entail. 1 — 1 I — I We also disagree with the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn FERC’s ruling that certain gas qualified as “new tight formation” gas under § 107(c)(5), 15 U. S. C. § 3317(c) (5), is automatically also qualified as deregulated “new” gas under § 102(c) or § 103, 15 U. S. C. §§ 3312(c), 3313. Section 107(c)(5) gives FERC authority to make eligible for special high-cost gas pricing natural gas “produced under such . . . conditions as [FERC] determines to present extraordinary risks or costs.” Pursuant to § 107(c)(5), FERC has defined “new tight formation gas” as gas “(i) Which is new natural gas, (as defined in section 102(c)), certain OCS gas qualifying for the new natural gas ceiling price, (as defined in section 102(d)), or gas produced through a new onshore production well (as defined in section 103(c); and “(ii) Which is produced from a designated tight formation through a well the surface drilling of which began on or after July 16, 1979.” 18 CFR § 271.703(b)(2) (1987). In the proceeding below, which did not address certain Outer Continental Shelf gas under § 102(d), 15 U. S. C. §3312(d), FERC has simply ruled that, because “[i]n order to qualify as new tight-formation gas under section 107(c)(5), a producer must file the same information, in addition to other information, that would be filed to qualify as a section 102 or 103 determination , a determination that gas qualifies as new tight-formation gas is implicitly a determination that the gas meets the qualifications for either section 102(c) or 103 . . . , regardless of whether that was explicit at the time that the determination was made.” 49 Fed. Reg. 46874, 46880 (1984). We see nothing objectionable about this ruling, which merely recognizes that, as defined, the types of “new tight formation gas” that were under consideration by FERC are a subset of deregulated “new” gas under § 102(c) or § 103. The Court of Appeals’ objections to the ruling were based on its conclusion that allowing one qualification to result automatically in a second qualification would interfere with what it inferred was Congress’ intent to give producers the right to select the categories they desired. 813 F. 2d, at 1069. The court had two bases for inferring this intent. One was its reading of § 101(b)(5), which we reject above. The other was its reading of certain portions of the legislative history, which state that governmental agencies have no affirmative obligation to identify the applicable classification and that it is up to producers to apply for the designations they want. 813 F. 2d, at 1070 (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. 29109, 38363-38364 (1978)). But the fact that Congress declined to impose affirmative investigative duties on agencies hardly means that it did not want FERC to adopt rules for classifying gas based on the evidence presented by producers at determination hearings. The producer respondents also argue that FERC’s rule intrudes on the jurisdiction other state and federal agencies have to make category determinations under §503, 15 U. S. C. §3413. FERC, however, has made no category determinations. It has merely promulgated a definitional rule applicable in determination proceedings. This FERC has ample authority to do. Not only does § 107(c)(5) give FERC broad authority to define the gas eligible for § 107(c) (5) treatment, but § 503 gives FERC authority to review the category determinations of other agencies and to prescribe the manner and substantiation with which such category determinations must be presented for its review. And under §501, 15 U. S. C. §3411, FERC has general authority to define terms under the Act and to prescribe “such rules and orders as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out its functions.” For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. CAMPBELL No. 81-1983. Argued February 28, 1983 Decided May 16, 1983 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Con-nor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 470. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 473. John H. Garvey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Anne Buxton Sobol. Ruben Nazario argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Toby Golick and Jane Greengold Stevens Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Eileen P. Sweeney for the Gray Panthers; and by Dan Stormer for Tulare/Kings Counties Legal Services et al. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue is whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services may rely on published medical-vocational guidelines to determine a claimant’s right to Social Security disability benefits. I The Social Security Act defines “disability” in terms of the effect a physical or mental impairment has on a person’s ability to function in the workplace. It provides disability benefits only to persons who are unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 81 Stat. 868, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(1)(A). And it specifies that a person must “not only [be] unable to do his previous work but [must be unable], considering his age, education, and work experience, [to] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In 1978, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated regulations implementing this definition. See 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (1978) (codified, as amended, at 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P (1982)). The regulations recognize that certain impairments are so severe that they prevent a person from pursuing any gainful work. See 20 CFR § 404.1520(d) (1982) (referring to impairments listed at 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1). A claimant who establishes that he suffers from one of these impairments will be considered disabled without further inquiry. Ibid. If a claimant suffers from a less severe impairment, the Secretary must determine whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either his former work or some less demanding employment. If a claimant can pursue his former occupation, he is not entitled to disability benefits. See §404.1520(e). If he cannot, the Secretary must determine whether the claimant retains the capacity to pursue less demanding work. See §404.1520(f)(1). ■ The regulations divide this last inquiry into two stages. First, the Secretary must assess each claimant’s present job qualifications. The regulations direct the Secretary to consider the factors Congress has identified as relevant: physical ability, age, education, and work experience. See 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 CFR § 404.1520(f) (1982). Second, she must consider whether jobs exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant’s qualifications could perform. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1566-404.1569 (1982). Prior to 1978, the Secretary relied on vocational experts to establish the existence of suitable jobs in the national economy. After a claimant’s limitations and abilities had been determined at a hearing, a vocational expert ordinarily would testify whether work existed that the claimant could perform. Although this testimony often was based on standardized guides, see 43 Fed. Reg. 9286 (1978), vocational experts frequently were criticized for their inconsistent treatment of similarly situated claimants. See Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F. 2d 925, 930 (CA3 1982); J. Mashaw, C. Goetz, F. Goodman, W. Schwartz, P. Verkuil, & M. Carrow, Social Security Hearings and Appeals 78-79 (1978). To improve both the uniformity and efficiency of this determination, the Secretary promulgated medical-vocational guidelines as part of the 1978 regulations. See 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1982). These guidelines relieve the Secretary of the need to rely on vocational experts by establishing through rulemaking the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy. They consist of a matrix of the four factors identified by Congress — physical ability, age, education, and work experience — and set forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific combinations of these factors exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Where a claimant’s qualifications correspond to the job requirements identified by a rule, the guidelines direct a conclusion as to whether work exists that the claimant could perform. If such work exists, the claimant is not considered disabled. t — I HH In 1979, Carmen Campbell applied for disability benefits because a back condition and hypertension prevented her from continuing her work as a hotel maid. After her application was denied, she requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge. He determined that her back problem was not severe enough to find her disabled without further inquiry, and accordingly considered whether she retained the ability to perform either her past work or some less strenuous job. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. He concluded that even though Campbell’s back condition prevented her from returning to her work as a maid, she retained the physical capacity to do light work. Ibid. In accordance with the regulations, he found that Campbell was 52 years old, that her previous employment consisted of unskilled jobs, and that she had a limited education. Id., at 28a-29a. He noted that Campbell, who had been born in Panama, experienced difficulty in speaking and writing English. She was able, however, to understand and read English fairly well. App. 42. Relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, the Administrative Law Judge found that a significant number of jobs existed that a person of Campbell’s qualifications could perform. Accordingly, he concluded that she was not disabled. App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. This determination was upheld by both the Social Security Appeals Council, id., at 16a, and the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, id., at 15a. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Campbell v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Services, 665 F. 2d 48 (1981). It accepted the Administrative Law Judge’s determination that Campbell retained the ability to do light work. And it did not suggest that he had classified Campbell’s age, education, or work experience incorrectly. The court noted, however, that it “has consistently required that ‘the Secretary identify specific alternative occupations available in the national economy that would be suitable for the claimant’ and that ‘these jobs be supported by “a job description clarifying the nature of the job, [and] demonstrating that the job does not require” exertion or skills not possessed by the claimant.’” Id., at 53 (quoting Decker v. Harris, 647 F. 2d 291, 298 (CA2 1981)). The court found that the medical-vocational guidelines did not provide the specific evidence that it previously had required. It explained that in the absence of such a showing, “the claimant is deprived of any real chance to present evidence showing that she cannot in fact perform the types of jobs that are administratively noticed by the guidelines.” 665 F. 2d, at 53. The court concluded that because the Secretary had failed to introduce evidence that specific alternative jobs existed, the determination that Campbell was not disabled was not supported by substantial evidence. Id., at 54. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. Schweiker v. Campbell, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982). We now reverse. III The Secretary argues that the Court of Appeals’ holding effectively prevents the use of the medical-vocational guidelines. By requiring her to identify specific alternative jobs in every disability hearing, the court has rendered the guidelines useless. An examination of both the language of the Social Security Act and its legislative history clearly demonstrates that the Secretary may proceed by regulation to determine whether substantial gainful work exists in the national economy. Campbell argues in response that the Secretary has misperceived the Court of Appeals’ holding. Campbell reads the decision as requiring only that the Secretary give disability claimants concrete examples of the kinds of factual determinations that the administrative law judge will be making. This requirement does not defeat the guidelines’ purpose; it ensures that they will be applied only where appropriate. Accordingly, respondent argues that we need not address the guidelines’ validity. A The Court of Appeals held that “[i]n failing to show suitable available alternative jobs for Ms. Campbell, the Secretary’s finding of ‘not disabled’ is not supported by substantial evidence.” 665 F. 2d, at 54. It thus rejected the proposition that “the guidelines provide adequate evidence of a claimant’s ability to perform a specific alternative occupation,” id., at 53, and remanded for the Secretary to put into evidence “particular types of jobs suitable to the capabilities of Ms. Campbell,” id., at 54. The court’s requirement that additional evidence be introduced on this issue prevents the Secretary from putting the guidelines to their intended use and implicitly calls their validity into question. Accordingly, we think the decision below requires us to consider whether the Secretary may rely on medical-vocational guidelines in appropriate cases. The Social Security Act directs the Secretary to “adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same” in disability cases. 42 U. S. C. § 405(a). As we previously have recognized, Congress has “conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the [Social Security] Act.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 43 (1981); see Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 (1977). Where, as here, the statute expressly entrusts the Secretary with the responsibility for implementing a provision by regulation, our review is limited to determining whether the regulations promulgated exeeded the Secretary's statutory authority and whether they are arbitrary and capricious. Herweg v. Ray, 455 U. S. 265, 275 (1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 44. We do not think that the Secretary’s reliance on medical-vocational guidelines is inconsistent with the Social Security Act. It is true that the statutory scheme contemplates that disability hearings will be individualized determinations based on evidence adduced at a hearing. See 42 U. S. C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (specifying consideration of each individual’s condition); 42 U. S. C. § 405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (disability determination to be based on evidence adduced at hearing). But this does not bar the Secretary from relying on rulemaking to resolve certain classes of issues. The Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration. See FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956). A contrary holding would require the agency continually to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding. See FPC v. Texaco Inc., supra, at 44. The Secretary’s decision to rely on medical-vocational guidelines is consistent with Texaco and Storer. As noted above, in determining whether a claimant can perform less strenuous work, the Secretary must make two determinations. She must assess each claimant’s individual abilities and then determine whether jobs exist that a person having the claimant’s qualifications could perform. The first inquiry involves a determination of historic facts, and the regulations properly require the Secretary to make these findings on the basis of evidence adduced at a hearing. We note that the regulations afford claimants ample opportunity both to present evidence relating to their own abilities and to offer evidence that the guidelines do not apply to them. The second inquiry requires the Secretary to determine an issue that is not unique to each claimant — the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national economy. This type of general factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by introducing the testimony of vocational experts at each disability hearing. See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 123 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 319, 359 F. 2d 624, 633 (1966) (en banc). As the Secretary has argued, the use of published guidelines brings with it a uniformity that previously had been perceived as lacking. To require the Secretary to relitigate the existence of jobs in the national economy at each hearing would hinder needlessly an already overburdened agency. We conclude that the Secretary’s use of medical-vocational guidelines does not conflict with the statute, nor can we say on the record before us that they are arbitrary and capricious. B We now consider Campbell’s argument that the Court of Appeals properly required the Secretary to specify alternative available jobs. Campbell contends that such a showing informs claimants of the type of issues to be established at the hearing and is required by both the Secretary’s regulation, 20 CFR §404.944 (1982), and the Due Process Clause. By referring to notice and an opportunity to respond, see 665 F. 2d, at 53-54, the decision below invites the interpretation given it by respondent. But we do not think that the decision fairly can be said to present the issues she raises. The Court of Appeals did not find that the Secretary failed to give sufficient notice in violation of the Due Process Clause or any statutory provision designed to implement it. See 42 U. S. C. §405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (requiring that disability claimants be given “reasonable notice and [an] opportunity for a hearing”). Nor did it find that the Secretary violated any duty imposed by regulation. See 20 CFR § 404.944 (1982) (requiring the administrative law judge to “loo[k] fully into the issues”). Rather the court’s reference to notice and an opportunity to respond appears to be based on a principle of administrative law — that when an agency takes official or administrative notice of facts, a litigant must be given an adequate opportunity to respond. See 5 U. S. C. § 556(e); McDaniel v. Celebrezze, 331 F. 2d 426 (CA4 1964). This principle is inapplicable, however, when the agency has promulgated valid regulations. Its purpose is to provide a procedural safeguard: to ensure the accuracy of the facts of which an agency takes notice. But when the accuracy of those facts already has been tested fairly during rulemaking, the rulemaking proceeding itself provides sufficient procedural protection. See, e. g., Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F. 2d 1144, 1156 (CA5 1982); Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F. 2d 1351, 1362 (CA11 1982); Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 677 F. 2d 167, 169 (CA1 1982). > HH The Court of Appeals’ decision would require the Secretary to introduce evidence of specific available jobs that respondent could perform. It would limit severely her ability to rely on the medical-vocational guidelines. We think the Secretary reasonably could choose to rely on these guidelines in appropriate cases rather than on the testimony of a vocational expert in each case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The regulations state that the Secretary will inquire into each of these factors and make an individual assessment of each claimant’s abilities and limitations. See 20 CFR §§404.1545-404.1565 (1982); cf. 20 CFR § 404.944 (1982). In determining a person’s physical ability, she will consider, for example, the extent to which his capacity for performing tasks such as lifting objects or his ability to stand for long periods of time has been impaired. See §404.1545. The Social Security hearing system is “probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.” J. Mashaw, C. Goetz, F. Goodman, W. Schwartz, P. Verkuil, & M. Carrow, Social Security Hearings and Appeals xi (1978). Approximately 2.3 million claims for disability benefits were filed in fiscal year 1981. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1981, pp. 32, 35 (1982). More than a quarter of a million of these claims required a hearing before an administrative law judge. Id., at 38. The need for efficiency is self-evident. Each of these four factors is divided into defined categories. A person’s ability to perform physical tasks, for example, is categorized according to the physical exertion requirements necessary to perform varying classes of jobs — i. e., whether a claimant can perform sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work. 20 CFR §404.1567 (1982). Each of these work categories is defined in terms of the physical demands it places on a worker, such as the weight of objects he must lift and whether extensive movement or use of arm and leg controls is required. Ibid. For example, Rule 202.10 provides that a significant number of jobs exist for a person who can perform light work, is closely approaching advanced age, has a limited education but who is literate and can communicate in English, and whose previous work has been unskilled. The regulations recognize that the rules only describe “major functional and vocational patterns.” 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 200.00(a) (1982). If an individual’s capabilities are not described accurately by a rule, the regulations make clear that the individual’s particular limitations must be considered. See app. 2, §§ 200.00(a), (d). Additionally, the regulations declare that the administrative law judge will not apply the age categories “mechanically in a borderline situation,” 20 CFR § 404.1563(a) (1982), and recognize that some claimants may possess limitations that are not factored into the guidelines, see app. 2, § 200.00(e). Thus, the regulations provide that the rules will be applied only when they describe a claimant’s abilities and limitations accurately. The Social Security Act provides each claimant with a right to a de novo hearing. 42 U. S. C. § 405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V); §421(d). The regulations specify when a claimant may exercise this right. See 20 CFR §§404.929-404.930 (1982). The Administrative Law Judge did not accept Campbell’s claim that her hypertension constituted an impairment. He found that this claim was not documented by the record and noted that her current medication appeared sufficient to keep her blood pressure under control. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. Campbell later reapplied for disability benefits and was found disabled as of January 1,1981. See Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 7. The Secretary’s subsequent decision does not moot this case since Campbell is claiming entitlement to benefits prior to January 1, 1981. Every other Court of Appeals addressing the question has upheld the Secretary’s use of the guidelines. See Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F. 2d 1144, 1157-1158 (CA5 1982); McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F. 2d 1138, 1144-1146 (CA8 1982); Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 677 F. 2d 167, 169 (CA1 1982); Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F. 2d 925, 934-936 (CA3 1982); Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F. 2d 81, 82-83 (CA7 1982); Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F. 2d 524, 529-535 (CA6 1981); Frady v. Harris, 646 F. 2d 143, 145 (CA4 1981). One Court of Appeals has agreed that the Secretary may use medical-vocational guidelines but has found that with respect to age the guidelines are arbitrary. See Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F. 2d 1351, 1359-1361 (CA11 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-816. The instant case does not present the issue addressed in Broz. The Courts of Appeals have read the decision below as implicitly invalidating the guidelines. See McCoy v. Schweiker, supra, at 1145; Torres v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, supra, at 169; Santise v. Schweiker, supra, at 937, and n. 25. Since Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1954 to provide for disability benefits, Pub. L. 761, § 106, 68 Stat. 1079, it repeatedly has suggested that the Secretary promulgate regulations defining the criteria for evaluating disability. See, e. g., Subcommittee on the Administration of the Social Security Laws of the House Committee on Ways and Means, Administration of Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Preliminary Report, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 17-18 (Comm. Print 1960) (requesting Secretary to develop “specific criteria for the weight to be given nonmedical factors in the evaluation of disability”); House Committee on Ways and Means, Committee Staff Report on the Disability Insurance Program, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (Comm. Print 1974) (recommending that the Secretary promulgate regulations defining disability to ease accelerating caseload); Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, H. R. 8076 — Disability Insurance Amendment of 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (Comm. Print 1977) (comments of Rep. Burke) (noting with approval that the Secretary had promised to promulgate medical-vocational guidelines to define disability). While these sources do not establish the original congressional intent, they indicate that later Congresses perceived that regulations such as the guidelines would be consistent with the statute. Both FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 40 (1964), and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956), were careful to note that the statutory scheme at issue allowed an individual applicant to show that the rule promulgated should not be applied to him. The regulations here provide a claimant with equal or greater protection since they state that an administrative law judge will not apply the rules contained in the guidelines when they fail to describe a claimant’s particular limitations. See n. 5, supra. Respondent did not raise either her due process or her regulatory argument below. See Brief for Appellant in Campbell v. Schweiker, No. 81-6108 (CA2); Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. Nor has respondent filed a cross-petition. As she prevailed below, we could consider grounds supporting her judgment different from those on which the Court of Appeals rested its decision. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475-476, n. 6 (1970). But where the ground presented here has not been raised below we exercise this authority “only in exceptional cases.” McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434 (1940). We do not think this is such a case. Alternatively, respondent suggests that if the Administrative Law Judge had inquired conscientiously and fully into the relevant facts, as required by 20 CFR § 404.944 (1982), he would have concluded that she was not capable of performing light work. The Secretary concedes that § 404.944 requires such an inquiry, see Brief for Petitioner 42, but argues that the inquiry undertaken by the Administrative Law Judge satisfied any regulatory duty. Again respondent appears not to have presented her § 404.944 argument to the Court of Appeals, and we decline to reach it here. The Court of Appeals did not identify any basis for imposing this requirement other than its earlier decision in Decker v. Harris, 647 F. 2d 291 (CA2 1981). Decker, however, identified the source of this requirement more clearly. It stated: “This requirement of specificity . . . assures the claimant of adequate notice of the grounds on which his claim may be denied, providing him with an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence. See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.18, at 198-206 (2d ed. 1980).” Id., at 298. In § 15.18 of his treatise, Professor Davis addresses the question of administrative or official notice of material facts in disability cases and the need for an adequate opportunity to respond. He states that an administrative law judge may take administrative notice of jobs in the national economy. He emphasizes, however, that “[a] quick remark by an ALJ that he takes official notice of availability of jobs in the national economy that would be suitable for the claimant could be unfair for lack of sufficient specificity. The jobs should be identified, their characteristics should be stated. . . .” § 15.18, at 204 (emphasis added). Decker’s reference to this treatise makes clear that the requirement of specificity derives from a principle of administrative law. Respondent does not challenge the rulemaking itself, and, as noted above, respondent was accorded a de novo hearing to introduce evidence on issues, such as physical and mental limitations, that require individualized consideration. See supra, at 462-468.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LACHANCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT v. ERICKSON et al. No. 96-1395. Argued December 2, 1997 Decided January 21, 1998 Rehnquist, G. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Roy W. McLeese III, David M. Cohen, Todd M. Hughes, Lorraine Lewis, Steven E. Abow, and Joseph E. McCann. Paul E. Marth argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Erickson. John R. Koch filed a brief for respondent Walsh. Neil C. Bonney filed a brief for respondent Kye. Together with Lachance, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. McManus et al., also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 12.4). Jody M. Litchford, James P. Manak, and Wayne W. Schmidt filed a brief for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. CHIEF Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by this action is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not. Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are Government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each ease, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately appealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employee’s false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee’s credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee’s underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson, 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court held that “an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employee’s denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge,” nor may “[d]enials of charges and related facts ... he considered in determining a penalty.” Id., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, judgt. order reported at 92 F. 3d 1208 (1996), the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Board’s conclusion that an employee’s “false statements . . : may not be considered” even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice, 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995). We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. 1117 (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969), we said: “Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions — lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.” Id., at 72 (footnote omitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here “for such eause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must: (1) give the employee “at least 30 days’ advance written notice”; (2) allow the employee “a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer”; (3) permit the employee to “be represented by an attorney or other representative”; and (4) provide the employee , with “a written decision and the specific reasons therefor.” 5 U. S. C. § 7513(b). In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to “put the government to its proof” by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” The Court of Appeals stated that “it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment,” 89 F. 3d, at 1581, and we assume that to be the ease for purposes of our decision. The core of due process is ingful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985). But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this action that a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct. It is well established that a testify does not include the light to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986); United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980); United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978). Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993), we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendant’s sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial. Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong, 431 U. S. 174 (1977). There we said that “the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood... does not justify perjury.” Id., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966). The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these eases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry. The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might “be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 (1978). There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as “entirely frivolous.” Id., at 55. If answering an agency’s investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906); United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980). It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the “prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify”). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36 (1961). For these reasons, we hold that a Government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. v. MORALES No. 93-1462. Argued January 9, 1995 Decided April 25, 1995 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 514. James Ching, Supervising Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Young, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Joan W. Cavanagh, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and G. Lewis Chartrand, Jr. James R. Asperger argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Daniel H. Bookin, Brian D. Boyle, and Thomas J. Karr Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Georgia by Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Terry L. Long, Assistant Attorney General, and Daryl A Robinson, Senior Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Pennsylvania et al. by Ernest D Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Andrea F. McKenna, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Gale A Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, John M. Bailey, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson, Attorney General of Guam, Robert A Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Roland W. Burris, Attorney General of Illinois, Pamela Fanning Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Jan Graham, Attorney General of Utah, Rosalie Simmonds Ballentine, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Eleni M. Constantine; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation et al. by Kent S. Scheidegger, Charles L. Hobson, and Kevin Washburn; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Ronald A Zumbrun and Anthony T. Caso. Ronald D. Maines, Robert Burke, and Jonathan Smith filed a brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1981, the State of California amended its parole procedures to allow the Board of Prison Terms to decrease the frequency of parole suitability hearings under certain circumstances. This case presents the question whether the application of this amendment to prisoners who committed their crimes before it was enacted violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. We conclude that it does not. I California twice has convicted respondent Jose Ramon Morales of murder. In 1971, the body of respondent’s girlfriend, Gina Wallace, was found in an abandoned medical building. She had been shot in the head, neck, and abdomen; her right thumb had been amputated and her face slashed repeatedly. A bloody fingerprint near the body matched respondent’s. A jury found respondent guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. While serving his sentence at the State Training Facility in Soledad, California, respondent met Lois Washabaugh, a 75-year-old woman who had begun visiting inmates after gaining an interest in prison reform. Ms. Washabaugh visited respondent on numerous occasions, and respondent kept in contact with her through correspondence. Respondent’s letters eventually expressed a romantic interest in Ms. Washabaugh, and the two were married some time after respondent’s release to a halfway house in April 1980. On July 4, 1980, Ms. Washabaugh left her home and told friends that she was moving to Los Angeles to live with her new husband. Three days later, police officers found a human hand on the Hollywood Freeway in Los Angeles. Ms. Washabaugh was reported missing at the end of July, and fingerprint identification revealed that the hand was hers. Her body was never recovered. Respondent was subsequently arrested and found in possession of Ms. Washabaugh’s car, purse, credit cards, and diamond rings. Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to the second-degree murder of Ms. Washabaugh. He was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life, but became eligible for parole beginning in 1990. As required by California law, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041 (West 1982), the Board of Prison Terms (Board) held a hearing on July 25, 1989, to determine respondent’s suitability for parole. California law required the Board to set a release date for respondent unless it found that “the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual.” § 3041(b). The Board found respondent unsuitable for parole for numerous reasons, including the heinous, atrocious, and cruel nature of his offense; the mutilation of Ms. Washabaugh during or after the murder; respondent’s record of violence and assaultive behavior; and respondent’s commission of his second murder while on parole for his first. Supplemental App. to Pet. for Cert. 45. Under the law in place at the time respondent murdered Ms. Washabaugh, respondent would have been entitled to subsequent suitability hearings on an annual basis. 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 165, §46. In 1981, however, the California Legislature had authorized the Board to defer subsequent suitability hearings for up to three years if the prisoner has been convicted of “more than one offense which involves the taking of a life” and if the Board “finds that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the following years and states the bases for the finding.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982). In light of the considerations that led it to find respondent unsuitable for parole, and based on its conclusion that a longer period of observation was required before a parole release date could be projected, the Board determined that it was not reasonable to expect that respondent would be found suitable for parole in 1990 or 1991. Pursuant to the 1981 amendment, the Board scheduled the next hearing for 1992. Respondent then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting that he was being held in custody in violation of the Federal Constitution. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254. Respondent argued that as applied to him, the 1981 amendment constituted an ex post facto law barred by Article I, § 10, of the United States Constitution. The District Court denied respondent’s habeas petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 16 F. 3d 1001 (1994). Because “a prisoner cannot be paroled without first having a parole hearing,” the Court of Appeals concluded that “any retrospective law making parole hearings less accessible would effectively increase the [prisoner’s] sentence and violate the ex post facto clause.” Id., at 1004. The Court of Appeals accordingly held that the Board was constitutionally constrained to provide respondent with annual parole suitability hearings, as required by the law in effect when he committed his crime. Id., at 1006. We granted certiorari, 512 U. S. 1287 (1994), and we now reverse. II Article I, §10, of the Constitution prohibits the States from passing any “ex post facto Law.” In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990), we reaffirmed that the Ex Post Facto Clause incorporated “a term of art with an established meaning at the time of the framing of the Constitution.” In accordance with this original understanding, we have held that the Clause is aimed at laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Id., at 43 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 391-392 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 169-170 (1925)). The legislation at issue here effects no change in the definition of respondent’s crime. Instead, the question before us is whether the 1981 amendment to §3041.5 increases the “punishment” attached to respondent’s crime. In arguing that it does, respondent relies chiefly on a trilogy of cases holding that a legislature may not stiffen the “standard of punishment” applicable to crimes that have already been committed. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (1937); Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423 (1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981). In Lindsey, we established the proposition that the Constitution “forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated.” 301 U. S., at 401. The petitioners in Lindsey had been convicted of grand larceny, and the sentencing provision in effect at the time they committed their crimes provided for a maximum sentence of “not more than fifteen years.” Id., at 398. The applicable law called for sentencing judges to impose an indeterminate sentence up to whatever maximum they selected, so long as it did not exceed 15 years. Id., at 398, 400. Before the petitioners were sentenced, however, a new statute was passed that required the judge to sentence the petitioners to the 15-year maximum; under the new statute, the petitioners could secure an earlier release only through the grace of the parole board. Id., at 398-399. We held that the application of this statute to petitioners violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because “the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier.” Id., at 401. Weaver and Miller held that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids the States to enhance the measure of punishment by altering the substantive “formula” used to calculate the applicable sentencing range. In Weaver, the petitioner had been sentenced to 15 years in prison for his crime of second-degree murder. Both at the time of his crime and at the time his sentence was imposed, state statutes provided a formula for mandatory reductions to the terms of all prisoners who complied with certain prison regulations and state laws. The statute that the petitioner challenged and that we invalidated retroactively reduced the amount of “gain time” credits available to prisoners under this formula. Though the statute preserved the possibility that some prisoners might win back these credits if they convinced prison officials to exercise their discretion to find that they were especially deserving, see 450 U. S., at 34, n. 18, we found that it effectively eliminated the lower end of the possible range of prison terms. Id., at 26-27, 31-33. The statute at issue in Miller contained a similar defect. The Florida sentencing scheme had established “presumptive sentencing ranges” for various offenses, which sentencing judges were required to follow in the absence of “clear and convincing reasons” for a departure. At the time that the petitioner in Miller committed his crime, his presumptive sentencing range would have been 3V2 to 4V2 years. Before his sentencing, however, the state legislature altered the formula for establishing the presumptive sentencing range for certain sexual offenses by increasing the “primary offense points” assigned to those crimes. As a result, petitioner’s presumptive, range jumped to 5V2 to 7 years. We held that the resulting increase in the “quantum of punishment” violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 482 U. S., at 433-434. Respondent insists that the California amendment before us is indistinguishable from the legislation at issue in Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller, and he contends that those cases control this one. We disagree. Both before and after the 1981 amendment, California punished the offense of second-degree murder with an indeterminate sentence of “confinement in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190 (West 1982). The amendment also left unchanged the substantive formula for securing any reductions to this sentencing range. Thus, although 15 years was the formal “minimum” term of confinement, see ibid., respondent was able to secure a one-third “credit” or reduction in this minimum by complying with prison rules and regulations, see §2931. The amendment had no effect on the standards for fixing a prisoner’s initial date of “eligibility” for parole, see In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464, 476, 703 P. 2d 100, 108 (1985), or for determining his “suitability” for parole and setting his release date, see Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§3041, 3041.5 (West 1982). The 1981 amendment made only one change: It introduced the possibility that after the initial parole hearing, the Board would not have to hold another hearing the very next year, or the year after that, if it found no reasonable probability that respondent would be deemed suitable for parole in the interim period. § 3041.5(b)(2). In contrast to the laws at issue in Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller (which had the purpose and effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms, see Miller, supra, at 433-434), the evident focus of the California amendment was merely “ ‘to relieve the [Board] from the costly and time-consuming responsibility of scheduling parole hearings’” for prisoners who have no reasonable chance of being released. In re Jackson, supra, at 473, 703 P. 2d, at 106 (quoting legislative history). Rather than changing the sentencing range applicable to covered crimes, the 1981 amendment simply “alters the method to be followed” in fixing a parole release date under identical substantive standards. See Miller, supra, at 433 (contrasting adjustment to presumptive sentencing range with change in “the method to be followed in determining the appropriate sentence”); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 293-294 (1977) (contrasting change in the “quantum of punishment” with statute that merely “altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed”). Ill Respondent nonetheless urges us to hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids any legislative change that has any conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner’s punishment. In his view, there is “no principled way to determine how significant a risk of enhanced confinement is to be tolerated.” Brief for Respondent 39. Our cases have never accepted this expansive view of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and we will not endorse it here. Respondent’s approach would require that we invalidate any of a number of minor (and perhaps inevitable) mechanical changes that might produce some remote risk of impact on a prisoner’s expected term of confinement. Under respondent’s approach, the judiciary would be charged under the Ex Post Facto Clause with the micromanagement of an endless array of legislative adjustments to parole and sentencing procedures, including such innocuous adjustments as changes to the membership of the Board of Prison Terms, restrictions on the hours that prisoners may use the prison law library, reductions in the duration of the parole hearing, restrictions on the time allotted for a convicted defendant’s right of allocution before a sentencing judge, and page limitations on a defendant’s objections to presentence reports or on documents seeking a pardon from the governor. These and countless other changes might create some speculative, attenuated risk of affecting a prisoner’s actual term of confinement by making it more difficult for him to make a persuasive case for early release, but that fact alone cannot end the matter for ex post facto purposes. Indeed, contrary to the approach advocated by respondent, we have long held that the question of what legislative adjustments “will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition” must be a matter of “degree.” Beazell, 269 U. S., at 171. In evaluating the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment, we must determine whether it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. We have previously declined to articulate a single “formula” for identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on substantive crimes or punishments to fall within the constitutional prohibition, see ibid., and we have no occasion to do so here. The amendment creates only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered crimes, and such conjectural effects are insufficient under any threshold we might establish under the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Dobbert, supra, at 294 (refusing to accept “speculation” that the effective punishment under a new statutory scheme would be “more onerous” than under the old one). First, the amendment applies only to a class of prisoners for whom the likelihood of release on parole is quite remote. The amendment enabled the Board to extend the time between suitability hearings only for those prisoners who have been convicted of “more than one offense which involves the taking of a life.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982). The California Supreme Court has noted that about 90% of all prisoners are found unsuitable for parole at the initial hearing, while 85% are found unsuitable at the second and subsequent hearings. In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d, at 473, 703 P. 2d, at 105. In light of these numbers, the amendment “was seen as a means ‘to relieve the [Board] from the costly and time-consuming responsibility of scheduling parole hearings for prisoners who have no chance of being released.’” Ibid, (quoting legislative history). Second, the Board’s authority under the amendment is carefully tailored to that end. The amendment has no effect on the date of any prisoner’s initial parole suitability hearing; it affects the timing only of subsequent hearings. Accordingly, the amendment has no effect on any prisoner unless the Board has first concluded, after a hearing, not only that the prisoner is unsuitable for parole, but also that “it. is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing during the following years.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982). “This is no arbitrary decision,” Morris v. Castro, 166 Cal. App. 3d 33, 38, 212 Cal. Rptr. 299, 302 (1985); the Board must conduct “a full hearing and review” of all relevant facts, ibid., and state the bases for its finding. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982). Though California law is not entirely clear on this point, the reliability of the Board’s determination may also be enhanced by the possibility of an administrative appeal. See 15 Cal. Admin. Code § 2050 (1994). Moreover, the Board retains the authority to tailor the frequency of subsequent suitability hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner. The default requirement is an annual hearing, but the Board may defer the next hearing up to two years more depending on the circumstances. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982). Thus, a mass murderer who has participated in repeated violent crimes both in prison and while on parole could perhaps expect a 3-year delay between suitability hearings, while a prisoner who poses a lesser threat to the “public safety,” see § 3041(b), might receive only a 2-year delay. In light of the particularized findings required under the amendment and the broad discretion given to the Board, the narrow class of prisoners covered by the amendment cannot reasonably expect that their prospects for early release on parole would be enhanced by the opportunity of annual hearings. For these prisoners, the amendment simply allows the Board to avoid the futility of going through the motions of reannouncing its denial of parole suitability on a yearly basis. Respondent suggests that there is some chance that the amendment might nevertheless produce an increased term of confinement for some prisoners who might experience a change of circumstances that could render them suitable for parole during the period between their hearings. Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent fails, however, to provide any support for his speculation that the multiple murderers and other prisoners subject to the amendment might experience an unanticipated change that is sufficiently monumental to alter their suitability for release on parole. Even if we assume the possibility of such a change, moreover, there is no reason to conclude that the amendment will have any effect on any prisoner’s actual term of confinement, for the current record provides no basis for concluding that a prisoner who experiences a drastic change of circumstances would be precluded from seeking an expedited hearing from the Board. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has suggested that under the circumstances hypothesized by respondent “the Board could advance the suitability hearing,” In re Jackson, supra, at 475, 703 P. 2d, at 107, and the California Department of Corrections indicates in its brief that the Board’s “practice” is to “review for merit any communication from an inmate asking for an earlier suitability hearing,” Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 1. If the Board’s decision to postpone the hearing is subject to administrative appeal, the controlling regulations also seem to preserve the possibility of a belated appeal. See 15 Cal. Admin. Code §2050 (1994) (time limits for administrative appeals “are directory only and may be extended”). An expedited hearing by the Board — either on its own volition or pursuant to an order entered on an administrative appeal — would remove any possibility of harm even under the hypothetical circumstances suggested by respondent. Even if a prisoner were denied an expedited hearing, there is no reason to think that such postponement would extend any prisoner’s actual period of confinement. According to the California Supreme Court, the possibility of immediate release after a finding of suitability for parole is largely “theoretica[l],” In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d, at 474, 703 P. 2d, at 106; in many cases, the prisoner’s parole release date comes at least several years after a finding of suitability. To the extent that these cases are representative, it follows that “the 'practical effect’ of a hearing postponement is not significant.” Id., at 474, 703 P. 2d, at 106-107. This is because the Board is bound by statute to consider “any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release dates” with an eye toward establishing “uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to the public.” Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041(a) (West 1982). Under these standards, the fact that a prisoner had been “suitable” for parole prior to the date of the hearing certainly would be “relevant” to the Board’s decision in setting an actual release date, and the Board retains the discretion to expedite the release date of such a prisoner. Thus, a prisoner who could show that he was “suitable” for parole two years prior to such a finding by the Board might well be entitled to secure a release date that reflects that fact. Such a prisoner’s ultimate date of release would be entirely unaffected by the change in the timing of suitability hearings. IV Given these circumstances, we conclude that the California legislation at issue creates only the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. The Ninth Circuit’s judgment that the amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is accordingly reversed. It is so ordered. The statute was again amended in 1990 to allow the Board the alternative of deferring hearings for five years if the prisoner has been convicted of more than two murders, Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3041.5(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1994), 1990 Cal. Stats., ch. 1053, and in 1994 to extend that alternative to prisoners convicted of even a single murder, 1994 Cal. Stats., ch. 560. The 5-year deferral applies, however, “only to offenses committed before July 1, 1977, or on or after January 1, 1991,” 1990 Cal. Stats., ch. 1053, and thus appears to have no application to respondent, whose most recent crime was committed in 1980. During the pendency of this action, respondent appeared before the Board for his 1992 suitability hearing. The Board again found respondent unsuitable and again determined that it was not reasonable to expect that he would be found suitable for parole at the following two annual hearings. Respondent’s next suitability hearing was then set for 1995. Our opinions in Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller suggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the “disadvantage” of covered offenders. See Lindsey, 301 U. S., at 401; Weaver, 450 U. S., at 29; Miller, 482 U. S., at 433. But that language was unnecessary to the results in those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990). After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of “disadvantage,” nor, as the dissent seems to suggest, on whether an amendment affects a prisoner’s “opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,” see post, at 518, but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. The dissent proposes a line between those measures that deprive prisoners of a parole hearing and those that “make it more difficult for prisoners to obtain release.” Post, at 524. But this arbitrary line has absolutely no basis in the Constitution. If a delay in parole hearings raises ex post facto concerns, it is because that delay effectively increases a prisoner’s term of confinement, and not because the hearing itself has independent constitutional significance. Other adjustments to mechanisms surrounding the sentencing process should be evaluated under the same standard. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at 519, we express no view as to the constitutionality of any of a number of other statutes that might alter the timing of parole hearings under circumstances different from those present here. The dissent suggests that any “speculation” as to the effect of the amendment on prison terms should “ru[n] in the other direction,” post, at 525, but this approach effectively shifts to the State the burden of persuasion as to respondent’s ex post facto claim. Not surprisingly, the dissent identifies no support for its attempt to undo the settled rule that a claimant must bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to the existence of an alleged constitutional violation. Although we have held that a party asserting an ex post facto claim need not carry the burden of showing that he would have been sentenced to a lesser term under the measure or range of punishments in place under the previous statutory scheme, see Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S., at 401, we have never suggested that the challenging party may escape the ultimate burden of establishing that the measure of punishment itself has changed. Indeed, elimination of that burden would eviscerate the view of the Ex Post Facto Clause that we reaffirmed in Collins. Just as “[t]he inhibition upon the passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed,” Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 590 (1896), neither does it require that the sentence be carried out under the identical legal regime that previously prevailed. The dissent mischaracterizes our analysis in suggesting that we somehow have concocted a “reduced” standard of judicial scrutiny for application to “a narrow group as unpopular ... as multiple murderers.” Post, at 522. The ex post facto standard we apply today is constant: It looks to whether a given legislative change has the prohibited effect of altering the definition of crimes or increasing punishments. Our application of that standard necessarily considers a number of factors — including, in this case, that the 1981 amendment targets a group of prisoners whom the California Legislature deemed less likely than others to secure early release on parole — but the constitutional standard is neither “enhanced” nor “reduced” on the basis of societal animosity toward multiple murderers. Cf. ibid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BAYSIDE ENTERPRISES, INC., et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 75-1267. Argued November 10, 1976 Decided January 11, 1977 Alan J. Levenson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent. On the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, Norton J. Come, and Elinor Hadley Stillman. Mb. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioners, collectively described as “Bayside,” are three affiliated corporations operating a large, vertically integrated poultry business in Maine. The question they present is whether six of their employees, who truck poultry feed from their feedmill to 119 farms on which their chickens are being raised, are “agricultural laborers” and therefore not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. After a few preliminary talks, Bayside refused to bargain with the union representing these drivers on the ground that they were not “employees” within the meaning of the Act. The union’s resulting unfair labor practice charge was sustained by the National Labor Relations Board and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. An apparent conflict with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits led us to grant certiorari, 425 U. S. 970. We now affirm. The protections of the National Labor Relations Act extend only to “employees.” Section 2 (3) of the Act; 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3), provides that the “term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer . . . .” Congress has further provided that the term “agricultural laborer” in the NLRA shall have the meaning specified in § 3 (f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is, therefore, that section and the decisions construing it which are relevant even though this proceeding arose under the NLRA. Section 3 (f) provides, in relevant part: “ ‘Agriculture’ includes farming in all its branches [including] the raising of . . . poultry, and any practices . . . performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations . . . .” 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 203 (f). This statutory definition includes farming in both a primary and a secondary sense. The raising of poultry is primary farming, but hauling products to or from a farm is not primary farming. Such hauling may, however, be secondary farming if it is work performed “by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations Since there is no claim that these drivers work “on a farm,” the question is whether their activity should be regarded as work performed “by a farmer,” The answer depends on the character of their employer’s activities. An employer’s business may include both agricultural and nonagricultural activities. Thus, even though most of the operations on a sugar plantation are agricultural, persons employed in the plantation’s sugar-processing plant are not “agricultural employees.” Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U. S. 254, 264-270. In this case, both parties agree that some of Bayside’s operations are agricultural and some are not. The mill in which Bayside produces poultry feed and the processing plant in which it slaughters and dresses poultry are not agricultural operations. On the other hand, the six farms on which it produces hatching eggs, and its activities in breeding and hatching chicks, are clearly agricultural in character. The parties are in dispute with respect to the character of Bayside’s work related to the raising of the chickens. The chickens are raised on 119 separate farms owned and operated by independent contractors. Pursuant to a standard contractual arrangement, Bayside provides each such farm with chicks, feed, medicine, fuel, litter, and vaccine. Bay-side retains title to the chicks and pays the farmer a guaranteed sum, plus a bonus based on the weight of the bird when grown, in exchange for the farmer’s services in housing and caring for the chicks. Bayside delivers the chicks to the independent farms when they are one day old and picks them up for processing about nine weeks later. During the nine-week period, the contract farmers feed the chicks with poultry feed delivered to their feedbins by Bayside drivers. Bayside argues that the activity on the independent farms is part of Bayside’s farming operation. The argument is supported by the pervasive character of its control over the raising of the chicks, its ownership of the chicks, its assumption of the risks of casualty loss and market fluctuations, and its control over both the source and the destination of the poultry. In response, the Labor Board argues that the owners of the farms are independent contractors rather than employees of Bayside and therefore the farming activity at these locations is attributable to them rather than to Bayside. The Labor Board has squarely and consistently rejected the argument that all of the activity on a contract farm should be regarded as agricultural activity of an integrated farmer such as Bayside. This conclusion by the Board is one we must respect even if the issue might “with nearly equal reason be resolved one way rather than another.” Even if we should regard a contract farm as a hybrid operation where some of the agricultural activity is performed by Bayside and some by the owner of the farm, we would nevertheless be compelled to sustain the Board’s order. For the activity of storing poultry feed and then using it to feed the chicks is work performed by the contract farmer rather than by Bayside. Since the status of the drivers is determined by the character of the work which they perform for their own employer, the work of the contract farmer cannot make the drivers agricultural laborers. And their employer’s operation of the feedmill is a nonagricultural activity. Thus, the Board properly concluded that the work of the truck drivers on behalf of their employer is not work performed “by a farmer” whether attention is focused on the origin or the destination of the feed delivery. The Board’s conclusion that these truck drivers are not agricultural laborers is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute, is consistent with the Board’s prior holdings, and is supported by the Secretary of Labor’s construction of § 3 (f) , Moreover, the conclusion applies to but one specific instance of the “[m]yriad forms of service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in the terms of employment, [which] blanket the nation’s economy,” and which the Board must confront on a daily basis. Accordingly, regardless of how we might have resolved the question as an initial matter, the appropriate weight which must be given to the judgment of the agency whose special duty is to apply this broad statutory language to varying fact patterns requires enforcement of the Board’s order. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary Poultry Processing, Inc., are operating corporations; the subsidiary Penobscot Poultry Co. is apparently inactive. The drivers are represented by Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 340, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. That local and the Amalgamated Meatcutters Local 385 jointly represent employees in petitioners’ processing plant. 216 N. L. R. B. 502, enf’d, 527 F. 2d 436 (1975). The Board’s order requires Bayside to bargain with the union. NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F. 2d 1025 (CA5 1969); NLRB v. Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F. 2d 20 (CA9 1972). 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. Annually since 1946, Congress, in riders to the Appropriations Acts for the Board, has tied the definition of “agricultural laborer” in § 2 (3) of the NLRA to § 3 (f) of the FLSA. The latest such rider (90 Stat. 23) provides in relevant part as follows: “Provided, That no part of this appropriation shall be available to organize or assist in organizing agricultural laborers or used in connection with investigations, hearings, directives, or orders concerning bargaining units composed of agricultural laborers as referred to in section 2 (3) of the Act of July 5, 1935 (29 U. S. C. 152), and as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, and as defined in section 3 (f) of the Act of June 25, 1938 (29 U. S. C. 203) . . . .” “First, there is the primary meaning. Agriculture includes farming in all its branches. Certain specific practices such as cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, etc., are listed as being included in this primary meaning. Second, there is the broader meaning. Agriculture is defined to include things other than farming as so illustrated. It includes any practices, whether or not themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm, incidentally to or in conjunction with 'such’ farming operations.” Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U. S. 755, 762-763. These operations are conducted by the subsidiary, Poultry Processing, Inc., which employs about 20 workers at its feedmill and about 380 at its processing plant in Belfast, Me. The Board has held that “when an employer contracts with independent growers for the care and feeding of the employer’s chicks, the employer’s status as a farmer engaged in raising poultry ends with respect to those chicks.” Imco Poultry, 202 N. L. R. B. 259, 260 (1973), citing Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 160 N. L. R. B. 236 (1966); 163 N. L. R. B. 972 (1967), enf. denied, 405 F. 2d 1025 (CA5 1969); Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., 189 N. L. R. B. 40 (1971), enf. denied, 471 F. 2d 20 (CA9 1972). Cf. Norton & McElroy Produce, Inc., 133 N. L. R. B. 104 (1961). This is an instance of the kind contemplated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., supra, at 770: “Both in the employments which the Fair Labor Standards Act covers and in the exemptions it makes, the Congress has cast upon the courts the duty of making distinctions that often are bound to be so nice as to appear arbitrary in relation to each other. A specific situation, like that presented in this case, presents a problem for construction which may with nearly equal reason be resolved one way rather than another.” The Board has found in comparable situations that delivery is incidental to the feedmill operation and therefore not an agricultural activity. McElrath Poultry Co., 206 N. L. R. B. 354, 355 (1973), enf. denied, 494 F. 2d 518 (CA5 1974); Samuel B. Gass, 154 N. L. R. B. 728, 732-733 (1965), enf'd, 377 F. 2d 438 (CA1 1967). Samuel B. Gass, supra; Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., supra; Victor Ryckebosch, Inc., supra; Abbott Farms, Inc., 199 N. L. R. B. 472 (1972), enf. denied, 487 F. 2d 904 (CA5 1973); Imco Poultry, supra; McElrath Poultry Co., Inc., supra. In 1961 the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor issued an interpretative bulletin which remains effective today. It reads, in pertinent part: “Contract arrangements for raising poultry. “Feed dealers and processors sometimes enter into contractual arrangements with farmers under which the latter agree to raise to marketable size baby chicks supplied by the former who also undertake to furnish all the required feed and possibly additional items. Typically, the feed dealer or processor retains title to the chickens until they are sold. Under such an arrangement, the activities of the farmers and their employees in raising the poultry are clearly within section 3 (f). The activities of the feed dealer or processor, on the other hand, are not ‘raising of poultry’ and employees engaged in them cannot be considered agricultural employees on that ground. Employees of the feed dealer or processor who perform work on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with the raising of poultry on the farm are employed in ‘secondary’ agriculture (see §§ 780.137 et seq., [explaining that work must be performed in connection with the farmer-employer's own farming to qualify as ‘secondary’ agriculture by a farmer] and Johnston v. Cotton Producers Assn., 244 F. 2d 553).” 29 CFR § 780.126 (1975). NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 126. In that opinion, id., at 131, the Court stated: ‘‘But where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited. Like the commissioner’s determination under the Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Act, that a man is not a ‘member of a crew’ (South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251) or that he was injured ‘in the course of employment’ (Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244) and the Federal Communications Commission’s determination that one company is under the ‘control’ of another (Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125), the Board’s determination that specified persons are ‘employees’ under this Act is to be accepted if. it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.” (Footnotes omitted.) Cf. NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U. S. 254, 260; Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 488; NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U. S. 264, 269.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EXXON CORP. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF WISCONSIN No. 79-509. Argued March 18, 1980 Decided June 10, 1980 Maeshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Stewart, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Thomas G. Ragatz argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Leonard S. Sosnowski, Lloyd M. McBride, and Paul D. Frenz. Gerald S. Wilcox, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Wiüiam D. Dexter, Charles A. Groddick, Attorney General of Alabama, George Deukme-jian, Attorney General of California, J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado, Richard Gebelein, Attorney General of Delaware, Demid H. Leroy, Attorney General of Idaho, Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana, Steven Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland, Frank J. Kelly, Attorney General of Michigan, Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, Thomas D. Roth, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General of New Mexico, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Albert R. Hausauer, Special Assistant Attorney General of North Dakota, James Redden, Attorney General of Oregon, Robert B. Hanen, Attorney General of Utah, and James R. Eads for the Multistate Tax Commission et al.; and by WiMcm J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois, and Fred H. Montgomery and John D. WhiteNack, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Carl B. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Warren B. Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, for the State of Illinois et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Theodore J. Carlson, Davison W. Grant, Joseph J. Schumm, Jr., and Thomas C. Hutton for Associated Dry Goods Corp.; and by Frank M. Keesling, pro se. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises three important questions regarding state taxation of the income of a vertically integrated corporation doing business in several States. The first issue is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from applying its statutory apportionment formula to the total corporate income of the taxpayer when the taxpayer’s functional accounting separates its income into the three distinct categories of marketing, exploration and production, and refining, and when the taxpayer performs only marketing operations within the State. The second issue is whether the Due Process Clause permits a State to subject to taxation under its statutory apportionment formula income derived from the extraction of oil and gas located outside the State which is used by the refining department of the taxpayer, or whether the State is required to allocate such income to the situs State. The third issue is whether the Commerce Clause requires such an allocation to the situs State. I A Appellant Exxon Corp., a vertically integrated petroleum company, is organized under the laws of Delaware with its general offices located in Houston, Tex. During the years in question here, 1965 through 1968, appellant’s corporate organization structure consisted of three parts: Corporate Management, Coordination and Services Management, and Operations Management. Corporate Management, which was the highest order of management for the entire corporation, consisted of the board of directors, the executive committee, the chairman of the board (who was also the chief executive officer), the president, and various directors-in-charge who were members of the board of directors. Coordination and Services Management was composed of corporate staff departments which provided specialized corporate services. These services included long-range planning for the company, maximization of overall company operations, development of financial policy and procedures, financing of corporate activities, maintenance of the accounting system, legal advice, public relations, labor relations, purchase and sale of raw crude oil and raw materials, and coordination between the refining and other operating functions “so as to obtain an optimum short range operating program.” App. 189; id., at 187-192. The third level of management within the corporation was Operations Management, which was responsible for directing the operating activities of the functional departments of the company. These functional departments were Exploration and Production, Refining, Marketing, Marine, Coal and Shale Oil, Minerals, and Land Management. Each functional department was organized as a separate unit operating independently of the other operating segments, and each department had its own separate management responsible for the proper conduct of the operation. These departments were treated as separate investment centers by the company, and a profit was determined for each functional department. At all relevant times each operating department was independently responsible for its performance. This arrangement permitted centralized management to evaluate each operation separately. Each department was therefore required to compete with the other departments for available investment funds, and with other members of the industry performing the same function for the company’s raw materials and refined products. There was no requirement that appellant’s crude oil go to its own refineries or that the refined products sold through marketing be produced from appellant’s crude oil. Transfers of products and raw materials among the three major functional departments — Exploration and Production, Refining, and Marketing — were theoretically based on competitive wholesale market prices. For purposes of separate functional accounting, transfers of crude oil from Exploration and Production to Refining were treated as sales at posted industry prices; transfers of products from Refining to Marketing were also based on wholesale market prices. If no readily available wholesale market value existed for a product, then representatives of the two departments involved would negotiate as to the appropriate internal transfer value. Appellant had no exploration and production operations or refining operations in Wisconsin; the only activity carried out in that State was marketing. The Wisconsin marketing district reported administratively to the central region office in Chicago, which in turn was responsible to the Marketing Department headquarters in Houston. App. 217. The motor oils, greases, and other packaged materials sold by appellant in Wisconsin during this period were manufactured outside the State and then shipped into that State from central warehouse facilities in Chicago. Tires, batteries, and accessories were centrally purchased through the Houston office and then shipped into Wisconsin for resale. The gasoline sold in Wisconsin was not produced by Exxon but rather was obtained from Pure Oil Co. in Illinois under an exchange agreement, permitting Exxon to reduce the cost of transporting the gasoline from its source to the retail outlets. This exchange agreement was negotiated by the Supply and Refining Departments. Additives were put into the Pure Oil gasoline in order to make the final product conform to uniform Exxon standards. Exxon used a nationwide uniform credit card system, which was administered out of the national headquarters in Houston. Uniform packaging and brand names were used, and the overall plan for distribution of products was developed in Houston. Promotional display equipment was designed by the engineering staff at the marketing headquarters. B Because appellant marketed its products in Wisconsin during the calendar years 1965 through 1968, it was required to file corporate income and franchise tax returns in that State for those years. Exxon prepared the returns based on separate state accounting methods, reflecting only the Wisconsin marketing operation. The returns showed losses in the amounts of $821,320 for 1965, $1,159,830 for 1966, $1,026,224 for 1967, and $919,575 for 1968. Accordingly, no tax was shown as being due for any of those years. Appellee Wisconsin Department of Revenue audited Exxon for the years in question, and on June 25, 1971, the Department sent the taxpayer a notice of assessment of additional income and franchise tax. The Department concluded that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 71.07 (2) (1967) the Wisconsin marketing operation was “an integral part of a unitary business,” and therefore Exxon’s taxable income in Wisconsin must be determined by application of the State’s apportionment formula to the taxpayer’s total income. The Department’s calculation revealed an additional taxable income of $4,532,155 for the period 1965 through 1968. Additional taxes in the amount of $316,470.85 were assessed against appellant. Exxon filed an application for abatement in July 1971, which the Department denied on November 30, 1971. Appellant then filed a petition for review with the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission. The Commission agreed with the Department that Exxon’s separate geographical accounting did not accurately reflect its Wisconsin income for tax purposes. CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶201-223, p. 10,410 (1976). However, the Commission concluded that appellant’s three main functional operating departments — Exploration and Production, Refining, and Marketing — were separate unitary businesses. Id., at 10,409. According to the Commission, Exxon’s marketing operation in Wisconsin was an integral part of its overall marketing function, but was not an integral part of its exploration and production function nor its refining function. Id., at 10,411. The Commission found that the statutory apportionment formula as applied by the Department “had the effect of imposing a tax on the [appellant’s] exploration and on its refining net income, all of which was derived solely from operations outside the State of Wisconsin and which had no integral relationship to the [appellant’s] marketing operations within Wisconsin.” Id., at 10,410. The Commission also found that taxation by Wisconsin of Exxon’s net income from its exploration and production function and its refining function would subject appellant “to multiple-state taxation as to such income.” Ibid. The Commission therefore concluded that the Department had erred in its application of the apportionment formula since it had included “extraterritorial income,” but that “apportioning income earned by the [appellant] from its marketing function within and without the State of Wisconsin, would be proper. . . .” Id., at 10, 411. The Circuit Court for Dane County set aside some of the factual findings and conclusions of law of the Tax Appeals Commission. CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶ 201-373, pp. 10,501-10,504 (1977). In particular, the Circuit Court held that the Commission’s finding that Exxon’s three main functional operating departments were separate unitary businesses was an erroneous conclusion of law. Id., at 10,502. Similarly, the court set aside the findings that there was no economic dependence between the Wisconsin marketing operations and Exxon’s exploration and production function or its refining function. Ibid. Instead the court held that “[t]he Wisconsin operation contributed sales to [Exxon’s] business of producing, refining and marketing petroleum products. This contribution was sufficient alone in the opinion of this Court to make [Exxon’s] business a unitary one.” Ibid. Accordingly, appellant’s business during the relevant years “considered as a whole both within and without Wisconsin constituted a unitary business” within the meaning of the apportionment statute. Ibid. The Circuit Court concluded, however, that another statute, Wis. Stat. § 71.07 (1) (1967), excluded from income subject to the apportionment formula all situs income derived from appellant’s oil and gas wells. CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶ 201-373, at 10,502-10,504. The Department had used a so-called “barrel formula” to separate two sets of income figures: income derived from the sale of crude oil to third parties, and income derived from crude oil produced by Exxon and transferred to its own refineries. The former was allocated to the situs State and excluded from Wisconsin taxable income, and the latter was included in the apportionment formula. A similar division was made of the income derived from appellant’s gas production. The Circuit Court held that both sets of income were derived from the oil and gas wells and should be allocated to the situs State under the statute. The court noted that “there is no question but that the department’s inclusion of [Exxon’s] income derived from crude oil and gas produced and not sold to third parties by [Exxon’s] production department resulted in double taxation of such income.” Id., at 10,503. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 90 Wis. 2d 700, 281 N. W. 2d 94 (1979). That court concluded that the test for what constituted a unitary business was “ 'whether or not the operation of the portion of the business within the state is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the business outside the state. If there is such a relationship the business is unitary.’ ” Id., at 711, 281 N. W. 2d, at 100, quoting G. Altman & F. Keesling, Allocation of Income in State Taxation 101 (2d ed. 1950). Reviewing the organizational structure and business operations of Exxon, the court reasoned that Exxon’s production and refining functions were dependent on its marketing operation to provide an outlet for its products, and Wisconsin was a part of that marketing system. In a high capital investment industry such as the petroleum industry, the court found, the existence of a stable marketing system was important for the full utilization of refining capacity. 90 Wis. 2d, at 718, 281 N. W. 2d, at 104. Accordingly, the court concluded that Exxon’s Wisconsin marketing operations were an integral part of one unitary business and therefore its total corporate income was subject to the statutory apportionment formula. Id., at 721-722, 281 N. W. 2d, at 105-106. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed with the Circuit Court on the issue of situs income. While the extraction and production of oil and gas constituted “mining” within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 71.07 (1) (1967), 90 Wis. 2d, at 723, 281 N. W. 2d, at 106, the court agreed with the Department that situs income which is part of the unitary stream of income is nonetheless apportionable under the statute, while situs income which does not enter the unitary stream of income is nonapportionable and must be excluded from the formula. Id., at 723-724, 281 N. W. 2d, at 106-107. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected appellant’s contention that its separate functional accounting proved that its exploration and production income was earned totally outside Wisconsin, noting that “the idea of separate functional accounting seems to be incompatible with the Very essence of formulary apportionment, namely, that where there are integrated, interdependent steps in the economic process carried on by a business enterprise, there is no logical or viable method for accurately separating out the profit attributable to one step in the economic process from other steps.’ ” Id., at 726, 281 N. W. 2d, at 109, quoting J. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation 400 (3d ed. 1969). The court concluded that the State was acting within constitutional limitations despite appellant’s evidence based on separate functional accounting. The court also rejected Exxon’s argument that the sources of income derived from exploration and production were all outside of Wisconsin and therefore could not be taxed in that State without impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. According to the court, Wisconsin was taxing only its “fair share” of appellant’s income, there was a substantial nexus between appellant and the State, the tax was not claimed to discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce, and the tax was fairly related to services provided by Wisconsin. 90 Wis. 2d, at 729-731, 281 N. W. 2d, at 110-111. Because of the importance of the issues raised, we noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U. S. 961 (1979). We now affirm. II We recently set forth at some length the basic principles for state taxation of the income of a business operating in interstate commerce, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425, 436-442 (1980), and need not repeat them here in great detail. It has long been settled that “the entire net income of a corporation, generated by interstate as well as intrastate activities, may be fairly apportioned among the States for tax purposes by formulas utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs.” Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 460 (1959); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 436. See generally Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U. S. 123 (1931); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267 (1978). See also Bass, Ratcliff & Oretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271 (1924). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements for such state taxation: a “minimal connection” or “nexus” between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and “a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 436, 437. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, supra, at 272-273; National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U. S. 753, 756 (1967); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325 (1968). The tax cannot be “out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in that State.” Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, supra, at 135. The nexus is established if the corporation “avails itself of the ‘substantial privilege of carrying on business’ within the State.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 437, quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444-445 (1940). In the present case, Exxon does not dispute that it avails itself of that privilege through its marketing operations within Wisconsin. Appellant contends, however, that this nexus is insufficient to permit inclusion of all of Exxon’s corporate income within the apportionment formula. While appellant appears to concede that Wisconsin may properly apply its apportionment statute to Exxon’s Marketing Department income as established by its separate functional accounting, see Brief for Appellant 18, 29, 33; Reply Brief for Appellant 2-3, it argues that it has demonstrated through its accounting method what portion of its income is derived from exploration and production and from refining — functions which do not occur in Wisconsin and of which the marketing operation in that State is not an integral part. Appellant relies heavily on Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, supra. The principal issue in that case was whether the single-factor sales formula used by Iowa to apportion for income tax purposes the income of an interstate business was prohibited by either the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause. In the course of that decision we noted that “[appellant does not suggest that it has shown that a significant portion of the income attributed to Iowa in fact was generated by its Illinois operations; the record does not contain any separate accounting analysis showing what portion of appellant’s profits was attributable to sales, to manufacturing, or to any other phase of the company’s operations.” 437 U. S., at 272. See also id., at 275, n. 9. Exxon contends that Moorman sanctions the use of separate functional accounting in order to prove the extraterritorial reach of a state tax statute, and that its accounting in this case demonstrates that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of the state apportionment statute violates the Due Process Clause. We cannot agree. As this Court has on several occasions recognized, a company’s internal accounting techniques are not binding on a State for tax purposes. For example, in Butler Bros. v. McColgan, supra, an interstate business challenged the application of the California apportionment statute. The company was engaged in the wholesale dry goods and general merchandise business as a middleman, and it had distributing houses in seven States, including one in California. Each house maintained stocks of goods, had a cognizable territory, had its own sales force, did its own solicitation of sales, made its own credit and collection arrangements, and kept its own books. There was, however, a central buying division that was able to purchase goods for resale at a lower price. The company used “recognized accounting principles,” 315 U. S., at 505, to allocate all costs and charges to each house, with certain centralized expenses allocated among the houses. Based on that “separate accounting system,” id., at 507, the business asserted there was no net income in California. We concluded that California could constitutionally apply its apportionment formula to the company’s total net income to establish taxable income, rather than being limited to the income shown by the taxpayer’s accounting methods to be attributable to the one house in that State. The company had the “distinct burden of showing by 'clear and cogent evidence’ that it results in extraterritorial values being taxed,” ibid., quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U. S. 682, 688 (1936), and the taxpayer’s accounting evidence was insufficient to meet that burden. “[W]e need not impeach the integrity of that accounting system to say that it does not prove appellant’s assertion that extraterritorial values are being taxed. Accounting practices for income statements may vary considerably according to the problem at hand. ... A particular accounting system, though useful or necessary as a business aid, may not fit the different requirements when a State seeks to tax values created by business within its borders. . . . That may be due to the fact, as stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 121, that a State in attempting to place upon a business extending into several States fits fair share of the-burden of taxation’ is ‘faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes conducted within its borders.’ Furthermore, the particular system used may not reveal the facts basic to the State’s determination. Bass, Ratcliff & Cretton, Ltd. v. Tax Commission, supra, p. 283. In either aspect of the matter, the results of the accounting system employed by appellant do not impeach the validity or propriety of the formula which California has applied here.” 315 U. S., at 507-508. Similarly, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, we noted that “separate accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in various States, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.” 445 U. S., at 438. Since such factors arise “from the operation of the business as a whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the income of the business as having a single identifiable ‘source.’ Although separate geographical accounting may be useful for internal auditing, for purposes of state taxation it is not constitutionally required.” Ibid The dicta in Moorman upon which appellant relies are not incompatible with these principles.. In Moorman we simply noted that the taxpayer had made no showing that its Illinois operations were responsible for profits from sales in Iowa. This hardly leads to the conclusion, urged by Exxon here, that a taxpayer’s separate functional accounting, if it purports to separate out income from various aspects of the business, must be accepted as a matter of constitutional law for state tax purposes. Such evidence may be helpful, but Moorman in no sense renders such accounting conclusive. The “linchpin of apportionability” for state income taxation of an interstate enterprise is the “unitary-business principle.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 439. If a company is a unitary business, then a State may apply an apportionment formula to the taxpayer’s total income in order to obtain a “rough approximation” of the corporate income that is “reasonably related to the activities conducted within the taxing State.” Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S., at 273. See also Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S., at 120. In order to exclude certain income from the apportionment formula, the company must prove that “the income was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that State.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 439. The court looks to the “underlying economic realities of a unitary business,” and the income must derive from “unrelated business activity” which constitutes a “discrete business enterprise,” 445 U. S., at 441, 442, 439. We agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that Exxon is such a unitary business and that Exxon has not carried its burden of showing that its functional departments are “discrete business enterprises” whose income is beyond the apportionment statute of the State. While Exxon may treat its operational departments as independent profit centers, it is nonetheless true that this case involves a highly integrated business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management and controlled interaction. As has already been noted, Exxon’s Coordination and Services Management provided many essential corporate services for the entire company, including the coordination of the refining and other operational functions “to obtain an optimum short range operating program.” App. 189. Many of the items sold by appellant in Wisconsin were obtained through a centralized purchasing office in Houston whose obvious purpose was to increase overall corporate profits through bulk purchases and efficient allocation of supplies among retailers. Cf. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S., at 508 (“the operation of the central buying division alone demonstrates that functionally the various branches are closely integrated”). Even the gasoline sold in Wisconsin was available only because of an exchange agreement with another company arranged by the Supply Department, part of Coordination and Services Management, and the Refining Department. Similarly, sales were facilitated through the use of a uniform credit card system, uniform packaging, brand names, and promotional displays, all run from the national headquarters. The important link among the three main operating departments of appellant was stated most clearly in the testimony of. an Exxon senior vice president. This official testified: “[I]n any industry which is highly capital intensive, such as the petroleum industry, the fixed operating costs are highly relative to total operating costs, and for this reason the profitability of such an industry is very sensitive and directly related to the full utilization of the capacity of the facilities. “So, in the case of the petroleum industry it is — where you have high capital investments in refineries, the existence of an assured supply of raw materials and crude is important and the assured and stable outlet for products is important, and therefore when there are — when these segments are under a single corporate entity, it provides for some assurance that the risk of disruptions in refining operations are minimized due to supply and demand imbalances that may occur from time to time. “[T]he placing individual segments under one corporate entity does provide greater profits stability for the reason that . . . nonparallel and nonmutual economic factors which may affect one department may be offset by the factors existing in another department.” App. 224-225. The evidence fully supports the conclusion of the court below that appellant’s marketing operation in Wisconsin is an integral part of a unitary business. Exxon’s use of separate functional accounting, and its decision for purposes of corporate accountability to assign wholesale market values to interdepartmental transfers of products and supplies, does not defeat the clear and sufficient nexus between appellant’s interstate activities and the taxing State. The same analysis disposes of the other prong of Exxon’s Due Process Clause attack on the Wisconsin statute. Appellant contends that at least the income derived from exploration and production must be treated as situs income and allocated to the situs State rather than included in the apportionment statute. Appellee did in fact exclude that income derived from the sale of crude oil and gas at the wellhead to third parties. However, the Department of Revenue concluded that the income characterized through appellant’s separate functional accounting as income derived from intracor-porate transfer of crude oil and gas for refining was part of the “unitary stream” of Exxon’s income and apportionable. We agree with appellee. As previously noted, appellant’s internal accounting system is not binding on the State for tax purposes. The decision to assign wholesale market values to internal transfers of raw materials for corporate accountability does not change the unitary nature of appellant’s business. An effective marketing operation is important to assure full or nearly full use of the refining capacities. Obviously the quality of the refined product affects the marketing operation. And the success of the Exploration and Production Department helps to keep the refineries operating at a capacity which is cost-efficient. There is indeed a unitary stream of income, of which the income derived from internal transfers of raw materials from exploration and production to refining is a part. There is a sufficient nexus to satisfy the Due Process Clause. There is also the necessary “rational relationship” between the income attributed to the State by the apportionment for-muía and the intrastate value of the business. Exxon had a total of $60,073,293 in sales income from its Wisconsin operation in the years 1965 through 1968. App. 799. The Wisconsin assessed taxable income for the four years in question represented 0.22 percent of total company net income adjusted to the Wisconsin basis, and Exxon’s Wisconsin sales for those years represented 0.41 percent of total company sales. 90 Wis. 2d, at 729, 281 N. W. 2d, at 110. This is hardly a case where the State has used its formula to attribute income “out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted ... in that State,” Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U. S., at 135, and application of the formula has not “led to a grossly distorted result,” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S., at 326. See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S., at 274. That Exxon’s Wisconsin marketing operation, through the use of separate geographic accounting, failed to show a net profit for the years in question does not change this rational relationship. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S., at 507-508; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S., at 284. Cf. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S., at 120. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of Wis. Stat. §§71.07(1) and (2) (1967) in this case does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ill Appellant also contends that the Commerce Clause requires allocation of all income derived from its exploration and production function to the situs State rather than inclusion of such income in the apportionment formula. The Court must therefore examine the “practical effect” of the tax to determine whether it “ 'is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ ” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S., at 443, quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977). See also Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 414 445 (1979); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978). It has already been demonstrated that the necessary nexus is present and that the tax is fairly apportioned. Similarly, appellant does not contest the conclusion that the tax is fairly related to the services rendered by Wisconsin, which include police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and “the advantages of a civilized society.” Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, at 445. Exxon asserts, however, that Wisconsin’s taxing statute, as applied, subjects interstate business to an unfair burden of multiple taxation. We were faced with a very similar argument in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, and we reject it now for the same reasons we rejected it in that case. Here, as in that prior case, the State seeks to tax income, not property ownership. Similarly, it is the risk of multiple taxation that is being asserted; actual multiple taxation has not been shown. While of course “the constitutionality of a [Wisconsin] tax should not depend on the vagaries of [another State’s] tax policy,” nonetheless “the absence of any existing duplicative tax does alter the nature of appellant’s claim.” Id., at 444. Exxon asserts, in essence, that the Commerce Clause requires allocation of exploration and production income to the situs State rather than apportionment among the States, regardless of the situs State’s actual tax policy. Cf. ibid, (dividend income). We do not agree. As was the case with income from intangibles, there is nothing “talismanic” about the concept of situs for income from exploration and production of crude oil and gas. Id., at 445. Presumably, the States in which appellant’s crude oil and gas production is located are permitted to tax in some manner the income derived from that production, there being an obvious nexus between the taxpayer and those States. However, “there is no reason in theory why that power should be exclusive when the [exploration and production income as distinguished through separate functional accounting] reflect[s].income from a unitary business, part of which is conducted in other States. In that situation, the income bears relation to benefits and privileges conferred by several States. These are the circumstances in which apportionment is ordinarily the accepted method.” Id., at 445-446. In short, the Commerce Clause does not require that any income which a taxpayer is able to separate through accounting methods and attribute to exploration and production of crude oil and gas be allocated to the States in which those production centers are located. The geographic location of such raw materials does not alter the fact that such income is part of the unitary business of the interstate enterprise and is subject to fair apportionment among all States to which there is a sufficient nexus with the interstate activities of the business. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is Affirmed. Me. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The original taxpayer during the years in question was Humble Oil and Refining Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey. In 1956, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey organized as a wholly owned subsidiary Pate Oil Co., a Delaware corporation. Pate acquired all of the assets and liabilities of Saxon Corp., a Wisconsin company which marketed petroleum products and accessory products in that State. Pate continued those marketing operations. In 1960, Pate was merged into Humble Oil and Refining Co., and the Wisconsin marketing operations were continued by that company under the brand name “Eneo.” In early 1973, Humble was merged into Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, and the corporate name was changed to Exxon Corp. Exxon is the legal successor to Humble Oil and Refining Co. The taxpayer will be referred to throughout this opinion by its present name, Exxon. The corporate staff departments which were part of Coordination and Services Management, and which were not considered profit centers for accounting purposes by appellant, included: Corporate Planning Department, Secretary’s Department, Supply Department, Treasury Department, Comptroller’s Department, Tax Department, Law Department, Public Relations Department, Government Relations Department, Employee Relations Department, General Services Department, Medical Department, and Aviation Department. App. 189-192. Wisconsin Stat. § 71.07 (2) (1967) during this period provided in relevant part: “Persons engaged in business within and without the state shall be taxed only on such income as is derived from business transacted and property located within the state. The amount of such income attributable to Wisconsin may be determined by an allocation and separate accounting thereof, when the business of such person within the state is not an integral part of a unitary business, provided, however, that the department of taxation may permit an allocation and separate accounting in any case in which it is satisfied that the use of such method will properly reflect the income taxable by this state. In all cases in which allocation and separate accounting is not permissible, the determination shall be made in the following manner: There shall first be deducted from the total net income of the taxpayer such part thereof (less related expenses, if any) as follows the situs of the property. . . . The remaining net income shall be apportioned to Wisconsin on the basis of the ratio obtained by taking the arithmetical average of the following 3 ratios: “(a) The ratio of the tangible property, real, personal and mixed, owned and used by the taxpayer in Wisconsin in connection with his trade or business during the income year to the total of such property of the taxpayer owned and used by him in connection with his trade or business everywhere. . . . “(b) . . . the ratio of the total cost of manufacturing, collecting, assembling or processing within this state to the total cost of manufacturing, or assembling or processing everywhere. . . . “(c) . . . the ratio of the total sales made through or by offices, agencies or branches located in Wisconsin during the income year to the total net sales made everywhere during said income year.” The additional net income was determined to be: 1965 . $759,371 1966 . $1,043,395 1967 . $1,264,946 1968 . $1,464,443 The additional taxes owed were determined to be: 1965 . $52,960.97 1966 ... $72,842.65 1967 . $88,351.22 1968 . $102,316.01 Wisconsin Stat. §71.07 (1) (1967) during this period provided in relevant part: “For the purposes of taxation income or loss from business, not requiring apportionment under sub. (2), . . . shall follow the situs of the business from which derived. Income or loss derived from . . . the operation of any . . . mine . . . shall follow the situs of the property from which derived.” The Circuit Court also held that on remand the Tax Appeals Commission should determine whether the Department had properly weighted the apportionment formula. The apportionment formula uses three factors: sales, property, and manufacturing costs. See n. 3, supra. The Department adjusted the formula as to manufacturing costs because not all of the products sold through Exxon’s Marketing Department were manufactured by Exxon; the Department divided by 2.6 rather than the statutory 3. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed that it was an issue for the Tax Appeals Commission on remand. 90 Wis. 2d 700, 731-735, 281 N. W. 2d 94, 111-113 (1979). That particular question is not before this Court. The fact that Exxon in the present case relies on its own separate functional accounting rather than separate geographic accounting, which it had used initially in preparing its Wisconsin income tax returns, does not make the principles expressed in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes any less applicable. In reaching this conclusion we need not challenge the integrity of Exxon’s separate functional accounting for its own internal purposes. See Butler Bros v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501, 507 (1942). Exxon also appears to suggest that the state statute requires allocation to the situs State of such income rather than apportionment. See Brief for Appellant 31-32, 40-41. That, of course, is a matter of state statutory construction which the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of that State’s law, has decided against appellant. Since appellee determined that income derived from the sale of crude oil and gas at the wellhead to third parties must, under the state statute, be allocated to the situs State and excluded from the reach of the apportionment statute, we need not address the issue of whether the Due Process Clause would require such allocation rather than apportionment. Because of appellee’s construction of the state statute involved, we do not here address the issue of whether the Commerce Clause requires allocation of income derived from the sale of crude oil and gas at the wellhead to third parties to the situs State rather than apportionment. Appellant presses the argument here that the risk of multiple taxation of income violates the Commerce Clause. Brief for Appellant 46 — 48; Reply Brief for Appellant 15-18; Supplemental Brief for Appellant 8. There was testimony by one witness before the Tax Appeals Commission that some States imposed “severance taxes” on oil and gas production. App. 432. Based on this brief testimony, the Tax Appeals Commission concluded that application of the state apportionment formula to Exxon’s net income from its exploration, production, and refining functions subjected that income to multiple taxation, CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶201-223, p. 10,410 (1976), and the Circuit Court for Dane County reached a similar result solely as to the exploration and production income, CCH Wis. Tax Rep. ¶ 201-373, p. 10,503 (1977). Severance taxes, however, are directed at the gross value of the mineral extracted or the quantity of production rather than the net income derived from the production activities. See B. Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law § 238, p. 490 (1955); 4 W. Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas § 801 (1938). See, e. g., La. Bev. Stat. Ann. §§47:633 (7) and (9) (West Supp. 1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court therefore properly concluded that “[t]he fact that the producing states may impose . . . severance taxes which have been held to be occupation taxes or property taxes does not render unfair or unconstitutional Wisconsin’s efforts to reach a proportionate share of the taxpayer’s income.” 90 Wis. 2d, at 731, 281 N. W. 2d, at 110-111 (footnotes omitted).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTH PRAIRIE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. LOCAL NO. 627, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, et al. No. 75-1097. Decided May 24, 1976 Together with No. 75-1243, National Labor Relations Board v. Local No. 627, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, et al., also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court. Per Curiam. Respondent Union filed a complaint in 1972 with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that South Prairie Construction Co. (South Prairie) and Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. (Kiewit) had violated §§ 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(5) and (1), by their continuing refusal to apply to South Prairie’s employees the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the Union and Kiewit. The Union first asserted that since South Prairie and Kiewit are wholly owned subsidiaries of Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc. (PKS), and engage in highway construction in Oklahoma, they constituted a single “employer” within the Act for purposes of applying the Union-Kiewit agreement. That being the case, the Union contended, South Prairie was obligated to recognize the Union as the representative of a bargaining unit drawn to include South Prairie’s employees. Disagreeing with the Administrative Law Judge on the first part of the Union’s claim, the Board concluded that South Prairie and Kiewit were in fact separate employers, and dismissed the complaint. On the Union’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit canvassed the facts of record. It discussed, inter alia, the manner in which Kiewit, South Prairie, and PKS functioned as entities; PKS’ decision to activate South Prairie, its nonunion subsidiary, in a State where historically Kiewit had been the only union highway contractor among the latter’s Oklahoma competitors; and the two firms’ competitive bidding patterns on Oklahoma highway jobs after South Prairie was activated in 1972 to do business there. Stating that it was applying the criteria recognized by this Court in Radio Union v. Broadcast Service, 380 U. S. 255 (1965), the Court of Appeals disagreed with the Board and decided that on the facts presented Kiewit and South Prairie were a single “employer.” It reasoned that in addition to the “presence of a very substantial qualitative degree of centralized control of labor relations,” the facts “evidence a substantial qualitative degree of interrelation of operations and common management — one that we are satisfied would not be found in the arm’s length relationship existing among uninte-grated companies.” 171 U. S. App. D. C. 102, 108, 109, 518 F. 2d 1040, 1046, 1047 (1975). The Board’s finding to the contrary was, therefore, in the view of the Court of Appeals “not warranted by the record.” Id., at 109, 518 F. 2d, at 1047. Having set aside this portion of the Board’s determination, however, the Court of Appeals went on to reach and decide the second question presented by the Union’s complaint which had not been passed upon by the Board. The court decided that the employees of Kiewit and South Prairie constituted the appropriate unit under § 9 of the Act for purposes of collective bargaining. On the basis of this conclusion, it decided that these firms had committed an unfair labor practice by refusing “to recognize Local 627 as the bargaining representative of South Prairie’s employees or to extend the terms of the Union’s agreement with Kiewit to South Prairie’s employees.” Id., at 112, 518 F. 2d, at 1050. The case was remanded to the Board for “issuance and enforcement of an appropriate order against . . . Kiewit and South Prairie.” Ibid. Petitioners South Prairie and the Board in their petitions here contest the action of the Court of Appeals in setting aside the Board’s determination on the “employer” question. But their principal contention is that the Court of Appeals invaded the statutory province of the Board when it proceeded to decide the § 9 “unit” question in the first instance, instead of remanding the case to the Board so that it could make the initial determination. While we refrain from disturbing the holding of the Court of Appeals that Kiewit and South Prairie are an “employer,” see NLRB v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1951), we agree with petitioners’ principal contention. The Court of Appeals was evidently of the view that since the Board dismissed the complaint it had necessarily decided that the employees of Kiewit and South Prairie would not constitute an appropriate bargaining unit under § 9. But while the Board’s opinion referred to its cases in this area and included a finding that “the employees of each constitute a separate bargaining unit,” 206 N. L. R. B. 562, 563 (1973), its brief discussion was set in the context of what it obviously considered was the dispositive issue, namely, whether the two firms were separate employers. We think a fair reading of its decision discloses that it did not address the “unit” question on the basis of any assumption, arguendo, that it might have been wrong on the threshold “employer” issue. Section 9 (b) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (b), directs the Board to “decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . The Board's cases hold that especially in the construction industry a determination that two affiliated firms constitute a single employer “does not necessarily establish that an employerwide unit is appropriate, as the factors which are relevant in identifying the breadth of an employer’s operation are not conclusively determinative of the scope of an appropriate unit.” Central New Mexico Chapter, National Electrical Contractors Assn., Inc., 152 N. L. R. B. 1604, 1608 (1965). See also B & B Industries, Inc., 162 N. L. R. B. 832 (1967). Cf. Gerace Constr., Inc., 193 N. L. R. B. 645 (1971). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Board’s principal case on the “unit” question, Central New Mexico Chapter, supra, was distinguishable because there the two affiliated construction firms were engaged in different types of contracting. It thought that this fact was critical to the Board’s conclusion in that case that the employees did not have the same “community of interest” for purposes of identifying an appropriate bargaining unit. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in this reasoning, we think that for it to take upon itself the initial determination of this issue was “incompatible with the orderly function of the process of judicial review.” NLRB v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U. S. 438, 444 (1965). Since the selection of an appropriate bargaining unit lies largely within the discretion of the Board, whose decision, “if not final, is rarely to be disturbed,” Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 491 (1947), we think the function of the Court of Appeals ended when the Board’s error on the “employer” issue was “laid bare.” FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17, 20 (1952). As this Court stated in NLRB v. Food Store Employees, 417 U. S. 1, 9 (1974): “It is a guiding principle of administrative law, long recognized by this Court, that 'an administrative determination in which is imbedded a legal question open to judicial review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative agency, after its error has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy committed to its charge.' FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 145 (1940).” In foreclosing the Board from the opportunity to determine the appropriate bargaining unit under § 9, the Court of Appeals did not give “due observance [to] the distribution of authority made by Congress as between its power to regulate commerce and the reviewing power which it has conferred upon the courts under Article III of the Constitution.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 141 (1940). The petitions for certiorari are accordingly granted, and that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which set aside the determination of the Board on the question of whether Kiewit and South Prairie were a single employer is affirmed. That part of the judgment which held that the two firms’ employees constituted the appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of the Act, and which directed the Board to issue an enforcement order, is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The relevant portions of the Act, §§ 8 and 9, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 and 159, provide in part: “Sec. 8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a). “Sec. 9 (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit.... “(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof . . . .” On the facts of this ease, the Union first had to establish that Kiewit and South Prairie were a single “employer.” If it succeeded, the existence of a violation under § 8 (a) (5) would then turn on whether under § 9 the “employer unit” was the “appropriate” one for collective-bargaining purposes. We need not for present purposes set out the facts as Summarized at length in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. See 171 U. S. App. D. C. 102, 104r-107, 518 F. 2d 1040, 1042-1045 (1975). “[I]n determining the relevant employer, the Board considers several nominally separate business entities to be a single employer where they comprise an integrated enterprise, N. L. R. B. Twenty-first Arm. Rep. 14r-15 (1956). The controlling criteria, Set out and elaborated in Board decisions, are interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations and common ownership.” 380 U. S., at 256. See n. 1, supra. “Were we called upon to pass on the Board's conclusions in the first instance or to make an independent' review of the review by the Court of Appeals, we might well support the Board’s conclusion and reject that of the court below. But Congress has charged the Courts of Appeals and not this Court with the normal and primary responsibility for granting or denying enforcement of Labor Board orders.” 340 U. S., at 502. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision in favor of the Union included a conclusion that the pertinent employees of Kiewit and South Prairie constituted an appropriate unit under § 9 (b). But that conclusion was, of course, preceded by the determination that the two firms were a single employer. In disagreeing on the “employer” issue, the Board was not compelled to reach the § 9 (b) question in order to dismiss the complaint. Compare Radio Union v. Broadcast Service, 380 U. S. 255 (1965), with Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 491-492 (1947).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEHMAN ON BEHALF OF HER CHILDREN, LEHMAN et al. v. LYCOMING COUNTY CHILDREN’S SERVICES AGENCY No. 80-2177. Argued March 30, 1982 Decided June 30, 1982 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Black-mun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 516. Martin Guggenheim argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Burt Neubome. Charles F. Greevy III argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. §2254, confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to consider collateral challenges to state-court judgments involuntarily terminating parental rights. I The facts of this case are described in detail in In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A. 2d 1228, cert. denied sub nom. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services, 439 U. S. 880 (1978), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision terminating the parental rights of petitioner Marjorie Lehman with respect to three sons born in 1963, 1965, and 1969. In 1971, Ms. Lehman discovered that she was pregnant again. Because of housing and other problems related to the care of her sons, Ms. Lehman voluntarily placed them in the legal custody of the Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, and it placed them in foster homes. . Although Ms. Lehman visited her sons monthly, she did not request their return until 1974. At that point, the Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency initiated parental termination proceedings. In those proceedings, the Orphan’s Court Division of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas heard testimony from Agency caseworkers, a psychologist, nutrition aides, petitioner, and the three sons. The judge concluded: “[I]t is absolutely clear to the court that, by reason of her very limited social and intellectual development combined with her five-year separation from the children, the mother is incapable of providing minimal care, control and supervision for the three children. Her incapacity cannot and will not be remedied.” In re Lehman, Nos. 2986, 2987, and 2988, p. 4 (Ct. Common Pleas, Lycoming County, Pa., June 3, 1976). The court therefore declared that petitioner’s parental rights respecting the three sons were terminated. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the termination order based on “parental incapacity, which does not involve parental misconduct.” In re William L., supra, at 331, 383 A. 2d, at 1232. It held that the legislature’s power to protect the physical and emotional needs of children authorized termination in the absence of serious harm or risk of serious harm to the children and in the absence of parental misconduct. The court stressed that, “[i]n the instant cases, the basis for termination is several years of demonstrated parental incapacity . . . .” Ibid. It also held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague either on its face or as applied. Petitioner sought this Court’s review in a petition for certiorari rather than by appeal. We denied the petition. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services, 439 U. S. 880 (1978). Petitioner then filed the instant proceeding on January 16, 1979, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241 and 2254. Petitioner requested (i) a declaration of the invalidity of the Pennsylvania statute under which her parental rights were terminated; (ii) a declaration that petitioner was the legal parent of the children; and (iii) an order releasing the children to her custody unless within 60 days an appropriate state court judicially determined that the best interest of the children required that temporary custody remain with the State. The District Court dismissed the petition without a hearing. Relying primarily on Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F. 2d 1103 (CA1 1978), the court concluded that “the custody maintained by the Respondent over the three Lehman children is not that type of custody to which the federal habeas corpus remedy may be addressed.” Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services Agency, Civ. No. 79-65 (MD Pa. 1979), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 135a, 147 a. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order of dismissal by a divided vote of six to four. 648 F. 2d 135 (1981). No majority opinion was written. A plurality of four, in an opinion written by Judge Garth, concluded that “disputes of the nature addressed here and which essentially involve no more than the question of who shall raise a child to maturity, do not implicate the federal interest in personal liberty sufficiently to warrant the extension of federal habeas corpus.” Id., at 146. In support of this conclusion, Judge Garth reasoned that “[i]t is not the liberty interest of the children that is sought to be protected in such a case, but only the right of the particular parent to raise them.” Id., at 140 (footnote omitted). A second plurality of four, in an opinion written by Judge Adams wrote that it “would appear to be both unwise and impolitic for the federal courts to uncover a whole new font of jurisdiction. . . .” Id., at 151. He would have disposed of the case on the ground that Ms. Lehman did not have standing to assert a habeas corpus action on behalf of her children. See id., at 151-155. This view was based on the conclusion that once a parent’s rights have been terminated in a state proceeding, a parent is no longer presumed to represent the interest of the child. See id., at 153-154. The question presented to this Court can be stated more fully as whether federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, under § 2254, may be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute under which a State has obtained custody of children and has terminated involuntarily the parental rights of their natural parent. As this is a question of importance not heretofore considered by this Court, and one over which the Circuits are/ divided, we granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 813 (1981). We now affirm. II A Petitioner seeks habeas corpus collateral review by a federal court of the Pennsylvania decision. Her application was filed under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a): “The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Although the language of § 2254(a), especially in light of § 2241, suggests that habeas corpus is available only to challenge the convictions of prisoners actually in the physical custody of the State, three modern cases have extended it to other situations involving challenges to state-court decisions. The first of these cases is Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963), in which the Court allowed a parolee to challenge his conviction by a habeas petition. The Court considered the parolee in “custody” for purposes of § 2254(b) because “the custody and control of the Parole Board involve significant restraints on petitioner’s liberty . . . which are in addition to those imposed by the State upon the public generally.” 371 U. S., at 242. And in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968), the Court allowed the writ in a challenge to a state-court judgment even though the prisoner, incarcerated at the time the writ was filed, had finished serving his sentence during the proceedings. The custody requirement had, of course, been met at the time the writ was filed, and the case was not moot because Carafas was subject to “‘collateral consequences’” as a result of his conviction, id., at 237, and “is suffering, and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities . . . .” Id., at 239. Most recently, in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411U. S. 345 (1973), the Court allowed the writ to be used to challenge a state-court conviction even though the defendant had been released on his own recognizance after sentencing but prior to the commencement of his incarceration. The Court held that the defendant was in the custody of the State for purposes of § 2254(b) because he was “subject to restraints ‘not shared by the public generally,”’ 411 U. S., at 351 (citation omitted) — indeed, his arrest was imminent. Thus, although the scope of the writ of habeas corpus has been extended beyond that which the most literal reading of the statute might require, the Court has never considered it a generally available federal remedy for every violation of federal rights. Instead, past decisions have limited the writ’s availability to challenges to state-court judgments in situations where — as a result of a state-court criminal conviction — a petitioner has suffered substantial restraints not shared by the public generally. In addition, in each of these cases the Court considered whether the habeas petitioner was “in custody” within the meaning of §2254. Ms. Lehman argues that her sons are involuntarily in the custody of the State for purposes of § 2254 because they are in foster homes pursuant to an order issued by a state court. Her sons, of course, are not prisoners. Nor do they suffer any restrictions imposed by a state criminal justice system. These factors alone distinguish this case from all other cases in which this Court has sustained habeas challenges to state-court judgments. Moreover, although the children have been placed in foster homes pursuant to an order of a Pennsylvania court, they are not in the “custody” of the State in the sense in which that term has been used by this Court in determining the availability of the writ of habeas corpus. They are in the “custody” of their foster parents in essentially the same way, and to the same extent, other children are in the custody of their natural or adoptive parents. Their situation in this respect differs little from the situation of other children in the public generally; they suffer no unusual restraints not imposed on other children. They certainly suffer no restraint on liberty as that term is used in Hensley and Jones, and they suffer no “collateral consequences” — like those in Carafas — sufficient to outweigh the need for finality. The “custody” of foster or adoptive parents over a child is not the type of custody that traditionally has been challenged through federal habeas. Ms. Lehman simply seeks to relitigate, through federal habeas, not any liberty interest of her sons, but the interest in her own parental rights. Although a federal habeas corpus statute has existed ever since 1867, federal habeas has never been available to challenge parental rights or child custody. Indeed, in two cases, the Court refused to allow the writ in such instances. Matters v. Ryan, 249 U. S. 375 (1919); In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (1890). These decisions rest on the absence of a federal question, but the opinions suggest that federal habeas corpus is not available to challenge child custody. Moreover, federal courts consistently have shown special solicitude for state interests “in the field of family and family-property arrangements.” United States v. Yazell, 382 U. S. 341, 352 (1966). Under these circumstances, extending the federal writ to challenges to state child-custody decisions — challenges based on alleged constitutional defects collateral to the actual custody decision — would be an unprecedented expansion of the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. B Federalism concerns and the exceptional need for finality in child-custody disputes argue strongly against the grant of Ms. Lehman’s petition. The writ of habeas corpus is a major exception to the doctrine of res judicata, as it allows relitigation of a final state-court judgment disposing of precisely the same claims. Because of this tension between the State’s interest in finality and the asserted federal interest, federal courts properly have been reluctant to extend the writ beyond its historic purpose. As Judge Campbell noted in Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers: “Federal habeas involves a substantial thrust by the federal system into the sphere normally reserved to the states and hence a change in the federal-state balance. This is so because the federal habeas remedy, as recently fashioned, offers a federal forum regardless of what state proceedings have already taken place and in effect allows a single federal district judge to overrule the judgment of the highest state court, unfettered by the constraints of collateral estoppel and res judicata.” 584 F. 2d, at 1111-1112. The State’s interest in finality is unusually strong in child-custody disputes. The grant of federal habeas would prolong uncertainty for children such as the Lehman sons, possibly lessening their chances of adoption. It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty over whether he is to remain in his current “home,” under the care of his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty is prolonged. Extended uncertainty would be inevitable in many cases if federal courts had jurisdiction to relitigate state custody decisions. l — l 1 — I Petitioner argues that habeas corpus should be available to her because it has been used as a procedure in child-custody cases in various States and in England. She notes that, in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S., at 238-240, the Court indicated that in construing the habeas statute, reference may be made to the common law and to practices in the States and in England. It is true that habeas has been used in child-custody cases in England and in many of the States. See id., at 239-240, and nn. 8, 12, and 13, citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U. S. 187 (1962); Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 138, 62 A. 2d 521, 528 (1948); Ex parte Swall, 36 Nev. 171, 174, 134 P. 96, 97 (1913); Ex parte M‘Clellan, 1 Dowl. 81 (K. B. 1831); Earl of Westmeath v. Countess of Westmeath, as set out in reporter’s footnote in Lyons v. Blenkin, 1 Jac. 245, 264, 37 Eng. Rep. 842, 848 (Ch. 1821). As these cases illustrate, the term “custody” in 28 U. S. C. §2255 — authorizing federal-court collateral review of federal decisions — could be construed to include the type of custody the Lehman children are subject to, since they are in foster homes pursuant to court orders. But reliance on what may be appropriate within the federal system or within a state system is of little force where — as in this case — a state judgment is attacked collaterally in a federal court. It is one thing to use a proceeding called “habeas corpus” in resolving child-custody disputes within a single system obligated to resolve such disputes. The question in such a case may be which procedure is most appropriate. The system is free to set time limits on the bringing of such actions as well as to impose other requirements to ensure finality and a speedy resolution of disputes in cases involving child custody or termination of parental rights. In this case, however, petitioner would have the federal judicial system entertain a writ that is not time-barred to challenge collaterally a final judgment entered in a state judicial system. In Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit gave a compelling answer to this argument: “Federal habeas when applied to persons under state control is a procedure of unique potency within the federal-state framework, having far different and more far-reaching consequences than a state’s utilization of habeas within its own system. State utilization of habeas to test the legal custody of a child is part of the fabric of its reserved jurisdiction over child custody matters. If a habeas remedy were not provided, some other procedure would be needed to effectuate the state’s substantive interest in these relationships. It is purely a matter of procedural detail whether the remedy is called ‘habeas’ or something else. The federal government, however, has no parallel substantive interest in child custody matters that federal habeas would serve. The sole federal interest is in the constitutional issues collateral to such disputes. At bottom, the question is whether these constitutional issues can be adequately raised through the usual channels — appeal, certiorari and the civil rights statutes — or whether the vehicle of federal habeas, with its unique features, is required.” 584 F. 2d, at 1111. IV The considerations in a child-custody case are quite different from those present in any prior case in which this Court has sustained federal-court jurisdiction under §2254. The federal writ of habeas corpus, representing as it does a profound interference with state judicial systems and the finality of state decisions, should be reserved for those instances in which the federal interest in individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and finality concerns. Congress has indicated no intention that the reach of § 2254 encompass a claim like that of petitioner. We therefore hold that § 2254 does not confer federal-court jurisdiction. The decision below, affirming the denial of a writ of habeas corpus, therefore is affirmed. It is so ordered. Petitioner has never been married. The fathers to these sons voluntarily have relinquished their parental rights in state-court proceedings. There was no evidence that any of the sons wanted to return to their mother. See Tr. 82, 117-118, 122-125, 127-129. It has now been over a decade since the sons were removed from the custody of their mother. Frank, the oldest, is now 18, and the case is moot with respect to him since he is free to seek adoption by anyone, including his natural mother. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26. The other two sons, Bill and Mark, are now 12 and 16 respectively. The judge relied on the Pennsylvania statute which provides, in relevant part: “The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: “(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2511(a) (1980). This decision appeared to have been a strategic one, making possible, in the event this Court did not grant plenary review, the filing of a habeas corpus petition in federal district court without any problem of res judicata on the federal issues as a result of this Court’s summary affirmance or dismissal of the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. At oral argument, however, petitioner’s lawyer also explained that he was confused as to whether he could appeal both the facial attack on the statute and the challenge to the statute as applied, and had therefore chosen the more conservative route of seeking a petition for a writ of certiorari on both issues. See Tr. Oral Arg. 21-22. Chief Judge Seitz filed a separate concurring opinion. He found the case “most difficult,” noting that “the literal statutory requirements for exercise of section 2254 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction can be said to be satisfied.” 648 F. 2d, at 155. But he nevertheless concurred in the result because habeas corpus has never been used to challenge state child-custody decisions, and “such a major departure from traditional uses of federal habeas corpus to challenge state-court judgments” should “await a congressional directive on the matter.” Id., at 156. Judge Rosenn, joined by two other judges, dissented. He stressed that “[t]he total extinction of a familial relationship between children and their biological parents is the most drastic measure that a state can impose, short of criminal sanctions.” Id., at 163. Judge Gibbons also filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that there was federal subject-matter jurisdiction and that habeas corpus should be an available remedy because a decision terminating parental rights has ongoing effects. Id., at 177. The federal courts have split on this issue. Only one court other than the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has addressed the question in a full opinion; in Sylvander v. New England Home far Little Wanderers, 584 F. 2d 1103 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that habeas corpus could not be used to avoid the finality of prior state-court child-custody proceedings, with a rationale much like Judge Garth’s in the instant case. Other federal courts have assumed — without full analysis— that habeas jurisdiction lies. See Davis v. Page, 640 F. 2d 599, 602 (CA5 1981) (en banc); Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F. 2d 437 (CA5 1980). See 28 U. S. C. § 2241 (empowering federal judges to grant such writs; subsection (c) provides that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall ... be granted unless [state remedies have not been exhausted or are not available, or there are] circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner*’) (emphasis added). When habeas corpus is made available by a federal court to challenge custody by federal entities, federalism concerns are not implicated. The only relevant question then is what federal remedy may be available. The grant of habeas relief in such instances — e. g., Strait v. Laird, 406 U. S. 341 (1972) (inactive Army Reserve member allowed to bring habeas petition to challenge his military obligation); Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U. S. 180, 182-184 (1956) (alien allowed to use habeas to challenge his exclusion from the United States) — is not precedent for the use of federal habeas to challenge judgments of state courts. As Judge Garth noted in his decision below: “[T]he writ assumes even more profound implications when its operation cuts across the federal and state judicial systems. In this latter context, the writ empowers a single federal judge to overrule determinations of federal issues which have been adjudicated by the highest court of a state.” 648 F. 2d, at 139. Jurisdiction to challenge both state and federal judgments is conferred by §2241. But §2254, conferring general jurisdiction to consider collateral attacks on state judgments, has no relevance to federal habeas proceedings challenging federal custody of nonprisoners. Thus, federal decisions made pursuant to § 2241 constitute no authority for the claim of jurisdiction under § 2254 in this case. In Hensley, the State would have placed the petitioner behind bars, but was prevented by a stay entered by the state trial court that subsequently was extended by two Justices of this Court. 411 U. S., at 351. Thus, although Hensley held the writ to be available in a case in which there was no actual custody in a state penal institution at the time the writ was filed, the extension was in the context of a person who had a strong claim to be treated as a prisoner for jurisdictional purposes. See Hensley, 411 U. S., at 345 (“This case requires us to determine whether a person released on his own recognizance is ‘in custody’ within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute . . .”); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S., at 238 (similar); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S., at 236 (similar). We express no view as to the availability of federal habeas when a child is actually confined in a state institution rather than being at liberty in the custody of a foster parent pursuant to a court order. At the hearing before the Pennsylvania trial court, petitioner’s lawyer actually stated “[t]his is not a custody proceeding . . . .” Tr. 67. The Court has considered constitutional challenges to custody or parental-rights proceedings, but these cases have reached the Court on direct review of the final state-court decision, not on federal habeas. See, e. g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (1982). Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion states that the legislative history, though admittedly sparse, supports its interpretation of the scope of § 2254 because “[t]he codification of the writ into federal law indicates no congressional intent to contract its common-law scope.” See post, at 518. But the dissenting opinion cites no legislative history relevant to state-court custody decisions. Moreover, for at least 100 years after passage of the statute in 1867, the writ was not used in child-custody cases. This history strongly suggests that the extension of federal habeas corpus to state custody cases was never contemplated by Congress, nor understood by the Bar to have been an available remedy. Petitioner maintains that the approval of habeas jurisdiction in this case may be limited. She suggests that it could be available only when the State takes the child away from its natural parents, but not when the State simply determines custody in a routine intrafamily dispute. It is not apparent that such distinctions are possible, either in legal theory or as a practical matter. The circumstances of custody vary widely, though in each disputed ease the child is in the custody of one person — over the objections of someone else — by order of a state court. We see no principled basis for distinguishing between the claim of a natural parent and the claim of grandparents or even the claim of an unrelated person who has been given legal custody that is challenged by a third party. Moreover, the arguments of res judicata and federalism apply with equal force in every collateral attack on a state custody decision in a federal court. The dissent suggests that comity and federalism concerns cannot inform a court’s construction of a statute in determining a question of jurisdiction over certain kinds of cases. Post, at 522-523. But in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981), precisely those concerns lead this Court to conclude that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear suits for tax refunds when state law provides an adequate remedy. In his decision below, Judge Garth expressed similar views: “While the ability to avoid res judicata is an extraordinary characteristic of habeas when the relitigation takes place within the same judicial system — that is, when a state court entertains the writ on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a court of that same state — the writ assumes even more profound implications when its operation cuts across the federal and state judicial systems. [T]he assumption of habeas jurisdiction by a federal court on behalf of a party complaining of a judgment rendered against him by a state court, represents an unparalleled assertion of federal authority over the state judicial system. Such an intrusion upon state judicial authority deeply implicates the principles of comity and may impair the smooth workings of our federal system. “The awesome power of the writ to avoid res judicata, and its implications for our federalism, demand that its use be confined to its proper role: the preservation of individual liberty and the relief from unlawful custody.” 648 F. 2d, at 139. There is also the danger that “if litigation expenses mount, social workers and charitable organizations . . . may well become less willing to seek placements for children over their parents’ objections, whether rational or irrational, even though in their honest judgment the child’s best interests demand it.” Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F. 2d, at 1112. In Hensley, this Court observed: “The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty. Since habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.” 411 U. S., at 351.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION CO. et al. v. NEW YORK CITY et al. No. 77-444. Argued April 17, 1978 Decided June 26, 1978 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. RehNquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 138. Daniel M. Gribbon argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were John R. Bolton and Carl Helmetag, Jr. Leonard Koerner argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Allen G. Schwartz, L. Kevin Sheridan, and Dorothy Miner. Assistant Attorney General Wald argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., and Carl Strass Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by David Bonder-man and Frank B. Gilbert for the National Trust for Historic Preservation et al.; by Paul S. Byard, Ralph C. Menapace, Jr., Terence H. Benbow, William C. Charder, Richard FI. Pershan, Francis T. P. Plimpton, Whitney North Seymour, and Bethuel M. Webster for the Committee to Save Grand Central Station et al.; and by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Philip Weinberg, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New York. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, E. Clement Shute, Jr., and Robert H. Connett, Assistant Attorneys General, and Richard C. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of California; and by Eugene J. Morris for the Real Estate Board of New York, Inc. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a city may, as part of a comprehensive program to preserve historic landmarks and historic districts, place restrictions on the development of individual historic landmarks — in addition to those imposed by applicable zoning ordinances — without effecting a “taking” requiring the payment of “just compensation.” Specifically, we must decide whether the application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to the parcel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal has “taken” its owners’ property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. I A Over the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 500 municipalities have enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic importance. These nationwide legislative efforts have been precipitated by two concerns. The first is recognition that, in recent years, large numbers of historic structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed without adequate consideration of éither the values represented therein or the possibility of preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive ways. The second is a widely shared belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all. Not only do these buildings and their workmanship represent the lessons of the past and embody precious features of our heritage, they serve as examples of quality for today. “ [Historic conservation is but one aspect of the much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of enhancing — or perhaps developing for the first time — the quality of life for people/' New York City, responding to similar concerns and acting pursuant to a New York State enabling Act, adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965. See N. Y. C. Admin. Code, ch. 8-A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976). The city acted from the conviction that “the standing of [New York City] as a world-wide tourist center and world capital of business, culture and government” would be threatened if legislation were not enacted to protect historic landmarks and neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter their character. § 205-1.0 (a). The city believed that comprehensive measures to safeguard desirable features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety of ways: e. g., fostering “civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the past”; protecting and enhancing “the city’s attractions to tourists and visitors”; “support[ing] and stimul[ating] business and industry”; “strengthen[ing] the economy of the city”; and promoting “the use of historic districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for the education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the city.” § 205-1.0 (b). The New York City law is typical of many urban landmark laws in that its primary method of achieving its goals is not by acquisitions of historic properties, but rather by involving public entities in land-use decisions affecting these properties and providing services, standards, controls, and incentives that will encourage preservation by private owners and users. While the law does place special restrictions on landmark properties as a necessary feature to the attainment of its larger objectives, the major theme of the law is to ensure the owners of any such properties both a “reasonable return” on their investments and maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes not inconsistent with the preservation goals. The operation of the law can be briefly summarized. The primary responsibility for administering the law is vested in the Landmarks Preservation Commission (Commission), a broad based, 11-member agency assisted by a technical staff. The Commission first performs the function, critical to any landmark preservation effort, of identifying properties and areas that have “a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation.” § 207-1.0 (n); see § 207-1.0 (h). If the Commission determines, after giving all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, that a building or area satisfies the ordinance’s criteria, it will designate a building to be a “landmark,” § 207-1.0 (n), situated on a particular “landmark site,” § 207-1.0 (o), or will designate an area to be a “historic district/’ §207-1.0 (h). After the Commission makes a designation, New York City’s Board of Estimate, after considering the relationship of the designated property “to the master plan, the zoning resolution, projected public improvements and any plans for the renewal of the area involved,” § 207-2.0 (g)(1), may modify or disapprove the designation, and the owner may seek judicial review of the final designation decision. Thus far, 31 historic districts and over 400 individual landmarks have been finally designated, and the process is a continuing one. Final designation as a landmark results in restrictions upon the property owner’s options concerning use of the landmark site. First, the law imposes a duty upon the owner to keep the exterior features of the building “in good repair” to assure that the law’s objectives not be defeated by the landmark’s falling into a state of irremediable disrepair. See § 207-10.0 (a). Second, the Commission must approve in advance any proposal to alter the exterior architectural features of the landmark or to construct any exterior improvement on the landmark site, thus ensuring that decisions concerning construction on the landmark site are made with due consideration of both the public interest in the maintenance of the structure and the landowner’s interest in use of the property. See §§ 207-4.0 to 207-9.0. In the event an owner wishes to alter a landmark site, three separate procedures are available through which administrative approval may be obtained. First, the owner may apply to the Commission for a “certificate of no effect on protected architectural features”: that is, for an order approving the improvement or alteration on the ground that it will not change or affect any architectural feature of the landmark and will be in harmony therewith. See § 207-5.0. Denial of the certificate is subject to judicial review. Second, the owner may apply to the Commission for a certificate of “appropriateness.” See § 207-6.0. Such certificates will be granted if the Commission concludes — focusing upon aesthetic, historical, and architectural values — that the proposed construction on the landmark site would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, perpetuation, and use of the landmark. Again, denial of the certificate is subject to judicial review.. Moreover, the owner who is denied either a certificate of no exterior effect or a certificate of appropriateness may submit an alternative or modified plan for approval. The final procedure — seeking a certificate of appropriateness on the ground of “insufficient return,” see § 207-8.0 — -provides special mechanisms, which vary depending on whether or not the landmark enjoys a tax exemption, to ensure that designation does not cause economic hardship. Although the designation of a landmark and landmark site restricts the owner’s control oyer the parcel, designation also enhances the economic position of the landmark owner in one significant respect. Under New York City’s zoning laws, owners of real property who have not developed their property to the full extent permitted by the applicable zoning laws are allowed to transfer development rights to contiguous parcels on the same city block. See New York City, Zoning Resolution Art. I, ch. 2, § 12-10 (1978) (definition of “zoning lot”). A 1968 ordinance gave the owners of landmark sites additional opportunities to transfer development rights to other parcels. Subject to a restriction that the floor area of the transferee lot may not be increased by more than 20% above its authorized level, the ordinance permitted transfers from a landmark parcel to property across the street or across a street intersection. In 1969, the law governing the conditions under which transfers from landmark parcels could occur was liberalized, see New York City Zoning Resolutions 74-79 to 74-793, apparently to ensure that the Landmarks Law would not unduly restrict the development options of the owners of Grand Central Terminal. See Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 372, 375 (1971). The class of recipient lots was expanded to include lots “across a street and opposite to another lot or lots which except for the intervention of streets or street intersections f[or]m a series extending to the lot occupied by the landmark building [, provided that] all lots [are] in the same ownership.” New York City Zoning Resolution 74-79 (emphasis deleted). In addition, the 1969 amendment permits, in highly commercialized areas like midtown Manhattan, the transfer of all unused development rights to a single parcel. Ibid. B This case involves the application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central Terminal (Terminal). The Terminal, which is owned by the Penn Central Transportation Co. and its affiliates (Penn Central), is one of New York City’s most famous buildings. Opened in 1913, it is regarded not only as providing an ingenious engineering solution to the problems presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent example of the French beaux-arts style. The Terminal is located in midtown Manhattan. Its south facade faces 42d Street and that street’s intersection with Park Avenue. At street level, the Terminal is bounded on the west by Vanderbilt Avenue, on the east by the Commodore Hotel, and on the north by the Pan-American Building. Although a 20-story office tower, to have been located above the Terminal, was part of the original design, the planned tower was never constructed. The Terminal itself is an eight-story structure which Penn Central uses as a railroad station and in which it rents space not needed for railroad purposes to a variety of commercial interests. The Terminal is one of a number of properties owned by appellant Penn Central in this area of midtown Manhattan. The others include the Barclay, Biltmore, Commodore, Roosevelt, and Waldorf-Astoria Hotels, the Pan-American Building and other office buildings along Park Avenue, and the Yale Club. At least eight of these are eligible to be recipients of development rights afforded the Terminal by virtue of landmark designation. On August 2, 1967, following a public hearing, the Commission designated the Terminal a “landmark” and designated the “city tax block” it occupies a “landmark site.” The Board of Estimate confirmed this action on September 21, 1967. Although appellant Penn Central had opposed the designation before the Commission, it did not seek judicial review of the final designation decision. On January 22, 1968, appellant Penn Central, to increase its income, entered into a renewable 50-year lease and sublease agreement with appellant UGP Properties, Inc. (UGP), a wholly owned subsidiary of Union General Properties, Ltd., a United Kingdom corporation. Under the terms of the agreement, UGP was to construct a multistory office building above the Terminal. UGP promised to pay Penn Central $1 million annually during construction and at least $3 million annually thereafter. The rentals would be offset in part by a loss of some $700,000 to $1 million in net rentals presently received from concessionaires displaced by the new building. Appellants UGP and Penn Central then applied to the Commission for permission to construct an office building atop the Terminal. Two separate plans, both designed by architect Marcel Breuer and both apparently satisfying the terms of the applicable zoning ordinance, were submitted to the Commission for approval. The first, Breuer I, provided for the construction of a 55-story office building, to be cantilevered above the existing facade and to rest on the roof of the Terminal. The second, Breuer II Revised, called for tearing down a portion of the Terminal that included the 42d Street facade, stripping off some of the remaining features of the Terminal’s facade, and constructing a 53-story office building. The Commission denied a certificate of no exterior effect on September 20, 1968. Appellants then applied for a certificate of “appropriateness” as to both proposals. After four days of hearings at which over 80 witnesses testified, the Commission denied this application as to both proposals. The Commission’s reasons for rejecting certificates respecting Breuer II Revised are summarized in the following statement: “To protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural features, one does not strip them off.” Record 2255. Breuer I, which would have preserved the existing vertical facades of the present structure, received more sympathetic consideration. The Commission first focused on the effect that the proposed tower would have on one desirable feature created by the present structure and its surroundings: the dramatic view of the Terminal from Park Avenue South. Although appellants had contended that the Pan-American Building had already destroyed the silhouette of the south facade and that one additional tower could do no further damage and might even provide a better background for the facade, the Commission disagreed, stating that it found the majestic approach from the south to be still unique in the city and that a 55-story tower atop the Termiml would be far more detrimental to its south facade than the Pan-American Building 375 feet away. Moreover, the Commission found that from closer vantage points the Pan-American Building and the other towers were largely cut off from view, which would not be the case of the mass on top of the Terminal planned under Breuer I. In conclusion, the Commission stated: “[We have] no fixed rule against making additions to designated buildings — it all depends on how they are done .... But to balance a 55-story office tower above a flamboyant Beaux-Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke. Quite simply, the tower would overwhelm the Terminal by its sheer mass. The 'addition’ would be four times as high as the existing structure and would reduce the Landmark itself to the status of a curiosity. “Landmarks cannot be divorced from their settings— particularly when the setting is a dramatic and integral part of the original concept. The Terminal, in its setting, is a great example of urban design. Such examples are not so plentiful in New York City that we can afford to lose any of the few we have. And we must preserve them in a meaningful way — with alterations and additions of such character, scale, materials and mass as will protect, enhance and perpetuate the original design rather than overwhelm it.” Id., at 2251. Appellants did not seek judicial review of the denial of either certificate. Because the Terminal site enjoyed a tax exemption, remained suitable for its present and future uses, and was not the subject of a contract of sale, there were no further administrative remedies available to appellants as to the Breuer' I. and Breuer II Revised plans. See n. 13, supra. Further, appellants did not avail themselves of the opportunity to develop and submit other plans for the Commission’s consideration and approval. Instead, appellants filed suit in New York Supreme Court, Trial Term, claiming, inter alia, that the application of the Landmarks Preservation Law had “taken” their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and arbitrarily deprived them of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the city from using the Landmarks Law to impede the construction of any structure that might otherwise lawfully be constructed on the Terminal site, and damages for the “temporary taking” that occurred between August 2, 1967, the designation date, and the date when the restrictions arising from the Landmarks Law would be lifted. The trial court granted the injunctive and declaratory relief, but severed the question of damages fqr a “temporary taking.” Appellees appealed, and the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (1975). The Appellate Division held that the restrictions on the development of the Terminal site were necessary to promote the legitimate public purpose of protecting landmarks and therefore that appellants could sustain their, constitutional claims only by proof that the regulation deprived them of all reasonable beneficial use of the property. The Appellate Division held that the evidence appellants introduced at trial — “Statements of Revenues and Costs,” purporting to show a net operating loss for the years 1969 and 1971, which were prepared for the instant litigation — had not satisfied their burden. First, the court rejected the claim that these statements showed that the Terminal was operating at a loss, for in the court’s view, appellants had improperly attributed some railroad operating expenses and taxes to their real estate operations, and compounded that error by failing to impute any rental value to the vast space in the Terminal devoted to railroad purposes. Further, the Appellate Division concluded that appellants had failed to establish either that they were unable to increase the Terminal’s commercial income by transforming vacant or underutilized space to revenue-producing use, or that the unused development rights over the Terminal could not have been profitably transferred to one or more nearby sites. The Appellate Division concluded that all appellants had succeeded in showing was that they had been deprived of the property’s most profitable use, and that this showing did not establish that appellants had been unconstitutionally deprived of their property. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 42 N. Y. 2d 324, 366 N. E. 2d 1271 (1977). That court summarily rejected any claim that the Landmarks Law had “taken” property without “just compensation,” id., at 329, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1274, indicating that there could be no “talcing” since the law had not transferred control of the property to the city, but only restricted appellants’ exploitation of it. In that circumstance, the Court of Appeals held that appellants’ attack on the- law could prevail only if the law deprived appellants of their property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether or not there was a denial of substantive due process turned on whether the restrictions deprived Penn Central of a “reasonable return” on the “privately created and privately managed ingredient” of the Terminal. Id., at 328, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1273. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Landmarks Law had not effected a denial of due process because: (1) the landmark regulation permitted the same use as had been made of the Terminal for more than half a century; (2) the appellants had failed to show that they could not earn a reasonable return on their investment in the Terminal itself; (3) even if the Terminal proper could never operate at a reasonable profit, some of the income from Penn Central’s extensive real estate holdings in the area, which include hotels and office buildings, must realistically be imputed to the Terminal; and (4) the development rights above the Terminal, which had been made transferable to numerous sites in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which were suitable for the construction of office buildings, were valuable to appellants and provided “significant, perhaps 'fair/ compensation for the loss of rights above the terminal itself.” Id., at 333-336, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1276-1278. Observing that its affirmance was “[o]n the present record,” and that its analysis had not been fully developed by counsel at any level of the New York judicial system, the Court of Appeals directed that counsel “should be entitled to present . . . any additional submissions which, in the light of [the court’s] opinion, may usefully develop further the factors discussed.” Id., at 337, 366 N. E. 2d, at 1279. Appellants chose not to avail themselves of this opportunity and filed a notice of appeal in this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction. 434 U.S. 983 (1977). We affirm. II The issues presented by appellants are (1) whether the restrictions imposed by New York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the Terminal site effect a “taking” of appellants’ property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), and, (2), if so, whether the transferable development rights afforded appellants constitute “just compensation” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. We need only address the question whether a “taking” has occurred. A Before considering appellants’ specific contentions, it will be useful to review the factors that have shaped the jurispru.dence of the Fifth Amendment injunction “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar' Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960), this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. See Gold-blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590, 594 (1962). Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely “upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.” United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958); see United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U. S. 149, 156 (1952). In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,' the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. See Cold-blatt v. Hempstead, supra, at 594. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, see, e. g., United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 413 (1922), and this Court has accordingly recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, that government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values. Exercises of the taxing power are one obvious example. A second are the decisions in which this Court has dismissed “taking” challenges on the ground that, while the challenged government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute "property” for Fifth Amendment purposes. See, e. g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499 (1945) (interest in high-water level of river for runoff for tailwaters to maintain power head is not property) ; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913) (no property interest can exist in navigable waters); see also Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U. S. 36 (1944); Muhlker v. Harlem R. Co., 197 U. S. 544 (1905); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 61-62 (1964). More importantly for the present case, in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that “the health, safety, morals, or general welfare” would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property interests. See Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928). Zoning laws are, of course, the classic example, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (prohibition of industrial use); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 608 (1927) (requirement that portions of parcels be left unbuilt); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91 (1909) (height restriction), which have been viewed as permissible governmental action even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, at 592-593, and cases cited; see also Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U. S. 668, 674 n. 8 (1976). Zoning laws generally do not affect existing uses of real property, but “taking” challenges have also been held to be without merit in a wide variety of situations when the challenged governmental actions prohibited a beneficial use to which individual parcels had previously been devoted and thus caused substantial individualized harm. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928), is illustrative. In that case, a state entomologist, acting pursuant to a state statute, ordered the claimants to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar trees because they produced cedar rust fatal to apple trees cultivated nearby. Although the statute provided for recovery of any expense incurred in removing the cedars, and permitted claimants to use the felled trees, it did not provide compensation for the value of the standing trees or for the resulting decrease in market value of the properties as a whole. A unanimous Court held that this latter omission did not render the statute invalid. The Court held that the State might properly make “a choice between the preservation of one class of property and that of the other” and since the apple industry was important in the State involved, concluded that the State had not exceeded “its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property [without compensation] in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.” Id., at 279. Again, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915), upheld a law prohibiting the claimant from continuing his otherwise lawful business of operating a brickyard in a particular physical community on the ground that the legislature had reasonably concluded that the presence of the brickyard was inconsistent with neighboring uses. See also United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., supra (Government order closing gold mines so that skilled miners would be available for other mining work held not a taking): Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 346 U. S. 346 (1953) (railroad may be required to share cost of constructing railroad grade improvement) ; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300 (1920) (law prohibiting manufacture of carbon black upheld); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171 (1915) (law prohibiting livery stable upheld); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting liquor business upheld). Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, is a recent example. There, a 1958 city safety ordinance banned any excavations below the water table and effectively prohibited the claimant from continuing a sand and gravel mining business that had been operated on the particular parcel since 1927. The Court upheld the ordinance against a “taking” challenge, although the ordinance prohibited the present and presumably most beneficial use of the property and had, like the regulations in Miller and Hadacheck, severely affected a particular owner. The Court assumed that the ordinance did not prevent the owner’s reasonable use of the property since the owner made no showing of an adverse effect on the value of the land. Because the restriction served a substantial public purpose, the Court thus held no taking had occurred. It is, of course, implicit in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real property may constitute a “taking” if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation, of a substantial public purpose, see Nectow v. Cambridge, supra; cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 513-514 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring), or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner’s use of the property. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), is the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a “taking.” There the claimant had sold the surface rights to particular parcels of property, but expressly reserved the right to remove the coal thereunder. A Pennsylvania statute, enacted after the transactions, forbade any mining of coal that caused the subsidence of any house, unless the house was the property of the owner of the underlying coal and was more than 150 feet from the improved property of another. Because the statute made it commercially impracticable to mine the coal, id., at 414, and thus had nearly the same effect as the complete destruction of rights claimant had reserved from the owners of the surface land, see id., at 414-415, the Court held that the statute was invalid as effecting a “taking” without just compensation. See also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40 (1960) (Government’s complete destruction of a materialman’s lien in certain property held a “taking”); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908) (if height restriction makes property wholly useless “the rights of property . . . prevail over the other public interest” and compensation is required). See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1229-1234 (1967). Finally, government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute “takings.” United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946), is illustrative. In holding that direct overflights above the claimant’s land, that destroyed the present use of the land as a chicken farm, constituted a “taking,” Causby emphasized that Government had not “merely destroyed property [but was] using a part of it for the flight of its planes.” Id., at 262-263, n. 7. See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84 (1962) (overflights held a taking); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922) (United States military installations’ repeated firing of guns over claimant’s land is a taking); United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917) (repeated floodings of land caused by water project is a taking); but see YMCA v. United States, 395 U. S. 85 (1969) (damage caused to building when federal officers who were seeking to protect building were attacked by rioters held not a taking). See generally Michelman, supra, at 1226-1229; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36 (1964). B In contending that the New York City law has “taken” their property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, appellants make a series of arguments, which, while tailored to the facts of this case, essentially urge that any substantial restriction imposed pursuant to a landmark law must be accompanied by just compensation if it is to be constitutional. Before considering these, we emphasize what is not in dispute. Because this Court has recognized, in a number of settings, that States and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city, see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976) ; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9-10 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S., at 108, appellants do not contest that New York City’s objective of preserving structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permissible governmental goal. They also do not dispute that the restrictions imposed on its parcel are appropriate means of securing the purposes of the New York City law. Finally, appellants do not challenge any of the specific factual premises of the decision below. They accept for present purposes both that the parcel of land occupied by Grand Central Terminal must, in its present state, be regarded as capable of earning a reasonable return, and that the transferable development rights afforded appellants by virtue of the Terminal’s designation as a landmark are valuable, even if not as valuable as the rights to construct above the Terminal. In appellants’ view none of these factors derogate from their claim that New York City’s law has effected a “taking.” They first observe that the airspace above the Terminal is a valuable property interest, citing United States v. Causby, supra. They urge that the Landmarks Law has deprived them of any gainful use of their “air rights” above the Terminal and that, irrespective of the value of the remainder of their parcel, the city has “taken” their right to this super-jacent airspace, thus entitling them to “just compensation” measured by the fair market value of these air rights. Apart from our own disagreement with appellants’ characterization of the effect of the New York City law, see infra, at 134-135, the submission that appellants may establish a “taking” simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development is quite simply untenable. Were this the rule, this Court would have erred not only in upholding laws restricting the development of air rights, see Welch v. Swasey, supra, but also in approving those prohibiting both the subjacent, see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962), and the lateral, see Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603 (1927), development of particular parcels. “Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole — here, the city tax block designated as the “landmark site.” Secondly, appellants, focusing on the character and impact of the New York City law, argue that it effects a “taking” because its operation has significantly diminished the value of the Terminal site. Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a “taking,” see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zoning law); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915) (87½% diminution in value); cf. Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U. S., at 674 n. 8, and that the “taking” issue in these contexts is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit. See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra. Appellants, moreover, also do not dispute that a showing of diminution in property value would not establish a “taking” if the restriction had been imposed as a result of historic-district legislation, see generally Maher v. New Orleans, 516 F. 2d 1051 (CA5 1975), but appellants argue that New York City’s regulation of individual landmarks is fundamentally different from zoning or from historic-district legislation because the controls imposed by New York City’s law apply only to individuals who own selected properties. Stated baldly, appellants’ position appears to be that the only means of ensuring that selected owners are not singled out to endure financial hardship for no reason is to hold that any restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the New York City scheme is a “taking” requiring the payment of “just compensation.” Agreement with this argument would, of course, invalidate not just New York City’s law, but all comparable landmark legislation in the Nation. We find no merit in it. It is true, as appellants emphasize, that both historic-district legislation and zoning laws regulate all properties within given physical communities whereas landmark laws apply only to selected parcels. But, contrary to appellants’ suggestions, landmark laws are not like discriminatory, or “reverse spot,” zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones. See 2 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 26-4, and n. 6 (4th ed. 1978). In contrast to discriminatory zoning, which is the antithesis of land-use control as part of some comprehensive plan, the New York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city, and as noted, over 400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been designated pursuant to this plan. Equally without merit is the related argument that the decision to designate a structure as a landmark “is inevitably arbitrary or at least subjective, because it is basically a matter of taste,” Reply Brief for Appellants 22, thus unavoidably singling out individual landowners for disparate and unfair treatment. The argument has a particularly hollow ring in this case. For appellants not only did not seek judicial review of either the designation or of the denials of the certificates of appropriateness and of no exterior effect, but do not even now suggest that the Commission’s decisions concerning the Terminal were in any sense arbitrary or unprincipled. But, in any event, a landmark owner has a right to judicial review of any Commission decision, and, quite- simply, there is no basis whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any greater difficulty identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark regulation than in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other context. Next, appellants observe that New York City’s law differs from zoning laws and historic-district ordinances in that the Landmarks Law does not impose identical or similar restrictions on all structures located in particular physical communities. It follows, they argue, that New York City’s law is inherently incapable of producing the fair and equitable distribution of benefits and burdens of governmental action which is characteristic of zoning laws and historic-district legislation and which they maintain is a constitutional requirement if “just compensation” is not to be afforded. It is, of course, true that the Landmarks Law has a more severe impact on some landowners than on others, but that in itself does not mean that the law effects a “taking.” Legislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than others. The owners of the brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar trees in Miller v. Schoene, and of the gravel and sand mine in Ooldblatt v. Hempstead, were uniquely burdened by the legislation sustained in those cases. Similarly, zoning laws often affect some property owners more severely than others but have not been held to be invalid on that account. For example, the property owner in Euclid who wished to use its property for industrial purposes was affected far more severely by the ordinance than its neighbors who wished to use their land for residences. In any event, appellants’ repeated suggestions that they are solely burdened and unbenefited is factually inaccurate. This contention overlooks the fact that the New York City law applies to vast numbers of structures in the city in addition to the Terminal — all the structures contained in the 31 historic districts and over 400 individual landmarks, many of which are close to the Terminal. Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City Council that the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole — which we are unwilling to do — we cannot conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the Landmarks Law. Doubtless appellants believe they are more burdened than benefited by the law, but that must have been true, too, of the property owners in Miller, Hadacheck, Euclid, and Goldblatt, Appellants’ final broad-based attack would have us treat the law as an instance, like that in United States v. Causby, in which government, acting in an enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their property for some strictly governmental purpose. Apart from the fact that Causby was a case of invasion of airspace that destroyed the use of the farm beneath and this New York City law has in nowise impaired the present use of the Terminal, the Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants’ parcel for city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial operations of the city. The situation is not remotely like that in Causby where the airspace above the property was in the flight pattern for military aircraft. The Landmarks Law’s effect is simply to prohibit appellants or anyone else from occupying portions of the airspace above the Terminal, while permitting appellants to use the remainder of the parcel in a gainful fashion. This is no more an appropriation of property by government for its own uses than is a zoning law prohibiting, for “aesthetic” reasons, two or more adult theaters within a specified area, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976), or a safety regulation prohibiting excavations below a certain level. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead. C Rejection of appellants’ broad arguments is not, however, the end of our inquiry, for all we thus far have established is that the New York City law is not rendered invalid by its failure to provide “just compensation” whenever a landmark owner is restricted in the exploitation of property interests, such as air rights, to a greater extent than provided for under applicable zoning laws. We now must consider whether the interference with appellants’ property is of such a magnitude that “there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S., at 413. That inquiry may be narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact of the law on appellants’ parcel, and its resolution in turn requires a careful assessment of the impact of the regulation on the Terminal site. Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt, Miller, Causby, Griggs, and Hadacheck, the New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions. So the law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel. More importantly, on this record, we must regard the New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a “reasonable return” on its investment. Appellants, moreover, exaggerate the effect of the law on their ability to make use of the air rights above the Terminal in two respects. First, it simply cannot be maintained, on this record, that appellants have been prohibited from occupying any portion of the airspace above the Terminal. While the Commission’s actions in denying applications to construct an office building in excess of 50 stories above the Terminal may indicate that it will refuse to issue a certificate of appropriateness for .any comparably sized structure, nothing the Commission has said or done suggests an intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal. The Commission’s report emphasized that whether any construction would be allowed depended upon whether the proposed addition “would harmonize in scale, material, and character with [the Terminal].” Record 2251. Since appellants have not sought approval for the construction of a smaller structure, we do not know that appellants will be denied any use of any portion of the airspace above the Terminal. Second, to the extent appellants have been denied the right to build above the Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied all use of even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings. Although appellants and others have argued that New York City’s transferable development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York courts here supportably found that, at least in the case of the Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these rights may well not have constituted “just compensation” if a “taking” had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation. Cf. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S., at 594 n. 3. On this record, we conclude that the application of New York City’s Landmarks Law has not effected a “taking” of appellants’ property. The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties. Affirmed. See National Trust for Historic Preservation, A Guide to State Historic Preservation Programs (1976); National Trust for Historic Preservation, Directory of Landmark and Historic District Commissions (1976). In addition to these state and municipal legislative efforts, Congress has determined that “the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people,” National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 915, 16 U. S. C. §470 (b) (1976 ed.), and has enacted a series of measures designed to encourage preservation of sites and structures of historic, architectural, or cultural significance. See generally Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 314 (1971). Over one-half of the buildings listed in the Historic American Buildings Survey, begun by the Federal Government in 1933, have been destroyed. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 574, 574 n. 1 (1972), citing Huxtable, Bank’s Building Plan Sets Off Debate on “Progress,” N. Y. Times, Jan. 17,1971, section 8, p. 1, col. 2. See, e. g., N. Y. C. Admin. Code § 205-1.0 (a) (1976). Gilbert, Introduction, Precedents for the Future, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 311, 312 (1971), quoting address by Robert Stipe, 1971 Conference on Preservation Law, Washington, D. C., May 1, 1971 (unpublished text, pp. 6-7). See N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law §96-a (McKinney 1977). It declares that it is the public policy of the State of New York to preserve structures and areas with special historical or aesthetic interest or value and authorizes local governments to impose reasonable restrictions to perpetuate such structures and areas. The consensus is that widespread public ownership of historic properties in urban settings is neither feasible nor wise. Public ownership reduces the tax base, burdens the public budget with costs of acquisitions and maintenance, and results in the preservation of public buildings as museums and similar facilities, rather than as economically productive features of the urban scene. See Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 329, 330-331, 339-340 (1971). See Costonis, supra n. 2, at 580-581; Wilson & Winkler, supra n. 6 ; Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New York City Landmark Preservation Law, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 366 (1971). The ordinance creating the Commission requires that it include at least three architects, one historian qualified in the field, one city planner or landscape architect, one realtor, and at least one resident of each of the city’s five boroughs. N. Y. C. Charter § 534 (1976). In addition to the ordinance’s requirements concerning the composition of the Commission, there is, according to a former chairman, a “prudent tradition” that the Commission include one or two lawyers, preferably with experience in municipal government, and several laymen with no specialized qualifications other than concern for the good of the city. Goldstone, Aesthetics in Historic Districts, 36 Law & Contemp. Prob. 379, 384-385 (1971). “ 'Landmark.’ Any improvement, any part of which is thirty years old or older, which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of the development, heritage or cultural character-isties of the city, state or nation and which has been designated as a landmark pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” § 207-1.0 (n). “ 'Landmark site.’ An improvement parcel or part thereof on which is situated a landmark and any abutting improvement parcel or part thereof used as and constituting part of the premises on which the landmark is situated, and which has been designated as a landmark site pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” §207-1.0 (o). ‘"Historic district.’ Any area which: (1) contains improvements which: (a) have a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value; and (b) represent one or more periods or styles of architecture typical of one or more eras in the history of the city; and (c) cause such area, by reason of such factors, to constitute a distinct section of the city; and (2) has been designated as a historic district pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” §207-1.0 (h), The Act also provides for the designation of a “scenic landmark,” see §207-1.0 (w), and an “interior landmark.” See §207-1.0 (m). See Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York, Landmarks and Historic Districts (1977). Although appellants are correct in noting that some of the designated landmarks are publicly owned, the vast majority are, like Grand Central Terminal, privately owned structures. If the owner of a non-ta-x-exempt parcel has been denied certificates of appropriateness for a proposed alteration and shows that he is not earning a reasonable return on the property in its present state, the Commission and other city agencies must assume the burden of developing a plan that will enable the landmark owner to earn a reasonable return on the landmark site. The plan may include, but need not be limited to, partial or complete tax exemption, remission of taxes, and authorizations for alterations, construction, or reconstruction appropriate for and not inconsistent with the purposes of the law. § 207-8.0 (c). The owner is free to accept or reject a plan devised by the Commission and approved by the other city agencies. If he accepts the plan, he proceeds to operate the property pursuant to the plan. If he rejects the plan, the Commission may recommend that the city proceed by eminent domain to acquire a protective interest in the landmark, but if the city does not do so within a specified time period, the Commission must issue a notice allowing the property owner to proceed with the alteration or improvement as originally proposed in his application for a certificate of appropriateness. Tax-exempt structures are treated somewhat differently. They become eligible for special treatment only if four preconditions are satisfied: (1) the owner previously entered into an agreement to sell the parcel that was contingent upon the issuance of a certificate of approval; (2) the property, as it exists at the time of the request, is not capable of earning a reasonable return; (3) the structure is no longer suitable to its past or present purposes; and (4) the prospective buyer intends to alter the landmark structure. In the event the owner demonstrates that the property in its present state is not earning a reasonable return, the Commission must either find another buyer for it or allow the sale and construction to proceed. But this is not the only remedy available for owners of tax-exempt landmarks. As the case at bar illustrates, see infra, at 121, if an owner files suit and establishes that he is incapable of earning a “reasonable return” on the site in its present state, he can be afforded judicial relief. Similarly, where a landmark owner who enjoys a tax exemption has demonstrated that the landmark structure, as restricted, is totally inadequate for the owner’s “legitimate needs,” the law has been held invalid as applied to that parcel. See Lutheran Church v. City of New York, 35 N. Y. 2d 121, 316 N. E. 2d 305 (1974). To obtain approval for a proposed transfer, the landmark owner must follow the following procedure. First, he must obtain the permission of the Commission which will examine the plans for the development of the transferee lot to determine whether the planned construction would be compatible with the landmark. Second, he must obtain the approbation of New York City’s Planning Commission which will focus on the effects of the transfer on occupants of the buildings in the vicinity of the transferee lot and whether the landmark owner will preserve the landmark. Finally, the matter goes to the Board of Estimate, which has final authority to grant or deny the application. See also Costonis, supra n. 2, at 585-586. The Terminal’s present foundation includes columns, which were built into it for the express purpose of supporting the proposed 20-story tower. The Commission’s report stated: “Grand Central Station, one of the great buildings of America, evokes a spirit that is unique in this City. It combines distinguished architecture with a brilliant engineering solution, wedded to one of the most fabulous railroad terminals of our time. Monumental in scale, this great building functions as well today as it did when built. In style, it represents the best of the French Beaux Arts.” Record 2240. Appellants also submitted a plan, denominated Breuer II, to the Commission. However, because appellants learned that Breuer II would have violated existing easements, they substituted Breuer II Revised for Breuer II, and the Commission evaluated the appropriateness only of Breuer II Revised. In discussing Breuer I, the Commission also referred to a number of instances in which it had approved additions to landmarks: “The office and reception wing added to Gracie Mansion and the school and church house added to the 12th Street side of the First Presbyterian Church are examples that harmonize in scale, material and character with the structures they adjoin. The new Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society building on Brooklyn Heights, though completely modern in idiom, respects the qualities of its surroundings and will enhance the Brooklyn Heights Historic District, as Butterfield Rouse enhances West 12th Street, and Breuer’s own Whitney Museum its Madison Avenue locale.” Record 2251. See N. Y. Real Prop. Tax Law §489-aa et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1977). Although that court suggested that any regulation of private property to protect landmark values was unconstitutional if “just compensation” were not afforded, it also appeared to rely upon its findings: first, that the cost to Penn Central of operating the Terminal building itself, exclusive of purely railroad operations, exceeded the revenues received from concessionaires and tenants in the Terminal; and second, that the special transferable development rights afforded Penn Central as an owner of a landmark site did not “provide compensation to plaintiffs or minimize the harm suffered by plaintiffs due to the designation of the Terminal as a landmark.” These statements appear to have reflected the costs of maintaining the exterior architectural features of the Terminal in “good repair” as required by the law. As would have been apparent in any case therefore, the existence of the duty to keep up the property was here — and will presumably always be — factored into the inquiry concerning the constitutionality of the landmark restrictions. The AppeEate Division also rejected the claim that an agreement of Penn Central with the Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Connecticut Transit Authority provided a basis for invalidating the application of the Landmarks Law. The record reflected that Penn Central had given serious consideration to transferring some of those rights to either the Biltmore Hotel or the Roosevelt Hotel. The Court of Appeals suggested that in calculating the value of the property upon which appellants were entitled to earn a reasonable return, the “publicly created” components of the value of the property — i. e., those elements of its value attributable to the “efforts of organized society” or to the “social complex” in which the Terminal is located — had to be excluded. However, since the record upon which the Court of Appeals decided the case did not, as that court recognized, contain a basis for segregating the privately created from the publicly created elements of the value of the Terminal site and since the judgment of the Court of Appeals in any event rests upon bases that support our affirmance, see infra, this page and 122, we have no occasion to address the question whether it is permissible or feasible to separate out the “social increments” of the value of property. See Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 402, 416-417 (1977). Our statement of the issues is a distillation of four questions presented in the jurisdictional statement: “Does the social and cultural desirability of preserving historical landmarks through government regulation derogate from the constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid for private property taken for public use? “Is Penn Central entitled to no compensation for that large but unmeasurable portion of the value of its rights to construct an office building over the Grand Central Terminal that is said to have been created by the efforts of 'society as an organized entity’? “Does a finding that Penn Central has failed to establish that there is no possibility, without exercising its development rights, of earning a reasonable return on all of its remaining properties that benefit in any way from the operations of the Grand Central Terminal warrant the conclusion that no compensation need be paid for the taking of those rights? “Does the possibility accorded to Penn Central, under the landmark-preservation regulation, of realizing some value at some time by transferring the Terminal development rights to other buildings, under a procedure that is conceded to be defective, severely limited, procedurally complex and speculative, and that requires ultimate discretionary approval by governmental authorities, meet the constitutional requirements of just compensation as applied to landmarks?” Jurisdictional Statement 3^4. The first and fourth questions assume that there has been a taking and raise the problem whether, under the circumstances of this case, the transferable development rights constitute “just compensation.” The second and third questions, on the other hand, are directed to the issue whether a taking has occurred. As is implicit in our opinion, we do not embrace the proposition that a “taking” can never occur unless government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel. Both the Jurisdictional Statement 7-8, n. 7, and Brief for Appellants 8 n. 7 state that appellants are not seeking review of the New York courts’ determination that Penn Central could earn a “reasonable return” on its investment in the Terminal. Although appellants suggest in their reply brief that the factual conclusions of the New York courts cannot be sustained unless we accept the rationale of the New York Court of Appeals, see Eeply Brief for Appellants 12 n. 15, it is apparent that the findings concerning Penn Central’s ability to profit from the Terminal depend in no way on the Court of Appeals’ rationale. These cases dispose of any contention that might be based on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922), that full use of air rights is so bound up with the investment-backed expectations of appellants that governmental deprivation of these rights invariably — i. e., irrespective of the impact of the restriction on the value of the parcel as a whole — constitutes a “taking.” Similarly, Welch, Goldblatt, and Gorieb illustrate the fahacy of appellants’ related contention that a “taking” must be found to have occurred whenever the land-use restriction may be characterized as imposing a “servitude” on the claimant’s parcel. Although the New York Court of Appeals contrasted the New York City Landmarks Law with both zoning and historic-district legislation and stated at one point that landmark laws do not “further a general community plan,” 42 N. Y. 2d 324, 330, 366 N. E. 2d 1271, 1274 (1977), it also emphasized that the implementation of the objectives of the Landmarks Law constitutes an “acceptable reason for singling out one particular parcel for different and less favorable treatment." Ibid., 366 N. E. 2d, at 1275. Therefore, we do not understand the New York Court of Appeals to disagree with our characterization of the law. When a property owner challenges the application of a zoning ordinance to his property, the judicial inquiry focuses upon whether the challenged restriction can reasonably be deemed to promote the objectives of the community land-use plan, and will include consideration of the treatment of similar parcels. See generally Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928). When a property owner challenges a landmark designation or restriction as arbitrary or discriminatory, a similar inquiry presumably will occur. Appellants attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that, in each, government was prohibiting a “noxious” use of land and that in the present case, in contrast, appellants’ proposed construction above the Terminal would be beneficial. We observe that the uses in issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in themselves. They involved no “blameworthiness, . . . moral wrongdoing or conscious act of dangerous risk-taking which induce[d society] to shift the cost to a pa[rt]icular individual.” Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 50 (1964).. These cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed “noxious” quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy — not unlike historic preservation — expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property. Nor, correlatively, can it be asserted that the destruction or fundamental alteration of a historic landmark is not harmful. The suggestion that the beneficial quality of appellants’ proposed construction is established by the fact that the construction would have been consistent with applicable zoning laws ignores the development in sensibilities and ideals reflected in landmark legislation like New York City’s. Cf. West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 282-283, 192 S. E. 881, 885-886, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 302 U. S. 658 (1937). There are some 53 designated landmarks and 5 historic districts or scenic landmarks in Manhattan between 14th and 59th Streets. See Landmarks Preservation Commission, Landmarks and Historic Districts (1977). It is, of course, true that the fact the duties imposed by zoning and historic-district legislation apply throughout particular physical communities provides assurances against arbitrariness, but the applicability of the Landmarks Law to a large number of parcels in the city, in our view, provides comparable, if not identical, assurances. Appellants, of course, argue at length that the transferable development rights, while valuable, do not constitute “just compensation.” Brief for Appellants 36-43. Counsel for appellants admitted at oral argument that the Commission has not suggested that it would not, for example, approve a 20-story office tower along the lines of that which was part of the original plan for the Terminal. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. See Costonis, supra n. 2, at 585-589. We emphasize that our holding today is on the present record, which in turn is based on Penn Central’s present ability to use the Terminal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion. The city conceded at oral argument that if appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future that circumstances have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be “economically viable,” appellants may obtain relief. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED AIRLINES, INC. v. McDONALD No. 76-545. Argued March 29, 1977 Decided June 20, 1977 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and White, J., joined, post, p. 396. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Stuart Bernstein argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Thomas R. Meites argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lynn Sara Frackman and Kenneth N. Flaxman. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 24 requires that an application to intervene in federal litigation must be “timely.” In this case a motion to intervene was filed promptly after the final judgment of a District Court, for the purpose of appealing the court’s earlier denial of class action certification. The question presented is whether this motion was “timely” under Rule 24. Until November 7, 1968, United Airlines required its female stewardesses to remain unmarried as a condition of employment; no parallel restriction was imposed on any male employees, including male stewards and cabin flight attendants. This “no-marriage rule” resulted in the termination of the employment of a large number of stewardesses, and in turn spawned a good deal of litigation. One of the first challenges to this rule was brought by Mary Sprogis, who filed timely charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in August 1966, contending that her discharge constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seg. (1970 ed. and Supp. V). The EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that United’s policy was illegal, and issued a “right to sue letter.” Sprogis then filed a timely individual action in a Federal District Court, and the court agreed that the no-marriage rule violated Title VII. 308 F. Supp. 959 (ND Ill.). United took an interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) on the issue of liability, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of sex discrimination. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194. While the appeal in the Sprogis case was pending, the present action was filed in the same District Court by Carole Romasanta, a United stewardess who had been discharged in 1967 because of her marriage. She, too, had filed charges with the EEOC, leading to a finding of cause to believe that the no-marriage rule violated Title VII and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter. Romasanta then promptly filed the present suit as a class action on behalf of herself and all other United stewardesses discharged because of the no-marriage rule. Another. United stewardess was later permitted to intervene as a named plaintiff. Several months later, the District Court granted United’s motion to strike the complaint’s class allegations, ruling that the class could properly consist of only those stewardesses who, upon the loss of their employment because of marriage, had filed charges under either a fair employment statute or United’s collective-bargaining agreement. As thus defined, the class numbered not more than 30 and in the court’s view did not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (a)(1). As part of its order, however, the District Court allowed 12 married stewardesses who had protested the termination of their employment to intervene as additional parties plaintiff. Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), the District Court certified for appeal its order striking the class allegations, but the Court of Appeals declined to accept this interlocutory appeal. The litigation proceeded as a joint suit on behalf of the original and the intervening plaintiffs, and the court ultimately determined that those plaintiffs not yet reinstated in their jobs were entitled to that remedy, and that every plaintiff was entitled to backpay. To aid in determining the amount of each backpay award, the court appointed as a Special Master the same person who had performed a similar task in the Sprogis litigation. Following guidelines adopted in Sprogis, the parties eventually agreed upon the amounts to be awarded each plaintiff, and upon consummation of this agreement the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on October 3, 1975. The specific controversy before us arose only after the entry of that judgment. The respondent, a former United stewardess, had been discharged in 1968 on account of the no-marriage rule. She was thus a putative member of the class as defined in the original Romasanta complaint. Knowing that other stewardesses had challenged United’s no-marriage rule, she had not filed charges with the EEOC or a grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement. After learning that a final judgment had been entered in the Romasanta suit, and that despite their earlier attempt to do so the plaintiffs did not now intend to file an appeal challenging the District Court’s denial of class certification, she filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the District Court’s adverse class determination order. Her motion was filed 18 days after the District Court’s final judgment, and thus was well within the 30-day period for an appeal to be taken. The District Judge denied the motion, stating: “Well, in my judgment, gentlemen, this is five years now this has been in litigation, and this lady has not seen fit to come in here and seek any relief from this Court in any way during that period of time, and litigation must end. I must deny this motion. Of course, that is an appealable order itself, and if I am in error then the Court of Appeals can reverse me and we will grant a hearing, but in my judgment this is too late to come in.” The respondent promptly appealed the denial of intervention as well as the denial of class certification to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed, holding that the District Court had been wrong in believing that the motion to intervene was untimely under Rule 24 (b), and had also erred in refusing to certify the class as described in the Romasanta complaint — a class consisting of all United stewardesses discharged because of the no-marriage rule, whether or not they had formally protested the termination of their employment. Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F. 2d 915. United’s petition for certiorari did not seek review of the determination that its no-marriage rule violated Title VII, nor did it contest the merits of the Court of Appeals’ decision on the class certification issue. Instead, it challenged only the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the respondent’s post-judgment application for intervention was timely. We granted the petition, 429 U. S. 998, to consider that single issue. In urging reversal, United relies primarily upon American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538. That case involved a private antitrust class action that had been filed 11 days short of the expiration of the statutory limitations period. The trial court later denied class certification because the purported class did not satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 (a)(1). Neither the named plaintiffs nor any unnamed member of the class appealed that order, either then or at any later time. Eight days after entry of the order, a number of the putative class members moved to intervene as plaintiffs, but the trial court denied the motions as untimely. This Court ultimately reversed that decision, ruling that in those circumstances “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.” 414 U. S., at 553. Since 11 days remained when the statute of limitations again began to run after denial of class certification, and the motions to intervene as plaintiffs were filed only eight days after that denial, they were timely. Id., at 560-561. It is United’s position that, under American Pipe, the relevant statute of limitations began to run after the denial of class certification in the Romasanta action. United thus reasons that the respondent’s motion to intervene was time barred, and in support of this position makes alternative arguments based on two different statutory periods of limitations prescribed by Title VII. This argument might be persuasive if the respondent had sought to intervene in order to join the named plaintiffs in litigating her individual claim based on the illegality of United’s no-marriage rule, for she then would have occupied the same position as the intervenors in American Pipe. But the later motion to intervene in this case was for a wholly different purpose. That purpose was to obtain appellate review of the District Court’s order denying class action status in the Bomasanta lawsuit, and the motion complied with, as it was required to, the time limitation for lodging an appeal prescribed by Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4 (a). Success in that review would result in the certification of a class, the named members of which had complied with the statute of limitations; the respondent is a member of that class against whom the statute had not run at the time the class action was commenced. The lawsuit had been commenced by the timely filing of a complaint for classwide relief, providing United with “the essential information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation . . . .” American Pipe, supra, at 555. To be sure, the case was “stripped of its character as a class action” upon denial of certification by the District Court. Advisory Committee’s Note on 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 7767. But “it does not . . . follow that the case must be treated as if there never was an action brought on behalf of absent class members.” Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F. R. D. 452, 461 (ED Pa.). The District Court’s refusal to certify was subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs, as United concedes. And since the named plaintiffs had attempted to take an interlocutory appeal from the order of denial at the time the order was entered, there was no reason for the respondent to suppose that they would not later take an appeal until she was advised to the contrary after the trial court had entered its final judgment. The critical fact here is that once the entry of final judgment made the adverse class determination appealable, the respondent quickly sought to enter the litigation. In short, as soon as it became clear to the respondent that the interests of the unnamed class members would no longer be protected by the named class representatives, she promptly moved to intervene to protect those interests. United can hardly contend that its ability to litigate the issue was unfairly prejudiced simply because an appeal on behalf of putative class members was brought by one of their own, rather than by one of the original named plaintiffs. And it would be circular to argue that an unnamed member of the putative class was not a proper party to appeal, on the ground that her interests had been adversely determined in the trial court. United was put on notice by the filing of the Romasanta complaint of the possibility of classwide liability, and there is no reason why Mrs. McDonald’s pursuit of that claim should not be considered timely under the circumstances here presented. Our conclusion is consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting post-judgment intervention for the purpose of appeal. The critical inquiry in every such case is whether in view of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly after the entry of final judgment. Cf. NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 366. Here, the respondent filed her motion within the time period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken an appeal. We-therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the respondent’s motion to intervene was timely filed and should have been granted. The judgment is Affirmed. Me. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. See generally Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1197-1201 (CA7). The relevant statutory provision at that time, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e), stated that if within 30 days after a charge was filed with the Commission or within 30 days after expiration of a period of reference of the charge to a state or local fair employment agency, the Commission had been unable to secure voluntary compliance, it “shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought” by the charging party. The period was extended to 90 days in 1972. § 2000e-5 (f) U) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Rule 23 (a) (1) lists as one prerequisite to maintenance of a class action that "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” In the Seventh Circuit, a denial of class certification is an interlocutory order not reviewable as of right until after entry of final judgment. Anschul v. Sitmar Cruises, Inc., 544 F. 2d 1364. Even were we to assume, arguendo, that the Seventh Circuit is wrong in not recognizing the so-called death-knell doctrine, which permits immediate appeal of adverse class determinations where the claims are so small that individual suits are uneconomical, appeal before final judgment would not have been available in this lawsuit, for the individual claims were suificiently large to permit the action to proceed, as it did, on an individual basis. See generally 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1802, pp. 271-277 (1972); id., at 129-130 (Supp. 1977). In Sprogis, following affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the District Court’s finding of liability, the case was remanded for further proceedings. The Special Master appointed by the District Court recommended that the plaintiff be awarded over $10,000 in damages, the District Court approved that award, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F. 2d 387, 389-390, 392 (CA7). As the opinion in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, makes clear, full relief under Title VII “may be awarded on a class basis . . . without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the unnamed class members.” Id., at 414 n. 8. See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747, 771. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4 (a). In relevant part, Rule 24(b) provides: “Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action . . . when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. ... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” See 414 U. S., at 541-542. See n. 3, supra. A person complaining of employment discrimination is ordinarily required to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the occurrence of the discriminatory act. 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Once the administrative process has been exhausted and the EEOC sends the complainant a right-to-sue letter, a civil action in federal district court must be filed within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. § 2000e-5 (f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. V), discussed in n. 2, supra. Since nearly three years passed after the adverse class determination before the respondent took any action, under United’s theory her action is time barred whichever of the two limitations periods is thought to be the relevant one. Cf. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 721, 727 (1968) (“It is both feasible and desirable to break down the concept of intervention into a number of litigation rights and to conclude that a given person has one or some of these rights but not all”). The unlawful discrimination alleged in the complaint — enforcement of the no-marriage rule — was plainly part of a uniform companywide policy that had been applied to all stewardesses. See also S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 27 (1971) (“[T]itle YII actions are by their very nature class cóm-plaints”), cited in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 414 n. 8. See, e. g., Share v. Air Properties Q., Inc., 538 F. 2d 279, 283 (CA9); Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F. 2d 508, 512 (CA3); Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc., 528 F. 2d 1181, 1188-1190 (CA10); Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 528 F. 2d 551, 553-554 (CA5); Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058, 1061-1063 (CA8); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F. 2d 862, 874-875 (CA3); Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F. 2d 1161, 1162-1165 (CA7); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F. 2d 1255, 1260-1262 (CA2); Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F. 2d 387 (CA6); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F. 2d 94 (CA10). United argues that it was unfairly surprised when after having settled the case with all of the original and intervening plaintiffs it nonetheless faced an appeal, and suggests that the negotiation of settlements will be impeded if post-judgment intervention like the respondent’s is permitted. The characterization of the resolution of the Romasanta action as a “settlement” could be slightly misleading. It is of course true that opposing counsel agreed upon a disposition that resulted in dismissal of the complaints. But that agreement came only after the District Judge had granted motions by some plaintiffs for partial summary judgment, and, there was never any question about United’s liability in view of the Sprogis decision. All that remained to be determined was the computation of backpay, and the guiding principles for that computation had been established in Sprogis. The “settlement” ultimately reached merely applied those principles to the claims in this case. The respondent’s motion to intervene was filed less than three weeks after the “settlement” was incorporated in the District Court’s final judgment, and necessarily “concern [ed] the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit.” American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring). There is no reason to believe that in that short period of time United discarded evidence or was otherwise prejudiced. A rule requiring putative class members who seek only to appeal from an order denying class certification to move to intervene shortly after entry of that order would serve no purpose. Intervention at that time would only have made the respondent a superfluous spectator in the litigation for nearly three years, for the denial of class certification was not appealable until after final judgment, see n. 4, supra. Moreover, such a rule would induce putative class members to file protective motions to intervene to guard against the possibility that the named representatives might not appeal from the adverse class determination. Cf. American Pipe, supra, at 553. The result would be the very “multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was designed to avoid.” 414 U. S., at 551. Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S., at 757 n. 9. A case closely in point is American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 3 F. R. D. 162 (SDNY). That case involved a plan for reorganization of the Interborough Rapid Transit Co. and for its consolidation with the Manhattan Elevated Railway. Mannheim, an owner of a series of bonds in the Manhattan Railway, had participated in the District Court not merely representing his own interests but also acting as “attorney in fact” for other owners of the bonds. After the District Court had approved the plan as fair and equitable, and had subsequently ordered its implementation, Mannheim filed a notice of appeal. He then decided to abandon the appeal and to seek to surrender his bonds pursuant to the terms of the plan. One of the other holders of the same series of bonds, for whom Mannheim had been acting as attorney-in-fact, then moved to intervene for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal on behalf of herself and all other nonsurrendering bondholders. Noting that it is “essential in the administration of our system of justice, that litigants should have their day in court” and that the motion was filed within the time in which an appeal might have been brought, the District Court ruled that the motion to intervene was timely. Id., at 164. The decision in Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 E. 2d 463 (CA9), is also similar to the case at bar. There a corporation had filed an action against corporate officers under § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78p (b), for recovery of short-swing profits. The District Court entered judgment for the defendants, and when the corporation failed to appeal, a shareholder sought to intervene for the purpose of appealing from the District Court decision. The Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court, ruled that the motion was timely and that intervention should have been permitted. 203 F. 2d, at 465-466. Post-judgment intervention for the purpose of appeal has been found to be timely even in litigation that is not representative in nature, and in which the intervenor might therefore be thought to have a less direct interest in participation in the appellate phase. See, e. g., Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 153 U. S. App. D. C. 407, 417-419, 473 F. 2d 118, 129; Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 372, 378-379, 408 F. 2d 175, 181-182; Zuber v. Allen, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 297, 387 F. 2d 862, discussed in Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F. R. D. 18, 29-30, n. 10 (DC); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 79 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 144, 144 F. 2d 505, 508; United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. 2d 521, 526-527 (CA4). Insofar as the motions to intervene in these cases were made within the applicable time for filing an appeal, they are consistent with our opinion and judgment in the present case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. PRICE. No. 414. Argued March 31, 1959. Decided June 29, 1959. James A. Wilcox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief' were E. C. Renwick, Malcolm Davis, Calvin M. Cory and IF. R. Rouse. Samuel S. Lionel argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a diversity common-law action brought by the respondent, a former employee of petitioner railroad, in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to recover damages from the railroad for allegedly wrongfully discharging him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The validity of the discharge was previously challenged upon the same grounds before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, First Division, in a proceeding brought by the Brotherhood on respondent’s behalf under § 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, seeking the respondent’s reinstatement with back pay. The Board rendered an award in favor of the petitioner. The question for decision here is whether the respondent may pursue a common-law remedy for damages for his allegedly wrongful dismissal after having chosen to pursue' the statutory remedy which resulted in a determination by the National Adjustment Board that his dismissal was justified. The respondent was employed, by petitioner as a swing brakeman (an extra brakeman who is not a regularly assigned member of a train crew) and was a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The collective bargaining agreement between the Brotherhood and the petitioner contained two provisions involved in the dispute over his discharge. One provision, .Article 32 (b), provided that: “Swing brakemen will not be tied up nor released at points where sleeping and eating accommodations are not available.” The other provision, Article 33 (a), provided that: “When a trainman is suspended for an alleged fault, no punishment will be fixed without, a thorough investigation, at which the accused may have a trainman of his choice present.” On July 12, 1949, the respondent was called to “deadhead” on Train No. .37 from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Nipton, California, at which point he was to detrain and await assignment to another train traveling to Las Vegas. Train No. 37 arrived at Nipton at 10:30 p. m., and the train dispatcher assigned respondent to train No. X 1622E> which was due to arrive at Nipton around 4 a. m., en route to Las Vegas. The respondent complained that there were no facilities available in- Nipton for eating or sleeping and told the dispatcher he would go back to Las Vegas and return after getting something to eat. The. dispatcher refused to release him and orderéd him to wait the arrival of train X 1622E. The respondent disobeyed this instruction and deadheaded back to Las Vegas on a train which left Nipton at 11:10 p.m. The railroad suspended the respondent on the morning of July 13. On July 16 he received a notice to appear at 10 a. m. on July 17 before an Assistant Superintendent of the railroad for an investigation. At the respondent’s request the investigation was postponed to the morning of July 18, at which time the respondent requested a further postponement until his representative, the Brotherhood’s Local Chairman, could be present. A postponement was again granted, until 2:30 p. m. of the 18th, but the respondent’s Local Chairman apparently was still not available at that time. When respondent failed to appear for the 2:30 hearing, the Assistant Superintendent proceeded with the investigation in his absence. The testimony of railroad witnesses was taken stenographically and transcribed; no evidence was received in respondent’s behalf. On July 24 the railroad notified the respondent that he was discharged. The Brotherhood processed respondent’s grievance through the required management levels, and when settlement could not be reached, nor agreement arrived at for a joint submission to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Brotherhood, in January 1951, filed an ex parte submission with the Board’s First Division. Hearing was waived by the parties and the submission was considered on the papers filed by them.’ The Adjustment Board; on June 25, 1952, rendered its award “Claim denied,” with supporting findings. Some three years after the filing of the award., the respondent, on June 6, 1955, brought the instant suit. His complaint alleges a cause of action predicated on the same grounds of allegedly wrongful dismissal in violation of the collective bargaining agreement which had been urged on the Adjustment Board, namely, (1) that he “was dismissed without cause” and (2) that he was dismissed without a “thorough investigation” because not “afforded an opportunity to have á trainman of his choice present at the investigation held” nor “afforded a reasonable opportunity. to prepare his defense,” “to present his defense,” “to have witnesses present” or “to participate in his own defense.” After filing an answer, the railroad moved for summary judgment on affidavits and other papers on file upon the ground that “any judicially enforceable cause of action arising from the- termination of the employment relationship ... is now barred by the adjudication and determination of the validity of such termination by the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the terms and conditions of said collective bargaining agreement, and pursuant to and in conformance with the Railway Labor Act . . . .” The District Court, without opinion, granted the motion and entered summary judgment in favor of the petitioner. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, assigning as the single point on the appeal that the District Court “erred in holding that the award of the National Railroad Adjustment Board entitled . . . [the railroad] to Summary Judgment.” The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed, 255 F. 2d 663. Although the Court of Appeals held that the District Court would be “without jurisdiction to entertain the action if the Board award represents a determination on the merits,” id., at 666, the court concluded that while the question whether the railroad was entitled to discharge the respondent “was one of the two questions which Price submitted for Board determination,” “the Board made no determination on the mérits” but determined only that in “the manner in which the investigation was conducted by the carrier . . . none of Price’s rights in that regard was abridged,” and held that the District Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain the action. Id., at 666-667. We granted certiorari to decide the important question raised by . the case of the interpretation' of the Railway Labor Act. 358 U. S. 892. We do not agree with the Court, of Appbals’ holding that the Board’s award was based solely on its decision that Article 33 (á) was. not violated by. the railroad because respondent’s dismissal followed a “thorough investigation.” Rather we think the award also reflects the Board’s determination that respondent was discharged for good cause. Thus we agree with Judge Healy, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that on the face of the customárily brief findings of the Board it appears “plain that the Board was of opinion, and in substance held, that the asserted violation by the Company of Article 32, even if true, would not serve to justify an employee’s violation of direct operating instructions and his abandonment of his post.” 255 F. 2d, at 667-668. Since the discharge could be set aside by the Board if either ground of the submission was sustained, the unqualified denial of the claim necessarily implied, we think, that the Board decided both grounds submitted adversely to the respondent. Even if the procedure followed by thq railroad constituted a proper investigation, the Board’s outright denial of the claim is explicable only on the ground that the Board also held that Article 32 (b) did not justify the respondent in disobeying the dispatcher’s instruction to remain at Nip-ton. We conclude that both issues were decided by the Board against the respondent, and therefore reach-the question whether the respondent, despite the adverse determination of the Adjustment Board, could pursue the common-law remedy for damages in the District Court. Congress has said in § 3 First (m) of the Railway-Labor Act that the Adjustment Board’s “awards shall be final and binding upon botji parties to the dispute., except insofar as they shall contain a money award.” Respondent does not argue that a “money award” is anything other than an award directing the payment of money. Indeed-, it would distort the English language to interpret that term as including a refusal to award a money payment. Thus, the plain language of § 3 First (m), on its face, imports that Congress intended that the Board’s disposition of a grievance should preclude a subsequent court action by the losing party. Furthermore, we have said of the Railway Labor Act that “the specification of one remedy normally excludes another.” Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 301. Thus, our duty to give, effect to the congressional purpose compels us to hold that the instant common-law action is precluded unless the overall scheme established by the Railway Labor Act and the legislative history clearly indicate a congressional intention contrary to that which the plain meaning of the words imports. Our understanding of the statutory scheme and the legislative history, however, reinforces what the statutory language already makes clear, namely, that Congress barred the employee’s subsequent resort to the common-law remedy after an adverse determination of his grievance by the Adjustment Board. The purpose of the Railway Labor Act was to provide a framework for peaceful settlement of labor disputes between carriers and their employees to “insure to the public continuity and efficiency of interstate transportation service, and to protect the public from the injuries and losses consequent upon any impairment or interruption of interstate commerce through failures of managers and employees to settle peaceably their controversies.” H. R. Rep. No. 328, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1. Congress did not, however, in the original 1926 Act, create the National Railroad Adjustment Board or make the use of such an agency compulsory upon the parties; rather the Act contemplated that settlement of disputes would be achieved through “machinery for amicable adjustment of labor disputes agreed upon by the parties . . . .” S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. Congress, therefore, provided that adjustment boards should be “created by agreement between any carrier or group of carriers, or the carriers as a whole, or its or their employees.” § 3 First of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 678. These adjustment boards, intended for use in settling what are termed minor disputes in the railroad industry, primarily grievances arising from the application of collective bargaining agreements to particular situations, see Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, were thus to be established by voluntary, agreement. Congress, even in 1926 however, recognized that the boards would not be useful in bringing about industrial peace unless their decisions were binding on the parties. Thus the 1926 Act required that agreements creating adjustment boards must .stipulate “that decisions of adjustment boards shall be final and binding on both parties to the dispute; and it shall be the duty of both to abide by such decisions . . . ,” § 3 First (e) of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 579. But the 1926 Act provided no sanctions to force the carriers and their employees to make agreements establishing adjustment boards and many railroads refused to participate on such boards or so limited their participation that the boards were ineffectual. Moreover, the boards which were created were composed of equal numbers of management and labor representatives and. deadlocks over particular cases became commonplace. Since no procedure for breaking such deadlocks was provided, many disputes remained unsettléd. As reported to Congress in 1934 by Mr. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation: “Another difficulty with the present law [the 1926 Act], even where an adjustment board has been established, is that, although its decisions are final and binding upon both parties, there can be no certainty that there will be a decision.” Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17. Strike threats became frequent in an atmosphere of mutual recriminations which presented the danger of creating the very strife which the statute had been designed to avoid. Mr. Eastman reported to the House Rules Committee: “[Grievances on a number of roads have in the past few years accumulated to such an extent that the only remedy the men could see was to threaten a strike and thus secure appointment by the President of a fact finding board which could go into the whole situation. That has happened on several occasions. Some of these grievances have accumulated up into the hundreds on the various roads and when the situation finally became intolerable the men would threaten a strike . . . .” Hearings before the House Rules Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 25; see also p. 14; see also Hearings before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17; and see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 725-726. The railroad labor organizations were particularly dissatisfied. They urged that effective adjustment of grievances could be attained only by amendments to the 1926 Act that would' establish a National Adjustment Board in which both carriers and employees would be required to participate, that would permit an employee to compel a carrier to submit a grievance to the Board, that would provide for a neutral person to break deadlocks occurring when the labor and management representatives divided equally, and, finally, that would make awards binding on the parties and enforceable in the courts, when favorable to the employees. These views prevailed in the Congress and resulted in the 1934 amendments which drastically changed the scheme of the Act. Act"of June 21, 1934, 48 Stat. 1185. The National Railroad Adjustment. Board was created and the carriers were required to participate through representatives selected'by them, § 3 First (a) .through (g)'. The Board is composed of four divisions each having jurisdiction over different employees and whose proceedings are independent of one another, § 3 First (h). Disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements must, be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officers of the carrier designated to handle such disputes, but failing adjustment. the disputes may be referred by the parties or by either party to the appropriate division, §3 First (i). Upon failure of a division to agree upon an award because of a deadlock or inability to secure a majority vote of the division members, the division must appoint a neutral referee to sit with the division as a member thereof and make an award, ■§ 3 First (1). Awards are final and binding except insofar as they contain a money award; in case of dispute involving an interpretation of the award either party may request the division to interpret the award in the light of the dispute, § 3 First (m). In case of an award favorable to the petitioner, the division shall make an order, directed tó the carrier, to make the. award effective and if the payment of money is required to pay such. sum to the employee, § 3 First (o). If the carrier does not comply with an order, enforcement may be sought by a suit in a District Court of the United States as provided in § 3 First (p). The labor spokesman for the proposal made it crystal clear that an essential feature of the proposal was that Board awards on grievances submitted by or on behalf of employees were to be final and binding upon the affected employees. The employees were willing to give up their remedies outside of the statute provided that a workable and binding statutory scheme was established to settle grievances. Mr. George Harrison, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, stated: “Grievances come about because the men file them themselves. Railroads don’t institute grievances. Grievances are instituted against railroad officers’ actions, and we are willing to take our chances with this national-board because we believe, out of our experience, that the national board is the best and most efficient method of getting a determination of these many controversies . . . .” Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 33. “[W]e are now ready to concede' that we can risk having our grievances-go to a board and ge.t them determined . . . [but] if we are going to get a hodgepodge arrangement by law, rather than what is suggested by this bill,.then we don’t want to give up that right, because we only- give up the right because we feel that we will get a measure of justice by this machinery that we'suggest here.” Id., at 35; Mr. Eastman echoed this thought : “decisions of the adjustment board . . . are made final and binding by the terms of this act, and as I understand it, the labor organizations, none of them, are objecting to that provision. They have their day in court and they have their members on the adjustment board, and if an agreement cannot be reached between the parties .representing both sides on the adjustment board, a neutral man steps in and renders the decision, and they will be required to accept that decision when made.....” Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 59. See also id., at 58-65. Thus the employees considered that their interests would be best served by a workable statutory scheme providing for the final-settlement of grievances by a tribunal composed of people experienced in the railroad industry. The employees’.representatives made it clear that, if such a statutory scheme were provided, the employees would accept the awards as to disputes processed through the schemé as final settlements of. those disputes which were not to be raised again. Despite the conclusion compelled by the over-all scheme of the Railway Labor Act and its legislative history, it is suggested that because an enforcement proceeding against a noncomplying carrier under § 3 First (p) affords the defeated carrier some opportunity to relitigate the issues decided by the Adjustment Board, unfairness results if § 3 First (in) is construed so as to deny the employee the fight to maintain this common-law action. We are referred to the emphasis upon the consideration of avoiding unfairness expressed in United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U. S. 426, which held that a denial by the Interstate Commerce Commission of a claim of a shipper for money reparations is reviewable in the federal courts, pointing out that a Commission award favorable to a shipper was not final and binding upon the railroad. But that holding rested upon an interpretation of 28 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 41 (28) providing that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . Of cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or. suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” • (Italics supplied.) In contrast, § 3 First (m) here involved, commands that the Adjustment Board’s “awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award.” The Adjustment Board’s award in controversy denied respondent’s claim for reinstatement and back pay, which, we have said, was not a “money. award.” Although the provisions for enforce-' ment of money awards in the Railway Labor Act, § 3 First (o) and (p), establish procedures similar to those under 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1) and (2) for enforcement of reparations orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, § 3 First (m) with which, we are here concerned has no counterpart in the Interstate Commerce Act. The disparity in judicial review of Adjustment Board orders, if it can be said to be unfair at all,, was explicitly created by Congress, and it is for Congress to say whether it ought be removed. Plainly the statutory scheme as revised by the 1934 amendments was designed for effective and final decision of grievances which arise daily, principally as matters of the administration and application of the provisions of collective bargaining agreements. This grist of labor relations is such that the statutory scheme cannot realistically- be squared with the contention that Congress did not purpose to foreclose litigation in the courts over grievances submitted to and disposed of by the Board, past the action under § 3 First (p) authorized against the noncomplying carrier, see Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App; D. C. 1, 124 F. 2d 235, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 319 U. S. 732, or the review sought of an award claimed to result from a denial of due process of law, see Ellerd v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 241 F. 2d 541; Barnett v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245 F. 2d 579, 582. So far as appears, all of the Courts of Appeals and District Courts which have dealt with this problem have reached the conclusion we reach here.. To say that the discharged employee may litigate the validity of- his discharge in a common-law action for damages after, failing to sustain his grievance before the Board is to say that Congress planned that the Board should function only to render advisory opinions, and intended the Act’s entire scheme for the settlement of-grievances to be regarded “as wholly conciliatory in character, involving no element'of legal effectiveness, with the consequence that the parties are entirely free to accept or ignore the Board’s decision ... [a contention] inconsistent with the Act’s terms, purposes and legislative history.” Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 720-721. We therefore hold that the respondent’s submission to the Board of his grievances as to the validity of his discharge precludes him from seeking damages in the instant common-law action. The judgment of the Court, of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the District Court. It is-so ordered. Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor- Act, 48 St at. 1191, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (i), provides: “The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the inter-, pretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in. the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an ádjustméiít in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.” It is conceded that respondent authorized the Brotherhood to bring his claim before the Adjustment Board. Compare Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, aff’d on rehearing, 327 U. S. 661. The pertinent excerpts from the findings are the following: “If the carrier is to have efficient operations on its railroad, employees must be relied on to obey operating instructions and orders. Claimant was found to have wilfully disobeyed his orders. This was insubordination and merited discipline. “The employee . . . seeks complete vindication on the grounds that he was denied the investigation-provided by the rules of agreement. Thus, the only question for review is whether there was substantial •compliance with the investigation rule. “Basically, the complaint is that the hearing was held when the claimant was not present. “. . . The right of the employee to be heard before being disciplined is a personal right which he can waive by action, inaction, or failure to act in good faith. . . . "... his position here would have been strengthened had he personally appeared at all stages of the proceeding to labor as best he could to preserve his record and to get his story to us first hand. All that the transcript reflects does claimant no credit, but leaves us with the feeling that the things of which he now complains Were planned by him that way.” Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L. J. 567, 584, describes the awards of the' First Division of the National Adjustment'.Board as follows: “It will be noted that, except for the purely jurisdictional recitals, the findings consist of a single sentence (‘The evidence indicates that the movements made did not constitute switching under Article I-R’) which constitutes the nub of the whole decision. Rarely does this central finding consist of more than a sentence or two. To a lay reader the sentence quoted above is meaningless. In order that it may be more intelligible the findings in their printed form are preceded by the employees’ statement of facts taken from their submission, and a statement of their position (likewise extracted from the submission), followed by the management’s statement of facts and a statement of its position derived similarly from its submission. From these rival statements it is easy to determine what' the controversy is about, but it is not easy to determine from the laconic findings'the real basis upon which the decision was reached.” In an interpretation announced on November 26, 1958, sought by the railroad under § 3 First (m) of the Railway Labor Act, the Board declared that its award reflected its conclusion that the railroad was justified in discharging respondent. This interpretation was not before the Court of Appeals in this case, and we refer to it only as further substantiation of our conclusion based on the iecord in the case. Since respondent, instead of bringing his claim in court as was his right under Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, chose to pursue that claim before the Adjustment Board, he does not even argue that a holding that the Railway Labor Act precludes a relitigation of that claim in the courts would deprive him of any constitutional right to a jury trial. 48 Stat. 1191-1192, 45 U..S. C. § 153 First (m). That section provides: “The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award the division of the Board upon request of either party shall interpret the award in the light of the dispute." Despite the clear import of the statutory language and the legislative history the respondent argues that this Court’s holding in Moore v. Illinois R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, requires us to hold that the instant suit is not precluded. However, the holding in Moore was simply that a common-law remedy for damages might be pursued by a discharged employee who did not resort to. the statutory remedy before the Board to challenge the validity of his dismissal. A different question arises here where the employee obtained a determination from the Board, and, having lost, is seeking to relitigate in the courts the same issue as to the validity of his discharge. See Hearings' before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15. The Chairman of the United States Board of Mediation described § 3 First of the 1926 Act as follows: “The provision in the present [1926] act for adjustment boards is in practice about as near a fool provision as anything could possibly be. I mean this — that on the face of it they shall, by. agreement, do so and so. Well,-you can do pretty nearly anything by agreement, but how can you get them to agree ?” Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate. Commerce on S. 3266; 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 137. Provision for judicial enforcement of awards against employees was thought to be unnecessary since grievances are usually asserted by employees challenging some action by the carrier, and if the grievance is not sustained by the Board, the award simply denies the claim and requires no affirmative action by the employee. If an unfavorable award results in a strike the carrier may obtain injunctive relief. Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30; see also Hearings before House Committee, on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7650, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 58-65. For discussion of the statutory scheme enacted in the Railway Labor Act and the 1934 amendments thereto, see Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711; Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30; Washington Terminal Co. w. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 124 F. 2d 235, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 319 U. S. 732. Section 3 First (p) of the Railway Labpr Act, 48 Stat. 1192, '45 U. S. C. § 153 First (p), provides: “If a carrier does not comply with an order of a division of the Adjustment Board within the .time limit in such order, the petitioner . . . may file in the District Court of the United States . . . a petition setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims relief, and the order of the division of the Adjustment Board in the premises. Such suit in the District Court of the United States shall proceed in all respects as other civil suits, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the division of the Adjustment'Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the petitioner shall not be liable ~for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, unless they accrue upon his appeal, and such costs shall be paid out of the appropriation for the expenses of the courts of the United' States.. If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed arid collected as a part of the costs of the suit. The district courts are empowered, under the rules of the court governing actions at law, to make such order and enter such judgment, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, as may be appropriate to enforce or set aside the order of the division of the Adjustment Board.” Barnett v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 245 F. 2d 579 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Bower v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 214 F. 2d 623 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Michel v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 188 F. 2d 224 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Reynolds v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 174 F. 2d 673 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 10, 124 F. 2d 235, 244 (C. A. D. C. Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 319 U. S. 732. Weaver v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 141 F. Supp. 214 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.), aff’d per curiam, 240 F. 2d 350 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Byers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 129 F. Supp. 109 (D. C. S. D. Cal.); Greenwood v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 129 F. Supp. 105 (D. C. S. D. Cal.); Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 907 (D. C. W. D. Wash.); Parker v. Illinois Central R. Co., 108 F. Supp. 186 (D. C. N. D. Ill.); Futhey v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 864 (D. C. N. D. Ill.); Kelly v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 75 F. Supp. 737 (D. C. E. D. Tenn.); Ramsey v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 75 Supp. 740 (D. C. N. D. Ohio); Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (D. C. W. D. Mo.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RADIO OFFICERS’ UNION OF THE COMMERCIAL TELEGRAPHERS UNION, AFL, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. NO. 5. Argued January 8, 1953. Reargued November 9, 1953. Decided February 1, 1954. Abner H. Silverman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 5 on the original argument, and Emanuel Butter on the reargument. With them on the briefs was Herbert S. Thatcher. Bernard Dunau argued the cause for the National Labor Relations Board. With him on the briefs on the original argument were Walter J. Cummings, Jr., then Solicitor General, George J. Bott, David P. Findling, Mozart G. Batner, Elizabeth W. Weston and Louis Schwartz in Nos. 5 and 6, and Acting Solicitor General Stern, Mr. Bott, Mr. Findling, Dominick L. Manoli and Frederick U. Reel in No. 7. With him on the briefs on the reargument were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Mr. Bott, Mr. Findling and Mr. Manoli. Julius Kass argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner in No. 7. John J. Manning argued the cause for respondents in No. 6. With him on the brief was Clif Langsdale. Stephen C. Vladeck filed a brief for the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers’ Union of New York and Vicinity, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the opinion of the Court. The necessity for resolution of conflicting interpretations by Courts of Appeals of § 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (a)(3), impelled us to grant certiorari in these three cases. That section provides that “it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: . ...” The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in No. 6 (hereinafter referred to as Teamsters), following a decision of the Third Circuit, held that express proof that employer discrimination had the effect of encouraging or discouraging employees in their attitude toward union membership is an essential element to establish violation of this section. That holding conflicts with the holdings of the Second Circuit in No. 5 (hereinafter referred to as Radio Officers) and No. 7 (hereinafter referred to as Gaynor), with which decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits accord, that such employee encouragement or discouragement may be inferred from the nature of the discrimination. (See Part III, p. 48, infra.) In reaching its decision in Gaynor, the Second Circuit also rejected the contention, which contention is supported by many decisions of the Courts of Appeals, that there can be no violation of § 8 (a) (3) unless it is shown by specific evidence that the employer intended his discriminatory action to encourage or discourage union membership. The Second Circuit determined that the employer intended the natural result of his discriminatory action. (See Part II, p. 42, infra.) Moreover, Radio Officers and Teamsters present conflicting views by Courts of Appeals as to the scope of the phrase “membership in any labor organization” in §8 (a)(3). The Eighth Circuit restricts this phrase to “adhesion to membership,” i. e., joining or remaining on a union's membership roster; the Second Circuit, on the other hand, interprets it to include obligations of membership, i. e., being a good union member. (See Part I, p. 39, infra.) Radio Officers also raises subsidiary questions regarding the interrelationship of §8 (a)(3) with § 8 (b) (2) of the Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents “to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection [8] (a) (3) . . . .” (See Part IV, p. 52, infra.) These cases were argued last term, and, upon our order, reargued this term. They reached us in the following manner. Teamsters. Upon the basis of a charge filed by Frank Boston, a truck driver employed by Byers Transportation Company and a member of Local Union No. 41, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A. F. L., the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against the union alleging violation of §§ 8 (b)(1)(A) and 8 (b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act by causing the company to discriminate against Boston by reducing his seniority standing because of Boston’s delinquency in paying his union dues. A hearing was had before a trial examiner, whose intermediate report was largely adopted by the Board with one member dissenting. The Board found that the union, as exclusive bargaining representative of the teamsters in the company’s employ, had in 1949 negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement with the company which governed working conditions on all over-the-road operations of the company. This agreement established a seniority system under which the union was to furnish periodically to the company a seniority list and provided that “any controversy over the seniority standing of any employee on this list shall be referred to the Union for settlement.” Union security provisions of the agreement were not effective due to lack of the authorization then required by § 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The seniority list therefore included both union members and nonmembers. Each new employee of the company, after a thirty-day trial period, was placed at the bottom of this list, and such employee would gradually advance in position as senior members were either removed from the list or reduced in their position on it. Position upon the seniority list governed the order of truck-driving assignments, the quality of such assignments, and the order of layoff. The bylaws of Teamsters Local Union No. 41 provided that “any member, under contract, one month in arrears for dues shall forfeit all seniority rights. . . A member’s dues were payable on the first day of each month, and he was deemed “in arrears” for any month’s dues on the second day of the following month. Boston did not pay his dues for June 1950 until July 5, 1950. When the union transmitted a new seniority list to the company on the following July 15, Boston, who had previously been eighteenth on the list, was reduced to fifty-fourth, the bottom position on the list. As a result of such reduction Boston was denied driving assignments he would otherwise have obtained and for which he would have received compensation. Upon these facts a majority of the Board found that the union had violated §§ 8 (b)(1)(A) and 8 (b)(2) of the Act. As to the former, the Board held that the union’s reduction of Boston’s seniority restrained and coerced him in the exercise of his right to refrain from assisting a labor organization guaranteed by § 7. The Board held that, “absent a valid contractual union-security provision, Boston had the absolute protected right under the Act to determine how he would handle his union affairs without risking any impairment of his employment rights and that the Union had no right at any time whether Boston was a member or not a member to make his employment status to any degree conditional upon the payment of dues . . . .” As to the latter, the Board concluded that the union had caused the company to discriminate against Boston and adopted the Trial Examiner’s finding that “the normal effect of the discrimination against Boston was to encourage nonmembers to join the Union, as well as members to retain their good standing in the Union, a potent organization whose assistance is to be sought and whose opposition is to be avoided. The Employer’s conduct tended to encourage membership in the Union. [] Its discrimination against Boston had the further effect of enforcing rules prescribed by the Union, thereby strengthening the Union in its control over its members and its dealings with their employers and was thus calculated to encourage all members to retain their membership and good standing either through fear of the consequences of losing membership or seniority privileges or through hope of advantage in staying in. . . .” The Board entered an order requiring the union to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from related conduct; to notify Boston and the company that the union withdraws its request for the reduction of Boston’s seniority and that it requests the company to offer to restore Boston to his former status; to make Boston whole for any losses of pay resulting from the discrimination; and to post appropriate notices of compliance. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the Board’s petition to enforce its order. The court held that “the evidence here abundantly supports the finding of the Board that the respondent caused or attempted to cause the employer to discriminate against Boston in regard to 'tenure ... or condition of employment/ ” but “discrimination alone is not sufficient” and “we can find no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the discrimination . . . did or would encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” This conclusion was reached because “the testimony of Boston . . . shows clearly that this act neither encouraged nor discouraged his adhesion to membership in the respondent union” and because, assuming the effect of the discrimination on other employees was relevant, the court found no evidence to support a conclusion that such employees were so encouraged or discouraged. We granted the Board’s petition for certiorari. Radio Officers. Upon the basis of a charge filed by William Christian Fowler, a member of The Radio Officers’ Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, A. F. L., the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against the union alleging violation of §§ 8 (b)(1)(A) and 8 (b)(2) of the Act by causing the A. H. Bull Steamship Company to dis-criminatorily refuse on two occasions to employ Fowler. No complaint was issued against the company because Fowler filed no charge against it. Following the usual proceedings under the Act, a hearing was had before a trial examiner, whose findings, conclusions, and recommendations with certain additions were adopted by the Board. The Board found that at the time the transactions giving rise to this case occurred the union had a collective-bargaining contract with a number of steamship concerns including the Bull Steamship Company covering the employment of radio officers on ships of the contracting companies. Pertinent provisions in this contract are: “Section 1. The Company agrees when vacancies occur necessitating the employment of Radio Officers, to select such Radio Officers who are members of the Union in good standing, when available, on vessels covered by this Agreement, provided such members are in the opinion of the Company qualified to fill such vacancies.” “Section 6. The Company shall have the right of free selection of all its Radio Officers and when members of the Union are transferred, promoted, or hired the Company agrees to take appropriate measures to assure that such members are in good standing, and the Union agrees to grant all members of the Union in good standing the necessary 'clearance’ for the position to which the Radio Officer has been assigned. If a member is not in good standing, the Union will so notify the Company in writing.” The union’s contention that this contract provided for a hiring hall under which complete control over selection of radio officers to be hired by any company was given to the union was rejected by the Trial Examiner and by a majority of the Board. Such an agreement would have legalized the actions of the union in this case. But the Board concluded, primarily from the last sentence of § 6 of the contract, that the contract “was clear on its face and did not provide for any hiring hall arrangement” and that it therefore was not improper for the Trial Examiner to exclude evidence that general, although not universal, practice had been for radio officers to be assigned to employers by the union. The Board also found that: On February 24, 1948, the company telegraphed an offer of a job as radio officer on the company’s ship S. S. Frances to Fowler, who had often previously been employed by the company; Fowler had notified the company that he would accept the job; the company then informed Kozel, the radio officer on the previous voyage of the ship, that he was being replaced by “a man with senior service in the company”; Fowler reported to the Frances without seeking clearance from the union and Kozel reported such action to the union; the union secretary wired Fowler that he had been suspended from membership for “bumping” another member and taking a job without clearance and notified the company that Fowler was not in good standing in the union; the union secretary had no authority to effect such a suspension, the suspension was void and Fowler was in good standing in the union at all times material in this case; express requests to the union for clearance of Fowler for employment on the Frances by the company and by Fowler were subsequently refused, the union secretary stating that he would never again clear Fowler for a position with that company although Fowler would be cleared for jobs with other employers; unable to obtain clearance for Fowler, the company gave the job to another man supplied by the union, and Fowler returned to his home in Florida; on April 22, 1948, Fowler returned to New York and again advised the company that he was available for work before reporting to the union; the union secretary told Fowler he was being made “a company stiff” and adhered to his position that he would not clear Fowler for work with that company; clearance sought by the company for Fowler for a job on the S. S. Evelyn was subsequently refused, and another man was dispatched to the job by the union. Upon these facts a majority of the Board found that the union had violated §§ 8 (b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2). The Board rejected the union’s defense that the union security provision of the contract, preferential hiring for members in good standing, immunized the union’s action. They found that Fowler was in good standing at all times notwithstanding his suspension by the union secretary, and that conformity with the union’s hiring-hall rules and procedures was not also required by the contract. Thus the Board concluded that the union, by refusing to clear Fowler in both February and April, restrained and coerced Fowler in his statutory right to refrain from observance of the union’s rules, and caused the company to discriminate against Fowler by denying him employment. The Board adopted the Trial Examiner’s finding that “the normal effect of the discrimination against Fowler was to enforce not only his obedience as a member, of such rules as the Respondent might prescribe, but also the obedience of all his fellow members. It thereby strengthened the Respondent both in its control of its members for their general, mutual advantage, and in its dealings with their employers as their representative. It thus encouraged non-members to join it as a strong organization whose favor and help was to be sought and whose opposition was to be avoided. In its effect upon nonmembers alone, it must therefore be regarded as encouraging membership in the Respondent. Finally, by its demonstration of the Respondent’s strength, the discrimination in the present case also had the normal effect of encouraging Fowler and other members to retain their membership in the Respondent either through fear of the consequences of dropping out of membership or through hope of advantage in staying in.” The Board entered an order requiring the union to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from related conduct; to notify Fowler and the company that it withdraws objection to his employment and requests the company to offer him employment as a radio officer; to make Fowler whole for any losses of pay resulting from the discrimination, and to post appropriate notices of compliance. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Board’s findings and conclusions and granted the Board’s petition for enforcement of its order. The court agreed that the provisions of the contract “plainly give the company the right to select the man it desires to hire, and require the union to grant ‘clearance’ if the man the company wants is a member in good standing,” that “such procedure is not a 'hiring hall’ arrangement,” and that Fowler was in good standing at the time of refusal of clearance. It rejected the union’s contention that its refusal to clear was merely a statement of views concerning breach of its rules and as such was within the protection of § 8 (c). We agree that, viewing the record as a whole, each of these findings is supported by substantial evidence. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 341 U. S. 694; Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474. As to §§ 8 (b)(2) and 8 (a)(3), the court held that “refusal of clearance caused the company to discriminate against Fowler in regard to hire. Without the necessary clearance it could not accept him as an employee. The result was to encourage membership in the union. No threats or promises to the company were necessary. . . . Whether the union’s motive was, as it argues, to enforce the contract provisions against discharging satisfactory radio officers such as Kozel, is immaterial .... Such conduct displayed to all non-members the union’s power and the strong measure it was prepared to take to protect union members. . . The court also held that “a finding that the union has violated § 8 (b)(2) can be made without joining the employer and finding a § 8 (a) (3) violation,” and that it was proper to enter a back-pay order against the union without ordering reinstatement by the employer. We granted the union’s petition for certiorari. Gaynor. Upon the basis of charges filed by Sheldon Loner, a nonunion employee of Gaynor News Company, the General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint against the company alleging inter alia violation of §§ 8 (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the Act by granting retroactive wage increases and vacation payments to employees who were members of the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers’ Union of New York and Vicinity and refusing such benefits to other employees because they were not union members. The Board adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with certain additions. The Board found that in .1946 the company, engaged in the wholesale distribution and delivery of newspapers and periodicals, entered into a collective-bargaining agreement respecting delivery-department employees with the union. This agreement provided for specified wages and paid vacations, and also provided for a closed shop, i. e., restricting employment by the company to members of the union. The agreement, however, permitted the employment by the company of nonunion employees pending such time as the union could supply union employees. This provision was necessary because the union was closed, ordinarily admitting to membership only first-born legitimate sons of members. The company at all pertinent times had nonunion as well as union employees in its delivery department. This original agreement was subsequently extended to 1948 and a supplementary agreement was executed by the parties in 1947 providing that in the event the parties negotiated a new contract, the wage rates set therein would be retroactive for three months. In October 1948 the company and the union entered into such a new contract which included an invalid union-security clause and provided for increased wage and vacation benefits. In this agreement the company expressly recognized the union as exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in the delivery department. In compliance with the 1947 supplementary agreement, the company in November 1948 made lump-sum payments to its union employees of the differential between the old and new wage rates for the three months’ retroactive period. Further payments were subsequently made to union members to compensate for differences in vacation benefits under the two contracts even though the supplementary agreement made no reference to such benefits. The company refused to make similar payments to any of its nonunion employees on the grounds that it was not contractually bound to do so, and, in its business judgment, did not choose to do so. The Board concluded that, since nothing in the supplementary agreement prohibited equal payment to nonunion employees, “the contract affords no defense to the allegation that the Respondent unlawfully engaged in disparate treatment of employees on the basis of union membership or lack of it . . . ,” and held that the company had violated the Act as alleged. The company’s arguments that its actions had not violated § 8 (a) (3) because “the record is barren of any evidence that the discriminatory treatment of non-union employes encouraged them to join the union” or had such purpose, and that there could be no such evidence because all the nonunion employees had previously sought membership in the union and been denied because of the union’s closed policy, were rejected. The Board adopted the Trial Examiner’s finding that “it is obvious that the discrimination with respect to retroactive wages and vacation benefits had the natural and probable effect not only of encouraging nonunion employees to join the Union, but also of encouraging union employees to retain their union membership.” We assume this concedes that the employer acted from self-interest and not to encourage unionism. An order was entered requiring the company to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from related conduct; to make whole Loner and all other nonunion employees similarly situated for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the company’s discrimination against them; and to post appropriate notices of compliance. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, upon the Board’s petition, granted enforcement of all parts of the order pertinent here. On the issue of the legality of the discrimination, the court distinguished Labor Board v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F. 2d 547, involving actions closely paralleling the company’s here by another company dealing with the same union, stating, “there discrimination resulted from what the court considered the entirely legal action of the minority union in asking special benefits for its members only. The union made no pretense of representing the majority of employees or of being the exclusive bargaining agent in the plant. The other non-union employees, reasoned the Court, were quite able to elect their own representative and ask for similar benefits. Not so here. The union here represented the majority of employees and was the exclusive bargaining agent for the plant. Accordingly, it could not betray the trust of non-union members, by bargaining for special benefits to union-members only, thus leaving the non-union members with no means of equalizing the situation.” 197 F. 2d, at 722. The court continued, in answer to the company’s contention that its action “had neither the purpose nor the effect required by § 8 (a) (3)”: “discriminatory conduct, such as that practiced here, is inherently conducive to increased union membership. In this respect, there can be little doubt that it ‘encourages’ union membership, by increasing the number of workers who would like to join and/or their quantum of desire. It may well be that the union, for reasons of its own, does not want new members at the time of the employer’s violations and will reject all applicants. But the fact remains that these rejected applicants have been, and will continue to be, ‘encouraged,’ by the discriminatory benefits, in their desire for membership. This backlog of desire may well, as the Board argues, result in action by non-members to ‘seek to break down membership barriers by any one of a number of steps, ranging from bribery to legal action.’ A union’s internal politics are by no means static; changes in union entrance rules may come at any time. If and when the barriers are let down, among the new and now successful applicants will almost surely be large groups of workers previously ‘encouraged’ by the employer’s illegal discrimination. We do not believe that, if the union-encouraging effect of discriminatory treatment is not felt immediately, the employer must be allowed to escape altogether. If there is a reasonable likelihood that the effects may be felt years later, then a reasonable interpretation of the Act demands that the employer be deemed a violator.” 197 F. 2d, at 722-723. We granted the company’s petition for certiorari. I. Meaning of “Membership.” The language employed by Congress in enacting the heart of § 8 (a) (3) is identical with that of the predecessor section in the Wagner Act, § 8 (3): “By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . .” 49 Stat. 452. These are the first cases to reach us involving application of this section or its predecessor to the problem of encouragement of union membership by employers. We have on many occasions considered aspects of the application of these sections to actions by employers aimed at discouragement of union membership. The principles invoked in those cases are, of course, equally applicable to both aspects of employer discrimination, but most of the issues of statutory construction raised here have not previously been considered by this Court. In past cases we have been called upon to clarify the terms “discrimination” and “membership in any labor organization.” Discrimination is not contested in these cases: involuntary reduction of seniority, refusal to hire for an available job, and disparate wage treatment are clearly discriminatory. But the scope of the phrase “membership in any labor organization” is in issue here. Subject to limitations, we have held that phrase to in-elude discrimination to discourage participation in union activities as well as to discourage adhesion to union membership. Similar principles govern the interpretation of union membership where encouragement is alleged. The policy of the Act is to insulate employees’ jobs from their organizational rights. Thus §§8 (a)(3) and 8 (b)(2) were designed to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood. The only limitation Congress has chosen to impose on this right is specified in the proviso to §8 (a)(3) which authorizes employers to enter into certain union security contracts, but prohibits discharge under such contracts if membership “was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members” or if “membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” Lengthy legislative debate preceded the 1947 amendment to the Act which thus limited permissible employer discrimination. This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees. Thus Congress recognized the validity of unions’ concern about “free riders,” i. e., employees who receive the benefits of union representation but are unwilling to contribute their share of financial support to such union, and gave unions the power to contract to meet that problem while withholding from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees for any other reason. Thus an employer can discharge an employee for nonmembership in a union if the employer has entered a union security contract valid under the Act with such union, and if the other requirements of the proviso are met. No other discrimination aimed at encouraging employees to join, retain membership, or stay in good standing in a union is condoned. From the foregoing it is clear that the Eighth Circuit too restrictively interpreted the term “membership” in Teamsters. Boston was discriminated against by his employer because he was delinquent in a union obligation. Thus he was denied employment to which he was otherwise entitled, for no reason other than his tardy payment of union dues. The union caused this discrimination by applying a rule apparently aimed at encouraging prompt payment of dues. The union’s action was not sanctioned by a valid union security contract, and, in any event, the union did not choose to terminate Boston’s membership for his delinquency. Thus the union by requesting such discrimination, and the employer by submitting to such an illegal request, deprived Boston of the right guaranteed by the Act to join in or abstain from union activities without thereby affecting his job. A fortiori the Second Circuit correctly concluded in Radio Officers that such encouragement to remain in good standing in a union is proscribed. Thus that union in causing the employer to discriminate against Fowler by denying him employment in order to coerce Fowler into following the union’s desired hiring practices deprived Fowler of a protected right. II. A. — Necessity for Proving Employer’s Motive. The language of § 8 (a) (3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimination. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization is proscribed. The relevance of the motivation of the employer in such discrimination has been consistently recognized under both § 8 (a) (3) and its predecessor. In the first case to reach the Court under the National Labor Relations Act, Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,, 301 U. S. 1, in which we upheld the constitutionality of § 8 (3), we said with respect to limitations placed upon employers’ right to discharge by that section that “the [employer’s] true purpose is the subject of investigation with full opportunity to show the facts.” Id,, at 46. In another case the same day we found the employer’s “real motive” to be decisive and stated that “the act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with employees.” Courts of Appeals have uniformly applied this criteria, and writers in the field of labor law emphasize the importance of the employer’s motivation to a finding of violation of this section. Moreover, the National Labor Relations Board in its annual reports regularly reiterates this requirement in its discussion of § 8 (a) (3). For example, a recent report states that “upon scrutiny of all the facts in a particular case, the Board must determine whether or not the employer’s treatment of the employee was motivated by a desire to encourage or discourage union membership or other activities protected by the statute.” That Congress intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to be controlling is clear. The Senate Report on the Wagner Act said: “Of course nothing in the bill prevents an employer from discharging a man for incompetence; from advancing him for special aptitude; or from demoting him for failure to perform.” Senator Wagner spoke of § 8 (3) as reaching “those very cases where the employer is strong enough to impress his will without the aid of the law.” With this consistent interpretation of that section before it, Congress, as noted above, chose to retain the identical language in its 1947 amendments. No suggestion is found in either the reports or hearings on those amendments that the section had been too narrowly construed, and the House Conference Report states that § 8 (a) (3) “prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee by reason of his membership or non-membership in a labor organization, except to the extent that he obligates himself to do so under the terms of a permitted union shop or maintenance of membership contract.” B. — Proof of Motive. But it is also clear that specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of §8 (a)(3). This fact was recognized in the House Report on the Wagner Act when it was stated that under § 8 (3) “agreements more favorable to the majority than to the minority are impossible . . . .” Both the Board and the courts have recognized that proof of certain types of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement. This recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application of the common-law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 31; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 539; Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36, 50. Thus an employer’s protestation that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discouragement. Concluding that encouragement or discouragement will result, it is presumed that he intended such consequence. In such circumstances intent to encourage is sufficiently established. Our decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. Labor Board, 324 U. S. 793, relied upon by the Board to support its contention that employers’ motives are irrelevant under § 8 (a)(3), applied this principle. That decision dealt primarily with the right of the Board to infer discouragement from facts proven for purposes of proof of violation of § 8 (3). In holding that discharges and suspensions of employees under company “no solicitation” rules for soliciting union membership, in the circumstances disclosed, violated § 8 (3), we noted that such employer action was not “motivated by opposition to the particular union or, we deduce, to unionism” and that “there was no union bias or discrimination by the company in enforcing the rule.” But we affirmed the Board’s holding that the rules involved were invalid when applied to union solicitation since they interfered with the employees’ right to organize. Since the rules were no defense and the employers intended to discriminate solely on the ground of such protected union activity, it did not matter that they did not intend to discourage membership since such was a foreseeable result. In Gaynor, the Second Circuit also properly applied this principle. The court there held that disparate wage treatment of employees based solely on union membership status is “inherently conducive to increased union membership.” In holding that a natural consequence of discrimination, based solely on union membership or lack thereof, is discouragement or encouragement of membership in such union, the court merely recognized a fact of common experience — that the desire of employees to unionize is directly proportional to the advantages thought to be obtained from such action. No more striking example of discrimination so foreseeably causing employee response as to obviate the need for any other proof of intent is apparent than the payment of different wages to union employees doing a job than to nonunion employees doing the same job. As noted above, the House Report on § 8 (3) of the Wagner Act emphasized that such disparate treatment was impossible under the Act. In Gaynor it was conceded that the sole criterion for extra payments was union membership, and the vacation payments were admittedly gratuitous. The wage differential payments, on the other hand, were based upon the 1947 supplementary agreement which the company below contended was negotiated solely in behalf of union members. However, the court below held that the union was exclusive bargaining agent for both union and nonunion employees. The company has not challenged this holding, asserting only that, even though the union represented all employees, the company’s only liability to the nonunion employees can be for breach of contract. The union’s representative status obviously does not effect the legality of the gratuitous payment. According to the reasoning of the Second Circuit, however, disparate payments based on contract are illegal only when the union, as bargaining agent for both union and nonunion employees, betrays its trust and obtains special benefits for the union members. That court considered such action unfair because such employees are not in a position to protect their own interests. Thus, it reasoned, if a union bargains only for its own members, it is legal for such union to cause an employer to give, and for such employer to give, special benefits to the members of the union for if nonmembers are aggrieved they are free to bargain for similar benefits for themselves. We express no opinion as to the legality of disparate payments where the union is not exclusive bargaining agent, since that case is not before us. We do hold that in the circumstances of this case, the union being exclusive bargaining agent for both member and nonmember employees, the employer could not, without violating § 8 (a)(3), discriminate in wages solely on the basis of such membership even though it had executed a contract with the union prescribing such action. Statements throughout the legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act emphasize that exclusive bargaining agents are powerless “to make agreements more favorable to the majority than to the minority.” Such discriminatory contracts are illegal and provide no defense to an action under § 8 (a) (3). See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192; Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248; J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332; Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330. III. Power op Board to Draw Inferences. Petitioners in Oaynor and Radio Officers contend that the Board's orders in these cases should not have been enforced by the Second Circuit because the records do not include “independent proof that encouragement of Union membership actually occurred.” The Eighth Circuit subscribed to this view that such independent proof is required in Teamsters when it denied enforcement of the Board’s order in that proceeding on the ground that it was not supported by substantial evidence of encouragement. The Board argues that actual encouragement need not be proved but that a tendency to encourage is sufficient, and “such tendency is sufficiently established if its existence may reasonably be inferred from the character of the discrimination.” We considered this problem in the Republic Aviation case. To the contention that “there must be evidence before the Board to show that the rules and orders of the employers interfered with and discouraged union organization in the circumstances and situation of each company,” we replied that the statutory plan for an adversary proceeding “does not go beyond the necessity for the production of evidential facts, however, and compel evidence as to the results which may flow from such facts. . . . An administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration. . . 324 U. S., at 798, 800. See also Labor Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105; Labor Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584. In these cases we but restated a rule familiar to the law and followed by all fact-finding tribunals — that it is permissible to draw on experience in factual inquiries. It is argued, however, that these cases ceased to be good law under the Taft-Hartley amendments. The House Report on their version of § 10 of the amendments, in discussing “shocking injustices” resulting from limited court review of Board rulings, stated that “requiring the Board to rest its rulings upon facts, not interferences [sic], conjectures, background, imponderables, and presumed expertness will correct abuses under the act.” We do not read that statement nor statements in the House Conference Report, upon which petitioners rely to support their contention, to hold that the Board may not draw reasonable inferences from proven facts. The House Conference Report stated that, under the Wagner Act standard of review, courts had “abdicated” to the Board and “in many instances deference on the part of the courts to specialized knowledge that is supposed to inhere in administrative agencies has led the courts to acquiesce in decisions of the Board, even when the findings concerned mixed issues of law and of fact [citing cases], or when they rested only on inferences that were not, in turn, supported by facts in the record [citing the Republic Aviation case].” The report concluded that the amendment to § 10 (e), requiring Board findings to be “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole,” “will be adequate to preclude such decisions as those in” inter alia the Nevada Copper Corp. and Republic Aviation cases. In Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474, we carefully considered this legislative history and interpreted it to express dissatisfaction with too restricted application of the “substantial evidence” test of the Wagner Act. We noted, however, that sufficiency of evidence to support findings of fact was not involved in the Republic Aviation case, and stated that the amendment was not “intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect.” There is nothing in the language of the amendment itself that suggests denial to the Board of power to draw reasonable inferences. It is inconceivable that the authors of the reports intended such a result, for a fact-finding body must have some power to decide which inferences to draw and which to reject. We therefore conclude that insofar as the power to draw reasonable inferences is concerned, Taft-Hartley did not alter prior law. The Board relies heavily upon the House Report on §8 (3), which stated that the section outlawed discrimination “which tends to ‘encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,’ ” for its conclusion that only a tendency to encourage or discourage membership is required by § 8 (a) (3). We read this language to mean that subjective evidence of employee response was not contemplated by the drafters, and to accord with our holding that such proof is not required where encouragement or discouragement can be reasonably inferred from the nature of the discrimination. Encouragement and discouragement are “subtle things” requiring “a high degree of introspective perception.” Cf. Labor Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U. S. 219, 231. But, as noted above, it is common experience that the desire of employees to unionize is raised or lowered by the advantages thought to be attained by such action. Moreover, the Act does not require that the employees discriminated against be the ones encouraged for purposes of violations of § 8 (a) (3). Nor does the Act require that this change in employees’ “quantum of desire” to join a union have immediate manifestations. Obviously, it would be gross inconsistency to hold that an inherent effect of certain discrimination is encouragement of union membership, but that the Board may not reasonably infer such encouragement. We have held that a natural result of the disparate wage treatment in Gaynor was encouragement of union membership; thus it would be unreasonable to draw any inference other than that encouragement would result from such action. The company complains that it could have disproved this natural result if allowed to prove that Loner, the employee who filed the charges against it, had previously applied for and been denied membership in the union. But it is clear that such evidence would not have rebutted the inference: not only would it have failed to disprove an increase in desire on the part of other employees, union members or nonmembers, to join or retain good standing in the union, but it would not have shown lack of encouragement of Loner. In rejecting this argument the Second Circuit noted that union admission policies are not necessarily static and that employees may be encouraged to join when conditions change. This proved to be an accurate prophecy regarding the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers’ Union, involved in this case, for in 1952 it altered its admission policy to allow membership of “all steady situation holders,” thus admitting many employees not previously eligible. The circumstances in Radio Officers and Teamsters are nearly identical. In each case the employer discriminated upon the instigation of the union. The purposes of the unions in causing such discrimination clearly were to encourage members to perform obligations or supposed obligations of membership. Obviously, the unions would not have invoked such a sanction had they not considered it an effective method of coercing compliance with union obligations or practices. Both Boston and Fowler were denied jobs by employers solely because of the unions’ actions. Since encouragement of union membership is obviously a natural and foreseeable consequence of any employer discrimination at the request of a union, those employers must be presumed to have intended such encouragement. It follows that it was eminently reasonable for the Board to infer encouragement of union membership, and the Eighth Circuit erred in holding encouragement not proved. IV. Sanction Against Union Under §8 (b)(2). Section 8 (b) (2) was added to the National Labor Relations Act by the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947. It provides that “it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.” 61 Stat. 141. Petitioner in Radio Officers contends that it was fatal error for the Board to proceed against it, a union, without joining the employer, and that absent a finding of violation of § 8 (a) (3) by and a reinstatement order against such employer, the Board could not order the union to pay back-pay under § 8 (b) (2). We find no support for these arguments in the Act. No such limitation is contained in the language of § 8 (b)(2). That section makes it clear that there are circumstances under which charges against a union for violating the section must be brought without joining a charge against the employer under §8 (a)(3), for attempts to cause employers to discriminate are proscribed. Thus a literal reading of the section requires only a showing that the union caused or attempted to cause the employer to engage in conduct which, if committed, would violate § 8 (a)(3). No charge was filed against the company by Fowler when he filed his charge against the union. The General Counsel is entrusted with “final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints,” but without a charge he has no authority to issue a complaint. Even when a charge is filed, many factors must influence exercise by the General Counsel of this discretion relative to prosecution of unfair labor practices. Abuse of discretion has not been shown, and, when a complaint is prosecuted, the Board is empowered by § 10 (a) “to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. . . .” It, therefore, had the power to find that the union had violated § 8 (b) (2). Nor does the absence of joinder of the employer preclude entry of a back-pay order against the union. The union cites in support of its position the language of § 10 (c) which empowers the Board to issue orders requiring “such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: 61 Stat. 147. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 189, we interpreted the phrase giving the Board power to order “reinstatement of employees with or without back pay” not to limit, but merely to illustrate, the general grant of power to award affirmative relief. Thus we held that the Board could order back pay without ordering reinstatement. The proviso in § 10 (c) was added by the 1947 amendments. The purpose of Congress in enacting this provision was not to limit the power of the Board to order back pay without ordering reinstatement but to give the Board power to remedy union unfair labor practices comparable to the power it possessed to remedy unfair labor practices by employers. Petitioner argues, however, that it will not “effectuate the policies of this Act” to require it to reimburse back pay if the employer is not made to share this burden, but, on the contrary, will frustrate the Act’s purposes. We do not agree. It does not follow that because one form of remedy is not available or appropriate in a case, as here, that no remedy should be granted. It is clear that petitioner committed an unfair labor practice and the policy of the Act is to make whole employees thus discriminated against. We therefore hold that the Board properly exercised its power in ordering petitioner to pay such back pay to Fowler. From the foregoing it follows that: The Radio Officers’ Union v. Labor Board is affirmed. Labor Board v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters is reversed. Gaynor News Co. v. Labor Board is affirmed. No. 5, affirmed. No. 6, reversed. No. 7, affirmed. “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made [; and (ii) if, following the most recent election held as provided in section 9 (e) the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to authorize such labor organization to make such an agreement: ] and has at the time the agreement was made or within the preceding twelve months received from the Board a notice of compliance with sections 9 (/), (g), (h), and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 9 (e) within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; . . . Section 8 (a) (3) was enacted as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, in 1947, and amended in 1951, 65 Stat. 601. Provisions added by the 1951 amendment are in italics; provisions eliminated in 1951 are in brackets. This section derived from § 8 (3) of the 1935 Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3), with the proviso amended. See note 42, infra. Labor Board v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 196 F. 2d 1, certiorari granted, 344 U. S. 853. See also Labor Board v. Del E. Webb Construction Co., 196 F. 2d 702. Labor Board v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F. 2d 547. See also Western Cartridge Co. v. Labor Board, 139 F. 2d 855. Radio Officers’ Union v. Labor Board, 196 F. 2d 960, certiorari granted, 344 U. S. 852. Labor Board v. Gaynor News Co., Inc., 197 F. 2d 719, certiorari granted, 345 U. S. 902. But cf. Labor Board v. Air Associates, Inc., 121 F. 2d 586. Labor Board v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F. 2d 883. Labor Board v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F. 2d 44. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F. 2d 547; Wells, Inc. v. Labor Board, 162 F. 2d 457; Labor Board v. Reynolds International P. Co., 162 F. 2d 680; Labor Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199; Labor Board v. Air Associates, Inc., 121 F. 2d 586. See also Union Starch & Refining Co. v. Labor Board, 186 F. 2d 1008; Colonie Fibre Co.v. Labor Board, 163 F. 2d 65; Labor Board v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F. 2d 44; Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc. v. Labor Board, 129 F. 2d 922; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 93 N. L. R. B. 981. 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (b) (2) : “(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — ■ “(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; . . . .” 345 U. S. 962. Requisite engagement in commerce for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act is admitted in all three cases. 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (b) (1) (A). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union “to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.” Section 157 provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3).” 94 N. L. R. B. 1494. This agreement, known as the “Central States Area Over-the-Road Agreement,” has been executed with employers by more than 300 locals of the Teamsters Union in 12 different states. See the bracketed language in note 1, supra. “Sec. 45. Any member, under contract, one month in arrears for dues shall forfeit all seniority rights. “(a) Clarification of the above paragraph: On the second day of the second month a member becomes in arrears with his dues.” See note 13, supra. (Trial Examiner’s Footnote.) “If, as Respondent appears to suggest, its conduct discouraged membership in a labor organization, it could be argued that from the plain meaning of Section 8 (a) (3), a union would equally violate the Act by causing an employer to discriminate against an employee in order to rid itself of slow-paying or otherwise recalcitrant members.” 196 F. 2d 1. In this connection, the court pointed out that Boston was a member of the union prior to the discrimination and retained his status as a member thereafter, and that Boston had testified that the discrimination neither encouraged nor discouraged him to remain in the union. 344 U. S. 853. 93 N. L. R. B. 1523. Such an agreement was permissible under § 8 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3). The agreement in this case was signed on January 11, 1947, and was extended for a period of one year on August 16, 1947. Under § 102 of the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 152, acts performed under such agreement which would not have been unfair labor practices under § 8 (3) were not unfair practices under the amended Act. The Board found that the union secretary’s “hasty attempt to suspend” Fowler was “in disregard of Fowler’s rights under the union bylaws and constitution. ... in no event could Howe’s authority exceed that of the general chairman, who in all instances was required by specific provisions of the bylaws to advise Fowler of his offense and to afford him an opportunity to conform with union rules before suspending him. It is clear that Fowler was not given such opportunity; his purported suspension was therefore ineffectual. . . .” The power of the Board to make this finding is not challenged here. 196 F. 2d 960. Judge Clark dissented as to this interpretation of the contract. Section 8 (e) provides: “The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 158 (c). 344 U. S. 852. Section 8 (a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title” and § 8 (a) (2) makes it an unfair practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . . .” The original charge filed on February 3, 1949, alleged violation only of §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3) by the above action relative to Loner between July and October 1948. This charge was amended on June 13, 1950, to allege violation of §§ 8 (a)(1) and (2) by executing the October 1948 contract with the illegal union security clause. The complaint issued by the General Counsel on the same day contained all of these allegations and alleged that the discriminatory treatment extended to all nonunion employees. The company contends that inclusion of such employees who did not file charges is prohibited by the six-month statute of limitations period provided in § 10 (b) of the Act. We agree with the Trial Examiner, the Board, and the court below that this charge relates back to the charges timely filed and thus the company was given adequate notice and was not prejudiced by the amendment. Labor Board v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8, 14; Labor Board v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F. 2d 144, 149; Labor Board v. Kingston Cake Co., 191 F. 2d 563, 567; cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 225, 238. 93 N. L. R. B. 299. This clause requiring all new employees to become union members within thirty days was not authorized as then required by § 8 (a) (3). See the bracketed language of note 1, supra. The 1946 contract stated that the union was contracting “for and in behalf of the Union and for and in behalf of the members thereof now employed and hereafter to be employed by the Employer.” The president of the company testified before the Trial Examiner that he believed the 1946 contract and the supplementary agreement applied to union members only. The Board rejected the company’s contention that since the closed-shop provision in the 1946 contract was valid under § 8 (3), see note 24, supra, and it thus could have legally discharged the nonunion employees during the life of that contract, it could legally retain such employees and contract to discriminate as to their wages. The Board found, however, that the “evidence indicates that the Respondent had contracted to make retroactive wage payments to the employees covered by the original contract . . . .” The Board also adopted the Trial Examiner’s finding that, regardless of the status of the wage payment, the retroactive vacation payments were entirely voluntary. 197 F. 2d 719. The court modified parts of the order concerning the illegality of the 1948 contract. Judge Chase dissented as to such modification. In its brief the company seeks to raise the issue of the illegality of that contract. This question was not presented in the petition for certiorari and is, therefore, not properly before the Court. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U. S. 175. 345 U. S. 902. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Gullett Gin Co., Inc., 340 U. S. 361; Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U. S. 474; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177; Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 7; Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332; Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240; Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1. Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., supra; Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., supra; Southern Steamship Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31. Cf. Labor Board v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464. Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103. Cf. Labor Board v. Kennametal, Inc., 182 F. 2d 817; Labor Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F. 2d 503. See § 7, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 157, note 13, supra. The full text of the proviso to § 8 (a) (3) is set out in note 1, supra. That Congress intended § 8 (a) (3) to proscribe all discrimination to encourage union membership not excepted by the proviso, see H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, where it is stated that § 8 (a) (3) “prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee by reason of his membership or nonmembership in a labor organization, except to the extent that he obligates himself to do so under the terms of a permitted union shop or maintenance of membership contract.” Under the Wagner Act the proviso read: “Provided, That nothing in sections 151-166 of this title or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in said sections as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159 (a) of this title, in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made.” 29 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) § 158 (3). See Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. Labor Board, 338 U. S. 355. For example, Senator Taft said: “It is contended that the employer should be obliged to discharge the man because the union does not like him. That is what we are trying to prevent. I do not see why a union should have such power over a man in that situation.” 93 Cong. Rec. 4191. In H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 33, it was stated that “The bill prohibits what is commonly known as the closed shop, or any form of compulsory unionism that requires a person to be a member of a union in good standing when the employer hires him.” See also 93 Cong. Rec. 4135, 4193, 4272, 4275, 4432; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 et seq.; H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28; H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41. See Labor Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F. 2d 684; Union Starch & Refining Co. v. Labor Board, 186 F. 2d 1008. Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103, 132. See cases cited, note 8, supra. E. g., Manoff, Labor Relations Law, 82; CCH, Guidebook to Labor Relations Law, 142; Wollett, Labor Relations and Federal Law, 62; Millis & Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 428; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20; Ward, “Discrimination” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 Yale L. J. 1152, 1158. N. L. R. B., 16th Annual Report 162. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 38. H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44. H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21; see also Ward, note 47, supra, at 1166. See, e. g., Labor Board v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F. 2d 87; Cusano v. Labor Board, 190 F. 2d 898; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 70 N. L. R. B. 348, enforced, 162 F. 2d 435; Labor Board v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F. 2d 847. S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13. During a debate on the Act, Senator Wagner stated: “Under this proposed legislation, assuming an agreement has been consummated by the agency elected by the majority of the employees, there will be no advantage which a majority can have under an agreement to which the minority is not also entitled, and in order to have that advantage the minority need not join any organization. It can join or not join, either way. It cannot be discriminated against under any other provision of the law.” 79 Cong. Rec. 7673. See also note 52, supra. H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41. H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55. See Cox, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 39 et seq. H. R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21. See Labor Board v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 192 F. 2d 654. Cf. Katz v. Labor Board, 196 F. 2d 411. 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §153 (d). Id., § 160(b). But see Labor Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U. S. 9, 17. 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 160 (c). See Labor Board v. J. I. Case Co., 198 F. 2d 919, 924; H. N. Newman, 85 N. L. R. B. 725, enforced, 187 F. 2d 488; Union Starch & Refining Co. v. Labor Board, 186 F. 2d 1008, 1014.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LANDGRAF v. USI FILM PRODUCTS et al. No. 92-757. Argued October 13, 1993 Decided April 26, 1994 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scaua, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 286. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 294. Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Paul C. Saunders, Timothy B. Garrigan, Richard T. Seymour, and Sharon R. Vinick. Solicitor General Days argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert A. Long, Jr., David K. Flynn, Dennis J. Dimsey, Rebecca K. Troth, and Donald R. Livingston. Glen D. Nager argued the cause for respondents. On the brief was David N. Shane Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Denny Chin, Doreena Wong, and Angelo N. Ancheta; and for the National Women’s Law Center et al. by Judith E. Schaeffer and Ellen J. Vargyas. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Trucking Associations et al. by James D. Holzhauer, Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Getter, Javier H. Rubinstein, Daniel R. Barney, and Kenneth R Kolson; and for Motor Express, Inc., by Alan J. Thiemann. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Mona C. Zeiberg; for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. by Marc L. Fleischaker, David L. Kelleher, Steven S. Zaleznick, Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, Steven M. Freeman, Michael Lieberman, Dennis Courtland Hayes, Willie Abrams, Samuel Rabinove, and Richard Foltin; and for Wards Cove Packing Co. by Douglas M. Fryer, Douglas M. Duncan, and Richard L. Phillips. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion óf the Court. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) creates a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Rev. Stat. § 1977A(a), 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), as added by § 102 of the 1991 Act, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072. The Act further provides that any party may demand a trial by jury if such damages are sought. We granted certiorari to decide whether these provisions apply to a Title VII case that was pending on appeal when the statute was enacted. We hold that they do not. I From September 4, 1984, through January 17, 1986, petitioner Barbara Landgraf was employed in the USI Film Products (USI) plant in Tyler, Texas. She worked the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift operating a machine that produced plastic bags. A fellow employee named John Williams repeatedly harassed her with inappropriate remarks and physical contact. Petitioner’s complaints to her immediate supervisor brought her no relief, but when she reported the incidents to the personnel manager, he conducted an investigation, reprimanded Williams, and transferred him to another department. Four days later petitioner quit her job. Petitioner filed a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission). The Commission determined that petitioner had likely been the victim of sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., but concluded that her employer had adequately remedied the violation. Accordingly, the Commission dismissed the charge and issued a notice of right to sue. On July 21,1989, petitioner commenced this action against USI, its corporate owner, and that company’s successor in interest. After a bench trial, the District Court found that Williams had sexually harassed petitioner causing her to suffer mental anguish. However, the court concluded that she had not been constructively discharged. The court said: “Although the harassment was serious enough to establish that a hostile work environment existed for Landgraf, it was not so severe that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. This is particularly true in light of the fact that at the time Landgraf resigned from her job, USI had taken steps ... to eliminate the hostile working environment arising from the sexual harassment. Landgraf voluntarily resigned from her employment with USI for reasons unrelated to the sexual harassment in question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3-4. Because the court found that petitioner’s employment was not terminated in violation of Title VII, she was not entitled to equitable relief, and because Title VII did not then authorize any other form of relief, the court dismissed her complaint. On November 21,1991, while petitioner’s appeal was pending, the President signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument that her case should be remanded for a jury trial on damages pursuant to the 1991 Act. Its decision not to remand rested on the premise that “a court must ‘apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.’ Bradley [v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696, 711 (1974)].” 968 F. 2d 427, 432 (CA5 1992). Commenting first on the provision for a jury trial in § 102(c), the court stated that requiring the defendant ‘‘to retry this case because of a statutory change enacted after the trial was completed would be an injustice and a waste of judicial resources. We apply procedural rules to pending cases, but we do not invalidate procedures followed before the new rule was adopted.” Id., at 432-433. The court then characterized the provision for compensatory and punitive damages in § 102 as ‘‘a seaehange in employer liability for Title VII violations” and concluded that it would be unjust to apply this kind of additional and unforeseeable obligation to conduct occurring before the effective date of the Act. Id., at 433. Finding no clear error in the District Court’s factual findings, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for respondents. We granted certiorari and set the case for argument with Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., post, p. 298. Our order limited argument to the question whether § 102 of the 1991 Act applies to cases pending when it became law. 507 U. S. 908 (1993). Accordingly, for purposes of our decision, we assume that the District Court and the Court of Appeals properly applied the law in effect at the time of the discriminatory conduct and that the relevant findings of fact were correct. We therefore assume that petitioner was the victim of sexual harassment violative of Title VII, but that the law did not then authorize any recovery of damages even though she was injured. We also assume, arguendo, that if the same conduct were to occur today, petitioner would be entitled to a jury trial and that the jury might find that she was constructively discharged, or that her mental anguish or other injuries would support an award of damages against her former employer. Thus, the controlling question is whether the Court of Appeals should have applied the law in effect at the time the discriminatory conduct occurred, or at the time of its decision in July 1992. II Petitioner’s primary submission is that the text of the 1991 Act requires that it be applied to cases pending on its enactment. Her argument, if accepted, would make the entire Act (with two narrow exceptions) applicable to conduct that occurred, and to cases that were filed, before the Act’s effective date. Although only § 102 is at issue in this case, we preface our analysis with a brief description of the scope of the 1991 Act. The 1991 Act is in large part a response to a series of decisions of this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964. Section 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, note following 42 U. S. C. § 1981, expressly identifies as one of the Act’s purposes “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” That section, as well as a specific finding in §2(2), identifies Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), as a decision that gave rise to special concerns. Section 105 of the Act, entitled “Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases,” is a direct response to Wards Cove. Other sections of the Act were obviously drafted with “recent decisions of the Supreme Court” in mind. Thus, § 101 (which is at issue in Rivers, post, p. 298) amended the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of racial discrimination in the “mak[ing] and enforce[ment] [of] contracts,” 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (1988 ed., Supp. IV), in response to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989); § 107 responds to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), by setting forth standards applicable in “mixed motive” cases; § 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755 (1989), by prohibiting certain challenges to employment practices implementing consent decrees; § 109 responds to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244 (1991), by redefining the term “employee” as used in Title VII to include certain United States citizens working in foreign countries for United States employers; §112 responds to Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900 (1989), by expanding employees’ rights to challenge discriminatory seniority systems; § 113 responds to West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991), by providing that an award of attorney’s fees may include expert fees; and § 114 responds to Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310 (1986), by allowing interest on judgments against the United States. A number of important provisions in the Act, however, were not responses to Supreme Court decisions. For example, §106 enacts a new prohibition against adjusting test scores “on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”; § 117 extends the coverage of Title VII to include the House of Representatives and certain employees of the Legislative Branch; and §§301-325 establish special procedures to protect Senate employees from discrimination. Among the provisions that did not directly respond to any Supreme Court decision is the one at issue in this case, §102. Entitled “Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimination,” § 102 provides in relevant part: “(a) Right of Recovery.— “(1) Civil Rights. — In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U. S. C. 2000e-5) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act (42 U. S. C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3), and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U. S. C. 1981), the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages ... in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent. “(c) Jury Trial. — If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section— “(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.” Before the enactment of the 1991 Act, Title VII afforded only “equitable” remedies. The primary form of monetary relief available was backpay. Title VI I’s backpay remedy, modeled on that of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c), is a “make-whole” remedy that resembles compensatory damages in some respects. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 418-422 (1975). However, the new compensatory damages provision of the 1991 Act is “in addition to,” and does not replace or duplicate, the back-pay remedy allowed under prior law. Indeed, to prevent double recovery, the 1991 Act provides that compensatory damages “shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” § 102(b)(2). Section 102 significantly expands the monetary relief potentially available to plaintiffs who would have been entitled to backpay under prior law. Before 1991, for example, monetary relief for a discriminatorily discharged employee generally included “only an amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, along with lost fringe benefits such as vacation pay and pension benefits.” United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 239 (1992). Under § 102, however, a Title VII plaintiff who wins a backpay award may also seek compensatory damages for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” § 102(b)(3). In addition, when it is shown that the employer acted “with malice or with reckless indifference to the [plaintiff’s] federally protected rights,” § 102(b)(1), a plaintiff may recover punitive damages. Section 102 also allows monetary relief for some forms of workplace discrimination that would not previously have justified any relief under Title VII. As this case illustrates, even if unlawful discrimination was proved, under prior law a Title VII plaintiff could not recover monetary relief unless the discrimination was also found to have some concrete effect on the plaintiff’s employment status, such as a denied promotion, a differential in compensation, or termination. See Burke, 504 U. S., at 240. (“[T]he circumscribed remedies available under Title VII [before the 1991 Act] stand in marked contrast not only to those available under traditional tort law, but under other federal anti-discrimination statutes, as well”). Section 102, however, allows a plaintiff to recover in circumstances in which there has been unlawful discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l), even though the discrimination did not involve a discharge or a loss of pay. In short, to further Title VII’s “central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination,” Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U. S., at 421, § 102 of the 1991 Act effects a major expansion in the relief available to victims of employment discrimination. In 1990, a comprehensive civil rights bill passed both Houses of Congress. Although similar to the 1991 Act in many other respects, the 1990 bill differed in that it contained language expressly calling for application of many of its provisions, including the section providing for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, to cases arising before its (expected) enactment. The President vetoed the 1990 legislation, however, citing the bill’s “unfair retroactivity rules” as one reason for his disapproval. Congress narrowly failed to override the veto. See 136 Cong. Rec. S16589 (Oct. 24, 1990) (66 to 34 Senate vote in favor of override). The absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot realistically be attributed to oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of the compromises that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to include the kind of explicit retroactivity command found in the 1990 bill. The omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990 bill — which was by no means the only source of political controversy over that legislation — is not dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the 1991 Act. The Legislature might, for example, have settled in 1991 on a less expansive form of retroactivity that, unlike the 1990 bill, did not reach cases already finally decided. See n. 8, supra. A decision to reach only cases still pending might explain Congress’ failure to provide in the 1991 Act, as it had in 1990, that certain sections would apply to proceedings pending on specific preenactment dates. Our first question, then, is whether the statutory text on which petitioner relies manifests an intent that the 1991 Act should be applied to cases that arose and went to trial before its enactment. Ill Petitioner’s textual argument relies on three provisions of the 1991 Act: §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c). Section 402(a), the only provision of the Act that speaks directly to the question before us, states: “Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment.” That language does not, by itself, resolve the question before us. A statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. Rather, she contends that the introductory clause of § 402(a) would be superfluous unless it refers to §§ 402(b) and 109(e), which provide for prospective application in limited contexts. The parties agree that § 402(b) was intended to exempt a single disparate impact lawsuit against the Wards Cove Packing Company. Section 402(b) provides: “(b) Certain Disparate Impact Cases. — Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983.” Section 109(c), part of the section extending Title VII to overseas employers, states: “(c) Application of Amendments — The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act.” According to petitioner, these two subsections are the “other provisions” contemplated in the first clause of § 402(a), and together create a strong negative inference that all sections of the Act not specifically declared prospective apply to pending cases that arose before November 21, 1991. Before addressing the particulars of petitioner’s argument, we observe that she places extraordinary weight on two comparatively minor and narrow provisions in a long and complex statute. Applying the entire Act to cases arising from preenactment conduct would have important consequences, including the possibility that trials completed before its enactment would need to be retried and the possibility that employers would be liable for punitive damages for conduct antedating the Act’s enactment. Purely prospective application, on the other hand, would prolong the life of a remedial scheme, and of judicial constructions of civil rights statutes, that Congress obviously found wanting. Given the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad coverage of the statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill, it would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through negative inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect. Petitioner, however, invokes the canon that a court should give effect to every provision of a statute and thus avoid redundancy among different provisions. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988). Unless the word “otherwise” in § 402(a) refers to either § 402(b) or § 109(c), she contends, the first five words in § 402(a) are entirely superfluous. Moreover, relying on the canon “[ejxpressio unius est exclusio alterius,” see Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 168 (1993), petitioner argues that because Congress provided specifically for' prospectivity in two places (§§ 109(c) and 402(b)), we should infer that it intended the opposite for the remainder of the statute. Petitioner emphasizes that § 402(a) begins: “Except as otherwise specifically provided.” A scan of the statute for other “specific provisions” concerning effective dates reveals that §§ 402(b) and 109(c) are the most likely candidates. Since those provisions decree prospectivity, and since § 402(a) tells us that the specific provisions are exceptions, § 402(b) should be considered as prescribing a general rule of retroactivity. Petitioner’s argument has some force, but we find it most unlikely that Congress intended the introductory clause to carry the critically important meaning petitioner assigns it. Had Congress wished § 402(a) to have such a determinate meaning, it surely would have used language comparable to its reference to the predecessor Title VII damages provisions in the 1990 legislation: that the new provisions “shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act.” S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 15(a)(4) (1990). It is entirely possible that Congress inserted the “otherwise specifically provided” language not because it understood the “takes effect” clause to establish a rule of retroactivity to which only two “other specific provisions” would be exceptions, but instead to assure that any specific timing provisions in the Act would prevail over the general “take effect on enactment” command. The drafters of a complicated piece of legislation containing more than 50 separate sections may well have inserted the “except as otherwise provided” language merely to avoid the risk of an inadvertent conflict in the statute. If the introductory clause of § 402(a) was intended to refer specifically to §§ 402(b), 109(c), or both, it is difficult to understand why the drafters chose the word “otherwise” rather than either or both of the appropriate section numbers. We are also unpersuaded by petitioner’s argument that both §§ 402(b) and 109(c) merely duplicate the “take effect upon enactment” command of § 402(a) unless all other provisions, including the damages provisions of § 102, apply to pending cases. That argument depends on the assumption that all those other provisions must be treated uniformly for purposes of their application to pending cases based on preenactment conduct. That thesis, however, is by no means an inevitable one. It is entirely possible — indeed, highly probable — that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the clarity of the 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts. Our precedents on retroactivity left doubts about what default rule would apply in the absence of congressional guidance, and suggested that some provisions might apply to cases arising before enactment while others might not. Compare Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204 (1988), with Bradley v. School 13d. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974). See also Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U. S. 632 (1985). The only matters Congress did not leave to the courts were set out with specificity in §§ 109(c) and 402(b). Congressional doubt concerning judicial retro-activity doctrine, coupled with the likelihood that the routine “take effect upon enactment” language would require courts to fall back upon that doctrine, provide a plausible explanation for both §§ 402(b) and 109(c) that makes neither provision redundant. Turning to the text of § 402(b), it seems unlikely that the introductory phrase (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act”) was meant to refer to the immediately preceding subsection. Since petitioner does not contend that any other provision speaks to the general effective date issue, the logic of her argument requires us to interpret that phrase to mean nothing more than “Notwithstanding § 402(a).” Petitioner’s textual argument assumes that the drafters selected the indefinite word “otherwise” in § 402(a) to identify two specific subsections and the even more indefinite term “any other provision” in § 402(b) to refer to nothing more than §402(b)’s next-door neighbor — § 402(a). Here again, petitioner’s statutory argument would require us to assume that Congress chose a surprisingly indirect route to convey an important and easily expressed message concerning the Act’s effect on pending cases. The relevant legislative history of the 1991 Act reinforces our conclusion that §§ 402(a), 109(c), and 402(b) cannot bear the weight petitioner places upon them. The 1991 bill as originally introduced in the House contained explicit retroactivity provisions similar to those found in the 1990 bill. However, the Senate substitute that was agreed upon omitted those explicit retroactivity provisions. The legislative history discloses some frankly partisan statements about the meaning of the final effective date language, but those statements cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any general agreement. The history reveals no evidence that Members believed that an agreement had been tacitly struck on the controversial retroactivity issue, and little to suggest that Congress understood or intended the interplay of §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c) to have the decisive effect petitioner assigns them. Instead, the history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct. Although the passage of the 1990 bill may indicate that a majority of the 1991 Congress also favored retroactive application, even the will of the majority does not become law unless it follows the path charted in Article I, §7, cl. 2, of the Constitution. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 946-951 (1983). In the absence of the kind of unambiguous directive found in §15 of the 1990 bill, we must look elsewhere for guidance on whether § 102 applies to this case. > It is not uncommon to find “apparent tension ’ between different canons of statutory construction. As Professor Llewellyn famously illustrated, many of the traditional canons have equal opposites. In order to resolve the question left open by the 1991 Act, federal courts have labored to reconcile two seemingly contradictory statements found in our decisions concerning the effect of intervening changes in the law. Each statement is framed as a generally applicable rule for interpreting statutes that do not specify their temporal reach. The first is the rule that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” Bradley, 416 U. S., at 711. The second is the axiom that “[Retroactivity is not favored in the law,” and its interpretive corollary that “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” Bowen, 488 U. S., at 208. We have previously noted the “apparent tension” between those expressions. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 837 (1990); see also Bennett, 470 U. S., at 639-640. We found it unnecessary in Kaiser to resolve that seeming conflict “because under either view, where the congressional intent is clear, it governs,” and the prejudgment interest statute at issue in that case evinced “clear congressional intent” that it was “not applicable to judgments entered before its effective date.” 499 U. S., at 837-838. In the case before us today, however, we have concluded that the 1991 Act does not evince any clear expression of intent on § 102’s application to cases arising before the Act’s enactment. We must, therefore, focus on the apparent tension between the rules we have espoused for handling similar problems in the absence of an instruction from Congress. We begin by noting that there is no tension between the holdings in Bradley and Bowen, both of which were unanimous decisions. Relying on another unanimous decision— Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268 (1969) — we held in Bradley that a statute authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to successful civil rights plaintiffs applied in a case that was pending on appeal at the time the statute was enacted. Bowen held that the Department of Health and Human Services lacked statutory authority to promulgate a rule requiring private hospitals to refund Medicare payments for services rendered before promulgation of the rule. Our opinion in Bowen did not purport to overrule Bradley or to limit its reach. In this light, we turn to the “apparent tension” between the two canons mindful of another canon of unquestionable vitality, the “maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821). A As Justice Scalia has demonstrated, the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the “principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.” Kaiser, 494 U. S., at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions. It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a “public use” and upon payment of “just compensation.” The prohibitions on “Bills of Attainder” in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 456-462 (1965). The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute’s prospective application under the Clause “may not suffice” to warrant its retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 17 (1976). These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for the Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have “fair warning” about the effect of criminal statutes, but also “restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.” Id., at 28-29 (citations omitted). The Constitution’s restrictions, of course, are of limited scope; Absent a violation of one of those specific provisions, the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope. Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, whether to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention of a new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary. However, a requirement that Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness. While statutory retroactivity has long been disfavored, deciding when a statute operates “retroactively” is not always a simple or mechanical task. Sitting on Circuit, Justice Story offered an influential definition in Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814), a case construing a provision of the New Hampshire Constitution that broadly prohibits “retrospective” laws both criminal and civil. Justice Story first rejected the notion that the provision bars only explicitly retroactive legislation, i. e., “statutes . . . enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage.” Id., at 767. Such a construction, he concluded, would be “utterly subversive of all the objects” of the prohibition. Ibid. Instead, the ban on retrospective legislation embraced “all statutes, which, though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and past transactions.” Ibid. “Upon principle, "Justice Story elaborated, “every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective . . . Ibid. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dali. 386 (1798), and Dash v. Van Kleeck, 1 Johns. 477 (N. Y. 1811)). Though the formulas have varied, similar functional conceptions of legislative “retroactivity” have found voice in this Court’s decisions and elsewhere. A statute does not operate “retrospectively” merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, see Republic Nat. Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates “retroactively” comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Any test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have “sound ... instinct[s],” see Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N. E. 1033, 1034 (1901) (Holmes, J.), and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance. Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights unless Congress had made clear its intent. Thus, in United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399 (1806), we refused to apply a federal statute reducing the commissions of customs collectors to collections commenced before the statute’s enactment because the statute lacked “clear, strong, and imperative” language requiring retroactive application, id., at 413 (opinion of Paterson, J.). The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact. Indeed, at common law a contrary rule applied to statutes that merely removed a burden on private rights by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or civil); such repeals were understood to preclude punishment for acts antedating the repeal. See, e. g., United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1934); Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 506 (1912); United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 93-95 (1871); Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 440-441 (1852); Maryland ex rel. Washington Cty. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 3 How. 534, 552 (1845); Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281, 284 (1809). But see 1 U. S. C. § 109 (repealing common-law rule). The largest category of cases in which we have applied the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting contractual or property rights, matters in which predictability and stability are of prime importance. The presumption has not, however, been limited to such cases. At issue in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 (1884), for example, was a provision of the “Chinese Restriction Act” of 1882 barring Chinese laborers from reentering the United States without a certificate prepared when they exited this country. We held that the statute did not bar the reentry of a laborer who had left the United States before the certification requirement was promulgated. Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court observed that the law in effect before the 1882 enactment had accorded laborers a right to reenter without a certificate, and invoked the “uniformly” accepted rule against “giv[ing] to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless compelled to do so by language so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt that such was the intention of the legislature.” Id., at 559. Our statement in Bowen that “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result,” 488 U. S., at 208, was in step with this long line of cases. Bowen itself was a paradigmatic case of retroactivity in which a federal agency sought to recoup, under cost limit regulations issued in 1984, funds that had been paid to hospitals for services rendered earlier, see id., at 207; our search for clear congressional intent authorizing retroactivity was consistent with the approach taken in decisions spanning two centuries. The presumption against statutory retroactivity had special force in the era in which courts tended to view legislative interference with property and contract rights circumspectly. In this century, legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and circumspection has given way to greater deference to legislative judgments. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S., at 15-16; Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 436-444 (1934). But while the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule. Because it accords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations. Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits. Such a requirement allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving legislators a predictable background rule against which to legislate. B Although we have long embraced a presumption against statutory retroactivity, for just as long we have recognized that, in many situations, a court should “apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,” Bradley, 416 U. S., at 711, even though that law was enacted after the events that gave rise to the suit. There is, of course, no conflict between that principle and a presumption against retroactivity when the statute in question is unambiguous. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103 (1801), illustrates this point. Because a treaty signed on September 30, 1800, while the case was pending on appeal, unambiguously provided for the restoration of captured property “not yet definitively condemned,” id., at 107 (emphasis in original), we reversed a decree entered on September 23, 1800, condemning a French vessel that had been seized in American waters. Our application of “the law in effect” at the time of our decision in Schooner Peggy was simply a response to the language of the statute. Id., at 109. Even absent specific legislative authorization, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably proper in many situations. When the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive. Thus, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921), we held that § 20 of the Clayton Act, enacted while the case was pending on appeal, governed the propriety of injunctive relief against labor picketing. In remanding the suit for application of the intervening statute, we observed that “relief by injunction operates in futuro,” and that the plaintiff had no “vested right” in the decree entered by the trial court. 257 U. S., at 201. See also, e. g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 464 (1921). We have regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed. Thus, in Bruner v. United States, 343 U. S. 112, 116-117 (1952), relying on our “consistent]” practice, we ordered an action dismissed because the jurisdictional statute under which it had been (properly) filed was subsequently repealed. See also Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508-509 (1916); Assessors v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567, 575 (1870). Conversely, in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 607-608, n. 6 (1978), we held that, because a statute passed while the case was pending on appeal had. eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-question cases, the fact that respondent had failed to allege $10,000 in controversy at the commencement of the action was “now of no moment.” See also United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960) (per curiam); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478 (1899). Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually “takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.” Hallowell, 239 U. S., at 508. Present law normally governs in such situations because jurisdictional statutes “speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties,” Republic Nat. Bank of Miami, 506 U. S., at 100 (Thomas, J., concurring). Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity. For example, in Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55,71 (1949), we held that 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a) governed the transfer of an action instituted prior to that statute’s enactment. We noted the diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure. 337 U. S., at 71. Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive. Cf. McBurney v. Carson, 99 U. S. 567, 569 (1879). Petitioner relies principally upon Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974), and Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268 (1969), in support of her argument that our ordinary interpretive rules support application of § 102 to her case. In Thorpe, we held that an agency circular requiring a local housing authority to give notice of reasons and opportunity to respond before evicting a tenant was applicable to an eviction proceeding commenced before the regulation issued. Thorpe shares much with both the “procedural” and “prospective-relief” cases. See supra, at 273-275. Thus, we noted in Thorpe that new hearing procedures did not affect either party’s obligations under the lease agreement between the housing authority and the petitioner, 393 U. S., at 279, and, because the tenant had “not yet vacated,” we saw no significance in the fact that the housing authority had “decided to evict her before the circular was issued,” id., at 283. The Court in Thorpe viewed the new eviction procedures as “essential to remove a serious impediment to the successful protection of constitutional rights.” Ibid. Cf. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 237 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Thorpe for propriety of applying new law to avoiding necessity of deciding constitutionality of old . one). Our holding in Bradley is similarly compatible with the line of decisions disfavoring “retroactive” application of statutes. In Bradley, the District Court had awarded attorney’s fees and costs, upon general equitable principles, to parents who had prevailed in an action seeking to desegregate the public schools of Richmond, Virginia. While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals, Congress enacted § 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, which authorized federal courts to award the prevailing parties in school desegregation cases a reasonable attorney’s fee. The Court of Appeals held that the new fee provision did not authorize the award of fees for services rendered before the effective date of the amendments. This Court reversed. We concluded that the private parties could rely on § 718 to support their claim for attorney’s fees, resting our decision “on the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.” 416 U. S., at 711. Although that language suggests a categorical presumption in favor of application of all new rules of law, we now make it clear that Bradley did not alter the well-settled presumption against application of the class of new statutes that would have genuinely “retroactive” effect. Like the new hearing requirement in Thorpe,, the attorney’s fee provision at issue in Bradley did not resemble the cases in which we have invoked the presumption against statutory retroactivity. Attorney’s fee determinations, we have observed, are “collateral to the main cause of action” and “uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial.” White v. New Hampshire Dept of Employment Security, 455 U. S. 445, 451-452 (1982). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 695, n. 24 (1978). Moreover, even before the enactment of § 718, federal courts had authority (which the District Court in Bradley had exercised) to award fees based upon equitable principles. As our opinion in Bradley made clear, it would be difficult to imagine a stronger equitable case for an attorney’s fee award than a lawsuit in which the plaintiff parents would otherwise have to bear the costs of desegregating their children’s public schools. See 416 U. S., at 718 (noting that the plaintiffs had brought the school board “into compliance with its constitutional mandate”) (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 494 (1954)). In light of the prior availability of a fee award, and the likelihood that fees would be assessed under pre-existing theories, we concluded that the new fee statute simply “d[id] not impose an additional or unforeseeable obligation” upon the school board. Bradley, 416 U. S., at 721. In approving application of the new fee provision, Bradley did not take issue with the long line of decisions applying the presumption against retroactivity. Our opinion distinguished, but did not criticize, prior cases that had applied the antiretroactivity canon. See id., at 720 (citing Greene v. United States, 376 U. S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 141, 164 (1944), and Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190, 199 (1913)). The authorities we relied upon in Bradley lend further support to the conclusion that we did not intend to displace the traditional presumption against applying statutes affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or duties to conduct arising before their enactment. See Kaiser, 494 U. S., at 849-850 (Scalia, J., concurring). Bradley relied on Thorpe and on other precedents that are consistent with a presumption against statutory retroactivity, including decisions involving explicitly retroactive statutes, see 416 U. S., at 713, n. 17 (citing, inter alia, Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160 (1865)), the retroactive application of intervening judicial decisions, see 416 U. S., at 713-714, n. 17 (citing, inter alia, Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607 (1935)), statutes altering jurisdiction, 416 U. S., at 713, n. 17 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602 (1960)), and repeal of a criminal statute, 416 U. S., at 713, n. 17 (citing United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 (1934)). Moreover, in none of our decisions that have relied upon Bradley or Thorpe have we cast doubt on the traditional presumption against truly “retrospective” application of a statute. When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i. e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. V We now ask whether, given the absence of guiding instructions from Congress, § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is the type of provision that should govern cases arising before its enactment. As we observed supra, at 260-261, and n. 12, there is no special reason to think that all the diverse provisions of the Act must be treated uniformly for such purposes. To the contrary, we understand the instruction that the provisions are to “take effect upon enactment” to mean that courts should evaluate each provision of the Act in light of ordinary judicial principles concerning the application of new rules to pending cases and preenactment conduct. Two provisions of § 102 may be readily classified according to these principles. The jury trial right set out in § 102(c)(1) is plainly a procedural change of the sort that would ordinarily govern in trials conducted after its effective date. If § 102 did no more than introduce a right to jury trial in Title VII cases, the provision would presumably apply to cases tried after November 21,1991, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. However, because § 102(c) makes a jury trial available only “[i]f a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages,” the jury trial option must stand or fall with the attached damages provisions. Section 102(b)(1) is clearly on the other side of the line. That subsection authorizes punitive damages if the plaintiff shows that the defendant “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” The very labels given “punitive” or “exemplary” damages, as well as the rationales that support them, demonstrate that they share key characteristics of criminal sanctions. Retroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise a serious constitutional question. See Turner Elkhorn, 428 U. S., at 17 (Court would “hesitate to approve the retrospective imposition of liability on any theory of deterrence ... or blameworthiness”); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 160 (1960) (“The mark of an ex post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated punishment for past acts”). See also Louis Vuitton S. A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F. 2d 966, 972 (CA2 1985) (retroactive application of punitive treble damages provisions of Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 “would present a potential ex post facto problem”). Before we entertained that question, we would have to be confronted with a statute that explicitly authorized punitive damages for preenactment conduct. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 contains no such explicit command. The provision of § 102(a)(1) authorizing the recovery of compensatory damages is not easily classified. It does not make unlawful conduct that was lawful when it occurred; as we have noted, supra, at 252-255, § 102 only reaches discriminatory conduct already prohibited by Title VII. Concerns about a lack of fair notice are further muted by the fact that such discrimination was in many cases (although not this one) already subject to monetary liability in the form of backpay. Nor could anyone seriously contend that the compensatory damages provisions smack of a “retributive” or other suspect legislative purpose. Section 102 reflects Congress’ desire to afford victims of discrimination more complete redress for violations of rules established more than a generation ago in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At least with respect to its compensatory damages provisions, then, § 102 is not in a category in which objections to retroactive application on grounds of fairness have their greatest force. Nonetheless, the new compensatory damages provision would operate “retrospectively” if it were applied to conduct occurring before November 21, 1991. Unlike certain other forms of relief, compensatory damages are quintesseritially backward looking. Compensatory damages may be intended less to sanction wrongdoers than to make victims whole, but they do so by a mechanism that affects the liabilities of defendants. They do not “compensate” by distributing funds from the public coffers, but by requiring particular employers to pay for harms they caused. The introduction of a right to compensatory damages is also the type of legal change that would have an impact on private parties’ planning. In this case, the event to which the new damages provision relates is the discriminatory conduct of respondents’ agent John Williams; if applied here, that provision would attach an important new legal burden to that conduct. The new damages remedy in § 102, we conclude, is the kind of provision that does not apply to events antedating its enactment in the absence of clear congressional intent. In cases like this one, in which prior law afforded no relief, § 102 can be seen as creating a new cause of action, and its impact on parties’ rights is especially pronounced. Section 102 confers a new right to monetary relief on persons like petitioner who were victims of a hostile work environment but were not constructively discharged, and the novel prospect of damages liability for their employers. Because Title VII previously authorized recovery of backpay in some cases, and because compensatory damages under § 102(a) are in addition to any backpay recoverable, the new provision also resembles a statute increasing the amount of damages available under a preestablished cause of action. Even under that view, however, the provision would, if applied in cases arising before the Act’s effective date, undoubtedly impose on employers found liable a “new disability” in respect to past events. See Society for Propagation of the Gospel, 22 F. Cas., at 767. The extent of a party’s liability, in the civil context as well as the criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored. Neither in Bradley itself, nor in any case before or since in which Congress had not clearly spoken, have we read a statute substantially increasing the monetary liability of a private party to apply to conduct occurring before the statute’s enactment. See Win-free v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 227 U. S. 296,301 (1913) (statute creating new federal cause of action for wrongful death inapplicable to case arising before enactment in absence of “explicit words” or “clear implication”); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306, 314-315 (1908) (construing statute restricting subcontractors’ rights to recover damages from prime contractors as prospective in absence of “clear, strong and imperative” language from Congress favoring retroactivity). It will frequently be true, as petitioner and amici forcefully argue here, that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption against retroactivity. Statutes are seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment may require adopting means other than those that would most effectively pursue the main goal. A legislator who supported a prospective statute might reasonably oppose retroactive application of the same statute. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the omission of the 1990 version’s express retroactivity provisions was a factor in the passage of the 1991 bill. Section 102 is plainly not the sort of provision that must be understood to operate retroactively because a contrary reading would render it ineffective. The presumption against statutory retroactivity is founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation. We are satisfied that it applies to § 102. Because we have found no clear evidence of congressional intent that § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply to cases arising before its enactment, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. It is so ordered. See Rev. Stat. §1977A(c), 42 U. S. C. §1981a(c) (1988 ed., Supp. IV), as added by § 102 of the 1991 Act. For simplicity, and in conformity with the practice of the parties, we will refer to the damages and jury trial provisions as §§ 102(a) and (c), respectively. Respondent Quantum Chemical Corporation owned the USI plant when petitioner worked there. Respondent Bonar Packaging, Inc., subsequently purchased the operation. Section 2(2) finds that the Wards Cove decision “has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections,” and §3(2) expresses Congress’ intent “to codify” certain concepts enunciated in “Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989).” We take note of the express references to that case because it is the focus of § 402(b), on which petitioner places particular reliance. See infra, at 258-263. We have not decided whether a plaintiff seeking backpay under Title VII is entitled to a jury trial. See, e. g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545, 549, n. 1 (1990) (assuming without deciding no right to jury trial); Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U. S. 558, 572 (1990) (same). Because petitioner does not argue that she had a right to jury trial even under pre-1991 law, again we need not address this question. “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in... an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-6(g) (1988 ed., Supp. IV). Section 102(b)(3) imposes limits, varying with the size of the employer, on the amount of compensatory and punitive damages that may be awarded to an individual plaintiff. Thus, the sum of such damages awarded a plaintiff may not exceed $50,000 for employers with between 14 and 100 employees; $100,000 for employers with between 101 and 200 employees; $200,000 for employers with between 200 and 500 employees; and $300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (discrimination in “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” actionable under Title VII “is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant section of the Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990), provided: "Sec. 15. Application of Amendments and Transition Rules. “(a) Application of Amendments. — The amendments made by— “(1) section 4 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 5, 1989 [the date of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642]; “(2) section 5 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after May 1,1989 [the date of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228]; “(3) section 6 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 12,1989 [the date of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755]; "(4) sections 7(a)(1), 7(a)(3) and 7(a)(4), 7(b), 8 [providing for compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination], 9, 10, and 11 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act; “(5) section 7(a)(2) shall apply to all proceedings pending on or after June 12, 1989 [the date of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900]; and “(6) section 12 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 15, 1989 [the date of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164]. “(b) Transition Rules — “(1) In General. — Any orders entered by a court between the effective dates described in subsection (a) and the date of enactment of this Act that are inconsistent with the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or 12, shall be vacated if, not later than 1 year after such date of enactment, a request for such relief is made. “(3) Final Judgments. — Pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2), any final judgment entered prior to the date of the enactment of this Act as to which the rights of any of the parties thereto have become fixed and vested, where the time for seeking further judicial review of such judgment has otherwise expired pursuant to title 28 of the United States Code, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, shall be vacated in whole or in part if justice requires pursuant to rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other appropriate authority, and consistent with the constitutional requirements of due process of law.” See President’s Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1632-1634 (Oct. 22,1990), reprinted in 136 Cong. Rec. S16418, S16419 (Oct. 22,1990). The President’s veto message referred to the bill’s “retroactivity” only briefly; the Attorney General’s Memorandum to which the President referred was no more expansive, and may be read to refer only to the bill’s special provision for reopening final judgments, see n. 8, supra, rather than its provisions covering pending cases. See Memorandum of the Attorney General to the President (Oct. 22, 1990) in App. to Brief for Petitioner A-13 (“And Section 15 unfairly applies the changes in the law made by S. 2104 to cases already decided") (emphasis added). The history of prior amendments to Title VII suggests that the “effective-upon-enactment” formula would have been an especially inapt way to reach pending cases. When it amended Title VII in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress explicitly provided: “The amendments made by this Act to section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed thereafter.” Pub. L. 92-261, § 14,86 Stat. 113. In contrast, in amending Title VII to bar discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in 1978, Congress provided: “Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendment made by this Act shall be effective on the date of enactment.” §2(a), 92 Stat. 2076. The only Courts of Appeals to consider whether the 1978 amendments applied to pending cases concluded that they did not. See Schwabenbauer v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. of Olean, 667 F. 2d 305, 310, n. 7 (CA2 1981); Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 631 F. 2d. 1136, 1139-1140 (CA4 1980). See also Jensen v. Gulf Oil Refining & Marketing Co., 623 F. 2d 406, 410 (CA5 1980) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act amendments designated to “take effect on the date of enactment of this Act” inapplicable to case arising before enactment); Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F. 2d 1116, 1119-1124 (CA3 1980) (same). If we assume that Congress was familiar with those decisions, cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-699 (1979), its choice of language in § 402(a) would imply nonretroactivity. There is some evidence that the drafters of the 1991 Act did not devote particular attention to the interplay of the Act’s “effective date” provisions. Section 110, which directs the EEOC to establish a “Technical Assistance Training Institute” to assist'employers in complying with antidiscrimination laws and regulations, contains a subsection providing that it “shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.” § 110(b). That provision and § 402(a) are unavoidably redundant. This point also diminishes the force of petitioner’s “expressio unius” argument. Once one abandons the unsupported assumption that Congress expected that all of the Act’s provisions would be treated alike, and takes account of uncertainty about the applicable default rule, §§ 109(c) and 402(b) do not carry the negative implication petitioner draws from them. We do not read either provision as doing anything more than definitively rejecting retroactivity with respect to the specific matters covered by its plain language. See, e. g., H. R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 113 (1991), reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec. H3924-H3925 (Jan. 3,1991). The prospectivity proviso to the section extending Title VII to overseas employers was first added to legislation that generally was to apply to pending cases. See H. R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 119(c) (1991), reprinted in 137 Cong. Rec. H3925-H3926 (June 5, 1991). Thus, at the time its language was introduced, the provision that became § 109(c) was surely not redundant. On the other hand, two proposals that would have provided explicitly for prospectivity also foundered. See 137 Cong. Rec. S3021, S3023 (Mar. 12,1991); id., at 13255,13265-13266. For example, in an “interpretive memorandum” introduced on behalf of seven Republican sponsors of S. 1745, the bill that became the 1991 Act, Senator Danforth stated that “[t]he bill provides that, unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this legislation shall take effect upon enactment and shall not apply retroactively.” Id., at 29047 (emphasis added). Senator Kennedy responded that it “will be up to the 'courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases and claims that were pending on the date of enactment.” Ibid, (citing Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U. S. 696 (1974)). The legislative history reveals other partisan statements on the proper meaning of the Act’s “effective date” provisions. Senator Danforth observed that such statements carry little weight as legislative history. As he put it: “[A] court would be well advised to take with a large grain of salt floor debate and statements placed in the Congressional Record which purport to create an interpretation for the legislation that is before us.” 137 Cong. Rec. S15325 (Oct. 29,1991).) See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950). Llewellyn’s article identified the apparent conflict between the canon that “[a] statute imposing a new penalty or forfeiture, or a new liability or disability, or creating a new right of action will not be construed as having a retroactive effect” and the countervailing rule that “[rjemedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive interpretation will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such construction.” Id., at 402 (citations omitted). See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 842-844, 855-856 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). See also, e. g., Dash v. Van Meeck, 7 Johns. *477, *503 (N. Y. 1811) (“It is a principle of the English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect”) (Kent, C. J.); Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1936). See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U. S. 181, 191 (1992) (“Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions”); Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Texas L. Rev. 426, 471 (1982) (“The rule of law... is a defeasible entitlement of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in advance”). See also L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 51-62 (1964) (hereinafter Fuller). Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§9, cl. 3), the other to the States (§10, cl. 1). We have construed the Clauses as applicable only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dali. 386, 390-391 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). See Richmond v. J. A Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 513-514 (1989) (“Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been committed”) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213, 247, n. 3 (1961) (retroactive punitive measures may reflect “a purpose not to prevent dangerous conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or classes of persons”). James Madison argued that retroactive legislation also offered special opportunities for the powerful to obtain special and improper legislative benefits. According to Madison, “[bjills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts” were “contrary to the first principles of .the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation,” in part because such measures invited the “influential” to “speculate] on public measures,” to the detriment of the “more industrious and less informed part of the community.” The Federalist No. 44, p. 301 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692,693 (1960) (a retroactive statute “may be passed with an exact knowledge of who will benefit from it”). In some cases, however, the interest in avoiding the adjudication of constitutional questions will counsel against a retroactive application. For if a challenged statute is to be given retroactive effect, the regulatory interest that supports prospective application will not necessarily also sustain its application to past events. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A Gray & Co., 467 U. S. 717, 730 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1,17 (1976). In this case the punitive damages provision may raise a question, but for present purposes we assume that Congress has ample power to provide for retroactive application of §102. Article 23 of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights provides: “Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes or the punishment of offenses.” At issue in the Society case was a new statute that reversed a common-law rule by allowing certain wrongful possessors of land, upon being ejected by the rightful owner, to obtain compensation for improvements made on the land. Justice Story held that the new statute impaired the owner’s rights and thus could not, consistently with Article 23, be applied to require compensation for improvements made before the statute’s enactment. See 22 F. Cas., at 766-769. See, e. g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 430 (1987) (“A law is retrospective if it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date’ ”) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 31 (1981)); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190, 199 (1913) (retroactive statute gives “a quality or effect to acts or conduct which they did not have or did not contemplate when they were performed”); Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 519 (1885) (a retroactive statute is one that “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability”). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1184 (5th ed. 1979) (quoting Justice Story’s definition from Society); 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §41.01, p. 337 (5th rev. ed. 1993) (“The terms ‘retroactive’ and ‘retrospective’ are synonymous in judicial usage .... They describe acts which operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of the act”). Even uncontroversially prospective statutes may unsettle expectations and impose burdens on past conduct: a new property tax or zoning regulation may upset the reasonable expectations that prompted those affected to acquire property; a new law banning gambling harms the person who had begun to construct a casino before the law’s enactment or spent his life learning to count cards. See Fuller 60 (“If every time a man relied on existing law in arranging his affairs, he were made secure against any change in legal rules, the whole body of our law would be ossified forever”). Moreover, a statute “is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.” Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427, 435 (1922). See Reynolds v. United States, 292 U. S. 443, 444-449 (1934); Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, 73 (1915). See, e. g., United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 469 U. S. 70, 79-82 (1982); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 141, 164 (1944); United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1, 3 (1926); Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637, 639 (1914); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S., at 199; Twenty per Cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187 (1874); Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 696, 699 (1873); Carroll v. Lessee of Carroll, 16 How. 276 (1854). While the great majority of our decisions relying upon the antiretroactivity presumption have involved intervening statutes burdening private parties, we have applied the presumption in cases involving new monetary obligations that fell only on the government. See United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U. S. 160 (1928); White v. United States, 191 U. S. 546 (1903). See also, e. g., Greene v. United States, 376 U. S. 149, 160 (1964); White v. United States, 191 U. S. 645 (1903); United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 762 (1878); Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421, 423 (1854); Ladiga v. Roland, 2 How. 581, 589 (1844). In Bruner, we specifically noted: “This jurisdictional rule does not affect the general principle that a statute is not to be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication. Compare United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1, 3 (1926), with Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U. S. 56, 61 (1927).” 343 U. S., at 117, n. 8. While we have strictly construed the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit application of new statutes creating or increasing punishments after the fact, we have upheld intervening procedural changes even if application of the new rule operated to a defendant’s disadvantage in the particular case. See, e. g., Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 293-294 (1977); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37 (1990); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925). Of course, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case. A new rule concerning the filing of complaints would not govern an action in which the complaint had already been properly filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule of evidence would not require an appellate remand for a new trial. Our orders approving amendments to federal procedural rules reflect the commonsense notion that the applicability of such provisions ordinarily depends on the posture of the particular case. See, e. g., Order Amending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 495 U. S. 969 (1990) (amendments applicable to pending cases “insofar as just and practicable”); Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 456 U. S. 1015 (1982) (same); Order Amending Bankruptcy Rules and Forms, 421 U. S. 1021 (1975) (amendments applicable to pending cases “except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular proceeding then pending would not be feasible or would work injustice”). Contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, post, at 290, we do not restrict the presumption against statutory retroactivity to cases involving “vested rights.” (Neither is Justice Story’s definition of retroactivity, quoted supra, at 269, so restricted.) Nor do we suggest that concerns about retroactivity have no application to procedural rules. Thorpe is consistent with the principle, analogous to that at work in the common-law presumption about repeals of criminal statutes, that the government should accord grace to private parties disadvantaged by an old rule when it adopts a new and more generous one. Cf. DeGurules v. INS, 833 F. 2d 861, 862-863 (CA9 1987). Indeed, Thorpe twice cited United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 (1934), which ordered dismissal of prosecutions pending when the National Prohibition Act was repealed. See Thorpe, 393 U. S., at 281, n. 38; id., at 282, n. 40. In Bradley, we cited Schooner Peggy for the “current law” principle, but we recognized that the law at issue in Schooner Peggy had expressly-called for retroactive application. See 416 U. S., at 712, n. 16 (describing Schooner Peggy as holding that Court was obligated to “apply the terms of the convention,” which had recited that it applied to all vessels not yet “definitively condemned”) (emphasis in convention). At the time Bradley was decided, it was by no means a truism to point out that rules announced in intervening judicial decisions should normally be applied to a case pending when the intervening decision came down. In 1974, our doctrine on judicial retroactivity involved a substantial measure of discretion, guided by equitable standards resembling the Bradley “manifest injustice” test itself. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97,106-107 (1971); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636 (1965). While it was accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision was only presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a firm rule of retroactivity. See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86 (1993); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987). See, e. g., Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 661-662, and n. 1 (1989) (considering intervening regulations in injunctive action challenging agency’s drug testing policy under Fourth Amendment) (citing Thorpe); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 662 (1987) (applying rule announced in judicial decision to case arising before the decision and citing Bradley for the “usual rule ... that federal cases should be decided in accordance with the law existing at the time of the decision”); Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U. S. 604, 608 (1987) (in case involving retroactivity of judicial decision, citing Thorpe for same “usual rule”); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S., at 694, n. 23 (relying on “general practice” and Bradley to uphold award of attorney’s fees under statute passed after the services had been rendered but while case was still pending); Youakim, 425 U. S., at 237 (per curiam) (remanding for reconsideration of constitutional claim for injunctive relief in light of intervening state regulations) (citing Thorpe)-, Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 77 (1976) (stating that Bradley warranted application of intervening statute transferring to administrative agency jurisdiction over claim for injunctive relief); Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 101-102 (1974) (reviewing obscenity conviction in light of subsequent First Amendment decision of this Court) (citing Bradley), California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21,49, n. 21 (1974) (in action for injunction against enforcement of banking disclosure statute, citing Thorpe for proposition that Court should consider constitutional question in light of regulations issued after commencement of suit); Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Inc., 404 U. S. 412, 414 (1972) (citing Thorpe in holding that intervening repeal of a state tax exemption for certain church property rendered “inappropriate” petitioner’s request for injunctive relief based on the Establishment Clause); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 419 (1971) (refusing to remand to agency under Thorpe for administrative findings required by new regulation because administrative record was already adequate for judicial review); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969) (in action for injunctive relief from state election statute, citing Thorpe as authority for considering intervening amendment of statute). As the Court of Appeals recognized, however, the promulgation of a new jury trial rule would ordinarily not warrant retrial of cases that had previously been tried to a judge. See n. 29, supra. Thus, customary practice would not support remand for a jury trial in this case. As petitioner and amici suggest, concerns of unfair surprise and upsetting expectations are attenuated in the case of intentional employment discrimination, which has been unlawful for more than a generation. However, fairness concerns would not be entirely absent if the damages provisions of § 102 were to apply to events preceding its enactment, as the facts of this case illustrate. Respondent USI’s management, when apprised of the wrongful conduct of petitioner's co-worker, took timely action to remedy the problem. The law then in effect imposed no liability on an employer who corrected discriminatory work conditions before the conditions became so severe as to result in the victim’s constructive discharge. Assessing damages against respondents on a theory of respondeat superior would thus entail an element of surprise. Even when the conduct in question is morally reprehensible or illegal, a degree of unfairness is inherent whenever the law imposes additional burdens based on conduct that occurred in the past. Cf. Weaver, 450 U. S., at 28-30 (Ex Post Facto Clause assures fair notice and governmental restraint, and does not turn on “an individual’s right to less punishment”). The new damages provisions of § 102 can be expected to give managers an added incentive to take preventive measures to ward off discriminatory conduct by subordinates before it occurs, but that purpose is not served by applying the regime to preenactment conduct. The state courts have consistently held that statutes changing or abolishing limits on the amount of damages available in wrongful-death actions should not, in the absence of clear legislative intent, apply to actions arising before their enactment. See, e. g., Dempsey v. State, 451 A. 2d 273 (R. I. 1982) (“Every court which has considered the issue . . . has found that a subsequent change as to the amount or the elements of damage in the wrongful-death statute to be substantive rather than procedural or remedial, and thus any such change must be applied prospectively”); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 224 Kan. 437, 444, 581 P. 2d 372, 378 (1978) (holding, in accord with the “great weight of authority,” that “an increase, decrease or repeal of the statutory maximum recoverable in wrongful death actions is not retroactive” and thus should not apply in a case arising before the statute’s enactment) (emphasis in original); Bradley v. Knutson, 62 Wis. 2d 432, 436, 215 N. W. 2d 369, 371 (1974) (refusing to apply increase in cap on damages for wrongful death to misconduct occurring before effective date; “statutory increases in damage[s] limitations are actually changes in substantive rights and not mere remedial changes”); State ex rel. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Buder, 515 S. W. 2d 409, 411 (Mo. 1974) (statute removing wrongful-death liability limitation construed not to apply to preenactment conduct; “an act or transaction, to which certain legal effects were ascribed at the time they transpired, should not, without cogent reasons, thereafter be subject to a different set of effects which alter the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto”); Mihoy v. Proulx, 113 N. H. 698, 701, 313 A. 2d 723, 725 (1973) (“To apply the increased limit after the date of the accident would clearly enlarge the defendant’s liability retrospectively. In the absence of an express provision, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended retrospective application”). ' See also Fann v. McGuffy, 534 S. W. 2d 770, 774, n. 19 (Ky. 1975); Muckier v. Buchl, 150 N. W. 2d 689, 697 (Minn. 1967). We have sometimes said that new “remedial” statutes, like new “procedural” ones, should presumptively apply to pending cases. See, e. g., Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S., at 71, and n. 38 (“Clearly, § 1404(a) is a remedial provision applicable to pending actions”); Beazell, 269 U. S., at 171 (Ex Post Facto Clause does not limit “legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance”). While that statement holds true for some kinds of remedies, see swpra, at 273-274 (discussing prospective relief), we have not classified a statute introducing damages liability as the sort of “remedial” change that should presumptively apply in pending cases. “Retroactive modification” of damages remedies may “normally harbo[r] much less potential for mischief than retroactive changes in the principles of liability,” Hastings v. Earth Satellite Corp., 628 F. 2d 85, 93 (CADC), cert, denied, 449 U. S. 905 (1980), but that potential is nevertheless still significant. Petitioner argues that our decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60 (1992), supports application of § 102 to her case. Relying on the principle that “where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong,’ ” id., at 66 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946)), we held in Franklin that the right of action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 included a claim for damages. Petitioner argues that Franklin supports her position because, if she cannot obtain damages pursuant to § 102, she will be left remediless despite an adjudged violation of her right under Title VII to be free of workplace discrimination. However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not a statute to which we would apply the “traditional presumption in favor of all available remedies.” 503 U. S., at 72. That statute did not create a “general right to sue” for employment discrimination, but instead specified a set of “circumscribed remedies.” See United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. 229, 240 (1992). Until the 1991 amendment, the Title VII scheme did not allow for damages. We are not free to fashion remedies that Congress has specifically chosen not to extend. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 97 (1981). [This opinion applies also to Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 92-938, post, p. 298.]

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AMERICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE, INC., et al. v. DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, et al. No. 79-1429. Argued January 21, 1981 Decided June 17, 1981 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 541. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., joined, post, p. 543. Powell, J., took no part in the decision of the cases. Robert H. Bork argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc., et al. were Neil J. King, A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Robert T. Thompson, Samuel K. Abrams, H. J. Elam III, Neil W. Koonce, Dan M. Byrd, Jr., Thomas A. Evins, Roger L. Tuttle, Lovic A. Brooks, Jr., Richard H. Monk, Jr., and C. Powers Dorsett. Charles M. Crump filed briefs for petitioner National Cotton Council of America. Deputy Solicitor General Getter argued the cause for the federal respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Barry Sullivan, Benjamin W. Mintz, Allen H. Feldman, Dennis K. Kade, Diane E. Burkley, and John A. Bryson. George H. Cohen argued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al., respondents in both cases under this Court’s Rule 19.6. With him on the brief were Robert M. Weinberg, Jeremiah A. Collins, Laurence Gold, J. Albert Woll, Elliot Bredhoff, and Arthur IN. Goldberg. Together with No. 79-1583, National Cotton Council of America v. Donovan, Secretary of Labor, et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert C. Barnard, Richard DeC. Hinds, and R. Bruce Dickson for the American Industrial Health Council; and by Stephen A. Bokat and Stanley T. Kdleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. J. Davitt McAteer and John A. Pillion filed a brief for the Brown Lung Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Allen A. Lauterbach and C. David Mayfield for the American Farm Bureau Federation; by Jerome Powell, W. Scott Railton, Barton C. Green, and David Berber for the American Iron and Steel Institute; by William J. Kilberg, Stephen E. Tallent, and H. Frederick Tepker for ASARCO Inc.; by Edwin H. Seeger and William F. Boyd for Bunker Hill Co.; and by J. Gordon Arbuckle and David B. Robinson for the Chocolate Manufacturers Association. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions . . . .” § 2 (b), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportunity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the workplace. 29 U. S. C. §§655 (a), (b). In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a “constellation of respiratory effects” known as “byssinosis.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27352, col. 3 (1978). This disease was one of the expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of the Act. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, p. 143 (Comm. Print 1971) (Leg. Hist.). Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the “Cotton Dust Standard” in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the Secretary of Labor and two labor organizations, counter that Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, and that the Act should therefore be construed not to require OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating that OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 54, 617 F. 2d 636 (1979). We granted certiorari, 449 U. S. 817 (1980), to resolve this important question, which was presented but not decided in last Term’s Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607 (1980), and to decide other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard. I Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as “brown lung” disease, is a serious and potentially disabling respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit 6-16, App. 15-22. Byssinosis is a “continuum . . . disease,” 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, col. 2 (1978), that has been categorized into four grades. In its least serious form, byssinosis produces both subjective symptoms, such as chest tightness, shortness of breath, coughing, and wheezing, and objective indications of loss of pulmonary functions. Id., at 27352, col. 2. In its most serious form, byssinosis is a chronic and irreversible obstructive pulmonary disease, clinically similar to chronic bronchitis or emphysema, and can be severely disabling. Ibid. At worst, as is true of other respiratory diseases including bronchitis, emphysema, and asthma, byssino-sis can create an additional strain on cardiovascular functions and can contribute to death from heart failure. See Exhibit 6-73, App. 72 (“there is an association between mortality and the extent of dust exposure”). One authority has described the increasing seriousness of byssinosis as follows: “In the first few years of exposure [to cotton dust], symptoms occur on Monday, or other days after absence from the work environment; later, symptoms occur on other days of the week; and eventually, symptoms are continuous, even in the absence of dust exposure.” A. Bouhuys, Byssinosis in the United States, Exhibit 6-16, App. 15. While there is some uncertainty over the manner in which the disease progresses from its least serious to its disabling grades, it is likely that prolonged exposure contributes to the progression. 43 Fed. Reg. 27354, cols. 1 and 2 (1978); Exhibit 6-27, App. 26; Exhibit 11, App. 162. It also appears that a worker may suddenly contract a severe grade without experiencing milder grades of the disease. Exhibit 41, App. 192. Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12 such workers, suffer from the most disabling form of byssinosis. 43 Fed. Reg. 27353, col. 3 (1978); Exhibit 124, App. 347. The Senate Report accompanying the Act cited estimates that 100,000 active and retired workers suffer from some grade of the disease. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Leg. Hist. 143. One study found that over 25% of a sample of active cotton-preparation and yarn-manufacturing workers suffer at least some form of the disease at a dust exposure level common prior to adoption of the current Standard. 43 Fed. Reg. 27355, col. 3 (1978) ; Exhibit 6-51, App. 44. Other studies confirm these general findings on the prevalence of byssinosis. See, e. g., Ct. of App. J. A. 3683; Ex. 6-56, id., at 376-385. Not until the early 1960’s was byssinosis recognized in the United States as a distinct occupational hazard associated with cotton mills. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, supra, at 3, Leg. Hist. 143. In 1966, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a private organization, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust be limited to a “threshold limit value” of 1,000 micrograms per cubic meter of air (1,000 /xg/m3) averaged over an 8-hour workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1 (1978). The United States Government first regulated exposure to cotton dust in 1968, when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U. S. C. § 35 (e), promulgated airborne contaminant threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that included the 1,000 /xg/m3 limit for total cotton dust. 34 Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969). Following passage of the Act in 1970, the 1,000 /xg/m3 standard was adopted as an “established Federal standard” under § 6 (a) of the Act, 84 Stat. 1593, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate protection of workers for the period between enactment of the statute and promulgation of permanent standards. In 1974, ACGIH, adopting a new measurement unit of respirable rather than total dust, lowered its previous exposure limit recommendation to 200 pg/m3 measured by a vertical elutriator, a device that measures cotton dust particles 15 microns or less in diameter. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1, 27355, col. 2 (1978). That same year, the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), pursuant to the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 669 (a)(3), 671 (d)(2), submitted to the Secretary of Labor a recommendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible exposure limit, (PEL) that “should be set at the lowest level feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as high as 0.2 mg lint-free cotton dust/cu m,” or 200 pg/m3 of lint-free respirable dust. Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11; 41 Fed. Reg. 56500, col. 1 (1976). Several months later, OSHA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 Fed. Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from interested parties on the NIOSH recommendation and other related matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile Worker’s Union of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest Research Group, petitioned the Secretary, urging a more stringent PEL of 100 /¿g/ms. On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to replace the existing federal standard on cotton dust with a new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5). 41 Fed. Reg. 56498. The proposed standard contained a PEL of 200 /¿g/m3 of vertical elutriated lint-free respirable cotton dust for all segments of the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implementation strategy for achieving the PEL that relied on respirators for the short term and engineering controls for the long term. Id., at 56506, cols. 2 and 3. OSHA invited interested parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period. Following the comment period, OSHA conducted three hearings in Washington, D. C., Greenville, Miss., and Lubbock, Tex., that lasted over 14 days. Public participation was widespread, involving representatives from industry and the work force, scientists, economists, industrial hygienists, and many others. By the time the informal rulemaking procedure had terminated, OSHA had received 263 comments and 109 notices of intent to appear at the hearings. 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 2 (1978). The voluminous record, composed of a transcript of written and oral testimony, exhibits, and posthearing comments and briefs, totaled some 105,000 pages. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 65, 617 F. 2d, at 647. OSHA issued its final Cotton Dust Standard — the one challenged in the instant case — on June 23, 1978. Along with an accompanying statement of findings and reasons, the Standard occupied 69 pages of the Federal Register. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350-27418 (1978); see 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (1980). The Cotton Dust Standard promulgated by OSHA establishes mandatory PEL’s over an 8-hour period of 200 /¿g/m3 for yarn manufacturing, 750 /¿g/m3 for slashing and weaving operations, and 500 ng/m3 for all other processes in the cotton industry. 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c) (1980). These levels represent a relaxation of the proposed PEL of 200 /¿g/m3 for all segments of the cotton industry. OSHA chose an implementation strategy for the Standard that depended primarily on a mix of engineering controls, such as installation of ventilation systems, and work practice controls, such as special floor-sweeping procedures. Full compliance with the PEL’s is required within four years, except to the extent that employers can establish that the engineering and work practice controls are infeasible. § 1910.1043 (e)(1). During this compliance period, and at certain other times, the Standard requires employers to provide respirators to employees. § 1910.1043 (f). Other requirements include monitoring of cotton dust exposure, medical surveillance of all employees, annual medical examinations, employee education and training programs, and the posting of warning signs. A specific provision also under challenge in the instant case requires employers to transfer employees unable to wear respirators to another position, if available, having a dust level at or below the Standard’s PEL’s, with “no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits as a result of the transfer.” § 1910.1043 (f) (2) (v)s. On the basis of the evidence in the record as a whole, the Secretary determined that exposure to cotton dust represents a “significant health hazard to employees,” 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1 (1978), and that “the prevalence of byssinosis should be significantly reduced” by the adoption of the Standard’s PEL’s, id., at 27359, col. 3. In assessing the health risks from cotton dust and the risk reduction obtained from lowered exposure, OSHA relied particularly on data showing a strong linear relationship between the prevalence of byssinosis and the concentration of lint-free respirable cotton dust. Id., at 27355-27359; Exhibit 6-51, App. 29-55. See also Ex. 6-17, Ct. of App. J. A. 235-245; Ex. 38D, id., at 1492-1839. Even at the 200 /¿g/m3 PEL, OSHA found that the prevalence of at least Grade % byssinosis would be 13% of all employees in the yarn manufacturing sector. 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, cols. 2 and 3 (1978). In promulgating the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA interpreted the Act to require adoption of the most stringent standard to protect against material health impairment, bounded only by technological and economic feasibility. Id., at 27361, col. 3. OSHA therefore rejected the industry’s alternative proposal for a PEL of 500 ng/m3 in yarn manufacturing, a proposal which would produce a 25% prevalence of at least Grade % byssinosis. The agency expressly found the Standard to be both technologically and economically feasible based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Although recognizing that permitted levels of exposure to cotton dust would still cause some byssinosis, OSHA nevertheless rejected the union proposal for a 100 yg/m3 PEL because it was not within the “technological capabilities of the industry.” Id., at 27359-27360. Similarly, OSHA set PEL’s for some segments of the cotton industry at 500 yg/m3 in part because of limitations of technological feasibility. Id., at 27361, col. 3. Finally, the Secretary found that “engineering dust controls in weaving may not be feasible even with massive expenditures by the industry,” id., at 27360, col. 2, and for that and other reasons adopted a less stringent PEL of 750 yg/m3 for weaving and slashing. The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major respects. The court rejected the industry’s claim that OSHA failed to consider its proposed alternative or give sufficient reasons for failing to adopt it. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 70-72, 617 F. 2d, at 652-654. The court also held that the Standard was “reasonably necessary and appropriate” within the meaning of § 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), because of the risk of material health impairment caused by exposure to cotton dust. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 72-73, and n. 83, 617 F. 2d, át 65A-655, and n. 83. Rejecting the industry position that OSHA must demonstrate that the benefits of the Standard are proportionate to its costs, the court instead agreed with OSHA’s interpretation that the Standard must protect employees against material health impairment subject only to the limits of technological and economic feasibility. Id., at 80-84, 617 F. 2d, at 662-666. The court held that “Congress itself struck the balance between costs and benefits in the mandate to the agency” under § 6 (b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5), and that OSHA is powerless to circumvent that judgment by adopting less than the most protective feasible standard. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 81, 617 F. 2d, at 663. Finally, the court held that the agency’s determination of technological and economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Id., at 73-80, 617 F. 2d, at 655-662. We affirm in part, and vacate in part. II The principal question presented in these cases is whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary, in promulgating a standard pursuant to § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5), to determine that the costs of the standard bear a reasonable relationship to its benefits. Relying on §§ 6 (b)(5) and 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §§655 (b)(5) and 652 (8), petitioners urge not only that OSHA must show that a standard addresses a significant risk of materiál health impairment, see Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 639 (plurality opinion), but also that OSHA must demonstrate that the reduction in risk of material health impairment is significant in light of the costs of attaining that reduction. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, pp. 38-41 Respondents on the other hand contend that the Act requires OSHA to promulgate standards that eliminate or reduce such risks “to the extent such protection is technologically and economically feasible.” Brief for Federal Respondent 38; Brief for Union Respondents 26-27. To resolve this debate, we must turn to the language, structure, and legislative history of the Act. A The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute itself. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U. S. 91, 97 (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979). Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §655 (b)(5) (emphasis added), provides: “The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.” Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that the phrase “to the extent feasible” contains the critical language in § 6 (b)(5) for purposes of these cases. The plain meaning of the word “feasible” supports respondents’ interpretation of the statute. According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 831 (1976), “feasible” means “capable of being done, executed, or effected.” Accord, the Oxford English Dictionary 116 (1933) (“Capable of being done, accomplished or carried out”); Funk & Wagnalls New “Standard” Dictionary of the English Language 903 (1957) (“That may be done, performed or effected”). Thus, § 6 (b)(5) directs the Secretary to issue the standard that “most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health,” limited only by the extent to which this is “capable of being done.” In effect then, as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by placing the “benefit” of worker health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this “benefit” unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in §6 (b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 718-719 (Marshall, J., dissenting). When Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute. One early example is the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U. S. C. § 701: “[T] he Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise, adversely affected.” (Emphasis added.) A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U. S. C. § 1347 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), providing that offshore drilling operations shall use “the best available and safest technologies which the Secretary determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a significant effect on safety, health, or the environment, except where the Secretary determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of using such technologies.” These and other statutes demonstrate that Congress uses specific language when intending that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, at 710, n. 27 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Certainly in light of its ordinary meaning, the word “feasible” cannot be construed to articulate such congressional intent. We therefore reject the argument that Congress required cost-benefit analysis in § 6 (b)(5). B Even though the plain language of §6 (b)(5) supports this construction, we must still decide whether §3 (8), the general definition of an occupational safety and health standard, either alone or in tandem with § 6 (b)(5), incorporates a cost-benefit requirement for standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Section 3 (8) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8) (emphasis added), provides: “The term ‘occupational safety and health standard’ means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.” Taken alone, the phrase “reasonably necessary or appropriate” might be construed to contemplate some balancing of the costs and benefits of a standard. Petitioners urge that, so construed, § 3 (8) engrafts a cost-benefit analysis requirement on the issuance of § 6 (b)(5) standards, even if § 6 (b) (5) itself does not authorize such analysis. We need not decide whether §3(8), standing alone, would contemplate some form of cost-benefit analysis. For even if it does, Congress specifically chose in § 6 (b) (5) to impose separate and additional requirements for issuance of a subcategory of occupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents: it required that those standards be issued to prevent material impairment of health to the extent feasible. Congress could reasonably have concluded that health standards should be subject to different criteria than safety standards because of the special problems presented in regulating them. See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 649, n. 54 (plurality opinion). Agreement with petitioners’ argument that § 3 (8) imposes an additional and overriding requirement of cost-benefit analysis on the issuance of § 6 (b) (5) standards would eviscerate the “to the extent feasible” requirement. Standards would inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by § 6 (b)(5). For example, if cost-benefit analysis indicated a protective standard of 1,000 /ig/m3 PEL, while feasibility analysis indicated a 500 pg/ms PEL, the agency would be forced by the cost-benefit requirement to choose the less stringent point. We cannot believe that Congress intended the general terms of § 3 (8) to countermand the specific feasibility requirement of §6 (b)(5). Adoption of petitioners’ interpretation would effectively write § 6 (b) (5) out of the Act. We decline to render Congress’ decision to include a feasibility requirement nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled rule that all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect. E. g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S., at 339; Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U. S. 609, 633-634 (1973); Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 303, 307-308 (1961). Congress did not contemplate any further balancing by the agency for toxic material and harmful physical agents standards, and we should not “ ‘impute to Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other.’ ” Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., supra, at 631, quoting Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480, 489 (1947). c The legislative history of the Act, while concededly not crystal clear, provides general support for respondents’ interpretation of the Act. The congressional Reports and debates certainly confirm that Congress meant “feasible” and nothing else in using that term. Congress was concerned that the Act might be thought to require achievement of absolute safety, an impossible standard, and therefore insisted that health and safety goals be capable of economic and technological accomplishment. Perhaps most telling is the absence of any indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a toxic material or harmful physical agent standard. The legislative history demonstrates conclusively that Congress was fully aware that the Act would impose real and substantial costs of compliance on industry, and believed that such costs were part of the cost of doing business. We thus turn to the relevant portions of the legislative history. Neither the original Senate bill, S. 2193, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), introduced by Senator Williams, nor the original House bill, H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), introduced by Representative Daniels, included specific provisions controlling the issuance of standards governing toxic materials and harmful physical agents, Leg. Hist. 1, 6-7 (Williams bill); 721, 728-732 (Daniels bill), although both contained the definitional section enacted as § 3 (8). The House Committee on Education and Labor, to which the Daniels bill was referred, reported out an amended bill that included the following section: “The Secretary, in promulgating standards under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, on the basis of the best available professional evidence, that no employee will suffer any impairment of health or functional capacity, or diminished life expectancy even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1291, p. 4 (1970) (to accompany H. R. 16785), Leg. Hist. 834. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, reporting on the Williams bill, included a provision virtually identical to the House version, except for the additional requirement that the Secretary set the standard “which most adequately and feasibly assures . . . that no employee will suffer any impairment of health.” Id., at 242 (the Senate provision was numbered § 6 (b) (5)) (emphasis added). This addition to the Williams bill was offered by Senator Javits, who explained his amendment: “As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of proposed standards. This is an improvement over the Daniels bill [as reported out of the House Committee], which might be interpreted to require absolute health and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the Administration bill, which contains no criteria for standards at all.” S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 58 (1970), Leg. Hist. 197 (emphasis added). Thus the Senator’s concern was that a standard might require “absolute health and safety” without any consideration as to whether such a condition was achievable. The full Senate Committee also noted that standards promulgated under this provision “shall represent feasible requirements,” S. Rep. No. 91-1282, at 7, Leg. Hist. 147, and commented that “[s]uch standards should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no employee will suffer impaired health . . . ,” ibid. (emphasis added). The final amendments to this Senate provision, resulting in § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, were proposed and adopted on the Senate floor after the Committee reported out the bill. Senator Dominick, who played a prominent role in this amendment process, see 116 Cong. Rec. 37631 (1970), Leg. Hist. 526 (comments of Sen. Javits); 116 Cong. Rec., at 37631, Leg. Hist. 527 (comments of Sen. Williams), continued to be concerned that the Act might be read to require absolute safety. He therefore proposed that the entire first sentence of § 6 (b)(5) be struck, explaining: “This requirement is inherently confusing and unrealistic. It could be read to require the Secretary to ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case of all occupations, it will be impossible to eliminate all risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria could, if literally applied, close every business in this nation. In addition, in many cases, the standard which might most 'adequately’ and 'feasibly’ assure the elimination of the danger would be the prohibition of the occupation itself.” Leg. Hist. 367 (comments of Sen. Dominick on his proposed amendment No. 1054) (emphasis in original). In the ensuing floor debate on this issue, Senator Dominick reiterated his concern that “[i]t is unrealistic to attempt, as [the Committee’s §6 (b)(5)] apparently does, to establish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is an impossibility . . . .” 116 Cong. Rec. 37614 (1970), Leg. Hist. 480. The Senator concluded: “Any administrator responsible for enforcing the statute will be faced with an impossible choice. Either he must forbid employment in all occupations where there is any risk of injury, even if the technical state of the art could not remove the hazard, or he must ignore the mandate of Congress . . . .” 116 Cong. Rec., at 37614, Leg. Hist. 481-482. Senator Dominick failed in his efforts to have the first sentence of § 6 (b) (5) deleted. However, after working with Senators Williams and Javits, he introduced an amended version of the first sentence which he thought was “agreeable to all” and which became § 6 (b) (5) as it now appears in the Act. 116 Cong. Rec., at 37622, Leg. Hist. 502. This amendment limited the applicability of § 6 (b)(5) to “toxic materials and harmful physical agents,” changed “health impairment” to “material impairment of health,” and deleted the reference to “diminished life expectancy.” Significantly, the feasibility requirement was left intact in the statute. Instead of the phrase “which most adequately and feasibly assures,” the amendment merely substituted “which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible,” to emphasize that the feasibility requirement operated as a limit on the promulgation of standards under § 6 (b) (5). Senator Dominick believed that his modifications made clearer that attainment of an absolutely safe working environment could not be achieved through “prohibition of the occupation itself,” Leg. Hist. 367, and that toxic material and harmful physical agent standards should not address frivolous harms that exist in every workplace. The feasibility requirement, along with the need for a “material impairment of health,” were thus thought to satisfy these two concerns. He explained the effect of the amendment: “What we were trying to do in the bill — unfortunately, we did not have the proper wording or the proper drafting — was to say that when we are dealing with toxic agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps as are feasible and practical to provide an atmosphere within which a person’s health or safety would not be affected. Unfortunately, we had language providing that anyone would be assured that no one would have a hazard . . . .” 116 Cong. Rec. 37622 (1970), Leg. Hist. 502. Senator Williams added that the amendment “will provide a continued direction to the Secretary that he shall be required to set the standard which most adequately and to the greatest extent feasible assures” that no employee will suffer any material health impairment. 116 Cong. Rec., at 37622, Leg. Hist. 503. The Senate thereafter passed S. 2193. One week later, the House passed a substitute bill which failed to contain any substantive criteria for the issuance of health standards in place of its original bill. 116 Cong. Rec., at 38716-38717, Leg. Hist. 1094-1096. At the joint House-Senate Conference, however, the House conferees acceded to the Senate’s version of § 6 (b)(5). Not only does the legislative history confirm that Congress meant “feasible” rather than “cost-benefit” when it used the former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that the Act would create substantial costs for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe and healthful working environment. Congress viewed the costs of health and safety as a cost of doing business. Senator Yarborough, a cosponsor of the Williams bill, stated: “We know the costs would be put into consumer goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in America.” 116 Cong. Rec., at 37345, Leg. Hist. 444. He asked: “One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too expensive for the company who for lack of proper safety equipment loses the services of its skilled employees? Is it too expensive for the employee who loses his hand or leg or eyesight? Is it too expensive for the widow trying to raise her children on meager allowance under workmen’s compensation and social security? And what about the man — a good hardworking man — tied to a wheel chair or hospital bed for the rest of his life? That is what we are dealing with when we talk about industrial safety. “We are talking about people’s lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants.” 116 Cong. Rec., at 37625, Leg. Hist. 510. Senator Eagleton commented that “[tjhe costs that will be incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and safety to be established under this bill are, in my view, reasonable and necessary costs of doing business.” 116 Cong. Rec., at 41764, Leg. Hist. 1150-1151 (emphasis added). Other Members of Congress voiced similar views. Nowhere is there any indication that Congress contemplated a different balancing by OSHA of the benefits of worker health and safety against the costs of achieving them. Indeed Congress thought that the financial costs of health and safety problems in the workplace were as large as or larger than the financial costs of eliminating these problems. In its statement of findings and declaration of purpose encompassed in the Act itself, Congress announced that “personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments.” 29 U. S. C. § 651 (a). The Senate was well aware of the magnitude of these costs: “[T]he economic impact of industrial deaths and disability is staggering. Over $1.5 billion is wasted in lost wages, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product is estimated to be over $8 billion. Vast resources that could be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay workmen’s compensation benefits and medical expenses.” S. Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 2 (1970), Leg. Hist. 142. Senator Eagleton summarized: “Whether we, as individuals, are motivated by simple humanity or by simple economics, we can no longer permit profits to be dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite.” 116 Cong. Rec. 41764 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1150-1151. Ill Section 6 (f) of the Act provides that “[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.” 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f). Petitioners contend that the Secretary’s determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is “economically feasible” is not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. In particular, they claim (1) that OSHA underestimated the financial costs necessary to meet the Standard’s requirements; and (2) that OSHA incorrectly found that the Standard would not threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry. In statutes with provisions virtually identical to § 6 (f) of the Act, we have defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 477 (1951). The reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence in the record, id., at 487-488, but “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence,” Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966). Since the Act places responsibility for determining substantial evidence questions in the courts of appeals, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), we apply the familiar rule that “[t]his Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the [substantial evidence] standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied” by the court below. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supra, at 491; see Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283, 292, 310 (1974); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U. S. 396, 400-401 (1958). Therefore, our inquiry is not to determine whether we, in the first instance, would find OSHA’s findings supported by substantial evidence. Instead we turn to OSHA’s findings and the record upon which they were based to decide whether the Court of Appeals “misapprehended or grossly misapplied” the substantial evidence test. A OSHA derived its cost estimate for industry compliance with the Cotton Dust Standard after reviewing two financial analyses, one prepared by the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an OSHA-contracted group, the other by industry representatives (Hocutt-Thomas) . The agency carefully explored the assumptions and methodologies underlying the conclusions of each of these studies. From this exercise the agency was able to build upon conclusions from each which it found reliable and explain its process for choosing its cost estimate. A brief summary of OSHA’s treatment of the two studies follows. OSHA rejected RTFs cost estimate of $1.1 billion for textile industry engineering controls for three principal reasons. First, OSHA believed that RTI’s estimate should be discounted by 30%, 43 Fed. Reg. 27372, col. 3 (1978), because that estimate was based on the assumption that engineering controls would be applied to all equipment in mills, including those processing pure synthetic fibers, even though cotton dust is not generated by such equipment. RTI had observed that “[ejxclusion of equipment processing man-made fibers only could reduce these costs by as much as 30 percent.” Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 585. Since the Standard did not require controls on synthetics-only equipment, OSHA rejected RTI’s assumption about application of controls to synthetics-only machines. 43 Fed. Reg. 27371, col. 3 (1978). Second, OSHA concluded that RTI “may have over-estimated compliance costs since some operations are already in compliance with the permissible exposure limit of the new standard.” Id., at 27370, cols. 2 and 3. Evidence indicated that some mills had attained PEL’s of 200 pg/m3 or less, while others were below the 1,000 pg/m3 total dust level. Therefore, OSHA disagreed with RTI’s assumption that the industry had not reduced cotton dus.t exposure below the existing standard’s 1,000 pg/m3 total dust PEL. Id., at 27370, col. 3. Third, OSHA found that the RTI study suffered from lack of recent accurate industry data. Id., at 27373, col. 1; see Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 858; Ex. 16., id., at 1357, 1359. In light of these deficiencies in the RTI study, OSHA adopted the Hocutt-Thomas estimate for textile industry engineering controls of $543 million, emphasizing that, because it was based on the most recent industry data, it was more realistic than RTI’s estimate. 43 Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 1 (1978). Nevertheless OSHA concluded that the Hocutt-Thomas estimate was overstated for four principal reasons. First, Hocutt-Thomas included costs of achieving the existing PEL of 1,000 yg/m3, while OSHA thought it likely that compliance was more widespread and that some mills had in fact achieved the final standard’s PEL. Ibid.; see n. 43, supra. Second, Hocutt-Thomas declined to make any allowance for the trend toward replacement of existing production machines with newer more productive equipment. Relying on this “[njatural production tren[d],” 43 Fed. Reg. 27359, col. 1 (1978), OSHA concluded that fewer machines than estimated by Hocutt-Thomas would require retrofitting or other controls, id., at 27372, col. 3. Third, OSHA thought that Hocutt-Thomas failed to take into account development of new technologies likely to occur during the 4-year compliance period. Ibid. Fourth, OSHA believed that Hocutt-Thomas might have improperly included control costs for synthetics-only machines, ibid., an inclusion which could result in a 30% cost overestimate. Petitioners criticize OSHA’s adoption of the Hocutt-Thomas estimate, since that estimate was based on achievement of somewhat less stringent PEL’s than those ultimately promulgated in the final Standard. Thus, even if the Hocutt-Thomas estimate was exaggerated, they assert that “only by the most remarkable coincidence would the amount of that overestimate be equal to the additional costs required to attain the far more stringent limits of the Standard OSHA actually adopted.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 27; see Brief for Petitioner in No. 79-1583, pp. 14-15. The agency itself recognized the problem cited by petitioners, but found itself limited in the precision of its estimates by the industry’s refusal to make more of its own data available. OSHA explained that, “in the absence of the [industry] survey data [of textile mills], OSHA cannot develop more accurate estimates of compliance costs.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27373, col. 1 (1978). Since § 6 (b)(5) of the Act requires that the Secretary promulgate toxic material and harmful physical agent standards “on the basis of the best available evidence,” 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5), and since OSHA could not obtain the more detailed confidential industry data it thought essential to further precision, we conclude that the agency acted reasonably in adopting the Hocutt-Thomas estimate. While a cost estimate based on the standard actually promulgated surely would be preferable, we decline to hold as a matter of law that its absence under the circumstances required the Court of Appeals to find that OSHA’s determination was unsupported by substantial evidence. Therefore, whether or not in the first instance we would find the Secretary’s conclusions supported by substantial evidence, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals in this case “misapprehended or grossly misapplied” the substantial evidence test when it found that “OSHA reasonably evaluated the cost estimates before it, considered criticisms of each, and selected suitable estimates of compliance costs.” 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 79, 617 F. 2d, at 661 (footnote omitted). B After estimating the cost of compliance with the Cotton Dust Standard, OSHA analyzed whether it was “economically feasible” for the cotton industry to bear this cost. OSHA concluded that it was, finding that “although some marginal employers may shut down rather than comply, the industry as a whole will not be threatened by the capital requirements of the regulation.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2 (1978); see id., at 27379, col. 3 (“compliance with the standard is well within the financial capability of the covered industries”). In reaching this conclusion on the Standard’s economic impact, OSHA made specific findings with respect to employment, energy consumption, capital financing availability, and profitability. Id., at 27377-27378. To support its findings, the agency relied primarily on RTI’s comprehensive investigation of the Standard’s economic impact. RTI evaluated the likely economic impact on the cotton industry and the United States’ economy of OSHA’s original proposed standard, an across-the-board 200 yg/m3 PEL. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 626. RTI had estimated a total compliance cost of $2.7 billion for a 200 yg/m3 PEL, and used this estimate in assessing the economic impact of such a standard. Id., at 736-737. As described in n. 44, supra, OSHA estimated total compliance costs of $656.5 million for the final Cotton Dust Standard, a standard less stringent than the across-the-board 200 a*g/m3 PEL of the proposed standard. Therefore, the agency found that the economic impact of its Standard would be “much less severe” than that suggested by RTI for a 200 y g/m3 PEL estimate of $2.7 billion. 43 Fed. Reg. 27378, col. 2 (1978). Nevertheless, it is instructive to review RTI’s conclusions with respect to the economic impact of a $2.7 billion cost estimate. RTI found: “Implementation of the proposed [200 /¿g/m3] standard will require adjustments within the cotton textile industry that will take time to work themselves out and that may be difficult for many firms. In time, however, prices may be expected to rise and markets to adjust so that revenues will cover costs. Although the impact on any one firm cannot be specified in advance, nothing in the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile industry as a whole will be seriously threatened by the impact of the proposed standard for control of cotton dust exposure.” Ex. 16, Ct. of App. J. A. 1380; id., at 3620. In reaching this conclusion, RTI analyzed the total and annual economic impact on each of the different sectors of the cotton industry. For example, in yam production (opening through spinning), RTI found that the total additional capital requirement per dollar of industry shipment was 7.8 cents, and that the corresponding annual requirement was 1.9 cents. Ex. 6-76, id., at 729. Average price increases necessary to maintain prestandard rates of return on investment were estimated to range from 0.22 cents to 6.25 cents per dollar of industry sales. Ibid. Even assuming no price increases, only one of the six yarn-producing operations would experience a negative rate of return on investment, while the five other rates of return would range from 1.4% to 3.9%. Id., at 652. RTI estimated the average prestandard rate of return for the yarn-producing sector as 4.1%, Ibid. Through an output demand elasticity analysis, RTI determined that price increases necessitated by the 200 yg/m3 standard would result in a 1.68% contraction of cottonyarn consumption. Id., at 685; see id., at 680-687. RTI also discussed the effects of such price increases on interfiber and domestic/foreign competition. RTI observed that “non-price factors have probably dominated” the competition between cotton and manmade fibers. Id., at 623, 948-953. Noting that international trade agreements restricting foreign imports of textile products “have tended to smother the effects of a small change in the relative prices of domestic versus foreign textile products,” id., at 622, RTI concluded that such small changes have had “very little impact” on domestic industries and markets, id., at 961; see id., at 954-961. In order to measure the ability of different sized textile companies to finance compliance costs, RTI constructed a ratio of capital requirements to profit after taxes. RTI found that two of the six yarn production operations would have financing difficulties, but that such difficulties decreased as company size increased. Id., at 730. Finally, impacts on energy costs, employment, inflation, and market structure were evaluated. See id., at 728-731. Relying on its comprehensive economic evaluation of the cotton industry’s ability to absorb the $2.7 billion compliance cost of a 200 jug/m3 PEL standard, RTI concluded that “nothing in the RTI study indicates that the cotton textile industry as a whole will be seriously threatened.” Ex. 16, id., at 1380. Therefore, it follows a fortiori that OSHA’s estimated compliance cost of $656.6 million is “economically feasible.” Even if OSHA’s estimate was understated, we are fortified in observing that RTI found that a standard more than four times as costly was nevertheless economically feasible. The Court of Appeals found that the agency “explained the economic impact it projected for the textile industry,” and that OSHA has “substantial support in the record for its . . . findings of economic feasibility for the textile industry.” 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 80, 617 F. 2d, at 662. On the basis of the whole record, we cannot conclude that the Court of Appeals “misapprehended or grossly misapplied” the substantial evidence test. IV The final Cotton Dust Standard places heavy reliance on the use of respirators to protect employees from exposure to cotton dust, particularly during the 4-year interim period necessary to install and implement feasible engineering controls. One part of the respirator provision requires the employer to give employees unable to wear a respirator the opportunity to transfer to another position, if available, where the dust level meets the Standard’s PEL. 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f)(2) (v) (1980). When such a transfer occurs, the employer must guarantee that the employee suffers no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits. Petitioners do not object to the transfer provision, but challenge OSHA’s authority under the Act to require employers to guarantee employees’ wage and employment benefits following the transfer. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA has such authority. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 93, 617 F. 2d, at 675. We hold that, whether or not OSHA has this underlying authority, the agency has failed to make the necessary determination or statement of reasons that its wage guarantee requirement is related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work environment. Respondents urge several statutory bases for the authority exercised here. They cite § 2 (b) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b), which declares that the purpose of the Act is “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions”; §2 (b)(5), which suggests achievement of the purpose “by developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems”; §6 (b)(5), which requires the agency to “set the standard which most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity . . .”; and § 3 (8), which provides that a standard must require “conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment.” Brief for Federal Respondent 68. Whatever methods these provisions authorize OSHA to apply, it is clear that such methods must be justified on the basis of their relation to safety or health. Section 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (f), requires that “determinations of the Secretary” must be supported by substantial evidence. Section 6 (e), 29 U. S. C. § 655 (e), requires the Secretary to include “a statement of the reasons for such action, which shall be published in the Federal Register.” In his “Summary and Explanation of the Standard,” the Secretary stated: “Each section includes an analysis of the record evidence and the policy considerations underlying the decisions adopted pertaining to specific provisions of the standard.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27380, col. 2 (1978). But OSHA never explained the wage guarantee provision as an approach designed to contribute to increased health protection. Instead the agency stated that the “goal of this provision is to minimize any adverse economic impact on the employee by virtue of the inability to wear a respirator.” Id., at 27387, col. 3. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, respondents in their briefs argue: “Experience under the Act has shown that employees are reluctant to disclose symptoms of disease and tend to minimize work-related health problems for fear of being discharged or transferred to a lower paying job. . . . It may reasonably be expected, therefore, that many employees incapable of using respirators would continue to breathe unhealthful air rather than request a transfer, thus destroying the utility of the respirator program.” Brief for Federal Respondent 67. See Brief for Union Respondents 51. Whether these arguments have merit, and they very well may, the post hoc rationalizations of the agency or the parties to this litigation cannot serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 419 (1971); Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168-169 (1962); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 87 (1943). For Congress gave OSHA the responsibility to protect worker health and safety, and to explain its reasons for its actions. Because the Act in no way authorizes OSHA to repair general unfairness to employees that is unrelated to achievement of health and safety goals, we conclude that OSHA acted beyond statutory authority when it issued the wage guarantee regulation. y When Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, it chose to place pre-eminent value on assuring employees a safe and healthful working environment, limited only by the feasibility of achieving such an environment. We must measure the validity of the Secretary’s actions against the requirements of that Act. For “[t]he judicial function does not extend to substantive revision of regulatory policy. That function lies elsewhere — in Congressional and Executive oversight or amendatory legislation.” Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 663 (Burger, C. J., concurring); see TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 185, 187-188, 194-195 (1978). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in all respects except to the extent of its approval of the Secretary’s application of the wage guarantee provision of the Cotton Dust Standard at 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f)(2) (v) (1980). To that extent, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded with directions to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of these cases. This opinion will use the terms OSHA and the Secretary interchangeably when referring to the agency, the Secretary of Labor, or the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health. The Secretary of Labor has delegated the authority to promulgate occupational safety and health standards to the Assistant Secretary. See 29 CFR § 1910.4 (1980). Petitioners in No. 79-1429 include 12 individual cotton textile manufacturers, and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (ATMI), a trade association representing approximately 175 companies. Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, pp. i, 2. In No. 79-1583, petitioner is the National Cotton Council of America, a nonprofit corporation chartered for the purpose of increasing the consumption of cotton and cotton products. Brief for Petitioner in No. 79-1583, pp. 3-4. The two labor organizations are the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, and the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO. In the Court of Appeals, the labor organizations challenged the Cotton Dust Standard as not sufficiently stringent. Justice Powell, concurring in part and in the judgment, was the only member of the Court to decide the cost-benefit issue expressly. Justice Powell concluded that the statute “requires the agency to determine that the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the expected benefits.” Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 667. Justice Marshall, dissenting, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun, indicated that the statute did not contemplate cost-benefit analysis. See id., at 717-718, n. 30, 719-720, n. 32. In addition to the cost-benefit issue, the other questions presented and addressed are (1) whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports OSHA’s determination that the Cotton Dust Standard is economically feasible; and (2) whether OSHA has the authority under the Act to require that employers guarantee the wages and benefits of employees who are transferred to other positions because of their inability to wear respirators. Cotton dust is defined as “dust present in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which may contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant matter, fiber, bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant matter and other contaminants which may have accumulated with the cotton during the growing, harvesting and subsequent processing or storage periods. Any dust present during the handling and processing of cotton through the weaving or knitting of fabrics, and dust present in other operations or manufacturing processes using new or waste cotton fibers or cotton fiber by-products from textile mills are considered cotton dust.” 29 CFR'§ 1910.1043 (b) (1980) (Cotton Dust Standard). References are made throughout this opinion to the Joint Appendix filed in this Court (App.), and to the Joint Appendix lodged in the Court of Appeals below (Ct. of App. J. A.). Known generally as the Schilling classification grades, they include: “[Grade] %: slight acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; no evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment. “[Grade] 1: definite acute effect of dust on ventilatory capacity; no evidence of chronic ventilatory impairment. “[Grade] 2: evidence' of slight to moderate irreversible impairment of ventilatory capacity. “[Grade] 3: evidence of moderate to severe irreversible impairment of ventilatory capacity.” Exhibit 6-27, App. 25; see 41 Fed. Reg. 56500-56501 (1976). Descriptions of the disease by individual mill workers, presented in hearings on the Cotton Dust Standard before an Administrative Law Judge, are more vivid: “When they started speeding the looms up the dust got finer and more and more people started leaving the mill with breathing problems. My mother had to leave the mill in the early fifties. Before she left, her breathing got so short she just couldn’t hold out to work. My stepfather left the mill on account of breaching [sic] problems. He had coughing spells til he couldn’t breath [sic], like a child’s whooping cough. Both my sisters who work in the mill have breathing problems. My husband had to give up his job when he was only fifty-four years old because of the breathing problem.” Ct. of App. J. A. 3791. “I suppose I had a breathing problem since 1973. I just kept on getting sick and began losing time at the mill. Every time that I go into the mill I get deathly sick, choking and vomiting losing my breath. It would blow down all that lint and cotton and I have clothes right here where I have wore and they have been washed several times and I would like for you all to see them. That will not come out in washing. “I am only fifty-seven years old and I am retired and I can’t even get to go to church because of my breathing. I get short of breath just walking around the house or dressing [or] sometimes just watching T. V. I cough all the time.” Id., at 3793. “. . . I had to quit because I couldn’t lay down and rest without oxygen in the night and my doctor told me I would have to get out of there .... I couln’t [sic] even breathe, I had to get out of the door so I could breathe and he told me not to go back in [the mill] under any circumstances.” Id., at 3804. Byssinosis is not a newly discovered disease, having been described as early as in the 1820’s in England, App. 404^405, and observed in Belgium in a study of 2,000 cotton workers in 1845, Exhibit 6-16, App. 15. As an expert representing the industry noted: “[T]he assumption is often made that the disorder progresses from % to 1 to 2 to 3 and, thus, all grades reflect the progress of the individual’s disability. In many instances, however, there is no progression at all. Sometimes Grade 3 seems to appear de novo, or there is a jump from 1 to 3. Among those who develop permanent disability, Grade 2 very often never occurs.” Exhibit 41, App. 192. The criterion of disability used for the 35,000-worker estimate was a Forced Expiratory Volume (FEV*) measurement of pulmonary function of 1.2 liters or less. 43 Fed. Reg. 27353, col. 3 (1978). An FEVX of 1.2 liters “is a small fraction of the pulmonary performance of a normal lung.” Ibid.; Ct. of App. J. A. 1231. There are between 126,000 and 200,000 active workers in the yarn-preparation and manufacturing segments of the cotton industry. 43 Fed. Reg. 27379, col. 2 (1978). Indeed the Senate Report on the Act expressly observed: “Studies of particular industries provide specific emphasis regarding the magnitude of the problem. For example, despite repeated warnings over the years from other countries that their cotton workers suffered from lung disease, it is only within the past decade that we have recognized byssinosis as a distinct occupational disease among workers in American cotton mills.” S. Rep. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Leg. Hist. 143. “Total dust” includes both respirable and nonrespirable cotton dust. The Secretary of Labor adopted the threshold limit values contained in a list that had been prepared by the ACGIH. Section 6 (a) of the Act, as set forth in 29 TJ. S. C. § 655 (a), provides in pertinent part: “[T]he Secretary shall, as soon as practicable during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two years after such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard . . . any established Federal standard, unless he determines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees.” In many cotton-preparation and manufacturing operations, including opening, picking, and carding, 1,000 pg/ms of total dust is roughly equivalent to 500 pg/ms of respirable dust. App. 464 ; 43 Fed. Reg. 27361, col. 2 (1978); see n. 22, infra. The Act established the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health as part of the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. NIOSH is authorized, inter alia, to “develop and establish recommended occupational safety and health standards.” 29 U. S. C. §671 (c)(1). At the request of the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of HEW, or on his own initiative, the Director of NIOSH may “conduct such research and experimental programs as he determines are necessary for the development of criteria for new and improved occupational safety and health standards, and . . . after consideration of the results of such research and experimental programs make recommendations concerning new or improved occupational safety and health standards.” § 671 (d). NIOSH presented its recommendation in a lengthy and detailed document entitled “Criteria for a Recommended Standard: Occupational Exposure to Cotton Dust.” Ex. 1, Ct. of App. J. A. 11-169. The report examined the effects of cotton dust exposure and suggested implementation of work practices, engineering controls, medical surveillance, and monitoring to decrease exposure to the recommended level. The Act specifies an informal rulemaking procedure to accompany the promulgation of occupational safety and health standards. See 29 U. S. C. §§655 (b)(2), (3), (4). The Standard provides that exposure to lint-free respirable cotton dust may be measured by a vertical elutriator, with its 15-micron particle size cutoff, or “a method of equivalent accuracy and precision.” 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (c) (1980). The manufacturing of cotton textile products is divided into several different stages. (1) In the operations of opening, picking, carding, drawing, and roving, raw cotton is cleaned and prepared for spinning into yarn. Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 7, n. 12. (2) In the operations of spinning, twisting, winding, spooling, and warping, the prepared cotton is made into yarn and readied for weaving and other processing. Id., at 7, n. 13. (3) In slashing and weaving, the yarn is manufactured into a woven fabric. Id., at 7, n. 14. The Cotton Dust Standard defines “yarn manufacturing” to mean “all textile mill operations from opening to, but not including, slashing and weaving.” 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (b) (1980). See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 27365, cols. 1 and 2 (1978). The nontextile industries covered by the Standard’s 500 /¿g/m3 PEL include, but are not limited to, “warehousing, compressing of cotton lint,' classing and marketing, using cotton yarn (i. e. knitting), reclaiming and marketing of textile manufacturing waste, delinting of cottonseed, marketing and converting of linters, reclaiming and marketing of gin motes and batting, yarn felt manufacturing using waste cotton fibers and by products.” Id., at 27360, col. 3. Ventilation systems include general controls, such as central air-conditioning, and local exhaust controls, which capture emissions of cotton dust as close to the point of generation as possible. See id., at 27363-27364. The court remanded to the agency that portion of the Standard dealing with the cottonseed oil industry, after concluding that the record failed to establish adequately the Standard’s economic feasibility. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 199 U. S. App. D. C. 54, 87, 95, 617 F. 2d 636, 669, 677 (1979). The postargument motions of the several parties for leave to file supplemental memoranda are granted. We decline to adopt the suggestion of the Secretary of Labor that we should “vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the ease so that the record may be returned to the Secretary for further consideration and development.” Supplemental Memorandum for Federal Respondent 4. We also decline to adopt the suggestion of petitioners that we should “hold these cases in abeyance and . . . remand the record to the court of appeals with an instruction that the record be remanded to the agency for further proceedings.” Response of Petitioners to Supplemental Memorandum for Federal Respondent 4. At oral argument, and in a letter addressed to the Court after oral argument, petitioners contended that the Secretary’s recent amendment of OSHA’s so-called “Cancer Policy” in light of this Court’s decision in Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607 (1980), was relevant to the issues in the present cases. We disagree. OSHA amended its Cancer Policy to “carry out the Court’s interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 that consideration must be given to the significance of the risk in the issuance of a carcinogen standard and that OSHA must consider all relevant evidence in making these determinations.” 46 Fed. Reg. 4889, col. 3 (1981). Previously, although lacking such evidence as dose-response data, the Secretary presumed that no safe exposure level existed for carcinogenic substances. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, supra, at 620, 624-625, 635-636, nn. 39 and 40 (plurality opinion). Following this Court’s decision, OSHA deleted those provisions of the Cancer Policy which required the “automatic setting of the lowest feasible level” without regard to determinations of risk significance. 46 Fed. Reg. 4890, col. 1 (1981). In distinct contrast with its Cancer Policy, OSHA expressly found that “exposure to cotton dust presents a significant health hazard to employees,” 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1 (1978), and that “cotton dust produced significant health effects at low levels of exposure,” id., at 27358, col. 2. In addition, the agency noted that “grade % byssinosis and associated pulmonary function decrements are significant health effects in themselves and should be prevented in so far as possible.” Id., at 27354, col. 2. In making its assessment of significant risk, OSHA relied on dose-response curve data (the Merchant Study) showing that 25% of employees suffered at least Grade % byssinosis at a 500 /¿g/m3 PEL, and that 12.7% of all employees would suffer byssinosis at the 200 /¿g/m3 PEL standard. Id., at 27358, cols. 2 and 3. Examining the Merchant Study in light of other studies in the record, the agency found that “the Merchant study provides a reliable assessment of health risk to cotton textile workers from cotton dust.” Id., at 27357, col. 3. OSHA concluded that the “prevalence of byssinosis should be significantly reduced” by the 200 /¿g/m3 PEL. Id., at 27359, col. 3; see id., at 27359, col. 1 (“200 /¿g/m3 represents a significant reduction in the number of affected workers”). It is difficult to imagine what else the agency could do to comply with this Court's decision in Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute. Petitioners ATMI et al. express their position in several ways. They maintain that OSHA “is required to show that a reasonable relationship exists between the risk reduction benefits and the costs of its standards.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 36. Petitioners also suggest that OSHA must show that “the standard is expected to achieve a significant reduction in [the significant risk of material health impairment]” based on “an assessment of the costs of achieving it.” Id., at 38, 40. Allowing that “[t]his does not mean that OSHA must engage in a rigidly formal cost-benefit calculation that places a dollar value on employee lives or health,” id., at 39, petitioners describe the required exercise as follows: “First, OSHA must make a responsible determination of the costs and risk reduction benefits of its standard. Pursuant to the requirement of Section 6 (f) of the Act, this determination must be factually supported by substantial evidence in the record. The subsequent determination whether the reduction in health risk is ‘significant’ (based upon the factual assessment of costs and benefits) is a judgment to be made by the agency in the first instance.” Id., at 40. Respondent Secretary disputes petitioners’ description of the exercise, claiming that any meaningful balancing must involve “placing a [dollar] value on human life and freedom from suffering,” Brief for Federal Respondent 59, and that there is no other way but through formal cost-benefit analysis to accomplish petitioners’ desired balancing, id., at 59-60. Cost-benefit analysis contemplates “systematic enumeration of all benefits and all costs, tangible and intangible, whether readily quantifiable or difficult to measure, that will accrue to all members of society if a particular project is adopted.” E. Stokey & R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis 134 (1978); see Commission on Natural Resources, National Research Council, Decision Making for Regulating Chemicals in the Environment 38 (1975). See generally E. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis (1976); Prest & Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 300 Economic Journal 683 (1965). Whether petitioners’ or respondent’s characterization is correct, we will sometimes refer to petitioners’ proposed exércise as “cost-benefit analysis.” As described by the union respondents, the test for determining whether a standard promulgated to regulate a “toxic material or harmful physical agent” satisfies the Act has three parts: “First, whether the ‘place of employment is unsafe — in the sense that significant risks are present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices.’ [Industrial Union Dept., supra, at 642 (plurality opinion).] Second, whether of the possible available correctives the Secretary has selected ‘the standard . . . that is most protective.’ Ibid. Third, whether that standard is ‘feasible.’” Brief for Union Respondents 40-41. We will sometimes refer to this test as “feasibility analysis.” Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. §655 (b)(5), also provides: “Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria, and of the performance desired.” In these cases we are faced with the issue whether the Act requires OSHA to balance costs and benefits in promulgating a single toxic material and harmful physical agent standard under §6 (b)(5). Petitioners argue that without cost-benefit balancing, the issuance of a single standard might result in a “serious misallocatio[n] of the finite resources that are available for the protection of worker safety and health,” given the other health hazards in the workplace. Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 10; see Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, pp. 38-39; Brief for Chamber of Commerce of United States as Amicus Curiae 12; Brief for American Industrial Health Council as Amicus Curiae 19. This argument is more properly addressed to other provisions of the Act which may authorize OSHA to explore costs and benefits for deciding between issuance of several standards regulating different varieties of health and safety hazards, e. g., § 6 (g) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (g); see Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 643-644; see also Case Comment, 60 B. U. L. Rev. 115, 122, n. 52 (1980), or for promulgating other types of standards not issued under § 6 (b) (5). We express no view on these questions. See, e. g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U. S. C. §§6295 (c), (d) (1976 ed., Supp. III); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1312 (b) (1), (2), 1314 (b) (1) (B); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U. S. C. § 1314 (b) (4) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 7545 (c) (2) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. III). In the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Congress directed the Administrator to consider “the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application.” 33 U. S. C. § 1314 (b)(1) (“BPT” limitations). With regard to 1987 effluent limitations, the Administrator is directed to consider total cost, but not in comparison with effluent reduction benefits. § 1314 (b) (2) (B) (“BAT” limitations). See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64, 71, n. 10, 76-77 (1980). In other statutes, Congress has used the phrase “unreasonable risk,” accompanied by explanation in legislative history, to signify a generalized balancing of costs and benefits. See, e. g., the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U. S. C. § 2056 (a) (“unreasonable risk of injury”); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1153, p. 33 (1972) (where the House stated: “It should be noted that the Commission’s authority to promulgate standards under this bill is limited to instances where the hazard associated with a consumer product presents an unreasonable risk of death, injury, or serious or frequent illness. . . . Protection against unreasonable risks is central to many Federal and State safety statutes and the courts have had broad experience in interpreting the term’s meaning and application. It is generally expected that the determination of unreasonable hazard will involve the Commission in balancing the probability that risk will result in harm and the gravity of such harm against the effect on the product’s utility, cost, and availability to the consumer”); S. Rep. No. 92-749, pp. 14—15 (1972). See also Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 569 F. 2d 831, 839 (CA5 1978); Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 182 U. S. App. D. C. 153, 168, 559 F. 2d 774, 789 (1977). The error of several cases finding a cost-benefit analysis mandate in the Act is their reliance on the different language and clear legislative history of the Consumer Product Safety Act to reach their conclusions. See Texas Independent Ginners Assn. v. Marshall, 630 F. 2d 398, 410 (CA5 1980); American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 581 F. 2d 493, 502-503 (CA5 1978), aff’d on other grounds, Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, supra. Senator Chiles was sufficiently certain that the Act did not contemplate cost-benefit analysis that he introduced an amendment in 1973 that, inter alia, “directs the Secretary to recognize the cost-benefit ratio in promulgating a new standard and to publish information relative to the projected financial impact. This provision will promote the development of standards justifiable in terms of the benefits to be derived and afford those to be affected an opportunity to make a reasoned evaluation of the proposal.” 119 Cong. Rec. 42151 (1973). In addition, as the legislative history malees plain, see infra, at 517-518, any standard that was not economically or technologically feasible would a fortiori not be “reasonably necessary or appropriate” under the Act. See Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 162 U. S. App. D. C. 331, 342, 499 F. 2d 467, 478 (1974) (“Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employers out of business”). This is not to say that § 3 (8) might not require the balancing of costs and benefits for standards promulgated under provisions other than § 6 (b) (5) of the Act. As a plurality of this Court noted in Industrial Union Dept., if § 3 (8) had no substantive content, “there would be no statutory criteria at all to guide the Secretary in promulgating either national consensus standards or permanent standards other than those dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents.” 448 U. S., at 640, n. 45. Furthermore, the mere fact that a § 6 (b) (5) standard is “feasible” does not mean that §3 (8)’s “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language might not impose additional restraints on OSHA. For example, all § 6 (b) (5) standards must be addressed to “significant risks” of material health impairment. Id., at 642. In addition, if the use of one respirator would achieve the same reduction in health risk as the use of five, the use of five respirators was “technologically and economically feasible,” and OSHA thus insisted on the use of five, then the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” limitation might come into play as an additional restriction on OSHA to choose the one-respirator standard. In this ease we need not decide all the applications that § 3 (8) might have, either alone or together with § 6 (b) (5). Although both versions of the Act contained provisions identical to §3 (8), 29 U. S. C. § 652 (8), there is no discussion in the legislative history of the meaning of the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Petitioners’ primary legislative history argument is that Senator Javits “took the position that OSHA standards should be 'feasible’ in the sense of being 'reasonable’ and 'practical’ as well as technologically achievable.” Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 32. A review of the record belies this contention. Senator Javits himself had introduced the administration’s bill, S. 2788, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), which he observed contained no criteria for issuance of standards. Leg. Hist. 31, 39-42. That proposed legislation, which established a National Occupational Safety and Health Board to promulgate standards, required the Board to submit proposed standards to an appropriate national standards-producing organization “to prepare a report on the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of such standard.” Id., at 39. Furthermore, either the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Health,- Education, and Welfare could object to a proposed standard on the basis, inter alia, that it “is not feasible,” id., at 40, at which point the Board could reaffirm the standard by a majority vote, ibid. President Nixon’s message accompanying S. 2788, which Senator Javits inserted in the Congressional Record, described the “report on the technical feasibility, reasonableness and practicality of such standard” under the Act as a “report on the feasibility of the proposed standards.” 115 Cong. Rec. 22517 (1969). From this slim reed petitioners fashion their legislative history argument. But even if Senator Javits fully subscribed to statements by President Nixon on the proposed legislation, of which there is some doubt, see id., at 22512, this hardly supports the view that the Senator’s addition of the feasibility requirement to the Williams bill included any such baggage. After all, the Senator described his amendment only with the word “feasible,” and specifically distinguished the amended Williams bill from the administration’s, on the basis of the latter’s lack of criteria. Senator Dominick gave several examples. For instance: “[L]et us take a fellow who is a streetcar conductor or a bus conductor at the present time. How in the world, in the process of the pollution we have in the streets or in the process of the automobile accidents that we have all during a working day of anyone driving a bus or trolley car, or whatever it may be, can we set standards that will make sure he will not have any risk to his life for the rest of his life? It is totally impossible for this to be put in a bill; and yet it is in the committee bill.” 116 Cong. Rec. 37337 (1970), Leg. Hist. 423. See also 116 Cong. Rec., at 37614, 36522, Leg. Hist. 481, 345. In acceding, the House obtained Senate agreement to another amendment, now § 6 (b) (6) (A) of the Act, that allowed employers to petition for a temporary variance from an occupational safety and health standard in certain cases, except that “[e]conomic hardship is not to be a consideration for the qualification for a temporary extension order.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1765, p. 35 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1188. The Conference Report, limited the variance procedure to the following cases: “unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of necessary materials or equipment or because necessary construction or alteration of facilities cannot be completed on time. . . . Such an order may be issued for a maximum period of one year and may not be renewed more than twice.” Ibid. Because the costs of compliance would weigh particularly heavily on small businesses, Congress provided in § 28 of the Act an amendment to the Small Business Act, 15 U. S. C. § 636, making small businesses eligible for economic assistance through the Small Business Administration to comply with standards promulgated by the Secretary. 84 Stat. 1618, Leg. Hist. 1257. Senator Dominick explained: “There is a provision in the bill which recognizes the impact that this particular legislation may have on small businesses. ... It permits the Secretary to make loans to small businesses wherever the standards that are set by the National Government are so severe as to have caused a real and substantial economic injury. Under those circumstances the Secretary is entitled, through the Small Business Administration, to make loans to those businesses to get them over the hump, because of the need for new equipment, or because of new conditions within the shop, which would permit them to continue in operation. “I think that is a very significant and important provision for minimizing economic injury which could occur if the bill resulted in situations which would have very serious effects on businesses.” 116 Cong. Rec. 37631 (1970), Leg. Hist. 525. Congress was concerned that some employers not obtain a competitive advantage over others by declining to invest in worker health and safety: “Although many employers in all industries have demonstrated an exemplary degree of concern for health and safety in the workplace, their efforts are too often undercut by those who are not so concerned. Moreover, the fact is that many employers — particularly smaller ones— simply cannot make the necessary investment in health and safety, and survive competitively, unless all are compelled to do so.” S. Rep. 91-1282, ,p. 4 (1970), Leg. Hist. 144. See, e. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 38386 (1970), Leg. Hist. 1030-1031 (remarks of Cong. Dent): “Although I am very much disturbed over adding new costs to the operation of our production facilities because of the threats from abroad, I would say there is a greater concern and that must be for the production men who do the producing — the men who work in the service industries and the men and women in this country who daily go out and keep the economy moving and make it safe for all of us to live and to work and to be able to prosper in it.” See RTI, Cotton Dust: Technological Feasibility Assessment and Final Inflationary Impact Statement (1976), Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 457, 573-748; RTI, Technological Feasibility and Economic Impact of Regulations for Cotton Dust: Testimony to be Presented by the Research Triangle Institute at Public Hearing (1977), Ex. 16, id., at 1320, 1351-1357. The industry estimates were presented by Hovan Hocutt and Arthur Thomas, employees of dust control equipment manufacturers. Statement of Hovan Hocutt, Senior Vice President, Engineering, Pneumafil Corp., Ex. 60, id., at 2228-2247; Statement of Arthur Thomas, Senior Vice President, The Bahnson Co., Ex. 62, id,., at 2248-2257. OSHA referred collectively to these two statements as the Hocutt-Thomas estimate. RTI estimated compliance costs of $984.4 million for yarn production (opening through spinning), Ex. 6-76, id., at 473, and $127.7 million for yam processing (winding through weaving/slashing), id., at 600. In another part of its study, RTI estimated yarn production costs of $885.6 million. Id., at 589. The explanation for this discrepancy is not readily apparent from the record, although it may be attributable to cost estimates for different years. RTI made what it called a “conservative estimate” that “controls would be applied to all the production equipment in mills processing cotton and cotton-synthetic blends, even if part of their product is pure synthetic.” Id., at 585. RTI’s David LeSourd explained that RTI did not have data on the degree of compliance for the industry as a whole, but only for some specific mills. Id., at 3637-3638. Therefore RTI merely assumed that industrywide PEL’s were at a 1,000 pg/ma total dust PEL. Ex. 6-76, id., at 579-580. The record contains conflicting evidence on the actual level of control in the industry. Some evidence suggests compliance by mills substantially better than the 1,000 /¿g/m® total dust level. See, e. g., Ex. 47, id., at 2037 (66% of Burlington Industries work areas at or below 500 pg/ma, 28% below 200 pg/m3); Ex. 78, id., at 2387. One expert, commenting on another study, observed that “substantial proportions of the industry are, in fact, within compliance of [200 i»g/m3].” Id., at 3637. Other evidence in the record suggests that some segments of the industry are not in compliance with the 1,000 pg/ma total dust PEL. See, e. g., id., at 3939 (criticizing RTI assumption of compliance). In any event, OSHA found that the “actual level of controls in the cotton industry could not be determined” on the basis of data available to RTI at the time of its study. 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 3 (1978). OSHA’s cost estimate included $543 million for engineering controls (the Hocutt-Thomas estimate), $7 million for monitoring, medical surveillance, and other provisions (the RTI estimate), $31.5 million for waste processing, and $75 million for seed processing, for a total of $656.5 million. Id., at 27380, col. 1. The Hocutt-Thomas study based its estimates on data obtained from a recent ATMI survey of cotton mills. Completed questionnaires from 353 mills, which processed 80% of the cotton bales in the United States, were returned. Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2231. The Hocutt-Thomas study included an aEowance for existing compliance efforts, by subtracting from its total estimate the cost of all engineering controls purchased by the industry prior to February 11, 1977. Id., at 2232, 2247. Whether this is a sufficient proxy for current industry compliance is not apparent from the record. Hocutt himself admitted that he did not have figures on what portion of the industry was meeting the 1,000 yg/m3 total dust PEL. Id., at 3941. John Figh, a vice president at Chase Manhattan Bank specializing in the textile industry, commented on the trend toward modernizing equipment in the mills: “[B]y continuing to upgrade plants with the most modern and efficient equipment, the textEe manufacturing industry will likely not be required due to demand to add much in the way of new bricks and mortar. There may be some individual cases of out-of-date facilities being replaced by new buildings; but for the most part, I believe we will see more in the way of modernization of existing plants . . . .’’ Ex. 63, id., at 2260 (emphasis added). One study explained why the costs of controls should be lower if a mill converts to new equipment as opposed to retrofitting old machines: “1) The operating cost of new equipment with controls on that equipment is less than the operating cost of the old equipment with controls necessary for the older, slower equipment to meet proscribed [sic] dust levels; and 2) by going to newer equipment with controls there is a likelihood that increased production rates will result in recovery of some or aE of the capital cost of control.” Ex. 79A, id., at 2532; see Ex. 79C, id., at 2550-2551; Ex. 63, id., at 2261; Ex. 78, id., at 2376-2377. Chase Manhattan Bank vice president Figh noted that “[t]here does not appear to be any vast new technology on the horizon,” but that “[a]s for new machinery, evolutionary changes are continuing at what appears to me to be about the same rate as in the last few years.” Ex. 63, id., at 2260-2261. One study is particularly critical of the assumption of a “static state of technology,” Ex. 78, id., at 2380, and documents technological advances that can be expected, id., at 2380-2386. Some experts were less optimistic of the role of technology. See, e. g., id., at 3643-3644 (RTI study). Hocutt-Thomas had some information on the “ratio of synthetics to cotton in blends” in the mills, but it is not clear from the record if and how they used this information. Ex. 60, id., at 2230. The final Cotton Dust Standard calls for PEL’s of 200 /¿g/m3 in opening through roving and spinning through warping, and 750 /¿g/m3 for slashing and weaving. The Hocutt-Thomas study similarly assumed a 200 /¿g/m3 PEL for opening through roving, but assumed less stringent PEL’s of 500 /¿g/m3 for spinning through warping, and 1,000 /¿g/m3 for slashing and weaving. For example, in questioning before an Administrative Law Judge, Hocutt answered: “Well, I’m beginning to wish I hadn’t said anything about this, which I did, and I have to be helpful. Practically all of this information that I have is confidential and I couldn’t reveal any of the sources. You can only take my word for the figures. I can’t substantiate it in any manner.” Id., at 3929. Petitioners note, however, that the industry subsequently provided its survey data to OSHA, and that the only information deleted was confidential information withheld by agreement with the agency in order to prevent identification of specific mills. Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 23, n. 32; see App. 388-390. OSHA responds that, “[b]ecause the number of machines was deleted and correlated dust data were not supplied, the data could not be used to support a specific cost adjustment.” Brief for Federal Respondent 64, n. 70. In any event, no contention is made that OSHA had access to Hocutt’s own data used to calculate his cost estimate. Both petitioners and respondents attempt their own calculations from evidence in the record to show the unreasonableness or reasonableness of OSHA’s rough equation between the Hocutt-Thomas overstatement in costs and the expense of achieving a standard somewhat more stringent for some operations. See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner in No. 79-1583, pp. 9-10; Brief for Union Respondents 14^18. Such manipulation of the data suggests a wide margin of error for any estimate, whether it be OSHA’s, the industry’s, or the unions’. Viewed in that light, the agency’s candor in confessing its own inability to achieve a more precise estimate should not precipitate a judicial review that nonetheless demands what the congressionally delegated “expert” says it cannot provide. The Secretary originally asked RTI to prepare cost estimates for several PEL levels, including 500, 200, and 100 /¿g/m3. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 509. Clearly the Secretary intended to have cost information on the different PEL’s that he might promulgate. Although RTI provided estimates for these levels in its final report, OSHA found them to be too unreliable to adopt as final estimates. See supra, at 524^525. Even if the Secretary had wanted to obtain a cost estimate based on confidential industry data for the actual PEL’s in the adopted Standard, he would have been unable to do so. Hoeutt had concluded that it was technologically impractical to achieve PEL’s below 500 /¿g/m3 for the operations of spinning through warping, Ex. 60, Ct. of App. J. A. 2239-2241, and PEL’s below 1,000 /¿g/m3 for weaving and slashing, id., at 2241-2243. Therefore, he declined to prepare cost estimates of a 200 /¿g/m3 PEL for those operations. The Secretary obviously disagreed with his judgment of technological feasibility. We also note that, although petitioners challenged the technological feasibility of the final Cotton Dust Standard in the Court of Appeals, they have abandoned such challenge here. Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 8, n. 16. The Court of Appeals observed that “the agency’s underlying cost estimates are not free from imprecision,” 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 80, 617 F. 2d, at 662, but that “[t]he very nature of economic analysis frequently imposes practical limits on the precision which reasonably can be required of the agency,” id., at 79, 617 F. 2d, at 661. We suspect that this results not only from the difficulty of obtaining accurate data, but also from the inherent crudeness of estimation tools. Of necessity both the RTI and Hocutt-Thomas studies had to rely on assumptions the truth or falsity of which could wreak havoc on the validity of their final numerical cost estimates. As the official charged by Congress with the promulgation of occupational safety and health standards that protect workers “to the extent feasible,” the Secretary was obligated to subject such assumptions to careful scrutiny, and to decide how they might affect the correctness of the proffered estimates. In one of their questions presented, petitioners ATMI et al. ask whether “the statutory requirement that compliance with an OSHA standard must be 'economically feasible’ can be satisfied merely by the agency’s conclusion that the standard will not put the affected industry out of business.” Pet. for Cert, in No. 79-1429, p. 2. However, in argument in their brief, petitioners appear to treat this issue primarily as a substantial evidence question. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, pp. 24-31. They finally summarize their position as follows: “OSHA must present a responsible prediction, supported by substantial evidence, of what its standard will cost and what impact it will have on such factors as production, employment, competition, and prices. And the agency must explain in a cogent manner — on the basis of intelligible criteria — why it concludes that a standard having such an economic impact is 'feasible.’” Id., at 35 (footnote omitted). As our review of OSHA’s economic feasibility determination demonstrates, OSHA presented a “responsible prediction” of what its Standard would cost and its impact on “production, employment, competition, and prices.” The agency concluded that its Standard is feasible because “compliance with [it] is well within the financial capability of the covered industries.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27379, col. 3 (1978). OSHA also found that the industry “will be able to meet the demands for production of cotton products.” Id., at 27378, col. 2. We take these findings to mean, as the Secretary suggests, that “[a]t bottom, the Secretary must [and did] determine that the industry will maintain long-term profitability and competitiveness.” Brief for Federal Respondent 49. See also United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 208 U. S. App. D. C. 60, 136, 647 F. 2d 1189, 1265 (1981) (“the practical question is whether the standard threatens the competitive stability of an industry”); Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 162 U. S. App. D. C., at 342, 499 F. 2d, at 478. This interpretation by the Secretary is certainly consistent with the plain meaning of the word “feasible.” See Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S., at 717-718, n. 30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Therefore, these cases do not present, and we do not decide, the question whether a standard that threatens the long-term profitability and competitiveness of an industry is “feasible” within the meaning of § 6 (b) (5) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b)(5). In contrast to the compliance cost estimates prepared by RTI, OSHA did not find any major flaws with RTI’s study of the economic impact of compliance costs. RTI specifically analyzed the impact of the Standard on the following areas in the cotton industry: “1) Additional employment requirements. “2) Energy consumption. “3) Increases in production costs and consequent price increases by affected industries. “4) Capital requirements and capital financing problems. “5) Competition effects on profit and market structure. “6) Inflationary impact on consumers and U. S. economy. “7) Employment impact due to the contraction of output demand.” Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 626. RTI also examined the economic impact of two other across-the-board PEL’s of 500 /ug/m3 and 100 Mg/m3. Ibid. This cost estimate included $984.4 million for yarn production (opening through spinning), $1,387.9 billion for winding through weaving/slashing, $292.2 million for cotton ginning, and $32 million for waste processing. Id., at 737. Cotton ginning was the subject of a separate regulation not at issue here. 43 Fed. Reg. 27350, col. 1 (1978); see 29 CFR § 1910.1046 (1980). RTI’s annual cost-of-compliance figure contained three components: an annualized capital charge, direct operating cost, and energy cost. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 643. The annualized capital charge consisted of depreciation, interest, administrative overhead, property tax, and in-; surance. Ibid. Depreciation and interest were computed “by use of a cápital recovery factor based upon the concept of capital rent, the value of which depends on the operating life of the equipment and the market interest rate.” Ibid. Petitioners’ primary criticism of OSHA’s reliance on the RTI study derives from their disagreement with RTI’s assumption that compliance costs would be passed on to the consumers. Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, pp. 28-29. This characterization misstates RTI’s position. In calculating price increases necessary to maintain prestandard rates of return, RTI “decided to adopt an extreme assumption of zero price demand elasticity in computing post-control price increases” because of difficulties in obtaining data necessary to compute elasticities for cotton yams. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 657. However, RTI carefully tested this assumption to determine “how much bias” it would introduce into the analysis. Id., at 657-659. RTI concluded that, “unless the true demand elasticity for the output of the given sector is substantially greater than unity, our impact analysis based on the assumption of zero price elasticity of demand would not be invalidated.” Id., at 659. Therefore, unless a 1% increase in price was met with substantially more than a 1% decrease in demand, RTI’s estimates of the price increases necessary to maintain prestandard rates of return were valid. Since there was no evidence suggesting such an effect, RTI proceeded with its assumption. In any event, RTI subsequently investigated short-term price elasticities of demand for 25 cotton consumer products, finding that 19 of them had elasticities less than or equal to unity. Id., at 681. RTI found higher price increases and lower rates of return when framing its analysis in pounds of cotton yarn produced. See id., at 654, 729-730. Petitioner National Cotton Council of America criticizes RTI’s use of short-term price elasticity coefficients, claiming that this underestimates long-term demand responses to price increases. Brief for Petitioner in No. 79-1583, pp. 16-17. However, RTI’s Dr. Lee, who conducted the elasticity analysis, observed that he used two independent procedures to compute demand contraction, and only one relied on short-term price elasticities. Ct. of App. J. A. 3626-3627. His “main procedure [was] input output table procedures,” which produced an even smaller demand contraction estimate than those calculations relying on the short-term coefficients. Ibid. RTI cited such nonprice factors as “research expenditures, promotion and advertising, fiber and fabric development, fiber properties, and care characteristics of fabric.” Ex. 6-76, id., at 623. John Figh, Chase Manhattan Bank vice president, observed that “polyester has grown at the expense of cotton over the last 10 years and I think it has penetrated most of the markets it can penetrate. . . . [T]he majority of it, the growth of polyster at the expense of cotton, has been completed.” App. 474-475. He noted that some cotton products, such as towels and 100%-cotton men’s shirts, enjoy the support of consumer preferences. Ibid. Although RTI cited the energy crisis without detailing its possible impact on man-made fiber products, Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 948, OSHA observed that changes in petroleum prices, a key ingredient in synthetic products, may have important impacts on the competitive balance, see 43 Fed. Reg. 27370, col. 2 (1978). Two of the six yarn production operations had ratios less than 1, two had ratios less than 2, and the remaining two were less than 6. Ex. 6-76, Ct. of App. J. A. 665. Chase Manhattan Bank’s John Figh agreed with RTI’s assessment that financing the $2.7 billion compliance cost for a 200 pg/m3 PEL standard would be most difficult for smaller textile companies. Ex. 63, id., at 2264 — 2265. RTI conducted similar economic impact analyses, although in less depth, for the twisting through weaving and waste-processing sectors of the cotton industry covered by the proposed 200 pg/m3 PEL standard. Ex. 6-76, id., at 462. RTI found, for example, that price increases per dollar of industry sales ranged from 0.5 cents to 18 cents for twisting through weaving operations, and that some of these operations would experience “severe” financing difficulties. Id., at 733-734. To recount in further detail these conclusions would be an irrelevant exercise. RTI calculated that a 200 pg/m3 standard for weaving/slashing would cost $1,259 billion, id., at 600, and computed the economic impact based on that figure. But RTI had also estimated that compliance costs for a 500 iug/m3 PEL would be zero. Ibid. Since the final Cotton Dust Standard sets a 750 p-g/m3 PEL for weaving/slashing, further review of RTI’s conclusion with respect to its $1,259 billion cost is particularly unnecessary. Petitioners note that, although RTI estimated that compliance with the Cotton Dust Standard would take eight or more years, OSHA required compliance within four years. Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 29. RTI chose an 8-year period primarily because of “problems the control industry may have in supplying the required equipment.” App. 415; see id., at 415-416. If this proves to be the case, then presumably individual mills will be able to obtain variances from the Standard’s requirements because of technological infeasibility. See 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (e) (1) (1980); 29 U. S. C. § 655 (b). Perhaps in light of this fact, neither petitioners ATMI et al. nor petitioner National Cotton Council of America frame their “economic impact” substantial evidence arguments based on OSHA’s estimate of compliance costs. Instead, they adopt as a minimum RTI’s $2.7 billion estimate for compliance costs with the proposed standard’s 200 /¿g/m3 PEL. Brief for Petitioner in No. 79-1583, pp. 15-16; Brief for Petitioners in No. 79-1429, p. 29. The final Standard, 29 CFR § 1910.1043 (f)(1) (1980), provides: “Where the use of respirators is required under this section, the employer shall provide, at no cost to the employee, and assure the use of respirators which comply with the requirements of this paragraph (f). Respirators shall be used in the following circumstances: “(i) During the time periods necessary to install or implement feasible engineering controls and work practice controls; “(ii) During maintenance and repair activities in which engineering and work practice controls are not feasible; “(iii) In work situations where feasible engineering and work practice controls are not yet sufficient to reduce exposure to or below the permissible exposure limit; and “(iv) In operations specified under paragraph (g)(1); “(v) Whenever an employee requests a respirator.” An employee may be unable to wear a respirator because of facial irritation, severe discomfort, or impaired breathing. 43 Fed. Reg. 27387, cols. 1 and 2 (1978). The regulation, 29 CFR § 1019.1043 (f) (2) (v) (1980) (emphasis added), provides: “Whenever a physician determines that an employee is unable to wear any form of respirator, including a power air purifying respirator, the employee shall be given the opportunity to transfer to another position which is available or which later becomes available having a dust level at or below the PEL. The employer shall assure that an employee who is transferred due to an inability to wear a respirator suffers no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits as a result of the transfer.” Although it cited no specific determination or statement of reasons proffered by the Secretary, the Court of Appeals was persuaded by this argument. 199 U. S. App. D. C., at 93, 617 F. 2d, at 675. There is evidence in the record that might support such a determination. Dr. Merchant testified that a medical surveillance program alone would not be sufficient for identifying and relocating employees suffering from byssinosis. App. 440-441. He observed: “There is reluctance very often among the employee himself to leave his job. I think clearly some guarantees as to wages and opportunities must be an integral part of any recommendation to relocate somebody and it has been the experience in coal mining where miners are allowed, under the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1968, to be transferred, a very low proportion of these men actually exercise their transfer rights.” Id., at 441. However, the courts will not be expected to scrutinize the record to uncover and formulate a rationale explaining an action, when the agency in the first instance has failed to articulate such rationale. See Automotive Parts & Accessories Assn. v. Boyd, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 200, 208, 407 F. 2d 330, 338 (1968). In its specific discussion of the transfer/guarantee provision, occupying more than two-thirds of a page in the Federal Register, OSHA argued that “[i]t is manifestly unfair that employees who are unable to wear respirators suffer . . . economic detriment because their employers have not yet achieved compliance with the engineering control requirements of the standard, but are relying instead on the interim and less effective device of respirators.” 43 Fed. Reg. 27387, cols. 2 and 3 (1978). The agency then stated its judgment that the “protection [the transfer and guarantee regulation] affords should greatly increase the success of the standard’s respiratory protection provisions.” Id., at 27387, col. 3. Since the Secretary had already presented an unauthorized reason for the guarantee provision, we decline to accept this “boilerplate” statement as a sufficient determination and statement of reasons within the meaning of the Act. 29 U. S. C. §§ 655 (e), (f). See Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Brennan, 503 F. 2d 1155, 1157, 1160 (CA3 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 973 (1975); Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 162 U. S. App. D. C., at 339-340, 499 F. 2d, at 475-476; Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. U. S. Dept. of Labor, 487 F. 2d 342, 354 (CA2 1973); Dry Color Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Department of Labor, 486 F. 2d 98, 105-106 (CA3 1973). See also Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 Ecology L. Q. 285, 298-299 (1978). Even had Justice Rehnquist correctly characterized the Court’s opinion, post, at 544 — and there were three possible constructions of the phrase “to the extent feasible” — this would hardly have been grounds for invalidating § 6 (b) (5) under the delegation doctrine. After all, this would not be the first time that more than one interpretation of a statute had been argued. See, e. g., Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259 (1981).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. RYLANDER et al. No. 81-1120. Argued January 18, 1983 Decided April 19, 1983 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 762. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Jerrold J. Ganz-fried, Charles E. Brookhart, Jo-Ann Horn, and William A. Whitledge. Joseph F. Harbison III, by appointment of the Court, 456 U. S. 1005, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Rylander was held in civil contempt by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California because of his failure to comply with its earlier order enforcing an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons for corporate books and records. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that holding, concluding that Rylander’s showing at the contempt hearing, together with his invocation of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, required the Government to shoulder the burden of producing evidence that Rylander was able to produce the documents in question. Because of a conflict among the various Courts of Appeals on this issue, we granted certiorari, 456 U. S. 943 (1982), and we now reverse. In January 1979, the IRS issued a summons to Rylander pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602. The summons ordered him to appear before an agent of the Service in Sacramento, Cal., and to produce for examination, and testify with respect to, books and records of two corporations. Rylander was the president of each corporation. When he failed to comply with the summons, the District Court issued an order to show cause why the summons should not be enforced. Ry-lander for several months succeeded in evading service, but in November 1979 the Marshal was able to personally serve the fourth successive order to show cause issued by the court. In January 1980, on the return date of that order, Rylander failed to file a responsive pleading and did not appear at the show cause hearing. He had sent an unsworn letter to the court claiming he was neither the president of either corporation nor associated with them in any way. The District Court enforced the IRS summons and ordered Rylander to appear before an agent of the Service in February 1980 to produce the corporate records. Rylander neither sought reconsideration of the enforcement order nor did he appeal from it. He appeared as ordered before the agent, but failed to produce the records. After this encounter, the District Court issued an order to show cause why Rylander should not be held in contempt. Rylander again successfully evaded service of the court’s order, and the court in May 1980 found that he was willfully avoiding service and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. The contempt hearing took place on two different dates in October 1980. After an initial skirmish, Rylander took the witness stand and verified an “Oath in Purgation of Contempt” which he had earlier submitted to the court. The essence of this declaration was that he did not possess the records and had not disposed of them to other persons. He refused to submit to additional questioning under oath from the Government, asserting the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination conferred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District Court held Rylander in contempt, finding that he had “fail[ed] to introduce any evidence” in support of his claim that he did not possess the records. The court affirmatively found that Rylander “as president or other corporate officer, had possession or control, or both, of the books and records of said corporations.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a-18a. Thus 21 months after the IRS had issued a summons to him, Rylander was finally faced with a civil contempt order directing him to either produce the subpoenaed records or face imprisonment. Rylander appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the District Court. 656 F. 2d 1313 (CA9 1981). The Court of Appeals agreed that the Government, in a contempt proceeding, meets its initial burden by showing only a failure to comply and the burden is then on the defendant to come forward with evidence showing “ ‘categorically and in detail’ ” why he is unable to comply. Id., at 1318. But the Court of Appeals concluded that a defendant need not meet this burden where “he properly claims that his testimony as to the whereabouts of the documents might be incriminatory.” Id., at 1319. The court stated further: “When the defendant has made a bona fide fifth amendment claim, his statement that the documents are not in his possession or under his control is sufficient to satisfy his burden of production. The burden then shifts to the government to produce evidence showing that the documents in question actually exist and are in the defendant’s possession or under his control.” Ibid. After concluding that Rylander’s failure to raise this defense in the enforcement proceeding did not limit his argument in the contempt proceeding, the court determined that if Rylander’s Fifth Amendment claim is valid, his burden of production had been met. We think the Court of Appeals was incorrect both in its view of the relationship between the enforcement proceeding and the contempt proceeding, and in its view of the effect of Rylander’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege on the burden of production at the latter hearing. On numerous occasions this Court has been called upon to review the statutory authorization for the IRS to summon witnesses and records and seek judicial enforcement of such summons. See, e. g., United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U. S. 298 (1978); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 (1976); United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48 (1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). There is no disagreement here concerning that basic statutory scheme. In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that notwithstanding the issuance of the enforcement order, Rylander was free to relitigate the question of his possession or control of the records in the contempt proceeding. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the enforcement proceeding was summary in nature, that the Government’s burden was light, and that there had been no express finding in the enforcement proceeding that Rylander was in possession or control of the records. We think the Court of Appeals’ view of the matter gave insufficient weight to this Court’s observations in Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 69 (1948): “It would be a disservice to the law if we were to depart from the long-standing rule that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of the original controversy. The procedure to enforce a court’s order commanding or forbidding an act should not be so inconclusive as to foster experimentation with disobedience.” See also id., at 75. Because a proceeding to enforce an IRS summons is an adversary proceeding in which the defendant may contest the summons “on any appropriate ground,” Reisman v. Caplin, supra, at 449, and because lack of possession or control of records is surely such a ground, the issue may not be raised for the first time in a contempt proceeding. Cf. United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349 (1950). See also United States v. Euge, 444 U. S. 707 (1980). In a civil contempt proceeding such as this, of course, a defendant may assert a present inability to comply with the order in question. Maggio v. Zeitz, supra, at 75—76; Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358, 366 (1929). While the court is bound by the enforcement order, it will not be blind to evidence that compliance is now factually impossible. Where compliance is impossible, neither the moving party nor the court has any reason to proceed with the civil contempt action. It is settled, however, that in raising this defense, the defendant has a burden of production. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 379 (1960); Maggio v. Zeitz, supra, at 75-76; Oriel v. Russell, supra, at 366. See also United States v. Fleischman, supra, at 362-363. Thus while Rylander could not attack the enforcement order on the ground that he lacked possession or control of the records at the time the order was issued, he could defend the contempt charge on the ground that he was then unable to comply because he lacked possession or control. The Court of Appeals, while recognizing that Rylander was obligated to assume the burden of production in making this defense, felt that the showing made by Rylander at the October 1980 hearing was sufficient to shift the burden back to the Government. We disagree. We first analyze the effect of Rylander’s denial of possession when he took the witness stand at the contempt hearing and when he submitted the “Oath in Purgation of Contempt.” Since he declined to be cross-examined with respect to his assertions of nonpossession, the District Court was entirely justified in concluding, as it did, that Rylander “fail[ed] to introduce any evidence at the contempt trial.” This was a time for testimony, and Rylander’s ex parte affidavit and uncross-examined testimony were properly disregarded by the District Court. McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 215 (1971); Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 155 (1958). The Court of Appeals also gave weight to the fact that Rylander’s asserted reason for refusing to allow cross-examination was his claim that answering such questions might lead him to incriminate himself. But while the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be a valid ground upon which a witness such as Rylander declines to answer questions, it has never been thought to be in itself a substitute for evidence that would assist in meeting a burden of production. We think the view of the Court of Appeals would convert the privilege from the shield against compulsory self-incrimination which it was intended to be into a sword whereby a claimant asserting the privilege would be freed from adducing proof in support of a burden which would otherwise have been his. None of our cases support this view. We have squarely rejected the notion, apparently subscribed to by the Court of Appeals, that a possible failure of proof on an issue where the defendant had the burden of proof is a form of “compulsion” which requires that the burden be shifted from the defendant’s shoulders to that of the government. McGautha v. California, supra; Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970); see also Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U. S. 398 (1970); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178 (1925); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896). In Williams, the Court said: “The defendant in a criminal trial is frequently forced to testify himself and to call other witnesses in an effort to reduce the risk of conviction. When he presents his witnesses, he must reveal their identity and submit them to cross-examination which in itself may prove incriminating or which may furnish the State with leads to incriminating rebuttal evidence. That the defendant faces such a dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The pressures generated by the State’s evidence may be severe but they do not vitiate the defendant’s choice to present an alibi defense and witnesses to prove it, even though the attempted defense ends in catastrophe for the defendant. However ‘testimonial’ or ‘incriminating’ the alibi defense proves to be, it cannot be considered ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 399 U. S., at 83-84 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals nonetheless thought that this Court’s decision in Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118 (1957), prevented Rylander from being required to carry his burden of production or risk the consequences from his failure of proof. We do not read the case that way. The issue in Curdo, as stated by the Court in its opinion in that case, was “whether petitioner’s personal privilege against self-incrimination attaches to questions relating to the whereabouts of the union books and records which he did not produce pursuant to subpoena.” Id., at 122. The Court went on to distinguish cases such as Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906), holding that a corporation had no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and cases such as Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911), and United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944), holding respectively that the custodians of neither records belonging to unions nor those belonging to corporations might withhold production of such records on the ground that the custodian might be incriminated by their production. The Court refused to accept the Government’s contention, based on those cases, that the custodian had no privilege to refuse to testify about such records on grounds that testimony might incriminate him. In reversing the contempt conviction, however, the Court pointedly noted: “This conviction related solely to petitioner’s failure to answer questions pursuant to the personal subpoena ad testificandum. He has not been charged with failing to produce the books and records demanded in the subpoena duces tecum.” 354 U. S., at 121. The instant proceeding is exactly the converse of the one in Curdo. Rylander was originally ordered both to produce books and records and to testify about them. But the only order against him remaining at the time of the contempt hearing was the order to produce books and records. The Court of Appeals assumed, as we do, that Rylander’s claim of privilege “attached” to questions about the whereabouts of the records; that was the issue decided in Curdo. But that is to say no more than if Rylander asserted a valid claim of privilege at the contempt hearing, then the claim could not be overruled by the court and the respondent incarcerated for failure to answer such questions. Rylander was not, however, incarcerated because he refused to submit himself to' cross-examination by the Government at the contempt hearing. He was held in contempt for failure to comply with a previous order of the District Court enforcing an IRS summons against him. This order, unappealed from, necessarily contained an implied finding that no defense of lack of possession or control had been raised and sustained in that proceeding. The only issue open to Rylander in defending the contempt proceeding was to show inability to then produce, and because of the presumption of continuing possession arising from the enforcement order, Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56 (1948), if he sought to defend on that ground he was required to come forward with evidence in support of it. The fact that his refusal to come forward with such evidence was accompanied by a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege may be an adequate reason for the court’s not compelling him to respond to cross-examination at the contempt hearing, but the claim of privilege is not a substitute for relevant evidence. Rylander was found by the District Court to be in contempt of the enforcement order which required him to produce documents — documents justifiably found by the District Court to be in his possession. He was committed to custody until such time as he should produce the documents, but the District Court again saved him the additional alternative of adducing evidence to show lack of possession or control. Rylander is thus not compelled “to submit to incarceration or run the risk of incriminating himself,” 656 F. 2d, at 1319; he is committed until he either produces the documents which the District Court found to be in his possession, or adduces evidence as to his present inability to comply with that order. We think our cases plainly support this result, and we are frank to say that we have no regret that they do. After 21 months of successfully avoiding sanctions for refusing to respond to an IRS summons, or show cause why he should not do so, with the District Court at each step patiently assuring itself that Rylander’s procedural rights were protected, he was finally held in contempt. The Court of Appeals’ view of the matter would require still additional hearings on the issue of possession or control of the corporate books or records, with the Government having the burden of production at the reopened contempt hearing. Given the oft-stated reliance of the federal income tax system on self-assessment, a plainer guide to the successful frustration of this system could hardly be imagined. As we said in an analogous context in United States v. Bryan: “A subpoena has never been treated as an invitation to a game of hare and hounds, in which the witness must testify only if cornered at the end of the chase. If that were the case, then, indeed, the great power of testimonial compulsion, so necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures, would be a nullity.” 339 U. S., at 331. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court for a finding concerning the validity of Rylander’s Fifth Amendment claim and, provided the claim is sustained, an opportunity for the Government to introduce additional evidence concerning Rylander’s ability to comply. The Government has argued that by submitting the ex parte declaration and by taking the witness stand to verify that declaration, Rylander waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148 (1958). Because of our disposition of the case, we need not decide this question. While the District Court did not state explicitly that Rylander still possessed the documents at the time of the contempt proceeding, we believe such a finding to be plainly implicit in the court’s conclusion that “as president or other corporate officer [Rylander] had possession or control, or both, of the books and records of said corporations.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a-18a. A finding of present possession was supported in this case; the District Court found that Rylander possessed the documents at the time of the enforcement proceeding and the circumstances themselves warranted an inference of continuing possession. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 64-67, 75-76 (1948).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

STEADMAN v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION No. 79-1266. Argued December 3, 1980 Decided February 25, 1981 BrennaN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 104. Peter J. Nickles argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Alex Kozinski. Ralph C. Ferrara argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Stephen M. Shapiro, Paul Gonson, Jacob H. Stillman, and Rosalind C. Cohen. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Carl L. Shipley for the National Committee of Discount Securities Brokers; and by Arthur F. Mathews, Robert B. McCaw, David M. Becker, and William J. Fitzpatrick for the Securities Industry Association. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. In administrative proceedings, the Securities and Exchange Commission applies a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof in determining whether the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have been violated. The question presented is whether such violations must be proved by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. I In June 1971, the Commission initiated a disciplinary proceeding against petitioner and certain of his wholly owned companies. The proceeding against petitioner was brought pursuant to § 9 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and § 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The Commission alleged that petitioner had violated numerous provisions of the federal securities laws in his management of several mutual funds registered under the Investment Company Act. After a lengthy evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge and review by the Commission in which the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was employed, the Commission held that between December 1965 and June 1972, petitioner had violated antifraud, reporting, conflict of interest, and proxy provisions of the federal securities laws. Accordingly, it entered an order permanently barring petitioner from associating with any investment adviser or affiliating with any registered investment company, and suspending him for one year from associating with any broker or dealer in securities. Petitioner sought review of the Commission’s order in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on a number of grounds, only one of which is relevant for our purposes. Petitioner challenged the Commission’s use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof in determining whether he had violated antifraud provisions of the securities laws. He contended that, because of the potentially severe sanctions that the Commission was empowered to impose and because of the circumstantial and inferential nature of the evidence that might be used to prove intent to defraud, the Commission was required to weigh the evidence against a clear-and-convincing standard of proof. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument, holding that in a disciplinary proceeding before the Commission violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 603 F. 2d 1126, 1143 (1979). See n. 8, supra. Because this was contrary to the position taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, see Whitney v. SEC, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 12, 604 F. 2d 676 (1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 562 F. 2d 820 (1977), we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 446 U. S. 917 (1980). We affirm. II Where Congress has not prescribed the degree of proof which must be adduced by the proponent of a rule or order to carry its burden of persuasion in an administrative proceeding, this Court has felt at liberty to prescribe the standard, for “[i]t is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary to resolve.” Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S. 276, 284 (1966). However, where Congress has spoken, we have deferred to “the traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence and standards of proof in the federal courts” absent countervailing constitutional constraints. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 265 (1980). For Commission disciplinary proceedings initiated pursuant to 15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b) and § 80b-3 (f), we conclude that Congress has spoken, and has said that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard should be applied. The securities laws provide for judicial review of Commission disciplinary proceedings in the federal courts of appeals and specify the scope of such review. Because they do not indicate which standard of proof governs Commission adjudications, however, we turn to § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 554, which “applies ... in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,” except in instances not relevant here. Section 5 (b), 5 U. S. C. § 554 (c)(2), makes the provisions of § 7, 5 U. S. C. § 566, applicable to adjudicatory proceedings. The answer to the question presented in this case turns therefore on the proper construction of § 7. The search for congressional intent begins with the language of the statute. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 56 (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979); 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593, 596 (1951). Section 7 (c), 5 U. S. C. § 556 (d), states in pertinent part: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” (Emphasis added.) The language of the statute itself implies the enactment of a standard of proof. By allowing sanctions to be imposed only when they are “in accordance with . . . substantial evidence,” Congress implied that a sanction must rest on a minimum quantity of evidence. The word “substantial” denotes quantity. The phrase “in accordance with . . . substantial evidence” thus requires that a decision be based on a certain quantity of evidence. Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “reliable, probative, and substantial evidence” sets merely a standard of quality of evidence is, therefore, unpersuasive. The phrase “in accordance with” lends further support to a construction of § 7 (c) as establishing a standard of proof. Unlike § 10 (e), the APA’s explicit “Scope of review” provision that declares that agency action shall be held unlawful if “unsupported by substantial evidence,” § 7 (c) provides that an agency may issue an order only if that order is “supported by and in accordance with . . . substantial evidence” (emphasis added). The additional words “in accordance with” suggest that the adjudicating agency must weigh the evidence and decide, based on the weight of the evidence, whether a disciplinary order should be issued. The language of § 7 (c), therefore, requires that the agency decision must be “in accordance with” the weight of the evidence, not simply supported by enough evidence “ ‘to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.’ ” Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966), quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300 (1939). Obviously, weighing evidence has relevance only if the evidence on each side is to be measured against a standard of proof which allocates the risk of error. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423 (1979). Section 10 (e), by contrast, does not permit the reviewing court to weigh the evidence, but only to determine that there is in the record “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ ” Consolo v. FMC, supra, at 620, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938). It is not surprising, therefore, in view of the entirely different purposes of § 7 (c) and § 10 (e), that Congress intended the words “substantial evidence” to have different meanings in context. Thus, petitioner’s argument that § 7 (c) merely establishes the scope of judicial review of agency orders is unavailing. While the language of § 7 (c) suggests, therefore, that Congress intended the statute to establish- a standard of proof, the language of the statute is somewhat opaque concerning the precise standard of proof to be used. The legislative history, however, clearly reveals the Congress’ intent. The original Senate version of § 7 (c) provided that “no sanction shall be imposed .. . except as supported by relevant, reliable, and probative evidence.” S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). After the Senate passed this version, the House passed the language of the statute as it reads today, and the Senate accepted the amendment. Any doubt as to the intent of Congress is revived by the House Report, which expressly adopted a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard: “[W]here a party having the burden of proceeding has come forward with a prima facie and substantial case, he will prevail unless his evidence is discredited or rebutted. In any case the agency must decide 'in accordance with the evidence.’ Where there is evidence pro and con, the agency must weigh it and decide in accordance with the preponderance. In short, these provisions require a conscientious and rational judgment on the whole record in accordance with the proofs adduced.” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 37 (1946) (emphasis added). Nor is there any suggestion in the legislative history that a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence was ever contemplated, much less intended. Congress was primarily concerned with the elimination of agency decision-making premised on evidence which was of poor quality— irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable, and nonprobative — and of insufficient quantity — less than a preponderance. See id., at 36-37 and 46; S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 320-322 and 376-378 (1946); n. 21, supra. The language and legislative history of § 7 (c) lead us to conclude, therefore, that § 7 (c) was intended to establish a standard of proof and that the standard adopted is the traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. III Our view of congressional intent is buttressed by the Commission’s longstanding practice of imposing sanctions according to the preponderance of the evidence. As early as 1938, the Commission rejected the argument that in'a proceeding to determine whether to suspend, expel, or otherwise sanction a brokerage firm and its principals for, inter alia, manipulation of security prices in violation of § 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78i, a standard of proof greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was required. In re White, 3 S. E. C. 466, 539-540 (1938). Use of the preponderance standard continued after passage of the APA, and persists today. E. g., In re Cea, 44 S. E. C. 8, 25 (1969); In re Pollisky, 43 S. E. C. 458, 459-460 (1967). The Commission’s consistent practice, which is in harmony with § 7 (c) and its legislative history, is persuasive authority that Congress intended that Commission disciplinary proceedings, subject to § 7 of the APA, be governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 358 (1979); United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 524 (1978), we stated that § 4 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 553, established the “maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.” In § 7 (c), Congress has similarly expressed its intent that adjudicatory proceedings subject to the APA satisfy the statute where determinations are made according to the preponderance of the evidence. Congress was free to make that choice, Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S., at 265-266, and, in the absence of countervailing constitutional considerations, the courts are not free to disturb it. Affirmed. Section 9 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80a-9 (b), empowers the Commission, in specified circumstances, “after notice and opportunity for hearing . . . [to] prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, either permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall deem appropriate in the public interest, any person from serving or acting as an employee, officer, director, member of an advisory board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a registered investment company or affiliated person of such investment adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter . . . Section 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §80b-3 (f), empowers the Commission, in specified circumstances, after notice and opportunity for hearing “on the record” to “censure or place limitations on the activities of any person associated or seeking to become associated with an investment adviser, or suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months or bar any such person from being associated with an investment adviser . . . Disciplinary proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission are governed by the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 17 CFR § 201.1 et seq. (1980), which enlarge, in certain respects, protections afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 524 (1978) (as to 5 U. S. C. § 553, “[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them”). A respondent in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to receive timely notice of the charges against him and the questions of fact and law to be determined. 17 CFR § 201.6 (a) (1980). He may retain counsel to represent him in connection with the proceeding, § 201.2(b), file an answer to the charges against him and move for a more definite statement of those charges, §§201.7 (a) and (d), and have a trial-type hearing presided over by an impartial administrative law judge, other duly-appointed officer, or a Commission member, §§ 201.11 (b)-(c). The respondent may present oral or documentary evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and object to the admission or exclusion of evidence. §201.14 (a). A respondent may compel production of evidence by subpoena, § 201.14(b), and may obtain witness statements in the possession of the Commission’s staff for cross-examination purposes, §201.11.1. At the conclusion of the hearing, the respondent has the right to submit briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. §201.16 (d). The initial decision of the administrative law judge must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, wdth supporting reasons, on all material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record. §201.16 (a). A respondent may seek review by the Commission, which may affirm, reverse, or modify the initial decision based on its independent review of the record. §§ 201.17 (g) (2), 201.21. Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a) ; § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78j (b), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1980); §§ 206 (l)-(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§80b-6 (l)-(2). Section 17 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78q (a), and Rule 17a-5 thereunder, 17 CFR §240.17a-5 (1980); §§30 (a) and 34 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-29 (a) and 80a-33 (b). Sections 15 (a) (1), 17 (a), and 17 (e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§ 80a-15 (a)(1), 80a-17 (a), and 80a-17 (e). Section 20 (a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-20 (a). Petitioner was allowed 90 days in which to sell his stock in Steadman Securities Corp. Compliance with the Commission’s order has been stayed pending completion of judicial review. Because the Commission imposed severe sanctions on petitioner, the Court of Appeals remanded to the Commission “to articulate carefully the grounds for its decision, including an explanation of why lesser sanctions will not suffice.” 603 F. 2d 1126, 1143 (CA5 1979). There is no reason to accord less deference to congressionally prescribed standards of proof and rules of evidence in administrative proceedings than in federal courts. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S., at 284 (ascertaining first that Congress had not legislated a standard of proof for administrative deportation proceedings before determining appropriate standard). Because the task of determining the appropriate standard of proof in the instant case is one of discerning congressional intent, many of petitioner’s arguments are simply inapposite. He contends, for example, that as a matter of policy, the potentially severe consequences to a respondent-in a Commission proceeding involving allegations of fraud demand that his burden of risk of erroneous factfinding should be reduced by requiring the Commission to prove violations of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws by clear and convincing evidence. This argument overlooks, however, Congress’ “traditional powers ... to prescribe . . . standards of proof . . . .” Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 265 (1980). It is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of Congress’ prescription. Title 15 U. S. C. §§ 77i, 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13 provide for judicial review of Commission orders in the courts of appeals. Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court “if supported by substantial evidence.” 15 U. S. C. §§ 78y, 80a-42, and 80b-13; cf. § 77i (Commission findings conclusive “if supported by evidence”). This disciplinary proceeding, brought by the Commission pursuant to 15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b) and § 80b-3 (f), is clearly a "case of adjudication” within 5 U. S. C. § 554. See International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. v. Electrical Workers, 419 U. S. 428, 445 (1975). Both § 80a-9 (b) and § 80b-3 (f) also explicitly require an “opportunity for [an agency] hearing.” Moreover, the disciplinary proceeding must be conducted “on the record.” The phrase “on the record” appears in § 80b-3 (f), and while it does not appear in § 80a-9 (b), see n. 1, supra, the absence of the specific phrase from § 80a-9 (b)' does not make the instant proceeding not subject to § 554. See United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co., 410 U. S. 224, 238 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742, 757 (1972); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F. 2d 872, 876 (CA1), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 824 (1978). Rather, the “on the record” requirement for § 80a-9 (b) is satisfied by the substantive content of the adjudication. Title 15 U. S. C. § 80a-42 provides for judicial review of Commission orders issued pursuant to § 80a-9 (b). Substantial-evidence review by the Court of Appeals here required a hearing on the record. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415 (1971); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F. 2d, at 877. Otherwise effective review by the Court of Appeals would have been frustrated. Ibid. In addition, the substantive violations to be proved pursuant to §§ 80a-9 (b) (l)-(3) are virtually identical to the substantive violations stated in §§ 80b-3 (e) (1), (4), and (5), which are incorporated by reference into § 80b-3 (f). The only substantive difference between § 80b-3 (f) and § 80a-9 (b) is that the former permits the Commission to impose sanctions on persons affiliated with an investment adviser and the latter on persons affiliated with an investment company. In both statutes, the Commission is required to prove violations of the securities law provisions enumerated, precisely the type of proceeding for which the APA’s adjudicatory procedures were intended. See generally 410 U. S., at 246. Section 5 (b), 5 U. S. C. § 554 (c)(2), provides that “[t]he agency shall give all interested parties opportunity for . . . hearing and decision on notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title.” Petitioner makes no claim that the Federal Constitution requires application of a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976) defines “substantial” to mean “considerable in amount.” Section 7 (c), of course, also sets minimum quality-of-evidence standards. For example, the provision directing agency exclusion of “irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence” and the further requirement that an agency sanction rest on “reliable” and “probative” evidence mandate that agency decisionmaking be premised on evidence of a certain level of quality. Thus, while the words “reliable” and “probative” may imply quality-of-evidence concerns, the word “substantial” implies quantity of evidence. Section 10 (e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C § 706, is entitled “Scope of review” and provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.” § 706 (2) (E). Section 10(e) expressly refers to §7. Addition of the words “in accordance with” could not have been inadvertent. See n. 18, supra. This is especially true in light of the House Report's discussion of the relationship between § 7 (c) and § 10 (e): “ ‘Substantial evidence’ [in § 10 (e)] means evidence which on the whole record is clearly substantial, plainly sufficient to support a finding or conclusion under the requirements of section 7 (c), and material to the issues.” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 45 (1946). It is true that the phrase “substantial evidence” is often used to denote the scope of judicial review. See n. 12, supra. But to conclude that the phrase “substantial evidence” in § 7 (c) defines the scope of judicial review would make the “substantial evidence” language of § 10 (e) redundant. Moreover, it is implausible to think that the drafters of the APA would place a scope-of-review standard in the middle of a statutory-provision designed to govern evidentiary issues in adjudicatory proceedings. Section 7 is entitled “Hearings; presiding employees; powers and duties; burden of proof; evidence; record as basis of decision.” It “is made up almost entirely of a specification of the various elements of trial procedure.” 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 10:07, p. 332 (2d ed. 1979). More specifically, §7 (c) allocates the burden of proof (placing it on the proponent of a rule or order), provides for a broad rule governing admissibility of evidence, directs an agency to exclude “irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence,” and delineates the evidentiary basis on which a “sanction may ... be imposed.” Petitioner’s argument overlooks the different functions of initial decision-making and judicial review of it. See Charlton v. FTC, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 418, 422, 543 F. 2d 903, 907 (1976); see generally 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§29.01-29.11 (1958). As we recognized in Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607 (1966), the reviewing court is not to weigh the evidence, which Consolo assumed had already been done. Representative Walter of Pennsylvania, author of the House Report and a principal drafter of the legislation, speaking during the floor debate on the day the bill was passed by the House, stated as to the meaning of the phrase “in accordance with . . . substantial evidence” that “the accepted standards of proof, as distinguished from the mere admissibility of evidence, are to govern in administrative proceedings as they do in courts of law and equity.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 365 (1946). This statement suggests that the usual preponderance standard was contemplated. See Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 200 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 190, 627 F. 2d 240, 243 (1980) (“The use of the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard is the traditional standard in civil and administrative proceedings. It is the one contemplated by the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 556 (d)”), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 834 (1980); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 304, 562 F. 2d 820, 823 (1977) (“The traditional standard of proof in a civil or administrative proceeding is the preponderance standard . . .”); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940); cf. Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S., at 288 (Clark, J., dissenting). Moreover, during the floor debate, in the context of a discussion of § 10 (e), it was noted that the substantial-evidence test became the scope-of-review standard because of a desire to have courts review agency decisionmaking more carefully than under the then-prevalent scintilla-of-evidence test. It is clear from the debate that Congress intended agency decisionmaking to be done according to the preponderance of the evidence: “Mr. Springer. . . . The gentleman from Iowa . . . has gone rather carefully over the provisions of the bill. I desire to call attention to only one .'. . relating to the question of reviewable acts, the review of the proceedings by the judiciary, and the scope of the review. Under the present procedure, in many cases where there is any evidence, even a scintilla of evidence, decisions have been rendered and predicated on that character of evidence before the hearing tribunal. “Mr. Hancock. Even though contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. “Mr. Springer. Yes, . . . that has been done in many cases even though it is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence introduced at the hearing.” S. Doc. No. 248, supra, at 376. Petitioner’s reliance on Woodby v. INS, supra, is misplaced. There the Court required the Immigration and Naturalization Service to establish facts in deportation proceedings by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. The Court adopted this standard of proof because deportation proceedings were not subject to the APA, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not prescribe a standard of proof, only the scope of judicial review. The Court reached this conclusion after examining the language, legislative history, and purpose of § 106 (a) (4) and § 242 (b) (4) of the INA. That both sections contained the words “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” has little bearing on the construction of somewhat different language in an entirely different statute. The language, purpose, and legislative history of these sections of the INA differ in material respects from the language, purpose, and legislative history of §7 (c). Section 106 (a)(4) was explicitly labeled a judicial review provision. Section 242 (b) (4) was also construed by the Court to be “addressed to reviewing courts,” 385 U. S., at 283, in part because at the time that the provision was adopted, there was no other scope-of-judicial-review provision in the INA, id., at 284. The APA, by contrast, was passed with an explicit judicial review provision, § 10 (e), and with a provision explicitly governing evidentiary matters before the agency, § 7 (c). To the extent § 242 (b) (4) was viewed by the Court as representing a “yardstick for the administrative factfinder,” the Court concluded that the provision was directed at the quality of evidence upon which an order could be based. Id., at 283. The language of § 242 (b) (4) differs from the language of §7 (c), which includes the additional phrase “in accordance with.” Moreover, as explained above, the legislative history and purpose of §7 (c) make clear that it was not limited to quality-of-evidence. concerns or directed at all at judicial review. We thus accept Justice Clark’s statement in dissent, with which the Court in Woodby did not disagree, that §§7 (c) and 10 (e) of the APA have “traditionally been held satisfied when the agency decides on the preponderance of the evidence.” Id., at 289, n. 1. Justice Clark’s understanding of § 7 (c), as expressed in Woodby, is entitled to particular respect. We have previously noted that the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) has been “¿ven some deference by this Court because of the role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the legislation,” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S., at 546, and Justice Clark was Attorney General both when the APA was passed and when the Manual was published.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NACIREMA OPERATING CO., INC., et al. v. JOHNSON et al. No. 9. Argued March 25, 1969—Reargued October 20, 1969 Decided December 9, 1969 Randall C. Coleman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 9 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was William B. Eley. Solicitor General Grisivold argued the cause for petitioners in No. 16 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Ruckelshaus and Lawrence G. Wallace. John J. O’Connor, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents Johnson et al. on the original argument and on the reargument in both cases. Ralph Rabinowitz argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Avery-on the original argument and on the reargument in both cases. E. D. Vickery, Francis A. Scanlan, Scott H. Elder, and J. Stewart Harrison filed a brief for the National Maritime Compensation Committee as amicus curiae urging reversal in both cases. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases were filed by Louis Waldman and Seymour M. Waldman for the International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, and by Paul S. Edelman for the American Trial Lawyers Association. Together with No. 16, Traynor et al., Deputy Commissioners v. Johnson et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The single question of statutory construction presented by these cases is whether injuries to longshoremen occurring on piers permanently affixed to shore are compen-sable under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927 (Longshoremen’s Act), 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950. Johnson and Klosek were employed by the Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen; Avery was similarly employed by the Old Dominion Stevedoring Corporation. All three men were engaged at the time of their accidents in performing similar operations as “slingers,” attaching cargo from railroad cars located on piers to ships’ cranes for removal to the ships. Klosek was killed, and each of the other men was injured, when cargo hoisted by the ship’s crane swung back and knocked him to the pier or crushed him against the side of the railroad car. Deputy Commisioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims for compensation in each case on the ground that the injuries had not occurred “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required by the Act. The District Courts upheld the Deputy Commissioners’ decisions. 243 E. Supp. 184 (D. C. Md. 1965); 245 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1965). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. 398 F. 2d 900 (1968). We granted certiorari, 393 U. S. 976 (1968), to resolve the resulting conflict with decisions in other circuits holding that pier injuries are not covered by the Act. We have concluded from an examination of the language, purpose, and legislative history of the Act, as well as prior decisions of this Court, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. Since long before the Longshoremen’s Act was passed, it has been settled law that structures such as wharves and piers, permanently affixed to land, are extensions of the land. Thus, literally read, a statute that covers injuries “upon the navigable waters” would not cover injuries on a pier even though the pier, like a bridge, extends over navigable waters. Respondents urge, however, that the 1927 Act, though it employs language that determines coverage by the “situs” of the injury, was nevertheless aimed at broader coverage: coverage of the “status” of the longshoreman employed in performing a maritime contract. We do not agree. Congress might have extended coverage to all longshoremen by exercising its power over maritime contracts. But the language of the Act is to the contrary and the background of the statute leaves little doubt that Congress’ concern in providing compensation was a narrower one. Ten years before the Act was passed this Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917), held that a State was without power to extend a compensation remedy to a longshoreman injured on the gangplank between the ship and the pier. The decision left longshoremen injured on the seaward side of the pier without a compensation remedy, while longshoremen injured on the pier enjoyed the protection of state compensation acts. State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922). Twice Congress attempted to fill this gap by passing legislation that would have extended state compensation remedies beyond the line drawn in Jensen. Each time, this Court struck down the statute as an unlawful delegation of congressional power. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920). Finally, responding to this Court’s suggestion that what Congress could not empower the States to do, it could do itself, Congress passed the Longshoremen’s Act. The clear implication is that in enacting its own compensation statute, Congress w.as trying to do what it had failed to do in earlier attempts: to extend a compensation remedy to workmen injured beyond the pier and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the States. This purpose was clearly expressed in the language limiting coverage to injuries occurring “upon the navigable waters/’ and permitting recovery only “if recovery . . . through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.” This conclusion is fully supported by the legislative history. As originally drafted, § 3 extended coverage to injuries “on a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, except employment of local concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce.” During the hearings, it was repeatedly emphasized and apparently assumed by representatives from both the shipping industry and the unions that a “place within the admiralty jurisdiction” did not include a dock or pier. In fact, a representative of the Labor Department objected to the bill precisely for that reason, urging the Committee to extend coverage to embrace the contract, “and not the man simply when he is on the ship.” If Congress had intended to adopt that suggestion, it could not have chosen a more inappropriate way of expressing its intent than by substituting the words “upon the navigable waters” for the words “within the admiralty jurisdiction.” Indeed, the Senate Report that accompanied the revised bill, containing the language of the present Act, makes clear that the suggestion was rejected, rather than adopted: “[Ijnjuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. We decline to ignore these explicit indications of a design to provide compensation only beyond the pier where the States could not reach. “That is the gap that we are trying to fill.” In filling that gap Congress did not extend coverage to longshoremen like those respondents whose injuries occurred on the landward side of the Jensen line, clearly entitling them to protection under state compensation Acts. Decisions of this Court have more than once embraced this interpretation. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1 (1946), held that neither the Jones Act nor the Longshoremen’s Act covered a longshoreman injured on the dock in the course of his employment even if the injury was caused by a vessel on navigable waters. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 249 (1941), concluded that the purpose of the Act “was to provide for federal compensation in the area which the specific decisions referred to placed beyond the reach of the states.” Davis v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 317 U. S. 249, 256 (1942), noted that in passing the Longshoremen’s Act, Congress had specifically adopted the Jensen line. The interpretation endorsed by these cases is also reflected in a consistent course of administrative construction commencing immediately after the enactment of the Act. Employees’ Compensation Commission Opinions Nos. 5 and 16, 1927 A. M. C. 1558 and 1855; No. 30, 1928 A. M. C. 417. It is true that since Jensen this Court has permitted recovery under state remedies in particular situations seaward of the pier, Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, supra, and in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114 (1962), approved recovery under - the Longshoremen’s Act for injuries occurring on navigable waters which might also have been compensable under state law. Calbeck made it clear that Congress intended to exercise its full jurisdiction seaward of the Jensen line and to cover all injuries on navigable waters, whether or not state compensation was also available in particular situations. The proviso to § 3 (a) conditioning coverage on the unavailability of state remedies was not meant to deny federal relief where the injury occurred on navigable waters. But removing uncertainties as to the Act’s coverage of injuries occurring on navigable waters is a far cry from construing the Act to reach injuries on land traditionally within the ambit of state compensation acts. Indeed, Calbeck freely cited the Parker and Davis declarations that the Longshoremen’s Act adopted the Jensen line, and Calbeck’s holding rejected the notion that the line should advance or recede simply because decisions of this Court had permitted state remedies in narrow areas seaward of that line. Otherwise, the reach of the federal Act would be subject to uncertainty, and its coverage would “expand and recede in harness with developments in constitutional interpretation as to the scope of state power to compensate injuries on navigable waters,” with the result “that every litigation raising an issue of federal coverage would raise an issue of constitutional dimension, with all that that implies . . . .” 370 U. S., at .126. As in Calbeck, we refuse to impute to Congress the intent of burdening the administration of compensation by perpetuating such confusion. Nor can we agree that what Congress did not do in 1927, it did in 1948 when it passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (Extension Act), 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. C. § 740. In pertinent part, that Act provides: “The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.” By its very choice of language, the Act re-enforces the conclusion that Congress was well aware of the distinction between land injuries and water injuries and that when it limited recovery to injuries on navigable waters, it did not mean injuries on land. The Act no doubt extended the admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship-caused injuries on a pier. But far from modifying the clear understanding in the law that a pier was an extension of land and that a pier injury was not on navigable waters but on land, the Act accepts that rule and nevertheless declares such injuries to be maritime torts if caused by a vessel on navigable waters. The Extension Act was passed to remedy the completely different problem that arose from the fact that parties aggrieved by injuries done by ships to bridges, docks, and the like could not get into admiralty at all. There is no evidence that Congress thereby intended to amend or affect the coverage of the Longshoremen’s Act or to overrule Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra, decided just two years earlier. While the Extension Act may have the effect of permitting respondents to maintain an otherwise unavailable libel in admiralty, see Gutierrez v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 373 U. S. 206 (1963), the Act has no bearing whatsoever on their right to a compensation remedy under the Longshoremen’s Act. There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen injured while loading or unloading a ship. But even construing the Extension Act to amend the Longshoremen’s Act would not effect this result, since longshoremen injured on a pier by pier-based equipment would still remain outside the Act. And construing the Longshoremen’s Act to coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction — whatever they may be and however they may change — simply replaces one line with another whose uncertain contours can only perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line, the same confusion that previously existed on the seaward side. While we have no doubt that Congress had the power to choose either of these paths in defining the coverage of its compensation remedy, the plain fact is that it chose instead the line in Jensen separating water from land at the edge of the pier. The invitation to move that line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this Court. Reversed. The piers involved extended from shore into the Patapsco River at Sparrows Point, Maryland, and into the Elizabeth River at Norfolk, Virginia. §3 (a) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §903 (a), provides in relevant part: “(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. . . .” The three cases were consolidated on appeal. In a fourth case, an award to a longshoreman who had drowned after being knocked off a pier into the water was affirmed by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 238 F. Supp. 78 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1965). Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F. 2d 221 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1051 (1968); Houser v. O’Leary, 383 F. 2d 730 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 954 (1968); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Shea, 382 F. 2d 344 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. McCollough v. Travelers Insurance Co., 389 U. S. 1050 (1968); Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 344 F. 2d 640 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 835 (1965). Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1 (1946); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U. S. 647 (1935); T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U. S. 179 (1928); State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 (1922); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316 (1908); The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (1866); 1 E. Benedict, The Law of American Admiralty §§ 28, 29 (6th ed. 1940); G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §§ 6-46, 7-17 (1957); G. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States § 11 (1939). We reject the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that all injuries on these piers, despite settled doctrine to the contrary, may now be considered injuries on navigable waters — a proposition rejected implicitly by a unanimous Court just last Term. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U. S. 352, 360, 366 (1969). Piers, like bridges, are not transformed from land structures into floating structures by the mere fact that vessels may pass beneath them. The admiralty jurisdiction in tort was traditionally “bounded by locality,” De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C. C. D. Mass. 1815) (Story, J.) (followed in Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1 (1871)), encompassing all torts that took place on navigable waters. By contrast, admiralty contract jurisdiction “extends over all contracts, (wheresoever they may be made or executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations,) which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea.” De Lovio v. Boit, supra, at 444. Since a workmen’s compensation act combines elements of both tort and contract, Congress need not have tested coverage by locality alone. As the text indicates, however, the history of the Act shows that Congress did indeed do just that. Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 227 (1924). The passage from Dawson & Co. was referred to in the hearings in both the Senate and the House. See Hearings on S. 3170 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 31, 103 and n. 3 (1926) (hereinafter “Senate Hearings”) ; Hearing on H. R. 9498 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, pp. 18, 119 and n. 3 (1926) (hereinafter “House Hearing”). Drydocks were conceded to be within the admiralty jurisdiction in both the hearings and the debates, even though such structures are not always floating structures. See House Hearing 34; 68 Cong. Rec. 5403 (1927). If Congress had thought the words “upon the navigable waters” were broad enough to embrace the limits of admiralty jurisdiction, there would have been no need to add the parenthetical “(including any dry dock).” See Senate Hearings 2. Mr. Dempsey, representing the International Longshoremen’s Association, testified that the bill would cover injuries on the dock as well as on the ship. When pressed as to how injuries on the dock could come within the admiralty jurisdiction, he confessed he did not understand the legal theory, and would defer to the longshoremen’s attorney, Mr. Austin. Mr. Austin proceeded to testify: that the dock was not within the admiralty jurisdiction; that injuries on the dock were compensable under state law; that the problem arose because the longshoreman was left “high and dry” once he left the State’s jurisdiction and stepped on the gangplank; and that “[t]hat is the gap that we are trying to fill . . . .” Senate Hearings 28, 30-31. Testimony that longshoremen injured on the docks would not be covered by the Act also came from representatives of the shipbuilders. See Senate Hearings 68, 95, 103. See also n. 15, infra; Hearing on S. 3170 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69tb Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, pt. 2, pp. 141, 157 (1926) (testimony on the revised bill, containing the language of the present §3). Senate Hearings 40. While the reason for the change in the language concerning the bill’s coverage is not expressly indicated, it appears to have been a response to objections that the original language, carving out an exception for employment of “local concern,” was too vague to define clearly the line being drawn, and might even encounter problems once again at the hands of this Court. See Senate Hearings 56-57, 95; House Hearing 77, 100. In fact, the same spokesman for the shipbuilders who objected to the vagueness of the “local concern” exception, also objected that the bill as written might “upset all the present arrangements with respect to compensating men on the dock.” Senate Hearings 57. The implication is that no one expected the federal law to extend into the area of the State’s jurisdiction on the dock, but that confusion existed as to whether, conversely, state remedies would be exclusive as to injuries “on navigable waters” but within the “maritime but local” exception created by Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922). This reading of the legislative history was adopted in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114, 121-127 (1962), where the Court concluded that the Act did not prevent recovery for injuries on navigable waters, even though a state remedy would also have been available under Rohde. See n. 12, supra. Other indications that Congress had no intention of replacing or overlapping state compensation- remedies for dockside injuries can be found throughout the hearings. At one point, in attempting to calculate the increased costs involved in the federal Act, Senator Cummins, Chairman of the Committee, pointed out that “we are proceeding on the theory that these people can not be compensated under the New York compensation law or any other compensation law.” “[T]he purpose of this law,” he agreed with a witness, was simply to cover the men who “are going to be exposed a part of the time on board vessels . . . and therefore will have to be compensated in some other way where the New York law is not the remedy available.” Senate Hearings 84-85. Similarly, Representative Graham, Chairman of the House Committee, agreed that “the real necessity for this legislation” was to provide workers with compensation when they stepped from dock to ship. House Hearing 25. In fact, the labor representative who was testifying at that point in the hearing insisted that the legislation sought was only for “[tjhose who are injured on board vessels at the dock.” Those injured on the dock “are taken care of under the State law.” Id., at 28. There was also testimony by a longshoremen's representative that “65 per cent of the accidents in the courts of New York happen on board ships or on gangplanks; . . . therefore . . . 65 per cent of the accidents of the men who are injured by performing this work will be compensable under this bill.” Id., at 35. See also id., at 44. Another noted that “our men that are working on the dock are protected, and well protected, under the New York compensation act, but our men on board ship are not protected. We feel that Congress wants to protect them . . . .” Senate Hearings 42. Both Johnson and Klosek’s widow and minor children have filed claims, and are concededly entitled to benefits, under the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act. Avery has already been awarded benefits under the Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Law. See Gilmore & Black, supra, n. 5, § 7-17. The legislative history of the Extension Act is devoid of any reference to the Longshoremen’s Act, as might well be expected in an Act dealing with a wholly unrelated problem. See S. Rep. No. 1593, 80th Gong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. R. Rep. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). The House Report accompanying the Extension Act notes that “the bill will not create new causes of action,” id., at 3, and the statute speaks of extending jurisdiction to suits “in rem or in per-sonam” for “damage” to “person or property” — concepts wholly at odds with the theory of workmen’s compensation — awards made in an administrative proceeding. The conclusion of the District Court is inescapable. “The two statutes do not deal with the same subject matter, are inherently inconsistent with each other, and cannot be read as being in pari materia.” 243 F. Supp. 184, 194 (1965). It is worth noting that a contemporaneous amendment of the Longshoremen’s Act contains no cross reference to the Extension Act. See Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 602 (a bill to increase benefits under the Longshoremen’s Act, passed five days after the Extension Act). And, a House Report dated July 28, 1958 — 10 years after enactment of the Extension Act — points out that employees “on the navigable waters of the United States” are covered under the Longshoremen’s Act, but are under state protection “when performing work on docks and in other shore areas.” H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (accompanying a bill to provide safety programs for longshoremen). We were informed in argument that two of the parties have in fact already commenced actions against the shipowner.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. E. C. ATKINS & CO. No. 419. Argued March 7, 10, 1947. — Decided May 19, 1947. Ruth Weyand argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Gerhard P. Van Arkel, Morris P. Glushien and Mozart G. Ratner. Frederic D. Anderson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Kurt F. Pantzer. Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. The problem posed by this case is whether private plant guards, who are required to be civilian auxiliaries to the military police of the United States Army, are employees within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3). At all material times, the respondent corporation was engaged in the manufacture of saws, tools and armor plate. It employed more than 1,200 production and maintenance employees at its two plants at Indianapolis, Indiana. Before it began to produce armor plate for defense and war purposes, respondent employed about six watchmen or guards. When it entered upon war production, however, the War Department required that an auxiliary military police force of sixty-four members be established to guard the plants. In 1943, after the necessary additional guards had been recruited, a union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for investigation and certification of representatives pursuant to § 9 (c) of the Act. It was alleged that the union represented the sixty-four plant guards employed by respondent at its two plants. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was not the employer of the guards within the meaning of § 2 (2) and that the guards were not employees as defined by § 2 (3). A hearing was thereupon held and evidence concerning the status of the guards was introduced. On October 19, 1943, the Board concluded from the evidence thus submitted that these plant guards were employees within the meaning of § 2 (3) despite their status as civilian auxiliaries to the military police. 52 N. L. R. B. 1470. It held that all the plant guards at respondent’s two plants, excluding the chief guards, lieutenants and all other supervisory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action, constituted a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. An election was therefore directed to be held, which resulted in the union in question being chosen as bargaining representative. The union was certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of the plant guards. Subsequently, the union filed charges that the respondent had refused to bargain collectively. A complaint was issued by the Board, followed by a hearing at which evidence regarding that refusal was introduced. The Board, on May 30, 1944, issued its decision in which it concluded that the guards were employees of respondent and that the latter had committed unfair labor practices in refusing to bargain with the union. 56 N. L. R. B. 1056. The Board accordingly issued an order requiring respondent to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the union, and commanding it to bargain with the union, upon request, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to enforce the Board’s order, holding (1) that the guards were not employees of the respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the Act since they were militarized, and (2) that even if the militarized guards were to be considered as employees of respondent, enforcement of the Board’s order should not be allowed because to do so would be or would likely be inimical to the public welfare. 147 F. 2d 730. In filing a petition in this Court for a writ of certiorari, the Board noted that the guard forces at respondent’s plants had been demilitarized early in 1944, but urged that the case was not thereby rendered moot. We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals “for further consideration of the alleged changed circumstances with respect to the demilitarization of the employees involved, and the effect thereof on the Board’s orders.” 325 U. S. 838. The Board and the respondent entered into a stipulation relative to the dates and circumstances of the demilitarization of the guards. The stipulation noted that most of the guards had been released from service and that only eleven of them had been retained as watchmen by respondent as of February 23, 1946; and those eleven had been “sworn in as Deputy Policemen by the City of Indianapolis.” The Board then filed a motion in the Circuit Court of Appeals for a decree enforcing its order. This motion was denied and the prior holding was reaffirmed, the court stating that the demilitarization was irrelevant to the issue of whether the plant guards were employees at the time when the respondent refused to bargain with the union. 155 F. 2d 567. The importance of the problem raised by the case, together with a conflict over the answer to this problem between the court below and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 146 F. 2d 718, prompted us to grant a further review of the case. We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the demilitarization of the guards did not render the case moot and that it had no effect upon the prime issue in the case. The Board’s order was based upon a holding that the respondent committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to recognize and bargain with the union selected by the militarized guards. And that refusal occurred at a time when the guards were still militarized. A determination that the respondent had a statutory duty to bargain with the union at that time is therefore essential to the validity of the Board’s order. The fact that the guards were subsequently demilitarized did not affect their status as employees at this crucial juncture; nor did it relieve respondent of any duty to bargain that it might otherwise have had at that point. The Board’s order, moreover, was a continuing direction to bargain collectively with the union designated by the guards. Demilitarization has not dispensed with whatever duty respondent may have now or in the future to comply with that order. If the guards were employees of respondent entitled to the benefits of the Act during the period of militarization, a fortiori they are employees now that all connections with the Army have been severed; and their statutory rights continue to be entitled to full respect. Respondent’s guard force still remains in existence, although considerably reduced in size, and the union presumably continues to be the representative of the guards. Under such circumstances, the case is not moot. Labor Board v. Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, 271; J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 U. S. 332, 334. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Goodyear Co., 304 U. S. 257, 260. As to the merits, it is elementary that the Board has the duty of determining in the first instance who is an employee for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act and that the Board’s determination must be accepted by reviewing courts if it has a reasonable basis in the evidence and is not inconsistent with the law. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111. Realizing that labor disputes and industrial strife are not confined to those who fall within ordinary legal classifications, Congress has not attempted to spell out a detailed or rigid definition of an employee or of an employer. The relevant portion of § 2 (3) simply provides that “The term 'employee’ shall include any employee, . . .” In contrast, § 2 (2) states that “The term ‘employer’ includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, . . .” As we recognized in the Hearst case, the terms “employee” and “employer” in this statute carry with them more than the technical and traditional common law definitions. They also draw substance from the policy and purposes of the Act, the circumstances and background of particular employment relationships, and all the hard facts of industrial life. And so the Board, in performing its delegated function of defining and applying these terms, must bring to its task an appreciation of economic realities, as well as a recognition of the aims which Congress sought to achieve by this statute. This does not mean that it should disregard the technical and traditional concepts of “employee” and “employer.” But it is not confined to those concepts. It is free to take account of the more relevant economic and statutory considerations. And a determination by the Board based in whole or in part upon those considerations is entitled to great respect by a reviewing court, due to the Board’s familiarity with the problems and its experience in the administration of the Act. Laying aside for the moment the matter of militarization, we cannot say in this case that the Board would be legally unjustified in holding that the rank-and-file plant guards are employees within the meaning of the Act. They bear essentially the same relation to management as maintenance and production employees. In fact, they are indistinguishable from ordinary watchmen, gatemen, patrolmen, firemen and guards — persons who have universally been regarded and treated as employees for purposes of union membership and employee benefits. They perform such duties as inspecting persons, packages and vehicles, carrying cash to various parts of the plant, and generally surveying the premises to detect fires, suspicious circumstances and sabotage. Moreover, the guards in question are not supervisors; they possess no power to affect the working conditions of other employees. Without collective bargaining, they are subject to the unilateral determination by the employer of their wages, hours, seniority, tenure and other conditions of work. Individually, they suffer from inequality of bargaining power and their need for collective action parallels that of other employees. From any economic or statutory standpoint, the Board would be warranted in treating them as employees. Even under conventional standards, they are controlled by management to an extent sufficient to justify designating them as employees. Nor can we say, as a matter of law, that permitting plant guards to be considered as employees entitled to the benefits of the Act would make them any less loyal to their employer in carrying out their designated tasks. In guarding the plant and personnel against physical danger, they represent the management’s legitimate interest in plant protection. But that function is not necessarily inconsistent with organizing and bargaining with the employer on matters affecting their own wages, hours and working conditions. They do not lose the right to serve themselves in these respects merely because in other respects they represent a separate and independent interest of management. As in the case of foremen, we see no basis in the Act whatever for denying plant guards the benefits of the statute when they take collective action to protect their collective interests. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U. S. 485. We cannot assume, moreover, that labor organizations will make demands upon plant guard members or extract concessions from employers so as to decrease the loyalty and efficiency of the guards in the performance of their obligations to the employers. There is always that possibility, but it does not qualify as a legal basis for taking away from the guards all their statutory rights. In other words, unionism and collective bargaining are capable of adjustments to accommodate the special functions of plant guards. The crucial problem in this case, however, is whether the militarization of the plant guards changed their status as employees as a matter of law so as to prohibit the Board from extending to them the benefits of the Act which they would otherwise have. The short answer to that problem is that militarization as such does not necessarily change the status of plant guards. It may or may not bring about a change, depending upon the particular circumstances. The militarization may be a qualified one; the employer may retain power to fix wages, hours and other conditions of work; the need and desirability for collective action on the part of the guards may exist as to the matters over which the employer retains control; and a recognition of the statutory rights of the guards may be entirely consistent with their military obligations. If that is the case, the guards remain employees for purposes of the Act. But if the militarization is such as to transfer to the Army all the matters over which the employer would normally have control, matters which would form the basis for collective bargaining as contemplated by the Act, the guards may lose their status as private employees within the purview of the statute. The Board’s determination that the militarization of the guards in respondent’s plants was of a type that did not alter their status as employees under the Act must therefore be tested by the applicable War Department regulations and by the evidence introduced at the hearing before the Board. If such a result is consistent with the regulations and has a reasonable basis in the other evidence, the Board’s order must be sustained. The plant guards in this case were enrolled as civilian auxiliaries to the military police under War Department regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941. That order authorized the Secretary of War to establish and maintain military guards and patrols, and to take other appropriate measures, to protect certain strategic premises, materials and utilities from injury and destruction. The Secretary of War accordingly directed the military organization of plant guard forces as auxiliary military police at plants important to the prosecution of the war, the directive to that effect being issued by the Adjutant General on July 2, 1942. Supplementary regulations were contained in Circular No. 15, issued on March 17, 1943, by Headquarters, Army Service Forces. As stated by these regulations, the purpose of the military organization of the plant guards was “to increase the authority, efficiency, and responsibility of guard forces at plants important to the prosecution of the war, and through military training to provide auxiliary forces throughout the United States to supplement the Army in wartime emergency situations.” It was made clear, however, that plant managements were not relieved of their responsibility “for providing adequate protection at all times against all hazards.” In other words, employers who wished to obtain government contracts for the production of war materials were required to provide “adequate protection” for their plants where the material was to be produced; if the existing plant protection forces were inadequate, additional guards were to be recruited by the employers. But all the original and additional guards were to be enrolled as civilian auxiliaries to the military police. The military authorities reserved the right to veto the hiring or firing of any plant guard where such action by the employer might impair the efficiency of the guard force. And the military plant guard officers were authorized to take appropriate action “through the plant management” to correct conditions which might result in “defective or inadequate performance by the guard forces of its ordinary protective duties.” The functions of these civilian auxiliaries to the military police were stated to be twofold: “(1) To provide internal and external protection of the plant against sabotage, espionage, and natural hazards. (2) To serve with the Army in providing protection to the plant and its environs in emergency situations.” They were subject to call for military service even where emergencies arose at places other than the plants where they normally worked. To these ends, military plant guard officers were authorized to exercise direct control over the guard forces “only in matters relating to military instruction and duties as Auxiliary Military Police.” But such orders “will be issued only after consultation with and, if possible, concurrence by the plant management. . . . Control, therefore, will be exercised as heretofore through the plant management except at drill and except in emergency situations. Although the plant guard officers will be in command at all times, they will not supplant the civilian guard officers, and unless expediency demands otherwise will exercise their authority through the chain of command established by the plant management.” The regulations also provided that the military drill of the guard forces should not . exceed one hour per week “except with the approval of the plant management.” As to the employer’s relations with the guard force, the regulations were explicit in recognizing that those relations remained essentially the same as if there were no militarization. According to Circular No. 15: “Basically, the militarization of plant guard forces does not change the existing systems of hiring, compensation, and dismissal; all remain primarily a matter between the guards and the plant managements. Guards in the employ of a private employer may, as heretofore, be dismissed by that employer.” A veto power over employment and dismissal, of course, was retained by the military. It was further provided: “The status of the employer in respect to the employee benefits for the guard force is not changed. For example, social security, workmen’s compensation, and employer’s liability provisions remain unaffected.” And the employer was expected to train the guard forces in their ordinary protective duties and was required to furnish them with uniforms and weapons. The right of the plant guards to bargain collectively was recognized by Circular No. 15, paragraph 6h (2) of which provided: “Auxiliary Military Police are permitted to bargain collectively, but no such activity will be tolerated which will interfere with their obligations as members of the Auxiliary Military Police. In view of recent decisions by the National Labor Relations Board (see In re Lord Mfg. Co. & United Rubber Workers of America, CIO, Case No. R-4826, February 1943) [Lord Manufacturing Co., 47 N. L. R. B. 1032], the Auxiliary Military Police should be represented in collective bargaining with the management by a bargaining unit other than that composed of the production and maintenance workers, although both bargaining units may be affiliated with the same labor organization. Where the guards are not now included in the same bargaining unit, this is mandatory; where the guards are included in such unit, serious consideration will be given to effect a change to conform to the foregoing policies.” Provision was also made that collective bargaining agreements covering plant guards who were civilian auxiliaries should include a clause recognizing that nothing in the collective bargaining relationship should interfere with the duties imposed upon the guards as auxiliary military police. The guards were required to sign agreements with the United States. Each agreement stated that the individual, who had been or was about to be employed by the particular company as a guard at its plant, agreed that he would support and defend the Constitution, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution, and faithfully discharge his duties as a civilian auxiliary to the military police. He also acknowledged in this agreement that appropriate Articles of War had been read and explained to him and that he was subject to military law during his employment. The applicable regulations then provided that he could be court-martialed where no other effective form of punishment would be effective. But “Unlike the court-martial punishment of a person in military service, a court martial cannot punish a member of the Auxiliary Military Police by reduction in military grade or by forfeiture of pay and allowances. Analogous punishments might be imposed, such as reduction in grade in the guard organization or temporary suspension from duty. A fine, as distinguished from forfeiture, is regarded as an appropriate form of punishment.” In all other respects, the guards remained subject to the civil courts. The evidence and testimony submitted to the Board confirmed the fact that the plant guards in respondent’s two plants were militarized in accordance with the foregoing regulations. The guards at each plant were under the direct supervision of a chief guard and several lieutenants — all of whom were civilians recruited by the respondent like the rank-and-file guards. The military superior of the chief guards was the District Plant Guard Officer stationed at the Continuous Security District Office of the War Department, Cincinnati, Ohio, an officer who also had charge of guard forces at other plants in the district. A general directive issued by this office repeated many of the provisions of Circular No. 15. It also provided that orders and regulations for the auxiliary military police would be issued in the name of the Chief of the District “after plant management has indicated its concurrence by signing the guard order in the lower left hand corner.” But the only guard orders received by the chief guards at respondent’s plants were three general ones signed by the District Plant Guard Officer, orders that were applicable to all militarized guards in the district. All the specific orders that were ever issued emanated from the chief guards. About the only direct contact between the military authorities and these guards occurred during the weekly drill period. Respondent recruited the necessary additional guards through its ordinary employment channels and it had the power to initiate dismissals from the force. Such actions, however, were subject to the approval of the military. Respondent at all times carried the guards on its regular pay rolls, determined their rate of compensation and paid their wages after making appropriate deductions. And since it did not operate on a cost-plus basis, respondent actually bore the cost of the guards’ wages. Respondent did not attempt to give orders to the guards, merely making suggestions to the chief guards. The latter worked in close cooperation with respondent’s personnel manager and no friction developed. Respondent delegated to the chief guards its power to determine the guards’ working hours and the promotion policies in regard to them. Finally, respondent maintained its liability as to the guards on matters of social security and workmen’s compensation and was obliged to obey all minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. From the foregoing, an ample basis is evident to support the Board’s determination that militarization did not destroy the employee status of the guards in respondent’s plants. The War Department regulations and the actual practice in these plants were based upon the explicit assumption that the guards were the private employees of respondent rather than employees or soldiers of the United States. The regulations made it unmistakable that the normal, private employer-employee relationship was to remain substantially intact. Especially clear was the fact that the right of the guards to join unions and to bargain collectively was to be respected. The military authorities took over from respondent only those attributes of control which were necessary to effectuate the rather limited military program, many aspects of that transferred power being exercisable by the Army only in the gravest emergencies. We cannot say that the Board was without warrant in law or in fact in concluding that respondent retained “a sufficient residual measure of control over the terms and conditions of employment of the guards” so that they might fairly be described as employees of respondent. The most important incidents of the employer-employees relationship — wages, hours and promotion — remained matters to be determined by respondent rather than by the Army. Respondent could settle those vital matters unilaterally or by agreement with the guards. And the guards were free to negotiate and bargain individually or collectively on these items. It is precisely such a situation to which the National Labor Relations Act is applicable. It is a situation where collective bargaining may be appropriate and where statutory objectives may be achieved despite the limitations imposed by militarization. Under such circumstances, the Board may properly find that an employee status exists for purposes of the Act. In this setting, it matters not that respondent was deprived of some of the usual powers of an employer, such as the absolute power to hire and fire the guards and the absolute power to control their physical activities in the performance of their service. Those are relevant but not exclusive indicia of an employer-employee relationship under this statute. As we have seen, judgment as to the existence of such a relationship for purposes of this Act must be made with more than the common law concepts in mind. That relationship may spring as readily from the power to determine the wages and hours of another, coupled with the obligation to bear the financial burden of those wages and the receipt of the benefits of the hours worked, as from the absolute power to hire and fire or the power to control all the activities of the worker. In other words, where the conditions of the relation are such that the process of collective bargaining may appropriately be utilized as contemplated by the Act, the necessary relationship may be found to be present. Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, supra, 129. The Board’s determination that there was a relationship in this case deserving of statutory protection does not reflect an isolated or careless reconciliation of the rights guaranteed by the Act with the important wartime duties of plant protection employees. In the course of its administration of the Act during the war, the Board was faced with this problem many times. It was well acquainted with the important and complex considerations inherent in the situation. The responsibility of representing the public interest in such matters and of reaching a judgment after giving due weight to all the relevant factors lay primarily with the Board. See Southern Steamship Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31, 47. In the absence of some compelling evidence that the Board has failed to measure up to its responsibility, courts should be reluctant to overturn the considered judgment of the Board and to substitute their own ideas of the public interest. We find no such evidence in this case. Here we have the Board’s considered and consistent judgment that militarized plant guards may safely be permitted to join unions and bargain collectively and that their military duties and obligations do not suffer thereby. In agreement with that viewpoint has been the War Department, the agency most directly concerned with the military aspects of the problem. Its regulations and directives have clearly acknowledged the feasibility of recognizing collective bargaining rights of these guards during wartime, provided only that no encroachment is made upon military necessities. This policy of the Board, moreover, has been confirmed by experience. The Board states that it has certified bargaining representatives for units of militarized guards in more than 105 cases, in none of which has any danger to the public interest or to the war effort resulted. Under such circumstances, it would be folly on our part to disregard or to upset the policy the Board has applied in this case. Since the Board’s order is in accord with the law and has substantial roots in the evidence, it should have been enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Respondent’s objections to the language and scope of the order are either without merit or have been removed by the demilitarization of the guards. And any issues concerning the subsequent deputization of the guards as policemen are answered by our decision in Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., post, p. 416. The judgment below is accordingly Reversed. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson dissent substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the court below, 155 F. 2d 567. Local 1683 of the International Association of Machinists, District 90. This union did not represent any of the maintenance or production employees in respondent’s plants, but it did admit to membership plant protection employees of other employers as well as those of respondent. Circular No. 15 was not introduced into evidence in tbe proceeding before the Board. But it was issued by military authorities pursuant to the power vested in the Secretary of War by Executive Order No. 8972 and we may take judicial notice of it. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 483-484. Circular No. 15, par. la. Id. par. lb. Id. par. 6b (2). Id. par. lb. Id. par. 2a. Id. par. 5a (2). Id. pars. 5e (2) and 6a (1). Id. par. 7g (1). Id. par. 6b (1). Id. par. 6f. The guards were required to salute Army officers and had the right to arrest anyone in the plants. They carried identification cards issued by the War Department and wore arm bands on which appeared the words “Auxiliary Military Police.” Id. par. 7. Id. par. 6h (1). If a guard refused to sign this agreement, he might be, but need not be, temporarily retained with the understanding that he would be dismissed as soon as he could be replaced, and in any event within a reasonable time. Id. par. 5b (1). Id. par. 8d. This directive, however, omitted par. 6h (2) of Circular No. 15, dealing with the right of guards to bargain collectively. Respondent argues that it was forced to pay the guards because of the War Department’s action in requiring additional plant protection. But respondent was not forced to enter into its war production contracts with the Government. It did so voluntarily and with the understanding that it would comply with any terms and conditions the Government saw fit to impose. One of these conditions was that respondent expand its peacetime guard force of six men to a wartime complement of sixty-four. So far as these additional guards being respondent’s employees is concerned, it is no different from a requirement that respondent employ more chemists or other production experts to facilitate execution of the contracts. The Board’s conclusion in this respect is confirmed by the results reached under other statutes. Militarized guards have been treated as private employees for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Walling v. Lum, 4 WH Cases 465. And they have consistently been treated as such by the National War Labor Board. Detroit Steel Products Co., 6 War Lab. Rep. 495; Brewster Aeronautical Corp., 11 War Lab. Rep. 286, 15 War Lab. Rep. 239,240-243; Great American Industries, 11 War Lab. Rep. 287; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 15 War Lab. Rep. 500, 19 War Lab. Rep. 813; General Motors Corp., 18 War Lab. Rep. 541. And see Labor Board v. Carroll, 120 F. 2d 457. See, e. g., Chrysler Corporation, 44 N. L. R. B. 881; Budd Wheel Co., 52 N. L. R. B. 666; Dravo Corporation, 52 N. L. R. B. 322. See also National Labor Relations Board, Seventh Annual Report (1943), p. 63; Eighth Annual Report (1944), p. 57. In adopting the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, Congress provided in § 7 (a) (2) that all actions of the National War Labor Board must conform to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act — an indication that Congress deemed the preservation of the right to collective bargaining to be essential in war industries.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ESTATE OF GRACE et al. No. 574. Argued April 22, 1969. Decided June 2, 1969. Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Roberts, Harris Weinstein, Harry Baum, Philip R. Miller, and Stuart A. Smith. William S. Downard argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Walter J. Rockier. Mk. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the application of § 811 (c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to a so-called “reciprocal trust” situation. After Joseph P. Grace’s death in 1950, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the value of a trust created by his wife was includible in his gross estate. A deficiency was assessed and paid, and, after denial of a claim for a refund, this refund suit was brought. The Court of Claims, with two judges dissenting, ruled that the value of the trust was not includible in decedent’s estate under § 811 (c) (1)(B) and entered judgment for respondent. Estate of Grace v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 745, 393 F. 2d 939 (1968). We granted certiorari because of an alleged conflict between the decision below and certain decisions in the courts of appeals and because of the importance of the issue presented to the administration of the federal estate tax laws. 393 U. S. 975 (1968). We reverse. I. Decedent was a very wealthy man at the time of his marriage to the late Janet Grace in 1908. Janet Grace had no wealth or property of her own, but, between 1908 and 1931, decedent transferred to her a large amount of personal and real property, including the family’s Long Island estate. Decedent retained effective control over the family’s business affairs, including the property transferred to his wife. She took no interest and no part in business affairs and relied upon her husband’s judgment. Whenever some formal action was required regarding property in her name, decedent would have the appropriate instrument prepared and she would execute it. On December 15, 1931, decedent executed a trust instrument, hereinafter called the Joseph Grace trust. Named as trustees were decedent, his nephew, and a third party. The trustees were directed to pay the income of the trust to Janet Grace during her lifetime, and to pay to her any part of the principal which a majority of the trustees might deem advisable. Janet was given the power to designate, by will or deed, the manner in which the trust estate remaining at her death was to be distributed among decedent and their children. The trust properties included securities and real estate interests. On December 30, 1931, Janet Grace executed a trust instrument, hereinafter called the Janet Grace trust, which was virtually identical to the Joseph Grace trust. The trust properties included the family estate and corporate securities, all of which had been transferred to her by decedent in preceding years. The trust instruments were prepared by one of decedent’s employees in accordance with a plan devised by decedent to create additional trusts before the advent of a new gift tax expected to be enacted the next year. Decedent selected the properties to be included in each trust. Janet Grace, acting in accordance with this plan, executed her trust instrument at decedent’s request. Janet Grace died in 1937. The Joseph Grace trust terminated at her death. Her estate’s federal estate tax return disclosed the Janet Grace trust and reported it as a nontaxable transfer by Janet Grace. The Commissioner asserted that the Janet and Joseph Grace trusts were “reciprocal” and asserted a deficiency to the extent of mutual value. Compromises on unrelated issues resulted in 55% of the smaller of the two trusts, the Janet Grace trust, being included in her gross estate. Joseph Grace died in 1950. The federal estate tax return disclosed both trusts. The Joseph Grace trust was reported as a nontaxable transfer and the Janet Grace trust was reported as a trust under which decedent held a limited power of appointment. Neither trust was included in decedent’s gross estate. The Commissioner determined that the Joseph and Janet Grace trusts were “reciprocal” and included the amount of the Janet Grace trust in decedent’s gross estate. A deficiency in the amount of $363,500.97, plus interest, was assessed and paid. II. Section 811 (c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided that certain transferred property in which a decedent retained a life interest was to be included in his gross estate. The general purpose of the statute was to include in a decedent’s gross estate transfers that are essentially testamentary — i. e., transfers which leave the transferor a significant interest in or control over the property transferred during his lifetime. See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, 643-644 (1949). The doctrine of reciprocal trusts was formulated in response to attempts to draft instruments which seemingly avoid the literal terms of §811 (c)(1)(B), while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment of his property. The doctrine dates from Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F. 2d 99 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 637 (1940). In Lehman, decedent and his brother owned equal shares in certain stocks and bonds. Each brother placed his interest in trust for the other’s benefit for life, with remainder to the life tenant’s issue. Each brother also gave the other the right to withdraw $150,000 of the principal. If the brothers had each reserved the right to withdraw $150,000 from the trust that each had created, the trusts would have been in-cludible in their gross estates as interests of which each had made a transfer with a power to revoke. When one of the brothers died, his estate argued that neither trust was includible because the decedent did not have a power over a trust which he had created. The Second Circuit disagreed. That court ruled that the effect of the transfers was the same as if the decedent had transferred his stock in trust for himself, remainder to his issue, and had reserved the right to withdraw $150,000. The court reasoned: “The fact that the trusts were reciprocated or ‘crossed’ is a trifle, quite lacking in practical or legal significance. . . . The law searches out the reality and is not concerned with the form.” 109 F. 2d, at 100. The court ruled that the decisive point was that each brother caused the other to make a transfer by establishing his own trust. The doctrine of reciprocal trusts has been applied numerous times since the Lehman decision. It received congressional approval in § 6 of the Technical Changes Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 893. The present case is, however, this Court’s first examination of the doctrine. The Court of Claims was divided over the requirements for application of the doctrine to the situation of this case. Relying on some language in Lehman and certain other courts of appeals’ decisions, the majority held that the crucial factor was whether the decedent had established his trust as consideration for the establishment of the trust of which he was a beneficiary. The court ruled that decedent had not established his trust as a quid pro quo for the Janet Grace trust, and that Janet Grace had not established her trust in exchange for the Joseph Grace trust. Rather, the trusts were found to be part of an established pattern of family giving, with neither party desiring to obtain property from the other. Indeed, the court found that Janet Grace had created her trust because decedent requested that she do so. It therefore found the reciprocal trust doctrine inapplicable. The court recognized that certain cases had established a slightly different test for reciprocity. Those cases inferred consideration from the establishment of two similar trusts at about the same time. The court held that any inference of consideration was rebutted by the evidence in the case, particularly the lack of any evidence of an estate tax avoidance motive on the part of the Graces. In contrast, the dissent felt that the majority’s approach placed entirely too much weight on subjective intent. Once it was established that the trusts were interrelated, the dissent felt that the subjective intent of the parties in establishing the trusts should become irrelevant. The relevant factor was whether the trusts created by the settlors placed each other in approximately the same objective economic position as they would have been in if each had created his own trust with himself, rather than the other, as life beneficiary. We agree with the dissent that the approach of the Court of Claims majority places too much emphasis on the subjective intent of the parties in creating the trusts and for that reason hinders proper application of the federal estate tax laws. It is true that there is language in Lehman and other cases that would seem to support the majority’s approach. It is also true that the results in some of those cases arguably support the decision below. Nevertheless, we think that these cases are not in accord with this Court’s prior decisions interpreting related provisions of the federal estate tax laws. Emphasis on the subjective intent of the parties in creating the trusts, particularly when those parties are members of the same family unit, creates substantial obstacles to the proper application of the federal estate tax laws. As this Court said in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 705-706 (1949): “Any requirement . . . [of] a post-death attempt to probe the settlor’s thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the effectiveness of . . . [section 811 (c)] as an instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions.” We agree that “the taxability of a trust corpus . . . does not hinge on a settlor’s motives, but depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer.” Id., at 705. See also Commissioner v. Estate of Church, supra. We think these observations have particular weight when applied to the reciprocal trust situation. First, inquiries into subjective intent, especially in intrafamily transfers, are particularly perilous. The present case illustrates that it is, practically speaking, impossible to determine after the death of the parties what they had in mind in creating trusts over 30 years earlier. Second, there is a high probability that such a trust arrangement was indeed created for tax-avoidance purposes. And, even if there was no estate-tax-avoidance motive, the settlor in a very real and objective sense did retain an economic interest while purporting to give away his property. Finally, it is unrealistic to assume that the settlors of the trusts, usually members of one family unit, will have created their trusts as a bargained-for exchange for the other trust. “Consideration,” in the traditional legal sense, simply does not normally enter into such intrafamily transfers. For these reasons, we hold that application of the reciprocal trust doctrine is not dependent upon a finding that each trust was created as a quid pro quo for the other. Such a “consideration” requirement necessarily involves a difficult inquiry into the subjective intent of the settlors. Nor do we think it necessary to prove the existence of a tax-avoidance motive. As we have said above, standards of this sort, which rely on subjective factors, are rarely workable under the federal estate tax laws. Rather, we hold that application of the reciprocal trust doctrine requires only that the trusts be interrelated, and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as they would have been in had they created trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries. Applying this test to the present case, we think it clear that the value of the Janet Grace trust fund must be included in decedent’s estate for federal estate tax purposes. It is undisputed that the two trusts are interrelated. They are substantially identical in terms and were created at approximately the same time. Indeed, they were part of a single transaction designed and carried out by decedent. It is also clear that the transfers in trust left each party, to the extent of mutual value, in the same objective economic position as before. Indeed, it appears, as would be expected in transfers between husband and wife, that the effective position of each party vis-á-vis the property did not change at all. It is no answer that the transferred properties were different in character. For purposes of the estate tax, we think that economic value is the only workable criterion. Joseph Grace’s estate remained undiminished to the extent of the value of his wife’s trust and the value of his estate must accordingly be increased by the value of that trust. The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 811 (c) (1) (B) provided that— “The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property . . . “(c) . . . “(1) General rule. To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth), by trust or otherwise— “(B) under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom . . . .” Section 811 (c) (1) (B) has been recodified as § 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 2036. See Colgan & Molloy, Converse Trusts — The Rise And Fall Of A Tax Avoidance Device, 3 Tax L. Rev. 271 (1948). See, e. g., Glaser v. United States, 306 F. 2d 57 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1962); Estate of Moreno v. Commissioner, 260 F. 2d 389 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1958); Hanauer’s Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F. 2d 857 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 770 (1945); Cole’s Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1944). See S. Rep. No. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1949); H. R. Rep. No. 920, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1949). See McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F. 2d 211 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1956); Newberry’s Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F. 2d 874 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1953); In re Lueder’s Estate, 164 F. 2d 128 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1947). E. g., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F. 2d 537 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 810 (1950). See cases cited in n. 5, supra. For example, in the present case decedent ostensibly devised the trust plan to avoid an imminent federal gift tax. Instead of establishing trusts for the present benefit of his children, he chose an arrangement under which he and his wife retained present enjoyment of the property and under which the property would pass to their children without imposition of either estate or gift tax. The present case is probably typical in this regard. Janet Grace created her trust because decedent requested that she do so; it was in no real sense a bargained-for quid pro quo for his trust. See also Hanauer’s Estate v. Commissioner, supra, n. 3. We do not mean to say that the existence of “consideration,” in the traditional legal sense of a bargained-for exchange, can never be relevant. In certain cases, inquiries into the settlor’s reasons for creating the trusts may be helpful in establishing the requisite link between the two trusts. We only hold that a finding of a bargained-for consideration is not necessary to establish reciprocity.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. GILLIARD et al. No. 86-509. Argued April 22, 1987 Decided June 25, 1987 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 609. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 634. Deputy Solicitor General Lauber argued the cause for appellant in No. 86-509. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Jerrold J. Ganzfried, and William Ranter. Catherine C. McLamb, Assistant Attorney General of North Carolina, argued the cause for appellants in No. 86-564. With her on the briefs were Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, and Lemuel W. Hinton, Assistant Attorney General. Jane R. Wettach argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With her on the brief were Lucie E. White, Julius LeVonne Chambers, Eric Schnapper, and Jean M. Cary Together with No. 86-564, Flaherty, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Human Resources, et al. v. Gilliard et al., also on appeal from the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Joan E. Berbin; for Juvenile and Family Court Judges by Thomas J. Madden; and for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. by Sally F. Goldfarb, Sarah E. Burns, and Marsha Levick. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. As part of its major effort to reduce the federal deficit through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, Congress amended the statute authorizing Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to require that a family’s eligibility for benefits must take into account, with certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers, and sisters living in the same home. The principal question presented in this litigation is whether that requirement violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it is applied to require a family wishing to receive AFDC benefits to include within its unit a child for whom child support payments are being made by a noncustodial parent. I This litigation began in 1970. At that time the federal statute did not require that all parents and siblings be included in an AFDC filing unit. Thus, for example, if a teenage child had significant income of her own, perhaps from wages or perhaps in support payments from an absent parent, the other members of her family could exclude her from the filing unit in order to avoid disqualifying the entire family from benefits or reducing its level of benefits. Beaty Mae Gilliard, one of the named class members in the 1970 suit, began receiving public assistance from North Carolina under AFDC in 1962. In February 1970, after her seventh child was born, the State automatically included him in the filing unit, thereby increasing the family’s monthly allotment from $217 to $227 to reflect the difference between the benefit for a family of seven and the benefit for a family of eight. Gilliard was, however, also receiving $43.33 each month in child support from the baby’s father. When a formal parental support order was entered in April 1970, the State credited the support payments against her account and reduced her monthly benefit to $184. Gilliard sued, contending that she had a statutory right to exclude her seventh child from the unit and thus to continue to receive the $217 benefit for a family of seven and also to retain the $43.33 paid by her youngest child’s father. A three-judge District Court agreed with her reading of the statute and entered an order requiring the State to reinstate her benefits at the $217 level and to reimburse her for the improper credits of $43 per month. Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587 (WDNC 1971). The District Court also granted classwide relief. We affirmed that judgment. 409 U. S. 807 (1972). No constitutional question was decided at that time. Congress amended the AFDC program in 1975 to require, as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for assistance must assign to the State any right to receive child support payments for any member of the family included in the filing unit. In response, North Carolina amended its laws to provide that the acceptance of public assistance on behalf of a dependent child would constitute an assignment of any right to support for that child. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 110-137 (Supp. 1985). These amendments, however, did not harm recipients like Gilliard because they did not affect the right to define the family unit covered by an application and thereby to exclude children with independent income, such as a child for whom support payments were being made. In 1983, the Secretary of Health and Human Services proposed certain amendments to the Social Security Act to “assure that limited Federal and State resources are spent as effectively as possible.” Letter of 25 May 1983, to the Honorable George Bush, President of the Senate, App. 168-169 (hereinafter Heckler Letter). One of the Secretary’s proposals was “to establish uniform rules on the family members who must file together for AFDC, and the situations in which income must be counted. In general, the parents, sisters, and brothers living together with a dependent child must all be included; the option of excluding a sibling with income, for example, would no longer be available.” Ibid. The Secretary stressed that the improveménts would result in an AFDC allocation program that “much more realistically reflects the actual home situation.” Id., at 169. The Secretary’s proposal was not enacted in 1983, but one of the provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) established a standard filing unit for the AFDC program. The Senate Finance Committee estimated that the change would save $455 million during the next three fiscal years. S. Print No. 98-169, p. 980 (1984) (hereinafter Senate Print). It explained the purpose of the amendment in language that removes any possible ambiguity in the relevant text of the statute: “Present Law “There is no requirement in present law that parents and all siblings be included in the AFDC filing unit. Families applying for assistance may exclude from the filing unit certain family members who have income which might reduce the family benefit. For example, a family might choose to exclude a child who is receiving social security or child support payments, if the payments would reduce the family’s benefits by an amount greater than the amount payable on behalf of the child. . . . “Explanation of Provision “The provision approved by the Committee would require States to include in the filing unit the parents and all dependent minor siblings (except SSI recipients and any stepbrothers and stepsisters) living with a child who applies for or receives AFDC. . . . “This change will end the present practice whereby families exclude members with income in order to maximize family benefits, and will ensure that the income of family members who live together and share expenses is recognized and counted as available to the family as a whole.” Ibid. See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1407 (1984). Because the 1984 amendment forced families to include in the filing unit children for whom support payments were being received, the practical effect was that many families’ total income was reduced. The burden of the change was mitigated somewhat by a separate amendment providing that the first $50 of child support collected by the State must be remitted to the family and not counted as income for the purpose of determining its benefit level. See 42 U. S. C. §§602(a)(8)(A)(vi), 657(b)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Thus, the net effect of the 1984 amendments for a family comparable to Gilliard’s would include three changes: (1) the addition of the child receiving support would enlarge the filing unit and entitle the family to a somewhat larger benefit; (2) child support would be treated as family income and would be assigned to the State, thereby reducing the AFDC benefits by that amount; and (3) the reduction would be offset by $50 if that amount was collected from an absent parent. In sum, if the assigned support exceeded $50 plus the difference in the benefit level caused by adding the child or children receiving support, the family would suffer; if less than $50 and the difference in the benefit level was collected as support, it would not. I — I I — 1 After North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 amendments, some members of the class that had earlier obtained relief filed a motion to reopen the 1971 decree and obtain further relief on behalf of the class. The State impleaded the Secretary of Health and Human Services, contending that if the State’s compliance with the federal statute resulted in any liability to appellees, the Federal Government should share in any payment of additional AFDC benefits. The District Court found that North Carolina’s and the Department of Health and Human Services’ regulations were in conformance with the statute, but concluded that the statutory scheme violated both the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court interpreted North Carolina law as imposing a duty on the custodial parent to use child support money exclusively for the benefit of the child for whom it had been obtained, and reasoned that a forced assignment of the support money to the State in exchange for AFDC benefits for the entire family was a taking of the child’s private property. Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1551-1555 (WDNC 1986). Additionally, the court reasoned that the use of the child’s support money to reduce the Government’s AFDC expenditures was tantamount to punishing the child for exercising the fundamental right to live with his or her family. Id., at 1557. Because of the serious impact on the autonomy of the family — including the child’s potential relationship with his or her noncustodial parent — “special judicial scrutiny” was considered appropriate, id., at 1555-1557, and the deprivation of property and liberty effected by the statutory scheme could not, in the court’s view, survive such scrutiny. We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. 1004 (1986). The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its perception that a number of needy families have suffered, and will' suffer, as a result of the implementation of the DEFRA amendments to the AFDC program. Such suffering is frequently the tragic byproduct of a decision to reduce or to modify benefits to a class of needy recipients. Under our structure of government, however, it is the function of Congress — not the courts — to determine whether the savings realized, and presumably used for other critical governmental functions, are significant enough to justify the costs to the individuals affected by such reductions. The Fifth Amendment “gives the federal courts no power to impose upon [Congress] their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy,” by telling it how “to reconcile the demands of . . . needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet those demands.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486, 472 (1970). Unless the Legislative Branch’s decisions run afoul of some constitutional edict, any inequities created by such decisions must be remedied by the democratic processes. The District Court believed that the amendment at issue did conflict with both the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We consider these arguments in turn, and reject them. t — I h-1 I — l The precepts that govern our review of appellees’ due process and equal protection challenges to this program are similar to those we have applied in reviewing challenges to other parts of the Social Security Act: “[0]ur review is deferential. ‘Governmental decisions to spend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are “not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.’” Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185 (1976), quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937).” Bowen v. Owens, 476 U. S. 340, 345 (1986). This standard of review is premised on Congress’ “plenary power to define the scope and the duration of the entitlement to . . . benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to terminate those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of the recipients’ needs and the resources available to fund the program.” Atkins v. Parker, 472 U. S. 115, 129 (1985); see also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U. S. 569 (1982); Califano v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 296 (1979); California v. Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170 (1978); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). The District Court had before it evidence that the DEFRA amendment was severely impacting some families. For example, some noncustodial parents stopped making their support payments because they believed that their payments were helping only the State, and not their children. 633 F. Supp., at 1542-1543. It is clear, however, that in the administration of a fund that is large enough to have a significant impact on the Nation’s deficit, general rules must be examined in light of the broad purposes they are intended to serve. The challenged amendment unquestionably serves Congress’ goal of decreasing federal expenditures. See Senate Print, at 981 (estimating that amendment in AFDC program will save $455 million during fiscal years 1984 through 1987); 130 Cong. Rec. 8368 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Dole). The evidence that a few noncustodial parents were willing to violate the law by not making court-ordered support payments does not alter the fact that the entire program has resulted in saving huge sums of money. The rationality of the amendment denying a family the right to exclude a supported child from the filing unit is also supported by the Government’s separate interest in distributing benefits among competing needy families in a fair way. Given its perceived need to make cuts in the AFDC budget, Congress obviously sought to identify a group that would suffer less than others as a result of a reduction in benefits. When considering the plight of two five-person families, one of which receives no income at all while the other receives regular support payments for some of the minor children, it is surely reasonable for Congress to conclude that the former is in greater need than the latter. This conclusion is amply supported by Congress’ assumption that child support payments received are generally beneficial to the entire family unit, see Senate Print, at 980, and by “the common sense proposition that individuals living with others usually have reduced per capita costs because many of their expenses are shared.” Termini v. Califano, 611 F. 2d 367, 370 (CA2 1979); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. 635, 638-643 (1986). It was therefore rational for Congress to adjust the AFDC program to reflect the fact that support money generally provides significant benefits for entire family units. This conclusion is not undermined by the fact that there are no doubt many families in which some — or perhaps all — of the support money is spent in a way that does not benefit the rest of the family. In determining how best to allocate limited funds among the extremely large class of needy families eligible for AFDC benefits, Congress is entitled to rely on a classwide presumption that custodial parents have used, and may legitimately use, support funds in a way that is beneficial to entire family units. As we have repeatedly explained: “If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis/ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.’ Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. ‘A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 785. We have no doubt that the DEFRA amendment satisfies this test. Appellees argue (and the District Court .ruled), however, that finding that Congress acted rationally is not enough to sustain this legislation. Rather, they claim that some form of “heightened scrutiny” is appropriate because the amendment interferes with a family’s fundamental right to live in the type of family unit it chooses. We conclude that the District Court erred in subjecting the DEFRA amendment to any form of heightened scrutiny. That some families may decide to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid the effect of the amendment, does not transform the amendment into an act whose design and direct effect are to “intrud[e] on choices concerning family living arrangements.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977). As was the case with the marriage-related provision upheld in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977), “Congress adopted this rule in the course of constructing a complex social welfare system that necessarily deals with the intimacies of family life. This is not a case in which government seeks to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling.” Id., at 54, n. 11. Last Term we rejected a constitutional challenge to a provision in the Federal Food Stamp Program, which determines eligibility and benefit levels on a “household” rather than an individual basis. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U. S. 635 (1986). We held that the guarantee of equal treatment in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the statutory requirement that generally treated parents, children, and siblings who lived together as a single household, and explained: “The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents, children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a ‘suspect’ or ‘quasi-suspect’ class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (per curiam). In fact, quite the contrary is true. “Nor does the statutory classification ‘directly and substantially’ interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n. 12 (1978). See id., at 403-404 (Stevens, J., concurring); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977).” Id., at 638. In light of this, we concluded in Lyng that the “District Court erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinction under ‘heightened scrutiny.’” Ibid. In this case the District Court committed the same error. As in Lyng, the standard of review here is whether “Congress had a rational basis” for its decision. Id., at 639. And as in Lyng, “the justification for the statutory classification is obvious.” Id., at 642. The provisions at issue do not violate the Due Process Clause. IV Aside from holding that the amendment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and its equal protection component, the District Court invalidated the DEFRA amendments as a taking of private property without just compensation. The court based this holding on the premise that a child for whom support payments are made has a right to have the support money used exclusively in his or her “best interest.” Yet, the court reasoned, the requirements (1) that a custodial parent who applies for AFDC must include a child’s support money in computing family income, and (2) that the support must be assigned to the State, effectively converts the support funds that were once to be used exclusively for the child’s best interests into an AFDC check which, under federal law, must be used for the benefit of all the children. § 405, 42 U. S. C. § 605. Therefore, the District Court held that the State was “taking” that child’s right to exclusive use of the support money. In addressing this issue, it is helpful to look first at whether the State “takes” the child’s property when it considers the support payments as part of the family’s income in computing AFDC eligibility. We will then consider whether the requirement that support payments be assigned to the State requires a finding that the amendments violate the taking prohibition. Some perspective on the issue is helpful here. Had no AFDC program ever existed until 1984, and had Congress then instituted a program that took into account support payments that a family receives, it is hard to believe that we would seriously entertain an argument that the new benefit program constituted a taking. Yet, somehow, once benefits are in place and Congress sees a need to reduce them in order to save money and to distribute limited resources more fairly, the “takings” label seems to have a bit more plausibility. For legal purposes though, the two situations are identical. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S. 41 (1986). Congress is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit level. Thus, notwithstanding the technical legal arguments that have been advanced, it is imperative to recognize that the amendments at issue merely incorporate a definitional element into an entitlement program. It would be quite strange indeed if, by virtue of an offer to provide benefits to needy families through the entirely voluntary AFDC program, Congress or the States were deemed to have taken some of those very family members’ property. The basic requirement that the AFDC filing unit must include all family members living in the home, and therefore that support payments made on behalf of a member of the family must be considered in determining that family’s level of benefits, does not even arguably take anyone’s property. The family members other than the child for whom the support is being paid certainly have no takings claim, since it is clear that they have no protected property rights to continued benefits at the same level. See Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, supra. Nor does the simple inclusion of the support income in the benefit calculation have any legal effect on the child’s right to have it used for his or her benefit. To the extent that a child has the right to have the support payments used in his or her “best interest,” he or she fully retains that right. Of course, the effect of counting the support payments as part of the filing unit’s income often reduces the family’s resources, and hence increases the chances that sharing of the support money will be appropriate. See n. 13, supra. But given the unquestioned premise that the Government has a right to reduce AFDC benefits generally, that result does not constitute a taking of private property without just compensation. The only possible legal basis for appellees’ takings claim, therefore, is the requirement that an applicant for AFDC benefits must assign the support payments to the State, which then will remit the amount collected to the custodial parent to be used for the benefit of the entire family. This legal transformation in the status of the funds, the argument goes, modifies the child’s interest in the use of the money so dramatically that it constitutes a taking of the child’s property. As a practical matter, this argument places form over substance, and labels over reality. Although it is true that money which was earmarked for a specific child’s or children’s “best interest” becomes a part of a larger fund available for all of the children, the difference between these concepts is, as we have discussed, more theoretical than practical. In evaluating whether governmental regulation of property constitutes a “taking” we have “eschewed the development of any set formula . . . and have relied instead on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case.” Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U. S. 211, 224 (1986). “To aid in this determination, however, we have identified three factors which have ‘particular significance’: (1) ‘the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant’; (2) ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations’; and (3) ‘the character of the governmental action.’ Penn Central Transportation Co., [438 U. S. 104,] 124.” Id., at 224-225. Here, each of these three factors refutes the conclusion that there has been a taking. First, in evaluating the economic impact of the assignment, it is important to remember that it is the impact on the child, not on the entire family unit, that is relevant. Thus, the fact that the entire family’s net income may be reduced does not necessarily mean that the amount of money spent for the benefit of a supported child will be any less than the amount of the noncustodial parent’s support payments. The reality is that the money will usually continue to be used in the same manner that it was previously since the typical AFDC parent will have used the support money as part of the general family fund even without its being transferred through AFDC. See n. 13, supra. Moreovér, any diminution in the value of the support payments for the child is mitigated by the extra $50 that the family receives as a result of the assignment, by the extra AFDC benefits that are received by the inclusion of an additional family member in the unit, and by the fact that the State is using its owm enforcement power to collect the support payments, and is bearing the risk of nonpayment in any given month. Whatever the diminution in value of the child’s right to have support funds used for his or her “exclusive” benefit may be, it is not so substantial as to constitute a taking under our precedents. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U. S. 470, 493-497 (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 131 (1978). Second, the child receiving support payments holds no vested protectable expectation that his or her parent will continue to receive identical support payments on the child’s behalf, and that the child will enjoy the same rights with respect to them. See Layton v. Layton, 263 N. C. 453, 456, 139 S. E. 2d 732, 734 (1965) (support is “not a property right of the child”). The prospective right to support payments, and the child’s expectations with respect to the use of such funds, are clearly subject to modification by law, be it through judicial decree, state legislation, or congressional enactment. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7 (1984) (modification of order for child support). For example, one of the chief criteria in assessing a child support obligation is the noncustodial parent’s ability to make payments, see Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N. C. 765, 133 S. E. 2d 700 (1963); Douglas, Factors in Determining Child Support, 36 Juvenile & Fam. Court J., No. 3, p. 27 (1985), and an adverse change in that parent’s ability may, of course, require a modification of the decree. 2 J. Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice § 10.25, pp. 527-528 (1986) (discussing reductions in support). Any right to have the State force a noncustodial parent to make payments is, like so many other legal rights (including AFDC payments themselves), subject to modification by “the public acts of government.” Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 319 (1932); see generally Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U. S., at 51-56. As the District Court explained, Congress, and the States, through their implementing statutes and regulations, have modified those rights through passage of (and the States’ compliance with) the DEFRA amendments. See 633 F. Supp., at 1548-1551; Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508, 521 (CA8 1987). This prospective change in the child’s expectations concerning future use of support payments is far from anything we have ever deemed a taking. Finally, the character of the governmental action here militates against a finding that the States or Federal Government unconstitutionally take property through the AFDC program. It is obviously necessary for the Government to make hard choices and to balance various incentives in deciding how to allocate benefits in this type of program. But a decision to include child support as part of the family income certainly does not implicate the type of concerns that the Takings Clause protects. This is by no means an enactment that forces “some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). The law does not require any custodial parent to apply for AFDC benefits. Surely it is reasonable to presume that a parent who does make such an application does so because she or he is convinced that the family as a whole — as well as each child committed to her or his custody — will be better off with the benefits than without. In making such a decision, the parent is not taking a child’s property without just compensation; nor is the State doing so when it responds to that decision by supplementing the collections of support money with additional AFDC benefits. y Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stewart described the courts’ role in cases such as this: “We do not decide today that the . . . regulation is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Congress] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. The Constitution may impose certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare administration, Goldberg v. Kelly, [397 U. S. 254 (1970)]. But the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess . . . officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients. ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. “ ‘The AFDC program is based on a scheme of cooperative federalism.’ King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316 (1968). Established by Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, ‘to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and care for them,’ Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251, 253 (1974), the federal program reimburses each State which chooses to participate with a percentage of the funds it expends. § 403, 42 U. S. C. § 603. In return, the State must administer its assistance program pursuant to a state plan that conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations. § 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602.” Heckler v. Turner, 470 U. S. 184, 189 (1985). The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, which fills over 700 pages of the Statutes at Large, includes two major divisions, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. The amendment at issue in this case is found in the latter division, 98 Stat. 1145. As a result of that amendment, § 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(38) (1982 ed., Supp. III) now provides, in pertinent part: “A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must— “(38) provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include— “(A) any parent of such child, and “(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this chapter) . . . .” Section 406(a), in turn, provides: “The term ‘dependent child’ means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home ... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical training), if before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or such training).” 42 U. S. C. § 606(a). The class was comprised of “persons who have been or may be subject to reduction of AFDC . . . benefits based upon unconstitutional or illegal claim of credit by administering agencies for outside income and other resources available to some but not all of a family group.” Gilliard, v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587, 588 (WDNC 1971). Section 402(a)(26)(A) provides: “[A]s a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be required— “(A) to assign to the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. III). The 1975 amendment also amended § 402 to require recipients to “cooperate with the State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining support payments for such applicant and for a child with respect to whom such aid is claimed, or in obtaining any other other payments or property due such applicant or such child ....’’ 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1982 ed., Supp. III). In support of the District Court’s judgment, appellees have asked us to adopt a construction of the statute that is completely inconsistent with the intent of Congress as explained in the Secretary’s request for the legislation, in the Senate Print, and in the Conference Report as well. Moreover, the arguments are inconsistent with the unambiguous regulations the Secretary has adopted to implement the statute. See 45 CFR § 206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1986). The District Court carefully considered these statutory arguments and rejected them. Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1548 (WDNC 1986). We agree with that court’s analysis of the meaning of the statute and find no merit in appellees’ statutory arguments advanced in this Court. See also Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508, 513-516 (CA8 1987). For example, under the July 1985 levels of payment in North Carolina, a family of four with no other income would have received $269. A child’s support income of $100 would therefore reduce the family’s AFDC payment to $169 if that child was included in the filing unit. The family would have a net income of $269. But if the family were permitted to exclude the child from the unit and only claim the somewhat smaller benefit of $246 for a family of three, it could have collected that amount plus the excepted child’s $100 and have a net income of $346. See App. 85. Therefore, under our example, n. 6, supra, the net income with the child included in the unit would have been $319. The Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated the following regulation to implement the DEFRA amendments: “For AFDC purposes only, in order for the family to be eligible, an application with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the same household and otherwise eligible for assistance: “(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the ease of States with laws of general applicability); and “(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister.” 45 CFR § 206.10 (a)(1)(vii) (1986). North Carolina’s implementing regulations are set forth in the District Court’s opinion. 633 F. Supp., at 1533-1534. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. The District Court relied on the following paragraph of the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N. C. 374, 379, 126 S. E. 2d 113, 117 (1962): “While defendant [father] was and is obligated to make the monthly payments called for in his contract for the support of his children, plaintiff [mother] is not the beneficiary of the moneys which defendant must pay. These moneys belong to the children. Plaintiff is a mere trustee for them. That part of the payments not reasonably necessary for support and maintenance, she must hold for the benefit of the children and account to them when they call upon her. She cannot, by contract with another person, profit at the expense of the children.” The Goodyear opinion did not purport to announce any rule of law unique to North Carolina; it quoted from Indiana and Iowa opinions and cited authorities from other jurisdictions. The only Court of Appeals, see Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F. 2d 508 (CA8 1987), and virtually all of the District Courts, that have addressed challenges to the inclusion of child support or other “exclusive use” funds have upheld the validity of these amendments, see, e. g., Showers v. Cohen, 645 F. Supp. 217 (MD Pa. 1986); Sherrod v. Hegstrom, 629 F. Supp. 150 (Ore. 1985); Huber v. Blinzinger, 626 F. Supp. 30 (ND Ind. 1985); Oliver v. Ledbetter, 624 F. Supp. 325 (ND Ga. 1985); Ardister v. Mansour, 627 F. Supp. 641 (WD Mich. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction); Shonkwiler v. Heckler, 628 F. Supp. 1013 (SD Ind. 1985) (denying preliminary injunction); cf. Park v. Coler, 143 Ill. App. 3d 727, 493 N. E. 2d 130 (1986); but see Lesko v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 1152 (ED Wis. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-744; Baldwin v. Ledbetter, 647 F. Supp. 623 (ND Ga. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-1140, stay pending appeal granted, 479 U. S. 1309 (1986) (Powell, J., in chambers). After ruling that the DEFRA amendment of AFDC was unconstitutional, the District Court considered the form of relief appellees were entitled to. In addition to granting prospective relief, the court ordered the state defendants to “pay retroactive AFDC benefits to all families in North Carolina whose benefits were denied, reduced or terminated as a result of the enforcement” of the state regulations. 633 F. Supp., at 1563. In response to the State’s argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred such a retroactive award, the District Court explained that the State had continuously been bound by the court’s 1971 injunction, and that if the State believed DEFRA had changed the applicable law, it should have sought modification of the injunction. Id., at 1563-1564. Because we interpret the District Court’s award of both prospective and retroactive relief to rest on its holding that the DEFRA amendment was unconstitutional, and read its discussion of the 1971 injunction as responding to the State’s claim that an award of retroactive benefits was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1974), our ruling that the DEFRA amendment is constitutionally valid requires reversal of both the District Court’s award of prospective relief and its award of retroactive relief. “General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 776.” Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977). An assumption that child support payments to families receiving AFDC benefits are typically used for the entire family’s needs is entirely reasonable. See Senate Print, at 980 (amendment will “ensure that the income of family members who live together and share expenses is recognized”). This conclusion does not rest on an assumption that custodial parents routinely violate state-law restrictions on the use of support money. For the requirement that the support income be used for the “benefit” of the child does not preclude its use for common expenses. Moreover, the custodial parent’s duty to benefit the supported child is not necessarily served simply by spending more money on him or her than on other children living in the same home. As the District Court recognized, nothing in North Carolina law requires a custodial parent to focus only on the economic interest of the child receiving support without taking into account the emotional and psychological welfare of the child. Congress’ finding that custodial parents were routinely using the support funds for the entire family thus reflects the reality that such use is typically proper since expenditures for an entire family unit typically benefit each member of the household. We do not question Congress’ reliance on the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ assurance that counting child support income as part of the family income “much more realistically reflects the actual home situation.” Heckler Letter, App. 168-169. Congress’ presumption is similar to the one made in § 402(a)(31), 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(31), which provides that portions of a stepparent’s income are to be considered as part of the family income for AFDC purposes. In Brown v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 985 (ED Pa. 1984), aff’d, 760 F. 2d 255 (CA3 1985), the court explained that the presumption that a stepparent will assist in supporting his or her spouse’s children is rational, even though stepparents are under no legal duty to assist the children, and not every stepparent does. See also Kollett v. Harris, 619 F. 2d 134 (CA1 1980) (holding that inclusion of stepparent’s income as available to child in the Supplemental Security Income program was not unconstitutionally irrational). For example, the District Court had before it an affidavit from one mother who stated that she had sent a child to live with the child’s father in order to avoid the requirement of including that child, and the support received from the child’s father, in the AFDC unit. 633 F. Supp., at 1537-1538. If the DEFRA amendment’s indirect effects on family living arrangements were enough to subject the statute to heightened scrutiny, then the entire AFDC program might also be suspect since it generally provides benefits only to needy families without two resident parents. Surely this creates incentive for some needy parents to live separately. The answer, of course, is that these types of incentives are the unintended consequences of many social welfare programs, and do not call the legitimacy of the programs into question. The District Court denied appellants’ motion for reconsideration in light of our decision in Lyng. App. to Juris. Statement in No. 86-509, p. 107 a. Nor is there any merit in the contention that the assignment provision, see supra, at 591, and n. 4, violates the Due Process Clause. Once it is determined that it is permissible to include all members of the family in the unit, the assignment of the benefits typically has no adverse effect on the child receiving support. To the contrary, through the assignment provision the Government takes over the responsibility of making sure that noncustodial parents actually perform their child support obligations. The State also bears the risk of nonpayment of support, since the family receives the identical amount of AFDC (although not the $50 supplement) whether or not the absent parent makes payments. In the first 10 years following the adoption of the assignment requirement in 1975, legal paternity was established for more than 1.5 million children, more than 3.5 million support orders were established, and $6.8 billion in support obligations was collected on behalf of children in AFDC families. 1 Office of Child Support Enforcement, U. S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, A Decade of Child Support Enforcement 1975-1985: Tenth Annual Report to Congress for the Period Ending September 30, 1985, pp. iii, 6, 9-10 (1985). In analyzing the effect of the assignment it is again instructive to ask what would happen to the support payments if there were no AFDC program at all. In that case, it would appear that custodial parents would have to use a much greater portion of the support payments to sustain the family unit, since it could hardly be deemed in the child’s best interest for his custodial parent and siblings to have no funds whatsoever. The overall practical effect of the AFDC program (even after the 1984 amendment), therefore, is to enhance the probability that a child whose custodial parent is receiving support payments in the child’s behalf will obtain direct economic benefit from those funds, in addition to the benefits that result from preserving the family unit. A reduction in that enhancement is no more a taking than any other reduction in a Social Security program.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 80-544. Argued April 21, 1981 Decided June 22, 1981 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 688. Sanford E. Pollack argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Perry S. Heidecker. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Elinor Had-ley Stillman, and Linda Sher. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Robert J. Fenlon for the American Society for Personnel Administration; by Marvin E. Frankel, Saul G. Kramer, and Stephen A. Bokat for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; and by Daniel Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar for the Washington Legal Foundation. J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, George Kaufmann, and John A. Fillion filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Must an employer, under its duty to bargain in good faith “with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” §§ 8 (d) and 8 (a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), as amended, 49 Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (d) and 158 (a)(5), negotiate with the certified representative of its employees over its decision to close a part of its business? In this case, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) imposed such a duty on petitioner with respect to its decision to terminate a contract with a customer, and the United States Court of Appeals, although differing over the appropriate rationale, enforced its order. I Petitioner, First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM), is a New York corporation éngaged in the business of providing housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance, and related services for commercial customers in the New York City area. It supplies each of its customers, at the customer’s premises, contracted-for labor force and supervision in return for reimbursement of its labor costs (gross salaries, FICA and FUTA taxes, and insurance) and payment of a set fee. It contracts for and hires personnel separately for each customer, and it does not transfer employees between locations. During the spring of 1977, petitioner was performing maintenance work for the Greenpark Care Center, a nursing home in Brooklyn. Its written agreement dated April 28, 1976, with Greenpark specified that Greenpark “shall furnish all tools, equiptment [sic], materials, and supplies,” and would pay petitioner weekly “the sum of five hundred dollars plus the gross weekly payroll and fringe benefits.” App. in No. 79-4167 (CA2), pp. 43, 44. Its weekly fee, however, had been reduced to $250 effective November 1, 1976. Id., at 46. The contract prohibited Greenpark from hiring any of petitioner’s employees during the term of the contract and for 90 days thereafter. Id., at 44. Petitioner employed approximately 35 workers in its Greenpark operation. Petitioner’s business relationship with Greenpark, seemingly, was not very remunerative or smooth. In March 1977, Greenpark gave petitioner the 30 days’ written notice of cancellation specified by the contract, because of “lack of efficiency.” Id., at 52. This cancellation did not become effective, for FNM’s work continued after the expiration of that 30-day period. Petitioner, however, became aware that it was losing money at Greenpark. On June 30, by telephone, it asked that its weekly fee be restored at the $500 figure and, on July 6, it informed Greenpark in writing that it would discontinue its operations there on August 1 unless the increase were granted. Id., at 47. By telegram on July 25, petitioner gave final notice of termination. Id., at 48. While FNM was experiencing these difficulties, District 1199, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO (union), was conducting an organization campaign among petitioner’s Greenpark employees. On March 31, 1977, at a Board-conducted election, a majority of the employees selected the union as their bargaining agent. On July 12, the union’s vice president, Edward Wecker, wrote petitioner, notifying it of the certification and of the union’s right to bargain, and stating: “We look forward to meeting with you or your representative for that purpose. Please advise when it will be convenient.” Id., at 49. Petitioner neither responded nor sought to consult with the union. On July 28, petitioner notified its Greenpark employees that they would be discharged three days later. Wecker immediately telephoned petitioner’s secretary-treasurer, Leonard Marsh, to request a delay for the purpose of bargaining. Marsh refused the offer to bargain and told Wecker that the termination of the Greenpark operation was purely a matter of money, and final, and that the 30 days’ notice provision of the Greenpark contract made staying on beyond August 1 prohibitively expensive. Id., at 79-81, 83, 85-86, 94. Wecker discussed the matter with Greenpark’s management that same day, but was unable to obtain a waiver of the notice provision. Id., at 91-93, 98-99. Greenpark also was unwilling itself to hire the FNM employees because of the contract’s 90-day limitation on hiring. Id., at 100-101, 106-107. With nothing but perfunctory further discussion, petitioner on July 31 discontinued its Greenpark operation and discharged the employees. Id., at 110-116. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against petitioner, alleging violations of the Act’s §§8 (a)(1) and (5). After a hearing held upon the Regional Director’s complaint, the Administrative Law Judge made findings in the union’s favor. Relying on Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N. L. R. B. 561 (1966), he ruled that petitioner had failed to satisfy its duty to bargain concerning both the decision to terminate the Greenpark contract and the effect of that change upon the unit employees. The judge reasoned: “That the discharge of a man is a change in his conditions of employment hardly needs comment. In these obvious facts, the law is clear. When an employer’s work complement is represented by a union and he wishes to alter the hiring arrangements, be his reason lack of money or a mere desire to become richer, the law is no less clear that he must first talk to the union about it. .. . If Wecker had been given an opportunity to talk, something might have been worked out to transfer these people to other parts of [petitioner’s] business. . . . Entirely apart from whether open discussion between the parties — with the Union speaking on behalf of the employees as was its right — might have persuaded [petitioner] to find a way of continuing this part of its operations, there was always the possibility that Marsh might have persuaded Greenpark to use these same employees to continue doing its maintenance work, either as direct employees or as later hires by a replacement contractor.” 242 N. L. R. B. 462, 465 (1979). The Administrative Law Judge recommended an order requiring petitioner to bargain in good faith with the union about its decision to terminate its Greenpark service operation and its consequent discharge of the employees, as well as the effects of the termination. He recommended, also, that petitioner be ordered to pay the discharged employees backpay from the date of discharge until the parties bargained to agreement, or the bargaining reached an impasse, or the union failed timely to request bargaining, or the union failed to bargain in good faith. The National Labor Relations Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s findings without further analysis, and additionally required petitioner, if it agreed to resume its Greenpark operations, to offer the terminated employees reinstatement to their former jobs or substantial equivalents; conversely, if agreement was not reached, petitioner was ordered to offer the employees equivalent positions, to be made available by discharge of subsequently hired employees, if necessary, at its other operations. Id., at 463. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with one judge dissenting in part, enforced the Board’s order, although it adopted an analysis different from that espoused by the Board. 627 F. 2d 596 (1980). The Court of Appeals reasoned that no per se rule could be formulated to govern an employer’s decision to close part of its business. Rather, the court said, § 8 (d) creates a presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining over such a decision, a presumption that is re-buttable “by showing that the purposes of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of a duty to bargain,” for example, by demonstrating that “bargaining over the decision would be futile,” or that the decision was due to “emergency financial circumstances,” or that the “custom of the industry, shown by the absence of such an obligation from typical collective bargaining agreements, is not to bargain over such decisions.” Id., at.601-602. The Court of Appeals’ decision in this case appears to be at odds with decisions of other Courts of Appeals, some of which decline to require bargaining over any management decision involving “a major commitment of capital investment” or a “basic operational change” in the scope or direction of an enterprise, and some of which indicate that bargaining is not mandated unless a violation of § 8 (a) (3) (a partial closing motivated by antiunion animus) is involved. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has imposed a duty to bargain over partial closing decisions. See NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F. 2d 512, cert. denied, 385 U. S. 935 (1966). The Board itself has not been fully consistent in its rulings applicable to this type of management decision. Because of the importance of the issue and the continuing disagreement between and among the Board and the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari.- 449 U. S. 1076 (1981). II A fundamental aim of the National Labor Relations Act is the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937). Central to achievement of this purpose is the promotion of collective bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between labor and management. § 1 of the Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §151. Congress ensured that collective bargaining would go forward by creating the Board and giving it the power to condemn as unfair labor practices certain conduct by unions and employers that it deemed deleterious to the process, including the refusal “to bargain collectively.” §§ 3 and 8, 29 U. S. C. §§ 153 and 158. Although parties are free to bargain about any legal subject, Congress has limited the mandate or duty to bargain to matters of “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” A unilateral change as to a subject within this category violates the statutory duty to bargain and is subject to the Board’s remedial order. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U. S. 736 (1962). Conversely, both employer and union may bargain to impasse over these matters and use the economic weapons at their disposal to attempt to secure their respective aims. NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395 (1952). Congress deliberately left the words “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” without further definition, for it did not intend to deprive the Board of the power further to define those terms in light of specific industrial practices. Nonetheless, in establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union’s members are employed. Despite the deliberate open-endedness of the statutory language, there is an undeniable limit to the subjects about which bargaining must take place: “Section 8 (a) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for mandatory bargaining. . . . But it does establish a limitation against which proposed topics must be measured. In general terms, the limitation includes only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and the employees.” Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U. S. 157, 178 (1971). See also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U. S. 488 (1979); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 (1964); Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283 (1959). Some management decisions, such as choice of advertising and promotion, product type and design, and financing arrangements, have only an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship. See Fibreboard, 379 U. S., at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Other management decisions, such as the order of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules, are almost exclusively “an aspect of the relationship” between employer and employee. Chemical Workers, 404 U. S., at 178. The present case concerns a third type of management decision, one that had a direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but had as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract with Greenpark, a concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship. This decision, involving a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether to be in business at all, “not in [itself] primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment.” Fibreboard, 379 U. S., at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Cf. Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U. S. 263, 268 (1965) (“an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases”). At the same time, this decision touches on a matter of central and pressing concern to the union and its member employees: the possibility of continued employment and the retention of the employees’ very jobs. See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F. 2d 720, 735-736 (CA3 1978); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N. L. R. B. 561, 566-568 (1966). Petitioner contends it had no duty to bargain about its decision to terminate its operations at Greenpark. This contention requires that we determine whether the decision itself should be considered part of petitioner’s retained freedom to manage its affairs unrelated to employment. The aim of labeling a matter a mandatory subject of bargaining, rather than simply permitting, but not requiring, bargaining, is to “promote the fundamental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management within the framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace,” Fibreboard, 379 U. S., at 211. The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective discussions backed by the parties’ economic weapons will result in decisions that are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. Ford Motor Co., 441 U. S., at 500-501; Borg-Warner, 356 U. S., at 350 (condemning employer’s proposal of “ballot” clause as weakening the collective-bargaining process). This will be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the bargaining process. Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business. It also must have some degree of certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach decisions without fear of later evaluations labeling its conduct an unfair labor practice. Congress did not explicitly state what issues of mutual concern to union and management it intended to exclude from mandatory bargaining. Nonetheless, in view of an employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business. The Court in Fibreboard implicitly engaged in this analysis with regard to a decision to subcontract for maintenance work previously done by unit employees. Holding the employer’s decision a subject of mandatory bargaining, the Court relied not only on the “literal meaning” of the statutory words, but also reasoned: “The Company’s decision to contract out the maintenance work did not alter the Company’s basic operation. The maintenance work still had to be performed in the plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the Company merely replaced existing employees with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the employer to bargain about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business.” 379 U. S., at 213. The Court also emphasized that a desire to reduce labor costs, which it considered a matter “peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework,” id., at 214, was at the base of the employer’s decision to subcontract: “It was induced to contract out the work by assurances from independent contractors that economies could be derived by reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime payments. These have long been regarded as matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework, and industrial experience demonstrates that collective negotiation has been highly successful in achieving peaceful accommodation of the conflicting interests.” Id., at 213-214. The prevalence of bargaining over “contracting out” as a matter of industrial practice generally was taken as further proof of the “amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process.” Id., at 211. With this approach in mind, we turn to the specific issue at hand: an economically motivated decision to shut down part of a business. Ill A Both union and management regard control of the decision to shut down an operation with the utmost seriousness. As has been noted, however, the Act is not intended to serve either party’s individual interest, but to foster in a nedtral manner a system in which the conflict between these interests may be resolved. It seems particularly important, therefore, to consider whether requiring bargaining over this sort of decision will advance the neutral purposes of the Act. A union’s interest in participating in the decision to close a particular facility or part of an employer’s operations springs from its legitimate concern over job security. The Court has observed: “The words of [§ 8 (d)] . . . plainly cover termination of employment which . . . necessarily results” from closing an operation. Fibreboard, 379 U. S., at 210. The union’s practical purpose in participating, however, will be largely uniform: it will seek to delay or halt the closing. No doubt it will be impelled, in seeking these ends, to offer concessions, information, and alternatives that might be helpful to management or forestall or prevent the termination of jobs. It is unlikely, however, that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well as its effects, will augment this flow of information and suggestions. There is no dispute that the union must be given a significant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the “effects” bargaining mandated by §8 (a)(5). See, e. g., NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F. 2d 191, 196 (CA3 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F. 2d 108 (CA8 1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 1011 (1966). And, under §8 (a)(5), bargaining over the effects of a decision must be conducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, and the Board may impose sanctions to insure its adequacy. A union, by pursuing such bargaining rights, may achieve valuable concessions from an employer engaged in a partial closing. It also may secure in contract negotiations provisions implementing rights to notice, information, and fair bargaining. See BNA, Basic Patterns in Union Contracts 62-64 (9th ed., 1979). Moreover, the union’s legitimate interest in fair dealing is protected by §8 (a) (3), which prohibits partial closings motivated by antiunion animus, when done to gain an unfair advantage. Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U. S. 263 (1965). Under §8 (a) (3) the Board may inquire into the motivations behind a partial closing. An employer may not simply shut down part of its business and mask its desire to weaken and circumvent the union by labeling its decision “purely economic.” Thus, although the union has a natural concern that a partial closing decision not be hastily or unnecessarily entered into, it has some control over the effects of the decision and indirectly'may ensure that the decision itself is deliberately considered. It also has direct protection against a partial closing decision that is motivated by an intent to harm a union. Management’s interest in whether it should discuss a decision of this kind is much more complex and varies with the particular circumstances. If labor costs are an important factor in a failing operation and the decision to close, management will have an incentive to confer voluntarily with the union to seek concessions that may make continuing the business profitable. Cf. U. S. News & World Report, Feb. 9, 1981, p. 74; BNA, Labor Relations Yearbook-1979, p. 5 (UAW agreement with Chrysler Corp. to make concessions on wages and fringe benefits). At other times, management may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and exigencies. It may face significant tax or securities consequences that hinge on confidentiality, the timing of a plant closing, or a reorganization of the corporate structure. The publicity incident to the normal process of bargaining may injure the possibility of a successful transition or increase the economic damage to the business. The employer also may have no feasible alternative to the closing, and even good-faith bargaining over it may both be futile and cause the employer additional loss. There is an important difference, also, between permitted bargaining and mandated bargaining. Labeling this type of decision mandatory could afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management’s intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose. See Comment, “Partial Terminations” — A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 1089, 1103-1105 (1967). In addition, many of the cases before the Board have involved, as this one did, not simply a refusal to bargain over the decision, but a refusal to bargain at all, often coupled with other unfair labor practices. See, e. g., Electrical Products Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F. 2d 977 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 871 (1981); NLRB v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 529 F. 2d 427 (CA5 1976); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F. 2d 1030 (CA8 1976); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F. 2d 74 (CA5 1965) (subcontracting); Smyth Mfg. Co., 247 N. L. R. B. 1139 (1980). In these cases, the employer’s action gave the Board reason to order remedial relief apart from access to the decisionmaking process. It is not clear that a union would be equally dissatisfied if an employer performed all its bargaining obligations apart from the additional remedy sought here. While evidence of current labor practice is only an indication of what is feasible through collective bargaining, and not a binding guide, see Chemical Workers, 404 U. S., at 176, that evidence supports the apparent imbalance weighing against mandatory bargaining. We note that provisions giving unions a right to participate in the decisionmaking process concerning alteration of the scope of an enterprise appear to be relatively rare. Provisions concerning notice and “effects” bargaining are more prevalent. See II BNA, Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts § 65:201-233 (1981); U. S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 2065, Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Jan. 1, 1978, pp. 96, 100, 101, 102-103 (1980) (charting provisions giving interplant transfer and relocation allowances; advance notice of layoffs, shutdowns, and technological changes; and wage-employment guarantees; no separate tables on decision-bargaining, presumably due to rarity). See also IT. S. Dept, of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 1425-10, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, Plant Movement, Transfer, and Relocation Allowances (July 1969). Further, the presumption analysis adopted by the Court of Appeals seems ill-suited to advance harmonious relations between employer and employee. An employer would have difficulty determining beforehand whether it was faced with a situation requiring bargaining or one that involved economic necessity sufficiently compelling to obviate the duty to bargain. If it should decide to risk not bargaining, it might be faced ultimately with harsh remedies forcing it to pay large amounts of backpay to employees who likely would have been discharged regardless of bargaining, or even to consider reopening a -failing operation. See, e. g., Electrical Products Div. of Midland-Ross Corp., 239 N. L. R. B. 323 (1978), enf’d, 617 F. 2d 977 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 871 (1981). Cf. Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, 554 F. 2d 115 (CA4 1976) (enjoining plant closure and transfer to permit negotiations). Also, labor costs may not be a crucial circumstance in a particular economically based partial termination. See, e. g., NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F. 2d 85 (CA9 1980) (change in marketing structure); NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F. 2d 698 (CA10 1969) (loss of major customer). And in those cases, the Board’s traditional remedies may well be futile. See ABC Trans-National Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F. 2d 675 (CA3 1981) (although employer violated its “duty” to bargain about freight terminal closing, court refused to enforce order to bargain). If the employer intended to try to fulfill a court’s direction to bargain, it would have difficulty determining exactly at what stage of its deliberations the duty to bargain would arise and what amount of bargaining would suffice before it could implement its decision. Compare Burns Ford, Inc., 182 N. L. R. B. 753 (1970) (one week’s notice of layoffs sufficient), and Hartmann Luggage Co., 145 N. L. R. B. 1572 (1964) (entering into executory subcontracting agreement before notifying union not a violation since contract not yet final), with Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N. L. R. B. 545, 555 (1964), enf. denied, 350 F. 2d 191 (CA3 1965) (two weeks’ notice before final closing of plant inadequate). If an employer engaged in some discussion, but did not yield to the union’s demands, the Board might conclude that the employer had engaged in “surface bargaining,” a violation of its good faith. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d 131 (CA1), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 887 (1953). A union, too, would have difficulty determining the limits of its prerogatives, whether and when it could use its economic powers to try to alter an employer’s decision, or whether, in doing so, it would trigger sanctions from the Board. See, e. g., International Offset Corp., 210 N. L. R. B. 854 (1974) (union’s failure to realize that shutdown was imminent, in view of successive advertisements, sales of equipment, and layoffs, held a waiver of right to bargain); Shell Oil Co., 149 N. L. R. B. 305 (1964) (union waived its right to bargain by failing to request meetings when employer announced intent to transfer a few days before implementation). We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an employer’s need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs thé incremental benefit that might be gained through the union’s participation in making the decision, and we hold that the decision itself is not part of § 8 (d)’s “terms and conditions,” see n. 12, supra, over which Congress has mandated bargaining. B In order to illustrate the limits of our holding, we turn again to the specific facts of this case. First, we note that when petitioner decided to terminate its Greenpark contract, it had no .intention to replace the discharged employees or to move that operation elsewhere. Petitioner’s sole purpose was to reduce its economic loss, and the union made no claim of antiunion animus. In addition, petitioner’s dispute with Greenpark was solely over the size of the management fee Greenpark was willing to pay. The union had no control or authority over that fee. The most that the union could have offered would have been advice and concessions that Greenpark, the third party upon whom rested the success or failure of the contract, had no duty even to consider. These facts in particular distinguish this case from the subcontracting issue presented in Fibreboard. Further, the union was not selected as the bargaining representative or certified until well after petitioner’s economic difficulties at Greenpark had begun. We thus are not faced with an employer’s abrogation of ongoing negotiations or an existing bargaining agreement. Finally, while petitioner’s business enterprise did not involve the investment of large amounts of capital in single locations, we do not believe that the absence of “significant investment or withdrawal of capital,” General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N. L. R. B., at 952, is crucial. The decision to halt work at this specific location represented a significant change in petitioner’s operations, a change not unlike opening a new line of business or going out of business entirely. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The record does not show the precise dimension of petitioner’s business. See 242 N. L. R. B. 462, 464 (1979). One of the owners testified that petitioner at that time had “between two and four” other nursing homes as customers. Ibid. The Administrative Law Judge hypothesized, however: “This is a large Company. For all I know, the 35 men at this particular home were only a small part of its total business in the New York area.” Id., at 465. The record does not disclose how the contract’s 30-day written notice provision was satisfied. In any event, the parties make no point of any shortage in the notice. The union was certified on May 11, 1977. App. in No. 79-4167 (CA2), p. 50. The Administrative Law Judge rejected petitioner’s contention that it had satisfied, by that single phone call to Wecker, its duty to bargain about the termination. The judge further found that petitioner’s “regular and usual” method of operation involved “taking on, finishing, or discontinuing this or that particular job,” 242 N. L. R. B., at 466, and that “[t]here was no capital involved when it decided to terminate the Greenpark job. The closing of this one spot in no sense altered the nature of its business, nor did it substantially affect its total size.” Ibid. The Administrative Law Judge therefore found inapplicable the Board’s ruling in Brockway Motor Trucks, Division of Mack Trucks, Inc., 230 N. L. R. B. 1002, 1003 (1977), enf. denied, 582 F. 2d 720 (CA3 1978), that an employer’s decision to close part of its business is not a mandatory subject of bargaining if it involves such a “ ‘significant investment or withdrawal of capital’ as to ‘affect the scope and ultimate direction of an enterprise,’ ” quoting from General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N. L. R. B. 951, 952 (1971). Because the court adopted different grounds for enforcement of the Board’s order, it was error to enforce without a remand to the Board for further examination of the evidence and proper factfinding. NLRB v. Pipefitters, 429 U. S. 507, 522, n. 9 (1977); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 95 (1943). The Court of Appeals in this case, for example, agreed, 627 F. 2d, at 601, with the Third Circuit in Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F. 2d 720 (1978), that a presumption in favor of bargaining was to be established, but it analyzed differently how that presumption would be rebutted. The Third Circuit had decided that the competing interests of the employer and the employees, under the particular circumstances, must be weighed, and it had remanded the case before it to the Board for fact-finding into the circumstances behind the partial closing. See also Equitable Gas Co. v. NLRB, 637 F. 2d 980 (CA3 1981) (subcontracting); ABC Trans-National Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F. 2d 675 (CA3 1981) (partial closing); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F. 2d 191 (CA3 1965) (partial closing). Several courts have agreed with the Second Circuit. See, e. g., Davis v. NLRB, 617 F. 2d 1264 (CA7 1980) (change of full-service restaurant to self-service cafeteria); NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F. 2d 451 (CA6 1979) (plant closing). See, e. g., NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F. 2d 85 (CA9 1980); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F. 2d 108 (CA8 1965), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 1011 (1966); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F. 2d 933 (CA9 1967); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F. 2d 1030 (CA8 1976); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F. 2d 170 (CA2 1961); NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F. 2d 698 (CA10 1969). See, e. g., Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F. 2d 254 (CA8 1970); NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F. 2d 1026 (CA8 1970); NLRB v. William J. Burns International Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F. 2d 897 (CA8 1965). Compare National Car Rental System, Inc., 252 N. L. R. B. 159, 161 (1980) (employer’s decision to terminate car leasing operations at' one location not a mandatory subject because “ ‘essentially financial and managerial in nature,’ involving a ‘significant investment or withdrawal of capital, affecting the scope and ultimate direction of an enterprise,’ ” quoting from General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N. L. R. B., at 952), and Summit Tooling Co., 195 N. L. R. B. 479, 480 (1972) (decision to close a subsidiary not a mandatory subject because “its practical effect was to take the Respondent out of the business of manufacturing tool and tooling products”), with Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N. L. R. B. 561, 567, 568 (1966) (employer’s decision to shut down one of multiple plants was a mandatory subject because it was “a decision directly affecting terms and conditions of employment” and “interests of employees are of sufficient importance that their representatives ought to be consulted in matters affecting them”). See also Kingwood Mining Co., 210 N. L. R. B. 844 (1974), aff'd sub nom. United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 169 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 515 F. 2d 1018 (1975). “Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S., at 42 (upholding the constitutionality of the Act). Sections 8 (a) (5) and 8 (b) (3) of the Act make it an unfair labor practice for an employer and union representative, respectively, “to refuse to bargain collectively.” 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a) (5) and 158(b)(3). Section 8 (d), added, as was §8 (b)(3), to the Act by the amendatory Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, defines the duty to bargain as “the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ....’’ 29 TJ. S. C. § 158 (d). Section 9 (a) further specifies that “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ...” 29 U. S. C. §159 (a). A matter that is not a mandatory subject of bargaining, unless it is illegal, may be raised at the bargaining table to be discussed in good faith, and the parties may incorporate it into an enforceable collective-bargaining agreement. Labor and management may not, however, insist on it to the point of impasse. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U. S. 342 (1958). In enacting the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Congress rejected a proposal in the House to limit the subjects of bargaining to “(i) [w]age rates, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing subjects.” H. R. 3020 §2 (11), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The adoption, instead, of the general phrase now part of § 8 (d) was clearly meant to preserve future interpretation by the Board. See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1947) (minority report) (“The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors. What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in the first instance to employers and trade-unions, and in the second place, to any administrative agency skilled in the field and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of industrial practices and traditions in each industry or area of the country, subject to review by the courts. It cannot and should not be strait-jacketed by legislative enactment”); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 34-35 (1947). Specific references in the legislative history to plant closings, however, are inconclusive. See 79 Cong. Rec. 7673, 9682 (1935) (comments of Sen. Walsh and Rep. Griswold). There is no doubt that petitioner was under a duty to bargain about the results or effects of its decision to stop the work at Greenpark, or that it violated that duty. Petitioner consented to enforcement of the Board’s order concerning bargaining over the effects of the closing and has reached agreement with the union on severance pay. App. in No. 79-4167 (CA2), pp. 21-22. “The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not prevent the employer ‘from refusing to make a collective contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms’ the employer ‘may by unilateral action determine.’ . . . The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S., at 45. Cf. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U. S. 543, 549 (1964) (“The objectives of national labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship”). The employer has no obligation to abandon its intentions or to agree with union proposals. On proper subjects, it must meet with the union, provide information necessary to the union’s understanding of the problem, and in good faith consider any proposals the union advances. In concluding to reject a union’s position as to a mandatory subject, however, it must face the union’s possible use of strike power. See generally Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 Va. L. Rev. 988 (1961). The subjects over which mandatory bargaining has been required have changed over time. Employers and unions have been required to bargain over such diverse topics as profit-sharing plans, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F. 2d 1343 (CA5), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 985 (1978); layoffs and recalls, see Awrey Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB, 548 F. 2d 138 (CA6 1976); contractual clauses concerning race discrimination, see Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., 222 N. L. R. B. 742 (1976) ; and “most favored nation” clauses, Dolly Madison Industries, Inc., 182 N. L. R. B. 1037 (1970). See also Borg-Warner, 356 U. S., at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We are aware of past instances where unions have aided employers in saving failing businesses by lending technical assistance, reducing wages and benefits or increasing production, and even loaning part of earned wages to forestafi closures. See S. Slichter, J. Healy, & E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management 845-851 (1960); C. Golden & H. Rutenberg, The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy 263-291 (1942). See also United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 1330, v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1 (ND Ohio), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 631 F. 2d 1264 (CA6 1980) (union sought to purchase failing plant); 104 LRR 239 (1980) (employee ownership plan instituted to save company); id., at 267-268 (union accepted pay cuts to reduce plant’s financial problems). These have come about without the intervention of the Board enforcing a statutory requirement to bargain. See International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F. 2d 549, 556-557 (CA1), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 845 (1972); Raskin Packing Co., 246 N. L. R. B. No. 15 (1979); M&M Transportation Co., 239 N. L. R. B. 73 (1978); Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 Duke L. J. 1, 9-10. Cf. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U. S. 301, 316 (1979) (noting the “danger of inadvertent leaks” in giving union confidential information). See ABC Trans-National Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F. 2d 675 (CA3 1981); Loomis & Herman, Management’s Reserved Rights and the NLRB — An Employer’s View, 19 Lab. L. J. 695 (1968); Comment, “Partial Terminations” — A Choice Between Bargaining Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 1089 (1967). In this opinion we of course intimate no view as to other types of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their particular facts. See, e. g., International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 150 U. S. App. D. C. 71, 463 F. 2d 907 (1972) (plant relocation predominantly due to labor costs); Weltronic Co. v. NLRB, 419 F. 2d 1120 (CA6 1969) (decision to move plant three miles), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 938 (1970); Dan Dee West Virginia Corp., 180 N. L. R. B. 534 (1970) (decision to change method of distribution, under which employee-drivers became independent contractors); Young Motor Truck Service, Inc., 156 N. L. R. B. 661 (1966) (decision to sell major portion of business). See also Schwarz, Plant Relocation or Partial Termination — The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 Ford. L. Rev. 81, 100-102 (1970). Despite the contentions of amicus AFL-CIO our decision in Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 362 U. S. 330 (1960), does not require that we find bargaining over this partial closing decision mandatory. In that case, a union certified as bargaining agent for certain railroad employees requested that the railroad bargain over its decision to close down certain stations thereby eliminating a number of jobs. When the union threatened to strike over the railroad’s refusal to bargain on this issue, the railroad sought an injunction in federal court. Construing the scope of bargaining required by § 2, First, of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 152, First, the Court held that the union’s effort to negotiate was not “an unlawful bargaining demand,” 362 U. S., at 341, and that the District Court was precluded from enjoining the threatened strike by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 104, which deprives federal courts of “jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from . . . [c] easing or refusing to perform any work. . . .” Although the Court in part relied on an expansive interpretation of § 2, First, which requires railroads to “exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions,” and § 13 (c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113 (c), defining “labor dispute” as “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,” its decision also rested on the particular aims of the Railway Labor Act and national transportation policy. See 362 U. S., at 336-338. The mandatory scope of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act and the extent of the prohibition against injunctive relief contained in Norris-LaGuardia are not coextensive with the National Labor Relations Act and the Board’s jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. See Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 402 U. S. 570, 579, n. 11 (1971) (“parallels between the duty to bargain in good faith and the duty to exert every reasonable effort, like all parallels between the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act, should be drawn with the utmost care and with full awareness of the differences between the statutory schemes”). Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. McCOY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF McCOY No. 87-75. Decided October 19, 1987 Per Curiam. In this case, we are asked to determine whether the United States Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdictional authority when, after affirming a decision of the United States Tax Court, it granted the taxpayer-estate’s request to forgive interest on the determined deficiency in estate tax and also to forgive a statutorily imposed late-payment penalty. We are constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals did exceed its authority. I Arthur H. McCoy died testate on April 23, 1980. His son, Robert McCoy, the respondent here, was appointed executor of his will. At his death, the decedent was the owner of an undivided interest in a family farm in Clinton County, Ohio. The then fair market value of that interest was $235,140. Under §2032A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 2032A (1982 ed. and Supp. Ill), however, an estate may elect a special method for valuing certain real property for federal estate tax purposes. This alternative usually is elected if it produces a lower valuation and a lower tax. At the time relevant for the McCoy estate, the election was available only if the land in question was “qualified real property,” see § 2032A(b)(l), and only if the election was made “not later than the time prescribed by section 6075(a) for filing the [estate tax] return . . . (including extensions thereof) . . . .” 26 U. S. C. §2032A(d)(l) (1976 ed.). Since § 6075(a) provided that the return was to be filed within nine months of the decedent’s death, and since no extension of time was obtained, respondent was required to make any election under §2032A not later than January 23, 1981. Respondent, however, did not file the return for the decedent’s estate until February 11. In the return, the election as to the interest in the farm — which, it is conceded, would have been “qualified real property” — was asserted. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, took the position that the election was untimely under §§2032A and 6075(a), and that the farm interest therefore was to be valued at the date-of-death figure of $235,140, rather than at the special-use figure of $103,304.70 claimed in the return as filed. The lower value would have produced no tax. The Commissioner, using the higher value, determined a deficiency in estate tax of $22,159.72. Respondent sought redetermination of the asserted deficiency in the United States Tax Court. He contended that the time for making the election under § 2032A had been extended retroactively by amendments to the statute effected by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § 421(k)(5), 95 Stat. 314, note following 26 U. S. C. § 2032A. The Tax Court rejected respondent’s contention and sustained the deficiency. Estate of McCoy, 50 TCM 1194 (1985), ¶ 85,509 P-H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 809 F. 2d 333 (CA6 1987). After the Tax Court’s decision, respondent did not file the appeal bond required by 26 U. S. C. § 7485, if assessment and collection of the deficiency were to be stayed. Despite the pendency of the appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Commissioner therefore assessed the deficiency and issued a notice and demand for payment. When the deficiency was not paid within 10 days, an addition to tax accrued under 26 U. S. C. § 6651(a)(3). Shortly after the Court of Appeals issued its affirming opinion, respondent paid the tax but filed a petition with the Court of Appeals asking that that court “forgive” interest on the assessment and also the late-payment penalty. Respondent asserted that the case was one of first impression and that the estate would otherwise be the victim of an obscure after-the-fact statutory amendment. Respondent also claimed that he had litigated in good faith the validity of his § 2032A election. The Court of Appeals on March 2, 1987, entered an order granting the relief requested by respondent’s petition. App. to Pet. for Cert. la. It noted that “the interest and penalties now exceed the assessed tax,” and it concluded that the interest and penalties should be forgiven “in order to achieve a fair and just result.” Ibid. The Commissioner seeks a writ of certiorari. II Under 26 U. S. C. § 7482(a), the regional federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review decisions of the Tax Court “in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” Section 7482(c)(1) provides that “such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the Tax Court is not in accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the decision of the Tax Court.” It follows that in reviewing a Tax Court decision, the duty of the court of appeals is to consider whether the Tax Court committed error. Plainly, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to decide an issue that was not the subject of the Tax Court proceeding or to grant relief that is beyond the powers of the Tax Court itself. Taylor v. Commissioner, 258 F. 2d 89, 91 (CA2 1958); Vandenberge v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 167, 168 (CA5), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 875 (1945). See Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320 U. S. 418 (1943). But cf. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 120-121 (1976). The Court of Appeals in this case clearly exceeded its jurisdictional bounds. Its only jurisdiction, under § 7482(a), was “to review the decisio[n] of the Tax Court.” The latter court’s decision was that “there is a deficiency in the amount of $22,159.72 in [respondent’s] Federal estate tax.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. The Court of Appeals ruled that that decision was correct. Its duty, then, was to affirm the decision. It was not empowered to proceed further to decide other questions relating to interest and penalty — questions that were not presented, and could not possibly have been presented, to the Tax Court — or to grant relief that the Tax Court itself had no jurisdiction to provide. Interest on a tax deficiency is separately mandated by 26 U. S. C. § 6601(a). A penalty that accrues under § 6651(a)(3) is also separate and outside the scope of the petition to the Tax Court. The deficiency asserted here was not assessed, and could not have been assessed, until after the Tax Court had rendered its decision. See § 6213(a). The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks general equitable powers. Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., supra. The estate, of course, was not without an opportunity to litigate the validity of the interest and the late-payment penalty. The proper procedure was for respondent to pay the interest and penalty and sue for their refund in an appropriate federal district court or in the Claims Court. The Sixth Circuit in the former case, and the Federal Circuit in the latter, then would have had jurisdiction to consider those issues on appeal. We note in passing that the fact that the Court of Appeals’ order under challenge here is unpublished carries no weight in our decision to review the case. The Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction regardless of nonpublication and regardless of any assumed lack of precedential effect of a ruling that is unpublished. Certiorari is therefore granted and the order of March 2, 1987, is reversed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHICAGO & SOUTHERN AIR LINES, INC. v. WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORP. NO. 78. Argued November 19, 1947. — Decided February 9, 1948. R. Emmett Kerrigan argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 78. Robert L. Stern argued the cause for petitioner in No. 88. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perl-man, Robert W. Ginnane, Emory T. Nunneley and Oliver Carter. Bon Geaslin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Francis H. Inge and Joseph M. Paul, Jr. Mr. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court. The question of law which brings this controversy here is whether § 1006 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U. S. C. § 646, authorizing judicial review of described orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board, includes those which grant or deny applications by citizen carriers to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation which are subject to approval by the President under § 801 of the Act. 49 U. S. C. § 601. By proceedings not challenged as to regularity, the Board, with express approval of the President, issued an order which denied Waterman Steamship Corporation a certificate of convenience and necessity for an air route and granted one to Chicago and Southern Air Lines, a rival applicant. Routes sought by both carrier interests involved overseas air transportation, § 1 (21) (b), between Continental United States and Caribbean possessions and also foreign air transportation, § 1 (21) (c), between the United States and foreign countries. Waterman filed a petition for review under § 1006 of the Act with the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Chicago and Southern intervened. Both the latter and the Board moved to dismiss, the grounds pertinent here being that because the order required and had approval of the President, under § 801 of the Act, it was not reviewable. The Court of Appeals disclaimed any power to question or review either the President’s approval or his disapproval, but it regarded any Board order as incomplete until court review, after which “the completed action must be approved by the President as to citizen air carriers in cases under Sec. 801.” 159 F. 2d 828. Accordingly, it refused to dismiss the petition and asserted jurisdiction. Its decision conflicts with one by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 121 F. 2d 810. We granted certiorari both to the Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. (No. 78) and to the Board (No. 88) to resolve the conflict. Congress has set up a comprehensive scheme for regulation of common carriers by air. Many statutory provisions apply indifferently whether the carrier is a foreign air carrier or a citizen air carrier, and whether the carriage involved is “interstate air commerce,” “overseas air commerce” or “foreign air commerce,” each being appropriately defined. 49 U. S. C. § 401 (20). All air carriers by similar procedures must obtain from the Board certificates of convenience and necessity by showing a public interest in establishment of the route and the applicant's ability to serve it. But when a foreign carrier asks for any permit, or a citizen carrier applies for a certificate to engage in any overseas or foreign air transportation, a copy of the application must be transmitted to the President before hearing; and any decision, either to grant or to deny, must be submitted to the President before publication and is unconditionally subject to the President’s approval. Also the statute subjects to judicial review “any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board under this Act, except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President as provided in section 801 of this Act.” It grants no express exemption to an order such as the one before us, which concerns a citizen carrier but which must have Presidential approval because it involves overseas and foreign air transportation. The question is whether an exemption is to be implied. This Court long has held that statutes which employ broad terms to confer power of judicial review are not always to be read literally. Where Congress has authorized review of “any order” or used other equally inclusive terms, courts have declined the opportunity to magnify their jurisdiction, by self-denying constructions which do not subject to judicial control orders which, from their nature, from the context of the Act, or from the relation of judicial power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate for review. Examples are set forth by Chief Justice Hughes in Federal Power Commission v. Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375, 384. Cf. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130. The Waterman Steamship Corporation urges that review of the problems involved in establishing foreign air routes are of no more international delicacy or strategic importance than those involved in routes for water carriage. It says, “It is submitted that there is no basic difference between the conduct of the foreign commerce of the United States by air or by sea.” From this premise it reasons that we should interpret this statute to follow the pattern of judicial review adopted in relation to orders affecting foreign commerce by rail, Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 654; News Syndicate Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 275 U. S. 179, or communications by wire, United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 272 F. 893, or by radio, Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 68 App. D. C. 336, 97 F. 2d 641; and it likens the subject-matter of aeronautics legislation to that of Title VI of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U. S. C. § 1171, and the function of the Aeronautics Board in respect to overseas and foreign air transportation to that of the Maritime Commission to such commerce when water-borne. We find no indication that the Congress either entertained or fostered the narrow concept that air-borne commerce is a mere outgrowth or overgrowth of surface-bound transport. Of course, air transportation, water transportation, rail transportation, and motor transportation all have a kinship in that all are forms of transportation and their common features of public carriage for hire may be amenable to kindred regulations. But these resemblances must not blind us to the fact that legally, as well as literally, air commerce, whether at home or abroad, soared into a different realm than any that had gone before. Ancient doctrines of private ownership of the air as appurtenant to land titles had to be revised to make aviation practically serviceable to our society. A way of travel which quickly escapes the bounds of local regulative competence called for a more penetrating, uniform and exclusive regulation by the nation than had been thought appropriate for the more easily controlled commerce of the past. While transport by land and by sea began before any existing government was established and their respective customs and practices matured into bodies of carrier law independently of legislation, air transport burst suddenly upon modern governments, offering new advantages, demanding new rights and carrying new threats which society could meet with timely adjustments only by prompt invocation of legislative authority. However useful parallels with older forms of transit may be in adjudicating private rights, we see no reason why the efforts of the Congress to foster and regulate development of a revolutionary commerce that operates in three dimensions should be judicially circumscribed with analogies taken over from two-dimensional transit. The “public interest” that enters into awards of routes for aerial carriers, who in effect obtain also a sponsorship by our government in foreign ventures, is not confined to adequacy of transportation service, as we have held when that term is applied to railroads. Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 531. That aerial navigation routes and bases should be prudently correlated with facilities and plans for our own national defenses and raise new problems in conduct of foreign relations, is a fact of common knowledge. Congressional hearings and debates extending over several sessions and departmental studies of many years show that the legislative and administrative processes have proceeded in full recognition of these facts. In the regulation of commercial aeronautics, the statute confers on the Board many powers conventional in other carrier regulation under the Congressional commerce power. They are exercised through usual procedures and apply settled standards with only customary administrative finality. Congress evidently thought of the administrative function in terms used by this Court of another of its agencies in exercising interstate commerce power: “Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from executive control.” Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628. Those orders which do not require Presidential approval are subject to judicial review to assure application of the standards Congress has laid down. But when a foreign carrier seeks to engage in public carriage over the territory or waters of this country, or any carrier seeks the sponsorship of this Government to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation, Congress has completely inverted the usual administrative process. Instead of acting independently of executive control, the agency is then subordinated to it. Instead of its order serving as a final disposition of the application, its force is exhausted when it serves as a recommendation to the President. Instead of being handed down to the parties as the conclusion of the administrative process, it must be submitted to the President, before publication even can take place. Nor is the President’s control of the ultimate decision a mere right of veto. It is not alone issuance of such authorizations that are subject to his approval, but denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation or suspension, as well. And likewise subject to his approval are the terms, conditions and limitations of the order. 49 U. S. C. § 601. Thus, Presidential control is not limited to a negative but is a positive and detailed control over the Board’s decisions, unparalleled in the history of American administrative bodies. Congress may of course delegate very large grants of its power over foreign commerce to the President. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294; United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U. S. 371. The President also possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ in foreign affairs. For present purposes, the order draws vitality from either or both sources. Legislative and Executive powers are pooled obviously to the end that commercial strategic and diplomatic interests of the country may be coordinated and advanced without collision or deadlock between agencies. These considerations seem controlling on the question whether the Board’s action on overseas and foreign air transportation applications by citizens are subject to revision or overthrow by the courts. It may be conceded that a literal reading of § 1006 subjects this order to re-examination by the courts. It also appears that the language was deliberately employed by Congress, although nothing indicates that Congress foresaw or intended the consequences ascribed to it by the decision of the Court below. The letter of the text might with equal consistency be construed to require any one of three things: first, judicial review of a decision by the President; second, judicial review of a Board order before it acquires finality through Presidential action, the court’s decision on review being a binding limitation on the President’s action; third, a judicial review before action by the President, the latter being at liberty wholly to disregard the court’s judgment. We think none of these results is required by usual canons of construction. In this case, submission of the Board’s decision was made to the President, who disapproved certain portions of it and advised the Board of the changes which he required. The Board complied and submitted a revised order and opinion which the President approved. Only then were they made public, and that which was made public and which is before us is only the final order and opinion containing the President’s amendments and bearing his approval. Only at that stage was review sought, and only then could it be pursued, for then only was the decision consummated, announced and available to the parties. While the changes made at direction of the President may be identified, the reasons therefor are not disclosed beyond the statement that “because of certain factors relating to our broad national welfare and other matters for which the Chief Executive has special responsibility, he has reached conclusions which require” changes in the Board’s opinion. The court below considered, and we think quite rightly, that it could not review such provisions of the order as resulted from Presidential direction. The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 454; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-321; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302. We therefore agree that whatever of this order emanates from the President is not susceptible of review by the Judicial Department. The court below thought that this disability could be overcome by regarding the Board as a regulatory agent of Congress to pass on such matters as the fitness, willingness and ability of the applicant, and that the Board’s own determination of these matters is subject to review. The court, speaking of the Board’s action, said: “It is not final till the Board and the court have completed their functions. Thereafter the completed action must be approved by the President as to citizen air carriers in cases under Sec. 801.” The legal incongruity of interposing judicial review between the action by the Board and that by the President are as great as the practical disadvantages. The latter arise chiefly from the inevitable delay and obstruction in the midst of the administrative proceedings. The former arises from the fact that until the President acts there is no final administrative determination to review. The statute would hardly have forbidden publication before submission if it had contemplated interposition of the courts at this intermediate stage. Nor could it have expected the courts to stay the President’s hand after submission while they deliberate on the inchoate determination. The difficulty is manifest in this case. Review could not be sought until the order was made available, and at that time it had ceased to be merely the Board’s tentative decision and had become one finalized by Presidential discretion. Until the decision of the Board has Presidential approval, it grants no privilege and denies no right. It can give nothing and can take nothing away from the applicant or a competitor. It may be a step which if erroneous will mature into a prejudicial result, as an order fixing valuations in a rate proceeding may fore-show and compel a prejudicial rate order. But administrative orders are not reviewable unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 244 U. S. 82; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 131. The dilemma faced by those who demand judicial review of the Board’s order is that before Presidential approval it is not a final determination even of the Board’s ultimate action, and after Presidential approval the whole order, both in what is approved without change as well as in amendments which he directs, derives its vitality from the exercise of unreviewable Presidential discretion. The court below considered that after it reviewed the Board’s order its judgment would be submitted to the President, that his power to disapprove would apply after as well as before the court acts, and hence that there would be no chance of a deadlock and no conflict of function. But if the President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it is one the courts were not authorized to render. Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government. To revise or review an administrative decision which has only the force of a recommendation to the President would be to render an advisory opinion in its most obnoxious form — advice that the President has not asked, tendered at the demand of a private litigant, on a subject concededly within the President’s exclusive, ultimate control. This Court early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive. It has also been the firm and unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action. Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dali. 409; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697; In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346; United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U. S. 386. We conclude that orders of the Board as to certificates for overseas or foreign air transportation are not mature and are therefore not susceptible of judicial review at anytime before they are finalized by Presidential approval. After such approval has been given, the final orders embody Presidential discretion as to political matters beyond the competence of the courts to adjudicate. This makes it unnecessary to examine the other questions raised. The petition of the Waterman Steamship Corp. should be dismissed. Judgment reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. MENDOZA-LOPEZ et al. No. 85-2067. Argued March 3, 1987 Decided May 26, 1987 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 842. Sc alia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 846. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Weld, and Deputy Solicitor General Bryson. Kathy Goudy, by appointment of the Court, 479 U. S. 981, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Richard F. Ziegler, Lucas Guttentag, Alvin J. Bronstein, and Kip Steinberg; and for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Susan M. Lydon and Bill Ong Hing. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we must determine whether an alien who is prosecuted under 8 U. S. C. § 1326 for illegal entry following deportation may assert in that criminal proceeding the invalidity of the underlying deportation order. I-H Respondents, Jose Mendoza-Lopez and Angel Landeros-Quinones, were arrested at separate locations in Lincoln, Nebraska, on October 23, 1984, by agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. On October 30, 1984, they were transported to Denver, Colorado, where a group deportation hearing was held for respondents along with 11 other persons, all of whom were, like respondents, Mexican nationals. After the hearing, respondents were ordered deported and were bused to El Paso, Texas. They were deported from El Paso on November 1,1984. Each received, at the time of his deportation, a copy of Form 1-294, which advised, in both Spanish and English, that a return to the United States without permission following deportation would constitute a felony. On December 12, 1984, both respondents were once again separately arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska. They were subsequently indicted by a grand jury in the District of Nebraska on charges of violating 8 U. S. C. §1326, which provides: “Any alien who— “(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported, and thereafter “(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States . . . “shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.” Respondents moved in the District Court to dismiss their indictments, on the ground that they were denied fundamentally fair deportation hearings. They contended that the Immigration Law Judge inadequately informed them of their right to counsel at the hearing, and accepted their unknowing waivers of the right to apply for suspension of deportation. The District Court ruled that respondents could collaterally attack their previous deportation orders. United States v. Landeros-Quinones, CR 85-L-06 (Feb. 28, 1985). It rejected their claims that they were not adequately informed of their right to counsel. It found, however, that respondents had apparently failed to understand the Immigration Judge’s explanation of suspension of deportation. The District Court concluded that respondents had not made knowing and intelligent waivers of their rights to apply for suspension of deportation or their rights to appeal, finding it “inconceivable that they would so lightly waive their rights to appeal, and thus to the relief they now claim entitlement, [sic] if they had been fully apprised of the ramifications of such a choice.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Holding that the “failure to overcome these defendants’ lack of understanding about the proceedings, which is apparent from listening to the tape recording, totally undermined the reliability of the proceedings” and that “substantial justice was not done,” the District Court dismissed the indictments in both cases. Id., at 26a. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 781 F. 2d 111 (1985). Noting a conflict among the Circuits regarding whether a defendant prosecuted under § 1326 may collaterally attack a deportation order, the court agreed with those Courts of Appeals that had concluded that a material element of the offense prohibited by § 1326 was a “lawful” deportation. Id., at 112. It went on to state that principles of fundamental fairness required a pretrial review of the underlying deportation to examine whether the alien received due process of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that there was a due process violation in this case, holding that, “[bjecause the defendants did not fully understand the proceedings, the hearing was fundamentally unfair, and the deportation order was obtained unlawfully. Thus, it cannot stand as a material element forming the basis of the charges against the defendants.” Id., at 113. To resolve the conflict among the Circuits, we granted certiorari. 479 U. S. 811 (1986). We affirm. I-H 1 — I In United, States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169 (1952), we left open whether the validity of an underlying order of deportation may be challenged in a criminal prosecution in which that prior deportation is an element of the crime. Today, we squarely confront this question in the context of § 1326, which imposes a criminal penalty on any alien who has been deported and subsequently enters, attempts to enter, or is found in, the United States. The issue before us is whether a federal court must always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order, even if the deportation proceeding was not conducted in conformity with due process. The first question we must address is whether the statute itself provides for a challenge to the validity of the deportation order in a proceeding under § 1326. Some of the Courts of Appeals considering the question have held that a deportation is an element of the offense defined by § 1326 only if it is “lawful,” and that §1326 therefore permits collateral challenge to the legality of an underlying deportation order. The language of the statute, however, suggests no such limitation, stating simply that “[a]ny alien who has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported,” 8 U. S. C. § 1826 (1), will be guilty of a felony if the alien thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, 8 U. S. C. § 1326(2). Nor does the sparse legislative history contain any evidence that Congress intended to permit challenge to the validity of the deportation in the § 1326 proceeding. Before § 1326 was enacted, three statutory sections imposed criminal penalties upon aliens who reentered the country after deportation: 8 U. S. C. § 180(a) (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that any alien who had been “deported in pursuance of law” and subsequently entered the United States would be guilty of a felony; 8 U. S. C. § 138 (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952), which provided that an alien deported for prostitution, procuring, or similar immoral activity, and who thereafter reentered the United States, would be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a different penalty; and 8 U. S. C. § 137-7(b) (1946 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1952), which stated that any alien who reentered the country after being deported for subversive activity would be guilty of a felony and subject to yet a third, more severe penalty. See H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 219-220 (1952). Congress thus had available to it in at least one of the predecessor sections — § 180(a) — express language that would have permitted collateral challenges to the validity of deportation proceedings in a criminal prosecution for reentry after deportation. It nonetheless failed to include in § 1326 the “in pursuance of law” language of § 180(a). And while there was, at the time of the enactment of § 1326, some case law suggesting that a collateral attack on a deportation proceeding might under certain circumstances be permitted, that principle was not so unequivocally established as to persuade us that Congress must have intended to incorporate that prior law into § 1326. The Immigration and Nationality Act does include sections that limit judicial review of deportation orders. 8 U. S. C. § 1105a provides that, outside of enumerated exceptions, the procedures prescribed by Title 28 of the United States Code for review of federal agency orders “shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation.” The enumerated exceptions permit an alien to challenge a deportation order, the validity of which has not previously been judicially determined, in a criminal proceeding against the alien for violation of 8 U. S. C. §§ 1252(d) or (e), 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(6), and any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review of that order in a habeas corpus proceeding, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(9). These sections are not directly applicable to this case, since respondents did not ask the District Court to vacate their deportation orders and the court did not do so. It ruled only that the orders could not properly be used as the predicate for a § 1326 conviction. Yet the text of § 1105a indicates that Congress considered and addressed some of the various circumstances in which challenges to deportation orders might arise and did not mention § 1326. See also 8 U. S. C. § 1101(g) (“For the purposes of this chapter any alien ordered deported . . . who has left the United States, shall be considered to have been deported in pursuance of law . . .”); but see Mendez v. INS, 563 F. 2d 956, 959 (CA9 1977). The text and background of § 1326 thus indicate no congressional intent to sanction challenges to deportation orders in proceedings under § 1326. HH HH h-1 That Congress did not intend the validity of the deportation order to be contestable in a § 1326 prosecution does not end our inquiry. If the statute envisions that a court may impose a criminal penalty for reentry after any deportation, regardless of how violative of the rights of the alien the deportation proceeding may have been, the statute does not comport with the constitutional requirement of due process. Our cases establish that where a determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 121-122 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944); cf. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185, 196-197 (1969). This principle means at the very least that where the defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the administrative order may be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal offense. The result of those proceedings may subsequently be used to convert the misdemeanor of unlawful entry into the felony of unlawful entry after a deportation. Depriving an alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be made available in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used to establish an element of a criminal offense. B Having established that a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review, the question remains whether that occurred in this case. The United States did not seek this Court’s review of the determination of the courts below that respondents’ rights to due process were violated by the failure of the Immigration Judge to explain adequately their right to suspension of deportation or their right to appeal. Pet. for Cert. 7. The United States has asked this Court to assume that respondents’ deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair in considering whether collateral attack on the hearing may be permitted. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. We consequently accept the legal conclusions of the court below that the deportation hearing violated due process. If the violation of respondents’ rights that took place in this case amounted to a complete deprivation of judicial review of the determination, that determination may not be used to enhance the penalty for an unlawful entry under § 1826. We think that it did. The Immigration Judge permitted waivers of the right to appeal that were not the result of considered judgments by respondents, and failed to advise respondents properly of their eligibility to apply for suspension of deportation. Because the waivers of their rights to appeal were not considered or intelligent, respondents were deprived of judicial review of their deportation proceeding. The Government may not, therefore, rely on those orders as reliable proof of an element of a criminal offense. C The United States asserts that our decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), answered any constitutional objections to the scheme employed in §1326. In Lewis, the Court held that a state-court conviction, even though it was uncounseled and therefore obtained in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), could be used as a predicate for a subsequent conviction under § 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202(a)(1), which forbade any person convicted of a felony from receiving, possessing, or transporting a firearm. We do not consider Lewis to control the issues raised by this case. The question in Lewis was whether Congress could define that “class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms,” 445 U. S., at 67, by reference to prior state felony convictions, even if those convictions had resulted from procedures, such as the denial of counsel, subsequently condemned as unconstitutional. The Court there rejected Lewis’ statutory challenge, holding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon the prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings, and further held that this use of uncounseled prior convictions did not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In rejecting the notion that the statute permitted, or the Constitution required, this “new form of collateral attack” on prior convictions, the Court pointed to the availability of alternative means to secure judicial review of the conviction: “[I]t is important to note that a convicted felon may challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm.” Ibid. It is precisely the unavailability of effective judicial review of the administrative determination at issue here that sets this case apart from Lewis. The fundamental procedural defects of the deportation hearing in this case rendered direct review of the Immigration Judge’s determination unavailable to respondents. What was assumed in Lewis, namely the opportunity to challenge the predicate conviction in a judicial forum, was precisely that which was denied to respondents here. Persons charged with crime are entitled to have the factual and legal determinations upon which convictions are based subjected to the scrutiny of an impartial judicial officer. Lewis does not reject that basic principle, and our decision today merely reaffirms it. Because respondents were deprived of their rights to appeal, and of any basis to appeal since the only relief for which they would have been eligible was not adequately explained to them, the deportation proceeding in which these events occurred may not be used to support a criminal conviction, and the dismissal of the indictments against them was therefore proper. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Respondents have at no point raised, and we do not express any opinion regarding, the propriety of the group deportation procedure used in this ease. Compare United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F. 2d 218, 219-220 (CA9 1978), with United States v. Calles-Pineda, 627 F. 2d 976, 977 (CA9 1980). The statute excepts those aliens who have either received the express consent of the Attorney General to reapply for admission or who otherwise establish that they were not required to obtain such consent. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1326 (2)(A), (B). Respondents do not contend that either exception applies to them. Suspension of deportation is a discretionary remedy providing relief from deportation. The statutory section applicable to respondents makes the remedy available to a deportable alien who has been physically present in the United States for at least seven years, who was during that time a person of good moral character, and whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or his spouse, parent, or child, who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a). Suspension of deportation not only provides relief from deportation, but enables the alien to adjust his status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Ibid. The District Court found that the Immigration Judge did not answer a question from one of the respondents regarding application for suspension of deportation; that the Immigration Judge addressed the wrong respondent while discussing eligibility for the remedy; that the Immigration Judge did not make clear how much time he would allow respondents to apply for suspension; and that Landeros-Quinones asked a question which demonstrated that he did not understand the concept of suspension of deportation, but that the Immigration Judge failed to explain further. The District Court contrasted this cursory and confusing treatment of the issue of suspension of deportation with the extensive inquiry that took place when two of the other aliens sought voluntary departure in lieu of deportation, one of whom was ultimately granted voluntary departure. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-22a. One judge dissented on the ground that a challenge to the propriety of a previous deportation order may never be asserted in a criminal proceeding under § 1326. 781 F. 2d, at 113-114. Compare, e. g., United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F. 2d 1089, 1090 (CA9 1985), and United States v. Bowles, 331 F. 2d 742, 749-750 (CA3 1964) (collateral attack on legality of deportation permitted in § 1326 proceeding), with United States v. Petrella, 707 F. 2d 64, 66 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 921 (1983), United States v. Gonzalez-Parra, 438 F. 2d 694, 697 (CA5), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 1010 (1971), and Arriaga-Ramirez v. United States, 325 F. 2d 857, 859 (CA10 1963) (collateral attacks barred in prosecutions under § 1326); see also United States v. Rosal-Aguilar, 652 F. 2d 721, 723 (CA7 1981) (trial de novo on the factual basis of the underlying deportation is not a constitutional prerequisite to conviction under § 1326, but “the Government must prove the underlying deportation to have been based on a valid legal predicate and obtained according to law”); Petrella v. United States, 464 U. S. 921, 922 (1983) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (internal quotation omitted). In Spector, an alien against whom an order of deportation was outstanding was prosecuted for failure to make timely application for documents necessary to his departure. He challenged the statute on vagueness grounds and prevailed in the District Court. The case was appealed directly to this Court, which ruled that the statute was not void for vagueness. 343 U. S., at 171-172. The Court noted the argument that the statute was unconstitutional because it afforded no opportunity for the court trying the criminal charge to pass on the validity of the order of deportation, but declined to address the issue because it “was neither raised by the appellee nor briefed nor argued here.” Id., at 172. “It will be time to consider whether the validity of the order of deportation may be tried in the criminal trial. . . when and if the appellee seeks to have it tried. That question is not foreclosed by this opinion. We reserve decision on it.” Id., at 172-173. Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Frankfurter joined, dissented on the ground that the statute at issue impermissibly allowed the use of an administrative determination as conclusive evidence of a fact in a criminal prosecution. “Having thus dispensed with important constitutional safeguards in obtaining an administrative adjudication that the alien is guilty of conduct making him deportable on the ground it is only a civil proceeding, the Government seeks to turn around and use the result as a conclusive determination of that fact in a criminal proceeding. We think it cannot make that use of such an order.” Id., at 179. Congress resolved the potential problem in Spector when, in 1961, it enacted 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(6), which provides explicitly that, if the validity of a deportation order has not been judicially determined, it may be challenged in a criminal proceeding against the alien under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(e) for willfully failing or refusing to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure. Section 1105a does not explicitly address the availability of collateral attack under § 1326. In its petition for certiorari, the United States did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ holding that the deportation proceeding in this case was fundamentally unfair and that the deportation order was therefore unlawful. Pet. for Cert. 7. See, e. g., United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F. 2d 149, 152 (CA9 1975) (“A material element of the offense defined by 8 U. S. C. § 1326 is a lawful deportation”); United States v. Bowles, supra, at 749 (“When Congress made use of the word ‘deported’ in the statute, it meant ‘deported according to law’ ”). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in deciding this case, noted that other courts had permitted collateral attack on the ground that “a material element of the offense prohibited by 8 U. S. C. § 1326 is a ‘lawful’ deportation” and stated that it “agree[d] with this rationale.” 781 F. 2d, at 112. The court does not appear to have relied entirely on the statute in ruling that the propriety of the deportation could be reviewed in the § 1326 proceeding, since it then continued: “Allowing a pretrial review of the underlying deportation to examine whether due process was provided insures fundamental fairness to the rights of the criminal defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that defendants in section 1326 prosecutions may collaterally attack their previous deportation orders on the ground that they were not accorded due process at the deportation hearing.” Id., at 112-113. Section 180(a) provided for punishment by imprisonment of not more than two years or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both; § 138 provided solely for imprisonment for up to two years; § 137-7(b) provided for imprisonment for up to five years. The purpose of § 1326 was to impose the same penalty on any person who returned to the United States without permission after deportation, regardless of the basis of the original deportation. See S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 655, 656 (1950). That Congress had before it the text of all three sections was clear— their text was in all pertinent respects reproduced as “existing law” in the House Report on the statute that included § 1326. H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 219-220 (1952). See, e. g., United States ex rel. Beck v. Neelly, 202 F. 2d 221, 222, 224 (CA7) (declining to decide whether deported alien may challenge prior deportation in habeas corpus proceeding), cert. denied, 345 U. S. 997 (1953); United States ex rel. Steffner v. Carmichael, 183 F. 2d 19, 20 (CA5) (collateral attack on deportation proceeding in later deportation proceeding impermissible unless there was “gross miscarriage of justice” in the former proceeding; prior order here was valid), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 829 (1950); Daskaloff v. Zurbrick, 103 F. 2d 579, 580-581 (CA6 1939) (alien deported as a prostitute who reentered country and was detained on warrant of deportation under 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1946 ed.) (repealed 1952) could not collaterally attack validity of earlier deportation through habeas corpus). Contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, post, at 849, our opinion today does not reject the holding in Mendez, as to which we express no view. ' The Government stated at oral argument that it was the position of the United States that there were “absolutely no due process limitations to the enforcement of Section 1326.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. Even with this safeguard, the use of the result of an administrative proceeding to establish an element of a criminal offense is troubling. See United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 179 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). While the Court has permitted criminal conviction for violation of an administrative regulation where the validity of the regulation could not be challenged in the criminal proceeding, Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944), the decision in that case was motivated by the exigencies of wartime, dealt with the propriety of regulations rather than the legitimacy of an adjudicative procedure, and, most significantly, turned on the fact that adequate judicial review of the validity of the regulation was available in another forum. Under different circumstances, the propriety of using an administrative ruling in such a way remains open to question. We do not reach this issue here, however, holding that, at a minimum, the result of an administrative proceeding may not be used as a conclusive element of a criminal offense where the judicial review that legitimated such a practice in the first instance has effectively been denied. A number of commentators have expressed the notion that, where the deportation proceeding violated fundamental fairness, its validity may be challenged in a criminal proceeding under § 1326. See, e. g., Comment, Collateral Attacks on Deportation Orders in Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 83, 90-91, 102-103 (1981) (where alien was denied fundamental fairness at the deportation hearing, collateral attacks in § 1326 proceedings would be proper); Note, Collaterally Attacking Deportation Orders in Criminal Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry Under Section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 56 Notre Dame Law. 677, 686-688 (1981) (fundamental fairness requires some form of collateral review of civil deportation proceedings which have criminal consequences). We decline at this stage to enumerate which procedural errors are so fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial review, requiring that the result of the hearing in which they took place not be used to support a criminal conviction. We have previously recognized, however, in the context of criminal proceedings, that “some errors necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair,” Rose v. Clark, 478 U. S. 570, 577 (1986) (use of coerced confession, adjudication by a biased judge); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 543-544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (mob violence, knowing use of perjured testimony). While the procedures required in an administrative proceeding are less stringent than those demanded in a criminal trial, analogous abuses could operate, under some circumstances, to deny effective judicial review of administrative determinations. We note parenthetically that permitting collateral challenge to the validity of deportation orders in proceedings under § 1326 does not create an opportunity for aliens to delay deportation, since the collateral challenge we recognize today is available only in criminal proceedings instituted after reentry. Cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115 (1967); see also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U. S. 222, 226-227 (1980) (MARSHALL, J., concurring) (court may not constitutionally use prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction collaterally to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor to a felony with an increased term of imprisonment); United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972) (court may not consider constitutionally invalid prior convictions in imposing sentence on unrelated offense); see also 8 U. S. C. § 1325, which provides that an unlawful entry into the United States constitutes a misdemeanor. Section 1326 serves to enhance the penalty for unlawful entry, imposing a steeper punishment on individuals who violate § 1325 and who have previously been deported.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. LaSALLE NATIONAL BANK et al. No. 77-365. Argued March 29, 1978 Decided June 19, 1978 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 319. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Stuart A. Smith, Robert E. Lindsay, Charles E. Brookhart, and Carle-ton D. Powell. Matt P. Cushner argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Gregory J. Perry. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is a supplement to our decision in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971). It presents the issue whether the District Court correctly refused to enforce Internal Revenue Service summonses when it specifically found that the special agent who issued them “was conducting his investigation solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct.” 76-1 USTC ¶ 9407, p. 84,073, 37 AFTR 2d ¶ 76-582, p. 76-1240 (ND Ill. 1976). I In May 1975, John F. Olivero, a special agent with the Intelligence Division of the Chicago District of the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS or Service), received an assignment to investigate the tax liability of John Gat tuso for his taxable years 1970-1972. App. 26-27, 33. Olivero testified that he had requested the assignment because of information he had received from a confidential informant and from an unrelated investigation. Id., at 35. The case was not referred to the IRS from another law enforcement agency, but the nature of the assignment, Olivero testified, was “[t]o investigate the possibility of any criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code.” Id., at 33. Olivero pursued the case on his own, without the assistance of a revenue agent. He received information about Gattuso from the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a result of the previous investigation. Id., at 36. He solicited and received additional data from the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the Secret Service, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the IRS Collection Division, and the Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago. Id., at 37-40. Mr. Gattuso’s tax returns for the years in question disclosed rental income from real estate. That property was held in Illinois land trusts by respondent LaSalle National Bank, as trustee, a fact revealed by land trust files collected by the IRS from banks. Id., at 27, 45. In order to determine the accuracy of Gattuso’s income reports, Olivero proceeded to issue two summonses, under the authority of § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U. S. C. § 7602, to respondent bank. Each summons related to a separate trust and requested, among other things, that the bank as trustee appear before Olivero at a designated time and place and produce its “files relating to Trust No. 31544 [or No. 35396] including the Trust Agreement” for the period 1970 through 1972 and also “all deeds, options, correspondence, closing statements and sellers statements, escrows, and tax bills pertaining to all property held in the trust at any time during” that period. App. 9-16. Respondent Joseph W. Lang, a vice president of the bank, appeared in response to the summonses but, on advice of counsel, refused to produce any of the materials requested. Brief for Respondents 2. The United States and Olivero, pursuant to §§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a) of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 7402 (b) and 7604 (a), then petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for enforcement of the summonses. App. 5. This was on November 11, 1975. Olivero testified that when the petition was filed he had not determined whether criminal charges were justified and had not made any report or recommendation about the case to his superiors. Id., at 30. It was alleged in the petition and in an incorporated exhibit that the requested materials were necessary for the determination of the tax liability of Gattuso for the years in question and that the information contained in the documents was not in the possession of the petitioners. Id., at 7, 17-18. The District Court entered an order to show cause, id., at 19, and respondents answered through counsel, who also represented Gattuso. Id., at 20-22. At the ensuing hearing and in a post-hearing brief, respondents argued that Olivero’s investigation was “purely criminal” in nature. Id., at 82. Gregory J. Perry, a lawyer specializing in federal taxation and employed by the same law firm that filed the answer, testified that in June 1975 Olivero told him that the Gattuso investigation “was strictly related to criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code.” Id., at 52. Respondents conceded that they bore the burden of proving that enforcement of the summonses would abuse the court’s process, but they contended that they did not have to show “that there is no civil purpose to the Summons.” Id., at 87. Instead, they urged that their burden was to show that the summonses were not issued in good faith because “the investigation is solely for the purpose of gathering evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.” Id., at 77. The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Although at the hearing the court seemed to recognize “that in any criminal investigation there’s always a probability of civil tax liability,” id., at 61, it focused its attention on the purpose of Special Agent Olivero: “I’ll say now that I heard nothing in Agent Olivero’s testimony to suggest that the thought of a civil investigation ever crossed his mind. “Now, unless I find something in the in camera inspection [of the IRS case file] that gives more support to the Government position than the Agent’s testimony did, it would be my conclusion that he was at all times involved in a criminal investigation, at least in his own mind.” Id., at 62. In its written memorandum, the District Court noted that Donaldson permitted the use of an IRS summons issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Relying on dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, 449 (1964), however, the court said that it was an improper use of the summons “to serve it solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.” 76-1 USTC, at 84,072, 37 AFTR 2d, at 76-1240. If, at the time of its issuance, the summons served this proscribed purpose, the court concluded, the absence of a formal criminal recommendation was irrelevant, the summons was not issued in good faith, and enforcement was precluded. The court then held: “It is apparent from the evidence that Special Agent John F. Olivero in his investigative activities had focused upon the possible criminal activities of John Gattuso, and was conducting his investigation solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct by Mr. Gattuso.” Id., at 84,073, 37 AFTR 2d, at 76-1240. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 554 F. 2d 302 (1977). It concluded that the District Court correctly had included the issue of criminal purpose within the good-faith inquiry: “[T]he use of an administrative summons solely for criminal purposes is a quintessential example of bad faith. . . . “We note that the district court formulated its factual finding by use of the expression 'sole criminal purpose’ rather than by a label such as 'bad faith.’ We find no basis for reversible error in that verbal formulation. The district court grasped the vital core of Donaldson and rendered its factual finding consistently therewith.” Id., at 309. The Court of Appeals further decided that the District Court had reached a factual, rather than a legal, conclusion when it found the summonses to have been issued solely for a criminal prosecution. Id., at 305. Appellate review, accordingly, was limited to application of the clearly-erroneous standard. Id., at 306. Although the Court of Appeals noted that Olivero had testified about the existence of a civil purpose for the investigation, the court said that “the record establishes that the district court did not believe him.” Id., at 309. The appellate court could not reverse the trial court’s judgment, it said, because it was “not left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake [had] been made.” Id., at 306. Because of the importance of the issue in the enforcement of the internal revenue laws, and because of conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the scope of IRS summons authority under § 7602, we granted certiorari. 434 U. S. 996 (1977). II In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 (1971), an IRS special agent issued summonses to a taxpayer’s putative former employer and its accountant for the production of the employer’s records of the taxpayer’s employment and compensation. When the records were not forthcoming, the IRS petitioned for the enforcement of the summonses. The taxpayer intervened and eventually appealed the enforcement order. This Court addressed the taxpayer’s contention that the summonses were unenforceable because they were issued in aid of an investigation that could have resulted in a criminal charge against the taxpayer. His argument there, see id., at 532, was based on the following dictum in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S., at 449: “[T]he witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d 767, 772-773 . . . .” In the light of the citation to Boren, the Court in Donaldson concluded that the dictum referred and was applicable to “the situation of a pending criminal charge or, at most, of an investigation solely for criminal purposes.” 400 U. S., at 533. Discerning the meaning of the brief Reisman dictum, however, did not resolve for the Court the question posed by Donaldson. The validity of the summonses depended ultimately on whether they were among those authorized by Congress. Having reviewed the statutory scheme, 400 IT. S., at 523-525, the Court concluded that Congress had authorized the use of summonses in investigating potentially criminal conduct. The statutory history, particularly the use of summonses under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, supported this conclusion, as did consistent IRS practice and decisions concerning effective enforcement of other comparable federal statutes. The Court saw no reason to force the Service to choose either to forgo the use of congressionally authorized summonses or to abandon the option of recommending criminal prosecutions to the Department of Justice. As long as the summonses were issued in good-faith pursuit of the congres-sionally authorized purposes, and prior to any recommendation to the Department for prosecution, they were enforceable. Id., at 536. HI The present case requires us to examine the limits of the good-faith use of an Internal Revenue summons issued under § 7602. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Donaldson does not control the facts now before us. There, the taxpayer had argued that the mere potentiality of criminal prosecution should have precluded enforcement of the summons. 400 U. S., at 532. Here, on the other hand, the District Court found that Special Agent Olivero was investigating Gattuso “solely for the purpose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct.” 76-1 USTC, at 84,073, 37 AFTR 2d, at 76-1240. The question then becomes whether this finding necessarily leads to the conclusion that the summonses were not issued in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602. A The Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U. S. C. §§ 7801 and 7802. Congress, by § 7601 (a), has required the Secretary to canvass revenue districts to “inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax.” With regard to suspected fraud, these duties encompass enforcement of both civil and criminal statutes. The willful submission of a false or fraudulent tax return may subject a taxpayer not only to criminal penalties under §§ 7206 and 7207 of the Code, but, as well, to a civil penalty, under § 6653 (b), of 50% of the underpayment. And § 6659 (a) provides that the civil penalty shall be considered as part of the tax liability of the taxpayer. Hence, when § 7602 permits the use of a summons “[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . , or collecting any such liability,” it necessarily permits the use of the summons for examination of suspected tax fraud and for the calculation of the 50% civil penalty. In Donaldson, 400 U. S., at 535, we clearly noted that § 7602 drew no distinction between the civil and the criminal aspects; that it “contains no restriction”; that the corresponding regulations were “positive”; and that there was no significance, “for civil as compared with criminal purposes, at the point of a special agent's appearance.” The Court then upheld the use of the summonses even though fraudulent conduct carried the potential of criminal liability. The Court repeated this emphasis in Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322, 326 (1973): “It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 7602, to issue an Internal Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil and possible criminal consequences.” This result is inevitable because Congress has created a law enforcement system in which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined. When an investigation examines the possibility of criminal misconduct, it also necessarily inquires about the appropriateness of assessing the 50% civil tax penalty. The legislative history of the Code supports the conclusion that Congress intended to design a system with interrelated criminal and civil elements. Section 7602 derives, assertedly without change in meaning, from corresponding and similar provisions in §§ 3614, 3615, and 3654 of the 1939 Code. By § 3614 (a) the Commissioner received the summons authority “for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or for the purpose of making a return where none has been made.” Section 3615 (b) (3) authorized the issuance of a summons “[w]henever any person who is required to deliver a monthly or other return of objects subject to tax delivers any return which, in the opinion of the collector, is erroneous, false, or fraudulent, or contains any undervaluation or understatement.” Section 3654 (a) stated the powers and duties of the collector: “Every collector within his collection district shall see that all laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal revenue taxes are faithfully executed and complied with, and shall aid in the prevention, detection, and punishment of any frauds in relation thereto. For such purposes, he shall have power to examine all persons, books, papers, accounts, and premises . . . and to summon any person to produce books and papers . . . and to compel compliance with such summons in the same manner as provided in section 3615.” Under § 3616 punishment for any fraud included both fine and imprisonment. The 1939 Code, therefore, contemplated the use of the summons in an investigation involving suspected criminal conduct as well as behavior that could have been disciplined with a civil penalty. In short, Congress has not categorized tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal components. Any limitation on the good-faith use of an Internal Revenue summons must reflect this statutory premise. B The preceding discussion suggests why the primary limitation on the use of a summons occurs upon the recommendation of criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice. Only at that point do the criminal and civil aspects of a tax fraud case begin to diverge. See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F. 2d 1347, 1351 (CA9 1977); United States v. Billingsley, 469 F. 2d 1208, 1210 (CA10 1972). We recognize, of course, that even upon recommendation to the Justice Department, the civil and criminal elements do not separate completely. The Government does not sacrifice its interest in unpaid taxes just because a criminal prosecution begins. Logically, then, the IRS could use its summons authority under § 7602 to uncover information about the tax liability created by a fraud regardless of the status of the criminal case. But the rule forbidding such is a prophylactic intended to safeguard the following policy interests. A referral to the Justice Department permits criminal litigation to proceed. The IRS cannot try its own prosecutions. Such authority is reserved to the Department of Justice and, more particularly, to the United States Attorneys. 28 U. S. C. § 647 (1). Nothing in § 7602 or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended the summons authority to broaden the Justice Department’s right of criminal litigation discovery or to infringe on the role of the grand jury as a principal tool of criminal accusation. Accord, United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572 F. 2d 36 (CA2 1978); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F. 2d 454, 458-459 (CA6 1973); United States v. O’Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250-251 (Mass. 1953); see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 536; cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 226 (1960). The likelihood that discovery would be broadened or the role of the grand jury infringed is substantial if post-referral use of the summons authority were permitted. For example, the IRS, upon referral, loses its ability to compromise both the criminal and the civil aspects of a fraud case. 26 U. S. C. § 7122 (a). After the referral, the authority to settle rests with the Department of Justice. Interagency cooperation on the calculation of the civil liability is then to be expected and probably encourages efficient settlement of the dispute. But such cooperation, when combined with the inherently intertwined nature of the criminal and civil elements of the case, suggests that it is unrealistic to attempt to build a partial information barrier between the two branches of the executive. Effective use of information to determine civil liability would inevitably result in criminal discovery. The prophylactic restraint on the use of the summons effectively safeguards the two policy interests while encouraging maximum interagency cooperation. C Prior to a recommendation for prosecution to the Department of Justice, the IRS must use its summons authority in good faith. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 536; United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57-58 (1964). In Powell, the Court announced several elements of a good-faith exercise: “ [The Service] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed .... [A] court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place if the summons had been issued • for an improper purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). A number of the Courts of Appeals, including the Seventh Circuit in this case, 554 F. 2d, at 309, have said that another improper purpose, which the Service may not pursue in good faith with a summons, is to gather evidence solely for a criminal investigation. The courts have based their conclusions in part on Donaldson’s explanation of the Reisman dictum. The language of Donaldson, however, must be read in the light of the recognition of the interrelated criminal/civil nature of a tax fraud inquiry. For a fraud investigation to be solely criminal in nature would require an extraordinary departure from the normally inseparable goals of examining whether the basis exists for criminal charges and for the assessment of civil penalties. In this case, respondents submit that such a departure did indeed occur because Special Agent Olivero was interested only in gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution. We disagree. The institutional responsibility of the Service to calculate and to collect civil fraud penalties and fraudulently reported or unreported taxes is not necessarily overturned by a single agent who attempts to build a criminal case. The review process over and above his conclusions is multilayered and thorough. Apart from the control of his immediate supervisor, the agent's final recommendation is reviewed by the district chief of the Intelligence Division, 26 CFR §§ 601.107 (b) and (c) (1977); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9600, §§ 9621.1, 9622.1, 9623 (CCH 1977); see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S., at 534. The Office of Regional Counsel also reviews the case before it is forwarded to the National Office of the Service or to the Justice Department. 26 CFR § 601.107 (c) (1977); Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions §1116(3), 39 Fed. Reg. 11602 (1974); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9600, §§ 9624, 9631.2, 9631.4 (C.CH 1977). If the Regional Counsel and the Assistant Regional Commissioner for Intelligence disagree about the disposition of a case, another complete review occurs at the national level centered in the Criminal Tax Division of the Office of General Counsel. Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions § 1113.-(11) 22, 39 Fed. Reg. 11599 (1974); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9600, § 9651 (1) (CCH 1977). Only after the officials of at least two layers of review have concurred in the conclusion of the special agent does the referral to the Department of Justice take place. At any of the various stages, the Service can abandon the criminal prosecution, can decide instead to assert a civil penalty, or can pursue both goals. While the special agent is an important actor in the process, his motivation is hardly dispositive. -It should also be noted that the layers of review provide the taxpayer with substantial protection against the hasty or over zealous judgment of the special agent. The taxpayer may obtain a conference with the district Intelligence Division officials upon request or whenever the chief of the Division determines that a conference would be in the best interests of the Government. 26 CFR § 601.107 (b)(2) (1977); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9300, § 9356.1 (CCH 1977). If prosecution has been recommended, the chief notifies the taxpayer of the referral to the Regional Counsel. 26 CFR § 601.107 (c) (1977); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9300, § 9356 (CCH 1977). As in Donaldson, then, where we refused to draw the line between permissible civil and impermissible criminal purposes at the entrance of the special agent into the investigation, 400 U. S., at 536, we cannot draw it on the basis of the agent’s personal intent. To do so would unnecessarily frustrate the enforcement of the tax laws by restricting the use of the summons according to the motivation of a single agent without regard to the enforcement policy of the Service as an institution. Furthermore, the inquiry into the criminal enforcement objectives of the agent would delay summons enforcement proceedings while parties clash over, and judges grapple with, the thought processes of each investigator. See United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572 F. 2d 36 (CA2 1978). This obviously is undesirable and unrewarding. As a result, the question whether an investigation has solely criminal purposes must be answered only by an examination of the institutional posture of the IRS. Contrary to the assertion of respondents, this means that those opposing enforcement of a summons do bear the burden to disprove the actual existence of a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose by the Service. After all, the purpose of the good-faith inquiry is to determine whether the agency is honestly pursuing the goals of § 7602 by issuing the summons. Without doubt, this burden is a heavy one. Because criminal and civil fraud liabilities are coterminous, the Service rarely will be found to have acted in bad faith by pursuing the former. On the other hand, we cannot abandon this aspect of the good-faith inquiry altogether. We shall not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to the Justice Department when there is an institutional commitment to make the referral and the Service merely would like to gather additional evidence for the prosecution. Such a delay would be tantamount to the use of the summons authority after the recommendation and would permit the Government to expand its criminal discovery rights. Similarly, the good-faith standard will not permit the IRS to become an information-gathering agency for other departments, including the Department of Justice, regardless of the status of criminal cases. D In summary, then, several requirements emerge for the enforcement of an IRS summons. First, the summons must be issued before the Service recommends to the Department of Justice that a criminal prosecution, which reasonably would relate to the subject matter of the summons, be undertaken. Second, the Service at all times must use the summons authority in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602. This second prerequisite requires the Service to meet the Powell standards of good faith. It also requires that the Service not abandon in an institutional sense, as explained in Parts III-A and III-C above, the pursuit of civil tax determination or collection. IV On the record before us, respondents have not demonstrated sufficient justification to preclude enforcement of the IRS summonses. No recommendation to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution has been made. Of the Powell criteria, respondents challenge only one aspect of the Service's showing: They suggest that Olivero' already may possess the evidence requested in the summonses. Brief for Respondents 16-19. Although the record shows that Olivero had uncovered the names and identities of the LaSalle National Bank land trusts, it does not show that the Service knows the value of the trusts or their income or the allocation of interests therein. Because production of the bank's complete records on the trusts reasonably could be expected to reveal part or all of this information, which would be material to the computation of Gattuso’s tax liability, the Powell criteria do not preclude enforcement. Finally, the District Court refused enforcement because it found that Olivero’s personal motivation was to gather evidence solely for a criminal prosecution. The court, however, failed to consider whether the Service in an institutional sense had abandoned its pursuit of Gattuso’s civil tax liability. The Court of Appeals did not require that inquiry. On the record presently developed, we cannot conclude that such an abandonment has occurred. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed with instructions to that court to remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Frequently, a revenue agent of the IRS Audit Division will refer a case on which he is working to the Intelligence Division for investigation of possible fraud. After such a referral, and at other times, the special agent and the revenue agent work together. Because of the importance and sensitivity of the criminal aspects of the joint investigation, the special agent assumes control of the inquiry. See, e. g., Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 4500, §§4563.431-4565.44 (CCH 1976 and 1978). As part of a planned reorganization, the IRS has announced its intention to redesignate the Audit Division and the Intelligence Division as the Examinations Division and the Criminal Enforcement Division, respectively. IRS News Release, Feb. 6, 1978. Respondents describe an Illinois land trust as follows: “An Illinois land trust is a contract by which a trustee is vested with both legal and equitable title to real property and the interest of the beneficiary is considered personal property. Under this trust the beneficiary or any person designated in writing by the beneficiary has the exclusive power to direct or control the trustee in dealing with the title and the exclusive control of the management, operation, renting and selling of the trust property together with the exclusive right to the earnings, avails and proceeds of said property. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 29, § 8.31 (1971).” Brief for Respondents 1-2, n. 1. Section 7602 reads: “For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized— “(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; “(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and “(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.” Section 7402 (b) states: “If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.” Section 7604 (a) reads: “If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.” The District Court was aware of and recognized the Government’s contention that the individual agent’s motive in the investigation was not dispositive: “The COURT: . . . [U]nder your theory any criminal investigation would not really be one until they closed it because there was always a possibility of a civil liability. “If that’s the law, you’re in trouble, Mr. Cushner [counsel for respondents]. “I think it boils down to an issue of law so it’s the cases really that I’m interested in plus any further clues I may find in the in camera inspection of the investigative file.” App. 61-62. The court agreed to inspect the IRS investigative file in camera after it refused to permit respondents to inspect the file. Id., at 50-51, 61-62. Compare United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F. 2d 1347, 1350-1351 (CA9 1977); United States v. Zack, 521 F. 2d 1366, 1368 (CA9 1975); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F. 2d 368, 374-375 (CA3 1975); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F. 2d 454, 460 (CA6 1973); United States v. Wall Corp., 154 U. S. App. D. C. 309, 311, 475 F. 2d 893, 895 (1972); and United States v. Billingsley, 469 F. 2d 1208, 1210 (CA10 1972), with United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 572 F. 2d 36, 41-42 (CA2 1978); and United States v. Troupe, 438 F. 2d 117, 119 (CA8 1971), regarding the conflict about whether the recommendation for criminal prosecution is dispositive of the so-called criminal purpose issue. Compare United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F. 2d, at 1351; and United States v. Billingsley, 469 F. 2d, at 1210, with United States v. Lafko, 520 F. 2d 622, 625 (CA3 1975), regarding the conflict about whether the criminal recommendation from the IRS to the Department of Justice or the recommendation from the special agent to his superiors is important in the enforcement inquiry. In Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d 767, 772-773 (1956), the Ninth Circuit distinguished United States v. O’Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (Mass. 1953), which involved an investigation of a taxpayer already under indictment. The Court had concluded earlier that the summoning of the employer’s and the accountant’s records for an investigation of the taxpayer did not violate the constitutional rights of any of them. 400 U. S., at 522. See §§ 3614, 3615, 3616, and 3654 of the 1939 Code, 53 Stat. 438-440, 446. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 11 (1970) (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act enforcement), citing Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 51-52 (1912) (Sherman Act enforcement). See Part III-B and n. 15, infra. The interrelated nature of the civil and criminal investigative functions is further demonstrated by the organization and functioning of the IRS. Pursuant to 26 CFR §601.107 (1977), each revenue district has an Intelligence Division, “whose mission is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with the internal revenue laws.” This purpose is implemented by “the investigation of possible criminal violations of such laws and the recommendation (when warranted) of prosecution and/or assertion of the 50 percent ad valorem addition to the tax.” Ibid. See generally Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions §§ 1113.563, 1114.8, and 1118.6, 39 Fed. Reg. 11572, 11581, 11601, and 11607 (1974). In its Manual for employees, the IRS instructs that the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Division includes all civil penalties except those related to the estimated income tax. Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 4500, § 4561 (CCH 1976). The Manual adds: “Intelligence features are those activities of developing and presenting admissible evidence required to prove criminal violations and the ad valorem penalties for civil fraud, negligence and delinquency (except those concerning tax estimations) for all years involved in cases jointly investigated to completion.” Id., § 4565.31 (4). The Manual also contains detailed instructions for coordination between special agents and revenue agents during investigations of tax fraud. E. g., id., §4563.431 (1978), and §§4565.22, 4565.32, 4565.41-4565.44 (1976). Statistics for the fiscal year 1976 show that the Intelligence Division has a substantially greater involvement with civil fraud than with criminal fraud. Of 8,797 full-scale tax fraud investigations in that year, only 2,037 resulted in recommendations for prosecution. The 6,760 cases not recommended involved approximately $11 million in deficiencies and penalties. See 1976 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 33, 61, 152. See H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A436 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 617 (1954). Internal Revenue officials received similar summons authority in Revenue Acts prior to the 1939 Code. See, e. g., Revenue Act of 1918, § 1305, 40 Stat. 1142; Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, § II ¶ I, 38 Stat. 178-179; Act of June 30,1864, § 14,13 Stat. 226. The interrelated nature of fraud investigations thus was apparent as early as 1864. Section 14 of the 1864 Act permitted the issuance of a summons to investigate a suspected fraudulent return. It also prescribed a 100% increase in valuation as a civil penalty for falsehood. Section 15 established the criminal penalties for such conduct. Four years later, when Congress created the position of district supervisor, that official received similar summons authority. Act of July 20, 1868, § 49, 15 Stat. 144-145; see Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 3450 (1868). The federal courts enforced these summonses when they were issued in good faith and in compliance with instructions from the Commissioner. See In re Meador, 16 F. Cas. 1294, 1296 (No. 9,375) (ND Ga. 1869); Stanwood v. Green, 22 F. Cas. 1077, 1079 (No. 13,301) (SD Miss. 1870) (“it being understood that this right upon the part of the supervisor extends only to such books and papers as relate to their banking operations, and are connected with the internal revenue of the United States”). The Third Circuit has suggested that our reference in Donaldson to the recommendation for criminal prosecution (“We hold that under § 7602 an internal revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution,” 400 U. S., at 536) intended to draw a line at the recommendation to the Service’s district office from the special agent, rather than at the recommendation from the Service to the Justice Department. United States v. Lafko, 520 F. 2d, at 625. This misread our intent. Given the interrelated criminal/civil nature of tax fraud investigation whenever it remains within the jurisdiction of the Service, and given the utility of the summons to investigate civil tax liability, we decline to impose the prophylactic restraint on the summons authority any earlier than at the recommendation to the Department of Justice. We cannot deny that the potential for expanding the criminal discovery rights of the Justice Department or for usurping the role of the grand jury exists at the point of the recommendation by the special agent. But we think the possibilities for abuse of these policies are remote before the recommendation to Justice takes place and do not justify imposing an absolute ban on the use of the summons before that point. Earlier imposition of the ban, given the balance of policies and civil law enforcement interests, would unnecessarily hamstring the performance of the tax determination and collection functions by the Service. See, e. g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F. 2d, at 1350, 1351; United States v. Zack, 521 F. 2d, at 1368; United States v. Lafko, 520 F. 2d, at 625; United States v. McCarthy, 514 F. 2d, at 374-375; United States v. Theodore, 479 F. 2d 749, 753 (CA4 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F. 2d, at 459; United States v. Wall Corp., 154 U. S. App. D. C., at 311, 475 F. 2d, at 895. We recognize, of course, that examination of agent motive may be necessary to evaluate the good-faith factors of Powell, for example, to consider whether a summons was issued to harass a taxpayer. The dissent would abandon this aspect of the good-faith inquiry. It would permit the IRS to use the summons authority solely for criminal investigation. It reaches this conclusion because it says the Code contains no limitation to prevent such use. Its argument reveals a fundamental misunderstanding about the authority of the IRS. The Service does not enjoy inherent authority to summon production of the private papers of citizens. It may exercise only that authority granted by Congress. In § 7602 Congress has bestowed upon the Service the authority to summon production for four purposes only: for “ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax ... or collecting any such liability.” Congress therefore intended the summons authority to be used to aid the determination and collection of taxes. These purposes do not include the goal of filing criminal charges against citizens. Consequently, summons authority does not exist to aid criminal investigations solely. The error of the dissent is that it seeks a limit on the face of the statute when it should seek an affirmative grant of summons authority for purely criminal investigations. We have made that search and could uncover nothing in the Code or its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to permit exclusively criminal use of summonses. As a result, the IRS employs its authority in good faith when it pursues the four purposes of § 7602, which do not include aiding criminal investigations solely. To the limited extent that the institutional good faith of the Service with regard to criminal purpose may be questioned before any recommendation to the Department of Justice, our position on this issue necessarily rejects the Government's argument that prerecommendation enforcement of summonses must meet only the Powell elements of good faith. We have concluded that the Government’s contention fails to recognize the essence of the good-faith inquiry. The Powell elements were not intended as an exclusive statement about the meaning of good faith. They were examples of agency action not in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602. The dispositive question in each case, then, is whether the Service is pursuing the authorized purposes in good faith. These requirements are not intended to be exclusive. Future cases may well reveal the need to prevent other forms of agency abuse of congressional authority and judicial process. Respondents argue that the District Court made a factual finding when it concluded that the summonses were issued solely to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution. They then submit that the District Court’s decision may be overturned only if this Court holds this finding to be clearly erroneous. Several Courts of Appeals have discussed the factual and legal issues that lurk in summons enforcement proceedings. Compare United States v. Zack, 521 F. 2d, at 1367-1368; United States v. National State Bank, 454 F. 2d 1249, 1252 (CA7 1972); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F. 2d, at 773, with United States v. Weingarden, 473 F. 2d, at 460. Whether the issue of the Service’s good faith generally poses a factual question, or a legal and factual one, or a legal question, is not necessarily presented in the case now before the Court, and we do not reach it. The lower courts employed an incorrect legal standard to measure good faith when they limited their consideration to the personal motivation of Special Agent Olivero. In this case, then, a legal error compels reversal.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HAIG, SECRETARY OF STATE v. AGEE No. 80-83. Argued January 14, 1981 Decided June 29, 1981 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Blacnmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. BlacKmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 310. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 310. Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Daniel, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Andrew J. Levander, Leonard Schaitman, Michael F. Herts, and William T. Lake. Melvin L. Wulf argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Chief Justice Burgee delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether the President, acting through the Secretary of State, has authority to revoke a passport on the ground that the holder’s activities in foreign countries are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. I A Philip Agee, an American citizen, currently resides in West Germany. From 1957 to 1968, he was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. He held key positions in the division of the Agency that is responsible for covert intelligence gathering in foreign countries. In the course of his duties at the Agency, Agee received training in clandestine operations, including the methods used to protect the identities of intelligence employees and sources of the United States overseas. He served in undercover assignments abroad and came to know many Government employees and other persons supplying information to the United States. The relationships of many of these people to our Government are highly confidential; many are still engaged in intelligence gathering. In 1974, Agee called a press conference in London to announce his “campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating.” He declared his intent “to expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they are operating.” Since 1974, Agee has, by his own assertion, devoted consistent effort to that program, and he has traveled extensively in other countries in order to carry it out. To identify CIA personnel in a particular country, Agee goes to the target country and consults sources in local diplomatic circles whom he knows from his prior service in the United States Government. He recruits collaborators and trains them in clandestine techniques designed to expose the “cover” of CIA employees and sources. Agee and his collaborators have repeatedly and publicly identified individuals and organizations located in foreign countries as undercover CIA agents, employees, or sources. The record reveals that the identifications divulge classified information, violate Agee’s express contract not to make any public statements about Agency matters without prior clearance by the Agency, have prejudiced the ability of the United States to obtain intelligence, and have been followed by episodes of violence against the persons and organizations identified. In December 1979, the Secretary of State revoked Agee’s passport and delivered an explanatory notice to Agee in West Germany. The notice states in part: “The Department’s action is predicated upon a determination made by the Secretary under the provisions of [22 CPR] Section 51.70(b)(4) that your activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. The reasons for the Secretary’s determination are, in summary, as follows: Since the early 1970’s it has been your stated intention to conduct a continuous campaign to disrupt the intelligence operations of the United States. In carrying out that campaign you have travelled in various countries (including, among others, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Jamaica, Cuba, and Germany), and your activities in those countries have caused serious damage to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Your stated intention to continue such activities threatens additional damage of the same kind.” The notice also advised Agee of his right to an administrative hearing and offered to hold such a hearing in West Germany on 5 days’ notice. Agee at once filed suit against the Secretary. He alleged that the regulation invoked by the Secretary, 22 CFR § 51.70 (b)(4) (1980), has not been authorized by Congress and is invalid; that the regulation is impermissibly over-broad; that the revocation prior to a hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process; and that the revocation violated a Fifth Amendment liberty interest in a. right to travel and a First Amendment right to criticize Government policies. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and he moved for summary judgment on the question of the authority to promulgate the regulation and on the constitutional claims. For purposes of that motion, Agee conceded the Secretary’s factual averments and his claim that Agee’s activities were causing or were likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. The District Court held that the regulation exceeded the statutory powers of the Secretary under the Passport Act of 1926, 22 U. S. C. § 211a, granted summary judgment for Agee, and ordered the Secretary to restore his passport. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (DC 1980). B A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Agee v. Muskie, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 46, 629 F. 2d 80 (1980). It held that the Secretary was required to show that Congress had authorized the regulation either by an express delegation or by implied approval of a “substantial and consistent” administrative practice, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 12 (1965). The court found no express statutory authority for the revocation. It perceived only one other case of actual passport revocation under the regulation since it was promulgated and only five other instances prior to that in which passports were actually denied “even arguably for national security or foreign policy reasons.” 203 U. S. App. D. C., at 51-52, 629 F. 2d, at 85-86. The Court of Appeals took note of the Secretary’s reliance on “a series of statutes, regulations, proclamations, orders and advisory opinions dating back to 1856,” but declined to consider those authorities, reasoning that “the criterion for establishing congressional assent by inaction is the actual imposition of sanctions and not the mere assertion of power.” Id., at 52-53, 629 F. 2d, at 86-87. The Court of Appeals held that its was not sufficient that “Agee’s conduct may be considered by some to border on treason,” since “[w]e are bound by the law as we find it.” Id., at 53, 629 F. 2d, at 87. The court also regarded it as material that most of the Secretary’s authorities dealt with powers of the Executive Branch “during time of war or national emergency” or with respect to persons “engaged in criminal conduct.” Id., at 52, 629 F. 2d, at 86. We granted certiorari sub nom. Muskie v. Agee, 449 U. S. 818 (1980), and stayed the judgment of the Court of Appeals until our disposition of the case on the grant of certiorari. II The principal question before us is whether the statute authorizes the action of the Secretary pursuant to the policy announced by the challenged regulation. A 1 Although the historical background that we develop later is important, we begin with the language of the statute. See, e. g., Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 771 (1981); Zemel, supra, at 7-8. The Passport Act of 1926 provides in pertinent part: “The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of the United States . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports.” 22 U. S. C. § 211a (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This language is unchanged since its original enactment in 1926. The Passport Act does not in so many words confer upon the Secretary a power to revoke a passport. Nor, for that matter, does it expressly authorize denials of passport applications. Neither, however, does any statute expressly limit those powers. It is beyond dispute that the Secretary has the power to deny a passport for reasons not specified in the statutes. For example, in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958), the Court recognized congressional acquiescence in Executive policies of refusing passports to applicants “participating in illegal conduct, trying to escape the toils of the law, promoting passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct which would violate the laws of the United States.” Id., at 127. In Zemel, the Court held that “the weightiest considerations of national security” authorized the Secretary to restrict travel to Cuba at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. 381 U. S., at 16. Agee concedes that if the Secretary may deny a passport application for a certain reason, he may revoke a passport on the same ground. 2 Particularly in light of the “broad rule-making authority granted in the [1926] Act,” Zemel, 381 U. S., at 12, a consistent administrative construction of that statute must be followed by the courts “ ‘unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.’ ” E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U. S. 46, 55 (1977), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969); see Zemel, supra, at 11. This is especially so in the areas of foreign policy and national security, where congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disapproval. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936), the volatile nature of problems confronting the Executive in foreign policy and national defense was underscored: “In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. ... As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.’ ” Id., at 319. Applying these considerations to statutory construction, the Zemel Court observed: “[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature, Congress — in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs — must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.” 381 U. S., at 17 (emphasis supplied). Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952), the Court observed that matters relating “to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” Id., at 589; accord, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948). B 1 A passport is, in a sense, a letter of introduction in which the issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer and requests other sovereigns to aid the bearer. 3 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law §268, p. 499 (1942). Very early, the Court observed: “[A passport] is a document, which, from its nature and object, is addressed to foreign powers; purporting only to be a request, that the bearer of it may pass safely and freely; and is to be considered rather in the character of a political document, by which the bearer is recog-nised, in foreign countries, as an American citizen; and which, by usage and the law of nations, is received as evidence of the fact.” Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 9 Pet. 692, 698 (1835). With the enactment of travel control legislation making a passport generally a requirement for travel abroad, a passport took on certain added characteristics. Most important for present purposes, the only means by which an American can lawfully leave the country or return to it — absent a Presi-dentially granted exception — is with a passport. See 8 U. S. C. § 1185 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As a travel control document, a passport is both proof of identity and proof of allegiance to the United States. Even under a travel control statute, however, a passport remains in a sense a document by which the Government vouches for the bearer and for his copduct. <^The history of passport controls since the earliest days of the Republic shows congressional recognition of Executive authority to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and foreign policy)> Prior to 1856, when there was no statute on the subject, file common perception was that the issuance of a passport was committed to the sole discretion of the Executive and that the Executive would exercise this power in the interests of the national security and foreign policy of the United States. This derived from the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the Executive. From the outset, Congress endorsed not only the underlying premise of Executive authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security, but also its specific application to the subject of passports. Early Congresses enacted statutes expressly recognizing the Executive authority with respect to passports. The first Passport Act, adopted in 1856, provided that the Secretary of State “shall be authorized to grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States . . . .” § 23, 11 Stat. 60. This broad and permissive language worked no change in the power of the Executive to issue passports; nor was it intended to do so. The Act was passed to centralize passport authority in the Federal Government and specifically in the Secretary of State. In all other respects, the 1856 Act “merely confirmed an authority already possessed and exercised by the Secretary of State. This authority was ancillary to his broader authority to protect American citizens in foreign countries and was necessarily incident to his general authority to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States under the Chief Executive.” Senate Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization of the Passport Functions of the Department of State, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (Comm. Print 1960). The President and the Secretary of State consistently construed the 1856 Act to preserve their authority to- withhold passports on national security and foreign policy grounds. Thus, as an emergency measure in 1861, the Secretary issued orders prohibiting persons from going abroad or entering the country without passports; denying passports to citizens who were subject to military service unless they were bonded; and absolutely denying passports to persons “on errands hostile and injurious to the peace of the country and dangerous to the Union.” 3 J. Moore, A Digest of International Law 920 (1906); U. S. Dept, of State, The American Passport 49-54 (1898). An 1869 opinion of Attorney General Hoar held that the granting of a passport was not “obligatory in any case.” 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 89, 92. This was elaborated in 1901 in an opinion of Attorney General Knox, in which he stated: “Substantial reasons exist for the use by Congress of the word ‘may’ in connection with authority to issue passports. Circumstances are conceivable which would make it most inexpedient for the public interests for this country to grant a passport to a citizen of the United States.” 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 509, 511. In 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt promulgated a rule providing that “[t]he Secretary of State has the right in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport, and will exercise this right towards anyone who, he has reason to believe, desires a passport to further an unlawful or improper purpose.” Subsequent Executive Orders issued between 1907 and 1917 cast no doubt on this position. This policy was enforced in peacetime years to deny passports to citizens whose conduct abroad was “likely to embarrass the United States” or who .were “disturbing, or endeavoring to disturb, the relations of this country with the representatives of foreign countries.” By enactment of the first travel control statute in 1918, Congress made clear its expectation that the Executive would curtail or prevent international travel by American citizens if it was contrary to the national security. The legislative history reveals that the principal reason for the 1918 statute was fear that “renegade Americans” would travel abroad and engage in “transference of important military information” to persons not entitled to it. The 1918 statute left the power to make exceptions exclusively in the hands of the Executive, without articulating specific standards. Unless the Secretary had power to apply national security criteria in passport decisions, the purpose of the Travel Control Act would plainly have been frustrated. Against this background, and while the 1918 provisions were still in effect, Congress enacted the Passport Act of 1926. The legislative history of the statute is sparse. However, Congress used language which is identical in pertinent part to that in the 1856 statute {supra, at 294), as amended, and the legislative history clearly shows congressional awareness of the Executive policy. There is no evidence of any intent to repudiate the longstanding administrative construction. Absent such evidence, we conclude that Congress, in 1926, adopted the longstanding administrative construction of the 1856 statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). The Executive construed the 1926 Act to work no change in prior practice and specifically interpreted it to authorize denial of a passport on grounds of national security or foreign policy. Indeed, by an unbroken line of Executive Orders, regulations, instructions to consular officials, and notices to passport holders, the President and the Department of State left no doubt thatQikelihood of damage to national security or foreign policy of the United States was the single most important criterion in passport decisions^ The regulations are instructive. The 1952 version authorized denial of passports to citizens engaged in activities which would violate laws designed to protect the security of the United States “[i]n order to promote the national interest by assuring that the conduct of foreign relations shall be free from unlawful interference.” 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952). The 1956 amendment to this regulation provided that a passport should be denied to any person whose “activities abroad would: (a) Violate the laws of the United States; (b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations; or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” 22 CFR § 51.136 (1958). This regulation remained in effect continuously until 1966. This history of administrative construction was repeatedly communicated to Congress, not only by routine promulgation of Executive Orders and regulations, but also by specific presentations, including 1957 and 1966 reports by the Department of State explaining the 1956 regulation and a 1960 Senate Staff Report which concluded that “the authority to issue or withhold passports has, by precedent and law, been vested in the Secretary of State as a part of his responsibility to protect American citizens traveling abroad, and what he considered to be the best interests of the Nation.” In 1966, the Secretary of State promulgated the regulations at issue in this case. 22 CFR §§ 51.70 (b) (4), 51.71 (a) (1980). Closely paralleling the 1956 regulation, these provisions authorize revocation of a passport where “[t]he Secretary determines that the national’s activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States.” 2 Zemel recognized that congressional acquiescence may sometimes be found from nothing more than silence in the face of an administrative policy. 381 U. S., at 11; see Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 313 (1933); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341, 345 (1932). Here, however, the inference of congressional approval “is supported by more than mere congressional inaction.” Zemel, 381 U. S., at 11-12. Twelve years after the promulgation of the regulations at issue and 22 years after promulgation of the similar 1956 regulation, Congress enacted the statute making it unlawful to travel abroad without a passport even in peacetime. 8 U. S. C. § 1185 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Simultaneously, Congress amended the Passport Act of 1926 to provide that “[ujnless authorized by law,” in the absence of war, armed hostilities, or imminent danger to travelers, a passport may not be geographically restricted. Title 8 U. S. C. § 1185 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) must be read in pari materia with the Passport Act. Zemel, supra, at 11-12; see 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 51.03, p. 299 (4th ed. 1973); cf. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U. S. 239, 243-244 (1972). The 1978 amendments are weighty evidence of congressional approval of the Secretary’s interpretation, particularly that in the 1966 regulations. Despite the longstanding and officially promulgated view that the Executive had the power to withhold passports for reasons of national security and foreign policy, Congress in 1978, “though it once again enacted legislation relating to passports, left completely untouched the broad rule-making authority granted in the earlier Act.” Zemel, supra, at 12; accord, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 274-275 (1974). 3 Agee argues that the only way the Executive can establish implicit congressional approval is by proof of longstanding and consistent enforcement of the claimed power: that is, by showing that many passports were revoked on national security and foreign policy grounds. For this proposition, he xelies on Kent, 357 U. S., at 127-128. A necessary premise for Agee’s contention is that there were frequent occasions for revocation and that the claimed Executive power was exercised in only a few of those cases. However^Cjtf there were no occasions — or few — to call the Secretary’s authority into play, the absence of frequent instances of enforcement is wholly irrelevant^ The exercise of a power emerges only in relation to a factual situation, and the continued validity of the power is not diluted simply because there is no need to use it. The history is clear that there have been few^situations involving substantial likelihood of serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the United States as a result of a passport holder’s activities abroad, and that in the cases which have arisen, the Secretary has consistently^ exercised his power to withhold passports. Perhaps the most notable example of enforcement of the administrative policy, which surely could not have escaped the attention of Congress, was the 1948 denial of a passport to a Member of Congress who sought to go abroad to support a movement in Greece to overthrow the existing government. Another example was the 1954 revocation of a passport held by a man who was supplying arms to groups abroad whose interests were contrary to positions taken by the United States. In 1970, the Secretary revoked passports of two persons who sought to travel to the site of an international airplane hijacking. See also Note, 61 Yale L. J. 170, 174-176 (1952). The Secretary has construed and applied his regulations consistently, and it would be anomalous to fault the Government because there were so few occasions to exercise the announced policy and practice. Although a pattern of actual enforcement is one indicator of Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive has “openly asserted” the power at issue. Zemel, 381 U. S., at 9; see id., at 10. Kent is not to the contrary. There, it was shown that the claimed governmental policy had not been enforced consistently. The Court stressed that “as respects Communists these are scattered rulings and not consistently of one pattern.” 357 U. S., at 128. In other words, the Executive had allowed passports to some Communists, but sought to deny one to Kent. The Court had serious doubts as to whether there was in reality any definite policy in which Congress could have acquiesced. Here, by contrast, there is no basis for a claim that the Executive has failed to enforce the policy against others engaged in conduct likely to cause serious damage to our national security or foreign policy. It would turn Kent on its head to say that simply because we have had only a few situations involving conduct such as that in this record, the Executive lacks the authority to deal with the problem when it is encountered. Agee also contends that the statements of Executive policy are entitled to diminished weight because many of them concern the powers of the Executive in wartime. However, the statute provides no support for this argument. History eloquently attests that grave problems of national security and foreign policy are by no means limited to times of formally declared war. 4 Relying on the statement of the Court in Kent that “illegal conduct” and problems of allegiance were, “so far as relevant here, . . . the only [grounds] which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice,” id., at 127-128, Agee argues that this enumeration was exclusive and is controlling here. This is not correct. The Kent Court had no occasion to consider whether the Executive had the power ,jfco revoke the passport of an individual whoseyQonduct is damaging the national security and foreign policy of the United States':'-.Went involved denials of passports solely on the basis of political beliefs entitled to First Amendment protection. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964). Although finding it unnecessary to reach the merits of that constitutional problem, the Kent Court emphasized the fact that “[w]e deal with beliefs, with associations, with ideological matters.” 357 U. S., at 130 (emphasis supplied). In particular, the Court noted that the applicants were “being denied their freedom of movement solely because of their refusal to be subjected to inquiry into their beliefs and associations. They do not seek to escape the law nor to violate it. They may or may not be Communists. But assuming they are, the only law which Congress has passed expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across our borders has not yet become effective. It would therefore be strange to infer that pending the effectiveness of that law, the Secretary has been silently granted by Congress the larger, the more pervasive power to curtail in his discretion the free movement of citizens in order to satisfy himself about their beliefs or associations.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The protection accorded beliefs standing alone is very different from the protection accorded conduct. Thus, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, supra, the Court held that a statute which, like the policy at issue in Kent, denied passports to Communists solely on the basis of political beliefs unconstitutionally “establishes an irrebuttable presumption that individuals who are members of the specified organizations will, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to the security of the United States.” 378 U. S., at 511. The Court recognized that the legitimacy of the objective of safeguarding our national security is “obvious and unarguable.” Id., at 509. The Court explained that the statute at issue was not the least restrictive alternative available: “The prohibition against travel is supported only by a tenuous relationship between the bare fact of organizational membership and the activity Congress sought to proscribe.” Id., at 514. Beliefs and speech are only part of Agee’s “campaign to fight the United States CIA.” In that sense, this case contrasts markedly with the facts in Kent and Aptheker, No presumptions, rebuttable or otherwise, are involved, for Agee’s conduct in foreign countries presents a serious danger to American officials abroad and serious danger to the national security. We hold that the policy announced in the challenged regulations is “sufficiently substantial and consistent” to compel the conclusion that Congress has approved it. See Zemel, 381 U. S., at 12. Ill Agee also attacks the Secretary’s action on three constitutional grounds: first, that the revocation of his passport im-permissibly burdens his freedom to travel; second, that the action was intended to penalize his exercise of free speech and deter his criticism of Government policies and practices; and third, that failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing-violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. In light of the express language of the passport regulations, which permits their application only in cases involving likelihood of “serious damage” to national security or foreign policy, these claims are without merit. Revocation of a passport undeniably curtails travel, but the freedom to travel abroad with a “letter of introduction” in the form of a passport issued by the sovereign is subordinate to national security and foreign policy considerations; as such, it is subject to reasonable governmental regulation. The Court has made it plain that the freedom to travel outside the United States must be distinguished from the right to travel within ’the United States. This was underscored in Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U. S. 170, 176 (1978): “Aznavorian urges that the freedom of international travel is basically equivalent to the constitutional right to interstate travel, recognized by this Court for over 100 years. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (Taney, C. J., dissenting). But this Court has often pointed out the crucial difference between the freedom to travel internationally and the right of interstate travel. “ 'The constitutional right of interstate travel is virtually unqualified, United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757-758 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 105-106 (1971). By contrast the “right” of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As such this “right,” the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process.’ (Citations omitted.) Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, 4 n. 6.” It is “obvious and unarguable” that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S., at 509; accord Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536, 546 (1956); see Zemel, supra, at 13-17. Protection of the foreign policy of the United States is a governmental interest of great importance, since foreign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be compartmentalized. Measures to protect the secrecy of our Government’s foreign intelligence operations plainly serve these interests. Thus, in Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980), we held that “[t]he Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.” See also id., at 511-513. The Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. properly emphasized: “[The President] has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.” 299 U. S., at 320. Accord, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U. S., at 111; The Federalist No. 64, pp. 392-393 (Mentor ed. 1961). Not only has Agee jeopardized the security of the United States, but he has also endangered the interests of countries other than the United States — thereby creating serious problems for American foreign relations and foreign policy. Restricting Agee’s foreign travel, although perhaps not certain to prevent all of Agee’s harmful activities, is the only avenue open to the Government to limit these activities. Assuming, arguendo, that First Amendment protections reach beyond our national boundaries, Agee’s First Amendment claim has no foundation. The revocation of Agee’s passport rests in part on the content of his speech: specifically, his repeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of intelligence personnel. Long ago, however, this Court recognized that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.” Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931), citing Z. Chafee, Freedom of Speech 10 (1920). Agee’s disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution. The mere fact that Agee is also engaged in criticism of the Government does not render his conduct beyond the reach of the law. To the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, “it is an inhibition of action,” rather than of speech. Zemel, 381 U. S., at 16-17 (emphasis supplied). Agee is as free to criticize the United States Government as he was when he held a passport — always subject, of course, to express limits on certain rights by virtue of his contract with the Government. See Snepp v. United States, supra. On this record, the Government is not required to hold a prerevocation hearing. In Cole v. Young, supra, we held that federal employees who hold “sensitive” positions “where they could bring about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation’s security” may be suspended without a presuspension hearing. 351 U. S., at 546-547. For the same reasons, when there is a substantial likelihood of “serious damage” to national security or foreign policy as a result of a passport holder’s activities in foreign countries, the. Government may take action to ensure that the holder may not exploit the sponsorship of his travels by the United States. “[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 160 (1963). The Constitution’s due process guarantees call for no more than what has been accorded here: a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a prompt postrevocation hearing. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Agee has been deported from Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe 286-300 (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978). The 1974 London statement was as follows: “Today, I announced a new campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating. This campaign will have two main functions: First, to expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they are operating; secondly, to seek within the United States to have the CIA abolished. “The effort to identify CIA people in foreign countries has been going on for some time. . . . (Today’s) list was compiled by a small group of Mexican comrades whom I trained to follow the comings and goings of CIA people before I left Mexico City. “Similar lists of CIA people in other countries are already being compiled and will be announced when appropriate. We invite participation in this campaign from all those who strive for social justice and national dignity.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a. See also P. Agee, Exposing the CIA, App. in No. 80-1125 (CADC), pp. 76-79 (hereinafter CA App.). In a series of incidents between 1974 and 1978, and in two books published in the same period, Agee has identified hundreds of persons as CIA personnel. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a-111a; see generally P. Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (1975); Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe 17-43 (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds.-1978), CA App. 66-79. See also P. Agee, Introduction, in Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa (E. Ray, W. Schapp, K. Van Meter, & L. Wolf eds. 1979). The latter two books contain “Who’s Where” sections listing the names of alleged CIA employees on a country-by-country basis and “Who’s Who” sections containing detailed biographical information on all such persons. See Affidavits of CIA Deputy Director for Operations, App. to Pet. for Cert. 112a, 114a; see also n. 5, infra. As a- condition for his employment by the Agency, Agee contracted that “[i]n consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or to participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific prior approval by the Agency.” CA App. 65. This language is identical to the clause which we construed in Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 508 (1980). In a separate lawsuit wherein the Government sought to enforce Agee’s agreement, the District Court held that “Agee has shown a flagrant disregard for the requirements of the Secrecy Agreement.” The court noted: “There is no dispute that Agee has openly flouted his refusal to submit writings and speeches to the CIA for prior approval, and has expressed a clear intention to reveal classified information and bring harm to the agency and its personnel.” Agee v. Centred Intelligence Agency, 500 F. Supp. 506, 509 (DC 1980) (footnote omitted). Affidavit of CIA Deputy Director for Operations, App. to Pet. for Cert. 112a. In December 1975, Richard Welch was murdered in Greece after the publication of an article in an English-language newspaper in Athens naming Welch as CIA Chief of Station. CA App. 92. In July 1980, two days after a Jamaica press conference at which Agee’s principal collaborator identified Richard Kinsman as CIA Chief of Station in Jamaica, Kinsman’s house was strafed with automatic gunfire. Four days after the same press conference, three men approached the Jamacia home of another man similarly identified as an Agency officer. Police challenged the men and gunfire was exchanged. Affidavit of United States Ambassador to Jamaica, App. to Pet. for Cert. 125a-127a. In January 1981, two American officials of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, previously identified as a CIA front by Agee and discussed extensively in Agee’s book Inside the Company: CIA Diary, were assassinated in El Salvador. N. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1981, p. A10, cols. A-5; id., Jan. 5, 1981, p. Al, col. 6, p. A10, cols. 3-6. The Secretary does not assert that Agee has specifically incited anyone to commit murder. However, affidavits of the CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations set out and support his judgment that Agee’s purported identifications are “thinly-veiled invitations to violence,” that “Agee’s actions could, in today’s circumstances, result in someone’s death,” and that Agee’s conduct has “markedly increased the likelihood of individuals so identified being the victims of violence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 111a, 116a-118a. One of those affidavits also shows that the ultimate effectiveness of Agee’s program depends on activities of hostile foreign groups, and that such groups can be expected to engage in physical surveillance, harassment, kidnaping, and, in extreme cases, murder of United States officials abroad. Id., at 116a-117a, Id., at 120a. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals suggested that the immediate impetus for the passport revocation may have been that Agee’s activities took on special significance in light of the crisis following the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (DC 1980); Agee v. Muskie, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 46, 47, 629 F. 2d 80, 81 (1980). The captors held more than 50 United States citizens, many of whom were diplomats and some of whom the captors alleged to be CIA agents. Government affidavits show that Agee made contact with the captors, urged them to demand certain CIA documents, and offered to travel to Iran to analyze the documents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a; N. Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1979, p. 6, col. 5. A Government affidavit also mentions, but does not vouch for the accuracy of, an earlier report that Agee had been invited to travel to Iran in order to participate in a “Revolutionary Tribunal” to pass judgment on those hostages. App. to Pet. for Cert. 116a-117a. See 22 CFR §§ 51.80-51.89 (1980). Agee made no effort to exhaust administrative remedies. The Secretary initially defended on this ground. Tr. 5-6 (Jan. 3, 1980). However, after Agee conceded that his activities are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security (see n. 11, infra), the Secretary did not continue to rely on failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Tr. 17 (Jan. 3, 1980). Agee’s counsel certified that “[t]here aren’t any factual disputes in the ease” and stated that for the purposes of the motion “I would concede any charge [the Government] want[s] to make against him.” Id., at 2, 13. See also Secretary’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, CA App. 35. The Secretary made clear that the Government’s affidavits were “an effort to establish the kinds of things which would have been established through the administrative process if Mr. Agee had proceeded in that direction . . . .” Tr. 8 (Jan. 29, 1980). 483 F. Supp., at 730. This statute is set out infra, at 290. On November 14, 1979, in response to the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran (n. 8, supra), President Carter declared a national emergency. Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457 (1980). The President’s Order contains an express finding, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U. S. C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 ed,, Supp. III), “that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States.” The Secretary has never relied upon that Order to justify the passport revocation in the present case. General restrictions on travel to Iran under American passports apparently did not go into effect until several months after Agee’s passport was revoked. See Exec. Order No. 12211, 3 CFR 253 (1980). Accordingly, our decision in this case does not depend on the declaration of national emergency. The Court of Appeals stressed that Agee had not been indicted. In dicta, the court expressed approval of 22 CFR § 51.70 (a) (1) (1980), which provides for withholding of a passport if the applicant is the subject of an outstanding federal felony warrant. 203 U. S. App. D. C., at 53, n. 10, 629 F. 2d, at 87, n. 10, citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 127-128 (1958). The Secretary represents that Agee’s passport has been canceled and that the Secretary has provided Agee with identification papers permitting him to return to the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11. The regulations at issue contain an exception for “direct return to the UnRed States.” 22 CFR §51.70 (a) (1980). In light of our decision on this issue, we have no occasion in this case to determine the scope of “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations — a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.” See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-320 (1936). In fact, the pertinent language has not been changed since 1874. See n. 26, infra. The sole amendment to the 1926 provision, enacted in 1978, limits the power of the Executive to impose geographic restrictions on the use of United States passports in the absence of war, armed hostilities, or imminent danger to travelers. See infra, at 300, and n. 48. However, by statute originally enacted in 1856, passports may not be issued to persons who do not owe allegiance to the United States. 22 U. S. C. §212; Kent, supra, at 127. This provision in no way diminishes the Secretary’s discretion as to eligible persons. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. That has been the Secretary’s consistent construction of the statute. See 22 CFE, § 51.71 (a) (1980), which provides, inter alia, that the grounds for denying passports set out in § 51.70 are also grounds for revoking, restricting, or limiting passports. This case does not involve a criminal prosecution; accordingly, strict construction against the Government is not required. With exceptions during the War of 1812 and the Civil War, see infra, at 294, n. 25, and 295, passports were not mandatory until 1918. See infra, at 296-297. It was not until 1978 that passports were required by statute in nonemergency peacetime. See n. 47, infra. In Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 9 Pet. 692, 699 (1835), the Court observed: “There is no law of the United States, in any manner regulating the issuing of passports, or directing upon what evidence it may be done, or declaring their legal effect. It is understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of citizenship is required, by the Secretary of State, before issuing a passport. This, however, is entirely discretionary with him.” See, e. g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 320-321; The Federalist No. 64, pp. 392-396 (Mentor ed. 1961). For example, the Act of Feb. 26, 1803, ch. 9, § 8, 2 Stat. 205, prohibited State Department representatives abroad from knowingly issuing passports to aliens, and the Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 10, 3 Stat. 199, prohibited travel to or from enemy territory "without a passport first obtained from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, or other officer . . . authorized by the President of the United States, to grant the same.” An 1874 amendment replaced the phrase “shall be authorized to” with “may.” Rev. Stat. § 4075. We are aware of no legislative history pertinent to that change. To the extent that amendment is relevant, it supports the Secretary’s position in this ease; “may” expressly recognizes substantial discretion. See 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 509, 511 (1901). The main impetus for the 1856 statute was the confusion caused by state and local officials issuing passports, a relic of the colonial period. See U. S. Dept, of State, The American Passport 36-42 (1898). Senator Mason, sponsor of the bill that became the 1856 statute, stated: “[I]t was the intention of the bill to leave, all that pertains to th§ diplomatic service of the country . . . exclusively to the Executive, where we consider the Constitution has placed it.” Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 1798 (1856). Despite this widely publicized Executive policy restricting passport eligibility on national security grounds, the only congressional action arguably in response to it was a statute in 1866 which re-enacted an 1856 prohibition against issuing passports to noncitizens. Act of May 30, 1866, ch. 102, 14 Stat. 54. Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports in the United States, Sept. 12, 1903, § 16, quoted in 3 J. Moore, A Digest of International Law 902 (1906). See Exec. Order No. 654 (1907); Exec. Order No. 2119-A (1915); Exec. Order No. 2362-A (1916); Exec. Order No. 2519-A (1917). 3 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 268, pp. 498-499 (1942), discussing refusal of a passport to an American citizen residing in China whose promotion of “gambling and immoral houses” had developed into a scandal. 2 Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States — 1907, p. 1082, discussing refusal of a passport to an American citizen residing in Egypt who was slandering foreign diplomats. Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 559. This statute provided in pertinent part that, upon Presidential wartime proclamation, “it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States unless he bears a valid passport.” Unlike the 1815 statute, n. 25, supra, which was limited in application to the then-current hostilities, the 1918 Act applied “when the United States is at war” and the President issued a proclamation. § 1, 40 Stat. 559. H. R. Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1918). Congress focused on the ease of “a United States citizen who recently returned from Europe after having, to the knowledge of our Government, done work in a neutral country for the German Government. There was strong suspicion that he came to the United States for no proper purpose. Nevertheless not only was it impossible to exclude him but it would now be impossible to prevent him from leaving the country if he saw fit to do so. The known facts in his case are not sufficient to warrant the institution of a criminal prosecution, and in any event the difficulty of securing legal evidence from the place of his activities in Europe may easily be imagined.” Id., at 3. See n. 26, supra. See Validity of Passports: Hearings on H. R. 11947 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 5, 8, 10-11 (1926) (1926 Hearings). Besides incorporating the 1856 provision, the 1926 Act added other provisions concerning fees and maximum terms for passports. See id., at 2. Assistant Secretary of State Carr, whom the House Committee regarded as “more familiar than anyone else with the entire subject,” explained that the only change in existing law worked by the pertinent section of the 1926 Act was to recognize authority of the Secretary of State to empower consuls, in addition to diplomatic officers, to issue passports in foreign countries. Id., at 1, 11. See Exec. Order No. 4800 (1928); Exec. Order No. 5860 (1932); Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681 (1938). See 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, 6069-6070, 6349 (1941); 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952); 22 CFR § 51.136 (1958). See, e. g., U. S. Dept, of State, Abstract of Passport Laws and Precedents, Passport Office Instructions, Code No. 7.21 (Nov. 1, 1955), excluding “[p]ersons whose travel would ... be inimical to the best interests of the United States,” and “[p]ersons whose travel would endanger the security of the United States.” From 1948 to 1955, the Department notified all bearers of passports that “interfere[nce] in the political affairs of foreign countries” would be taken as a ground for refusing passports and for refusing protection. U. S. Dept, of State, Information for Bearers of Passports (Jan. 1, 1948, through Jan. 15, 1955, eds.). See Hearing on Right to Travel before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, pp. 59-61 (1957); Proposed Travel Controls, Hearings on S. 3243 before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 72 (1966). Senate Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization of the Passport Functions of the Department of State, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (Comm. Print 1960). Pursuant to the general delegation statute, 3 U. S. C. § 301, the power of the President to prescribe passport regulations has been delegated to the Secretary. Exec. Order No. 11295, 3 CFR 570 (1966-1970 Comp.). Section 51.70 (b) (4) authorizes denial of a passport for this reason. Section.51.71 (a), setting out grounds for revoking, restricting, or limiting passports, incorporates § 51.70 by reference. There have been no pertinent changes in these regulations since 1966. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, §707 (b), 92 Stat. 993. This statute provides: “Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.” This provision amended §215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U. S. C. § 1185. Under the 1952 version, passports were required only in wartime or when the President had declared an emergency. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, § 124, 92 Stat. 971, 22 U. S. C. § 211a (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This amendment added the following language to the Passport Act: “Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for travel to or for use in any country other than a country with which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of United States travellers.” The statute provides that the purpose of this amendment is “achieving greater United States compliance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975).” 92 Stat. 971. See also S. Rep. No. 94-1168, pp. 32-33 (1976). Indeed, the inference of congressional approval is stronger here than in Zemel, where the Court relied on amendments to the Travel Control Act. 381 U. S., at 11-12. Here, the amendment was to the Passport Act itself. Congress is therefore presumed to have adopted the administrative construction. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978). The Court of Appeals accepted this argument. See 203 U. S. App. D. C., at 53, 629 F. 2d, at 87, quoted supra, at 288. See N. Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1948, p. E9. Brief for Petitioner 39; see Developments in the Law — The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1150-1151, n. 76 (1972). See Sirhan v. Rogers, No. 70 Civ. 3965 (SDNY, Sept. 11, 1970), appeal dism’d, No. 35364 (CA2, Sept. 11, 1970) (denying plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief). Congress considered, but did not enact, proposals to spell out passport standards in the 1926 Act. See 1926 Hearings, at 4-5. Congress itself has from time to time deemed it necessary to enact peacetime passport restrictions, and those measures recognize considerable discretion in the Executive. E. g., Act of Oct. 7, 1978 (n. 47, supra); Act of May 30, 1866 (nn. 19, 29, supra). The same is true of Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 144 (1958), the companion case to Kent. In Dayton, the Secretary refused to issue a passport to a physicist who sought to go to India to engage in experimental research. The Secretary relied on the applicant’s “ ‘connection with the Science for Victory Committee and his association at that time with various communists,’ ” and on his “ ‘association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring and his alleged presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material obtained for the use of a foreign government.’ ” Id., at 146. Although reserving the question of “[w]hether there are undisclosed grounds adequate to sustain the Secretary’s action,” this Court held that the Secretary’s “Decision and Findings” showed “only a denial of a passport for reasons which we have today held to be impermissible,” citing Kent. 357 U. S.,' at 150. The “Decision and Findings,” set out in the Appendix to the Court’s opinion, id., at 150-154, does not cite a single instance of Dayton’s conduct, as distinguished from mere support for “the Communist movement” or association with known Communists. See supra, at 283-287, and nn. 1-8. Agee’s deportation from Great Britain was expressly grounded, inter alia, on Agee’s “disseminating information harmful to the security of the United Kingdom,” and his “aid[ing] and counseling] others in obtaining for publication information which could be harmful to the security of the United Kingdom.” P. Agee & L. Wolf, supra n. 1, at 289. Agee argues that the Government should be limited to an injunction ordering him to comply with his secrecy agreement. Tr, of Oral Arg. 36-39. This argument ignores the governmental interests at stake. As Agee concedes, such an injunction would not be enforceable outside of the United States. Id., at 39. The District Court held that_sinee_ Agee’s conduct falls within the core of the regulation, Agee lackjstanding Jo contend that the regulation is vague and overbroad. Tr. 11 — 12 (Jan. 3, 1980). We agree. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 755-756 (1974). In any event, there is no basis for a claim that the regulation is being used as a subterfuge to punish criticism of the Government. As evidenced in this case, the Government’s interpretation of the terms “serious damage” and “national security” shows proper regard for constitutional rights and is precisely in accord with our holdings on the subject. E. g., Cole v. Young, 351 U. S. 536 (1956). Nor is there any basis for a claim of discriminatory enforcement. The Government is entitled to concentrate its scarce legal resources on cases involving the most serious damage to national security and foreign policy. We do not decide that these procedures are constitutionally required.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HARRISON, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. v. PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. No. 78-1918. Argued January 16, 1980 Decided May 27, 1980 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAn, White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 594. BlackmuN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 595. Rehnquist, J., post, p. 595, and Stevens, J., post, p. 602, filed dissenting opinions. Maryann Walsh argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, William Alsup, Jacques B. Gelin, and Michele B. Corash. Charles F. Lettow argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were V. Peter Wynne, Jr., Oliver P. Stock-well, and Gene W. Lafitte. Me. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 307 (b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (Act) provides for direct review in a federal court of appeals of certain locally and regionally applicable actions taken by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under specifically enumerated provisions of the Act, and of “any other final action of the Administrator under '[the] Act . . . which is locally or regionally applicable.” (Emphasis added.) The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was correct in concluding that it was without jurisdiction under §307 (b)(1) to entertain a petition for review in which PPG Industries, Inc. (PPG), and Conoco, Inc. (Conoco), the respondents here, challenged a decision of the Administrator concerning the applicability of EPA’s “new source” performance standards to a power generating facility operated by PPG. More specifically, we must decide whether the Administrator’s decision falls within the ambit of “any other final action” reviewable in a court of appeals under § 307 (b)(1). I The dispute underlying this jurisdictional question involves a decision of the Administrator under § 111 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7411 (1976 ed., Supp. II). That provision requires the Administrator to publish, and from time to time to revise, a list of categories of any stationary source that he determines “causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” § 111 (b)(1)(A), and to promulgate regulations establishing standards of performance for “new sources” within the list of those categories, § 111 (b)(1) (B). The Act defines a “new source” as “any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.” § 111 (a)(2). In 1971, the Administrator included “fossil fuel-fired steam generators” in his list of stationary sources. 36 Fed. Reg. 5931. Later that year, pursuant to his mandate to promulgate “new source” performance standards, the Administrator established certain emission limits for any “fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit” of more than 250 million Btu’s per hour heat input, the construction or modification of which was commenced after August 17, 1971, the date on which the standards were proposed. 40 CFR §§ 60.1-60.15, 60.40-60.46 (1979). These “new source” regulations define the term, “fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit,” § 60.41 (a), and also create a procedure under which the Administrator, upon request, will determine whether any action taken or planned by the owner or operator of a facility constitutes or will constitute “construction” or “modification” of the facility for purposes of triggering the applicability of the performance standards. § 60.5. Sometime in 1970, the respondent PPG, a chemical manufacturing corporation, began the planning and preliminary construction of a new power generating facility at its plant in Lake Charles, La. That facility, designed to take advantage of fuel-efficient “cogeneration” technology, was to consist of two gas turbine generators, two “waste-heat” boilers, and a turbogenerator. The dispute between EPA and PPG concerns the applicability of the “new source” performance standards to the waste-heat boilers of this facility. This controversy first arose in 1975, when the respondent Conoco, PPG’s fuel supplier, informed EPA that Conoco was switching the supply of fuel to the Lake Charles facility from natural gas to fuel oil. An exchange of correspondence ensued, initiated by EPA’s request that PPG submit additional information bearing on whether the waste-heat boilers were covered by the “new source” standards. PPG’s submissions revealed that although assembly of the waste-heat boilers had not begun until 1976, the new power facility itself, of which the boilers were an integral component, had been originally designed and partially ordered in 1970, a year before the proposed date of the “new source” performance standards. On the basis of PPG’s submissions, the Regional Director for Enforcement of the EPA notified PPG of his conclusion that the boilers were subject to the “new source” standards, since construction of the boilers themselves had not begun until long after January 14, 1971, the date on which the standards had been proposed. In response, PPG took the position that the boilers were part of an integrated unit, the construction of which had begun in 1970, before the proposed date of the standards. The Regional Director, nevertheless, reaffirmed his initial decision. Pursuant to the procedure outlined in the “new source” regulations, 40 CFR § 60.5 (1979), PPG then submitted a formal request for an EPA determination that (1) the “new source” standards for “fossil fuel-fired steam generators” do not apply to the type of boilers in question, and (2) in any event, since construction of the facility of which the boilers were a part began before the date on which the standards were proposed, the boilers were not “new sources” and thus not- subject to the performance standards. In the event that EPA determined that PPG’s waste-heat boilers were subject to the standards, PPG also requested a clarification as to how those standards would apply. Responding to PPG’s request, the Regional Administrator notified PPG by letter that he had concluded that the waste-heat boilers were, indeed, subject to the “new source” standards for “fossil fuel-fired steam generators,” and rejected PPG’s argument that construction of the boilers had begun with the construction of other facets of the Lake Charles facility. Thus, the Regional Administrator affirmed the previous EPA determination that the waste-heat boilers were subject to the “new source” performance standards. With regard to the manner in which those standards were to apply to the waste-heat boilers, the Regional Administrator indicated that since PPG’s gas turbine generators were not subject to the “new source” standards, PPG would be held accountable only for those emissions from the waste-heat boilers attributable to the combustion of fossil fuel, not those emissions attributable to waste heat from the gas turbine generators. PPG then filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking review of EPA’s decision concerning the applicability of the “new source” standards to its waste-heat boilers. Because of its uncertainty regarding the proper forum for judicial review, PPG also filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Administrator in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. That suit has been stayed pending the disposition of the present case. PPG’s uncertainty, and the issue in this case, stem from conflicting views as to the proper interpretation of § 307 (b) (1) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Before 1977, §307 (b)(1) provided for exclusive review in an appropriate court of appeals of certain locally or regionally applicable actions of the Administrator under several specifically enumerated provisions of the Act. Actions of the Administrator under provisions not specifically enumerated in §307 (b)(1) were reviewable only in a district court under its federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Congress expanded the ambit of § 307 (b)(1) in 1977. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776, added to the list of locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable exclusively in the appropriate court of appeals both (1) actions of the Administrator under another specifically enumerated provision of the Act, and (2) “any other final action of the Administrator under [the] Act which is locally or regionally applicable.” (Emphasis added.) Later in 1977, in enacting the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, Pub. L. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1404, Congress added several more provisions to those listed in § 307 (b)(1) under which a locally or regionally applicable action of the Administrator is reviewable in the appropriate court of appeals. It was under §307 (b)(1), as amended, that PPG filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Despite having filed its petition there, PPG, and Conoco as intervenor, argued that that court was without jurisdiction, since the Administrator’s decision was not an action taken under one of the provisions specifically enumerated in § 307 (b) (1), and could not be properly characterized as “any other final action of the Administrator.” The latter phrase, they argued, referred only to other locally or regionally applicable final actions under the provisions of the Act specifically enumerated in § 307 (b)(1). In response, EPA argued that the phrase, “any other final action,” should be read literally to mean any final action of the Administrator. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Administrator’s decision did not fall within the meaning of “any other final action” under §307 (b)(1). 587 F. 2d 237. It was the court’s view that “[i]f Congress intended ... to cast the entire responsibility for reviewing all EPA action under the Act into the courts of appeals, the numeration of specific sections would appear to be redundant.” Id., at 243. The “most revealing” aspect of the legislative history of § 307 (b)(1), the court thought, was the complete absence of any discussion of such a “massive shift” in jurisdiction. Moreover, the court found it unlikely that Congress could have intended a shift of jurisdiction that would require the courts of appeals to review decisions of the Administrator that simply applied or interpreted his regulations, as in this case. Such a decision, the court noted, is often based on a “skeletal record” that may leave the reviewing court unable to perform meaningful judicial review. Since an appellate court is ill-suited to augment such a record, especially when compared to a trial court in which the tools of discovery are available, the court concluded that “[w]hatever addition to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals Congress may have contemplated by adding the ‘any other final action’ language to § 307 (b)(1), we assume that section was drafted with the mechanical limitations of the courts of appeals in mind.” 587 F. 2d, at 245. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed PPG’s petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 307 (b)(1). We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 823, because of the importance of determining the locus of judicial review of the actions of EPA. II It is undisputed that the Administrator’s decision concerning the applicability of the “new source” performance standards to PPG’s waste-heat boilers was locally applicable action under a provision of the Act not specifically enumerated in § 307 (b)(1). The question at issue is whether the Administrator’s decision falls within the scope of the phrase, “any other final action of the Administrator,” so as to make that decision reviewable in a federal court of appeals under § 307 (b)(1). At the outset, we note that the parties are in agreement that the Administrator’s decision was “final action” as that term is understood in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act and other provisions of federal law. It is undisputed that the Administrator’s ruling represented EPA’s final determination concerning the applicability of the “new source” standards to PPG’s power facility. Short of an enforcement action, EPA has rendered its last word on the matter. The controversy thus is not about whether' the Administrator’s decision was “final,” but rather about whether it was “any other final action” within the meaning of § 307 (b)(1), as amended in 1977. A The petitioners argue that the phrase, “any other final action,” should be construed in accordance with its literal meaning so as to reach any action of the Administrator under the Act that is “final” and not taken under a specifically enumerated provision in §307 (b)(1). The respondents argue that the statutory language 'should be construed more narrowly. Relying on the familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis, they assert that the phrase, “any other final action,” should be read not to reach all final actions of the Administrator, but rather only those similar to the actions under the specifically enumerated provisions that precede that catchall phrase in the statute. The similarity that the respondents discern among the actions under the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307 (b)(1) is that those actions must be based on what the respondents refer to as “a contemporaneously compiled administrative record,” by which they mean a record “based on administrative proceedings reflecting at least notice and opportunity for hearing.” Since the Administrator’s informal decision in this case was not based on such a record, the respondents argue that his decision was not “other final action” within the meaning of §307 (b)(1) and thus not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The respondents’ reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis is, we think, misplaced in two respects. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are read as applying only to other items akin to those specifically enumerated. Applying this rule to § 307 (b)(1), the respondents argue that “any other final action” must refer only to final actions based on an administrative record reflecting at least notice and opportunity for a hearing. The flaw in this argument is that at least one of the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307 (b)(1), namely, § 112 (c) of the Act, 42 TJ. S. C. § 7412 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. II), does not require the Administrator to act only after notice and opportunity for a hearing. In fact, the respondents themselves recognize that an action by the Administrator under § 112 (c) would be based on an administrative record not unlike that involved in this case. Thus, even if the rule of ejusdem generis were applied, it would not significantly narrow the ambit of “any other final action” under §307 (b)(1). The second problem with the respondents’ reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis is more fundamental. As we have often noted: “‘The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty.’ ” United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 91, quoting Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128. With regard to § 307 (b) (1), we discern no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, “any other final action.” When Congress amended the provision in 1977, it expanded its ambit to include not simply “other final action,” but rather “any other final action.” This expansive language offers no indication whatever that Congress intended the limiting construction of §307 (b)(1) that the respondents now urge. Accordingly, we think it inappropriate to apply the rule of ejusdem generis in construing § 307 (b)(1). Rather, we agree with the petitioners that the phrase, “any other final action,” in the absence of legislative history to the contrary, must be construed to mean exactly what it says, namely, any other final action. B We have found nothing in the legislative history to support a conclusion that the phrase, “any other final action,” in § 307 (b)(1) means anything other than what it says. Congress added the language, “any other final action,” to § 307 (b) (1) in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The phrase first appeared in H. R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). That bill, as reported out of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to include review of not only certain EPA actions of nationwide consequences under specifically enumerated provisions of the Act, but also “any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under [the] Act.” In parallel fashion, the bill expanded the jurisdiction of the regional courts of appeals to include review not only of certain local or regional actions under specifically enumerated provisions, but also of “any other final action of the Administrator under [the] Act which is locally or regionally applicable.” (Emphasis added.) The only extended discussion of this proposed amendment to § 307 (b)(1) was contained in the Committee Report accompanying H. R. 6161. H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, pp. 323-324 (1977). That discussion, however, focused not on the jurisdictional question at issue here, but rather on the proper venue as between the District of Columbia Circuit and the other Federal Circuits. The Committee Report described the proposed amendments as “intended to clarify some questions relating to venue for review of rules or orders under the [A]ct.” Id., at 323. In this regard, the Committee Report explained: “[The proposed addition to the first sentence of § 307 (b)(1)] makes it clear that any nationally applicable regulations promulgated by the Administrator under the Clean Air Act could be reviewed only in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. . . . “[The proposed addition to the second sentence] provides for essentially locally, statewide, or regionally applicable rules or orders to be reviewed in the U. S. court of appeals for the circuit in which such locality, State, or region is located. . . .” Ibid. The Committee Report further stated that the proposed changes reflected the Committee’s agreement with certain venue proposals of the Administrative Conference of the United States, but added the caveat that the adoption of these proposals was not to be taken as an endorsement of the remainder of the Administrative Conference’s recommendations. Id., at 324. The respondents infer from this scant legislative history that Congress never intended the addition of the phrase, “any other final action,” to § 307 (b)(1) to enlarge the jurisdiction of the .courts of appeals to include the review of cases based on an administrative record reflecting less than notice and an opportunity for a hearing. But, insofar as the respondents rely on what the Committee said in its Report, we fail to see how the Committee’s observations on venue have any bearing at all on the jurisdictional issue now before the Court. Moreover, since the Administrative Conference had not proposed that the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals be expanded to include “any other final action,” the fact that the Committee expressly disclaimed an endorsement of the recommendations of the Administrative Conference on matters other than venue would appear wholly irrelevant. The respondents also rely on what the Committee and the Congress did not say about the 1977 amendments to § 307 (b)(1). It is unlikely, the respondents assert, that Congress would have expanded so radically the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, and divested the district courts of jurisdiction, without some consideration and discussion of the matter. We cannot accept this argument. First, although the number of actions comprehended by a literal interpretation of “any other final action” is no doubt substantial, the number would not appear so large as ineluctably to have provoked comment in Congress. Secondly, it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a statute. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark. C The respondents finally argue that, as a matter of policy, the basic purpose of §307 (b)(1) — to provide prompt pre-enforcement review of EPA action — would be better served by providing for judicial review of cases such as this in a district court rather than a court of appeals. It is the respondents’ view that since agency action predicated on neither formal adjudication nor informal rulemaking is apt to be based on a record too scant to permit informed judicial review, the district court is the preferable forum, since the tools of discovery are there available to augment the record, whereas in a court of appeals a time-consuming remand to EPA might be required. This is an argument to be addressed to Congress, not to this Court. It is not our task to determine which would be the ideal forum for judicial review of the Administrator’s decision in this case. See, e. g., Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1975). Rather, we must determine what Congress intended when it vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction under §307 (b)(1) to review “any other final action.” The language of the statute clearly provides that a decision of the sort at issue here is reviewable in a court of appeals, and nothing in the legislative history points to any different conclusion. We add only that, as a matter of policy, this conferral of jurisdiction upon the courts of appeals is not wholly irrational. The most obvious advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a district court, followed by a second review on appeal. It may be seriously questioned whether the overall time lost by court of appeals remands to EPA of those cases in which the records are inadequate would exceed the time saved by forgoing in every case initial review in a district court. But whatever the answer to this empirical question, an appellate court is not without recourse in the event it finds itself unable to exercise informed judicial review because of an inadequate administrative record. In such a situation, an appellate court may always remand a case to the agency for further consideration. For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court, of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 307 (b)(1) provides in full: “A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 112, any standard of performance or requirement under section 111,- any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 202 (b) (1)), any determination under section 202 (b)(5), any control or prohibition under section 211, any standard under section 231, any rule issued under section 113, 119, or under section 120, or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator’s action in approving or. promulgating any implementation plan under section 110 or section 111 (d), any order under section 111 (j), under section 112 (c), under section 118 (d), under section 119, or under section 120, or his action under section 119 (c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) (as in effect before the date of enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or any other final action of the Administrator under this Act (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under title I) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination. Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise.” (Emphasis added.) § 307 (b) (1) of the Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1708, and amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L, 95-95, 91 Stat. 776, and the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, § 14 of Pub. L. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1404, 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). In a request for clarification, PPG expressed its understanding that the “new source” standards would not be applicable during the normal course of operation of the boilers, but only during performance tests or other periods when the boilers were operating on 100% fossil fuel. EPA by letter confirmed PPG’s understanding. This position, however, was inconsistent with both the Regional Administrator’s earlier ruling and with EPA’s position in similar cases. Accordingly, an EPA representative notified PPG by telephone that the letter was incorrect. In a subsequent letter, the Director of the Division of Stationary Source Enforcement of EPA reiterated that the “new source” standards would be applicable during the normal operation of the waste-heat boilers, but only to the extent that the boilers were operating on fossil fuel, rather than waste heat. The Director also indicated that, pursuant to the standards, PPG would be required to operate the boilers at all times with fuel containing less than a certain specified content of sulfur. He further noted that PPG would be required to install and operate opacity monitors in the stacks of the boilers and to perform alternative monitoring tests. The respondents have abandoned the construction of the statute they advanced in the Court of Appeals, namely, that the phrase, “any other final action,” refers only to other final actions under those provisions specifically enumerated in §307 (b)(1). That construction, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, is inconsistent with the fact that the phrase, “any other final action,” is modified not by “under these sections,” but rather by “under this Act.” It would appear that the respondents’ construction of the statute is that adopted by the Court of Appeals, although the matter is not free from doubt. The doubt arises from the fact that the Court of Appeals’ opinion can also be read as establishing a jurisdictional test that turns on a case-by-case inquiry into the adequacy of the administrative record. But, as the respondents themselves acknowledge, that reading, of the opinion would create excessive uncertainty as to the proper forum for judicial review. The respondents argue that this exception should be ignored in' applying the rule of ejusdem generis, since § 112 (c) governs the regulation of “hazardous air pollutants” for which Congress may have wanted “special review” in the courts of appeals, even in the absence of procedures requiring notice and opportunity for a hearing. It is our view, however, that if the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable, it must be applied to actions under all the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307 (b) (1), not simply those that fit the respondents’ theory. The respondents raise several objections to so literal a reading of §307 (b)(1), none of which we find persuasive. First, the respondents assert that such a construction of §307 (b)(1) is both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with another provision of the Act. The internal inconsistency is said to arise from the fact that if the phrase, “any other final action,” were construed to include any final action of the Administrator, it would nullify the express exception from review in §307 (b)(1) of any “standard required to be prescribed under section 202 (b)(1).” The inconsistency with another provision in the Act is said to arise from the fact that a literal reading of “any other final action” would effectively repeal another judicial review provision in the Act, §206 (b)(2)(B), 42 U. S. C. § 7525 (b) (2) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. II). These objections fall far short of the mark, however, for the general language of the catchall phrase, “any other final action,” must obviously give way to specific express provisions in the Act. The respondents also argue that if Congress had intended the phrase, “any other final action,” to refer to all final actions of the Administrator, it would have been unnecessary, in 1977, to add to the list in § 307 (b) (1) of specifically enumerated provisions under which actions of the Administrator are reviewable in the courts of appeals. This may be true, but the fact remains that even if Congress had intended the phrase, “any other final action,” to be read, as the respondents urge, in accordance with the rule of ejusdem generis, there still would have been no necessity to add to the list of specifically enumerated provisions. That the Committee intended the phrase, “any other final action,” to result in at least some expansion of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is evident in the fact that the Committee Report expressly indicated that several types of nationwide actions under provisions not specifically enumerated in § 307 (b) (1) would be reviewable in the District of Columbia Circuit. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, pp. 323-324 (1977) (e. g., regulations to carry out the nonattainment policy set out in § 117 of the Act). Thus, as even the respondents concede, the issue here is not whether Congress intended any expansion of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, but rather the extent to which Congress intended to expand that jurisdiction. As to that issue, the legislative history is silent. Arthur Conan Doyle, The Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes (1938). The respondents also argue that a literal construction of §307 (b)(1) would violate due process of law. This argument turns on the interrelationship between §307 (b)(1) and its companion provision, §307 (b)(2), which provides that “[a]ction of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under [§ 307 (b) (1)] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.” 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). To preclude a defendant in a civil or criminal enforcement proceeding from attacking the validity of informal action on the part of the Administrator would, in the respondents’ view, violate the defendant’s due process right to a “reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 433. The short answer to the respondents’ argument is that the validity of § 307 (b) (2) is not at issue here. The constitutional question raised by the respondents must, therefore, await another day. The dissenting opinions would modify the language of §307 (b)(1) so as to read either (1) any other final action similar to that under the specifically enumerated provisions other than those added in the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, post, at 600-602, or (2) any other final action expressly, but not impliedly, authorized under the sections of the Act not specifically enumerated in §307 (b)(1), post, at 607. But neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports either of these proposed readings of §307 (b)(1). Whether the present administrative record in this ease is adequate to permit informed judicial review is a question that the Court of Appeals must determine.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HERWEG et vir v. RAY, GOVERNOR OF IOWA, et al. No. 80-60. Argued January 13, 1982 Decided February 23, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, post, p. 278. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 279. Neal S. Dudovitz argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Christine M. Luzzie and Gill Deford. Brent R. Appel, First Assistant Attorney General of Iowa, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, John Black, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Stephen C. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Robert P. Jaye for the United States; and by Silvia Drew Ivie for the Gray Panthers. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Last Term in Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 49-50 (1981), we upheld the validity of federal Medicaid regulations that permit “deeming” of income between spouses in those States that have exercised the so-called “§ 209(b) option” provided for in the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). “Deeming,” in the parlance of the Social Security laws and regulations, means that a State determines eligibility by assuming that a portion of the spouse’s income is “available” to the applicant. Because an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits depends in part on the financial resources that are “available” to him, “[djeeming. . . has the effect of reducing both the number of eligible individuals and the amount of assistance paid to those who qualify.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 36. We rejected contentions that these regulations were arbitrary or capricious and that the regulations were inconsistent with § 1902(a)(17) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17). 453 U. S., at 43. In the present case, we are called upon to decide to what extent the State of Iowa, an “SSI State,” may consider the income of the institutionalized Medicaid applicant’s noninstitutionalized spouse in determining eligibility for Medicaid. As we explained in greater detail in Gray Panthers, supra, Medicaid as originally enacted “required participating States to provide medical assistance to ‘categorically needy’ individuals who received cash payments under one of four welfare programs established elsewhere in the [Social Security] Act.” Id., at 37. This program was restructured in 1972 by Congress, when it replaced three of the four categorical programs with Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), 42 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). Fearing that some States might withdraw from the Medicaid program rather than bear the increased costs imposed by the restructuring, Congress offered the States the “§ 209(b) option.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(f). Under the § 209(b) option, the States may elect to provide Medicaid assistance only to those individuals who would have been eligible under the State’s Medicaid plan in effect on January 1, 1972. In other words, the § 209(b) option allows the States to avoid the effect of the link between the SSI and Medicaid programs: States may become either “§ 209(b) States” or “SSI States.” If a State participates in the Medicaid program without exercising the § 209(b) option, the State is required to make Medicaid assistance available to all recipients of SSI benefits. 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 CFR §435.120 (1980). SSI States, however, are not limited to providing Medicaid benefits to SSI recipients. The Medicaid program offers participating States the option of providing Medicaid assist-anee to certain other groups of individuals, see 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C), one of which is the “optional categorically needy.” See 42 CFR §§435.200-435.231 (1980). Included among the “optional categorically needy,” are (1) individuals who would be eligible for, but for some reason are not receiving, SSI benefits and (2) individuals who would be eligible for SSI benefits but for their institutionalized status. 42 CFR §§435.210-435.211 (1980). With regard to the “optional categorically needy,” the Secretary’s regulations require the States to “deem” the income and resources of spouses who share the same household. 42 CFR §435.723(b) (1980). Where both spouses are eligible for Medicaid, the States must “deem” income for the first six months after the spouses cease to live together. After this 6-month period, the States may consider only the income and resources actually contributed by one spouse to the other. § 435.723(c). If only one spouse is eligible for Medicaid, a similar rule applies but the time period is one month instead of six. § 435.723(d). In effect, § 435.723 places time limitations on the States’ ability to consider the spouse’s income as “available” to the applicant after the spouses cease to live together. The question addressed by the lower courts, and now presented for our decision, is whether this regulation is a permissible exercise of the Secretary’s authority under the Act to define what income is “available.” I Petitioner Elvina Herweg has been in a comatose state since August 1976 as a result of two cerebral hemorrhages. When she was placed in a long-term care facility, her husband, petitioner Darrell Herweg, applied for Medicaid assistance on Elvina’s behalf. Elvina does not receive SSI benefits, although .the parties and the United States as amicus curiae agree that she is eligible to receive such benefits. Iowa applied its own formula to determine Elvina’s eligibility for Medicaid and to ascertain the amount Darrell would be required to contribute toward his wife’s care. This formula was based on the income Darrell earned as a butcher and on standard living allowances allowed Darrell and his three children living at home. In other words, Iowa was “deeming,” or attributing, income earned by one spouse to the other. Iowa, however, was deeming in a manner inconsistent with the Secretary’s regulations, which place time limitations upon the States’ ability to consider as available to the applicant his spouse’s income where the spouses do not share the same household. Swpra, at 269 and this page, and n. 4. Because Elvina was institutionalized and because Darrell is not eligible for Medicaid, the Secretary’s regulations prohibit Iowa from considering Darrell’s income after one month from the time the couple ceased to live together. See 42 CFR § 435.723(d) (1980). Petitioners filed the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa challenging Iowa’s “deeming” of the income of a Medicaid applicant’s spouse. After certifying a class of plaintiffs, the District Court held that § 1902(a)(17) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17), required Iowa’s procedures to “provide for a factual determination in each instance of the amount of the spouse’s income which is in fact reasonably available for the support of the institutionalized spouse. . . . Such determination must give due consideration to the individual obligations and the particular needs of each spouse and family.” 443 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (1978). In interpreting § 1902(a)(17), the District Court concluded that “ ‘deeming’ is contrary to congressional intent whether income of the non-institutionalized spouse is deemed available or unavailable.” Id., at 1320. The District Court noted that the predecessor to 42 CFR 435.723 (1980) was inconsistent with its interpretation of § 1902(a)(17). In the District Court’s view, therefore, the Secretary’s regulation was inconsistent with §1902(a)(17) because the regulation disabled the States in certain instances from considering the spouse’s income as available to the applicant. In response to this order, Iowa adopted a procedure for making individualized factual determinations of the amount of income available to an institutionalized spouse. The District Court approved this plan and petitioners appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided Court. 619 F. 2d 1265 (1980) (en banc). We reverse. II Although Elvina Herweg does not receive SSI benefits, the class certified without objection by the District Court includes SSI recipients. We therefore construe the order entered by the District Court, and the plan adopted by Iowa in response, as applying both to SSI recipients and to the optional categorically needy. A With regard to recipients of SSI benefits, the District Court’s order clearly conflicts with § 1902(a)(10)(A) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), which requires States not having exercised the § 209(b) option to provide Medicaid assistance to all SSI recipients. 42 CFR §435.120 (1980). See Beltran v. Myers, 451 U. S. 625, 626, n. 3 (1981). The SSI program, contained in Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1382 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), contains its own eligibility provisions. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 1382(a)(1), 1382c(b), (f)(1). Pursuant to the District Court’s order, however, Iowa is permitted to deny Medicaid benefits to institutionalized SSI recipients if, after making an individualized factual determination, Iowa concludes that the income of the SSI recipient’s spouse should be considered available even though it was not actually contributed. Because Congress has clearly spoken in this regard, to the extent it permits Iowa to deny Medicaid assistance to SSI recipients, the District Court’s order cannot stand. In requiring individualized determinations of income available to the Medicaid applicant, the District Court held that the Secretary has exceeded his authority in permitting any “deeming” whatsoever. In Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S., at 45, however, we held that Congress intended to permit a state Medicaid plan to deem the income from the applicant’s spouse as part of the available income which the state plan may consider in determining eligibility. Thus, to the extent that the District Court’s order forbids deeming under any circumstances, the order conflicts with our decision in Gray Panthers. B The issue that remains, therefore, is whether § 1902(a)(17) precludes the Secretary from promulgating regulations that impose time limitations upon the States’ ability to consider the income of the institutionalized applicant’s spouse. Relying on § 1902(a)(17)(D), respondents argue that the Secretary has exceeded his authority in placing time limitations upon the States’ authority to consider the financial responsibility of spouses. Subsection (17)(D), respondents argue, evidences Congress’ intent to permit the States to consider the financial responsibility of spouses and parents. Nothing in the statute or the legislative history, respondents contend, suggests that Congress intended to prevent the States from enforcing their financial responsibility policies simply because the Medicaid applicant is institutionalized. We think, however, that respondents overemphasize the effect of subsection (17)(D). That provision may not be read independently of subsection (17)(B). Subsection (17)(B) provides that participating States must grant benefits to eligible individuals “taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). In Gray Panthers, we recognized that subsection (17)(B) delegates to the Secretary broad authority to prescribe standards setting eligibility requirements for state Medicaid plans. In view of Congress’ explicit delegation of authority to give substance to the meaning of “available,” the Secretary’s definition of the term is “‘entitled to more than mere deference or weight.’” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 44, quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 426 (1977). Because Congress has entrusted the primary responsibility of interpreting a statutory term to the Secretary rather than to the courts, his definition is entitled to “ ‘legislative effect.’ ” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 44; Batterton v. Francis, supra, at 426. As in Gray Panthers and Batterton, our review is limited to determining whether the Secretary has exceeded his statutory authority and whether the regulation is arbitrary and capricious. Although Congress has approved of some deeming of income between Medicaid applicants and their spouses, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 48, we cannot agree with respondents that Congress intended the States to enforce their spousal responsibility policies wholly unimpeded by the Secretary’s congressionally authorized power to give substance to the term “available.” In placing time limitations upon the States’ ability to consider the spouse’s income where the Medicaid applicant and his spouse no longer live together, the Secretary has done nothing more than define what income is “available.” Although Congress intended that a spouse’s income could be part of the income which the Secretary may determine should be considered by the States as available to the Medicaid applicant, Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 45, we see nothing in subsection (17)(D) that precludes the Secretary from imposing upon the States the time limits at issue in the instant case. We find nothing in subsection (17)(D) either that disables the Secretary from defining the term “available” in such circumstances, or that gives the States authority to “deem” income unimpeded by the Secretary’s authority under subsection (17)(B). Subsection (17)(D) cannot be read to require the Secretary to permit the States to consider the income of a spouse no longer living with the applicant as available to the applicant for an unlimited duration. Although we do not agree with the contention of the United States, and apparently that of petitioners, that the time limitations in 42 CFR §435.723 (1980) are compelled by the relationship between the Medicaid and SSI programs, we do agree that the Secretary may acknowledge this relationship in defining “availability” of income with regard to Medicaid applicants within the optional categories. As we have explained, the optional categorically needy consists in part of those individuals who are eligible for, but are not receiving, SSI benefits and those individuals who, but for their institutionalization, would be eligible for SSI benefits. Supra, at 269. Since these groups are defined in part with regard to SSI income limitations, it is reasonable that the Secretary should determine that States electing to provide Medicaid assistance to the optional categorically needy should apply a similar method for calculating income as that employed in the SSI program. The 1-month and 6-month limitations in 42 CFR §435.723 (1980) are virtually identical to the SSI requirements. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1382(a)(1), 1382c(b), (f)(1). We cannot say that it is either arbitrary or capricious for the Secretary to conclude that SSI recipients and the optional categorically needy should be treated similarly with respect to the method used for calculating income in determining whether the State is entitled to receive federal financial assistance under the Medicaid program. In upholding the Secretary’s limitation on deeming, we do not thereby render subsection (17)(D) meaningless. That provision, however, may not be read in isolation from the other provisions of the Social Security Act. We have no doubt that some tension exists between the Secretary’s con-gressionally authorized power under subsection (17)(B) to determine what income is “available” to the applicant and Congress’ intent in subsection (17)(D) to permit the States to enforce their spousal responsibility policies. Because Congress in subsection (17)(B) has delegated broad authority to the Secretary to set eligibility standards for the Medicaid program, however, we cannot say that the Secretary’s regulations placing time limitations on the States’ ability to deem income between spouses who do not share the same household are unreasonable or contrary to law. A reviewing court may not set aside the Secretary’s regulations “simply because it would have interpreted the statute in a different manner.” Batterton v. Francis, supra, at 425. A fortiori, Iowa may not ignore federal regulations simply because it interprets § 1902(a)(17) in a manner it considers preferable to the Secretary’s interpretation. This would be a different case, and respondents’ arguments more compelling, if the Secretary had sought to use his authority under subsection (17)(B) to foreclose entirely the States’ ability to consider the income of the institutionalized applicant’s spouse. Such a reading of the statute could well render subsection (17)(D) superfluous. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S., at 45. The Secretary’s regulations, however, impose no such across-the-board limitation on the States’ ability to implement their spousal responsibility policies. The challenged regulation applies only to those SSI States that have decided to extend Medicaid benefits to the optional categorically needy, and it prohibits deeming only after the spouses have ceased to live together for prescribed periods of time. On the contrary, 42 CFR §435.723 (1980) is simply an exception to the general rule that the spouse’s income may be considered available to the applicant. With regard to the optional categorically needy, SSI States are required to deem the income and resources of spouses living in the same household. § 435.723(b). States exercising the § 209(b) option are required to deem income to the extent required in SSI States and may deem to the full extent they did before 1972. §435.734. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 40. Finally, the SSI applicant is considered to a similar extent to have available to him his spouse’s income and financial resources. See n. 2, supra. We conclude that the Secretary need not interpret § 1902 (a)(17) to require an individualized factual determination in each instance as to the amount of income of an applicant’s spouse that may reasonably be considered available to the applicant. With regard to SSI recipients in SSI States, such an interpretation would be contrary to § 1902(a)(10)(A), 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). With regard to the optional categorically needy, we find that the Secretary has not exceeded his authority in promulgating 42 CFR §435.723 (1980), and that this regulation is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 1902(a)(17) provides that a state plan for medical assistance must "include reasonable standards ... for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse or such individual’s child who is under age 21 or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter), is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such program); and provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under State law.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17). The SSI program, in turn, has its own eligibility requirements, which include “deeming” provisions. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1382, 1382c(b), (f)(1). The States, if they choose to do so, may extend Medicaid coverage to the “medically needy.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C); 42 CFR §§435.300-435.325, 435.800-435.845 (1980). Since Iowa does not extend Medicaid assistance to the medically needy, the Secretary’s deeming regulations applicable to this optional program are not at issue in this case. See 42 CFR §435.822 (1980). Title 42 CFR § 435.723 (1980) provides: “(a) If the agency provides Medicaid to SSI recipients, it must meet the requirements of this section in determining eligibility of aged, blind, and disabled individuals under the optional coverage provisions of §§435.210, 435.211, and 435.231. “(b) The agency must consider income and resources of spouses living in the same household as available to each other, whether or not they are actually contributed. “(c) If both spouses apply or are eligible as aged, blind, or disabled and cease to live together, the agency must consider their income and resources as available to each other for the first 6 months after the month they cease to live together. After this 6-month period, the agency must consider only the income and resources that are actually contributed by one spouse to the other. “(d) If only one spouse in a couple applies or is eligible and they cease to live together, the agency must consider only the income and resources of the ineligible spouse that are actually contributed to the eligible spouse after the month in which they cease to live together.” Elvina, therefore, is considered part of the optional categorically needy. 42 CFR §435.210 (1980). Petitioners’ challenge was based both on statutory and constitutional grounds. Petitioners contended that Iowa’s procedures were in conflict with § 1902(a)(17) of the Social Security Act and with the Secretary’s regulations, now codified at 42 CFR §435.723'(1980). Petitioners also contended that Iowa’s procedures violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Petitioners’ constitutional claims were not considered either by the District Court or by the Court of Appeals and are not before this Court. The District Court certified a class consisting of “all married couples residing in Iowa of which: (1) one spouse is eligible for Medicaid and requires institutionalization; and (2) the other spouse is not institutionalized; and (3) the non-institutionalized spouse has income which is, under current state procedures, being deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.” 443 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (1978). 45 CFR §248.3 (1976). Section 1902(a)(10)(A) requires a state Medicaid plan to provide “for making medical assistance available to all individuals receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, or with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are being paid under sub-chapter XVI of this chapter . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (emphasis added). Although we do not believe that § 1902(a)(10)(A) can be characterized as ambiguous in this regard, the legislative history of the original Medicaid statute is rather explicit in requiring the participating States to provide medical assistance to recipients under the four categorical welfare programs then in existence. “[A] State plan to be approved must include provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or assistance under State plans approved under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI. It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical assistance to the less needy.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 77 (1965). Titles I, X, and XVI were respectively Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, the three categorical welfare programs replaced by SSI. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 37-38, and nn. 1, 3 (1981). We find nothing in the adoption of the SSI program that would alter the meaning of § 1902(a)(10)(A). Section 1902(a)(17)(D) provides that the States’ standards for determining eligibility for, and the extent of, Medicaid assistance may “not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or recipient under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is such individual’s spouse or such individual’s child . . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D). Respondents rely in particular on a portion of the 1965 Senate Report we quoted in Gray Panthers: “The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled children.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 78. Contrary to the dissent, we do not interpret subsection (17)(D) as "authorizing” the States to deem, without any limitation, income between spouses. That subsection simply prohibits the States from considering the financial responsibility of any individual for the Medicaid applicant unless that individual is the applicant’s spouse or parent. See nn. 1, 11, supra. As conceded by petitioners at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, Iowa is free to obtain reimbursement from the noninstitutionalized spouse in a lawsuit brought under its family responsibility laws. We recognize that such lawsuits may not be a uniformly practical alternative. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S., at 46. To a certain extent, therefore, the barriers Iowa faces in implementing its spousal responsibility policies are attributable to the choices it has made with regard to the Medicaid options available. Iowa has decided to become an SSI State rather than a § 209(b) State. The Secretary permits SSI States to opt for ‘“§ 209(b) status’ at any time.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, supra, at 39, n. 6. In addition, Iowa is subject to 42 CFR §435.723 (1980) only because it has decided to extend Medicaid assistance to the optional categorical needy. §435.700.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF MADISON JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 8 et al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION et al. No. 75-946. Argued October 12, 1976 Decided December 8, 1976 Gerald C. Kops argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Henry A. Gempeler. Robert C. Kelly argued the cause for appellee Madison Teachers, Inc. With him on the brief was William Haus Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by William W. Van Alstyne for the American Association of University Professors; by Robert T. Thompson and Lawrence Kraus for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by James Newton Wilhoit III, Rex H. Reed, and James K. RuKly for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation; by Sylvester Petro for the Public Service Research Council; by John J. Gunther for the United States Conference of Mayors; and by James F. Clark and Karen A. Mercer for the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc. Briefs of amid curiae were filed by J. Albert WoU and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and by Robert H. Chanin and David Rubin for the National Education Assn. Me. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented on this appeal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is whether a State may constitutionally require that an elected board of education prohibit teachers, other than union representatives, to speak at open meetings, at which public participation is permitted, if such speech is addressed to the subject of pending collective-bargaining negotiations. The Madison Board of Education and Madison Teachers, Inc. (MTI), a labor union, were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement during the calendar year of 1971. In January 1971 negotiations commenced for renewal of the agreement and MTI submitted a number of proposals. One among them called for the inclusion of a so-called “fair-share” clause, which would require all teachers, whether members of MTI or not, to pay union dues to defray the costs of collective bargaining. Wisconsin law-expressly permits inclusion of “fair share” provisions in municipal employee collective-bargaining agreements. Wis. Stat. § 111.70 (2) (1973). Another proposal presented by the union was a provision for binding arbitration of teacher dismissals. Both of these provisions were resisted by the school board. The negotiations deadlocked in November 1971 with a number of issues still unresolved, among them “fair share” and arbitration. During the same month, two teachers, Holmquist and Reed, who were members of the bargaining unit, but not members of the union, mailed a letter to all teachers in the district expressing opposition to the “fair share” proposal. Two hundred teachers replied, most commenting favorably on Holmquist and Reed’s position. Thereupon a petition was drafted calling for a one-year delay in the implementation of “fair share” while the proposal was more closely analyzed by an impartial committee. The petition was circulated to teachers in the district on December 6, 1971. Holmquist and Reed intended to present the results of their petition effort to the school board and to MTI at the school board’s public meeting that same evening. Because of the stalemate in the negotiations, MTI arranged to have pickets present at the school board meeting. In addition, 300 to 400 teachers attended in support of the union’s position.. During a portion of the meeting devoted to expression of opinion by the public, the president of MTI took the floor and spoke on the subject of the ongoing negotiations. He concluded his remarks by presenting to the board a petition signed by 1,300-1,400 teachers calling for the expeditious resolution of the negotiations. Holmquist was next given the floor, after John Matthews, the business representative of MTI, unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade him from speaking. Matthews had also spoken to a member of the school board before the meeting and requested that the board refuse to permit Holmquist to speak. Holmquist stated that he represented “an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools” and that he desired to inform the board of education, as he had already informed the union, of the results of an informational survey concerning the “fair share” clause. He then read the petition which had been circulated to the teachers in the district that morning and stated that in the 31 schools from which reports had been received, 53% of the teachers had already signed the petition. Holmquist stated that neither side had adequately addressed the issue of “fair share” and that teachers were confused about- the meaning of the proposal. He concluded by saying: “Due to this confusion, we wish to take no stand on the proposal itself, but ask only that all alternatives be presented clearly to all teachers and more importantly to the general public to whom we are all responsible. We ask simply for communication, not confrontation.” The sole response from the school board was a question by the president inquiring whether Holmquist intended to present the board with' the petition. Holmquist answered that he would. Holmquist’s presentation had lasted approximately 2% minutes. Later that evening, the board met in executive session and voted a proposal acceding to all of the union’s demands with the exception of “fair share.” During a negotiating session the following morning, MTI accepted the proposal and a contract was signed on December 14, 1971. (1) In January 1972, MTI filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) claiming that the board had committed a prohibited labor practice by permitting Holmquist to speak at the December 6 meeting. MTI claimed that in so doing the board had engaged in negotiations with a member of the bargaining unit other than the exclusive collective-bargaining representative, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70 (3)(a)l, 4 (1973). Following a hearing the Commission concluded that the board was guilty of the prohibited labor practice and ordered that it “immediately cease and desist from permitting employes, other than representatives of Madison Teachers Inc., to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education, on matters subject to collective bargaining between it and Madison Teachers Inc.” The Commission’s action was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Dane County. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed. 69 Wis. 2d 200, 231 N. W. 2d 206. The court recognized that both the Federal and State Constitutions protect freedom of speech and the right to petition the government, but noted that these rights may be abridged in the face of “ ‘a clear and present danger that [the speech] will bring about the substantive evils that [the legislature] has a right to prevent.’ ” Id., at 211, 231 N. W. 2d, at 212, citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). The court held that abridgment of the speech in this case was justified in order “to avoid the dangers attendant upon relative chaos in labor management relations.” 69 Wis. 2d, at 212, 231 N. W. 2d, at 213. (2) The Wisconsin court perceived “clear and present danger” based upon its conclusion that Holmquist’s speech before the school board constituted “negotiation” with the board. Permitting such “negotiation,” the court reasoned, would undermine the bargaining exclusivity guaranteed the majority union under Wis. Stat. § 111.70 (3)(a)4 (1973). From that premise it concluded that teachers’ First Amendment rights could be limited. Assuming, arguendo, that such a “danger” might in some circumstances justify some limitation of First Amendment rights, we are unable to read this record as presenting such danger as would justify curtailing speech. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion that Holmquist’s terse statement during the public meeting constituted negotiation with the board was based upon its adoption of the lower court’s determination that, “‘[e]ven though Holmquist’s statement superficially appears to be merely a “position statement,” the court deems from the total circumstances that it constituted “negotiating.” ’ ” This cryptic conclusion seems to ignore the ancient wisdom that calling a thing by a name does not make it so. Holmquist did not seek to bargain or offer to enter into any bargain with the board, nor does it appear that he was authorized by any other teachers to enter into any agreement on their behalf. Although his views were not consistent with those of MTI, communicating such views to the employer could not change the fact that MTI alone was authorized to negotiate and to enter into a contract with the board. Moreover the school board meeting at which Holmquist was permitted to speak was open to the public. He addressed the school board not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of his government. We have held that teachers may not be “compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952). Where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find justification for excluding teachers who make up the overwhelming proportion of school employees and who are most vitally concerned with the proceedings. It is conceded that any citizen could have presented precisely the same points and provided the board with the same information as did Holmquist. Regardless of the extent to which true contract negotiations between a public body and its employees may be regulated— an issue we need not consider at this time — the participation in public discussion of public business cannot be confined to one category of interested individuals. To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees. Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between speakers on the basis of their employment, or the content of their speech. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). (3)' The WERC’s order is not limited to a determination that a prohibited labor practice had taken place in the past; it also restrains future conduct. By prohibiting the school board from “permitting employes ... to appear and speak at meetings of the Board of Education” the order constitutes an indirect, but effective, prohibition on persons such as Holmquist from communicating with their government. The order would have a substantial impact upon virtually all communication between teachers and the school board. The order prohibits speech by teachers “on matters subject to collective bargaining.” As the dissenting opinion below noted, however, there is virtually no subject concerning the operation of the school system that could not also be characterized as a potential subject of collective bargaining. Teachers not only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school system, but they are the very core of that system; restraining teachers’ expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the schools would seriously impair the board’s ability to govern the district. The Wisconsin court’s reliance on Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973), for the proposition that one whose conduct falls squarely within an otherwise valid proscription may not challenge that proscription on grounds of vagueness, is inapposite. The challenged portion of the order is designed to govern speech and conduct in the future, not to punish past conduct, and as such it is the essence of prior restraint. The judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MTI had been certified on June 7, 1966, as majority collective-bargaining representative of the teachers in the district by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The text of the letter was as follows: “Dear Fellow Madisonian Educator, “E. C. — 0. L. 0. G. Y. “Educator’s Choice — Obligatory Leadership Or Cover[n]anee by Fou “SAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE “A Closed Shop (agency shop) Removes This Freedom “1. Does an organization which represents the best interests of teachers and pupils NEED mandatory membership deductions? “2. Need relationships between administrators and teachers be further strained by LEGALLY providing for mandatory adversary camps? “3. Should minority voices be mandatorily SILENCED? “4. Could elimination of outside dissent produce NON-RESPONSIVENESS to change? “5. And . . . isn’t this lack of FREEDOM OF CHOICE undemocratic? “SUPPORT FREEDOM OF CHOICE— OPPOSE AGENCY SHOP “I wish to maintain freedom of choice: “I oppose agency shop on principle - “I oppose agency shop and would sign a petition stating so - “I oppose agency shop and would work actively to maintain freedom of choice - “Let us hear from YOU. “A1 Holmquist /s/ E. C.— O. L. 0. G. Y. “A1 Holmquist P. 0. Box 5184 “Ralph Reed /s/ Madison, WI 53705 “Ralph Reed “Teacher co-chairmen” The text of the petition was as follows: “To: Madison Board of Education December 6, 1971 Madison Teachers, Incorporated “We the undersigned ask that the fair-share proposal (agency shop) being negotiated by Madison Teachers, Incorporated and the Madison Board of Education be deferred this year. We propose the following: “1) The fair-share concept being negotiated be thoroughly studied by an impartial committee composed of representatives from all concerned groups. “2) The findings of this study be made public. “3) This impartial committee will ballot (written) all persons affected by the contract agreement for their opinion on the fair-share proposal. “4) The results of this written ballot be made public.” The statute provides in relevant part: "(3) PROHIBITED PRACTICES AND THEIR PREVENTION, (a) It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer individually or in concert with others: “1. To. interfere with, restrain or coerce municipal employes in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in sub. (2). “4. To refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of a majority of its employes in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. Such refusal shall include action by the employer to issue or seek to obtain contracts, including those provided for by statute, with individuals in the collective bargaining unit while collective bargaining, mediation or fact-finding concerning the terms and conditions of a new collective bargaining agreement is in progress, unless such individual contracts contain express language providing that the contract is subject to amendment by a subsequent collective bargaining agreement.” The detennination of the state courts that certain conduct constituted “negotiating” under state law, standing alone, would not ordinarily be open to our review; only its use as a predicate for restraining speech opens it to review here. This meeting was open to the public pursuant to a Wisconsin statute which requires certain governmental decisionmaking bodies to hold open meetings. Wis. Stat. § 66.77 (1) (1973), now § 19.81 (1) (1976). There are exceptions to the statute, and one of these has been interpreted to cover labor negotiations between a municipality and a labor organization. 54 Op. Atty. Gen. of Wis. vi (1965), cited with approval, Board of School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 653, 168 N. W. 2d 92, 99-100 (1969). Thus, in contrast to the open session where the public was invited, the true bargaining sessions between the union and the board were conducted in private. We need not decide whether a municipal corporation as an employer has First Amendment rights to hear the views of its citizens and employees. It is enough that Holmquist and other teachers and citizens have a protected right to communicate with the board. Since the board’s ability to hear them is “inextricably meshed” with the teachers’ right to speak, the board may assert those rights on behalf of Holmquist. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 409 (1974). Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business. See n. 6, supra. The WERC order does not prohibit all speech to the board on the subject of collective bargaining. Union representatives would continue to be entitled to come before the board at its public meetings and make their views known. The impact of such a rule is underscored by the fact that the union need not rely upon public meetings to make its position known to the school board; it can also do so at closed negotiating sessions. See n. 6, supra. Surely no one would question the absolute right of the nonunion teachers to consult among themselves, hold meetings, reduce their views to writing, and communicate those views to the public generally in pamphlets, letters, or expressions carried by the news media. It would strain First Amendment concepts extraordinarily to hold that dissident teachers could not communicate those views directly to the very decisionmaking body charged by law with making the choices raised by the contract renewal demands. Counsel for the union conceded at oral argument that the WERC order was constitutionally overbroad, but asked the Court to narrow it simply to prohibit the board from negotiating with employees in the bargaining unit. It is not the function of this Court to undertake that task. On the other hand, it is not the case that Holmquist was speaking “simply as a member of the community.” On the contrary, as noted, supra, at 171, Holmquist opened his remarks to the board by stating that he represented “an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools.” Thus, he appeared and spoke both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ENGELMAN, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF PUBLIC WELFARE, DEPT. OF INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES, et al. v. AMOS et al. No. 70-33. Decided November 9, 1971 Per Curiam. The motion of appellee Amos for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. A three-judge District Court has enjoined New Jersey-officials from enforcing a state regulation applicable to payments under the federally financed program for Aid to Families With Dependent Children, Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-610: The regulation in question, § 615 of the New Jersey Categorical Assistance Budget Manual, would deny AFDC benefits to the extent that a family’s “total available adjusted income,” calculated without deduction for the “income disregards” specified by § 402 (a) (8) of the federal Act, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a)(8), exceeds a ceiling specified by the State. The regulation is challenged on the grounds (1) that it is in conflict with § 402 (a) (8), and (2) that it fails to provide that, in the calculation of earned family income which is to be compared with the § 615 ceiling, a stepfather’s earnings are not to be taken into account unless they are “actually available” for the current use of the dependent child, 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii). It was also suggested in the proceedings below that § 615.5 of the state regulation conflicts with § 406 (b) of the federal Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (b), when it authorizes payments directly to vendors who provide goods or services to beneficiaries. The District Court upheld the challenge on all three grounds. Judgment was entered enjoining the enforcement of § 615 “insofar as it violates the federal statute” and ordering that New Jersey “revise the regulation to conform to the federal statute.” The state officials appeal. The appellants and also the United States, in its amicus curiae brief, appropriately point out that there is nothing in the federal statute that prohibits a State from making vendor payments so long as they are made from state funds without federal matching. The statute, § 406, merely does not provide for reimbursement to the State for payments of that kind. We agree with these observations by the appellants and the amicus, and thus disagree with the District Court’s conclusion with respect to direct payments insofar as those payments are made entirely with state funds not reimbursable under § 406 of the federal Act. With this limitation in the application of its general language, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MOBIL OIL CORP. v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION et al. No. 73-437. Argued April 17, 1974 Decided June 10, 1974 BrenNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Members joined except Stewart and Powell, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Carroll L. Gilliam argued the cause for petitioner in No. 73-437. With him on the briefs were Tom P. Hamill, Robert D. Haworth, and Philip R. Ehrenkranz. George E. Morrow argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 73^457 and 73-464. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 73-464 were Ruben Goldberg and Charles F. Wheat-ley, Jr. Michael H. Rosenbloom filed briefs for petitioner in No. 73-457. Leo E. Forquer argued the cause for respondent Federal Power Commission in all cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Mark L. Evans, and George W. McHenry, Jr. John R. Rebman argued the cause for producer respondents in all cases. With him on the brief for respondents Exxon Corp. et al. were Martin N. Erck, David G. Stevenson, Richard F. Generelly, Edward J. Kremer, Charles E. McGee, Cecil N. Cook, Thomas H. Burton, W. J. Stark, Warren M. Sparks, B. James McGraw, Robert W. Henderson, William A. Sackmann, John L. Williford, Paul W. Hicks, Oliver L. Stone, Ronald J. Jacobs, Richard F. Remmers, Stanley M. Morley, Louis Flax, H. W. Varner, Pat Timmons, Scott P. Anger, Kirk W. Weinert, C. Fielding Early, Jr., and George C. Bond. Raymond N. Shibley filed a brief for respondent Pipeline Purchaser Group in all cases. Francis R. Kirkham, James B. Atkin, Woollen H. Walshe, Justin R. Wolf, and David B. Ward filed a brief for respondent The California Company, a Division of Chevron Oil Co., in all cases. John E. Holtzinger, Jr., and Frederick Moring filed a brief for respondent Associated Gas Distributors in all cases. C. William Cooper, Tilford A. Jones, Edward H. Gersten-field, Robert Corp, Norman A. Flaningam, Lauman Martin, Richard M. Merriman, Elmer Nafziger, Jon D. Noland, James O’Malley, Jr., Richard A. Rosan, William W. Ross, Thomas C. Matthews, Arthur R. Seder, Jr., Charles V. Shannon, Justin A. Stanley, and J. Stanley Stroud filed a brief for respondents United Distribution Companies in all cases. Together with No. 73-457, Public Service Commission of New York v. Federal Power Commission et al., and No. 73-464, Municipal Distributors Group v. Federal Power Commission et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. We review here the affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of a 1971 order of the Federal Power Commission that established an area rate structure for interstate sales of natural gas produced in the Southern Louisiana area. The Southern Louisiana area is one of seven geographical areas defined by the Commission for the purpose of prescribing areawide price ceilings. This is the second area rate case to reach this Court. The first was the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968), in which the Court sustained the constitutional and statutory authority of the Commission to adopt a system of area regulation and to impose supplementary requirements in the discharge of its responsibilities under §§ 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act to determine whether producers’ rates are just and reasonable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 1971 order in its entirety as an appropriate exercise of administrative discretion supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Placid Oil Co. v. PPC, 483 F. 2d 880 (1973). We granted the petitions for certiorari in these three cases to review the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ holding sustaining the 1971 order as in all respects within the Commission’s statutory powers, and to determine whether the Court of Appeals misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial-evidence standard. 414 U. S. 1142 (1974). We affirm. I The Commission first instituted proceedings to establish an area rate structure for the Southern Louisiana area on May 10, 1961. 25 F. P. C. 942. The area consists of the southern portion of the State of Louisiana and the federal and state areas of the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast. The area accounts for about one-third of the Nation’s domestic natural gas production and has been described as “the most important gas-producing area in the country.” Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F. 2d 407, 418 (CA5 1970) (hereafter SoLa I). Proceedings continued over seven years. On September 25, 1968, the Commission issued an order establishing an area rate structure, 40 F. P. C. 530, and, on March 20, 1969, a modified order on rehearing, 41 F. P. C. 301. Refunds under this structure for overcharges during the pendency of the proceeding amounted to some $375 million. An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 19, 1970, the Court of Appeals affirmed the FPC orders but with "serious misgivings/’ SoLa I, supra, at 439. Noting that “[a] serious shortage, in fact, may already be unavoidable id., at 437, the Court of Appeals was critical of the Commission’s failure adequately to assess “supply and demand in either a semi-quantitative or qualitative way,” id., at 436. It was reinforced in this view by the evidence, including an FPC Staff Report, issued while the appeal was pending, that the Nation was faced with “a severe gas shortage, with disastrous effects on consumers and the economy alike.” Id., at 435 n. 87. Therefore, although determining “that affirmance is the best course,” id., at 439, the Court of Appeals declared that the judgment was not in any wise to foreclose the Commission from making such changes in its orders, as to both past and future rates, as it found to be in the public interest. The court noticed the fact that, while the appeal was pending, the Commission, in March 1969, had instituted proceedings to reconsider rates for the offshore portion of Southern Louisiana, see 41 F. P. C. 378, and later that year expanded the procedure to include the entire area, 42 F. P. C. 1110. Thus, it stated: “The mandate of this Court should not, however, be interpreted to interfere with Commission action that would change the rates we have approved here. We specifically and emphatically reject the contention advanced . . . that the Commission has no power to set aside rates once determined by it to be just and reasonable when it has reason to believe its determinations may have been erroneous. In fact, the existence of the new proceedings, which as we understand them will take into account many of the issues whose absence has concerned us here, has been one of the factors we have considered in deciding to affirm the Commission’s decisions.” 428 F. 2d, at 444-445. Pending decision on petitions for rehearing, however, the Commission advised the Court of Appeals, in a letter requested by the court, that, unless that court otherwise directed, it did not believe that it had authority to modify, rescind, or set aside a rate order or moratorium affirmed by the court. The Court of Appeals answered in its opinion denying rehearing, 444 F. 2d 125, 126-127 (1970): “We wish to make crystal clear the authority of the Commission in this case to reopen any part of its order that circumstances require be reopened. Under section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, this Court has the broad remedial powers that inhere in a court of equity, and pursuant to our equitable powers we make it part of the remedy in this case that the authority of the Commission to reopen any part of its orders, including those affecting revenues from gas already delivered, is left intact. The Commission can make retrospective as well as prospective adjustments in this case if it finds that it is in the public interest to do so. “At the same time, we emphasize that our judgment is an affirmance and not a remand. The appropriate place for originally considering what parts of the orders must be reopened in light of new evidence is before the Commission. It may be that the Commission will decide that the refunds it has ordered are just and reasonable or at least that their significance to the public interest is outweighed by the confusion and delay that would result from their reopening. In this event, the Commission will allow its refund orders to stand as they are. Or it may be that the refunds are too burdensome in light of new evidence to be in the public interest. In that case, it is our judgment that the Commission shall have the power and the duty to remedy the situation by changing its orders.” The Commission thereupon formally reopened the 1961 proceeding and consolidated it with the new proceeding, 44 F. P. C. 1638 (1970). An extensive record of many thousands of pages of testimony and more than a hundred exhibits was compiled between April 1970 and March 1971. Pursuant to the instructions of the Court of Appeals, much of the evidence focused on the gas shortage, projected levels of demand, and estimates of new supply needed to alleviate the problem. Evidence was also adduced bearing upon rate levels needed to induce additional supply, the potential industry consequences of any new order, and new cost trends based on data unavailable at the time of the earlier proceedings. Contemporaneously with the hearings, settlement conferences were instituted, on motion, by the Presiding Examiner, 46 F. P. C. 86, 103 (1971), and those conferences were attended by producers, pipelines, distributors, state commissions, municipally owned utilities, and the Commission staff. Eventually, a settlement proposal was submitted by one of the parties, and, after being placed on the record for comments, it was agreed to by a large majority of all interests. An intermediate decision of the Presiding Examiner was waived, and the Commission took up the case. At the outset, the Commission stated that it believed that adoption of the settlement proposal was precluded unless the Commission found the terms to be in the public interest and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commission evaluated the proposal in the light of the massive record that had been compiled in the decade since 1961, including the additional year of hearings directed in large part to the terms of the settlement proposal and the nature of the supply shortage. The Commission concluded that the terms of the proposed settlement were just and reasonable, and found them to be supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ceiling rates established in the 1968 orders, which because of Commission and court stays had never gone into effect, were held “now [to] perform no office,” 46 F. P. C., at 102. The effective date of the 1971 order was August 1, 1971. By the terms of this order “flowing gas,” i. e., gas delivered after August 1, 1971, under contracts dated prior to October 1, 1968, receives treatment different from “new gas,” i. e., gas delivered after August 1, 1971, under contracts dated after October 1, 1968. The established flowing gas price ceilings are 22.2750 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) for gas produced onshore and 21.3750 per Mcf for gas produced offshore. The established new gas price ceilings are 260 for both onshore and offshore gas. Flowing gas ceilings automatically increased 0.50 per Mcf on October 1, 1973, and, as a further incentive for increasing the gas supply, the Commission also established increases up to 1.50 per Mcf, contingent upon the industry’s finding and dedicating new gas reserves. New gas rates automatically increase H per Mcf on October 1, 1974. A moratorium is imposed upon the filing of producer rate increases for flowing gas until October 1, 1976, and for new gas until October 1, 1977. The Commission also established minimal pipeline rates to be charged producers by pipelines for the transportation of certain liquid and liquefiable hydrocarbons, and eliminated the price differential between casinghead gas (gas dissolved in or associated with the production of oil) and new gas-well gas that it had imposed in earlier cases. 46 F. P. C., at 144. See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 760-761. The problem of refunds concerns deliveries of flowing gas prior to August 1, 1971. The rates established by the 1971 order were higher than those that would have been established under the 1968 order had they been put into effect. If refunds had been calculated on the basis of the 1968 order, they would have aggregated over $375 million. If they had been calculated upon the basis of the 1971 flowing gas ceiling rates, refunds would have aggregated less than $150 million. However, the proposed settlement stipulated a refund obligation of $150 million, with a proviso that this could be worked off by the commitment by a refund obligor of additional gas reserves to the interstate market. The Commission adopted this proposal as an integral part of the 1961-1971 rate structure and established a schedule aggregating $150 million of refunds from those that were owed but not yet paid by producers who had collected rates in excess of certain prescribed levels lower than the established flowing gas rates. II Before addressing petitioners’ arguments, we must consider briefly the situation in which the Commission has found itself in its attempts to regulate the natural gas market; the teachings of Permian Basin and other decisions of this Court as to the extent of the Commission’s statutory authority in this area; the limitations upon review by the Court of Appeals of the Commission’s order; and the limitations upon review by this Court of the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the order. The history of the Commission’s early experience with the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717 et seq., >has been fully developed in our first area rate opinion, Permian Basin, supra, at 755-759, and may be merely summarized here. With the passage of the Act in 1938, 52 Stat. 821, Congress gave the Commission authority to determine and fix “just and reasonable rate[s],” § 5 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a), for the “sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use . . . .” § 1 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (b). The Act was patterned after earlier regulatory statutes that applied to traditional public utilities and transportation companies, and that provided for setting rates equal to such companies’ costs of service plus a reasonable rate of return. Until 1954, the Commission construed its mandate as requiring that it regulate the chain of distribution of natural gas only from the point where an interstate pipeline acquired it. Because such pipelines were relatively few in number and fell within the transportation company model, the Commission was able to apply a traditional regulatory approach, using individualized costs of service as a basis for determining price. In 1954, however, this Court ruled in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672, that independent producers are “[n]atural-gas companies]” within the meaning of § 2 (6) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717a (6). In response, the Commission at first attempted to extend to this new industry its old regulatory methods, including establishment of individual rates based on each producer’s costs of service. The effort foundered on the sheer size of the task — thousands of independent producers being engaged in jurisdictional sales of gas at that time. In the early 1960's the Commission discontinued its attempts to deal with individual companies, and turned to the area rate method. The Commission established a number of discrete geographical areas within which it believed that costs and general operating conditions were reasonably similar, and set out to establish, by convening hearings and compiling massive records, uniform rate schedules that would govern all producers within each area. Upon the conclusion of the first of these undertakings, we reviewed the Commission's efforts and found no reversible error. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968). See Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U. S. 294 (1963). But, the Commission was soon confronted with indications, both from data available to it, and from criticism of its effort, that its cost emphasis in rate determination was being accompanied by a severe shortage in the supply of natural gas being dedicated to the interstate market. Since the Commission's subsequent area rate orders, including both its 1968 and 1971 orders, are adapted from the initial Permian Basin model and are governed by the same statutory provisions concerning ratemaking and judicial review, we will preface our discussion of the Commission’s response to these difficulties with a brief review of the Permian Basin order and the applicable rules laid down in our opinion sustaining that order. Subsequent to its establishment of geographical areas in 1961, the Commission consolidated three of those areas to form the Permian Basin area. The rate structure devised for this area set two ceiling prices, the higher one for gas produced from gas wells and dedicated to interstate commerce after January 1, 1961, and the other for gas-well gas dedicated to interstate commerce before January 1, 1961, and all gas produced from oil wells (casinghead gas) either associated with the production of the oil or dissolved in it. The Commission derived the higher rate for the newer “vintage” gas-well gas from composite cost data obtained both from answers to producer questionnaires and from published data said to reflect the national costs of finding and producing gas-well gas in I960. It derived the lower rate from Permian Basin historical cost data for the older vintage gas-well gas, and applied that rate to both that and casinghead gas without distinction. To these composite costs, the Commission added a return of 12% on the producers’ average production investment, obtained by examining the cost data, imputing a rate base, and assuming that gas wells deplete at a constant rate beginning one year after investment and ending 20 years later. Finally, an adjustment up or down from the area ceiling rates was specified for gas of higher or lower quality and energy content than set by a selected standard. The resulting ceiling rates, including allowances for state taxes, were 14.50 per Mcf for first vintage and casinghead gas, and 16.50 for second vintage gas. For those producers who individually might suffer hardship under this fate schedule, the Commission indicated that it would on rare occasions provide special relief, but it declined to specify what circumstances would justify such action. On review, the Court of Appeals refused to approve the Commission’s order, holding that certain determinations of the ultimate effects of the order had not been made as required by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944), that more precise delineation of the requirements for relief from the order must be set forth, and that the Commission could not require that producers refund excess charges during the pendency of the proceeding unless it concluded that aggregate actual area revenues exceeded aggregate permissible area revenues, and then apportioned only the excess among producers on an equitable basis. 375 F. 2d 6, 36 (1967). On certiorari, this Court initially noted that judicial review of the Commission’s orders is extremely limited: “Section 19 (b) of the Natural Gas Act provides without qualification that the ‘finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.’ More important, we have heretofore emphasized that Congress has entrusted the regulation of the natural gas industry to the informed judgment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts. A presumption of validity therefore attaches to each exercise of the Commission’s expertise, and those who would overturn the Commission’s judgment undertake ‘the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.’ FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra, at 602. We are not obliged to examine each detail of the Commission’s decision; if the ‘total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.’ Ibid. “Moreover, this Court has often acknowledged that the Commission is nqt required by the Constitution or the Natural Gas Act to adopt as just and reasonable any particular rate level; rather, courts are without authority to set aside any rate selected by the Commission which is within a ‘zone of reasonableness.’ FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585. No other rule would be consonant with the broad responsibilities given to the Commission by Congress; it must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests.” Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 767. Applying these limitations in the context of review of area rate regulation, Permian Basin defined the criteria governing the scope of judicial review as follows: “First, [the reviewing court] must determine whether the Commission’s order, viewed in light of the relevant facts and of the Commission’s broad regulatory duties, abused or exceeded its authority. Second, the court must examine the manner in which the Commission has employed the methods of regulation which it has itself selected, and must decide whether each of the order’s essential elements is supported by substantial evidence. Third, the court must determine whether the order may reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable. The court’s responsibility is not to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors.” Id., at 791-792 (emphasis supplied). Where application of these criteria discloses no infirmities in the Commission’s order, the order cannot be said to produce an “arbitrary result,” and must be sustained. FPC v. Hops Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 602. Applying these criteria, Permian reversed the Court of Appeals and sustained the Commission’s order, although noting that the Commission had not adhered rigidly to a cost-based determination of rates, much less to one that based each producer’s rates on his own costs. Each deviation from cost-based pricing was found not to be unreasonable and to be consistent with the Commission’s responsibility to consider not merely the interests of the producers in “maintain [ing] financial integrity, attracting] necessary capital, and fairly compensating] investors for the risks they have assumed,” but also “the relevant public interests, both existing and foreseeable.” 390 U. S., at 792. “The Commission’s responsibilities necessarily oblige it,” the Court said, “to give continuing attention to values that may be reflected only imperfectly by producers’ costs; a regulatory method that excluded as immaterial all but current or projected costs could not properly serve the consumer interests placed under the Commission’s protection.” Id., at 815. Permian Basin teaches that application of the three criteria of judicial review of Commission orders is primarily the task of the courts of appeals. For “this [the Supreme] Court’s authority is essentially narrow and circumscribed.” Id., at 766. The 'responsibility to assess the record to determine whether agency findings are supported by substantial evidence is not ours. Section 19 (b) of the Act provides that “[t]he judgment and decree of the [Court of Appeals] affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court . . . upon certiorari . . . We have held as to a like provision in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e), that thus “[w]hether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the. rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 491 (1951). Ill Before reviewing the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the Commission’s 1971 order for compliance with Permian’s requirements, we address contentions that challenge the statutory authority of the Commission to adopt the order, rather than the terms of the order itself. The first of these challenges, made by New York and MDG, is that the Commission had no statutory authority to change rates and refund obligations fixed in the Commission’s 1968 order after that order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in SoLa I. Brief for MDG 18; Brief for New York 15. The argument is that the affirmance was “unqualified” and therefore exhausted the Court of Appeals’ powers of review under § 19 (b), thus rendering its authorization to the Commission to reopen its 1968 orders without legal effect. But the affirmance of the 1968 order was not “unqualified.” Although the Commission could not have reopened the order on its own, see Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 254 (1951); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S., at 618, the Court of Appeals’ opinion on rehearing made it “crystal clear” that, despite the form of the court’s judgment, the Commission was fully authorized to reopen any part of the 1968 order that seemed appropriate and necessary if evidence as to the future supply problem indicated that this should be done. The Court of Appeals properly took this step in light of new information, unavailable at the time of the 1968 order, that suggested the possible inadequacy of the 1968 determination, although not necessarily an inadequacy that justified setting aside the order. See Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U. S. 478 (1939). Moreover, the 1968 order had not been made effective, being continuously stayed until withdrawn by the 1971 order. See 46 F. P. C., at 101. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the action of the Court of Appeals exceeded its powers under § 19 (b) “to affirm, modify, or set aside [an] order in whole or in part.” This jurisdiction to review the orders of the Commission is vested in a court with equity powers, Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 128 F. 2d 481 (CA7 1942), see Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 364, 373 (1939), and we cannot say that the Court improperly exercised those powers in the circumstances. Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, 94 U. S. App. D. C. 247, 255-258, 219 F. 2d 742, 750-752 (1954). Indeed, § 19 (b) provides that the Court of Appeals may authorize the Commission in proper cases to take new evidence, upon which the Commission may modify its findings of fact and make recommendations, concerning the disposition of its original order. Under the Court of Appeals disposition, the 1968 order was therefore not final and thus it was within the power of the Commission to reconsider and change it. See United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223, 229 (1965). Only New York presses the second challenge to the Commission’s statutory authority to adopt the 1971 order. New York contends that the Commission is without power to adopt as a rate order a settlement proposal that lacks unanimous agreement of the parties to the proceeding. That contention has no merit. The Commission clearly had the power to admit the agreement into the record — indeed, it was obliged to consider it. That it was admitted for the record did not, of course, establish without more the justness and reasonableness of its terms. But the Commission did not treat it as such. As we have noted, the Commission weighed its terms by reference to the entire record in the Southern Louisiana area proceeding since 1961, and further supplemented that record with extensive testimony and exhibits directed at the proposal’s terms. We think that the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the situation and stated the correct legal principles: “No one seriously doubts the power — indeed, the duty — of FPC to consider the terms of a proposed settlement which fails to receive unanimous support as a decision on the merits. We agree with the D. C. Circuit that even 'assuming that under the Commission’s rules [a party’s] rejection of the settlement rendered the proposal ineffective as a settlement, it could not, and we believe should not, have precluded the Commission from considering the proposal on its merits.’ Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. FPC, 1960, 108 U. S. App. D. C. 409, 283 F. 2d 204, 224..... “As it should FPC is employing its settlement power under the APA, 5 U. S. C. A. § 554 (c), and its own rules 18 C. F. R. § 1.18 (a), to further the resolution of area rate proceedings. If a proposal enjoys unanimous support from all of the immediate parties, it could certainly be adopted as a settlement agreement if approved in the general interest of the public. But even if there is a lack of unanimity, it may be adopted as a resolution on the merits, if FPC makes an independent finding supported by 'substantial evidence on the record as a whole’ that the proposal will establish 'just and reasonable’ rates for the area.” 483 F. 2d, at 893. (Emphasis in original.) The choice of an appropriate structure for the rate order is a matter of Commission discretion, to be tested by its effects. The choice is not the less appropriate because the Commission did not conceive of the structure independently. New York presents a final argument against the Commission’s authority. It contends that the Court of Appeals’ opinion on rehearing in SoLa I authorized modification of the 1968 refund provisions only if the 1968 refunds “are too burdensome in light of new evidence to be in the public interest.” 444 F. 2d, at 127. It argues that this means the Commission was required first to find, based on substantial new evidence, that refunds “would substantially and adversely affect the producers’ ability to meet the continuing gas needs of the interstate market,” Brief for New York 18, and contends that the revision of the refund terms is therefore unauthorized because the Commission made no such finding. New York’s premise is unsupportable. The opinion on rehearing is explicit that the Commission was to have “great flexibility,” and could “make retrospective as well as prospective adjustments in this case if it finds that it is in the public interest to do so.” 444 F. 2d, at 126-127. Moreover, in the opinion under review, the Court of Appeals flatly rejected the argument New York has repeated in this Court. “[W]e categorically rejected [in SoLa I] the notion that the label 'affirmance’ could possibly impair FPC’s ability to alter or modify any of the provisions, particularly the refund provisions, of its SoLa I rate scheme if it believed that the exigencies of the gas industry required more effective remedial measures.” 483 F. 2d, at 904 (emphasis in original). IV We turn now to petitioners’ challenges to the rate order itself. We treat these contentions in three groups: challenges to the established price levels, challenges to the Commission’s allocation of gas and receipts among pipelines and producers through the refund credits and contingent escalations, and, finally, claims that certain specific provisions of the rate order lack substantial evidence. A Petitioner Mobil contends that the rates fixed for both flowing or first vintage gas and new or second vintage gas are too low. New York and MDG attack the rates for flowing gas as too high, but do not attack the new-gas rates. Each of the arguments is premised on a common error: that certain provisions of the order can be isolated and viewed without regard to the total effect the order is designed to achieve. Mobil’s attack on the Commission’s evidence of costs is clearly frivolous. The Commission took extensive evidence of costs in its 1968-order hearings for flowing gas, and in both its 1968-order and 1971-order hearings for new gas. In response to the Commission’s rates, selected from the final cost “range” it found to be justifiable on the basis of the entire record, Mobil points to selected fragments of the record. We have examined the testimony cited and do not think that it sustains Mobil’s heavy burden of showing that the final Commission choice was outside what the Court of Appeals could have found to lie within the Commission’s authority. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585 (1942). Mobil further contends that the inclusion of refund workoff credits and contingent escalations in the Commission’s just and reasonable rates indicates that producers unable to gain part or all of their share of such payments will receive merely their “bare-bones” costs, which constitute illegally low prices. We do not question that such producers may receive less per unit of gas than will others. But that hardly invalidates the Commission’s order. See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 818-819. Mobil’s argument assumes that there is only one just and reasonable rate possible for each vintage of gas, and that this rate must be based entirely on some concept of cost plus a reasonable rate of return. We rejected this argument in Permian Basin and we reject it again here. The Commission explicitly based its additional “non-cost” incentives on the evidence of a need for increased supplies. Obviously a price sufficient to maintain a producer, while not itself necessarily required by the Act, may not be sufficient also to encourage an increase in production. As we said in Permian Basin, supra, at 796-798: “The supply of gas-well gas is therefore relatively elastic, and its price can meaningfully be employed by the Commission to encourage exploration and production. . . . “. . . We have emphasized that courts are without authority to set aside any rate adopted by the Commission which is within a ‘zone of reasonableness.’ . . . The Commission may, within this zone, employ price functionally in order to achieve relevant regulatory purposes; it may, in particular, take fully into account the probable consequences of a given price level for future programs of exploration and production. Nothing in the purposes or history of the Act forbids the Commission to require different prices for different sales, even if the distinctions are unrelated to quality, if these arrangements are ‘necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.’ . . . We hold that the statutory ‘just and reasonable’ standard permits the Commission to require differences in price for simultaneous sales of gas of identical quality, if it has permissibly found that such differences will effectively serve the regulatory purposes contemplated by Congress.” Plainly the Court of Appeals did not err in deciding that it was well within Commission discretion and expertise to conclude that the refund workoff credits and contingent escalations could provide opportunity for increased prices that would help in generating capital funds and in meeting rising costs, while assuring that such increases would not be levied upon consumers unless accompanied by increased supplies of gas. It is true that the Commission concluded that it could not determine the precise amount of additional gas supply that would be found and dedicated to interstate sales as a result of this formula. But this was also true of any change it might have made in gas prices. The Commission took massive evidence on supply, demand, and the relation between the two. Its difficulties, while not minor, did not stem from any failure to seek answers. Rather, the Commission pointed out that the results of exploratory activity are by nature dependent to some extent on chance, and the level of exploratory activity in turn may be influenced by many other factors besides price, including, the Commission said, “monetary inflation, changes in real cost of input resources, availability of input resources, changes in alternative investment opportunities, development of new producing areas, size of prospective reservoirs, changes in business confidence, degree of directionality of exploratory effort [toward gas or oil], changes in industry technology, and other factors influencing business decisions.” We think the record sufficiently supports the Commission’s conclusion: “Summarizing, there exists a positive relationship between gas contract price levels and exploratory effort; no reliable quantitative forecasts may be made by increments of additional gas supply resulting from specific increased gas prices; increases in ceiling prices which yield increases in producer revenues will result in expanded gas exploration activity; and the adequacy of expanded gas exploratory activity in terms of sufficiency of gas supply in relation to gas demands must be determined by continued Commission observation of the results of our decisions.” 46 F. P. C., at 124. New York’s contention that the rates on flowing or first vintage gas are not supported by substantial evidence is also predicated on an erroneously limited view of the permissible range of the Commission’s authority to employ price to encourage exploration or production. Reduced to simplest form, New York’s contention is that the 1968 order set just and reasonable rates for first vintage gas, that no new evidence was introduced as to the cost of that gas, and that the 1971-order prices for that gas are consequently excessive. Again, as we said in Permian, the Commission is not so limited in its construction of rate formulae. Its justification here for increasing the price of flowing or first vintage gas was not that new evidence showed that the conditions of producing that gas differed from the conditions found in the 1968 opinion, but, as the Commission frankly acknowledged, new revenues were deemed necessary to expand future production. As between placing the burden of that expansion on new or second vintage gas alone or spreading it over both old and new gas, it judged the latter more equitable and more likely to lead to the immediately increased capital necessary in the face of a crisis. We see nothing in New York’s argument to suggest that the Commission could not — in view of its finding that increased revenues were necessary — place the burden of those payments on all users rather than on those alone who purchased gas in the future. Indeed, it is worth noting that the Commission’s rate orders in Permian included in the cost components of gas a noncost price element for future expansion of exploratory effort. In this situation, the Commission could reasonably choose its formula as an appropriate mechanism for protecting the public interest. And, against the background of a serious and growing domestic gas shortage, the Court of Appeals could certainly conclude that the Commission might reasonably decide that, as compared with adjustments in the rate ceilings for gas producers to induce more exploration and production, its responsibility to maintain adequate supplies at the lowest reasonable rate could better be discharged by means of the contingent escalation and refund credit provisions. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals’ holding that “these periodic escalations were a proper subject for the exercise of administrative discretion and clearly fall within that 'zone of reasonableness’ which we allow FPC on review.” 483 F. 2d, at 908. B Mobil, New York, and MDG all raise claims that even if the Commission’s rates are sufficient to satisfy the Act’s minimum requirements as to amount and, on the basis of the Commission’s chosen methodology, are supported by substantial evidence, they are nonetheless unduly discriminatory and therefore unlawful under §§ 4 and 5 of the Act. This attack is directed both to the contingent escalations on flowing or first vintage gas and to the refund credits. The background to Mobil’s argument is a Commission program inaugurated after promulgation in 1960 of guidelines for area rate regulation. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F. P. C. 818 (1960); Fourth Amendment to Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 26 F. P. C. 661 (1961). That program was aimed at disposing of claims arising from rates that exceeded guideline levels. The program encouraged settlement of contested rate dockets and resulted in substantial producer refunds, reduction of producer rates to guideline levels, and mora-toria on producer rate increases for substantial periods. Major producers like Mobil that cooperated with the program thus had little if any refund obligation to “work off” among the $150 million refunds directed by the 1971 order, whereas producers who for over a decade had not cooperated with FPC but had continued collection of higher rates, had high refund liabilities, and thus enjoyed the benefits of the refund credit formula. Mobil contends undue discrimination results because these producers earn refund credits by dedicating new natural gas reserves which are not counted toward industry escalations, yet also receive all escalations in flowing gas ceiling rates earned by dedication of new natural gas reserves by other producers. Moreover, Mobil’s argument continues, the refund credits provide the noncooperating producers with working capital they may use, for example, in competitive lease biddings and other corporate activities, while cooperating producers like Mobil are not allowed comparable allowances in the revenues to be realized from the area rates. The Commission squarely faced up to the Mobil argument as follows, 46 F. P. C., at 109-110: “The substance of their argument is that the rate design in the settlement proposal unlawfully discriminates against producers who in the past cooperated with the Commission and consumer and distributor interests by executing companywide settlements, and made refunds which reduced their revenues to the general level of the Commission’s Section 7 guideline level, and in favor of producers who did not enter into such rate settlements or otherwise reduce their contested Section 4 and Section 7 rates. The latter ... in the meantime have collected rates considerably higher than those realized by the group which settled. Under the proposed settlement, as Mobil points out, one group is in effect rewarded for their relative intransigence — they will be able to retain revenues collected up to the agreed 22.375(£ (where their contracts permit) and achieve a favored revenue position. “The logic of this [Mobil’s] position cannot be assailed. Candor requires us to admit that some of the predicted inequities as among producers will surely occur, and those who have attempted to work ‘within the system’ are comparatively disadvantaged. We have chosen to go the route of the alternative rate design suggested in the [settlement] proposal. The inequitable consequences which might flow from it have to be compared with its advantages, and . . . no scheme can be free of some inequities. The broader acceptability of the [settlement] proposal with the distributor group impels us to act as we do.” In other words, it was the Commission’s judgment that even though the refund credit device does not operate as favorably for producers who paid refunds and lowered rates, the advantages in the public interest that could result from encouraging exploration and increased production overrode such possible inequitable consequences. The Court of Appeals held that in thus striking the balance, the Commission acted within its statutory authority upon substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals stated, 483 F. 2d, at 905: “FPC concluded that the overall structure would stimulate greater exploration and development and have a general pro-competitive effect. We will not reject an administrative decision merely because one producer’s piece of cake is iced and another’s is not. The crucial factor, in total alignment with both Permian and SoLa I, is that both get some cake. Given the wisdom of the administrative desire to elicit new supply, and accepting the proposition that the incalculable relationship between rate and supply is positive, we refuse to tamper with an overall program which effectively exploits that relationship. FPC’s order setting the total refund obligation of all gas producers in [the Southern Louisiana area] is therefore fully sustained.” The question ultimately becomes whether this degree of discrimination in some of the provisions of the rate order renders the order unjust and unreasonable as a whole, despite its overall balance of effects and purposes. Obviously, some discrimination arises from the mere fact of area, rather than individual-producer, regulation, but Permian held such effects justified. Similarly, departure from cost basing in setting rates can, on Mobil’s theory of the meaning of “discrimination,” be said to be discriminatory, but Permian held that this too may be justified by other regulatory concerns. Here, although the impact on Mobil exists, the size of that impact will depend on the fortuity of other producers’ success in future exploratory efforts, and, of course, the favorable terms of its settlement would have to be considered in mitigation of that impact. We cannot say that the Court of Appeals misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial-evidence standard in concluding that the Commission’s assessment of the need for the refund credits, compared to the costs and benefits of some other scheme, was adequately supported. Mobil voluntarily exercised a business judgment in deciding early in the course of the proceedings to compromise in advance refund liabilities that might be imposed upon it at the conclusion of the various rate proceedings. In a sense, therefore, the claimed discrimination arises solely from its voluntary decision. This was part of the Commission’s answer to Mobil’s contention, 46 F. P. C., at 135, “Parties who enter into settlements or those who refuse to do so, always run the risk that the ultimate Commission determination may be higher or lower than the settlement levels.” And the Court of Appeals pointed out, 483 F. 2d, at 906 n. 31: “If the [1971] rates were lower than those established in these agreements, the private settlements would have been worthwhile. As it turns out, FPC was more generous in [1971] than was anticipated. But this clearly furnishes no basis for attack.” Moreover, it is a matter of speculation whether Mobil's gain from its settlement actually might be less advantageous than its hypothetical gains from refund credits. New York and MDG argue that the refund credit formula is discriminatory against pipeline purchasers because it permits producers to work off refunds by offering 50%, rather than 100%, of the new reserves to pipeline purchasers other than those owed the refunds. It may suffice to answer that the pipeline purchasers affected make no complaint. In any event, since the purpose of the device is to increase supply, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the provision was within Commission discretion. The record shows that two-thirds of the refund obligations are owed to three of the 14 pipeline companies serving the area. The Commission could reasonably conclude that in guaranteeing that 60% of the new reserves must be offered to these three companies, their producers’ incentive to explore for and produce new gas anywhere in the area, could result in their dedication of new reserves that would exceed in benefit the amount of the refunds. It is also contended that, because the work-off provision of the order applies entirely to present producers, the work-off provision “imperil [s] the entry of new producer entrants and [gives] a competitive advantage to producers who had charged the most unreasonable rates in the past.” Brief for MDG 47. The 0.50 per Mcf incentive increases on flowing gas are attacked on the same ground. Brief for New York 37. The Court of Appeals, addressing this attack upon both the contingent escalation provisions and the refund work-offs, sufficiently answered these arguments: “And for that unnamed new market entrant, for whom much concern is expressed, we fail to see why he would be in the least bit dissuaded from committing new reserves at 260/Mcf by the fact that it might allow some of his competitors to raise their 22.3750/Mcf flowing gas price by a half-penny.” 483 F. 2d, at 908. Finally, New York argues that some producers might abandon their normal business of exploring for and developing new reserves and yet enjoy the 0.50 per Mcf increase in their prices for flowing gas if other producers go ahead and contribute substantial additional reserves. We are not persuaded. The Commission's belief that producers already operating in the area will continue to do so is certainly at least an equally tenable judgment. The Commission’s purpose is to obtain increasing production of gas, and its targets are not so demonstrably unrelated as to justify acceptance of New York’s fears that contingent escalations will have a negative effect on overall exploratory effort. In any event, other than the expressed fears, New York offered nothing to overcome the “presumption of validity [that] attaches to each exercise of the Commission’s expertise.... [T]hose who would overturn the Commission’s judgment undertake The heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.’ ” Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 767. C We come last in our consideration of the Commission’s order to a series of more narrowly drawn objections raised by the various parties. Mobil objects to the Commission’s fixing of moratoria on new rate filings — until October 1, 1976, for flowing or first vintage gas contracts, and until October 1, 1977, for new or second vintage gas contracts. It contends that those provisions are unsupported by required findings of fact and by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion and we are not able to say that this conclusion misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial-evidence standard. We pointed out in Permian Basin that, unless raised as an attack on the viability of the entire order, such claims are, at best, premature. It is true, as Mobil argues, that the underlying conditions of stability justifying the moratorium in Permian have been found by the Commission to be no longer true. But the Commission has responsively shifted from reliance upon stable prices to reliance upon automatic escalations together with refund credits and contingent escalations. Even as to producers like Mobil that settled (for a yet-unknown financial benefit) their refund obligations, the contingent escalations and automatic escalations introduced for the purpose of both encouraging increased exploratory activity and covering inflation costs offer adequate assurances of keeping those producers above that line where a moratorium might run afoul of the minimum return required under the Act and the Constitution. See Permian Basin, supra, at 769-771. In addition, as the Court of Appeals said: “ [T]here are several alternative methods by which a single aggrieved producer may establish higher rates as his circumstances warrant. . . . Thus, the system is so structured that FPC can retain industry and area wide rate stability for a period of at least five years while simultaneously protecting the financial integrity of the individual producer. And if the change in circumstances is so widespread that the area rate is no longer economically feasible as set, FPC has the power to lift its moratorium or establish new area rates, or both.” 483 F. 2d, at 909. Mobil also complains that the Commission failed to provide automatic adjustments in area rates to compensate for anticipated higher royalty costs. It relies on Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 149 U. S. App. D. C. 310, 463 F. 2d 256 (1972),where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a Commission holding that subjected royalties to FPC administrative ceilings. Mobil argues that under that decision the 1971 rate schedules must take into account the possibility of higher royalty obligations. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Mobil’s argument is hypothetical at this stage and that in any event an affected producer is entitled to seek individualized relief. The Court of Appeals said: “[W]e are not willing to alter or stay the implementation of area wide rates for the entire industry merely on the basis of what might happen to some producers’ costs if [the District of Columbia Circuit’s] statement of the law prevails. “If, as subsequent events develop, the producers are put in a bind by their royalty obligations, they may certainly petition FPC for individualized relief. Permian contemplated it.” 483 F. 2d, at 911 (emphasis in original). New York objects to the Commission’s elimination of the rMst.irifit.imi in maximum permissible rates between casinghead gas and gas-well gas so far as new dedications are concerned. Casinghead gas has traditionally been treated as a byproduct of oil and therefore costed and priced lower than gas-well gas. The Court of Appeals held that “FPC acted within the bounds of administrative propriety in abandoning any such distinction.” Id., at 910. We cannot say that this conclusion, supported by the following reasoning, was error: “We believe that several considerations support this course of action: (i) ‘the exigencies of administration demand the smallest possible number of separate area rates/ Permian, supra, 390 U. S. at 761, . . . (ii) there is a serious problem of allocating the proper amount of exploration and development expenses between oil and gas, see SoLa I: 428 F. 2d 422 n. 30, (iii) imposing a lower price on casinghead gas might ‘ “invite the divergence of such gas to the intrastate market,” ’ Op: 598, ¶ 167, and (iv) making the production of casinghead gas economically unfeasible might encourage profit-minded producers to flare it rather than market it — thus making natural gas in [the Southern Louisiana area] not merely a wasting but a wasted, asset. . . .” 483 F. 2d, at 909 (emphasis in original) . Such pragmatic adjustments were used in Permian Basin as a way of equating first vintage gas and all casinghead gas, new and old. All that the Commission has done here is to equate all new casinghead gas with all new gas just as old casinghead gas has always been equated with old gas-well gas. Mobil complains of the provision of the order that established minimum rates to be paid by producers to pipelines for transportation of liquids and liquefiable hydrocarbons. Mobil argues that these minimum rates are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals disagreed. “We have examined the testimony regarding this matter and conclude that FPC had a substantial evidentiary basis from which it could conclude that the particular rates which it established should supply a reasonable floor on these charges. This answers Mobil’s objection.” Id., at 911. Mobil has not met its burden of demonstrating that the Court of Appeals misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial-evidence standard. Y The overriding objective of the Commission was, as the Court of Appeals observed, to adopt “a total rate structure to motivate private producers to fully develop [the Southern Louisiana area’s] resources.” Id., at 891. The Commission’s findings, 46 F. P. C., at 102, emphasize that goal: “Our duty is to take all the action we believe necessary to reverse a downtrend of the exploration and development effort, thereby to increase the likelihood of augmenting the national inventory of proved reserves of natural gas. We would be derelict — we can think of no softer word — if we were to be guided by the legalisms of the past in seeking solutions to the problems which have grown like barnacles as this case has aged and its size has mounted.” Features of the 1971 order designed to increase supplies of natural gas may strike some as novel but we have emphasized that the Commission “must be free ... to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests.” Permian, 390 U. S., at 767. That principle has obvious applicability in this time of acute energy shortage. This accents the observation, apparently still the case, that “area regulation of producer prices is avowedly still experimental in its terms and uncertain in its ultimate consequences.” Id., at 772. For, as the Court of Appeals said: “Cast in the perspective of the human travail, some might say that the dozen year experience with area rate regulation should arguably justify a holding that the experimental phase has passed. In 1971, . . . however, FPC had only twice been the beneficiary of the judicial function to declare ‘what the law is’. No one can honestly say that judges have been any more sure than commissioners, as all struggle with a problem that grows out of the peculiar mixture of a simultaneous service and exhaustion of a depletable asset. All have been groping. The day for groping is not yet over. And it does not denigrate what FPC has done to say that much may yet be imperfect and much remains to be done or redone. So we can find that FPC has conscientiously attempted to establish ‘just and reasonable’ rates within the framework allowed by judicial precedent, yet, it is still experimenting.” 483 F. 2d, at 889. We cannot now hold that, in these circumstances, the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the Commission's 1971 order was an appropriate exercise of administrative discretion supported by substantial evidence. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. Opinion No. 598, 46 F. P. C. 86 (1971), together with the Commission’s order correcting certain errors and denying rehearing as to all other issues, Opinion No. 598-A, 46 F. P. C. 633 (1971). As in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 754 n. 2 (1968), sales within the Commission’s jurisdiction will, for convenience, be termed “jurisdictional” or “interstate” sales. See n. 17, infra. The Court of Appeals reported the status of area rate proceedings in 483 F. 2d 880, 886 n. 3. The Commission has updated that information as follows: “1. Permian Basin Area “Opinion Nos. 468 and 468-A, 34 FPC 159, and 1068, respectively (1965), affirmed Permian Basin Area Bate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 (1968) “New rates for this area were established in: “Opinion Nos. 662 and 662-A (Area Rate Proceeding, Permian Basin Area),-FPC-,-, (Docket No. AR70-1 (Phase I), is- sued August 7, 1973, and September 28, 1973, respectively); pending review sub nom. Chevron Oil Co., Western Division, et al. v. F. P. C. (9th Cir. Nos. 73-2861, et al., filed September 28, 1973) “2. Southern Louisiana Area “Opinion Nos. 546 and 546-A, 40 FPC 530, 41 FPC 301, respectively (1968), affirmed sub nom. Austral Oil Co., et al. v. F. P. C., 428 F. 2d 407 (5th Cir.1970), on rehearing, 444 F. 2d 125 (1970); certiorari denied sub nom. Municipal Distributors Group v. F. P. C., 400 U. S. 950 (1970) “New rates for this area were established in: “Opinion Nos. 598 and 598-A, 46 FPC 86 and 633, respectively (1971), affirmed sub nom. Placid Oil Co., et al. v. F. P. C., 483 F. 2d 880 (1973) [the instant case]. "3. Texas Gulf Coast Area “Opinion Nos. 595 and 595-A, 45 FPC 674 and 46 FPC 827, respectively (1971), reversed and remanded sub nom. Public Service Commission of the State of New York, et al. v. F. P. C., 487 F. 2d 1043 (D. C. Cir. 1973), certiorari pending sub nom. Shell Oil Co., et al. v. Public Service Commission of the State of New York, et al. (Sup. Ct. Nos. 73-966, et al., filed December 22, 1973). "4. Hugoton-Anadarko Area “Opinion No. 586, 44 FPC 761 (1970), affirmed sub nom. People of the State of California, et al. v. F. P. C., 466 F. 2d 974 (9th Cir.1972). “5. Other Southwest Area “Opinion Nos. 607 and 607-A, 46 FPC 900 and 47 FPC 99, respectively (1971), affirmed sub nom. Shell Oil Co., et al. v. F. P. C., 484 F. 2d 469 (5th Cir.1973), certiorari pending sub nom. Mobil Oil Corp. v. F. P. C. (Sup. Ct. No. 73-438, filed September 6, 1973). “6. Appalachian and Illinois Basin “Order Nos. 411, 411-A and 411-B, 44 FPC 1112, 1334 and 1487, respectively (1970) (these orders were never appealed). “The Commission declined to establish new area rates for this area in Opinion No. 639, 48 FPC 1299 (1972), affirmed sub nom. Shell Oil Co., et al. v. F. P. C., - F. 2d - (5th Cir. Nos. 73-1369, et al., decided March 14, 1974). “7. Rocky Mountain Area “Opinion Nos. 658 and 658-A, 49 FPC 924 and-FPC-, respectively (1973), petition for review filed and dismissed on motion of petitioner sub nom. Exxon Corporation v. F. P. C. (D. C. Cir. No. 73-1854, dismissed February 22, 1974). “Opinion Nos. 658 and 658-A prescribed just and reasonable rates for gas produced in this area from wells commenced prior to January 1, 1973 and sold under contracts dated prior to October 1, 1968. Sales from this area which are not covered by the rates established in Opinion Nos. 658 and 658-A will be governed by the rates prescribed in the Commission's pending nationwide rate proceedings (see below). Pending completion of the nationwide proceedings, such sales are being permanently certified under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. 717f, at the initial rates prescribed in Order No. 435, 46 FPC 68 (1971) sub nom. American Public Gas Association, et al. v. F. P. C. (D. C. Cir. Nos. 72-1812, et al., May 23, 1974).” The Commission further advises that “[proceedings to establish uniform nationwide rates for all jurisdictional producer sales have been instituted at the Commission. When these proceedings are completed, the rates prescribed therein will supersede all area rates. As to gas from wells commenced on or after January 1, 1973, see; “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order Prescribing Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 10014 (Docket No. R-389-B, issued April 11, 1973). “As to gas from wells commenced prior to January 1, 1973, see; “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order Prescribing Procedures, 38 Fed. Reg. 14295 (Docket No. R-478, issued May 23, 1973).” Memorandum from General Counsel, FPC (May 17, 1974). As to the Commission’s shift from individual ratemaking through an adjudicative procedure to area ratemaking through a rulemaking procedure, see Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking — The New Approach at the FPC: Ad Hoc Rulemaking in the Ratemaking Process, 1973 Duke L. J. 41. Sections 4 (a) and 5 (a), 15 U. S. C. §§ 717c (a) and 717d (a), respectively provide: § 4 (a) “All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges, shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared to be unlawful.” § 5 (a) “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order: Provided, however, That the Commission shall have no power to order any increase in any rate contained in the currently effective schedule of such natural gas company on file with the Commission, unless such increase is in accordance with a new schedule filed by such natural gas company; but the Commission may order a decrease where existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, otherwise unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates.” Petitioner in No. 73-437, Mobil Oil Corp., is a major producer of natural gas in the Southern Louisiana area. Petitioner in No. 73-457, Public Service Commission of the State of New York and petitioner in No. 73-464, Municipal Distributors Group— a group of approximately 200 municipally owned gas distributors— represent major consumer interests. Hereafter in this opinion they will be referred to respectively as “Mobil,” “New York,” and “MDG.” Although all three attack at times the same provisions of the 1971 order, the attacks make different arguments as best serve the self-interest of the particular petitioner. Thus, the ceiling rate for flowing gas established by the Commission includes a noncost factor designed to facilitate investment by producers in exploration and development of new gas reserves. Mobil, understandably concerned with higher prices, argues that the noncost addition is not enough; indeed, that the rates fixed both for flowing gas and for new gas are too low. New York and MDG, on the other hand, concerned with lower prices, object that the rates for flowing gas are too high and reduce the level of refund obligations. Approximately five years were consumed by hearings, and the trial examiner’s opinion issued on December 30, 1966, 40 F. P. C. 703. Pursuant to its authority, upheld in Permian, to use price flexibly, the Commission established three “vintages” for onshore gas delivered under contracts made, respectively, (1) before 1961, (2) between January 1, 1961, and October 1, 1968, and (3) after October 1, 1968. It set price ceilings for the three vintages, respectively; at 18.50 per thousand cubic feet (Mcf), 19.50 per Mcf, and 200 per Mcf. For offshore gas in the federal domain, which is not subject to the Louisiana severance tax, the ceilings were 1.50 per Mcf below onshore levels. The Commission also ordered refunds aggregating approximately $375 million for gas sold and delivered between the initiation of the proceedings and the effective date of its opinion, October 1, 1968, at prices above the established pre-October 1 ceilings. Finally, it established, subject to the right of individual producers to petition for exceptions, an indefinite moratorium on rate increases above the pre-October 1 ceilings, and a moratorium until January 1, 1974 (over five years), on rate increases above the post-October 1 maximum. Such mora-toria provide for automatic suspension of any rate filing, without determination of justness and reasonableness. See, e. g., United Gas v. Callery Properties, 382 U. S. 223 (1965). As of the end of 1970, the precise amount of these refunds was $376,428,000, see 5 App. 237e, but they were accruing interest under terms of the Commission’s order. Opinion No. 546, 40 F. P. C. 530 (1968). See SoLa I, 428 F. 2d 407, 435 n. 87 (CA5 1970). This report was updated by FPC Staff Report No. 2, National Gas Supply and Demand 1971-1990 (1972), which states in part: ‘"The emergence of a natural gas shortage during the past two years marks a historic turning point — the end of natural gas industry growth uninhibited by supply considerations. . . . For practical short-term purposes we are confronted with the fact that current proven reserves in the lower 48 states . . . have dropped from 289.3 trillion cubic feet [Tcf] in 1967 to 259.6 in 1970, a 10.3 percent drop within a three-year period. . . .’ ” FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U. S. 621, 626 n.2 (1972). On January 26, 1971, the consolidated proceeding was expanded to include all rate certification proceedings that had been, or would have been, initiated in the Southern Louisiana area during the pendency of the case. Pet. for Cert, of New York 9. 46 F. P. C., at 101. United Distribution Companies, a group of 32 major distribution companies. Id., at 103 n. 25. The Commission’s tabulation stated: “In support of the settlement proposal are 32 major distribution companies representing 25 percent of the gas distribution operations in the United States, serving about 10.3 million customers at retail; 55 gas distribution companies which supply gas service to more than 10 million customers; all interstate pipelines purchasing gas from the Southern Louisiana area; and 46 natural gas producers, comprising 80 percent of the total gas production flowing from the area. . . . The Commission staff likewise supported the settlement proposal.” Id., at 103. The Commission opinion states: “We have more than a settlement proposal before us. We have the entire record made in the original Southern Louisiana proceedings, plus the record opened with the institution of Docket No. AR 69-1 and concluded after Docket No. AR 61-2 was consolidated with it. The settlement proposal was obviously heavily influenced by the teachings of [SoLa 7], as the parties perceived those teachings, and so was the record made in conjunction with it. It is our duty to review that record and to make findings thereon, and to come to conclusions therefrom. Only if substantial evidence supports it can we approve the settlement proposal, and this means that we must analyze supply and demand, supply-cost relationships, and costing methodology. Rate design, incentives, refunds, and economic considerations, as the record permits insight into these matters, must also be discussed.” Id., at 106. The Commission’s conclusion that the rates were just and reasonable is to be found in 46 E. P. C., at 110. Conclusions that they were supported by substantial evidence appear throughout the opinion following appropriate examination of the record evidence. See, e. g., id., at 131, 137-138, 142. Under the formula if, before October 1, 1977, the industry as a whole finds and dedicates to the interstate market new gas reserves in the Southern Louisiana area of seven and one half Tcf, the rate for flowing gas will escalate by 0.50; if, prior to that date, such reserves equal eleven and one quarter Tcf, the rate will increase by an additional 0.50; if, prior to the same date, such reserves equal 15 Tcf, a final 0.50 escalation will become effective. Id., at 143. The rates that would have been established had the 1968 orders become effective ranged from 170 per Mcf to 200 per Mcf. The Commission’s formula works thus: Any company with a “refund obligation” to any natural gas pipeline company is allowed to reduce the refund obligation by one cent for each Mcf of new gas reserves committed to the interstate market in the Southern Louisiana area during the period ending October 1, 1977. Any portion of the “refund obligation’' not so discharged is payable in cash with interest, subject to certain special relief provisions for producers who either achieve 65% of their obligations by August 1, 1976, or who have nonetheless made a "sincere and diligent effort” to discharge them. Opinion No. 598-A, 46 F. P. C. 633, 641 (1971). The producer is required to commit, or give right of first refusal to, at least 50% of the new reserves to the purchaser to whom the refund would otherwise be payable. The reserves committed to reduce the refund obligation may not be counted by the producer committing those reserves as a part of the industry reserves required to trigger the escalated prices for flowing gas referred to in n. 16 above. The rate levels for refund purposes are as follows: (a) For deliveries prior to January 1, 1965, 20.6250 per Mcf for onshore gas and 19.6250 per Mcf for offshore gas. (b) For deliveries from January 1, 1965, to September 30, 1968, 21.250 per Mcf for onshore gas and 20.250 per Mcf for offshore gas. (c) For deliveries from October 1, 1968, to January 1, 1971, 30.5% of the difference between revenues during this period based on rates prior to October 1, 1970, and the revenues that would have resulted during this period through the application of rates established in SoLa I, as modified. This percentage factor of 30.5 may be increased to as high as 33% to produce the $150 million refund total. (d) For deliveries after January 1, 1971, base area rates prescribed in the 1971 order, see 46 F. P. C., at 140. See n. 4, supra. Section 717 (b) provides: “The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.” See, e. g., Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. See Kitch, Regulation of the Field Market for Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, 11 J. Law and Econ. 243 (1968); Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 Geo. L. J. 695, 702, 704 (1956). The contention was early made that in regulating the ultimate source of a production, here the natural-gas producer, the problem is not to ensure a reasonable rate of return, but to use prices functionally to produce a supply that will satisfy a socially selected level of demand, and efficiently to allocate that supply. See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 629 (1944) (separate opinion of Jackson, J.): ‘'The heart of this problem is the elusive, exhaustible, and irreplaceable nature of natural gas itself. Given sufficient money, we can produce any desired amount of railroad, bus, or steamship transportation, or communications facilities, or capacity for generation of electric energy, or for the manufacture of gas of a kind. In the service of such utilities one customer has little concern with the amount taken by another, one’s waste will not deprive another, a volume of service can be created equal to demand, and today’s demands will not exhaust or lessen capacity to serve tomorrow. But the wealth of Midas and the wit of man cannot produce or reproduce a natural gas field.” Compare, for a review of the possible purposes of natural gas regulation and the arguments for and against the scheme of the Natural Gas Act, Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 941, especially 944r-952 (1973). See Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F. P. C. 200 (1940); cases cited in Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 756 n. 7. Section 1 (b), 15 U. S. C. §717 (b), exempts “the production or gathering of natural gas” from the Act. Both the reason for the Commission’s view and the logical infirmity in it appear in the legislative history of the Act. The growing concentration of natural gas pipelines had led to traditional abuses associated with monopoly power — limitation of supply, discriminatory pricing, and barriers to entry. Hearings on H. R. 4008 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 47, 70-73, 89-91, 101-103 (1937). The States first proved incapable of combating these foreign corporations, id., at 50, 93, and then were barred by decisions of this Court holding that such regulation violated the Interstate Commerce Clause. See, e. g., Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 270 U. S. 550 (1926). Congress’ response was to take over where the States’ power ceased, following the chain of distribution back into the interstate market, and it quite naturally used a public utility model. But, once begun, prevention of the circumvention of such regulation virtually compelled extension of control to the source. Although the debate continues today as to whether the production of natural gas is, or has the potential to be, competitive, compare Diener, Area Price Regulation in the Natural Gas Industry of Southern Louisiana, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 695 (1972) (not competitive), with Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 941 (1973) (competitive), revision of the regulation required by the Act is a matter for consideration by the Congress, not by this Court. See FPC v. Texaco, post, at 400-401. Prior to the Phillips case there were fewer than 200 pipeline companies subject to Commission regulation. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F. P. C. 818 (1960). Immediately prior to passage of the Act, four holding company groups controlled over 55% of the Nation’s pipeline mileage. Hearings on H. R. 11662 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 12, 52 (1936). See Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F. P. C. 537, 542 (1960). Section 717a provides: “When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires— “(6) ‘Natural-gas company’ means a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale.” See Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, at 542. Various statistics presented by the Commission in its Phillips opinion on remand indicated a total of 3,372 independent producers with rates on file and an estimated backlog So large that,, if the staff of the Commission were tripled, it would take over 82 years to reach current status. 24 F. P. C., at 545-546. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F. P. C. 818 (1960). Ibid. See Opinion No. 598, 46 F. P. C., at 112-114 (American Gas Association, Committee on Natural Gas Reserves, Annual Reports). See, e. g., Kitch, supra, n. 22, at 276-280. See also Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 816-817. See n. 3, supra. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, supra. Permian Basin, supra, at 759-760. Id., at 761. Ibid.; cf. infra, at 329-330. The Commission has raised the rate of return to 15% in the instant case. 46 F. P. C., at 131. Cf. ibid. Cf. ibid. See 46 F. P. C., at 143: “The maximum standard will be 1050 Btu’s per cubic foot of gas, . . . and the minimum standard will be 1000 Btu’s per cubic foot of gas.” Adjustments outside this range are to be on a proportional basis. This was the standard used in Permian Basin, see 390 U. S., at 762-763. Id., at 770-771. Indeed, in addition to its general approval of such an approach, see 390 U. S., at 814-815, the Court in Permian Basin listed each of the noneost factors used by the Commission and approved them. See id., at 815 n. 98. Section 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717r (b), states: “ (b) Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. . . . Upon the filing of such petition such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record with it shall be exclusive, to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part. . . . The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . . The judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari . . . New York asserts (Brief 17-18) that the Court of Appeals “does not sit as a court of equity in reviewing actions of an administrative agency . . . .” We agree with and adopt the Commission’s answer to that contention, Brief for Federal Power Commission 24 n. 20: “But the case it cites for that proposition, Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, is wholly inapposite. The issue there was whether [the Supreme] Court had jurisdiction to review a decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia setting aside an order of the Federal Radio Commission. [The] Court held that it did not have jurisdiction, because under the pertinent statute the court of appeals, as a legislative court, was in effect 'a superior and revising agency’ (281 U. S., at 467). The proceeding in the court of appeals thus 'was not a case or controversy in the sense of the judiciary article, but was an administrative proceeding, and therefore . . . the decision therein is not reviewable by [the Supreme] Court’ (id., at 470). “[The Supreme] Court’s statement that the court of appeals in such cases does not exercise 'ordinary jurisdiction at law or in equity’ (id., at 468) refers only to that court’s former special role as a legislative court. It does not mean, as New York mistakenly infers, that reviewing courts exercising judicial rather than administrative jurisdiction do not sit as courts of equity. As [that] Court stated, the jurisdiction of reviewing courts under statutes similar to the Natural Gas Act is ‘quite unlike the jurisdiction exercised on appeals from the Radio Commission’ (id., at 470).” Title 18 CFR § 1.18 (a) provides: “(a) To adjust or settle proceedings. In order to provide opportunity for the submission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment, for settlement of a proceeding, or any of the issues therein, or consideration of means by which the conduct of the hearing may be facilitated and the disposition of the proceeding expedited, conferences between the parties to the proceeding and staff for such purposes may be held at any time prior to or during such hearings before the Commission or the officer designated to preside thereat as time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest may permit.” See text accompanying nn. 7-8, supra. The Appendix filed in this Court, and containing only those portions of the record designated by the parties, includes over 800 pages of testimony and over 300 pages of exhibits from the reopened proceedings. We note that four different cost studies were presented. These studies estimated costs of production ranging from 18.20 to 24.030 per Mcf for gas flowing under contracts dated prior to October 1, 1968. With respect to gas sold under contracts dated on or after October 1, 1968, the cost estimates based on a 1969 test year ranged from 19.390 to 38.020. The rates ultimately fixed by the Commission, even including incentive increments, were within the range of cost estimates. See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 769-770. We said there: “[T]he just and reasonable standard of the Natural Gas Act 'coincides’ with the applicable constitutional standards, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., [315 U. S. 575,] 586, and any rate selected by the Commission from the broad zone of reasonableness permitted by the Act cannot properly be áttacked as confiscatory.” Id., at 770. The Court then refused to invalidate, without reference to particular cases, a Commission plan to provide “ ‘appropriate relief’ if [a producer] establishes that its ‘out-of-pocket expenses in connection with the operation of a particular well’ exceed its revenue from the well under the applicable area price.” Id., at 770-771. See n. 48, supra. The evidence is set out at length and discussed in 46 F. P. C., at 110-123. This is well exemplified by the problems arising from the fact that many costs are jointly incurred in the production of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons. One witness testified that any number of accounting methods may be used to allocate such costs, and listed 10 of them. 4 App. 635-637. He further testified that these methods would produce a widely varying range of results, and that a choice of one of them was largely a matter of preference. The Commission’s determination to use a “modified Btu” approach, whereby a Btu of natural gas is assumed to be “worth” only a selected fraction of a Btu of oil, is a policy choice having significant consequences for the industry. The same witness testified that switching from the Commission’s assumption in its 1968 opinion that a Btu of oil is worth 3.5 times a Btu of natural gas to a 2.34 factor would make several cents’ difference in the ceiling rates. Id., at 550. An assumption of equality would thus appear likely to have a large impact. Yet no market price comparison of the values of oil and gas is available for the interstate market since the Commission sets the price of natural gas. Moreover, another witness testified that, since natural gas competes with oil in many markets, producers of both harm themselves when they expand their production of natural gas under the restraint of price ceilings. Id., at 476-481. Cf. n. 23, supra. 46 F. P. C., at 121. See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 815 n. 98. With the introduction of the formula used in this case, the Commission stated: “Adjustment for Exploration in Excess of Production. This adjustment was designed, in prior eases, to continue to provide findings in excess of production. At the present time, findings of non-associated gas are substantially less than production .... As we indicated in Texas Gulf Coast, our concept of economic costing includes the costs of eliciting the required exploratory and drilling effort. Thus, there is no reason to consider special allowance categories.” 46 F. P. C., at 133. See 5 App. 266e. In its opinion on rehearing the Commission stated, 46 F. P. C., at 636-637: “We note, again, that the Btu content of casinghead and gas-well gas is about the same, and the record shows that substantial volumes of casinghead gas are being flared in Southern Louisiana — reason in itself for eliminating the price discrimination.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF NEW YORK No. 79-134. Argued March 17, 1980 Decided June 20, 1980 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 544. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 544. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Parts I and II of which Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 548.. Joseph D. Block argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Peter P. Garam. Peter H. SchijJ argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Howard J. Read Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Walter L. Stratton for the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Inc.; by Stanley T. Kaleczyc for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America; by Burt Neuborne for Long Island Lighting Co.; by Edward H. Dowd, Myma P. Field, and John Cannon for the Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation et al.; by Edwin P. Rome and William H. Roberts for Mobil Corp.; by Malcolm H. Furbush, Joseph I. Kelly, Robert L. Harris, Gordon Pearce, Guenter S. Cohn, Timothy W. Tower, John Bury, and Leslie Christian Hauck for Pacific Gas and Electric Co. et al.; and by Daniel J. Popeo for the Washington Legal Foundation. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Kristin Booth Glen and Melvin L. Wulf for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al.; and by Harold I. Abramson and John C. Esposito for the New York State Consumer Protection Board et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Cameron F. MacRae for the Edison Electric Institute; and by William W. Becker for the New England Legal Foundation. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is whether the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. I The Consolidated Edison Company of New York, appellant in this case, placed written material entitled “Independence Is Still a Goal, and Nuclear Power Is Needed To Win the Battle” in its January 1976 billing envelope. The bill insert stated Consolidated Edison’s views on “the benefits of nuclear power,” saying that they “far outweigh any potential risk” and that nuclear power plants are safe, economical, and clean. App. 35. The utility also contended that increased use of nuclear energy would further this country’s independence from foreign energy sources. In March 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), requested Consolidated Edison to enclose a rebuttal prepared by NRDC in its next billing envelope. Id., at 45-46. When Consolidated Edison refused, NRDC asked the Public Service Commission of the State of New York to open Consolidated Edison’s billing envelopes to contrasting views on controversial issues of public importance. Id., at 32-33. On February 17,1977, the Commission, appellee here, denied NRDC’s request, but prohibited “utilities from using bill inserts to discuss political matters, including the desirability of future development of nuclear power.” Id., at 50. The Commission explained its decision in a Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotional Practices of Public Utilities issued on February 25, 1977. The Commission concluded that Consolidated Edison customers who receive bills containing inserts are a captive audience of diverse views who should not be subjected to the utility’s beliefs. Accordingly, the Commission barred utility companies from including bill inserts that express “their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues of public policy.” App. to Juris. Statement 43a. The Commission did not, however, bar utilities from sending bill inserts discussing topics that are not “controversial issues of public policy.” The Commission later denied petitions for rehearing filed by Consolidated Edison and other utilities. Id., at 59a. Consolidated Edison sought review of the Commission’s order in the New York state courts. The State Supreme Court, Special Term, held the order unconstitutional. 93 Misc. 2d 313, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1978). But the State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 63 App. Div. 2d 364, 407 N. Y. S. 2d 735 (1978), and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 390 N. E. 2d 749 (1979). The Court of Appeals held that the order did not violate the Constitution because it was a valid time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect the privacy of Consolidated Edison’s customers. Id., at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U. S. 822 (1979). We reverse. II The restriction on bill inserts cannot be upheld on the ground that Consolidated Edison is not entitled to freedom of speech. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), we rejected the contention that a State may confine corporate speech to specified issues. That decision recognized that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.” Id., at 777. Because the state action limited protected speech, we concluded that the regulation could not stand absent a showing of a compelling state interest. Id., at 786. The First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that no State shall “abridg[e] the freedom of speech.” See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 500-501 (1952). Freedom of speech is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth,” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The First and Fourteenth Amendments remove “governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity....” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971). This Court has emphasized that the First Amendment “embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern. . . .” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1940); see Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). In the mailing that triggered the regulation at issue, Consolidated Edison advocated the use of nuclear power. The Commission has limited the means by which Consolidated Edison may participate in the public debate on this question and other controversial issues of national interest and importance. Thus, the Commission’s prohibition of discussion of controversial issues strikes at the heart of the freedom to speak. Ill The Commission’s ban on bill inserts is not, of course, invalid merely because it imposes a limitation upon speech. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 786. We must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its regulation is constitutionally permissible. The Commission’s arguments require us to consider three theories that might justify the state action. We must determine whether the prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation, or (iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest. A This Court has recognized the validity of reasonable time, place, or manner regulations that serve a significant governmental interest and leave ample alternative channels for communication. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 86, 93 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 104 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941), this Court upheld a licensing requirement for parades through city streets. The Court recognized that the regulation, which was based on time, place, or manner criteria, served the municipality’s legitimate interests in regulating traffic, securing public order, and insuring that simultaneous parades did not prevent all speakers from being heard. Id., at 576. Similarly, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972), we upheld an antinoise regulation prohibiting demonstrations that would disturb the good order of an educational facility. The narrowly drawn restriction constitutionally advanced the city’s interest “in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students’ learning. . . .” Id., at 119. Thus, the essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate governmental goals. No matter what its message, a roving sound truck that blares at 2 a. m. disturbs neighborhood tranquility. A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech may be imposed so long as it is reasonable. But when regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited “merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.” Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). As a consequence, we have emphasized that time, place, and manner regulations must be “applicable to all speech irrespective of content.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 209 (1975); see Carey v. Brown, ante, at 470. Governmental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter “ ‘slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content.’ ” Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972), quoting Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 29. Therefore, a constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. The Commission does not pretend that its action is unrelated to the content or subject matter of bill inserts. Indeed, it has undertaken to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they address controversial issues of public policy. The Commission allows inserts that present information to consumers on certain subjects, such as energy conservation measures, but it forbids the use of inserts that discuss public controversies. The Commission, with commendable candor, justifies its ban on the ground that consumers will benefit from receiving “useful” information, but not from the prohibited information. See App. to Juris. Statement 66a-67a. The Commission’s own rationale demonstrates that its action cannot be upheld as a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation. B The Commission next argues that its order is acceptable because it applies to all discussion of nuclear power, whether pro or con, in bill inserts. The prohibition, the Commission contends, is related to subject matter rather than to the views of a particular speaker. Because the regulation does not favor either side of a political controversy, the Commission asserts that it does not unconstitutionally suppress freedom of speech. The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an. entire topic. As a general matter, “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, supra, at 95; see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 580-581 (1965) (opinion of Black, J.). In Mosley, we held that a municipality could not exempt labor picketing from a general prohibition on picketing at a school even though the ban would have reached both pro- and anti-union demonstrations. If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to choose “which issues are worth discussing or debating . . . 408 U. S., at 96. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, at 214-215; Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 510-511 (1969). To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth. Nevertheless, governmental regulation based on subject matter has been approved in narrow circumstances. The court below relied upon two cases in which this Court has recognized that the government may bar from its facilities certain speech that would disrupt the legitimate governmental purpose for which the property has been dedicated. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), we held that the Federal Government could prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other subjects. See id., at 838, n. 10. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (opinion of Blackmun, J.), a plurality of the Court similarly concluded that a city transit system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial advertising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. The municipality’s refusal to accept political advertising was based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopardize long-term commercial revenue, that commuters would be subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of particular political advertisements might lead to charges of favoritism. Id., at 302, 304. Greer and Lehman properly are viewed as narrow exceptions to the general prohibition against subject-matter distinctions. In both cases, the Court was asked to decide whether a public facility was open to all speakers. The plurality in Lehman and the Court in Greer concluded that partisan political speech would disrupt the operation of governmental facilities even though other forms of speech posed no such danger. The analysis of Greer and Lehman is not applicable to the Commission’s regulation of bill inserts. In both cases, a private party asserted a right of access to public facilities. Consolidated Edison has not asked to use the offices of the Commission as a forum from which to promulgate its views. Rather, it seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy. The Commission asserts that the billing envelope, as a necessary adjunct to the operations of a public utility, is subject to the State’s plenary control. To be sure, the State has a legitimate regulatory interest in controlling Consolidated Edison’s activities, just as local governments always have been able to use their police powers in the public interest to regulate private behavior. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). But the Commission’s attempt to restrict the free expression of a private party cannot be upheld by reliance upon precedent that rests on the special interests of a government in overseeing the use of its property. C Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). See also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960). The Commission argues finally that its prohibition is necessary (i) to avoid forcing Consolidated Edison’s views on a captive audience, (ii) to allocate limited resources in the public interest, and (iii) to ensure that ratepayers do not subsidize the cost of the bill inserts. The State Court of Appeals largely based its approval of the prohibition upon its conclusion that the bill inserts intruded upon individual privacy. The court stated that the Commission could act to protect the privacy of the utility’s customers because they have no choice whether to receive the insert and the views expressed in the insert may inflame their sensibilities. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d, at 755. But the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the seriousness of the intrusion. Even if a short exposure to Consolidated Edison’s views may offend the sensibilities of some consumers, the ability of government “to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S., at 21. A less stringent analysis would permit a government to slight the First Amendment’s role “in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 783; see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the “captive” audience cannot avoid objectionable speech. Passengers on public transportation, see Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S., at 307-308 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment), or residents of a neighborhood disturbed by the raucous broadcasts from a passing sound truck, cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), may well be unable to escape an unwanted message. But customers who encounter an objectionable billing insert may “effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.” Cohen v. California, supra, at 21. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 412 (1974) (per curiam). The customer of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket. The Commission contends that because a billing envelope can accommodate only a limited amount of information, political messages should not be allowed to take the place of inserts that promote energy conservation or safety, or that remind consumers of their legal rights. The Commission relies upon Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra, in which the Court held that the regulation of radio and television broadcast frequencies permits the Federal Government to exercise unusual authority over speech. But billing envelopes differ from broadcast frequencies in two ways. First, a broadcaster communicates through use of a scarce, publicly owned resource. No person can broadcast without a license, whereas all persons are free to send correspondence to private homes through the mails. Thus, it cannot be said that billing envelopes are a limited resource comparable to the broadcast spectrum. Second, the Commission has not shown on the record before us that the presence of the bill inserts at issue would preclude the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might be ordered lawfully to include in the billing envelope. Unlike radio or television stations broadcasting on a single frequency, multiple bill inserts will not result in a “cacophony of competing voices.” Id., at 376. Finally, the Commission urges that its prohibition would prevent ratepayers from subsidizing the costs of policy-oriented bill inserts. But the Commission did not base its order on an inability to allocate costs between the shareholders of Consolidated Edison and the ratepayers. Rather, the Commission stated that “using bill inserts to proclaim a utility’s viewpoint on controversial issues {even when the stockholder pays for it in full) is tantamount to taking advantage of a captive audience. . . .” App. to Juris. Statement 43a (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is no basis on this record to assume that the Commission could not exclude the cost of these bill inserts from the utility’s rate base. Mere speculation of harm does not constitute a compelling state interest. See Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217, 222-223 (1967). IV The Commission’s suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The state action is neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, nor a permissible subject-matter regulation, nor a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the regulation is invalid. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 795. The decision of the New York Court of Appeals is Reversed. Nor does Consolidated Edison’s status as a privately owned but government regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment rights. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, post, at 566-568. We have recognized that the speech of heavily regulated businesses may enjoy constitutional protection. See, e. g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 763-765 (1976). Consolidated Edison’s position as a regulated monopoly does not decrease the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters. See generally Public Media Center v. FCC, 190 U. S. App. D. C. 425, 428, 429, 587 F. 2d 1322, 1325, 1326 (1978); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 127-129, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350, 352-353 (1976). Freedom of speech also protects the individual’s interest in self-expression. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777, n. 12 (1978); see T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 (1970). See also A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 35-36 (1965). See also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93-94 (1977); Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U. S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam). For example, when courts are asked to determine whether a species of speech is covered by the First Amendment, they must look to the content of the expression. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, post, at 561-563 (commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572-573 (1942) (fighting words). Compare FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746-747 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.), with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 761 (opinion of Powell, J.), 762-763 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (indecent speech). The necessity for excluding partisan speech was based upon the traditional policy “of keeping official military activities . . . wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind.” 424 U. S., at 839. Thus, the Court’s decision construed the public right of access in light of “the unique character of the Government property upon which the expression is to take place.” Id., at 842 (Powell, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Douglas, who concurred in the judgment in Lehman, did not view “the content of the message as relevant either to petitioner’s right to express it or to the commuters’ right to be free from it.” 418 U. S., at 308. Rather, Mr. Justice Douglas upheld the municipality’s actions because commuters were a captive audience. Id., at 306-308. The Consolidated Edison customers who receive bill inserts are not a captive audience. See infra, at 541-542. Four Justices dissented in Lehman on the ground that the municipality could not' discriminate among advertisers. 418 U. S., at 308, 309 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., dissenting). Lehman and Greer represent only one category of this Court’s cases dealing with rights of access to governmental property. Compare Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 512-513 (1969), and Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966). The Commission contends that its order should be judged under the standard of United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968), because the order “is only secondarily concerned with the subject matter of Consolidated Edison communications. . . .” Brief for Appellee 9, n. 3. The O’Brien test applies to regulations that incidentally limit speech where “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. . . .” 391 U. S., at 377. The bill insert prohibition does not further a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech. Indeed, the court below justified the ban expressly on the basis that the speech might be harmful to consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 106-107, 390 N. E. 2d 749, 755 (1979). The State Court of Appeals also referred to the alternative means by which Consolidated Edison might promulgate its views on controversial issues of public policy. Although a time, place, and manner restriction cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of communication open to potential speakers, see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willing-boro, 431 U. S., at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means of expression. See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S., at 757, n. 15; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975) ; Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 411, n. 4 (1974) {per curiam). Although this Court has recognized the special privacy interests that attach to persons who seek seclusion within their own homes, see Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U. S. 728, 737 (1970), the arrival of a billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the visit of a door-to-door solicitor. Yet the Court has rejected the contention that a municipality may ban door-to-door solicitors because they may invade the privacy of households. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1943). Even if there were a compelling state interest in protecting consumers against overly intrusive bill inserts, it is possible that the State could achieve its goal simply by requiring Consolidated Edison to stop sending bill inserts to the homes of objecting customers. See Rowan v. Post Office Department, supra. In its denial of petitions for rehearing, the Commission re-emphasized that it would impose the ban without regard to allocation of costs between shareholders and ratepayers. App. to Juris. Statement 67a, n. 1. The Commission also contends that ratepayers cannot be forced to support the costs of Consolidated Edison’s bill inserts. Because the Commission has failed to demonstrate that such costs could not be allocated between shareholders and ratepayers, we have no occasion to decide whether the rule of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977), would prevent Consolidated Edison from passing on to ratepayers the costs of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. ST. CYR No. 00-767. Argued April 24, 2001 Decided June 25, 2001 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 326. Scaiia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined, and in which O’Connor, J., joined as to Parts I and III, post, p. 326. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Underwood, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Paul R. Q. Wolf son, Stephen C. Robinson, Donald E. Keener, Alison R. Drucker, Ernesto H. Molina, and James K. Filan, Jr. Lucas Guttentag argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Gelernt, Judy Rabinovitz, Steven R. Shapiro, Jayashri Srikantiah, Michael G. Moore, and Paul A. Engelmayer. Daniel J. Popeo and R. Shawn Gunnarson filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center et al. by Rebecca Sharpless; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Manuel D. Vargas and Joshua L. Dratel. James Oldham, Michael J. Wishnie, and Douglas W. Baruch filed a brief for Legal Historians as amici curiae. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), enacted on April 24,1996, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), enacted on September 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-546, contain comprehensive amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. This case raises two important questions about the impact of those amendments. The first question is a procedural one, concerning the effect of those amendments on the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §2241. The second question is a • substantive one, concerning the impact of the amendments on conduct that occurred before their enactment and on the availability of discretionary relief from deportation. Respondent, Enrico St. Cyr, is a citizen of Haiti who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986. Ten years later, on March 8, 1996, he pleaded guilty in a state court to a charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut law. That conviction made him deportable. Under pre-AEDPA law applicable at the time of his conviction, St. Cyr would have been eligible for a waiver of deportation at the discretion of the Attorney General. However, removal proceedings against him were not commenced until April 10, 1997, after both AEDPA and IIRIRA became effective, and, as the Attorney General interprets those statutes, he no longer has discretion to grant such a waiver. In his habeas corpus petition, respondent has alleged that the restrictions on discretionary relief from deportation contained in the 1996 statutes do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a de-portable crime before their enactment. The District Court accepted jurisdiction of his application and agreed with his submission. In accord with the decisions of four other Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 229 F. 3d 406 (2000). The importance of both questions warranted our grant of certiorari. 531 U. S. 1107 (2001). I The character of the pre-AEDPA and pre-IIRIRA law that gave the Attorney General discretion to waive deportation in certain cases is relevant to our appraisal of both the substantive and the procedural questions raised by the petition of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We shall therefore preface our discussion of those questions with an overview of the sources, history, and scope of that law. Subject to certain exceptions, § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 excluded from admission to the United States several classes of aliens, including, for example, those who had committed crimes “involving moral turpitude.” 39 Stat. 875. The seventh exception provided “[t]hat aliens returning after a temporary absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years may be admitted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such conditions as he may prescribe.” Id., at 878. Although that provision applied literally only to exclusion proceedings, and although the deportation provisions of the statute did not contain a similar provision, the INS relied on §3 to grant relief in deportation proceedings involving aliens who had departed and returned to this country after the ground for deportation arose. See, e. g., Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (1940). Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which replaced and roughly paralleled § 3 of the 1917 Act, excluded from the United States several classes of aliens, including those convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude or the illicit traffic in narcotics. See 66 Stat. 182-187. As with the prior law, this section was subject to a proviso granting the Attorney General broad discretion to admit excludable aliens. See id., at 187. That proviso, codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c), stated: “Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General....” Like § 3 of the 1917 Act, § 212(c) was literally applicable only to exclusion proceedings, but it too has been interpreted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to authorize any permanent resident alien with “a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years” to apply for a discretionary waiver from deportation. See Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (1976) (adopting position of Francis v. INS, 532 F. 2d 268 (CA2 1976)). If relief is granted, the deportation proceeding is terminated and the alien remains a permanent resident. The extension of § 212(c) relief to the deportation context has had great practical importance, because deportable offenses have historically been defined broadly. For example, under the INA, aliens are deportable upon conviction for two crimes of “moral turpitude” (or for one such crime if it occurred within five years of entry into the country and resulted in a jail term of at least one year). See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994 ed., Supp. V). In 1988, Congress further specified that an alien is deportable upon conviction for any “aggravated felony,” Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4469-4470, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which was defined to include numerous offenses without regard to how long ago they were committed. Thus, the class of aliens whose continued residence in this country has depended on their eligibility for § 212(c) relief is extremely large, and not surprisingly, a substantial percentage of their applications for § 212(c) relief have been granted. Consequently, in the period between 1989 and 1995 alone, § 212(c) relief was granted to over 10,000 aliens. Three statutes enacted in recent years have reduced the size of the class of aliens eligible for such discretionary relief. In 1990, Congress amended § 212(c) to preclude from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years. §511, 104 Stat. 5052 (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c)). In 1996, in § 440(d) of AEDPA, Congress identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would preclude such relief. See 110 Stat. 1277 (amending 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c)). And finally, that same year, Congress passed IIRIRA. That statute, inter alia, repealed § 212(c), see § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597, and replaced it with a new section that gives the Attorney General the authority to cancel removal for a narrow class of inadmissible or deportable aliens, see id., at 3009-594 (creating 8 U. S. C. § 1229b (1994 ed., Supp. V)). So narrowed, that class does not include anyone previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.” §1229b(a)(3) (1994 ed., Supp. V). In the Attorney General’s opinion, these amendments have entirely withdrawn his § 212(c) authority to waive deportation for aliens previously convicted of aggravated felonies. Moreover, as a result of other amendments adopted in AEDPA and IIRIRA, the Attorney General also maintains that there is no judicial forum available to decide whether these statutes did, in fact, deprive him of the power to grant such relief. As we shall explain below, we disagree on both points. In our view, a federal court does have jurisdiction to decide the merits of the legal question, and the District Court and the Court of Appeals decided that question correctly in this case. 1 — 4 K-< The first question we must consider is whether the District Court retains jurisdiction under the general habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2241, to entertain St. Cyr’s challenge. His application for a writ raises a pure question of law. He does not dispute any of the facts that establish his deport-ability or the conclusion that he is deportable. Nor does he contend that he would have any right to have an unfavorable exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion reviewed in a judicial forum. Rather, he contests the Attorney General’s conclusion that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, he is not eligible for discretionary relief. The District Court held, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that it had jurisdiction to answer that question in a habeas corpus proceeding. The INS argues, however, that four sections of the 1996 statutes — specifically, § 401(e) of AEDPA and three sections of IIRIRA (8 U. S. C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V)) — stripped the, courts of jurisdiction to decide the question of law presented by respondent’s habeas corpus application. For the INS to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 102 (1869) (“We are not at liberty to except from [habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law”); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 660-661 (1996) (noting that “[n]o provision of Title I mentions our authority to entertain original habeas petitions,” and the statute “makes no mention of our authority to hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this Court”). Implications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal. Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105 (“Repeals by implication are not favored. They are seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy; and never, we think, when the former act can stand together with the new act”). In this case, the plain statement rule draws additional reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction. First, as a general matter, when a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result. See Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). Second, if an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is “fairly possible,” see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932), we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 408 (1909). A construction of the amendments at issue that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions. Article I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Because of that Clause, some “judicial intervention in deportation cases” is unquestionably “required by the Constitution.” Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229, 235 (1953). Unlike the provisions of AEDPA that we construed in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651 (1996), this case involves an alien subject to a federal removal order rather than a person confined pursuant to a state-court conviction. Accordingly, regardless of whether the protection of the Suspension Clause encompasses all cases covered by the 1867 Amendment extending the protection of the writ to state prisoners, cf. id., at 663-664, or by subsequent legal developments, see LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F. 3d 1035 (CA7 1998), at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ “as it existed in 1789.” Felker, 518 U. S., at 663-664. At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest. See, e. g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 380, n. 13 (1977); id., at 385-386 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (noting that “the traditional Great Writ was largely a remedy against executive detention”); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial”). In England prior to 1789, in the Colonies, and in this Nation during the formative years of our Government, the writ of habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as well as to citizens. It enabled them to challenge Executive and private detention in civil cases as well as criminal. Moreover, the issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the jurisdiction of the custodian, but encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes. It was used to command the discharge of seamen who had a statutory exemption from impressment into the British Navy, to emancipate slaves, and to obtain the freedom of apprentices and asylum inmates. Most important, for our purposes, those early cases contain no suggestion that habeas relief in cases involving Executive detention was only available for constitutional error. Notwithstanding the historical use of habeas corpus to remedy unlawful Executive action, the INS argues that this case falls outside the traditional scope of the writ at common law. It acknowledges that the writ protected an individual who was held without legal authority,' but argues that the writ would not issue where “an official had statutory authorization to detain the individual . . . but ... the official was not properly exercising his discretionary power to determine whether the individual should be released.” Brief for Respondent in Colcano-Martinez v. INS, O. T. 2000, No. 00-1011, p. 33. In this case, the INS points out, there is no dispute that the INS had authority in law to hold St. Cyr, as he is eligible for removal. St. Cyr counters that there is historical evidence of the writ issuing to redress the improper exercise of official discretion. See n. 23, supra; Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 Yale L. J. 2609 (1998). St. Cyr’s constitutional position also finds some support in our prior immigration cases. In Heikkila v. Barber, the Court observed that the then-existing statutory immigration scheme “had the effect of precluding judicial intervention in deportation cases except insofar as it was required by the Constitution,” 345 U. S., at 234-236 (emphasis added) — and that scheme, as discussed below, did allow for review on habeas of questions of law concerning an alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief. Therefore, while the INS’ historical arguments are not insubstantial, the ambiguities in the scope of the exercise of the writ at common law identified by St. Cyr, and the suggestions in this Court’s prior decisions as to the extent to which habeas review could be limited consistent with the Constitution, convince us that the Suspension Clause questions that would be presented by the INS’ reading of the immigration statutes before us are difficult and significant. In sum, even assuming that the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. It necessarily follows that a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to accept the INS’ submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1395-1397 (1953). The necessity of resolving such a serious and difficult constitutional issue — and the desirability of avoiding that necessity — simply reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent. Moreover, to conclude that the writ is no longer available in this context would represent a departure from historical practice in immigration law. The writ of habeas corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive detention. See Felker, 518 U. S., at 663; Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S., at 380, n. 13; id., at 385-386 (Burger, C. J., concurring); Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 533 (Jackson, J., concurring in result). Federal courts have been authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and §2241 of the Judicial Code provides that federal judges may grant the writ of habeas corpus on the application of a prisoner held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241. Before and after the enactment in 1875 of the first statute regulating immigration, 18 Stat. 477, that jurisdiction was regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context. See, e. g., In re Kaine, 14 How. 103 (1853); United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621, 626-632 (1888). Until the enactment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole means by which an alien could test the legality of his or her deportation order was by bringing a habeas corpus action in district court. See, e. g., United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621 (1888); Heikkila, 345 U. S., at 235; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8 (1908); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922). In such cases, other than the question whether there was some evidence to support the order, the courts generally did not review factual determinations made by the Executive. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659 (1892). However, they did review the Executive’s legal determinations. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3, 9 (1915) (“The statute by enumerating the conditions upon which the allowance to land may be denied, prohibits the denial in other cases. And when the record shows that a commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas corpus”); see also Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law after the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1963, 1965-1969 (2000). In case after case, courts answered questions of law in ha-beas corpus proceedings brought by aliens challenging Executive interpretations of the immigration laws. Habeas courts also regularly answered questions of law that arose in the context of discretionary relief. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1964); United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957). Traditionally, courts recognized a distinction between eligibility for discretionary relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise of discretion, on the other.hand. See Neuman, 113 Harv. L. Rev., at 1991 (noting the “strong tradition in habeas corpus law . . . that subjects the legally erroneous failure to exereise discretion, unlike a substantively unwise exercise of discretion, to inquiry on the writ”). Eligibility that was “governed by specific statutory standards” provided “a right to a ruling on an applicant’s eligibility,” even though the actual granting of relief was “not a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace.” Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 353-354 (1956). Thus, even though the actual suspension of deportation authorized by § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917 was a matter of grace, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260 (1954), we held that a deportable alien had a right to challenge the Executive’s failure to exercise the discretion authorized by the law. The exercise of the District Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction to answer a pure question of law in this case is entirely consistent with the exercise of such jurisdiction in Accardi. See also United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S., at 77. Thus, under the pre-1996 statutory scheme — and consistent with its common-law antecedents — it is clear that St. Cyr could have brought his challenge to the BIA’s legal determination in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The INS argues, however, that AEDPA and IIRIRA contain four provisions that express a clear and unambiguous statement of Congress’ intent to bar petitions brought under §2241, despite the fact that none of them mention that section. The first of those provisions is AEDPA’s § 401(e). While the title of § 401(e) — “Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus” — would seem to support the INS’ submission, the actual text of that provision does not. As we have previously noted, a title alone is not controlling. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (“ ‘[T]he title of a statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning of the text. For interpretive purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase’ ” (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947))). The actual text of § 401(e), unlike its title, merely repeals a subsection of the 1961 statute amending the judicial review provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. See n. 31, supra. Neither the title nor the text makes any mention of 28 U. S. C. §2241. Under the 1952 Act, district courts had broad authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief in immigration cases, including orders adjudicating deportability and those denying suspensions of deportability. See Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 225-226 (1963). The 1961 Act withdrew that jurisdiction from the district courts and provided that the procedures set forth in the Hobbs Act would be the "sole and exclusive procedure” for judicial review of final orders of deportation, subject to a series of exceptions. See 75 Stat. 651. The last of those exceptions stated that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings.” See id., at 652, codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(10) (repealed Sept. 30, 1996). The INS argues that the inclusion of that exception in the 1961 Act indicates that Congress must have believed that it would otherwise have withdrawn the pre-existing habeas corpus jurisdiction in deportation cases, and that, as a result, the repeal of that exception in AEDPA in 1996 implicitly achieved that result. It seems to us, however, that the 1961 exception is best explained as merely confirming the limited scope of the new review procedures. In fact, the 1961 House Report provides that this section "in no way disturbs the Habeas Corpus Act.” H. R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1961). Moreover, a number of the courts that considered the interplay between the general habeas provision and INA § 106(a)(10) after the 1961 Act and before the enactment of AEDPA did not read the 1961 Act’s specific habeas provision as supplanting jurisdiction under §2241. Orozco v. INS, 911 F. 2d 539, 541 (CA11 1990); United States ex rel. Marcello v. INS, 634 F. 2d 964, 967 (CA5 1981); Sotelo Mondragon v. Ilchert, 653 F. 2d 1254, 1255 (CA9 1980). ' In any case, whether § 106(a)(10) served as an independent grant of habeas jurisdiction or simply as an acknowledgment of continued jurisdiction pursuant to §2241, its repeal cannot be sufficient to eliminate what it did not originally grant— namely, habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2241. See Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105-106 (concluding that the repeal of “an additional grant of jurisdiction” does not “operate as a repeal of jurisdiction theretofore allowed”); Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 515 (1869) (concluding that the repeal of portions of the 1867 statute conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in habeas proceedings did “not affect the jurisdiction which was previously exercised”). The INS also relies on three provisions of IIRIRA, now codified at 8 U. S. C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V). As amended by §306 of IIRIRA, 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. V) now provides that, with certain exceptions, including those set out in subsection (b) of the same statutory provision, “[j]udicial review of a final order of removal... is governed only by” the Hobbs Act’s procedures for review of agency orders in the courts of appeals. Similarly, § 1252(b)(9), which addresses the “ [consolidation of questions for judicial review,” provides that “[judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” Finally, § 1252(a)(2)(C), which concerns “[mjatters not subject to judicial review,” states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” certain enumerated criminal offenses. The term “judicial review” or “jurisdiction to review” is the focus of each of these three provisions. In the immigration context, “judicial review” and “habeas corpus” have historically distinct meanings. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953). In Heikkila, the Court concluded that the finality provisions at issue “precluded] judicial review” to the maximum extent possible under the Constitution, and thus concluded that the APA was inapplicable. Id., at 235. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the right to habeas corpus. Ibid. Noting that the limited role played by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings was far narrower than the judicial review authorized by the APA, the Court concluded that “it is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates” habeas review from “judicial review.” Id., at 236; see also, e. g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 278 (1902) (noting that under the extradition statute then in effect there was “no right of review to be exercised by any court or judicial officer,” but that limited review on habeas was nevertheless available); Ekiu, 142 U. S., at 663 (observing that while a decision to exclude an alien was subject to inquiry on habeas, it could not be “impeached or reviewed”). Both §§ 1252(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C) speak of “judicial review”— that is, full, nonhabeas review. Neither explicitly mentions habeas, or 28 U. S. C. § 2241. Accordingly, neither provision speaks with sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction pursuant to the general habeas statute. The INS also makes a separate argument based on 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9) (1994 ed., Supp. V). We have previously described § 1252(b)(9) as a “zipper clause.” A ADC, 525 U. S. 471, 483 (1999). Its purpose is to consolidate “judicial review” of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals, but it applies only “[wjith respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Accordingly, this provision, by its own terms, does not bar habeas jurisdiction over removal orders not subject to judicial review under § 1252(a)(1) — including orders against aliens who are removable by reason of having committed one or more criminal offenses. Subsection (b)(9) simply provides for the consolidation of issues to be brought in petitions for “[jjudicial review,” which, as we note above, is a term historically distinct from habeas. See Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F. 3d 3, 12 (CA1 2000); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F. 3d 1133, 1140 (CA9 2000). It follows that § 1252(b)(9) does not clearly apply to actions brought pursuant to the general habeas statute, and thus cannot repeal that statute either in part or in whole. If it were clear that the question of law could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS’ reading of § 1252. But the absence of such a forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions. Cf. Felker, 518 U. S., at 660-661. Accordingly, we conclude that habeas jurisdiction under §2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. Ill The absence of a clearly expressed statement of congressional intent also pervades our review of the merits of St. Cyr’s claim. Two important legal consequences ensued from respondent’s entry of a guilty plea in March 1996: (1) He became subject to deportation, and (2) he became eligible for a discretionary waiver of that deportation under the prevailing interpretation of § 212(c). When IIRIRA went into effect in April 1997, the first consequence was unchanged except for the fact that the term “removal” was substituted for “deportation.” The issue that remains to be resolved is whether IIRIRA § 304(b) changed the second consequence by eliminating respondent’s eligibility for a waiver. The INS submits that the statute resolves the issue because it unambiguously communicates Congress’ intent to apply the provisions of IIRIRA’s Title III-A to all removals initiated after the effective date of the statute, and, in any event, its provisions only operate prospectively and not retrospectively. ,The Court of Appeals, relying primarily on the analysis in our opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 (1994), held, contrary to the INS’ arguments, that Congress’ intentions concerning the application of the “Cancellation of Removal” procedure are ambiguous and that the statute imposes an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who, in reliance on the possibility of § 212(c) relief, pleaded guilty to aggravated felonies. See 229 F. 3d, at 416, 420. We agree. Retroactive statutes raise special concerns. See Land-graf, 511 U. S., at 266. “The Legislature’s unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.” Ibid. Accordingly, “congressional enactments . . . will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 208 (1988). “[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the 'principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal human appeal.’ Kaiser, 494 U. S., at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.” Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 265-266 (footnote omitted). Despite the dangers inherent in retroactive legislation, it is beyond dispute that, within constitutional limits, Congress has the power to enact laws with retrospective effect. See id., at 268. A statute may not be applied retroactively, however, absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result. “Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” Id., at 272-273. Accordingly, the first step in determining whether a statute has an impermissible retroactive effect is to ascertain whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively. Martin v. Radix, 527 U. S. 343, 352 (1999). The standard for finding such unambiguous direction is a demanding one.. “[C]ases where this Court has found truly 'retroactive’ effect adequately authorized by statute have involved statutory language that was so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation.” Lindk v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 820, 328, n. 4 (1997). The INS makes several arguments in favor of its position that IIRIRA achieves this high level of clarity. First, the INS points to the comprehensive nature of IIRIRA’s revision of federal immigration law. “Congress’s comprehensive establishment of a new immigration framework,” the INS argues, “shows its intent that, after a transition period, the provisions of the old law should no longer be applied at all.” Brief for Petitioner 33-34. We rejected a similar argument, however, in Landgraf, a case that, like this one, involved Congress’ comprehensive revision of an important federal statute. 511 U. S., at 260-261. By itself, the comprehensiveness of a congressional enactment says nothing about Congress’ intentions with respect to the retro-activity of the enactment’s individual provisions. The INS also points to the effective date for Title III-A as providing a clear statement of congressional intent to apply IIRIRA’s repeal of § 212(c) retroactively. See IIRIRA § 309(a), 110 Stat. 3009-625. But the mere promulgation of an effective date for a statute does not provide sufficient assurance that Congress specifically considered the potential unfairness that retroactive application would produce. For that reason, a “statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.” Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 257. The INS further argues that any ambiguity in Congress’ intent is wiped away by the “saving provision” in IIRIRA § 309(c)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-625. Brief for Petitioner 34-36. That provision states that, for aliens whose exclusion or deportation proceedings began prior to the Title III-A efifec-tive date, “the amendments made by [Title III-A] shall not apply, and ... the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments.” This rule, however, does not communicate with unmistakable clarity Congress’ intention to apply its repeal of § 212(c) retroactively. Nothing in either § 309(c)(1) or the statute’s legislative history even discusses the effect of the statute on proceedings based on pre-IIRIRA convictions that are commenced after its effective date. Section 309(c)(1) is best read as merely setting out the procedural rules to be applied to removal proceedings pending on the effective date of the statute. Because “[cjhanges in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity,” Landgraf 511 U. S., at 275, it was necessary for Congress to identify which set of procedures would apply in those circumstances. As the Conference Report expressly explained, “[§ 309(c)] provides for the transition to new procedures in the case of an alien already in exclusion or deportation proceedings on the effective date.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, p. 222 (1996) (emphasis added). Another reason for declining to accept the INS’ invitation to read § 309(c)(1) as dictating the temporal reach of IIRIRÁ § 304(b) is provided by Congress’ willingiiess, in other sections of IIRIRA, to indicate unambiguously its intention to apply specific provisions retroactively. IIRIRA’s amendment of the definition of “aggravated felony,” for example, clearly states that it applies with respect to “convietion[s]... entered before, on, or after” the statute’s enactment date. § 321(b). As the Court of Appeals noted, the fact that Congress made some provisions of IIRIRA expressly applicable to prior convictions, but did not do so in regard to § 304(b), is an indication “that Congress did not definitively decide the issue of §304’s retroactive application to pre-enactment convictions.” See 229 F. 3d, at 415. The “saving provision” is therefore no more significant than the specification of an effective date. The presumption against retroactive application of ambiguous statutory provisions, buttressed by “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien,” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 449 (1987), forecloses the conclusion that, in enacting § 304(b), “Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” Landgraf 511 U. S., at 272-273. We therefore proceed to the second step of Landgraf s retro-activity analysis in order to determine whether depriving removable aliens of consideration for § 212(c) relief produces an impermissible retroactive effect for aliens who, like respondent, were convicted pursuant to a plea agreement at a time when their plea would not have rendered them ineligible for § 212(c) relief. “The inquiry into whether a statute operates retroactively demands a commonsense, functional judgment about ‘whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.’” Martin, 527 U. S., at 357-358 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270). A statute has retroactive effect when it “‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past Id., at 269 (quoting Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814) (Story, J.)). As we have repeatedly counseled, the judgment whether a particular statute acts retroactively “should be informed and guided by ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’” Martin, 527 U. S., at 358 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270). IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief for people who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that they would be eligible for such relief clearly “‘attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.’” Id., at 269. Plea agreements involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government. See Newton v. Rumery, 480 U. S. 386, 393, n. 3 (1987). In exchange for some perceived benefit, defendants waive several of their constitutional rights (including the right to a trial) and grant the government numerous “tangible benefits, such as promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial resources. ” Ibid. There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F. 3d 603, 612 (CA9 1999) (“That an alien charged with a crime . . . would factor the immigration consequences of conviction in deciding whether to plead or proceed to trial is well-documented”); see also 3 Bender, Criminal Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999) (“ ‘Preserving the client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence’” (quoted in Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 13)). Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial. The case of Charles Jideonwo, a petitioner in a parallel litigation in the Seventh Circuit, is instructive. Charged in 1994 with violating federal narcotics law, Jideonwo entered into extensive plea negotiations with the Government, the sole purpose of which was to ensure that ‘“he got less than five years to avoid what would have been a statutory bar on 212(c) relief.’” Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F. 3d 692, 699 (CA7 2000) (quoting the Immigration Judge’s findings of fact). The potential for unfairness in the retroactive application of IIRIRA § 304(b) to people like Jideonwo and St. Cyr is significant and manifest. Relying upon settled practice, the advice of counsel, and perhaps even assurances in open court that the entry of the plea would not foreclose § 212(c) relief, a great number of defendants in Jideonwo’s and St. Cyr’s position agreed to plead guilty. Now that prosecutors have received the benefit of these plea agreements, agreements that were likely facilitated by the aliens' belief in their continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief, it would surely be contrary to “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations,” Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270, to hold that IIRIRA’s subsequent restrictions deprive them of any possibility of such relief. The INS argues that deportation proceedings (and the Attorney General’s discretionary power to grant relief from deportation) are “inherently prospective” and that, as a result, application of the law of deportation can never have a retroactive effect. Such categorical arguments are not particularly helpful in undertaking Landgrafs commonsense, functional retroactivity analysis. See Martin, 527 U. S., at 359. Moreover, although we have characterized deportation as “look[ing] prospectively to the respondent’s right to remain in this country in the future,” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1984), we have done so in order to reject the argument that deportation is punishment for past behavior and that deportation proceedings are therefore subject to the “various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial.” Ibid. As our cases make clear, the presumption against retroactivity applies far beyond the confines of the criminal law. See Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 272. And our mere statement that deportation is not punishment for past crimes does not mean that we cannot consider an alien’s reasonable reliance on the continued availability of discretionary relief from deportation when deciding whether the elimination of such relief has a retroactive effect. Finally, the fact that § 212(c) relief is discretionary does not affect the propriety of our conclusion. There is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation. Cf. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 949 (1997) (an increased likelihood of facing a qui tarn, action constitutes an impermissible retroactive effect for the defendant); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U. S. 397, 401 (1937) (“Removal of the possibility of a sentence of less than fifteen years . . . operates to [defendants’] detriment” (emphasis added)). Prior to AEDPA and IIRIRA, aliens like St. Cyr had a significant likelihood of receiving § 212(c) relief. Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial, the elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect. We find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress considered the question whether to apply its repeal of § 212(c) retroactively to such aliens. We therefore hold that § 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like respondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. The judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. See Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F. 3d 3 (CA1 2000); Liang v. INS, 206 F. 3d 308 (CA3 2000); Tasios v. Reno, 204 F. 3d 544 (CA4 2000); Flores-Mimmontes v. INS, 212 F. 3d 1133 (CA9 2000). But see Max-George v. Reno, 205 F. 3d 194 (CA5 2000); Morales-Ramirez v. Reno, 209 F. 3d 977 (CA7 2000); Richardson v. Reno, 180 F. 3d 1311 (CA11 1999). The INS was subsequently transferred to the Department of Justice. See Matter of L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, n. 1 (1940). As a result, the powers previously delegated to the Secretary of Labor were transferred to the Attorney General. See id., at 2. The exercise of discretion was deemed a mine pro tunc correction of the record of reentry. In approving of this construction, the Attorney General concluded that strictly limiting the seventh exception to exclusion proceedings would be “capricious and whimsical.” Id., at 5. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43) (1994 ed. and Supp. V). While the term has always been defined expansively, it was broadened substantially by IIRIRA. For example, as amended by that statute, the term includes all convictions for theft or burglary for which a term of imprisonment of at least one year is imposed (as opposed to five years pre-IIRIRA), compare § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1994 ed., Supp.V) with § 1101(a)(43)(G) (1994 ed.), and all convictions involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000 (as opposed to $200,000 pre-IIRIRA), compare § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (1994 ed., Supp.V) with § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (1994 ed.). In addition, the term includes any “crime of violence” resulting in a prison sentence of at least one year (as opposed to five years pre-IIRIRA), compare § 1101(a)(43)(F) (1994 ed., Supp.V) with §1101(a)(43)(F) (1994 ed.), and that phrase is itself broadly defined. See 18 U. S. C. § 16 (“[A]n offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” or “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”). See, e. g., Rannik, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death Sentence for the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 123, 150, n. 80 (1996) (providing statistics indicating that 51.5% of the applications for which a final decision was reached between 1989 and 1995 were granted); see also Mattis v. Reno, 212 F. 3d 31, 33 (CA1 2000) (“[I]n the years immediately preceding the statute’s passage, over half the applications were granted”); Tasios, 204 F. 3d, at 551 (same). In developing these changes, the BIA developed criteria, comparable to common-law rules, for deciding when deportation is appropriate. Those criteria, which have been set forth in several BIA opinions, see, e. g., Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dee. 581 (1978), include the seriousness of the offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration of the alien’s residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the number of citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed Forces. See Rannik, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev., at 150, n. 80. However, based on these statistics, one cannot form a reliable estimate of the number of individuals who will be affected by today’s decision. Since the 1996 statutes expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” substantially — and retroactively — the number of individuals now subject to deportation absent § 212(c) relief is significantly higher than these figures would suggest. In addition, the nature of the changes (bringing under the definition more minor crimes which may have been committed many years ago) suggests that an increased percentage of applicants will meet the stated criteria for § 212(c) relief. The new provision barred review for individuals ordered deported because of a conviction for an aggravated felony, for a drug conviction, for certain weapons or national security violations, and for multiple convictions involving crimes of moral turpitude. See 110 Stat. 1277. See n. 1, supra; n. 33, infra. See, e. g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986); see also McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479,498 (1991); Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 373-374 (1974). “In traditionally sensitive areas,... the requirement of [a] clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33 (1992) (“Waivers of the [Federal] Government’s sovereign immunity, to be effective,'must be “unequivocally expressed’”); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985) (“Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute”); see also Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992) (“[T]he Court... has tended to create the strongest clear statement rules to confine Congress’s power in areas in which Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything”). Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1018 (1984) (“[W]here two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895), ‘[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’ This approach ... also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 269 (1884)); see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 499-501, 504 (1979); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924); Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S., at 407-408; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448-449 (1830) (Story, J.). The fact that this Court would be required to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely. Cf. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 980 (1998) (noting that “reconstructing habeas corpus law . . . [for purposes of a Suspension Clause analysis] would be a difficult enterprise, given fragmentary documentation, state-by-state disuniformity, and uncertainty about how state practices should be transferred to new national institutions”). At common law, “[w]hile habeas review of a court judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court’s jurisdictional competency, an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the detention.” Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038,1238 (1970). See W. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 115 (1980) (noting that “the common-law writ of habeas corpus was in operation in all thirteen of the British colonies that rebelled in 1776”). See Sommersett v. Stewart, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 79-82 (K. B. 1772); Case of the Hottentot Venus, 13 East 195, 104 Eng. Rep. 344 (K. B. 1810); King v. Schiever, 2 Burr. 765, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K. B. 1759); United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377 (No. 16,622) (CC Pa. 1797); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle 392 (Pa. 1815); Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813); see also Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 10-11; Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev., at 990-1004. See King v. Nathan, 2 Strange 880, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K. B. 1724); Ex parte Boggin, 13 East 549, 104 Eng. Rep. 484 (K. B. 1811); Hollings-head's Case, 1 Salkeld 351, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K. B. 1702); Dr. Groenvelt’s Case, 1 Ld. Raym. 213, 91 Eng. Rep. 1038 (K. B. 1702); Bushell’s Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670); Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J., on circuit); Ex parte D’Olivera, 7 F. Cas. 853 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813); Respublica v. Keppele, 2 Dali. 197 (Pa. 1793). See, e. g., Hollingshead’s Case, 1 Salkeld 351, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K. B. 1702); King v. Nathan, 2 Strange 880,93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K. B. 1724); United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816); Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J., on circuit); see also Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 3-10 (collecting cases). See, e. g., the case of King v. White (1746) quoted in the addendum to Sommersett v. Stewart, 20 How. St. Tr., at 1376. Id., at 79-82. King v. Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K. B. 1763). King v. Turlington, 2 Burr. 1115, 97 Eng. Rep. 741 (K. B. 1761). See, e. g., Ex parte Boggin, 13 East 549, n. (b), 104 Eng. Rep. 484, n. (a)2 (K. B. 1811) (referring to Chalacombe’s Case, in which the court required a response from the Admiralty in a case involving the impressment of a master of a coal vessel, despite the argument that exemptions for “seafaring persons of this description” were given only as a matter of “grace and favour,” not “of right”); Hollingshead’s Case, 1 Salkeld 351, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K. B. 1702) (granting relief on the grounds that the language of the warrant of commitment — authorizing detention until “otherwise discharged by due course of tow” — exceeded the authority granted under the statute to commit “till [the bankrupt] submit himself to be examined by the commissioners”); see also Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 8-10, 18-28. The dissent, however, relies on Chalacombe’s Case as its sole support for the proposition that courts treated Executive discretion as “lying entirely beyond the judicial ken.” See post, at 343 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Although Lord Ellenborough expressed “some hesitation” as to whether the case should “stand over for the consideration of the Admiralty,” he concluded that, given the public importance of the question, the response should be called for. 13 East, at 549, n. (b), 104 Eng. Rep., at 484, n. (a). The case ultimately became moot when the Admiralty discharged Chala-combe, but it is significant that, despite some initial hesitation, the court decided to proceed. The dissent reads into Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807), support for a proposition that the Chief Justice did not endorse, either explicitly or implicitly. See post, at 339-340 (opinion of Scaua, J.). He did note that “the first congress of the United States” acted under “the immediate influence” of the injunction provided by the Suspension Clause when it gave “life and activity” to “this great constitutional privilege” in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and that the writ could not be suspended until after the statute was enacted. 4 Cranch, at 95. That statement, however, surely does not imply that Marshall believed the Framers had drafted a Clause that would proscribe a temporary abrogation of the writ, while permitting its permanent suspension. Indeed, Marshall’s comment expresses the far more sensible view that the Clause was intended to preclude any possibility that “the privilege itself would be lost”-by either the inaction or the action of Congress. See, e. g., ibid, (noting that the Founders “must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation” imposed by the Suspension Clause). In fact, §2241 descends directly from § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the 1867 Act. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82; Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. Its text remained undisturbed by either AEDPA or IIRIRA. After 1952, judicial review of deportation orders could also be obtained by declaratory judgment actions brought in federal district court. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48 (1955). However, in 1961, Congress acted to consolidate review in the courts of appeals. See Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963). See, e. g., United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927) (holding that deportation “on charges unsupported by any evidence is a denial of due process which may be corrected on habeas corpus”). “And when the record shows that a commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas corpus. The conclusiveness of the decisions of immigration officers under §25 is conclusiveness upon matters of fact. This was implied in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, relied on by the Government.” Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3, 9 (1915). See, e. g., Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388,391 (1947) (rejecting on habeas the Government’s interpretation of the statutory term “entry”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 149 (1945) (rejecting on habeas the Government’s interpretation of the term “affiliation” with the Communist Party); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22, 35 (1939) (holding that “as the Secretary erred in the construction of the statute, the writ must be granted”). Cf. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 46 (1924) (reviewing on habeas the question whether the absence of an explicit factual finding that the aliens were “undesirable” invalidated the warrant of deportation). Indeed, under the pre-1952 regime which provided only what Heikkila termed the constitutional minimum of review, on habeas lower federal courts routinely reviewed decisions under the Seventh Proviso, the statutory predecessor to § 212(c), to ensure the lawful exercise of discretion. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Devenuto v. Curran, 299 F. 206 (CA2 1924); Hee Fuk Yuen v. White, 273 F. 10 (CA9 1921); United States ex rel. Patti v. Curran, 22 F. 2d 314 (SDNY 1926); Gabriel v. Johnson, 29 F. 2d 347 (CA1 1928). During the same period, habeas was also used to review legal questions that arose in the context of the Government’s exercise of other forms of discretionary relief under the 1917 Act. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F. 2d 371 (CA2 1950); United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489 (CA2 1950); Mastrapasqua v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 999 (CA2 1950); United States ex rel. de Sousa v. Day, 22 F. 2d 472 (CA2 1927); Gonzalez-Martinez v. Landon, 203 F. 2d 196 (CA9 1953); United States ex rel. Berman v. Curran, 13 F. 2d 96 (CA3 1926). The section reads as follows: “(e) Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus. — Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U. S. C. 1105a(a)) is amended— “(1) in paragraph (8), by adding ‘and’ at the end; “(2) in paragraph (9), by striking and’ at the end and inserting a period; and “(3) by striking paragraph (10).” 110 Stat. 1268. Moreover, the focus of the 1961 amendments appears to have been the elimination of Administrative Procedure Act (APA) suits that were brought in the district court and that sought declaratory relief. See, e. g., H. R. No. 2478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1958) (“[H]abeas corpus is a far more expeditious judicial remedy than that of declaratory judgment”); 104 Cong. Rec. 17178 (1958) (statement of Rep. Walter) (stating that courts would be “relieved of a great burden” once declaratory actions were eliminated and noting that habeas corpus was an “expeditious” means of review). As the INS acknowledges, the overwhelming majority of Courts of Appeals concluded that district courts retained habeas jurisdiction under §2241 after AEDPA. See Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F. 3d 110 (CA1 1998); Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106 (CA2 1998); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F. 3d 225 (CA3 1999); Bowrin v. INS, 194 F. 3d 483 (CA4 1999); Requena-Rodriguez v. Pasquarell, 190 F. 3d 299 (CA5 1999); Pak v. Reno, 196 F. 3d 666 (CA6 1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F. 3d 719 (CA8 1999); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F. 3d 603 (CA9 1999); Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F. 3d 1135 (CA10 1999); Mayers v. INS, 175 F. 3d 1289 (CA11 1999). But see LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F. 3d 1035 (CA7 1998). Title 8 U. S. C. § 1252(g) (1994 ed., Supp. V), entitled “Exclusive jurisdiction,” is not relevant to our analysis of the jurisdictional issue. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471 (1999) (AADC), we explained that that provision applied only to three types of discretionary decisions by the Attorney General — specifically, to commence proceedings, to adjudicate cases, or to execute removal orders— none of which are at issue here. Contrary to the dissent, see post, at 330 (opinion of Scalia, J.), we do not think, given the longstanding distinction between “judicial review” and “habeas,” that § 1252(e)(2)’s mention of habeas in the subsection governing “[judicial review of orders under section 1225(b)(1)” is sufficient to establish that Congress intended to abrogate the historical distinction between two terms of art in the immigration context when enacting IIRIRA. “[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952). At most, § 1252(e)(2) introduces additional statutory ambiguity, but ambiguity does not help the INS in this case. As we noted above, only the clearest statement of congressional intent will support the INS’ position. See supra, at 305. It is worth noting that in enacting the provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA that restricted or altered judicial review, Congress did refer specifically to several different sources of jurisdiction. See, e.g., §381, 110 Stat. 3009-650 (adding to grant of jurisdiction under 8 U. S. C. § 1329 (1994 ed., Supp. V) a provision barring jurisdiction under that provision for suits against the United States or its officers or agents). Section 401(e), which eliminated supplemental habeas jurisdiction under the INA, expressly strikes paragraph 10 of § 106(a) of the INA, not 28 U. S. C. §2241. Similarly, §306 of IIRIRA, which enacted the new INA §242, specifically precludes reliance on the provisions of the APA providing for the taking of additional evidence, and imposes specific limits on the availability of declaratory relief. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1535(e)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (explicitly barring aliens detained under “alien terrorist removal” procedures from seeking “judicial review, including application for a writ of habeas corpus, except for a claim by the alien that continued detention violates the alien’s rights under the Constitution”). At no point, however, does IIRIRA make express reference to § 2241. Given the historic use of §2241 jurisdiction as a means of reviewing deportation and exclusion orders, Congress’ failure to refer specifically to §2241 is particularly significant. Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 396, n. 23 (1991). As we noted in AADC, courts construed the 1961 amendments as channeling review of final orders to the courts of appeals, but still permitting district courts to exercise their traditional jurisdiction over claims that were viewed as being outside of a “final order.” 525 U. S., at 485. Read in light of this history, § 1252(b)(9) ensures that review of those types of claims will now be consolidated in a petition for review and considered by the courts of appeals. The dissent argues that our decision will afford more rights to criminal aliens than to noncriminal aliens. However, as we have noted, the scope of review on habeas is considerably more limited than on APA-style review. Moreover, this case raises only a pure question of law as to respondent’s statutory eligibility for discretionary relief, not, as the dissent suggests, an objection to the manner in which discretion was exercised. As to the question of timing and congruent means of review, we note that Congress could, without raising any constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through the courts of appeals. See, e. g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 381 (1977) (“[T]he substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s detention” does not violate the Suspension Clause). The INS appears skeptical of the notion that immigrants might be considered an ‘“unpopular group.’” See Brief for Petitioner 15, n.8. But see Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 Texas L. Rev. 1615, 1626 (2000) (observing that, because noncitizens cannot vote, they are particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation). The INS’ argument that refusing to apply § 304(b) retroactively creates an unrecognizable hybrid of old and new is, for the same reason, unconvincing. “(c) Transition for Aliens in Proceedings.— “(1) General rule that new rules do not apply. — Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title III-A effective date— “(A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and “(B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments.” §309, 110 Stat. 3009-625. The INS’ reliance, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 12, on INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S. 415, 420 (1999), is beside the point because that decision simply observed that the new rules would not apply to a proceeding filed before IIRIRA’s effective date. See also IIRIRA § 321(e) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred . . .”); § 322(c) (“The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act”); § 342(b) (the amendment adding incitement of terrorist activity as a ground for exclusion' “shall apply to incitement regardless of when it occurs”); § 344(c) (the amendment adding false claims of U. S. citizenship as ground for removal “shall apply to representations made on or after the date” of enactment); § 347(c) (amendments rendering alien excludable or deportable any alien who votes unlawfully “shall apply to voting occurring before, on, or after the date” of enactment); § 348(b) (amendment providing for automatic denial of discretionary waiver from exclusion “shall be effective on the date of the enactment . . . and shall apply in the case of any alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of such date unless a final administrative order in such proceedings has been entered as of such date”); § 350(b) (amendment adding domestic violence and stalking as grounds for deportation “shall apply to convictions, or violations of court orders, occurring after the date” of enactment); § 351(c) (discussing deportation for smuggling and providing that amendments “shall apply to applications for waivers filed before, on, or after the date” of enactment); § 352(b) (amendments adding renouncement of citizenship to avoid taxation as a ground for exclusion “shall apply to individuals who renounce United States citizenship on and after the date” of enactment); § 380(c) (amendment imposing civil penalties on aliens for failure to depart “shall apply to actions occurring on or after” effective date); § 384(d)(2) (amendments adding penalties for disclosure of information shall apply to “offenses occurring on or after the date” of enactment); § 531(b) (public charge considerations as a ground for exclusion “shall apply to applications submitted on or after such date”); § 604(c) (new asylum provision “shall apply to applications for asylum filed on or after the first day of the first month beginning more than 180 days after the date” of enactment). The INS argues that the Title III-B amendments containing such express temporal provisions are unrelated to the subject matter of § 304(b). Brief for Petitioner 37-38. But it is clear that provisions such as IIRIRA § 321(b), which addresses IIRIRA’s redefinition of “aggravated felony,” deal with subjects quite closely related to §304(b)’s elimination of § 212(c) relief for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. The legislative history is significant because, despite its comprehensive character, it contains no evidence that Congress specifically considered the question of the applicability of IÍRIRA § 304(b) to pre-IIRIRA convictions. Cf. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“ ‘In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night’ ”), cited in Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U. S., at 396, n. 23 (citing A. Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335 (1927)). The INS argues that we should extend deference under Chevron US. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), to the BIA’s interpretation of IIRIRA as applying to all deportation proceedings initiated after IIRIRA’s effective date. We only defer, however, to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal “tools of statutory construction,” are ambiguous. Id., at 843, n. 9; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S., at 447-448. Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 264, there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve. As we noted in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939 (1997), this language by Justice Story “does not purport to define the outer limit of impermissible retroactivity.” Id., at 947. Instead, it simply describes several “sufficient,” as opposed to “necessary,” conditions for finding retroactivity. Ibid. “If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 260 (1971). Many States, including Connecticut, the State in which respondent pleaded guilty, require that trial judges advise defendants that immigration consequences may result from accepting a plea agreement. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1016.5 (West 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. §54-lj (2001); D. C. Code Ann. §16-713 (1981-1997); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (1999); Ga. Code Ann. §17-7-93 (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. §802E-2 (1993); Md. Rule 4-242 (2001); Mass. Gen. Laws § 278:29D (1996 Supp.); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2000); Mont. Code Ann. §46-12-210 (1997); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2001); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §220.50(7) (McKinney 2001 Cum. Supp. Pamphlet); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2943.031 (1997); Ore. Rev. Stat. §135.385 (1997); R. I. Gen. Laws §12-12-22 (2000); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon 1989 and Supp. 2001); Wash. Rev. Code §10.40.200 (1990); Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (1993-1994). And the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, if a defendant will face deportation as a result of a conviction, defense counsel “should fully advise the defendant of these consequences.” 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14-3.2 Comment, 75 (2d ed. 1982). See n. 5, supra. Even if the defendant were not initially aware of §212(c), competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised him concerning the provision’s importance. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 6-8. Ninety percent of criminal convictions today are obtained by guilty plea. See U. S. Dept, of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Section 5: Judicial Processing of Defendants, in United States Sentencing Commission, 1999 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (2000) (Tables 5.30, 5.51). The significance of that reliance is obvious to those who have participated in the exercise of the discretion that was previously available to delegates of the Attorney General under § 212(c). See In re Soriano, 16 BIA Immig. Rptr. Bl-227, B1-238 to Bl-239 (1996) (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring and dissenting) (“I find compelling policy and practical reasons to go beyond such a limited interpretation as the one the majority proposes in this case. All of these people, and no doubt many others, had settled expectations to which they conformed their conduct”). We are equally unconvinced by the INS’ comparison of the elimination of § 212(c) relief for people like St. Cyr with the Clayton Act’s elimination of federal courts’ power to enjoin peaceful labor actions. In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921), and Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 464 (1921), we applied the Clayton Act’s limitations on injunctive relief to cases pending at the time of the statute’s passage. But unlike the elimination of § 212(c) relief in this case, which depends upon an alien’s decision to plead guilty to an “aggravated felony,” the deprivation of the District Court’s power to grant injunctive relief at issue in Duplex Printing did not in any way result from or depend on the past action of the party seeking the injunction. Thus, it could not plausibly have been argued that the Clayton Act attached a ‘“new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.’” Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 269. See n. 5, supra. The INS cites several cases affirming Congress’ power to retroactively unsettle such expectations in the immigration context. See Brief for Petitioner 40-41, and n. 21. But our recognition that Congress has the power to act retrospectively in the immigration context sheds no light on the question at issue at this stage of the Landgraf analysis: whether a particular statute in fact has such a retroactive effect. Moreover, our decision today is fully consistent with a recognition of Congress’ power to act retrospectively. We simply assert, as we have consistently done in the past, that in legislating retroactively,' Congress must make its intention plain. Similarly, the fact that Congress has the power to alter the rights of resident aliens' to remain in the United States is not determinative of the question whether a particular statute has a retroactive effect. See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 (1884). Applying a statute barring Chinese nationals from reentering the country without a certificate prepared when they left to people who exited the country before the statute went into effect would have retroactively unsettled their reliance on the state of the law when they departed. See id., at 559. So too, applying IIRIRA § 304(b) to aliens who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to crimes on the understanding that, in so doing, they would retain the ability to seek discretionary § 212(c) relief would retroactively unsettle their reliance on the state of the law at the time of their plea agreement. The recent Circuit authorities cited by the Court, which postdate IIRIRA, see Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F. 3d 3, 12 (CA1 2000); and Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F. 3d 1133, 1140 (CA9 2000)), cited ante, at 314, hardly demonstrate any historical usage upon which IIRIRA was based. Anyway, these cases rely for their analysis upon a third Court of Appeals decision — Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F. 3d 225, 235 (CA3 1999) — which simply relies on the passage from Heikkila under discussion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

John F. KERRY, Secretary of State, et al., Petitioners v. Fauzia DIN. No. 13-1402. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 23, 2015. Decided June 15, 2015. Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, DC, for petitioners. Mark E. Haddad, for respondent. Anoop Prasad, Jenny Zhao, Nasrina Bargzie, Yaman Salahi, Winifred Kao, Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus, San Francisco, CA, Mark E. Haddad, Counsel of Record, Geoffrey D. DeBoskey, David R. Carpenter, Heidi Larson Howell, Amanda Farfel, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Kathleen M. Mueller, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent Fauzia Din. Mary E. McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington, DC, Stevan E. Bunnell, General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Elaine J. Goldenberg, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Colin A. Kisor, Stacey I. Young, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Opinion Justice SCALIAannounced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join. Fauzia Din is a citizen and resident of the United States. Her husband, Kanishka Berashk, is an Afghan citizen and former civil servant in the Taliban regime who resides in that country. When the Government declined to issue an immigrant visa to Berashk, Din sued. The state action of which Din complains is the denial of Berashk'svisa application. Naturally, one would expect him-not Din-to bring this suit. But because Berashk is an unadmitted and nonresident alien, he has no right of entry into the United States, and no cause of action to press in furtherance of his claim for admission. See Kleindienst v. Mandel,408 U.S. 753, 762, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). So, Din attempts to bring suit on his behalf, alleging that the Government's denial of her husband'svisa application violated herconstitutional rights. See App. 36-37, Complaint ¶ 56. In particular, she claims that the Government denied her due process of law when, without adequate explanation of the reason for the visa denial, it deprived her of her constitutional right to live in the United States with her spouse. There is no such constitutional right. What Justice BREYER's dissent strangely describes as a "deprivation of her freedom to live together with her spouse in America," post,at 2142, is, in any world other than the artificial world of ever-expanding constitutional rights, nothing more than a deprivation of her spouse's freedom to immigrate into America. For the reasons given in this opinion and in the opinion concurring in the judgment, we vacate and remand. I A Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.,an alien may not enter and permanently reside in the United States without a visa. § 1181(a). The INA creates a special visa-application process for aliens sponsored by "immediate relatives" in the United States. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a). Under this process, the citizen-relative first files a petition on behalf of the alien living abroad, asking to have the alien classified as an immediate relative. See §§ 1153(f), 1154(a)(1). If and when a petition is approved, the alien may apply for a visa by submitting the required documents and appearing at a United States Embassy or consulate for an interview with a consular officer. See §§ 1201(a)(1), 1202. Before issuing a visa, the consular officer must ensure the alien is not inadmissible under any provision of the INA. § 1361. One ground for inadmissibility, § 1182(a)(3)(B), covers "[t]errorist activities." In addition to the violent and destructive acts the term immediately brings to mind, the INA defines "terrorist activity" to include providing material support to a terrorist organization and serving as a terrorist organization's representative. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), (iii)-(vi). B Fauzia Din came to the United States as a refugee in 2000, and became a naturalized citizen in 2007. She filed a petition to have Kanishka Berashk, whom she married in 2006, classified as her immediate relative. The petition was granted, and Berashk filed a visa application. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, interviewed Berashk and denied his application. A consular officer informed Berashk that he was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(B)but provided no further explanation. Din then brought suit in Federal District Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the United States to properly adjudicate Berashk's visa application; a declaratory judgment that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)-(3), which exempts the Government from providing notice to an alien found inadmissible under the terrorism bar, is unconstitutional as applied; and a declaratory judgment that the denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act. App. 36-39, Complaint ¶¶ 55-68. The District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Din "has a protected liberty interest in marriage that entitled [her] to review of the denial of [her] spouse's visa," 718 F.3d 856, 860 (2013), and that the Government's citation of § 1182(a)(3)(B)did not provide Din with the "limited judicial review" to which she was entitled under the Due Process Clause, id.,at 868. This Court granted certiorari. 573 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 44, 189 L.Ed.2d 896 (2014). II The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Although the amount and quality of process that our precedents have recognized as "due" under the Clause has changed considerably since the founding, see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,499 U.S. 1, 28-36, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991)(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), it remains the case that noprocess is due if one is not deprived of "life, liberty, or property," Swarthout v. Cooke,562 U.S. 216, 219, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011)(per curiam). The first question that we must ask, then, is whether the denial of Berashk's visa application deprived Din of any of these interests. Only if we answer in the affirmative must we proceed to consider whether the Government's explanation afforded sufficient process. A The Due Process Clause has its origin in Magna Carta. As originally drafted, the Great Charter provided that "[n]o freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." Magna Carta, ch. 29, in 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 45 (1797) (emphasis added). The Court has recognized that at the time of the Fifth Amendment's ratification, the words "due process of law" were understood "to convey the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land' " in Magna Carta. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,18 How. 272, 276, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856). Although the terminology associated with the guarantee of due process changed dramatically between 1215 and 1791, the general scope of the underlying rights protected stayed roughly constant. Edward Coke, whose Institutes "were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of law," Klopfer v. North Carolina,386 U.S. 213, 225, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), thoroughly described the scope of the interests that could be deprived only pursuant to "the law of the land." Magna Carta, he wrote, ensured that, without due process, "no man [may] be taken or imprisoned"; "disseised of his lands, or tenements, or dispossessed of his goods, or chattels"; "put from his livelihood without answer"; "barred to have the benefit of the law"; denied "the franchises, and priviledges, which the subjects have of the gift of the king"; "exiled"; or "forejudged of life, or limbe, disherited, or put to torture, or death." 1 Coke, supra,at 46-48. Blackstone's description of the rights protected by Magna Carta is similar, although he discusses them in terms much closer to the "life, liberty, or property" terminology used in the Fifth Amendment. He described first an interest in "personal security," "consist[ing] in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation." 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 125 (1769). Second, the "personal liberty of individuals" "consist[ed] in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint." Id.,at 130. And finally, a person's right to property included "the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions." Id.,at 134. Din, of course, could not conceivably claim that the denial of Berashk's visa application deprived her-or for that matter even Berashk-of life or property; and under the above described historical understanding, a claim that it deprived her of liberty is equally absurd. The Government has not "taken or imprisoned" Din, nor has it "confine[d]" her, either by "keeping [her] against h[er] will in a private house, putting h[er] in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining h[er] in the street." Id.,at 132. Indeed, not even Berashk has suffered a deprivation of liberty so understood. B Despite this historical evidence, this Court has seen fit on several occasions to expand the meaning of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause to include certain implied "fundamental rights." (The reasoning presumably goes like this: If you have a right to do something, you are free to do it, and deprivation of freedom is a deprivation of "liberty"-never mind the original meaning of that word in the Due Process Clause.) These implied rights have been given moreprotection than "life, liberty, or property" properly understood. While one may be dispossessed of property, thrown in jail, or even executed so long as proper procedures are followed, the enjoyment of implied constitutional rights cannot be limited at all, except by provisions that are "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores,507 U.S. 292, 301-302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). Din does not explicitly argue that the Government has violated this absolute prohibition of the substantivecomponent of the Due Process Clause, likely because it is obvious that a law barring aliens engaged in terrorist activities from entering this country isnarrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. She nevertheless insists that, because enforcement of the law affects her enjoyment of an implied fundamental liberty, the Government must first provide her a full battery of procedural-due-process protections. I think it worth explaining why, even ifone accepts the textually unsupportable doctrine of implied fundamental rights, Din's arguments would fail. Because "extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest ... place[s] the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action," Washington v. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), and because the "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended," Collins v. Harker Heights,503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), "[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," ibid.Accordingly, before conferring constitutional status upon a previously unrecognized "liberty," we have required "a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest," as well as a demonstration that the interest is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed." Glucksberg, supra,at 720-721, 117 S.Ct. 2258(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Din describes the denial of Berashk's visa application as implicating, alternately, a "liberty interest in her marriage," Brief for Respondent 28, a "right of association with one's spouse," id.,at 18, "a liberty interest in being reunited with certain blood relatives," id.,at 22, and "the liberty interest of a U.S. citizen under the Due Process Clause to be free from arbitrary restrictions on his right to live with his spouse," ibid.To be sure, this Court has at times indulged a propensity for grandiloquence when reviewing the sweep of implied rights, describing them so broadly that they would include not only the interests Din asserts but many others as well. For example: "Without doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, [and] to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience" Meyer v. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). But this Court is not bound by dicta, especially dicta that have been repudiated by the holdings of our subsequent cases. And the actual holdings of the cases Din relies upon hardly establish the capacious right she now asserts. Unlike the States in Loving v. Virginia,388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), Zablocki v. Redhail,434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), and Turner v. Safley,482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Federal Government here has not attempted to forbid a marriage. Although Din and the dissent borrow language from those cases invoking a fundamental right to marriage, they both implicitly concede that no such right has been infringed in this case. Din relies on the "associational interests in marriage that necessarily are protected by the right to marry," and that are "presuppose[d]" by later cases establishing a right to marital privacy. Brief for Respondent 16, 18. The dissent supplements the fundamental right to marriage with a fundamental right to live in the United States in order to find an affected liberty interest. Post,at 2142 - 2143 (BREYER, J., dissenting). Attempting to abstract from these cases some liberty interest that might be implicated by Berashk's visa denial, Din draws on even more inapposite cases. Meyer,for example, invalidated a state statute proscribing the teaching of foreign language to children who had not yet passed the eighth grade, reasoning that it violated the teacher's "right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children." 262 U.S., at 400, 43 S.Ct. 625. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), extended Meyer,finding that a law requiring children to attend public schools "interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-506, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), extended this interest in raising children to caretakers in a child's extended family, striking down an ordinance that limited occupancy of a single-family house to members of a nuclear family on the ground that "[d]ecisions concerning child rearing ... long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives." And Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), concluded that a law criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples violated "penumbral rights of 'privacy and repose' " protecting "the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom"-rights which do not plausibly extend into the offices of our consulates abroad. Nothing in the cases Din cites establishes a free-floating and categorical liberty interest in marriage (or any other formulation Din offers) sufficient to trigger constitutional protection whenever a regulation in any way touches upon an aspect of the marital relationship. Even if our cases could be construed so broadly, the relevant question is not whether the asserted interest "is consistent with this Court's substantive-due-process line of cases," but whether it is supported by "this Nation's history and practice." Glucksberg,521 U.S., at 723-724, 117 S.Ct. 2258(emphasis deleted). Even if we might "imply" a liberty interest in marriage generally speaking, that must give way when there is a tradition denying the specific application of that general interest. Thus, Glucksbergrejected a claimed liberty interest in "self-sovereignty" and "personal autonomy" that extended to assisted suicide when there was a longstanding tradition of outlawing the practice of suicide. Id.,at 724, 727-728, 117 S.Ct. 2258(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, a long practice of regulating spousal immigration precludes Din's claim that the denial of Berashk's visa application has deprived her of a fundamental liberty interest. Although immigration was effectively unregulated prior to 1875, as soon as Congress began legislating in this area it enacted a complicated web of regulations that erected serious impediments to a person's ability to bring a spouse into the United States. See Abrams, What Makes the Family Special? 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7, 10-16 (2013). Most strikingly, perhaps, the Expatriation Act of 1907 provided that "any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband." Ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228. Thus, a woman in Din's position not only lacked a liberty interest that might be affected by the Government's disposition of her husband's visa application, she lost her ownrights as a citizen upon marriage. When Congress began to impose quotas on immigration by country of origin less than 15 years later, with the Immigration Act of 1921, it omitted fiances and husbands from the family relations eligible for preferred status in the allocation of quota spots. § 2(d), 42 Stat. 6. Such relations were similarly excluded from the relations eligible for nonquota status, when that status was expanded three years later. Immigration Act of 1924, § 4(a), 43 Stat. 155. To be sure, these early regulations were premised on the derivative citizenship of women, a legacy of the law of coverture that was already in decline at the time. C. Bredbenner, A Nationality of Her Own 5 (1998). Modern equal-protection doctrine casts substantial doubt on the permissibility of such asymmetric treatment of women citizens in the immigration context, and modern moral judgment rejects the premises of such a legal order. Nevertheless, this all-too-recent practice repudiates any contention that Din's asserted liberty interest is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Glucksberg, supra,at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258(citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Indeed, the law showed little more solicitude for the marital relationship when it was a male resident or citizen seeking admission for his fiancee or wife. The Immigration Act of 1921 granted nonquota status only to unmarried, minor children of citizens, § 2(a), while granting fiancees and wives preferred status withinthe allocation of quota spots, § 2(d). In other words, a citizen could move his spouse forward in the line, but once all the quota spots were filled for the year, the spouse was barred without exception. This was not just a theoretical possibility: As one commentator has observed, "[f]or many immigrants, the family categories did little to help, because the quotas were so small that the number of family members seeking slots far outstripped the number available." Abrams, supra,at 13. Although Congress has tended to show "a continuing and kindly concern ... for the unity and the happiness of the immigrant family," E. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy 1798-1965, p. 518 (1981), this has been a matter of legislative grace rather than fundamental right. Even where Congress has provided special privileges to promote family immigration, it has also "written in careful checks and qualifications." Ibid.This Court has consistently recognized that these various distinctions are "policy questions entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the Congress." Fiallo v. Bell,430 U.S. 787, 798, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977). Only by diluting the meaning of a fundamental liberty interest and jettisoning our established jurisprudence could we conclude that the denial of Berashk's visa application implicates any of Din's fundamental liberty interests. C Justice BREYER suggests that procedural due process rights attach to liberty interests that either are (1) created by nonconstitutional law, such as a statute, or (2) "sufficiently important" so as to "flow 'implicit[ly]' from the design, object, and nature of the Due Process Clause." Post,at 2142. The first point is unobjectionable, at least given this Court's case law. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly,397 U.S. 254, 262, and n. 8, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Collins,503 U.S., at 129, 112 S.Ct. 1061. But it is unhelpful to Din, who does not argue that a statute confers on her a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice BREYER attempts to make this argument for Din, latching onto language in Wilkinson v. Austin,545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005), saying that a liberty interest "may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies." Such an "expectation" has been created here, he asserts, because "the law ... surrounds marriage with a host of legal protections to the point that it creates a strong expectation that government will not deprive married individuals of their freedom to live together without strong reasons and (in individual cases) without fair procedure," post,at 2143. But what Wilkinsonmeant by an "expectation or interest" was not that sort of judicially unenforceable substantial hope, but a present and legally recognized substantive entitlement.As sole support for its conclusion that nonconstitutional law can create constitutionally protected liberty interests, Wilkinsoncited Wolff v. McDonnell,418 U.S. 539, 556-558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), which held that a prisoner could not be deprived of statutory good-time credit without procedural due process. That was not because a prisoner might have " 'a strong expectation' " that the government would not deprive him of good-time credit " 'without strong reasons' " or " 'fair procedure,' " but because "the State itself has not only provided a statutory rightto good time [credit] but also specifies that it is to be forfeited onlyfor serious misbehavior," id.,at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963(emphasis added). The legal benefits afforded to marriages and the preferential treatment accorded to visa applicants with citizen relatives are insufficient to confer on Din a right that can be deprived only pursuant to procedural due process. Justice BREYER's second point-that procedural due process rights attach even to some nonfundamental liberty interests that have notbeen created by statute-is much more troubling. He relies on the implied-fundamental-rights cases discussed above to divine a "right of spouses to live together and to raise a family," along with "a citizen's right to live within this country." Post,at 2142. But perhaps recognizing that our established methodology for identifying fundamental rights cuts against his conclusion, see Part II-B, supra,he argues that the term "liberty" in the Due Process Clause includes implied rights that, although not so fundamental as to deserve substantive-due-process protection, are important enough to deserve procedural-due-process protection. Post,at 2142. In other words, there are two categories of implied rights protected by the Due Process Clause: really fundamental rights, which cannot be taken away at all absent a compelling state interest; and not-so-fundamental rights, which can be taken away so long as procedural due process is observed. The dissent fails to cite a single case supporting its novel theory of implied nonfundamental rights. It is certainly true that Vitek v. Jones,445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), and Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990), do not entail implied fundamentalrights, but this is because they do not entail impliedrights at all. Vitekconcerned the involuntary commitment of a prisoner, deprivation of the expressly protected right of liberty under the original understanding of the term, see Part II-A, supra. " 'Among the historic liberties' protected by the Due Process Clause is the 'right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.' " Vitek, supra,at 492, 100 S.Ct. 1254. The same is true of Harper,which concerned forced administration of psychotropic drugs to an inmate. 494 U.S., at 214, 110 S.Ct. 1028. Arguably, Paul v. Davis,424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), also addressed an interest expressly contemplated within the meaning of "liberty." See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 125 ("The right of personal security consists in a person's ... reputation"). But that case is of no help to the dissent anyway, since it found no liberty interest entitled to the Due Process Clause's protection. Paul, supra,at 713-714, 96 S.Ct. 1155. Finally, the dissent points to Goss v. Lopez,419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), a case that "recognize[d] ... as a property interest" a student's right to a public education conferred by Ohio's express statutory creation of a public school system; and further concluded that the student's 10-day suspension implicated the constitutionally grounded liberty interest in " 'a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.' " Ultimately, the dissent identifies no case holding that there is an implied nonfundamental right protected by procedural due process, and only one case even suggestingthat there is. That suggestion, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform,431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977), is contained in dictum in a footnote, id.,at 842, n. 48, 97 S.Ct. 2094. The holding of the case was that "the procedures provided by New York State ... and by New York Cit[y] ... are adequate to protect whateverliberty interests appellees mayhave." Id.,at 856, 97 S.Ct. 2094(emphasis added). The footnoted dictum that Justice BREYER proposes to elevate to constitutional law is a dangerous doctrine. It vastly expands the scope of our implied-rights jurisprudence by setting it free from the requirement that the liberty interest be "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Glucksberg,521 U.S., at 720-721, 117 S.Ct. 2258(internal quotation marks omitted). Even shallow-rooted liberties would, thanks to this new procedural-rights-only notion of quasi-fundamental rights, qualify for judicially imposed procedural requirements. Moreover, Justice BREYER gives no basis for distinguishing the fundamental rights recognized in the cases he depends on from the nonfundamentalright he believes they give rise to in the present case. Neither Din's right to live with her spouse nor her right to live within this country is implicated here. There is a "simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen's legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally." O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center,447 U.S. 773, 788, 100 S.Ct. 2467, 65 L.Ed.2d 506 (1980). The Government has not refused to recognize Din's marriage to Berashk, and Din remains free to live with her husband anywhere in the world that both individuals are permitted to reside. And the Government has not expelled Din from the country. It has simply determined that Kanishka Berashk engaged in terrorist activities within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and has therefore denied him admission into the country. This might, indeed, deprive Din of something "important," post, at 2142, but if that is the criterion for Justice BREYER's new pairing of substantive and procedural due process, we are in for quite a ride. * * * Because Fauzia Din was not deprived of "life, liberty, or property" when the Government denied Kanishka Berashk admission to the United States, there is no process due to her under the Constitution. To the extent that she received any explanation for the Government's decision, this was more than the Due Process Clause required. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Justice KENNEDY, with whom Justice ALITOjoins, concurring in the judgment. The respondent, Fauzia Din, is a citizen and resident of the United States. She asserts that petitioner Government officials (collectively, Government) violated her own constitutional right to live in this country with her husband, an alien now residing in Afghanistan. She contends this violation occurred when the Government, through State Department consular officials, denied her spouse's immigrant visa application with no explanation other than that the denial was based on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), the statutory provision prohibiting the issuance of visas to persons who engage in terrorist activities. The plurality is correct that the case must be vacated and remanded. But rather than deciding, as the plurality does, whether Din has a protected liberty interest, my view is that, even assuming she does, the notice she received regarding her husband's visa denial satisfied due process. Today's disposition should not be interpreted as deciding whether a citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of her alien spouse. The Court need not decide that issue, for this Court's precedents instruct that, even assuming she has such an interest, the Government satisfied due process when it notified Din's husband that his visa was denied under the immigration statute's terrorism bar, § 1182(a)(3)(B). See ante,at 2131 - 2132. I The conclusion that Din received all the process to which she was entitled finds its most substantial instruction in the Court's decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel,408 U.S. 753, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). There, college professors-all of them citizens-had invited Dr. Ernest Mandel, a self-described " 'revolutionary Marxist,' " to speak at a conference at Stanford University. Id.,at 756, 92 S.Ct. 2576. Yet when Mandel applied for a temporary nonimmigrant visa to enter the country, he was denied. At the time, the immigration laws deemed aliens "who advocate[d] the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of World communism" ineligible for visas. § 1182(a)(28)(D) (1964 ed.). Aliens ineligible under this provision did have one opportunity for recourse: The Attorney General was given discretion to waive the prohibition and grant individual exceptions, allowing the alien to obtain a temporary visa. § 1182(d)(3). For Mandel, however, the Attorney General, acting through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), declined to grant a waiver. In a letter regarding this decision, the INS explained Mandel had exceeded the scope and terms of temporary visas on past trips to the United States, which the agency deemed a " 'flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country.' " 408 U.S., at 759, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The professors who had invited Mandel to speak challenged the INS' decision, asserting a First Amendment right to " 'hear his views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.' " Id.,at 760, 92 S.Ct. 2576. They claimed the Attorney General infringed this right when he refused to grant Mandel relief. See ibid. The Court declined to balance the First Amendment interest of the professors against "Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.' " Id.,at 766, 768, 92 S.Ct. 2576(citation omitted). To do so would require "courts in each case ... to weigh the strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in refusing a [visa] to the particular applicant," a nuanced and difficult decision Congress had "properly ... placed in the hands of the Executive." Id.,at 769, 92 S.Ct. 2576. Instead, the Court limited its inquiry to the question whether the Government had provided a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for its action. Id.,at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. Finding the Government had proffered such a reason-Mandel's abuse of past visas-the Court ended its inquiry and found the Attorney General's action to be lawful. See ibid.The Court emphasized it did not address "[w]hat First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking an exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced." Ibid. The reasoning and the holding in Mandelcontrol here. That decision was based upon due consideration of the congressional power to make rules for the exclusion of aliens, and the ensuing power to delegate authority to the Attorney General to exercise substantial discretion in that field. Mandelheld that an executive officer's decision denying a visa that burdens a citizen's own constitutional rights is valid when it is made "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason." Id., at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. Once this standard is met, "courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against" the constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might implicate. Ibid.This reasoning has particular force in the area of national security, for which Congress has provided specific statutory directions pertaining to visa applications by noncitizens who seek entry to this country. II Like the professors who sought an audience with Dr. Mandel, Din claims her constitutional rights were burdened by the denial of a visa to a noncitizen, namely her husband. And as in Mandel,the Government provided a reason for the visa denial: It concluded Din's husband was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(B)'s terrorism bar. Even assuming Din's rights were burdened directly by the visa denial, the remaining question is whether the reasons given by the Government satisfy Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard. I conclude that they do. Here, the consular officer's determination that Din's husband was ineligible for a visa was controlled by specific statutory factors. The provisions of § 1182(a)(3)(B)establish specific criteria for determining terrorism-related inadmissibility. The consular officer's citation of that provision suffices to show that the denial rested on a determination that Din's husband did not satisfy the statute's requirements. Given Congress' plenary power to "suppl[y] the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States," United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,338 U.S. 537, 543, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950), it follows that the Government's decision to exclude an alien it determines does not satisfy one or more of those conditions is facially legitimate under Mandel. The Government's citation of § 1182(a)(3)(B)also indicates it relied upon a bona fide factual basis for denying a visa to Berashk. Cf. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc.,272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926). Din claims due process requires she be provided with the facts underlying this determination, arguing Mandelrequired a similar factual basis. It is true the Attorney General there disclosed the facts motivating his decision to deny Dr. Mandel a waiver, and that the Court cited those facts as demonstrating "the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power that Congress delegated to the Executive." 408 U.S., at 769, 92 S.Ct. 2576. But unlike the waiver provision at issue in Mandel,which granted the Attorney General nearly unbridled discretion, § 1182(a)(3)(B)specifies discrete factual predicates the consular officer must find to exist before denying a visa. Din, moreover, admits in her Complaint that Berashk worked for the Taliban government, App. 27-28, which, even if itself insufficient to support exclusion, provides at least a facial connection to terrorist activity. Absent an affirmative showing of bad faith on the part of the consular officer who denied Berashk a visa-which Din has not plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity-Mandelinstructs us not to "look behind" the Government's exclusion of Berashk for additional factual details beyond what its express reliance on § 1182(a)(3)(B)encompassed. See 408 U.S., at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. The Government, furthermore, was not required, as Din claims, to point to a more specific provision within § 1182(a)(3)(B). To be sure, the statutory provision the consular officer cited covers a broad range of conduct. And Din perhaps more easily could mount a challenge to her husband's visa denial if she knew the specific subsection on which the consular officer relied. Congress understood this problem, however. The statute generally requires the Government to provide an alien denied a visa with the "specific provision or provisions of law under which the alien is inadmissible," § 1182(b)(1); but this notice requirement does not apply when, as in this case, a visa application is denied due to terrorism or national security concerns. § 1182(b)(3). Notably, the Government is not prohibited from offering more details when it sees fit, but the statute expressly refrains from requiring it to do so. Congress evaluated the benefits and burdens of notice in this sensitive area and assigned discretion to the Executive to decide when more detailed disclosure is appropriate. This considered judgment gives additional support to the independent conclusion that the notice given was constitutionally adequate, particularly in light of the national security concerns the terrorism bar addresses. See Fiallo v. Bell,430 U.S. 787, 795-796, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). And even if Din is correct that sensitive facts could be reviewed by courts in camera,the dangers and difficulties of handling such delicate security material further counsel against requiring disclosure in a case such as this. Under Mandel,respect for the political branches' broad power over the creation and administration of the immigration system extends to determinations of how much information the Government is obliged to disclose about a consular officer's denial of a visa to an alien abroad. For these reasons, my conclusion is that the Government satisfied any obligation it might have had to provide Din with a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for its action when it provided notice that her husband was denied admission to the country under § 1182(a)(3)(B). By requiring the Government to provide more, the Court of Appeals erred in adjudicating Din's constitutional claims. Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGANjoin, dissenting. Fauzia Din, an American citizen, wants to know why the State Department denied a visa to her husband, a noncitizen. She points out that, without a visa, she and her husband will have to spend their married lives separately or abroad. And she argues that the Department, in refusing to provide an adequate reason for the denial, has violated the constitutional requirement that "[n]o person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. In my view, Ms. Din should prevail on this constitutional claim. She possesses the kind of "liberty" interest to which the Due Process Clause grants procedural protection. And the Government has failed to provide her with the procedure that is constitutionally "due." See Swarthout v. Cooke,562 U.S. 216, 219, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011)(per curiam) (setting forth the Court's two-step inquiry for procedural due process claims). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. I The plurality opinion (which is not controlling) concludes that Ms. Din lacks the kind of liberty interest to which the Due Process Clause provides procedural protections. Ante, at 2132 - 2138. Justice KENNEDY's opinion "assum[es]" that Ms. Din possesses that kind of liberty interest. Ante, at 2131 (opinion concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). I agree with Justice KENNEDY's assumption. More than that, I believe that Ms. Din possesses that kind of constitutional interest. The liberty interest that Ms. Din seeks to protect consists of her freedom to live together with her husband in the United States. She seeks procedural, not substantive, protection for this freedom. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin,545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005)(Due Process Clause requires compliance with fair procedureswhen the government deprives an individual of certain "liberty" or "property" interests), with Reno v. Flores,507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)(Due Process Clause limits the extent to which government can substantivelyregulate certain "fundamental" rights, "no matter what process is provided"). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality & Reform,431 U.S. 816, 842, n. 48, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977)(liberty interests arising under the Constitution for procedural due process purposes are not the same as fundamental rights requiring substantive due process protection). Our cases make clear that the Due Process Clause entitles her to such procedural rights as long as (1) she seeks protection for a liberty interest sufficiently important for procedural protection to flow "implicit[ly]" from the design, object, and nature of the Due Process Clause, or (2) nonconstitutional law (a statute, for example) creates "an expectation" that a person will not be deprived of that kind of liberty without fair procedures. Wilkinson, supra,at 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384. The liberty for which Ms. Din seeks protection easily satisfies both standards. As this Court has long recognized, the institution of marriage, which encompasses the right of spouses to live together and to raise a family, is central to human life, requires and enjoys community support, and plays a central role in most individuals' "orderly pursuit of happiness," Meyer v. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). See also, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 485-486, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Zablocki v. Redhail,434 U.S. 374, 386, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Moore v. East Cleveland,431 U.S. 494, 500-503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977)(plurality opinion); Smith, supra,at 843, 97 S.Ct. 2094. Similarly, the Court has long recognized that a citizen's right to live within this country, being fundamental, enjoys basic procedural due process protection. See Ng Fung Ho v. White,259 U.S. 276, 284-285, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922); Baumgartner v. United States,322 U.S. 665, 670, 64 S.Ct. 1240, 88 L.Ed. 1525 (1944). At the same time, the law, including visa law, surrounds marriage with a host of legal protections to the point that it creates a strong expectation that government will not deprive married individuals of their freedom to live together without strong reasons and (in individual cases) without fair procedure. Cf. Turner v. Safley,482 U.S. 78, 95-96, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)(noting various legal benefits of marriage); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i)(special visa preference for spouse of an American citizen). Justice SCALIA's response-that nonconstitutional law creates an "expectation" that merits procedural protection under the Due Process Clause only if there is an unequivocal statutory right, ante,at 2136 - 2137-is sorely mistaken. His argument rests on the rights/privilege distinction that this Court rejected almost five decades ago, in the seminal case of Goldberg v. Kelly,397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). See generally Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)("[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights"); id.,at 572, 92 S.Ct. 2701("In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed"). Justice SCALIA's more general response-claiming that I have created a new category of constitutional rights, ante,at 2136 - 2138-misses the mark. I break no new ground here. Rather, this Court has alreadyrecognized that the Due Process Clause guarantees that the government will not, without fair procedure, deprive individuals of a host of rights, freedoms, and liberties that are no more important, and for which the state has created no greater expectation of continued benefit, than the liberty interest at issue here. See, e.g.,Wolff v. McDonnell,418 U.S. 539, 556-557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)(prisoner's right to maintain "goodtime" credits shortening term of imprisonment; procedurally protected liberty interest based on nonconstitutional law); Paul v. Davis,424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)(right to certain aspects of reputation; procedurally protected liberty interest arising under the Constitution); Goss v. Lopez,419 U.S. 565, 574-575, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)(student's right not to be suspended from school class; procedurally protected liberty interest arising under the Constitution); Vitek v. Jones,445 U.S. 480, 491-495, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980)(prisoner's right against involuntary commitment; procedurally protected liberty interest arising under the Constitution); Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210, 221-222, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990)(mentally ill prisoner's right not to take psychotropic drugs; procedurally protected liberty interest arising under the Constitution); see generally Goldberg, supra,at 262-263, 90 S.Ct. 1011(right to welfare benefits; procedurally protected property interest based on nonconstitutional law). But cf. ante, at 2136 - 2138 (plurality opinion) (making what I believe are unsuccessful efforts to distinguish these cases). How could a Constitution that protects individuals against the arbitrary deprivation of so diverse a set of interests not also offer some form of procedural protection to a citizen threatened with governmental deprivation of her freedom to live together with her spouse in America? As compared to reputational harm, for example, how is Ms. Din's liberty interest any less worthy of due process protections? II A The more difficult question is the nature of the procedural protection required by the Constitution. After all, sometimes, as with the military draft, the law separates spouses with little individualized procedure. And sometimes, as with criminal convictions, the law provides procedure to one spouse but not to the other. Unlike criminal convictions, however, neither spouse here has received any procedural protection. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright,430 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)(availability of alternative procedures can satisfy due process). Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,345 U.S. 206, 213, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953)(no due process protections for aliens outside United States), with Zadvydas v. Davis,533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001)(such protections are available for aliens inside United States). And, unlike the draft (justified by a classic military threat), the deprivation does not apply similarly to hundreds of thousands of American families. Cf. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo.,239 U.S. 441, 445, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915). Rather, here, the Government makes individualized visa determinations through the application of a legal rule to particular facts. Individualized adjudication normally calls for the ordinary application of Due Process Clause procedures. Londoner v. City and County of Denver,210 U.S. 373, 385-386, 28 S.Ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908). And those procedures normally include notice of an adverse action, an opportunity to present relevant proofs and arguments, before a neutral decisionmaker, and reasoned decisionmaking. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,542 U.S. 507, 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004)(plurality opinion); see also Friendly, Some Kind of a Hearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1278-1281 (1975). These procedural protections help to guarantee that government will not make a decision directly affecting an individual arbitrarily but will do so through the reasoned application of a rule of law. It is that rule of law, stretching back at least 800 years to Magna Carta, which in major part the Due Process Clause seeks to protect. Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516, 527, 4 S.Ct. 292, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884). Here, we need not consider all possible procedural due process elements. Rather we consider only the minimum procedure that Ms. Din has requested-namely, a statement of reasons, some kind of explanation, as to why the State Department denied her husband a visa. We have often held that this kind of statement, permitting an individual to understand why the government acted as it did, is a fundamental element of due process. See, e.g., Goldberg,397 U.S., at 267-268, 90 S.Ct. 1011; Perry v. Sindermann,408 U.S. 593, 603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer,408 U.S. 471, 485, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Wolff, supra,at 563-564, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Goss, supra,at 581, 95 S.Ct. 729; Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319, 345-346, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill,470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); Wilkinson,545 U.S., at 224, 125 S.Ct. 2384; Hamdi, supra,at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633(plurality opinion). That is so in part because a statement of reasons, even one provided after a visa denial, serves much the same function as a "notice" of a proposed action. It allows Ms. Din, who suffered a "serious loss," a fair "opportunity to meet" "the case" that has produced separation from her husband. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,341 U.S. 123, 171-172, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Hamdi, supra,at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633(plurality opinion); Wolff, supra,at 563, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Friendly, supra,at 1280 ("notice" must provide "the grounds for" the relevant action). Properly apprised of the grounds for the Government's action, Ms. Din can then take appropriate action-whether this amounts to an appeal, internal agency review, or (as is likely here) an opportunity to submit additional evidence and obtain reconsideration, 22 CFR 42.81(e) (2014). I recognize that our due process cases often determine the constitutional insistence upon a particular procedure by balancing, with respect to that procedure, the "private interest" at stake, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" absent the sought-after protection, and the Government's interest in not providing additional procedure. Eldridge, supra,at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893; but cf. Hamdi, supra,at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633(plurality opinion) (suggesting minimal due process requirements cannot be balanced away). Here "balancing" would not change the result. The "private interest" is important, the risk of an "erroneous deprivation" is significant, and the Government's interest in not providing a reason is normally small, at least administratively speaking. Indeed, Congress requires the State Department to provide a reason for a visa denial in most contexts. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1). Accordingly, in the absence of some highly unusual circumstance (not shown to be present here, see infra, at 2146), the Constitution requires the Government to provide an adequate reason why it refused to grant Ms. Din's husband a visa. That reason, in my view, could be either the factual basis for the Government's decision or a sufficiently specific statutory subsection that conveys effectively the same information. B 1 Justice KENNEDY, without denying that Ms. Din was entitled to a reason, believes that she received an adequate reason here. According to the complaint, however, the State Department's denial letter stated only that the visa "had been denied under ... 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)." App. 30. In response to requests for further explanation, the State Department sent an e-mail stating that the visa "had been denied under ... 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)-the terrorism and national security bars to admissibility." Id.,at 31. I do not see how either statement could count as adequate. For one thing, the statutory provision to which it refers, § 1182(a)(3)(B), sets forth, not one reason, but dozens. It is a complex provision with 10 different subsections, many of which cross-reference other provisions of law. See Appendix, infra. Some parts cover criminal conduct that is particularly serious, such as hijacking aircraft and assassination. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (IV). Other parts cover activity that, depending on the factual circumstances, cannot easily be labeled "terrorist." One set of cross-referenced subsections, for example, brings within the section's visa prohibition any individual who has "transfer[red] ... [any] material financial benefit" to "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which ... has a subgroup which engages" in "afford[ing] material support ... for ... any individual who ... plans" "[t]he use of any ... weapon ... with intent ... to cause substantial damage to property." §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), (vi)(III), (iv)(VI)(bb), (iii)(V). At the same time, some subsections provide the visa applicant with a defense; others do not. See, e.g.,§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd)(permitting applicant to show "by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization"). Taken together the subsections, directly or through cross-reference, cover a vast waterfront of human activity potentially benefitting, sometimes in major ways, sometimes hardly at all, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, sometimes a few people, sometimes many, sometimes those with strong links, sometimes those with hardly a link, to a loosely or strongly connected group of individuals, which, through many different kinds of actions, might fall within the broad statutorily defined term "terrorist." See, e.g., Daneshvar v. Ashcroft,355 F.3d 615, 628 (C.A.6 2004) (alleging material support for selling newspapers); Singh v. Wiles,747 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1227 (W.D.Wash.2010) (alleging material support for letting individuals sleep on a temple floor). For another thing, the State Department's reason did not set forth any factual basis for the Government's decision. Cf., e.g.,Wilkinson,545 U.S., at 225-226, 125 S.Ct. 2384(prison administrators must inform prisoners of "factual basis" for extreme solitary confinement). Perhaps the Department denied the visa because Ms. Din's husband at one point was a payroll clerk for the Afghan Government when that government was controlled by the Taliban. See ante,at 2140 - 2141 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). But there is no way to know if that is so. The generality of the statutory provision cited and the lack of factual support mean that here, the reason given is analogous to telling a criminal defendant only that he is accused of "breaking the law"; telling a property owner only that he cannot build because environmental rules forbid it; or telling a driver only that police pulled him over because he violated traffic laws. As such, the reason given cannot serve its procedural purpose. It does not permit Ms. Din to assess the correctness of the State Department's conclusion; it does not permit her to determine what kinds of facts she might provide in response; and it does not permit her to learn whether, or what kind of, defenses might be available. In short, any "reason" that Ms. Din received is not constitutionally adequate. 2 Seemingly aware that he cannot deny these basic legal principles, Justice KENNEDY rests his conclusions upon two considerations that, in his view, provide sufficient grounds for an exception.Ante, at 2140 - 2141. Most importantly, he says that ordinary rules of due process must give way here to national security concerns. But just what are those concerns? And how do they apply here? Ms. Din's counsel stated at oral argument that there were no such concerns in this case. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. And the Solicitor General did not deny that statement. In other cases, such concerns may exist. But, when faced with the need to provide public information without compromising security interests, the Government has found ways to do so, for example, by excising sensitive portions of documents requested by the press, members of the public, or other public officials. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Moreover, agencies and courts have found ways to conduct proceedings in private, through internal review or in camera proceedings, and thereby protect sensitive information. See Webster v. Doe,486 U.S. 592, 604, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988); Brief for Respondent 48-52, and n. 20; Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae23-28. Would these (or other) methods prove adequate in other cases where a citizen's freedom to live in America with her spouse is at issue? Are they even necessary here? The Government has not explained. I do not deny the importance of national security, the need to keep certain related information private, or the need to respect the determinations of the other branches of Government in such matters. But protecting ordinary citizens from arbitrary government action is fundamental. Thus, the presence of security considerations does not suspend the Constitution. Hamdi,542 U.S., at 527-537, 124 S.Ct. 2633(plurality opinion). Rather, it requires us to take security needs into account when determining, for example, what "process" is "due." Ibid. Yet how can we take proper account of security considerations without knowing what they are, without knowing how and why they require modification of traditional due process requirements, and without knowing whether other, less restrictive alternatives are available? How exactly would it harm important security interests to give Ms. Din a better explanation? Is there no way to give Ms. Din such an explanation while also maintaining appropriate secrecy? I believe we need answers to these questions before we can accept as constitutional a major departure from the procedural requirements that the Due Process Clause ordinarily demands. Justice KENNEDY also looks for support to the fact that Congress specifically exempted the section here at issue, § 1182(a)(3)(B), from the statutory provision requiring the State Department to provide a reason for visa denials. § 1182(b)(3). An exception from a statutory demand for a reason, however, is not a command to do the opposite; rather, at most, it leaves open the question whether other law requires a reason. Here that other law is the Constitution, not a statute. In my view, the Due Process Clause requires the Department to provide an adequate reason. And, I believe it has failed to do so. * * * For these reasons, with respect, I dissent. APPENDIX Title 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)provides: "(B) Terrorist activities "(i) In general "Any alien who- "(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity; "(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in clause (iv)); "(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity; "(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of- "(aa) a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or "(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity; "(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi); "(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the alien can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; "(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization; "(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in section 2339D(c)(1) of title 18) from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was received, was a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or "(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this subparagraph, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years, "is inadmissible. An alien who is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is considered, for purposes of this chapter, to be engaged in a terrorist activity. "(ii) Exception "Subclause (IX) of clause (i) does not apply to a spouse or child- "(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section; or "(II) whom the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe has renounced the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section. "(iii) 'Terrorist activity' defined "As used in this chapter, the term 'terrorist activity' means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: "(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). "(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. "(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. "(IV) An assassination. "(V) The use of any- "(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or "(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), "with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. "(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. "(iv) 'Engage in terrorist activity' defined "As used in this chapter, the term 'engage in terrorist activity' means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization- "(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; "(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity; "(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity; "(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for- "(aa) a terrorist activity; "(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or "(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; "(V) to solicit any individual- "(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this subsection; "(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or "(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III) unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; or "(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training- "(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity; "(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; "(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any member of such an organization; or "(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), or to any member of such an organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization. "(v) 'Representative' defined "As used in this paragraph, the term 'representative' includes an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity. "(vi) 'Terrorist organization' defined "As used in this section, the term 'terrorist organization' means an organization- "(I) designated under section 1189 of this title; "(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization engages in the activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv); or "(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv)." The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. Justice BREYER characterizes this as a reintroduction of "the rights/privilege distinction that this Court rejected almost five decades ago." Post,at 2143. Not so. All I insist upon (and all that our cases over the past five decades require) is that the privilege be one to which the claimant has been given an entitlement.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CUOMO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK v. CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATION, L. L. C., et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 08-453. Argued April 28, 2009 Decided June 29, 2009 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 537. Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General of New York, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, pro se, Michelle Aronowitz, Deputy Solicitor General, and Richard Dearing, Assistant Solicitor General. Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Kagan, Matthew D. Roberts, Julie L. Williams, Daniel R Stipano, Horace G. Sneed, and Douglas B. Jordan. Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent Clearing House Association, L. L. C. With him on the brief were Edward C. DuMont, Catherine M. A. Carroll, Christopher R. Lipsett, Noah A. Levine, Anne K. Small, H. Rodgin Cohen, Robinson B. Lacy, and Michael M. Wiseman. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Members of Congress by Linda Singer and David, Reiser; for the State of North Carolina et al. by Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor General, Gary R. Govert, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General of Alaska, Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General of Arkansas, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, John W. Suthers, Attorney General of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, Richard S. Gebelein, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Delaware, Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General of the District of Columbia, Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett, Attorney General of Hawaii, Lawrence Wasden, Attorney General of Idaho, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Tom Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Steve Six, Attorney General of Kansas, Jack Conway, Attorney General of Kentucky, James D. Caldwell, Attorney General of Louisiana, Janet T. Mills, Attorney General of Maine, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Lori Swanson, Attorney General of Minnesota, Jim Hood, Attorney General of Mississippi, Chris Koster, Attorney General of Missouri, Steve Bullock, Attorney General of Montana, Jon Bruning, Attorney General of Nebraska, Catherine C. Masto, Attorney General of Nevada, Kelly A Ayotte, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Anne Milgram, Attorney General of New Jersey, Gary K. King, Attorney General of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General of North Dakota, Richard Cordray, Attorney General of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, John R. Kroger, Attorney General of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster, Attorney General of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General of Tennessee, Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, William C. Mims, Attorney General of Virginia, Rob McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General of West Virginia, J. B. Van Hollen, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators by Stefan L. Jouret, John Foskett, and Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.; for the Center for Responsible Lending et al. by Eric Halperin, Jean Constantine-Davis, Nina F. Simon, and Michael Schuster; for the Comptroller of the City of New York by Lewis S. Finkelman; for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors by David T. Goldberg, Sean H. Donahue, and John Gorman; for the Connecticut Fair Housing Center by Jonathan R. Macey; for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey Fisher, Joshua Civin, John Payton, Jacqueline A. Berrien, and Debo P. Adegbile; for the National Association of Realtors by David C. Frederick, Scott H. Angstreich, Laurene K. Janik, and Ralph W. Holmen; for the National Governors Association et al. by Richard Ruda and Thomas W. Merrill; and for the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., by Keith R. Fisher. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for All Former Comptrollers of the Currency Since 1973 by Drew S. Days III, L. Richard Fischer, Seth M. Galanter, Howard N. Cayne, Laurence J. Hutt, and Nancy L. Perkins; for the American Bankers Association et al. by Theodore B. Olson, Mark A. Perry, and Amir C. Tayrani; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Sri Srinivasan, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; and for the Financial Services Roundtable by Robert A. Long, Jr., Stuart C. Stock, Keith A Noreika, and Hal S. Scott. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2005, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General for the State of New York, sent letters to several national banks making a request “in lieu of subpoena” that they provide certain nonpublic information about their lending practices. He sought this information to determine whether the banks had violated the State’s fair-lending laws. Spitzer’s successor in office, Andrew Cuomo, is the petitioner here. Respondents, the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller or OCC) and the Clearing House Association, a banking trade group, brought suit to enjoin the information request, claiming that the Comptroller’s regulation promulgated under the National Bank Act prohibits that form of state law enforcement against national banks. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an injunction in favor of respondents, prohibiting the Attorney General from enforcing state fair-lending laws through demands for records or judicial proceedings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 510 F. 3d 105 (2007). We granted certiorari. 555 U. S. 1130 (2009). The question presented is whether the Comptroller’s regulation purporting to preempt state law enforcement can be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the National Bank Act. I Section 484(a) of Title 12 U. S. C., a provision of the National Bank Act, 13 Stat. 99, reads as follows: “No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either House duly authorized.” The Comptroller, charged with administering the National Bank Act, adopted, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the regulation at issue here designed to implement the statutory provision. Its principal provisions read as follows: “§ 7.4000 Visitorial powers. “(a) General rule. (1) Only the OCC or an authorized representative of the OCC may exercise visitorial powers with respect to national banks, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section. State officials may not exercise visitorial powers with respect to national banks, such as conducting examinations, inspecting or requiring the production of books or records of national banks, or prosecuting enforcement actions, except in limited circumstances authorized by federal law. However, production of a bank’s records (other than nonpublic OCC information under 12 CFR part 4, subpart C) may be required under normal judicial procedures. “(2) For purposes of this section, visitorial powers include: “(i) Examination of a bank; “(ii) Inspection of a bank’s books and records; “(iii) Regulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law; and “(iv) Enforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state laws concerning those activities.” 12 CFR §7.4000 (2009). By its clear text, this regulation prohibits the States from “prosecuting enforcement actions” except in “limited circumstances authorized by federal law.” Under the familiar Chevron framework, we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). There is necessarily some ambiguity as to the meaning of the statutory term “visitorial powers,” especially since we are working in an era when the prerogative writs — through which visitorial powers were traditionally enforced — are not in vogue. The Comptroller can give authoritative meaning to the statute within the bounds of that uncertainty. But the presence of some uncertainty does not expand Chevron deference to cover virtually any interpretation of the National Bank Act. We can discern the outer limits of the term “visitorial powers” even through the clouded lens of history. They do not include, as the Comptroller’s expansive regulation would provide, ordinary enforcement of the law. Evidence from the time of the statute’s enactment, a long line of our own cases, and application of normal principles of construction to the National Bank Act make that clear. A Historically, the sovereign’s right of visitation over corporations paralleled the right of the church to supervise its institutions and the right of the founder of a charitable institution “to see that [his] property [was] rightly employed,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 469 (1765). By extension of this principle, “[t]he king [was] by law the visitor of all civil corporations,” ibid. A visitor could inspect and control the visited institution at will. When the National Bank Act was enacted in 1864, “visitation” was accordingly understood as “[t]he act of examining into the affairs of a corporation” by “the government itself.” 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 790 (15th ed. 1883). Lower courts understood “visitation” to mean “the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to examine into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and regulations.” First Nat. Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740 (CC ND Ohio 1881). A State was the “visitor” of all companies incorporated in the State, simply by virtue of the State’s role as sovereign: The “legislature is the visitor of all corporations founded by it.” Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 157 (1905) (internal quotation marks omitted). This relationship between sovereign and corporation was understood to allow the States to use prerogative writs— such as mandamus and quo warranto — to exercise control “whenever a corporation [wa]s abusing the power given it ... or acting adversely to the public, or creating a nuisance.” H. Wilgus, Private Corporations, in 8 American Law and Procedure § 157, pp. 224-225 (J. Hall ed. 1910). State visitorial commissions were authorized to “exercise a general supervision” over companies in the State. I. Wormser, Private Corporations § 80, pp. 100, 101, in 4 Modern American Law (1921). B Our cases have always understood “visitation” as this right to oversee corporate affairs, quite separate from the power to enforce the law. In the famous Dartmouth College case, Justice Story, describing visitation of a charitable corporation, wrote that Dartmouth was “subject to the controling authority of its legal visitor, who.. . . may amend and repeal its statutes, remove its officers, correct abuses, and generally superintend the management of [its] trusts,” and who is “liable to no supervision or control.” Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 676, 681 (1819) (concurring opinion). This power of “genera[l] superintend[ence]” stood in contrast to action by the court of chancery, which acted “not as itself possessing a visitorial power . . . but as possessing a general jurisdiction ... to redress grievances, and frauds.” Id., at 676. In Guthrie, supra, we held that a shareholder acting in his role as a private individual was not exercising a “visitorial power” under the National Bank Act when he petitioned a court to force the production of corporate records, id., at 159. “[Cjontrol in the courts of justice,” we said, is not visitorial, and we drew a contrast between the nonvisitorial act of “su[ing] in the courts of the State” and the visitorial “supervision of the Comptroller of the Currency,” id., at 159, 157. In First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640 (1924), we upheld the right of the Attorney General of Missouri to bring suit to enforce a state anti-bank-branching law against a national bank. We said that only the United States may perform visitorial administrative oversight, such as “inquiring] by quo warranto whether a national bank is acting in excess of its charter powers.” Id., at 660. But if a state statute of general applicability is not substantively pre-empted, then “the power of enforcement must rest with the [State] and not with” the National Government, ibid. Our most recent decision, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A., 550 U. S. 1 (2007), does not, as the dissent contends, post, at 552, “suppor[t] OCC’s construction of the statute.” To the contrary, it is fully in accord with the well established distinction between supervision and law enforcement. Watters held that a State may not exercise “ ‘general supervision and control’ ” over a subsidiary of a national bank, 550 U. S., at 8, because “multiple audits and surveillance under rival oversight regimes” would cause uncertainty, id., at 21. “[G]eneral supervision and control” and “oversight” are worlds apart from law enforcement. All parties to the case agreed that Michigan’s general oversight regime could not be imposed on national banks; the sole question was whether operating subsidiaries of national banks enjoyed the same immunity from state visitation. The opinion addresses and answers no other question. The foregoing cases all involve enforcement of state law. But if the Comptroller’s exclusive exercise of visitorial powers precluded law enforcement by the States, it would also preclude law enforcement by federal agencies. Of course it does not. See, e. g., Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Douglas, 105 F. 2d 100, 105-106 (CADC 1939) (Securities Exchange Commission investigation of bank fraud is not an exercise of “visitorial powers”); Peoples Bank of Danville v. Williams, 449 F. Supp. 254, 260 (WD Va. 1978) (same). In sum, the unmistakable and utterly consistent teaching of our jurisprudence, both before and after enactment of the National Bank Act, is that a sovereign’s “visitorial powers” and its power to enforce the law are two different things. There is not a credible argument to the contrary. And contrary to what the Comptroller’s regulation says, the National Bank Act pre-empts only the former. C The consequences of the regulation also cast doubt upon its validity. No one denies that the National Bank Act leaves in place some state substantive laws affecting banks. See Brief for Federal Respondent 20; Brief for Respondent Clearing House Association, L. L. C. 29; post, at 552. But the Comptroller’s rule says that the State may not enforce its valid, non-pre-empted laws against national banks. Post, at 552-553. The bark remains, but the bite does not. The dissent admits, with considerable understatement, that such a result is “unusual,” post, at 556. “Bizarre” would be more apt. As the Court said in St. Louis: “To demonstrate the binding quality of a statute but deny the power of enforcement involves a fallacy made apparent by the mere statement of the proposition, for such power is essentially inherent in the very conception of law.” 263 U. S., at 660. In sharp contrast to the “unusual” reading propounded by the Comptroller’s regulation, reading “visitorial powers” as limiting only sovereign oversight and supervision would produce an entirely commonplace result — the precise result contemplated by our opinion in St. Louis, which said that if a state statute is valid as to national banks, “the corollary that it is obligatory and enforceable necessarily results.” Id., at 659-660 (emphasis added). Channeling state attorneys general into judicial law-enforcement proceedings (rather than allowing them to exercise “visitorial” oversight) would preserve a regime of exclusive administrative oversight by the Comptroller while honoring in fact rather than merely in theory Congress’s decision not to pre-empt substantive state law. This system echoes many other mixed state/federal regimes in which the Federal Government exercises general oversight while leaving state substantive law in place. See, e. g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555 (2009). This reading is also suggested by § 484(a)’s otherwise inexplicable reservation of state powers “vested in the courts of justice.” As described earlier, visitation was normally conducted through use of the prerogative writs of mandamus and quo warranto. The exception could not possibly exempt that manner of exercising visitation, or else the exception would swallow the rule. Its only conceivable purpose is to preserve normal civil and criminal lawsuits. To be sure, the reservation of powers “vested in the courts of justice” is phrased as an exception from the prohibition of visitorial powers. But as we have just discussed, it cannot possibly be that, and it is explicable only as an attempt to make clear that the courts’ ordinary powers of enforcing the law are not affected. On a pragmatic level, the difference between visitation and law enforcement is clear. If a State chooses to pursue enforcement of 'its laws in court, then it is not exercising its power of visitation and will be treated like a litigant. An attorney general acting as a civil litigant must file a lawsuit, survive a motion to dismiss, endure the rules of procedure and discovery, and risk sanctions if his claim is frivolous or his discovery tactics abusive. Judges are trusted to prevent “fishing expeditions” or an undirected rummaging through bank books and records for evidence of some unknown wrongdoing. In New York, civil discovery is far more limited than the full range of “visitorial powers” that may be exercised by a sovereign. Courts may enter protective orders to prevent “unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice,” N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. § 3103(a) (West 2005), and may supervise discovery sua sponte, § 3104(a). A visitor, by contrast, may inspect books and records at any time for any or no reason. II The Comptroller’s regulation, therefore, does not comport with the statute. Neither does the Comptroller’s interpretation of its regulation, which differs from the text and must be discussed separately. Evidently realizing that exclusion of state enforcement of all state laws against national banks is too extreme to be contemplated, the Comptroller sought to limit the sweep of its regulation by the following passage set forth in the agency’s statement of basis and purpose in the Federal Register: ‘What the case law does recognize is that ‘states retain some power to regulate national banks in areas such as contracts, debt collection, acquisition and transfer of property, and taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort law.’ [citing a Ninth Circuit case.] Application of these laws to national banks and their implementation by state authorities typically does not affect the content or extent of the Federally-authorized business of banking ... but rather establishes the legal infrastructure that surrounds and supports the ability of national banks . . . to do business.” 69 Fed. Reg. 1896 (2004) (footnote omitted). This cannot be reconciled with the regulation’s almost categorical prohibition in 12 CFR § 7.4000(a)(1) of “prosecuting enforcement actions.” Nor can it be justified by the provision in subsection (a)(2)(iv) which defines visitorial powers to include “[e]nforcing compliance with any applicable . . . state laws concerning” “activities authorized or permitted pursuant to federal banking law,” § 7.4000(a)(2)(iii). The latter phrase cannot be interpreted to include only distinctively banking activities (leaving the States free to enforce non-banking state laws), because if it were so interpreted subsection (a)(2)(iii), which uses the same terminology, would limit the Comptroller’s exclusive visitorial power of “[rjegulation and supervision” to distinctively banking activities — which no one thinks is the case. Anyway, the National Bank Act does specifically authorize and permit activities that fall within what the statement of basis and purpose calls “the legal infrastructure that surrounds and supports the ability of national banks ... to do business.” See, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 24 Third (power to make contracts); § 24 Seventh (“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking”). And of course a distinction between “implementation” of “infrastructure” and judicial enforcement of other laws can be found nowhere within the text of the statute. This passage in the statement of basis and purpose, resting upon neither the text of the regulation nor the text of the statute, attempts to do what Congress declined to do: exempt national banks from all state banking laws, or at least state enforcement of those laws. Ill The dissent fails to persuade us. Its fundamental contention — that the exclusive grant of visitorial powers can be interpreted to preclude state enforcement of state laws — rests upon a logical fallacy. The dissent establishes, post, at 541-543 (and we do not at all contest), that in the course of exercising visitation powers the sovereign can compel compliance with the law. But it concludes from that, post, at 545, that any sovereign attempt to compel compliance with the law can be deemed an exercise of the visitation power. That conclusion obviously does not follow. For example, in the course of exercising its visitation powers, the sovereign can assuredly compel a bank to honor obligations that are in default. Does that mean that the sovereign’s taking the same action in executing a civil judgment for payment of those obligations can be considered an exercise of the visitation power? Of course not. Many things can be compelled through the visitation power that can be compelled through, the exercise of other sovereign power as well. The critical question is not what is being compelled, but what sovereign power has been invoked to compel it. And the power to enforce the law exists separate and apart from the power of visitation. The dissent argues that the Comptroller’s expansive reading of “visitorial powers” does not intrude upon “ ‘the historic police powers of the States/ ” post, at 554 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)), because, like federal maritime law, federal involvement in this field dates to “ ‘the earliest days of the Republic/ ” post, at 555 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U. S. 89,108 (2000)). For that reason, the dissent concludes, this case does not raise the sort of federalism concerns that prompt a presumption against pre-emption. We have not invoked the presumption against pre-emption, and think it unnecessary to do so in giving force to the plain terms of the National Bank Act. Neither, however, should the incursion that the Comptroller’s regulation makes upon traditional state powers be minimized. Although the sovereign visitorial power of assuring national-bank compliance with all laws inhered in the Federal Government from the time of its creation of national banks, the Comptroller was not given authority to enforce non-pre-empted state laws until 1966. See Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Tit. III, 80 Stat. 1046-1055. A power first exercised during the lifetime of every current Justice is hardly involvement “from the earliest days of the Republic.” States, on the other hand, have always enforced their general laws against national banks — and have enforced their banking-related laws against national banks for at least 85 years, as evidenced by St. Louis, in which we upheld enforcement of a state anti-bank-branching law, 263 U. S., at 656. See also Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 237, 248-249 (1944) (state commissioner of revenue may enforce abandoned-bank-deposit law against national bank through “judicial proceedings”); State ex rel. Lord v. First Nat. Bank of St. Paul, 313 N. W. 2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1981) (state treasurer may enforce general unclaimed-property law with “specific provisions directed toward” banks against national bank); Clovis Nat. Bank v. Callaway, 69 N. M. 119, 130-132, 364 P. 2d 748, 756 (1961) (state treasurer may enforce unclaimed-property law against national-bank deposits); State v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 61 Ore. 551, 554-557, 123 P. 712, 714 (1912) (state attorney general may enforce bank-specific escheat law against national bank). The dissent seeks to minimize the regulation’s incursion upon state powers by claiming that the regulation does not “declare the pre-emptive scope of the [National Bank Act]” but merely “interpret^] the term ‘visitorial powers.’ ” Post, at 555. That is much too kind. It is not without reason that the regulation is contained within a subpart of the Comptroller’s regulations on “Bank Activities and Operations” that is entitled “Preemption.” The purpose and function of the statutory term “visitorial powers” is to define and thereby limit, the category of action reserved to the Federal Government and forbidden to the States. Any interpretation of “visitorial powers” necessarily “declares the preemptive scope of the NBA,” ibid. What is clear from logic is also clear in application: The regulation declares that “[s]tate officials may not . . . proseeut[e] enforcement actions.” 12 CFR § 7.4000(a). If that is not pre-emption, nothing is. IV Applying the foregoing principles to this case is not difficult. “Visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act refers to a sovereign’s supervisory powers over corporations. They include any form of administrative oversight that allows a sovereign to inspect books and records on demand, even if the process is mediated by a court through prerogative writs or similar means. The Comptroller reasonably interpreted this statutory term to include “conducting examinations [and] inspecting or requiring the production of books or records of national banks,” §7.4000, when the State conducts those activities in its capacity as supervisor of corporations. When, however, a state attorney general brings suit to enforce state law against a national bank, he is not acting in the role of sovereign-as-supervisor, but rather in the role of sovereign-as-law-enforcer. Such a lawsuit is not an exercise of “visitorial powers,” and thus the Comptroller erred by extending the definition of “visitorial powers” to include “prosecuting enforcement actions” in state courts, §7.4000. The request for information in the present case was stated to be “in lieu of” other action; implicit was the threat that if the request was not voluntarily honored, that other action would be taken. All parties have assumed, and we agree, that if the threatened action would have been unlawful the request-cum-threat could be enjoined. Here the threatened action was not the bringing of a civil suit, or the obtaining of a judicial search warrant based on probable cause, but rather the Attorney General’s issuance of subpoena on his own authority under New York Executive Law, which permits such subpoenas in connection with his investigation of “repeated fraudulent or illegal acts ... in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business.” See N. Y. Exec. Law Ann. §63(12) (West 2002). That is not the exercise of the power of law enforcement “vested in the courts of justice” which 12 U. S. C. § 484(a) exempts from the ban on exercise of supervisory power. Accordingly, the injunction below is affirmed as applied to the threatened issuance of executive subpoenas by the Attorney General for the State of New York, but vacated insofar as it prohibits the Attorney General from bringing judicial enforcement actions. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part (hereinafter the dissent) attempts to distinguish Dartmouth College on the ground that the college was a charitable corporation, whose visitors (unlike the State as visitor of for-profit corporations) had no law-enforcement power. See post, at 543, n. 1. We doubt that was so. As Justice Story’s opinion in Dartmouth College stated, visitors of charitable corporations had “power to . . . correct all irregularities and abuses,” 4 Wheat., at 673, which would surely include operations in violation of law. But whether or not visitors of charitable corporations had law-enforcement powers, the powers that they did possess demonstrate that visitation is different from ordinary law enforcement. Indeed, if those powers did not include the power to assure compliance with law that demonstration would be all the more forceful. The dissent attempts to distinguish St. Louis by invoking the principle that an agency is free to depart from a court’s interpretation of the law. Post, at 550-551 (citing National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 983 (2005)). This again misses the point. St. Louis is relevant to proper interpretation of 12 U. S. C. § 484(a) not because it is authoritative on the question whether States can enforce their banking laws, but because it is one in a long and unbroken line of cases distinguishing visitation from law enforcement. Respondents contend that St. Louis holds only that States can enforce their law when federal law grants the national bank no authority to engage in the activity at issue. Even if that were true it would make no difference. The ease would still stand for the proposition that the exclusive federal power of visitation does not prevent States from enforcing their law. We reject respondents’ contention that the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, § 102(f)(1)(B), 108 Stat. 2349, 12 U. S. C. § 36(f)(1)(B), establishes that the Comptroller’s visitorial power pre-empts state law enforcement. That provision states that some state laws respecting bank branching “shall be enforced” by the Comptroller. We need not decide here whether converting the Comptroller's visitorial power to assure compliance with all applicable laws, see infra, at 534, into an obligation to assure compliance with certain state laws preempts state enforcement of those particular laws. Even if it had that effect it would shed no light on the meaning of “visitorial powers” in the National Bank Act, a statute that it does not refer to and that was enacted more than a century earlier. The prohibition is not entirely categorical only because it is subject to the phrase at the end of the sentence (applicable to all of the regulation’s enumerated “visitorial powers” forbidden to the States): “except in limited circumstances authorized by federal law.” This replicates a similar exception contained in 12 U. S. C. § 484(a) itself (“No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law”), and certainly does not refer to case law finding state action non-preempted. If it meant that, §484(a)’s apparent limitation of visitorial powers would be illusory — saying, in effect, that national banks are subject to only those visitorial powers that the courts say they are subject to. Cases that find state action non-pre-empted might perhaps be described as “permitting” the state action in question, but hardly as “authorizing” it. In both the statutory and regulation context, “federal law” obviously means federal statutes. All of these eases were decided before Congress added to §484 its current subsection (b), which authorizes “State auditors and examiners” to review national-bank records to assure compliance with state unclaimed-property and escheat laws. See 96 Stat. 1521.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE v. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, INC., et al. No. 80-327. Argued November 4, 1981 Decided January 12, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 490. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 513. C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for the federal parties as respondents under this Court’s Rule 19.6 in support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Leonard Schaitman, and Bruce Bagni. Lee Boothby argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Robert W. Nixon Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Nathan Z. Dershowitz and Marc D. Stem for the American Jewish Congress et al.; and by Leo Pfeffer for the National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty et al. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. I Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, of the Constitution vests Congress with the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the . . . Property belonging to the United States.” Shortly after the termination of hostilities in the Second World War, Congress enacted the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 377, as amended, 40 U. S. C. § 471 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The Act was designed, in part, to provide “an economical and efficient system for . . . the disposal of surplus property.” 63 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. §471. In furtherance of this policy, federal agencies are directed to maintain adequate inventories of the property under their control and to identify excess property for transfer to other agencies able to use it. See 63 Stat. 384, 40 U. S. C. §§ 483(b), (c). Property that has outlived its usefulness to the Federal Government is declared “surplus” and may be transferred to private or other public entities. See generally 63 Stat. 385, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §484. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Secretary of Education) to assume responsibility for disposing of surplus real property “for school, classroom, or other educational use.” 63 Stat. 387, as amended, 40 U. S. C. §484(k)(l). Subject to the disapproval of the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary may sell or lease the property to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institutions for consideration that takes into account “any benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the United States” from the transferee’s use of the property. 63 Stat. 387, 40 U. S. C. §§484(k)(l)(A), (C). By regulation, the Secretary has provided for the computation of a “public benefit allowance,” which discounts the transfer price of the property “on the basis of benefits to the United States from the use of such property for educational purposes.” 34 CFR § 12.9(a) (1980). The property which spawned this litigation was acquired by the Department of the Army in 1942, as part of a larger tract of approximately 181 acres of land northwest of Philadelphia. The Army built on that land the Valley Forge General Hospital, and for 30 years thereafter, that hospital provided medical care for members of the Armed Forces. In April 1973, as part of a plan to reduce the number of military installations in the United States, the Secretary of Defense proposed to close the hospital, and the General Services Administration declared it to be “surplus property.” The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) eventually assumed responsibility for disposing of portions of the property, and in August 1976, it conveyed a 77-acre tract to petitioner, the Valley Forge Christian College. The appraised value of the property at the time of conveyance was $577,500. This appraised value was discounted, however, by the Secretary’s computation of a 100% public benefit allowance, which permitted petitioner to acquire the property without making any financial payment for it. The deed from HEW conveyed the land in fee simple with certain conditions subsequent, which required petitioner to use the property for 30 years solely for the educational purposes described in petitioner’s application. In that description, petitioner stated its intention to conduct “a program of education . . . meeting the accrediting standards of the State of Pennsylvania, The American Association of Bible Colleges, the Division of Education of the General Council of the Assemblies of God and the Veterans Administration.” Petitioner is a nonprofit educational institution operating under the supervision of a religious order known as the Assemblies of God. By its own description, petitioner’s purpose is “to offer systematic training on the collegiate level to men and women for Christian service as either ministers or laymen.” App. 34. Its degree programs reflect this orientation by providing courses of study “to train leaders for church related ministries.” Id,., at 102. Faculty members must “have been baptized in the Holy Spirit and be living consistent Christian lives,” id., at 37, and all members of the college administration must be affiliated with the Assemblies of God, id., at 36. In its application for the 77-acre tract, petitioner represented that, if it obtained the property, it would make “additions to its offerings in the arts and humanities,” and would strengthen its “psychology” and “counselling” courses to provide services in inner-city areas. In September 1976, respondents Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. (Americans United), and four of its employees, learned of the conveyance through a news release. Two months later, they brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, later transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to challenge the conveyance on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See id., at 10. In its amended complaint, Americans United described itself as a nonprofit organization composed of 90,000 “taxpayer members.” The complaint asserted that each member “would be deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes in violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Ibid. Respondents sought a declaration that the conveyance was null and void, and an order compelling petitioner to transfer the property back to the United States. Id., at 12. On petitioner’s motion, the District Court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. A42. The court found that respondents lacked standing to sue as taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and had “failed to allege that they have suffered any actual or concrete injury beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A43. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed the judgment of the District Court by a divided vote. Americans United v. U. S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F. 2d 252 (1980). All members of the court agreed that respondents lacked standing as taxpayers to challenge the conveyance under Flast v. Cohen, supra, since that case extended standing to taxpayers qua taxpayers only to challenge congressional exercises of the power to tax and spend conferred by Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, and this conveyance was authorized by legislation enacted under the authority of the Property Clause, Art. IV, §3, cl. 2. Notwithstanding this significant factual difference from Flast, the majority of the Court of Appeals found that respondents had standing merely as “citizens,” claiming “‘injury in fact’ to their shared individuated right to a government that ‘shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.’” 619 F. 2d, at 261. In the majority’s view, this “citizen standing” was sufficient to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Art. III. One judge, perhaps sensing the doctrinal difficulties with the majority’s extension of standing, wrote separately, expressing his view that standing was necessary to satisfy “the need for an available plaintiff,” without whom “the Establishment Clause would be rendered virtually unenforceable” by the judiciary. Id., at 267, 268. The dissenting judge expressed the view that respondents’ allegations constituted a “generalized grievance . . . too abstract to satisfy the injury in fact component of standing.” Id., at 269. He therefore concluded that their standing to contest the transfer was barred by this Court’s decisions in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), and United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974). 619 F. 2d, at 270-271. Because of the unusually broad and novel view of standing to litigate a substantive question in the federal courts adopted by the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari, 450 U. S. 909 (1981), and we now reverse. H-1 I Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial power” of the United States to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.” The constitutional power of federal courts cannot be defined, and indeed has no substance, without reference to the necessity “to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.” Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). The requirements of Art. Ill are not satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process. The judicial power of the United States defined by Art. Ill is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. The power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments, this Court said 90 years ago, “is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy.” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892). Otherwise, the power “is not judicial . . . in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.” United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock requirement, this Court has always required that a litigant have “standing” to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit. The term “standing” subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975), and it has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the “standing” requirement have been required by Art. Ill ex proprio vigore, or whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by the language of the Constitution. See Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 97. A recent line of decisions, however, has resolved that ambiguity, at least to the following extent: at an irreducible minimum, Art. Ill requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to “show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action” and “is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner does Art. Ill limit the federal judicial power “to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 97. The requirement of “actual injury redressable by the court,” Simon, swpra, at 39, serves several of the “implicit policies embodied in Article III,” Flast, supra, at 96. It tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action. The “standing” requirement serves other purposes. Because it assures an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact, a court may decide the case with some confidence that its decision will not pave the way for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of the case actually decided by the court. The Art. Ill aspect of standing also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial order. The federal courts have abjured appeals to their authority which would convert the judicial process into “no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.” United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of “standing” would be quite unnecessary. But the “cases and controversies” language of Art. Ill forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating forums. As we said in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 740 (1972): “The requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected . . . does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.” The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can show “injury in fact” resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate. The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between the coequal arms of the National Government. The effect is, of course, most vivid when a federal court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch. While the exercise of that “ultimate and supreme function,” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, supra, at 345, is a formidable means of vindicating individual rights, when employed unwisely or unnecessarily it is also the ultimate threat to the continued effectiveness of the federal courts in performing that role. While the propriety of such action by a federal court has been recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), it has been recognized as a tool of last resort on the part of the federal judiciary throughout its nearly 200 years of existence: “[Repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S., at 188 (Powell, J., concurring). Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable injury. Thus, this Court has “refrain[ed] from passing upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative branches] unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.” Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 279 (1919). The importance of this precondition should not be underestimated as a means of “defining] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power.” Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 95. Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing. Thus, this Court has held that “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 499. In addition, even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. Ill, the Court has refrained from adjudicating “abstract questions of wide public significance” which amount to “generalized grievances,” pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches. Id., at 499-500. Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiff’s complaint fall within “the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970). Merely to articulate these principles is to demonstrate their close relationship to the policies reflected in the Art. Ill requirement of actual or threatened injury amenable to judicial remedy. But neither the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the “case or controversy” requirement should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. Ill requirements themselves. Satisfaction of the former cannot substitute for a demonstration of “ ‘distinct and palpable injury’. . . that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 501). That requirement states a limitation on judicial power, not merely a factor to be balanced in the weighing of so-called “prudential” considerations. We need not mince words when we say that the concept of “Art. Ill standing” has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it, nor when we say that this very fact is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition. But of one thing we may be sure: Those who do not possess Art. Ill standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States. Article III, which is every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial power of the United States as in its granting of that power, is not merely a troublesome hurdle to be overcome if possible so as to reach the “merits” of a lawsuit which a party desires to have adjudicated; it is a part of the basic charter promulgated by the Framers of the Constitution at Philadelphia in 1787, a charter which created a general government, provided for the interaction between that government and the governments of the several States, and was later amended so as to either enhance or limit its authority with respect to both States and individuals. I — I The injury alleged by respondents in their amended complaint is the “deprivation] of the fair and constitutional use of [their] tax dollar.” App. 10. As a result, our discussion must begin with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). In that action a taxpayer brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921, which provided federal funding to the States for the purpose of improving maternal and infant health. The injury she alleged consisted of the burden of taxation in support of an unconstitutional regime, which she characterized as a deprivation of property without due process. “Looking through forms of words to the substance of [the] complaint,” the Court concluded that the only “injury” was the fact “that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional.” Id., at 488. Any tangible effect of the challenged statute on the plaintiff’s tax burden was “remote, fluctuating and uncertain.” Id., at 487. In rejecting this as a cognizable injury sufficient to establish standing, the Court admonished: “The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. . . . Here the parties plaintiff have no such case.” Id., at 488. Following the decision in Frothingham, the Court confirmed that the expenditure of public funds in an allegedly unconstitutional manner is not an injury sufficient to confer standing, even though the plaintiff contributes to the public coffers as a taxpayer. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), plaintiffs brought suit as citizens and taxpayers, claiming that a New Jersey law which authorized public school teachers in the classroom to read passages from the Bible violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing: “This Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over their manner of expenditure. . . . Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by taxpayer’s action to restrain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate what the Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: ‘The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’” Id., at 433-434 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, at 488) (citations omitted). In short, the Court found that plaintiffs’ grievance was “not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference.” 342 U. S., at 434. A case or controversy did not exist, even though the “clash of interests [was] real and . . . strong.” Id., at 436 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court again visited the problem of taxpayer standing in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968). The taxpayer plaintiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which they alleged were being used to support religious schools in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court developed a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue. First, because a taxpayer alleges injury only by virtue of his liability for taxes, the Court held that “a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution.” Id., at 102. Second, the Court required the taxpayer to “show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.” Id., at 102-103. The plaintiffs in Flast satisfied this test because “[t]heir constitutional challenge [was] made to an exercise by Congress of its power under Art. I, § 8, to spend for the general welfare,” id., at 103, and because the Establishment Clause, on which plaintiffs’ complaint rested, “operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. .1, §8,” id., at 104. The Court distinguished Frothingham v. Mellon, supra, on the ground that Mrs. Frothingham had relied, not on a specific limitation on the power to tax and spend, but on a more general claim based on the Due Process Clause. 392 U. S., at 105. Thus, the Court reaffirmed that the “case or controversy” aspect of standing is unsatisfied “where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.” Id., at 106. Unlike the plaintiffs in Flast, respondents fail the first prong of the test for taxpayer standing. Their claim is deficient in two respects. First, the source of their complaint is not a congressional action, but a decision by HEW to transfer a parcel of federal property. Flast limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed “only [at] exercises of congressional power.” Id., at 102. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 228 (denying standing because the taxpayer plaintiffs “did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch”). Second, and perhaps redundantly, the property transfer about which respondents complain was not an exercise of authority conferred by the Taxing and Spending Clause of Art. I, § 8. The authorizing legislation, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, was an evident exercise of Congress’ power under the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Respondents do not dispute this conclusion, see Brief for Respondents Americans United et al. 10, and it is decisive of any claim of taxpayer standing under the Flast precedent. Any doubt that once might have existed concerning the rigor with which the Flast exception to the Frothingham principle ought to be applied should have been erased by this Court’s recent decisions in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra. In Richardson, the question was whether the plaintiff had standing as a federal taxpayer to argue that legislation which permitted the Central Intelligence Agency to withhold from the public detailed information about its expenditures violated the Accounts Clause of the Constitution. We rejected plaintiffs claim of standing because “his challenge [was] not addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA.” 418 U. S., at 175. The “mere recital” of those claims “demonstrate[d] how far he [fell] short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he [fell] within the Frothingham holding left undisturbed.” Id., at 174-175. The claim in Schlesinger was marred by the same deficiency. Plaintiffs in that case argued that the Incompatibility Clause of Art. 1 prevented certain Members of Congress from holding commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve. We summarily rejected their assertion of standing as taxpayers because they “did not challenge an enactment under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status.” 418 U. S., at 228 (footnote omitted). Respondents, therefore, are plainly without standing to sue as taxpayers. The Court of Appeals apparently reached the same conclusion. It remains to be seen whether respondents have alleged any other basis for standing to bring this suit. IV Although the Court of Appeals properly doubted respondents’ ability to establish standing solely on the basis of their taxpayer status, it considered their allegations of taxpayer injury to be “essentially an assumed role.” 619 F. 2d, at 261. “Plaintiffs have no reason to expect, nor perhaps do they care about, any personal tax saving that might result should they prevail. The crux of the interest at stake, the plaintiffs argue, is found in the Establishment Clause, not in the supposed loss of money as such. As a matter of primary identity, therefore, the plaintiffs are not so much taxpayers as separationists . . . .” Ibid. In the court’s view, respondents had established standing by virtue of an “ ‘injury in fact’ to their shared individuated right to a government that ‘shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.’” Ibid. The court distinguished this “injury” from “the question of ‘citizen standing’ as such.” Id., at 262. Although citizens generally could not establish standing simply by claiming an interest in governmental observance of the Constitution, respondents had “set forth instead a particular and concrete injury” to a “personal constitutional right.” Id., at 265. The Court of Appeals was surely correct in recognizing that the Art. Ill requirements of standing are not satisfied by “the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by . . . citizens.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 223, n. 13. This Court repeatedly has rejected claims of standing predicated on “‘the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law . . . .’ Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129 [1922].” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 208 (1962). See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, supra, at 216-222; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1 (1972); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 (1937). Such claims amount to little more than attempts “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air. . . generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S., at 106. In finding that respondents had alleged something more than “the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance,” Schlesinger, supra, at 217, the Court of Appeals relied on factual differences which we do not think amount to legal distinctions. The court decided that respondents’ claim differed from those in Schlesinger and Richardson, which were predicated, respectively, on the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses, because “it is at the very least arguable that the Establishment Clause creates in each citizen a ‘personal constitutional right’ to a government that does not establish religion.” 619 F. 2d, at 265 (footnote omitted). The court found it unnecessary to determine whether this “arguable” proposition was correct, since it judged the mere allegation of a legal right sufficient to confer standing. This reasoning process merely disguises, we think with a rather thin veil, the inconsistency of the court’s results with our decisions in Schlesinger and Richardson. The plaintiffs in those cases plainly asserted a “personal right” to have the Government act in accordance with their views of the Constitution; indeed, we see no barrier to the assertion of such claims with respect to any constitutional provision. But assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. Ill without draining those requirements of meaning. Nor can Schlesinger and Richardson be distinguished on the ground that the Incompatibility and Accounts Clauses are in some way less “fundamental” than the Establishment Clause. Each establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honor — to no greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution. To the extent the Court of Appeals relied on a view of standing under which the Art. Ill burdens diminish as the “importance” of the claim on the merits increases, we reject that notion. The requirement of standing “focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 99. Moreover, we know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary “sliding scale” of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the United States. “The proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 227. The complaint in this case shares a common deficiency with those in Schlesinger and Richardson. Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. Ill, even though the disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms. It is evident that respondents are firmly committed to the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his advocacy. “[T]hat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 204, is the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who has been injured in fact; it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself. In reaching this conclusion, we do not retreat from our earlier holdings that standing may be predicated on noneconomic injury. See, e. g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686-688; Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S., at 153-154. We simply cannot see that respondents have alleged an injury of any kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to confer standing. Respondents complain of a transfer of property located in Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia; their organizational headquarters are located in Washington, D. C. They learned of the transfer through a news release. Their claim that the Government has violated the Establishment Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court. The federal courts were simply not constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare. V The Court of Appeals in this case ignored unambiguous limitations on taxpayer and citizen standing. It appears to have done so out of the conviction that enforcement of the Establishment Clause demands special exceptions from the requirement that a plaintiff allege “ ‘distinct and palpable injury to himself,’ . . . that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501). The court derived precedential comfort from Flast v. Cohen: “The underlying justification for according standing in Flast it seems, was the implicit recognition that the Establishment Clause does create in every citizen a personal constitutional right, such that any citizen, including taxpayers, may contest under that clause the constitutionality of federal expenditures.” 619 F. 2d, at 262. The concurring opinion was even more direct. In its view, “statutes alleged to violate the Establishment Clause may not have an individual impact sufficient to confer standing in the traditional sense.” Id., at 267-268. To satisfy “the need for an available plaintiff,” id., at 267, and thereby to assure a basis for judicial review, respondents should be granted standing because, “as a practical matter, no one is better suited to bring this lawsuit and thus vindicate the freedoms embodied in the Establishment Clause,” id., at 266. Implicit in the foregoing is the philosophy that the business of the federal courts is correcting constitutional errors, and that “cases and controversies” are at best merely convenient vehicles for doing so and at worst nuisances that may be dispensed with when they become obstacles to that transcendent endeavor. This philosophy has no place in our constitutional scheme. It does not become more palatable when the underlying merits concern the Establishment Clause. Respondents’ claim of standing implicitly rests on the presumption that violations of the Establishment Clause typically will not cause injury sufficient to confer standing under the “traditional” view of Art. III. But “[t]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S., at 227. This view would convert standing into a requirement that must be observed only when satisfied. Moreover, we are unwilling to assume that injured parties are nonexistent simply because they have not joined respondents in their suit. The law of averages is not a substitute for standing. Were we to accept respondents’ claim of standing in this case, there would be no principled basis for confining our exception to litigants relying on the Establishment Clause. Ultimately, that exception derives from the idea that the judicial power requires nothing more for its invocation than important issues and able litigants. The existence of injured parties who might not wish to bring suit becomes irrelevant. Because we are unwilling to countenance such a departure from the limits on judicial power contained in Art. Ill, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. The Act defines “excess property” as “property under the control of any Federal agency which is not required for its needs and the discharge of its responsibilities.” 68 Stat. 378, 40 U. S. C. § 472(e). The Act defines “surplus property” as “any excess property not required for the needs and the discharge of the responsibilities of all Federal agencies, as determined by the Administrator [of General Services].” 63 Stat. 379, 40 U. S. C. § 472(g). See 20 U. S. C. §§3411, 3441(a)(2)(P) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The property is to “be awarded to the applicant having a program of utilization which provides, in the opinion of the Department [of Education], the greatest public benefit.” 34 CFR § 12.5 (1980). Applicants must be willing and able to assume immediate responsibility for the property and must demonstrate the financial capacity to implement the approved program of educational use. § 12.8(b). In calculating the public benefit allowance, the Secretary considers factors such as the applicant’s educational accreditation, sponsorship of public service training, plans to introduce new instructional programs, commitment to student health and welfare, research, and service to the handicapped. 34 CFR pt. 12, Exh. A (1980). The remaining property was conveyed to local school districts for educational purposes or set aside for park and recreational use. At the time of the conveyance, petitioner was known as the Northeast Bible College. The appraiser placed no value on the buildings and fixtures situated on the tract. The buildings had been constructed for use as an Army hospital and, in his view, the expense necessary to render them useful for other purposes would have offset the value of such an endeavor. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” See Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, ante, at 161; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 72 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 261, 262 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 218, 220-221 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 179-180 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 493 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617-618 (1973). See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., supra, at 80; Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 113-114 (1976). See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S., at 80. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra, at 100, n. 6; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 39, n. 19 (1976). Justice Brennan’s dissent takes us to task for “tend[ing] merely to obfuscate, rather than inform, our understanding of the meaning of rights under the law.” Post, at 490. Were this Court constituted to operate a national classroom on “the meaning of rights” for the benefit of interested litigants, this criticism would carry weight. The teaching of Art. Ill, however, is that constitutional adjudication is available only on terms prescribed by the Constitution, among which is the requirement of a plaintiff with standing to sue. The dissent asserts that this requirement “overrides no other provision of the Constitution,” post, at 493, but just as surely the Art. Ill power of the federal courts does not wax and wane in harmony with a litigant’s desire for a “hospitable forum,” post, at 494. Article III obligates a federal court to act only when it is assured of the power to do so, that is, when it is called upon to resolve an actual case or controversy. Then, and only then, may it turn its attention to other constitutional provisions and presume to provide a forum for the adjudication of rights. See Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). Respondent Americans United has alleged no injury to itself as an organization, distinct from injury to its taxpayer members. As a result, its claim to standing can be no different from those of the members it seeks to represent. The question is whether “its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 511. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 40; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 739-741 (1972). Respondents do not challenge the constitutionality of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act itself, but rather a particular Executive Branch action arguably authorized by the Act. The Act was designed “to simplify the procurement, utilization, and disposal of Government property” in order to achieve an “efficient, businesslike system of property management.” S. Rep. No. 475, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1949). See H. R. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1949). Among the central purposes of the Act was the “maximum utilization of property already owned by the Government and minimum purchasing of new property.” S. Rep. No. 475, supra, at 4. Congress recognized, however, that from time to time certain property would become surplus to the Government, and in particular, property acquired by the military to meet wartime contingencies. Congress provided a means of disposing of this property to meet well-recognized public priorities, including education. See S. Rep. No. 475, supra, at 4-5; H. R. Rep. No. 670, supra, at 5-6. Although not necessary to our decision, we note that any connection between the challenged property transfer and respondents’ tax burden is at best speculative and at worst nonexistent. Although public funds were expended to establish the Valley Forge General Hospital, the land was acquired and the facilities constructed 30 years prior to the challenged transfer. Respondents do not challenge this expenditure, and we do not immediately perceive how such a challenge might now be raised. Nor do respondents dispute the Government’s conclusion that the property has become useless for federal purposes and ought to be disposed of in some productive manner. In fact, respondents’ only objection is that the Government did not receive adequate consideration for the transfer, because petitioner’s use of the property will not confer a public benefit. See Brief for Respondents Americans United et al. 13. Assuming, arguendo, that this proposition is true, an assumption by no means clear, there is no basis for believing that a transfer to a different purchaser would have added to Government receipts. As the Government argues, “the ultimate purchaser would, in all likelihood, have been another non-profit institution or local school district rather than a purchaser for cash.” Brief for Federal Respondents 30. Moreover, each year of delay in disposing of the property depleted the Treasury by the amounts necessary to maintain a facility that had lost its value to the Government. Even if respondents had brought their claim within the outer limits of Flast, therefore, they still would have encountered serious difficulty in establishing that they “personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 508. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A]nd a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time”). U. S. Const., Art. I, §6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office”). Justice Brennan’s dissent is premised on a revisionist reading of our precedents which leads to the conclusion that the Art. Ill requirement of standing is satisfied by any taxpayer who contends “that the Federal Government has exceeded the bounds of the law in allocating its largesse,” post, at 508. “The concept of taxpayer injury necessarily recognizes the continuing stake of the taxpayer in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has contributed his taxes, and his right to have those funds put to lawful uses.” Post, at 497-498. On this novel understanding, the dissent reads cases such as Frothingham and Flast as decisions on the merits of the taxpayers’ claims. Frothingham is explained as a holding that a taxpayer ordinarily has no legal right to challenge congressional expenditures. Post, at 499. The dissent divines from Flast the holding that a taxpayer does have an enforceable right “to challenge a federal bestowal of largesse” for religious purposes. Post, at 509. This right extends to “the Government as a whole, regardless of which branch is at work in a particular instance,” post, at 511, and regardless of whether the challenged action was an exercise of the spending power, post, at 512. However appealing this reconstruction of precedent may be, it bears little resemblance to the cases on which it purports to rest. Frothingham and Flast were decisions that plainly turned on standing, and just as plainly they rejected any notion that the Art. Ill requirement of direct injury is satisfied by a taxpayer who contends “that the Federal Government has exceeded the bounds of the law in allocating its largesse.” Post, at 508. Moreover, although the dissent’s view may lead to a result satisfying to many in this case, it is not evident how its substitution of “legal interest,” post, at 499, for “standing” enhances “our understanding of the meaning of rights under law,” post, at 490. Logically, the dissent must shoulder the burden of explaining why taxpayers with standing have no “legal interest” in congressional expenditures except when it is possible to allege a violation of the Establishment Clause: yet it does not attempt to do so. Nor does the dissent’s interpretation of standing adequately explain cases such as Schlesinger and Richardson. According to the dissent, the taxpayer plaintiffs in those cases lacked standing, not because they failed to challenge an exercise of the spending power, but because they did not complain of “the distribution of Government largesse.” Post, at 511. And yet if the standing of a taxpayer is established by his “continuing stake ... in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has contributed his taxes,” post, at 497-498, it would seem to follow that he can assert a right to examine the budget of the CIA, as in Richardson, see 418 U. S., at 170, and a right to argue that Members of Congress cannot claim Reserve pay from the Government, as in Schlesinger, see 418 U. S., at 211. Of course, both claims have been rejected, precisely because Art. Ill requires a demonstration of redressable injury that is not satisfied by a claim that tax moneys have been spent unlawfully. In Schlesinger, we rejected the argument that standing should be recognized because “the adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests and views and were supported by able briefs and arguments.” 418 U. S., at 225: “We have no doubt about the sincerity of respondents’ stated objectives and the depth of their commitment to them. But the essence of standing ‘is not a question of motivation but of possession of the requisite . . . interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct.’ Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 435 (1952).” Id., at 225-226. Respondents rely on our statement in Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U. S., at 154, that “[a] person or family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 [1963].” Respondents apparently construe this language to mean that any person asserting an Establishment Clause violation possesses a “spiritual stake” sufficient to confer standing. The language will not bear that weight. First, the language cannot be read apart from the context of its accompanying reference to Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). In Schempp, the Court invalidated laws that required Bible reading in the public schools. Plaintiffs were children who attended the schools in question, and their parents. The Court noted: “It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can be challenged only by persons having standing to complain. . . . The parties here are school children and their parents, who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain.” Id., at 224, n. 9. The Court also drew a comparison with Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), in which the identical substantive issues were raised, but in which the appeal was “dismissed upon the graduation of the school child involved and because of the appellants’ failure to establish standing as taxpayers.” 374 U. S., at 224, n. 9. The Court’s discussion of the standing issue is not extensive, but it is sufficient to show the error in respondents’ broad reading of the phrase “spiritual stake.” The plaintiffs in Schempp had standing, not because their complaint rested on the Establishment Clause — for as Doremus demonstrated, that is insufficient — but because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them. Respondents have alleged no comparable injury. Respondent Americans United claims that it has certain unidentified members who reside in Pennsylvania. It does not explain, however, how this fact establishes a cognizable injury where none existed before. Respondent is still obligated to allege facts sufficient to establish that one or more of its members has suffered, or is threatened with, an injury other than their belief that the transfer violated the Constitution. Respondents also claim standing by reference to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 702, which authorizes judicial review at the instance of any person who has been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” Neither the Administrative Procedure Act, nor any other congressional enactment, can lower the threshold requirements of standing under Art. III. See, e. g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S., at 100; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 501. Respondents do not allege that the Act creates a legal right, “the invasion of which creates standing,” Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S., at 617, n. 3, and there is no other basis for arguing that its existence alters the rules of standing otherwise applicable to this case. The majority believed that the only thing which prevented this Court from openly acknowledging this position was the fact that the complaint in Flast had alleged no basis for standing other than the plaintiffs’ taxpayer status. 619 F. 2d, at 262. As the dissent below pointed out, this view is simply not in accord with the facts. See id., at 269-270. The Flast plaintiffs and several amici strongly urged the Court to adopt the same view of standing for which respondents argue in this case. The Court plainly chose not to do so. Even if respondents were correct in arguing that the Court in Flast was bound by a “perceived limitation in the pleadings,” 619 F. 2d, at 262, we are not so bound in this case, and we find no merit in respondents’ vision of standing. Were we to recognize standing premised on an “injury” consisting solely of an alleged violation of a “ ‘personal constitutional right’ to a government that does not establish religion,” id,., at 265, a principled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents’ standing to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge every affirmative-action program on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose but two among as many possible examples as there are commands in the Constitution.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHEFF v. SCHNACKENBERG, U. S. CIRCUIT JUDGE, et al. No. 67. Argued March 3, 1966. Decided June 6, 1966. Joseph E. Casey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Thomas B. Scott. Nathan Lewin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Sidney M. Glazer, E. K. Elkins and Miles J. Brown. Mr. Justice Clark announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Fortas join. This is a companion case to No. 412, Shillitani v. United States, and No. 442, Pappadio v. United States, ante, p. 364. Unlike those cases, this is a criminal contempt proceeding. Upon petition of the Federal Trade Commission, Cheff was charged, along with Holland Furnace Company and 10 other of its officers, with criminal contempt of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The alleged contemnors were tried before a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeals without a jury. The corporation and three of its officers, including Cheff, were found guilty of violating a previous order of that court. Cheff, a former president and chairman of the board of Hollánd, was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment; the other two officers were fined $500 each; and the corporation was fined $100,000. The remaining eight individuals were acquitted. 341 F. 2d 548. Cheff and Holland petitioned for certiorari. We denied Holland’s petition, 381 U. S. 924, and granted Cheff’s, limited to a review of the question whether, after a denial of a demand for a jury, a sentence of imprisonment of six months is constitutionally permissible under Article III and the Sixth Amendment. 382 U. S. 917. We hold that Cheff was not entitled to a jury trial and affirm the judgment. I. The case had its inception in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission where, in 1954, complaints were issued against Holland charging it with unfair methods of competition and deceptive trade practices in connection with the sale of its products. After extensive hearings, the Commission issued a cease-and-desist order against Holland “and its officers, agents, representatives and employees” prohibiting the continuance of practices the Commission found illegal. In the Matter of Holland Furnace Co., 55 F. T. C. 55 (1958). Holland petitioned the Court of Appeals to review and set aside the order of the Commission. Soon thereafter the Commission, claiming that Holland was continuing to violate its order, moved the Court of Appeals for a pendente lite order requiring compliance. On August 5, 1959, the court issued an order commanding Holland to “obey and comply with the order to cease and desist . . . unless and until said order shall be set aside upon review by this Court or by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .” This order forms the basis of this criminal contempt proceeding. Meanwhile, Holland’s petition for review was decided adversely to the corporation. In separate opinions, the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the Commission, to enter its cease-and-desist order, 269 F. 2d 203 (1959), and affirmed on the merits, 295 F. 2d 302 (1961). In March 1962 the Commission petitioned the Court of Appeals to enter a show cause order against Holland for contempt of its pendente lite order. A rule was issued and attorneys appointed to prosecute on behalf of the court. Thereafter, in April 1963, rules were issued against Cheff and the other officers, as individuals, to show cause why they should not be held in criminal contempt “by reason of having knowingly, wilfully and intentionally caused, and aided and abetted in causing, respondent Holland Furnace Company to violate and disobey, and fail and refuse to comply with” the order of August 5, 1959. Cheff demanded a jury trial, which was denied, and following A full hearing extending over a 10-day period the court found him guilty. As we have stated, a sentence of six months was imposed. In accordance with the limited grant of certiorari, there is no issue here as to the sufficiency of the hearing, excepting the absence of a jury. II. Cheff first contends that contempt proceedings in the Court of Appeals which stem from administrative law enforcement proceedings are civil, rather than criminal, in nature. This may be true where the purpose of the proceeding is remedial. Cf. Shillitani v. United States, ante, p. 364. Within the context of the question before us, however, the contention is irrelevant, for a jury trial is not required in civil contempt proceedings, as we specifically reaffirm in Shillitani, supra. In any event, the contention is without merit. The purpose of the proceedings against Cheff could not have been remedial for he had severed all connections with Holland in 1962, long before the contempt proceedings were instituted against him. He had no control whatever over the corporation and could no longer require any compliance with the order of the Commission. Moreover, as Cheff himself points out, the corporation “had completely withdrawn from the business of replacement of furnaces, which is the area in which the violation is alleged.” There was, therefore, an “absence of any necessity of assuring future compliance” which made the six-month sentence “entirely punitive.” Brief for Petitioner, p. 16. There can be no doubt that the courts of appeals have the power to punish for contempt. 18 U. S. C. §401 (1964 ed.). See, e. g., cases cited in United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 694, n. 12 (1964). And it matters not that the contempt arises indirectly from proceedings of an administrative agency. Cheff was found in contempt of the Court of Appeals, not of the Commission. The sole ground for the contempt proceedings is stated in the initial order served on Cheff and the other parties to show cause why they should not be adjudged in criminal contempt of that court, for violations of that court’s pendente lite order. Indeed, Cheff’s answer itself verified that he had not violated, disobeyed, and failed and refused to comply with “an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered on August 5, 1959 . . . (Italics added.) In addition, the Court of Appeals itself was quite specific in limiting the contempt charges to “cover the period from August 5, 1959 to the entry of the final judgment [in October 1961] by this court.” 341 F. 2d, at 550. As the court clearly had the authority to enter its interlocutory order, Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (c) (1964 ed.), it follows that the court has the power to punish for contempt any disobedience of that order. Cheff’s next and chief contention is that criminal contempt proceedings are criminal actions falling within the requirements of Article III and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Only two Terms ago we held to the contrary in United States v. Barnett, supra; however, some members of the Court were of the view there that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses. 376 U. S., at 694, n. 12. Cheff, however, would have us hold that the right to jury trial attaches in all criminal contempts and not merely in those which are outside the category of “petty offenses.” Cheff’s argument is unavailing, for we are constrained to view the proceedings here as equivalent to a procedure to prosecute a petty offense, which under our decisions does not require a jury trial. Over 75 years ago in Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 557 (1888), this Court stated that “in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose,” a jury trial is not required. And as late as 1937 the Court reiterated in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, 624, that: “It is settled by the decisions of this Court . . . that the right of trial by jury . . . does not extend to every criminal proceeding. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described as 'petty,’ which were tried summarily without a jury . . . .” See also Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621 (1891); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 141-142 (1894); Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 68-72 (1904); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, 72-73 (1930). Indeed, Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas, took the position in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Barnett, supra, at 751, that “at the time of the Constitution all types of 'petty’ offenses punishable by trivial penalties were generally triable without a jury. This history justifies the imposition without trial by jury of no more than trivial penalties for criminal contempts.” According to 18 U. S. C. § 1 (1964 ed.), “[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months” is a “petty offense.” Since Cheff received a sentence of six months’ imprisonment (see District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra, at 627-628), and since the nature of criminal contempt, an offense sui generis, does not, of itself, warrant treatment otherwise (cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, supra), Cheff’s offense can be treated only as “petty” in the eyes of the statute and our prior decisions. We conclude therefore that Cheff was properly convicted without a jury. At the same time, we recognize that by limiting our opinion to those cases where a sentence not exceeding six months is imposed we leave the federal courts at sea in instances involving greater sentences. Effective administration compels us to express a view on that point. Therefore, in the exercise of the Court’s supervisory power and under the peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases, we rule further that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof. Nothing we have said, however, restricts the power of a reviewing court, in appropriate circumstances, to revise sentences in contempt cases tried with or without juries. The judgment in this case is Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart, joining Part I of Mr. Justice Harlan’s separate opinion, concurs in the result. Mr. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the result in No. 67 and dissenting in Nos. 412 and 442. By the opinions in these cases, two new limitations on the use of the federal contempt power are inaugurated. In Cheff, it is announced that prison sentences for criminal contempt in a federal court must be limited to six months unless the defendant is afforded a trial by jury. In Shillitani and Pappadio, an automatic “purge” clause and related indicia are found to convert a criminal sentence into a civil sanction which cannot survive the grand jury’s expiration. I believe these limitations are erroneous in reasoning and result alike. I. The decision to extend the right to jury trial to criminal contempts ending in sentences greater than six months is the product of the views of four Justices who rest that conclusion on the Court’s supervisory power and those of two others who believe that jury trials are constitutionally required in all but “petty” criminal contempts. The four Justices who rely on the supervisory power also find the constitutional question a “difficult” one. Ante, at 365. However, as recently as 1958, this Court in Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, unequivocally declared that the prosecution of criminal contempts was not subject to the grand and petit jury requirements of Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This doctrine, which was accepted by federal judges in the early days of the Republic and has been steadfastly adhered to in case after case in this Court, should be recognized now as a definitive answer to petitioners’ constitutional claims in each of the cases before us. The prevailing opinion’s new supervisory-power rule seems to me equally infirm. The few sentences devoted to this dictum give no reason why a six-month limitation is desirable. Nor is there anything about the sentences actually imposed in these instances that warrants reappraisal of the present practice in contempt sentencing. In Cheff itself the sentence was for six months. Shillitani and Pappadio involved two-year sentences but each was moderated by a purge clause and seemingly in neither case were there disputed facts suitable for a jury. Among the prominent shortcomings of the new rule, which are simply disregarded, is the difficulty it may generate for federal courts seeking to implement locally unpopular decrees. Another problem is in administration: to decide whether to proffer a jury trial, the judge must now look ahead to the sentence, which itself depends on the precise facts the trial is to reveal. In my view, before this Court improvises a rule necessarily based on pure policy that largely shrugs off history, a far more persuasive showing can properly be expected. II. No less remarkable is the Court’s upsetting of the sentences in Shillitani and Pappadio on the ground that the jailings were really for civil contempt which cannot endure beyond the grand jury’s term. It can hardly be suggested that the lower courts did not intend to invoke the criminal contempt power to keep the petitioners in jail after the grand jury expired; the contrary is demonstrated by the entire record. Instead, the Court attempts to characterize the proceedings by a supposed primary or essential “purpose” and then lops off so much of the sentences as do not conform to that purpose. What the Court fails to do is to give any reason in policy, precedent, statute law, or the Constitution for its unspoken premise that a sentencing judge cannot combine two purposes into a single sentence of the type here imposed. Without arguing about which purpose was primary, obviously a fixed sentence with a purge clause can be said to embody elements of both criminal and civil contempt. However, so far as the safeguards of criminal contempt proceedings may be superior to civil, the petitioners have not been disadvantaged in this regard, nor do they claim otherwise. Adding a purge clause to a fixed sentence is a benefit for the petitioners, not a reason for complaint. Similarly the public interest is served by exerting strong pressure to obtain answers while tailoring the length of imprisonment so that it may punish the defendant only for his period of recalcitrance and no more. I see no reason why a fixed sentence with an automatic purge clause should be deemed impermissible. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgments in all three cases on the basis of Green and leave the authority of that case unimpaired. The relevant portions of these provisions declare: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .” Art. Ill, § 2. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” Sixth Amendment. E. g., Ex parte Burr, 4 Fed. Cas. 791, 797 (No. 2,186) (C. C. D. C. 1823) (Cranch, C. J.): “[C]ases of contempt of court have never been considered as crimes within the meaning and intention of the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United States; nor have attachments for contempt ever been considered as criminal prosecutions within the sixth amendment. . . . Many members of the [constitutional] convention were members of the first congress, and it cannot be believed that they would have silently acquiesced in so palpable a violation of the then recent constitution, as would have been contained in the seventeenth section of the judiciary act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73), — which authorizes all the courts of the United States ‘to punish by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same,’ — if their construction of the constitution had been that which has, in this case, been contended for at the bar.” See Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 313 (1888) (Harlan, J.); Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 278 (1889) (Harlan, J.); Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 36 (1890) (Miller, J.); Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 489 (1894) (Harlan, J.); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 336-337 (1904) (Brewer, J.); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 450 (1911) (Lamar, J.); Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 610-611 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383 (1919) (White, C. J.); Myers v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 104-105 (1924) (McReynolds, J.); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 67 (1924) (Sutherland, J. ); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 117-118 (1925) (Taft, C. J.); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U. S. 155, 159-160 (1949) (Reed, J.); Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.). This question was never raised in Pappadio nor encompassed by the limited grant of certiorari in that case, see 382 U. S. 916; in Shillitani, where the issue is properly before the Court, petitioner filed a certiorari petition discussing the point but tendered no brief on the merits on any phase of the case. For example, in each case the Judgment and Commitment states that “the defendant is guilty of criminal contempt” and orders him committed “for a period of Two (2) Years, or until further order of this Court,” should the questions be answered within that period before the grand jury expires. The two-year sentences imposed on Shillitani and Pappadio do not call for the exercise of this Court’s corrective power over contempt sentences, see Green, 356 U. S., at 187-189; as has been noted, both sentences carried purge clauses.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. JOHN J. FELIN & CO., INC. No. 17. Argued May 7, 1947. — Reargued November 18-19, 1947. Decided June 14, 1948. Assistant Solicitor General Washington argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Paul A. Sweeney and Harry I. Rand. Arthur L. Winn, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Wilbur La Roe, Jr. and Frederick E. Brown. Mr. Justice Frankfurter announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Burton concurred. This is a claim for just compensation, based on the Fifth Amendment, by a slaughterer whose meat products the Government requisitioned for war purposes. The Court of Claims awarded damages above the maximum prices fixed by the Office of Price Administration for such products and measured by what that court deemed the replacement cost of the requisitioned property. 107 Ct. Cl. 155, 67 F. Supp. 1017. The implications of this ruling reach far, and so we brought the case here. 330 U. S. 814. While the immediate facts of this controversy are few and undisputed, they can be understood only in connection with the recognized facts in the meat industry. Of these we must take judicial notice inasmuch as we must translate the idiom of the industry into vernacular English. Also, of course, we must consider the facts in the context of the rather intricate system of meat price regulation by O. P. A. The respondent was engaged in the business of packing pork products in Philadelphia. It bought hogs in Chicago, St. Louis, and Indianapolis and transported them to Philadelphia where they were slaughtered and converted into various pork cuts and products. It sold these products to retail dealers in Philadelphia, and it had also supplied pork products to Government agencies. On January 30, 1942, the President approved the Emergency Price Control Act. 56 Stat. 23, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V, 1946) § 901. Accordingly, the Price Administrator, by a series of regulations, established maximum prices for dressed hogs and wholesale pork cuts. Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 148, issued on October 22, 1942, governed the pork cuts here involved. 7 Fed. Reg. 8609,8948,9005; 8 Fed. Reg. 544. To meet the food needs entailed by the war, the President under the authority of the Second War Powers Act, 56 Stat. 176, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V, 1946) § 633, created the Food Distribution Administration, with the Secretary of Agriculture as its head. E. O. 9280, 7 Fed. Reg. 10179. This Administration was given authority to assign food priorities, to “allocate” food to governmental agencies and for private account, and to assist in carrying out the program of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 31. To carry out the task thus delegated by the President, the Food Distribution Administration issued to each packer operating under federal inspection a priority order calling for delivery of a proportionate part of the total quantity needed at the particular time. A packer’s quota was based on the ratio of meat produced in his plant to the total production in all federally inspected plants. In conformity with this system, the respondent, on February 2, 1943, was requested to deliver 225,000 pounds of lard and pork products to the Federal Surplus Commodity Corporation for delivery under the Lend-Lease program. The respondent was advised that this order was to be filled in preference to any other order or contract of lower priority, and at the applicable O. P. A. ceiling prices. Insisting that it could no longer afford to sell to the Government at ceiling prices, respondent refused to make delivery. On March 1, 1943, the Food Distribution Administration, exercising powers not questioned, issued an order requisitioning the lard and pork products in controversy. On March 3, 1943, the property was duly seized in respondent’s Philadelphia packing house. On March 24, 1943, respondent filed its claim with the Administration for “just compensation” for taking this property. Its total claim was $55,525, of which $16,250 was for lard and $39,275 for pork cuts. On May 7, 1943, the Administration, by way of preliminary determination of the just compensation for the requisitioned property, fixed the value of the lard at $15,543.78 and the pork cuts at $25,112.50. These amounts were based on the O. P. A. ceiling prices applicable to these products. On May 22, 1943, the preliminary award was made final. Respondent accepted in full payment the award as to the lard; it refused to accept the determination as to the pork cuts and, in accordance with the statutory procedure in the case of rejection of such an award, was paid half of it. On June 24, 1943, respondent instituted this action in the Court of Claims to recover the additional amount which when added to the $12,556.25, the half of the Government's valuation for those cuts, would constitute “just compensation” for what the Government had taken. The Court of Claims referred the proceeding to a commissioner, who took evidence and reported to the court. Upon the basis of his report and the underlying evidence, the Court of Claims found as a fact that the replacement cost of the requisitioned pork cuts at the time and place of the taking was $30,293, and concluded, as a matter of law, that such replacement cost and not the maximum ceiling price was the proper measure of damages for the taking. We heard argument at the last Term, and after due consideration deemed it appropriate to order reargument at this Term. At the outset it is important to make clear what it is we are called upon to decide. The conventional criterion for determining what is “just compensation” for private property taken for public use is what it would bring in the free, open market. E. g., Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 123; L. Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 337, 340. But there must be a market to make the criterion available. Here there was a market in which the respondent could have sold the pork cuts, but it was not a free and open market; it was controlled in its vital feature, selling price, by the O. P. A. It is this fact that creates the problem of the case, assuming that the case is not dogmatically disposed of by holding that inasmuch as the maximum price is the only price which respondent could legally have got for its goods it is just compensation. We are not passing on the abstract question whether a lawfully established maximum price is the proper measure of “just compensation” whenever property is taken for public use. We are adjudicating only the precise issues that emerge from this case. The Second War Powers Act, 1942, under which respondent’s property was authorized to be taken, restricted compensation for the taking to that which the Fifth Amendment enjoins. 56 Stat. 176, 181. In enforcing this constitutional requirement “the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.” Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195; McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363. Respondent’s sole claim is for the pecuniary equivalent of the property taken. This is not a situation where consequential damages, in any appropriate sense of the term, are urged as a necessary part of just compensation. Respondent does not claim such damages on the theory that, in order to protect its good will, it had to supply its regular customers and that this compelled replacement of the requisitioned pork products by the purchase, slaughter, and processing of live hogs. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 382; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 377-78; United States ex rel. T. V. A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 281-82. Respondent claims that replacement cost is the proper measure of the value of the property when requisitioned. This action was brought to recover damages which the respondent would suffer, so it maintains, if it accepted the Government’s offer of the applicable ceiling prices in satisfaction of “just compensation.”' The burden therefore rests on the respondent to prove the damages it would suffer by not receiving more than the ceiling prices. Marion & Rye Valley R. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 280, 285. The Court of Claims found that the principal item in the cost of processing respondent’s products was what it had to pay for live hogs; that, inasmuch as live hogs were not then covered by price regulation, the Chicago market quotations governed price in the packing industry; that the Chicago average live hog price was $15.59 during March 1943; and that, on the basis of this price, the replacement cost for the requisitioned property was $30,293. We are of opinion that in reaching this conclusion the court below failed to take into account decisive factors for the proper disposition of the action brought by the respondent. We are dealing with a claim for damages arising out of a transaction pertaining to a particular industry, and the transaction cannot be torn from the context of that industry. It is practically a postulate of the slaughtering industry that replacement cost does not afford a relevant basis for determining the true value of the industry’s products. “Manufacturing operations in the meat packing industry do not consist of assembling raw materials for the purpose of obtaining one finished product, but rather of separating or breaking down raw materials (cattle, etc.) into many parts, one of which (dressed carcass) is the major product, and the other parts of which are further processed into numerous byproducts.” Kingan & Co. v. Bowles, 144 F. 2d 253, 254. In consequence, cost in the industry generally is like a fagot that cannot be broken up into simple, isolated pieces. See Greer, Packinghouse Accounting (Prepared by the Committee on Accounting of the Institute of American Meat Packers), passim. “The accounting procedure in the hog business is even more complicated than that of the cattle, calf, or sheep business, because the operations involve a greater breaking up of the dressed carcass and more numerous processes extending over considerable periods of time.” Id. at 33-34. The problem is one of “joint cost” in a business which “produces no single major product,” id. at 213, with the result that no accountant has thus far “been able to devise a method yielding by-product or joint-cost figures which does not embody a dominance of arbitrariness and guesswork.” Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 Law and Contemp. Prob. 321, 328; cf. Greenbaum, The Basis of Property Shall Be the Cost of Such Property: How is Cost Defined?, 3 Tax L. Rev. 351, 356-59. If, as suggested in argument, a hog were nothing but an articulated pork chop, and the processing of edible and inedible by-products were not characteristic of the industry, the price of a live hog might well represent the collective cost of the derivative pork cuts. The pork chop, however, is but one of the many edible hog products. According to an estimate about the time of the requisitioning of these pork cuts, there were more than 200 pork items (exclusive of sausage products) in the market. See Supplementary Statement of Considerations for Revised Regulation No. 148, Pike and Fischer, 3 OPA Food Desk Book 46,151. “Most pork products,” the Administrator found, “are consumed in a cured or processed state. Fresh pork products, such as pork chops and fresh ham, represent not over 20 per cent of the vast quantity of pork which moves by rail. The remaining 80 per cent reaches the consumer in a wide variety of processed forms, including dried, dry cured, sweet pickled, smoked, cooked, baked, and canned.” Id. at 46,141. It deserves noting that the requisitioned products in controversy included cured regular hams, cured clear bellies, cured picnics, and salted fatbacks. The petitioner was also engaged in by-product processing, for the Government took from him 100,000 pounds of refined pure lard. For the value of the lard the respondent accepted the administrative award. Admittedly, part of the cost of the live hog must be charged to by-products. However, any method of apportioning the total cost to the by-products is highly speculative. Since so much speculative approximation and guesswork entered into the determination of cost, selling price, and profit, the industry, naturally enough, was in almost continuous controversy with the Price Administrator about them. The respondent was party to these controversies. On July 17,1942, it filed a protest against Maximum Price Regulation No. 148 which was consolidated with the protest of 115 other pork slaughterers against this regulation. On the basis of calculations as to the cut-out value or replacement cost of various pork cuts, the slaughterers contended that the regulation did not allow them sufficient operating margin over the cost of live hogs. In rejecting the protest, on April 23, 1943, the Administrator made this ruling: “The interdependence of all phases of the operations of packing establishments makes precise evaluation of the relationship between prices on dressed and processed meats and live hog prices impossible except in terms of the over-all financial position of the industry.’'' In the Matter of Rapides Packing Co., Pike and Fischer, 1 OPA Opinions and Decisions 243. The respondent, on March 8, 1943, had also protested, again on the basis of the cost of live hogs, against the revision of the regulation. This protest was consolidated with those of 15 other pork slaughterers and, substantially on the ground taken in the Rapides Packing Co. case, this second protest was likewise rejected by the Administrator. In the Matter of Greenwood Packing Plant, Pike and Fischer, 1 OPA Opinions and Decisions 296,299. Review by the Emergency Court of Appeals was not sought, although the first denial of respondent’s claim for the replacement cost of pork cuts, based on live hog prices, came shortly after the Government’s requisitioning of the products as to which he now makes the same contention. It is noteworthy that the pork price margins were almost the only meat price margins which were not challenged before the Emergency Court of Appeals in what has been called "the battle of the meat regulations.” See Hyman and Nathanson, Judicial Review of Price Control: The Battle of the Meat Regulations, 42 Ill. L. Rev. 584. The considerations which underlay the Administrator’s meat price determinations are most pertinent to the solution of our immediate problem. The result of his analysis was that the profit-and-loss data on a slaughterer’s entire operations were the only dependable figures from which the fairness of meat prices could be deduced. The Administrator pointed out that the industry, on the basis of its accounting figures, had historically lost money on its meat sales. Since, however, by taking the by-product sales into full account its operations as a whole were highly profitable, these meat sale losses were “more in the nature of bookkeeping losses which failed to take fully into account the integrated nature of the industry.” These views were approvingly quoted by the Emergency Court of Appeals in Armour & Co. v. Bowles, 148 F. 2d 529, 535. In both of the consolidated proceedings to which the respondent was a party, the Administrator explicitly requested to be furnished with the industry’s profit-and-loss data. In the earlier proceeding, no proof of loss was filed by any of the protestants. In the Matter of Rapides Packing Co., supra. In the second proceeding the Administrator made this finding: “The three Protestants who submitted further evidence did not even thus sustain their claims of individual hardship. One of them showed a net profit of $60,492.44 for the five months period ending March 27, 1942; another a net profit of $6,838.00 for the three months period ending April 1, 1943, and the third failed to submit a profit and loss statement and balance sheet although specifically requested to do so.” In the Matter of Greenwood Packing Plant, supra, at 297. Not merely does the industry generally seem to have prospered under price control, but so did the respondent despite the fact that throughout the period in controversy it continued to buy live hogs at prevailing prices and to sell pork products derived from them at the authorized ceiling prices, even when this meant selling its pork products below the price that the Court of Claims found to be their replacement cost value. Most pertinent, therefore, are the pronouncements of the packing industry made before these matters became embroiled in price-fixing litigation. “The cost of a dressed hog carcass, or of a lot of dressed hog carcasses, may be determined quite satisfactorily; but when a carcass is cut up into its various merchantable parts, all record of cost is lost, as it is impossible to determine the cost of any of these cuts.” Greer, Packinghouse Accounting (Prepared by the Committee on Accounting of the Institute of American Meat Packers), p. 246, and also pp. 43, 58, 61-62. Since the “results for the hog business as a whole can be found only by adding the profits or losses for all merchandising departments,” id. at 218, the only accurate formula for costs in hog slaughtering is a profit-and-loss statement for the entire operations. Id. at 43-44. It is as old as the common law that an allegation purporting to be one of fact but contradicted by common knowledge is not confessed by a demurrer. Of course, findings of fact are binding on this Court, but if this Court had to treat as the starting point for the determination of constitutional issues a spurious finding of “fact” contradicted by an adjudicated finding between the very parties to the instant controversy, constitutional adjudication would become a verbal game. There are facts and facts, even in Court of Claims’ litigation. It is the function of the Court of Claims to make findings. But when a judgment based on such findings is here brought in question it is the function of this Court to ascertain the meaning of the findings in order to determine their legal significance. The judgment of the court below that “replacement cost” is the proper measure of just compensation and the mode by which it reached the amount of that cost are inescapably enmeshed in considerations that are clearly familiar issues of law and particularly of constitutional law. Where the conclusion is a “composite of fact and law,” Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 668, this Court may certainly hold that as a matter of law the findings are erroneous. See, e. g., Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 528. Even when this Court reviews State court judgments involving constitutional issues it “must review independently both the legal issues and those factual matters with which they are commingled.” See Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633, 636 (and the authorities therein cited). Similarly, findings concurred in by two courts do not control the decision here where “facts and their constitutional significance are too closely connected” and “the standards and the ultimate conclusion involve questions of law inseparable from the particular facts to which they are applied.” United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 404. Even where the parties to the litigation have stipulated as to the “facts,” this Court will disregard the stipulation, accepted and applied by the courts below, if the stipulation obviously forecloses real questions of law. See, e. g., Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281. The prior proceedings between the same parties, as to which we would be blind not to take judicial notice, as well as the unquestioned facts pertaining to the meat industry are relevant to interpret the findings of the Court of Claims. We have concluded that here “replacement cost” is a spurious, i. e. non-legal, basis for determining just compensation. It is as though the Court of Claims had based its opinion on a balance sheet and we had to interpret the balance sheet into actualities. And so we hold that, as a matter of law, the court below erred in utilizing replacement cost as the basis for determining what constituted just compensation. When due regard is given to the findings of the Court of Claims, they fail to establish that the compensation proffered by the Government for the requisitioned pork cuts, based on the maximum ceiling prices, falls short of “just compensation.” We are therefore not called upon to consider whether as a matter of constitutional law prices fixed by the Government for the sale of commodities are the measure of “just compensation” for commodities seized by the Government. As the conflict of opinion here indicates, that is a debatable issue which, since we can, we must avoid adjudicating. See Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. The burden of proving its case was upon the respondent. The nature of this burden was to prove, in light of the governing facts of the industry, that the administrative award for the taking of respondent’s property was less than just compensation, based as it was on prices which the Administrator had established for those products and which had been left undisturbed by the process devised by Congress for assuring the fairness of these prices. By evidence merely of bookkeeping losses, respondent did not carry its burden of proving actual damage. Just compensation is a practical conception, a matter of fact and not of fiction. Respondent introduced no evidence, and the Court of Claims made no findings, to establish a loss based on its total operations during the period relevant to the slaughtering of the hogs from which the requisitioned products were processed. On the basis of such figures it would be necessary to determine by reasonable allocations the portion of the loss properly attributable to the goods seized by the Government. In the proceedings below the respondent neither alleged such a loss nor submitted proof in support of it. Since it has not maintained its burden of proving that the ceiling price award entails damages, the judgment of the Court of Claims cannot stand. The judgment is reversed with directions to the Court of Claims to enter a judgment for the respondent in an amount not exceeding $12,556.25, with interest on the amount of $25,112.50 from March 3,1943, the date of the requisition, to May 22, 1943, the date of the final award made hy the Director of the Food Distribution Administration. In 1943 there were 308 hog slaughterers whose establishments operated under federal inspection. Livestock, Meats, and Wool Market Statistics and Related Data 1945, compiled by the Livestock Branch, .Production and Marketing Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, p. 31. In 1942 there had been only 218 hog slaughtering establishments under federal inspection, and in 1944 there were 322. Ibid. The requisitioned property consisted of the following: 40,000 pounds Cured Regular Hams, 14 to 18 lb. range 40,000 pounds Cured Clear Bellies, 10 to 14 lb. range 15,000 pounds Cured Picnics, 6 to 10 lb. range 30,000 pounds Salted Fatbacks, 8 to 12 lb. range 100,000 pounds Refined Pure Lard, 1 lb. prints (30 lbs. to carton) After the case was taken under advisement, following reargument, a matter was brought to our attention which calls for consideration, however summary. We were advised that on March 23, 1943, the respondent filed with the O. P. A. an “Application for Adjustment of Maximum Prices for Commodities or Services under Government Contracts or Subcontracts,” pursuant to Procedural Regulation No. 6, 7 Fed. Reg. 5087, and Supplementary Order No. 9, 7 Fed. Reg. 5444. (See 7 Fed. Reg. 5088 for the form of the application.) The purpose of these regulations was to afford opportunity for relief to sellers who had made, or proposed to make, “contracts or subcontracts” with the Government. This application had lain dormant from the date of its filing until December 13, 1947, when we were advised by counsel for the Government that it was now in the files of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which is third in the chain of title from the O. P. A., through the Office of Temporary Controls, charged with the administration of these two regulations. On December 15, 1947, counsel for the respondent advised the R. F. C. that it withdrew the application insofar as it pertained to the requisitioned commodities in controversy here. While the Government does not suggest that the dormancy of this application renders present proceedings, if not moot, premature, such apparently is the intimation. If the regulations in fact authorized one who is not a “contractor or subcontractor” in the ordinary meaning of those terms to obtain special administrative relief apart from the statutory scheme relating to requisitioned property, technical issues would have to be faced which we need not particularize. Counsel for the Government advise us that a counsel for the R. F. C. has now interpreted the regulations not only (1) as applicable to requisitioned commodities, but (2) as authorizing retroactive price adjustments for requisition transactions completed before readjustment is sought. Not unnaturally, the Government states that the applicability of this procedure for readjustment “to requisitioned commodities may not be readily apparent from its terms.” While normally we accept the construction placed upon a regulation by those charged with its administration, we must reject a construction that is not only as unnatural as what is now proposed but comes to us post litem motam five years after the application. It should also be pointed out that the construction now placed upon the regulations is not made by the administration that promulgated it but by the second successor agency for liquidating what is left of this administration. With due regard for the respect we owe to administrative rulings in their normal setting, it would require such a remaking of the regulations as reason and fair dealing here reject. The provisions for readjustment of contracts relate to a transaction in which the seller and the purchasing agency of the Government were in agreement as to the contract price. The price was paid, subject to the approval of the application for adjustment. If so approved, the seller retained the purchase price; if disapproved, the seller had to make a refund. See Armour & Co. v. Brown, 137 F. 2d 233, 240. In the case of a requisitioned commodity, certainly prior to the filing of an application, no amount is agreed upon, and no provision for refund has been made. In short, we reject this belated and novel construction and are of the opinion that the pendency of this moribund application before the R. F. C., now withdrawn by the respondent, was no bar to this suit. If the respondent had sold the pork products in controversy here to its regular customers, it would have done so at the applicable ceiling prices. If the Government had then requisitioned the property from these customers, there would have been no question that the ceiling prices would have been the measure of just compensation. This was obviously not the cost of the hogs from which the pork products requisitioned by the order of March 1, 1943, were processed. The relevant hogs were purchased in some previous month and at a lower cost. The Chicago average was $15.35 in February and $14.78 in January, 1943, and $14.01 in December and $13.96 in November, 1942. Livestock, Meats, and Wool Market Statistics and Related Data 1945, compiled by the Livestock Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, p. 54. Moreover, these were the average prices for average weights of hogs. Ibid. The Government took specific pork products which were processed from hogs of a definite weight for which the respondent paid specific prices in the Chicago, St. Louis, or Indianapolis markets. There are “numerous by-products,” and the computation of the values for “such by-products as casings, grease, fertilizer, and hog hair, is rather complex.” Greer, Packinghouse Accounting (Prepared by the Committee on Accounting of the Institute of American Meat Packers) (1929) at 213 and 219, respectively; see, generally, Clemen, By-Products in the Packing Industry (1929); Moulton and Lewis, Meat through the Microscope (rev. ed. 1940); Readings on By-Products of the Meat Packing Industry, collected by the Institute of Meat Packing, University of Chicago (1941); Rhoades, Merchandising Packinghouse Products, Institute of Meat Packing, University of Chicago (1929); Tolman, Packing-House Industries (1922). Since, as we hold, the value of the individual products can only be determined by proportionate allocation from the over-all operations, it seems to us that respondent’s acceptance of the award as to the lard was hardly consistent with its rejection of the award as to the other pork products. “On much of the material transferred [from one of the slaughterer’s departmental accounts to another], such as blood, bones, tankage, glue stock, etc., there is no ascertainable outside market, and the packers must perforce place quite arbitrary valuations on this material having no probable relation to either cost or market. Again certain products are in the green stage when transferred, and an outside market only obtains for the finished stage, with the result that arbitrary deductions must be made from the finished market, estimated to establish a nonexistent ‘green’ market. The certification of internal transfer prices presents, accordingly, an almost interminable problem to any outside reviewing body.” Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat-Packing Industry (1920), Part V, 56. The industry’s position as to the utilization of such cost allocations and the Price Administrator’s objections thereto are quoted fully and discussed in Armour & Co. v. Bowles. 148 F. 2d 529, 535-39. It is also significant that none of the other 130 protestants sought review in the Emergency Court of Appeals. Cf., e. g., Kingan & Co. v. Bowles, 144 F. 2d 253, and Armour & Co. v. Bowles, 148 F. 2d 529, for that court’s views on replacement cost as a basis for the determination of value. “It is a notable fact, that according to the present method of departmental accounting, the packers are in the habit of showing low profits or even positive losses in the carcass-meat departments, while at the same time exhibiting large profits in the by-products or ‘specialty’ departments, the chief reason for this somewhat extraordinary state of affairs being found in the valuations placed upon transfers.” Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the MeatPacking Industry (1920), Part V, 56. While a great deal of time has passed since this 1920 report, the Price Administrator reached the same conclusions in 1943, and the Emergency Court of Appeals quoted the report more fully in 1945. See Armour & Co. v. Bowles, 148 F. 2d at 537. See War Profits Study No. 14, Office of Research, Financial Analysis Branch, Office of Price Administration, Office of Temporary Controls (1947) pp. 17, 45-47, 73-75. This is a study of the profits of 520 food processors, but the foregoing references were to the separate tabulations concerning the 79 meat packers included in the study. The financial data was compiled from Moody’s Industrials, Standard & Poor’s Corporation Records, and the OPA Financial Reports submitted by the packers. Id. at 19. Of the total 79 meat packers, 54 are processing slaughterers, 10 non-processing slaughterers, and 15 non-slaughterers. The comparison between the 1943 operations and the base period (1936-39 average) operations shows for the 54 processing slaughterers: Net sales: 1943 — $4,575,528,000 (after renegotiation refunds)/base period — $2,382,211,000; Profits before income taxes: 1943 — $125,463,000 (after renegotiation refunds)/base period — $24,415,000; Profits after taxes: 1943 — $50,402,000 (after renegotiation refunds)/base period — $19,255,000; Return on sales: 1943 — 2.7%/base period — 1.0%; Return onnet worth: 1943 — 19.5%/ base period — 4.1%; Return on invested capital: 1943 — 16.5%/base period — 4.1%. Id. at 45, 47. For the 10 non-processing slaughterers, the comparison shows: Net sales: 1943 — $62,098,000/base period— $29,927,000; Profits before income taxes: 1943 — $1,027,000/base period — $184,000; Profits after taxes: 1943 — $390,000/base period— $147,000; Return on sales: 1943 — 1.7%/base period — .6%; Return on net worth: 1943 — 28.0%/base period — 6.3%; Return on invested capital: 1943 — 25.5%/base period — 5.9%. Ibid. Respondent’s income account for the year ending December 31, 1943, shows: “Net sales. $14,225,056 Cost of sales.... 12,950,785 Selling, etc., exp. 869,770 Operating profit. 404,500 Other income.... 18,717 Total income.... 423,217 Mise, deductions. 13,229 Income taxes.... 176, 619 Net income. 233,369 Earn., pfd. share $40.21 Earn., com. share 17.97” See Moody’s Manual of Investments, American and Foreign, Industrial Securities, 1944, p. 647. The 1943 net income figure of $233,369 compared favorábly with preceding years: 1942 — $73,292; 1941— $150,069; 1940 — $148,164; and 1939 — d$76,986. The court below found that in order to protect its good will and keep its organization intact, “Throughout the period mentioned [prior to and after the March 1943 requisition], plaintiff [respondent] continued to buy live hogs at prevailing prices and to sell pork products derived from them at the ceiling prices authorized by regulations of the Office of Price Administration, even when the cost of live hogs was greater than the wholesale prices of the products obtained from them.” 67 F. Supp. at 1022. “If one enters my close, and with an iron sledge and bar breaks and displaces the stones on the land, being my chattels, and I request him to desist, and he refuses, and threatens me if I shall approach him; and upon this I, to prevent him from doing more damage to the stones, not daring to approach him, throw some stones at him molliter et molli manu, and they fall upon him molliter, still this is not a good justification, for the judges say that one cannot throw stones molliter, although it were confessed by a demurrer Cole v. Maunder, 2 Roll. Abr. 548 (K. B. 1635) (as translated from the Norman French in Ames, Cases on Pleading (1875) 2). The court below found that the $25,112.50 award was the equivalent of the ceiling price of the requisitioned property when sold at wholesale in carload quantities at Philadelphia on March 3, 1943, the date the Government took possession and title; that the respondent customarily sold its products at wholesale but in lots of less than 500 pounds each and that it made delivery to its customers by means of 57 route trucks; that the ceiling price if the requisitioned property had been sold in.this customary manner would have been $26,362.50; that the difference between the two ceiling price figures resulted from the $1 per cwt. deduction established by the price regulation for sales in carload quantities; and that the “$1.00 differential was intended to partially defray the expense incurred for delivery and sale in less than carload quantities.” 67 F. Supp. at 1022. Respondent did not challenge the reasonableness of the $1 differential in its petition filed with the court below. Respondent argues here, however, that the effect of the differential is to reduce the return it would have netted if it had been allowed to sell the requisitioned products in small quantities. But, bearing in mind that this is a suit for actual damages, the argument has a fatal weakness. If the respondent had sold in smaller quantities at the higher ceiling price and made delivery by truck, it would have incurred all of the expenses that motivated the differential — invoicing, billing, handling, and transportation. None of these expenses was incurred when the Government requisitioned the pork products. The “loss” in the gross sales figures would have been counterbalanced, to some extent at least, by the additional expenditures. Cf. Superior Packing Co. v. Clark, 164 F. 2d 343, 347-48. All this bears on the guiding consideration that recovery in this action must be related to proof of actual loss.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ASPHALT PRODUCTS CO., INC. No. 86-1053. Decided June 1, 1987 Together with No. 86-1054, Asphalt Products Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court. Per Curiam. Asphalt Products Co. (APC) manufactures emulsified asphalt, a paving material containing oil refining residues, principally for sale to Tennessee county governments for use in highway construction. For reasons related to the rise in oil prices attending the 1973 Arab oil embargo, APC’s 1974 year-end inventories and accounts receivable were substantially higher than in prior years. Because APC kept its books, and prepared its 1974 federal tax return, on a cash receipts and disbursements basis, its reported 1974 taxable income did not fully reflect these changes. APC’s 1974 return also claimed a deduction of $1,103.04 for the expense of transporting two trucks from their place of purchase in Seattle to Tennessee. The trucks were driven to Tennessee by way of California, where they picked up two trailer-mounted waste water treatment plants bought by APC’s shareholders in their individual capacities. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that, because of the increases in APC’s inventories and accounts receivable, the company’s traditional cash-basis bookkeeping did not “clearly reflect income,” 26 U. S. C. § 446(b), for the 1974 tax year, and APC was therefore required to compute its 1974 income on an accrual basis. The Commissioner also disallowed the deduction for the expense of transporting the trucks and trailers, on the ground that it was a personal expense of the shareholders. After several other adjustments, the Commissioner recomputed APC’s taxes to show a deficiency of $154,332.16. The Commissioner further contended that APC’s use of the wrong accounting method and its deduction of the truck transportation expenses constituted negligence, and it added to the deficiency a penalty under 26 U. S. C. § 6653(a)(1), which then provided: “If any part of any underpayment. . . is due to negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations (but without intent to defraud), there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 5 percent of the underpayment.” (Section 6653 was amended in minor respects by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 1503, 100 Stat. 2742; unless otherwise indicated, all further references are to the pre-1986 statute.) The penalty totaled $7,716.61 — 5% of the full alleged underpayment of $154,332.16. In the Tax Court, APC stipulated that the truck transportation expenses were not properly deductible, unsuccessfully contested the requirement that it use accrual accounting, and successfully contested certain other determinations, resulting in a recalculated deficiency of $133,248.69 — almost all of which was due to the change in accounting methods. The Tax Court concluded that APC’s use of cash-basis accounting was nonnegligent, but affirmed the Commissioner’s finding that APC had negligently deducted the truck transportation expenses. It thus added to APC’s tax a negligence penalty of $6,943.37, computed as before by reference to the full amount of the deficiency (adjusted for carryback credits, see 26 U. S. C. §§6211, 6653(c)(1)). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, over a dissent, the Tax Court’s determination that APC was required to use accrual accounting, and unanimously (albeit with little enthusiasm) affirmed the finding that the deduction for truck transportation expenses was negligent. 796 F. 2d 843 (1986). APC has petitioned for certiorari on those two issues in No. 86-1054, and we deny that petition. Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion we accept, without approving, the Commissioner’s finding of negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court’s imposition of the negligence penalty on the full amount of the deficiency, concluding that the penalty “should be applied only to that portion of the deficiency attributable to the disallowed deduction.” Id., at 850. The Commissioner has petitioned for certiorari on that issue in No. 86-1058. Because this holding is in apparent conflict with Abrams v. United States, 449 F. 2d 662 (CA2 1971), and is in obvious conflict with the plain language of the statute, we grant certiorari in No. 86-1053 and reverse. Section 6653(a)(1) could not be clearer. If “any part of any underpayment” is due to negligence, the Commissioner shall add to the tax a penalty of “5 percent of the underpayment.” It is impossible further to explain the statute without merely repeating its language — the penalty is imposed on “the underpayment,” not on the “part of [the] underpayment” attributable to negligence. By contrast (if contrast is thought necessary), the very next paragraph of the statute, § 6653(a)(2) (added in 1981, see Pub. L. 97-34, § 722(b)(1), 95 Stat. 342), limits the 50% penalty on interest due on negligent underpayments to “the portion of the underpayment . . . which is attributable to the [taxpayer’s] negligence.” The section imposing interest penalties on fraudulent underpayments contains the same proviso, § 6653(b)(2)(A), as does (after the 1986 Tax Reform Act) the provision for direct penalties on fraudulent underpayments. See § 1503(b)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 2742 (“If any part of any underpayment... is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax ... 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud”). As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Abrams v. United States: “It is evident that it was intended that the five percent was to be assessed not just against that segment of the deficiency due to negligence but against the entire amount. The language is clear and leads to no other interpretation.” 449 F. 2d, at 664. The taxpayers in Abrams argued “that a literal application of the statute could lead to absurd results where a comparatively insignificant item of income is negligently omitted,” ibid., and the court in Abrams expressly reserved judgment on that situation. Ibid. (“That case is not before us on this appeal and we therefore express no opinion whatever as to its proper disposition if it should ever arise”). The Court of Appeals in this litigation relied on that reservation, and on the absence of any “egregious attempts [by APC] to avoid the payment of taxes,” 796 F. 2d, at 849, to distinguish Abrams, concluding that the Commissioner’s construction of the statute lets “the tail wag the dog.” 796 F. 2d, at 850; ibid. (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Where the taxpayer is subject to a penalty only because of the negligent omission of a comparatively insignificant item of income, and the Commissioner also asserts that there is a large underpayment not claimed to be due to negligence, I agree with the court that it would be absurd to let the Commissioner calculate the negligence penalty by applying the statutory percentage to the sum of the negligent and non-negligent underpayments”). This was error. Judicial perception that a particular result would be unreasonable may enter into the construction of ambiguous provisions, but cannot justify disregard of what Congress has plainly and intentionally provided. Given the Government’s plausible interest in deterring negligent tax preparation and given the statute’s explicit limitation of other penalties to the amount of the negligent or fraudulent underpayment, no conclusion can be drawn from the provision here at issue except that Congress desired to impose a modest penalty (5%) upon underpayments any part of which was attributable to negligence of the taxpayer. It is not our assigned role to alter that disposition. The decision of the Court of Appeals limiting the amount of the negligence penalty is Reversed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOWEN, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al. v. MICHIGAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS et al. No. 85-225. Argued January 22, 1986 Decided June 9, 1986 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Rehnquist, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, and Anthony J. Steinmeyer. Alan G. Gilchrist argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Jack R. Bierig filed a brief for the American Medical Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented in this case is whether Congress, in either § 1395ff or § 1395ii of Title 42 of the United States Code, barred judicial review of regulations promulgated under Part B of the Medicare program. Respondents, who include an association of family physicians and several individual doctors, filed suit to challenge the validity of 42 CFR § 405.504(b) (1985), which authorizes the payment of benefits in different amounts for similar physicians’ services. The District Court held that the regulation contravened several provisions of the statute governing the Medicare program: “There is no basis to justify the segregation of allopathic family physicians from all other types of physicians. Such segregation is not rationally related to any legitimate purpose of the Medicare statute. To lump MDs who are family physicians, but who have chosen not to become board certified family physicians for whatever motive, with chiropractors, dentists, and podiatrists for the purpose of determining Medicare reimbursement defies all reason.” Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 502 F. Supp. 751, 755 (ED Mich. 1980). Because it ruled in favor of respondents on statutory grounds, the District Court did not reach their constitutional claims. See id., at 756. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the Secretary’s regulation was “obviously] inconsistent] with the plain language of the Medicare statute” and held that “this regulation is irrational and is invalid.” Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 728 F. 2d 326, 332 (CA6 1984). Like the District Court, it too declined to reach respondents’ constitutional claims. See id., at 332, n. 5. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has not sought review of the decision on the merits invalidating the regulation. Instead, he renews the contention, rejected by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, that Congress has forbidden judicial review of all questions affecting the amount of benefits payable under Part B of the Medicare program. Because the question is important and has divided the Courts of Appeals, we granted the petition for a writ of certiorari. We now affirm. I We begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action. From the beginning “our cases [have established] that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (citing cases). See generally L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 339-353 (1965). In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), a case itself involving review of executiye action, Chief Justice Marshall insisted that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws.” Later, in the lesser known but nonetheless important case of United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8, 28-29 (1835), the Chief Justice noted the traditional observance of this right and laid the foundation for the modem presumption of judicial review: “It would excite some surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle, furnished with a department whose appropriate duty it is to decide questions of right, not only between individuals, but between the government and individuals; a ministerial officer might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process . . . leaving to the debtor no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country, if he should believe the claim to be unjust. But this anomaly does not exist; this imputation cannot be cast on the legislature of the United States.” Committees of both Houses of Congress have endorsed this view. In undertaking the comprehensive rethinking of the place of administrative agencies in a regime of separate and divided powers that culminated in the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§551-559, 701-706, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary remarked: “Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board.” S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945). Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1946). The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives agreed that Congress ordinarily intends that there be judicial review, and emphasized the clarity with which a contrary intent must be expressed: “The statutes of Congress are not merely advisory when they relate to administrative agencies, any more than in other cases. To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.” Ibid. Taking up the language in the House Committee Report, Justice Harlan reaffirmed the Court’s holding in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 379-380 (1962), that “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S., at 141 (citations omitted). This standard has been invoked time and again when considering whether the Secretary has discharged “the heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review of his decision,” Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 567 (1975). Subject to constitutional constraints, Congress can, of course, make exceptions to the historic practice whereby courts review agency action. The presumption of judicial review is, after all, a presumption, and “like all presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by,” inter alia, “specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent,” or a specific congressional intent to preclude judicial review that is “‘fairly discernible’ in the detail of the legislative scheme.” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349, 351 (1984). In this case, the Government asserts that two statutory provisions remove the Secretary’s regulation from review under the grant of general federal-question jurisdiction found in 28 U. S. C. § 1331. First, the Government contends that 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II), which authorizes “Appeal by individuals,” impliedly forecloses administrative or judicial review of any action taken under Part B of the Medicare program by failing to authorize such review while simultaneously authorizing administrative and judicial review of “any determination . . . as to . . . the amount of benefits under part A,” § 1395ff(b)(l)(C). Second, the Government asserts that 42 U. S. C. §1395ii (1982 ed., '-Supp. II), which makes applicable 42 U. S. C. §405(h) (1982 ed., Supp. II), of the Social Security Act to the Medicare program, expressly precludes all administrative or judicial review not otherwise provided in that statute. We find neither argument persuasive. II Section 1395ff on its face is an explicit authorization of judicial review, not a bar. As a general matter, “‘[t]he mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.’” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S., at 141 (quoting L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 357 (1965)). See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, 166 (1970); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944). In the Medicare program, however, the situation is somewhat more complex. Under Part B of that program, which is at issue here, the Secretary contracts with private health insurance carriers to provide benefits for which individuals voluntarily remit premiums. This optional coverage, which is federally subsidized, supplements the mandatory institutional health benefits (such as coverage for hospital expenses) provided by Part A. Subject to an amount-in-controversy requirement, individuals aggrieved by delayed or insufficient payment with respect to benefits payable under Part B are afforded an “opportunity for a fair hearing by the carrier, ” 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added); in comparison, and subject to a like amount-in-controversy requirement, a similarly aggrieved individual under Part A is entitled “to a hearing thereon by the Secretary . . . and to judicial review,” 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395ff(b)(l)(C), (b)(2) (1982 ed. and Supp. II). “In the context of the statute’s precisely drawn provisions,” we held in United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982), that the failure “to authorize further review for determinations of the amount of Part B awards . . . provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims.” Not limiting our consideration to the statutory text, we investigated the legislative history which “confirm[ed] this view,” ibid., and disclosed a purpose to “ ‘avoid overloading the courts’ ” with “‘trivial matters,’” a consequence which would “‘unduly ta[x]’ ” the federal court system with “ ‘little real value’ ” to be derived by participants in the program, id., at 210, n. 13 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bennett)). Respondents’ federal-court challenge to the validity of the Secretary’s regulation is not foreclosed by § 1395ff as we construed that provision in Erika. The reticulated statutory scheme, which carefully details the forum and limits of review of “any determination . . . of . . . the amount of benefits under part A,” 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff(b)(l)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. II), and of the “amount of . . . payment” of benefits under Part B, 42 U. S. C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C), simply does not speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such amounts are to be determined rather than the determinations themselves. As the Secretary has made clear, “the legality, constitutional or otherwise, of any provision of the Act or regulations relevant to the Medicare Program” is not considered in a “fair hearing” held by a carrier to resolve a grievance related to a determination of the amount of a Part B award. As a result, an attack on the validity of a regulation is not the kind of administrative action that we described in Erika as an “amount determination” which decides “the amount of the Medicare payment to be made on a particular claim” and with respect to which the Act impliedly denies judicial review. 456 U. S., at 208. That Congress did not preclude review of the method by which Part B awards are computed (as opposed to the computation) is borne out by the very legislative history we found persuasive in Erika. The Senate Committee Report on the original 1965 legislation reveals an intention to preclude “judicial review of a determination concerning the amount of benefits under part B where claims will probably be for substantially smaller amounts than under part A.” S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 54-55 (1965) (emphasis added). The Report makes plain that “carriers, not the Secretary, would review beneficiary complaints regarding the amount of benefits.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1965) (“Under the supplementary plan [Part B], carriers, not the Secretary, would review beneficiary complaints regarding the amount of benefits” (emphasis added)). The legislative history of the pertinent 1972 amendment likewise reveals that judicial review was precluded only as to controversies regarding determinations of amounts of benefits. The Conference Report on the 1972 amendment explains that “there is no authorization for an appeal to the Secretary or for judicial review on matters solely involving amounts of benefits under Part B.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 61 (1972) (emphasis added). Senator Bennett’s introductory explanation to the amendment confirms that preclusion of judicial review of Part B awards — designed “to avoid overloading the courts with quite minor matters” — embraced only “decisions on a claim for payment for a given service.” 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972). The Senator feared that “[i]f judicial review is made available where any claim is denied, as some court decisions have held, the resources of the Federal court system would be unduly taxed and little real value would be derived by the enrollees. The proposed amendment would merely clarify the original intent of the law and prevent the overloading of the courts with trivial matters because the intent is considered unclear.” Ibid. As we found in Erika, 456 U. S., at 206, Congress has precluded judicial review only “of adversé hearing officer determinations of the amount of Part B payments.” Careful analysis of the governing statutory provisions and their legislative history thus reveals that Congress intended to bar judicial review only of determinations of the amount of benefits to be awarded under Part B. Congress delegated this task to carriers who would finally determine such matters in conformity with the regulations and instructions of the Secretary. We conclude, therefore, that those matters which Congress did not leave to be determined in a “fair hearing” conducted by the carrier — including challenges to the validity of the Secretary’s instructions and regulations — are not impliedly insulated from judicial review by 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff (1982 ed. and Supp. II). Ill In light of Congress’ express provision for carrier review of millions of what it characterized as “trivial” claims, it is implausible to think it intended that there be no forum to adjudicate statutory and constitutional challenges to regulations promulgated by the Secretary. The Government nevertheless maintains that this is precisely what Congress intended to accomplish in 42 U. S. C. §1395ii (1982 ed., Supp. II). That section states that 42 U. S. C. § 405(h) (1982 ed., Supp. II), along with a string citation of 10 other provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act, “shall also apply with respect to this subchapter to the same extent as they are applicable with respect to subchapter II of this chapter.” Section 405(h), in turn, reads in full as follows: “(h) Finality of Secretary’s decision “The findings and decision of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.” The Government contends that the third sentence of § 405(h) by its terms prevents any resort to the grant of general federal-question jurisdiction contained in 28 U. S. C. § 1331. It finds support for this construction in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 756-762 (1975), and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 614-616, 620-626 (1984). Respondents counter that the dispositions in these two cases are consistent with the view that Congress’ purpose was to make clear that whatever specific procedures it provided for judicial review of final action by the Secretary were exclusive, and could not be circumvented by resort to the general jurisdiction of the federal courts. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 764-765; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S., at 621-622. Whichever may be the better reading of Salfi and Ringer, we need not pass on the meaning of § 405(h) in the abstract to resolve this case. Section 405(h) does not apply on its own terms to Part B of the Medicare program, but is instead incorporated mutatis mutandis by § 1395Ü. The legislative history of both the statute establishing the Medicare program and the 1972 amendments thereto provides specific evidence of Congress’ intent to foreclose review only of “amount determinations” — ! e., those “quite minor matters,” 118 Cong. Rec. 33992 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bennett), remitted finally and exclusively to adjudication by private insurance carriers in a “fair hearing.” By the same token, matters which Congress did not delegate to private carriers, such as challenges to the validity of the Secretary’s instructions and regulations, are cognizable in courts of law. In the face of this persuasive evidence of legislative intent, we will not indulge the Government’s assumption that Congress contemplated review by carriers of “trivial” monetary claims, ibid., but intended no review at all of substantial statutory and constitutional challenges to the Secretary’s administration of Part B of the Medicare program. This is an extreme position, and one we would be most reluctant to adopt without “a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence/” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S., at 141, to overcome the “strong presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial review” of executive action, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S., at 567. We ordinarily presume that Congress intends the executive to obey its statutory commands and, accordingly, that it expects the courts to grant relief when an executive agency violates such a command. That presumption has not been surmounted here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in conflict with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, has held that regulations promulgated under Part B of the Medicare program are insulated from judicial review. See Starnes v. Schweiker, 748 F. 2d 217, 218 (1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1017 (1985). In fact, we did so twice. We first granted the petition for a writ of certiorari to allow the Court of Appeals to consider its jurisdictional ruling in the light of Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984). 467 U. S. 1223 (1984). On remand, the Court of Appeals ultimately decided to reinstate its original judgment, see Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 757 F. 2d 91 (1985); Michigan Academy of Family Physicians v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 751 F. 2d 809 (1984), whereupon we issued the writ on which the judgment is now before us. 474 U. S. 815 (1985). See, e. g., Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U. S. 768, 778 (1985); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S., at 567; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159, 166-167 (1970) (“Indeed, judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an exception which must be demonstrated”). See also Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F. 2d 715, 718 (CA2 1966) (Friendly, J.) (“[Ojnly in the rare — some say non-existent-case . . . may review for ‘abuse’ be precluded”). Of course, this Court has “never applied the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard in the strict evidentiary sense”; nevertheless, the standard serves as “a useful reminder to courts that, where substantial doubt about the congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is controlling.” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 350-351 (1984). A strong presumption finds support in a wealth of scholarly literature. See, e. g., 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law §9:6, p. 240 (1979) (praising “the case law since 1974” for being “strongly on the side of reviewability”); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 327 (1965) (“An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law, the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the ‘common law,’ and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution”); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 8.1, p. 436 (2d ed. 1984) (“The responsibility of enforcing the limits of statutory grants of authority is a judicial function;. . . [wjithout judicial review, statutory limits would be naught but empty words”); Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 432 (1958) (“[Jjudicial review is the rule. ... It is a basic right; it is a traditional power and the intention to exclude it must be made specifically manifest”); Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 Yale L. J. 1487,1489, n. 11 (1983) (since passage of the APA, the sustained effort of administrative law has been to “continuously narro[w] the category of actions considered to be so discretionary as to be exempted from review”). “The congressional intent necessary to overcome the presumption may also be inferred from contemporaneous judicial construction barring review and the congressional acquiescence in it, see, e. g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948), or from the collective import of legislative and judicial history behind a particular statute, see, e. g., Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953). More important for purposes of this case, the presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole. See, e. g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491 (1977); Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943).” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S., at 349. The pertinent text of § 1395ff reads as follows: “(a) Entitlement to and amount of benefits “The determination of whether an individual is entitled to benefits under part A or part B, and the determination of the amount of benefits under part A, shall be made by the Secretary in accordance with regulations prescribed by him. “(b) Appeal by individuals “(1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination under subsection (a) of this section as to— “(A) whether he meets the conditions of section 426 or section 426a of this title [which set forth eligibility requirements to be satisfied before an individual is permitted to participate in Part A of the Medicare program], or “(B) whether he is eligible to enroll and has enrolled pursuant to the provisions of part B of [the Medicare program]... , or, “(C) the amount of the benefits under part A (including a determination where such amount is determined to be zero) shall be entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary to the same extent as is provided in section 405(b) of this title and to judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision after such hearing as is provided in section 405(g) of this title.” Medicare Carrier’s Manual § 12016 (1985). In a “fair hearing” conducted pursuant to § 1395u(b)(3)(C), see 42 CFR §405.820 (1985), the carrier designates a hearing officer, § 405.823, whose jurisdiction is circumscribed by regulation as follows: “The hearing officer in exercising the authority to conduct a hearing under section 1842(b)(3)(C) of the Act is to comply with all the provisions of title XVIII of the Act and regulations issued thereunder, as well as with policy statements, instructions, and other guides issued by the Health Care Financing Administration in accordance with the Secretary’s agreement with the carriers.” §405.860. One of those guides is a compilation of instructions prepared by the Secretary and entitled the “Carrier’s Manual.” Section 12016 of the Manual, part of which is quoted in text, provides as follows: “Authority — the HO [Hearing Officer] occupies a significant position in the administration appeals process. Authority of the HO is limited to the extent that he must comply with all provisions of title XVIII of the Act and regulations issued thereunder, as well as with HCFA. The HO may not overrule the provisions of the law or interpret them in a way different than HCFA does when he disagrees with their intent; nor may he use hearing decisions as a vehicle for commenting upon the legality, constitutional or otherwise, of any provision of the Act or regulations relevant to the Medicare Program.” The fourth footnote of our opinion in Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S., at 608-609, n. 4, on which the Government relies for the proposition that Part B challenges are never cognizable in a judicial forum, merely declined to review “claims for Part B benefits.” Id., at 609, n. 4. The single sen-fence in which we disposed of respondents’ claim rested entirely on Erika and its companion case of Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U. S. 188 (1982). (Schweiker upheld the constitutionality of “fair hearing” proceedings conducted by private insurance carriers against a Due Process Clause attack.) We did not, in that single sentence, extend the preclusion of judicial review beyond the Part B “amount determinations” with which both Erika and that part of the Ringer opinion were concerned. The Government also argues that the challenged regulation is a “decision of the Secretary” which the second sentence of § 405(h) excepts from “reviefw] by any . . . tribunal.” The Government’s assumption that the regulation is such a decision, however, ignores the contextual definition of “decision” in the first sentence as those determinations made by “the Secretary after a hearing.” The purpose of “the first two sentences of § 405(h),” as we made clear in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 757 (1975), is to “assure that administrative exhaustion will be required.” Respondents’ attack on the regulation here is not subject to such a requirement because there is no hearing, and thus no administrative remedy, to exhaust. See Ellis v. Blum, 643 F. 2d 68, 74 (CA2 1981) (Friendly, J.). Cf. S. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1939); H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 43-44 (1939). In this connection it bears mention that the legislative history summarized in the preceding section speaks to provisions for appeal generieally, and is thus as probative of congressional intent in enacting § 1395Ü as it is of §1395ff. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1965) (“Appeals”); H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 47 (1965) (“Appeals”); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1605, p. 61 (1972) (“CLARIFICATION OF MEDICARE APPEAL PROCEDURES”); 118 Cong. Rec. 33991 (1972) (“DETERMINATIONS AND APPEALS”) (caption to amendment proposed by Sen. Bennett). We do not believe that our decision will open the floodgates to millions of Part B Medicare claims. Unlike the determinations of amounts of benefits, the method by which such amounts are determined ordinarily affects vast sums of money and thus differs qualitatively from the “quite minor matters” review of which Congress confined to hearings by carriers. In addition, as one commentator pointed out, “permitting review only [of]. . . a particular statutory or administrative standard . . . would not result in a costly flood of litigation, because the validity of a standard can be readily established, at times even in a single ease.” Note, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 778, 792 (1984) (footnote omitted). We observed no flood of litigation in the first 20 years of operation of Part B of the Medicare program, and we seriously doubt that we will be inundated in the future. Our disposition avoids the “serious constitutional question” that would arise if we construed § 1395Ü to deny a judicial forum for constitutional claims arising under Part B of the Medicare program. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 762 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974). See Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 433-444 (1944); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring); Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 921, n. 113 (1984) (“[A]ll agree that Congress cannot bar all remedies for enforcing federal constitutional rights”). Cf. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1378-1379 (1953). It also accords with our decision in Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U. S. 188 (1982), in which we resolved a constitutional challenge arising under Part B of the Medicare program. Although the Government notes, quite accurately, that our opinion in McClure makes no mention of the jurisdictional question, we can hardly be charged with overlooking that point. McClure was argued and announced the same day as Erika, a case which did concern the judicial competence to review a challenge arising under Part B; it was written by the same Member of this Court who authored Erika, immediately precedes Erika in the United States Reports, and contains a number of cross-references to that opinion. Finally, we cannot, as the Government would have us, dismiss respondents’ constitutional attack as insubstantial — that is to say, “essentially fictitious,” “obviously frivolous,” and “obviously without merit” — under Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 537 (1974) (internal quotations omitted), as would be necessary to decline jurisdiction over the case. Both courts below found the classification embodied in the regulation to be “irrational,” see supra, at 668-669, and although this finding was made with respect to respondents’ statutory claims, it surely casts sufficient doubt on the constitutionality of the classification under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to merit resolution of the constitutional challenge.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RETURN MAIL, INC., Petitioner v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al. No. 17-1594 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued February 19, 2019 Decided June 10, 2019 Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, DC, for the petitioner. Malcolm L. Stewart, for the respondents. Richard L. Rainey, Beth S. Brinkmann, Kevin F. King, Nicholas L. Evoy, Daniel G. Randolph, Tarek J. Austin, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, for petitioner. Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark R. Freeman, Megan Barbero, Courtney L. Dixon, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondents. Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. In the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq. , Congress created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and established three new types of administrative proceedings before the Board that allow a "person" other than the patent owner to challenge the validity of a patent post-issuance. The question presented in this case is whether a federal agency is a "person" able to seek such review under the statute. We conclude that it is not. I A The Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Pursuant to that authority, Congress established the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) and tasked it with "the granting and issuing of patents." 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2(a)(1). To obtain a patent, an inventor submits an application describing the proposed patent claims to the Patent Office. See §§ 111(a)(1), 112. A patent examiner then reviews the application and prior art (the information available to the public at the time of the application) to determine whether the claims satisfy the statutory requirements for patentability, including that the claimed invention is useful, novel, nonobvious, and contains eligible subject matter. See §§ 101, 102, 103. If the Patent Office accepts the claim and issues a patent, the patent owner generally obtains exclusive rights to the patented invention throughout the United States for 20 years. §§ 154(a)(1), (2). After a patent issues, there are several avenues by which its validity can be revisited. The first is through a defense in an infringement action. Generally, one who intrudes upon a patent without authorization "infringes the patent" and becomes subject to civil suit in the federal district courts, where the patent owner may demand a jury trial and seek monetary damages and injunctive relief. §§ 271(a), 281-284. If, however, the Federal Government is the alleged patent infringer, the patent owner must sue the Government in the United States Court of Federal Claims and may recover only "reasonable and entire compensation" for the unauthorized use. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Once sued, an accused infringer can attempt to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that the patent never should have issued in the first place." Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P. , 564 U. S. 91, 96-97, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) ; see 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). If a defendant succeeds in showing that the claimed invention falls short of one or more patentability requirements, the court may deem the patent invalid and absolve the defendant of liability. The Patent Office may also reconsider the validity of issued patents. Since 1980, the Patent Act has empowered the Patent Office "to reexamine-and perhaps cancel-a patent claim that it had previously allowed." Cuozzo Speed Technologies , LLC v. Lee , 579 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2137, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016). This procedure is known as ex parte reexamination. "Any person at any time" may cite to the Patent Office certain prior art that may "bea[r] on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent"; and the person may additionally request that the Patent Office reexamine the claim on that basis. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 302(a). If the Patent Office concludes that the prior art raises "a substantial new question of patentability," the agency may reexamine the patent and, if warranted, cancel the patent or some of its claims. §§ 303(a), 304-307. The Director of the Patent Office may also, on her "own initiative," initiate such a proceeding. § 303(a). In 1999 and 2002, Congress added an "inter partes reexamination" procedure, which similarly invited "[a]ny person at any time" to seek reexamination of a patent on the basis of prior art and allowed the challenger to participate in the administrative proceedings and any subsequent appeal. See § 311(a) (2000 ed.); §§ 314(a), (b) (2006 ed.); Cuozzo Speed Technologies , 579 U. S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2137. B In 2011, Congress overhauled the patent system by enacting the America Invents Act (AIA), which created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and phased out inter partes reexamination. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 ; H. R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, pp. 46-47. In its stead, the AIA tasked the Board with overseeing three new types of post-issuance review proceedings. First, the "inter partes review" provision permits "a person" other than the patent owner to petition for the review and cancellation of a patent on the grounds that the invention lacks novelty or nonobviousness in light of "patents or printed publications" existing at the time of the patent application. § 311. Second, the "post-grant review" provision permits "a person who is not the owner of a patent" to petition for review and cancellation of a patent on any ground of patentability. § 321; see §§ 282(b)(2), (b)(3). Such proceedings must be brought within nine months of the patent's issuance. § 321. Third, the "covered-business-method review" (CBM review) provision provides for changes to a patent that claims a method for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice or management of a financial product or service. AIA §§ 18(a)(1), (d)(1), 125 Stat. 329, note following 35 U.S.C. § 321, p. 1442. CBM review tracks the "standards and procedures of" post-grant review with two notable exceptions: CBM review is not limited to the nine months following issuance of a patent, and "[a] person" may file for CBM review only as a defense against a charge or suit for infringement. § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 330. The AIA's three post-issuance review proceedings are adjudicatory in nature. Review is conducted by a three-member panel of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 35 U.S.C. § 6(c), and the patent owner and challenger may seek discovery, file affidavits and other written memoranda, and request an oral hearing, see §§ 316, 326; AIA § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 329; Oil States Energy Services , LLC v. Greene's Energy Group , LLC , 584 U. S. ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 1365, 1371-72, 200 L.Ed.2d 671 (2018). The petitioner has the burden of proving unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. §§ 282, 316(e), 326(e). The Board then either confirms the patent claims or cancels some or all of the claims. §§ 318(b), 328(b). Any party "dissatisfied" with the Board's final decision may seek judicial review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, §§ 319, 329; see § 141(c), and the Director of the Patent Office may intervene, § 143. In sum, in the post-AIA world, a patent can be reexamined either in federal court during a defense to an infringement action, in an ex parte reexamination by the Patent Office, or in the suite of three post-issuance review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The central question in this case is whether the Federal Government can avail itself of the three post-issuance review proceedings, including CBM review. C Return Mail, Inc., owns U. S. Patent No. 6,826,548 ('548 patent), which claims a method for processing mail that is undeliverable. Beginning in 2003, the United States Postal Service allegedly began exploring the possibility of licensing Return Mail's invention for use in handling the country's undelivered mail. But the parties never reached an agreement. In 2006, the Postal Service introduced an enhanced address-change service to process undeliverable mail. Return Mail's representatives asserted that the new service infringed the '548 patent, and the company renewed its offer to license the claimed invention to the Postal Service. In response, the Postal Service petitioned for ex parte reexamination of the '548 patent. The Patent Office canceled the original claims but issued several new ones, confirming the validity of the '548 patent. Return Mail then sued the Postal Service in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking compensation for the Postal Service's unauthorized use of its invention, as reissued by the Patent Office. While the lawsuit was pending, the Postal Service again petitioned the Patent Office to review the '548 patent, this time seeking CBM review. The Patent Board instituted review. The Board agreed with the Postal Service that Return Mail's patent claims subject matter that was ineligible to be patented, and it canceled the claims underlying the '548 patent. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. See 868 F. 3d 1350 (2017). As relevant here, the Federal Circuit held, over a dissent, that the Government is a "person" eligible to petition for CBM review. Id. , at 1366 ; see AIA § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 330 (only a qualifying "person" may petition for CBM review). The court then affirmed the Patent Board's decision on the merits, invalidating Return Mail's patent claims. We granted certiorari to determine whether a federal agency is a "person" capable of petitioning for post-issuance review under the AIA. 586 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 397, 202 L.Ed.2d 309 (2018). II The AIA provides that only "a person" other than the patent owner may file with the Office a petition to institute a post-grant review or inter partes review of an issued patent. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 321(a). The statute likewise provides that a "person" eligible to seek CBM review may not do so "unless the person or the person's real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement." AIA § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 330. The question in this case is whether the Government is a "person" capable of instituting the three AIA review proceedings. A The patent statutes do not define the term "person." In the absence of an express statutory definition, the Court applies a "longstanding interpretive presumption that 'person' does not include the sovereign," and thus excludes a federal agency like the Postal Service. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens , 529 U. S. 765, 780-781, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) ; see United States v. Mine Workers , 330 U. S. 258, 275, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) ; United States v. Cooper Corp. , 312 U. S. 600, 603-605, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941) ; United States v. Fox , 94 U. S. 315, 321, 24 L.Ed. 192 (1877). This presumption reflects "common usage." Mine Workers , 330 U. S. at 275, 67 S.Ct. 677. It is also an express directive from Congress: The Dictionary Act has since 1947 provided the definition of " 'person' " that courts use "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise." 1 U.S.C. § 1 ; see Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council , 506 U. S. 194, 199-200, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993). The Act provides that the word " 'person' ... include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals." § 1. Notably absent from the list of "person[s]" is the Federal Government. See Mine Workers , 330 U. S. at 275, 67 S.Ct. 677 (reasoning that Congress' express inclusion of partnerships and corporations in § 1 implies that Congress did not intend to include the Government). Thus, although the presumption is not a "hard and fast rule of exclusion," Cooper , 312 U. S. at 604-605, 61 S.Ct. 742, "it may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary," Stevens , 529 U. S. at 781, 120 S.Ct. 1858. The Postal Service contends that the presumption is strongest where interpreting the word "person" to include the Government imposes liability on the Government, and is weakest where (as here) interpreting "person" in that way benefits the Government. In support of this argument, the Postal Service points to a different interpretive canon: that Congress must unequivocally express any waiver of sovereign immunity for that waiver to be effective. See FAA v. Cooper , 566 U. S. 284, 290, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012). That clear-statement rule inherently applies only when a party seeks to hold the Government liable for its actions; otherwise immunity is generally irrelevant. In the Postal Service's view, the presumption against treating the Government as a statutory person works in tandem with the clear-statement rule regarding immunity, such that both apply only when a statute would subject the Government to liability. Our precedents teach otherwise. In several instances, this Court has applied the presumption against treating the Government as a statutory person when there was no question of immunity, and doing so would instead exclude the Federal Government or one of its agencies from accessing a benefit or favorable procedural device. In Cooper , 312 U. S. at 604-605, 614, 61 S.Ct. 742, for example, the Court held that the Federal Government was not " '[a]ny person' " who could sue for treble damages under § 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Accord, International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund , 500 U. S. 72, 82-84, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (concluding that the National Institutes of Health was not authorized to remove an action as a " 'person acting under [a federal]' officer" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ); Davis v. Pringle , 268 U. S. 315, 317-318, 45 S.Ct. 549, 69 L.Ed. 974 (1925) (reasoning that "normal usages of speech" indicated that the Government was not a "person" entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Act); Fox , 94 U. S. at 321 (holding that the Federal Government was not a " 'person capable by law of holding real estate,' " absent "an express definition to that effect"). Thus, although the presumption against treating the Government as a statutory person is " 'particularly applicable where it is claimed that Congress has subjected the [sovereign] to liability to which they had not been subject before,' " Stevens , 529 U. S. at 781, 120 S.Ct. 1858, it is hardly confined to such cases. Here, too, we proceed from the presumption that the Government is not a "person" authorized to initiate these proceedings absent an affirmative showing to the contrary. B Given the presumption that a statutory reference to a "person" does not include the Government, the Postal Service must show that the AIA's context indicates otherwise. Although the Postal Service need not cite to "an express contrary definition," Rowland , 506 U. S. at 200, 113 S.Ct. 716, it must point to some indication in the text or context of the statute that affirmatively shows Congress intended to include the Government. See Cooper , 312 U. S. at 605, 61 S.Ct. 742. The Postal Service makes three arguments for displacing the presumption. First, the Postal Service argues that the statutory text and context offer sufficient evidence that the Government is a "person" with the power to petition for AIA review proceedings. Second, the Postal Service contends that federal agencies' long history of participation in the patent system suggests that Congress intended for the Government to participate in AIA review proceedings as well. Third, the Postal Service maintains that the statute must permit it to petition for AIA review because § 1498 subjects the Government to liability for infringement. None delivers. 1 The Postal Service first argues that the AIA's reference to a "person" in the context of post-issuance review proceedings must include the Government because other references to persons in the patent statutes appear to do so. Indeed, it is often true that when Congress uses a word to mean one thing in one part of the statute, it will mean the same thing elsewhere in the statute. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit , 547 U. S. 71, 86, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 164 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006). This principle, however, "readily yields to context," especially when a statutory term is used throughout a statute and takes on "distinct characters" in distinct statutory provisions. See Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573 U. S. 302, 320, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is the case here. The Patent Act and the AIA refer to "person[s]" in at least 18 different places, and there is no clear trend: Sometimes "person" plainly includes the Government, sometimes it plainly excludes the Government, and sometimes-as here-it might be read either way. Looking on the bright side, the Postal Service and the dissent, see post , at 1868, focus on § 207(a)(1), which authorizes "[e]ach [f]ederal agency" to "apply for, obtain, and maintain patents or other forms of protection ... on inventions in which the Federal Government owns a right, title, or interest." It follows from § 207(a)(1)'s express inclusion of federal agencies among those eligible to apply for patents that the statute's references to "person[s]" in the subsections governing the patent-application process and questions of patentability (§§ 102(a), 118, and 119) must also include federal agencies. In other words, the right described in § 207(a)(1) provides a sufficient contextual clue that the word "person"-when used in the other provisions governing the application process § 207(a)(1) makes available to federal agencies-includes the Government. But § 207(a)(1) provides no such clue as to the interpretation of the AIA review provisions because it implies nothing about what a federal agency may or may not do following the issuance of someone else's patent. Conversely, reading the review provisions to exclude the Government has no bearing on a federal agency's right to obtain a patent under § 207(a)(1). An agency may still apply for and obtain patents whether or not it may petition for a review proceeding under the AIA seeking cancellation of a patent it does not own. There is thus no reason to think that "person" must mean the same thing in these two different parts of the statute. See Utility Air , 573 U. S. at 320, 134 S.Ct. 2427. The Postal Service cites other provisions that may refer to the Government-namely, the "intervening rights" provisions that offer certain protections for "any person" who is lawfully making or using an invention when the Patent Office modifies an existing patent claim in a way that deems the person's (previously lawful) use to be infringement. See §§ 252, 307(b), 318(c), 328(c). The Postal Service argues that the Government must be among those protected by these provisions and from there deduces that it must also be permitted to petition for AIA review proceedings because the review provisions and the intervening-rights provisions were all added to the Patent Act by the AIA at the same time. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. , 551 U. S. 224, 232, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007) (invoking the consistent-usage canon where the same term was used in related provisions enacted at the same time). But regardless of whether the intervening-rights provisions apply to the Government (a separate interpretive question that we have no occasion to answer here), the Postal Service's chain of inferences overlooks a confounding link: The consistent-usage canon breaks down where Congress uses the same word in a statute in multiple conflicting ways. As noted, that is the case here. In the face of such inconsistency, the mere existence of some Government-inclusive references cannot make the "affirmative showing," Stevens , 529 U. S. at 781, 120 S.Ct. 1858, required to overcome the presumption that Congress did not intend to include the Government among those "person[s]" eligible to petition for AIA review proceedings. 2 The Postal Service next points to the Federal Government's longstanding history with the patent system. It reminds us that federal officers have been able to apply for patents in the name of the United States since 1883, see Act of Mar. 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 625-which, in the Postal Service's view, suggests that Congress intended to allow the Government access to AIA review proceedings as well. But, as already explained, the Government's ability to obtain a patent under § 207(a)(1) does not speak to whether Congress meant for the Government to participate as a third-party challenger in AIA review proceedings. As to those proceedings, there is no longstanding practice: The AIA was enacted just eight years ago. More pertinently, the Postal Service and the dissent both note that the Patent Office since 1981 has treated federal agencies as "persons" who may cite prior art to the agency or request an ex parte reexamination of an issued patent. See post , at 1870. Recall that § 301(a) provides that "[a]ny person at any time may cite to the Office in writing ... prior art ... which that person believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent." As memorialized in the Patent Office's Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), the agency has understood § 301 's reference to "any person" to include "governmental entit[ies]." Dept. of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, MPEP §§ 2203, 2212 (4th rev. ed., July 1981). We might take account of this "executive interpretation" if we were determining whether Congress meant to include the Government as a "person" for purposes of the ex parte reexamination procedures themselves. See, e.g. , United States v. Hermanos y Compañia, 209 U. S. 337, 339, 28 S.Ct. 532, 52 L.Ed. 821 (1908). Here, however, the Patent Office's statement in the 1981 MPEP has no direct relevance. Even assuming that the Government may petition for ex parte reexamination, ex parte reexamination is a fundamentally different process than an AIA post-issuance review proceeding. Both share the common purpose of allowing non-patent owners to bring questions of patent validity to the Patent Office's attention, but they do so in meaningfully different ways. In an ex parte reexamination, the third party sends information to the Patent Office that the party believes bears on the patent's validity, and the Patent Office decides whether to reexamine the patent. If it decides to do so, the reexamination process is internal; the challenger is not permitted to participate in the Patent Office's process. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303. By contrast, the AIA post-issuance review proceedings are adversarial, adjudicatory proceedings between the "person" who petitioned for review and the patent owner: There is briefing, a hearing, discovery, and the presentation of evidence, and the losing party has appeal rights. See supra , at 1860 - 1861. Thus, there are good reasons Congress might have authorized the Government to initiate a hands-off ex parte reexamination but not to become a party to a full-blown adversarial proceeding before the Patent Office and any subsequent appeal. After all, the Government is already in a unique position among alleged infringers given that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 limits patent owners to bench trials before the Court of Federal Claims and monetary damages, whereas 35 U.S.C. § 271 permits patent owners to demand jury trials in the federal district courts and seek other types of relief. Thus, there is nothing to suggest that Congress had the 1981 MPEP statement in mind when it enacted the AIA. It is true that this Court has often said, "[w]hen administrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations as well." Bragdon v. Abbott , 524 U. S. 624, 645, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). But there is no "settled" meaning of the term "person" with respect to the newly established AIA review proceedings. Accordingly, the MPEP does not justify putting aside the presumptive meaning of "person" here. 3 Finally, the Postal Service argues that it must be a "person" who may petition for AIA review proceedings because, like other potential infringers, it is subject to civil liability and can assert a defense of patent invalidity. See §§ 282(b)(2)-(3). In the Postal Service's view, it is anomalous to deny it a benefit afforded to other infringers-the ability to challenge a patent de novo before the Patent Office, rather than only as an infringement defense that must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. See ibid. ; Microsoft Corp. , 564 U. S. at 95, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (holding that § 282 's presumption of validity in litigation imposes a clear and convincing evidence standard on defendants seeking to prove invalidity). The Postal Service overstates the asymmetry. Agencies retain the ability under § 282 to assert defenses to infringement. Once sued, an agency may, like any other accused infringer, argue that the patent is invalid, and the agency faces the same burden of proof as a defendant in any other infringement suit. The Postal Service lacks only the additional tool of petitioning for the initiation of an administrative proceeding before the Patent Office under the AIA, a process separate from defending an infringement suit. We see no oddity, however, in Congress' affording nongovernmental actors an expedient route that the Government does not also enjoy for heading off potential infringement suits. Those other actors face greater and more uncertain risks if they misjudge their right to use technology that is subject to potentially invalid patents. Most notably, § 1498 restricts a patent owner who sues the Government to her "reasonable and entire compensation" for the Government's infringing use; she cannot seek an injunction, demand a jury trial, or ask for punitive damages, all of which are available in infringement suits against nongovernmental actors under § 271(e)(4). Thus, although federal agencies remain subject to damages for impermissible uses, they do not face the threat of preliminary injunctive relief that could suddenly halt their use of a patented invention, and they enjoy a degree of certainty about the extent of their potential liability that ordinary accused infringers do not. Because federal agencies face lower risks, it is reasonable for Congress to have treated them differently. Finally, excluding federal agencies from the AIA review proceedings avoids the awkward situation that might result from forcing a civilian patent owner (such as Return Mail) to defend the patentability of her invention in an adversarial, adjudicatory proceeding initiated by one federal agency (such as the Postal Service) and overseen by a different federal agency (the Patent Office). We are therefore unpersuaded that the Government's exclusion from the AIA review proceedings is sufficiently anomalous to overcome the presumption that the Government is not a "person" under the Act. III For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a federal agency is not a "person" who may petition for post-issuance review under the AIA. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting. When A sues B for patent infringement, B may defend against the lawsuit by claiming that A's patent is invalid. In court, B must prove the invalidity of A's patent by "clear and convincing evidence." Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L. P. , 564 U. S. 91, 95, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011). Congress, however, has also established a variety of administrative procedures that B may use to challenge the validity of A's patent. Although some of the statutes setting forth these administrative procedures have existed for several decades, we consider here the three administrative procedures that Congress established in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011. See ante , at 1859 - 1861. All three involve hearings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which is part of the Patent and Trademark Office. And all three involve a lower burden of proof: B need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that A's patent is invalid. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) ; see America Invents Act, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 329. The America Invents Act states that all three administrative procedures may be invoked only by a "person." 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 321(a) ; America Invents Act, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 330. Here we must decide whether the Government falls within the scope of the word "person." Are federal agencies entitled to invoke these administrative procedures on the same terms as private parties? In my view, the answer is "yes." For purposes of these statutes, Government agencies count as "persons" and so may invoke these procedures to challenge the validity of a patent. The Court reaches the opposite conclusion based on the interpretive presumption that the word "person" excludes the Government. See ante , at 1861 - 1862. This presumption, however, is "no hard and fast rule of exclusion." United States v. Cooper Corp. , 312 U. S. 600, 604-605, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941). We have long said that this presumption may be overcome when " '[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, [or] the executive interpretation ... indicate an intent' " to include the Government. International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund , 500 U. S. 72, 83, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (quoting Cooper , supra , at 605, 61 S.Ct. 742 ). And here these factors indicate that very intent. I The language of other related patent provisions strongly suggests that, in the administrative review statutes at issue here, the term "person" includes the Government. The Patent Act states that "[e]ach Federal agency is authorized" to "apply for, obtain, and maintain patents or other forms of protection ... on inventions in which the Federal Government owns a right, title, or interest." 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The Act then provides that a "person " shall be "entitled to a patent" if various "[c]onditions for patentability" have been met. § 102(a)(1) (emphasis added). It authorizes a "person to whom the inventor has assigned" an invention to apply for a patent in some circumstances. § 118 (emphasis added). And it generally allows "any person " who initially files a patent application in a foreign country to obtain in the United States the advantage of that earlier filing date. § 119 (emphasis added). Because the Government is authorized to "obtain" patents, there is no dispute here that the word "person" in these patent-eligibility provisions must include the Government. See ante , at 1863 - 1864. Now consider a few of the statutory provisions that help those accused of infringing a patent. Suppose A obtains a patent in Year One, modifies this patent in Year Three, and then accuses B of infringing the patent as modified in Year Five. What if B's conduct infringes the modified patent but did not infringe A's patent as it originally stood in Year One? In these circumstances, Congress has provided that A generally cannot win an infringement suit against B. The relevant statutes, known as the "intervening rights" provisions, state that B is entitled to a defense that his conduct did not violate the original, unmodified patent. §§ 252, 307(b), 318(c), 328(c). These statutes, several of which were enacted alongside the three administrative review procedures in the America Invents Act, provide that a "person " may take advantage of this defense. Ibid. (emphasis added). Again, as the parties all agree, the word "person" in these provisions includes the Government. See Reply Brief 3; Lamson v. United States , 117 Fed. Cl. 755, 760 (2014) (noting that the Government may "avail itself of any defense that is available to a private party in an infringement action"). The majority refers to several patent-related provisions that use the word "person" but that do not include the Government within the scope of that term. See ante , at 1863 - 1864, and n. 4. These provisions, however, concern details of administration that, almost by definition, could not involve an entity such as the Government. The first provision cited by the majority says that administrative patent judges must be "persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability." § 6(a). Patent judges are human beings, not governments or corporations or other artificial entities. The second requires the Patent Office to keep confidential a referral to the Attorney General of possible fraud unless the Government charges "a person" with a related criminal offense. § 257(e). Although the word "person" here could refer to a corporation, it cannot refer to the Government, for governments do not charge themselves with crimes. The third concerns payment for the "subsistence expenses and travel-related expenses" of "persons" who attend certain programs relating to intellectual property law. § 2(b)(11). But governments as entities do not travel, attend events, or incur expenses for "subsistence" or "lodging"; only their employees do. Ibid. (The majority also refers to a fourth provision, which defines a "joint research agreement" as an agreement between "2 or more persons or entities." § 100(h). If the Government is not a "person" under this provision, it is only because the adjacent term "entities" already covers the Government.) The fact that the word "person" does not apply to the Government where that application is close to logically impossible proves nothing at all about the word's application here. On the one hand, Congress has used the word "person" to refer to Government agencies when the statute concerns the criteria for obtaining patents, or when the statute concerns the availability of certain infringement defenses. On the other, Congress has not used the word "person" to refer to Government agencies when doing so would be close to logically impossible, or where the context otherwise makes plain that the Government is not a "person." The provisions at issue here, which establish administrative procedures for the benefit of parties accused of infringement, are much closer to the former category than the latter. It therefore makes little sense to presume that the word "person" excludes the Government, for the surrounding provisions point to the opposite conclusion. II The statutes' purposes, as illuminated by the legislative history and longstanding executive interpretation, show even more clearly that Congress intended the term "person" to include the Government in this context. Congress enacted the new administrative review procedures for two basic reasons. First , Congress sought to "improve the quality of patents" and "make the patent system more efficient" by making it easier to challenge "questionable patents." H. R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, pp. 39, 48 (2011); see id. , at 39 (noting the "growing sense that questionable patents are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge"); id. , at 45 (explaining that pre-existing administrative procedures were "less viable alternativ[es] to litigation ... than Congress intended"). Congress' goal of providing an easier way for parties to challenge "questionable patents" is implicated to the same extent whether the Government or a private party is the one accused of infringing an invalid patent. That is perhaps why the Executive Branch has long indicated that Government agencies count as "perso[ns]" who are entitled to invoke the administrative review procedures that predate the America Invents Act. See Dept. of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §§ 2203, 2212 (4th rev. ed., Sept. 1982). Second , the statutes help maintain a robust patent system in another way: They allow B, a patent holder who might be sued for infringing A's (related) patent, to protect B's own patent by more easily proving the invalidity of A's patent. Insofar as this objective underlies the statutes at issue here, it applies to the same extent whether B is a private person or a Government agency. Indeed, the Patent Act explicitly states that the Government may "maintain" patents and "undertake all other suitable and necessary steps to protect and administer rights to federally owned inventions on behalf of the Federal Government." 35 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1), (3). And the use of administrative procedures to "protect" a patented invention from claims of infringement (by clearing away conflicting patents that cover the same or similar ground) would seem to be "suitable and necessary" whether a private person or a Government agency invokes these procedures. Cf. Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. , 579 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1923, 1935, 195 L.Ed.2d 278 (2016) (noting that a third-party patent covering part of an invention may be used to exact "licensing fees" from the inventor); Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Laboratories, Inc. , 903 F. 3d 1310, 1337 (CA Fed. 2018) (explaining that a third-party patent covering part of an invention may be used to deter or curtail the inventor's use of the invention). The majority responds that allowing a Government agency to invoke these administrative procedures would create an "awkward situation," as one Government agency-namely, the Patent Office-would end up adjudicating the patent rights of another Government agency. Ante , at 1867. But why is that "awkward"? In the field of patent law, a Government agency facing a possible infringement suit has long been thought legally capable of invoking other forms of administrative review. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §§ 2203, 2212. Moreover, the statutes before us presumably would permit a private party to invoke any of the three new procedures to challenge a Government patent. In such cases, one Government agency, the Patent Office, would be asked to adjudicate the patent rights of another. Thus, the situation the majority attempts to avoid is already baked into the cake. The majority also says that because federal agencies "do not face the threat of preliminary injunctive relief" when they are sued for patent infringement, Congress could have reasonably concluded that it was not necessary for the Government to be able to use the administrative procedures at issue here. Ante , at 1866 - 1867; see 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (limiting the patentee to "reasonable and entire compensation" for infringement by the Government). But patent infringement suits against the Government still threaten to impose large damages awards. See, e.g. , Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States , 31 Fed. Cl. 481, 488 (1994) (indicating that the value of the infringing technologies developed by the Government exceeded $ 3.5 billion); Pet. for Cert. in United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co. , 525 U.S. 1177, 119 S.Ct. 1112, 143 L.Ed.2d 108 (1999) (noting that damages ultimately exceeded $ 100 million). That fact can create a strong need for speedy resolution of a dispute over patent validity. When, for example, the Department of Homeland Security recently instituted a research initiative to equip cell phones with hazardous-materials sensors in order to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks, it faced an infringement lawsuit that threatened to interfere with the project. See Golden v. United States , 129 Fed. Cl. 630 (2016) ; Brief for Prof. Tejas N. Narechania as Amicus Curiae 9. When the Federal Communications Commission tried to ensure that cell phones would be able to provide their current location automatically to 911 operators, the threat of infringement litigation delayed the deployment of technologies designed to comply with that requirement. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 Geo. L. J. 1483, 1498-1501 (2015). And when Congress enacted statutes requiring the examination of electronic passports at airports, the Government faced the threat of an infringement suit because airlines could not "comply with [their] legal obligations" without engaging in activities that would allegedly infringe an existing patent. IRIS Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp. , 769 F. 3d 1359, 1362 (CA Fed. 2014) ; see id. , at 1363 (concluding that the Government may be sued based on the infringing activities of airlines). I express no view on the merits of these actions. I simply point out that infringement suits against the Government can threaten to injure Government interests even absent the threat of injunctive relief. That fact runs counter to the majority's efforts to find an explanation for why Congress would have wanted to deny Government agencies the ability to invoke the speedier administrative procedures established by the America Invents Act. * * * That, in my view, is the basic question: Why? Government agencies can apply for and obtain patents; they can maintain patents; they can sue other parties for infringing their patents; they can be sued for infringing patents held by private parties; they can invoke certain defenses to an infringement lawsuit on the same terms as private parties; they can invoke one of the pre-existing administrative procedures for challenging the validity of a private party's patents; and they can be forced to defend their own patents when a private party invokes one of the three procedures established by the America Invents Act. Why, then, would Congress have declined to give federal agencies the power to invoke these same administrative procedures? I see no good answer to that question. Here, the statutes' "purpos[es]," the "subject matter," the "context," the "legislative history," and the longstanding "executive interpretation," together with the way in which related patent provisions use the term "person," demonstrate that Congress meant for the word "person" to include Government agencies. International Primate Protection League , 500 U. S. at 83, 111 S.Ct. 1700 (quoting Cooper , 312 U. S. at 605, 61 S.Ct. 742 ). I would affirm the Federal Circuit's similar conclusion. Consequently, with respect, I dissent. The CBM review program will stop accepting new claims in 2020. See AIA § 18(a)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 330; 77 Fed. Reg. 48687 (2012). The Federal Circuit rejected Return Mail's argument that the Postal Service cannot petition for CBM review for the independent reason that a suit against the Government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is not a suit for infringement. 868 F. 3d 1350, 1366 (2017). We denied Return Mail's petition for certiorari on this question and therefore have no occasion to resolve it in this case. Accordingly, we assume that a § 1498 suit is one for infringement and refer to it as the same. For example, the statute expressly includes the Government as a "person" in § 296(a), which, as enacted, provided that States "shall not be immune ... from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent under section 271." 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1988 ed., Supp. IV) (ruled unconstitutional by Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank , 527 U. S. 627, 630, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) ). For example, in § 6(a), the Patent Act provides that the administrative patent judges comprising the Board must be "persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability." Likewise, § 257(e) requires the Patent Office Director to treat as confidential any referral to the Attorney General of suspected fraud in the patent process unless the United States charges "a person" with a criminal offense in connection with the fraud. See also § 2(b)(11) (authorizing the Patent Office to cover the expenses of "persons" other than federal employees attending programs on intellectual-property protection); § 100(h) (defining a " 'joint research agreement' " as a written agreement between "2 or more persons or entities"). Some of these provisions (§§ 2(b)(11), 6(a), and 100(h) ) were enacted as part of the AIA, alongside the AIA review proceedings. See 125 Stat. 285, 313, 335. Section 102(a) provides that "[a] person shall be entitled to a patent" as long as the patent is novel. Section 118 states that "[a] person to whom the inventor has assigned" an invention may file a patent application. Section 119 discusses the effect of a patent application filed in a foreign country "by any person" on the patent-application process in the United States. Likewise, we are not persuaded by the dissent's suggestion that § 207(a)(3)-which authorizes federal agencies "to protect and administer rights" to federally owned inventions-provides a statutory basis for the Postal Service's initiation of AIA review proceedings. See post , at 1870 - 1871. The statute explains how a federal agency is to "protect" those rights: "either directly or through contract," such as by "acquiring rights for and administering royalties" or "licensing." § 207(a)(3). The AIA review proceedings, which a "person" may initiate regardless of ownership, do not fall clearly within the ambit of § 207(a)(3). The dissent responds that we should set aside the statutory references to "person[s]" that naturally exclude the Government and instead count only those references that expressly or impliedly include the Government. See post , at 1869 - 1870. But the point of the canon the Postal Service invokes is to ascertain the meaning of a statutory term from its consistent usage in other parts of the statute, not to pick sides among differing uses. Moreover, for those of us who consider legislative history, there is none that suggests Congress considered whether the Federal Government or its agencies would have access to the AIA review proceedings. As discussed above, see supra , at 1859 - 1860, ex parte reexamination is not one of the three new proceedings added by the AIA, and therefore the question whether its reference to a "person" includes the Government is beyond the scope of the question presented. Moreover, neither party contests that a federal agency may cite prior art to the Patent Office and ask for ex parte reexamination. If the Government were a "person" under the AIA, yet another anomaly might arise under the statute's estoppel provisions. Those provisions generally preclude a party from relitigating issues in any subsequent proceedings in federal district court, before the International Trade Commission, and (for inter partes review and post-grant review) before the Patent Office. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) ; AIA § 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. 330. Because infringement suits against the Government must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims-which is not named in the estoppel provisions-the Government might not be precluded by statute from relitigating claims raised before the Patent Office if it were able to institute post-issuance review under the AIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Although Return Mail cites this asymmetry in support of its interpretation, we need not rely on it, because Return Mail already prevails for the reasons given above. At any rate, the practical effect of the estoppel provisions' potential inapplicability to the Government is uncertain given that this Court has not decided whether common-law estoppel applies in § 1498 suits. Nor do we find persuasive the dissent's argument that the Postal Service should be allowed to petition for post-issuance review proceedings because its participation would further the purpose of the AIA: to provide a cost-effective and efficient alternative to litigation in the courts. See post , at 1870; H. R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, pp. 47-48 (2001). Statutes rarely embrace every possible measure that would further their general aims, and, absent other contextual indicators of Congress' intent to include the Government in a statutory provision referring to a "person," the mere furtherance of the statute's broad purpose does not overcome the presumption in this case. See Cooper , 312 U. S. at 605, 61 S.Ct. 742 ("[I]t is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made").

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. FAUSTO No. 86-595. Argued October 7, 1987 Decided January 25, 1988 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 455. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 455. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the United’ States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, and Robert A. Reutershan. John M. Nannes, by invitation of the Court, 480 U. S. 904, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. Respondent filed a brief pro se. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, by Mark D. Roth and Kevin M. Grite; and for Joseph D. Finn et al. by Irving Kator, Joseph B. Scott, and Michael J. Kator. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Joseph A. Fausto, an employee of the Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), was suspended from his job for 30 days because of unauthorized use of a Government vehicle. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that he could maintain a suit for backpay in the United States Claims Court alleging that his suspension was in violation of Department of the Interior regulations. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act), Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 et seq. (codified, as amended, in various sections of 5 U. S. C. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV)), which affords an employee in respondent’s situation no review of the agency’s decision, precludes such a Claims Court suit. I Respondent was hired by FWS in January 1978, as an administrative officer for the Young Adult Conservation Corps camp in Virginia Beach, Virginia. His position was in the excepted service, and was to last for the duration of the Conservation Corps program at Virginia Beach, but not beyond September 30, 1982. In November 1980, FWS advised respondent that it intended to dismiss him for a number of reasons, including unauthorized use of a Government vehicle. After respondent replied to the charges, he received a memorandum from FWS informing him that he would be removed effective January 16,1981. That memorandum did not advise respondent of his grievance rights under Department of the Interior regulations, which included the right to a formal hearing conducted by a grievance examiner. See Department of the Interior Federal Personnel Manual — 231, pt. 370 DM, ch. 771, subch. 3, 3.22A (May 4, 1981). Respondent sought review of his removal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which dismissed his appeal in August 1981, on the ground that under the CSRA a nonpreference eligible in the excepted service has no right to appeal to the MSPB. Fausto v. Department of Interior, No. PH 075281102271 (M. S. P. B. Aug. 27, 1981), aff’d, 738 F. 2d 454 (CA Fed. 1984) (judgment order). On September 18, 1981, FWS permanently closed the camp at Virginia Beach. In March 1982, in response to an inquiry initiated on behalf of respondent, FWS admitted that respondent had not been informed of his grievance rights, and offered him the opportunity to challenge his removal. Respondent filed a formal grievance, and on June 30, 1982, FWS concluded, based on the administrative file and without a hearing, that respondent should not have been removed. FWS found that most of the charges against respondent were de minimis and warranted no penalty, but imposed a 30-day suspension for misuse of a Government vehicle. See 31 U. S. C. § 638a(c)(2) (1976 ed.) (now codified at 31 U. S. C. § 1349(b)). FWS offered respondent backpay from February 15, 1981, the date his 30-day suspension would have ended, through September 18, 1981, the date the camp was closed. Respondent filed an appeal with the Department of the Interior, claiming that his suspension was unwarranted and that he was entitled to additional backpay for the period covered by the suspension as well as for the period from the date on which the camp closed through the date on which FWS admitted that he should not have been removed. The Secretary of the Interior upheld FWS’s decision. In February 1983, respondent filed the present action under the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. §5596, in the Claims Court. The Claims Court dismissed, holding that the CSRA comprised the exclusive catalog of remedies for civil servants affected by adverse personnel action. 7 Cl. Ct. 459, 461 (1985). The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, 783 F. 2d 1020 (1986), holding that although the CSRA did not afford nonpreference excepted service employees a right of appeal to the MSPB, it did not preclude them from seeking the Claims Court review traditionally available under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, based on the Back Pay Act. 783 F. 2d, at 1022-1023. On the merits it found Fausto’s suspension wrongful and awarded backpay for the period of the suspension. Id., at 1023-1024. The Court of Appeals denied the Government’s petition for rehearing of the case en banc, but issued a second panel opinion reaffirming its decision. 791 F. 2d 1554 (1986). The Government petitioned for certiorari on the question whether a nonveteran member of the excepted service may obtain, under the Tucker Act, judicial review of adverse personnel action for which the CSRA does not provide him a right of review. II We have recognized that the CSRA “comprehensively overhauled the civil service system,” Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U. S. 768, 773 (1985), creating an elaborate “new framework for evaluating adverse personnel actions against [federal employees],” id., at 774. It prescribes in great detail the protections and remedies applicable to such action, including the availability of administrative and judicial review. No provision of the CSRA gives nonpreference members of the excepted service the right to administrative or judicial review of suspension for misconduct. The question we face is whether that withholding of remedy was meant to preclude judicial review for those employees, or rather merely to leave them free to pursue the remedies that had been available before enactment of the CSRA. The answer is to be found by-examining the purpose of the CSRA, the entirety of its text, and the structure of review that it establishes. See Lindahl, supra, at 779; Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 345 (1984). A leading purpose of the CSRA was to replace the haphazard arrangements for administrative and judicial review of personnel action, part of the “outdated patchwork of statutes and rules built up over almost a century” that was the civil service system, S. Rep. No. 95-969, p. 3 (1978). Under that pre-existing system, only veterans enjoyed a statutory right to appeal adverse personnel action to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the predecessor of the MSPB. 5 U. S. C. §7701 (1976 ed.). Other employees were afforded this type of administrative review by Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 11491, §22, 3 CFR 874 (1966-1970 Comp.), note following 5 U. S. C. §7301 (1976 ed.) (extending CSC review to competitive service employees). Still others, like employees in respondent’s classification, had no right to such review. As for appeal to the courts: Since there was no special statutory review proceeding relevant to personnel action, see 5 U. S. C. §703, employees sought to appeal the decisions of the CSC, or the agency decision unreviewed by the CSC, to the district courts through the various forms of action traditionally used for so-called nonstatutory review of agency action, including suits for mandamus, see, e. g., Taylor v. United States Civil Service Comm’n, 374 F. 2d 466 (CA9 1967), injunction, see, e. g., Hargett v. Summerfield, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 243 F. 2d 29 (1957), and declaratory judgment, see, e. g., Camero v. McNamara, 222 F. Supp. 742 (ED Pa. 1963). See generally R. Vaughn, Principles of Civil Service Law § 5.4, p. 5-21, and nn. 13-17 (1976) (collecting cases). For certain kinds of personnel decisions, federal employees could maintain an action in the Court of Claims of the sort respondent seeks to maintain here. See, e. g., Ainsworth v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 110, 399 F. 2d 176 (1968). Criticism of this “system” of administrative and judicial review was widespread. The general perception was that “appeals processes [were] so lengthy and complicated that managers [in the civil service] often avoid[ed] taking disciplinary action” against employees even when it was clearly warranted. S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 9. With respect to judicial review in particular, there was dissatisfaction with the “wide variations in the kinds of decisions . . . issued on the same or similar matters,” id., at 63, which were the product of concurrent jurisdiction, under various bases of jurisdiction, of the district courts in all Circuits and the Court of Claims. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit repeatedly noted, beginning the judicial process at the district court level, with repetition of essentially the same review on appeal in the court of appeals, was wasteful and irrational. See Polcover v. Secretary of Treasury, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 338, 341-342, 477 F. 2d 1223, 1226-1228 (1973). Congress responded to this situation by enacting the CSRA, which replaced the patchwork system with an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review, designed to balance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees with the needs of sound and efficient administration. See S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 4. Three main sections of the CSRA govern personnel action taken against members of the civil service. In each of these sections, Congress deals explicitly with the situation of nonpreference members of the excepted service, granting them limited, and in some cases conditional, rights. Chapter 43 of the CSRA governs personnel actions based on unacceptable job performance. It applies to both competitive service employees and members of the excepted service. 5 U. S. C. §4301. It provides that before an employee can be removed or reduced in grade for unacceptable job performance certain procedural protections must be afforded, including 30 days’ advance written notice of the proposed action, the right to be represented by an attorney or other representative, a reasonable period of time in which to respond to the charges, and a written decision specifying the instances of unacceptable performance. § 4303(b)(1). Although Congress extended these protections to nonpreference members of the excepted service, it denied them the right to seek either administrative or judicial review of the agency’s final action. Chapter 43 gives only competitive service employees and preference eligible members of the excepted service the right to appeal the agency’s decision to the MSPB and then to the Federal Circuit. § 4303(e). Chapter 23 of the CSRA establishes the principles of the merit system of employment, § 2301, and forbids an agency to engage in certain “prohibited personnel practices,” including unlawful discrimination, coercion of political activity, nepotism, and reprisal against so-called whistleblowers. § 2302. Nonpreference excepted service employees who are not in positions of a confidential or policymaking nature are protected by this chapter, § 2302(a)(2)(B), and are given the right to file charges of “prohibited personnel practices” with the Office of Special Counsel of the MSPB, whose responsibility it is to investigate the charges and, where appropriate, to seek remedial action from the agency and the MSPB. § 1206. Chapter 75 of the Act governs adverse action taken against employees for the “efficiency of the service,” which includes action of the type taken here, based on misconduct. Sub-chapter I governs minor adverse action (suspension for 14 days or less), §§ 7501-7504, and Subchapter II governs major adverse action (removal, suspension for more than 14 days, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough for 30 days or less), §§7511-7514. In each subchapter, covered employees are given procedural protections similar to those contained in Chapter 43, §§ 7503(b), 7513(b), and in Subchapter II covered employees are accorded administrative review by the MSPB, followed by judicial review in the Federal Circuit. §§ 7513(d), 7703. The definition of “employee[s]” covered by Subchapter II (major adverse action) specifically includes preference eligibles in the excepted service, § 7511(a)(1)(B), but does not include other members of the excepted service. The Office of Personnel Management is, however, given authority to extend coverage of Subchapter II to positions in the excepted service that have that status because they have been excluded from the competitive service by OPM regulation. § 7511(c). The Court of Appeals viewed the exclusion of nonpreference members of the excepted service from the definitional sections of Chapter 75 as congressional silence on the issue of what review these employees should receive for the categories of personnel action covered by that chapter, including a suspension of the duration at issue here, which would come within Subchapter II. The court therefore found respondent free to pursue whatever judicial remedies he would have had before enactment of the CSRA. We view the exclusion quite differently. In the context of the entire statutory scheme, we think it displays a clear congressional intent to deny the excluded employees the protections of Chapter 75— including judicial review — for personnel action covered by that chapter. In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S., at 345-348, we observed that, under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the omission of review procedures for consumers affected by milk market orders, coupled with the provision of such procedures for milk handlers so affected, was strong evidence that Congress intended to preclude consumers from obtaining judicial review. Similarly, in United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201 (1982), we found that in the context of the “precisely drawn provisions” of the Medicare statute, the provision of judicial review for awards made under Part A of the statute, coupled with the omission of judicial review for awards under Part B, “provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims.” Id., at 208 (citations omitted). The same type of analysis applies here. The comprehensive nature of the CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to the rights of nonpreference excepted service employees, and the fact that it does not include them in provisions for administrative and judicial review contained in Chapter 75, combine to establish a congressional judgment that those employees should not be able to demand judicial review for the type of personnel action covered by that chapter. Their exclusion from the scope of those protections can hardly be explained on the theory that Congress simply did not have them in mind, since, as noted earlier, Congress specifically included in Chapter 75 preference eligible excepted service employees, § 7511(a)(1)(B), and specifically provided for optional inclusion (at the election of OPM) of certain nonpreference excepted service employees with respect to certain protections of the chapter, including MSPB and judicial review, § 7511(c). (Respondent, incidentally, falls within the category eligible for that optional inclusion, see ibid.; 5 CPR §213.3102(hh) (1978), which OPM has chosen not to invoke.) It seems to us evident that the absence of provision for these employees to obtain judicial review is not an uninformative consequence of the limited scope of the statute, but rather manifestation of a considered congressional judgment that they should not have statutory entitlement to review for adverse action of the type governed by Chapter 75. This conclusion emerges not only from the statutory language, but also from what we have elsewhere found to be an indicator of nonreviewability, the structure of the statutory scheme. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, supra, at 345; see Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U. S. 444, 456-459 (1979). Two structural elements important for present purposes are clear in the framework of the CSRA: First, the preferred position of certain categories of employees — competitive service employees and “preference eligibles” (veterans). See 5 U. S. C. §§ 4303(e), 7501(1), 7503, 7511(a)(1), 7513. This is of course not an innovation of the CSRA, but continuation of a traditional feature of the civil service system. See Veterans Preference Act of 1944, ch. 287, § 14, 58 Stat. 390; Exec. Order No. 10988, § 14, 3 CFR 527 (1959-1963 Comp.). The second structural element is the primacy of the MSPB for administrative resolution of disputes over adverse personnel action, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1205, 4303(e), 7513(d), 7701 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), and the primacy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for judicial review, § 7703. This enables the development, through the MSPB, of a unitary and consistent Executive Branch position on matters involving personnel action, avoids an “unnecessary layer of judicial review” in lower federal courts, and “[ejncourages more consistent judicial decisions . . . .” S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 52; see Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U. S., at 797-798. Interpreting the exclusion of nonpreference excepted service personnel from Chapter 75 as leaving them free to pursue other avenues of review would turn the first structural element upside down, and would seriously undermine the sec - ond. As to the former: Under respondent’s view, he would be able to obtain judicial review of a 10-day suspension for misconduct, even though a competitive service employee would not, since Chapter 75 makes MSPB review, and hence judicial review, generally unavailable for minor adverse personnel action, including suspensions of less than 14 days. Moreover, this inverted preference shown to nonpreference excepted service employees would be shown as well to probationary employees, another disfavored class. See 5 U. S. C. § 4303(f)(2) (expressly excluding probationary employees from review under Chapter 43); § 7511(a)(1)(A) (expressly excluding probationary employees from Chapter 75); S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 45 (“It is inappropriate to restrict an agency’s authority to separate an employee who does not perform acceptably during the [probationary period]”). Since probationary employees, like nonpreference excepted service employees, are excluded from the definition of “employee” for purposes of Chapter 75, respondent’s theory that persons so excluded retain their pre-CSRA remedies must apply to them as well. And as it happens, the very case relied upon by the Federal Circuit as demonstrating the pre-CSRA right to Court of Claims review involved a probationary employee. See Greenway v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 72 (1963). The manner in which respondent’s interpretation would undermine the second structural element of the Act is obvious. First, for random categories of employees, legally enforceable employment entitlements will exist that are not subject to the unifying authority, in consistency of fact-finding as well as interpretation of law, of the MSPB. Second, for these same employees, the second layer of judicial review, which Congress meant to eliminate, would persist, see Lindahl, supra, at 797-798, since pre-CSRA causes of action had to be commenced in the federal courts of first instance rather than in the courts of appeals. Finally, for certain kinds of actions, these employees would be able to obtain review in the district courts and the regional courts of appeals throughout the country, undermining the consistency of interpretation by the Federal Circuit envisioned by § 7703 of the Act. Although a Tucker Act suit is appeal-able only to the Federal Circuit, regardless of whether it is brought in the Claims Court or in district court, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1295(a)(2), 1295(a)(3), 1346(a)(2), actions brought under the other statutes used to obtain judicial review before the CSRA, see supra, at 445, would be appealable to the various regional Circuits. When, as would often be the case, particular agency action could be challenged under either the Tucker Act or one of the other bases of jurisdiction, an agency office would not know whether to follow the law of its geographical Circuit or the conflicting law of the Federal Circuit. This, and the other consequences of respondent’s theory that the pre-CSRA remedies of nonpreference excepted service employees were not meant to be affected by the Act, are inherently implausible. Amicus contends that interpreting the CSRA to foreclose review in this case is contrary to two well-established principles of statutory construction. The first is that Congress will be presumed to have intended judicial review of agency action to be available unless there is “persuasive reason” to believe otherwise. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967). We agree with the principle, but find ample basis for applying the exception it contains. As we have made clear elsewhere, the presumption favoring judicial review is not to be applied in the “strict evidentiary sense,” but may be “overcom[e] whenever the congressional intent to preclude review is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.’” Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S., at 351 (quoting Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 157 (1970)). Here, as in Block, we think Congress’ intention is fairly discernible, and that “the presumption favoring judicial review . . . [has been] overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.” 467 U. S., at 349. The other principle of statutory construction to which amicus appeals is the doctrine that repeals by implication are strongly disfavored, Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 524 (1987); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 133 (1974), so that a later statute will not be held to have implicitly repealed an earlier one unless there is a clear repugnancy between the two, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 456-457 (1945); Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 362-363 (1842). This means, amicus asserts, that absent an express statement to the contrary, the CSRA cannot be interpreted to deprive respondent of the the statutory remedy he possessed under the Back Pay Act. Once again we agree with the principle, but do not find it applicable here. Repeal by implication of an express statutory text is one thing; it can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically address language on the statute books that it wishes to change. See, e. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974) (Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. II), did not negate employment preference for Indians expressly established by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq.). But repeal by implication of a legal disposition implied by a statutory text is something else. The courts frequently find Congress to have done this — whenever, in fact, they interpret a statutory text in the light of surrounding texts that happen to have been subsequently enacted. This classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to “make sense” in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the implications of a later statute. And that is what we have here. By reason of the interpretation we adopt today, the Back Pay Act does not stand repealed, but remains an operative part of the integrated statutory scheme set up by Congress to protect civil servants. All that we find to have been “repealed” by the CSRA is the judicial interpretation of the Back Pay Act — or, if you will, the Back Pay Act’s implication — allowing review in the Court of Claims of the underlying personnel decision giving rise to the claim for backpay. To be more explicit: The Back Pay Act provides in pertinent part: “An employee of an agency who, on the basis of a timely appeal or an administrative determination ... is found by appropriate authority under applicable law, rule, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement, to have been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action ... [is entitled to back pay].” 5 U. S. C. § 5596(b)(1) (emphasis added). Before enactment of the CSRA, regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission provided that a court authorized to correct, or to direct the correction of, an unjustified personnel action was an “appropriate authority” within the meaning of the Back Pay Act. 5 CFR § 550.803(c) (1968). And the Court of Claims had held (with some circularity of reasoning) that it was such a court because it had jurisdiction to award backpay. Ainsworth v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl., at 118-119, 399 F. 2d, at 181. Without disagreeing with that determination made in the context of the pre-existing patchwork scheme, see supra, at 444-445, we find that under the comprehensive and integrated review scheme of the CSRA, the Claims Court (and any other court relying on Tucker Act jurisdiction) is not an “appropriate authority” to review an agency’s personnel determination. This does not mean that the statutory remedy provided in the Back Pay Act is eliminated, or even that the conditions for invoking it are in any way altered. Now, as previously, if an employee is found by an “appropriate authority” to have undergone an unwarranted personnel action a suit for backpay will lie. PostCSRA, such an authority would include the agency itself, or the MSPB or the Federal Circuit where those entities have the authority to review the agency's determination. It seems to us that what respondent would have us invoke is a rule akin to the doctrine that statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed — that is, a presumption against any change rather than a presumption against implicit repeal of a statute. We decline to embrace that principle. The CSRA established a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees. Its deliberate exclusion of employees in respondent’s service category from the provisions establishing administrative and judicial review for personnel action of the sort at issue here prevents respondent from seeking review in the Claims Court under the Back Pay Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The CSRA divides civil service employees into three main classifications that can be generally described as follows: “Senior Executive Service” employees are those who occupy high-level positions in the Executive Department, but for whom appointment by the President and confirmation by the Senate is not required. 5 U. S. C. § 3132(a)(2). “Competitive service” employees are all other employees for whom nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate is not required, and who are not specifically excepted from the competitive service by statute or by statutorily authorized regulation. § 2102. “Excepted service” personnel are the remainder — those who are in neither the competitive service nor the Senior Executive Service. § 2103. Respondent’s position was in the excepted service because it had been excluded from the competitive service by authorized Civil Service Commission (now Office of Personnel Management) regulation. 5 CFR § 213.3102(hh) (1978). Within each of the three classifications of employment, the Act accords preferential treatment to certain veterans and their close relatives — so-called “preference eligibles.” §2108. Respondent, who is not a preference eligible, is referred to as a nonpreference member of the excepted service. Both parties have characterized the grievance rights included in the Department of the Interior Federal Personnel Manual as agency regulations. For purposes of this case we assume, without deciding, that they are such. This assumes, of course, that competitive service employees, who are given review rights by Chapter 75, cannot expand these rights by resort to pre-CSRA remedies. Cf. Pinar v. Dole, 747 F. 2d 899, 910-912 (CA4 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1016 (1985); Carducci v. Regan, 230 U. S. App. D. C. 80, 82-84, 714 F. 2d 171, 173-175 (1983). Even respondent has not questioned this assumption. The dissent makes no attempt to explain these anomalies, except to assert that we have “create[d] from thin air the notion” that the CSRA affords preferred status to competitive service and preference eligible employees. See post, at 466. Aside from the obvious linguistic response to this assertion — that the CSRA explicitly draws distinctions between “preference” and nonpreference members of the excepted service, 5 U. S. C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) — we think it sufficient to reiterate that this preferred status is a traditional feature of the civil service system. See supra, at 449. This in no way means, of course, that Congress has judged nonpreference excepted service employees to be “less worthy than other federal emplyees,” post, at 466, but only that it has chosen to give them less employ-' ment protection. The dissent seeks to minimize the impact of respondent’s interpretation by observing that the remedy he seeks will be “limited to those instances when the agency violates its own regulations.” Ibid. This sounds like a substantial limitation, but is in reality an insignificant one. The Department of the Interior grievance system that is the subject of this suit not only provides to nonpreference excepted service employees in respondent’s position the right to be advised of grievance procedures (which is the precise matter at issue here) but also provides that the grievance will be successful unless “management. . . establishes] the facts it asserts by a preponderance of evidence demonstrating that its action was for such cause as would promote the efficiency of the service.” Department of the Interior Federal Personnel Manual — 231, pt. 370 DM, ch. 771, subch. 3, app. A-l(H) (May 4, 1981). Therefore, under respondent’s analysis, a non-preference excepted service employee in his position would be able to appeal to the courts, as a violation of agency regulations, the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to prove the acts for which he was dismissed, and the alleged failure of those acts to establish that his dismissal would promote the efficiency of the service. That would hardly be a narrow supplement to the otherwise integrated system of review established by the CSRA.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

T-MOBILE SOUTH, LLC, Petitioner v. CITY OF ROSWELL, GEORGIA. No. 13-975. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Nov. 10, 2014. Decided Jan. 14, 2015. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, for Petitioner. Ann O'Connell, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting neither party. Richard A. Carothers, Altoona, PA, for Respondent. Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, David A. Miller, Laura Buckland, Timothy X. Sullivan, John L. Zembruski, Bellevue, WA, Thomas Scott Thompson, Counsel of Record, Peter Karanjia, Daniel P. Reing, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Richard A. Carothers, Counsel of Record, Regina Benton Reid, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Respondent. Opinion Justice SOTOMAYORdelivered the opinion of the Court. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." 110 Stat. 151, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). The question presented is whether, and in what form, localities must provide reasons when they deny telecommunication companies' applications to construct cell phone towers. We hold that localities must provide or make available their reasons, but that those reasons need not appear in the written denial letter or notice provided by the locality. Instead, the locality's reasons may appear in some other written record so long as the reasons are sufficiently clear and are provided or made accessible to the applicant essentially contemporaneously with the written denial letter or notice. I In February 2010, petitioner T-Mobile South, LLC, applied to build a new, 108-foot-tall cell phone tower on 2.8 acres of vacant residential property in the city of Roswell, Georgia (City). Roswell's city ordinances require that any cell phone tower proposed for a residential zoning district must take the form of an "alternative tower structure"-an artificial tree, clock tower, steeple, or light pole-that, in the opinion of the city council (City Council or Council), is "compatible with the natural setting and surrounding structures" and that effectively camouflages the tower. Code of Ordinances §§ 21.2.2, 21.2.5(a); see App. 68, 75. In accordance with these provisions, petitioner's application proposed a structure in the shape of an artificial tree or "monopine." Id.,at 42. The City's Planning and Zoning Division reviewed petitioner's application, along with a substantial number of letters and petitions opposing it, and ultimately issued a memorandum to the City Council concluding that the application met all of the requirements set out in the City's ordinances. It recommended that the City Council approve the application on three conditions to which petitioner was prepared to agree. The City Council then held a 2-hour-long public hearing on April 12, 2010, to consider petitioner's application. Petitioner arranged privately to have the hearing transcribed, and, as discussed below, the City subsequently issued detailed minutes summarizing the proceedings. At the hearing, after the Planning and Zoning Division presented its recommendation and after petitioner's representatives made a presentation in support of the application, a number of residents raised concerns. Among these were concerns that the tower would lack aesthetic compatibility, that the technology was outdated and unnecessary, and that the tower would be too tall. Petitioner's representatives responded by reiterating that it had met all of the ordinance's requirements and by providing testimony from a property appraiser that placement of cell phone towers does not reduce property values. Members of the City Council then commented on the application. One member of the six-person Council was recused, see id.,at 111 (hearing transcript); id.,at 322 (meeting minutes), leaving five voting members. Member Igleheart said that other carriers had sufficient coverage in the area and that the City did not need to level the playing field for petitioner. Id.,at 173-174 (hearing transcript). He also stated that his "[b]ottom line" was that he did not think it was "appropriate for residentially zoned properties to have the cell towers in their location." Id.,at 174 (hearing transcript); id.,at 338 (meeting minutes). Member Dippolito found it difficult to believe that the tower would not negatively impact the area and doubted that it would be compatible with the natural setting. Id.,at 175-176 (hearing transcript); id.,at 339 (meeting minutes). Member Wynn expressed concerns about the lack of a backup generator for emergency services, id.,at 172 (hearing transcript), and did not think the tower would be "compatible with this area," id.,at 176 (hearing transcript); id.,at 339 (meeting minutes). Member Orlans said only that he was impressed with the information put together by both sides. Id.,at 173 (hearing transcript); id.,at 337 (meeting minutes). Finally, Member Price, the liaison to the Planning and Zoning Division, made a motion to deny the application. She said that the tower would be aesthetically incompatible with the natural setting, that it would be too tall, and that its proximity to other homes would adversely affect the neighbors and the resale value of their properties. Id.,at 176-177 (hearing transcript); id.,at 339-340 (meeting minutes). The motion was seconded, and then passed unanimously. Id.,at 177 (hearing transcript); id.,at 340 (meeting minutes). Two days later, on April 14, 2010, the Planning and Zoning Division sent a letter to petitioner that said in its entirety: "Please be advised the City of Roswell Mayor and City Council denied the request from T-Mobile for a 108' mono-pine alternative tower structure during their April 12, 2010 hearing. The minutes from the aforementioned hearing may be obtained from the city clerk. Please contact Sue Creel or Betsy Branch at [phone number]. "If you have any additional questions, please contact me at [phone number]." Id.,at 278. The detailed written minutes of the hearing, however, were not approved and published by the City until 26 days later, on May 10, 2010. See id.,at 321-341 (meeting minutes). On May 13, 2010, 3 days after the detailed minutes were published-and now 29 days after the City denied petitioner's application-petitioner filed suit in Federal District Court. It alleged that the denial of the application was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and would effectively prohibit the provision of wireless service in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City had violated the Act when it failed to issue a written decision that stated the reasons for denying petitioner's application. The District Court interpreted the Act to require that a written denial letter or notice describe the reasons for the denial and that those reasons be sufficiently explained to allow a reviewing court to evaluate them against the written record. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 731 F.3d 1213 (2013). It explained that, in T-Mobile South, LLC v. Milton,728 F.3d 1274 (2013), which was decided after the District Court's decision in this case, it had held that "to the extent that the decision must contain grounds or reasons or explanations, it is sufficient if those are contained in a different written document or documents that the applicant is given or has access to." Id.,at 1285. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the Courts of Appeals had split on that question, and that it had departed from the majority rule. Compare Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Todd,244 F.3d 51, 60 (C.A.1 2001)(requiring that a locality issue a written denial that itself contains a "sufficient explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons"); New Par v. Saginaw,301 F.3d 390, 395-396 (C.A.6 2002); MetroPCS, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,400 F.3d 715, 723 (C.A.9 2005), with AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach,155 F.3d 423, 429 (C.A.4 1998)(holding that written minutes of a meeting and the word "denied" stamped on a letter describing the application were sufficient). Applying its rule to this case, the Eleventh Circuit found that the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii)were satisfied because petitioner had its own transcript as well as a written letter stating that the application had been denied and informing petitioner that it could obtain access to the minutes of the hearing. 731 F.3d, at 1221. It did not consider when the City provided its written reasons to petitioner. We granted certiorari, 572 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2136, 188 L.Ed.2d 1123 (2014), and now reverse the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit. II A The first question we answer is whether the statute requires localities to provide reasons when they deny applications to build cell phone towers. We answer that question in the affirmative. Our conclusion follows from the provisions of the Telecommunications Act. The Act generally preserves "the traditional authority of state and local governments to regulate the location, construction, and modification" of wireless communications facilities like cell phone towers, but imposes "specific limitations" on that authority. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,544 U.S. 113, 115, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005); see § 332(c)(7)(B). One of those limitations is that any decision to deny a request to build a tower "shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Another is that parties adversely affected by a locality's decision may seek judicial review. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). In order to determine whether a locality's denial was supported by substantial evidence, as Congress directed, courts must be able to identify the reason or reasons why the locality denied the application. See Rancho Palos Verdes,544 U.S., at 128, 125 S.Ct. 1453(BREYER, J., joined by O'Connor, Souter, and GINSBURG, JJ., concurring) (observing that the Act "requires local zoning boards ... [to] give reasons for [their] denials 'in writing' "). The requirement that localities must provide reasons when they deny applications is further underscored by two of the other limitations on local authority set out in the Act. The Act provides that localities "shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services," and may not regulate the construction of personal wireless service facilities "on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the [Federal Communications Commission's] regulations concerning such emissions." §§ 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), (iv).Again, it would be considerably more difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether a locality had violated these substantive provisions if the locality were not obligated to state its reasons. This conclusion is not just commonsensical, but flows directly from Congress' use of the term "substantial evidence." The statutory phrase "substantial evidence" is a "term of art" in administrative law that describes how "an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court." United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,373 U.S. 709, 715, 83 S.Ct. 1409, 10 L.Ed.2d 652 (1963). There is no reason discernible from the text of the Act to think that Congress meant to use the phrase in a different way. See FAA v. Cooper,566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012)( "[W]hen Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, for those who consider legislative history relevant, the Conference Report accompanying the Act confirmed as much when it noted that "[t]he phrase 'substantial evidence contained in a written record' is the traditional standard used for review of agency actions." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, p. 208(1996), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10. By employing the term "substantial evidence," Congress thus invoked, among other things, our recognition that "the orderly functioning of the process of [substantial-evidence] review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed," and that "courts cannot exercise their duty of [substantial-evidence] review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review." SEC v. Chenery Corp.,318 U.S. 80, 94, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)(explaining that an agency must "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action" to enable substantial-evidence review); Beaumont, S.L. W.R. Co. v. United States,282 U.S. 74, 86, 51 S.Ct. 1, 75 L.Ed. 221 (1930)("Complete statements by the [agency] showing the grounds upon which its determinations rest are quite as necessary as are opinions of lower courts setting forth the reasons on which they base their decisions ..."). In response, the City primarily argues that a reason-giving obligation would deprive it of local zoning authority. But Congress intended to place "specific limitations on the traditional authority of state and local governments" regarding cell phone tower siting applications. Rancho Palos Verdes,544 U.S., at 115, 125 S.Ct. 1453. One of those "limitations," § 332(c)(7)(B), necessarily implied by the Act's "substantial evidence" requirement, is that local zoning authorities state their reasons when they deny applications. In short, the statutory text and structure, and the concepts that Congress imported into the statutory framework, all point clearly toward the conclusion that localities must provide reasons when they deny cell phone tower siting applications. We stress, however, that these reasons need not be elaborate or even sophisticated, but rather, as discussed below, simply clear enough to enable judicial review. B The second question we answer is whether these reasons must appear in the same writing that conveys the locality's denial of an application. We answer that question in the negative. Like our conclusion that localities must provide reasons, our conclusion that the reasons need not appear in a denial letter follows from the statutory text. Other than providing that a locality's reasons must be given in writing, nothing in that text imposes any requirement that the reasons be given in any particular form. The Act's saving clause makes clear that, other than the enumerated limitations imposed on local governments by the statute itself, "nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities." § 332(c)(7)(A). Given this language, and the system of "cooperative federalism" on which the Act is premised, Rancho Palos Verdes,544 U.S., at 128, 125 S.Ct. 1453(BREYER, J., concurring), we understand the enumerated limitations to set out an exclusive list. So while the text and structure of the Act render it inescapable that localities must provide reasons in writing when they deny applications, we can locate in the Act no command-either explicit or implicit-that localities must provide those reasons in a specific document. We therefore conclude that Congress imposed no specific requirement on that front, but instead permitted localities to comply with their obligation to give written reasons so long as the locality's reasons are stated clearly enough to enable judicial review. Although the statute does not require a locality to provide its written reasons in any particular format, and although a locality may rely on detailed meeting minutes as it did here, we agree with the Solicitor General that "the local government may be better served by including a separate statement containing its reasons." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae26; see also id.,at 34. If the locality writes a short statement providing its reasons, the locality can likely avoid prolonging the litigation-and adding expense to the taxpayers, the companies, and the legal system-while the parties argue about exactly what the sometimes voluminous record means. Moreover, in that circumstance, the locality need not worry that, upon review of the record, a court will either find that it could not ascertain the locality's reasons or mistakenly ascribe to the locality a rationale that was not in fact the reason for the locality's denial. We hasten to add that a locality cannot stymie or burden the judicial review contemplated by the statute by delaying the release of its reasons for a substantial time after it conveys its written denial. The statute provides that an entity adversely affected by a locality's decision may seek judicial review within 30 days of the decision. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). Because an entity may not be able to make a considered decision whether to seek judicial review without knowing the reasons for the denial of its application, and because a court cannot review the denial without knowing the locality's reasons, the locality must provide or make available its written reasons at essentially the same time as it communicates its denial. This rule ought not to unduly burden localities given the range of ways in which localities can provide their reasons. Moreover, the denial itself needs only to be issued (or the application otherwise acted upon) "within a reasonable period of time." § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). In an interpretation we have recently upheld, see Arlington v. FCC,569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1863, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (2013), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has generally interpreted this provision to allow localities 90 days to act on applications to place new antennas on existing towers and 150 days to act on other siting applications. In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions of Section 332(c)(7)(b),24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 13995, ¶ 4 (2009). If a locality is not in a position to provide its reasons promptly, the locality can delay the issuance of its denial within this 90- or 150-day window, and instead release it along with its reasons once those reasons are ready to be provided. Only once the denial is issued would the 30-day commencement-of-suit clock begin. III Petitioner offers four reasons why, in its view, our analysis in Part II-B is incorrect. Petitioner argues that the statute requires that a locality's reasons appear in the writing conveying the denial itself, but none of petitioner's reasons are persuasive. First, petitioner argues that the word "decision" in the statute-the thing that must be "in writing"-connotes a written document that itself provides all the reasons for a given judgment. See Brief for Petitioner 24 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 407 (6th ed. 1990) (a "decision" is a written document providing " 'the reasons given for [a] judgment' ")). But even petitioner concedes, with its preferred dictionary in hand, that the word "decision" can also mean "something short of a statement of reasons explaining a determination." Brief for Petitioner 24 (citing Black's Law Dictionary, at 407). Second, petitioner claims that other provisions in the Act use the word "notify" when the Act means to impose only a requirement that a judgment be communicated. Because the provision at issue here does not use the word "notify," petitioner argues, it must contemplate something more than a judgment. This does not logically follow. For one thing, the statute at issue here does not use any verb at all to describe the conveying of information from a locality to an applicant; it just says that a denial "shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). But more to the point, "notify" is a verb the use-or nonuse-of which does not reveal what the thing to be notified of or about is. Third, petitioner contends that the "substantial evidence" requirement itself demands that localities identify their reasons in their written denials. See Brief for Petitioner 23. Certainly, as discussed above, the phrase "substantial evidence" requires localities to give reasons, but it says nothing on its own about the document in which those reasons must be stated or presented to a reviewing court. Finally, petitioner invokes the statutory requirement that any adversely affected person shall have their challenge heard by a court "on an expedited basis." § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). See Brief for Petitioner 14-15, 28. As long as the reasons are provided in a written record, however, and as long as they are provided in such a manner that is clear enough and prompt enough to enable judicial review, there is no reason to require that those reasons be provided in the written denial itself. We acknowledge that petitioner, along with those Courts of Appeals that have required a locality's reasons to appear in its written denial itself, have offered plausible bases for a rule that would require as much. See, e.g.,Todd,244 F.3d, at 60("A written record can create difficulties in determining the rationale behind a board's decision ..."). Congress could adopt such a rule if it were so inclined, but it did not do so in this statute. It is not our place to legislate another approach. IV Thus, we hold that the Act requires localities to provide reasons when they deny cell phone tower siting applications, but that the Act does not require localities to provide those reasons in written denial letters or notices themselves. A locality may satisfy its statutory obligations if it states its reasons with sufficient clarity in some other written record issued essentially contemporaneously with the denial. In this case, the City provided its reasons in writing and did so in the acceptable form of detailed minutes of the City Council meeting. The City, however, did not provide its written reasons essentially contemporaneously with its written denial. Instead, the City issued those detailed minutes 26 days after the date of the written denial and just 4 days before petitioner's time to seek judicial review would have expired.The City therefore did not comply with its statutory obligations. We do not consider questions regarding the applicability of principles of harmless error or questions of remedy, and leave those for the Eleventh Circuit to address on remand. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Brief minutes had been adopted on April 19, but these only noted that the motion to deny the application had passed with five members in favor and one member recused. See Council Brief 041210, online at http:// roswell.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=657578&GUID=08D5297C-0271-41 F9-9DAA-E8E3DD6314BD&Options=&Search= (all Internet Materials as visited January 12, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). According to the meeting calendar for the City Council's May 10, 2010, meeting, it was on that day that the City Council approved detailed minutes of the April 12 meeting that included a recitation of each member's statements during the hearing. See http://roswell.legistar.com/MeetingDetail.aspx? ID=101786&GUID=63828B21-EB83-4485-B4EA-10EE65CF48CD&Options=info&Search=. The last "limitation" listed in the Act provides that localities shall act on applications to construct personal wireless service facilities "within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed ... taking into account the nature and scope of such request." § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). THE CHIEF JUSTICE's dissent rejects this particular requirement, and instead invents a process that turns judicial review on its head. Rather than give effect to a process that would permit an entity seeking to challenge a locality's decision to see the locality's written reasons before it files its suit-and the dissent agrees that the statute requires that a locality convey its reasons in writing, see post,at 5-the dissent would fashion a world in which a locality can wait until a lawsuit is commenced and a court orders it to state its reasons. The entity would thus be left to guess at what the locality's written reasons will be, write a complaint that contains those hypotheses, and risk being sandbagged by the written reasons that the locality subsequently provides in litigation after the challenging entity has shown its cards. The reviewing court would then need to ensure that those reasons are not post hocrationalizations, see Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962), but the dissent offers no guidance as to how a reviewing court that has never seen near-contemporaneous reasons would conduct that inquiry. The City urges us to hold that the clock does not begin to run until after the reasons are given. We cannot so hold, however, without rewriting the statutory text. The Act provides that a lawsuit may be filed by "[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act ... within 30 days after such action or failure to act." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The relevant "final action" is the issuance of the written notice of denial, not the subsequent issuance of reasons explaining the denial. See Bennett v. Spear,520 U.S. 154, 177-178, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997)(agency action is "final" if it "mark[s] the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process" and determines "rights or obligations" or triggers "legal consequences" (internal quotation marks omitted)). One of petitioner's amiciargues that Congress has used the word "decision" in the context of other communications laws to mean something more than a judgment or verdict. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (Chamber) et al. 9-13. But while it is true that a word used across "the same act" should be given the same meaning, see Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2004-2005, 182 L.Ed.2d 903 (2012), the Chamber's evidence is less persuasive because it arises out of entirely different "acts" and does not involve any term of art. By relying on other parts of Title 47 of the U.S. Code-some enacted in the Communications Act of 1934 decades before the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 at issue here-the Chamber stretches to invoke this canon of construction beyond its most forceful application. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 172-173 (2012). For example, petitioner cites § 11 (FCC must "notify the parties concerned" when it makes a "determination and order" regarding a railroad or telegraph company's failure to maintain and operate a telegraph line for public use) and § 398(b)(5) ("Whenever the Secretary [of Commerce] makes a final determination ... that a recipient" of federal funds has engaged in impermissible discrimination, the Secretary shall "notify the recipient in writing of such determination ..."). Brief for Petitioner 24-25. Though petitioner arranged for a transcript of the meeting to be recorded on its own initiative and at its own expense, see App. 109-275, the fact that petitioner took steps to reduce oral statements made at the City Council meeting to writing cannot be said to satisfy the obligation that Congress placed on the City to state clearly its reasons, and to do so in a writing it provides or makes available.* * *

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MOBIL OIL EXPLORATION & PRODUCING SOUTHEAST, INC., et al. v. UNITED DISTRIBUTION COS. et al. No. 89-1452. Argued November 5, 1990 Decided January 8, 1991 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Kennedy, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. Rex E. Lee argued the cause for petitioners in No. 89-1452. With him on the briefs were Eugene R. Elrod, Carter G. Phillips, Jay G. Martin, Charles M. Darling IV, William H. Emerson, Stephen A. Herman, David G. Norrell, Mario M. Garza, R. Gordon Gooch, Harris S. Wood, Harry E. Barsh, Jr., David J. Evans, Ernest J. Altgelt III, C. Roger Hoffman, Douglas W. Rasch, Toni D. Hennike, Robert C. Murray, ■ Thomas G. Johnson, John K. McDonald, John L. Williford, Robert A. Miller, Jr., John J. Wolfe, Michael L. Pate, Thomas G. Johnson, Thomas B. Deal, Dee H. Richardson, Ernest L. Kubosh, and Ralph J. Pearson. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners in No. 89-1453. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, William S. Scherman, Jerome M. Feit, and Robert H. Solomon. Roberta Lee Halladay argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With her on the brief were Peter Buscemi, C. William Cooper, and Ronald D. Jones Together with No. 89-1453, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. United Distribution Cos. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Mexico et al. by Hal Stratton, Attorney General of New Mexico, Randall W. Childress, Deputy Attorney General, and Craig W. Hulvey, Kevin M. Sweeney, and George C. Garikes, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, William J. Guste, Attorney General of Louisiana, and David B. Robinson, Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Interstate Oil Compact Commission by Robert J. Woody, Philip F. Patman, W. Timothy Dowd, and Richard C. Byrd; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases involve the validity of two orders, No. 451 and No. 451-A, promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) to make substantial changes in the national market for natural gas. On petitions for review, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the orders as exceeding the Commission’s authority under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 92 Stat. 3352, 15 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. 885 F. 2d 209 (1989). In light of the economic interests at stake, we granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for briefing and oral argument. 496 U. S. 904 (1990). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and sustain the Commission’s orders in their entirety. I The Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 62 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. §717 et seq., was Congress’ first attempt to establish nationwide natural gas regulation. Section 4(a) mandated that the present Commission’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, ensure that all rates and charges requested by a natural gas company for the sale or transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce be “just and reasonable.” 15 U. S. C. §717c(a). Section 5(a) further provided that the Commission order a “just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract” connected with the sale or transportation of gas whenever it determined that any of these standards or actions were “unjust” or “unreasonable.” 15 U. S. C. §717d(a). Over the years the Commission adopted a number of different approaches in applying the NGA’s “just and reasonable” standard. See Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y. v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U. S. 319, 327-331 (1983). Initially the Commission, construing the NGA to regulate gas sales only at the downstream end of interstate pipelines, proceeded on a company-by-company basis with reference to the historical costs each pipeline operator incurred in acquiring and transporting gas to its customers. The Court upheld this approach in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944), explaining that the NGA did not bind the Commission to “any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates.” Id., at 602. The Commission of necessity shifted course in response to our decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672 (1954). Phillips interpreted the NGA to require that the Commission regulate not just the downstream rates charged by large interstate pipeline concerns, but also upstream sales rates charged by thousands of independent gas producers. Id., at 682. Faced with the regulatory burden that resulted, the Commission eventually opted for an “area rate” approach for the independent producers while retaining the company-by-company method for the interstate pipelines. First articulated in 1960, the area rate approach established a single rate schedule for all gas produced in a given region based upon historical production costs and rates of return. See Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F. P. C. 818 (1960). Each area rate schedule included a two-tiered price ceiling: the lower ceiling for gas prices established in “old” gas contracts and a higher ceiling for gas prices set in “new” contracts. Id., at 819. The new two-tiered system was termed “vintage pricing” or “vintaging.” Vili-taging rested on the premise that the higher ceiling price for new gas production would provide incentives that would be superfluous for old gas already flowing because “price could not serve as an incentive, and since any price above average historical costs, plus an appropriate return, would merely confer windfalls.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 797 (1968). The balance the Commission hoped to strike was the development of gas production through the “new” gas ceilings while ensuring continued protection of consumers through the “old” gas price limits. At the same time the Commission anticipated that the differences in price levels would be “reduced and eventually eliminated as subsequent experience brings about revisions in the prices in the various areas.” Statement of General Policy, supra, at 819. We upheld the vintage pricing system in Permian Basin, holding that the courts lacked the authority to set aside any Commission rate that was within the “‘zone of reasonableness.’” 390 U. S., at 797 (citation omitted). By the early 1970’s, the two-tiered area rate approach no longer worked. Inadequate production had led to gas shortages which in turn had prompted a rapid rise in prices. Accordingly, the Commission abandoned vintaging in favor of a single national rate designed to encourage production. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 51 F. P. C. 2212 (1974). Refining this decision, the Commission prescribed a single national rate for all gas drilled after 1972, thus rejecting an earlier plan to establish different national rates for succeeding biennial vintages. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 52 F. P. C. 1604, 1615 (1974). But the single national pricing scheme did not last long either. In 1976 the Commission reinstated vin-taging with the promulgation of Order No. 770. National Rates for Jurisdictional Sales of Natural Gas, 56 F. P. C. 509. At about the same time, in Order No. 749, the Commission also consolidated a number of the old vintages for discrete areas into a single nationwide category for all gas already under production before 1973. Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 54 F. P. C. 3090 (1975), aff’d sub nom. Texaco Oil Co. v. FERC, 571 F. 2d 834 (CA5), cert. dism’d, 439 U. S. 801 (1978). Despite this consolidation, the Commission’s price structure still contained 15 different categories of old gas, each with its own ceiling price. Despite all these efforts, moreover, severe shortages persisted in the interstate market because low ceiling prices for interstate gas sales fell considerably below prices the same gas could command in intrastate markets, which were as yet unregulated. Congress responded to these ongoing problems by enacting the NGPA, the statute that controls this controversy. See Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., supra, at 330-331. The NGPA addressed the problem of continuing shortages in several ways. First, it gave the Commission the authority to regulate prices in the intrastate market as well as the interstate market. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U. S. 409, 420-421 (1986) (Transco). Second, to encourage production of new reserves, the NGPA established higher price ceilings for new and hard-to-produce gas as well as a phased deregulation scheme for these types of gas. §§ 102, 103, 105, 107 and 108; 15 U. S. C. §§ 3312, 3313, 3315, 3317, 3318. Finally, to safeguard consumers, §§ 104 and 106 carried over the vintage price ceilings that happened to be in effect for old gas when the NGPA was enacted while mandating that these be adjusted for inflation. 15 U. S. C. §§3314 and 3316. Congress, however, recognized that some of these vintage price ceilings “may be too low and authorized] the Commission to raise [them] whenever traditional NGA principles would dictate a higher price.” Mid-Louisiana Gas, 463 U. S., at 333. In particular, §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c) provided that the Commission “may, by rule or order, prescribe a maximum lawful ceiling price, applicable to any first sale of any natural gas (or category thereof, as determined by the Commission) otherwise subject to the preceding provisions of this section.” 15 U. S. C. §§ 3314(b)(2) and 3316(c). The only conditions that Congress placed on the Commission were, first, that the new ceiling be higher than the ceiling set by the statute itself and, second, that it be “just and reasonable” within the meaning of the NGA. §§ 3314(b)(1), 3316(a). The new incentives for production of new and hard-to-produce gas transformed the gas shortages of the 1970’s into gas surpluses during the 1980’s. One result was serious market distortions. The higher new gas price ceilings prevented the unexpected oversupply from translating into lower consumer prices since the lower, vintage gas ceilings led to the premature abandonment of old gas reserves. App. 32-36. Accordingly, the Secretary of Energy in 1985 formally recommended that the Commission issue a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the old gas pricing system. 50 Fed. Reg. 48540 (1985). After conducting two days of public hearings and analyzing approximately 113 sets of comments, the Commission issued the two orders under dispute in this case: Order No. 451, promulgated in June 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 22168 (1986); and Order No. 451-A, promulgated in December 1986, which reaffirmed the approach of its predecessor while making certain modifications. 51 Fed. Reg. 46762 (1986). The Commission’s orders have three principal components. First, the Commission collapsed the 15 existing vintage price categories of old gas into a single classification and established an alternative maximum price for a producer of gas in that category to charge, though only to a willing buyer. The new ceiling was set at $2.57 per million Btu’s, a price equal to the highest of the ceilings then in effect for old gas (that having the most recent, post-1974, vintage) adjusted for inflation. 51 Fed. Reg. 22183-22185 (1986); see 18 CFR §271.402(c)(3)(iii) (1986). When established the new ceiling exceeded the then-current market price for old gas. The Commission nonetheless concluded that this new price was “just and reasonable” because, among other reasons, it generally approximated the replacement cost of gas based upon the current cost of finding new gas fields, drilling new wells, and producing new gas. See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F. 2d 1061 (CA5 1975) (holding that replacement cost formula appropriate for establishing “just and reasonable” rates under the NGA), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976). In taking these steps, the Commission noted that the express and unambiguous terms of §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c) gave it specific authorization to raise old gas prices so long as the resulting ceiling met the just and reasonable requirement. 51 Fed. Reg., at 22179. The second principal feature of the orders establishes a “Good Faith Negotiation” (GFN) procedure that producers must follow before they can collect a higher price from current pipeline customers. 18 CFR §270.201 (1986). The GFN process consists of several steps. Initially, a producer may request a pipeline to nominate a price at which the pipeline would be willing to continue purchasing old gas under any existing contract. § 270.201(b)(1). At the same time, however, this request is also deemed to be an offer by the producer to release the purchaser from any contract between the parties that covers the sale of old gas. § 270.201(b)(4). In response, the purchaser can both nominate its own price for continuing to purchase old gas under the contracts specified by the purchaser and further request that the producer nominate a price at which the producer would be willing to continue selling any gas, old or new, covered under any contracts specified by the purchaser that cover at least some old gas. If the parties cannot come to terms, the producer can either continue sales at the old price under existing contracts or abandon its existing obligations so long as it has executed a new contract with another purchaser and given its old customer 30 days’ notice. §§ 157.301, 270.201(c)(1), (e)(4). The Commission’s chief rationale for the GFN process was a fear that automatic collection of the new price by producers would lead to market disruption given the existence of numerous gas contracts containing indefinite price-escalation clauses tied to whatever ceiling the agency established. 51 Fed. Reg., at 22204. The Commission further concluded that NGA § 7(b), which establishes a “due hearing” requirement before abandonments could take place, did not prevent it from promulgating an across-the-board rule rather than engage in case-by-case adjudication. 15 U. S. C. § 717f(b). Finally, the Commission rejected suggestions that it undertake completely to resolve the issue of take-or-pay provisions in certain natural gas contracts in the same proceeding in which it addressed old gas pricing. The Commission explained that it was already addressing the take-or-pay problem in its Order No. 436 proceedings. It further pointed out that the GFN procedure, in allowing the purchaser to propose new higher prices for old gas in return for renegotiation of take-or-pay obligations, would help resolve many take-or-pay disputes. The Commission also reasoned that the expansion of old gas reserves resulting from its orders would reduce new gas prices and thus reduce the pipelines’ overall take-or-pay exposure. 51 Fed. Reg., at 22174-22175, 22183, 22196-22197, 46783-46784. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the orders on the ground that the Commission had exceeded its statutory authority. The court first concluded that Congress did not intend to give the Commission the authority to set a single ceiling price for old gas under §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c). The court also dismissed the ceiling price itself as unreasonable since it was higher than the spot market price when the orders were issued and so amounted to “de facto deregulation.” 885 F. 2d, at 218-222. Second, the court rejected the GFN procedure on the basis that the Commission lacked the authority to provide for across-the-board, preauthorized abandonment under §7(b). Id., at 221-222. Third, the court chided the Commission for failing to seize the opportunity to resolve the take-or-pay issue, although it did acknowledge that the Commission was addressing that matter on remand from the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 824 F. 2d 981 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 1006 (1988). The dissent disagreed with all three conclusions, observing that the majority should have deferred to the Commission as the agency Congress delegated to regulate natural gas. 885 F. 2d, at 226-235 (Brown, J., dissenting). We granted certiorari, 496 U. S. 904 (1990), and now reverse and sustain the Commission’s orders. II Section 104 (a) provides that the maximum price for old gas should be computed as provided in § 104(b). The general rule under § 104(b)(1) is that each category of old gas would be priced as it was prior to the enactment of the NGPA, but increased over time in accordance with an inflation formula. This was the regime that obtained under the NGPA until the issuance of the orders at issue here. Section 104(b)(2), however, plainly gives the Commission authority to change this regulatory scheme applicable to old gas: “The Commission may, by rule or order, prescribe a maximum lawful ceiling price, applicable to any first sale of any natural gas (or category thereof, as determined by the Commission) otherwise subject to the preceding provisions of this section, if such price is — “(A) higher than the maximum lawful price which would otherwise be applicable under such provisions; and “(B) just and reasonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act [15 U. S. C. 717 et seq.].” 15 U. S. C. §§ 3314(b)(2) and 3316(c). Nothing in these provisions prevents the Commission from either increasing the ceiling price for multiple old gas vintages or from setting the ceiling price applicable to each vintage at the same level. To the contrary, the statute states that the Commission may increase the ceiling price for “any natural gas (or category thereof, as determined by the Commission).” (Emphasis added.) Likewise, § 104(b)(2) allows the Commission to “prescribe a ceiling price” applicable to any natural gas category. Insofar as “any” encompasses “all,” this language enables the Commission to set a single ceiling price for every category of old gas. As we have stated in similar contexts, “[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, ‘that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U. S. 478, 482 (1990) (quoting K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 291 (1988)). Respondents counter that the structure of the NGPA points to the opposite conclusion. Specifically, they contend that Congress could not have intended to allow the Commission to collapse all old gas vintages under a single price where the NGPA created detailed incentives for new and hard-to-produce gas on one hand, yet carefully preserved the old gas vintaging scheme on the other. Brief for Respondents 33-37. We disagree. The statute’s bifurcated approach implies no more than that Congress found the need to encourage new gas production sufficiently pressing to deal with the matter directly, but was content to leave old gas pricing within the discretion of the Commission to alter as conditions warranted. The plain meaning of § 104(b)(2) confirms this view. Further, the Commission’s decision to set a single ceiling fully accords with the two restrictions that the NGPA does establish. With respect to the first, the requirement that a ceiling price be “higher than” the old vintage ceilings carried over from the NGA does nothing to prevent the Commission from consolidating existing categories and setting one price equivalent to the highest previous ceiling. 15 U. S. C. §§ 3314(b)(2)(A) and 3316(c)(1). With respect to the second, collapsing the old vintages also comports with the mandate that price ceilings be “just and reasonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act.” 15 U. S. C. §§3314(b)(2)(B) and 3316(c)(2). Far from binding the Commission, the “just and reasonable” requirement accords it broad ratemaking authority that its decision to set a single ceiling does not exceed. The Court has repeatedly held that the just and reasonable standard does not compel the Commission to use any single pricing formula in general or vintaging in particular. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 586 (1942); Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 776-777; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 386-389 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U. S. 283, 308 (1974). Courts of Appeals have also consistently affirmed the Commission’s use of a replacement-cost-based method under the NGA. E. g., Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F. 2d 1061, 1082-1083 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976); American Public Gas Assn. v. FPC, 567 F. 2d 1016, 1059 (CADC 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 907 (1978). By incorporating the “just and reasonable” standard into the NGPA, Congress clearly meant to preserve the pricing flexibility the Commission had historically exercised under the NGA. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 378-382 (1982). In employing a replacement cost formula, the Commission did no more than what it had previously done under the NGA: collapse vintage categories together because the replacement cost for natural gas is the same regardless of when it was placed in production. See Order No. 749, Just and Reasonable National Rates for Sales of Natural Gas, 54 F. P. C. 3090 (1975). Respondents contend that even if the statute allows the Commission to set a single old gas ceiling, the particular ceiling it has set is unjustly and impermissibly high. They first argue that the Commission conceded that actual collection of the new price would not be just and therefore established the GFN procedures as a requisite safeguard. The Commission correctly denies having made any such concession. In its orders, in its briefs, and at oral argument, the agency has been at pains to point out that its ceiling price, which was no higher than the highest of the ceilings then applicable to old gas, falls squarely within the “zone of reasonableness” mandated by the NGA. See Permian Basin, supra, at 767. What the agency has acknowledged is that automatic collection of prices up to the ceiling under the escalator clauses common to industry contracts would produce “inappropriate” market distortion, especially since the market price remains below the ceiling. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 89-1453, p. 12. In consequence the Commission instituted the GFN process to mitigate too abrupt a transition from one pricing regime to the next. Respondents have not sought to challenge (and we do not today consider) the Commission’s authority to require this process, but they assert that the requiring of it amounts to an acknowledgment by the Commission that the new ceiling price is in fact unreasonable. We disagree. There is nothing incompatible between the belief that a price is reasonable and the belief that it ought not to be imposed without prior negotiations. We decline to disallow an otherwise lawful rate because additional safeguards accompany it. We likewise reject respondents’ more fundamental objection that no order “deregulating” the price of old gas can be deemed just and reasonable. The agency’s orders do not deregulate in any legally relevant sense. The Commission adopted an approved pricing formula, set a maximum price, and expressly rejected proposals that it truly deregulate by eliminating any ceiling for old gas whatsoever. App. 170-171. Nor can we conclude that deregulation results simply because a given ceiling price may be above the market price. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U. S. 332, 343 (1956); FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348, 353 (1956); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 397 (1974). Ill We further hold that Order No. 45l’s abandonment procedures fully comport with the requirements set forth in §7(b) of the NGA. 15 U. S. C. §717f(b). In particular, we reject the suggestion that this provision mandates individualized proceedings involving interested parties before a specific abandonment can take place. Section 7(b), which Congress retained when enacting the NGPA, states: “No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.” 15 U. S. C. §717f(b). As applied to this case § 7(b) prohibits a producer from abandoning its contractual service obligations to the purchaser unless the Commission has, first, granted its “permission and approval” of the abandonment; second, made a “finding” that “present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment”; and, third, held a “hearing” that is “due.” The Commission has taken each of these steps. First, Order No. 451 permits and approves the abandonment at issue. That approval is not specific to any single abandonment but is instead general, prospective, and conditional. These conditions include: failure by the purchaser and producer to agree to a revised price under the GFN procedures; execution of a new contract between the producer and a new purchaser; and 30-days’ notice to the previous purchaser of contract termination. 18 CFR § 270.201(c)(1) (1986). Neither respondents nor the Court of Appeals holding directly questions the Commission’s orders for failing to satisfy this initial requirement. As we have previously held, nothing in § 7(b) prevents the Commission from giving advance approval of abandonment. FPC v. Moss, 424 U. S. 494, 499-502 (1976). See Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 776. Second, the Commission also made the necessary findings that “present or future public interest or necessity” allowed the conditional abandonment that it prescribed. 51 Fed. Reg., at 46785-46787. Reviewing “all relevant factors involved in determining the overall public interest,” the Commission found that preauthorized abandonment under the GFN regime would generally protect purchasers by allowing them to buy at market rates elsewhere if contracting producers insisted on the new ceiling price; safeguard producers by allowing them to abandon service if the contracting purchaser fails to come to terms; and serve the market by releasing previously unused reserves of old gas. See Felmont Oil Corp. and Essex Offshore, Inc., 33 FERC ¶61,333, p. 61,657 (1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. FERC, 262 U. S. App. D. C. 222, 823 F. 2d 630 (1987). At bottom these findings demonstrate the agency’s determination that the GFN conditions make certain matters common to all abandonments. Contrary to respondents’ theory, § 7(b) does not compel the agency to make “specific findings” with regard to every abandonment when the issues involved are general. As we held in the context of disability proceedings under the Social Security Act, “general factual issue[s] may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking” as by considering specific evidence when the questions under consideration are “not unique” to the particular case. Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 468 (1983). Finally, it follows from the foregoing that the Commission discharged its §7(b) duty to hold a “due hearing.” Before promulgating Order No. 451, the agency held both a notice and comment hearing and an oral hearing. As it correctly concluded, § 7(b) required no more. Time and again, “[t]he Court has recognized that even where an agency’s enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration.” Heckler v. Campbell, supra, at 467; Permian Basin, supra, at 774-777; FPC v. Texaco Inc., 377 U. S. 33, 41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192, 205 (1956). The Commission’s approval conditions establish, and its findings confirm, that the abandonment at issue here is precisely the type of issue in which “[a] contrary holding would require the agency continually to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding.” Heckler v. Campbell, supra, at 467. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 285 U. S. App. D. C. 115, 907 F. 2d 185, 188 (1990); Kansas Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 271 U. S. App. D. C. 252, 256-259, 851 F. 2d 1479, 1483-1486 (1988); Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 35, n. 17, 824 F. 2d 981, 1015, n. 17 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 1006 (1988). Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondents have uncovered a convincing rationale for holding otherwise. Relying on United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U. S. 529 (1979), the panel majority held that Order No. 451’s prospective approval of abandonment was impermissible given the “practical” control the GFN process afforded producers. 885 F. 2d, at 221-223. McCombs, however, is inapposite since that case dealt with a producer who attempted to abandon with no Commission approval, finding, or hearing whatsoever. Nor can respondents object that the Commission made no provision for individual determinations under its abandonment procedures where appropriate. Under Order No. 451, a purchaser who objects to a given abandonment on the grounds that the conditions the agency has set forth have not been met may file a complaint with the Commission. See 18 CFR §385.206 (1986). IV We turn, finally, to the problem of “take-or-pay” contracts. A take-or-pay contract obligates a pipeline to purchase a specified volume of gas at a specified price and, if it is unable to do so, to pay for that volume. A plausible response to the gas shortages of the 1970’s, this device has created significant dislocations in light of the oversupply of gas that has occurred since. Today many purchasers face disastrous take-or-pay liability without sufficient outlets to recoup their losses. The Court of Appeals cited this problem as a further reason for invalidating Order No. 451. Specifically, the court chastised the Commission for its “regrettable and unwarranted” failure to address the take-or-pay problem in the rulemaking under consideration. 885 F. 2d, at 224. Exactly what the court held, however, is another matter. The dissent viewed the majority’s discussion as affirmatively ordering the Commission “once and for all to solve” the entire take-or-pay issue. 885 F. 2d, at 234 (Brown, J., dissenting). Respondents more narrowly characterize the holding as that the Commission should have addressed the take-or-pay problem at least to the extent that Order No. 451 exacerbated it. Brief for Respondents 67-70. We have no need to choose between these interpretations because the Court of Appeals erred under either view. The court clearly overshot the mark if it ordered the Commission to resolve the take-or-pay problem in this proceeding. An agency enjoys broad discretion in determining how best to handle related, yet discrete, issues in terms of procedures, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), and priorities, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 831-832 (1985). We have expressly approved an earlier Commission decision to treat the take-or-pay issue separately where a different proceeding would generate more appropriate information and where the agency was addressing the question. FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U. S. 9, 49-51 (1968). The record in this case shows that approximately two-thirds of existing take-or-pay contracts do not involve old gas. We are satisfied that the agency could compile relevant data more effectively in a separate proceeding. We are likewise satisfied that “the Commission itself has taken steps to alleviate take-or-pay problems.” Id., at 50. In promulgating Order No. 451, the agency explained that it had chosen not to deal with the take-or-pay matter directly primarily because it was addressing the matter on remand from the D. C. Circuit. Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, supra. The court likewise erred if it meant that the Commission should have addressed the take-or-pay problem insofar as Order No. 451 “exacerbated” it. This rationale does not provide a basis for invalidating the Commission’s orders. As noted, an agency need not solve every problem before it in the same proceeding. This applies even where the initial solution to one problem has adverse consequences for another area that the agency was addressing. See Vermont Yankee, supra, at 543-544 (agencies are free to engage in multiple rulemaking “[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances”). Moreover, the agency articulated rational grounds for concluding that Order No. 451 would do more to ameliorate the take-or-pay problem than worsen it. 51 Fed. Reg., at 22196, 46783-46784. The agency reasoned that the GFN procedures would encourage the renegotiation of take-or-pay provisions in contracts involving the sale of old gas or old gas and new gas together. Id,., at 22196-22197. The agency further noted that the release of old gas would reduce the market price for new gas and thus reduce the pipelines’ aggregate liability. We are neither inclined nor prepared to second-guess the agency’s reasoned determination in this complex area. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). V We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the Commission lacked the authority to set a single ceiling price for old gas; possessed no power to authorize conditional preauthor-ized abandonment of producers’ obligations to provide old gas; or had a duty to address the take-or-pay problem more fully in this proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and sustain Orders Nos. 451 and 451-A in their entirety. So ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision of these cases. The term “Commission” will refer to both the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission. Order No. 451 shall refer to both orders where the distinction is not relevant. A take-or-pay clause requires a purchasing pipeline to take a specified volume of gas from a producer or, if it is unable to do so, to pay for the specified volume. See Transco, 474 U. S. 409, 412 (1986). Section 104 in its entirety reads: “Ceiling price for sales of natural gas dedicated to interstate commerce. “(a) Application. — In the case of natural gas committed or dedicated to interstate commerce on [November 8, 1978,] and for which a just and reasonable rate under the Natural Gas Act [15 U. S. C. §717 et seq.] was in effect on such date for the first sale of such natural gas, the maximum lawful price computed under subsection (b) shall apply to any first sale of such natural gas delivered during any month. “(b) Maximum lawful price. — “(1) General rule. —The maximum lawful price under this section for any month shall be the higher of— “(A)(i) the just and reasonable rate, per million Btu’s, established by the Commission which was (or would have been) applicable to the first sale of such natural gas on April 20, 1977, in the case of April 1977; and “(ii) in the case of any month thereafter, the maximum lawful price, per million Btu’s, prescribed under this subparagraph for the preceding month multiplied by the monthly equivalent of the annual inflation adjustment factor applicable for such month, or “(B) any just and reasonable rate which was established by the Commission after April 27, 1977, and before [November 9, 1978,] and which is applicable to such natural gas. “(2) Ceiling prices may be increased if just and reasonable. —The Commission may, by rule or order, prescribe a maximum lawful ceiling price, applicable to any first sale of any natural gas (or category thereof, as determined by the Commission) otherwise subject to the>preceding provisions of this section, if such price is — “(A) higher than the maximum lawful price which would otherwise be applicable under such provisions; and “(B) just and reasonable within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act [15 U. S. C. 717 et seq.].” Section 106(c) deals in almost identical language with the ceiling prices for sales under “rollover” contacts, which the NGPA defines as contracts entered into on or after November 8, 1978, for the first sale of natural gas that was previously subject to a contract that expired at the end of a fixed term specified in the contract itself. 15 U. S. C. § 3301(12). A reference to § 104(b)(2) is here used to refer to both provisions. Even had we concluded that §§ 104(b)(2) and 106(c) failed to speak unambiguously to the ceiling price question, we would nonetheless be compelled to defer to the Commission’s interpretation. It follows from our foregoing discussion that the agency’s view cannot be deemed arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the NGPA. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984); K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U. S. 281, 292 (1988). The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit has since invalidated the Commission’s principal attempt at solving the problem. Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 283 U. S. App. D. C. 265, 899 F. 2d 1250 (1990). See also American Gas Assn. v. FERC, 286 U. S. App. D. C. 142, 912 F. 2d 1496 (1990) (approving other aspects of the Commission’s take-or-pay proceedings), cert. pending sub nom. Willcox v. FERC, No. 90-806. Nothing in our holding today precludes interested parties from petitioning the Commission for further rulemaking should it become apparent that the agency is no longer addressing the take-or-pay problem. See Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 281 U. S. App. D. C. 318, 890 F. 2d 435 (1989).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. CONWAY CORP. et al. No. 75-342. Argued April 21, 1976 Decided June 7, 1976 White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Allan Abbot Tuttle argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Drexel D. Journey and Robert■ W. Perdue. Robert C. McDiarmid argued the cause for respondents Conway Corp. et al. With him on the brief was Sandra J. Strebel. Harry A. Roth, Jr., and Robert T. Hall III filed briefs for Arkansas Power & Light Co. as respondent under this Court’s Rule 21 (4). Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Northcutt Ely and Frederick H. Ritts for the American Public Power Assn.; and by Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., and Grace Powers Monaco for the City of Batavia, Ill., et al. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in this case is this: When a power company that sells electricity at both wholesale and retail seeks to raise its wholesale rates, does the Federal Power Commission (Commission) have jurisdiction to consider the allegations of the company’s wholesale customers that the proposed wholesale rates, which are within the Commission's jurisdiction, are discriminatory and noncompetitive when considered in relation to the company’s retail rates, which are not within the jurisdiction of the Commission? We hold that it does. I Arkansas Power & Light Co. (Company) is a public utility engaged .in the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce under the meaning of § 201 of the Federal Power Act (Act), as added, 49 Stat. 847, 16 U. S. C. § 824. Its wholesale rates are thus within reach of the Commission’s powers under § 206 (a) of the Act to establish rates which are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 16 U. S. C. § 824e (a). The Company also sells at retail and seeks industrial sales in competition with some of its wholesale customers. These wholesale customers include the seven municipally owned electric systems and the two electric power cooperatives which are respondents here. Each of these respondents (Customers) operates in the State of Arkansas and each borders on or is surrounded by the territory served by the Company. In June 1973, the Company filed with the Commission a wholesale rate increase pursuant to §205 (d). The Customers sought to intervene before the Commission, urging that the rate increase be rejected. Among other grounds, it was asserted that the Customers and the Company were in competition for industrial retail accounts and that the rate increase was “an attempt to squeeze [the Customers] or some of them out of competition and to make them more susceptible to the persistent attempts of the company to take over the public [ly] owned systems in the State.” App. 6. It was alleged that the proposed wholesale rates would make it “impossible for the [Customers] to sell power to an industrial load of any size at a competitive price with [the Company], since, in many cases, the revenues therefrom would not even cover the incremental power costs to [the Customers].” Id., at 7. It was also asserted that the rate filing was “plainly discriminatory against the single class of customer which [the Company] has historically attempted to drive out of business, without justification on any ordinary cost of service basis . . . Id., at 19. The Company opposed the petition. The Commission permitted the Customers to intervene but ruled that it would “limit Customers' participation in this proceeding to matters other than the alleged anti-competitive activities” because the Customers had failed to demonstrate that the relief sought was “within this Commission’s authority to direct.” Id., at 35. The Commission also denied the Customers’ amended petition to intervene, again refusing to consider the tendered anticompetitive and discrimination issues. Inasmuch as the Commission’s authority is limited to wholesale rates and does not reach sales at retail, the Commission’s opinion was that “the relief sought by [the Customers] is beyond the authority granted to us under the Federal Power Act.” Id., at 53. In later denying the Customers’ petition for rehearing, the Commission stated that in considering the Company’s cost base for its proposed wholesale rates, it would of course put aside those costs properly allocable to the Company’s retail business; but it again ruled that the anticompetitive issue presented by the Customers was “beyond the scope of this Commission’s jurisdiction, contrary to the purposes of the Federal Power Act and inappropriate in this proceeding, the purpose of which is to review the justness and reasonableness of the [Company’s] proposed wholesale rates.” Id., at 55. The Customers sought review of the Commission’s action in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the Commission’s view as to the reach of its powers, held that the Commission’s jurisdiction over wholesale rates for electricity sold in interstate commerce furnished the necessary authority to consider the alleged discriminatory and anticompetitive effects of the requested increase. The Company’s retail rates, the court held, “in a market in which it is competing with its own customers are part of the factual context in which the proposed wholesale rate will function . . and should be considered in determining whether or not the rate increase was just and reasonable. 167 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 52, 510 F. 2d 1264, 1273 (1975). The case was therefore remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. We granted the Commission’s petition for certiorari to consider the question whether the Court of Appeals had correctly construed the statutes controlling the Commission’s jurisdiction. 423 U. S. 945 (1975). We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II Section 201 (b) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 824 (b), confers jurisdiction on the Commission with respect to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The prohibition against discriminatory or preferential rates or services imposed by § 205 (b) and the Commission’s power to set just and reasonable rates under § 206 (a) are accordingly limited to sales “subject to. the jurisdiction of the Commission,” that is, to sales of electric energy at wholesale. The Commission has no power to prescribe the rates for retail sales of power companies. Nor, accordingly, would it have power to remedy an alleged discriminatory or anticompetitive relationship between wholesale and retail rates by ordering the company to increase its retail rates. As the Commission is at great pains to establish, this is the proper construction of the Act, the legislative history of § 205 indicating that the section was expressly limited to jurisdictional sales to foreclose the possibility that the Commission would seek to correct an alleged discriminatory relationship between wholesale and retail rates by raising or otherwise regulating the nonjurisdic-tional, retail price. Insofar as we are advised, no party to this case contends otherwise. Building on this history, the Commission makes a skillful argument that it may neither consider nor remedy any alleged discrimination resting on a difference between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rates. But the argument, in the end, is untenable. Section 205 (b) forbids the maintenance of any “unreasonable difference in rates” or service “with respect to any . . . sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.” A jurisdictional sale is necessarily implicated in any charge that the difference between wholesale and retail rates is unreasonable or anticompetitive. If the undue preference or discrimination is in any way traceable to the level of the jurisdictional rate, it is plain enough that the section would to that extent apply; and to that extent the Commission would have power to effect a remedy under § 206 by an appropriate order directed to the jurisdictional rate. This was the view of the Court of Appeals, and we agree with it. The Commission appears to insist that a just and reasonable wholesale rate can never be a contributing factor to an undue discrimination: Once the jurisdictional rate is determined to be just and reasonable, inquiry into discrimination is irrelevant for § 206 (a) purposes, for if the discrimination continues to exist, it is traceable wholly to the non jurisdictional, retail rate. This argument assumes, however, that ratemaking is an exact science and that there is only one level at which a wholesale rate can be said to be just and reasonable and that any attempt to remedy a discrimination by lowering the jurisdictional rate would always result in an unjustly low rate that would fail to recover fully allocated wholesale costs. As the Court of Appeals pointed out and as this Court has held, however, there is no single cost-recovering rate, but a zone of reasonableness: “Statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a pinpoint. It allows a substantial spread between what is unreasonable because too low and what is unreasonable because too high.” Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U. S. 246, 251 (1951). The Commission itself explained the matter in In re Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 134, 149 (1940): “It occurs to us that one rate in its relation to another rate may be discriminatory, although each rate per se, if considered independently, might fall within the zone of reasonableness. There is considerable latitude within the zone of reasonableness insofar as the level of a particular rate is concerned. The relationship of rates within such a zone, however, may result in an undue advantage in favor of one rate and be discriminatory insofar as another rate is concerned. When such a situation exists, the discrimination found to exist must be removed.” The Commission thus cannot so easily satisfy its obligation to eliminate unreasonable discriminations or put aside its duty to consider whether a proposed rate will have anticompetitive effects. The exercise by the Commission of powers otherwise within its jurisdiction “clearly carries with it the responsibility to consider, in appropriate circumstances, the anticompetitive effects of regulated aspects of interstate utility operations pursuant to . .. directives contained in §§ 205, 206 ....” Gulf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U. S. 747, 758-759 (1973). The Commission must arrive at a rate level deemed by it to be just and reasonable, but in doing so it must consider the tendered allegations that the proposed rates are discriminatory and anticompetitive in effect. We think the Court of Appeals was quite correct in concluding: “When costs are fully allocated, both the retail rate and the proposed wholesale rate may fall within a zone of reasonableness, yet create a price squeeze between themselves. There would, at the very least, be latitude in the FPC to put wholesale rates in the lower range of the zone of reasonableness, without concern that overall results would be impaired, in view of the utility’s own decision to depress certain retail revenues in order to curb the retail competition of its wholesale customers.” 167 U. S. App. D. C., at 53, 510 F. 2d, at 1274. (Footnote omitted.) Because the Commission had raised a jurisdictional barrier and refused to consider or hear evidence concerning the Customers’ allegations, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether a wholesale rate, if set low enough partially or wholly to abolish any discriminatory effects found to exist, would fail to recover wholesale costs. The case was therefore remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. We agree with this disposition. It does not invade a non jurisdictional area. The remedy, if any, would operate only against the rate for jurisdictional sales. Whether that rate would be affected at all would involve, as the Court of Appeals indicated, an examination of the entire “factual context in which the proposed wholesale rate will function.” Id., at 52, 510 F. 2d, at 1273. These facts will naturally include those related to non jurisdictional transactions, but consideration of such facts would appear to be an everyday affair. As the Commission concedes, in determining whether the proposed wholesale rates are just and reasonable, it would in any event be necessary to determine which of the Company’s costs are allocable to its non jurisdictional, retail sales and which to its jurisdictional, wholesale sales — this in order to insure that the wholesale rate is paying its way, but no more. In this sense, consideration of the relationship between jurisdictional and non jurisdictional rate structures is commonplace, and is nothing more than is required by Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 581 (1945), and by Panhandle Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S. 635 (1945). Furthermore, § 206 (a) provides that whenever the Commission finds that “any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” (Emphasis added.) The rules, practices, or contracts “affecting” the jurisdictional rate are not themselves limited to the jurisdictional context. In the Panhandle case, supra, decided under the almost identical provision of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U. S. C. § 717d (a), the Court emphasized the same aspect of the section, and went on to hold that because it was “clear” that a gas company’s “contracts covering direct industrial sales” are contracts “affecting” jurisdictional rates, “[t]he Commission, while it lacks authority to fix rates for direct industrial sales, may take those rates into consideration when it fixes the rates for interstate wholesale sales which are subject to its jurisdiction.” 324 U. S., at 646. The Court of Appeals’ construction of the Act is sound and its judgment is affirmed. So ordered. Section 206 (a) provides: “Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order.” 49 Stat. 852,16 U. S. C. § 824e (a). Section 205 (b) forbids rates that are preferential or discriminatory: “No public utility shall, with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.” 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (b). The respondent customers are Conway Corp. (Conway, Ark.); Benton Municipal Light & Water Works; Hope Water & Light Commission; city of North Little Rock; city of Osceola; city of Prescott; city of West Memphis; Farmers Electric Cooperative Corp.; and Mississippi County Electric Cooperative, Inc. Section 205 (d) provides: “Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days’ notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the thirty days’ notice herein provided for by an order specifying the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the manner in which they shall be filed and published.” 49 Stat. 851, 16 U. S. C. § 824d (d). Section 201 (b) provides in relevant part: “The provisions of this Part shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce, but shall not apply to any other sale of electric energy or deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.” Under the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887, it was held that the Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered to order that a nonjurisdictional, intrastate freight rate be raised to eliminate a discrimination. Houston & Texas R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 356-359 (1914). “The function which an allocation of costs (including return) is designed to perform in a rate case of this character is clear. The amount of gross revenue from each class of business is known. Some of those revenues are derived from sales at rates which the Commission has no power to fix. The other part of the gross revenues comes from the interstate wholesale rates which are under the Commission’s jurisdiction. The problem is to allocate to each class of the business its fair share of the costs. It is of course immaterial that the revenues from the intrastate sales or the direct industrial sales may exceed their costs, since the authority to regulate those phases of the business is lacking. To the extent, however, that the revenues from the interstate wholesale business exceed the costs allocable to that phase of the business, the interstate wholesale rates are excessive.” 324 U. S., at 588. “We agree that the Commission must make a separation of the regulated and unregulated business when it fixes the interstate wholesale rates of a company whose activities embrace both. Otherwise the profits or losses, as the case may be, of the unregulated business would be assigned to the regulated business and the Commission would transgress the jurisdictional lines which Congress wrote into the Act. The Commission recognizes this necessity. As it stated in Re Cities Service Gas Co., 50 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65, 89: ‘The company’s facilities and operations are devoted in part to natural gas service which is not subject to our jurisdiction. This service consists principally of gas sales made directly to large industrial consumers. The necessity arises, therefore, for making an allocation of costs as between the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional sales.’ The question is whether a formal allocation was necessary under the exceptional circumstances of this case.” 324 U. S., at 641-642. (Footnote omitted.) Eor the proposition that there is no room within the Act to consider any discriminatory or anticompetitive relationship between a jurisdictional and a nonjurisdictional rate, the Commission relies upon the statement in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Colorado Interstate Co. v. FPC, 324 U. S., at 615: “It is true that the Natural Gas Act forbids discrimination only as between regulated rates and does not forbid discriminations between the regulated and unregulated ones.” But the Justice went on to make clear that a nonjurisdictional price could be used in determining what is the “just and reasonable” jurisdictional rate. “By use of the unregulated price as a basis for comparison I think a reduction in the wholesale rates for resale to the public is in order. If this makes low price industrial business less desirable, it will be in the long-range public interest for reasons more fully stated by me m [FPC v. Hope Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944)].” Ibid.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. NATIONAL CASUALTY CO. No. 435. Argued April 9-10, 1958 Decided June 30, 1958. Ralph S. Spritzer argued the causes for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Earl W. Kintner and James E. Cor key. John F. Langs argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 435. J. D. Wheeler argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 436. A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed by Paul L. Adams, Attorney General of Michigan, Samuel J. Torina, Solicitor General, and Stanton S. Faville, Chief Assistant Attorney General, joined in by State Attorneys General Robert Morrison of Arizona, Bruce Bennett of Arkansas, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, John J. Bracken of Connecticut, Richard W. Ervin of Florida, Eugene Cook of Georgia, Latham Castle of Illinois, Edwin K. Steers of Indiana, Norman A. Erbe of Iowa, John Anderson, Jr. of Kansas, Jo M. Ferguson of Kentucky, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, C. Ferdinand Sybert of Maryland, John M. Dalton of Missouri, Clarence S. Beck of Nebraska, Harvey Dickerson of Nevada, Louis C. Wyman of New Hampshire, Fred M. Standley of New Mexico, Louis J. Lefkowitz of New York, Leslie R. Burgum of North Dakota, William Saxbe of Ohio, Mac Q. Williamson of Oklahoma, Robert Y. Thornton of Oregon, Thomas D. McBride of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent of Rhode Island, T. C. Callison of South Carolina, Phil Saunders of South Dakota, George F. McCanless of Tennessee, Will Wilson of Texas, E. Richard Callister of Utah, A. S. Harrison, Jr. of Virginia, Frederick M. Reed of Vermont, John J. O’Connell of Washington, W. W. Barron of West Virginia, Stewart G. Honeck of Wisconsin and Thomas 0. Miller of Wyoming. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were also filed by Franklin J. Marryott, L. J. Carey, Joseph P. Craugh, John W. Joanis and Garl Watkins for the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, Whitney North Seymour for the Health Insurance Association of America, and Hugh B. Cox and H. Thomas Austern for the Life Insurance Association of America and the American Life Convention. Together with No. 436, Federal Trade Commission v. American Hospital & Life Insurance Co., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Per Curiam. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have set aside cease-and-desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission prohibiting respondent insurance companies from carrying on certain advertising practices found by the Commission to be false, misleading, and deceptive, in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U. S. C. § 45. These orders seek to proscribe activities within the boundaries of States that have their own statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive insurance practices as well as within States that do not. The courts below concluded that in view of the existence of these statutes, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011— 1015, prohibits the Federal Trade Commission from regulating such practices within the States having these statutes. We granted certiorari to review this interpretation of an important federal statute. 355 U. S. 867. Respondents, the National Casualty Company in No. 435 and the American Hospital and Life Insurance Company in No. 436, engage in the sale of health and accident insurance. National is licensed to sell policies in all States, as well as the District of Columbia and Hawaii, while American is licensed in fourteen States. Solicitation of business for National is carried on by independent agents who operate on commission. The company’s advertising material is prepared by it and shipped in bulk to these agents, who distribute the material locally and assume the expense of such dissemination. Only an insubstantial amount of any advertising goes directly by mail from the company to the public, and there is no use of radio, television, or other means of mass communication by the company. American does not materially differ from National in method of operation. The pertinent portions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act are set forth in the margin. An examination of that statute and its legislative history establishes that the Act withdrew from the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate respondents’ advertising practices in those States which are regulating those practices under their own laws. Petitioner asserts that for constitutional reasons the McCarran-Ferguson Act should be construed to authorize federal regulation in these cases. It is urged that because Congress understood that in accordance with due process there are territorial limitations on the power of the States to regulate an interstate business, it did not intend to foreclose federal regulation of interstate insurance as a supplement to state action. However, petitioner concedes that this constitutional infirmity on the power of the States does not operate to hinder state regulation of the advertising practices of the respondents in the instant cases. Whatever may have been the intent of Congress with regard to interstate insurance practices which the States cannot for constitutional reasons regulate effectively, that intent is irrelevant in the cases before us. Respondents’ advertising programs require distribution by their local agents, and there is no question but that the States possess ample means to regulate this adver-) tising within their respective boundaries. Cf., e. g., Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440, 445, n. 6, 461. Petitioner also argues in a different vein that even if the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars federal regulation where state regulation has been effectively applied, the exercise of Commission authority in these cases should be upheld because the States have not “regulated” within the meaning of the Section 2 (b) proviso. This argument is not persuasive in the instant cases. Each State in question has enacted prohibitory legislation which proscribes unfair insurance advertising and authorizes enforcement through a scheme of administrative supervision. Petitioner does not argue that the statutory provisions here under review were mere pretense. Rather, it urges that a general prohibition designed to guarantee certain standards of conduct is too “inchoate” to be “regulation” until that prohibition has been crystallized into “administrative elaboration of these standards and application in individual cases.” However, assuming there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson Act between “legislation” and “regulation,” nothing in the language of that Act or its legislative history supports the distinctions drawn by petitioner. So far as we can determine from the records and arguments in these cases, the proviso in Section 2 (b) has been satisfied. The judgments of the Courts of Appeals are Affirmed. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reported at 243 F. 2d 719. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reported at 245 F. 2d 883. “That the Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. “Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. “(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, . . . the Clayton Act, and . . . the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law. . . .” 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 61 Stat. 448, 70 Stat. 908. The crucial proviso in Section 2 (b) was the subject of extended debate. See, especially, the remarks of Senator McCarran, 91 Cong. Rec. 1443, and Senator Ferguson, 91 Cong. Rec. 1481. A substantial amount of material appears during the formulating period of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., and the remarks of Senators Ferguson, Murdock, and Radcliffe, 91 Cong. Rec. 482-483, and of Representatives Hancock and Gwynne, 91 Cong. Rec. 1087, 1089-1090. Cf., e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, and 91 Cong. Rec. 1442. See also Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313; Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53. At the time the complaints were filed thirty-six States had enacted the “Model Unfair Trade Practices Bill for Insurance.” Eight others had statutes essentially the same in effect as the “Model Bill.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MICHIGAN, et al., Petitioners v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et al. Utility Air Regulatory Group, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. National Mining Association, Petitioner v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Nos. 14-46 14-47 14-49. Supreme Court of the United States Argued March 25, 2015. Decided June 29, 2015. Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, for State Petitioners. F. William Brownell, for Industry Petitioners and Respondents in support. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, for the Federal Respondents. Paul M. Smith, Washington, DC, for Industry Respondents. Carroll W. McGuffey III, Justin T. Wong, Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, GA, Peter S. Glaser, Counsel of Record, Troutman Sanders LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner National Mining Association. F. William Brownell, Counsel of Record, Henry V. Nickel, Lee B. Zeugin, Elizabeth L. Horner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Leslie Sue Ritts, Ritts Law Group, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, for Petitioner American Public Power Association. Bart E. Cassidy, Katherine L. Vaccaro, Manko, Gold, Katcher & Fox, LLP, Bala Cynwyd, PA, for Petitioner ARIPPA. Michael Nasi, Jackson Walker LLP, Austin, TX, for Petitioner Gulf Coast Lignite Coalition. Dennis Lane, Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Washington, DC, Parthenia B. Evans, Stinson Leonard Street LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Petitioner Kansas City Board of Public Utilities. Eric Groten, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Austin, TX, for Petitioner White Stallion Energy Center, LLC. Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Melissa Hoffer, Tracy L. Triplett, Assistant Attorneys General, Environmental Protection Division, Boston, MA, Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Oakland, CA, George Jepsen, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, Matthew P. Denn, Attorney General of Delaware, Wilmington, DE, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Chicago, IL, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, Janet T. Mills, Attorney General of Maine, Augusta, ME, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, Lori Swanson, Attorney General of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, Joseph A. Foster, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Concord, NH, Hector Balderas, Attorney General of New Mexico, Santa Fe, NM, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, Albany, NY, Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, Raleigh, NC, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General of Oregon, Salem, OR, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Providence, RI, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, Montpelier, VT, Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, George A. Nilson, City Solicitor for the City of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, Stephen R. Patton, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Michael A. Siragusa, County Attorney for the County of Erie, Buffalo, NY, Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Respondents. Neil D. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, Environment, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Division, Bill Schuette, Michigan Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lansing, MI, for Petitioners. Luther Strange, Attorney General, State of Alabama, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Petitioner State of Alabama. Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Steven E. Mulder, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, AK, for Petitioner State of Alaska. Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, James T. Skardon, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Enforcement Section, Phoenix, AZ, Counsel for Petitioner State of Arizona. Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, Attorney General, Little Rock, AR, for Petitioner State of Arkansas, ex rel. Dustin McDaniel, Attorney General. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, ID, for Petitioner State of Idaho, Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General, Valerie Tachtiris, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Petitioner State of Indiana. Michael Bousselot, Des Moines, for Petitioner Terry E. Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa on behalf of the People of Iowa. Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Chanay, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Kansas, Topeka, KS, for Petitioner State of Kansas. Jack Conway, Attorney General, Frankfort, KY, for Petitioner Jack Conway. Jim Hood, Attorney General, Harold E. Pizzetta III, Assistant Attorney General, Director, Civil Litigation Division, Jackson, MS, for Petitioner State of Mississippi. Chris Koster, Attorney General, James R. Layton, Jefferson City, MO, for Petitioner State of Missouri. Doug Peterson, Attorney General, Dave Bydalek, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Blake Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Lincoln, NE, for Petitioner State of Nebraska. Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, Margaret I. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for Petitioner State of North Dakota. Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner State of Ohio. E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General, Patrick Wyrick, Solicitor General, P. Clayton Eubanks, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, OK, for Petitioner State of Oklahoma. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Robert D. Cook, Solicitor General, James Emory Smith, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Columbia, SC, for Petitioner State of South Carolina. Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Charles E. Roy, First Assistant Attorney General, James E. Davis, Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation, Jon Niermann, Chief, Environmental Protection Division, Mark Walters, Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Environmental Protection Division, Austin, TX, for Petitioners State of Texas, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Texas Public Utility Commission, and Railroad Commission of Texas, Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General, Salt Lake City, UT, for Petitioner State of Utah. Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner State of West Virginia, Peter K. Michael, Attorney General, Michael J. McGrady, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, WY, for Petitioner State of Wyoming. Brendan K. Collins, Counsel of Record, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Ronald M. Varnum, Lorene L. Boudreau, Ballard Spahr LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Paul M. Smith, Matthew E. Price, Erica L. Ross, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC, for Industry Respondents. Sanjay Narayan, Sierra Club, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent Sierra Club. James S. Pew, Neil E. Gormley, Earthjustice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent Chesapeake, Bay Foundation Clean Air Council, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Sierra Club, and Waterkeeper Alliance, Sean H. Donahue, Counsel of Record, David T. Goldberg, Donahue & Goldberg, LLP, Washington, D.C., Vickie L. Patton, Graham McCahan, Tomás Carbonell, Environmental Defense Fund, Boulder, CO, for Respondent Environmental Defense Fund. John Suttles, Southern Environmental Law Center, Chapel Hill, NC, for Respondent American Academy of Pediatrics, American Lung Association, American Nurses Association, American Public Health Association and Physicians for Social Responsibility. Ann Brewster Weeks, Darin T. Schroeder, Clean Air Task Force, Boston, MA, for Respondent Citizens for Pennsylvania's Future, Conservation Law Foundation, Environment America, Izaak Walton League of America, Natura, Resources Council of Maine, and Ohio Environmental Council. John D. Walke, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C., for Respondent Natural Resource Defense Council. Opinion Justice SCALIAdelivered the opinion of the Court. The Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from power plants if the Agency finds regulation "appropriate and necessary." We must decide whether it was reasonable for EPA to refuse to consider cost when making this finding. I The Clean Air Act establishes a series of regulatory programs to control air pollution from stationary sources (such as refineries and factories) and moving sources (such as cars and airplanes). 69 Stat. 322, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q. One of these is the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Program-the hazardous-air-pollutants program, for short. Established in its current form by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 104 Stat. 2531, this program targets for regulation stationary-source emissions of more than 180 specified "hazardous air pollutants." § 7412(b). For stationary sources in general, the applicability of the program depends in part on how much pollution the source emits. A source that emits more than 10 tons of a single pollutant or more than 25 tons of a combination of pollutants per year is called a major source. § 7412(a)(1). EPA is required to regulate all major sources under the program. § 7412(c)(1)-(2). A source whose emissions do not cross the just-mentioned thresholds is called an area source. § 7412(a)(2). The Agency is required to regulate an area source under the program if it "presents a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment ... warranting regulation." § 7412(c)(3). At the same time, Congress established a unique procedure to determine the applicability of the program to fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The Act refers to these plants as electric utility steam generating units, but we will simply call them power plants. Quite apart from the hazardous-air-pollutants program, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 subjected power plants to various regulatory requirements. The parties agree that these requirements were expected to have the collateral effect of reducing power plants' emissions of hazardous air pollutants, although the extent of the reduction was unclear. Congress directed the Agency to "perform a study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by [power plants] of [hazardous air pollutants] after imposition of the requirements of this chapter." § 7412(n)(1)(A). If the Agency "finds ... regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the study," it "shall regulate [power plants] under [§ 7412]." Ibid.EPA has interpreted the Act to mean that power plants become subject to regulation on the same terms as ordinary major and area sources, see 77 Fed.Reg. 9330 (2012), and we assume without deciding that it was correct to do so. And what are those terms? EPA must first divide sources covered by the program into categories and subcategories in accordance with statutory criteria. § 7412(c)(1). For each category or subcategory, the Agency must promulgate certain minimum emission regulations, known as floor standards. § 7412(d)(1), (3). The statute generally calibrates the floor standards to reflect the emissions limitations already achieved by the best-performing 12% of sources within the category or subcategory. § 7412(d)(3). In some circumstances, the Agency may also impose more stringent emission regulations, known as beyond-the-floor standards. The statute expressly requires the Agency to consider cost (alongside other specified factors) when imposing beyond-the-floor standards. § 7412(d)(2). EPA completed the study required by § 7412(n)(1)(A)in 1998, 65 Fed.Reg. 79826 (2000), and concluded that regulation of coal- and oil-fired power plants was "appropriate and necessary" in 2000, id.,at 79830. In 2012, it reaffirmed the appropriate-and-necessary finding, divided power plants into subcategories, and promulgated floor standards. The Agency found regulation "appropriate" because (1) power plants' emissions of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants posed risks to human health and the environment and (2) controls were available to reduce these emissions. 77 Fed.Reg. 9363. It found regulation "necessary" because the imposition of the Act's other requirements did not eliminate these risks. Ibid.EPA concluded that "costs should not be considered" when deciding whether power plants should be regulated under § 7412. Id.,at 9326. In accordance with Executive Order, the Agency issued a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" alongside its regulation. This analysis estimated that the regulation would force power plants to bear costs of $9.6 billion per year. Id.,at 9306. The Agency could not fully quantify the benefits of reducing power plants' emissions of hazardous air pollutants; to the extent it could, it estimated that these benefits were worth $4 to $6 million per year.Ibid.The costs to power plants were thus between 1,600 and 2,400 times as great as the quantifiable benefits from reduced emissions of hazardous air pollutants. The Agency continued that its regulations would have ancillary benefits-including cutting power plants' emissions of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, substances that are not covered by the hazardous-air-pollutants program. Although the Agency's appropriate-and-necessary finding did not rest on these ancillary effects, id.,at 9320, the regulatory impact analysis took them into account, increasing the Agency's estimate of the quantifiable benefits of its regulation to $37 to $90 billion per year, id.,at 9306. EPA concedes that the regulatory impact analysis "played no role" in its appropriate-and-necessary finding. Brief for Federal Respondents 14. Petitioners (who include 23 States) sought review of EPA's rule in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. As relevant here, they challenged the Agency's refusal to consider cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants. The Court of Appeals upheld the Agency's decision not to consider cost, with Judge Kavanaugh concurring in part and dissenting in part. White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA,748 F.3d 1222 (2014)(per curiam). We granted certiorari. 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 702, 703, 190 L.Ed.2d 434 (2014). II Federal administrative agencies are required to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking." Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB,522 U.S. 359, 374, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998)(internal quotation marks omitted). "Not only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational." Ibid.It follows that agency action is lawful only if it rests "on a consideration of the relevant factors." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted). EPA's decision to regulate power plants under § 7412allowed the Agency to reduce power plants' emissions of hazardous air pollutants and thus to improve public health and the environment. But the decision also ultimately cost power plants, according to the Agency's own estimate, nearly $10 billion a year. EPA refused to consider whether the costs of its decision outweighed the benefits. The Agency gave cost no thought at all,because it considered cost irrelevant to its initial decision to regulate. EPA's disregard of cost rested on its interpretation of § 7412(n)(1)(A), which, to repeat, directs the Agency to regulate power plants if it "finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary." The Agency accepts that it couldhave interpreted this provision to mean that cost is relevant to the decision to add power plants to the program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. But it chose to read the statute to mean that cost makes no difference to the initial decision to regulate. See 76 Fed.Reg. 24988 (2011)("We further interpret the term 'appropriate' to not allow for the consideration of costs"); 77 Fed.Reg. 9327("Cost does not have to be read into the definition of 'appropriate' "). We review this interpretation under the standard set out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Chevrondirects courts to accept an agency's reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers.Id.,at 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Even under this deferential standard, however, "agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation." Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2442, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014)(internal quotation marks omitted). EPA strayed far beyond those bounds when it read § 7412(n)(1)to mean that it could ignore cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants. A The Clean Air Act treats power plants differently from other sources for purposes of the hazardous-air-pollutants program. Elsewhere in § 7412, Congress established cabined criteria for EPA to apply when deciding whether to include sources in the program. It required the Agency to regulate sources whose emissions exceed specified numerical thresholds (major sources). It also required the Agency to regulate sources whose emissions fall short of these thresholds (area sources) if they "presen[t] a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment ... warranting regulation." § 7412(c)(3). In stark contrast, Congress instructed EPA to add power plants to the program if (but only if) the Agency finds regulation "appropriate and necessary." § 7412(n)(1)(A). One does not need to open up a dictionary in order to realize the capaciousness of this phrase. In particular, "appropriate" is "the classic broad and all-encompassing term that naturally and traditionally includes consideration of all the relevant factors." 748 F.3d, at 1266(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). Although this term leaves agencies with flexibility, an agency may not "entirely fai[l] to consider an important aspect of the problem" when deciding whether regulation is appropriate. State Farm, supra,at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Read naturally in the present context, the phrase "appropriate and necessary" requires at least some attention to cost. One would not say that it is even rational, never mind "appropriate," to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. In addition, "cost" includes more than the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost. EPA's interpretation precludes the Agency from considering anytype of cost-including, for instance, harms that regulation might do to human health or the environment. The Government concedes that if the Agency were to find that emissions from power plants do damage to human health, but that the technologies needed to eliminate these emissions do even more damage to human health, it would stilldeem regulation appropriate. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 70. No regulation is "appropriate" if it does significantly more harm than good. There are undoubtedly settings in which the phrase "appropriate and necessary" does not encompass cost. But this is not one of them. Section 7412(n)(1)(A)directs EPA to determine whether "regulationis appropriate and necessary." (Emphasis added.) Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages andthe disadvantages of agency decisions. It also reflects the reality that "too much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious) problems." Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,556 U.S. 208, 233, 129 S.Ct. 1498, 173 L.Ed.2d 369 (2009)(BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Against the backdrop of this established administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether "regulation is appropriate and necessary" as an invitation to ignore cost. Statutory context reinforces the relevance of cost. The procedures governing power plants that we consider today appear in § 7412(n)(1), which bears the caption "Electric utility steam generating units." In subparagraph (A), the part of the law that has occupied our attention so far, Congress required EPA to study the hazards to public health posed by power plants and to determine whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. But in subparagraphs (B) and (C), Congress called for two additional studies. One of them, a study into mercury emissions from power plants and other sources, must consider "the health and environmental effects of such emissions, technologies which are available to control such emissions, and the costs of such technologies." § 7412(n)(1)(B)(emphasis added). This directive to EPA to study cost is a further indication of the relevance of cost to the decision to regulate. In an effort to minimize this express reference to cost, EPA now argues that § 7412(n)(1)(A)requires it to consider only the study mandated by that provision, not the separate mercury study, before deciding whether to regulate power plants. But when adopting the regulations before us, the Agency insisted that the provisions concerning all three studies "provide a framework for [EPA's] determination of whether to regulate [power plants]." 76 Fed.Reg. 24987. It therefore decided "to interpret the scope of the appropriate and necessary finding in the context of all three studies." 77 Fed.Reg. 9325(emphasis added). For example: • EPA considered environmental effects relevant to the appropriate-and-necessary finding. It deemed the mercury study's reference to this factor "direct evidence that Congress was concerned with environmental effects." 76 Fed.Reg. 24987. • EPA considered availability of controls relevant to the appropriate-and-necessary finding. It thought that doing so was "consistent with" the mercury study's reference to availability of controls. Id., at 24989. • EPA concluded that regulation of power plants would be appropriate and necessary even if a single pollutant emitted by them posed a hazard to health or the environment. It believed that "Congress' focus" on a single pollutant in the mercury study "support[ed]" this interpretation. Ibid. EPA has not explained why § 7412(n)(1)(B)'s reference to "environmental effects ... and ... costs" provides "direct evidence that Congress was concerned with environmental effects," but not "direct evidence" that it was concerned with cost. Chevronallows agencies to choose among competing reasonable interpretations of a statute; it does not license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not. B EPA identifies a handful of reasons to interpret § 7412(n)(1)(A)to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate. We find those reasons unpersuasive. EPA points out that other parts of the Clean Air Act expressly mention cost, while § 7412(n)(1)(A)does not. But this observation shows only that § 7412(n)(1)(A)'s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors (which include but are not limited to cost); other provisions' specific references to cost encompass just cost. It is unreasonable to infer that, by expressly making cost relevant to other decisions, the Act implicitly makes cost irrelevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants. (By way of analogy, the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause requires searches to be "[r]easonable," while its Warrant Clause requires warrants to be supported by "probable cause." Nobody would argue that, by expressly making level of suspicion relevant to the validity of a warrant, the Fourth Amendment implicitly makes level of suspicion categorically irrelevantto the reasonableness of a search. To the contrary, all would agree that the expansive word "reasonable" encompasses degree of suspicion alongside other relevant circumstances.) Other parts of the Clean Air Act also expressly mention environmental effects, while § 7412(n)(1)(A)does not. Yet that did not stop EPA from deeming environmental effects relevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants. Along similar lines, EPA seeks support in this Court's decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,531 U.S. 457, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). There, the Court addressed a provision of the Clean Air Act requiring EPA to set ambient air quality standards at levels "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). Read naturally, that discrete criterion does not encompass cost; it encompasses health and safety. The Court refused to read that provision as carrying with it an implicit authorization to consider cost, in part because authority to consider cost had "elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted." 531 U.S., at 467, 121 S.Ct. 903. American Truckingthus establishes the modest principle that where the Clean Air Act expressly directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a factor that on its face does not include cost, the Act normally should not be read as implicitly allowing the Agency to consider cost anyway. That principle has no application here. "Appropriate and necessary" is a far more comprehensive criterion than "requisite to protect the public health"; read fairly and in context, as we have explained, the term plainly subsumes consideration of cost. Turning to the mechanics of the hazardous-air-pollutants program, EPA argues that it need not consider cost when first deciding whetherto regulate power plants because it can consider cost later when deciding how muchto regulate them. The question before us, however, is the meaning of the "appropriate and necessary" standard that governs the initial decision to regulate. And as we have discussed, context establishes that this expansive standard encompasses cost. Cost may become relevant again at a later stage of the regulatory process, but that possibility does not establish its irrelevance at thisstage. In addition, once the Agency decides to regulate power plants, it must promulgate certain minimum or floor standards no matter the cost (here, nearly $10 billion a year); the Agency may consider cost only when imposing regulations beyondthese minimum standards. By EPA's logic, someone could decide whether it is "appropriate" to buy a Ferrari without thinking about cost, because he plans to think about cost later when deciding whether to upgrade the sound system. EPA argues that the Clean Air Act makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants. The Agency claims that it is reasonable to interpret § 7412(n)(1)(A)in a way that "harmonizes" the program's treatment of power plants with its treatment of other sources. This line of reasoning overlooks the whole point of having a separate provision about power plants: treating power plants differentlyfrom other stationary sources. Congress crafted narrow standards for EPA to apply when deciding whether to regulate other sources; in general, these standards concern the volume of pollution emitted by the source, § 7412(c)(1), and the threat posed by the source "to human health or the environment," § 7412(c)(3). But Congress wrote the provision before us more expansively, directing the Agency to regulate power plants if "appropriate and necessary." "That congressional election settles this case. [The Agency's] preference for symmetry cannot trump an asymmetrical statute." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Revenue,562 U.S. 277, 296, 131 S.Ct. 1101, 179 L.Ed.2d 37 (2011). EPA persists that Congress treated power plants differently from other sources because of uncertainty about whether regulation of power plants would still be needed after the application of the rest of the Act's requirements. That is undoubtedly oneof the reasons Congress treated power plants differently; hence § 7412(n)(1)(A)'s requirement to study hazards posed by power plants' emissions "after imposition of the requirements of [the rest of the Act]." But if uncertainty about the need for regulation were the onlyreason to treat power plants differently, Congress would have required the Agency to decide only whether regulation remains "necessary," not whether regulation is "appropriate andnecessary." In any event, EPA stated when it adopted the rule that "Congress did not limit [the] appropriate and necessary inquiry to [the study mentioned in § 7412(n)(1)(A)]." 77 Fed.Reg. 9325. The Agency instead decided that the appropriate-and-necessary finding should be understood in light of all three studies required by § 7412(n)(1), and as we have discussed, one of those three studies reflects concern about cost. C The dissent does not embrace EPA's far-reaching claim that Congress made costs altogether irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. Instead, it maintains that EPA need not "explicitly analyze costs" before deeming regulation appropriate, because other features of the regulatory program will on their own ensure the cost-effectiveness of regulation. Post, at 2714 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). This line of reasoning contradicts the foundational principle of administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,318 U.S. 80, 87, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943). When it deemed regulation of power plants appropriate, EPA said that cost was irrelevantto that determination-not that cost-benefit analysis would be deferred until later. Much less did it say (what the dissent now concludes) that the consideration of cost at subsequent stages will ensure that the costs are not disproportionate to the benefits. What it said is that cost is irrelevant to the decision to regulate. That is enough to decide these cases. But for what it is worth, the dissent vastly overstates the influence of cost at later stages of the regulatory process. For example, the dissent claims that the floor standards-which the Act calibrates to reflect emissions limitations already achieved by the best-performing sources in the industry-reflect cost considerations, because the best-performing power plants "must have considered costs in arriving at their emissions outputs."Post, at 2719. EPA did not rely on this argument, and it is not obvious that it is correct. Because power plants are regulated under other federal and state laws, the best-performing power plants' emissions limitations might reflect cost-blind regulation rather than cost-conscious decisions. Similarly, the dissent suggests that EPA may consider cost when dividing sources into categories and subcategories. Post, at 2720. Yet according to EPA, "it is notappropriate to premise subcategorization on costs." 77 Fed.Reg. 9395(emphasis added). That statement presumably explains the dissent's carefully worded observation that EPA considered "technological, geographic, and other factors" when drawing categories, post, at 2720, n. 4, which factors were in turn "related to costs" in some way, post, at 2719. Attenuated connections such as these hardly support the assertion that EPA's regulatory process featured "exhaustive consideration of costs," post,at 2714. All in all, the dissent has at most shown that some elements of the regulatory scheme mitigate cost in limited ways; it has not shown that these elements ensure cost-effectiveness. If (to take a hypothetical example) regulating power plants would yield $5 million in benefits, the prospect of mitigating cost from $11 billion to $10 billion at later stages of the program would not by itself make regulation appropriate. In all events, we need not pursue these points, because EPA did not say that the parts of the regulatory program mentioned by the dissent prevent the imposition of costs far in excess of benefits. "[EPA's] action must be measured by what [it] did, not by what it might have done." Chenery, supra,at 93-94, 63 S.Ct. 454. D Our reasoning so far establishes that it was unreasonable for EPA to read § 7412(n)(1)(A)to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants. The Agency must consider cost-including, most importantly, cost of compliance-before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law unambiguously required the Agency, when making this preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value. It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation) how to account for cost. Some of the respondents supporting EPA ask us to uphold EPA's action because the accompanying regulatory impact analysis shows that, once the rule's ancillary benefits are considered, benefits plainly outweigh costs. The dissent similarly relies on these ancillary benefits when insisting that "the outcome here [was] a rule whose benefits exceed its costs." Post, at 2722. As we have just explained, however, we may uphold agency action only upon the grounds on which the agency acted. Even if the Agency couldhave considered ancillary benefits when deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary-a point we need not address-it plainly did not do so here. In the Agency's own words, the administrative record "utterly refutes [the] assertion that [ancillary benefits] form the basis for the appropriate and necessary finding." 77 Fed.Reg. 9323. The Government concedes, moreover, that "EPA did not rely on the [regulatory impact analysis] when deciding to regulate power plants," and that "[e]ven if EPA had considered costs, it would not necessarily have adopted ... the approach set forth in [that analysis]." Brief for Federal Respondents 53-54. * * * We hold that EPA interpreted § 7412(n)(1)(A)unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WENGLER v. DRUGGISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. et al. No. 79-381. Argued. February 25, 1980 Decided April 22, 1980 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNNAN, Stewart, Marshall, BlackmtjN, and Powell, JJ., joined. SteveNS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 154. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 153. John W. Reid II argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Ralph C. Kleinschmidt argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Gerre S. Langton Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Stuart A. Smith, Brian K. Landsberg, and Mark L. Gross filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a provision of the Missouri workers’ compensation laws, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979), which is claimed to involve an invalid gender-based discrimination. I The facts are not in dispute. On February 11, 1977, Ruth Wengler, wife of appellant Paul J. Wengler, died in a work-related accident in the parking lot of her employer, appellee Dicus Prescription Drugs, Inc. Appellant filed a claim for death benefits under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979) , under which a widower is not entitled to death benefits unless he either is mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earning or proves actual dependence on his wife’s earnings. In contrast, a widow qualifies for death benefits without having to prove actual dependence on her husband’s earnings. Appellant stipulated that he was neither incapacitated nor dependent on his wife’s earnings, but argued that, owing to its disparate treatment of similarly situated widows and widowers, § 287.240 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim was administratively denied, but the Circuit Court of Madison County reversed, holding that § 287.240 violated the Equal Protection Clause because the statutory restriction on a widower’s recovery of death benefits did not also apply to a surviving wife. Dicus and its insurer, appellee Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., were ordered to pay death benefits to appellant in the appropriate amount. App. to Juris. Statement A22-A25. The Missouri Supreme Court, distinguishing certain cases in this Court, reversed the Circuit Court’s decision. The equal protection challenge to § 287.240 failed because “the substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women justifies the advantage that [§287.240] administratively gives to a widow.” 583 S. W. 2d 162, 168 (1979). Because the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri arguably conflicted with our precedents, we noted probable jurisdiction. 444 U. S. 924 (1979). We now reverse. II The Missouri law indisputably mandates gender-based discrimination. Although the Missouri Supreme Court was of the view that the law favored, rather than disfavored, women, it is apparent that the statute discriminates against both men and women. The provision discriminates against a woman covered by the Missouri workers’ compensation system since, in the case of her death, benefits are payable to her spouse only if he is mentally or physically incapacitated or was to some extent dependent upon her. Under these tests, Mrs. Wengler’s spouse was entitled to no benefits. If Mr. Wengler had died, however, Mrs. Wengler would have been conclusively presumed to be dependent and would have been paid the statutory amount for life or until she remarried even though she may not in fact have been dependent on Mr. Wengler. The benefits, therefore, that the working woman can expect to be paid to her spouse in the case of her work-related death are less than those payable to the spouse of the deceased male wage earner. It is this kind of discrimination against working women that our cases have identified and in the circumstances found unjustified. At issue in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1976), was a provision in the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g), that granted survivors’ benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father covered by the Act both to his widow and to the couple’s minor children in her care, but that granted benefits based on the earnings of a covered deceased wife and mother only to the minor children and not to the widower. In concluding that the provision violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, we noted that, “ [ojbviously, the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645, citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 354, n. 7 (1974). But such a generalization could not itself justify the gender-based distinction found in the Act, for § 402 (g) “clearly operate[d] ... to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment.” 420 U. S., at 645. The offensive assumption was “that male workers’ earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute to their families’ support.” Id., at 643 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977), we dealt with a Social Security Act provision providing survivors’ benefits to a widow regardless of dependency, but providing the same benefits to a widower only if he had been receiving at least half of his support from his deceased wife. 42 U. S. C. § 402 (f) (1) (D). Mr. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion pointed out that, under the challenged section, “female insureds received less protection for their spouses solely because of their sex” and that, as in Wiesenfeld, the provision disadvantaged women as compared to similarly situated men by providing the female wage earner with less protection for her family than it provided the family of the male wage earner even though the family needs might be identical. Califano v. Goldfarb, supra, at 208. The plurality opinion, in the circumstances there, found the discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), involved a similar discrimination. There, a serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent without regard to whether she was in fact dependent upon him and so obtain increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits. A servicewoman, on the other hand, could not claim her husband as a dependent for these purposes unless he was in fact dependent upon her for over one-half .of his support. This discrimination, devaluing the service of the woman as compared with that of the man, was invalidated. The Missouri law, as the Missouri courts recognized, also discriminates against men who survive their employed wives’ dying in work-related accidents. To receive benefits, the surviving male spouse must prove his incapacity or dependency. The widow of a deceased wage earner, in contrast, is presumed dependent and is guaranteed a weekly benefit for life or until remarriage. It was this discrimination against the male survivor as compared with a similarly situated female that Mr. Justice Stevens identified in Califano v. Goldfarb, supra, as resulting in a denial of equal protection. 430 U. S., at 217-224 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Ill However the discrimination is described in this case, our precedents require that gender-based discriminations must serve important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 85 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 316-317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). Acknowledging that the discrimination involved here must satisfy the Craig v. Boren standard, 583 S. W. 2d, at 164-165, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that “the purpose of the [law] was to favor widows, not to disfavor them” and that when the law was passed in 1925 the legislature no doubt believed that “a widow was more in need of prompt payment of death benefits upon her husband’s death without drawn-out proceedings to determine the amount of dependency than was a widower.” Id,., at 168. Hence, the conclusive presumption of dependency satisfied “a perceived need widows generally had, which need was not common to men whose wives might be killed while working.” Ibid. The survivor’s “hardship was seen by the legislature] as more immediate and pronounced on women than on men,” and “the substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women justifies the advantage that [the law] administratively gives to a widow.” Ibid. Providing for needy spouses is surely an important governmental objective, Orr v. Orr, supra, at 280, and the Missouri statute effects that goal by paying benefits to all surviving female spouses and to all surviving male spouses who prove their dependency. But the question remains whether the discriminatory means employed — discrimination against women wage earners and surviving male spouses — itself substantially serves the statutory end. Surely the needs of surviving widows and widowers would be completely served either by paying benefits to all members of both classes or by paying benefits only to those members of either class who can demonstrate their need. Why, then, employ the discriminatory means of paying all surviving widows without requiring proof of dependency, but paying only those widowers who make the required demonstration? The only justification offered by the state court or appellees for not treating males and females alike, whether viewed as wage earners or survivors of wage earners, is the assertion that most women are dependent on male wage earners and that it is more efficient to presume dependency in the case of women than to engage in case-to-case determination, whereas individualized inquiries in the postulated few cases in which men might be dependent are not prohibitively costly. The burden, however, is on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed justification, and this burden is not carried simply by noting that in 1925 the state legislature thought widows to be more in need of prompt help than men or that today “the substantive difference in the economic standing of working men and women justifies the advantage” given to widows. 583 S. W. 2d, at 168. It may be that there is empirical support for the proposition that men are more likely to be the principal supporters of their spouses and families, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645, but the bare assertion of this argument falls far short of justifying gender-based discrimination on the grounds of administrative convenience. Yet neither the court below nor appellees in this Court essay any persuasive demonstration as to what the economic consequences to the State or to the beneficiaries might be if, in one way or another, men and women, whether as wage earners or survivors, were treated equally under the workers’ compensation law, thus eliminating the double-edged discrimination described in Part II of this opinion. We think, then, that the claimed justification of administrative convenience fails, just as it has in our prior cases. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 689-690, the Government claimed that, as an empirical matter, wives are so frequently dependent upon their husbands and husbands so rarely dependent upon their wives that it was cheaper to presume wives to be dependent upon their husbands while requiring proof of dependency in the case of the male. The Court found the claimed justification insufficient to save the discrimination. And in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971), the Court said “[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. . . .” See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S., at 219-220 (opinion of Stevens, J.). It may be that there are levels of administrative convenience that will justify discriminations that are subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, but the requisite showing has not been made here by the mere claim that it would be inconvenient to individualize determinations about widows as well as widowers. IV Thus we conclude that the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in upholding the constitutional validity of § 287.240. We are left with the question whether the defect should be cured by extending the presumption of dependence to widowers or by eliminating it for widows. Because state legislation is at issue, and because a remedial outcome consonant with the state legislature’s overall purpose is preferable, we believe that state judges are better positioned to choose an appropriate method of remedying the constitutional violation. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri and remand the case to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, continuing to believe that Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977), was wrongly decided, and that constitutional issues should be more readily reexamined under the doctrine of stare decisis than other issues, dissents and would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri. Missouri Rev. Stat. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979) provides in its entirety (emphasis added): “If the injury causes death, either with or without disability, the compensation therefor shall be as provided in this section: “(1) In all cases the employer shall pay direct to the persons furnishing the same the reasonable expense of the burial of the deceased employee not exceeding two thousand dollars. But no person shall be entitled to compensation for the burial expenses of a deceased employee unless he has furnished the same by authority of the widow or widower, the nearest relative of the deceased employee in the county of his death, his personal representative, or the employer, who shall have the right to give the authority in the order named. All fees and charges under this section shall be fair and reasonable, shall be subject to regulation by the division or the commission and shall be limited to such as are fair and reasonable for similar ■ service to persons of a like standard of living. The division or the commission shall also have jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes as to the charges. If the deoeased employee leaves no dependents the death benefit in this subdivision provided shall be the limit of the liability of the employer under this chapter on account of the death, except as herein provided for burial expenses and except as provided in section 287.140; provided, that in all cases when the employer admits or does not deny liability for the burial expense, it shall be paid within thirty days after written notice, that the service has been rendered, has been delivered to the employer. The notice may be sent by registered mail, return receipt requested, or may be made by personal delivery; “(2) The employer shall also pay to the total dependents of the employee a death benefit on the basis of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the employee’s average weekly earnings during the year immediately preceding the injury as provided in section 287.250. Compensation shall be payable in installments in the same manner that compensation is required to. be paid under this chapter, but in no case be less than at the rate of sixteen dollars per week nor more than one hundred twenty dollars per week or as provided in section 287.160. If there is a total dependent, no death benefit shall be payable to partial dependents or any other persons except as provided in subdivision (1); “(3) If there are partial dependents, and no total dependents, a part of the death benefit herein provided in the case of total dependents, determined by the proportion of his contributions to all partial dependents by the employee at the time of the injury, shall be paid by the employer to each of the dependents proportionately; “(4) The word ‘dependent’ as.used in this chapter shall be construed to mean a relative by blood or marriage of a deceased employee, who is actually dependent for support, in whole or in part, upon his wages at the time of the injury. The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be totally dependent for support upon a deceased employee and any death benefit shall be payable to them to the exclusion of other total dependents: “(a) A wife upon a husband legally liable for her support, and a husband mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earning upon a wife; provided, that on the death or remarriage of a widow or widower, the death benefit shall cease unless there be other total dependents entitled to any death benefit under this chapter. In the event of remarriage, a lump sum payment equal in amount to the benefits due for a period of two years shall be paid to the widow or widower. Thereupon the periodic death benefits shall cease unless there are other total dependents entitled to any death benefit under this chapter in which event the periodic benefits to which said widow or widower would have been entitled had he or she not died or remarried, shall be divided among such other total dependents and paid to them during their period of entitlement under this chapter; “(b) A natural, posthumous, or adopted child or children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, under the age of eighteen years, or over that age if physically or mentally incapacitated from wage earning, upon the parent legally hable for the support or with whom he is living at the time of the death of the parent. In case there is a wife or a husband mentally or physically incapacitated from wage earning, dependent upon a wife, and a child or more than one child thus dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them in such proportion as may be determined by the commission after considering their ages and other facts bearing on the dependency. In all other eases questions of total or partial dependency shall be determined in accordance with the facts at the time of the injury, and in such other cases if there is more than one person wholly dependent the death benefit shall be divided equally among them. The payment of death benefits to a child or other dependent as provided in this paragraph shall cease when the dependent dies, attains the age of eighteen years, or becomes physically and mentally capable of wage earning over that age, or until twenty-two years of age if the child of the deceased is in attendance and remains as a full-time student in any accredited educational institution, or if at eighteen years of age the dependent child is a member of the armed forces of the United States on active duty; provided, however, that such dependent child shall be entitled to compensation during four years of full-time attendance at a fully accredited educational institution to commence prior to twenty-three years of age and immediately upon cessation of his active duty in the armed forces, unless there are other total dependents entitled to the death benefit under this chapter; “(5) The division or the commission may, in its discretion, order or award the share of compensation of any such child to be paid to the parent, grandparent, or other adult next of kin or legal guardian of the child for the latter’s support, maintenance and education, which order or award upon notice to the parties may be modified from time to time by the commission in its discretion with respect to the person to whom shall be paid the amount of the order or award remaining unpaid at the time of the-modification; “(6) The payments of compensation by the employer in accordance with the order or award of the division or the commission shall discharge the employer from all further obligations as to the compensation; “(7) All death benefits in this chapter shall be paid in installments in the same manner as provided for disability compensation; “(8) Every employer shall keep a record of the correct names and addresses of the dependents of each of his employees, and upon the death of an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment shall so far as possible immediately furnish the division with said names and addresses.” At the time of her death Mrs. Wengler’s wages were $69 per week. Had appellant prevailed in his attempt to receive full death benefits under the statute, his compensation would have been $46 per week. App. to Juris. Statement A23; see Mo. Rev. Stat. §287.240 (2) (Supp. 1979). These benefits would have continued until appellant's death or remarriage. §287.240 (4) (a). Recent decisions in three States have held unconstitutional workers’ compensation statutes with presumptions of dependency identical to that at issue in this case. Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P. 2d 849 (1977); Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 8, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (1976); Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 75 N. J. 62, 379 A. 2d 848 (1977). The workers’ compensation laws of the vast majority of States now make no distinction between the eligibility of widows and widowers for death benefits. In Kahn v. Shevin, the Court upheld a Florida annual $500 real estate tax exemption for all widows in the face of an equal protection challenge. The Court believed that statistics established a lower median income for women than men, a discrepancy that justified "a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.” 416 U. S., at 355. As in Kahn we accept the importance of the state goal of helping needy spouses, see infra, at 151, but as described in text the Missouri law in our view is not “reasonably designed” to achieve this goal. Thus the holding in Kahn is in no way dispositive of the case at bar. As noted previously, see n. 3, supra, three state courts have recently held unconstitutional workers’ compensation statutes with presumptions of dependency identical to that at issue in this case. In each of the three cases the court characterized the statute’s discrimination as against both working wives and surviving husbands. See Arp v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 19 Cal. 3d, at 406, 563 P. 2d, at 855 ("[I]t is noteworthy that the conclusive presumption in favor of widows discriminates not only against the widower but against the employed female as well”); Passante v. Walden Printing Co., 53 App. Div. 2d, at 12, 385 N. Y. S. 2d, at 181 (the statute “compels dissimilar treatment both for surviving husbands and working wives, respectively, vis-á-vis widows and working males”); Tomarchio v. Township of Greenwich, 75 N. J., at 75, 379 A. 2d, at 854 (statute unconstitutionally discriminates against both working women and surviving husbands). Appellees attempt to draw support from the fact that Goldfarb and Wiesenfeld arose in the context of the Social Security program. First, they argue, the statute at issue here, unlike a social insurance system that provides blanket survivorship benefits, seeks to compensate for specific economic loss to the worker or his dependents, and appellant can claim no such loss. Relatedly, a widower who suffers and can prove any loss of support is entitled to a corresponding level of benefits under § 287.240, whereas Mr. Goldfarb, under the Social Security Act provision, had to show that he had received at least one-half of his support from his wife at the time of her death. These arguments rely on the fact that covered widowers suffering provable economic loss will receive benefits corresponding to that loss under § 287.240, but they ignore the statute’s discriminatory effect on working women by providing them with less protection for their families than working men. Appellees also argue that, unlike the Social Security program, the workers’ compensation system is not based on mandatory contributions from past wage earnings of the employee. Thus appellant’s late wife was not deprived of a portion of her earnings to contribute to a fund out of which her husband would not benefit. But we have before rejected the proposition that “the Constitution is indifferent to a statute that conditions the availability of noncontributory welfare benefits on the basis of gender,” Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 85 (1979), and we refuse to part ways with our earlier decisions by applying a different standard of review in this case simply because the system is funded by employer rather than employee contributions.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BOARD OF PARDONS et al. v. ALLEN et al. No. 86-461. Argued April 1, 1987 Decided June 9, 1987 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’ConnoR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 381. Clay R. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Montana, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Michael T. Greely, Attorney General. Stephen L. Pevar argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward I. Koren, Elizabeth Alexander, and Alvin J. Bronstein. Randáll D. Schmidt filed a brief for Eugene Newbury as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Dennis E. Curtis, Judith Resnik, William J. Genego, John L. Potten-ger, Jr., and Stephen Wizner filed a brief for the Yale Law School Legal Services Organization et al. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether respondents have a liberty interest in parole release that is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I — ( Respondents are George Allen and Dale Jacobsen, inmates of the Montana State Prison. In 1984, after their applications for parole were denied, they filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 on behalf of a class of all present and future inmates of the Montana State Prison who were or might become eligible for parole. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory damages, the complaint charged the State Board of Pardons (Board) and its Chair with violations of the inmates’ civil rights. Specifically, respondents alleged that the Board does not apply the statutorily mandated criteria in determining inmates’ eligibility for parole, Complaint ¶¶6-9, App. 5a-6a, and that the Board does not adequately explain its reasons for denial of parole, id., ¶¶9, 10, App. 6a. The District Court first acknowledged that the case was controlled by the principles established in this Court’s decision in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979). In Greenholtz the Court held that, despite the necessarily subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release decision, see id., at 12, state statutes may create liberty interests in parole release that are entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. The Court concluded that the mandatory language and the structure of the Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz created an “expectancy of release,” which is a liberty interest entitled to such protection. Ibid. Although the District Court recognized that the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, contained language mandating release under certain circumstances, it decided that respondents “were not entitled to due process protections in connection with the board’s denial of parole.” App. 17a. The court concluded that, because the Board is required to make determinations with respect to the best interest of the community and the prisoner, its discretion is too broad to provide a prisoner with a liberty interest in parole release. The Court of Appeals reversed. It compared the provisions of the Montana statute to those of the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz and found their structure and language virtually indistinguishable: “The Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz, uses mandatory language. It states that the Board ‘shall’ release a prisoner on parole when it determines release would not be harmful, unless specified conditions exist that would preclude parole. There is no doubt that it, like the Nebraska provision in Greenholtz, vests great discretion in the Board. Under both statutes the Board must make difficult and highly subjective decisions about risks of releasing inmates. However, the Board may not deny parole under either statute once it determines that harm is not probable.” 792 F. 2d 1404, 1406 (CA9 1986). The court thus held that respondents had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, and remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of “the nature of the process which is due [respondents]” and “whether Montana’s present procedures accord that due process.” Id., at 1408. We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 947 (1986), and now affirm. I — I I — I Greenholtz set forth two major holdings. The Court first held that the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. The Court also held, however, that the Nebraska statute did create an “expectation of parole” protected by the Due Process Clause. 442 U. S., at 11. To decide whether the Montana statute also gives rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest, we scrutinize it under the standards set forth in Greenholtz. The Nebraska statute involved in Greenholtz provides as follows: “Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because: “(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole; “(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law; “(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or “(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-1,114(1) (1981) (emphasis added). The statute also sets forth a list of 14 factors (including one catchall factor permitting the Nebraska Board to consider other information it deems relevant) that the Board must consider in reaching a decision. §§ 83-1,114(2) (a)-(n). In deciding that this statute created a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the Court found significant its mandatory language — the use of the word “shall” — and the presumption created — that parole release must be granted unless one of four designated justifications for deferral is found. See Greenholtz, 442 U. S., at 11-12. The Court recognized — indeed highlighted — that parole-release decisions are inherently subjective and predictive, see id., at 12, but nonetheless found that Nebraska inmates possessed a liberty interest in release. The Court observed that parole release is an equity-type judgment involving “a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individual inmate and for the community,” id., at 8, and acknowledged that the Nebraska statute, like most parole statutes, “vest[ed] very broad discretion in the Board,” id., at 13. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the Board’s argument “that a presumption [of release] would be created only if the statutory conditions for deferral were essentially factual, . . . rather than predictive.” Id., at 12. The Court thus held in Greenholtz that the presence of general or broad release criteria — delegating significant discretion to the decisionmaker — did not deprive the prisoner of the liberty interest in parole release created by the Nebraska statute. In essence, the Court made a distinction between two entirely distinct uses of the term discretion. In one sense of the word, an official has discretion when he or she “is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question.” R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 32 (1977). In this sense, officials who have been told to parole whomever they wish have discretion. In Greenholtz, the Court determined that a scheme awarding officials this type of discretion does not create a liberty interest in parole release. But the term discretion may instead signify that “an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him [or her] by authority”; in other words, an official has discretion when the standards set by a statutory or regulatory scheme “cannot be applied mechanically.” Dworkin, supra, at 31, 32; see also id., at 69 (“[W]e say that a man has discretion if his duty is defined by standards that reasonable [people] can interpret in different ways”). The Court determined in Greenholtz that the presence of official discretion in this sense is not incompatible with the existence of a liberty interest in parole release when release is required after the Board determines (in its broad discretion) that the necessary prerequisites exist. Throughout this litigation, the Board’s arguments have had a single theme: that the holding of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with our decision in Greenholtz. The Board is mistaken. The Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute, creates a liberty interest in parole release. It provides in pertinent part: “Prisoners eligible for parole. (1) Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole . . . any person confined in the Montana state prison or the women’s correction center . . . when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community [.] “(2) A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society and not as an award of clemency or a reduction of sentence or pardon. A prisoner shall be placed on parole only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.” Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201 (1985) (emphasis added). Significantly, the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute, uses mandatory language (“shall”) to “creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted” when the designated findings are made. Greenholtz, 442 U. S., at 12. See Statement of Assistant Attorney General of Montana, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6 (“under our statute once the Board of Pardons determines that the facts underlying a particular parole application are such that the release can occur consistently with the three criteria the statute specifies, then under our law the Board is required to order release”). We reject the argument that a statute that mandates release “unless” certain findings are made is different from a statute that mandates release “if,” “when,” or “subject to” such findings being made. Any such statute “creates a presumption that parole release will be granted.” Greenholtz, supra, at 12. Moreover, the “substantive predicates,” see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 472 (1983), of parole release in Montana are similar to those in Nebraska. In both States, the Parole Board must assess the impact of release on both the prisoner and the community. A central concern of each is the prisoner’s ability “to lead a law-abiding life.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83 — 1,114(l)(d) (1981); see § 83 — 1,114(l)(a) (prisoner may not be released if there is “a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole”); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201(2) (1985) (prisoner must be released when, inter alia, it will cause no detriment to him or her and must not be released unless the prisoner is “able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen”). An interrelated concern of both statutes is whether the release can be achieved without “detriment to . . . the community.” Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201(1) (1985); see § 46-23-201(2) (prisoner must be released only “for the best interests of society”); see Neb. Rev. Stat. §83-l,114(l)(b) (1981) (prisoner must not be released if it “would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law”). The discretion left with the parole boards is equivalent in Montana and Nebraska. The legislative history further supports the conclusion that this statute places significant limits on the discretion of the Board. The statute was enacted in 1955, replacing a 1907 statute which had granted absolute discretion to the Board: “Parole of prisoners in State Prison.— The Governor may recommend and the State Board of Prison Commissioners may parole any inmate of the State Prison, under such reasonable conditions and regulations as may be deemed expedient, and adopted by such state board.” Mont. Rev. Code §9573 (1907). The new statute made release mandatory upon certain findings and specified its purpose in its title: “An Act Creating a Board of Pardons and Prescribing the Appointment and Composition Thereof, With Power and Duty to Grant Paroles, Within Restrictions . . . Act of Mar. 3, 1955, 1955 Mont. Laws, ch. 153 (emphasis added). The new statute also added a provision for judicial review of the Board’s parole-release decisions, see Mont. Code Ann. §46-23-107 (1985), thus providing a further indication of a legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board. Here, as in Greenholtz, the release decision is “necessarily subjective . . . and predictive,” see 442 U. S., at 13; here, as in Greenholtz, the discretion of the Board is “very broad,” see ibid.; and here, as in Greenholtz, the Board shall release the inmate when the findings prerequisite to release are made. See supra, at 377-378 and 379-380. Thus, we find in the Montana statute, as in the Nebraska statute, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Both respondents were released on parole after this suit was filed. 792 F. 2d 1404, 1408, n. 2 (1986). The action is not moot, however. In addition to requesting injunctive and declaratory relief, the complaint sought damages from Henry Burgess, Chair of the Board of Pardons, in both his official and personal capacities. Because “this Court has not decided whether state parole officials enjoy absolute immunity as a matter of federal law,” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U. S. 193, 200 (1985), “the validity of respondents’ claim for damages ... is not so insubstantial or so clearly foreclosed by prior decisions that this case may not proceed.” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1978). Of the 350 individuals released from prison in Montana in 1985, 276 were conditionally released, the vast majority of them on parole; only 74 persons released had served their full sentences. See U. S. Dept, of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1985, Table 43 (1985). Only 69 of 363 released in 1984 had discharged their full sentences. See U. S. Dept, of Justice, Bureau of Justice Standards, Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1984, Table 13 (1984). There is far more to liberty than interests conferred by language in state statutes. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460, 466 (1983); Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 468 (1981) (White, J., concurring). Four Members of this Court are of the view that the existence of a liberty interest in parole release is not solely a function of the wording of the governing statute. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S., at 18 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not believe, however, that the application of the Due Process Clause to parole-release determinations depends upon the particular wording of the statute governing the deliberations of the parole board”); id., at 22 (MARSHALL, J., with Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting in part) (“[A]ll prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a liberty interest of which they may not be deprived without due process, regardless of the particular statutory language that implements the parole system”). At stake in the parole-release decision is a return to freedom, albeit conditional freedom; liberty from bodily restraint is at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Thus, inmates may have a liberty interest in parole release “derived solely from the existence of a system that permit[s] criminal offenders to serve their sentences on probation or parole.” Id., at 24-25 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting in part); see also id., at 19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hen a state adopts a parole system that applies general standards of eligibility, prisoners justifiably expect that parole will be granted fairly and according to law whenever those standards are met”). We proceed, however, to apply the Court’s analysis in Greenholtz, because it too necessitates the conclusion that Montana inmates have a liberty interest in parole release. Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, supra, at 471-472. In that ease the Court held that Pennsylvania’s administrative segregation statutes and regulations created a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. The Court relied on the State’s use of “language of an unmistakably mandatory character” and its specification of “substantive predicates” to confinement — “the need for control,” or “the threat of a serious disturbance.” See also Greenholtz, supra, at 10 (quoting Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert — Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 803, 813 (1961)) (“The decision turns on a ‘discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done’ ”). See Pet. for Cert. 8 (“Reasons for Granting the Writ[:] The Court of Appeals’ Opinion Clearly Misconstrues Greenholtz”)', Brief for Petitioners 10 (The conclusion that respondents had no protected liberty interest under the Montana statute “is consistent with, and required by, Green-holtz”); id., at 11 (“The Court of Appeals’ opinion deviates from Greenholtz, as well as from related decisions, and must therefore be reversed”); Reply Brief for Petitioners 3, n. 1 (“The parties . . . have not urged abandonment of Greenholtz, but rather have contended that it is consonant with their respective positions”). This section also provides that “(a) No convict. . . may be paroled until he has served at least one-half of his full term, . . . except that a convict designated as a nondangerous offender . . . may be paroled after he has served one-quarter of his full term .... Any offender serving a time sentence may be paroled after he has served . . . ITh years. “(b) No convict serving a life sentence may be paroled until he has served 30 years . . . .” Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201 (1985). Cf. Grifaldo v. State, 182 Mont. 287, 596 P. 2d 847 (1979) (Section 46-18-404(1) provides that the sentencing court “shall” designate a defendant a nondangerous offender if either of two conditions are met; this mandatory language entitled the defendants to the designation and the parole-eligibility status that accompanies it). The Board argues that this Court is bound by statements of the Montana Supreme Court that parole is a privilege, a matter of grace, not of right. It is true that a State has no duty to establish a parole system or to provide for parole for all categories of convicted persons, see Greenholtz, 442 U. S., at 7, and that a State may place conditions on parole release; only in this sense is parole a privilege, not a right. None of the Montana cases cited by the Board decide whether parole release is mandatory for an eligible inmate upon a finding that the statutory prerequisites have been met. See Cavanaugh v. Crist, 189 Mont. 274, 615 P. 2d 890 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing a sentencing judge to forbid parole release of certain offenders); Lopez v. Crist, 176 Mont. 352, 578 P. 2d 312 (1978) (allowing the Board to keep a defendant whose parole had been wrongfully revoked in custody for up to 30 days to devise an acceptable new parole plan, because the Board has a statutory duty to impose and supervise conditions of parole); In re Frost, 146 Mont. 18, 403 P. 2d 612 (1965) (finding no blanket entitlement to parole after serving statutory minimum period); In re Hart, 145 Mont. 203, 399 P. 2d 984 (1965) (permitting the reineareeration of a defendant who ignored the conditions of his parole); State ex rel. Herman v. Powell, 139 Mont. 583, 367 P. 2d 553 (1961) (finding that the Board has no right to extinguish a sentence by paroling an individual on a subsequent sentence); Goff v. State, 139 Mont. 641, 367 P. 2d 557 (1961) (finding that the inmate was not denied equal protection because his codefendant was paroled before he was). The District Court found significant that, while the statute at issue in Greenholtz lists 14 factors that the Nebraska Board is obligated to consider in making the designated findings, the Montana statute “lists no factors required to be considered by the parole board.” App. 17a. In Montana, however, the Board considers these same 14 factors, which are set forth in the Board’s regulations. See Administrative Rules of Montana § 20.25.505 (1980). This Court, and the Courts of Appeals, see n. 10, infra, have recognized the relevance of regulations to a determination of whether a certain scheme gives rise to a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S., at 470-471; see also Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S., at 467 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). In addition, the Montana statute does obligate the Board to consider certain information in making its parole-release decision. See Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-202(1) (1985) (“[T]he board shall consider. . . the circumstances of his offense, his previous social history and criminal record, his conduct, employment, and attitude in prison, and the reports of any physical and mental examinations which have been made”). As Justice White has pointed out, the Circuits have split on the question whether the absence of mandatory language creating a presumption of release precludes a finding that a statute or regulation creates a liberty interest. See Anderson v. Winsett, 449 U. S. 1093 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But, as the following analysis of the decisions of the Courts of Appeals demonstrates, even under the most “restrictive interpretation of Greenholtz,” Baumann v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 754 F. 2d 841, 844 (CA9 1985), courts have held that the presence of mandatory language in the statute gives rise to a liberty interest in parole release. The Montana statute, by its use of the word “shall” and the phrase “[sjubject to the following restrictions,” creates a liberty interest under this most restrictive interpretation. Courts of Appeals’ decisions since Greenholtz fall into four categories. When statutes or regulatory provisions are phrased in mandatory terms or explicitly create a presumption of release, courts find a liberty interest. See Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F. 2d 653, 661 (CA8 1984) (Arkansas regulation); Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F. 2d 175, 178 (CA6 1984) (Tennessee Board of Parole Rule); Williams v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 661 F. 2d 697, 698 (CA8 1981) (Missouri statute), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 993 (1982). Conversely, statutes or regulations that provide that a parole board “may” release an inmate on parole do not give rise to a protected liberty interest. See Dace v. Mickelson, 797 F. 2d 574, 576 (CA8 1986) (South Dakota statute); Parker v. Corrothers, supra, at 657 (Arkansas statute); Gale v. Moore, 763 F. 2d 341, 343 (CA8 1985) (amended Missouri statute); Dock v. Latimer, 729 F. 2d 1287, 1288 (CA10 1984) (Utah statute); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F. 2d 1215, 1216 (CA5 1984) (Mississippi statute); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F. 2d 868, 869 (CA10 1981) (New Mexico statute); Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F. 2d 274, 276 (CA5) (Texas statute), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 854 (1981); Schuemann v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole, 624 F. 2d 172, 174 (CA10 1980) (Colorado statute); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F. 2d 805, 806-807 (CA10 1979) (Oklahoma statute); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F. 2d 866, 867 (CA6 1979) (Ohio statute). A third type of statute provides that an individual shall not be released unless or shall be released only when certain conditions are met; courts have divided on whether such statutes create a liberty interest. Most courts have found that such statutes set forth criteria that must be met before release, but that they do not require release if those findings are made. See Patten v. North Dakota Parole Board, 783 F. 2d 140, 142 (CA8 1986) (North Dakota statute); Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F. 2d 203, 204-205 (CA7 1986) (Indiana statute); Berard v. State of Vermont Parole Board, 730 F. 2d 71, 75 (CA2 1984) (Vermont statute); Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F. 2d 487, 488 (CA11 1982) (Alabama statute); Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F. 2d 686, 688 (CA5 1982) (Florida statute); Jackson v. Reese, 608 F. 2d 159, 160 (CA5 1979) (Georgia statute); Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F. 2d 661, 664 (CA2 1979) (New York statute); but see United States ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Parole and Pardon Board, 669 F. 2d 1185, 1188 (CA7 1982) (Illinois statute). Yet a fourth type of analysis finds a liberty interest when a statute or a regulatory parole-release scheme uses elaborate and explicit guidelines to structure the exercise of discretion. See Dace v. Mickelson, supra, at 577-578 (South Dakota regulations); Green v. Black, 755 F. 2d 687, 688 (CA8 1985) (Missouri policy statement); Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F. 2d 996, 1007 (CA3 1980) (Delaware regulations), cert. denied 449 U. S. 1093 (1981).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DICKINSON, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS v. ZURKO et al. No. 98-377. Argued March 24, 1999 Decided June 10, 1999 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Scaua, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 170. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Edward C. DuMont, William Ranter, Bruce G. Forrest, Albín F. Drost, Karen A. Buchanan, and Kenneth R. Corsello. Ernest Gellhorn argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ann G. Weymouth, Janice M. Mueller, and Russell Wong. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Intellectual Property Professors by John F. Duffy and Thomas G. Field, Jr.; and for Theis Research, Inc., by Paul R. Johnson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Biotechnology Industry Organization by Scott F. Partridge, Bob E. Shannon, and Scott K Field; for the Houston Intellectual Property Law Association by Jeffrey W. Tayon; for the International Trademark Association by Albert Robin; for the New York Intellectual Property Law Association by Bruce M. Wexler and Howard B. Bamaby; for the Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia by Lynn Eccleston, David W. Long, and Harold Wegner; for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by Gerald J. Mossinghoff; and for John P. Sutton, pro se. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Dallas-Fort Worth Intellectual Property Law Association by D. Scott Hemingway; and for Intellectual Property Creators et al. by David Roy Pressman, pro se. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets forth standards governing judicial review of findings of fact made by federal administrative agencies. 5 U. S. C. §706. We must decide whether §706 applies when the Federal Circuit reviews findings of fact made by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). We conclude that it does apply, and the Federal Circuit must use the framework set forth in that section. I Section 706, originally enacted in 1946, sets forth standards that govern the “Scope” of court “review” of, e.g., agency factfinding (what we shall call court/agency review). It says that a “reviewing court shall— “(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency . . . findings ... found to be— “(A) arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion, or... “(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a ease subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute;... “In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party ... Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) sets forth standards that govern appellate court review of findings of fact made by a district court judge (what we shall call court/court review). It says that the appellate court shall set aside those findings only if they are “clearly erroneous.” Traditionally, this eourt/court standard of review has been considered somewhat stricter (i. e., allowing somewhat closer judicial review) than the APA’s court/agency standards. 2 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §11.2, p. 174 (3d ed. 1994) (hereinafter Davis & Pierce). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit believes that it should apply the “clearly erroneous” standard when it reviews findings of fact made by the PTO. In re Zurko, 142 F. 3d 1447, 1459 (1998) (ease below). The Commissioner of Patents, the PTO’s head, believes to the contrary that ordinary APA court/agency standards apply. See, e. g., In re Kemps, 97 F. 3d 1427, 1430-1431 (CA Fed. 1996); In re Napier, 55 F. 3d 610, 614 (CA Fed. 1995); In re Brana, 51 F. 3d 1560, 1568-1569 (CA Fed. 1995). The case before us tests these two competing legal views. Respondents applied for a patent upon a method for increasing computer security. The PTO patent examiner concluded that respondents’ method was obvious in light of prior art, and so it denied the application. See 35 U. S. C. § 103 (1994 ed., Supp. III). The PTO’s review board (the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences) upheld the examiner’s decision. Respondents sought review in the Federal Circuit, where a panel treated the question of what the prior art teaches as one of fact, and agreed with respondents that the PTO’s factual finding was “clearly erroneous.” In re Zurko, 111 F. 3d 887, 889, and n. 2 (1997). The Federal Circuit, hoping definitively to resolve the review-standard controversy, then heard the matter en banc. After examining relevant precedents, the en bane court concluded that its use of the stricter court/court standard was legally proper. The Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Patents, sought certiorari. We granted the writ in order to decide whether the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO factfinding must take place within the framework set forth in the APA. rH 1 — I The parties agree that the PTO is an “agency subject to the APA’s constraints, that the PTO’s finding at issue in this case is one of fact, and that the finding constitutes “agency action.” See 5 U. S. C. §701 (defining “agency” as an “authority of the Government of the United States”); § 706 (applying APA “Scope of review” provisions to “agency action”). Hence a reviewing court must apply the APA’s court/agency review standards in the absence of an exception. The Federal Circuit rests its claim for an exception upon §559. That section says that the APA does “not limit or repeal additional requirements . .. recognized by law.” In the Circuit’s view: (1) at the time of the APA’s adoption, in 1946, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), a Federal Circuit predecessor, applied a court/court “clearly erroneous” standard; (2) that standard was stricter than ordinary court/agency review standards; and (8) that special tradition of strict review consequently amounted to an “additional requirement” that under §559 trumps the requirements imposed by §706. Recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action, see, e. g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 489 (1951); 92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946) (statement of Rep. Walter), we have closely examined the Federal Circuit’s claim for an exception to that uniformity. In doing so, we believe that respondents must show more than a possibility of a heightened standard, and indeed more than even a bare preponderance of evidence in their favor. Existence of the additional requirement must be clear. This is suggested both by the phrase “recognized by law” and by the congressional specification in the APA that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so expressly.” § 12, 60 Stat. 244, 5 U. S. C. §559. A statutory intent that legislative departure from the norm must be clear suggests a need for similar clarity in respect to grandfathered common-law variations. The APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity. It would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on the basis of a requirement “recognized” only as ambiguous. In any event, we have examined the 89 cases which, according to respondents and supporting amici, embody the pre-APA standard of review. See App. to Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae 1a-6a (collecting eases), and we conclude that those cases do not reflect a well-established stricter court/court standard of judicial review for PTO factfinding, which circumstance fatally undermines the Federal Circuit’s conclusion. The 89 pre-APA eases all involve CCPA review of a PTO administrative decision, which either denied a patent or awarded priority to one of several competing applicants. See 35 U. S. C. § 59a (1934 ed.) (granting CCPA review authority over PTO decisions); 35 U. S. C. § 141 (current grant of review authority to the Federal Circuit). The major consideration that favors the Federal Circuit’s view consists of the fact that 23 of the cases use words such as “clear case of error” or “clearly wrong” to describe the CCPA’s review standard, while the remainder use words such as “manifest error,” which might be thought to mean the same thing. See App. to Brief for New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae 1a-6a. When the CCPA decided many of these eases during the 1930’s and early 1940’s, legal authorities had begun with increasing regularity to use the term “clearly erroneous” to signal court/court review, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) (adopted in 1987), and the term “substantial evidence” to signal less strict court/agency review. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 88 (1944) (describing congressional debates in which members argued for and against applying the “clearly erroneous” standard to agency review “precisely because it would give administrative findings less finality than they enjoyed under the ‘substantial evidence* rule”). Yet the presence of these phrases is not conclusive. The relevant linguistic conventions were less firmly established before adoption of the APA than they are today. At that time courts sometimes used words such as “clearly erroneous” to describe less strict court/agency review standards. See, e. g., Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F. 2d 175, 181 (CA7 1943); New York Trust Co. v. SEC, 131 F. 2d 274, 275 (CA2 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 786 (1943); Hall v. Commissioner, 128 F. 2d 180, 182 (CA7 1942); First National Bank of Memphis v. Commissioner, 125 F. 2d 157 (CA6 1942) (per curiam); NLRB v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F. 2d 602, 606 (CA7 1941). Other times they used words such as “substantial evidence” to describe stricter court/ court review (including appeals in patent infringement cases challenging district court factfinding). See, e. g., Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 142 F. 2d 157, 160 (CA2 1944); Dow Chemical Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 139 F. 2d 473, 475 (CA6 1943), aff'd, 324 U. S. 320 (1945); Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F. 2d 487, 496-497 (CA6), aff’d, 320 U. S. 714 (1943); Electro Mfg. Co. v. Yellin, 132 F. 2d 979, 981 (CA7 1943); Ajax Hand Brake Co. v. Superior Hand Brake Co., 132 F. 2d 606, 609 (CA7 1943); Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. Beckwith Machinery Co., 105 F. 2d 941, 942 (CA3 1939). Indeed, this Court itself on at least one occasion used the words “substantial evidence” to explain why it would not disturb a trial court’s factual findings. Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251, 261 (1986); see also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 420 (1937) (accepting trial court’s findings of fact because they have “substantial support in the record”). Nor is the absence of the words “substantial evidence” in the CCPA’s eases especially significant. Before the APA, the use of that term to describe court/agency review proceeded by fits and starts, with the standardization of the term beginning to take hold only after Congress began using it (or the like) in various federal statutes. For example, this Court first used the phrase “substantial evidence” in the agency context to describe its approach to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s (ICC’s) factual findings, ICC v. Union Pacifijc R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 548 (1912), even though the underlying statute simply authorized a court of competent jurisdiction to suspend or set aside orders of the Commission, § 12, 36 Stat. 551. The Court did not immediately grant the Federal Trade Commission the same leeway it granted the ICC, see FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 580 (1923), even though the underlying Act used language to which the phrase “substantial evidence” might have applied, see §5,38 Stat. 720 (the “findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive”). As the words “substantial evidence” began to appear more often in statutes, the Court began to use those same words in describing review standards, sometimes supplying the modifier “substantial” when Congress had left it out. See, e. g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938); see Stason, “Substantial Evidence” in Administrative Law, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1026, 1026-1028 (1941) (collecting statutes); see also Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 499 (1943) (speaking generally of the “theoretical and practical reasonfs] for . . . [crediting] administrative decisions”). The patent statutes, however, did not and do not use the term “substantial evidence” or any other term to describe the standard of court review. 35 U. S. C. §§ 61, 62 (1934 ed.). Indeed, it apparently remains disputed to this day (a dispute we need not settle today) precisely which APA standard — “substantial evidence” or “arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion” — would apply to court review of PTO factfinding. See 5 U. S. C. §706(2)(E) (applying the term “substantial evidence” where agency factfinding takes place “on the record”); see also Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 745 F 2d 677, 683-684 (CADC 1984) (Sealia, J.) (finding no difference between the APA’s “arbitrary, capricious” standard and its “substantial evidence” standard as applied to court review of agency factfinding.) Further, not one of the 89 opinions actually uses the precise words “clear error” or “clearly erroneous,” which are terms of art signaling court/court review. Most of the 89 opinions use words like “manifest error,” which is not now such a term of art. At the same time, precedent from this Court undermines the Federal Circuit’s claim that the phrases “clearly wrong” or “manifest error” signal court/court review. The Federal Circuit traced its standard of review back to Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U. S. 120 (1894), which it characterized as the foundation upon which the CCPA later built its review standards. 142 F. 3d, at 1453-1454. We shall describe that case in some detail. Morgan arose out of a Patent Office interference proceeding — a proceeding to determine which of two claimants was the first inventor. The Patent Office decided the factual question of “priority” in favor of one claimant; the Circuit Court, deciding the ease “without any additional testimony,” 153 U. S., at 122, reversed the Patent Office’s factual finding and awarded the patent to the other claimant. This Court in turn reversed the Circuit Court, thereby restoring the Patent Office decision. “What,” asked Justice Brewer for the Court, “is the rule which should control the [reviewing] court in the determination of this case?” Ibid. Is it that the Patent Office decision “should stand unless the testimony shows beyond any reasonable doubt that the plaintiff was the first inventor”? Id., at 123. The Court then cited two cases standing for such a “reasonable doubt” standard. Ibid, (citing Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U. S. 689, 695 (1886), and Coffin v. Ogden, 18 Wall. 120, 124 (1874)). The Court found the two cases “closely in point.” 153 U. S., at 123. Justice Brewer wrote that a person “challenging the priority awarded by the Patent Office . . . should ... be held to as strict proof. ” Ibid. (emphasis added). The Court, pointing out that the Circuit Court had used language “not quite so strong” (namely, “a clear and undoubted preponderance of proof”), thought that the Circuit Court’s standard sounded more like the rule used by “an appellate court in reviewing findings of fact made by the trial court.” Ibid. The Court then wrote: “But this is something more than a mere appeal. It is an application to the court to set aside the action of one of the executive departments of the government. ... A new proceeding is instituted in the courts ... to set aside the conclusions reached by the administrative department .... It is . . . not to be sustained by a mere preponderance of evidence.... It is a controversy between two individuals over a question of fact which has once been settled by a special tribunal, entrusted with full power in the premises. As such it might be well argued, were it not for the terms of this statute, that the decision of the patent office was a finality upon every matter of fact.” Id., at 124 (emphasis added). The Court, in other words, reasoned strongly that a court/ court review standard is not proper; that standard is too strict; a somewhat weaker standard of review is appropriate. We concede that the Court also used language that could be read as setting forth a court/court standard of review. It said, for example, that the “Patent Office [decision] must be accepted as controlling upon that question of fact . . . unless the contrary is established by testimony which . . . carries thorough conviction. ... [I]f doubtful, the decision of the Patent Office must control.” Id., at 125 (emphasis added). It added that the testimony was “not... sufficient to produce a clear conviction that the Patent Office made a mistake.” Id., at 129 (emphasis added). But the Court did not use the emphasized words today; it used those words more than 100 years ago. And its reasoning makes clear that it meant those words to stand for a court/agency review standard, a standard weaker than the standard used by “an appellate court in reviewing findings of fact made by the trial court.” Id., at 123. The opinions in the 89 CCPA cases, cataloged in the Appendix to this opinion, reveal the same pattern. They use words such as “manifest error” or “clearly wrong.” But they use those words to explain why they give so much, not so little, deference to agency factfinding. And, their further explanations, when given, indicate that they had court/ agency, not court/court, review in mind. In nearly half of the eases, the CCPA explains why it uses its “manifest error” standard by pointing out that the PTO is an expert body, or that the PTO can better deal with the technically complex subject matter, and that the PTO consequently deserves deference. In more than three-fourths of the eases the CCPA says that it should defer to PTO fact-finding because two (and sometimes more) PTO tribunals had reviewed the matter and agreed about the factual finding. These reasons are reasons that courts and commentators have long invoked to justify deference to agency factfinding. See Universal Camera, 340 U. S., at 496-497 (intraagency agreement); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 597 (1941) (expertise); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145-146 (1939) (expertise); ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 98 (1913) (expertise); Stern, 58 Harv. L. Rev., at 81-82 (expertise); 2 Davis & Pierce § 11.2, at 178-181 (intraageney agreement). They are net the reasons courts typically have given for deferring to factfinding made by a lower court judge. See, e. g., Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 623 (1993); Stern, supra, at 82-83 (trial court advantages lie in, e. g., evaluation of witness, not comparative expertise). And we think it also worth noting, in light of the pre-APA movement toward standardization discussed above, supra, at 157, that the CCPA began to refer more frequently to technical complexity and agency expertise as time marched closer to 1946. Out of the 45 cases in our sample decided between 1929 and 1936, 40% (18 of 45) specifically referred to technical complexity. That percentage increased to 57% (25 of 44) for the years 1937 to 1946. Given the CCPA’s explanations, the review standard’s origins, and the nondeterminative nature of the phrases, we cannot agree with the Federal Circuit that in 1946, when Congress enacted the APA, the CCPA “recognized” the use of a stricter court/court, rather than a less strict court/ agency, review standard for PTO decisions. Hence the Federal Circuit’s review of PTO findings of fact cannot amount to an “additional requirement] . . . recognized by law.” 5 U.S.C. §559. III The Federal Circuit also advanced several policy reasons which in its view militate against use of APA standards of review. First, it says that both bench and bar have now become used to the Circuit’s application of a “clearly erroneous” standard that implies somewhat stricter court/court review. It says that change may prove needlessly disruptive. 142 F. 3d, at 1457-1458. Supporting amici add that it is better that the matter remain “ ‘settled than that it be settled right.’ ” Brief for Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae 23 (quoting Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U. S. 409, 424 (1986)). This Court, however, has not previously settled the matter. The Federal Circuit’s standard would require us to create §559 precedent that itself could prove disruptive by too readily permitting other agencies to depart from uniform APA requirements. And in any event we believe the Circuit overstates the difference that a change of standard will mean in practice. This Court has described the APA eourt/agency “substantial evidence” standard as requiring a court to ask whether a “reasonable mind might aceept” a particular evidentiary record as “adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U. S., at 229. It has described the court/eourt “clearly erroneous” standard in terms of whether a reviewing judge has a “definite and firm conviction” that an error has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948). And it has suggested that the former is somewhat less strict than the latter. Universal Camera, 340 U. S., at 477, 488 (analogizing “substantial evidence” test to review of jury findings and stating that appellate courts must respect agency expertise). At the same time the Court has stressed the importance of not simply rubber-stamping agency factfinding. Id., at 490. The APA requires meaningful review; and its enactment meant stricter judicial review of agency factfinding than Congress believed some courts had previously conducted. Ibid. The upshot in terms of judicial review is some practical difference in outcome depending upon which standard is used. The court/agency standard, as we have said, is somewhat less strict than the court/court standard. But the difference is a subtle one — so fine that (apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome. Cf. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 448 F. 2d 1127, 1142 (CADC 1971) (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (wrongly believing — and correcting himself — that he had found the “case dreamed of by law school professors” where the agency’s findings, though “clearly erroneous,” were “nevertheless” supported by “substantial evidence”). The difficulty of finding such a case may in part reflect the basic similarity of the reviewing task, which requires judges to apply logic and experience to an evidentiary record, whether that record was made in a court or by an agency. It may in part reflect the difficulty of attempting to capture in a form of words intangible factors such as judicial confidence in the fairness of the factfinding process. Universal Camera, supra, at 489; Jaffe, Judicial Review: “Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,” 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1233, 1245 (1951). It may in part refleet the comparatively greater importance of case-specific factors, such as a finding’s dependence upon agency expertise or the presence of internal agency review, which factors will often prove more influential in respect to outcome than will the applicable standard of review. These features of review underline the importance of the fact that, when a Federal Circuit judge reviews PTO fact-finding, he or she often will examine that finding through the lens of patent-related experience — and properly so, for the Federal Circuit is a specialized court. That comparative expertise, by enabling the Circuit better to understand the basis for the PTO’s finding of fact, may play a more important role in assuring proper review than would a theoretically somewhat stricter standard. Moreover, if the Circuit means to suggest that a change of standard could somehow immunize the PTO’s fact-related "reasoning” from review, 142 F. 3d, at 1449-1450, we disagree. A reviewing court reviews an agency’s reasoning to determine whether it is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” or, if bound up with a record-based factual conclusion, to determine whether it is supported by “substantial evidence.” E. g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 89-93 (1943). Second, the Circuit and its supporting amici believe that a change to APA review standards will create an anomaly. An applicant denied a patent can seek review either directly in the Federal Circuit, see 35 U. S. C. § 141, or indirectly by first obtaining direct review in federal district court, see § 145. The first path will now bring about Federal Circuit court/agency review; the second path might well lead to Federal Circuit court/court review, for the Circuit now reviews federal district court factfinding using a “clearly erroneous” standard. Gould v. Quigg, 822 F. 2d 1074, 1077 (1987). The result, the Circuit claims, is that the outcome may turn upon which path a disappointed applicant takes; and it fears that those applicants will often take the more complicated, time-consuming indirect path in order to obtain stricter judicial review of the PTO’s determination. We are not convinced, however, that the presence of the two paths creates a significant anomaly. The second path permits the disappointed applicant to present to the court evidence that the applicant did not present to the PTO. Ibid. The presence of such new or different evidence makes a factfinder of the district judge. And nonexpert judicial factfinding calls for the court/court standard of review. We concede that an anomaly might exist insofar as the district judge does no more than review PTO factfinding, but nothing in this opinion prevents the Federal Circuit from adjusting related review standards where necessary. Cf. Fregeau v. Mossingkojf, 776 F. 2d 1034, 1038 (CA Fed. 1985) (harmonizing review standards). Finally, the Circuit reasons that its stricter court/court review will produce better agency factfinding. It says that the standard encourages the creation of "administrative records that more fully describe the metes and bounds of the patent grant” and “help avoid situations where board fact finding on matters such as anticipation or the factual inquiries underlying obviousness become virtually unreviewable.” 142 F. 3d, at 1458. Neither the Circuit nor its supporting amici, however, have explained convincingly why direct review of the PTO’s patent denials demands a stricter fact-related review standard than is applicable to other agencies. Congress has set forth the appropriate standard in the APA. For the reasons stated, we have not found circumstances that justify an exception. For these reasons, the judgment of the Federal Circuit is reversed. We remand the ease for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Review of 89 Pre-APA CCPA Patent Cases Reciting “Clear” or “Manifest” Error Standard Cases Referring to both Technical Complexity/Ageney Expertise and the Agreement (Disagreement) Within the Agency Stern v. Schroeder, 17 C. C. P. A. 670, 674, 36 F. 2d 515, 517 (1929) In re Ford, 17 C. C. P. A. 893, 894, 38 F. 2d 525, 526 (1930) In re Demarest, 17 C. C. P. A. 904, 906, 38 F. 2d 895, 896 (1930) In re Wietzel, 17 C. C. P. A. 1079, 1082, 39 F. 2d 669, 671 (1930) In re Anhaltzer, 18 C. C. P. A. 1181, 1184, 48 F. 2d 657, 658 (1931) Dover v. Moody, 18 C. C. P. A. 1188, 1190, 48 P. 2d 388, 389 (1931) In re Hornsey, 18 C. C. P. A. 1222, 1224, 48 F. 2d 911, 912 (1931) Rowe v. Holtz, 19 C. C. P. A. 970, 974, 55 F. 2d 468, 470-471 (1932) In re Fessenden, 19 C. C. P. A. 1048, 1050-1051, 56 F. 2d 669, 670 (1932) Martin v. Friendly, 19 C. C. P. A. 1181, 1182-1183, 58 F. 2d 421 422 (1932) In re Dubilier, 20 C. C. P. A. 809, 815, 62 F. 2d 374, 377 (1933) In re Alden, 20 C. C. P. A. 1083, 1084-1085, 65 F. 2d 136, 137 (1933) Farmer v. Pritchard, 20 C. C. P. A. 1096, 1101, 65 F. 2d 165, 168 (1933) In re Pierce, 20 C. C. P. A. 1170, 1175, 65 F. 2d 271, 274 (1933) Angell v. Morin, 21 C. C. P. A. 1018, 1024, 69 F. 2d 646, 649 (1934) Daley v. Trube, 24 C. C. P. A. 964, 971, 88 F. 2d 308, 312 (1937) Coast v. Dubbs, 24 C. C. P. A. 1023, 1031-1032, 88 F. 2d 734, 739 (1937) Bryson v. Clarke, 25 C. C. P. A. 719, 721, 92 F. 2d 720, 722 (1937) Brand v. Thomas, 25 C. C. P. A. 1053, 1055, 96 F. 2d 301, 302 (1938) Creed v. Potts, 25 C. C. P. A. 1084, 1089, 96 F. 2d 317, 321 (1938) In re Cassidy, 25 C. C. P. A. 1282, 1285, 97 F. 2d 93, 95 (1938) Krebs v. Melicharek, 25 C. C. P. A. 1362, 1365-1366, 97 F. 2d 477, 479 (1938) Parker v. Ballantine, 26 C. C. P. A. 799, 804, 101 F. 2d 220, 223 (1939) (disagreement) Reed v. Edwards, 26 C. C. P A. 901, 904, 101 F. 2d 550, 552 (1939) Bill v. Casler, 26 C. C. P. A. 930, 932, 102 F. 2d 219, 221 (1939) Tears v. Robinson, 26 C. C. P A. 1391, 1392, 104 F. 2d 813, 814 (1939) In re Bertsch, 27 C. C. P. A. 760, 763-764, 107 F. 2d 828, 831 (1939) In re Wuertz, 27 C. C. P. A. 1039, 1046, 110 F. 2d 854, 857 (1940) In re Kaplan, 27 C. C. P A. 1072, 1075, 110 F. 2d 670, 672 (1940) Prahl v. Redman, 28 C. C. P A. 937, 940, 117 F. 2d 1018, 1021 (1941) In re Bertsch, 30 C. C. P A. 813, 815-816, 132 F. 2d 1014, 1016 (1942) In re Stacy, 30 C. C. P A. 972, 974, 135 F. 2d 232, 233 (1943) Poulsen v. McDowell, 31 C. C. P. A. 1006, 1011, 142 F. 2d 267, 270 (1944) Pinkerton v. Stahly, 32 C. C. P A. 723, 728, 144 F. 2d 881, 885 (1944) Cases Referring to Technical Complexity/Agency Expertise In re Engelhardt, 17 C. C. P. A. 1244, 1251, 40 F. 2d 760, 764 (1930) In re McDonald, 18 C. C. P A. 1099, 1102, 47 F. 2d 802, 804 (1931) In re Hermans, 18 C. C. P. A. 1211, 1212, 48 F. 2d 386, 387 (1931) In re Batcher, 19 C. C. P A. 1275, 1278, 59 F. 2d 461, 463 (1932) In re Carlton, 27 C. C. P A. 1102, 1105, 111 F. 2d 190, 192 (1940) Farnsworth v. Brown, 29 C. C. P. A. 740, 749, 124 F. 2d 208, 214 (1941) In re Ubbelhode, 29 C. C. P. A. 1042, 1046, 128 F. 2d 458, 456 (1942) In re Cohen, 30 C. C. P. A. 876, 880, 183 F. 2d 924, 926 (1943) In re Ruzicka, 32 C. C. P. A. 1165, 1169, 150 F. 2d 550, 553 (1945) In re Allbright, 33 C. C. P. A. 760, 764, 152 F. 2d 984, 986 (1946) Cases Referring to Agreement Within the Agency Beidler v. Caps, 17 C. C. P. A. 703, 705, 36 F. 2d 122, 123 (1929) Stern v. Schroeder, 17 C. C. P. A. 690, 696-697, 36 F. 2d 518, 521-522 (1929) Janette v. Folds, 17 C. C. P. A. 879, 881, 38 F. 2d 361, 362 (1930) In re Moulton, 17 C. C. P. A. 891, 892, 38 F. 2d 359, 360 (1930) In re Banner, 17 C. C. P. A. 1086, 1090, 39 F. 2d 690, 692 (1930) In re Walter, 17 C. C. P. A. 982, 983, 39 F. 2d 724 (1930) Pengilly v. Copeland, 17 C. C. P. A. 1143, 1145, 40 F. 2d 995, 996 (1930) Thompson v. Pettis, 18 C. C. P. A. 755, 757, 44 F. 2d 420, 421 (1930) In re Kochendorfer, 18 C. C. P. A. 761, 763, 44 F. 2d 418, 419 (1930) In re Dickerman, 18 C. C. P. A. 766, 768, 44 F. 2d 876, 877 (1930) Bennett v. Fitzgerald, 18 C. C. P. A. 1201, 1202, 48 F. 2d 917, 918 (1931) In re Doherty, 18 C. C. P. A. 1278, 1280, 48 F. 2d 952, 953 (1931) In re Murray, 19 C. C. P. A. 766, 767-768, 53 F. 2d 540, 541 (1931) In re Breer, 19 C. C. P. A. 929, 931, 55 F. 2d 485, 486 (1932) Robbins v. Steinbart, 19 C. C. P. A. 1069, 1072, 57 F. 2d 378, 379 (1932) Henry v. Harris, 19 C. C. P. A. 1092, 1096-1097, 56 F. 2d 864, 866 (1932) Fageol v. Midboe, 19 C. C. P. A. 1117, 1122, 56 F. 2d 867, 870 (1932) Gamble v. Church, 19 C. C. P. A. 1145, 1146, 57 F. 2d 761, 762 (1932) Thompson v. Fawick, 20 C. C. P. A. 953, 956, 64 F. 2d 125, 127 (1933) Evans v. Clocker, 20 C. C. P. A. 956, 960, 64 F. 2d 137, 139 (1933) In re Bloch, 20 C. C. P. A. 1180, 1183, 65 F. 2d 268, 269 (1933) In re Snyder, 21 C. C. P. A. 720, 722, 67 F. 2d 493, 495 (1933) Osgood v. Ridderstrom, 21 C. C. P. A. 1176, 1182, 71 F. 2d 191, 195 (1934) Urschel v. Crawford, 22 C. C. P. A. 727, 730, 73 F. 2d 510, 511 (1934) Marine v. Wright, 22 C. C. P. A. 946, 948-949, 74 F. 2d 996, 997 (1935) Berman v. Rondelle, 22 C. C. P. A. 1049, 1052, 75 F. 2d 845, 847 (1935) Tomlin v. Dunlap, 24 C. C. P. A. 1108, 1114, 88 F. 2d 727, 731 (1937) Lasker v. Kurowski, 24 C. C. P. A. 1253, 1256, 90 F. 2d 132, 134 (1937) In re Taylor, 25 C. C. P. A. 709, 711, 92 F. 2d 705, 706 (1937) In re Adamson, 25 C. C. E A. 726, 729-730, 92 F. 2d 717, 720 (1937) Adams v. Stuller, 25 C. C. E A. 865, 870, 94 F. 2d 403, 406 (1938) Ellis v. Maddox, 25 C. C. P. A. 1045, 1053, 96 F. 2d 308, 314 (1938) Kauffman v. Etten, 25 C. C. P. A. 1127, 1134, 97 F. 2d 134, 139 (1938) Kindelmann v. Morsbach, 25 C. C. P. A. 1344, 1349, 97 F. 2d 796, 799-800 (1938) King v. Young, 26 C. C. P. A. 762, 771, 100 F. 2d 663, 670 (1938) Meuer v. Schellenger, 26 C. C. P. A. 1430, 1434, 104 F. 2d 949, 952 (1939) McBride v. Teeple, 27 C. C. P. A. 961, 972, 109 F. 2d 789, 797, cert. denied, 311 U. S. 649 (1940) Vickery v. Barnhart, 28 C. C. P. A. 979, 982, 118 F. 2d 578, 581 (1941) Shumaker v. Paulson, 30 C. C. P. A. 1136, 1138, 136 F. 2d 686, 688 (1943) Paulson v. Hyland, 30 C. C. P. A. 1150, 1152, 136 F. 2d 695, 697 (1943) Dreyer v. Haffcke, 30 C. C. P. A. 1278, 1280, 137 F. 2d 116, 117 (1943) Cases Referring to Neither Technical Complexity/Agency Expertise nor Agreement Within the Agency In re Schmidt, 26 C. C. P. A. 773, 777, 100 F. 2d 673, 676 (1938) Hamer v. White, 31 C. C. P. A. 1186, 1189, 143 F. 2d 987, 990 (1944) Kenyon v. Platt, 33 C. C. P. A. 748, 752, 152 F. 2d 1006, 1009 (1946) Beall v. Ormsby, 33 C. C. P. A. 959, 967, 154 F. 2d 663, 668 (1946)

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KEYES et al. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, et al. No. 71-507. Argued October 12, 1972 — Decided June 21, 1973 BreNNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 214. Burger, C. J., concurred in the result. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 217. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 254. White, J., took no part in the decision of the case. James M. Nabrit III and Gordon G. Greiner argued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief were Jack Greenberg, Charles Stephen Ralston, Norman J. Chachkin, Robert T. Connery, and Anthony G. Amsterdam. William K. Ris argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Thomas E. Creighton, Benjamin L. Craig, and Michael H. Jackson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford Jay Rosen, and Edwin S. Kahn for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, David Rubin, Larry F. Hobbs, and Leonard N. Waldbaum for the National Education Association et al.; by Arnold Forster, Paul Hartman, Paul S. Berger, Joseph B. Robison, and Samuel Rabinove for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al.; and by Mario G. Obledo and Michael Mendelson for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Wendell C. Hamacher, Deputy Attorney General, and William F. Harvey for the State of Indiana; by Thomas A. Shannon, Donald R. Lincoln, and Paul D. Engstrand for San Diego Unified School District; and by Willis Hannawalt and Vivian Hannawalt for Robert G. Nelson et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Norman, James P. Turner, Brian K. Landsberg, and Thomas M. Keeling for the United States, and by David I. Caplan for the Jewish Rights Council, Inc. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This school desegregation case concerns the Denver, Colorado, school system. That system has never been operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated or permitted racial segregation in public education. Rather, the gravamen of this action, brought in June 1969 in the District Court for the District of Colorado by parents of Denver schoolchildren, is that respondent School Board alone, by use of various techniques such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood school policy, created or maintained racially or ethnically (or both racially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school district, entitling petitioners to a decree directing desegregation of the entire school district. The boundaries of the school district are coterminous with the boundaries of the city and county of Denver. There were in 1969, 119 schools with 96,580 pupils in the school system. In early 1969, the respondent School Board adopted three resolutions, Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531, designed to desegregate the schools in the Park Hill area in the northeast portion of the city. Following an election which produced a Board majority opposed to the resolutions, the resolutions were rescinded and replaced with a voluntary student transfer program. Petitioners then filed this action, requesting an injunction against the rescission of the resolutions and an order directing that the respondent School Board desegregate and afford equal educational opportunity “for the School District as a whole.” App. 32a. The District Court found that by the construction of a new, relatively small elementary school, Barrett, in the middle of the Negro community west of Park Hill, by the gerrymandering of student attendance zones, by the use of so-called “optional zones,” and by the excessive use of mobile classroom units, among other things, the respondent School Board had engaged over almost a decade after 1960 in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation with respect to the Park Hill schools. The court therefore ordered the Board to desegregate those schools through the implementation of the three rescinded resolutions. 303 F. Supp. 279 and 289 (1969). Segregation in Denver schools is not limited, however, to the schools in the Park Hill area, and not satisfied with their success in obtaining relief for Park Hill, petitioners pressed their prayer that the District Court order desegregation of all segregated schools in the city of Denver, particularly the heavily segregated schools in the core city area. But that court concluded that its finding of a purposeful and systematic program of racial segregation affecting thousands of students in the Park Hill area did not, in itself, impose on the School Board an affirmative duty to eliminate segregation throughout the school district. Instead, the court fractionated the district and held that petitioners had to make a fresh showing of de jure segregation in each area of the city for which they sought relief. Moreover, the District Court held that its finding of intentional segregation in Park Hill was not in any sense material to the question of segregative intent in other areas of the city. Under this restrictive approach, the District Court concluded that petitioners’ evidence of intentionally discriminatory School Board action in areas of the district other than Park Hill was insufficient to “dictate the conclusion that this is de jure segregation which calls for an all-out effort to desegregate. It is more like de facto segregation, with respect to which the rule is that the court cannot order desegregation in order to provide a better balance.” 313 P. Supp. 61, 73 (1970). Nevertheless, the District Court went on to hold that the proofs established that the segregated core city schools were educationally inferior to the predominantly “white” or “Anglo” schools in other parts of the district — that is, “separate facilities . . . unequal in the quality of education provided.” Id., at 83. Thus, the court held that, under the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), respondent School Board constitutionally “must at a minimum . . . offer an equal educational opportunity,” 313 F. Supp., at 83, and, therefore, although all-out desegregation “could not be decreed, . . . the only feasible and constitutionally acceptable program — the only program which furnishes anything approaching substantial equality — is a system of desegregation and integration which provides compensatory education in an integrated environment.” 313 F. Supp. 90, 96 (1970). The District Court then formulated a varied remedial plan to that end which was incorporated in the Final Decree. Respondent School Board appealed, and petitioners cross-appealed, to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. That court sustained the District Court’s finding that the Board had engaged in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation with respect to the Park Hill schools and affirmed the Final Decree in that respect. As to the core city schools, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the legal determination of the District Court that those schools were maintained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the unequal educational opportunity afforded, and therefore set aside so much of the Final Decree as required desegregation and educational improvement programs for those schools. 445 F. 2d 990 (1971). In reaching that result, the Court of Appeals also disregarded respondent School Board's deliberate racial segregation policy respecting the Park Hill schools and accepted the District Court’s finding that petitioners had not proved that respondent had a like policy addressed specifically to the core city schools. We granted petitioners’ petition for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ judgment insofar as it reversed that part of the District Court’s Final Decree as pertained to the core city schools. 404 U. S. 1036 (1972). The judgment of the Court of Appeals in that respect is modified to vacate instead of reverse the Final Decree. The respondent School Board has cross-petitioned for certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed that part of the District Court’s Final Decree as pertained to the Park Hill schools. Docket No. 71-572, School District No. 1 v. Keyes. The cross-petition is denied. I Before turning to the primary question we decide today, a word must be said about the District Court’s method of defining a “segregated” school. Denver is a triethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial, community. The overall racial and ethnic composition of the Denver public schools is 66% Anglo, 14% Negro, and 20% His-pano. The District Court, in assessing the question of de jure segregation in the core city schools, preliminarily resolved that Negroes and Hispanos should not be placed in the same category to establish the segregated character of a school. 313 F. Supp., at 69. Later, in determining the schools that were likely to produce an inferior educational opportunity, the court concluded that a school would be considered inferior only if it had “a concentration of either Negro or His-pano students in the general area of 70 to 75 percent.” Id., at 77. We intimate no opinion whether the District Court’s 70%-to-75% requirement was correct. The District Court used those figures to signify educationally inferior schools, and there is no suggestion in the record that those same figures were or would be used to define a “segregated” school in the de jure context. What is or is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a school’s student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty and staff and the community and administration attitudes toward the school, must be taken into consideration. The District Court has recognized these specific factors as elements of the definition of a “segregated” school, id., at 74, and we may therefore infer that the court will consider them again on remand. We conclude, however, that the District Court erred in separating Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of defining a "segregated” school. We have held that His-panos constitute an identifiable class for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 (1954). See also United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848 (CA5 1972) (en banc); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 467 F. 2d 142 (CA5 1972) (en banc); Alvarado v. El Paso Independent School District, 445 F. 2d 1011 (CA5 1971); Soria v. Oxnard School District, 328 F. Supp. 155 (CD Cal. 1971); Romero v. Weakley, 226 F. 2d 399 (CA9 1955). Indeed, the District Court recognized this in classifying predominantly Hispano schools as "segregated” schools in their own right. But there is also much evidence that in the Southwest Hispanos and Negroes have a great many things in common. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has recently published two Reports on Hispano education in the Southwest. Focusing on students in the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the Commission concluded that Hispanos suffer from the same educational inequities as Negroes and American Indians. In fact, the District Court itself recognized that “[o]ne of the things which the Hispano has in common with the Negro is economic and cultural deprivation and discrimination.” 313 F. Supp., at 69. This is agreement that, though of different origins, Negroes and His-panos in Denver suffer identical discrimination in .treatment when compared with the treatment afforded Anglo students. In that circumstance, we think petitioners are entitled to have schools with a combined predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the category of “segregated” schools. II In our view, the only other question that requires our decision at this time is that subsumed in Question 2 of the questions presented by petitioners, namely, whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect legal standard in addressing petitioners’ contention that respondent School Board engaged in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate segregation in the core city schools. Our conclusion is that those courts did not apply the correct standard in addressing that contention. Petitioners apparently concede for the purposes of this case that in the case of a school system like Denver’s, where no statutory dual system has ever existed, plaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action. Petitioners proved that for almost a decade after 1960 respondent School Board had engaged in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation in the Park Hill schools. Indeed, the District Court found that “[bjetween 1960 and 1969 the Board’s policies with respect to these northeast Denver schools show an undeviating purpose to isolate Negro students” in segregated schools "while preserving the Anglo character of [other] schools.” 303 F. Supp., at 294. This finding did not relate to an insubstantial or trivial fragment of the school system. On the contrary, respondent School Board was found guilty of following a deliberate segregation policy at schools attended, in 1969, by 37.69% of Denver’s total Negro school population, including one-fourth of the Negro elementary pupils, over two-thirds of the Negro junior high pupils, and over two-fifths of the Negro high school pupils. In addition, there was uncontroverted evidence that teachers and staff had for years been assigned on the basis of a minority teacher to a minority school throughout the school system. Respondent argues, however, that a finding of state-imposed segregation as to a substantial portion of the school system can be viewed in isolation from the rest of the district, and that even if state-imposed segregation does exist in a substantial part of the Denver school system, it does not follow that the District Court could predicate on that fact a finding that the entire school system is a dual system. We do not agree. We have never suggested that plaintiffs in school desegregation cases must bear the burden of proving the elements of de jure segregation as to each and every school or each and every student within the school system. Rather, we have held that where plaintiffs prove that a current condition of segregated schooling exists within a school district where a dual system was compelled or authorized by statute at the time of our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty “to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system,” Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II), see also Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968), that is, to eliminate from the public schools within their school system “all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971); This is not a case, however, where a statutory dual system has ever existed. Nevertheless, where-plaintiffs prove that the school authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system, it is only common sense to conclude that there exists a predicate for a finding of the existence of a dual school system. Several considerations support this conclusion. First, it is obvious that a practice of concentrating Negroes in certain schools by structuring attendance zones or designating “feeder” schools on the basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping other nearby schools predominantly white. Similarly, the practice of building a school — such as the Barrett Elementary School in this case — to a certain size and in a certain location, “with conscious knowledge that it would be a segregated school,” 303 F. Supp., at 285, has a substantial reciprocal effect on the racial composition of other nearby schools. So also, the use of mobile classrooms, the drafting of student transfer policies, the transportation of students, and the assignment of faculty and staff, on racially identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmarking schools according to their racial composition, and this, in turn, together with the elements of student assignment and school construction, may have a profound reciprocal effect on the racial composition of residential neighborhoods within a metropolitan area, thereby causing further racial concentration within the schools. We recognized this in Swann when we said: “They [school authorities] must decide questions of location and capacity in light of population growth, finances, land values, site availability, through an almost endless list of factors to be considered. The result of this will be a decision which, when combined with one technique or another of student assignment, will determine the racial composition of the student body in each school in the system. Over the long run, the consequences of the choices will be far reaching. People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition of inner-city neighborhoods. “In the past, choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating or maintaining a state-segregated school system. In addition to the classic pattern of building schools specifically intended for Negro or white students, school authorities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools which appeared likely to become racially mixed through changes in neighborhood residential patterns. This was sometimes accompanied by building new schools in the areas of white suburban expansion farthest from Negro population centers in order to maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure from the formal principles of ‘neighborhood zoning.’ Such a policy does more than simply influence the short-run composition of the student body of a new school. It may well promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with ‘neighborhood zoning,’ further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the races. Upon a proper showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy.” 402 U. S., at 20-21. In short, common sense dictates the conclusion that racially inspired school board actions have an impact beyond the particular schools that are the subjects of those actions. This is not to say, of course, that there can never be a case in which the geographical structure of, or the natural boundaries within, a school district may have the effect of dividing the district into separate, identifiable and unrelated units. Such a determination is essentially a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court in the first instance, but such cases must be rare. In the absence of such a determination, proof of state-imposed segregation in a substantial portion of the district will suffice to support a finding by the trial court of the existence of a dual system. Of course, where that finding is made, as in cases involving statutory dual systems, the school authorities have an affirmative duty “to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.” Brown II, supra, at 301. On remand, therefore, the District Court should decide in the first instance whether respondent School Board's deliberate racial segregation policy with respect to the Park Hill schools constitutes the entire Denver school system a dual school system. We observe that on the record now before us there is indication that Denver is not a school district which might be divided into separate, identifiable and unrelated units. The District Court stated, in its summary of findings as to the Park Hill schools, that there was “a high degree of interrelationship among these schools, so that any action by the Board affecting the racial composition of one would almost certainly have an effect on the others.” 303 F. Supp., at 294. And there was cogent evidence that the ultimate effect of the Board’s actions in Park Hill was not limited to that area: the three 1969 resolutions designed to desegregate the Park Hill schools changed the attendance patterns of at least 29 schools attended by almost one-third of the pupils in the Denver school system. This suggests that the official segregation in Park Hill affected the racial composition of schools throughout the district. On the other hand, although the District Court did not state this, or indeed any, reason why the Park Hill finding was disregarded when attention was turned to the core city schools — beyond saying that the Park Hill and core city areas were in its view “different”— the areas, although adjacent to each other, are separated by Colorado Boulevard, a six-lane highway. From the record, it is difficult to assess the actual significance of Colorado Boulevard to the Denver school system. The Boulevard runs the length of the school district, but at least two elementary schools, Teller and Steck, have attendance zones which cross the Boulevard. Moreover, the District Court, although referring to the Boulevard as “a natural dividing line,” 303 F. Supp., at 282, did not feel constrained to limit its consideration of de jure segregation in the Park Hill area to those schools east of the Boulevard. The court found that by building Barrett Elementary School west of the Boulevard and by establishing the Boulevard as the eastern boundary of the Barrett attendance zone, the Board was able to maintain for a number of years the Anglo character of the Park Hill schools. This suggests that Colorado Boulevard is not to be regarded as the type of barrier that of itself could confine the impact of the Board’s actions to an identifiable area of the school district, perhaps because a major highway is generally not such an effective buffer between adjoining areas. Cf. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U. S. 33 (1971). But this is a factual question for resolution by the District Court on remand. In any event, inquiry whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied the correct legal standards in addressing petitioners’ contention of deliberate segregation in the core city schools is not at an end even if it be true that Park Hill may be separated from the rest of the Denver school district as a separate, identifiable, and unrelated unit. Ill The District Court proceeded on the premise that the finding as to the Park Hill schools was irrelevant to the consideration of the rest of the district, and began its examination of the core city schools by requiring that petitioners prove all of the essential elements of de jure segregation — that is, stated simply, a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action directed specifically to the core city schools. The segregated character of the core city schools could not be and is not denied. Petitioners’ proof showed that at the time of trial 22 of the schools in the core city area were less than 30% in Anglo enrollment and 11 of the schools were less than 10% Anglo. Petitioners also introduced substantial evidence demonstrating the existence of a disproportionate racial and ethnic composition of faculty and staff at these schools. On the question of segregative intent, petitioners presented evidence tending to show that the Board, through its actions over a period of years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated character of the core city schools. Respondents countered this evidence by arguing that the segregation in these schools is the result of a racially neutral “neighborhood school policy” and that the acts of which petitioners complain are explicable within the bounds of that policy. Accepting the School Board's explanation, the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that a finding of de jure segregation as to the core city schools was not permissible since petitioners had failed to prove “(1) a racially discriminatory purpose and (2) a causal relationship between the acts complained of and the racial imbalance admittedly existing in those schools.” 445 F. 2d, at 1006. This assessment of petitioners' proof was clearly incorrect. Although petitioners had already proved the existence of intentional school segregation in the Park Hill schools, this crucial finding was totally ignored when attention turned to the core city schools. Plainly, a finding of intentional segregation as to a portion of a school system is not devoid of probative value in assessing the school authorities’ intent with respect to other parts of the same school system. On the contrary, where, as here, the case involves one school board, a finding of intentional segregation on its part in one portion of a school system is highly relevant to the issue of the board’s intent with respect to other segregated schools in the system. This is merely an application of the well-settled evidentiary principle that “the prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a part of a scheme or not, is useful as reducing the possibility that the act in question was done with innocent intent.” 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 200 (3d ed. 1940). “Evidence that similar and related offenses were committed . . . tend[s] to show a consistent pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of intent.” Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 618 (1949). Similarly, a finding of illicit intent as to a meaningful portion of the item under consideration has substantial probative value on the question of illicit intent as to the remainder. See, for example, the cases cited in 2 Wigmore, supra, at 301-302. And “[t]he foregoing principles are equally as applicable to civil cases as to criminal cases . . . .” Id., at 300. See also C. McCormick, Evidence 329 (1954). Applying these principles in the special context of school desegregation cases, we hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. This is true even if it is determined that different areas of the school district should be viewed independently of each other because, even in that situation, there is high probability that where school authorities have effectuated an intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion of the school system, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in other areas of the system. We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate. Where school authorities have been found to have practiced purposeful segregation in part of a school system, they may be expected to oppose system-wide desegregation, as did the respondents in this case, on the ground that their purposefully segregative actions were isolated and individual events, thus leaving plaintiffs with the burden of proving otherwise. But at that point where an intentionally segrega-tive policy is practiced in a meaningful or significant segment of a school system, as in this case, the school authorities cannot be heard to argue that plaintiffs have proved only “isolated and individual” unlawfully segrega-tive actions. In that circumstance, it is both fair and reasonable to require that the school authorities bear the burden of showing that their actions as to other segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by segregative intent. This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, “is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations.” 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940). In the context of racial segregation in public education, the courts, including this Court, have recognized a variety of situations in which “fairness” and “policy” require state authorities to bear the burden of explaining actions or conditions which appear to be racially motivated. Thus, in Swann, 402 U. S., at 18, we observed that in a system with a “history of segregation,” “where it is possible to identify a 'white school' or a ‘Negro school’ simply by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, a prima jade case of violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause is shown.” Again, in a school system with a history of segregation, the discharge of a disproportionately large number of Negro teachers incident to desegregation “thrust [s] upon the School Board the burden of justifying its conduct by clear and convincing evidence.” Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Education, 364 F. 2d 189, 192 (CA4 1966) (en banc). See also United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F. 2d 836, 887-888 (CA5 1966), aff’d en banc, 380 F. 2d 385 (1967); North Carolina Teachers Assn. v. Asheboro City Board of Education, 393 F. 2d 736, 743 (CA4 1968) (en banc); Williams v. Kimbrough, 295 F. Supp. 578, 585 (WD La. 1969); Bonner v. Texas City Independent School District, 305 F. Supp. 600, 621 (SD Tex. 1969). Nor is this burden-shifting principle limited to former statutory dual systems. See, e. g., Davis v. School District of the City of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734, 743, 744 (ED Mich. 1970), aff’d, 443 F. 2d 573 (CA6 1971); United States v. School District No. 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 228 (ND Ill. 1969), modified on other grounds, 432 F. 2d 1147 (CA7 1970). Indeed, to say that a system has a “history of segregation” is merely to say that a pattern of intentional segregation has been established in the past. Thus, be it a statutory dual system or an allegedly unitary system where a meaningful portion of the system is found to be intentionally segregated, the existence of subsequent or other segregated schooling within the same system justifies a rule imposing on the school authorities the burden of proving that this segregated schooling is not also the result of intentionally segregative acts. In discharging that burden, it is not enough, of course, that the school authorities rely upon some allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation for their actions. Their burden is to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions. The courts below attributed much significance to the fact that many of the Board’s actions in the core city area antedated our decision in Brown. We reject any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to the issue of intent. If the actions of school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less “intentional.” This is not to say, however, that the prima facie case may not be met by evidence supporting a finding that a lesser degree of segregated schooling in the core city area would not have resulted even if the Board had not acted as it did. In Sioann, we suggested that at some point in time the relationship between past segregative acts and present segregation may become so attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure segregation warranting judicial intervention. 402 U. S., at 31-32. See also Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 495 (DC 1967), aff’d sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 372, 408 F. 2d 175 (1969). We made it clear, however, that a connection between past segregative acts and present segregation may be present even when not apparent and that close examination is required before concluding that the connection does not exist. Intentional school segregation in the past may have been a factor in creating a natural environment for the growth of further segregation. Thus, if respondent School Board cannot disprove segregative intent, it can rebut the prima facie case only by showing that its past segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of the core city schools. The respondent School Board invoked at trial its “neighborhood school policy” as explaining racial and ethnic concentrations within the core city schools, arguing that since the core city area population had long been Negro and Hispano, the concentrations were necessarily the result of residential patterns and not of purposefully segregative policies. We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a “neighborhood school policy” of itself will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure segregation. It is enough that we hold that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dis-positive where, as in this case, the school authorities have been found to have practiced de jure segregation in a meaningful portion of the school system by techniques that indicate that the “neighborhood school” concept has not been maintained free of manipulation. Our observations in Swann, supra, at 28, are particularly instructive on this score: “Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation. . . . "... 'Racially neutral’ assignment plans proposed by school authorities to a district court may be inadequate ; such plans may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation. When school authorities present a district court with a ‘loaded game board,’ affirmative action in the form of remedial altering of attendance zones is proper to achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments. In short, an assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to be neutral.” Thus, respondent School Board having been found to have practiced deliberate racial segregation in schools attended by over one-third of the Negro school population, that crucial finding establishes a prima facie case of intentional segregation in the core city schools. In such case, respondent's neighborhood school policy is not to be determinative “simply because it appears to be neutral.” IV In summary, the District Court on remand, first, will afford respondent School Board the opportunity to prove its contention that the Park Hill area is a separate, identifiable and unrelated section of the school district that should'be treated as isolated from the rest of the district. If respondent School Board fails to prove that contention, the District Court, second, will determine whether respondent School Board’s conduct over almost a decade after 1960 in carrying out a policy of deliberate racial segregation in the Park Hill schools constitutes the entire school system a dual school system. If the District Court determines that the Denver school system is a dual school system, respondent School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system “root and branch.” Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S., at 438. If the District Court determines, however, that the Denver school system is not a dual school system by reason of the Board’s actions in Park Hill, the court, third, will afford respondent School Board the opportunity to rebut petitioners’ prima facie case of intentional segregation in the core city schools raised by the finding of intentional segregation in the Park Hill schools. There, the Board’s burden is to show that its policies and practices with respect to schoolsite location, school size, school renovations and additions, student-attendance zones, student assignment and transfer options, mobile classroom units, transportation of students, assignment of faculty and staff, etc., considered together and premised on the Board’s so-called “neighborhood school” concept, either were not taken in effectuation of a policy to create or maintain segregation in the core city schools, or, if unsuccessful in that effort, were not factors in causing the existing condition of segregation in these schools. Considerations of “fairness” and “policy” demand no less in light of the Board’s intentionally segrega-tive actions. If respondent Board fails to rebut petitioners’ prima facie case, the District Court must, as in the case of Park Hill, decree all-out desegregation of the core city schools. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modified to vacate instead of reverse the parts of the Final Decree that concern the core city schools, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [Map of elementary school boundaries follows this page.] Mr. Chief Justice Burger concurs in the result. Mr. Justice White took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice Douglas. While I join the opinion of the Court, I agree with my Brother Powell that there is, for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the school cases, no difference between de facto and de jure segregation. The school board is a state agency and the lines that it draws, the locations it selects for school sites, the allocation it makes of students, the budgets it prepares are state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. As Judge Wisdom cogently stated in United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, segregated schools are often created, not by dual school systems decreed by the legislature, but by the administration of school districts by school boards. Each is state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. “Here school authorities assigned students, faculty, and professional staff; employed faculty and staff; chose sites for schools; constructed new schools and renovated old ones; and drew attendance zone lines. The natural and foreseeable consequence of these actions was segregation of Mexican-Americans. Affirmative action to the contrary would have resulted in desegregation. When school authorities, by their actions, contribute to segregation in education, whether by causing additional segregation or maintaining existing segregation, they deny to the students equal protection of the laws. “We need not define the quantity of state participation which is a prerequisite to a finding of constitutional violation. Like the legal concepts of 'the reasonable man,’ 'due care,’ 'causation,’ 'preponderance of the evidence,’ and 'beyond a reasonable doubt,’ the necessary degree of state involvement is incapable of precise definition and must be defined on a case-by-case basis. Suffice it to say that school authorities here played a significant role in causing or perpetuating unequal educational opportunities for Mexican-Americans, and did so on a system-wide basis.” Id., at 863-864. These latter acts are often said to create de facto as contrasted with de jure segregation. But, as Judge Wisdom observes, each is but another form of de jure segregation. I think it is time to state that there is no constitutional difference between de jure and de facto segregation, for each is the product of state actions or policies. If a “neighborhood” or “geographical” unit has been created along racial lines by reason of the play of restrictive covenants that restrict certain areas to “the elite,” leaving the “undesirables” to move elsewhere, there is state action in the constitutional sense because the force of law is placed behind those covenants. There is state action in the constitutional sense when public funds are dispersed by urban development agencies to build racial ghettoes. Where the school district is racially mixed and the races are segregated in separate schools, where black teachers are assigned almost exclusively to black schools, where the school board closed existing schools located in fringe areas and built new schools in black areas and in distant white areas, where the school board continued the “neighborhood” school policy at the elementary level, these actions constitute state action. They are of a kind quite distinct from the classical de jure type of school segregation. Yet calling them de facto is a misnomer, as they are only more subtle types of state action that create or maintain a wholly or partially segregated school system. See Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F. 2d 100. When a State forces, aids, or abets, or helps create a racial “neighborhood,” it is a travesty of justice to treat that neighborhood as sacrosanct in the sense that its creation is free from the taint of state action. The Constitution and Bill of Rights have described the design of a pluralistic society. The individual has the right to seek such companions as he desires. But a State is barred from creating by one device or another ghettoes that determine the school one is compelled to attend. To the contrary, Art. IX, § 8, of the Colorado Constitution expressly prohibits any “classification of pupils ... on account of race or color.” As early as 1927, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a Denver practice of excluding black students from school programs at Manual High School and Morey Junior High School violated state law. Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 P. 386. There were 92 elementary schools, 15 junior high schools, 2 junior-senior high schools, and 7 senior high schools. In addition, the Board operates an Opportunity School, a Metropolitan Youth Education Center, and an Aircraft Training Facility. The so-called “Park Hill schools” are Barrett, Stedman, Hallett, Smith, Philips, and Park Hill Elementary Schools; and Smiley Junior High School. East High School serves the area but is located outside of it. (See map following p. 214.) The so-called “core city schools” which are said to be segregated are Boulevard, Bryant-Webster, Columbine, Crofton, Ebert, Elm-wood, Elyria, Fairmont, Fairview, Garden Place, Gilpin, Greenlee, Harrington, Mitchell, Smedley, Swansea, Whittier, Wyatt, and Wy-man Elementary Schools; Baker, Cole, and Morey Junior High Schools; and East, West, and Manual High Schools. (See map following p. 214.) The first of the District Court's four opinions, 303 F. Supp. 279, was filed July 31, 1969, and granted petitioners’ application for a preliminary injunction. The second opinion, 303 F. Supp. 289, was filed August 14, 1969, and made supplemental findings and conclusions. The third opinion, 313 F. Supp. 61, filed March 21, 1970, was the opinion on the merits. The fourth opinion, 313 F. Supp. 90, was on remedy and was filed May 21, 1970. The District Court filed an unreported opinion on October 19, 1971, in which relief was extended to Hallett and Stedman Elementary Schools which were found by the court in its July 31, 1969, opinion to be purposefully segregated but were not included within the scope of the three 1969 Board resolutions. The Court of Appeals filed five unreported opinions: on August 5, 1969, vacating preliminary injunctions; on August 27, 1969, staying preliminary injunction; on September 15, 1969, on motion to amend stay; on October 17, 1969, denying motions to dismiss; and on March 26, 1971, granting stay. MR. Justice BreNNAN, on August 29, 1969, filed an opinion reinstating the preliminary injunction, 396 U. S. 1215, and on April 26, 1971, this Court entered a per curiam order vacating the Court of Appeals’ stay, 402 U. S. 182. The parties have used the terms “Anglo,” “Negro,” and “His-pano” throughout the record. We shall therefore use those terms. “Hispano” is the term used by the Colorado Department of Education to refer to a person of Spanish, Mexican, or Cuban heritage. Colorado Department of Education, Human Relations in Colorado, A Historical Record 203 (1968). In the Southwest, the “His-panos” are more commonly referred to as “Chícanos” or “Mexican-Americans.” The more specific racial and ethnic composition of the Denver public schools is as follows: United States Commission on Civil Rights, Mexican American Education Study, Report 1, Ethnic Isolation of Mexican Americans in the Public Schools of the Southwest (Apr. 1971); United States Commission on Civil Rights, Mexican American Educational Series, Report 2, The Unfinished Education (Oct. 1971). The Commission’s second Report, on p. 41, summarizes its findings: “The basic finding of this report is that minority students in the Southwest — Mexican Americans, blacks, American Indians — do not obtain the benefits of public education at a rate equal to that of their Anglo classmates.” Our Brother Rehnquist argues in dissent that the Court somehow transgresses the “two-court” rule. Post, at 264. But at this stage, we have no occasion to review the factual findings concurred in by the two courts below. Cf. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 (1972). We address only the question whether those courts applied the correct legal standard in deciding the case as it affects the core city schools. The Board was found guilty of intentionally segregative acts of one kind or another with respect to the schools listed below. (As to Cole and East, the conclusion rests on the rescission of the resolutions.) The total Negro school enrollment in 1968 was: Elementary 8,297 Junior High 2,893 Senior High 2,442 Thus, the above-mentioned schools included: Elementary 25.36% of all Negro elementary pupils Junior High 68.99% of all Negro junior high pupils Senior High 42.55% of all Negro senior high pupils Total 37.69% of all Negro pupils Our Brother Rehnquist argues in dissent that Brown v. Board of Education did not impose an “affirmative duty to integrate” the schools of a dual school system but was only a “prohibition against discrimination” “in the sense that the assignment of a child to a particular school is not made to depend on his race . . . .” Infra, at 258. That is the interpretation of Brown expressed 18 years ago by a three-judge court in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (1955): “The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination.” But Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437-438 (1968), rejected that interpretation insofar as Green expressly held that “School boards .. . operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged [by Brown 77] with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.” Green remains the governing principle. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971). See also Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education, 317 F. Supp. 980, 984 (1970). As a former School Board President who testified for the respondents put it: “Once you change the boundary of any one school, it is affecting all the schools . . . .” Testimony of Mrs. Lois Heath Johnson on cross-examination. App. 951a-952a. Similarly, Judge Wisdom has recently stated: “Infection at one school infects all schools. To take the most simple example, in a two school system, all blacks at one school means all or almost all whites at the other.” United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F. 2d 848, 888 (CA5 1972). See the chart in 445 F. 2d, at 1008-1009, which indicates that 31,767 pupils attended the schools affected by the resolutions. Our Brother RehNquist argues in dissent that the District Court did take the Park Hill finding into account in addressing the question of alleged de jure segregation of the core city schools. Post, at 262. He cites the following excerpt from a footnote to the District Court's opinion of March 21, 1970, 313 F. Supp., at 74-75, n. 18: “Although past discriminatory acts may not be a substantial factor contributing to present segregation, they may nevertheless be probative on the issue of the segregative purpose of other discriminatory acts which are in fact a substantial factor in causing a present segregated situation.” But our Brother Rehnquist omits the rest of the footnote: “Thus, in part I of this opinion, we discussed the building of Barrett, boundary changes and the use of mobile units as they relate to the purpose for the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524 and 1531.” Obviously, the District Court was carefully limiting the comment to the consideration being given past discriminatory acts affecting the Park Hill schools in assessing the causes of current segregation of those schools. In addition to these 22 schools, see 313 F. Supp., at 78, two more schools, Elyria and Smedley Elementary Schools, became less than 30% Anglo after the District Court’s decision on the merits. These two schools were thus included in the list of segregated schools. 313 F. Supp., at 92. 402 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1971). It may be that the District Court and Court of Appeals were applying this test in holding that petitioners had failed to prove that the Board's actions “caused” the current condition of segregation in the core city schools. But, if so, certainly plaintiffs in a school desegregation case are not required to prove “cause” in the sense of “non-attenuation.” That is a factor which becomes relevant only after past intentional actions resulting in segregation have been established. At that stage, the burden becomes the school authorities’ to show that the current segregation is in no way the result of those past segregative actions. We therefore do not reach, and intimate no view upon, the merits of the holding of the District Court, premised upon its erroneous finding that the situation “is more like de jacto segregation,” 313 F. Supp., at 73, that nevertheless, although all-out desegregation “could not be decreed . . . the only feasible and constitutionally acceptable program ... is a system of desegregation and integration which provides compensatory education in an integrated environment.” Id., at 96.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE v. RAY et al. No. 90-747. Argued October 9, 1991 Decided December 16, 1991 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, O’ConnoR, and Souter, JJ., joined, and in all but Part III of which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Kennedy, J., joined, post, p. 179. Thomas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, Leonard Schaitman, and Bruce G. Forrest. Michael Dean Ray, pro se, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Neil Dwight Kolner and Eric J. Sinrod. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Debra A Valentine, David L. Sobel, John A Powell, Lucas Guttentag, and Gary M. Stern; for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Robert C. Bernius, René P. Milam, Barbara Wartelle Wall, Jane E. Kirtley, Richard M. Schmidt, Bruce W. Sanford, James E. Grossberg, and George Freeman; and for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights et al. by David C. Vladeck and Alan B. Morrison. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. In response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the Department of State produced 25 documents containing information about Haitian nationals who had attempted to immigrate illegally to the United States and were involuntarily returned to Haiti. Names of individual Haitians had been deleted from 17 of the documents. The question presented is whether these deletions were authorized by FOIA Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA disclosure requirements do not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6). I Haiti is a densely populated nation located about 500 nautical miles southeast of Florida on the western third of the Caribbean Island of Hispaniola. Prior to 1981, its history of severe economic depression and dictatorial government motivated large numbers of its citizens to emigrate to Florida without obtaining the permission of either the Haitian Government or the Government of the United States. A small number of those undocumented aliens were eligible for asylum as political refugees, but almost all of them were subject to deportation if identified and apprehended. In response to this burgeoning “illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens” from Haiti and other countries, President Reagan ordered the Coast Guard and the Secretary of State to intercept vessels carrying undocumented aliens and, except for passengers who qualified for refugee status, to return them to their point of origin. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4865, 3 CFR 50 (1981 Comp.); Exec. Order No. 12324, 3 CFR 180 (1981 Comp.). The President also directed the Secretary of State to enter into “cooperative arrangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal migration to the United States by sea.” Ibid. Following this directive, the Secretary of State obtained an assurance from the Haitian Government that interdicted Haitians would “not be subject to prosecution for illegal departure.” See Agreement on Migrants — Interdiction, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, 33 U. S. T. 3559, 3560, T. I. A. S. No. 10241. In order to monitor compliance with that assurance, State Department personnel conducted confidential interviews with a “representative sample” of unsuccessful emigrants about six months after their involuntary return. All but one or two of the emigrants reported that they had not been harassed or prosecuted since their return to Haiti. Respondents in this case are a Florida lawyer who represents undocumented Haitian nationals seeking political asylum in the United States and three of his clients. In immigration proceedings, respondents are attempting to prove that Haitians who immigrated illegally will face a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their homeland and therefore are refugees entitled to asylum in this country. Relying in part on the evidence in the reports of the interviews with former passengers on vessels interdicted by the Coast Guard, the Government has taken the position in those proceedings that respondents’ fear of persecution is not well founded. In order to test the accuracy of the Government’s assertion that undocumented Haitian nationals have not been persecuted upon their return to Haiti, respondents made a series of FOIA requests to three Government agencies for copies of reports of the interviews by State Department personnel with persons who had been involuntarily returned to Haiti. Insofar as relevant to the question before us, the net result of these requests was the production by the State Department of 25 documents, containing approximately 96 pages, which describe a number of interviews with specific returnees and summarize the information that had been obtained during successive periods. Thus, for example, a summary prepared in March 1985 reported that since the followup program had begun 3V2 years earlier, United States embassy officials in Haiti had interviewed 812 returnees, 22.83 percent of the total migrant interdictee population. During that time, the report continued, “only two interdictees have mentioned a threat or mistreatment by the authorities. In one case the claim was unverifiable as there were no witnesses present, in the second case higher authorities intervened to prevent mistreatment by a rural policeman.” In 17 of the documents, the information related to individual interviews, but the names and other identifying information had been redacted before the documents were delivered to respondents. The only issue for us to decide is whether that redaction was lawful. The District Court found that any invasion of privacy from the “mere act of disclosure of names and addresses would be de minimis and little more than' speculation” and was clearly outweighed by the public interest in the “safe relocation of returned Haitians.” Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502, 505 (SD Fla. 1989). It therefore ordered the Department to produce the redacted information. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 908 F. 2d 1549 (CA11 1990). For two reasons, however, it disagreed with the District Court’s “de minimis” characterization of the privacy interest at stake. First, it noted that respondents wanted the redacted information in order to enable them to contact the interviewees directly and to question them about their treatment by the Haitian Government. Id., at 1554. Second, the Court recognized that “the returnees were promised confidentiality before they talked with U. S. government officials.” Ibid. Thus, the Court of Appeals began its balancing process “by acknowledging that there are significant privacy interests at stake.” Ibid. It nevertheless concluded that those interests were outweighed by the public interest in learning whether the Government is “adequately monitoring Haiti’s compliance with its obligation not to persecute returnees” and “is honest to the public” when its officials express the opinion that Haiti is adhering to that obligation. Id., at 1555. The court recognized that the redacted information would not, in and of itself, tell respondents anything about Haiti’s treatment of the returnees or this Government’s honesty, but it concluded that the indirect benefit of giving respondents the means to locate the Haitian returnees and to cross-examine them provided a public value that required disclosure. Id., at 1555-1556. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ construction of Exemption 6, 499 U. S. 904 (1991), and now reverse. II It is appropriate to preface our evaluation of the narrow question that we must decide with an identification of certain matters that have been resolved in earlier stages of the litigation. After the District Court’s initial decision, the State Department filed additional affidavits in support of a claim that the redacted information was protected from disclosure by Exemption 1, the exemption for classified documents, and also by Exemption 7(C), the exemption for law enforcement records which, if released, “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The District Court ruled that the Government had waived those claims by not raising them until after its Exemption 6 claim had been denied, 725 F. Supp., at 505, and the Court of Appeals held that that ruling was not an abuse of discretion, 908 F. 2d, at 1557. We denied the Government’s certiorari petition insofar as it sought review of that question, but mention it here because the Government’s burden in establishing the requisite invasion of privacy to support an Exemption 6 claim is heavier than the standard applicable to Exemption 7(C). See Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 756 (1989). To prevail in this case under Exemption 6, the Government must establish that the invasion of the interviewees’ privacy would be “clearly unwarranted.” In attempting to meet its burden, the Government relies, in part, on the fact that the interviews with the Haitian returnees were conducted pursuant to assurances of confidentiality. In this Court, respondents have suggested that the texts of some of the reported interviews do not expressly mention such assurances. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals, however, questioned the fact that promises of confidentiality had actually been made; on the contrary, after finding that such assurances had been made, both courts concluded as a matter of law that they did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Insofar as the promises of confidentiality are relevant, we of course accept the factual predicate for the Court of Appeals decision. That court’s conclusion rested, in part, on what it described as the public interest in learning “whether our government is honest to the public about Haiti’s treatment of returnees.” 908 F. 2d, at 1555. The Court of Appeals did not, however, suggest that there was any evidence in the State Department records that was inconsistent with any public statement made by Government officials, or that there was any other factual basis for questioning the honesty of its officials. Thus, as with the assurances of confidentiality, we have no occasion to question the Government’s version of the relevant facts. We note, finally, that respondents have never questioned the Government’s position that the documents at issue consist of “personnel and medical files and similar files” within the meaning of Exemption 6. Because the 17 reports from which identifying information was deleted unquestionably apply to the particular individuals who had been returned and interviewed, they are “similar files” within the meaning of the exemption. See Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U. S. 595, 602 (1982). The only question, therefore, is whether the disclosure of the unredacted interview reports “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person’s privacy.” III The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to facilitate public access to Government documents. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U. S. 146, 151 (1989). The statute was designed “‘to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 361 (1976). Consistently with this purpose, as well as the plain language of the Act, the strong presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents. Ibid.; Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 755. That burden remains with the agency when it seeks to justify the redaction of identifying information in a particular document as well as when it seeks to withhold an entire document. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The redaction procedure is, however, expressly authorized by FOIA. Congress thus recognized that the policy of informing the public about the operation of its Government can be adequately served in some cases without unnecessarily compromising individual interests in privacy. Accordingly, in the leading case interpreting Exemption 6, we held that the statute required disclosure of summaries of Air Force Academy disciplinary proceedings “with personal references or other identifying information deleted.” Rose, 425 U. S., at 380. The question in this case is whether petitioner has discharged its burden of demonstrating that the disclosure of the contents of the interviews with the Haitian returnees adequately served the statutory purpose and that the release of the information identifying the particular interviewees would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of their privacy. As we held in Rose, the text of the exemption requires the Court to balance “the individual’s right of privacy” against the basic policy of opening “agency action to the light of public scrutiny,” id., at 372. The District Court and the Court of Appeals properly began their analysis by considering the significance of the privacy interest at stake. We are persuaded, however, that several factors, when considered together, make the privacy interest more substantial than the Court of Appeals recognized. First, the Court of Appeals appeared to assume that respondents sought only the names and addresses of the interviewees. But respondents sought — and the District Court ordered that the Government disclose — the unredacted interview summaries. As the Government points out, many of these summaries contain personal details about particular interviewees. Thus, if the summaries are released without the names redacted, highly personal information regarding marital and employment status, children, living conditions, and attempts to enter the United States would be linked publicly with particular, named individuals. Although disclosure of such personal information constitutes only a de minimis invasion of privacy when the identities of the interviewees are unknown, the invasion of privacy becomes significant when the personal information is linked to particular interviewees. Cf. id., at 380-381. In addition, disclosure of the unredacted interview summaries would publicly identify the interviewees as people who cooperated with a State Department investigation of the Haitian Government’s compliance with its promise to the United States Government not to prosecute the returnees. The Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge the significance of this fact. As the State Department explains, disclosure of the interviewees’ identities could subject them or their families to “embarrassment in their social and community relationships.” App. 43. More importantly, this group of interviewees occupies a special status: They left their homeland in violation of Haitian law and are protected from prosecution by their government’s assurance to the State Department. Although the Department’s monitoring program indicates that that assurance has been fulfilled, it nevertheless remains true that the State Department considered the danger of mistreatment sufficiently real to necessitate that monitoring program. How significant the danger of mistreatment may now be is, of course, impossible to measure, but the privacy interest in protecting these individuals from any retaliatory action that might result from a renewed interest in their aborted attempts to emigrate must be given great weight. Indeed, the very purpose of respondents’ FOIA request is to attempt to prove that such a danger is present today. We are also persuaded that the Court of Appeals gave insufficient weight to the fact that the interviews had been conducted pursuant to an assurance of confidentiality. We agree that such a promise does not necessarily prohibit disclosure, but it has a special significance in this case. Not only is it apparent that an interviewee who had been given such an assurance might have been willing to discuss private matters that he or she would not otherwise expose to the public — and therefore would regard a subsequent interview by a third party armed with that information as a special affront to his or her privacy — but, as discussed above, it is also true that the risk of mistreatment gives this group of interviewees an additional interest in assuring that their anonymity is maintained. Finally, we cannot overlook the fact that respondents plan to make direct contact with the individual Haitian returnees identified in the reports. As the Court of Appeals properly recognized, the intent to interview the returnees magnifies the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of their identities. IV Although the interest in protecting the privacy of the redacted information is substantial, we must still consider the importance of the public interest in its disclosure. For unless the invasion of privacy is “clearly unwarranted,” the public interest in disclosure must prevail. As we have repeatedly recognized, FOIA’s “basic policy of ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,’... focuses on the citizens’ right to be informed about ‘what their government is up to.’ Official information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose.” Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., 489 U. S., at 773 (quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S., at 360-361) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals properly recognized that the public interest in knowing whether the State Department has adequately monitored Haiti’s compliance with its promise not to prosecute returnees is cognizable under FOIA. We are persuaded, however, that this public interest has been adequately served by disclosure of the redacted interview summaries and that disclosure of the unredacted documents would therefore constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the interviewees’ privacy. The unredacted portions of the documents that have already been released to respondents inform the reader about the State Department’s performance of its duty to monitor Haitian compliance with the promise not to prosecute the returnees. The documents reveal how many returnees were interviewed, when the interviews took place, the contents of individual interviews, and details about the status of the interviewees. The addition of the redacted identifying information would not shed any additional light on the Government’s conduct of its obligation. The asserted public interest on which respondents rely stems not from the disclosure of the redacted information itself, but rather from the hope that respondents, or others, may be able to use that information to obtain additional information outside the Government files. The Government argues that such “derivative use” of requested documents is entirely beyond the purpose of the statute and that we should adopt a categorical rule entirely excluding the interest in such use from the process of balancing the public interest in disclosure against the interest in privacy. There is no need to adopt such a rigid rule to decide this case, however, because there is nothing in the record to suggest that a second series of interviews with the already-interviewed returnees would produce any relevant information that is not set forth in the documents that have already been produced. Mere speculation about hypothetical public benefits cannot outweigh a demonstrably significant invasion of privacy. Accordingly, we need not address the question whether a “derivative use” theory would ever justify release of information about private individuals. We are also unmoved by respondents’ asserted interest in ascertaining the veracity of the interview reports. There is not a scintilla of evidence, either in the documents themselves or elsewhere in the record, that tends to impugn the integrity of the reports. We generally accord Government records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy. If a totally unsupported suggestion that the interest in finding out whether Government agents have been telling the truth justified disclosure of private materials, Government agencies would have no defense against requests for production of private information. What sort of evidence of official misconduct might be sufficient to identify a genuine public interest in disclosure is a matter that we need not address in this case. On the record before us, we are satisfied that the proposed invasion of the serious privacy interest of the Haitian returnees is “clearly unwarranted.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Article 1.2 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U. N. T. S. 268, to which the United States acceded in 1968,19 U. S. T. 6223, 6261, T. I. A. S. No. 6577, defines a “refugee” as a person absent from his or her country due to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” The Protocol obligates the United States to comply with the substantive requirements of Articles 2 through 34 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951,189 U. N. T. S. 150. 19 U. S. T., at 6225. Article 33.1 of the Convention, 19 U. S. T., at 6267, states: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” See generally INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407, 416-418 (1984). Article 34, 19 U. S. T., at 6267, provides that “Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. ...” See generally INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 436-441 (1987). Respondents also sought disclosure of an alleged list of 600 Haitians who had been returned to Haiti and had not been mistreated after their arrival. The District Court found, however, that the “record fails to disclose that any documents have been improperly withheld o[r] that they, indeed, exist,” Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502, 504 (SD Fla. 1989), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this finding, Ray v. United States Department of Justice, 908 F. 2d 1549, 1559-1560 (1990). We have no reason to question this finding and, therefore, we are concerned only with the 25 documents containing summaries of interviews with illegal Haitian immigrants who were involuntarily returned to Haiti. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Filing Defendant State Department’s Edited Documents 12. The May 1985 report, the last report in the record, states that as of that date, embassy officials had interviewed 1,052 of the returnees, 23.28 percent of the total migrant returnee population. Id., at 96. The report concluded that the interviews provide “further evidence” that Haiti “is keeping its commitment under the 1981 Migrant Interdiction Agreement not to prosecute or harass returned migrants for their illegal departure,” but noted that “the embassy will continue its follow-up program with the goal of reaching a 25-percent interview rate of returned migrants.” Ibid. For example, one memorandum relates the following: “-is an unemployed 21-year-old living with his mother and five younger siblings in a one-room shack in Delmas. His older brother, who is employed and living in Port-au-Prince, had paid the $100 fare for_ to travel on the S/V Sainte Marie, interdicted enroute to Miami on 6/13/83. “-explained that he had wanted to live in Miami, although he has no family there. He never went to school and has no marketable skills. -says that he is thinking of another attempt to reach the States. He cannot find a job here and said that he would like to travel. The twelve days spent on board the S/V Sainte Marie were difficult, he admitted, but he is willing to take another chance. _emphatically said that he had had no problems from Haitian officials since his return. He has been assisted twice by the Red Cross with food and money grants totalling $60.” Attachment 2 to Declaration of John Eaves, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Mandatory Review of the Classification and Declassification Center of the Department of State 6. The relevant portions of Exemptions 1, 6, and 7 read as follows: “(b) [The FOIA disclosure] section does not apply to matters that are— “(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order; “(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; “(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . .5 U. S. C. § 552. Thus, the Court of Appeals explained: “We are also mindful, as the government points out, that the returnees were promised confidentiality before they talked with U. S. government officials. That, of course, is a factor that adds weight to the privacy interests at stake here, but it is not a factor that compels us to prohibit disclosure in this case.” 908 F. 2d, at 1554; see also 725 F. Supp., at 505 (“The promise of confidentiality by the State Dept, is only one factor to be considered and, in this case, is not determinative of the outcome”). See n. 6, supra. As we noted in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749, 755, n. 7 (1989): “Congress employed ... language [similar to that contained in Exemption 6] earlier in the statute to authorize an agency to delete identifying details that might otherwise offend an individual’s privacy: ‘“To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction.’ § 552(a)(2).” In addition, Congress mandated that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt. ...” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b). See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1965) (“The authority to delete identifying details after written justification is necessary in order to be able to balance the public’s right to know with the private citizen’s right to be secure in his personal affairs which have no bearing or effect on the general public. For example, it may be pertinent to know that unseasonably harsh weather has caused an increase in public relief costs; but it is not necessary that the identity of any person so affected be made public”); H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966) (“The public has a need to know, for example, the details of an agency opinion or statement of policy on an income tax matter, but there is no need to identify the individuals involved in a tax matter if the identification has no bearing or effect on the general public”). These examples guided our analysis in Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm., supra, in which we held that criminal identification records, or “rap sheets,” were law enforcement records which, if released, “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and therefore were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7. We explained that: “Both public relief and income tax assessments — like law enforcement— are proper subjects of public concern. But just as the identity of the individuals given public relief or involved in tax matters is irrelevant to the public’s understanding of the Government’s operation, so too is the identity of individuals who are the subjects of rap sheets irrelevant to the public’s understanding of the system of law enforcement. For rap sheets reveal only the dry, chronological, personal history of individuals who have had brushes with the law, and tell us nothing about matters of substantive law enforcement policy that are properly the subject of public concern.” Id., at 766, n. 18. See n. 5, supra. We emphasize, however, that we are not implying that disclosure of a list of names and other identifying information is inherently and always a significant threat to the privacy of the individuals on the list. Instead, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that whether disclosure of a list of names is a “ ‘significant or a de minimis threat depends upon the characteristic(s) revealed by virtue of being on the particular list, and the consequences likely to ensue.'” National Assn. of Retired Federal Employees v. Horner, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 27, 31, 879 F. 2d 873, 877 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U. S. 1078 (1990). As discussed infra, disclosure of the interviewees’ names would be a significant invasion of their privacy because it would subject them to possible embarrassment and retaliatory action.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

EDWARD J. DeBARTOLO CORP. v. FLORIDA GULF COAST BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL et al. No. 86-1461. Argued January 20, 1988 Decided April 20, 1988 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., concurred in the judgment. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Lawrence M. Cohen argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Deputy Solicitor General Cohen argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Rosemary M. Collyer, Norton J. Come, Linda Sher, and Carmel P. Ebb. Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondent Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council. With him on the brief were Mark F. Kelly, Laurence J. Cohen, David M. Silberman, George Kaufmann, and Marsha Berzon. Solicitor General Fried and Rosemary M. Collyer filed a brief for the National Labor Relations Board, as respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6, in support of petitioner. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Retail Federation by Jack L. Whitacre; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Edward B. Miller and Stephen A. Bokat; and for the International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc., by Edward J. Sack and Stephanie McEvily. John A. Powell, Helen Hershkoff, Steven R. Shapiro, C. Edwin Baker, Robert A. Bush, and Ira L. Gottlieb filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. This case centers around the respondent union’s peaceful handbilling of the businesses operating in a shopping mall in Tampa, Florida, owned by petitioner, the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo). The union’s primary labor dispute was with H. J. High Construction Company (High) over alleged substandard wages and fringe benefits. High was retained by the H. J. Wilson Company (Wilson) to construct a department store in the mall, and neither DeBartolo nor any of the other 85 or so mall tenants had any contractual right to influence the selection of contractors. The union, however, sought to obtain their influence upon Wilson and High by distributing handbills asking mall customers not to shop at any of the stores in the mall “until the Mall’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits.” The handbills’ message was that “[t]he payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community.” The handbills made clear that the union was seeking only a consumer boycott against the other mall tenants, not a secondary strike by their employees. At all four entrances to the mall for about three weeks in December 1979, the union peacefully distributed the handbills without any accompanying picketing or patrolling. After DeBartolo failed to convince the union to alter the language of the handbills to state that its dispute did not involve DeBartolo or the mall lessees other than Wilson and to limit its distribution to the immediate vicinity of Wilson’s construction site, it filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), charging the union with engaging in unfair labor practices under § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 61 Stat. 141, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158(b)(4). The Board’s General Counsel issued a complaint, but the Board eventually dismissed it, concluding that the handbilling was protected by the publicity proviso of § 8(b)(4). Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun cil, 252 N. L. R. B. 702 (1980). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board, 662 F. 2d 264 (1981), but this Court reversed in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U. S. 147 (1983). There, we concluded that the handbilling did not fall within the proviso’s limited scope of exempting “publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is ‘distributed by’ the secondary employer” because DeBartolo and the other tenants, as opposed to Wilson, did not distribute products of High. Id., at 155-157. Since there had not been a determination below whether the union’s handbilling fell within the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so, whether it was protected by the First Amendment, we remanded the case. On remand, the Board held that the union’s handbilling was proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 273 N. L. R. B. 1431 (1985). It stated that under its prior cases “handbilling and other activity urging a consumer boycott constituted coercion.” Id., at 1432. The Board reasoned that “[appealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business,” and “such appeals constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are therefore a form of coercion.” Id., at 1432, n. 6. It viewed the object of the hand-billing as attempting “to force the mall tenants to cease doing business with DeBartolo in order to force DeBartolo and/or Wilson’s not to do business with High.” Id., at 1432. The Board observed that it need not inquire whether the prohibition of this handbilling raised serious questions under the First Amendment, for “the statute’s literal language and the applicable case law require[d]” a finding of a violation. Ibid. Finally, it reiterated its longstanding position that “as a congressionally created administrative agency, we will presume the constitutionality of the Act we administer.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F. 2d 1328, 1346 (1986). Because there would be serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4) could constitutionally ban peaceful hand-billing not involving nonspeech elements, such as patrolling, the court applied our decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 (1979), to determine if there was a clear congressional intent to proscribe such handbilling. The language of the section, the court held, revealed no such intent, and the legislative history indicated that Congress, by using the phrase “threaten, coerce, or restrain,” was concerned with secondary picketing and strikes rather than appeals to consumers not involving picketing. 796 F. 2d, at 1336-1340. The court also concluded that the publicity proviso did not manifest congressional intent to ban all speech not coming within its terms because it was “drafted as an interpretive, explanatory section” and not as an exception to an otherwise all-encompassing prohibition on publicity in § 8(b)(4). Id., at 1344. The court went on to construe the section as not prohibiting consumer publicity; DeBartolo petitioned for certiorari. Because this case presents important questions of federal constitutional and labor law, we granted the petition, 482 U. S. 913 (1987), and now affirm. The Board, the agency entrusted by Congress with the authority to administer the NLRA, has the “special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963); see Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U. S. 95, 114 (1985); NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U. S. 357, 362-363 (1958). Here, the Board has construed § 8(b)(4) of the Act to cover handbilling at a mall entrance urging potential customers not to trade with any retailers in the mall, in order to exert pressure on the proprietor of the mall to influence a particular mall tenant not to do business with a nonunion construction contractor. That statutory interpretation by the Board would normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-843, and n. 9 (1984). Another rule of statutory construction, however, is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Catholic Bishop, supra, at 499-501, 504. This cardinal principle has its roots in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804), and has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate. E. g., Catholic Bishop, supra, at 500-501; Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 577 (1929); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390 (1924); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408 (1909); Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448-449 (1830) (Story, J.). As was stated in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 (1895), “[t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” This approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. See Grenada County Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, 269 (1884). We agree with the Court of Appeals and respondents that this case calls for the invocation of the Catholic Bishop rule, for the Board’s construction of the statute, as applied in this case, poses serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)(4) under the First Amendment. The handbills involved here truthfully revealed the existence of a labor dispute and urged potential customers of the mall to follow a wholly legal course of action, namely, not to patronize the retailers doing business in the mall. The handbilling was peaceful. No picketing or patrolling was involved. On its face, this was expressive activity arguing that substandard wages should be opposed by abstaining from shopping in a mall where such wages were paid. Had the union simply been leafletting the public generally, including those entering every shopping mall in town, pursuant to an annual educational effort against substandard pay, there is little doubt that legislative proscription of such leaflets would pose a substantial issue of validity under the First Amendment. The same may well be true in this case, although here the handbills called attention to a specific situation in the mall allegedly involving the payment of unacceptably low wages by a construction contractor. That a labor union is the leafletter and that a labor dispute was involved does not foreclose this analysis. We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial speech such as advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits, for they pressed the benefits of unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy and the standard of living of the populace. Of course, commercial speech itself is protected by the First Amendment, Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976), and however these handbills are to be classified, the Court of Appeals was plainly correct in holding that the Board’s construction would require deciding serious constitutional issues. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 534-535, 537 (1980); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97, 102-103 (1979); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419-420 (1971). The Board was urged to construe the statute in light of the asserted constitutional considerations, but thought that it was constrained by its own prior authority and cases in the Courts of Appeals, as well' as by the express language of the Act, to hold that § 8(b)(4) must be construed to forbid the handbilling involved here. Even if this construction of the Act were thought to be a permissible one, we are quite sure that in light of the traditional rule followed in Catholic Bishop, we must independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). This the Court has done in several cases. In NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 284 (1960), for example, the Court rejected the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “restrain or coerce” to include peaceful recognitional picketing and stated: “In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from such picketing. Therefore, unless there is the clearest indication in the legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(A) supporting the Board’s claim of power under that section, we cannot sustain the Board’s order here. We now turn to an examination of the legislative history.” That examination of the legislative history failed to yield the requisite “clearest indication.” Similarly, in NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 63 (1964) (Tree Fruits), we disagreed with the Board’s determination that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited all consumer picketing at a secondary establishment, no matter the economic consequences of that picketing, because our examination of the legislative history led us to “conclude that it does not reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, and, particularly, any concern with peaceful picketing when it is limited, as here, to persuading” customers not to purchase a specific product of the secondary establishment. We once more looked for the “isolated evils” that Congress had focused on because “[b]oth the congressional policy and our adherence to this principle of interpretation reflect concern that a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Id., at 62-63; see id., at 67, 71. Because there was not the required “clearest indication in the legislative history,” we rejected the Board’s interpretation that limited expressive activities. Again, in Catholic Bishop, we independently determined whether the Board’s jurisdiction extended to parochial schools in the face of a substantial First Amendment challenge, although the Board itself had previously considered the First Amendment challenge and presumably interpreted the statute cognizable of those limits. 440 U. S., at 497-499. We follow this course here and conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the section is open to a construction that obviates deciding whether a congressional prohibition of handbilling on the facts of this case would violate the First Amendment. The case turns on whether handbilling such as involved here must be held to “threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” to cease doing business with another, within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). We note first that “inducting] or encouragting]” employees of the secondary employer to strike is proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(i). But more than mere persuasion is necessary to prove a violation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): that section requires a showing of threats, coercion, or restraints. Those words, we have said, are “nonspecific, indeed vague,” and should be interpreted with “caution” and not given a “broad sweep,” Drivers, supra, at 290; and in applying § 8(b)(1)(A) they were not to be construed to reach peaceful recognitional picketing. Neither is there any necessity to construe such language to reach the handbills involved in this case. There is no suggestion that the leaflets had any coercive effect on customers of the mall. There was no violence, picketing, or patrolling and only an attempt to persuade customers not to shop in the mall. The Board nevertheless found that the handbilling “coerced” mall tenants and explained in a footnote that “[a]p-pealing to the public not to patronize secondary employers is an attempt to inflict economic harm on the secondary employers by causing them to lose business. As the case law makes clear, such appeals constitute ‘economic retaliation’ and are therefore a form of coercion.” 273 N. L. R. B., at 1432, n. 6. Our decision in Tree Fruits, however, makes untenable the notion that any kind of handbilling, picketing, or other appeals to a secondary employer to cease doing business with the employer involved in the labor dispute is “coercion” within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) if it has some economic impact on the neutral. In that case, the union picketed a secondary employer, a retailer, asking the public not to buy a product produced by the primary employer. We held that the impact of this picketing was not coercion within the meaning of § 8(b)(4) even though, if the appeal succeeded, the retailer would lose revenue. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U. S. 607 (1980) (Safeco), in turn, held that consumer picketing urging a general boycott of a secondary employer aimed at causing him to sever relations with the union’s real antagonist was coercive and forbidden by § 8(b)(4). It is urged that Safeco rules this case because the union sought a general boycott of all tenants in the mall. But “picketing is qualitatively ‘different from other modes of communication,'” Babbitt v. Farm, Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 311, n. 17 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 465 (1950)), and Safeco noted that the picketing there actually threatened the neutral with ruin or substantial loss. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence in Safeco, 447 U. S., at 619, picketing is “a mixture of conduct and communication” and the conduct element “often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment.” Handbills containing the same message, he observed, are “much less effective than labor picketing” because they “depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea.” Ibid. Similarly, the Court stated in Hughes v. Superior Court, supra, at 465: “Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication.” In Tree Fruits, we could not discern with the “requisite clarity” that Congress intended to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites. There is even less reason to find in the language of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), standing alone, any clear indication that handbilling, without picketing, “coerces” secondary employers. The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business, and not because they are intimidated by a line of picketers, is the result of mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than what its customers honestly want it to do. The Board argues that our first DeBartolo case goes far to dispose of this case because there we said that the only non-picketing publicity “exempted from the prohibition is publicity intended to inform the public that the primary employer’s product is ‘distributed by’ the secondary employer.” . 463 U. S., at 155. We also indicated that if the handbilling were protected by the proviso, the distribution requirement would be without substantial practical effect. Id., at 157. But we obviously did not there conclude or indicate that the handbills were covered by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), for we remanded the case on this very issue. Id., at 157-158. It is nevertheless argued that the second proviso to § 8(b)(4) makes clear that that section, as amended in 1959, was intended to proscribe nonpicketing appeals such as hand-billing urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That proviso reads as follows: “Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.” By its terms, the proviso protects nonpicketing communications directed at customers of a distributor of goods produced by an employer with whom the union has a labor dispute. Because handbilling and other consumer appeals not involving such a distributor are not within the proviso, the argument goes, those appeals must be considered coercive within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Otherwise, it is said, the proviso is meaningless, for if handbilling and like communications are never coercive and within the reach of the section, there would have been no need whatsoever for the proviso. This approach treats the proviso as establishing an exception to a prohibition that would otherwise reach the conduct excepted. But this proviso has a different ring to it. It states that § 8(b)(4) “shall not be construed” to forbid certain described nonpicketing publicity. That language need not be read as an exception. It may indicate only that without the proviso, the particular nonpicketing communication the proviso protects might have been considered to be coercive, even if other forms of publicity would not be. Section 8(b)(4), with its proviso, may thus be read as not covering nonpicketing publicity, including appeals to customers of a retailer as they approach the store, urging a complete boycott of the retailer because he handles products produced by nonunion shops. The Board’s reading of § 8(b)(4) would make an unfair labor practice out of any kind of publicity or communication to the public urging a consumer boycott of employers other than those the proviso specifically deals with. On the facts of this case, newspaper, radio, and television appeals not to patronize the mall would be prohibited; and it would be an unfair labor practice for unions in their own meetings to urge their members not to shop in the mall. Nor could a union’s handbills simply urge not shopping at a department store because it is using a nonunion contractor, although the union could safely ask the store’s customers not to buy there because it is selling mattresses not carrying the union label. It is difficult, to say the least, to fathom why Congress would consider appeals urging a boycott of a distributor of a nonunion product to be more deserving of protection than non-picketing persuasion of customers of other neutral employers such as that involved in this case. Neither do we find any clear indication in the relevant legislative history that Congress intended § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to proscribe peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied by picketing, urging a consumer boycott of a neutral employer. That section was one of several amendments to the NLRA enacted in 1959 and aimed at closing what were thought to be loopholes in the protections to which secondary employers were entitled. We recounted the legislative history in Tree Fruits and NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46 (1964), and the Court of Appeals carefully reexamined, it in this case and found “no affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed to prohibit nonpicketing labor publicity.” 796 F. 2d, at 1346. For the following reasons, for the most part expressed by the Court of Appeals, we agree with that conclusion. First, among the concerns of the proponents of the provision barring threats, coercion, or restraints aimed at secondary employers was consumer boycotts of neutral employers carried out by picketing. At no time did they suggest that merely handbilling the customers of the neutral employer was one of the evils at which their proposals were aimed. Had they wanted to bar any and all nonpicketing appeals, through newspapers, radio, television, handbills, or otherwise, the debates and discussions would surely have reflected this intention. Instead, when asked, Congressman Griffin, cosponsor of the bill that passed the House, stated that the bill covered boycotts carried out by picketing neutrals but would not interfere with the constitutional right of free speech. 105 Cong. Rec. 15673, 2 Leg. Hist. 1615. Second, the only suggestions that the ban against coercing secondary employers would forbid peaceful persuasion of customers by means other than picketing came from the opponents of any proposals to close the perceived loopholes in § 8(b)(4). Among their arguments in both the House and the Senate was that picketing and handbilling a neutral employer to force him to cease dealing in the products of an employer engaged in labor disputes, appeals which were then said to be legal, would be forbidden by the proposal that became § 8(b) (4)(ii)(B). The prohibition, it was said, “reaches not only picketing but leaflets, radio broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering -with freedom of speech.” 105 Cong. Rec. 15540, 2 Leg. Hist. 1576. The views of opponents of a bill with respect to its meaning, however, are not persuasive: “[W]e have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach. 'The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is-in doubt.’” Tree Fruits, 377 U. S., at 66 (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951)). Without more, the interpretation put on the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” by those opposed to the amendment hardly settles the matter. Third, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was one of the amendments agreed upon by a House-Senate Conference on the House’s LandrumGriffin bill and the Senate’s Kennedy-Ervin bill. An analysis of the Conference bill was presented in the House by Representative Griffin and in the Senate by Senator Goldwater. With respect to appeals to consumers, the summary said that the House provision prohibiting secondary consumer picketing was adopted but “with clarification that other forms of publicity are not prohibited.” 105 Cong. Rec. 18706, Leg. Hist. 1454 (Sen. Goldwater); 105 Cong. Rec. 18022, Leg. Hist. 1712 (Rep. Griffin). The clarification referred to was the second proviso to § 8(b)(4). See supra, at 581-582. The Court of Appeals held that although the proviso was itself confined to advising the customers of an employer that the latter was distributing a product of another employer with whom the union had a labor dispute, the legislative history did not foreclose understanding the proviso as a clarification of the meaning of § 8(b)(4) rather than an exception to a general ban on consumer publicity. We agree with this view. In addition to the summary presented by Senator Goldwater and Representative Griffin, Senator Kennedy, the Chairman of the Conference Committee, in presenting the Conference Report on the Senate floor, 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg. Hist. 1431-1432, stated that under the amendments as reported by the Conference Committee, a “union can hand out handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over the radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.” And he assured Senator Goldwater that union buy-American campaigns — that is, publicity requesting that consumers not buy foreign-made products, even though there is no ongoing labor dispute with the actual producer — would not be prohibited by the section. Senator Kennedy included in his statement, however, the following: “Under the Landrum-Griffin Bill it would have been impossible for a union to inform the customers of a secondary employer that that employer or store was selling goods which were made under racket conditions or sweatshop conditions, or in a plant where an economic strike was in progress. We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picketing.” 105 Cong. Rec. 17898-17899, 2 Leg. Hist. 1432. The Board relies on this part of the Senator’s exposition as an authoritative interpretation of the words “threaten, coerce, or restrain” and argues that except as saved by the express language of the proviso, informational appeals to customers not to deal with secondary employers are unfair labor practices. The Senator’s remarks about the meaning of §8(b)(4)(ii) echoed his views, and that of others, expressed in opposing and defeating in the Senate any attempts to give more protection to secondary employers from consumer boycotts, whether carried out by picketing or non-picketing means. See n. 8, supra, and accompanying text. And if the proviso added in conference were an exception rather than a clarification, it surely would not follow, as the Senator said, that under the Conference bill, unions would be free to “conduct informational activity short of picketing” and could handbill, advertise in newspapers, and carry out all publicity short of ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site. Nor would buy-American appeals be permissible, for they do not fall within the proviso’s terms. At the very least, the Kennedy-Goldwater colloquy falls far short of revealing a clear intent that all nonpicketing appeals to customers urging a secondary boycott were unfair practices unless protected by the express words of the proviso. Nor does that exchange together with the other bits of legislative history relied on by the Board rise to that level. In our view, interpreting § 8(b)(4) as not reaching the hand-billing involved in this case is not foreclosed either by the language of the section or its legislative history. That construction makes unnecessary passing on the serious constitutional questions that would be raised by the Board’s understanding of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia concur in the judgment. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Handbill read: “PLEASE DON’T SHOP AT EAST LAKE SQUARE MALL PLEASE “The FLA. GULF COAST BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO, is requesting that you do not shop at the stores in the East Lake Square Mall because of The Mall ownership’s contribution to substandard wages. “The Wilson’s Department Store under construction on these premises is being built by contractors who pay substandard wages and fringe benefits. In the past, the Mall’s owner, The Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation, has supported labor and our local economy by insuring that the Mall and its stores be built by contractors who pay fair wages and fringe benefits. Now, however, and for no apparent reason, the Mall owners have taken a giant step backwards by permitting our standards to be torn down. The payment of substandard wages not only diminishes the working person’s ability to purchase with earned, rather than borrowed, dollars, but it also undercuts the wage standard of the entire community. Since low construction wages at this time of inflation means decreased purchasing power, do the owners of East Lake Mall intend to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of workers of the community by encouraging the stores in East Lake Mall to cut their prices and lower their profits? “CUT-RATE WAGES ARE NOT FAIR UNLESS MERCHANDISE PRICES ARE ALSO CUT-RATE. ‘We ask for your support in our protest against substandard wages. Please do not patronize the stores in the East Lake Square Mall until the Mall’s owner publicly promises that all construction at the Mall will be done using contractors who pay their employees fair wages and fringe benefits. “IF YOU MUST ENTER THE MALL TO DO BUSINESS, please express to the store managers your concern over substandard wages and your support of our efforts. We are appealing only to the public — the consumer. We are not seeking to induce any person to cease work or to refuse to make deliveries.” That section provides in pertinent part: “§ 158. Unfair labor practices “(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents — “(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is — “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing; “. . . Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution.” The Board cited two of its decisions that had been enforced by the Courts of Appeals as authority for its construction of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The court in Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 131 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 6, 401 F. 2d 952, 957 (1968), enf’g 167 N. L. R. B. 1030 (1967), upheld the Board’s determination that the handbilling there violated § 8(b) (4)(ii)(B), but that handbilling was part and parcel of a consumer picketing campaign in which the handbills were distributed at the edge of a line of picketers who were patrolling the entrance to the mall. The absence of picketing in the present case distinguishes it from Honolulu Typographical. In Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F. 2d 434, 436 (CA9), enf’g 150 N. L. R. B. 467 (1964), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 1002 (1966), the court upheld the Board’s determination that the handbilling there fell within the publicity proviso and thus was not unlawful, but it stated in dictum that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) covered the union activity. The court provided no analysis in support of the brief sentence and we find it unpersuasive. The Board points out that Tree Fruits indicates urging customer boycotts can be coercion within the meaning of § 8(b)(4). See 377 U. S., at 72. But the Court was there talking about picketing and not mere handbilling. The Board’s reliance on pre-1959 cases interpreting the phrase “restrain or coerce” in § 8(b)(1) — and similar wording in § 8(a)(1) — to support its interpretation of the phrase “threaten, coerce, or restrain” in §8(b) (4)(ii)(B) is misplaced. The Board had interpreted “restrain or coerce” to prohibit peaceM picketing calling attention to a labor dispute, but this Court held in NLRB v. Drivers, 362 U. S. 274, 290 (1960), that those words, as used in § 8(b)(1)(A), reached only violent conduct and did not even include peaceful picketing. See supra, at 577. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had rejected the Board’s holding that the circulation of “We Do Not Patronize” lists was coercive. NLRB v. International Assn. of Machinists, 263 F. 2d 796 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U. S. 940 (1960). The Board suggests that NLRB v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 269 F. 2d 694, 701 (CA4 1959), rev’d, 362 U. S. 329 (1960), is to the contrary, but the opinion in that case focused on handbilling combined with picketing; and it was the Ninth Circuit case that was later referred to on the Senate floor in reference to nonpicketing appeals. See n. 8, infra. Contrary to the Board’s view, the eases finding blacklisting of employees to be coercive within the meaning of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) are not particularly helpful here. They do no more than illustrate that the “restrain or coerce” language of those sections has been construed to reach conduct, such as blacklisting, that threatens employees’ livelihood and is imposed in retaliation for the exercise of NLRA § 7 rights. Furthermore, when done by the union, blacklisting urges employers to discriminate against prospective employees on the basis of union membership, an unlawful practice under the Act. 29 U. S. C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3). See, e. g., Pacific American Shipowners Assn., 98 N. L. R. B. 582, 586, 639-640 (1952). Of course, as we have explained in the text, the post-1959 decisions of the Board construing § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to reach nonpieketing publicity do not foreclose our independent inquiry into the meaning of that section. Consumer picketing against the distributor of a struck manufacturer’s product was the paradigm case considered in the debates. 105 Cong. Rec. 17904 (1959), 2 NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, p. 1437 (1959) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.) (Sen. Goldwater, discussing Conference agreement); 105 Cong. Rec. 15672-15673, 2 Leg. Hist. 1615 (Rep. Griffin); 105 Cong. Rec. 16591, 2 Leg. Hist. 1708 (analysis prepared by Rep. Thompson and Sen. Kennedy). At oral argument of this cause, counsel for DeBartolo and the Board admitted that such publicity would be prohibited under the Board’s interpretation of the section. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9, 37-38, 40 (counsel for DeBartolo); id., at 17-19 (counsel for the Board). This statement was made in an analysis of the Landrum-Griffin bill by Representatives Thompson and Udall, two of its opponents. Shortly thereafter but prior to agreement on a Conference bill, this analysis on the secondary boycott provision was adopted almost verbatim in a report issued by Representative Thompson and Senator Kennedy, who also opposed the Landrum-Griffin bill. 105 Cong. Rec. 16591, 2 Leg. Hist. 1708. Other members of the opposition made similar claims, most notably Senator Humphrey, who led the fight against amending § 8(b)(4) and urged that the limit on secondary boycotts proposed by Senator Goldwater would overturn settled law permitting leafletting of secondary businesses. He referred particularly to a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Machinists case discussed in n. 5, supra. 105 Cong. Rec. 6232, 2 Leg. Hist. 1037. That summary describes the limits on secondary boycotts as falling within four categories; “1. Closes loophole which permitted secondary boycott through coercion applied directly against secondary employer (instead of his employees). “2. Closes loophole which permitted secondary boycott by inducing employees individually (rather than in concert). “3. Closes loophole which permitted secondary boycotts involving railroads, municipalities, and governmental agencies because their employees were not ‘employees’ under definition in the act. “4. Prohibits secondary customer picketing at retail store which happens to sell product produced by manufacturer with whom union has dispute.” As for the fourth category, the report notes that the Conference agreement “[ajdopts House provision with clarification that other forms of publicity are not prohibited; also clarification that picketing at primary site is not secondary boycott.” 105 Cong. Rec. 18706, 18022, 2 Leg. Hist. 1454, 1712.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PPL CORPORATION and Subsidiaries, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 12-43. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Feb. 20, 2013. Decided May 20, 2013. Paul D. Clement, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Ann O'Connell, for Respondent. Ashley C. Parrish, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, DC, Richard E. May, Mark B. Bierbower, Timothy L. Jacobs, Hunton & Williams LLP, Washington, DC, Paul D. Clement, Counsel of Record, Erin E. Murphy, Bancroft PLLC, Washington, DC, for Petitioners. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Kathryn Keneally, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Thomas J. Clark, Francesca U. Tamami, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1997, the United Kingdom (U.K.) imposed a one-time "windfall tax" on 32 U.K. companies privatized between 1984 and 1996. This case addresses whether that tax is creditable for U.S. tax purposes. Internal Revenue Code § 901(b)(1) states that any "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" paid overseas are creditable against U.S. income taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 901(b)(1). Treasury Regulations interpret this section to mean that a foreign tax is creditable if its "predominant character" "is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense." Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(1)(ii), 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(1) (1992). Consistent with precedent and the Tax Court's analysis below, we apply the predominant character test using a commonsense approach that considers the substantive effect of the tax. Under this approach, we hold that the U.K. tax is creditable under § 901 and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. I A During the 1980's and 1990's, the U.K.'s Conservative Party controlled Parliament and privatized a number of government-owned companies. These companies were sold to private parties through an initial sale of shares, known as a "flotation." As part of privatization, many companies were required to continue providing services at the same rates they had offered under government control for a fixed period, typically their first four years of private operation. As a result, the companies could only increase profits during this period by operating more efficiently. Responding to market incentives, many of the companies became dramatically more efficient and earned substantial profits in the process. The U.K.'s Labour Party, which had unsuccessfully opposed privatization, used the companies' profitability as a campaign issue against the Conservative Party. In part because of campaign promises to tax what it characterized as undue profits, the Labour Party defeated the Conservative Party at the polls in 1997. Prior to coming to power, Labour Party leaders hired accounting firm Arthur Andersen to structure a tax that would capture excess, or "windfall," profits earned during the initial years in which the companies were prohibited from increasing rates. Parliament eventually adopted the tax, which applied only to the regulated companies that were prohibited from raising their rates. See Finance (No. 2) Act, 1997, ch. 58, pt. I, cls. 1 and 2(5) (Eng.) (U.K. Windfall Tax Act). It imposed a 23 percent tax on any "windfall" earned by such companies. Id., cl. 1(2). A separate schedule "se[t] out how to quantify the windfall from which a company was benefitting." Id., cl. 1(3). See id., sched. 1. In the proceedings below, the parties stipulated that the following formula summarizes the tax imposed by the Labour Party: P Tax = 23% [(365 × (-) × 9) - FV] D D equals the number of days a company was subject to rate regulation (also known as the "initial period"), P equals the total profits earned during the initial period, and FV equals the flotation value, or market capitalization value after sale. For 27 of the 32 companies subject to the tax, the number of days in the initial period was 1,461 days (or four years). Of the remaining five companies, one had no tax liability because it did not earn any windfall profits. Three had initial periods close to four years (1,463, 1,456, and 1,380 days). The last was privatized shortly before the Labour Party took power and had an initial period of only 316 days. The number 9 in the formula was characterized as a price-to-earnings ratio and was selected because it represented the lowest average price-to-earnings ratio of the 32 companies subject to the tax during the relevant period. See id., sched. 1, § 1, cl. 2(3); Brief for Respondent 7. The statute expressly set its value, and that value was the same for all companies. U.K. Windfall Tax Act, sched. 1, § 1, cl. 2(3). The only variables that changed in the windfall tax formula for all the companies were profits (P) and flotation value (FV); the initial period (D) varied for only a few of the companies subject to the tax. The Labour government asserted that the term [365 x (P/D) x 9] represented what the flotation value should have been given the assumed price-to-earnings ratio of 9. Thus, it claimed (and the Commissioner here reiterates) that the tax was simply a 23 percent tax on the difference between what the companies' flotation values should have been and what they actually were. B Petitioner PPL Corporation (PPL) was an owner, through a number of subsidiaries, of 25 percent of South Western Electricity plc, 1 of 12 government-owned electric companies that were privatized in 1990 and that were subject to the tax. See 135 T.C. 304, 307, App. (2010) (diagram of PPL corporate structure in 1997). South Western Electricity's total U.K. windfall tax burden was £90,419,265. In its 1997 federal income-tax return, PPL claimed a credit under § 901 for its share of the bill. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) rejected the claim, but the Tax Court held that the U.K. windfall tax was creditable for U.S. tax purposes under § 901. See id., at 342. The Third Circuit reversed. 665 F.3d 60, 68 (2011). We granted certiorari, 568 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 571, 184 L.Ed.2d 338 (2012), to resolve a Circuit split concerning the windfall tax's creditability under § 901. Compare 665 F.3d, at 68, with Entergy Corp. & Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 683 F.3d 233, 239 (C.A.5 2012). II Internal Revenue Code § 901(b)(1) provides that "[i]n the case of ... a domestic corporation, the amount of any income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States" shall be creditable. Under relevant Treasury Regulations, "[a] foreign levy is an income tax if and only if ... [t]he predominant character of that tax is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense." 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(1). The parties agree that Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2 applies to this case. That regulation codifies longstanding doctrine dating back to Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 578-579, 58 S.Ct. 379, 82 L.Ed. 431 (1938), and provides the relevant legal standard. The regulation establishes several principles relevant to our inquiry. First, the "predominant character" of a tax, or the normal manner in which a tax applies, is controlling. See id., at 579, 58 S.Ct. 379 ("We are here concerned only with the 'standard' or normal tax"). Under this principle, a foreign tax that operates as an income, war profits, or excess profits tax in most instances is creditable, even if it may affect a handful of taxpayers differently. Creditability is an all or nothing proposition. As the Treasury Regulations confirm, "a tax either is or is not an income tax, in its entirety, for all persons subject to the tax." 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(a)(1). Second, the way a foreign government characterizes its tax is not dispositive with respect to the U.S. creditability analysis. See § 1.901-2(a)(1)(ii) (foreign tax creditable if predominantly "an income tax in the U.S. sense"). In Biddle, the Court considered the creditability of certain U.K. taxes on stock dividends under the substantively identical predecessor to § 901. The Court recognized that "there is nothing in [the statute's] language to suggest that in allowing the credit for foreign tax payments, a shifting standard was adopted by reference to foreign characterizations and classifications of tax legislation." 302 U.S., at 578-579, 58 S.Ct. 379. See also United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 145, 110 S.Ct. 462, 107 L.Ed.2d 449 (1989) (noting in interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 902 that Biddle is particularly applicable "where a contrary interpretation would leave" tax interpretation "to the varying tax policies of foreign tax authorities"); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 279, and n. 7, 58 S.Ct. 926, 82 L.Ed. 1337 (1938) (state-law definitions generally not controlling in federal tax context). Instead of the foreign government's characterization of the tax, the crucial inquiry is the tax's economic effect. See Biddle,supra, at 579, 58 S.Ct. 379 (inquiry is "whether [a tax] is the substantial equivalent of payment of the tax as those terms are used in our own statute"). In other words, foreign tax creditability depends on whether the tax, if enacted in the U.S., would be an income, war profits, or excess profits tax. Giving further form to these principles, Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2(a)(3)(i) explains that a foreign tax's predominant character is that of a U.S. income tax "[i]f ... the foreign tax is likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances in which it applies." The regulation then sets forth three tests for assessing whether a foreign tax reaches net gain. A tax does so if, "judged on the basis of its predominant character, [it] satisfies each of the realization, gross receipts, and net income requirements set forth in paragraphs (b)(2), (b)(3) and (b)(4), respectively, of this section." § 1.901-2(b)(1). The tests indicate that net gain (also referred to as net income) consists of realized gross receipts reduced by significant costs and expenses attributable to such gross receipts. A foreign tax that reaches net income, or profits, is creditable. III A It is undisputed that net income is a component of the U.K.'s "windfall tax" formula. See Brief for Respondent 23 ("The windfall tax takes into account a company's profits during its four-year initial period"). Indeed, annual profit is a variable in the tax formula. U.K. Windfall Tax Act, sched. 1, § 1, cls. 2(2) and 5. It is also undisputed that there is no meaningful difference for our purposes in the accounting principles by which the U.K. and the U.S. calculate profits. See Brief for Petitioners 47. The disagreement instead centers on how to characterize the tax formula the Labour Party adopted. The Third Circuit, following the Commissioner's lead, believed it could look no further than the tax formula that the Parliament enacted and the way in which the Labour government characterized it. Under that view, the windfall tax must be considered a tax on the difference between a company's flotation value (the total amount investors paid for the company when the government sold it) and an imputed "profit-making value," defined as a company's "average annual profit during its 'initial period' ... times 9, the assumed price-to-earnings ratio." 665 F.3d, at 65. So characterized, the tax captures a portion of the difference between the price at which each company was sold and the price at which the Labour government believed each company should have been sold given the actual profits earned during the initial period. Relying on this characterization, the Third Circuit believed the windfall tax failed at least the Treasury Regulation's realization and gross receipts tests because it reached some artificial form of valuation instead of profits. See id., at 67, and n. 3. In contrast, PPL's position is that the substance of the windfall tax is that of an income tax in the U.S. sense. While recognizing that the tax ostensibly is based on the difference between two values, it argues that every "variable" in the windfall tax formula except for profits and flotation value is fixed (at least with regard to 27 of the 32 companies). PPL emphasizes that the only way the Labour government was able to calculate the imputed "profit-making value" at which it claimed companies should have been privatized was by looking after the fact at the actual profits earned by each company. In PPL's view, it matters not how the U.K. chose to arrange the formula or what it claimed to be taxing, because a tax based on profits above some threshold is an excess profits tax, regardless of how it is mathematically arranged or what labels foreign law places on it. PPL, thus, contends that the windfall taxes it paid meet the Treasury Regulation's tests and are creditable under § 901. We agree with PPL and conclude that the predominant character of the windfall tax is that of an excess profits tax, a category of income tax in the U.S. sense. It is important to note that the Labour government's conception of "profit-making value" as a backward-looking analysis of historic profits is not a recognized valuation method; instead, it is a fictitious value calculated using an imputed price-to-earnings ratio. At trial, one of PPL's expert witnesses explained that " '9 is not an accurate P/E multiple, and it is not applied to current or expected future earnings.' " 135 T. C., at 326, n. 17 (quoting testimony). Instead, the windfall tax is a tax on realized net income disguised as a tax on the difference between two values, one of which is completely fictitious. See App. 251, Report ¶ 1.7 ("[T]he value in profit making terms described in the wording of the act ... is not a real value: it is rather a construct based on realised profits that would not have been known at the date of privatisation"). The substance of the windfall tax confirms the accuracy of this observation. As already noted, the parties stipulated that the windfall tax could be calculated as follows: P Tax = 23% [(365 × (-) × 9) - FV] D This formula can be rearranged algebraically to the following formula, which is mathematically and substantively identical: (365 × 9 × 23%) D Tax = [---------------] × {P - [FV × ---------]} D (365 × 9) The next step is to substitute the actual number of days for D. For 27 of the 32 companies subject to the windfall tax, the number of days was identical, 1,461 (or four years). Inserting that amount for D in the formula yields the following: (365 × 9 × 23%) 1,461 Tax = [---------------] × {P - [FV × ---------]} 1,461 (365 × 9) Simplifying the formula by multiplying and dividing numbers reduces the formula to: FV Tax = 51.71% × [P - (--) × 4.0027] 9 As noted, FV represents the value at which each company was privatized. FV is then divided by 9, the arbitrary "price-to-earnings ratio" applied to every company. The economic effect is to convert flotation value into the profits a company should have earned given the assumed price-to-earnings ratio. See 135 T. C., at 327 (" 'In effect, the way the tax works is to say that the amount of profits you're allowed in any year before you're subject to tax is equal to one-ninth of the flotation price. After that, profits are deemed excess, and there is a tax' " (quoting testimony from the treasurer of South Western Electricity plc)). The annual profits are then multiplied by 4.0027, giving the total "acceptable" profits (as opposed to windfall profit) that each company's flotation value entitled it to earn during the initial period given the artificial price-to-earnings ratio of 9. This fictitious amount is finally subtracted from actual profits, yielding the excess profits, which were taxed at an effective rate of 51.71 percent. The rearranged tax formula demonstrates that the windfall tax is economically equivalent to the difference between the profits each company actually earned and the amount the Labour government believed it should have earned given its flotation value. For the 27 companies that had 1,461-day initial periods, the U.K. tax formula's substantive effect was to impose a 51.71 percent tax on all profits earned above a threshold. That is a classic excess profits tax. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159, Tit. II, § 201, 39 Stat. 1000 (8 percent tax imposed on excess profits exceeding the sum of $5,000 plus 8 percent of invested capital). Of course, other algebraic reformulations of the windfall tax equation are possible. See 665 F.3d, at 66; Brief for Anne Alstott et al. as Amici Curiae 21-23 (Alstott Brief). The point of the reformulation is not that it yields a particular percentage (51.75 percent for most of the companies). Rather, the algebraic reformulations illustrate the economic substance of the tax and its interrelationship with net income. The Commissioner argues that any algebraic rearrangement is improper, asserting that U.S. courts must take the foreign tax rate as written and accept whatever tax base the foreign tax purports to adopt. Brief for Respondent 28. As a result, the Commissioner claims that the analysis begins and ends with the Labour government's choice to characterize its tax base as the difference between "profit-making value" and flotation value. Such a rigid construction is unwarranted. It cannot be squared with the black-letter principle that "tax law deals in economic realities, not legal abstractions." Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 315, 76 S.Ct. 395, 100 L.Ed. 347 (1956). Given the artificiality of the U.K.'s method of calculating purported "value," we follow substance over form and recognize that the windfall tax is nothing more than a tax on actual profits above a threshold. B We find the Commissioner's other arguments unpersuasive as well. First, the Commissioner attempts to buttress the argument that the windfall tax is a tax on value by noting that some U.S. gift and estate taxes use actual, past profits to estimate value. Brief for Respondent 17-18 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-3 (2012) and 26 U.S.C. § 2032A ). This argument misses the point. In the case of valuation for gift and estate taxes, past income may be used to estimate future income streams. But, it is future revenue-earning potential, reduced to market value, that is subject to taxation. The windfall profits tax, by contrast, undisputedly taxed past, realized net income alone. The Commissioner contends that the U.K. was not trying to establish valuation as of the 1997 date on which the windfall tax was enacted but instead was attempting to derive a proper flotation valuation as of each company's flotation date. Brief for Respondent 21. The Commissioner asserts that there was no need to estimate future income (as in the case of the gift or estate recipient) because actual revenue numbers for the privatized companies were available. Ibid. That argument also misses the mark. It is true, of course, that the companies might have been privatized at higher flotation values had the government recognized how efficient-and thus how profitable-the companies would become. But, the windfall tax requires an underlying concept of value (based on actual ex post earnings) that would be alien to any valuer. Taxing actual, realized net income in hindsight is not the same as considering past income for purposes of estimating future earning potential. The Commissioner's reliance on Example 3 to the Treasury Regulation's gross receipts test is also misplaced. Id., at 37-38; 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(3)(ii), Ex. 3. That example posits a petroleum tax in which "gross receipts from extraction income are deemed to equal 105 percent of the fair market value of petroleum extracted. This computation is designed to produce an amount that is greater than the fair market value of actual gross receipts."Ibid. Under the example, a tax based on inflated gross receipts is not creditable. The Third Circuit believed that the same type of algebraic rearrangement used above could also be used to rearrange a tax imposed on Example 3. It hypothesized: "Say that the tax rate on the hypothetical extraction tax is 20%. It is true that a 20% tax on 105% of receipts is mathematically equivalent to a 21% tax on 100% of receipts, the latter of which would satisfy the gross receipts requirement. PPL proposes that we make the same move here, increasing the tax rate from 23% to 51.75% so that there is no multiple of receipts in the tax base. But if the regulation allowed us to do that, the example would be a nullity. Any tax on a multiple of receipts or profits could satisfy the gross receipts requirement, because we could reduce the starting point of its tax base to 100% of gross receipts by imagining a higher tax rate." 665 F.3d, at 67. The Commissioner reiterates the Third Circuit's argument. Brief for Respondent 37-38. There are three basic problems with this approach. As the Fifth Circuit correctly recognized, there is a difference between imputed and actual receipts. "Example 3 hypothesizes a tax on the extraction of petroleum where the income value of the petroleum is deemed to be ... deliberately greater than actual gross receipts." Entergy Corp., 683 F.3d, at 238. In contrast, the windfall tax depends on actual figures. Ibid. ("There was no need to calculate imputed gross receipts; gross receipts were actually known"). Example 3 simply addresses a different foreign taxation issue. The argument also incorrectly equates imputed gross receipts under Example 3 with net income . See 665 F.3d, at 67 ("[a]ny tax on a multiple of receipts or profits"). As noted, a tax is creditable only if it applies to realized gross receipts reduced by significant costs and expenses attributable to such gross receipts . 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i). A tax based solely on gross receipts (like the Third Circuit's analysis) would be noncreditable because it would fail the Treasury Regulation's net income requirement. Finally, even if expenses were subtracted from imputed gross receipts before a tax was imposed, the effect of inflating only gross receipts would be to inflate revenue while holding expenses (the other component of net income) constant. A tax imposed on inflated income minus actual expenses is not the same as a tax on net income. For these reasons, a tax based on imputed gross receipts is not creditable. But, as the Fifth Circuit explained in rejecting the Third Circuit's analysis, Example 3 is "facially irrelevant" to the analysis of the U.K. windfall tax, which is based on true net income. Entergy Corp., supra, at 238. The economic substance of the U.K. windfall tax is that of a U.S. income tax. The tax is based on net income, and the fact that the Labour government chose to characterize it as a tax on the difference between two values is not dispositive under Treasury Regulation § 1.901-2. Therefore, the tax is creditable under § 901. The judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. A price-to-earnings ratio "is defined as the stock price divided by annual earnings per share. It is typically calculated by dividing the current stock price by the sum of the previous four quarters of earnings." 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Money & Finance 176 (1992). Prior to enactment of what is now § 901, income earned overseas was subject to taxes not only in the foreign country but also in the United States. See Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7, 52 S.Ct. 275, 76 L.Ed. 587 (1932). The relevant text making "income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes" creditable has not changed since 1918. See Revenue Act of 1918, §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 40 Stat. 1073, 1080. The relevant provisions provide as follows: "A foreign tax satisfies the realization requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed-(A) Upon or subsequent to the occurrence of events ('realization events') that would result in the realization of income under the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code." 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(b)(2)(i). "A foreign tax satisfies the gross receipts requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed on the basis of-(A) Gross receipts; or (B) Gross receipts computed under a method that is likely to produce an amount that is not greater than fair market value." § 1.901-2(b)(3)(i). "A foreign tax satisfies the net income requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, the base of the tax is computed by reducing gross receipts ... to permit-(A) Recovery of the significant costs and expenses (including significant capital expenditures) attributable, under reasonable principles, to such gross receipts; or (B) Recovery of such significant costs and expenses computed under a method that is likely to produce an amount that approximates, or is greater than, recovery of such significant costs and expenses."§ 1.901-2(b)(4)(i). The rearrangement requires only basic algebraic manipulation. First, because order of operations does not matter for multiplication and division, the formula is rearranged to the following: P Tax = 23% [(365 × 9 × (-)) - FV] D (365 × 9) Next, everything outside the brackets is multiplied by [---------], and D D everything inside the brackets is multiplied by the inverse, [---------]. (365 × 9) The effect is the same as multiplication by the number one (since (365 × 9) D {[---------] × [---------]} = 1). That multiplication yields the formula in the D (365 × 9) text. Mathematically, the Third Circuit's hypothetical was incomplete. It should have been: 20% [ 105% (Gross Receipts) − Expenses ] = Tax But 105% of gross receipts minus expenses is not net income. Thus, the 20% tax is not a tax on net income and is not creditable. An amici brief argues that because two companies had initial periods substantially shorter than four years, the predominant character of the U.K. windfall tax was not a tax on income in the U.S. sense. See Alstott Brief 29 (discussing Railtrack Group plc and British Energy plc). The argument amounts to a claim that two outliers changed the predominant character of the U.K. tax. See 135 T.C. 304, 340, n. 33 (2010) (rejecting this view). The Commissioner admitted at oral argument that it did not preserve this argument, a fact reflected in its briefing before this Court and in the Third Circuit. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36; Opening Brief for Appellant and Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 11-1069(CA3). We therefore express no view on its merits. * * *

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?